Conclusion Conclusion Towards certain ends or for certain purposes, a few aspects of the neo-ilustrados ’ pursuit and assumption of political power deserve more than just passing consideration. For ours at least two issues are decidedly most significant, namely, First, the basis of Cory Aquino’s 'claim of right' to the presidency (or as set out in chapter 2, supra, 'setting out the source and basis of "legal authority" in the ensuing neo- ilustrado revolutionary government'); and Secondly, the nature or extent of the People’s Power Revolution (or in chapter 2, supra, 'the problem of understanding the "People’s Power" Revolution in the Philippines'). Correlatively with the first issue, we may also consider whether the four-day Uprising in February 1986, insofar as the close ilustrada was concerned, involved or betokened no more than what we may call a mere 'ad hoc change' in ilustrado factional rule—that is, even if by non-constitutional mediation.^ 2 Contrariwise—or rather, corollary to this—there is the further question of whether there really was 'no change' in the structure of class domination by the ilustrada.83 This argument may be called 'synthetic': Among others, it may include such variations as putting emphasis on U.S. influence on Philippine socio-political relations (e.g., 'the US will not allow the Philippines to fall into the communists’ hands'); or the one attributed to KBL vice-presidential candidate Arturo Tolentino, 'that the few thousand blockaders on EDSA couldn’t be interpreted as a national revolution because, even of just the population of Manila, they formed only a small fraction’. (See Quijano, op cit., 109.) All of them, however, lead to the same conclusion, namely, that the so-called people’s power revolution was not a revolution, and that the ensuing government between February 1986 and February 1987 could not have been revolutionary. This is the counterpart of the 'synthetic' argument, and may be called 'analytic'. It bases a 'revolution' on the change in social and economic structure, not on the political. 'The Philippine revolution of 1896', Sison remarked, ‘took full form only after the peasantry became mobilized into a powerful national liberation movement against colonialism and serfdom'. See his speech delivered at the College of Agriculture, University of the Philippines, Los Banos, Laguna, on March 23, 1966. See also Guerrero, op cit., 181 et seq., in which the revolution in the late nineteenth century and 293 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION Let us first analyze the 'ad hoc change' argument inasmuch as, being more relevant to the question of formal 'priorities', it conveniently delimits the scope of the other issues, such as the 'no change' proposition, or even whether there really was a revolution or not. We may also delineate it in its most complete sense--that is, in terms of so-called enforcement action, the extent of change, and leadership. To begin with, this argument may imply that (1) whatever 'changes' were instituted were for this case only, (2) correctively, the 'process' or procedure followed was not to be regular or repetitive; (3) the scope of changes was limited to the control or direction of the government or bureaucracy; and (4) factions or groupings of the same 'social class' were the main protagonists. In its most specific sense, the argument is concerned only with the transfer of political power from the Marcos regime to the Enrile-Aquino-Laurel alliance. And by the latter’s 'enforcement action', the procedure that they followed simply sought the regime’s compliance with the 'true results' of the snap presidential elections on February 7 of that year. There was, however, no other effectual means of enforcement (which was lawful) except by non-constitutional mediation (reformist) because constitutional mediation had already broken down. At any rate, the 'people’s'—or, specifically, the masses’- -participation in it (i.e., the enforcement action) is deemed of merely secondary importance—that is, to the 'results' of the election (as well as to the 'will' of the ilustrada to subrogate one political grouping [Aquino’s] for another [Marcos’s]). Such was the basis of the changes which followed, such as those concerning economic policies and the highest-ranked positions of the government as well as constitutional—or, more appropriately, administrative—law and other relationships. There were, however, hardly any structural change (such as 'land reform') in the relations of production and economic priorities. On the whole the structure of priority involving the CPP-NPA insurgency in the 1960s-70s are merged into the 'continuous Philippine Revolution: the national-democratic and socialist stages'; A. R. Magno, 'The Filipino Left at the Crossroads: Current Debates on Strategy and Revolution', in Third World Studies Center (ed.), Marxism in the Philippines (Quezon City, Phil.: Univ. of the Philippines, 1988), 80, in which the 'class-based struggle' led by the CPP is discussed: 'The Party is the revolution'; and Hick, op cit., 100-101. 294 Conclusion state-oriented and folk-charismatic relations remained largely as they were before. (It follows that, without going into details, if this argument were correct, then the 'no change' argument correspondingly would be true too.) Upon these grounds, it may then be concluded that the 'Revolution' of February 1986 was not so much a true revolution as a mere (even if unusual) change of the ways by which to determine which ilustrado faction would have the pouvoir to govern. In such a context, the 'ad hoc change' argument (and also that of 'no change') has a twofold basis; that is, on both the 'parcellized' and 'absolutist' leadership of the ilustrada. To briefly illustrate the former, since the Americans’ Occupation of the Philippines the ilustrada or, rather, ilustrado factions had been dominating state-oriented power structures and relations as against the taos’ unsubstantial leadership. This means that whereas the colonizers had already pre-empted sovereign power, the ilustrados’ legal authority (or, more appropriately 'authority as negative opportunity') followed the constitutional doctrine of 'popular representation' in the government. And most effectually, the means by which this domination was secured was the formal electoral or voting process. The political choices and options of the people, however, were largely predetermined by folk-charismatic (such as 'patron-client') relationships. Thus, as the taos habitually looked up to the ilustrada for 'leadership', the latter’s factions were able to long dominate colonial state-oriented relations. Such factional or parcellized leadership patterns carried over to post-independence politics. And so the Nacionalista and Liberal parties alternately gained control of the government. But with sovereignty—or le Pouvoir—having now devolved upon the ilustrada, the electoral system was re­ established as a mere means of conflict resolution between the factions of ilustrados—that is, for each to succeed in government and to assume authority as negative opportunity. This parcellized leadership changed into the latter—the absolutist—with the institution of the Marcos regime. After martial law was declared he reversed the traditional functioning of electoral politics in the Old Society. He manipulated its representational structuring so that his regime—or more specifically, the KBL candidates—always 'won' in all subsequent voting by huge or at least clear margins. By sheer 'force' 295 PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION (military or otherwise), however, no effectual opposition to his regime was allowed. In doing so Marcos reduced the electoral process to a mere trivial formality (e.g., no secrecy of the ballot, no freedom of choice, etc.). Yet, by holding it he could still claim his regime’s 'legitimacy'; and in orchestrating (or propagandizing) it, he also could make a showing of his 'adherence to democratic principles'. In substance, then, voting and election ceased as a conventional means of conflict resolution within the ilustrada. As a matter of fact, there was no longer any conflict resolution by constitutional mediation. On the contrary, the sovereignty (power) of the State had absorbed all government (authority) in his legal-absolutist regime. And so the basis of 'legal authority'—whether as positive or negative opportunity- disappeared. Non-constitutional mediation, then, became the only practicable means by which opposition groupings could resolve worsening political conflicts, not because it was likely to lead to substantive rationality, but because there was no other lawful way by which the Marcos regime might be replaced. The subsequent change in the form of conflict resolution did not, however, imply a parallel change in the substance of state-oriented and folk-charismatic relationships. Ilustrada-tao (class) relations were maintained in the New Society as they had built up in the Old. And after the faction of Aquino’s had succeeded in its enforcement action, the absolutist leadership of Marcos’s was eventually replaced again with the parcellized leadership of the ilustrados. But without further changes—that is, no direct participation, no overhaul of educational values, no land redistribution—state-oriented and folk-charismatic relationships remained substantively the same as in the Old Society. This viewpoint, however, does not explain the 'massive and spontaneous' participation of the taos in the multi-pronged struggle towards their 'liberation' from the Marcos regime. Long before the enforcement action (ilustrado) had taken place, this struggle already had firm stirrings. In fact, long before the snap elections the 'revolutionary mood' (anti- Marcos, anti-American) had been building up among the masses. All this brings up the question of origination again— that is, of cause-and-effect relations. Specifically, there is here an instance of Gottschalk’s fifth—the necessary and 296 Conclusion immediate—cause of revolution. And it also exemplifies our notion of the struggle for sovereignty. Thus, vis-a-vis the weakening of the Marcos regime—the conservative classes, the revolutionary masses were gaining strength.