Bruce Hofman, Fernando Reinares, eds.. The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to 's Death. Columbia Studies in and Irregular Warfare Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. 696 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-231-16898-4.

Reviewed by Paul Springer

Published on H-War (April, 2016)

Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University)

Edited collections that bring together more a lot of very nasty terrorist threats that are active than two dozen authors are always a tricky in the world today. More surprisingly, there is lit‐ prospect. They are hard to coordinate and bal‐ tle coverage devoted to sub-Saharan Africa, in ance, and they run the risk of heading in too particular the dangers represented by Boko many directions to create a useful product. To pull Haram, and Yemen, the home of Al Qaeda in the of this type of a project requires the leadership of Arabian Peninsula. Both of these groups are ma‐ editors with a frm hand, a variety of author back‐ jor regional threats with aspirations toward glob‐ grounds, and a substantial number of diverse per‐ al reach, and neither are recent additions to the spectives. In the current case, all three factors are global terrorism lists. well represented, resulting in a superb fnal prod‐ Part 1 of the book concentrates on attacks uct that belongs on the shelf of any reader inter‐ within and against Western nations, to include ested in the recent history of global terrorism. In North America, Europe, and Australia. Chapter 1 particular, this work is well suited to undergradu‐ explains the central role in Al Qaeda held by ate and graduate courses dealing with this chal‐ Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, both before and after lenging subject, as it is almost tailor written for the . After examining this classroom adoption. Each of the chapters is a sol‐ pivotal fgure, the work then moves into case id, well-researched efort that could stand alone studies of specifc operations against Western tar‐ as a class reading selection. The only caveat to gets, beginning with the 2004 Madrid train bomb‐ this argument is that the book is far more target‐ ings. The chapter dedicated to the Madrid attacks ed than the title might indicate, although this fact makes the claim that these bombings, which oc‐ is clarifed in the introduction. This book is about curred on March 11, 2004, happened exactly 911 Islamist violence, mostly that perpetrated and di‐ days after the September 11, 2001, airliner at‐ rected by Al Qaeda, which by defnition leaves out tacks. Apparently, either the author or the Al Qae‐ H-Net Reviews da claimants forgot that 2004 was a leap year, and posed a Melbourne terror cell, although it was the hence, the attacks were actually 912 days later. Sydney cell that presented the greater danger due This minor, but strange, error aside, the second to its desire to use chemical or high-explosive chapter does an excellent job walking through the bombs. As yet another counterterrorism success, participants, the operation, the relationship be‐ this operation demonstrates that while terror or‐ tween the attackers and the central leadership of ganizations might claim a global reach, efective Al Qaeda, and the role of the attacks in the overall counterterrorism techniques have also spread Al Qaeda strategic efort. throughout the Western world. The next chapter Chapter 3 examines Operation Crevice, the makes the unfortunate decision to return to the largest counterterrorism operation in British his‐ London bombings of 2005, previously discussed in tory. This chapter underlines the importance of chapter 3, aptly demonstrating some of the dif‐ monitoring the activities of Al Qaeda afliates be‐ culty in editing these types of collections. The fore an attack can be launched. In this case, those awkward turning back to Operation Crevice large‐ partners hoped to follow the same pattern as the ly covers the same material without ofering any Madrid bombings, but failed thanks to the astute‐ signifcant new arguments. Chapter 9 examines ness of British ofcials. The following chapter also the 2006 airline plots that intended to attack details British attempts to foil a terror attack, in Heathrow departures headed to the this case focusing on Operation Rhyme and the ac‐ and Canada. The international links and meticu‐ tivities of Dhiren Barot, who largely operated lous planning that undergirded these failed at‐ alone. tacks show the increased sophistication and con‐ tinued danger of airline hijackings, even with the Chapter 5 walks through the murder of Theo massively enhanced security procedures of the Van Gogh, carried out by Mohammed Bouyeri. In post-9/11 world. addition to chronicling this specifc attack, it illus‐ trates the issues of homegrown terrorists, lone- Chapters 10 through 14 constitute a series of wolf actors, and the eforts by Al Qaeda and other short case studies, including an examination of groups to get sympathizers to pledge allegiance to groups and plots active in Italy, Germany, Den‐ the group and carry out attacks without formal mark, Spain, and France. Each serves to bolster training or membership. It also spends some time the overall theme of the work, that Al Qaeda and analyzing the poor track record of Dutch courts its ofshoots represent a global terrorism threat regarding counterterrorism prosecutions, which that can only be countered by a truly global re‐ the author argues makes the Netherlands an at‐ sponse. The individual eforts of single nations tractive target for terror attacks. The next chapter might serve to spoil or mitigate the efects of one examines the case of the Toronto 18, who had no attack, but they can do little to disrupt the group technical connection to Al Qaeda but still felt as a whole, particularly because Al Qaeda has the some allegiance to the group and followed its advantage of choosing where and when to launch lead. The fact that this group failed to carry out its its attacks, and can operate with greater coordina‐ attacks is presented as a good example of efective tion than the governments it seeks to damage and counterterrorism, in that the Canadian govern‐ destroy. ment was able to identify and apprehend these Part 2 of the book concentrates on areas out‐ actors before they could cause mass casualties. side of the West. By breaking the work into two Chapter 7 shifts the focus to Australia, where major sections, the editors essentially ease the lay Operation Pendennis exposed the frst Australian reader into the concepts of global terrorism, be‐ suicide bomber. An intercepted telephone call ex‐ ginning with attacks that are likely more familiar

2 H-Net Reviews to Western readers and then broadening their dis‐ although it is by far the largest and most danger‐ cussion to encompass non-Western events. Chap‐ ous organization to date. ter 15 provides an examination of Al Qaeda in Chapter 21 points out that the myth of Moroc‐ , where the group is not very popular, can exceptionalism was punctured by Al Qaeda in in part due to its direct support toward insurgent the Islamic Maghreb’s attacks of 2003 and 2007. groups. The next chapter, an extremely short These attacks caused little damage but provoked a group overview of al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah in legislative response that included religious re‐ Southeast Asia, is an examination with so little forms. Because the government reacted strongly depth as to be almost worthless and ultimately is and the population demonstrated support for the the most disappointing chapter of the book. reforms, Al Qaeda found little sympathy among Chapter 17 returns to the case study model of the citizens of Morocco, and the government saw examining a single attack while drawing larger little need to appease religious radicals. The lessons about Al Qaeda’s activities. In this case, round of 2007 suicide bombings in Algiers also the study analyzes a series of missile attacks in met with a strong government response, forcing Mombasa against El Al airliners. While the attacks Al Qaeda to minimize civilian deaths and focus its failed, they demonstrated a renewed focus on soft eforts on kidnapping tourists for ransom. In com‐ targets that might cause mass casualties. The fol‐ parison, the attacks launched by Al Qaeda in the lowing chapter looks at the same general concept Arabian Peninsula, carried out in 2003 in Riyadh in , specifcally examining the sectarian terror and 2008 in Sanaa, showed that this group re‐ created by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his attempts tained its primary focus against the United States, to trigger a civil war. Most of the attacks carried and as a result, provoked a far weaker govern‐ out by his group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, were aimed at ment response. civilian groups with little or no government pro‐ Chapter 24 provides an overview of Pakistani tection, assuming it would cause massive retalia‐ terrorist organizations, with a focus on the 2008 tory measures. The larger point is that terror Mumbai attacks. It argues that Lashkar-e-Taibi op‐ groups, even those with enormous resources and erates under the direction of Pakistani intelli‐ long reach like Al Qaeda, cannot achieve their ob‐ gence ofcers, and because it does not target Pak‐ jectives on their own—they require massive assis‐ istanis, it has garnered little ofcial response be‐ tance from larger groups or unforced errors, usu‐ yond a pro forma condemnation of its violent ac‐ ally in the form of overreactions, from the target‐ tivities. The last case study chapter analyzes the ed states. 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which Chapter 19 analyzes the Istanbul attacks of targeted watchers of the World Cup. The perpetra‐ 2003, which targeted Jewish and British citizens. tors of the attack, members of Al Shabaab, had re‐ This is one of the few chapters not directly exam‐ cently pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda, creating a ining an Al Qaeda group or plot, as the perpetra‐ dangerous partnership that expanded the parent tors came from a Kurdish organization. Chapter organization’s reach into a previously ignored re‐ 20 also looks at a non-Al Qaeda case, specifcally gion. the attacks against Israeli targets in the Sinai from In many ways, this book is fundamentally 2004 through 2006 that were carried out by about Al Qaeda as a global terror movement. Salafst perpetrators. Both are relatively short Through expansions, alliances, afliations, and in‐ case studies that demonstrate the point that Al fuence, Al Qaeda has managed to increase its Qaeda is not the only group that carries out these power and volatility to become the frst truly glob‐ types of attacks, or chooses these specifc targets, al terror organization. However, there is no set

3 H-Net Reviews pattern of Al Qaeda’s behavior toward afliated groups, making predictions regarding the group’s activities particularly difcult. The core group of Al Qaeda has proven extremely resilient, and is responsible for directing almost all of the interna‐ tional terror attacks against the United States and the for the past ffteen years. At the same time, counterterrorism strategies have continued to improve, and global cooperation in reacting to and reducing the threat presented by Al Qaeda has shown a long-term increase in suc‐ cessful eforts to disrupt and destroy Al Qaeda. Overall, this book is an excellent single-vol‐ ume source on the rise, activities, and possible de‐ cline of Al Qaeda. While some of the chapters are uneven in style, length, and quality, the total of the work far exceeds the sum of its parts. It is a worthy addition to the shelves of any reader in‐ terested in terrorism, Al Qaeda, and global eforts to counter radical, violent ideology.

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Citation: Paul Springer. Review of Hofman, Bruce; Reinares, Fernando, eds. The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death. H-War, H-Net Reviews. April, 2016.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42835

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

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