Bruce Hoffman, Fernando Reinares, eds.. The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. 696 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-231-16898-4. Reviewed by Paul Springer Published on H-War (April, 2016) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) Edited collections that bring together more a lot of very nasty terrorist threats that are active than two dozen authors are always a tricky in the world today. More surprisingly, there is lit‐ prospect. They are hard to coordinate and bal‐ tle coverage devoted to sub-Saharan Africa, in ance, and they run the risk of heading in too particular the dangers represented by Boko many directions to create a useful product. To pull Haram, and Yemen, the home of Al Qaeda in the off this type of a project requires the leadership of Arabian Peninsula. Both of these groups are ma‐ editors with a frm hand, a variety of author back‐ jor regional threats with aspirations toward glob‐ grounds, and a substantial number of diverse per‐ al reach, and neither are recent additions to the spectives. In the current case, all three factors are global terrorism lists. well represented, resulting in a superb fnal prod‐ Part 1 of the book concentrates on attacks uct that belongs on the shelf of any reader inter‐ within and against Western nations, to include ested in the recent history of global terrorism. In North America, Europe, and Australia. Chapter 1 particular, this work is well suited to undergradu‐ explains the central role in Al Qaeda held by ate and graduate courses dealing with this chal‐ Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, both before and after lenging subject, as it is almost tailor written for the September 11 attacks. After examining this classroom adoption. Each of the chapters is a sol‐ pivotal fgure, the work then moves into case id, well-researched effort that could stand alone studies of specific operations against Western tar‐ as a class reading selection. The only caveat to gets, beginning with the 2004 Madrid train bomb‐ this argument is that the book is far more target‐ ings. The chapter dedicated to the Madrid attacks ed than the title might indicate, although this fact makes the claim that these bombings, which oc‐ is clarified in the introduction. This book is about curred on March 11, 2004, happened exactly 911 Islamist violence, mostly that perpetrated and di‐ days after the September 11, 2001, airliner at‐ rected by Al Qaeda, which by definition leaves out tacks. Apparently, either the author or the Al Qae‐ H-Net Reviews da claimants forgot that 2004 was a leap year, and posed a Melbourne terror cell, although it was the hence, the attacks were actually 912 days later. Sydney cell that presented the greater danger due This minor, but strange, error aside, the second to its desire to use chemical or high-explosive chapter does an excellent job walking through the bombs. As yet another counterterrorism success, participants, the operation, the relationship be‐ this operation demonstrates that while terror or‐ tween the attackers and the central leadership of ganizations might claim a global reach, effective Al Qaeda, and the role of the attacks in the overall counterterrorism techniques have also spread Al Qaeda strategic effort. throughout the Western world. The next chapter Chapter 3 examines Operation Crevice, the makes the unfortunate decision to return to the largest counterterrorism operation in British his‐ London bombings of 2005, previously discussed in tory. This chapter underlines the importance of chapter 3, aptly demonstrating some of the diffi‐ monitoring the activities of Al Qaeda affiliates be‐ culty in editing these types of collections. The fore an attack can be launched. In this case, those awkward turning back to Operation Crevice large‐ partners hoped to follow the same pattern as the ly covers the same material without offering any Madrid bombings, but failed thanks to the astute‐ significant new arguments. Chapter 9 examines ness of British officials. The following chapter also the 2006 airline plots that intended to attack details British attempts to foil a terror attack, in Heathrow departures headed to the United States this case focusing on Operation Rhyme and the ac‐ and Canada. The international links and meticu‐ tivities of Dhiren Barot, who largely operated lous planning that undergirded these failed at‐ alone. tacks show the increased sophistication and con‐ tinued danger of airline hijackings, even with the Chapter 5 walks through the murder of Theo massively enhanced security procedures of the Van Gogh, carried out by Mohammed Bouyeri. In post-9/11 world. addition to chronicling this specific attack, it illus‐ trates the issues of homegrown terrorists, lone- Chapters 10 through 14 constitute a series of wolf actors, and the efforts by Al Qaeda and other short case studies, including an examination of groups to get sympathizers to pledge allegiance to groups and plots active in Italy, Germany, Den‐ the group and carry out attacks without formal mark, Spain, and France. Each serves to bolster training or membership. It also spends some time the overall theme of the work, that Al Qaeda and analyzing the poor track record of Dutch courts its offshoots represent a global terrorism threat regarding counterterrorism prosecutions, which that can only be countered by a truly global re‐ the author argues makes the Netherlands an at‐ sponse. The individual efforts of single nations tractive target for terror attacks. The next chapter might serve to spoil or mitigate the effects of one examines the case of the Toronto 18, who had no attack, but they can do little to disrupt the group technical connection to Al Qaeda but still felt as a whole, particularly because Al Qaeda has the some allegiance to the group and followed its advantage of choosing where and when to launch lead. The fact that this group failed to carry out its its attacks, and can operate with greater coordina‐ attacks is presented as a good example of effective tion than the governments it seeks to damage and counterterrorism, in that the Canadian govern‐ destroy. ment was able to identify and apprehend these Part 2 of the book concentrates on areas out‐ actors before they could cause mass casualties. side of the West. By breaking the work into two Chapter 7 shifts the focus to Australia, where major sections, the editors essentially ease the lay Operation Pendennis exposed the frst Australian reader into the concepts of global terrorism, be‐ suicide bomber. An intercepted telephone call ex‐ ginning with attacks that are likely more familiar 2 H-Net Reviews to Western readers and then broadening their dis‐ although it is by far the largest and most danger‐ cussion to encompass non-Western events. Chap‐ ous organization to date. ter 15 provides an examination of Al Qaeda in Chapter 21 points out that the myth of Moroc‐ Afghanistan, where the group is not very popular, can exceptionalism was punctured by Al Qaeda in in part due to its direct support toward insurgent the Islamic Maghreb’s attacks of 2003 and 2007. groups. The next chapter, an extremely short These attacks caused little damage but provoked a group overview of al-Jemaah al-Islamiyah in legislative response that included religious re‐ Southeast Asia, is an examination with so little forms. Because the government reacted strongly depth as to be almost worthless and ultimately is and the population demonstrated support for the the most disappointing chapter of the book. reforms, Al Qaeda found little sympathy among Chapter 17 returns to the case study model of the citizens of Morocco, and the government saw examining a single attack while drawing larger little need to appease religious radicals. The lessons about Al Qaeda’s activities. In this case, round of 2007 suicide bombings in Algiers also the study analyzes a series of missile attacks in met with a strong government response, forcing Mombasa against El Al airliners. While the attacks Al Qaeda to minimize civilian deaths and focus its failed, they demonstrated a renewed focus on soft efforts on kidnapping tourists for ransom. In com‐ targets that might cause mass casualties. The fol‐ parison, the attacks launched by Al Qaeda in the lowing chapter looks at the same general concept Arabian Peninsula, carried out in 2003 in Riyadh in Iraq, specifically examining the sectarian terror and 2008 in Sanaa, showed that this group re‐ created by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his attempts tained its primary focus against the United States, to trigger a civil war. Most of the attacks carried and as a result, provoked a far weaker govern‐ out by his group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, were aimed at ment response. civilian groups with little or no government pro‐ Chapter 24 provides an overview of Pakistani tection, assuming it would cause massive retalia‐ terrorist organizations, with a focus on the 2008 tory measures. The larger point is that terror Mumbai attacks. It argues that Lashkar-e-Taibi op‐ groups, even those with enormous resources and erates under the direction of Pakistani intelli‐ long reach like Al Qaeda, cannot achieve their ob‐ gence officers, and because it does not target Pak‐ jectives on their own—they require massive assis‐ istanis, it has garnered little official response be‐ tance from larger groups or unforced errors, usu‐ yond a pro forma condemnation of its violent ac‐ ally in the form of overreactions, from the target‐ tivities. The last case study chapter analyzes the ed states. 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which Chapter 19 analyzes the Istanbul attacks of targeted watchers of the World Cup.