CHAPTER 1 4 SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC ARE A HEN, "In Sixteen Hundred and Forty-One", the folks of Mexico' s W Acapulco Bay waited in vain for the return from the Philippine s of Bret Harte's legendary "Lost Galleon", while that ship searched fruit- lessly in mid-Pacific for the day she had missed on the 180th meridian , they were puzzled by a problem which plagued the historian recordin g events in that ocean in Nineteen Hundred and Forty-One . Pearl Harbour lies 1,300 miles east of the 180th meridian. Wake Island, an isolated atoll over which the American flag waved in December 1941, lies som e 800 miles west of the meridian. Yet, though only some 2,100 mile s distant from one another they are, in the local time each keeps, separated by 22 hours. On the line (running approximately E . by N.-W. by S. between Kota Bharu and Pearl Harbour for a distance of some 6,00 0 miles) along which the Japanese struck on the 7th-8th December 1941, i t would seem, if local times only are considered, that initial blows fell over a period of 28 hours ; from the air attack on Pearl Harbour at 7 .55 a.m. on the 7th December to that on Wake Island at noon on the 8th . Actually, the Japanese struck initially at six points (including Hong Kong, well to the north of the line mentioned above) within a space of seven hours, in the chronological order Malaya, Pearl Harbour, the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake Island. Reduced to the common denominator of Eastern Australian Time, here used while describin g events against the Melbourne background, the initial Japanese attack s were : Kota Bharu 3 .5 a.m., 8th December Pearl Harbour 4.25 a.m., 8th December Philippine s ▪ 8 a.m., 8th December Guam • 8.27 a.m • ., 8th December Hong Kong 10 a.m., 8th December Wake Island . 10 a.m., 8th December With the exception of that on Kota Bharu, all of these were air attacks . The first news of the Japanese attacks—a signal from the Commander- in-Chief, China, stating that the enemy were attempting to land at Kota Bharu—reached Navy Office, Melbourne, soon after 4 .30 a.m. on the 8th December, a Monday . Soon after 6 a .m. a signal from the Com- mander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, addressed to the Australian and Ne w Zealand Naval Boards, and to the Dutch Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Netherlands East Indies, Vice-Admiral Helfrich, requested implementa- tion of that section of "Plenaps" calling for air and naval reinforcement s of Singapore to meet an attack on Malaya . In view of the Commonwealth Government's stipulation on the 26th November regarding the minimum it could accept as protection on the Australia Station before agreeing t o the transfer of strategic control of Australian ships, and of its instruction s oo° 120' 160' 180' 160° 140° 120' U . S. S. R . ♦5 P t Aleu tian khalin \5 . 'I iokkaid o 40 lIon shu .-' TN ..Tokyo . ; C H I N A NORT H PACIFI C B@ Kyush u . Bonin Is. <, Midway 'Marcus I . 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Java Timor Darwini, Coral Sea y., Samoa INDIA N ti New `,: mo Naval Striking Force Hebrides ; Society Is .” , ( 1 {4 Airforce Attack s 2 'Iiji - .Tonga Is. 2 0 Nei ;, - ---o--- Convoy Invasion Force s OCEAN Caledoni a AUSTRALIA —i— r—r— .—1+ Covering Force s IN.W.GeosraI ----------- - 100 120' 160 ° 8 0 16o 120° The Japanese Attacks between 3 .5 a .m. and 10 a.m., 8th December 1941 486 SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC AREA 8Dec1941 to Admiral Royle to enter into no commitments at Singapore without prior submission to the Government, no action was called for by the Australian Navy. The New Zealand Government, however, ordere d H.M.N.Z.S. Achilles, then patrolling north of New Zealand, to fuel at Suva and proceed swiftly via Port Moresby to join the Eastern Fleet at Singapore). At 7.43 a.m. the Admiralty war signal, " Commence hos- tilities against Japan at once" reached Navy Office, and was immediatel y passed to H.M.A. Ships2 and to the four Area Combined Headquarters . During the forenoon Ocean Island reported that a Japanese aircraft dropped bombs on the island at 11 a .m. Meanwhile short wave broadcast reports of Japanese attacks reache d Melbourne, and these continued to arrive throughout the day, and to give some indications of the scope of the enemy's plan . They included reports that an air attack on Pearl Harbour began at 4 a .m. ; that an announcement from Tokyo declared that Japan had entered a state o f war with Britain and the United States in the Western Pacific ; and that Shanghai had been attacked by Japanese aircraft and marines . A broadcast from Wake Island reported the aerodrome there bombed out by twent y Japanese aircraft and appealed for immediate assistance ; and an inter- cepted message from some unknown station stated that Guam had been bombed. Singapore also reported an air attack ; and a report was receive d that Bangkok had been bombed by aircraft and bombarded from the sea . From Nauru came information that a Japanese aircraft had flown ove r the island without attacking . 3 These reports were considered by the War Cabinet at a meeting hel d in Melbourne that day, and it was agreed that the situation should b e accepted as involving a state of war with Japan . 4 In the absence at the conference in Singapore of Admiral Royle, the Acting Chief of the Naval Staff, Commodore Durnford, told the meeting what naval measures ha d been instituted. The departure of merchant ships for overseas was sus- pended; merchant vessels in northern waters were instructed to fall bac k on Rabaul and Port Moresby; a convoy consisting of the coastal line r Katoomba carrying troops for Rabaul and escorted by Adelaide, was held at Port Moresby ; instructions were issued for the extinction of coasta l navigation lights excepting those at Rabaul and Port Moresby, which wer e controlled by the Naval Officers-in-charge ; and coastwatchers were warned Achilles reached Port Moresby at 4 .30 p .m. on 11 Dec, the day after the loss of Prince of Wale s and Repulse. She was ordered back to the New Zealand Station, and reached Auckland on th e 16th . HMAS Adelaide was in Port Moresby on the morning of 8 Dec, and one of her officers late r recalled : "In the wardroom, the officers had just finished their breakfast when the signal officer pinned a pink signal on the notice board, from the Naval Board, which read : ` Commence hostilities with Japan .' One by one the officers read it and walked quietly away . There wa s 9othing to be said . They all realised the implications of such a decision—prolonging of the wa r and much bloodshed—yet of what avail were mere words . An impetuous sub. said, 'Now the fun starts', and a lieutenant who had traded to Japan for many years in the Merchant Nav y remarked I've been waiting for this day for a long time' ; but otherwise a pregnant silence prevailed ." Lt W. N . Swan, RANR(S), "Another Job Done" , HMAS (1942), p . 198 . a Combined Operational Intelligence Centre, "Situation Report No . 1". Information received u p to 4 p.m., 8 Dec . * The formal decision to declare war on Japan was made on 9 Dec . (Advisory War Council Minute 586 .) 4-12 Dec TROOPS TO KOEPANG 487 to extra vigilance. Durnford told the War Cabinet that no immediate decisions as to naval measures were required of it. He outlined the dis- positions of the larger units of the R .A.N. : Adelaide at Moresby, Westralia at Darwin; Kanimbla and Manoora at Singapore ; Australia on passage from Simonstown to Fremantle ; Canberra and Perth in the Tasman Se a area; Hobart in the Mediterranean ; and Yarra in the Persian Gulf .6 Dis- cussing the possibility of Japanese attack on Australia, Durnford told the War Cabinet that an air attack from an enemy aircraft carrier wa s unlikely in the early stages because of the cruiser escort that the carrie r would need . Attacks on trade by armed merchant cruisers could b e expected; but though Australian escort facilities were limited he considered they were adequate to deal with armed merchant cruiser or limited cruiser attack. He thought an attack on Rabaul was possible . Regarding the dispatch of A .I.F. troops to Koepang, the Prime Minister, Mr Curtin, told the War Cabinet that he had approved of this the previou s day. Durnford told the meeting that, there being no cruiser at Darwin , Westralia had been ordered to escort Zealandia to Koepang. There was no immediate enemy threat in the area, and air cover would be available over most of the route. The War Cabinet confirmed both actions. ("Spar- row" Force sailed from Darwin in the early morning of the 10th December with a total of 1,402 troops, 957 in Zealandia and 445 in Westralia.