CHAPTER 1 6 DEFEAT IN ABDA RILE the Japanese surface forces stealing up the Musi River wer e W being continuously attacked by Allied air forces on the 15th Feb- ruary, Doorman's striking force was the target for repeated fierce attack s by Japanese aircraft to the east of Banka Island . The force weighed and left Oosthaven at 4 p .m. on the 14th, and formed in two columns . The Dutch cruisers, led by De Ruyter, were to starboard ; and the British, led by Hobart as Senior Officer, to port . The six U.S. destroyers screened ahead ; and three Dutch astern. One of the four Dutch ships had bee n sent on ahead to mark Two Brothers Island off the south-east coast o f Sumatra, and join later. Air reconnaissance on the 13th had indicated four groups of enemy vessels : two cruisers, two destroyers, and two transports about sixty miles south of the Anambas Islands, steering south-west a t 10 a.m. ; one cruiser, three destroyers and eight transports some twenty miles to the eastward of the first group, and steering south at 10.30 a.m. ; three cruisers, five destroyers and one transport, about sixty miles nort h of Banka Island and steering west at 3 .30 p.m.; and two destroyers with fourteen transports about 100 miles north of Billiton island, and steerin g S.S.W., at 4.30 p.m. Doorman led his force northwards in accordance with the decision s reached by him and Helfrich—to go northwards through Gaspar Strait, round Banka, and back through Banka Strait, "destroying any enemy force s seen". Visibility was poor during the night (14th-15th February) passage , and at 5 .20 a.m. on the 15th the Dutch destroyer Van Ghent ran ashore on a reef in Stolze Strait . Banckert was sent to stand by and take off her crew. At 6 a.m. De Ruyter flew off her aircraft which, at 8 .37 a.m., re- ported seven cruisers and three destroyers ten miles N .E. of Pulau Laut (some forty-five miles north of Banka Island) steering N .W. at high speed. Interception of this force was not possible if it continued its northerly course and speed. Doorman continued as planned, cleared Gaspar Strait , and steered in a north-westerly curve some sixty miles east of Banka, to round the north of the island . Japanese shadowing aircraft were sighte d at 9.23 a .m. on the 15th, and from then on the force was continuousl y shadowed while north of Gaspar Strait . The first bombing attack wa s delivered by two Japanese formations at 11 .50 a.m. By 12.30 p .m., when it was obvious that the position, course and com- position of the force had been reported, and as conditions were favourabl e for air attack, Doorman decided, in view of the total absence of Allied ai r support, to return to Batavia—and through Gaspar Strait. Course was accordingly reversed at 12.42 p.m., when the force was about forty mile s east of the north-east point of Banka Island. Until dusk the ships were the target for successive heavy air attacks—at 11 .50 a.m., and, during the afternoon, at 12 .17 ; 12.29 ; 2 p.m. ; 2.20; 2.41 ; 2.50; 2.54 ; 2.59; 3.3 574 DEFEAT IN ABDA 15-16 Feb 194 2 p .m . ; 3.17; 5.13 ; and 5 .28. Ships were near-missed and often completely hidden in the lofty columns of water raised by the exploding bombs ; but they were skilfully handled and escaped other than superficial damage , though Barker and Bulmer were badly shaken . Hobart estimated that a total of 109 enemy aircraft took part in the attacks, the heaviest of whic h was when three formations, of nine, eight, and seven aircraft respectively , carried out a simultaneous attack on the Australian cruiser. The average size of the enemy bomb was 500 lb, though some heavier were dropped . It was of this day's attacks that Captain Howden later wrote : "the bombs fell close enough for me to see the ugly red flash of their burst and to feel the heat of their explosions across my face—but the ship steame d clear." Commenting that with a less alert engine-room team the results might have been different, he remarked that "There have been occasion s when I have had to call for the most violent manoeuvring of the mai n engines, and the instant answer has resulted in swinging the ship in a manner I hardly thought possible. On one occasion I found it necessary to go from 24 knots ahead to 24 knots astern on one engine, while going full ahead on the other." The shadowing aircraft sighted by Doorman 's force at 9 .23 a .m. on the 15th was a reconnaissance machine flown off by Chokai, Ozawa's flagship. The Japanese admiral received its report about 10 a .m., "Three enemy cruisers and five destroyers sailing northwards through Gaspar Strait 0938". The main Japanese convoy from Camranh Bay was then east of the Lingga Archipelago, steering south . Ozawa ordered it to with- draw to the north ; and aircraft from Ryujo, and land attack aircraft of the Genzan Air Unit, to deliver the attacks which they made on the Allied force during the day. Not until it was clear that Doorman had withdrawn, did Ozawa order the main convoy to resume to the southward, and it wa s the evening of the 16th before it reached the mouth of the Musi River, an d the afternoon of the 17th before it reached Palembang, by which time the advance force had occupied the town. Because of the congestion at Tanjong Priok (where on 16th Februar y every berth was crowded and at least thirty ships were anchored in th e roads) the striking force was split up between Java and Sumatra on it s return. "Hobart, Exeter, Tromp, Barker and Bulmer followed De Ruyte r in to Tanjong Priok and anchored at 9 .52 a.m. on the 16th," recorded Hobart. That morning too, the rest of the American destroyers arrived at Ratai Bay to fuel. It was noted, as the force returned south through Gaspar Strait, that Van Ghent which had been bombed was now a fiercely burning wreck. Howden observed of the operation that it again directed attention to the necessity of providing adequate air protection for ships operating within range of enemy aircraft . It illustrated, also, the disability imposed upon Doorman by distance . With the Japanese thrusting spear- heads a thousand miles apart, invaluable time was lost by the Allies i n endeavouring, with the small naval forces at their disposal, to meet and counter each alternate thrust as it was made . Inevitably it meant that they were too late. Doorman's northward sweep delayed the arrival of the main 13-19 Feb WITHDRAWAL FROM OOSTHAVEN 575 Japanese convoy at Palembang by twenty-four hours . Had Doorman bee n twenty-four hours earlier, he could have gone north through Banka Strait, and his attack on the leading Japanese convoy and covering forces coul d have coincided with Allied air attacks thereon, with possibly far reachin g effects on the fate of southern Sumatra. As it was, the advance convoy was beyond his reach on the 15th, and distance alone would have pre - vented his reaching the main convoy, even without the enemy air attac k which, had he persisted in attempting to go north or enter Banka Strait , would most probably have involved him in heavy and fruitless losses. In the circumstances, to withdraw as he did was the only wise course . II On the 16th February, the day some of the American destroyers o f the striking force reached Ratai Bay, near Oosthaven, preparations were well under way for the final withdrawal of Allied forces and refugees from Sumatra through that port. The ships of convoys "JS .l" and "JS.2" were still there. Troops had disembarked from "JS .1", and equipment had bee n off-loaded; but the re-embarkation of the troops and the destruction o f the equipment on shore had been ordered ; and the troops in "JS.2" (Orcades) were ordered not to disembark . In addition to the ships of th e two convoys, naval vessels at Oosthaven included the Australian ship s Yarra (now under the command of Lieut-Commander Rankin') ; Goul- burn; and Burnie; the Dutch gunboat Soemba; 2 and the British Tenedos and Encounter . On the 16th the ships of convoys "JS .1" and "JS .2" sailed for Java. Yarra escorted Filleigh, Lulworth Hill and Hai Lee to Batavia ; and Tenedos and Encounter escorted Orcades and Yoma to that port. Meanwhile attempts to clear the congestion at Tanjong Priok continued , and on the 16th convoy "SJ.2", Plancius and Empire Star, carrying be- tween them some 3,000 refugees, sailed thence, Plancius for Colombo , escorted by Durban; and Empire Star for Fremantle, proceeding indepen- dently after clearing Sunda Strait . Admiral Hart was a passenger in Durban. From the 13th to the 16th February Goulburn and Burnie provided anti-submarine protection of the approaches to Oosthaven ; and on the 17th they entered the port to see if they could there help the demolitio n parties in their work. Goulburn, however, was diverted from this to escort four Dutch ships—Both (2,601 tons) ; Marilyse Moller (786 tons) ; Stagen (2,539 tons) ; and Balikpapen (1,279 tons)—clear of the Malay Barrier into the Indian Ocean .