By Anne Millar

Home , Charles Gavan Power, Jack Mackenzie, Montreal District, Robert Charles Wallace, Sidney Earle Smith, Wilfrid Eggleston

Wartime Training at Canadian Universities during the Second World War

Anne Millar

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate of Philosophy degree in history

Department of History Faculty of Arts University of Ottawa

Abstract

This dissertation provides an account of the contributions of Canadian universities to the Second World War. It examines the deliberations and negotiations of university, government, and military officials on how best to utilize and direct the resources of

Canadian institutions of higher learning towards the prosecution of the war and postwar reconstruction.

During the Second World War, university leaders worked with the Dominion

Government and high-ranking military officials to establish comprehensive training programs on campuses across the country. These programs were designed to produce service personnel, provide skilled labour for essential war and civilian industries, impart specialized and technical knowledge to enlisted service members, and educate returning veterans.

University administrators actively participated in the formation and expansion of these training initiatives and lobbied the government for adequate funding to ensure the success of their efforts. This study shows that university heads, deans, and prominent faculty members eagerly collaborated with both the government and the military to ensure that their institutions’ material and human resources were best directed in support of the war effort and that, in contrast to the First World War, skilled graduates would not be heedlessly wasted. At the center of these negotiations was the National Conference of

Canadian Universities, a body consisting of heads of universities and colleges from across the country. This organization maintained an active presence in all major deliberations and exercised substantial influence over the policies affecting the mobilization of university resources. iii

Dedicated to Josh and Beth

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Jeffrey

Keshen, for his continuous encouragement and guidance. His interest in my research convinced me to attend the University of Ottawa and throughout my time there he provided me with vital support and countless professional opportunities. I have benefitted greatly from his commitment to his students.

Thank you to the members of my thesis evaluation committee, Dr. Chad Gaffield,

Dr. Ruby Heap, Dr. Ida Kranakis, and Dr. Paul Stortz, for their insightful comments and encouragement. In particular, I am indebted to Dr. Heap who throughout my doctoral work gave me valuable opportunities to engage with historians of higher education. I have been honoured to be a part of many of her professional initiatives.

I also wish to thank Dr. Jonathan Vance who influenced my decision to pursue graduate studies and who encouraged my enthusiasm for historical research. It was he who set me on the path to examining universities in wartime. Nathan Sassi and Jennifer

Bruce provided appreciated moral support. I am grateful to both for their friendship.

This research would not have been possible without the financial support of the

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Ontario Government, and the University of Ottawa. Additionally, this project has benefitted from the expert knowledge and invaluable research assistance of archivists and staff members of Library and Archives Canada, the Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections, the

McGill University Archives, the University of British Columbia Archives, the University of Guelph Library Archival and Special Collections, and the University of Toronto

Archives and Records Management Services. I am especially grateful to Mary Houde, v

Loryl MacDonald, Harold Averill, Barbara Edwards, and Jan Brett. I thank also the dozens of other individuals who sent me photographs and scanned images of university war memorials and honour rolls.

Thank you to my family for encouraging me to take advantage of all of the academic opportunities I have been fortunate enough to be given. My parents, Lynn and

Mervin, emphasized the importance of higher education and believed that their children could accomplish anything they set their minds to. Their validation has proven invaluable. My gratitude also goes to my brothers, Philip and David, for encouraging me to be competitive and for providing strong examples of hard work and perseverance. My aunts, Joan and Donna, spent countless hours providing emotional support, coordinating logistics, and helping me organize my thoughts. I am appreciative of the memories and stories of my late grandparents and my great aunt. It is to them that I first turned to for an understanding of the impact of the Second World War on Canadian society. I am also deeply appreciative of my new family, Jolyn, Paul, Eli, and Laura, for their interest in my research and encouragement.

Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Joshua Perell, for his unwavering support and unrelenting confidence in my abilities. He is my best friend and has loved, supported, encouraged, and helped me through this work. We made this journey together and I am blessed to have him by my side.

Table of Contents

Page

Abstract……………………………………………………………………………… ii

Dedication …………………………………………………………………………… iii

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………... iv

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………….. vi

List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………….... viii

List of Figures………………………………………………………………………... xi

List of Appendices…………………………………………………………………… xiv

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………... 1

Chapter One The Mobilization of University Students and the Cooperation and Collaboration of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1940-1945…………………………………………. 14

Chapter Two University Service Training, Part I: The Establishment of University Service Training Units, 1939-1945………………….. 75

Chapter Three University Service Training, Part II: The Coordination of Service Training Units on Campus, 1942-1945………………… 128

Chapter Four Producing Essential Personnel, Part I: The Debate over the Acceleration of University Courses, 1939-1943……………… 194

Chapter Five Producing Essential Personnel, Part II: The Introduction of Specialized, Short-Term Training Programs, 1940-1944……….. 259

Chapter Six Education for Reestablishment, Part I: The University Training Plan, 1939-1954…………………………………………………. 305

Chapter Seven Education for Reestablishment, Part II: Student Veteran Criticism of the University Training Plan and Veteran Organization on Campus, 1945-1950…………………………… 363

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………. 397

vii

Figures………………………………………………………………………………... 408

Appendices…………………………………………………………………………... 450

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………….. 510

viii

List of Abbreviations

AFHQ Air Force Headquarters ARP Air Raid Precaution ATB Auxiliary Training Battalion ATC Advanced Training Centre BCATP British Commonwealth Air Training Plan CAMSI Canadian Association of Medical Students and Interns CASF Canadian Active Service Force CAUC Canadian Army University Corps CDC Canadian Dental Corps CGS Chief of the General Staff CMA Canadian Medical Association CMHC Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation COTC Canadian Officers Training Corps CRCC Canadian Red Cross Corps CRCS Canadian Red Cross Society CWAAF Canadian Women’s Auxiliary Air Force CWAC Canadian Women’s Army Corps DAG Deputy Adjutant General DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff DGMS Director General of Medical Services DMS Department of Munitions and Supply DND Department of National Defence DNWS Department of National War Services DOC District Officer Commanding DOR Directorate of Requirements DPNH Department of Pensions and National Health DUASC Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections DVA Department of Veterans Affairs EDT Engineering Defense Training EFTS Elementary Flying Training School ESMDT Engineering, Science and Management Defense Training GACDR General Advisory Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation ITS Initial Training School IUS International Union of Students JSM Joint Staff Mission (Britain) JSUTB Joint Services University Training Board JSUTC Joint Services University Training Committee LAC Library and Archives Canada MCC Medical Council of Canada MHC Military Hospitals Commission MRTB Military Reserve Training Battalion (McGill University) MUA McGill University Archives MUS McGill University Scrapbook NCCU National Conference of Canadian Universities ix

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NCSV National Conference of Student Veterans NDHQ National Defence Headquarters NES National Employment Service NFCUS National Federation of Canadian University Students NPAM Non-Permanent Active Militia NRC National Research Council NRMA National Resources Mobilization Act NSHQ Naval Service Headquarters NSS National Selective Service OEC Organization and Establishments Committee OSAB Officers Selection and Appraisal Board OSAC Officers Selection and Appraisal Centre OTC Officer Training Centre OTC Officer Training Corps (Britain) OTRI Ontario Training and Reestablishment Institute OTU Operational Training Unit PAED Pre-Aircrew Education Detachment PDRO Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order POM Potential Officer Material QUA Queen’s University Archives RAF Royal Air Force RCA Royal Canadian Artillery RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force RCAMC Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps RCASC Royal Canadian Army Service Corps RCCS Royal Canadian Corps of Signals RCE Royal Canadian Engineers RCN Royal Canadian Navy RCNVR Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve RCOC Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps RCSCC Royal Canadian Sea Cadet Corps RDF Radio Direction Finding SFTS Service Flying Training School SJAA St. John’s Ambulance Association SOUT Staff Officer University Training TWET Tactical Exercises Without Troops UAB University Advisory Board UAS University Air Squadrons UATC University Air Training Corps UATP University Air Training Plan UBCA University of British Columbia Archives UGLASC University of Guelph Library Archival and Special Collections UKALM United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission UMA University of Manitoba Archives and Special Collections UNTD University Naval Training Detachment x

UTARMS University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services UTOD University Training Organization Detachment VLA Veterans’ Land Act VRA Veterans Rehabilitation Act WAD Women’s Athletic Directorate WBTP Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel WEPT War Emergency Training Plan WRCNS Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service WSTD Women’s Service Training Detachment WVSC Women’s Voluntary Service Corps xi

List of Figures

Figure 1 Full-Time University Enrolment in Canada by Gender and Select Years, 1920-1960

Figure 2 Full-Time University Enrolment in Canada by Province and Select Years, 1920-1960

Figure 3 Number of Male Students who Failed or were in the Lower Half of the Class at Close of 1943-1944 Academic Session

Figure 4 Enlistment in University Naval Training Divisions by Division, 1943- 1945

Figure 5 Enrolment of Medical Students at Canadian Universities, 1939-1940

Figure 6 Graduates of Canadian Medical Faculties, 1934-1945

Figure 7 Analysis of Enlistments Required at Canadian Universities to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics, 1941

Figure 8 Progress of No. 2 Canadian Army University Course as of 19 January 1944

Figure 9 Estimated Expenses and Tuition Fees for 1945-1946 Academic Year due to Veteran Enrolment Assuming a 75% Increase in Student Population over the 1944-1945 Academic Year at Select Universities

Figure 10 Additional Expenditures on Behalf of Veterans Enrolled in University per Veteran, 1945-1946

Figure 11 Additional Expenditures on Behalf of Veterans Enrolled in University per Veteran, 1946-1947

Figure 12 Information from Supplementary Grant Claims, 1946-1947

Figure 13 Information from Financial Statements Regarding Supplementary Grant Claims, 1946-1947

Figure 14 Total Veteran Enrolment at Canadian Universities from December 31st of Indicated Year, 1943-1953

Figure 15 Statistics of the Committee on University Requirements for University Training of Veterans, 1945-1946

xii

Figure 16 DVA Statistics on Receiving University Training Benefits Recorded at Head Office up to 30 June 1946

Figure 17 Enrolment of Undergraduate Veterans Under University Training Benefits by Program and Year of Study as Reported by the DVA, November 1946

Figure 18 Distribution of Veterans Enrolled under University Training Benefits as at 15 February 1947

Figure 19 Cumulative Figures in University Training by District to 31 March 1947

Figure 20 Enrolment of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of British Columbia by Year, 1944-1952

Figure 21 Distribution of Canadian Veterans by Faculty in American Universities as of 15 February 1947

Figure 22 Distribution of Canadian Veterans in Training in American Universities as at 15 February 1947

Figure 23 Registration of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of Toronto by Faculty and Year, 1945-1947

Figure 24 Registration of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of Toronto by Faculty and Year, 1947-1948 and 1949-1950

Figure 25 Analysis of Veteran Student Results by University, 1946-1947

Figure 26 Analysis of Veteran Student Results by University, 1947-1948

Figure 27 Percentage of Reinstatements Failing by District, 1951-1952

Figure 28 Analysis of Veterans no Longer in Receipt of University Training Allowances (Undergraduate and Post-Graduate), as of 15 February 1947

Figure 29 Analysis of Veterans no Longer in Receipt of University Training Allowances (Pre-University) as of 15 February 1947

Figure 30 Estimated Costs of a Year’s Attendance at Various Universities and Colleges for a Single Person Based on the Preliminary Report of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics on the Student Cost of Living Survey, 1946

xiii

Figure 31 Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Single Veterans at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

Figure 32 Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Married Veterans at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

Figure 33 Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Married Veterans with Dependents at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

xiv

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 Representatives and Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1939-1950

Appendix 2 Proposals Discussed at the Preliminary Meeting of Government Officials on 5 May 1942 Regarding the Coordination of Estimated Requirements for Engineering and Science Graduates

Appendix 3 National Selective Service Questionnaire Regarding Administration of NSS Mobilization Regulations, 1943

Appendix 4 Consolidated Responses to the 1943 National Selective Service Questionnaire Regarding Administration of NSS Mobilization Regulations

Appendix 5 Universities and Colleges Providing COTC or Basic Military Training by Military District as of 9 May 1941

Appendix 6 Women’s National Service Training Syllabus at the University of Toronto, 1942-1943

Appendix 7 Order-in-Council P.C. 2983 Establishing the UATC, 13 May 1942

Appendix 8 Organizational Chart for the UATC

Appendix 9 Order-in-Council P.C. 4453 Establishing the UNTD, 6 June 1943

Appendix 10 COTC Reorganization as Proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, 25 April 1944

Appendix 11 COTC Reorganization as Proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, 25 April 1944

Appendix 12 Order-in-Council P.C. 3086, 1 May 1941

Appendix 13 Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191, 6 May 1941

Appendix 14 Order-in-Council P.C. 75/11590, 23 December 1942

Appendix 15 Order-in-Council P.C. 38/9591 Establishing the No. 1 Canadian Army Course

Appendix 16 Order-in-Council P.C. 129/6181 Establishing the No. 2 Canadian Army University Course

Appendix 17 Order-in-Council P.C. 4068½ Authorizing Appointment of Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation, 7 December 1939

Appendix 18 Order-in-Council P.C. 7633, The Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order, 1 October 1941

Appendix 19 Order-in-Council P.C. 3206 Establishing the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans, 3 May 1945

Appendix 20 Veteran Rehabilitation Training Supervisory Districts, 1945-1946

Appendix 21 Rehabilitation of Members of Canadian Armed Forces Survey, 1944

Appendix 22 DVA Summary of Final Follow-up for University Training, October 1951

Appendix 23 Questionnaire Distributed to Student Veterans by the University of Saskatchewan Veteran’s Association

Appendix 24 Canadian Legion Brief on Housing Control

Appendix 25 McGill Student Veterans’ Society Referendum on Maintenance Grants, 1946

Introduction

In 1944, the National Film Board of Canada (NFB) produced an eleven-minute film entitled “Universities at War” as part of its Canada Carries On series to highlight the wartime and postwar contributions of Canadian universities during the Second World

War. The NFB planned to show the film in fifteen languages in twenty-seven countries to an estimated 160 million viewers. In addition to profiling the mobilization of academic research in support of the war effort, the film highlighted military training being given to civilian students on campuses across the country through the Canadian Officers Training

Corps (COTC), the University Air Training Corps (UATC), and the University Naval

Training Detachments (UNTD). The opening scene depicted a crowd of army, air force, and naval cadets at the University of British Columbia proudly arranged to form the letters “UBC.”1

Officer training on Canadian campuses was not the only contribution of institutions of higher learning to the nation’s Second World War effort. While far from the fields of battle, Canadian universities were directly and indirectly affected by the war.

Thousands of students and alumni rushed to enlist, their names carefully recorded in the serial honour rolls published in student newspapers. The conflict, at least for its duration, impacted virtually all aspects of campus life. Universities invited prominent community members and military officials to give public lectures. Teaching resources were taxed under the weight of faculty leaving for overseas service and war-related government positions. The introduction of accelerated courses and special war courses for military

1 University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Combined Services Trust Committee (collector), Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion collection, Box 2, Scrapbook, “UBC Students Perform for Wartime Movie,” March 1944; and National Film Board of Canada, Universities at War (Ottawa: National Film Board of Canada, 1944). 2 and civilian personnel only intensified demand for faculty with the requisite education.

On a broader level, war brought universities into closer contact with the Dominion

Government, situating education at the forefront of national policy and altering public perceptions of the role of higher education in society.

The contributions of universities to the war effort were considerable and varied.

University service training units prepared male students to enter the army, air force, and navy and war service training programs provided first aid and home nursing courses for female students. With the encouragement of administrators and alumni, students redirected their social activities in support of thrift campaigns and war charities, knitted articles for service personnel and civilians in bombed areas, organized blood drives, and very early in the war began to plan to commemorate their fallen brethren. There was a greater emphasis on medicine, dentistry, physics, chemistry, and certain branches of engineering, which resulted in a greater concentration of staff and students in these subjects and ultimately the acceleration of medical and dental programs. The greatest adaptations were found in faculties of graduate studies, where every effort was made to meet research needs and demands. By 1942, the work of Canadian universities had become closely coordinated with that of the National Research Council (NRC).

Many of the wartime efforts of universities and their administrators, faculty, and students were undertaken as a result of individual planning. They mirrored the varied patriotic endeavours undertaken on campuses across the country during the First World

War, initiatives that were mostly organized at the institutional level. There were, however, a number of larger efforts coordinated at a national level that were implemented at most, if not all, Canadian institutions during the Second World War. These national 3 programs were almost exclusively training programs designed to mobilize university resources to meet a variety of wartime training needs.2 Together they helped produce future service personnel, provide skilled labour for industries, impart specialized and technical knowledge to already enlisted service members, and educate returning veterans.3

Canadian university authorities willingly, and often eagerly, collaborated with government and military officials to implement and develop training policies, procedures, and programs that would enable their institutions to make vital contributions to the war effort. They placed their facilities, faculties, and resources at the disposal of the armed services and war industries. They did not, however, cede control to government officials.

They maintained an active presence in all major deliberations. University administrators and prominent faculty actively worked to influence, shape, and improve wartime policies.

They negotiated with the Dominion Government and the military to ensure that their institutions maximized their potential contribution to the war effort and that the government—who they insisted should assume the burden of additional expenditures— adequately financed their efforts.

All mobilization policies and training programs described in this study stemmed from the desire of university authorities to see that their facilities and resources were used to their utmost in support of the war and the want of political leaders and key government

2 Some began as small experimental initiatives at a select number of universities but grew into larger programs on campuses across the country. 3 This study covers all of the national training programs that were implemented on Canadian university campuses but does not provide an account of the NRC’s efforts to mobilize and coordinate university war research programs. A considerable amount of scholarship already exists on the wartime efforts of the NRC. Most notably Wilfrid Eggleston’s work and Donald Avery’s The Science of War examine the Dominion Government’s efforts to mobilize university research scientists. See Donald Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998); and Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: the NRC, 1916-1966 (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1978). 4 officials to ensure that, in contrast to the First World War, university resources and skilled graduates would not be wasted. As a result of these complementary interests, the

Second World War did not strip universities of their students. Full-time university enrolment in Canada increased from 26,386 in 1940 to 64,731 in 1945 (see Figures 1 and

2).

Despite the ambitions and motives of university, government, and military leaders, plans to mobilize university resources for wartime training did not always run smoothly. When problems confronted the success of these schemes, university authorities readily collaborated with the government and military to shape and improve each program based on the assessed results. Importantly, the programs implemented on campus to mobilize university students were, at times, at odds with each other. University administrators actively worked to engage government and military authorities to promote the greater coordination of their efforts, asking for enhanced cooperation between the armed services and war industries in the utilization of their resources and graduates with essential technical skills and knowledge. In particular, they asked government officials to clarify if the production of essential personnel should be given precedence over compulsory military training for students. Where they believed military training interfered with the latter, they lobbied the government to change mobilization legislation.

At the centre of this cooperation was the National Conference of Canadian

Universities (NCCU), a body consisting of heads of universities and colleges from across the country.4 Because of its efforts to shape wartime policies affecting institutions of

4 The impetus for the NCCU’s formation was a meeting held in 1903 by Gilbert Parker, a British member of parliament. He invited representatives from thirty-one universities and colleges throughout the Empire to attend the first Allied Colonial Universities Conference. From this conference, a number of important concepts and resolutions were presented highlighting the importance of communication amongst 5 higher education, during the Second World War the NCCU became the primary mediator between the universities and the Dominion Government. As the official voice of

Canadian universities and as an instrument of policy and publicity, the impact of the

NCCU on the wartime collaboration of universities cannot be overvalued. The NCCU mediated all key negotiations concerning the contributions of Canadian universities to the war effort: it promoted and facilitated the creation of special committees to guide the government on specific war-related issues, including compulsory military training for students and the acceleration of courses; worked to ensure that the wartime contributions of institutions of higher learning made the best use of university resources; and mediated the implementation of key government legislation, including the National Resources

Mobilization Act (NRMA) and the Veterans Rehabilitation Act. Through the NCCU, universities cooperated and collaborated with government and military officials to ensure their resources, both human and material, were appropriately and efficiently directed to meet the nation’s wartime goals and priorities.

Given the extensive contributions made by universities to the Second World War, it is surprising that there is no comprehensive study of Canadian universities during the conflict. In fact, little has been written on Canadian universities in wartime more largely.

The scholarship undertaken by military historians has indirectly explored the impact of war on universities and the contributions of these institutions. In their work on Canadian scientists and technologies during the Second World War, Donald Avery, David

Zimmerman, and Wilfrid Eggleston considered the scientific contributions made by

institutions of higher learning. Twenty-four representatives from fifteen Canadian institutions attended the meeting. In 1911, the NCCU met for the first time. Like in Britain, prior to this meeting there was little to no cooperation or communication amongst universities in Canada. For a history of the NCCU, see Gwendoline Pilkington, A History of the National Conference of Canadian Universities (Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto, 1974). For a list of NCCU representatives and member institutions, see Appendix 1. 6 universities.5 Avery’s The Science of War delivers the most significant account of university research efforts. In an effort to evaluate the contribution of Canadian scientists to the success of joint Allied wartime scientific projects, Avery examined the war research undertaken by faculty and graduate students at universities in central Canada. He focused on the work of the NRC in coordinating scientific research, highlighted the wartime importance of engaging university scientists and engineers, and explored how the war strengthened the relationship between academia and the Dominion Government.

Peter Neary, J.L. Granatstein, and Shaun Brown have produced critical studies on the

Veterans’ Charter. This work outlined the provision of free university education for

Second World War veterans. They focused, however, on veteran education within the larger context of Canada’s reestablishment policies, comparing university education to other forms of veteran assistance. They did not explore the scheme’s impact within the framework of university war efforts. Moreover, this work did not make use of the valuable records found at university archives.6 In his examination of National Selective

Service (NSS), Michael Stevenson used student deferment as a case study to explore the nation’s mobilization policies. While he noted the exceptional cooperation of university and government officials, he did not provide a full account of the scope of that cooperation nor did he examine the range of documents used in this study that illustrate

5 Avery, The Science of War; David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); and Wilfrid Eggleston, Canada’s Nuclear Story (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965). 6 Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein, eds., The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Peter Neary, On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011); Peter Neary and Shaun Brown, “The Veterans Charter and Canadian Women Veterans of the Second World War,” British Journal of Canadian studies 9, no. 2 (1994): 249-277; and Shaun Brown, “Re-Establishment and Rehabilitation: Canadian Veteran Policy, 1933-1946” (Ph.D. Diss., the University of Western Ontario, 1995). 7 the breadth of the ties between university administrators, civilian politicians, and military officers.7

In comparison, the work of historians of higher education has tended to be institutional in focus. More comprehensive histories of universities in Canada, in fact, do not explore the wars. Paul Axelrod, for example, has written extensively on the history of

Canadian universities but has focused on their general development in the 1930s and the post-Second World War period.8 Immediately following both world wars, some universities commissioned and published accounts of their wartime contributions, most notably R.C. Fetherstonhaugh’s work on McGill University.9 The majority of these accounts, however, recorded the loss of university students and alumni and provided only brief, laudatory narratives of the wartime activities of their institutions, emphasizing research activities, military training on campus through the COTC, and the volunteer activities of female students. In university histories by Walter Johns, P.B. Waite, James

Cameron, and H.B. Neatby, the impact of the world wars is addressed in single chapters.10

7 Michael D. Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001); and Michael D. Stevenson, “National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War” (Ph.D. Diss., the University of Western Ontario, 1992). 8 Paul Axelrod, Scholars and Dollars: Politics, Economics, and the Universities of Ontario, 1945-1980 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982); and Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid, eds., Youth, University and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 1989). 9 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, McGill University at War: 1914-1918, 1939-1945 (Montreal: McGill University, 1947) and R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, No. 3 Canadian General Hospital (McGill), 1914-1919 (Montreal: Gazette Printing Co., 1928). 10 Walter H. Johns, The History of the University of Alberta 1908-1969 (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 1981); P.B. Waite, The Lives of Dalhousie (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994); James D. Cameron, For the People: A History of St. Francis Xavier University (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996); and H. B. Neatby, Creating Carleton: The Shaping of a University (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002). 8

The growth and influence of social history encouraged historians of higher education to explore the connection between changes at universities and larger socio- economic and political developments. This influence is most evident in A.B. McKillop’s

Matters of Mind, which contains an exceptional chapter on Ontario universities between

1939 and 1945.11 It is also evident in the institutional histories by Frederick W. Gibson and C.M. Johnson and John Weaver, which examine student and academic life on campus during wartime.12 Similarly, in an effort to evaluate the impact of war on the women’s movement and women’s rights, historians of higher education have produced a number of important studies on the impact of the world wars on women’s professional education. Ruby Heap, for example, has explored how the First World War influenced the growth of household science at the University of Toronto.13 Along with Ellen

Scheinberg, Heap has also documented the impact of the Second World War on women in the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the same institution from 1939 to

1950.14

The best account of universities in wartime is the 2012 anthology Cultures,

Communities, and Conflict: Histories of Canadian Universities and War, edited by Paul

11 A.B. McKillop, Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario, 1791-1951 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 12 Frederick W. Gibson, Queen’s University Volume II, 1917-1961, to serve and yet be free (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983); and C.M. Johnson and John Weaver, Student Days: Student Life at McMaster University from the 1890s to the 1980s (Hamilton: McMaster University Alumni Association, 1986). 13 Ruby Heap, “From the Science of Housekeeping to the Science of Nutrition: Pioneers in Canadian Nutrition and Dietetics at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Household Science, 1900-1950,” in Challenging Professions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Women’s Professional Work, eds. Elizabeth Smyth et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 14 Ruby Heap and Ellen Scheinberg, “‘Just One of the Gang’: Women at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering, 1939-50,” in Learning to Practice: Professional Education in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, eds. Ruby Heap, Wyn Miller, and Elizabeth Smyth (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2005). 9

Stortz and Lisa Panayotidis.15 The collection is a significant step forward in the historiography on the wartime role of Canadian universities and the impact of the nation’s wars on campus culture. It contains a series of essays addressing universities during the Boer War, world wars, and the Vietnam War. The majority of the essays assess university developments during the First World War.16 Four chapters examine institutions of higher learning during the Second World War. Using existing secondary source material, Paul Axelrod and Charles Levi compare the First and Second World War experiences of Canadian and British universities. Michael Horn examines a number of controversies surrounding academic freedom in Canadian universities during the two world wars in an effort to assess why these incidences were so few. Donald Avery’s contribution condenses some of his earlier scholarship on the NRC, examining the work of university scientists in university laboratories and various defence programs during the

Second World War. Finally, Paul Stortz looks at refugee professors at the University of

Toronto during the Second World War.17 The arguments of these scholars emphasize the

15 Paul Stortz and E. Lisa Panayotidis, eds., Cultures, Communities, and Conflict: Histories of Canadian Universities and War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 16 Barry Moody examines student culture at Acadia University from the Boer War to the post-First World War period and explores how the institution’s response to war was “infinitely complex and multilayered.” Mark Kuhlberg’s chapter argues that the war did not contribute to long-term profound changes within the Faculty of Forestry at the University of Toronto. In examining women’s wartime participation in the Canadian Red Cross Society at McGill University, Queen’s University, and the University of Toronto, Linda Quiney finds that university women did not comply with the “prescribed standard of women’s patriotic service” imposed by the organized but instead interpreted and constructed their own “version of participation.” Sara Burke’s essay explores developments at five Ontario universities. She disputes the notion that the First World War was a watershed in the history of women’s higher education, arguing instead that the increasing integration of women students “pre-dated 1914.” James Pitsula examines how the response to war was shaped by conceptions of masculinity at the University of Saskatchewan. James Hull’s essay looks at the mobilization of university research for the wartime efforts of both the military and industry, emphasizing the “unquestionably significant” wartime research developments but arguing that the infrastructure and organization of university research and the relationship to the government predated and had “little direct relationship” to the war. See Stortz and Panayotidis, 27, 89, 73, 96, 146, 148. 17 Axelrod and Levi contend that in both countries, universities strived to contribute what they could to both war efforts while preserving the integrity of their academic programs and research. Horn found that when a professor became the subject of criticism it was not for opposing wartime participants; rather, it was for being deemed “too critical” or “insufficiently patriotic.” He concludes that professors were strongly 10 larger thesis of the collection: that the university is not an “elite ‘ivory tower’ divorced from the realities of regional or national life” but is rather a “microcosm of Canadian society.”18 As this dissertation also emphasizes, Stortz and Panayotidis’ collection argues that war reveals the essentiality of universities to society; the “tangible and intellectual mobilization” of university resources in support of the war effort made evident the

“immediate practicability” of institutions of higher learning.19

What is missing from the scholarship is the larger context of how universities and the government collaborated to determine the wartime role of institutions of higher learning. While Avery examined the mobilization of science, there is no assessment of the regulations and policies affecting the mobilization of university students and the directing of the training capabilities of universities towards wartime and immediate post- war needs and objectives at a national level. How were national mobilization policies and training programs implemented and how did they affect campuses across the country?

There are a number of critical social histories examining individual institutional contributions that provide insight into the impact of war on higher education and the contribution of Canadian universities in times of war; yet, there remains a need for a larger national analysis. Were institutional efforts reflective of a larger national program?

What agency did university administrators have in the implementation of wartime

patriotic and did not resent constraints on academic freedom during wartime. Avery also emphasizes the important role played by university scientists in the “development of important weapon systems.” He argues that the mobilization of scientists is one of the best examples of how the war brought universities into closer contact with the Dominion Government. Stortz concludes that the university failed to address the plight of refugees. He insists that the professoriate “upheld the value system of the community in which they lived” and that the anti-Semitic attitudes of the university reflected those of the larger society. See Stortz and Panayotidis, 204, 177, 244. 18 Ibid., 9, 244. 19 Ibid., 7. 11 policies and initiatives? University wartime efforts need to be contextualized within the larger wartime setting, something this study provides.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to describe the agency of university authorities in determining how their institutions would contribute to the Second World

War. A secondary aim is to offer a basis on which the wartime efforts of individual institutions can be assessed. As the first-ever comprehensive analysis of Canadian universities in either world war, this thesis contributes to existing scholarship on

Canada’s military history and the history of higher education. An assessment of wartime training at universities during the Second World War provides a unique perspective on the Canadian war effort and the relationship of universities and the Dominion

Government. This study makes use of a wide selection of sources, looking at the rich primary source material found at individual university archives as well as the extensive material located at the national archives, both of which contain material relevant to the wartime collaboration of universities, the Dominion Government, key government ministries, and the armed services.

This dissertation is organized into four sections. The first chapter outlines the involvement of university officials in the development of policies and regulations affecting the wartime mobilization of university students. It explores how the NCCU shaped regulations affecting university students and the wider wartime role of institutions of higher learning. Chapters two and three assess the establishment and coordination of service training units on campuses across the country and discuss how the negotiations surrounding the military training of students became more complex with the introduction of air and naval programs. University, military, and government cooperation was 12 essential in reducing competition between the three services. The third section evaluates university efforts to aid in the training of essential personnel for both war related industries and active service. Chapter four examines the protracted debates between university and government officials surrounding the question of accelerating university courses and reforming established curriculums for medicine, dentistry, engineering, and science. This chapter also provides an account of the introduction of a financial aid program to encourage students to enroll in subjects perceived as essential to the war effort. Chapter five chronicles the organization and development of short-term programs designed to provide specialized training for enlisted service personnel in the air force and army through three case studies: University Training Detachments, Pre-Aircrew

Education Detachments, and the Canadian Army University Course. Taken together, these chapters reveal that the discussions and debates surrounding programs for active enlistees were far less complicated than the negotiations concerning the mobilization of civilian university students. Finally, chapters six and seven detail the implementation of the university training plan, which provided free higher education for veterans, and describe how the substantial success of this program was only possible due to the close collaboration of university administrators and government officials.

University authorities played a pivotal part in determining the wartime role of their institutions. They adapted university resources to meet the training needs of

Canada’s wartime program and negotiated with the Dominion Government in order to influence, shape, and improve the legislation and programs affecting the mobilization of their students, faculties, and facilities. The relationship between university heads and government leaders was not antagonistic or resentful. It was characterized by mutual 13 respect and common goals and was in large part made possible due to the government’s recognition of the expertise of university authorities. Through the NCCU, university heads acted as key advisors for the government on a variety of matters including the directing of university resources towards the winning of the war. They shaped mobilization and demobilization regulations, expanded military training to all three armed services, accelerated essential courses, influenced the introduction and parameters of a Dominion-Provincial student aid scheme, promoted and developed special short courses for enlisted service personnel, and adapted their institutions and programs to welcome the flood of veterans receiving free higher education under the country’s rehabilitation legislation. As will be seen, during the Second World War university administrators were almost always able to exercise influence over the implementation of mobilization and training policies on their campuses. 14

Chapter One

The Mobilization of University Students and the Cooperation and Collaboration of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1940-1945

It is not so long ago that the aristocrat of an army was the mighty six footer who could wield a claymore or a broadsword. At the turn of the century such a man proved to be a good target for Boer sharpshooters and short stocky men came into their own. Then in the First Great War the soldier with intelligence, with the individual initiative, was earmarked. Now the mechanization of the army has forcefully emphasized the value of education.1

The development of policies and regulations pertaining to the wartime mobilization of university students was accomplished through the close cooperation and collaboration of government and university officials. This partnership, as University of

Saskatchewan President James Sutherland Thomson later explained, was the result of a

“mutual respect” that characterized the “growing involvement” of universities in national politics during the Second World War.2 At the centre of policy development was the

National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU), a body consisting of heads of institutions of higher learning from across the country whose strong leadership between

1939 and 1945 expanded the organization’s power and influence (see Appendix 1).3

Government officials permitted the NCCU to shape regulations affecting university students and the wider wartime role of universities. They requested the presence of

NCCU representatives at major meetings on policy development, authorized the NCCU to appoint university officials to advisory positions and committees, and consulted with

1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, “An Aristocracy of Education,” unidentified newspaper, 29 September 1941. 2 James S. Thomson, Yesteryears at the University of Saskatchewan: 1937-1949 (Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1969), 37. 3 For a history of the NCCU, see Gwendoline Pilkington, A History of the National Conference of Canadian Universities (Ph.D. Diss., University of Toronto, 1974). 15 university heads and deans about policy implementation. Early regulations emphasized the authority of universities and the preference of administrators that students finish their degrees before enlisting, a stance supported by key government officials in Ottawa who lamented the previous war’s heedless waste of the nation’s best and brightest. As the war progressed and the demand for skilled personnel intensified, however, officials in the

Department of Labour sought to increase the output of graduates in needed professional and scientific fields, in particular medicine, dentistry, engineering, science, and agriculture. As Michael Stevenson explained in his pioneering study of National

Selective Service, students became increasingly subject to more “stringent, comprehensive, and standardized mobilization initiatives.”4 Yet even in the midst of government wartime priorities and pressures, the NCCU worked to ensure it would play a vital role in the development of new policies, in particular determining which students would be eligible for postponement of military call up under the country’s mobilization regulations. In so doing, the NCCU met its wartime agendas: it helped the government mobilize university resources in aid of the war while working to ensure the independence and traditional function of institutions of higher learning.

*****

When Canada entered the war on 10 September 1939, Prime Minister William

Lyon Mackenzie King pledged he would not institute conscription for overseas service.

He envisioned the country’s principal contributions would be economic and insisted most

Canadians would support the war by manufacturing the industrial and agricultural goods required by Britain, rather than through military service. By June 1940, with the success

4 Michael Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 51. 16 of German troops in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France, however, it had become clear that Canada would be unable to fight a war of “limited liability” and would need to mobilize for total war. Amidst criticism of the Dominion Government’s “partial effort” and public cries for a larger wartime role, the expansion of the nation’s war effort became regarded by almost all as essential to ensuring Allied success.5

On 20 June 1940, the House of Commons passed Bill 43, known as the National

Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA). The NRMA gave the Governor in Council

“special emergency powers” to institute orders and regulations allowing the government to conscript a person and their “material resources” for the duration of hostilities if deemed “necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.” These powers could only be exercised to conscript persons for home defence service in Canada and its territorial waters. Under the authority of the NRMA, the government registered and mobilized

Canadians with the intention of ensuring that all persons of an employable age would make the “most effective contribution.”6

The Department of National War Services (DNWS) administered Canada’s mobilization regulations under the direction of the Minister of Agriculture, James G.

Gardiner, until the government established National Selective Service (NSS) to oversee civilian mobilization within the Department of Labour on 21 March 1942 through Order-

5 For examples of some of the press coverage see “Total War Effort Demanded,” The Globe and Mail, 15 May 1940, 6; “Complete Mobilization Of Men and Industry to Win War Is Urged,” The Globe and Mail 22 May 1940, 4; and “Utmost Share in War Effort, Speech Pledge,” The Globe and Mail, 27 May 1940, 1. 6 LAC, RG27, Volume 635, File 143, the House of Commons, Bill 43 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, I.S.O., 1940); and LAC, RG27, Volume 986, File 9, “Manitoba Educational Association Presentation to the Government of Manitoba,” 2 May 1942. For a history of the NRMA, see Daniel Byers, “Mobilizing Canada: The National Resources Mobilization Act, the Department of National Defence, and Compulsory Military Service in Canada, 1940-1945” (Ph.D. Diss., McGill University, 2000). 17 in-Council P.C. 2254.7 Order-in-Council P.C. 8800 of 26 September 1942 allocated the control of military mobilization to NSS in an effort to further coordinate and centralize mobilization policy and organization and NSS assumed responsibility for compulsory military training regulations on 1 December 1942. Under the supervision of Arthur James

MacNamara, the Director of NSS, the Department of Labour thenceforth administered both national registration and mobilization, facilitating a more consistent and effective cooperation between the two divisions.8

Thirteen administrative divisions of the DNWS and later NSS administered mobilization regulations: “A” London, “B” Toronto, “C” Kingston, “D” Port Arthur, “E”

Montreal, “F” Quebec City, “G” Halifax, “H” Saint John, “K” Vancouver, “M” Regina, and “N” Edmonton.9 Each division consisted of a divisional registrar and first a National

War Services Board under the DNWS and later a National Selective Service Mobilization

Board under NSS. These boards acted in virtually the same manner, overseeing all decisions regarding postponement of compulsory military service and applications for leaves of absence.10

7 This was the result of the government’s decision to centralize the allocation and distribution of “available manpower” within the Department of Labour. See LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 2254, 21 March 1942; and LAC, RG35, Volume 19, “The Development of the National Selective Service (Civilian) Organization in World War II to December 31, 1945,” n.d. 8 MacNamara served as Deputy Minister of Labour in Manitoba during the Great Depression before coming to Ottawa in 1940 to serve as chair of the Dependent’s Allowance Board of the Department of National Defence and the Acting Chair of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. After being named Director of NSS, he was also appointed Deputy Minister of Labour. He served as Deputy Minister until 1953 when he became a special adviser on the employment of civilians for the DND. Because of his skills as a negotiator and his belief in the importance of compromise, MacNamara has been called the “great compromiser” and the “master conciliator.” See LAC, RG35, Volume 19, Raymond Ranger and P.H. Casselman, “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 31 December 1949, 33; LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 8800, 26 September 1942; and Michael Stevenson, “Conscripting Coal: The Regulation of the Coal Labour Force in Nova Scotia during the Second World War,” Acadiensis XXIX, no. 2 (Spring 2000). 9 For a list of the electoral districts in each division see LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 10924, 1 December 1942, Schedule “B.” 10 “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 35- 36. 18

When NSS took over the regulation of civilian mobilization, it was assigned three primary tasks: first, to estimate the human resource requirements of the various war services; second, to increase the availability of human resources for war-related work; and third, to direct men and women into the type of wartime service best suiting their education, experience, and skills. An important function of NSS was to coordinate the

“policies and activities” of government departments and agencies “affected or related” to the supply and demand of essential wartime labour.11

The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel (WBTP) acted as the primary intermediary in negotiations between NSS and university officials, helping to shape and determine future policies in light of labour requirements.12 In response to heavy demand for skilled personnel, the WBTP had been established by the Department of Labour on 12

February 1941 through Order-in-Council P.C. 780. Under the supervision of its director—a position held by Elliott M. Little and later H.W. Lea—and assistant-director

L. Austin Wright, the WBTP coordinated the competing needs of the armed forces and war industries for different scientific, technical, and professional personnel, including the increasing demand for university graduates.13

In its first year of operation, the WBTP worked to register all technical personnel and to develop a “system of manpower controls” to ensure the most efficient utilization of scientists and engineers. The WBTP was also tasked with identifying potential labour

11 Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 18-20; and Michael Stevenson, “National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War” (PhD Diss., the University of Western Ontario, 1992), 25. 12 In addition to other efforts, the WBTP collaborated with universities to develop a plan for joint Dominion-Provincial financial aid to students in engineering and science, organized and directed summer employment for engineering and science students, and helped staff university departments with much- needed instructors. 13 Department of Labour, “Selective Service and the Universities,” The Labour Gazette XLIII, no. 1 (January 1943): 34. 19 deficiencies and with determining “in what classes and to what extent” training could be increased. Once the WBTP determined requirements, the training branch of the

Department of Labour cooperated with the provincial governments, universities, and colleges to develop the “necessary plans” and arrange the “appropriate agreements” to increase the output of needed personnel.14

On 5 July 1940, university heads gathered in Ottawa to meet with government and military officials to discuss the position of students in light of the new mobilization priorities outlined in the NRMA. Chalmers Jack Mackenzie, the Acting Head of the

National Research Council (NRC), and arguably the most important figure in the postwar growth of science in Canada, made the first address.15 He explained that the government needed men with university training. Universities must “let nothing interfere” with their work, he advised: “It’s plain that Canada must do things for itself which it did not have to do for itself in the last war and which it has never done before. We can’t do it without your help.” Military officials, including the Deputy Minister of National Defence, echoed

Mackenzie’s assessment, insisting it was an “incredible waste” when any student discontinued their course of study. The armed services, they insisted, required students studying a range of subjects, from history, foreign languages, and philosophy to mathematics and science.16

In relating the events of the meeting, President Thomson of the University of

Saskatchewan reported the government had embraced an “enlightened view” of higher

14 “Selective Service and the Universities,” 34; and Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel, Annual Report, 1944, 1. 15 See Donald Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 16 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Office of the President, Box 326, File 6, untitled statement by President Carleton Stanley to all male students, [c. November 1941]. 20 education. “The universities were recognized as fully concerned about the national emergency,” he maintained, “and they could be trusted to act with complete responsibility concerning their distinctive role.” Moreover, he insisted, it was evident the government recognized university heads as “the most competent judges of what this implied.”17 The results of this meeting were critical for university administrations. It clarified the government’s initial instructions that university students should remain in their course of study until it had been decided how best to utilize their skills.18

Representatives also identified higher education as an essential component to the war work of universities. As University of Toronto President Henry John Cody quite succinctly explained, the government recognized “better-trained men” would ensure

“better service in every branch of the fighting forces.”19 The meeting set the stage for subsequent policy developments. The guiding principal for future regulations affecting university students would thenceforth be two-pronged: first, policies should facilitate the graduation of students needed by the armed services and essential industries; and second,

17 Thomson, 37. 18 The most referenced letter in this respect came from Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, then President of the National Research Council. On 16 September 1939, he wrote twenty university heads that it was the opinion of the NRC that because the war was likely to be of a long duration, students should continue their university courses, especially those in technical and scientific studies. His statement was interpreted as an encouragement for all students to remain in their studies: “It is the view of the Council that, owing to the possibility of the present war extending over a very long period and the need that there will be for large numbers of well trained men in all branches of pure and applied science, including medicine, dentistry and agriculture, students now pursuing successfully university courses in these fields will serve their country in a most valuable way by continuing their university training until graduation, and that specially able students should be encouraged to continue their studies in post-graduate courses in all branches of science, especially along the lines required to meet national requirements as they develop.” See University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0006 Correspondence, 1939-1940, Box 043, File 3, A.G.L. McNaughton to H.J. Cody, 16 September 1939; and LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, Distribution of Letter dated 16 September, 1939, to University Presidents, n.d. 19 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, (Toronto: s.n., 1942), 74. 21 in the development of these policies, mobilization officials should defer to the expertise of university heads and deans.

On 27 August 1940, the Dominion Government passed the National War Services

Regulations, 1940, through Order-in-Council P.C. 4185, instituting compulsory military training for single men20 and childless widowers between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five deemed medically fit by an examining physician and called up under the

NRMA.21 The regulations exempted seven groups from mandatory training and identified additional categories to be given special consideration for deferment.22 University students fell into this latter group. Section 16, entitled “University and College Students,” outlined in four points the conditions of postponement. Military training of a “bona fide” male university student could be postponed until the end of the academic year or session providing the student undertook military training on campus through the Canadian

Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) or an auxiliary unit. The Department of National

20 The definition of a single man remained unchanged during the war. Under both the National War Services Regulations and the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, a single man was one who was unmarried on 15 July 1940. If married after this date, a man would only be identified as married for the purpose of qualifying for dependents’ allowances. 21 The introduction of new legislation at various times during the war expanded the category of men liable for call up for compulsory training. Orders-in-Council P.C. 5840 and P.C. 5841 of 7 July 1942 extended the category to include men twenty years-of-age and made this group subject to call up for military training. Orders-in-Council P.C. 8918 and P.C. 5708 of 30 September 1942 and 9 August 1943 lowered the age to nineteen and eighteen respectively. Similarly, the proclamation authorized by Order-in-Council P.C. 11326 of 15 December 1942 instituted compulsory training for married men born in 1917 or in a later year that had been previously designated. Order-in-Council P.C. 5708 of 8 August 1943 authorized another proclamation extending this designation to married men born in the years 1913 through 1916. Finally, Order-in-Council P.C. 1355 of 4 March 1944 made married men liable for call up if they were not maintaining their family or making a “reasonable contribution” to their family’s subsistence. See “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 43-45. 22 The following groups were exempted for compulsory military service under Section 6: “ (a) Judges of Superior, District or County Courts of Justice; (b) Members of the Clergy or Religious Orders; (c) Regular Clergymen or Ministers of religious denominations; (d) Members of the Naval, Military or Air Force of Canada on Active Service and Cadets entered at the Royal Military College of Canada; (e) Permanently employed members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and of Provincial Police Forces; (f) Permanently employed members of Police Forces and Fire Brigades of any incorporated city; (g) Permanently employed wardens and officers of all penitentiaries, prisons and lunatic asylums, or mental hospitals.” See LAC, RG2, A1a, Volume 1685, Order-in-Council P.C. 4185, 27 August 1940; and “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 55. 22

Defence (DND) had to assess this training as “at least equivalent” to that given to men called up under the regulations. Additionally, Section 16 tasked National War Services

Boards with maintaining a record of the institutions providing approved training and stipulated that each university had to furnish their divisional registrar with two lists: a register of all male students undertaking or intending to take military training and a record of those not and the reasons for their exemption. The purpose of Section 16 was to permit students to “discharge their obligations” under the government’s mobilization policies without interrupting their academic course.23

To discuss university military training within the context of Section 16, H.J.

Cody, the President of the University of Toronto and the NCCU, called a special meeting of nineteen NCCU members representing fourteen institutions to be held in Ottawa on 9

September 1940.24 Following a discussion amongst themselves, the committee members conferred with Charles Gavan Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air, and J.G.

Gardiner. Three critical proposals emerged from the conference. First, university military training should be compulsory for all physically fit male students eighteen years-of-age or older. Only students enrolled in full-time courses leading to a degree or diploma should be permitted to undertake university military training.25 Students who were twenty-one or who would turn twenty-one by 1 July 1941 should be required to take 110 hours of training during the university session followed by two weeks of training at a

23 P.C. 4185; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1496, File 2-C-133, LaFlèche to Lorne McDonnell, 16 August 1941. 24 The NCCU did not convene a national conference between 1939 and 1942, but its executive committee called a number of special meetings in Ottawa during this period to discuss wartime concerns and regulations. 25 In other words, correspondence students, part-time undergraduate and graduate students, special students not taking courses for credit, students in second and third years of education, medical students in their intern year, pre-accountancy and accountancy students, students in evening courses, students in diploma courses or short courses in agriculture, and summer school students were not permitted to take military training in a university unit. 23 summer military camp. For students between the ages of eighteen and twenty, the same program should be followed if the universities and the military district deemed it “a physical possibility.” If unfeasible, the program could be reduced as necessary for the accommodation of training but some military training should be mandatory. University training should be optional for those under the age of eighteen and for non-British subjects. Second, the committee agreed students in the twenty-one and over category taking compulsory military training should be exempted from the compulsory one-month camp training demanded under the NRMA. Third, local military tribunals would deal with conscientious objectors twenty-one years-of-age and over, but those between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one would remain under the jurisdiction of their respective university.26

On 24 February 1941, university heads again met in Ottawa to discuss Section 16, this time for a conference with DNWS officials. Those present endorsed the September recommendations. Based on this, the NCCU passed a number of significant resolutions that they forwarded in a brief to the DNWS after the conference. The brief contained a detailed plan under which university military training would act as a substitute for the military training mandated under the National War Services Regulations. First, students who turned twenty-one years-of-age between 1 July 1940 and 30 June 1941 and who completed no less than 110 hours of university military training and two weeks of summer military camp should be considered as having completed the required thirty days’ training then specified under the NRMA. Second, students who turned twenty-one

26 If a male student refused to take intramural training, did not perform this training to the satisfaction of the DOC, or failed his examinations, he would be subject to call up. See DUASC, UA1, Board of Governors of Dalhousie University Fonds, Minutes, 1937-1940, “Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Board of Governors,” 17 September 1940, 1-2. 24 prior to 1 July 1940 and who completed no less than 100 hours of university military training should be considered as having satisfied the required thirty days’ training. The

NCCU requested that this latter cohort still be allowed to voluntarily attend two weeks of summer training camp.27

In addition, the brief made seven related requests and recommendations. First, it requested that the COTC be continued in the universities. Second, students accepted into the COTC who would qualify within two years for commission in the armed services should be considered as having satisfied training requirements. Third, students enrolled in the COTC should be allowed to postpone their military training. Fourth, students enrolled in the COTC be permitted to apply for postponement until the end of the academic year and should be given this training during the summer vacation months.

Fifth, military training during the academic year should be compulsory for all physically- fit male students registered in a regular course leading to a degree or diploma who were not members of the COTC and who would be eighteen years-of-age or older at the time of their registration for the 1941-1942 session. Foreign students and students under eighteen years-of-age should be permitted to take this training voluntarily. Sixth, the

DND should recognize auxiliary training units in universities and continue to issue uniforms and boots and provide instructional staff. Finally, students who completed at least 110 hours of university military training and who were called up by the DND to undergo training pursuant to the National War Services Regulations should be given credit for their previous training.28 These extensive recommendations revealed the

27 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, “Recommendations to Department of National War Services,” [c. 24 February 1941]. 28 “Recommendations to Department of National War Services;” and LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2- 133, Part 1, Nelson C. Hart to L.R. LaFlèche, 24 February 1941. 25 support of the NCCU for compulsory military training and its confidence in the ability of university administrations to provide training that would adequately prepare students for eventual war service. The brief also revealed the NCCU’s efforts to ensure that students be permitted to complete their studies.

In response to the meeting and the NCCU’s brief, the DNWS began to revise

Section 16. An initial draft was submitted to Major-General Leo R. LaFlèche, the

Associate Deputy Minister of the DNWS, on 4 March 1941.29 This work was part of a larger revision of the original regulations and culminated in the passing of Order-in-

Council P.C. 1822 of 18 March 1941. P.C. 1822 amended and consolidated the National

War Services Regulations and issued a new version of the document effective as of 25

February 1941. The conditions for student deferment were now ratified in Section 17.30

Section 17 first defined who constituted a student, which had been missing from the 1940 regulations:

… a person pursuing a full time course of studies at a Canadian University or college leading to a degree in Arts, Science or Commerce, or a person at a preparatory school pursuing in good faith, in the opinion of the Board, an academic course the satisfactory completion of which is required as a prerequisite to entrance upon a course of studies leading to a degree in Arts, Science or Commerce, or a person at a Canadian university, college or school pursuing a course of studies the satisfactory completion of which, in the opinion of the Board, would be in the national interest or in aid of the successful prosecution of the war.31

29 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, Brigadier George H. Cassels to L.R. LaFlèche, 4 March 1941. For more on LaFlèche’s wartime career, see J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 243-247. 30 LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 1822, 25 February 1941. 31 The 1940 regulations did not define “bona fide student” and elicited confusion as to which students qualified. In response to requests for a clear definition, one official said a student was a person registered or admitted in a full-time time course at a university or college for the “sole object of securing a degree or diploma which, following an examination, entitles him to the practice of a profession which would ensure his sustenance and be his means of living.” Even after the release of the revised 1941 regulations, there was discussion about the definition because it identified arts, science, and commerce students. The Ministry of National War Services later released a memorandum explaining these categories included medicine, law, music, and agriculture. See P.C. 4185; and “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 55. 26

The section then legislated that 110 hours of intramural training in a university COTC or auxiliary training unit plus two weeks of training in a camp or training centre was equivalent to the one-month military training mandated by the government. It also explained required military training for students in light of the 24 February 1941 proclamation issued by the Governor in Council, which extended required training from thirty days to four-months for men twenty-one years-of-age.32 Under the revised regulations, students who turned twenty-one prior to 1 July 1940 and completed equivalent training would not be called up for the four months of training prescribed by the proclamation “unless and until” men in the same age category who had also completed the thirty days of training were called up for four months training. Students under twenty-one eligible for the increased amount of training would be regarded as having satisfied this requirement if they completed at least 110 hours of university military training. Additionally, a male student undergoing a course to qualify as a commissioned officer could apply for postponement and, if he ultimately qualified to be a commissioned officer in the armed services, would be considered as having met the new requirement for four months training.33

The deferment of military training for students under these regulations incited some criticism. A number of mobilization officials, in particular Justice A.M. Manson, the war services board chair of division “K” Vancouver, and Colonel Edgar W. Mingo, the divisional registrar of “G” Quebec City, questioned deferment policies and argued

32 By proclamation on 11 September 1940, the government introduced thirty days of mandatory military training for men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four. A 13 September 1940 proclamation mandated that all physically fit men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five could be called out for thirty days of military training. The 24 February 1941 proclamation increased mandatory training to four months. After December 1942, men called up for training were enrolled in the army for the duration of the war until the suspension of the call up in May 1945. 33 P.C. 1822; and “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 48. 27 many students were using membership in a university training unit as an escape from service. W.A. Elliott, the registrar in division “D” Port Arthur, worried the regulations would privilege the wealthy. Men who could afford university courses would be able to

“evade military training for several years,” he argued, while those less fortunate would be

“required to fulfil their obligations.”34 Justice J.F.L. Embury, the chair of board “M” in

Regina, was arguably the toughest and most vocal critic and called the “preferential treatment in time of war” of university students “unfair and wrong.” “If we had less so- called higher education we would have more courage and public spirit,” he insisted.

“Let’s hope the Russians win the war for us. The way we’re going we’d never manage our share for ourselves.”35 Given the discretionary powers of the boards in the application of policies in their divisions and in the granting of postponements, in particular by the board chairs, these criticisms could not be discounted.

DNWS officials in Ottawa explained the purpose of Section 17 was to “advance the national interest” by enabling young men to complete their courses, but they still cautioned universities were not to be “used as a refuge for any young man poor enough in spirit to desire to evade his military obligations by merely remaining on as a student.”36

LaFlèche adamantly defended the training scheme, arguing it had repeatedly been made clear in discussions with government officials, in particular with Lea and Wright of the

WBTP, that the country was facing a shortage of educated men. It was an “absolute necessity,” LaFlèche maintained, that nothing be allowed to “interfere with the flow into

34 LAC, RG27, Volume 1497, File 2-D-133, W.A. Elliott to G.R. Benoit, 25 August 1941. 35 Ibid., Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, J.F.L. Embury to LaFlèche, 23 September 1941. See also LAC, RG27, Volume 1501, File 2-M-133, Embury to LaFlèche, 21 August 1941. 36 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, J.K. Lawson to all district officers commanding, 10 September 1941. 28 institutions of higher learning.” The nation required the “finished product,” he insisted.37

He firmly believed university heads were willing and eager to do their duty:

Having met the principals of the several universities on more than one occasion and having discussed matters with a number of them individually, I am convinced that our university and college authorities are very much intent upon seeing that all students do their duty. On the other hand, it must be remembered that this country must have educated men not only as a direct contribution to winning the war but during the aftermath which will be an extremely difficult period. The very fundamental of Section 17 is that all young men shall do their military duty without the State stopping them in their studies. From what I have observed of results, I am quite satisfied although I realize that as we have necessarily been proceeding by trial and error, this coming scholastic year may bring some changes.38

As far as LaFlèche was concerned, critics of the legislation were not “in possession of all facts pertaining to the situation.”39 By the winter of 1942, LaFlèche was reporting that student mobilization was progressing “surprisingly” well despite some individuals anticipating problems during the fall of 1940. The credit, he insisted, belonged to university authorities who demonstrated “no hesitation or holding back anywhere.” He concluded, “I am deeply impressed by the value of such cooperation from such authorities as mobilization in the future may be concerned.”40

LaFlèche’s confidence was merited. When university heads welcomed new and returning students in the fall of 1941, they publically announced their full support for the government’s mobilization regulations. “The University of Manitoba, in common with other Canadian universities is resolute in its intention and duty to assist in every possible way the successful prosecution of the war and the attainment of that victory which will secure for us our way of life and the opportunity to improve that way of life,” explained

37 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, LaFlèche to Embury, 26 September 1941. 38 Ibid., Part 2, LaFlèche to Edgar W. Mingo, 4 August 1941. 39 LaFlèche to Embury, 26 September 1941. 40 LAC, RG27, Volume 1498, File 2-E-133, LaFlèche to Orville M.M. Kay, 24 January 1942. 29

University of Manitoba President Sidney Smith. “To that end the University will carry out, in the letter and in the spirit, instructions and advice given to it by the Canadian

Government.”41 To ensure the entire student body understood the particulars of compulsory military training, the University of Toronto published the regulations in a special supplementary issue of its student newspaper The Varsity. President Cody contextualized the legislation on the front page:

Never were universities made more responsible for our war effort than they are to-day; and never, I trust, will there be a more prompt and wholehearted answer than you will give. I want every member of this University not only to do his academic work with all his might and mind, but also to do some extra work related to the war effort and preferably to national service. Your active military service is postponed only on condition that military training is taken here, and with the purpose that you may be the better fitted for every duty which your country lays upon you. The University is not a haven of refuge for those who seek to avoid their solemn obligations, but a place where men and women alike are prepared for the better discharge of these obligations.42

Cody could not have been clearer in his endorsement of the regulations, nor his expectations for male students.

While university heads assured the government of their support, however, students in medicine and engineering, especially those in their upper years, claimed military training was disruptive to their studies. Take, for example, McGill University medical student Charles H. Read Junior’s letter to Colonel James Layton Ralston, the

41 LAC, RG27, Volume 1498, File 2-E-133, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, “President Smith’s statement on Compulsory Military Training,” 10 September 1942. 42 Cody made similar remarks in his 1941 opening address: “I do not wish to see groups seeking to avoid military training. No one who seeks to avoid this duty realizes the seriousness of the present situation. We ourselves are in peril and the British Empire to which we belong is in deadly peril … We are fighting for our own survival, and for the spiritual values without which no decent life can be lived.” See “Students Learn University Won’t Be ‘House of Refuge’ To Avoid Military Training,” Toronto Telegram, 25 September 1941, 3; and “A Message from the President,” The Varsity, 21 September 1942, 1. 30

Minister of National Defence, on 2 October 1941.43 Maintaining that his opinions had the support of his fellow classmates and Jonathan Campbell Meakins, the Dean of Medicine at McGill, Read complained military training was interfering with academic study and requested exemption from training for medical students. He and his peers felt “rightly or wrongly” that the basic training given to students in the 1940-1941 academic year was a distraction and a waste of time and as applied to them “in no way” aided the war effort.

Read insisted medical training was equivalent to military training because medical students were doing “an essential war service” and asked that they be allowed to do their part by first being “good doctors” and later “good soldiers.”44

Read’s appeals were far from extraordinary.45 In December 1941, a group of students at the University of Saskatchewan led by third-year arts student Harvey H.

Moats requested the creation of an alternative form of service within the university on the grounds that they were conscientious objectors.46 In particular, throughout the 1941 fall

43 For more on Ralston, see Daniel Byers, “J.L. Ralston and the First World War: The Origins of a Life of Service,” Canadian Military History 22, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 3-16; and John R. Campbell, “James Layton Ralston and Manpower for the Canadian Army,” (M.A. Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1986). 44 As further support, Read pointed to the British and American examples: the former exempted medical students from military training and the latter issued deferments until the conclusion of the course. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, Charles H. Read to J.L. Ralston, 2 October 1941. 45 After its fourth annual conference held in March 1941, the Canadian Association of Medical Students and Interns (CAMSI) issued a statement arguing that, while they were “extremely desirous of doing their part,” they hoped that the DND and universities could establish a “more advantageous” plan. The military training required during the last year, they insisted, had interfered with the medical curriculum and lowered the standard of medical education and was therefore “incompatible with our maximum war effort.” They requested that basic training be replaced with courses on war medicine or specialized medical officer training. In October 1941, the University of Toronto’s student newspaper The Varsity interviewed over 100 students in their third through sixth year of medical training. Almost unanimously, they argued training other than Army Medical Corps studies was an “unnecessary infringement on valuable time. “We will be better doctors and more useful to the armed forces if we have more clinical work and less footwork,” said one student. “The question is whether we are to be doctors or soldiers—we can’t be both, properly,” argued another. See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1939-1940, Box 048, File 15, Guy. E Joron to H.J. Cody, 19 April 1941; and UTARMS, Office of the President fonds, A1968-0003, Box 008, War Diary 1940-1943 (2 of 2), “New Government Order Meets With Disapproval Among Medical Students,” The Varsity, 20 October 1941, unidentified page. 46 Their request created a huge controversy. The board chair, Embury, insisted that no alternative form of service was to be given to students. The students insisted Embury had refused to hear their requests. M.J. 31 session, divisional registrars reported medical and engineering students were coming to their offices to discuss and request exemption from training. Some of this was attributed to misinformation. J.P. Isaac, the Registrar for Division “N” Edmonton, for example, reported that several students claimed their university administrations had instructed upper year students in medicine and engineering they were not required to undergo training.47 Regardless of their location, students consistently framed their arguments within the context of wartime contributions, arguing that if they were allowed to forego or substitute the required training, they would ultimately be of better use to the war effort.

There was no plan underway to exempt engineering students, but the DND was considering a proposal to allow medical students in their final years to take a course in military medicine in lieu of military training.48 The scheme was accepted following a conference between a sub-committee of the NCCU, the training branch of the DND, and

LaFlèche. Medical students in their final years would be allowed to substitute military training with an equivalent number of hours spent in a military medicine course.

LaFlèche reported the course would consist of subjects “better suited” to these students becoming military medical officers, including the unique features of military medicine and the treatment of war injuries such as gas poisoning. The Director General of Medical

Services of the DND was tasked with preparing the syllabus and it was delivered to universities during the first week of November. LaFlèche was adamant this was not an

Coldwell, the Member of Parliament for the riding Rosetown-Biggar and Co-operative Commonwealth Federation chair, became involved, speaking out against the actions of Embury’s board, which he said had “shown an entire disregard of British & Democratic principles & should be compelled to abide by the proper interpretation of the law & regulations.” See LAC, RG27, Volume 1501, File 2-M-133, Embury to James Thomson, 3 December 1941; LAC, RG27, Volume 1501, File 2-M-133, Moats to T.C. Davis, 4 December 1941; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1501, File 2-M-133, M.J. Coldwell to J.T. Thorson, 5 December 1941. For more on Coldwell, see “Major James Coldwell,” in Saskatchewan Politicians: Lives Past and Present, ed. Brett Quiring (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2004): 46-47. 47 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, J.P. McIsaac to LaFlèche, 29 September 1941. 48 Ibid., LaFlèche to J.P. McIsaac, 3 October 1941. 32 exemption for medical students but rather a substitute form of training. “There is no exemption, there is no partial exemption,” he wrote to the Honourable Chief Justice H.

Harvey, the chair of administrative board “N” Edmonton, on 20 October 1941, “but, instead of doing one kind of training these Medical students will logically be called upon to devote their time which ordinarily would be devoted to other military subjects, to that which will best help them and the country.”49

The question of engineering student exemption remained prominent throughout the 1941-1942 academic year and increasingly gained the support of deans of engineering and science. In the fall of 1941, a number of deans wrote the WBTP requesting that at the very least engineering students should be exempt from camp training. On 17 December

1941, Leroy Egerton Westman, Little’s executive assistant at the WBTP, wrote LaFlèche requesting that engineering students be allowed to bypass camp and go directly to war work.50 Given that such a decision would fall under the purview of the DND, the next day

LaFlèche wrote Brigadier Orville M.M. Kay, the Deputy Adjutant-General, to recommend authorization.51

On 6 January 1942, Westman again wrote LaFlèche about the matter. He explained that since his last letter, he had come to understand the conflict between summer camps and summer employment for engineering students was “even worse than I had understood” and affected between 2,000 and 3,000 students. Because the camps were held in June, most students could not accept employment until after camp and therefore

49 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, LaFlèche to H. Harvey, 20 October 1941. 50 Westman joined the WBTP in 1941 and was initially very involved in the organization of the bureau and its work in surveying requirements for engineers, chemists, and science workers. He represented the Department of Labour in the development of the University Science Students’ Regulations. In 1943, he was appointed Associate Director of NSS and put in charge of matters relating to war industries. He retired on 30 June 1945, the day before his death. See “Obituaries,” The Engineering Journal 28, no. 8 (August 1945): 533. 51 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, LaFlèche to Orville Kay, 17 December 1941. 33 lost about five weeks of summer wages. Westman had recently spoken again with deans of engineering and as a result was “convinced” that both engineering and applied science students should be exempted from summer camp if they could demonstrate they were

“advancing their professional experience… in a war industry.” Surely if engineering students were to enter war industries in a civilian capacity, he insisted, their military training was not “an urgent matter,” nor would two weeks away from camp have a great impact if they were to enter the active services. LaFlèche fully supported Westman’s recommendations and again referred the issue to Kay for approval, reiterating that a

“long-term view” needed to be taken.52

Some university heads worried the exemption of engineering students from camp would create tension amongst other student groups and advised the government approach any changes in policy with considerable caution. On 5 February 1942, for example,

Principal Frank Cyril James of McGill University wrote Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour, and expressed concern that the exemption of engineering students might intensify the efforts of medical students who had been persistently arguing all year for exemption from military training and camp. Other student groups would understandably want to claim the same privileges, he explained, and would insist military training similarly impacted their own studies and ability to best contribute to the war effort.53 Six days later, James also wrote LaFlèche about his concerns and recommended exemption from camp be extended to medical and dental students. “Naturally, undergraduate students in the Medical and Dental Faculties will feel themselves ill-used if they are required to go to camp when their Engineering colleagues do not,” he argued, and this, he

52 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, LaFlèche to Orville Kay, 7 January 1942. 53 Ibid., F. Cyril James to Humphrey Mitchell, 5 February 1942. 34 added, would surely impact the morale and “esprit de corps” of the undergraduate military training program. James insisted there was little reason why medical and dental students should not also be exempted from camp training because military training was

“even further removed” from their wartime contribution. He proposed that before making a decision about engineering student exemption, the DNWS study the question of the necessity of camp training within the context of possibly accelerating academic and professional training within universities. The problem was simple: the government needed to decide whether it was more important for students to attend military camp, to work during the summer months, or continue their academic studies with a view to more rapidly proceeding to graduation.54 It was evident, James had revealed, the government’s military training requirements conflicted with the pressure on universities to increase the output of needed graduates.

As the importance of producing required personnel increasingly became the top priority for mobilization and armed services officials, the government adjusted military training requirements. When Kay informed LaFlèche on 11 February that new training instructions had been issued the day prior to all district commanding officers, he reported that it had been considered “desirable” to extend the same provisions for exemption to medical and dental students and students in the pure sciences. The new guidelines granted students in engineering, medicine, dentistry, applied sciences, and pure sciences credit for two weeks camp training provided they secured employment in “essential occupations and war industry that would be of importance to and that would further the war effort in

54 Mobilization officials were similarly conscious that policies affecting specific cohorts of students would “inevitably invite comparisons.” See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, F. Cyril James to LaFlèche, 11 February 1942; and LAC, RG27, Volume 997, File 2-106-812, Circular Memorandum No. 812, 24 March 1943, Appendix B. 35 the national interest.” Students had to apply in writing to their commanding officers for such leave at least fourteen days prior to the beginning of camp and furnish written proof of their employment. On completion of employment and before 30 September 1942, students also had to submit to their commanding officer a certificate from the employer showing the period of actual employment and the nature of the work undertaken.

Additionally, the same cohort of students could be granted leave on similar conditions if they were engaged in “courses of professional training or study with a view to earlier graduation, or the advancement of their professional status in their particular course of study.”55 The latter would enable students to take accelerated programs being developed at many institutions for the 1942-1943 academic year.56

This change in policy was the direct result of the recommendations of university officials, particularly deans of engineering and science, but it also reflected new mobilization priorities that leaned towards privileging the importance of producing required graduates over military training priorities. By the fall of 1941, labour concerns and the shortage of skilled and technically trained personnel had increased competition between the armed services and civilian industries for the skills and services of university students, graduates, and faculty. In fact, for the remainder of the war, the supply of newly graduated technical personnel would fail to equal wartime demand.57

The WBTP had been working with university officials in consultation with the armed services and concerned government departments to develop and implement

55 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, Circular Memorandum No. 455, 12 February 1942. 56 See chapter four. 57 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, UAB, “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” Appendix to Minutes, WBTP, “Notes on Position of University Students with Regard to Mobilization, etc.,” 17 January 1945. For a history of the management of human resources during the Second World War, see David Allan Wilson, “Close and Continuing Attention: Human Resources Management in Canada during the Second World War” (Ph.D. Diss., the University of New Brunswick, 1997). 36 methods for meeting these requirements, including enlarging university enrolments in required fields, maximizing university facilities, and accelerating essential courses. In early 1942, however, the WBTP compiled a statistical report that indicated the government had failed to increase the reserve of engineers and scientists “to any extent” since 1939.58 The three armed services and various war-related industries were individually responsible for their recruiting plans, but the Department of Labour concluded it was clear the demand for engineering and science graduates would need to be coordinated at a larger level. The government had to more closely supervise the distribution of trained personnel, MacNamara insisted, in order to eliminate the

“opposing pressures” confronting universities.59 One central, recognized authority would also be better able to offer guidance and direct students. The situation, LaFlèche reported, had become “more and more aggravated” and created an “impossible situation” for concerned government departments, the universities, and students themselves. “As it is,” he maintained, “no one has a clear idea of what should be done in the National

Interest.”60 LaFlèche concluded that at the very least it was necessary to begin restricting enrollment in courses not deemed in the national interest or in aid of the prosecution of the war.61

From May 11-12, 1942, the NCCU executive and deans of engineering and science met in Ottawa for an inter-departmental conference with NSS, the DNWS, the

WBTP, the Department of Munitions and Supply (DMS), the Department of Labour, the

NRC, and representatives of the three armed services to discuss and develop a plan to

58 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.E. Westman to LaFlèche, 9 April 1942. 59 “Selective Service and the Universities,” 34-35; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1500, File 2-J-133, Humphrey Mitchell to Sidney Smith, 21 January 1942. 60 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, LaFlèche to G.R. Benoit, 7 April 1942. 61 Ibid., LaFlèche to E.M. Little, 1 May 1942. 37 better coordinate the “supply, training and guidance” of undergraduates in engineering and science.62 In preparation, LaFlèche organized a preliminary meeting on 5 May between representatives of the DND, DMS, Department of Labour, NRC, DNWS, NSS, and WBTP to “facilitate the coordination” of their interests. He advised that universities were “prepared to accept guidance” on issues pertaining to the training of students because the government had “taken on the responsibility of aiding undergraduates in these categories.” These representatives discussed and agreed upon eight proposals to be presented at the larger conference (see Appendix 2).63

Representatives at the larger conference separated into three groups for discussion. University presidents met with LaFlèche and Robert F. Thompson, the

Supervisor of Training at the Department of Labour, to discuss government plans for granting financial aid to undergraduates. Deans of engineering met with Lea from the

WBTP and representatives of the DMS, the armed services, and the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada to discuss the details of engineering personnel requirements and the eight proposals of the pre-conference. The deans of science met with David A. Keys, the research personnel officer of the WBTP, and representatives of the armed services, the DMS, the NRC, and the Inspection Board to similarly discuss science personnel requirements and the pre-conference proposals.64

At the evening general meeting on 12 May, Lea and Keys presented accounts of the proceedings and decisions of their respective group discussions before the conference

62 LaFlèche to G.R. Benoit, 7 April 1942. 63 LaFlèche to E.M. Little, 1 May 1942; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, Minutes of pre-Conference meeting of representatives of the following departments to be held at New Supreme Court Building, Room 59, Tuesday, May 5th, 1942, at 10.30 o’clock,” n.d. 64 LaFlèche to G.R. Benoit, 7 April 1942; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” n.d., 2-3. 38 as a whole was asked to vote upon each of the pre-conference proposals. Nine resolutions were unanimously agreed upon. First, the number of engineers and science workers at present enrolled in universities was not sufficient to meet all “known and probable” requirements. Second, all civil and military departments of the government should submit their requirements for engineering, science, and agricultural graduates to the Director of

NSS, who, by the start of the fall semester, would be given sole authority to guide such graduates into the armed services or war industries. Third, the DNWS should require the early physical examination of all students and graduates in engineering and science and direct such individuals into the armed services or industry. If this proved successful, it could be extended to students in other faculties. Fourth, students identified by the NRC as exceptional for research should be allocated to work on war projects, subject to the agreement of the DND and the DNWS. Fifth, the NCCU endorsed the action taken by the

Department of Labour to provide financial aid to students in engineering and science, according to requirements, through a joint Dominion-provincial arrangement or by other direct means. Sixth, if the Director of NSS determined the number of students in first- year engineering and science needed to be increased, the Department of Labour would be asked to extend financial aid to a sufficient number of top ranking high school students.

Seventh, the Director of NSS should consult with the DMS on the needs of war industries for graduates and be given authorization to “safeguard the interests of contractors producing war materials when allocating graduates and planning reserves in training.”

Eighth, the DNWS and DND should consider modifying the mandatory military training program of students in engineering and science based on plans that “appear to be essential” to the DMS, NSS, and the NRC. Ninth, the Director of NSS should study the 39 need for refresher courses amongst graduate engineers and other classes of professional scientific personnel and establish such courses if necessary.65 The proposals were given further consideration and support at the NCCU’s nineteenth national conference held in

June 1942 at the University of Toronto, the first national conference held since the outbreak of the war.66

In addition, at the request of NSS, Humphrey Mitchell initiated discussions with the provincial governments to create a financial aid program for students in essential studies, the cost of which would be equally shared by the two governments. As a result, assistance was made available in the form of a grant or a loan to students in their second year or subsequent years of a medical or dental program and to students in all years of physics, chemistry, mathematics, and engineering. To be eligible, a student had to possess sufficient academic standing, prove they could not continue or commence their course without financial assistance, and sign an agreement that they would make their services available to the war effort “when and where required in the capacity for which they have been trained.”67

The effort to coordinate personnel needs ultimately led to the government passing the University Science Students Regulations through Order-in-Council P.C. 9566 of 26

November 1942. Effective as of 1 December, this legislation provided for the “control

65 “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 4-5; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 52-53. 66 The proposals were not approved because they recommended that the co-ordination of all plans be placed under the “direction and authority” of the Director of NSS. This would place student postponements beyond the direct authority of the mobilization boards. In July 1942, LaFlèche reported to Westman that any effort to push their proposals forward would result in the “disintegration of compulsory mobilization in Canada.” See “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 1-2; LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, LaFlèche to Westman, 9 July 1942; and Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 55-56. 67 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, Circular Memorandum No. 660, 12 August 1942, 3. For more on student aid, see chapter four. 40 and regulation” of the employment of science students, defined as a male student registered at a university in a full time course the successful completion of which would qualify him as a technical person. Under these regulations, before a male student was permitted to begin or resume a course of study in science, he had to make a declaration indicating whether he intended to volunteer for active service as a technical officer. At the request of the Minister of Labour, a list of students indicating their desire to volunteer had to be supplied. The Minister would select and submit the names of persons from these lists to the branches of the armed services for which they were qualified. If the number of science students declaring their intent to volunteer for service was deemed “at any time” inadequate, the Minister was granted authority to request any science student accept “status in the reserve army and undergo such military studies and duties, whether during the academic year or not, as he may specify.” Universities had to dismiss science students if they refused to accept this status and undergo the prescribed studies and training. Students who completed a science course and did not volunteer for service had to accept and remain in employment in work defined by the Minister as essential to the efficient prosecution of the war. Moreover, under these regulations universities had to provide the Minister with statistics on science student enrolment. The armed services, departments and agencies of the federal and provincial governments, and all others employing technical personnel also had to supply the Minister with information on their present and future requirements for technical personnel. If “at any time” the Minister believed the number of science students should be increased, he would recommend to universities the “steps which ought to be taken to train the necessary number of technical persons.”68

68 These regulations also prohibited any person from interviewing a science student for employment, 41

The WBTP administered the regulations in cooperation with the NCCU. The intent was to direct science and technical students “with due regard for their personal preferences” into a position suitable to their education and training. This, argued

MacNamara, would ensure the “greatest national use” of their skills while freeing universities from the “competitive and inconsistent demands with which the Navy, the

Army, the Air Force, Government departments and the war industries have heretofore been plaguing them.”69 In short, P.C. 9566 gave the Minister of Labour authority over students in essential courses. These regulations ultimately became part of the National

Selective Service Civilian Regulations under Order-in-Council P.C. 246 of 19 January

1943.70 P.C. 246 instituted an even “greater degree of compulsion” in directing men and women to specified employment in an effort to maximize the “productive effort of the country on all fronts.” It consolidated the 1942 National Selective Service Regulations, the regulations affecting technical personnel, the regulations affecting university science students, and labour exit permit requirements.71 The Minister retained authority over the education of students in essential subjects and “some authority to direct their activities after graduation.”72

soliciting a student to accept employment, offering employment to a science student, or taking into their employ a science student before or after graduation without the consent of the Minister of Labour. Any person who violated these rules could be fined and imprisoned under the terms of the Order. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 3, “Order in Council establishing The University Science Students Regulations, 1942, P.C. 9566,” 26 November 1942. 69 The regulations were the civilian counterpart to the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. See “Selective Service and the Universities,” 34-35; and “Historical Summary of the National Selective Service Civilian Regulations,” 626-633. 70 Department of Labour, “Manpower: Consolidation of National Selective Service Civilian Regulations,” The Labour Gazette for the year 1943 XLIII, no. 1 (January 1943): 16. 71 These regulations were as follows: Orders-in-Council P.C. 2254, April 1942; P.C. 5083, June 1942; P.C. 7595, September 1942; P.C. 7994, September 1942; P.C. 638, April 1942; P.C. 9566, December 1942; and P.C. 9011, November 1942. Those affecting science students remained unchanged after the consolidation. 72 The regulations were very successful and useful in directing students into needed areas. In February 1945, for example, WBTP representatives interviewed 1,282 graduating students. Of these, 815 were referred to representatives of the technical branches of the navy or army to be considered for technical 42

*****

On 1 December 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. 10924 revoked the National War

Services Regulations and replaced them with the National Selective Service Mobilization

Regulations to reflect the transfer of the registration and mobilization machinery to NSS.

Under the new regulations, students could have their regular military training postponed if they met the following conditions: (1) they submitted to a medical examination at the beginning of each academic year in accordance with the “Physical Standards and

Instructions for the Medical Examination of Recruits” and if found fit, enrolled in the

COTC or an auxiliary unit; (2) their military training was considered “satisfactory” to the

District Officer Commanding (DOC); and (3) they passed all term and annual academic examinations. A student now required the consent of the university authorities and the

DOC to change their academic course and their transfer to a new course was conditional on the change being “in the national interest” or “in aid of the prosecution of the war effort.” By the same token, no student could pursue post-graduate studies if the subject of study did not meet this same condition. Upon completion or termination of their course, physically fit students had to report for military training unless granted permission to commence a post-graduate course.73

The regulations also legislated new measures to “safeguard against” students remaining in university with the intention of evading their obligations. All male students now had to submit to a medical examination at the beginning of each year and if physically fit, had to enroll in a COTC or auxiliary unit and undergo military training.

appointments. See “Manpower: Consolidation of National Selective Service Civilian Regulations,” 19; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, “Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of February, 1945,” n.d. 73 LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 10924, 1 December 1942. 43

The divisional registrar was tasked with reporting those who refused to enroll in a training unit, failed to perform such training “to the satisfaction” of the DOC, or failed to pass a term or final examination required by the university, unless the failure was deemed by university authorities and the DOC to be the result of “circumstances beyond the control of such student.” University authorities had to provide the DOC and their divisional registrar with a list of all who failed to pass a required academic examination.

To assist in finding these individuals, the list was to include the student’s name, date and place of birth, last known address, and the electoral district and polling division numbers of the student’s registration certificate.74

Subsections eight, nine, and ten of P.C. 10924 dealt specifically with the conditions under which an individual could pursue studies outside of Canada. If already taking a course at a university outside of the country or wishing to leave to pursue a course unavailable in Canada, an individual was permitted to continue or commence the course “to its normal completion.” Permission could also be granted if the mobilization board deemed the course in the national interest. The mobilization board was empowered to grant an order for the postponement of military training. Under these regulations, students had to report immediately for military training upon termination or completion of their course or if they failed in any term or yearly academic examination not deemed to be due to circumstances beyond their control. Those wishing to enter American universities and colleges had to apply to the Department of Labour for a certificate of authorization to leave the country. Upon entering the United States, students had to secure a “certificate of non-residence” from the American selective service within three

74 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, J.K. Lawson to all district officers commanding, 10 September 1941; P.C. 10924; and “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 78-79. 44 months otherwise they would become liable to registration and military service in the

United States.75

P.C. 10924 also attempted to definitively address the issue of exemption for theology students. The DNWS regulations exempted from call up members of the clergy, regular clergymen, and ministers. This definition included Roman Catholic seminary students who were considered clergy upon entrance into the seminary. Divinity students of Protestant denominations, on the other hand, were not considered ministers until they were ordained and thus were not exempt from service in the armed services. They could only continue in their studies if they undertook the university military training required of all students. Protestant church officials and organizations, in particular the General

Council of the United Church, considered the distinction between Catholic and Protestant seminarians discriminatory and the issue became the subject of heated discussion.76

When the National War Services Regulations were consolidated for the final time on 16

September 1942, the government attempted to subdue criticism and clarify its stance. It expanded the list of categories to whom the regulations did not apply to include “bona

75 NSS authorities, however, recognized that Canadian students in courses not regarded as “essential” under American regulations would have difficulty obtaining certificates of non-residence; therefore, on 7 December 1942, NSS informed all divisional registrars that only students entitled to request deferment under United States selective service regulations would be permitted to leave the country. Circular Memorandum No. 812 of 24 March 1943 listed these courses as follows: engineering (aeronautical, automotive, chemical, civil, electrical, marine, mechanical, mining, radio, and transportation), bacteriology, chemistry, geophysics, mathematics, meteorology, naval architecture, physics, medicine, dentistry, osteopathy, veterinary science, theology, agriculture, forestry, pharmacy, and optometry. In January 1944, the United States announced a change in its policy in an effort to “curtail drastically” the deferments of men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. It divided students into three general classes and instituted quotas for deferment for each group. The Canadian NSS boards were requested to refer all applications for permission to study in the United States to the WBTP. Certificates would thenceforth only be authorized to medically fit male students studying chemistry, engineering, geology, geophysics, medicine, dentistry, veterinary science, osteopathy, and theology. See P.C. 10924; LAC, RG27, Volume 991, File 2-90-73, Mobilization Act Interpretative Letter No. 8, 30 March 1944; Circular Memorandum No. 812, Appendix B and Appendix C; and LAC, RG27, Volume 997, File 2-106-812, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to Charles Henry, 24 May 1943. 76 The discussion was not limited to Protestant clergy. Heads of Jewish rabbinical schools, such as Rabbi A.A. Price, the Dean of the Yeshivah Torath Chaim in Toronto, also requested exemptions for their students. See LAC, RG27, Volume 986, File 9, A.A. Price to J.T. Thorson, 20 June 1942. 45 fide candidates or students for the ministry of a religious denomination eligible to supply chaplains to the armed forces” at the discretion of the mobilization board.77 Essentially, however, this only placed in writing what was already in practice. Candidates for the priesthood were not subject to call up, but all theological students were liable to military service at the discretion of their respective boards and had to wait on a ruling from board officials.

This only worked to incite further accusations of discrimination.78 Reverend

David T. Owens, a professor of philosophy and lecturer in sociology and Christian ethics at United College in Manitoba, called the regulations “manifestly unfair” and requested the government take the decision for exemption away from the administrative divisions and develop a uniform national policy.79 Daniel Firth, the President of Knox Theological

College at the University of Toronto also rushed to the defence of Protestant theological students. Critics referenced the precedent of the First World War and pointed to the examples of Britain and the United States where theological students were granted exemption from service. In November 1942, however, the Justice Department ruled that mobilization boards had sole discretion in deciding exemptions.80 The regulations for

Protestant theology students therefore remained unchanged with the passing of the new

NSS regulations. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, MacNamara issued special instructions to the mobilization boards recommending leniency in such decisions. Despite

77 “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II,” 55, 59. 78 LaFlèche defended the regulations, saying he was “horrified and hurt” by charges of discrimination: “We could not have allowed discrimination between denominations because it would have tended to weaken the church. Freedom of worship is one of the freedoms we are fighting to preserve.” See “No Divinity Students Exempt From Army Service,” The Globe and Mail, 10 September 1942, 3. 79 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 3, David Owens to LaFlèche, 16 November 1942. 80 Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 57. 46 encouraging exemptions, ultimate authority still remained with the boards and was thus a bone of contention for the remainder of the war.81

The new NSS mobilization regulations were even more detailed and comprehensive, with Section 12 containing ten regulations for university and college students. They restricted a student from changing their course or beginning a postgraduate course if it was not deemed in the national interest by the responsible mobilization board. This, in effect, restricted enrolment in courses deemed non-essential to the war effort. A student in arts would have little difficulty obtaining approval to transfer to engineering, but an engineering student would almost certainly be denied a request to change to the arts or humanities. Regardless of such restrictions, all university students were still eligible for deferment of military training. For the remainder of the war, these regulations guided student mobilization policy. When Order-in-Council P.C.

1355 of 4 March 1944 revised and consolidated the National Selective Service

Mobilization Regulations and replaced them with the National Selective Service

Mobilization Regulations, 1944, Section 12 concerning students remained unchanged.82

Until the end of 1942, NSS policy towards student deferment had been relatively broad, largely emphasizing the authority of universities and mobilization boards in determining military eligibility. Boards generally granted postponements “automatically”

81 Owens continued to press for an amendment to the legislation. In the fall of 1943, he wrote Mackenzie King and MacNamara to ask that the postponement of theological students be made mandatory, rather than at the discretion of the mobilization boards, and called the regulations an “intolerable … religious inequality.” MacNamara responded that the question was still under consideration. He explained, however, that mobilization officials felt the discretion had to be used in such matters and that the people “best able to do so are those who have an intimate knowledge of the area over which they have jurisdiction.” See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 5, Owens to MacNamara, 30 September 1943; LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 5, Owens to Mackenzie King, 30 September 1943; LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 5, Owens to Mackenzie King, 18 October 1943; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 5, MacNamara to Owens, 30 October 1943. 82 P.C. 1355. 47 to students admitted to university courses and continued to allow automatic postponements to “continuing students who enrolled prior to reaching the callable age.”83

Three key factors, however, were increasingly challenging the status quo: critics of these policies, the personnel requirements of the armed services and industry, and government officials who believed arts courses were non-essential to the war effort.

The NCCU was adamant arts courses needed to be preserved and gave the issue much attention at the 1942 conference in a session on the future of the arts faculty. All members recognized the threats to liberal arts within the context of the war and mounting government pressure, namely: (1) the view of arts as dispensable, impractical, unnecessary, and not contributing to the war effort; (2) the concentration on professional and vocational education; and (3) the “much better condition” of the sciences in the curriculum due to the war’s emphasis on applied science.84 The session presenters, consisting of Queen’s University Principal Robert Charles Wallace, Abbé Arthur

Maheux, a professor of history at Université Laval, and University of New Brunswick

President Norman A.M. MacKenzie, emphasized the necessity of preserving arts education, calling it “indispensable in a well-rounded education,” the “best means for mental training,” “the core or centre of every university,” and essential to national unity.

University of Toronto President Cody argued that if “the humanities do not find place in our curricula, we shall lose incalculably as civilized beings … We aim to send into the community men and women trained in wisdom, not only to make a living, but also to

83 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 4, Mobilization Act Interpretive Letter No. 5, 15 September 1943. 84 The advancement of the sciences resulted from a number of factors, including the preference of the “best” students to enter non-arts courses, the demand for scientific personnel and the resulting effort to train needed men in scientific fields more rapidly, and employment being the main incentive in the choice of course. 48 build a worthy life and to help mould and make a better world.” All agreed efforts to limit studies in the arts would severely affect the universities, and in particular, the classical colleges in Quebec.85

Despite the NCCU’s adamant defence of the contributions made by male students in arts and their refusal to “surrender” arts education entirely, the relevance of arts courses to the war effort became a topic of lengthy public debate and remained prominent in public discussions throughout the war. In addition to drawing in key government figures, university heads, professors, and students, it also incited strong reactions from the general public, many of whom felt university students, particularly those in arts, regarded as non-essential to the war effort, were shirking their duty.86 Within this context, two university heads, Principal Wallace of Queen’s and Principal James of McGill, began considering a plan to curtail arts education. According to Queen’s historian Frederick

Gibson, the two principals were influenced by three main considerations: a “personal zeal to give every possible assistance; “a sensitivity to public criticism”; and a desire to ensure

Canadian universities contribute on a scale similar to that of American and British

85 Maheux reported the position of arts was in a much better position in Quebec than in the rest of Canada. He insisted the veneration for the classics had not weakened in his province and that it was still regarded as “the best means for mental training.” He also insisted its study was essential to national unity because it created a common experience. This insistence was part of his larger efforts to strengthen national unity amidst the threats of the war. During the war, Maheux gave a number of lectures on the importance of Canadian unity, including a series of radio broadcasts entitled “Pourquoi sommes-nous divisés?” For more on Maheux, see Arthur Maheux, Pourquoi sommes-nous divisés? (Montreal: Radio-Canada, 1943); Maheux, Problems of Canadian Unity (Quebec: Les Éditions des Bois-Francs, 1944); Hugh B. Myers, “Profile of a Patriot: Msgr. Arthur Maheux,” Queen’s Quarterly 76, no. 1 (Spring 1969), 11-17; Ronald Rudin, Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997): 51-52. See NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 76, 119, 130, 136, 139. 86 See for example, L.B.G., “War and the Arts Student,” The Gateway, 12 December 1941, 3; “Arts Faculties Endangered, Wallace Says,” The Globe and Mail, 12 June 1942, 4; and “Arts Courses in Wartime,” The Globe and Mail, 24 December 1942, 6. 49 institutions, which had respectively curtailed and severely limited arts enrolment.87 James and Wallace favoured reducing enrolment. They agreed to place their proposal before university heads and then the Dominion Government. By the fall of 1942, rumours were circulating they had written the government to suggest that faculties of arts, commerce, law, and education be suspended for the duration of the war.88 By October, the press was reporting that Ottawa was intending to introduce these measures. The Montreal Star, for example, reported that plans were under discussion to curtail admission to courses “of no direct benefit to war activities” and that an announcement of “this action” was expected before the end of the year.89

University heads quickly organized to prevent the scheme. The new NCCU

President, University of Manitoba President Sidney Smith, wrote officials in Ottawa to protest “any measure which would bar physically fit students from enrolling in arts courses.”90 The Social Science Research Council, which had been formed in 1940, drew up a memorandum to counter the scheme. Harold Innis, a professor of political economy at the University of Toronto and president of the Academy of Social Sciences of the

Royal Society of Canada, appointed a special committee under the direction of Watson

Kirkconnell, the founder of the Humanities Research Council (1943) and a professor at

McMaster University, to obtain the opinions of humanities and arts departments in

87 Frederick W. Gibson, Queen’s University Volume II, 1917-1961, to serve and yet be free (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 207. 88 Pilkington, 328-329. 89 McGill University Archives (MUA), McGill University Scrapbook (MUS), Volume 10, “University Curbs Loom: Ottawa Hints Early Announcement,” The Montreal Star, 20 October 1942. 90 Calling such a move the “first steps towards totalitarianism,” Smith insisted that he and his administration were “practically as one” in agreeing they could not adopt the suggestions of James and Wallace. “Frankly, we wondered,” he wrote, “…whether the two men in question, who are frequently in Ottawa and who are close to governmental authorities, are ‘selling us down the river.’” See “Arts Course Is Valuable: Manitoba’s President Opposes Restrictions,” The Globe and Mail, 23 October 1942, 2; and Sidney Smith to Carleton Stanley, 20 November 1942. 50 universities across the country.91 The result was a memorandum calling for the

“strengthening of the humanities” signed by “forty-one anxious humanists” and sent to

Mackenzie King and President Smith.92 Smith proposed to hold a meeting to discuss and decide “this fundamental issue,” insisting he was confidant the majority opinion would be that it was in the immediate and long-term interests of the nation that male students of military age and fitness be permitted to enroll and continue courses in arts and commerce.93

From January 9-10, 1943, the NCCU met in Ottawa to discuss with NSS and

WBTP officials the continuing “manpower” crisis and the “rumour” that the government was intending to “recommend or require” that all physically fit male students be made to discontinue arts courses “which do not give specific training that can be of immediate use in the war effort.” After President Smith’s introduction, MacNamara opened the conference, gave an overview of the current situation and policies, and attempted to reassure university representatives that, as far as he was aware, the government was not planning to impose such a measure. Universities were one of the “established manpower institutions of the community,” he insisted, and were playing an essential role in the war effort. MacNamara assured university heads that “unless” the war so necessitated, arts studies would not be prohibited. Yet, while he insisted the government did not wish to discontinue liberal arts courses, he explained that this education would likely have to be

“rationed” because of the demands of the armed services and war industries. In light of current pressures, MacNamara felt the circumstances were clear:

91 For more Kirkconnell, see J.R.C. Perkin, The Undoing of Babel: Watson Kirkconnell, the Man and His Work (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975). 92 Pilkington, 329-333; and Watson Kirkconnell, A Slice of Canada: A Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967): 235-239. 93 Sidney Smith to Carleton Stanley, 20 November 1942. 51

For the present, however, speaking quite unofficially, I venture the personal conviction that if the universities will ruthlessly weed out the incompetent and mediocre students, if we continue to require that all students take their military training while at the universities and if it can be understood that when the requirements of the armed forces or the industrial war effort so necessitate, national selective service would be authorized to call up students even though that interrupts their courses, no immediate further restriction would be necessary.

MacNamara’s speech in some ways was a denial of such efforts, but more than this it was an effort to diffuse tensions. He reviewed for NCCU representatives a number of issues and proposed that the members “weigh the problem” and help the government find a

“balance” between the “ideal and the practical needs” of universities and the war effort.94

Following a presentation by Lea of the WBTP on the needs of war industries, the conference spent the remainder of the morning session and the afternoon and evening sessions discussing the selective service and the universities. Officials agreed to pass three resolutions. The first and second expressed the NCCU’s appreciation for the government’s “enlightened policy” in the “maintenance of higher education” and the

NCCU’s “determination” to cooperate “whole-heartedly” and “in every possible way” in the prosecution of the war.95 The third resolution contained three points, with the first two expressing gratitude that the government recognized the value to the “war effort and national welfare of those creative forces which flow from sound education” and the worth of war service already undertaken by universities. The third point was the most significant. The NCCU agreed to the proposals MacNamara had laid out in his introduction, namely that universities would “ruthlessly weed out the incompetent …

94 MacNamara also pointed out that Great Britain had recently decided not to grant deferments to students beyond June 1943 and the United States had announced liberal arts education would be “virtually suspended” in lieu of the technical training to be given to approximately 350,000 students in universities and colleges. See “Selective Service and the Universities,” 31; and “War in Universities: Fewer Arts Students, More Engineers,” The Lethbridge Herald, 11 January 1943, 2. 95 NCCU, National Conference of Canadian Universities Twentieth Meeting held at McMaster University, June 12th-14th, 1944, (Hamilton: s.n., 1944), Appendix G, 64-67. 52 students” and authorize NSS to call up students when the requirements of the armed services and industry “so necessitated,” if the government would institute no further restrictions on students. The NCCU executive committee would remain in close contact with government officials so that in the event of an “emergency” necessitating a revision of the nation’s labour policies, a special meeting of the conference could be called.96

The response to the resolutions was immediate. While NCCU President Smith cautioned the resolutions would result in a “ruthless reduction” in the number of students taking liberal arts courses, institutions immediately began reporting the names of

“mediocre” students to divisional registrars.97 Press reports claimed university and government leaders had agreed on a new “wartime program” that would result in a

“virtual rationing” of higher education; only those students “prepared to work hard and capable of earning high marks” would be permitted to take university courses.98 Even students weighed in on the discussion. The commerce issue of The McGill Daily, for example, included a satirical article reporting that the Commerce Undergraduate Society had elected a special committee to “ruthlessly weed out the incompetent and mediocre professors.”99

Watson Kirkconnell argued the meeting revealed three facts: first, supporters of the arts and humanities had been gravely worried about government plans; second, the government had come dangerously close to discontinuing arts courses and as such, to

96 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 4, A.B. Fennell to MacNamara, 18 January 1943; and “War in Universities: Fewer Arts Students, More Engineers,” 2. 97 On 20 January, for example, McGill gave the names of sixty-six students to the university senate that were forwarded to the local registrar. See MUA, MUS, Volume 10, “McGill to Give Selective Service Names of 66 ‘Mediocre’ Students,” The Montreal Gazette, 21 January 1943. 98 MUA, MUS, Volume 10, “Education ‘Rationing’ University Leaders Draft Wartime Student Program,” The Montreal Star, 11 January 1943. 99 “Mediocre and Incompetent Pedagogues Weeded Out Due to RVC Love Shortage,” The McGill Daily, 19 February 1943, 1. 53 exerting a much larger degree of influence over academic policy; and third, the humanities suffered from the lack of a larger representative body to coordinate and protect its interests.100 In addition, the meeting made evident that government and NCCU officials were willing to discuss and alter the criteria for justifying postponements to students. Their resolutions were the first step towards the NCCU approving legislation that would classify university courses as essential and non-essential to the prosecution of the war.

In the midst of the arts crisis, NSS was also realizing that a clearer understanding of policies for postponement was required.101 The reasons justifying postponement remained the same—conscientious objection, compassionate grounds, and national interest—but mobilization board chairs and university officials regularly expressed the need for a clearer, more regulated program.102 In an effort to assess current procedures in order to ultimately create a “uniform plan,” NSS distributed a questionnaire to mobilization boards during the summer of 1943. It asked twenty-one questions about the administration of NSS regulations in relation to the granting of postponements to students. These were concerned with the application process and requirements, the terms of postponements, the relationship of each respective mobilization board to the universities in their administrative division, the process for distributing mobilization materials, the methods for maintaining records and keeping track of students in each

100 Pilkington, 334-335. 101 Mobilization Act Interpretive Letter No. 5. 102 LAC, RG27, Volume 3002, National Selective Service – Mobilization Section, Law Students, 1943, MacNamara to the R.B. Hanson, 24 June 1943. 54 division, and the procedure whereby boards dealt with students who failed to comply with the regulations (see Appendix 3).103

The results further illustrated the need for a comprehensive program (see

Appendix 4). Almost all of the boards followed the administrative policies expected by

NSS when it came to the submission of applications, but the length of postponements varied. Six boards reported they granted postponements for an academic term, whereas four granted postponements for the academic year. Moreover, four boards (St. John,

Prince Edward Island, Regina, and Edmonton) had neglected to request confirmation from universities that students had passed their required term and yearly examinations.

Three of the boards (Kingston, Regina, and Edmonton) did not even possess a list of the universities and colleges in their respective districts. Even worse, Edmonton reported the universities and colleges in its division did not comply with the provisions of Section 12 of the regulations. The majority of boards also admitted their officials kept poor records on the status of students, with three admitting they had taken no measures to ensure they would be notified when a student had failed, graduated, or discontinued their studies. In addition, the questionnaire revealed a significant degree of support for the exclusion of arts studies. G.R. Bickerton, the acting chair in Embury’s absence in district “M” Regina, said it was the opinion of his board that a “more rigid restriction should be exercised in allowing entry or the maintenance of students who seek to use these institutions as an avenue to escape Military Service.” He recommended that only students “essential to the war effort be maintained” in universities, that all students of a callable age be required to take medical examinations by the order of the divisional registrars, and the appointment of a committee to oversee necessary action consisting of representatives from each

103 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 4, Charles Henry to all divisional registrars, 23 July 1943. 55 university in the province, the provincial department of education, the provincial department of agriculture, and the DND.104

MacNamara distributed the results of the questionnaire to the NCCU and the conference of representatives of universities and deans of engineering and science faculties. MacNamara called a number of meetings to discuss the results, culminating in a conference between NSS and the NCCU in Ottawa on 30 August 1943. The conference was presided over by President Smith and in addition to MacNamara, included representatives of NCCU member institutions, NSS, the three armed services, the WBTP, and the DMS. The result was a “definite recommendation” on mobilization policies pertaining to university students. MacNamara proposed the following plan:

(i) No male student following a course of studies, the completion of which would permit admission to University, who has reached the age of 18½ years and has not attained a standing in education which is equal to that recognized by the Provincial Department of Education as one which should have been attained by a person of his age, shall be considered eligible for postponement to permit continuance with his studies … (ii) Students accepted by a university for enrolment as “Science students”, or in medicine and dentistry, will receive postponement of military service upon the report of the university authorities. Such postponements will be cancelled in the event of failure in examinations, or failure to comply with military training. The universities will be asked to co-operate in limiting enrolments in these courses to the end that there should be a minimum of wastage during the academic year. (iii) Students in theology will continue to be entitled to exemption from military service as provided under existing regulations. (iv) Students wishing to enter, or already enrolled in other university courses will be served with Orders-Medical Examination in the usual course, and if they wish may apply individually to the Mobilization Boards for postponement of military service.105

104 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part2a, Charles Henry to MacNamara, H.J. Riley, and S.H. McLaren, 28 August 1943, Schedules A, B, C, D, E, F, G. 105 LAC, RG27, File 2-133-6, Part 2a, “Minutes of a Conference between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Director of National Selective Service held in Ottawa on August 30th, 1943,” n.d., 1. 56

Under these proposals, students enrolled in courses other than medicine, dentistry, and science would have to make individual applications for postponement of military training. The intended result of the proposals, explained MacNamara, was two-fold: first, they would “eliminate” students who were “not good material for higher education,” and second, they would prevent the granting of postponements to students taking courses other than those specified, except in “special circumstances.”106 MacNamara urged the

NCCU to approve the resolutions and reaffirm its 9 January 1943 resolution “to weed out incompetent students.”107 There was an “acute shortage of manpower,” he earnestly explained, and university students were needed to “replenish the gap.” Enrolment needed to be curtailed.108

The response of NCCU members was mixed. They agreed with the first, second, and third recommendations after some alterations and restructuring of the text to provide further protection for the priorities of their institutions, but were concerned about the impact of the fourth recommendation. It, they argued, would drain universities and colleges of students in non-essential courses and ultimately lead to the demise of arts faculties. NCCU representatives proposed an alternative plan. Any male student who completed the requirements for admission to a university for the 1943-1944 academic year would be permitted to enter the university and receive a postponement for one academic year, regardless of the course of study. The NCCU member institutions wished to “deal fairly with male students,” explained President Smith, by ensuring that their

106 “Minutes of a Conference between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Director of National Selective Service held in Ottawa on August 30th, 1943,” 1. 107 Mobilization Act Interpretive Letter No. 5. 108 “Pre-Meds And Pre-Dents Not on Preferred Lists; No Reference to Women; ’44 Grads Not Affected,” The Gateway, 18 February 1944, 1; and “Dr. Newton Addresses Mass Meet of Men Re: Regulations,” The Gateway, 25 February 1944, 1. 57 work during the 1943-1944 year “would not be lost” while also keeping in mind “the national interest.” After that year, medically fit students in courses identified as non- essential by the Director of NSS in consultation with a university committee would be denied further postponements and be subject to call up. The NCCU requested that the government approve the establishment of the University Advisory Board (UAB), which would include representatives of the NCCU and interested government departments, to advise MacNamara on aspects of mobilization relevant to students and universities more broadly.109

Under the new agreed upon proposals, any male student who had completed admission requirements would be permitted to enter university and receive postponement for no more than one academic session. The proposal also instituted three key policies for male students eighteen-and-a-half years-of-age or more subject to call up. First, such students were ineligible for postponement to continue their education if they did not attain the appropriate academic standing.110 Second, those who had completed the requirements for admission to a university more than twelve months before the application date for admission would not be admitted to the university without the consent of the concerned mobilization board. Finally, those who had completed the work of at least one academic session would be served an Order-Medical Examination unless enrolled in a course defined as essential by the Director of NSS on the recommendation

109 While not appointed as members, various military representatives also attended meetings of the UAB. See “Minutes of a Conference between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Director of National Selective Service held in Ottawa on August 30th, 1943,” 1-2. 110 This standing had to be equal to that recognized by the appropriate Provincial Department of Education. 58 of a university board. If in an essential course, the student would be granted a postponement and permitted to remain enrolled until graduation.111

Despite criticism from officials in the Department of Labour, MacNamara maintained the new policy was intended to be “fair to all interests concerned.”112 For university heads, the compromise was a resounding success. K.P.R. Neville, the registrar at the University of Western Ontario, said the agreement reflected the “finest kind of co- operative understanding” between universities and the government.113 President Smith thanked MacNamara for his cooperation and the “confidence” he demonstrated in universities. “You have made a profound impression on all the representatives of the

Conference,” he stated.114

On 22 December 1943, MacNamara and Humphrey Mitchell formally recommended the creation of the UAB. The recommendation mandated that the

Department of Labour would ask the UAB to meet from “time to time” to advise the

Minister of Labour “on matters pertaining to universities, during the state of war now existing.” Six university representatives and four government officials were appointed to the board and placed under the direction of its chair, MacNamara.115

111 Essential courses were defined as those “contributing to the prosecution of the war or in the national interest.” This postponement would be cancelled if the student failed his examination of did not comply with compulsory military training regulations. See “Minutes of a Conference between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Director of National Selective Service held in Ottawa on August 30th, 1943,” 1-2. 112 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 5, Department of Labour, News Release Number 230, 27 September 1943. For more on criticism of this plan, see Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 61-62. 113 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2a, K.P.R. Neville to MacNamara, 25 September 1943, quoted in Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 62. 114 Ibid., Sidney Smith to MacNamara, 2 September 1943. 115 The representatives initially appointed to the UAB were: Sidney Smith, President, University of Manitoba; R.C. Wallace, Principal, Queen’s University; H.J. Cody, President, University of Toronto; Paul Beique, Consulting Engineering, Montreal; Cyrille Gagnon, Rector, Université Laval; Norman Mackenzie, President, University of New Brunswick; James S. Thomson, President, University of Saskatchewan; J.C. Fogo, Associate Coordinator of Controls, DMS; Paul Goulet, Associate Director, NSS; H.W. Lea, Director, 59

During its operation, other interested parties and major stakeholders attended

UAB meetings, including representatives of the branches of the armed services, NSS, and the WBTP, DPNH, and DVA. The NCCU reported that a “spirit of co-operation and mutual confidence” characterized UAB deliberations.116 It met six times in 1944 and twice in 1945 and functioned by submitting recommendations to the Minister. If the

Minister accepted a recommendation, it was incorporated into an Interpretive Letter by the Director of Mobilization, approved by the Minister, and given the “force and effect of law” under Section 15 (2) of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations.117

In light of the proposals recommended at the August conference, at its first meeting on 6 January 1944, the UAB identified a list of university courses that would be considered essential and began developing a student postponement policy for the 1944-

1945 academic year. There was a considerable amount of debate amongst representatives.

President Cody reported that the Faculty of Arts at the University of Toronto believed the

“selection of male students to be retained in university” should be made on the basis of the student’s attainments rather than the course of study. President Smith responded that this had been the suggestion of Principal Wallace last August but that the “view of the unanimous findings” of the NCCU conference at that time had been that the UAB should not “depart from the proposed method of selecting courses considered to be essential to

WBTP; and S.H. McLaren, Associate Director of the Mobilization Section, NSS. Smith served as Vice- Chair and Lea as Secretary. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 3, UAB, “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 6th, 1944, at 10 A.M.”, n.d.; and LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, University Advisory Board, Minutes of Meetings and Correspondence Re Mobilization of Students 1943-1945 (hereafter NSS – Mobilization Section), Department of Labour, NSS, “Order,” 22 December 1943. 116 NCCU, National Conference of Canadian Universities: Twentieth Meeting held at McMaster University, June 12th-14th, 1944, 47. 117 Section 15(2) read: “The Minister may issue such directions not inconsistent with these regulations as he may deem necessary to give effect thereto according to their true intent and purpose, and any such direction shall have the same force and effect as if enacted herein.” See P.C. 10924. 60 the prosecution of the war.” The board then moved to a discussion of whether certain courses should be discontinued. The Rector of Université Laval, Cyrille Gagnon, disagreed, and insisted that all faculties were “essential to the national interest” because each produced “the future leaders of the country.” Moreover, he cautioned the country still needed graduates in non-essential courses in order to generate the teaching staff required for the instruction of discharged service personnel under the government’s rehabilitation scheme.118

Ultimately, the board agreed to identify the following areas as essential: medicine, dentistry, engineering or applied science, architecture, agriculture, pharmacy, forestry, education, commerce, veterinary science, and specialized courses in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, or geology or courses preparing students to qualify for such specialized courses. Any student eighteen-and-a-half years-of-age and older subject to call up under the mobilization regulations would be considered pursuing an essential course if specializing in one of these disciplines. Subsequent correspondence clarified that the board members presumed that students classified as “essential” would be permitted to pursue their course of study until graduation provided they satisfied the university’s academic standards.119

All male students eighteen-and-a-half years-of-age or older enrolled in the 1943-

1944 academic year or entering the 1944-1945 academic year for the first time in a course not listed above would be considered to be pursuing an essential course if they finished in the top fifty percent of their program as determined by the final examinations.

118 “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 6th, 1944, at 10 A.M.”, n.d., 3-4. 119 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 3, Mobilization Act Interpretive Letter No. 7, 10 February 1944, 1. 61

This was known as the “fifty percent rule” because at the end of the 1943-1944 academic year, all enrollments in non-essential courses would be reduced by fifty percent. In subsequent years, only the first-year class would be so reduced. Those who succeeded in placing in the upper half of their year would be allowed to proceed to graduation, barring failure. The intent of the fifty percent rule was to immediately make male students available to the armed services and industry but, in general, mobilization boards allowed students to complete the academic term in progress before ordering them to report for military training. The UAB made no recommendations in regards to procedures beyond the 1944-1945 academic year. Interpretive Letter No. 7 of 10 February 1944 outlined the new policies for mobilization board chairs.120

While university heads by and large supported the regulations and immediately set about seeing to their implementation, some took exception to the fifty percent rule.

University of Alberta President Robert Newton, for example, disapproved of aspects of the regulations, particularly the mandatory reductions, which he called “especially hard.”

In a speech to a “packed auditorium” of male students on 18 February 1944, he outlined his criticisms and explained that while MacNamara identified the labour shortage as the impetus for the classifications, he believed the real driver was the demand of the army for reinforcements. The Minister of National Defence, J.L. Ralston, he recalled, had recently announced the need for 60,000 more men. Newton asked the UAB to permit a minimum number of students in each course and year, to designate pre-medical and pre-dental

120 Mobilization Act Interpretive Letter No. 7, 1-2; Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 62-63; and “Dr. Newton Addresses Mass Meet of Men Re: Regulations,” The Gateway, 25 February 1944, 1. 62 courses essential, and to introduce a progressively smaller reduction in subsequent years.121

The designation of arts as “non-essential” also provoked protests from some university students. “Previously we thought of Selective Service regulations as a

‘weeding-out’ process,” wrote Norman Halford, an arts student at McGill University,

“but now they are nothing more than a scheme for slicing off an important part of the student population each year in a manner that might almost be termed indiscriminate. It is difficult to believe that any group of people with more than a superficial knowledge of the University curriculum could recommend such action.”122 A poem in the University of

Manitoba’s student newspaper The Manitoban called the regulations a “terrible riding” of arts students.123

Controversy erupted at the University of Toronto when, in February 1944, Rhys

Dixon, a fourth year student in political science and economics, wrote the editor of The

Varsity to protest the regulations. He insisted that by not discontinuing the courses outright, the government was recognizing the “essentialness” of non-essential courses.

Dixon accused Ottawa of bowing to public pressure, stating the regulations were clearly a compromise between “an uninformed public on the one hand and the government’s own better judgement on the other.” The Varsity editor replied on 1 March, defending the

121 The UAB considered Newton’s recommendations at their June meeting but ruled against any changes after MacNamara advised the board that he was “presently” opposed to a “relaxation of any existing restrictions” given that the manpower problem remained “acute.” See “Dr. Newton Addresses Mass Meet of Men Re: Regulations;” and LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 453, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Friday, February 25th, 1944,” n.d., 2-3. 122 The McGill Daily, on the other hand, reported the number of students affected by the change was “not as great as first expected”—only 136 male students in arts and 33 in law. See “Letter Forum,” The McGill Daily, 18 February 1943, 2, 4. 123 After detailing the plight of the arts student, the closing two stanza’s read: “And so, may dear young fellow / Please don’t feel too bad, / Beside this terrible riding, / You’re not a bad old lad. / So lo! My gentle Arts-man, / And hold your head up high, / ‘Cause although you’re not a superman / You’re really quite a guy.” See “The Arts Student,” The Gateway, 3 March 1944, 4. 63 regulations and arguing students should be grateful they were not more severe, given the harsher measures adopted in the United States. Two days later, another student in fourth year political science and economics, Paul Fox, opined that a comparison between

Canada and the United States was too narrow a basis for acceptance of the regulations.

He also argued that since the government was already preparing for peace, it seemed

“unfair” to restrict courses training men who would be “of the very greatest value to society in the immediate post-war period.”124 The controversy culminated with the holding of an open meeting to discuss and protest the “stigma attached to certain courses in the liberal arts” and the “arbitrary distinctions” between essential and non-essential courses. One hundred students met in the economics building on 9 March 1944 to present a petition asking that the regulations be revised. “There is no better case for the marginal engineer than there is for the marginal arts man,” explained Dixon. Over four hundred students signed the petition.125

At their meetings, UAB members clarified the policies outlined in Interpretive

Letter No. 7, responded to criticisms, corrected misunderstandings of the application of the regulations, and adjusted the policies in response to institutional discrepancies in educational standards and procedures.126 At its February meeting, the UAB decided to

124 “Varsity Arts Students Meet to Discuss Regulations,” The McGill Daily, 9 March 1944, 3. 125 A.B. Fennell, the registrar at the University of Toronto, reported that the administration did not “attach undue importance” to the petition. The UAB discussed the petition at its June meeting and concluded that if the university explained to the students that general science students are treated “just as they are” then these students would “relinquish the viewpoint that they are being stigmatized.” The UAB agreed to reply to the petition by letter to offer three explanations: that students in Allied countries were receiving less favourable treatment, that students in commerce and general science were in the same category as arts and humanities students, and that the board was acting based on the needs of the armed services and industry. See “Essential Courses Defined, Must Be in Top Half to Continue in Arts,” The Varsity, 17 February 1944, 1; “Arts Students Protest Non-Essential Listing,” The Globe and Mail, 10 March 1944, 5; and LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Saturday, June 10th, 1944,” n.d., 6. 126 A number of university administrations and mobilization board officials misunderstood the fifty percent rule, believing the reduction applied to all years for each academic year. 64 discontinue financial aid to first year students in engineering and pure sciences because these students would likely not graduate in time to contribute to the war. It also ruled students in pre-medical and pre-dental courses at the University of Alberta would be considered essential and not subject to the fifty percent rule because Newton had explained that his institution limited enrolment in these courses to students considered

“likely to qualify” for the professional course.127 At the February and June meetings, members considered the position of students in classical colleges in Quebec who entered university approximately two years older than in other provinces and were therefore subject to the regulations much earlier in their post-secondary education.128 In June, the

UAB designated science pass courses and commerce courses non-essential. It also considered applying the fifty percent rule to all first year students but MacNamara convinced members that the need for certain types of graduates was too great and needed to be given “urgent priority.” The UAB also agreed that students entering a faculty of education or medicine after completing a degree, a requirement in many universities, would not be considered as having changed their course.129

In addition, the UAB assessed the efforts of universities to “faithfully” carry out

“their undertaking to weed out incompetent students.”130 At its June meeting, its secretary presented a report on the number of university students who failed to pass their examinations and the number refused or granted permission to return to their studies (see

Figure 3). The purpose was to determine the number who failed to meet university

127 “Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 453, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Friday, February 25th, 1944,” 2-3, 5; LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, Lea to Justice H. Harvey, 10 August 1944. 128 The age of entrance to university in Quebec was approximately two years older than in other provinces. 129 “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Saturday, June 10th, 1944,” 4-5. 130 Ibid., 4. 65 academic requirements and to ascertain whether universities had been “more lenient” on students in the 1943-1944 academic year than in previous years. The totals revealed that fewer students (almost half) were reported at the mid-term for 1943-1944 than had been at the previous year’s mid-term: 686 and 1,214 respectively.131 The study revealed the very different procedures adopted by universities to deal with students who failed, even amongst institutions of “comparable size and character.” Some reported that men who failed were allowed to continue their courses if under the callable age and others allowed male students to continue after failure while waiting for the call to report to active service.132 The UAB decided, however, that universities could adopt the procedure “most suited” to their needs so long as they fulfilled the intent of the regulations, which was to reduce the number of students in non-essential courses by fifty percent.133

In subsequent meetings, the UAB considered several other issues relevant to wartime regulations affecting universities: the postponement of call up for instructors and demonstrators; the return of staff members from the armed services and civilian war work with the government and private industry; students studying in the United States; compulsory military education in peacetime; academic allowances for returned men and women; the excess number of applications to medical schools; and the application of the fifty percent rule to ex-service personnel.

131 At the end of the 1943-1944 session, universities reported 1,115 male students had failed and 1,138 were in the lower half of their class. The classical colleges (Prince of Wales College, College Ste. Anne, College du Sacre Coeur, St. Thomas College, St. Jerome’s College, St. Patrick’s College, College Mathieu, Concordia College, Canadian Junior College, and the sixteen colleges affiliated with the Université de Montréal) reported 127 failures. See LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Report – Numbers of Students Who Failed or were in the Lower Half of the Class at Close of Session 1943-44,” [c. June 1944]; and LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Report of Failures for Session 1943-44 – Classical Colleges,” [c. June 1944]. 132 NCCU, National Conference of Canadian Universities: Twentieth Meeting held at McMaster University, June 12th-14th, 1944, Appendix D, 49-50. 133 “Minutes of a Meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Saturday, June 10th, 1944,” 4. 66

By the end of 1944, the UAB focused almost exclusively on the transition to peacetime. At its September 1944 meeting, the UAB emphasized the importance of arranging discussions to focus exclusively on issues related to ex-service personnel and at their next meeting in November new business consisted solely of veteran affairs.134 On 18

January 1945, in the midst of the success of the Soviet offensive in Eastern Europe, the

UAB met to discuss “the desirability” of making changes to the existing labour controls with respect to university students. MacNamara invited high-ranking officials from the armed services and representatives of the DVA to offer their opinions. At the opening of the meeting, he explained that the army was in need of additional personnel and that this could be supplied by “enlisting men now attending universities.” MacNamara asked the board if the “present situation” required “any further restrictions.”135

After S.H. McLaren, the Associate Director of the Mobilization Division at NSS, reviewed existing controls affecting students, the board heard presentations from representatives of the armed services and the WBTP. Brigadier A.C. Spencer, Vice

Adjutant-General, reported the army still had some need for medical and dental officers and potential officer candidates, but no longer required engineering and science graduates. Air Vice-Marshal John Alfred Sully, the Air Member for Personnel, reported that as everyone already knew, the air force had no need for additional personnel, and

Commander M.A. Medland, the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel, said the navy only needed men for replacements. In contrast to the low demand reported by armed services

134 LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Saturday, September 9th, 1944,” n.d., 2, 4-5; and LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Monday, November 27th, 1944,” n.d., 2. 135 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, “Memorandum for the Honourable Humphrey Mitchell giving Outline of the Recommendations of the University Advisory Board at meeting January 18, 1945,” 31 January 1945; and “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” 4. 67 representatives on the UAB (which deviated significantly from other reports given to the

WBTP by armed services officials), Lea reported the demand for technical personnel in civilian war industries was heavier than ever.136

After general discussion, the UAB agreed “that if present conditions necessitate action, such changes to existing university policy as will be required to meet the situation should be recommended, no matter how drastic the remedy.”137 MacNamara concluded the morning session by stating that it was clear the UAB was in favour of further restrictions for students. When the meeting reconvened in the mid-afternoon, members made five recommendations: that based on the results of the final exams that spring, all callable male students in the lower half of their course in all years, except the final year, be reported to mobilization boards as being available for military service; that no callable student seeking entrance to university for the 1945-1946 session be accepted unless their academic standing was “equal to or better than” the average students accepted for entrance in the fall of 1944; that the number of students accepted by any university in any first year course in the fall of 1945 not exceed the number enrolled in the comparable courses in first year in the fall of 1943; that ex-service personnel not on postponement and service personnel be excluded from consideration of the first three recommendations; and that courses that had been subject to the fifty percent rule at the end of the 1943-1944 session not be further reduced in numbers. The effect of these regulations would be a further reduction in the number of male students attending university.138 The UAB

136 “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” 5-6. 137 Ibid., 7. 138 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, “Memorandum for the Honourable Humphrey Mitchell giving Outline of the Recommendations of the University Advisory Board at meeting January 18, 1945,” 31 January 1945; and “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” 7. 68 recognized these recommendations were severe and required an “exhaustive review” before being applied.139

Despite MacNamara’s estimation that the proposals “would not provide a large volume of men for military service,” the main intent of their implementation was to direct university students into the armed services. On 20 March 1945, when Humphrey Mitchell wrote General A.G.L. McNaughton, the new Minister of National Defence, to explain the new regulations and their intended result, he estimated the changes would reduce the number of male students in the universities by approximately 5,000-6,000 pupils out of a total of approximately 18,000.140 He informed McNaughton that from this number and

“out of this reduction the army should obtain four thousand.”141

Ultimately, the regulations were not implemented. At its 29 May meeting, the

UAB reported “events in Europe and the resultant change in the manpower situation were such as to warrant a modification of the views entertained at the time.” Yet these proposals provide much insight into the changing motivations of UAB representatives during the war’s last year. Why, after years of trying to influence mobilization policies to ensure the maintenance of their student populations and the production of graduates to meet labour requirements, did university heads approve the implementation of such strict regulations? Certainly, with Allied success, predictions that the war was soon to be won, and the return of service personnel from overseas, university administrations had less to

139 Despite this, NCCU President James S. Thomson said it was unnecessary to ask the NCCU to approve the proposals. He argued they would support the increased sanctions since no new policy was being proposed and that the proposals were only a “broadening of existing policy.” See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, UAB, “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Tuesday, May 29th, 1945,” n.d., 2. 140 When Ralston was forced to resign as Minister in the fall of 1944 over the conscription crisis, McNaughton replaced him. For more on McNaughton, see “McNaughton: The God That Failed,” in The Generals, 53-82. 141 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, Mitchell to McNaughton, 20 March 1945. 69 fear by reducing the number of students in their halls. By 1945, government and army officials were predicting between 40,000 and 50,000 veterans would enter universities through the government’s rehabilitation program. A further reduction in the enrolment of civilian students now posed far less a threat to the bottom line.142

Equally, university heads wanted to redeem the public image of universities, which had come under attack by the press, the broader public, and a handful of vocal mobilization officials who criticized student postponement policies.143 They wanted to ensure that their institutions would be remembered as full and essential contributors to the war effort. President Smith of the University of Manitoba, for example, requested the minutes of the January meeting be made public, even though the proposals were not acted upon.144 In discussing the proposals at the January meeting, Principal James of McGill

University pointed out that the press had a “definite lack of knowledge of the facts” of regulations affecting students and had continually misrepresented the number of enrolled students in non-essential courses. He explained that when university authorities tried to correct erroneous statements that placed their institutions in a poor light, the press was not “altogether inclined to accept the corrections.” James asked that the Department of

Labour make the public “fully aware of the facts,” since the department could have “no ulterior motive with respect to the subject” and the public would accept the information

142 “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Tuesday, May 29th, 1945,” 2. See chapter six. 143 For example, an editorial in the Montreal Gazette from 8 January 1944, accused universities of “sheltering” the sons of the wealthy. It claimed university training during the war was being denied to men whose families were of “modest circumstances.” The WBTP asked universities to correct such errors by bringing more attention to the government’s aid program. See “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” Appendix to Minutes, WBTP, “Notes on Position of University Students with Regard to Mobilization, etc.” 144 “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Tuesday, May 29th, 1945,” 2. 70

“at its face value.”145 Additionally, following the approval of the amendments, Principal

Wallace of Queen’s University recommended that the Department of Labour make a public announcement of the changes at the “earliest possible opportunity.” MacNamara assured university heads that a statement correcting misinterpretations in the press could be made as a result of the meeting within the next two weeks and said the changes to policy would place universities “in an excellent position from the point of view of public opinion.”146

At the May meeting of the UAB, MacNamara reported that telegrams had been sent to all universities informing them that it was no longer necessary to report to mobilization authorities the names of students who finished in the lower half of non- essential subjects. Divisional registrars had been instructed to suspend the call up of men for military training, students were no longer required to report for training on completion of their studies, and subsections five and six of the mobilization regulations, dealing with changes in the course of study and the pursuance of post-graduate studies, had been suspended.147 Only two items remained to be considered by the board—the request for the early release of former members of the staff from armed service and the continuation of mandatory military training in peacetime—and MacNamara expressed doubt as to necessity of holding a meeting of the UAB for such matters.148 The first matter was resolved on 21 June, when Lea advised universities to forward a list of all former members of university faculty and staff in the armed services whose return would be

145 “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945,” 5. 146 Ibid., 5, 9. 147 Science student regulations were still in effect because they were civilian employment controls. 148 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, MacNamara to UAB, 20 August 1945. 71

“desired.”149 Military training had been the subject of much debate at the previous four meetings of the UAB, and ultimately the members agreed they would make no formal recommendations and leave the decision to the NCCU.150 The work of the UAB had ended.151

The government suspended military call up of eligible men on 7 May 1945 and

Order-in-Council P.C. 3449 of 14 August 1946 revoked all registration and military mobilization regulations. The relaxation of civilian labour controls began in the fall of

1944 and continued until 1947. In May 1945, a “De-control Committee” was established consisting of officials of the Department of Labour for the purpose of advising on the reduction of civilian labour controls. On 16 August 1945, Humphrey Mitchell announced that the “manpower freeze” restriction would be removed as of 17 September; that persons transferred under compulsory direction would be permitted to return to other employment as of 3 September; and that restrictions on advertising for employees would be modified as of 3 September. On 17 August 1945, the majority of the regulations adopted under P.C. 246 were rescinded and on 21 December the majority of NSS regulations were removed. P.C. 1166 of 31 March 1947 rescinded all remaining NSS civilian mobilization regulations.152

*****

149 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 1, Lea to the Heads of Canadian Universities, 21 June 1945. 150 Smith, Wallace, MacKenzie, and Thomson all favoured compulsory military training at a reduced level but worried it would lead to conflict. Arthur Maheux, a professor of history at Université Laval, reported that Cyrille Gagnon, his university’s Rector, wished military training to be undertaken on a voluntary basis. See “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Tuesday, May 29th, 1945,” 2-5. 151 Many of the UAB members were appointed to the new Advisory Committee for University Training of Veterans, established by Order-in-Council P.C. 3206 of 3 May 1945. 152 LAC, RG35(7), Volume 19, “Development of the National Selective Service During WWII,” 21; “Report on the Operations of National Registration and Military Mobilization during World War II;” and Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle, 26, 36. 72

Under the regulatory framework of the NRMA, the Dominion Government organized and instituted mobilization regulations and training requirements for university students. Under the National War Services Regulations and later the National Selective

Service Mobilization Regulations, all male students liable for call up for compulsory military training could postpone this training provided they enrolled in their university

COTC or an auxiliary university training unit. This policy was guided by the principal that university studies were in the national interest or in aid of the prosecution of the war.

As LaFlèche summarized, the “underlying necessity is that we need educated men to help

Canada help win the war.”153 University students were permitted to continue their studies not because they were a privileged class, but because of the needs of the armed services and war industries for trained personnel and a recognition that the country required educated leaders to ensure a prosperous post-war order. Government and university officials had high expectations for students, namely that they fulfill their obligations by enthusiastically taking full advantage of the university military training program, excel in their academic course, and make their services and skills available to the war effort wherever needed upon completion of their studies.

Government officials emphasized the success of their policies. In 1945,

MacNamara concluded that, in his opinion, the procedures “had proven to be well designed to produce the intended results, and had given Canada a wartime educational policy which compares favourably with that of any other allied nation.” Lea of the WBTP reported that a “critical situation would have arisen if new reserves had not been constantly made available by continuing university instruction in the courses involved.”

He argued that in Canada the government had been able to meet all technical needs of the

153 LAC, RG27, Volume 1496, File 2-C-133, LaFlèche to Lorne McDonnell, 16 August 1941. 73 armed services and most of the essential industries by “leaving the academic programme undisturbed and making available every year people with proper training along the lines which apparently met very satisfactorily with the needs of both the Armed Forces and such highly essential civilian operations as required to be staffed.” Quoting Sir Hector

Hetherington, the Principal of the University of Glasgow, Lea concluded: “You make a soldier out of a chemist in not more than one year, but you still cannot make a chemist out of a soldier in under four years.”154

From the outbreak of war, government officials insisted universities should continue their activities and urged students in essential fields to see their studies through to completion. In turn, universities agreed to allow and assist military training on campus and to use their facilities and resources to their maximum capacity. The priorities of these officials often coincided, and both parties recognized they required the cooperation of the other. For the NCCU, universities required federal monies to meet wartime demands.

They also wished to prevent their halls from being stripped of students. For government, to simply impose measures was insufficient; it needed university officials to cooperate in the development of plans that required the expertise and knowledge of university administrators well versed in the resources and limitations of their institutions. At their broadest examination, the regulations reflected an understanding of the integral role universities and their students had to play in the nation’s war effort. They also reflected the developing, and increasingly complex, cooperation of government and university officials, one that often relied on MacNamara’s ability to mediate compromises in regards to new policies.

154 “Minutes of a meeting held in the Board Room, Confederation Building, on Thursday, January 18th, 1945, Appendix to Minutes, WBTP, “Notes on Position of University Students with Regard to Mobilization, etc.,” 17 January 1945, 1, 4. 74

Throughout their negotiations with DNWS, NSS, and WBTP officials of the

Department of Labour, universities never lost sight of the magnitude and importance of the war effort. As one government official later reported: “it was evident in all their dealings with the Department of Labour that their attitude was one of simple readiness to carry out any task which they might be called upon by the government to undertake.”155

No doubt that as the war progressed, the needs of the war effort became the deciding factor in decisions about mobilization policies affecting university students. However, these increasingly comprehensive—and generally successful—policies were developed through the exceptional cooperation of mobilization and university officials.

155 “Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Historical Record of Wartime Activities,” 36, quoted in Pilkington, 351. 75

Chapter Two

University Service Training, Part I: The Establishment of University Service Training Units, 1939-1945

The old college spirit fires both barrels when Canadian students don Army, Navy and RCAF uniforms and combine new stream-lined studies with military training. Now in wartime in all Canadian Universities, ‘teen age boys address their teachers as ‘Colonel’ or ‘Commander’ or ‘Sir.’ Mining, mechanical engineering, chemistry, farming are all in the day’s work, bulls-eyed for war or post-war application. The college campus ain’t what it used to be—even the pretty coeds turn out to be expert Red Cross Nurses.1

Canada’s Second World War mobilization regulations mandated that all medically fit male university students were subject to call up for compulsory military service. Under the National War Services Regulations and later the National Selective

Service Mobilization Regulations, however, students could defer service until completion of their course of study provided they undertook university service training. This consisted—with some variations and exemptions based on age and course of study—of

110 hours of intramural training during the academic year and two weeks of summer training at a military camp.2 Intramural training was initially provided by the Canadian

Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) or an auxiliary training unit, but later also through the

University Air Training Corps (UATC) of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the

University Naval Training Division (UNTD) of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer

Reserve (RCNVR). While the regulations did not apply to female university students, the introduction of compulsory training for male students intensified discussion about the wartime responsibilities of women and prompted university administrations to

1 “Old College Spirit—Military Style!” The Hartford Courant Magazine, 4 June 1944, 6. 2 See chapter one. 76 independently develop and implement mandatory war service training programs for female students.

The expansion of university service training would not have been possible without the support of university authorities. Through the National Conference of

Canadian Universities (NCCU) and various university-government committees, university authorities negotiated with government and military officials to develop service training programs designed to fulfill the requirements of the government’s mobilization regulations, meet the needs of the armed services for technically trained and professional graduates, prepare students for eventual service without interrupting their academic studies, and afford students the opportunity to work towards a commission.

These negotiations intensified and became more complex as university service training expanded over the course of the war.

I: The Canadian Officers’ Training Corps and the Introduction of Auxiliary Training Units

The origins of the COTC lay in the creation of Britain’s Officer Training Corps

(OTC). Established in 1908 in response to arguments about the inefficiency of the British military arising from poor performance in the South African War (1899-1902), the OTC offered basic military training to cadet corps in public schools and volunteer corps in universities with the intention of creating a potential pool of officers.3 In 1908, imperial staff officers came to Canada to promote the organization of an analogous program.

Despite facing initial opposition from government officials who argued such training

3 For more on the OTC, see E.M. Teagarden, “Lord Haldane and the Origins of the Officer Training Corps,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 45, no. 182 (1967): 91-96; and Ian Worthington, “Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officers Training Corps,” Military Affairs 43, no. 2 (April 1979): 90-96. 77 would increase the militia budget, by 1909 the plan had garnered the attention of the

Chief of the General Staff, Colin John Mackenzie, and the support of the Minister of

Militia and Defence, Frederick William Borden. The Militia Department appointed a board of officers to examine the implementation of a similar program and in 1910 this body prepared a draft set of regulations to forward to university heads.4

Between 1910 and 1912, university administrations argued with government officials about who would be responsible for financing the costs of training and debated the details of the plan, in particular the necessity of building campus drill halls. The most favourable support came from McGill University whose Principal, William Peterson, was anxious to “take advantage of the opportunity offered.”5 On 4 April 1912, C.J. Mackenzie announced the McGill University Board of Governors had accepted a proposal to establish the McGill contingent of the COTC. General Order No. 211 of 18 November

1912 formally authorized its formation under the provisions of Section 22 of the 1904

Militia Act.6 This success encouraged the establishment of additional contingents.

Université Laval formed a contingent at its Montreal campus in April 1913 and a year later a second contingent at its Quebec City location. Throughout the spring and summer of 1914, other university administrations began negotiations to determine the logistical

4 Daniel Byers, “The Canadian Officers’ Training Corps: support for military training in the universities of Canada, 1908-1935,” (M.A. Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1993), 17, 30, 35. 5 Ibid., 40. 6 R.C. Fetherstonhaugh, McGill University at War: 1914-1918, 1939-1945 (Montreal: Gazette Printing Company Ltd., 1947), 4. For a history of the McGill University COTC, see Desmond Morton, “McGill’s Contingent of the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) 1912-1968,” Canadian Military Journal 10, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 37-47. 78 and financial details for the program’s establishment at their institutions, including the

University of Toronto, Dalhousie University, and the University of Alberta.7

The primary objective of the program was to provide university and college students with “a standardized measure of elementary training” with a view to creating a pool of qualified officers for the non-permanent active militia, without disrupting a candidate’s academic career.8 Under the 1913 provisional regulations, training comprised instructional parades and exercises, a musketry course, and voluntary summer training in a military camp. Enlistment was initially voluntary and while members were encouraged to earn certificates to become eligible for commissions in militia units, they were not obligated to commit to joining the military upon conclusion of their studies.9

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 significantly altered the growth of the COTC. John Alexander Nicholson, the registrar of McGill University, said the war

“galvanised the sickly corps into intense vitality” and imbued “its members with the spirit of service.”10 Universities without a contingent quickly requested government authorization and by the end of the 1914-1915 academic year, the COTC had swelled to sixteen active contingents. By the war’s end, the program comprised twenty-two contingents.11

7 In order to organize a contingent, university authorities had to establish a committee on military education to coordinate the work of the contingent with the academic calendar, to administer and control funds, and to arrange the theoretical instruction of officers and members. 8 Unlike its British counterpart, the COTC did not incorporate cadet training and was initially limited to offering infantry training to university students. 9 Regulations for the Canadian Officers Training Corps, Provisional, 1913 (Ottawa: Canadian Army, Officers Training Corps, 1913), 2, 10; and Byers, v, 30-33. 10 McGill University Archives (MUA), RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 112, File 3012, J.A. Nicholson, McGill’s War Record (Montreal: Publicity Committee of the McGill Centennial Endowment Campaign, n.d.), 13. 11 Byers, 78. 79

Standards of training and efficiency varied greatly depending on the size and geographical location of the institution, but most administrations widely supported the program and considered it a vital component of the university war effort.12 Perhaps most importantly, the COTC departed from its original focus on officer training and instead focused more broadly on recruiting and training for overseas service. This emphasis became official policy early in 1917 when the Militia Department stopped accepting

COTC commissions for the Canadian Expeditionary Force, an important precedent that would prove critical to the program’s operation during the Second World War.13

The immediate post-war years witnessed the decline of the COTC and the closure of a handful of contingents. Training, however, was revived in the early 1920s and continued with the support of university administrations throughout this and the next decade.14 Military training was attacked by a number of pacifist groups, such as the

Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, but most individuals affiliated with universities held more moderate views.15 In his master’s thesis on the first thirty years of the COTC, Daniel Byers argued that three factors contributed to continued university support for military training on campus. First, a vocal majority of academics in

12 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 85, File 2306, F. Cyril James, untitled history of the COTC, 15 March 1946, 2. 13 Byers, 70-71, 84. 14 The University of New Brunswick and the Nova Scotia Technical College even maintained compulsory military training for all physically fit male students throughout this period. The latter imposed this regulation because it desired to ensure that in the case of a future conflict its graduates would be drafted only as officers. This would prevent the “tragedy” of university-trained men enlisting as privates, as was the case during the First World War. See Byers, 108, 114; and DUASC, UA-10, Box 32, File 27, Frederick Henry Sexton to G.S. Harrington, 22 March 1928. 15 Paul Axelrod has estimated that only approximately five percent of university students participated in “left-leaning movements for social change” during the 1930s and that the majority of students were by and large politically moderate, as evidenced by the activities of the “apolitical” National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS). See Paul Axelrod, “Spying on the Young in Depression and War: Students, Youth Groups and the RCMP, 1935-1942,” Labour 35, (Spring 1995): 43-63; and Paul Axelrod, “The Student Movement of the 1930s,” in Youth, University, and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education, ed. Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid (Montreal: 1989): 216-246. 80

Canadian universities possessed a “general ideological support” for militarism and military training. Second, administrations acknowledged the practical educational value of COTC training, reasoning it provided physical exercise, shaped moral character, taught discipline, and reinforced the importance of duty. Finally, COTC funding constituted an important form of financial assistance from the federal government and offered a means of improving university facilities, particularly during the years of the Great Depression.

Certainly, by the mid-1930s, the prospect of another war bolstered support. After Hitler introduced military conscription in Germany in 1935, few disputed COTC training constituted a vital means of preparing for possible conflict in Europe.16

When war broke out again in 1939, the COTC was thus more established than had been the case at the outbreak of the First World War. Its objective remained consistent: it would continue to provide the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM) and the Canadian

Active Service Force (CASF) with fully qualified commissioned officers. Like in 1914, enlistment in the COTC grew rapidly. Closed contingents were revived and in the first two years following the declaration of war, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) authorized new contingents at ten institutions. University authorities advised students to remain in their studies, heeding the counsel of government officials, but they encouraged students to join the COTC. Students needed no prompting and they rushed to enroll. “The opening of the war saw a marked quickening of interest and activity in the Canadian

Officers’ Training Corps,” reported President Leonard S. Klinck of the University of

British Columbia.17 “Expansion was immediate and thorough,” said Captain J.E. March of McGill University’s contingent. “Undergraduates and graduates cheerfully offered

16 Byers, vi-vii, 162. 17 Report of the President of the University of British Columbia for the Academic Year Ended August 31st, 1940 (Vancouver: the University of British Columbia, 1940), 14. 81 themselves for the intensive and serious training.”18 After receiving over 1,800 applications within two weeks of its registration, the University of Toronto contingent was forced to stop accepting new recruits.19

To accommodate the rush of applicants, universities requested authority from

NDHQ to increase their establishments. NDHQ authorized most requests by the end of

1939, increasing the establishment of the University of Toronto contingent, for example, from a headquarters and four companies with a total strength of 516 to a headquarters and twelve companies with a strength of 1,500 all ranks.20 The most important immediate problem was the need to recruit and train former officers, non-commissioned officers, and graduates of the Royal Military College to create “an efficient instructional cadre.”21

The growth of a contingent during the first year of the war directly correlated to its peacetime enrollment and the size of the respective institution. Smaller institutions experienced less pronounced growth, typically reporting approximately double pre-war numbers. The strength of the Dalhousie University and King’s College contingent, for example, increased from 102 cadets in June 1939 to 229 during the 1939-1940 academic year.22 Similarly, enrolment in the University of Western Ontario contingent almost doubled from 260 to 500 candidates in the fall of 1939.23 At the University of Alberta, the contingent reached a strength of over 700 by November compared to 275 from the

18 J.E. March, “C.O.T.C.,” Old McGill 43 (1940): 184. 19 The administration estimated this number would likely have doubled if it had not stopped recruiting. See University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 006, File 02, H.H. Madill, “The Canadian Officers Training Corps 1939-40,” n.d., 2. 20 UTARMS, Office of the President, Accession A1968-0003, Box 006, History 1939-1945, H.J. Cody, untitled history of University of Toronto Contingent COTC, n.d., 2. 21 “C.O.T.C.,” 184. 22 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C. Murchie to the Minister, 8 June 1944, Appendix A; and Dalhousie University, Pharos: Yearbook of 1940 (Halifax: Dalhousie University Council of Students, 1940), 79-80. 23 Andrew Theobald, “Western’s War: A Study of an Ontario Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Contingent, 1939-1945,” Ontario History, XCVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 53. 82 previous October.24 Larger institutions in more populated centres reported proportionately higher numbers. By early October, new recruits at the University of

British Columbia totaled 500, almost six times the peacetime enrollment.25 Enrolment in the University of Toronto contingent increased by more than five times its pre-war total.26

At the close of the 1938-1939 academic year, the strength of the McGill University contingent numbered approximately 125—with only 58 cadets on strength reporting back at the opening of the fall 1939 session—but by the middle of November, 1,125 cadets were on parade with the contingent. During the 1939-1940 training season, cadets on strength totaled close to 1,400, over eleven times the strength of the previous year.27 This immense growth reflected the size of the institution but also the McGill contingent’s lower interwar numbers. Approximately the same number of students enrolled for officer training at McGill and Toronto during the 1939-1940 academic year, for example, but the growth of the Toronto contingent was proportionately smaller given its larger pre-war enrolment of 298.28

The outbreak of war prompted the development of a number of new initiatives that would substantially affect the operation of the COTC. In 1939, graduates of accredited universities were permitted to enlist as cadets for the first time in the program’s history. This was also the first year undergraduate students received academic credit for passing COTC qualifying examinations, thus offering an additional incentive

24 “C.O.T.C. Contingent Has Wide Range of Activities,” The Gateway, 6 January 1939, 3; and “C.O.T.C. States Strength of Over 700 Is Reached,” The Gateway, 3 November 1939, 1. 25 “Varsity Men Acknowledge War Policy,” The Gateway, 13 October 1939, 8. 26 J.C. Murchie to the Minister, 8 June 1944, Appendix A. 27 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 122, File 3024, “The Contribution of McGill University to the War Effort,” 15 November 1941, 16. 28 J.C. Murchie to the Minister, 8 June 1944, Appendix A. 83 for students to enroll.29 Some of the most significant changes affected the syllabus.

Before the opening of the fall session in 1939, the new three rank drill replaced infantry drill and the old close order drill in four ranks and infantry platoons were reduced from four to three sections of ten men. The Department of National Defence (DND) arranged special classes in August 1939 to familiarize officers and non-commissioned officers

(NCO) with the new form of training.30 The COTC continued to provide primarily infantry training with theoretical and practical drill instruction, physical training, and small arms training, but lectures became more comprehensive and training intensified to increase efficiency.31 At Dalhousie University, for example, cadets received instruction in field engineering, studied the organization and layout of trenches, undertook simulated night operations, and were familiarized with patrol work.32 Moreover, courses were made available at larger institutions such as the University of British Columbia, McGill

University, Queen’s University, and the University of Toronto for specialized instruction in several branches of the service, including infantry (rifle), infantry (machine gun), artillery (mobile), and engineering.33

The DND also discontinued the Imperial War Office promotion examinations for certificates “A” (Lieutenant) and “B” (Captain), which constituted the qualifying standard in prior years, in favour of the Canadian standards outlined in “How to Qualify,

29 F. Cyril James, untitled history of the COTC, 2; H.H. Madill, “The Canadian Officers Training Corps 1939-40,” 2; and University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion Collection / Combined Services Trust Committee, Box 1, Daily Orders 1941, S.E. Walmsley for G.M. Shrum, “Daily Orders Part II,” 30 November 1944. 30 H.H. Madill, “The Canadian Officers Training Corps 1939-1940,” 1-2. 31 Due to a shortage of manuals for instruction, University of Toronto faculty prepared their own pamphlets on the new form of drill, military law, map reading, organization, and administration. These pamphlets became in high demand across the country, both in the NPAM and the CASF. See H.H. Madill, “The Canadian Officers Training Corps 1939-40,” 3. 32 Pharos: Yearbook of 1940, 78. 33 UBCA, Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion Collection / Combined Services Trust Committee, Box 2, COTC, “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1939 to August 31, 1940,” n.d., 3. 84

1938.”34 The number of weekly hours of training doubled to six per week and officer certificates were combined, making cadets eligible to sit for their examinations during their first year of training instead of after their second, as had previously been the policy.35 The DND required two written papers for qualification and set written examinations in December and March of each academic year: the first paper “common to all arms” and the second paper “special to arm.”36 To qualify for commission, students had to pass a third practical examination during their camp training. While the COTC would continue to provide qualified commissioned officers for the NPAM and the CASF, members were restricted to qualifying only for the rank of lieutenant.37

The introduction of a national program of compulsory military training had by far the largest impact on university service training. Under the National War Services

Regulations of 27 August 1940, the government instituted mandatory military training for single men between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five called up under the National

Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA).38 Full-time university and college students, however, could postpone military training provided they underwent equivalent training through the COTC or an auxiliary training unit.39

In anticipation of the coming regulations, on 5 July 1940 the NCCU met with

Colonel Allen A. Magee, the Executive Assistant to the Minister of National Defence,

34 After the 1941 examinations, officers conducted subsequent courses using the 1939 edition of “How to Qualify.” See “The Contribution of McGill University to the War Effort,” 17. 35 Students could elect to qualify in one or two years. Those taking the two-year course were not classified as to the arm of service in which they intended to specialize. 36 The first paper for the one-year course was written in mid-December and the first paper for the two-year course and the second paper for the one-year course were written in mid-March. 37 Report of the President of the University of British Columbia for the Academic Year Ended August 31st, 1940, 56-57. 38 Passed on 20 June 1940, the NRMA gave the government power to conscript persons for home defence service. 39 Students who were members of the RCNVR or the NPAM were exempt from intramural military training provided they supplied written evidence of such membership. For more information on the mobilization and regulation of university students, see chapter one. 85 and other government and military officials to discuss what the universities could do to further aid the war effort and more specifically what would be required of undergraduates by reason of the enactment of compulsory military training.40 The meeting was lengthy: the conference began its discussion at 10:00 a.m. and assembled for its last deliberations at 8:25 p.m. Of particular concern for representatives of the NCCU, government, and the military was the impact of compulsory military training regulations on existing university service training. They unanimously agreed distinction would need to be made between students who voluntarily enlisted for the active service force and those who would be trained in reserve militia units under the NRMA.41

In addition to voicing their support for compulsory training, the NCCU approved and adopted four recommendations presented by Colonel Henry Harrison Madill, the

Officer Commanding of the contingent at the University of Toronto, on behalf of the officers commanding of the University of Toronto, McGill University, and Queen’s

University units of the COTC. First, a reserve militia unit would be formed in each university “which desires to do so” to provide required military training for those who were not members of the COTC. Second, the COTC would continue to train potential officers. Third, each contingent would appoint a board of officers to identify qualified applicants for the COTC from amongst members of reserve militia units and graduates who desired to become members of the COTC. And fourth, consideration would be given to the “advisability” of providing the reserve militia unit with training equivalent to at

40 Those present were heads or representatives of the University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta, the University of Saskatchewan, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, Queen’s University, the University of Ottawa, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, University of Bishop’s College, and Dalhousie University. President Patterson of Acadia University wired his comments. See Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Box 256, File 4, National Research Council of Canada, “Meeting of the Conference of Canadian Universities, Ottawa, 5 July 1940,” n.d., unnumbered attached list. 41 Ibid., 15. 86 least half of that required by the NRMA, and that the remainder would be taken at a regular training centre or camp conducted by the military organization in each university.

Additionally, on the recommendation of Principal Robert Charles Wallace of Queen’s

University, the NCCU approved the creation of a special committee of the NCCU consisting of officers commanding of COTC contingents to address any “unforeseen problems” that might arise because of developments in government policies. This committee was subsequently known as the COTC Committee of the NCCU.42

Following the NCCU’s decision to recommend universities adopt a policy of compulsory military training, university Senates and Boards of Governors approved resolutions instituting compulsory military training for all physically-fit male students of

British nationality eighteen years-of-age and over at the time of registration. This immediately enlarged the university service training program and militarized campus culture. “A very military atmosphere surrounds the University this year,” reported the

University of Toronto Monthly in December 1940. “Every male undergraduate who is not exempted for medical or other reasons is taking military training in one form or another.”43 By 9 May 1941, over forty institutions of higher learning offered COTC training or some form of basic military training (see Appendix 5).44 The number of students enrolled in training across the country—including summer military camp— increased from 2,138 in 1940 to 10,422 in 1941.45

42 “Meeting of the Conference of Canadian Universities, Ottawa, 5 July 1940,” n.d., 15-16; and DUASC, UA-3, Box 256, File 4, H.J. Cody to J.L. Ralston, 13 July 1940. 43 “The University and the War,” The University of Toronto Monthly XLI, no. 3 (December 1940): 64. 44 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-4, A.A. Bell for J.K. Lawson, to Supervisor of Recruiting, for Military Training, Department of National War Service, 9 May 1941. 45 Even though military training remained compulsory, these numbers declined in subsequent years: 8,353 in 1942, 8,957 in 1943, 7,184 in 1944, and 7,440 in 1945. This, in part, was the result of the introduction of policies exempting students in essential courses from summer camp and reducing the number of required hours of training for senior students. See LAC, RG27, Volume 2-133, Part 6, unsigned letter to Maingot, 17 87

Students rushed to join the COTC in order to fulfill their obligations under the government’s regulations. The University of British Columbia contingent increased from

98 in 1938-1939 to 219 in 1939-1940 after the outbreak of war and to 1,738 in 1940-1941 after the implementation of the war services regulations.46 Between 1938 and 1943, the total strength of COTC contingents across the country almost quadrupled. In June 1938, the COTC consisted of twenty-one authorized contingents with a total strength of 271 officers and 2,755 other ranks; as of 30 November 1943, this had reached 604 officers and 11,207 other ranks.47 By the end of 1943, the COTC was operating at thirty-three institutions of higher learning with the largest strengths at the Université de Montréal

(1,761),48 the University of Manitoba (1,184),49 the University of Toronto (1,176), the

University of British Columbia (895), and McGill University (878).50

Larger institutions were better equipped to meet the challenges associated with training record numbers. McGill University and the University of Toronto had their own armouries and were able to provide students with more centralized training. Institutions

September 1945, in Michael Stevenson, Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 52, 191. 46 Report of the President of the University of British Columbia for the Academic Year Ended August 31st, 1941 (Vancouver: the University of British Columbia, 1941), 80; and UBCA, Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion Collection / Combined Services Trust Committee, Box 2, COTC, “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1940 to August 31, 1941,” n.d., 4. 47 In 1939, the COTC had an authorized establishment of 282 officers and 4,512 other ranks. In 1943, the authorized establishment was 768 officers and 12,756 other ranks. 48 This number is significantly higher because it includes enrolment at the affiliated colleges. 49 This number is comparatively higher because it includes the personnel taking basic training through the auxiliary training battalion. 50 These institutions were: the University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta, Regina College, the University of Saskatchewan, Brandon College, the University of Manitoba, Collège du Sacré-Coeur, Université Saint-Joseph, St. Thomas University, Mount Allison University, the University of New Brunswick, Collège Ste-Anne, St. Dunstan’s University, St. Francis Xavier University, Acadia University, Nova Scotia Technical College, Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf, Collège Mont-Saint-Louis, Macdonald College, University of Bishop’s College, Université de Montréal, Loyola College, McGill University, University of Ottawa, Queen’s University, Osgoode Hall, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, the Ontario Agricultural College, and the University of Western Ontario. See J.C. Murchie to the Minister, 8 June 1944, Appendix A. 88 without campus accommodations, on the other hand, struggled to secure adequate facilities. The University of Manitoba, for example, carried out training at three locations ten miles apart: Minto Street Armoury, MacGregor Barracks, and Fort Garry.51 All training at the University of British Columbia during 1940-1941 was undertaken outdoors. As a result of the need for additional accommodations, in particular a drill floor, the university decided to build its own armoury, which officially opened on 22

November 1941.52

The intensification of the country’s war effort and the resulting introduction of compulsory training precipitated the reorganization of university service training. Officer training was restricted to senior students and students with previous military training and experience. Almost all universities, with the exception of the University of Manitoba, reorganized officer training based on the arm of service rather than by faculty, as had previously been the practice. Where before there were companies for medicine, engineering, and arts, now there were companies for infantry, artillery, and signals.

Larger contingents followed the example set by the University of Toronto and McGill

University the previous year and began providing training for officer qualifications for several specialized branches of the service, such as the Royal Canadian Army Service

Corps (RCASC), the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), the Royal Canadian Engineers

(RCE), the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC), the Royal Canadian Army Medical

51 Students in second-, third-, and fourth-year engineering, third- and fourth-year science, and all students in architecture and agriculture received training at Fort Garry. Students of the junior division, the affiliated colleges, and grade twelve students from local high schools received training at the Minto Street barracks. See University of Manitoba Archives and Special Collections (UMA), UA41, Box 1, Folder 6, C.R. Hopper to Military District No. 10, 8 September 1943. 52 “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1940 to August 31, 1941,” n.d., 6; and UBCA, Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion Collection / Combined Services Trust Committee, Box 2, COTC, “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1941 to August 31, 1942,” n.d., 3. 89

Corps (RCAMC), and the Canadian Dental Corps (CDC).53 To help students choose which arm of service in which to qualify, NDHQ distributed information on the probable demand for officers in the various arms. In September 1940, these percentages were as follows: 17% artillery, 15% engineers, 4% signals, 30% infantry (rifle), 16% infantry

(machine gun), 5% army service corps, 3% army dental corps, 7% army medical corps, and 3% ordnance corps.54 Smaller institutions lacked the resources to provide special to arm training. Dalhousie University’s contingent, for example, was infantry only. In some instances, the local army training establishment and larger universities met the needs of smaller institutions. University of Manitoba students who had completed basic training underwent specialized or advanced training with a local reserve unit, which was better supplied with instructors and had fewer men to train.55 The McGill University and

Université de Montréal contingents offered instruction to cadets of other contingents in their military district who were unable to provide instruction in arms other than infantry due to a lack of instructional staff and equipment.56

In addition to the expansion of the COTC, in order to meet the terms agreed upon at the July 1940 conference, university authorities introduced auxiliary training units to

53 In 1939, for example, the McGill COTC was divided into eight companies with specific platoons and sections for members seeking commissions in a specific branch of the service. Principal F. Cyril James of McGill University later argued that without these cadets, specialized units would have been “hard pressed to have completed their establishments for the Units and Drafts which were being rapidly organized and sent Overseas.” See F. Cyril James, untitled COTC history, 2. 54 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 006, University of Toronto Training Centre Battalion War Diary 1941-1942 (2 of 2), “University of Toronto Contingent C.O.T.C. Auxiliary Battalion,” Information Regarding Arms of the Service, 23 September 1940. 55 In the fall of 1944, for example, approximately 180 students from the University of Manitoba took special to arm training with a local reserve unit. Of these, 75 were taking training in the RCAMC, 20 in the RCE, 40 in the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS), 2 in the RCA, and 45 in MT and MC. See DUASC, UA-3, Box 256, File 4, “Comments and suggestions concerning University contribution to War Services and National Defence,” n.d.; and UMA, UA41, Box 1, Folder 7, C.R. Hopper, “C.O.T.C. Training 1944-45,” n.d. 56 UTARMS, B1993-0045, Box 2, File COTC 1, H.H. Madill, “Report of the Syllabus Sub-Committee of the C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities,” 28 October 1943. 90 accommodate and facilitate compulsory training.57 Most commonly named auxiliary training battalions, these units provided basic training for three groups: (1) students needing to satisfy the government’s regulations; (2) students who required basic training because they were planning to later enroll in officer training through the COTC; and (3) students under twenty years-of-age or ineligible for call up but who wanted to voluntarily enroll for training. Initially, these units were not authorized units of the Canadian Army and held no military status; accordingly, members were not given pay or provided with uniforms. Commanding officers carried out auxiliary training in accordance with the standard syllabus for Canadian Militia Training Centres, a thirty-day program comprising

220 hours of instructional periods that, in general, instilled the fundamentals of infantry training. As in the case of officer training, 110 hours were conducted on campus during the academic year and the remaining 110 hours at a military camp during the spring and summer months.58

Take, for example, the reorganization of the University of Toronto COTC. In order to better provide instruction to over 3,500 undergraduates and 425 graduates during the 1940-1941 academic year, the university divided its contingent into three divisions: the Officer Training Battalion, the Training Centre Battalion, and a division providing basic training for male students under twenty years-of-age. The Officer Training

57 At the 5 July 1940 meeting between university heads and government and military officials, the government asked universities to organize auxiliary training corps to facilitate the compulsory training of students. See DUASC, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, Carleton Stanley, untitled address to students, 2 November 1941. 58 Camp training included drill, night marching, route marching, physical training, visual training, demonstrations of firepower, fieldwork, bayonet exercises, map reading, fieldwork, and a rifle range course. See “The Contribution of McGill University to the War Effort,” 20; Dalhousie University, Pharos: Yearbook of 1941 (Halifax: Dalhousie University Council of Students, 1941), 73; and Lewis Gwynne Thomas, The University of Alberta in the War of 1939-45 (Edmonton: the University of Alberta, 1948), 10. 91

Battalion was divided into twelve companies according to arm of service.59 Enrolment was restricted to those on strength with the contingent the previous year, graduates, and undergraduate students in their final year of study (over 700, 425, and over 300 respectively).60 Before being taken on strength, new applicants had to pass a personal interview with a board of officers and agree to accept commission in the CASF or the

NPAM if it were offered. Given their large number, the remaining 2,000 undergraduates—a little over fifty percent of the total number taking military training on campus—were divided by age for required basic training. Facetiously referred to as the

“kindergarten group,” approximately 850 students underwent military instruction in the eighteen- and nineteen-year-old division.61 The Training Centre Battalion offered two courses of military training for the remainder: a basic course for students not enrolled in the last session and an advanced course for students enrolled in the battalion in the previous session who had completed the prescribed hours of intramural and camp training.62

59 These companies were as follows: A Coy Artillery (150 graduates), B Coy Artillery (164 undergraduates), C Coy Engineers (167), D Coy OME and Signals (117), E Coy Infantry Rifle (135), F Coy Infantry Rifle (90), G Coy Infantry Rifle (95), H Coy Infantry Machine Gun (101), I Coy Infantry Machine Gun (92), K Coy Army Service Corps (126), L Coy Medicine (160), and M Coy Dentistry (89). See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 006, File 02, H.H. Madill, “Report of the Officer Commanding the University of Toronto Contingent Canadian Officers Training Corps, 1940-1941,” 4. 60 This was typical of other contingents. Officer training at the University of British Columbia, for example, was restricted to graduate students, undergraduate students in the final years of their program, third- and fourth-year students in applied science, third-year students in arts and science and agriculture, and students in their first or second years who were members of the NPAM or CASF. See “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1940 to August 31, 1941,” 1. 61 As a result of the larger number of students requiring training, those under twenty years-of-age at the institution received only two hours of military instruction per week, consisting of elementary instruction in drill and weapons training. See H.J. Cody, untitled history of University of Toronto Contingent COTC, 8; “Report of the Officer Commanding the University of Toronto Contingent Canadian Officers Training Corps, 1940-1941,” 4-7; and “Training 3,800 for Army In C.O.T.C. at University,” The Globe and Mail, 14 November 1940, 4. 62 MUA, UA41, Box 1, Folder 5, “University of Toronto Regulations respecting military training for the session 1941-1942,” n.d. 92

The creation of auxiliary training units substantially reduced the number of students enrolled in officer training. Between 1939-1940 and 1940-1941, officer training through the McGill University contingent of the COTC decreased by approximately fifty percent. Enrolment in the university’s auxiliary unit, the Military Reserve Training

Battalion (MRTB), on the other hand, reached 1,562 in 1940-1941, ten percent more than the strength of the COTC contingent the previous year.63 In the same year, the officer training units of the University of Saskatchewan and the University of Manitoba numbered 516 and 576 respectively while their auxiliary units totaled over 740 and 716 respectively.64 There was one notable exception to this pattern. Enrolment in the

Dalhousie University contingent remained almost completely unchanged. With a total strength of 228 in 1940-1941, the contingent numbered only one less member than it had in the previous year. Still, like at other institutions, the 240 students enrolled in the university’s auxiliary unit exceeded those taking officer training.65

II: Women’s Service Training Units

The introduction of compulsory training for male students intensified discussion about the wartime obligations of female university students. If the government required male students to take military training in order to continue in their studies, should female students not also be expected to share in their wartime responsibilities and make an analogous contribution? In the first year of the war, university authorities had reminded women that they, too, had a part to play in victory, but they left it to each female student

63 Morton, 43. 64 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1940-1941 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan: 1941), 97; “One Thousand Take Military Training At Saskatchewan,” The Ubyssey, 29 October 1940, 1; and Thomas, 10. 65 Pharos: Yearbook of 1940, 79-80; and Pharos: Yearbook of 1941, 71. 93 to determine the form and extent of their wartime activities. The NCCU executive did not initially consider the matter, but Charlotte Melrose, the president of the Canadian

Federation of University Women, advised university women they could best assist in the war by providing “sane leadership” and laying a strong foundation for post-war conditions.66 Alice Douglas, the Dean of Women at Queen’s University, urged “every girl to realize her responsibilities” even though they were not called upon to drill.67 By the same token, President Henry John Cody of the University of Toronto recognized that while “specific duties in connection with our national war effort have not been laid upon the women undergraduates,” he knew they were “eager … to do their utmost.” Women would always have a “chief share in maintaining morale,” Cody maintained, and he encouraged women to “consider and devise methods of sharing in the various war efforts of the community within the limits of opportunity imposed by their university studies”

(Emphasis in Original).68

The onus on female students to determine for themselves a suitable contribution, however, diminished as the nation’s war effort intensified. By the 1942-1943 academic year, most of Canada’s leading universities had mapped out definite service training programs for their female students.69 The Women’s Service Training Detachments

66 “Co-eds’ Part in War Explained,” The Gateway, 20 October 1939, 1. 67 The Queen’s Journal, 1 October 1940, quoted in Frederick W. Gibson, Queen’s University Volume II: 1917-1961 (Kingston and Montreal: Queen’s University Press, 1983), 185. 68 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 006, University of Toronto Training Centre Battalion War Diary 1941-1942 (2 of 2), “A Message from the President,” 23 September 1940. 69 Dalhousie University, Université Laval, and the University of Bishop’s College did not require female students to follow a prescribed course of war work or service training. There were very few female students at Université Laval during the war; therefore, a program was largely unnecessary. The university offered, however, a program entitled “Préparation militaire supérieure” and there is a record of one female student, Andrea Cliche, attending a course titled “Corps universitaire d’entrainement militaire.” Dalhousie University offered instruction in home nursing and training through a women’s firefighting brigade under the supervision of Major O.R. Crowell of the COTC, but such training was entirely voluntary. See “Notice: Physical Training at Dal,” Dalhousie Gazette, 2 October 1942, 4; “Girls of Dalhousie Do Their Part,” 94

(WSTD) of the Canadian Red Cross Corps (CRCC) comprised one of the most extensive and comprehensive programs of service training for female university students. After the

NCCU ruled senior intercollegiate competitions for male students would be discontinued for the 1940-1941 academic year—based on the argument that the “energy and available time of male students should be given to military training”—a discussion emerged at the

University of Toronto about whether it was prudent to continue women’s competitive sports. Undergraduates of the institution’s Women’s Athletic Directorate (WAD) decided that if service training could incorporate “suitable” physical exercise, women athletes would support a service program over continued participation in intercollegiate athletics.

The WAD subsequently contacted different service organizations to discuss collaboration and the most amenable response came from the Women’s Voluntary Service Corps

(WVSC) of the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS), formed in June 1940 to train young women for regular or emergency duty in various forms of national service. The CRCS and university authorities were “convinced” that at least one of the four sections of the

WVSC—transport, nursing auxiliary, office administration, and food administration— would appeal to university women, and the CRCS made plans to establish an experimental detachment at the University of Toronto under the direct supervision of the

Adelaide M. Plumptre, the National Commandant of the WVSC.70

On 10 October 1940, Cody announced the formation of the WSTD, to be financed by the Women’s Athletic Association and organized into six platoons based on college

Dalhousie Gazette, 4 December 1942, 4; and “Dal Girls All-Out In War Effort,” Dalhousie Gazette, 19 February 1943, 1. 70 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 006, University of Toronto Training Centre Battalion War Diary 1941-1942 (2 of 2), “Compulsory Military Training,” 23 September 1940; and “The University and the War,” University of Toronto Monthly XLI, no. 7 (April 1941): 185-186. 95 and faculty under the command of A.E. Marie Parkes, the secretary of the WAD.71 The program, developed by the WAD and university officials in cooperation with Plumptre, prepared women “for service in time of need, both in war and peace.” It consisted of elementary and company drill and instruction in the complete course on civilian Air Raid

Precautions (ARP), which was required by the Ontario Government. The training curriculum included instruction in the history and organization of the CRCS. In addition, the syllabus incorporated material on civilian defence organization, military organization, martial law, military communication, and triage procedures. Enrolment was voluntary and limited to 200 full-time undergraduate students eighteen years-of-age and older, with preference given to senior students, athletes, and students with leadership experience.

Approximately 150 women registered within ten days of its formation. Plumptre called women at the university “pioneers in this work” and said that while there was no guarantee the government would call up women, she “strongly believed that the time was not far off when their services would be needed.”72

The WSTD program quickly spread to other institutions in central Canada. In

1940-1941, McMaster University, McGill University, and Queen’s University formed their own detachments of the CRCS. The University of New Brunswick established its

71 The WSTD consisted of one platoon each from St. Hilda’s College and Victoria College, one from Occupational Therapy and Physiotherapy, and three from University College, of which one was composed of graduating students, one of second-year students, and one of non-graduating third-year students. 72 “The University and the War” (December 1940): 65; “The University and the War,” The University of Toronto Monthly XLII, no. 2 (November 1941): 38; “The University and the War,” The University of Toronto Monthly XLI, no. 4 (January 1941): 94; and “The Universtiy and the War” (April 1941): 186-187. For more on the war effort of women at the University of Toronto, see Nancy Kiefer and Ruth Roach Pierson, “The War Effort and Women Students at the University of Toronto, 1939-45,” in Youth, University, and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education, eds. Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989), 161-184. 96 short-lived detachment in 1943, the first university in the Maritimes to do so.73

Universities in western Canada never formed WSTD detachments (although Red Cross training was offered through local detachments of the CRCC), but these institutions developed their own service training plans for their female students. The University of

British Columbia Board of Governors authorized the Department of Nursing and Health to offer a course in home nursing for a limited number of senior women students and the

University of Saskatchewan allowed students to take one of three types of training in groups being formed on campus: (1) servicing and driving cars; (2) practical first aid, bandaging, and dressing; (3) and sewing and knitting for the CRCS.74 Grace Gordon

Hood, the Director of Home Economics at the University of Manitoba, developed a voluntary war emergency program in the fall of 1940, which provided co-eds with a maximum of four hours of training per week. Considered “highly practical,” it offered courses in auto mechanics, first aid, home nursing, large quantity cooking, canteen service, money management, occupational therapy, farm aid, and conservation of clothing and household furnishings.75

Meanwhile, on 2 October 1940, the McGill University Board of Governors approved the formation of the Women’s Training Program, the first compulsory service training plan for full-time female university students pursuing courses leading to degrees or diplomas. Its institution was the result of the combined initiative of Muriel Roscoe, the warden of Royal Victoria College, and the university’s principal, Frank Cyril James, both of whom fervently supported mandatory service training and recognized the need to

73 UNB Archives and Special Collections, “The Second World War at UNB,” accessed February 2014, . 74 “Coeds May Organize War Groups Similar to East U’s,” The Gateway, 8 October 1941, 1; and “Governors Authorize Home Nursing Course,” The Ubyssey, 3 November 1939, 1. 75 “Co-Ed Training At Manitoba University,” The Ubyssey, 29 October 1940, 1. 97 equip women to face wartime disasters. A special committee chaired by Roscoe deliberated on the content for the training curriculum and considered recommendations received from the CRCS and the St. John’s Ambulance Association (SJAA). For women to render the most beneficial service, the committee insisted the program needed to provide training for physical fitness and preparation for war emergencies; thus, it devised a “two-fold program” comprising two hours of physical training for all medically fit female students and two hours of course work per week during the academic year in subjects such as first aid and home nursing, the latter of which was developed by the

Faculty of Medicine and the School for Graduate Nurses in consultation with the CRCS and the SJAA.76

Roscoe explained the program was aimed at preparing women to provide

“effective” assistance in the event of an immediate wartime emergency or service in the post-war world:

It has been increasingly realized that calamities of war are not localized and that accidents and sabotage, invasion and bombings may occur almost anywhere and at any time. Thus, under the first aspect of the McGill plan, it has been considered of prime importance to visualize what happens in a community visited by disaster and to acquire such technical knowledge and skills as would be needed by women under such conditions. Actually, the task is one of caring for civilian casualties and coping with disorganized life.77

University authorities agreed the plan would enable female students to make the

“appropriate” contribution if they were called upon to do so. The Board of Governors insisted it was intended to offer female students “opportunities comparable to those

76 It was expected that all female students would be required to obtain the joint certificate of these organizations at the conclusion of the course. See MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, File 2252, Press Release, 3 October 1940; MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, File 2252, “National Service Programme for Women,” 2 October 1940; and MUA, RG2, A0000-0016, Container 113, File 3058, “War Service Programme for Women,” 16 October 1940. 77 Muriel Roscoe, “Women’s War Service,” Old McGill 44 (1941): 257. 98 which men students enjoy under the terms of the Compulsory Military Training programme which was put into effect at the beginning of the present session.” Principal

James called the plan a “magnificent opportunity” for women to prepare themselves for definite contributions” in event of any emergency. He insisted the national service of women and men was now “linked.” “Men have immediate work, but the work of maintaining the quality of society, of facing domestic problems, of having minds of your own and of being aware of political issues—that job is yours,” explained James. “As war becomes more serious and man power becomes more efficiently organized, you will be called upon to take part in tasks outside the pale of women’s usual activities.”78

791 students enrolled in the first year of the program.79 In view of the potential

“total effect of disaster on the community,” students prepared in a multitude of areas for possible wartime and post-war emergencies including: the handling of evacuees; the establishment of temporary accommodations; the organization of canteens; emergency rationing; contamination of foods and methods to decontaminate water supplies; disruption of transportation facilities, telephone, and telegraph systems; fire hazards;

ARP; a study of gas mains, gas leakage, water supplies, electric systems, and government and volunteer organizations; and the physical and administrative organization of the community. Course work included a six-week study of first aid topics, including elementary nursing techniques, the treatment of shock, exposure, and exhaustion, preventative measures in relation to public health, the nature and prevention of exposure to diseases, and the importance and methods of psychotherapy. The physical training

78 Press Release, 3 October 1940; and “McGill Co-Eds Receive Compulsory Training,” The Ubyssey, 29 October 1940, 1. 79 569 students enrolled from Royal Victoria College and 222 at Macdonald College. An additional 40 were granted exemptions. 99 syllabus was modeled in part on Britain’s “Keep Fit” program and included corrective and developmental exercises, conditioning and rhythmic exercises, drill, and marching, all of which emphasized the development of physical strength and endurance to cope with prolonged periods of physical and mental exertion.80

Other institutions soon followed McGill’s example. For the 1941-1942 academic year, at the request of female students, the University of Alberta introduced a required forty hours of war service work for women undergraduates consisting of three hours of service per week in one of the following areas: SJAA first aid, home nursing, ARP, signaling, CRCS, clerical work, canteen work, or work with precision instruments and drill. That same year, Queen’s University introduced mandatory service training for women. First year students were required to enroll in the SJAA first aid course and senior students intending to enlist in the Canadian Women’s Army Corps (CWAC) or Canadian

Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (CWAAF) were encouraged to enter the WSTD.81 As in

Alberta, female students at the University of British Columbia requested a compulsory program in the spring of 1942 and over the course of the summer a committee devised a scheme of training comprised of one hour of physical training and one hour of war work in either the Red Cross, first aid, home nursing, map reading, motor mechanics, day

80 MUA, RG2, A0000-0016, Container 113, File 3058, Muriel Roscoe, “Report to Senate on the War Service Program for Women,” 14 February 1941; Muriel Roscoe, “Women’s War Service,” 257, 299; Muriel Roscoe, “Women’s War Work,” Old McGill 45 (1942): 263, 282; and “Women’s National Service Training,” The Varsity, 23 September 1944, 4. 81 The DND did not encourage female students to leave their studies to enlist in the CWAC. When a misunderstanding arose over whether the CWAC intended to recruit from universities, Major-General H.F.C. Letson, the Adjutant-General, clarified that all military officials agreed women students, particularly those in science, medicine, and dentistry, would be of greater help to the war after they had completed their training. See MUA, RG2, A0000-0016, Container 113, File 3058, H.F.C. Letson to F. Cyril James, 8 September 1942. 100 nursery, or measurements and instruments, with the last four courses being open only to students who had already completed one year of training.82

The following year, the University of Toronto made its women’s service training program compulsory, as did the University of Saskatchewan, the University of Manitoba, and Brandon College. The program at the University of Toronto was one of the most extensive. Students completed their required service training through the prescribed

Women’s National Service Training Courses comprised of eight training courses: the university detachment of the CRCC, hospital nursing aids, volunteers for civic day nurseries, nutrition, recreation leadership, Red Cross sewing, ARP and home nursing, and

ARP and first aid certificate (see Appendix 6).83 Every woman was required to undergo

60 hours of training during the academic year, but some courses were more demanding than others. For example, the hospital nursing aids course required 20 hours of lectures and 60 hours of service in hospital wards and students had to agree to serve at least 250 hours after completing their training.84

While certainly prompted by the institution of the National War Services

Regulations, the importance of service training for female students was reinforced by a number of other developments. The creation of university detachments of the CRCC, the pioneering, mandatory program introduced by McGill University in 1940, and the demands of organized female students were particularly instrumental. As a result of labour shortages, the government created the Women’s Division of National Selective

82 Thomas, 11; UBCA, Senate Fonds, Box 12, File 17, “Report on Women’s Compulsory War Work for the Session 1942-43,” n.d.; and “War Training Plan To Stress Special Work; Weekly P-T,” The Ubyssey, 22 September 1942, 1. 83 “Women’s National Service Training,” The Varsity, 21 September 1942, 4; and “The University and the War,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 2 (November 1942): 41. 84 “Compulsory War Training For University Women,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 4 (January 1943): 112. 101

Service in the spring of 1942 to oversee and mobilize women for employment in war industries and essential services.85 Most significantly, after the government authorized the formation of the CWAC and the CWAAF in the summer of 1941 and the Women’s

Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS) in July of the following year, university authorities could no longer deny it was both desirable and necessary to provide basic training to prepare female students for enlistment. There was now “no question of the world’s need of women’s services, particularly in wartime,” reasoned Dean Douglas of

Queen’s University.86 Principal James of McGill University insisted universities had to at least “attempt” to provide women with basic training “in the same way that basic training of men is given as a preparation for enlistment in the Army.”87

Despite the recognized importance of women’s training, proposals by government and university authorities to nationalize a compulsory service training program for female university students were unsuccessful. In 1943, the DND briefly considered establishing a course for women corresponding to that given to men through the COTC, UATC, and

UNTD to prepare female students for commissions in the three women’s corps. This was ultimately abandoned in view of opposition from university heads who argued such training was superfluous given that the suggested syllabus was almost identical to the preliminary training of the CWAC.88

At the nineteenth conference of the NCCU in June 1942, President Robert

Newton of the University of Alberta asked delegates to deliberate on three questions: (1)

85 Kiefer and Pierson, 174. 86 Queen’s University Archives (QUA), “Queen’s Remembers: The Second World War,” accessed February 2014, . 87 MUA, RG2, A0000-0016, Container 113, File 3058, F. Cyril James to H.F.C. Letson, 29 July 1942. 88 Ibid., File 3065, “Minutes of a meeting of the University Committee on Military Education,” 3 February 1943, 3. 102 what did the NCCU consider a “reasonable” amount of compulsory service training for female students? (2) should an attempt be made to develop a standard syllabus on the basis of what would be “most helpful to women students who later enlist in the armed services?” and (3) should a special course of training be developed for female students preparing to enter war industries? On the last day of the conference, Newton brought forward a motion calling for the integration of service training for women and the training in the CWAC. He argued this would allow women to “get credit for the training they have had in the universities” along lines similar to that being given to male students with COTC training when they entered the army. His motion was not seconded. Principal

Wallace of Queen’s University argued the variety of training undertaken by women was

“in itself security that they will find their way into useful occupations.” President James

Sutherland Thomson of the University of Saskatchewan and Robert Fletcher Argue, the

Dean of Junior Men at the University of Manitoba, agreed with Wallace, and the conference ruled to continue to allow each institution to determine and plan its own program for women.89

Service training programs for female students were thus developed and implemented based on the needs and resources of each institution and the expressed interests of the student body. They remained specific to each institution throughout the war. The number of required hours of service ranged from 40 to 110 per academic year, with the majority of institutions requiring 60 hours per year.90 While this was less substantial than the program for male students, service training constituted only one type

89 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942 (Toronto: s.n., 1942), 53-54, 106-108. 90 “Canadian Co-eds Are En masse Behind The Country’s War Effort,” Dalhousie Gazette LXXV, no. 5 (20 October 1942), 1. 103 of war work for female students. It should be noted that in many cases, female students went beyond the compulsory requirements, organizing additional study periods and taking part in numerous fundraising and relief efforts.

The training programs for female students offered similar courses and operated under the same basic principles and mandates. As in the case of male students, service training for women was designed to make national service possible without “interfering” with the completion of the students’ academic course.91 Most operated with the assistance of COTC instructors, who often provided training for female students. Regimental

Sergeant-Major A. Andrews of the University of Toronto contingent of the COTC, for example, provided instruction in elementary and company drill to female students, and the McGill COTC Signals Section trained 154 students of the Royal Victoria College in a course for wireless operators in the fall term of 1941.92 The content of courses reflected gendered notions of women’s inherent qualities and responsibilities and exemplified, in many ways, what historian Linda Quiney termed “gendered militarism.”93 As Principal

James of McGill University so clearly explained in an address to students in September

1941, such programs were intended to prepare women for work in “spheres of activity” through which they could “most effectively contribute.”94 In public announcements and speeches on women’s training, university officials emphasized the role of women as caretakers and nurturers but they also frequently underscored that women would need to help win the war by entering non-traditional roles. Moreover, they likened women’s

91 “Canadian Co-eds Are En masse Behind The Country’s War Effort,” 1. 92 John William Griffin, “The University and the War,” Torontonensis (1941), 213; and MUA, RG2, A0000-0016, Container 113, File 3058, William Bowie to J. Argue, 2 December 1941. 93 Linda J. Quiney, “‘Bravely and Loyally They Answered the Call’: St. John Ambulance, the Red Cross, and the Patriotic Service of Canadian Women During the Great War,” History of Intellectual Culture 5, no. 1 (2005), 6. 94 “Principal’s Message To the Students,” McGill Daily, 29 September 1941, 1. 104 service training to the basic training given to male students. The message was not without its conflicting sentiments: women should contribute using the skills regarded as characteristic of their gender, but they had to also be prepared to do the work of men if it became necessary to relieve men for overseas service.

III: The University Air Service Corps

University service training continued to expand and became increasingly specialized with the introduction of air and naval training programs on campus. The

RCAF and the RCNVR recognized the contributions made by the COTC and established their own training units based on the army program. The RCAF was the first to recognize the value of service training at universities. The creation of the University Air Training

Corps (UATC), renamed the University Air Squadrons (UAS) in 1944, had its roots in the establishment of radio mechanics training courses at universities in 1941.95

To help meet British demand for an estimated 2,500 radio direction finding (RDF) personnel, in early 1941 Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King proposed the establishment of a training program for radio mechanics in Canada. The British Air

Ministry approved the course on the condition that recruits would be enlisted in the

RCAF and undertake training within institutions of higher learning, two stipulations that proved critical to future RCAF-university collaboration. An RCAF special committee collaborated with university officials and oversaw the development and implementation of the program. In May and June of 1941, 2,502 candidates began training through

Course No. 1 at fifteen universities across the country. Despite a high wastage rate,

Charles Gavan Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air, deemed the program a

95 For more on the history of wartime radio training in Canadian universities, see chapter five. 105 success because of the excellent standard of training given by university staff. Additional contracts were drawn up between the government and universities to offer further courses.96

The perceived success of radio training demonstrated the usefulness of university resources to the RCAF war effort and encouraged an emerging and much larger discussion amongst RCAF officials about the future role of institutions of higher education in air force training. On 23 July 1941, university officials travelled to RCAF headquarters in Ottawa to discuss with the RCAF special committee the future of radio mechanics training and to arrange the details of the program for the 1941-1942 academic year. Group Captain D.C.M. Hume, the Director of Technical Training for the RCAF, chaired the meeting.97 Eighteen university officials representing fourteen institutions and fourteen air force officials, including representatives of the Director of Air Force

Manning, the Director of Airmen Personnel Services, the Director of Air Organization, and the Director of Training Plans and Requirements, attended the conference. The most important outcome of the meeting was a proposal for the expansion of air training in universities. Hume insisted universities had the ability to “very materially assist in producing trained men” and urged an expansion of their use for RCAF training. He asked

96 Robert F. Linden, “Policies and Politics in RCAF Radar – World War II,” in Canadians on Radar: Royal Canadian Air Force, 1940-1945, ed. Robert F. Linden (Ottawa: Canadian Radar History Project, 2000), I- 5, I-6; Albert de Niverville to A.F. Baird, D.G. McGregor, H.R. Theakston, and D.A. Keys, 26 March 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. de Niverville to Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, 25 March 1941; UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, File 17, C.G. Power to H.J. Cody, 27 June 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. de Niverville to All Commands, 30 March 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, K.G. Nairn, “Memorandum Re Radio Mechanics – Accommodation at University of Toronto,” 20 November 1942. 97 Hume was born in England and educated as an engineer. He served with the Royal Naval Air Service and later worked on aeronautical engineering design in the production department of the RAF during the First World War. In 1923, he came to Canada and joined the RCAF. He served as a technical officer for the permanent force of the RCAF for twenty years and as the national director of the Air Cadet League of Canada from May 1942 until his retirement in 1944. See “Group Capt. Hume Will Be Retired,” Ottawa Citizen, 27 April 1944, 10. 106 university heads if their institutions could “infuse into their courses” for radio mechanics subjects that were particularly important for potential air force personnel, including polarized mathematics, navigation, and signals in order to “benefit” students intending to enlist in the RCAF after they completed the academic year. Hume suggested such a course could be combined with air force training “along C.O.T.C. lines,” allowing students to bypass Initial Training Schools (ITS) of the BCATP in their ground training,

“substantially” decreasing the time it took to produce much-needed aircrew.98

Hume’s recommendations received favourable support amongst university officials. This was unsurprising. At the 5 July 1940 conference with government and military representatives, university heads had suggested that, given the popularity of the air force amongst students, some form of primary training be given by universities equipped to do so and that some of the “ground subjects” might be taught to students in the COTC who were interested in joining the RCAF.99

The RCAF began working on a proposal for aircrew training at universities in consultation with representatives of the University Military Training Committee, army officials, and the Department of National War Services (DNWS). After Power, Colonel

J.K. Lawson, the Director of Military Training, and the DNWS approved the plan, the concerned air officers commanding distributed the details to university heads in late

September 1941. The proposal called for the creation of the University Air Training Plan

(UATP), a pre-enlistment training program primarily designed to give preliminary

98 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” n.d. 99 Terrence Sheard, representing the Deputy Minister of Air, however, struck down this proposal. He argued universities could best assist the RCAF by helping with the training of instructors for ground work. Since he regarded university graduates as the best material for this purpose, Sheard suggested the RCAF and universities establish a cooperative organization through which the RCAF could apply for the “type of man wanted.” See “Meeting of the Conference of Canadian Universities, Ottawa, 5 July 1940,” 12. 107 training for aircrew and intended to produce a reserve of potential pilots and observers for the RCAF. The UATP would comprise the entire course of ground instruction given at

ITS and would be much more intensive than the COTC, consisting of 201 hours of training.100 If the candidate already had military training and a good knowledge of mathematics, however, this training could be considerably reduced. The syllabus would include air force drill, an early type of flight simulation using the recently developed visual link trainer, and lectures on signals, the recognition of hostile aircraft, and air force law, discipline, administration, and organization. In addition, at the end of each academic year, UATP trainees would attend a two-week camp at a nearby air force station.

Successful recruits would be eligible for entrance to Elementary Flying Training Schools

(EFTS).101 Students would be required to complete compulsory military training in the first year of their studies before enrolling and would have to be of aircrew medical standard and at least eighteen years-of-age at the completion of air training. Those who took air training would be recognized as fulfilling the requirements of the NRMA.102 The proposal also stipulated the RCAF would provide instructors for the subjects for which universities had no trained personnel. In reality, while the university, the COTC, and the

100 This training was divided as follows: 25 hours in mathematics, 22 hours in armament, 2 hours in hygiene and sanitation, 20 hours in drill, 30 hours in physical training, 10 hours in organized sports, 6 hours in law, discipline, administration, and organization, 2 hours in visual link trainer exercises, 8 hours in recognition of hostile aircraft, 40 hours in signals, 25 hours in navigation, 6 hours in airmanship, 3 hours in theory of flight, and 2 hours on the principles and basic operation of four-stroke engines. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, T. Sheard for S.L. de Carteret to L.R. LaFlèche, 25 September 1941. 101 The usual procedure for men wishing to undertake aircrew training was for them to spend three to four weeks at a manning depot, several weeks on security guard duty, and eight weeks at ITS. The intention was that after successfully completing the UATP course, students could bypass these three stages. 102 This had not yet received official confirmation. On 25 September 1941, S.L. de Carteret wrote Major General L.R. LaFlèche, the Associate Deputy Minister of the DNWS, to request that the National War Services Regulations be amended to recognize the UATP. LaFlèche responded the next day that he anticipated no problems in making these arrangements. He explained Section 17 regulations would need to be amended to account for air or naval training, given the original regulations were written around army training. See T. Sheard for S.L. de Carteret to L.R. LaFlèche, 25 September 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, L.R. LaFlèche to S.L. de Carteret, 26 September 1941. 108

RCAF assumed joint responsibility for the curriculum, UATP trainees received the majority of their training from COTC instructors during the 1941-1942 academic year.

Air officers commanding asked university heads to immediately contact their training command headquarters if they were “in a position to provide the attached course of instruction.” On 25 September 1941, the Air Ministry announced its plans to the press.103

Owing to the late start of the program, some university administrations found it difficult to enroll students and others postponed its implementation entirely; thus, air training in universities remained a small undertaking during the 1941-1942 academic year.104 As of 27 January 1942, the UATP comprised seven squadrons in training with a combined strength of only 191: 72 at the University of Toronto, 43 at McGill University,

21 at the University of Western Ontario, 20 at the Ontario Agricultural College, 15 at

Queen’s University, 12 at the University of British Columbia, and 8 at the University of

Saskatchewan. Plans were already underway, however, for a substantial expansion of the program. Air Vice-Marshal John Alfred Sully, the Air Member for Personnel,105

103 University of Guelph Library Archival and Special Collections (UGLASC), RE1 OAC A0541, Ontario Agricultural College, President (1928-1947 – Christie), Military Training, Univ. R.C.A.F. Unit, 1941-45, S.L. de Carteret to G.I. Christie, 24 September 1941; T. Sheard for S.L. de Carteret to L.R. LaFlèche, 25 September 1941; and “Universities plan aircrew training,” Montreal Gazette, 26 September 1941, 6. 104 For example, at its 5 December 1941 meeting, the University of Manitoba’s Committee on Military Education decided to not approve the introduction of the UATP for the current academic year. The decision was based on reports from officers commanding of service training units in other universities, a discussion of the local situation, and the fact that the programme could not be completed during the current year given that the fall term was so well advanced. See UMA, UA41, Box 1, Folder 5, Minutes of a meeting of the Committee of Military Education, 5 December 1941. 105 The Air Member for Personnel was responsible for overseeing many areas, including recruiting, manning policies, and pay. Sully occupied this position from November 1941 to April 1945. See Allan Douglas English, Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew, 1939-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 1996), 29; and W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 624. 109 projected an additional 23 squadrons might commence training in September 1942 with a total estimated strength of 1,020.106

RCAF training officials argued it was in the national interest to substantially increase the strength of the UATP. Throughout the 1941-1942 academic year they discussed and planned for the expansion and improvement of air training in consultation with university heads and officers commanding of COTC contingents. In March and

April 1942, air officers commanding distributed the details of a new plan to university heads in a memorandum prepared by AFHQ. It called for the superseding of the UATP with the UATC. Under the terms of the proposal, much would remain unchanged: students would still be required to complete one year of basic military training to qualify for air force training; service in the UATC would satisfy the requirements of the NRMA; university air training would continue to be primarily concerned with shortening the preparation required for students wishing to become aircrew; and successful candidates would be considered as qualified in accordance with ITS standards and immediately commence flying training upon entry into the service. Students would undertake a similar course of instruction, albeit with a few additions such as lectures on navigation, airmanship, engines, armament, and theory of flight. The fundamental difference between the two programs, however, was that the UATC would be established as a reserve corps of the RCAF and undergraduate students would be enlisted rather than simply enrolled.107

106 This number was based on the establishment of squadrons at the Ontario Agricultural College, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, Osgoode Hall, Queen’s University, the University of Ottawa, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Sir George William’s College, Collège Mont-Saint-Louis, Loyola College, Université Laval, the University of New Brunswick, Mount Allison University, Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia Technical College, Acadia University, St. Francis Xavier University, the University of Alberta, and the University of British Columbia. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully, memorandum to A.M.S. (D.P.E.), 27 January 1942. 107 A similar program—the British University Air Squadrons—had recently been established in Britain. Its first course began on 15 April 1941 and was offered at eleven institutions: the University of Oxford, the 110

To train in the UATC, students would have to “declare” their “intention to transfer to active service on termination” of their university course and their enlistment would be subject to their “suitability” for active service under current government regulations and

RCAF standards and requirements.108 Given the support expressed by university officials for air training, RCAF officials did not anticipate any disagreement to their terms and intended to immediately proceed with the formation of UATC squadrons on campuses across the country.109

Order-in-Council P.C. 2983 of 13 May 1942 established the UATC as a reserve corps of the RCAF “for the purpose of training University students during the period of their University course” (see Appendix 7). The order stipulated the corps would bear the same relationship to the air force as the COTC did to the army. In other words, it placed the UATC “on parallel” with the COTC.110 The program’s implementation, however, was delayed pending a government decision on a proposal recently submitted by representatives of the NCCU executive, deans of engineering and science, the three armed services, National Selective Service (NSS), the Wartime Bureau of Technical

University of Cambridge, the University of Manchester, the University of Dundee, the University of Glasgow, the University of Aberdeen, the University of St. Andrews (Belfast), Aberystwych University, the University of Leeds, Durham University, and the University Liverpool. Candidates selected by a special RAF board were attested to the RAF before being placed on deferred service for the course of their university training. They received instruction in mathematics, mechanics, electricity, magnetism, engineering, meteorology, and navigation. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, Vincent Massey to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 4 February 1941. 108 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18612, Volume 1, Royal Canadian Air Force Attestation Paper, n.d. 109 UGLASC, RE OAC A0541, Ontario Agricultural College, President (1928-1947 – Christie), Military Training, Univ. R.C.A.F. Unit, 1941-45, J.M. Cohu to G.I. Christie, 29 March 1942; and UGLASC, RE OAC A0541, Ontario Agricultural College, President (1928-1947 – Christie), Military Training, Univ. R.C.A.F. Unit, 1941-45, J.M. Cohu to the President, University of Toronto, the Ontario Agricultural College, and the University of Western Ontario, the Principal, Queen’s University, and the Chancellor, McMaster University, 25 April 1942. 110 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, Organizational Order No. 227, Formation of the University Air Training Corps of the Royal Canadian Air Force, 10 September 1942. 111

Personnel (WBTP), and other interested government departments.111 This proposal emerged from a conference held in Ottawa on May 11-12, 1942, to discuss and develop a plan to coordinate the demand for students studying engineering and science.112 For

RCAF training officials, the most significant resolution recommended that National

Selective Service begin directing and assigning students in high demand to one of the branches of the armed services or war industry. This resolution could potentially limit the benefits of their new training scheme, especially since one of the primary motivations in establishing the UATC was to facilitate the recruitment of several hundred students in engineering and science for positions as aeronautical and works engineers, signals and radio officers, and instructors in air navigation. On 22 May 1942, Colonel R.G.

Whitelaw, the Director of Military Training, wrote Brigadier Ernest P. Weeks, the

Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to explain the problem:

It would appear that the R.C.A.F. do not intend to take further action either in the organization of new units or in the preparation of their regulations until they have some assurance that, in any policy adopted by the government with respect to the allotment of manpower as a result of the meeting on the 11th May, there will be sufficient personnel eligible in the universities to make the organization of these units worthwhile.113

Ultimately, the proposal to place engineering and science students under the control of

NSS was unsuccessful due to vehement opposition from mobilization board officials.114

111 NSS was established in March 1942 to oversee civilian mobilization, which was previously the responsibility of the Department of National War Services. In September 1942, control of military mobilization was also allocated to NSS. The WBTP was established in February 1941 to coordinate the needs of the armed services and war industries for scientific and technical personnel. For more on NSS and the WBTP, see chapter one. 112 For example, the proposal called for the armed services to stop “direct recruiting” in universities, requested that compulsory military training be made mandatory for no more than two years, and recommended the COTC be dramatically reduced in size by redirecting it to its original purpose of preparing potential officer material. 113 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, Department of National Defence, memorandum to the Director of Military Training, H.Q. 1161-1-26 (Trng. 3), 25 May 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, Department of National Defence memorandum, DMT to DCGS, H.Q. 1161-1-26 (Trng. 3), 26 May 1942. 114 Stevenson, 55-56. 112

By September, air officers commanding were concluding it appeared unlikely government control would be exercised in regards to the enrolment of male students and the allocation of technically trained university graduates.115 Plans to institute the UATC program resumed.

Organizational Order No. 227 of 10 September 1942 made the formation of the

UATC effective as of 15 September 1942 and stipulated the corps would be comprised of squadrons already authorized. The order also allowed for the future authorization of additional squadrons.116 It stipulated each squadron would be under the authority of the appropriate regional command: No. 1 Training Command in Toronto overseeing southern

Ontario; No. 2 Training Command in Winnipeg overseeing northwestern Ontario and

Manitoba; No. 3 Training Command in Montreal overseeing Eastern Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes; and No. 4 Training Command in Calgary overseeing Saskatchewan,

Alberta, and British Columbia.117 According to the order, the officer commanding of each squadron would be a member of the university staff with previous air force experience and would be appointed to commission in the UATC of the RCAF and given the rank of squadron leader. University administrations would nominate candidates to AFHQ. The initial establishment of UATC squadrons allowed for UATC personnel comprised of the officer commanding and an RCAF detachment consisting of one administrative officer

115 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, A. de Niverville to the University of Laval, University of Montreal, Acadia University, Dalhousie University, University of Mount Allison, University of New Brunswick, McGill University, University of Ottawa, 3 September 1942. 116 These squadrons were: No. 1 Ontario Agricultural College Squadron, No. 2 University of Western Ontario Squadron, No. 3. University of Toronto Squadron, No. 4 Queen’s University Squadron, No. 5 McGill University Squadron, No. 6 University of British Columbia Squadron, No. 7 University of Saskatchewan Squadron, No. 8 University of Alberta Squadron, No. 9 University of Manitoba Squadron, No. 10 Acadia University Squadron, No. 11 University of New Brunswick Squadron, No. 12 Mount Allison University Squadron, No. 13 McMaster University Squadron, No. 14 Université de Montréal Squadron, No. 15 Université Laval Squadron, No. 16 Dalhousie University Squadron, No. 17 Collège Jean- de-Brébeuf Squadron, and No. 18 Mount Royal College Squadron. 117 These were created to implement the BCATP. 113 with the rank of flight lieutenant, one disciplinarian with the rank of warrant officer class

1, and one administrative clerk with the rank of flight sergeant (see Appendix 8). This establishment was to remain the same regardless of the number of students who enlisted.

Wherever possible universities provided instructors but some institutions found it necessary to secure special reserve staff to assist in giving lectures due to the shortage of qualified instructors. The RCAF provided uniforms and necessary equipment.118

To enlist, students were directed to go to the nearest recruiting centre. Mobile recruiting units were also dispatched to universities in the fall of 1942 to encourage enlistment.119 Physical standards for potential UATC recruits were higher than those of the COTC and as a result, a higher percentage of UATC applicants were rejected. Of the

328 applications for enlistment to the University of British Columbia squadron in 1943-

1944, for example, 69 (21%) were rejected on medical grounds. Upon enlistment, students were given the rank of aircraftsman second class and classified as airmen but not deemed to be on active service. Due to the late start of the program, students transferring to the UATC were given credit for the drills and lectures they had undergone while in the

COTC.120

UATC squadrons were divided into two distinct flight groups: students in arts took aircrew training while those in medicine, engineering, or science took basic ground training similar to the course given by the RCAF to administrative officers. Training

118 “Organizational Order No. 227, Formation of the University Air Training Corps of the Royal Canadian Air Force;” and LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, B.F. Wood, memorandum to A.M.P., 10 November 1942. 119 Mobile recruiting units were very successful. For example, the mobile unit at Mount Allison University enlisted fifty-five students into the UATC on 9 October 1942. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3- 1, F.N. Pickford to Director of Airmen Personnel Services, 12 October 1942. 120 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18611, Volume 1, “U.A.T.C. University Air Training Corps,” pamphlet, n.d.; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, T.H. Matthews, “University Air Training Plan,” 8 April 1942. 114 common to both flights, such as drill, physical training, anti-gas training, and lectures on air force law, discipline, administration, and organization, was given to squadrons as a whole. The schedule was similar to that provided by the COTC—130 hours of training per academic session—but trainees spent significantly more time in lectures as opposed to drill (on average only approximately one hour per week), making the program more attractive to students who wanted to avoid drilling during the colder weather. At the end of each academic year, UATC members attended a two-week summer camp at air force stations where they were given practical experience characteristic of an EFTS. Students who completed the UATC course were eligible for entrance to the EFTS or Air Observer

Schools with the rank of leading aircraftsman. The entire course was completed in two academic years, following which if the student did not enlist for active service, they were reclassified as leading aircraftsman and given more advanced training. Air force regulations ordered that these trainees, upon transferring to active service as aircrew, should bypass the greater portion of air force basic training and proceed to more advanced training courses “as quickly as the exigencies of the Service permit.”121 By and large, this meant students who successfully completed UATC training went to a manning depot for a period of approximately three or four weeks where they would be given inoculations and complete the required documentation. They then proceeded to an ITS for approximately ten days to complete special medical tests and continue visual link training exercises before going to the EFTS. This reduced regular air force training by almost five months.122

121 “U.A.T.C. University Air Training Corps;” LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, G.O. Johnson to the President of the University of Toronto, the Principal of McMaster University, and the Chancellor or Queen’s University, 28 August 1942; and T.H. Matthews, “University Air Training Plan.” 122 “McGill Plans Air Training,” The McGill Daily, 1 October 1942, 6. 115

The response of university students to air training exceeded the expectations of officials. On 9 November 1942, Air Vice-Marshal J.A. Sully, the Air Member for

Personnel, reported the total strength of the nine squadrons of the UATC numbered

1,250.123 Less than one month later, the reported total strength had increased to 1,840, with the largest numbers enlisting at McGill University (300), Queen’s University (300), the University of Toronto (250), the University of Manitoba (250), and the University of

Alberta (225).124 Sully also reported that based on information received from training commands, an additional four squadrons would soon be formed with the following strengths: 100 at University of British Columbia, 150 at the Université de Montréal, 150 at Université Laval, and 100 at Dalhousie University. This would bring the total strength of the UATC to 2,340. By 18 February 1943, seventeen squadrons were in operation.125

IV: The University Naval Training Detachments

Preparations for the establishment of the University Naval Training Detachments

(UNTD) occurred concurrently with the negotiations that brought about the creation of the UATC. In 1940, Albert Wesley (Jack) Baker, the head of the Department of

Entomology and Zoology at the Ontario Agricultural College, urged the navy to establish a training program in universities for undergraduate students. Baker was already active in naval affairs as a member of the Canadian Navy League and a recruiting agent for the

Hamilton, Ontario, division of the RCNVR and had helped establish the Royal Canadian

123 400 were enlisted at McGill University, 250 at the University of Toronto, 150 at Queen’s University, 100 at the Ontario Agricultural College, 80 at the University of New Brunswick, 70 at Acadia University, 70 at the University of Western Ontario, 70 at McMaster University, and 60 at Mount Allison University. 124 An additional 100 students enlisted at the Ontario Agricultural College, 95 at the University of New Brunswick, 75 at Acadia University, 70 at the University of Western Ontario, 65 at McMaster University, and 60 at Mount Allison. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully, Memorandum to AMO, 1 December 1942. 125 J.A. Sully, Memorandum to AMO, 1 December 1942. 116

Sea Cadet Corps (RCSCC) Ajax in Guelph, Ontario.126 Baker obtained support from

Captain Ernest Reginald Brock, the Commanding Officer of the RCNVR; Captain Harold

Taylor Wood Grant, the Director of Naval Personnel; and Captain Johnson, the Director of Naval Manning.127 The relationship between Baker and Brock played the most significant role in the creation of the UNTD. The two had met in 1938 when Baker was on holiday in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and Brock was aboard the HMCS Saguenay for training. After Brock was appointed Director of Reserve Divisions at Naval Service

Headquarters (NSHQ) in 1939, they often saw each other when Baker visited Ottawa for meetings of the NCCU and other administrative duties.128

Baker and Brock were initially unsuccessful in persuading NSHQ of the necessity of naval officer training in universities. However, in August 1942, Brock visited Baker in

Guelph and proposed the creation of a trial unit at the Ontario Agricultural College. They met with President George Irving Christie to discuss the plan and with his agreement and the approval of university authorities, the first university naval training unit was established in the fall of 1942 as a tender to the HMCS Star in Hamilton. Nine students were attested as ordinary seamen and began their training under the unit’s officers at

RCSCC Ajax.129

126 Baker was a member of the staff at the Ontario Agricultural College from 1911 to 1955. He established the program of entomology and zoology, which included the first undergraduate program in wildlife management in Ontario. He also played a major role in organizing the graduate program at the institution. 127 Grant became the Chief of Naval Staff in 1947. For information on Grant, see Wilfred G.D. Lund, “Chapter 9 Vice-Admiral Harold Grant: Father of the Post-War Royal Canadian Navy,” in Warrior Chiefs: Perspective on Senior Canadian Military Leaders, ed. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), 193-218. 128 Naval Historical Section, Naval Headquarters, Ottawa, “The University Naval Training Divisions,” 1963, accessed November 2013, . 129 UGLASC, RE1 OAC A0166, O.A.C.-O.V.C. University Naval Training Division History, R.H. Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division,” [c. 1961]. 117

The timing of the creation of the experimental unit was the direct result of the establishment of the UATC in May 1942. The regulations governing university air training stipulated students had to declare their intention to serve in the air force following the completion of their university studies, and because of this, the COTC was considering reorganizing its training program to ensure university graduates continued to enter army service. By the early summer of 1942, it was clear that if the Royal Canadian

Navy (RCN) was to be equally as competitive in enlisting university graduates, it would need to establish an analogous training program within institutions of higher learning.

The navy was facing a mounting officer shortage, a result of the service’s enormous wartime growth, and required educated men for positions as petty officers and commissioned officers.130

The naval training unit at the Ontario Agricultural College made “very satisfactory progress” and NSHQ became more interested in the program. Brock asked

Baker to prepare a memorandum on university naval training to potentially be used as a guideline for the creation of a nationwide plan. In December 1942, NSHQ asked Baker to go on active service and to begin visiting universities to discuss the establishment of naval training units. Baker was in a good position to undertake this task. He was active in the NCCU and knew most university heads personally. As a faculty member and department head, he also valued and understood university needs and priorities.131

Baker’s efforts were successful. On 16 January 1943, he was offered a commission as a lieutenant (special branch) in the RCNVR. On 26 January, NSHQ accepted Baker’s memorandum as the plan of operation and recruited him to launch and

130 By 15 August 1945, almost 100,000 additional men entered the navy, requiring over 6,000 officers. See Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952), 7. 131 Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division.” 118 administer university naval divisions. Baker was subsequently promoted to lieutenant commander (special branch) and served as Staff Officer University Training (SOUT) under Brock. For four years he served in the navy, administering the university training program, securing officer technical personnel, and representing the navy on the Technical

Personnel Allocation Committee.132

After Baker’s visits to universities concluded in early 1943, Brock sent a special memorandum to university heads offering to establish naval training on the same basis as the COTC and the UATC. Under the outlined plan, the Department of National Defence for Naval Service proposed the formation of separate divisions named UNTDs within universities situated in cities where there were RCNVR divisions. The regulations mirrored those used in the creation of the UATC. Area commanding officers would be responsible for the direction of training and the appointment of instructors. A member of the faculty nominated by the university and deemed acceptable to NSHQ would be appointed commanding officer to take charge of the division under the corresponding area officer commanding. Students would be enlisted in the navy as ordinary seamen on divisional strength in the local RCNVR division for the duration of the war, regularly attested as ratings, and entitled to defer service until graduation or leave of the university

“subject to the exigencies of the Service.” Training would be divided between the university and the barracks. Students would be issued a kit by the area officer commanding and given pay in conformity with the practices of the COTC and UATC.

132 After his retirement from the navy, Baker remained active in naval and military affairs. He served as a member of the Naval Defence Conference and later as trustee and director of the Naval Benevolent Fund, Vice-Chairman of the Military Studies Committee of the NCCU, and president of the Hamilton and District Branch of the Naval Officers Association of Canada. Baker was also responsible for the establishment of the Navy League of Canada’s scholarship program. See Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division;” and UGLASC, RE1 OAC A0057, File RE1OACA0391, OAC Dept of Entomology and Zoology, Chairman (1920-1955 – Baker), Curriculum Vitae, A.W. Baker, n.d. 119

Consideration would be given to obtaining commissions for suitable ratings. The memorandum stipulated that only students in their third year would be permitted to transfer from the COTC or the UATC before the close of the 1942-1943 academic year.

The senior ranking officer at the university, under the authority of the respective military committee, would be responsible for matters affecting more than one service on campus, such as timetable or training facilities. Service procedure, however, would be observed at all times.133

On 15 February 1943, Brock sent a memorandum to all RCNVR divisions to report arrangements had been completed to establish UNTD divisions.134 The legislation was slow to follow. On 17 April 1943, NSHQ wrote a draft order for the establishment of the UNTD and this was given consideration by the Privy Council on 27 May. Order-in-

Council P.C. 68/4453 of 1 June approved the outlined terms and on 19 June, Naval Order

2854 officially established the training program (see Appendix 9).135 On 22 March 1943,

Major-General Harry Farnham Germain Letson, the Adjutant-General, informed all general officers commanding, all district commanders, the commanders at Camp Borden and Petawawa, and the heads of all branches and directorates of the NDHQ that training given in the UNTD was to be considered equivalent to that given in COTCs. On 15

March 1943, Vice Admiral Percy Walker Nelles, the Chief of the Naval Staff, asked

Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff, to notify the

Department of Labour that the UNTD was considered equivalent to the COTC, as Stuart

133 Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division;” and LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186112, Volume 1, G.H. Cameron to E.R. Brock, “The University Naval Training Division Training and Organization 1943-1944,” 6 July 1944. 134 Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division.” 135 LAC, RG2, Order-in-Council P.C. 68/4453, 1 June 1943. 120 had done in connection with the UATC the previous year.136 The Department of Labour’s

Circular Memorandum No. 816 of 30 March informed all mobilization board chairs and registrars that UNTD training was equivalent to that given by the COTC so far as the administration of mobilization regulations was concerned.137

By the end of the 1942-1943 academic year, the UNTD consisted of sixteen divisions. The division at the Nova Scotia Technical College was subsequently amalgamated into the division at Dalhousie University and King’s College, and thus the program operated at fifteen universities for the 1943-1944 and 1944-1945 academic years: the University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta, the University of

Saskatchewan, the University of Manitoba, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster

University, the Ontario Agricultural College, the University of Toronto, Queen’s

University, the University of Ottawa, McGill University, the Université de Montréal,

Université Laval, Dalhousie University, and St. Francis Xavier University.138

Recruiting for the UNTD began at most institutions in the spring and summer of

1943. Training on campus, however, did not commence until the fall, primarily because it would have interfered with academic examinations and because many administrations rightly ascertained there would be insufficient time for students to complete the proscribed hours of training unless given a full term or year.139 The first group of UNTD ratings received practical and active training during the summer of 1943 at camp and as seamen and stokers on corvettes on patrol along the Atlantic seaboard, but subsequent

136 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, Chief of the Naval Staff to the Chief of the General Staff, 15 March 1943. 137 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-4, Circular Memorandum No. 816, 30 March 1943. 138 Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division;” LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 1, DND, Naval Service, untitled chart on enrolment in UNTD divisions, n.d; and LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 2, E.R. Brock to the Secretary, Naval Board, NSHQ, 28 April 1945. 139 Ellis, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division.” 121 students were recruited and entered the program at the beginning of the academic year.

Students studying mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, engineering physics, or honours mathematics and honour physics were appointed as stoker second class, while all others, excepting medical and dental students, were appointed ordinary seamen.140 The enlistment of applied science students was restricted because of the need for technical personnel and this incited great discussion between university officials and the WBTP.

Under Order-in-Council P.C. 68/4453, science students could enroll and be trained in the

UNTD but were subject to the provisions of Order-in-Council P.C. 246 of 19 January

1943, the National Selective Service Civilian Regulations. University authorities permitted and encouraged science and engineering students to take their military training in the UNTD providing they intended to apply for commissions in the RCNVR engineer branch upon graduation. The assignment of pay corresponded with that of the COTC and

UATC, which varied by institution.141

Enlistment in the UNTD was significantly lower than other university service units (see Figure 4). In 1943-1944, ratings in all naval training divisions totaled 1,306, with the majority of students in their first year of service training on campus.142 Total strength increased to 1,547 the following academic year partly due to the disbandment of the UATC in December 1944, which left the UNTD the only alternative to the COTC. In

140 Medical and dental students could enroll in the UNTD because their training was under the purview of the army. Medical students were enlisted in the RCAMC as active with army pay and allowances in the final two years of their course and did not know definitely whether they would go on service wit the air force, army, or navy until after graduation. See LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, FileND1000-186112, Volume 1, “University Naval Training Division University of Toronto,” [c. 1944]. 141 At the University of British Columbia, for example, ninety percent of pay went to the General Services Trust Fund and ten percent to the individual service’s fund. See LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, FileND1000- 18611, Volume 1, H.J. Cody to E.R. Brock, 5 February 1943; and MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 113, File 3065, Minutes of a meeting of the Executive Committee of the University Committee on Military Instruction, 3 February 1943, 2. 142 For example, at the University of Toronto approximately 250 of the 284 students on divisional strength with the UNTD were in their first year. See “University Naval Training Division University of Toronto.” 122

1943-1944, the largest numbers were trained at the University of Toronto (285), the

University of Manitoba (157), and the University of British Columbia (142), and in 1944-

1945, at the University of Toronto (294), the University of British Columbia (180), and

McGill University (129).143 This proportionately smaller enlistment was in part the result of new military regulations introduced in October 1943 that reduced the required amount of time spent in training for most upper year university students to one hour per week.

Without upper-year men who had completed training the UNTD was unable to profit from the reduced hours and divisions failed to attract students who might otherwise have joined. Moreover, naval regulations did not permit the attestation of men under the age of seventeen-and-a-half, a restriction that affected students in their initial years of study.144

UNTD training inspired less enthusiasm than that given by the UATC; still, some students eagerly anticipated the program. There was understandably more enthusiasm for the program at the Ontario Agricultural College, given Baker’s efforts and its pioneering program. In 1943, for example, McMaster University had about half of the ratings as the

Ontario Agricultural College.145 Universities offering radio artificers courses in 1942, such as the University of New Brunswick and the University of Alberta, reported earlier and greater interest in naval service training amongst students. Naval training also became a more attractive option following the announcement of the termination of the

UATC. On 10 January 1945, Principal John H. Garden of Mount Royal College wrote the

Commanding Officer of the HMCS Tecumseh to report that the “young men at the

143 DND, Naval Service, untitled chart on enrolment in UNTD divisions; LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 2, DND, Naval Service, “Estimate Number of UNTD Ratings Under Training 271607 November, 1945,” n.d; and E.R. Brock to the Secretary, Naval Board, NSHQ, 28 April 1945. 144 “University Naval Training Division,” Old McGill 47 (1944): 275. 145 A.L. McKenzie, “University Naval Training Division,” The O.A.C. Review LVI, no. 2 (November 1943): 106. 123

College” were quite “anxious” for a UNTD to be organized because of the discontinuation of air training at his institution. He estimated there would be at least thirty-five to forty “fit men” for enlistment.146

UNTD divisions were under the administration of the local RCNVR headquarters.

The UNTD was regarded as a tender or auxiliary of the nearest RCNVR reserve division and was under the command of an officer selected from the university staff. The RCNVR supplied instructors and provided facilities for much of the training. Requirements for attestation as seamen were similar to those for aircrew in the RCAF. All were enlisted in the RCNVR and were subject to active service call on leaving the university. Those intending to go on active service went before an Officer Selection Board, making the

UNTD the only remaining route of direct entry to active service as an Officer

Candidate.147

The primary purpose of the UNTD was to prepare students for “eventual service” with the RCNVR. Like in the UATC, UNTD training provided an opportunity for suitable university candidates to take officer training while in undergraduate studies in order to prepare for promotion to commissioned rank following graduation. The UNTD, was not, however, an officers’ training unit. Students enlisted as ratings and were given every opportunity to become officers but they were not assured commissions. It was intended for students definitely planning to join the navy before the beginning of the next academic term and for those under the minimum age limit for compulsory military training planning to join the navy. Although the navy did not promise commissions to

146 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186127, Volume 1, John H. Garden to Commanding Officer, HMCS Tecumseh, 10 January 1945. 147 “University Naval Training Division,” Old McGill, 274. 124 those enrolled in the UNTD, students, explained Baker, would be given consideration toward becoming officers.148

The UNTD curriculum was a combination of the training given to ratings and officers. The UNTD course comprised 110 hours of naval training (six hours per week) given during the academic year and a minimum of two weeks of summer camp. The syllabus was a three-year, progressive training programme devised specifically for university students. It covered basic training given to active service ratings in divisional establishments, including instruction in seamanship, rifle drill, visual signaling, and lectures on naval customs, regulations, traditions, and punishment. There was, however, no specialist training in the corps. In the 1943-1944 syllabus, approximately 32 hours were allocated to squad drill, rifle drill, and seamanship, the latter including boat drill in the early fall. Another 58 hours were devoted to lectures on the work of the navy under the headings of “the service,” “the man,” and “the ship,” with any remaining time dedicated to the general subject of “upper deck signals.”149 Students in their second year of training repeated the exercises in seamanship and gunnery, but were given more advanced lectures. As of 30 April 1945, the syllabus for third-year ratings consisted of four areas of study: the ship, the ship’s company, theory, and destroyer routine. The first consisted of the study of scale models and drawings of tribal- and river-class destroyers.

The second focused on the duties and responsibilities of all officers, the composition of the ship’s crew, and watch and quarter bill. Lectures on theory discussed a variety of gear, including gunnery, torpedoes, ammunition, depth charge, the hedgehog, ASDIC,

148 John H. Garden to Commanding Officer, HMCS Tecumseh, 10 January 1945; and “The University and the War,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 5 (February 1943): 141. 149 UGLASC, RE1 OAC A0541, Ontario Agricultural College, President (1928-1947 – Christie), Military Training, Univ. R.C.A.F. Unit, 1941-45, “University Naval Training Division Fall and Winter Terms 1943- 44,” n.d. 125 radar, ship’s engines, and communications.150 They also included lessons pertaining to a general description of the gear, problems arising during its use, and information on team composition. Lessons on destroyer routine examined the commissioning of a new ship, the working up of a new ship, the ship at sea, and ship operations.151

At camp, students were given a “general idea of a sailor’s life” in a training base and at sea. Physical training was mixed with athletic activities and sailboat races to keep the students interested and in the “best of humor.” Ratings spent at least three or four days aboard a ship where they were familiarized with ship routine, performed gunnery exercises, and learned how to throw depth charges.152 After attending the 1943 summer camp, A.L. McKenzie, a student in the Ontario Agricultural College UNTD, reported the first week of training began with duty watch, physical training, gunnery school, and lectures on sights, fire control, automatic weapons, ammunition, general gunnery, torpedoes, and depth charges. The second week was devoted to seamanship, he explained, which included lectures on rigging, sounding, compass and helm, and lookout, and included movies depicting the navy in action. One day was spent sailing whalers and two days were spent at sea aboard the HMCS Elk and the HMCS Renard, both armed yachts. “These were indeed the most interesting days that we had,” McKenzie reported.

“The division to a man votes this our most interesting course.”153 Students underwent similar training at the 1944 summer camp. They learned the intricacies of a ship’s wiring

150 ASDIC was the primary underwater sonar system used for submarine detection by Allied escorts during the Second World War. The hedgehog was an anti-submarine weapon used by escorts in addition to depth charge. 151 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18616, Volume 1, J.H.E. Colby for the Commanding Officer, HMCS Donnacona, to the Commanding Officer, Naval Divisions, 30 April 1945. 152 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18618, Volume 1, “J’ai fait tout ce que je croyais nécessaire au traitement equitable de toutes les classes (Godbout),” L’Evenement Journale, 30 July 1944, 1. 153 A.L. MacKenzie, “U.N.T.D. News,” The O.A.C. Review LV, no. 8 (Midsummer 1943): 470-471. 126 system and the use of high explosives during the first two weeks of training then advanced to gunnery and drill on big guns before proceeding to seamanship training.154

Before the end of each academic year, each rating was contacted and evaluated.

Those completing their first academic year were classified “as under training” and only assessed for character while all others were assessed for character and efficiency. Ratings were also interviewed to determine whether they planned on enlisting or would be returning to the university in the fall. If returning, the student was dispatched to the coast for two weeks of active service training and then discharged again on divisional strength.

Ratings who hoped to go on active service with the navy appeared before a preliminary officers’ selection board of the local RCNVR division for evaluation and if deemed successful, were selected as officer candidates and sent to take the new entry course at

HMCS Cornwallis. Once they had completed this course, they appeared before a fleet promotion board and if again selected, were promoted to commissioned rank. If not chosen, ratings were called into active service and subject to the usual naval channels.155

It is difficult to estimate the number of officers produced by the UNTD during the war because UNTD officer candidates were treated no differently than other candidates, but some estimates place the number at around 500.156

*****

University service training units operated as important recruiting programs for the

Department of National Defence and made a substantial contribution to Canada’s war

154 “J’ai fait tout ce que je croyais nécessaire au traitement equitable de toutes les classes (Godbout),” 1. 155 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 2, E.R. Brock to Commanding Officer Naval Divisions, 21 December 1945; “The University Naval Training Divisions;” and “University Naval Training Division University of Toronto.” 156 Michael L. Hadley, “From ‘Wavy Navy’ to ‘Jolly Green Giants,’ 1945-68,” in Citizen Sailors: Chronicles of Canada’s Naval Reserve, 1910-2010, ed. Richard H. Gimblett and Michael L. Hadley (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010): 78-79. 127 effort. These programs were designed to harness the students and the pedagogical resources available on Canada’s university campuses to supply the army, air force, and navy with highly qualified, educated, and specially trained personnel. Under the federal government’s mobilization regulations, university students could remain in their studies if they joined the COTC or an auxiliary training unit. After the establishment of air and naval training programs later in the war, this policy was extended to students who trained in the UATC or UNTD. As such, the government made it possible for students to simultaneously complete their academic course while fulfilling their obligations to undertake military training. This policy reflected lessons learned during the mobilization of university students during the First World War. The chief concern of university, government, and military officials was that the mistakes of 1914-1918 not be repeated; that precious and limited resources not be needlessly wasted and that young men and women with unique skills and specialized knowledge be utilized to the greatest possible benefit of the nation’s war effort. As this chapter has shown, the expansion of the COTC and the formation of auxiliary training units, women’s service training units, the UATC, and the UNTD were the product of historically significant and complicated deliberations.

The creation of these programs, and their maintenance throughout the Second World War was unfortunately not, however, without pitfalls. The following chapter provides an account of how the founding and expansion of university service training entailed further complications, including rivalries between different branches of the armed services, bureaucratic wrangling over efforts to reform or streamline the programs, and duplication of efforts, that limited their potential impact and importance to Canada’s war effort. 128

Chapter Three

University Service Training, Part II: The Coordination of Service Training Units on Campus, 1942-1945

The Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC) played the largest role in providing service training for Canadian university students during the Second World

War. The introduction of auxiliary training units, the University Air Training Corps

(UATC), and the University Naval Training Divisions (UNTD), while historically significant for a number of reasons, did not displace or supersede the COTC as the organization supervising the training of the largest numbers of university students. The vast majority of male students joined the COTC to fulfill their obligations under the nation’s mobilization regulations and the COTC establishment provided the essential and much-in-demand instructors for administration and basic training, with the exception of the basic training given to naval recruits. On campuses across the country, the COTC trained the majority of university students who enlisted in all three services during the

Second World War. An illustrative example can be taken from the University of British

Columbia. Its contingent of the COTC trained 86% of the students enlisting from the institution’s service units between 3 September 1939 and 31 August 1945, while its

UATC and UNTD trained only 5% and 9% respectively. Yet, less than half of the students who trained through the COTC ultimately enlisted in the Canadian Army: 38% joined the air force, 37% the army, and 25% the navy.1

1 Looking more closely at the figures of enlistments of COTC cadets by service and year at the University of British Columbia, it is evident that enlistment varied significantly by year and was largely tied to the needs of the services. In 1940-1941, for example, 53% of COTC cadets enlisted in the air force, 32% in the army, and 16% in the navy. In the following year, 48% enlisted in the air force, 42% in the army, and 10% in the navy. 1942-1943 witnessed the most even distribution amongst the services: 34% enlisted in the air force, 29% in the army, and 27% in the navy. As the war progressed, the majority of cadets joined the army, due to the diminishing need for air and naval recruits. In 1943-1944, 62% joined the army, 25% the 129

After the introduction of compulsory military training for all physically fit male university students under the 1940 National War Services Regulations, universities created auxiliary training units to provide required basic training. While these units proved useful in distributing students into more manageable groups for instruction, they did not decrease the burden on COTC establishments. The growth in university service training taxed COTC resources and officers commanding struggled to coordinate the training of an unprecedented number of cadets with the academic syllabus. The additional training was made all the more difficult by increased demand for training facilities and the fact that a large percentage of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and other trained personnel providing instruction had left to join the active services during the

1939-1940 academic year. The introduction of compulsory military training not only dramatically increased the scope and responsibility of the COTC by mandating a rapid and substantial expansion of the COTC across the country; the government’s mobilization policies also undermined the organization’s ability to provide recruits with the highest quality of training. The COTC’s heavy burden threatened standards of training. The dramatically increased number of recruits rendered progressive military training difficult at best. Many recruits had neither military experience nor interest in becoming officers with the reserve or active armies. The number of inexperienced recruits was also disproportionate to cadets with previous military training or experience.

air force, and 13% the navy. In 1945-1945, with the UATC no longer in operation, 79% joined the army and 21% the navy. See University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Combined Services Trust Committee (collector), Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Western University Battalion collection, Box 2, COTC Commanding Officers’ Reports, September 1939-August 1940, September 1940-August 1941, September 1941-August 1942, September 1942-August 1943, September 1943-August 1944, and September 1944-August 1945. 130

As one university editorial noted, more than a few had never handled a rifle and were

“greener than an Irish Shamrock.”2

Rather than reducing the burden of compulsory training, the introduction of air and naval training on campus created competition between the three services for

“suitable” recruits. In particular, officers commanding of the COTC contingents and army training officials feared the greater appeal of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) uniform would leave the army saddled with the UATC’s rejected candidates. Further, a fundamental shift in the army’s policy for the training of officers—which both rendered officer training less productive and less engaging for students and eliminated the incentive of commissions upon enlistment—exacerbated the situation. By 1943, army officials were calling for the complete reorganization of university service training.

The need to address the status of the COTC provoked extensive discussion and debate amongst representatives of the National Conference of Canadian Universities

(NCCU), officers commanding of COTC contingents, senior army officials, training officials in all three armed services, and officials of the Department of National Defence

(DND). These negotiations ultimately led to the creation of the Joint Services University

Training Board (JSUTB) and the university-based Joint Services University Training

Committees (JSUTC) in 1944 to oversee the coordination and scope of training of university students. This combined initiative was the culmination of the extensive collaboration of university, government, and military authorities in the development of university service training.

The training of prospective officers through the COTC was one of the most contentious issues. The creation of auxiliary training units had been designed to provide

2 “The University and the War,” The University of Toronto Monthly XLI, no. 2 (November 1940): 37. 131 the largest number of students with rudimentary training but university administrations could not simply abandon efforts to provide students with more advanced officer training.

While acknowledging the additional burdens placed on these institutions by the new mobilization policies, in 1940 the DND had explicitly requested universities maintain the

COTC program which led to commission while also providing required elementary training to students who might eventually volunteer to become enlisted men or non- commissioned officers.3 “The Defence Department has laid a large additional task on us in asking us, while maintaining the O.T.C., to undertake, under O.T.C. auspices, the more elementary training of the other students who are not in the O.T.C. and who fall under the compulsory training scheme,” explained President Carleton Stanley of Dalhousie

University.4 The COTC therefore had to meet the need for a greater variety of training, particularly in respect to those students who had completed the required 220 hours of basic training but had not become non-commissioned officers.

This proved difficult. University administrations and COTC officers recognized compulsory training demanded a larger degree of repetition in instruction, which in turn, they observed, lowered morale and intensified criticism of the monotony of university army training. Principal Frank Cyril James of McGill University, for example, insisted the burden of basic training made it difficult to interject “sufficient progressive changes to maintain interest” in the syllabus after the second year of training and lowered the

“general average of interest and enthusiasm in the COTC.”5 Further concentration on

3 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Office of the President, Box 326, File 6, untitled statement by President Carleton Stanley to all male students, [c. November 1941]. 4 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, Carleton Stanley to J.L. Ralston, 11 July 1940. 5 McGill University Archives (MUA), RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 85, File 2306, F. Cyril James, untitled COTC history, 15 March 1946, 2. 132 squad and musketry drill, he argued in the spring of 1941, would only “induce boredom and destroy the excellent spirit” of the trainees.6 Moreover, university heads noted that disparity between students taking training in auxiliary units and those in the more respected COTC created enmity between the two groups, all the more apparent given that auxiliary units held no military status and therefore members did not receive uniforms or pay. President Henry John Cody of the University of Toronto, in fact, requested uniforms for students in auxiliary training units in order to increase morale and reduce the perceived bias.7 University authorities found themselves in the difficult position of having to provide a variety of both general and specialized training on their campuses while simultaneously having to contend with the feelings and concerns of their students, whose morale and enthusiasm for military training was undercut by the absence of a possible commission and the boredom engendered by repetitive drills.

In addresses and letters to student newspapers, university heads, officers commanding, and even students worked to strengthen morale and defend intramural training. President William Alexander Robb Kerr of the University of Alberta reminded students they each had an assigned role to play, quoting from Alexander Pope’s famous poem An Essay on Man: “Act well your part, there all the honour lies.”8 President Cody beseeched students to recognize “the great issues that are at stake” and prepare themselves for the “desperately hard” task at hand by “mastering your general and your

6 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 113, File 3069, “Minutes of a meeting of the University Committee on Military Instruction,” 25 March 1941. 7 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 048, File 15, H.J. Cody to A.A. Magee, 4 November 1940; and UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 048, File 6, H.H. Madill to District Headquarters, Military District No. 2, 20 November 1940. 8 “Message,” The Gateway, 4 October 1940, 1. 133 specifically military studies.”9 In an article for the student newspaper, The Varsity, student Michael O’Mara argued the “routine and discipline” of basic training transformed students into “the finished product.” They went to camp a “typical group of college students after the grind of final examinations—pale, tired, lackadaisical,” he recounted.

“When they returned to Toronto two weeks later they were an entirely different body of men—tanned, fit, marching with precision.”10

Numerous reports by university heads and officers commanding minimized cases of conscientious objection and stressed that the majority of students supported compulsory training and were fulfilling their national duty.11 Take, for example, the

1940-1941 report of Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Merritt Shrum, the officer commanding of the University of British Columbia contingent:

The gravity of the international situation and the resulting need for an ever increasing number of technically trained young men in the armed forces, both overseas and at home, and in the war industries of the nation were reflected in the increased earnestness of the students not only in their University studies but also in their military training. Whereas it had been expected that the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory training program would create a number of administrative problems some of which might require disciplinary action, it is gratifying to note that such was not the case and, with a few minor exceptions, the students taking the compulsory training showed the same keenness in their military studies and the same willingness to co-operate as those who had formerly taken the training on a voluntary basis.12

9 “The Honorary Colonel’s Message,” Torontonensis (1942), 214. 10 Michael O’Mara, “From Torrid Camp Niagara Seasoned Student-Soldiers Return in Fighting Trim,” The Varsity, 29 September 1941, 1, 4. 11 Cases of conscientious objection received national media attention and incited criticism of university students. For example, see “Army to Probe Drill Refusal,” The Globe and Mail, 1 November 1940, 14; “Student Defaulters Ordered to Train,” The Globe and Mail, 24 November 1942, 16; “20 Students Refuse Mlitary Training,” The Globe and Mail, 3 December 1942, 23; DUA, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, “66 Students To Be Reported,” Montreal Star, 21 January 1943; DUA, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, “22 McMaster Students Ousted,” Montreal Star, 26 January 1943; and DUA, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, “Eleven Ousted At Dalhousie,” Montreal Star, 7 January 1943. 12 “Commanding Officer’s Report September 1, 1940 to August 31, 1941,” 1-2. 134

Similarly, Principal James of McGill University explained that while “more than a score of students expressed conscientious objections” in the early stages of compulsory training, the administration had successfully convinced the majority to participate, with only two students remaining “adamant.”13 President Cody reported training was “[b]eing carried through most successfully, and with great enthusiasm on the part of the students.”

“We are training practically a whole brigade,” he boasted.14

The administrative difficulties associated with the dramatic expansion of the

COTC and the creation of auxiliary training units, including concerns over student criticism of the monotony of training, lack of training resources and on-campus facilities, shortages of qualified instructors, and the impact of an absence of standardization of training across campuses, were not the only challenges confronting the efficient mobilization of university students for armed service during the Second World War. The establishment of the UATC and the UNTD in 1942 and 1943 respectively on university campuses created additional complications for the COTC that both undermined the efficiency of on-campus army training and created inter-service rivalries for the best available candidates.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. Part one provides accounts of the difficult negotiations that led to the founding of the UATC and to a lesser extent the UNTD, and the challenges these units created for the already established

COTC. Prior to the introduction of both air and naval training, the establishment of auxiliary training units had burdened the COTC with the responsibility of training

13 Forty students protested compulsory military training. See MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 112, File 3024, F. Cyril James to R.H. Coats, 22 November 1941, “The Contribution of McGill University of the War Effort: A Reply to the Questionnaire of the Dominion Statistician which was addressed to all Canadian Universities on the above subject on the month of October, 1941,” 19-20. 14 H.J. Cody to A.A. Magee, 4 November 1940. 135 significantly larger numbers. Even as the COTC was trying to manage its larger mandate and maximize the efficiency and utility of its training programs, it also had to contend with new challenges presented by the UATC and the UNTD. As will be shown, the establishment of the UATC presented a more significant challenge to the COTC than the founding of the UNTD. Naval training was always a significantly smaller undertaking.

Part two examines how changes to officer promotion regulations intensified competition between the COTC, the UATC, and the UNTD for resources and in particular, for the best candidates from among student populations. All university training branches lobbied to influence the evolution of student mobilization policy to suit the interests of their respective branches of the Canadian military. Part three examines efforts to improve, better coordinate, and reform university service training, including efforts to change the

COTC’s mandate and composition. The discussion below will show that, throughout the war, negotiations between officials in all three services and university and government leaders emphasized or tried to address perceived deficiencies and inconsistencies in university service training for students. Numerous reforms were proposed and debated but substantive changes were difficult to achieve. Ultimately, the course of the war, not mobilization policy or the administration of training units, had the greatest impact on how

Canada prepared its university students to contribute to the war effort.

I: Negotiating the Establishment of the University Air Training Corps and the University Naval Training Division

On 20 April 1942, the university heads and the officers commanding of the COTC contingents at the University of Toronto, McGill University, McMaster University, the

Université de Montréal, the University of Ottawa, Queen’s University, and the University 136 of Western Ontario met in Toronto to discuss the details of Air Force Headquarters’

(AFHQ) UATC proposal. It called for the creation of the UATC as a reserve corps of the

RCAF to replace the University Air Training Plan (UATP), which provided preliminary training for aircrew for university students during the 1941-1942 academic year.

University heads and officers commanding approved the program’s introduction subject to five conditions, which President Cody outlined in a memorandum and forwarded to

Charles Gavan Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air:

(1) the appointment of a military committee at each university to supervise all

service training, consisting of representatives of the various military training

corps on each campus;

(2) the senior ranking officer in each university, under the general authority of the

military committee, be granted responsibility for matters of concern to all training

corps;

(3) the UATC have full responsibility for its own training programme and internal

discipline;

(4) the UATC follow the same procedure with regard to the pay received by

students as that being observed in the COTC; and

(5) the government make “adequate compensation” to each university for

expenditures incurred in connection with training in the UATC.

The majority of university heads also agreed the required hours of training in the UATP syllabus undertaken the previous year—totaling 192 hours—was “excessive” and should be reduced to 120 hours to conform to COTC requirements.15

15 University of Manitoba Archives and Special Collections (UMA), UA41, Box 1, Folder 6, H.J. Cody, “Memorandum for the Minister of National Defence, Air regarding the University Air Training Plan, 137

The conditions outlined at the April conference were intended to facilitate the coordination of armed services training in universities in order to ensure the creation of the UATC would not threaten the COTC’s continued work. President Sidney Earle Smith of the University of Manitoba, for example, later explained that the desire to have UATC squadrons under the supervision of a military committee was not to obscure the identity of the unit; rather, it was part of an effort to create a relationship between the UATC and the military committee that would parallel that “established and maintained” between the

COTC and the university.16

On 30 April 1942, C.G. Power wrote President Cody to report that he had received the recommendations and a reply would be communicated “in due course” after the appropriate officers had given them attention.17 When Cody had yet to receive a reply to the memorandum by the end of the summer, he requested an update from Air-Vice

Marshal George Owen Johnson, the Air Officer Commanding of No. 1 Training

Command in Toronto, who was responsible for overseeing air training in southern

Ontario. Johnson responded on 28 August 1942 in a letter to the heads of four of the universities in his command: Cody, President George Irving Christie of the Ontario

Agricultural College, Chancellor George P. Gilmour of McMaster University, and

Principal Robert Charles Wallace of Queen’s University.18 Johnson reported the opinions of university officials had received “the closest attention” during the planning process submitted by certain universities in conference at the University of Toronto on April 20th, 1942,” 20 April 1942. 16 UMA, UA41, Box 1, Folder 6, Sidney Smith to H.H. Atkinson, 15 October 1942. 17 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 052, File 9, Charles G. Power to H.J. Cody, 30 April 1942. 18 Other air officers commanding distributed the details of the new policy to the universities in their command in early September. See MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, A. de Niverville to University of Laval, University of Montreal, Acadia University, Dalhousie University, University of Mount Allison, University of New Brunswick, McGill University, University of Ottawa, 3 September 1942. 138 and the RCAF was now ready to set forth the terms under which it was willing to proceed with the formation of the UATC. The proposed plan outlining the general policy, procedure, and course of instruction, however, was a marked departure from the proposal submitted to university heads in the spring. Johnson explained AFHQ would decide all matters of general policy and each squadron would be directly responsible to command headquarters for administration, training, and inspection. Under the new terms, all ranks of the UATC would be entitled to pay and allowances for up to a total of forty days per year, ten days more than that given in the COTC. In addition to providing aircrew training, the UATC would also offer basic ground training to undergraduates in medicine and certain fields of engineering or specializing in navigation who upon graduation would qualify for appointment to a commission rank in the medical, radio, signals, air navigation, aeronautical engineering, or armament branches of the RCAF. Moreover, the proposal did not stipulate students had to complete one year of basic military training before enlisting in the UATC, as was the case with students entering the COTC.19 Cody informed Johnson that before giving a definite reply to his communication, he would discuss the matter with the authorities present at the 20 April conference given that the proposed plan contained “considerable divergence from the general principles then laid down by the university representatives.”20

Officers commanding of COTC contingents and university heads argued the terms outlined by Johnson differed “considerably” and varied “in essential particulars” from the

19 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, University Naval and Air Training Plan, G.O. Johnson to the President, UofT, the Principal, Queen’s, and the Chancellor, McMaster, 28 August 1942. 20 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 058, File 01, H.J. Cody to G.O. Johnson, 10 September 1942. 139 conditions set down by university representatives.21 In particular, university authorities opposed allowing medical and dental students to take air training, arguing they should remain with the COTC in their early years of study and then enlist in the Royal Canadian

Army Medical Corps (RCAMC) and the Canadian Dental Corps (CDC) according to the current procedure. President Sidney Smith of the University of Manitoba insisted the arrangements already in place to provide training to medical students through the

RCAMC especially should not be undone.22 COTC officers and university heads also believed National Selective Service (NSS)—the body responsible for administering

Canada’s mobilization regulations—should decide whether students in engineering and sciences would be permitted to join the RCAF. They argued that only those so identified should be allowed to join the UATC. Furthermore, officers commanding took exception to allowing first year students to enlist in the UATC.23 At a meeting on 5 September

1942, COTC officers at the University of Toronto pointed out that to date, the COTC establishment had provided basic training common to all arms. To conduct such training in separate classes would be “uneconomical of instructors and accommodation to the

21 Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Anundson of the Directorate of Military Training attributed some of the contention over the terms for the establishment of the UATC to the fact that many of the OCs of COTC contingents were recalling proposals made by the RCAF in the fall of 1941. See LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, E.H. Anundson, Memorandum on the UATC to the Director of Military Training, DND, 9 September 1942. 22 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, Sidney Smith to J.M. Morris, [c. August 1942]. 23 Some university officials disagreed with this point, most notably Thomas H. Matthews, the registrar at McGill University. On 11 August 1942, Matthews wrote Principal F. Cyril James to recommend that first year students be allowed to join the UATC. He pointed out that last year the UATP was restricted to those who had a year of basic training but that at present, “a large number of parents are anxious that their boys should have one year at college and the boys are anxious to join the Air Force as soon as possible.” “I think there is a lot to be said for giving youngsters a year of college before they join the Army,” he concluded, “but the necessity of taking two years at college to get the benefit of the Air Force scheme would not appeal to a number of young men.” See MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 112, File 3085, T.H. Matthews to F. Cyril James, 11 August 1942. 140 extent of being very difficult if not impossible.”24 While these officers agreed it was desirable to provide air force training to undergraduates “definitely” intending to join the air force, they argued it was necessary and desirable this not interfere with the organization of the COTC. “The organization has been expanded since the beginning of the war to accommodate the numbers and considerable expenditures and commitments that have been made both by the University and the C.O.T.C. over a period of years to provide accommodation and equipment,” they argued. “These would still be required by the C.O.T.C. even if numbers are reduced.” These officers insisted fields of training needed to be clearly defined and urged the DND to ensure there was no competition on the campus between the two corps.25

University heads and COTC officers were particularly concerned that no mention had been made of establishing military committees at each university to coordinate the activities of service units with the academic syllabus. “According to what the Air Force authorities suggest,” President Cody wrote to various university heads, “there would be two quite independent rival organizations on the same university campus … The general tenor of the Air Force’s present proposal is towards complete separation from and independence of the C.O.T.C.” Cody insisted it would be a “great mistake” to have the enrolment procedure and financial conditions of the UATC differ from those of the

COTC.26 Major O.B. Rexford, the second-in-command of the McGill University contingent, agreed the revised plan “without any doubt envisages” a training program

24 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, “University of Toronto Contingent Canadian Officers Training Corps Comments re University Air Training Corps,” 5 September 1942. 25 “University of Toronto Contingent Canadian Officers Training Corps Comments re University Air Training Corps.” 26 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 112, File 3085, J.H. Cody to F. Cyril James, 14 September 1942. 141 with a separate organization from the existing COTC. He insisted that in “the interests of the war effort, the close association between Army training, Air Force training and if it develops, Naval training, in any one University would prove more efficient, more economical and more practical than three independent and more or less unrelated

Corps.”27

From September 7-8th, 1942, COTC representatives from eight contingents met in

Brockville, Ontario, to discuss the creation of the UATC and to consider its impact on the

COTC.28 Lieutenant-Colonel R.O. Earl, the convener of the COTC Committee of the

NCCU established during the conference’s 5 July 1940 meeting also attended.29 The representatives discussed a number of concerns but they stressed that the existing training disparity would disrupt COTC training. RCAF officers, they accused, were too “lax” in their training methods and had failed to follow a syllabus based on the terms of the

National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) during the 1941-1942 academic year, the legislation authorizing the government’s mobilization policies.30 Those backing the creation of the UATC, they argued, were more interested in “securing personnel who would be definitely earmarked for the R.C.A.F. whenever needed or available” than providing training along the lines of that given by the COTC. The representatives insisted standards and regulations needed to “apply equally” to all university service training.

This, they argued, could be achieved through the terms outlined at the April conference.

In their report on the meeting, the representatives expressed their “complete agreement”

27 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, O.B. Rexford, memoranda of conference between F/Lt. Riches and Major O.B. Rexford re University Air Training Corps, 8 September 1942. 28 These were: the University of Toronto, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Queen’s University, Université Laval, the University of New Brunswick, the University of Manitoba, and the University of Saskatchewan. 29 Despite Earl convening the meeting, those present argued the opinions put forward did not represent the COTC Committee of the NCCU but were rather part of an informal discussion. 30 For more on the NRMA, see chapter one. 142 and support for the terms, in particular the creation of a military committee at each university. They stated they had no desire to “hinder” RCAF training and insisted

“friendly cooperation should prevail,” but argued there needed to be a clear understanding “on all sides” of the spheres of responsibility in order to prevent the deterioration of university army training. In addition, they recommended students be required to take one year of military training before admission to the UATC, as done in the UATP, and that some categories of students be required to remain in the COTC, to be decided by NSS.31 In reporting the details of the conference to Brigadier Ernest P.

Weeks, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS), Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Holley

Keefler, the Assistant Director of Military Training, endorsed many of the same opinions and concluded that since the approach of the RCAF to the problem was “so different from ours,” it would likely be “very difficult to find a common meeting ground.”32

On 15 September 1942, President Cody and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harrison

Madill, Lieutenant-Colonel William Stewart Wilson, and Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur

D’Orr Lepan of the University of Toronto COTC met with Squadron Leader S.A.

Sprange, Squadron Leader Spence, and Pilot Officer Hallett of No. 1 Training Command to discuss the conditions of the UATC plan. Cody opened the meeting by explaining the air force had failed to issue definite indications of the policy to address the points

31 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, R.O. Earl, “Report on Discussion of U.A.T.C. by Representatives of C.O.T.C. Contingents at O.T.C., Brockville, 7th Sept. 1942,” n.d.; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, E.H. Anundson, memorandum on the UATC to the Director of Military Training, DND, 9 September 1942. 32 Keefler served during the war as a staff officer with the Second Canadian Infantry Division in 1940 and as Director of Military Training from 1942 to 1945. In the winter of 1944-1945, he commanded the Sixth Canadian Infantry Brigade at Nijmegen and the battles of the Relchwald and Hochwald. In 1945, he was promoted to major-general and commanded the Third Canadian Infantry Division during the advance through Holland and into Germany. See LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, R.H. Keefler to Ernest P. Weeks, 16 September 1942; and “Obituary: Holley Keefler,” The Montreal Gazette, 21 September 1981, H-10. 143 recorded at the April conference. He insisted these points required clarification. For university authorities, the meeting was a success. Sprange advised it was understood the

COTC and UATC would operate under the control of a committee composed of university authorities and COTC and UATC officers. He also explained it was understood the senior ranking officer on campus would be responsible under the general authority of this committee. Students enrolling for air training would be required to give an honourable declaration to join the RCAF upon graduation, a policy not required of

COTC candidates. Moreover, the UATC would be responsible for its own training program and would employ the same procedure for pay. Cody later reported that because of the meeting, the “main points of difference were ironed out and agreed upon by the representatives of the Air Training Forces.”33

Concern that the formation of the UATC would create competition for recruits was not unfounded.34 First-year students wishing to take air training would be enlisted in the RCAF, whereas those taking COTC training could enter any of the three armed services on completion of their university studies. Additionally, as will be discussed, the

COTC had recently discontinued the granting of commissions direct from its training, which significantly diminished the prestige and perceived advantage of the corps.

Officers commanding of COTC contingents rightfully feared students would desire to transfer from the COTC to the UATC because of the novelty of the air program, the

33 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 058, File 01, S.A. Sprange to H.J. Cody, 18 September 1942; UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 058, File 01, H.J. Cody to G.O. Johnson, 26 September 1942. 34 The concern that two similar corps would create “complications” and competition prompted Dalhousie University and King’s College to initially refuse to form a UATP and UATC. Brigadier W.W. Foster, the District Officer Commanding of Military District No. 6, later explained the university had feared the air force would offer “certain advantages” compared to the COTC: little outside drill, travel on railways at active force rates, and permission to wear their uniforms at all times. See LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, W.W. Foster to the Secretary, DND, H.C. 110-135-1, 26 November 1942. 144 greater proportion of time spent in lectures instead of drill, and the more direct path to commission. When Major William Gordon Jones, the officer commanding of the

University of New Brunswick contingent of the COTC, wrote district headquarters on 1

October 1942, he reported 103 students had already signed an application to join the

UATC.35 63 of these students were in their second, third, or fourth year of study and currently on strength with the COTC.36 This was not an exceptional scenario. On 15

October, President Sidney Smith reported over 100 students at the University of

Manitoba had indicated their intention to join the UATC.37 Five days later, Thomas H.

Matthews, the registrar of McGill University, estimated that approximately 300 students had already enrolled in the UATC from his institution.38 275 students applied to join the

University of Toronto corps as of 19 October 1942.39 Fifty-two members of the

Dalhousie University COTC transferred to the UATC by the end of December, particularly alarming given that the total strength of the contingent for the 1942-1943 academic year totaled only 284.40

The numbers at the University of New Brunswick alarmed Brigadier Gerald

Gardnier Anglin, the District Officer Commanding of Military District No. 7. In an

October 1942 report to the DND, he pointed out that students wishing to transfer from the

COTC to the UATC at the university represented approximately 37% of the contingent’s

35 The University of New Brunswick had, in fact, been “reluctant” to form the UATC because they felt a separate military organization from the COTC was unnecessary given their small registration. They finally acquiesced in response to the “urgent request of the R.C.A.F.” See LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3- 1, C.E. Miller to Gregg, 9 September 1944. 36 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, W.G. Jones to District Headquarters, 1 October 1942. 37 Sidney Smith to H.H. Atkinson, 15 October 1942. 38 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3085, T.H. Matthews, memorandum to the Principal, the University Air Training Corps, 20 October 1942. 39 “275 Students Apply to Join Air Training Corps at U.ofT.,” The Globe and Mail, 20 October 1942, 4. 40 Dalhousie University, Pharos: Yearbook of 1943 (Halifax: Dalhousie University Council of Students, 1943), 63. 145 total strength. “It will be seen,” he wrote, “how drastically this new U.A.T.C. policy is going to cut in on our C.O.T.Cs. provided the latter do not have treatment and opportunities at least equal to those now possessed by the U.A.T.C.” Anglin insisted the loss of these men was “not only a keen disappointment to those who have worked so hard to make it a success, but also a detriment to training and to the Contingent as a whole.”

He asked for instruction on what action could be taken to “alleviate the situation.”41

In response to the discussion about the developments at the University of New

Brunswick, Colonel R.H. Keefler, who had been promoted the new Director of Military

Training in September, insisted National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) needed to address the issue given that similar situations would likely arise in other districts. On 16

October 1942, Keefler wrote Brigadier E.P. Weeks, the DCGS, and recommended establishing a clear policy to provide direction to COTC cadets who wished to enlist in the UATC. He proposed that a deadline of 15 November be set for students requesting a discharge for the purpose of undertaking training in the air corps.42

On 27 October 1942, Colonel James Arthur deLalanne of the Directorate of

Requirements (DOR) weighed in on the question and submitted a memorandum to

Weeks. The memorandum reported the DOR believed the most “important consideration” in respect to the transfer of students to the UATC be the “extent to which whatever policy is adopted will affect the total manpower available for the Active Army.” DeLalanne explained that if a candidate left the COTC to join the UATC, it could be presumed the individual would still be considered a “total loss” to the active army, given that he would

41 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, G.G. Anglin to the Secretary, DND, 6 October 1942. 42 Students could not be transferred from the COTC to the UATC because members of the COTC were in the same category as soldiers of other reserve army units. See LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, R.H. Keefler to Ernest P. Weeks, 16 October 1942. 146 very probably enlist in the RCAF following graduation. On the other hand, there would be many cases in which a candidate would not meet the medical standards of the RCAF and might later join the active army. There was additionally no guarantee that if a candidate remained in the COTC under the current regulations, he would enlist in the army following graduation. DeLalanne therefore did not think there would be any

“serious difference in manpower” if the DND permitted transfers from the COTC to the

UATC. Although DeLalanne said he was not “directly concerned with the details of this change,” he felt the suggestion for a deadline of 15 November was reasonable. He did, however, assert that if a student was taking a course of study that would “suit him particularly” for a specific corps of the army but which held no value to the RCAF, it would be “desirable” that the candidate be directed into the COTC rather than the

UATC.43

On 2 November 1942, Weeks wrote the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific commands, all district officers commanding, the Commanders of Petawawa Military Camp and Camp Borden, and the Commandant at the Royal

Military College to explain the new policy regarding the transfer of students currently on strength in the COTC to the UATC.44 The new policy contained three major points. First, personnel currently on strength with COTC contingents wanting to join the UATC would be permitted, “subject to the concurrence of the Military Committee of the University concerned,” to receive a discharge from the COTC for the purpose of enlisting in the

UATC. Second, discharge from the COTC for the purpose of enlisting in the UATC could be authorized until 31 December 1942, after which discharge for enlistment in the

43 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, J.A. deLalanne, memorandum to the DCGS, DND, H.Q. 1161-1- 26 (Req.), 27 October 1942. 44 The letter was also distributed to all heads of the various branches and directorates of NDHQ. 147

UATC would be prohibited.45 Third, in “all cases of doubt” respecting discharge from the

COTC for the purpose of enlisting in the UATC, the decision would rest with the district officer commanding on the recommendation of the university military committee. Weeks also stipulated students would not be discharged from the COTC without the permission of the concerned district officer commanding if they were a member of the COTC and studying a course that would “suit him particularly” for the army and be of no “particular value” to the air force.46

Air training officials were similarly concerned that the UATC be established on equal footing with the COTC. In response to the growing enlistment in UATC squadrons during the fall 1942 semester, Air Vice-Marshal John Alfred Sully, the Air Member for

Personnel, received several requests from air officers commanding to increase the UATC establishment to make it on par with the COTC. For example, Air Commodore George

Robert Howsam, the Air Officer Commanding of No. 4 Training Command in Calgary,

Alberta, “recommended strongly” that the rank of commanding officers be changed from squadron leader to wing commander and that flight commanders be given the rank of flight lieutenant. He insisted the commanding officers of UATC squadrons should be of equal rank to those of COTC contingents in order to “ensure equal prestige.”47 By the same token, Air Commodore Albert de Niverville, the Air Officer Commanding of No. 3

45 While 31 December 1942 was set as the latest date for transfers, university authorities were permitted to set an earlier date provided the concerned district officer commanding had no objection. For example, after RCAF representatives explained at a meeting of the Queen’s University Military Committee that their syllabus could not be completed unless students entered before 20 November 1942, the university set this date as the deadline for discharge. See LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, F.L. Armstrong to the Secretary, DND, 13 November 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, Ernest P. Weeks to F.L. Armstrong, 17 November 1942. 46 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, Ernest P. Weeks to General Officers Commanding-in-Chief, Atlantic and Pacific Commands, All District Officers Commanding, Military Districts, Commander, Petawawa Military Camp, Commander, Camp Borden, and Commandant, Royal Military College, H.Q. 1161-1-26 (DCGS), 2 November 1942. 47 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, G.R. Howsam to the Secretary, DNDA, 25 September 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, G.R. Howsam to the Secretary, DNDA, 21 November 1942. 148

Training Command in Montreal, argued the present establishment under Organizational

Order No. 227 was “inadequate to cope with the situation” and unable to provide the necessary instruction, supervision, and administration. He requested the addition of one flying officer to provide instruction in navigation, three disciplinarians (one with the rank of flying officer and two with the rank of sergeant), one administrative clerk with the rank of corporal, and one stenographer (to be appointed from the RCAF Women’s

Division or a civilian post). The McGill University COTC numbered approximately 900, de Niverville observed, and had a permanent staff of three majors, two captains, six lieutenants, and fourteen non-commissioned officers, in addition to thirty-two reserve army officers detailed at the university to provide instruction. Because the UATC was

“more or less in direct competition” with the COTC, he concluded, additional RCAF staff was necessary to give students “instruction on a fair comparative basis.”48

All training officials agreed the RCAF needed to avoid the “unfortunate results” of the UATP in the 1941-1942 academic year, which as of 27 January 1942 consisted of seven squadrons with a combined strength of only 191. Requests to expand the establishment initially met with resistance from high-ranking officials at AFHQ.49 In early October 1942, both Group Captain Herbert Philip Crabb, the Director of Manning,50 and Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Thomas Noel Cowley, the Air Member for Organization and chair of the Organization and Establishments Committee (OEC), insisted the current establishment was sufficient, providing university staff participated to the extent expected

48 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, A. deNiverville to the Secretary, DNDA, 26 October 1942. 49 See chapter two. 50 Crabb was appointed Deputy Director of Manning in March 1940 and was Director of Manning from November 1941 to October 1942. For more information on Crabb’s military service, see UMA, H.P. Crabb Fonds, Military Service (1915-1974), Boxes 1 and 2. 149 by giving instruction in subjects such as navigation, meteorology, and the theory of flight.51

As the strength of squadrons continued to expand beyond expectations, however, it quickly became apparent AFHQ needed to give immediate attention to providing additional personnel. Sully began to consider the issue in consultation with other AFHQ training officials, including A.T.N. Cowley; Group Captain John M. Cohu, the Director of Technical Training; Group Captain Joseph L. Hurley, the Director of Organization; and Wing Commander Byron F. Wood, the new Director of Manning.52 Throughout his correspondence, Sully consistently stressed the importance of the UATC, contending it was a “valuable source” of air force personnel and insisting the establishment would have to be expanded. He believed “every encouragement” and “all essential assistance” needed to be given to ensure the vital new program would not be disadvantaged and would continue to expand.53

Between November 1942 and January 1943, Sully prepared and revised a set of recommendations to expand the existing establishment, intermittently placing these before Cowley for consideration. On 4 February 1943, Sully’s plan was placed before the

OEC. It called for four additions: (1) one flight lieutenant administrative officer at each training command headquarters for the supervision and administration of the UATC squadrons in that command to ensure the maintenance of an “efficient and consistent”

51 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, H.P. Crabb to the AMP, 6 October 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, A.T.N. Cowley to Air Officer Commanding, No. 4 Training Command, 15 October 1942. 52 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully to AMO, 3 November 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully to AMO, 9 November 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.M. Cohu to AMP, 17 November 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully, Memorandum to AMO, 1 December 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.L. Hurley to AMO, 10 December 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, B.F. Wood to AMP, 8 January 1943; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully to DofO, 15 January 1943. 53 J.A. Sully, Memorandum to AMO, 1 December 1942; and J.A. Sully to DofO, 15 January 1943. 150 course of study; (2) one flying officer to squadrons exceeding 150 other ranks to provide navigation instruction where such instruction could not be given by the university or the personnel of the RCAF pre-aircrew education detachment; (3) one sergeant disciplinarian and one stenographer clerk from the RCAF Women’s Division to UATC squadrons with a strength exceeding 250; and (4) one flight lieutenant for each 75 other ranks in a UATC squadron to assist the commanding officer with administration and training.54 In total, this last provision would involve an addition of 30 flight lieutenants to UATC personnel.

After carefully reviewing Sully’s proposal, the OEC approved the plan subject to two revisions. First, No. 2 Training Command did not require a flight lieutenant administrative officer because it oversaw only one university squadron.55 Second, the provision for a navigation officer would be postponed on the understanding that this recommendation would be given consideration at a later date when the UATC “had been developed to a greater extent.” With these two amendments agreed upon, the revised proposal was referred to Cowley for “establishment action.”56 Under the authority of the

OEC, AFHQ informed training commands of the amendments to their establishment.

Nos. 1, 3, and 4 Training Commands were told they would be given an additional flight lieutenant to administer and supervise UATC squadrons.57 All training commands were

54 Sully believed the appointment of a clerk stenographer from the RCAF Women’s Division would not only provide much needed administrative support, but might also be helpful in recruiting university women. He advised that care should be exercised in the selection of personnel for these duties and preference given to those with university degrees, “preferably obtained from the University to which posted.” See J.A. Sully to the AMO, 3 November 1942. 55 In fact, on 26 February 1943, the administration of No. 9 Squadron at the University of Manitoba was transferred from No. 2 Training Command to No. 4 Training Command. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, R.C.A.F. Message, 15 March 1943. 56 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J.A. Sully, “Abstract of Minutes of O. & E. Committee Meeting No. 70, February 4th, 1943,” 16 February 1943. 57 Ibid., J. Gardner for Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, No. 4 Training Command, 16 February 1943; Ibid., J. Gardner for Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, No. 3 Training Command, 16 February 1943; and Ibid., J. Gardner for Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, No. 1 Training Command, 16 February 1943. 151 informed AFHQ had decided to add one sergeant disciplinarian and one aircraftwoman clerk stenographer each at Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 9 Detachments—those located at squadrons with a strength of over 250. No action was taken to advise squadrons that the establishment had been increased to permit the appointment of one flight lieutenant for each seventy-five other ranks.58 This was largely due to the “unsettled status” of the

UATC given the winding down of the BCATP program. It was considered “inadvisable to institute an entirely new procedure” and develop more definite policies given the uncertainty about the number of UATC squadrons that would continue to function during the 1943-1944 academic year.59

The introduction of the UNTD incited less concern for the COTC than the establishment of the UATC. After Captain Ernest Reginald Brock, the Commanding

Officer of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve (RCNVR) sent a memorandum to universities in early 1943 offering to establish separate naval divisions, the Ontario

Agricultural College and McMaster University quickly accepted Brock’s terms. Other universities soon followed suit: Queen’s University announced the formation of its division in early February; the McGill University Senate approved a division on 15

February 1943; the major stakeholders at the University of Alberta agreed to the memorandum on March 22 and 23; the University of British Columbia Board of

Governors approved a division on 29 March; and the University of Manitoba and

Dalhousie University approved their divisions in March and April respectively.60

58 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, J. Gardner for Chief of the Air Staff to Air Officer Commanding, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 Training Commands, 18 February 1943. 59 Ibid., W.M. Graham, File Memorandum, 215-3-1 (D. of M.5), 12 March 1943; and Ibid., A.H. Mielke for DSA to AMAF, 5 April 1943. 60 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND 1000-18618, Volume 1, “Our Students at the Great Naval Base, H.M.C.S. ‘Cornwallis,’” 20 July 1944. 152

This immediate and positive response was, in part, due to an early recognition that university naval training would be undertaken on a much smaller scale than air training, but more importantly from the perspective of university authorities, it reflected an understanding on the part of naval and university officials that the conditions establishing the UNTD needed to be designed with the intention of better coordinating naval training with the work of the COTC. Brock’s memorandum proposing the establishment of the

UNTD included two key resolutions: (1) only students in their third year would be permitted to transfer from the COTC or the UATC before the close of the 1942-1943 academic year; and (2) the senior ranking officer at the university, under the authority of the respective military committee, would be responsible for matters affecting more than one service on campus.61 University authorities were confident they could apply the models used in the establishment of the UATC in their negotiations with naval officials.

Thus, after receiving Brock’s proposal, President Cody responded that his administration would only agree to the establishment of a division of the UNTD if the navy met the same conditions laid out in the formation of the UATC at the 20 April 1942 conference.

In other words, the UNTD would have full responsibility for its own training program and internal discipline but a military committee appointed by the university would supervise the plan. The senior ranking officer in the university would be responsible for matters of concern to all units; the procedure of pay would conform with that used by the

COTC and the UATC; the UNTD syllabus would require the same number of hours of training as that of the COTC; and adequate compensation would be made to the

61 University of Guelph Library Archival and Special Collections (UGLASC), RE1 OAC A0166, O.A.C.- O.V.C. University Naval Training Division History, R.H. Ellis, Lieutenant-Commander, RCN (Reserve), Department of Public Relations, OAC, “A Chronology of the Ontario Agricultural College University Naval Training Division,” [c. 1961]. 153 university by the government for the use of its facilities and any expenditures incurred by the university in connection with the UNTD on the same scale as paid by the COTC.

Cody insisted that commanding officers of the UNTD be appointed only after first being nominated by the university; that service in the UNTD be identified as satisfying compulsory military training requirements under the National Selective Service

Regulations (which superseded the National War Services Regulations); that enlistment be prohibited for medical and dental students; and that enlistment be limited to the sixty- five students who had already completed offers of service in the RCNVR, students who signified their intention to enlist for active service in the RCNVR before the opening of the next session, and students enrolled during the current session in either the COTC or

UATC who wished to transfer to the UNTD.62 On 9 February 1943, Brock agreed to

Cody’s terms, calling them “entirely satisfactory.” He asked to be advised of any necessary arrangements required to immediately commence training.63

There was still cause for concern. The addition of another corps made the need to coordinate university service training all the more apparent. The formation of the UNTD at the Université Laval was delayed until 15 September 1943 at the request of Rector

Camille Roy who felt the enlistment of more than 200 recruits in the UATC had already

“considerably deranged” the organization of training on campus. It would be easier, he argued, to give attention to training in all three services when students returned in the fall.64 In discussions about the status of the COTC, army training officials and university heads referred to the competition created by both the UATC and the UNTD.

62 LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18611, Volume 1, Cody to Brock, 5 February 1943. 63 Ibid., Brock to Cody, 9 February 1943. 64 Ibid., Camille Roy to Brock, 20 February 1943. 154

The UNTD may have been proportionately smaller, but the program specifically targeted students studying engineering, mathematics, and physics who were needed for more specialized army units such as the Royal Canadian Engineers. Additionally, the

UNTD offered greater incentives to students wishing to join or transfer from the COTC.

Most importantly, the UNTD afforded students the opportunity to secure officer commissions upon enlistment in the navy after graduation and offered science students enlisted in the program paid summer employment while they were still undertaking their academic course. The RCN gave ratings studying science and interested in service in the technical branches of the navy the opportunity to volunteer for active service during their summer vacation and return to their studies in the fall. Students were given six weeks of training and subsequently rated as temporary technicians as electrical or engineer room fourth class artificers for pay purposes only. They remained on active service for their summer vacation and were eligible for draft to seagoing ships. Those interested in radio took a concentrated course at HMCS St. Hyacinthe in Montreal and those interested in mechanical training went to HMCS Stadacona in Halifax.65

II: Competing for the Best Recruits and the Impact of New Officer Promotion Regulations in the Canadian Army

Army training officials, officers commanding of COTC contingents, and university authorities agreed the establishment of both the UATC and the UNTD

65 While this training plan held wide appeal, on 22 May 1943, George A. Brown, the Commanding Officer of the HMCS Brunswicker, reported he was having difficulty enlisting science students for employment. Most students, Brown found, joined the RCAF and others had already obtained summer employment in technical fields. This he attributed in part to a late start in the RCN’s recruiting efforts, recommending that future recruiting begin at least two months prior to final examinations. However, it was also the result of student preference for the RCAF, the WBTP’s efforts to allocate science students to needed war industry, and the fact that naval training on university campuses was still very much a new endeavour. See LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-18619, Volume 1, George A. Brown to Brock, 22 May 1943; and “The University Naval Training Divisions.” 155 intensified competition for recruits. In August 1944, Lieutenant-Colonel James Meredith

Morris, the officer commanding of the McGill University contingent of the COTC, summarized the impact of these two units:

Before the advent of the U.A.T.C. and later the U.N.T.D. within the University Training Plan, Cadets in the C.O.T.C. were considered, and in the main proved, good potential officer material. With the introduction of these two Units…new problems arose. First of all an important percentage of the students who would otherwise have found their way into the C.O.T.C. elected to transfer from the M.R.T.B. [the auxiliary training unit] or, in the case of first year men, went directly into these Units without passing through the Auxiliary Battalion. Secondly and while later some latitude developed, students attested in these Units were considered as enlisted in the R.C.A.F. or the R.C.N. respectively, with the result that these Units were allowed to select or reject candidates and those not found suitable by these two Services remained in, or in some cases reverted back, to the Army Training (C.O.T.C.). This situation has been obviously to the disadvantage of the C.O.T.C. training as it has included an increasing number of students who either did not intend to enlist or were forced to take the Army training where they had expressed a definite preference for either the Air Force or Navy. This fact, coupled with the necessity of arranging progressive military training between the first and fourth years, decided us, and probably most of the other Universities, to consolidate all Army training in one Unit.66

Not only had the UATC and the UNTD diminished the pool of suitable recruits, but many army officials insisted the standard of training needed immediate improvement in order to compete with the appeal of air and naval training. The role of the COTC had developed well beyond the scope of providing officer material for the reserve or active army and in so doing had lost much of its prestige.

The concern over the impact of the creation of air and naval training units on university campuses—which largely focused on the UATC and the UNTD being a threat to COTC standards and student enthusiasm for service in the Canadian Army— intensified with the introduction of new regulations for officer promotion. Under the

66 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C. Murchie to the Minister, DND (Army), 31 August 1944. 156 government’s 1939 mobilization instructions, units could obtain officers from their own active lists or reserve corps, from other units, from graduates or ex-cadets of the Royal

Military College, from members or former members of the COTC with certificates of qualification, or by promotion from within their own ranks. At the start of the Second

World War, COTC cadets were allowed to take commissions in the reserve army directly following satisfactory completion of their training, the same procedure employed during the First World War. After German troops invaded France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg in May 1940, however, the Canadian Army started to dramatically expand and it became clear the training of active service officers would need to keep pace.67

Government and army officials began considering changing the policies affecting the granting of commissions, in particular whether officers-in-training should be forced to enlist in the ranks and work their way up to commissions. In August 1940, Brigadier

Kenneth Stuart, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, recommended that commissions be granted only through the ranks.68 In a speech in the House of Commons on 15

November 1940, James Layton Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, reported the government would introduce new measures based on “the experience of the last war” and

67 In September 1939, officer strength totaled a little over 2,000, representing 3.9% of the total strength of the army. This increased to 3,414 (5.39%) by the end of 1939. Officer strength totaled 5,974 in 1940, 6,875 in 1941, 8,868 in 1942, and 9,876 in 1943. Officer production slowed in 1944 and 1945. Between September 1939 and June 1946, 42,613 officer commissions were granted. See Frederick Thorburn Brown, “A Study of the Selection of University C.O.T.C. Candidates” (Ph.D. Diss., McGill University, 1950), 30- 31. 68 Stuart served during the First World War with the Royal Canadian Engineers. From 1934 to 1937, he was an instructor at the Royal Military College and from 1937 to 1938 he was a professor of tactics at the same college. In 1938, Stuart became Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at NDHQ and in 1940 he was made Deputy Chief General Staff. In 1941, he was appointed Vice Chief General Staff and then Chief of the General Staff. In December 1943, Stuart became the Acting General Officer Commanding of the First Canadian Army and Chief of Staff Canadian Military Headquarters in England. 157 the “present practice in the British Army,” to ensure “uniformity” and a higher standard of officer qualification.69

By late 1940, new policies dictated officer candidates had to serve as enlisted soldiers before receiving commissioned rank. As of 1 April 1941, all candidates for non- specialist commissions in the army had to spend a minimum amount of time in the ranks before undergoing training as reinforcement officers: four months for members of the active army (later increased to five months) and approximately one year for members of the reserve, the latter equivalent to thirty days of training.70 In an effort to ensure more uniform standards of qualification, in the spring of 1941, two Officer Training Centres

(OTC) were opened, one in Brockville, Ontario, to serve eastern Canada, and one in

Gordon Head, British Columbia, to serve the west. A francophone OTC established at St-

Jérome, Quebec, prepared candidates to be sent to Brockville. Due to the growing need for officers, military officials still considered time spent in the COTC “equivalent to enlisted service,” but the COTC could no longer grant commissions direct from COTC training. Instead, cadets selected as potential officer material were sent to an OTC and commissions were awarded to those who graduated from these courses.71

The 1941-1942 syllabus of the COTC reflected the new regulations. In the summer of 1941, the DND developed a guide for progressive instruction in the COTC

69 Ralston was twice Minister of National Defence: from 1926-1930 and from July 1940 until his resignation on 1 November 1944 over the conscription crisis. See C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1 Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 127-129; and Robert Engen, Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 63. 70 As Stacey explains, specialists were still permitted to receive direct commissions, primarily those with “technical university degrees or other specialized training suitable for appointments to the Engineers, Judge-Advocate General’s Branch, the Pay or Ordnance Corps or the Chaplain Service.” See Stacey, 129. 71 Stacey, 129; Engen, 63; John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991), 71; and F. Cyril James, untitled history of the COTC, 2. 158 based on a four-year university course. While not intended to be a set of “hard and fast” regulations, all officials agreed it constituted “the most suitable progressive plan for

C.O.T.Cs who are mainly concerned with preparing candidates for Active Force commissions.” In the planning of the syllabus, officials emphasized three factors: the need to attract students pursuing degrees in engineering, science, medicine, and dentistry; the necessity of having students finish their degrees before entering the active services; and the desire to enroll those considered potential officer material (POM) in the COTC at the earliest stage in their military training in order to ensure their “continuity in the corps.” At a meeting of representatives of COTC contingents held on 30 August 1941 at

Queen’s University, officers commanding gave their general approval for the introduction of this plan.72 In October 1941, officers commanding were instructed that future examinations would be given under the general arrangements outlined in the syllabus.73

Colonel John Kelburne Lawson, the Director of Military Training at NDHQ, forwarded the syllabus guide to all district officers commanding on 9 September 1941.

The guide divided training into four stages corresponding to year of study: the first two stages provided for basic training common to all arms; the third for instruction according to syllabus “A” or “B” and “C”; and the fourth for more advanced specialized training in specific subjects and basic training particular to arm of service in preparation for work at advanced training centres (ATC).74 During the first and second years of training, students

72 Those who had attended a COTC for only six weeks were required to attend a two-week platoon tactics course before proceeding to an advanced training centre. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-4, J.K. Lawson to all District Officers Commanding, 9 September 1941. 73 “McGill University Contingent, Canadian Officers Training Corps,” Old McGill 45 (1942), 290. 74 Under the training system introduced in Canada in March 1941, every new army recruit spent two months at a basic training centre and received elementary common-to-all-arms training before moving to an 159 would undertake 110 hours of military training and two weeks of camp training, which in the army constituted the first two months of the standard basic training syllabus. During the third year, students wishing to qualify for active or service (special) qualification would be given instruction in syllabus “A,” a common to all arms program that was more advanced than the basic training program, while those wishing to take reserve qualifications only would take syllabus “B” and syllabus “C,” a common to all arms course and a special to arms course respectively. Those who passed the examination for syllabus “A” would be eligible for selection for a special eight-week course at an OTC to prepare for taking the reserve (special) qualification, consisting of six weeks of special to arm training and a two-week platoon tactics course.75 During the fourth year, students would select and take any two of the following courses according to the arm of service to which they wished to be commissioned: military M.T. maintenance, military chemistry, military mathematics, advanced military mathematics, military law and administration, radio theory, advanced radio, meteorology, and military history. Students wishing to join the navy could take marine navigation, naval engineering, and naval history and the influence of sea power. Additionally, the syllabus indicated that where equipment and instructors were available, contingents should offer special to arm subjects to better prepare candidates “to cope” with the work at an ATC. Under this program, when a student completed their university course they would be eligible to attend an ATC.76

In another significant change in policy, the new guidelines also capped COTC enrolment. Lawson explained the four-year syllabus did not permit an increase in

advanced training centre for two months of special-to-arm training. See Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1 Six Years of War, 121. 75 In other words, these candidates would bypass the first month of training at an OTC. 76 J.K. Lawson to all district officers commanding, 9 September 1941, Appendix A; and “McGill University Contingent, Canadian Officers Training Corps,” 290. 160 numbers. The army’s requirements for officers from the COTC had been estimated, he reported, and the total strength of the COTC should not exceed 10,000, excluding officers. Under the new guidelines, the number of first- and second-year students taken on strength had to be balanced against those leaving each contingent.77

The introduction of new regulations restricting enlistment in the reserve army in

1942 further circumvented the role of the COTC in officer training. As a temporary war measure, in February 1942 NDHQ introduced new conditions for the appointment of officers to reserve formations and units of the Canadian Army under the 1942-1943

“Policy of Training for Reserve Army.” In addition to classifying the COTC as the only corps of the reserve army furnishing personnel for the active army, the regulations prohibited enlistment in the reserve army of men of high medical categories between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five. A provision in the regulations, however, allowed bona fide university students to continue as members of the COTC until graduation.78 “The

C.O.T.C. is still considered as one of the chief sources of officers for the Active Force for which they may be selected for entry to Officers’ Training Centre for the completion of qualification for an Active Force commission,” explained Ralston. “The C.O.T.C. is not,

77 J.K. Lawson to all district officers commanding, 9 September 1941. 78 Enlistment in reserve units was restricted to the following classes: men between the ages of nineteen and thirty-five in a medical class lower than category B; men granted or entitled to postponement of compulsory training under the NRMA; men between thirty-five and fifty years-of-age; and COTC personnel until their graduation. In other words, officer candidates for the reserve army had to be at least twenty-one years-of-age and if single and under thirty-five years-of-age, be in medical category C or have been granted postponement from call-up under the NRMA. There were four main medical categories on enlistment: category “A” meant that a candidate was fit for service in any theatre of war; “B” meant a candidate was fit for service in any theatre of war but if overseas should be employed on lines of communication, office work, etc.; “C” meant a candidate could only serve in Canada; and “E” meant a candidate was unfit for service whatsoever. Category “D” was given following hospitalization for injury or disease. See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 008, War Diary 1940-1943 (2 of 2), H.C.H. Miller, Memorandum, 25 July 1942; UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 008, War Diary 1940-1943 (2 of 2), H.C.H. Miller to company commanders O.T. Bn. & T.C. Bn., Circular Letter G.-A 7, 1942, Re Status of Members of C.O.T.C. Contingents, 27 March 1942; and DUA, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, “Remarks by District Medical officer, M.D. 6,” n.d., 2. 161 however, intended to be a source of supply for officers for other Reserve units, unless after graduation individuals come within the conditions laid down for appointment to the

Reserve Army.”79

Canadian Army Order No. 129 of 16 May 1942 clarified the conditions for university undergraduates in the COTC. Students could apply for commissions provided they (1) were at least eighteen years-of-age; (2) provided a written undertaking to serve in an active formation or unit of the Canadian army upon graduation or leave of the university; and (3) relinquished their commission if they (a) failed to fulfill the undertaking or (b) on graduation did not obtain qualification for the rank of lieutenant in the reserve army.80 Subject to these qualifications a COTC officer could, if recommended, be appointed to the active force with the rank of provisional 2nd

Lieutenant. Otherwise he was required to first enlist in the active force and proceed as a cadet on attending an OTC.81

Changes to officer selection altered the primary purpose of the COTC. For the remainder of the war, its role differed considerably from previous years. The COTC discontinued courses leading to the qualification of lieutenant and instead officers commanding selected and recommended potential officer candidates on the basis of their

COTC work for more advanced training. Candidates selected before 16 July 1943 went directly to an Officers Selection and Appraisal Centre (OSAC), where they were put through a series of tests over the course of a one-week period and interviewed by a board

79 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 056, File 3, J.L. Ralston to H.J. Cody, 24 March 1942. 80 NDHQ could grant release from the written undertaking if the candidate was required for work in an essential war industry. 81 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 008, War Diary 1940-1943 (2 of 2), H.C.H. Miller, Memorandum, 28 July 1942. 162 before a final decision was made about whether they should proceed to an OTC.82 After the July deadline, recommended candidates were given credit for basic training and sent to an ATC for no less than two months. Candidates then proceeded to the OSAC for two to four weeks of training followed by twelve weeks of special to arm training at an OTC where they would graduate with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Finally, they entered a Corps

Training Centre for special to arm training in the particular branch in which the candidate wished to serve for eight to twelve weeks. On completion of this training, the officer would be qualified for the rank of Lieutenant in the arm concerned.83

Given that the COTC could no longer qualify men as officers or even assure students of receiving officers’ training in the army, it was no longer beneficial or necessary to separate students taking required basic training from students taking common to all arms training in preparation for special to arm and potential officer training.84 COTC contingents absorbed auxiliary training units and broadened once again to include all male students in training at universities, excepting those taking training in the UATC and the UNTD. COTC training was redirected towards more practical

82 Established by early 1943 in an effort to institute a more “uniform” and “scientific” selection process, OSACs were overseen by brigadiers with experience in selection and training. They consisted of senior officers from all corps, psychiatrists, psychologists, and educational officers. Officer candidates from all sources were sent to these centres and if found suitable, proceeded to officer training centres. The OSACs for eastern and western Canada were organized at Trois-Rivières, Quebec, and Chilliwack, British Columbia, respectively. 83 Engen, 64-65; and Stacey, 130-132. 84 At the University of Toronto, for example, students enrolled in military training were divided into two groups: (1) those who had not completed one year of training in the Training Command Battalion or one year of training in a reserve unit (including camp), medical students in their first, second, and third academic years, dental students except those in the Canadian Dental Corps, and all male students eighteen years-of-age who wished to take training voluntarily; and (2) those who were members of the COTC during the previous year, had completed one year of training in the Training Command Battalion (with or without camp, or had completed one year of training with a reserve unit (including camp). The first group took basic army training common to all arms and advanced training was given to medical and dental students with one or more year of training. The second group took basic training and special to arm training and instruction to prepare for potential officer training at OTCs. See “A Message from the President,” The Varsity, 21 September 1942, 1. 163 fieldwork and less theoretical work, with fewer lectures and a greater emphasis on tactical schemes. It emphasized basic training as a means of thoroughly familiarizing all ranks with subjects such as map reading, military law, drill, and weapon training so that upon potentially proceeding to active service in the army, cadets would have a solid foundation in these subjects. With this new focused training came a greater emphasis on a candidate’s willingness to go on active service. For the 1942-1943 academic year, most contingents required officer candidates to make a declaration of their intention to join the active army upon completion of their course, in line with the policies of both the UATC and the UNTD. This, of course, in a very real sense mirrored the wartime need to prepare young men for overseas service but it was also an effort to make the procedures of the

COTC more on par with university air and naval training regulations.85

The change to officer promotion regulations did away with complaints about the

“unjust and unwarranted” differentiation between officer and basic training on university campuses, but it also signaled that the COTC was no longer a top priority in comparison with active service units.86 Canadian Army Routine Order #3790 placed the COTC at the bottom of the list in order of precedence of units of the Canadian Army and officers commanding argued this placed the COTC junior to the non-combatant arms and expressed deep concern with the change. In discussions between university heads and officers commanding, the issue of securing the best recruits for service in the army again became a significant concern. University heads agreed with commanding officers that the

COTC was not getting the respect it warranted and as such worried that students who might otherwise have enrolled for officer training in the COTC would instead join the

85 Untitled COTC history 1939-1945, 21; and “General Information,” The Varsity, 21 September 1942, 2. 86 Andrew Theobald, “Western’s War: A Study of an Ontario Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Contingent, 1939-1945,” Ontario History XCVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 64. 164

UATC or the UNTD, both of which offered more direct paths to commissions.87 In his

1941-1942 annual report, Principal James of McGill University feared the new regulations seemed to “foreshadow the elimination of University O.T.C.’s as a training ground of the officers of Canada’s armed services.” The value of the COTC was in danger of being “overlooked,” he insisted, and he argued that while it was foolish to assume university students were better officer material, there could be “no doubt that special training of selected men with high educational qualifications and marked ability” would produce “as excellent a group of leaders in time of war as it does during the more normal years of peace.” James argued the change in regulations would “discourage” voluntary enlistment because many students felt “conscientiously” that since they would have to serve in the ranks in any event, they would be better off concentrating on their studies while at university and leave military training until after graduation and enlistment.88

A year later, Principal James reported his concerns had been justified. He noted students were bored with the monotony of COTC training and found it unprofitable since no credit was given to trainees when they entered the active army:

Although there is no student feeling against the idea of military training … it must be confessed that there is a growing resentment against the monotony of the present syllabus and against the attitude of the Army authorities towards the whole scheme. The syllabus now in effect is not sufficiently progressive, especially when it is remembered that university undergraduates are, on the average, more intelligent than other groups of young men; and the fact that the Department of National Defence does not give any credit for this military training when the student actually enters

87 “The University and the War,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 1 (October 1942): 4. 88 In his 1946 history of the COTC, however, James acknowledged the regulations were “a very sound and logical evolution” because they “eliminated in large measure the previous disadvantage” associated with fresh university cadets who were in competition for commissions with men from overseas, the latter of whom were much more familiar with the use of weapons, equipment, and tactics. See Annual Report for the Year 1941-1942 (Montreal: McGill University, 1942), 8; and F. Cyril James, untitled history of the COTC, 2. 165

the Army has tended to create the impression that it is a waste of time. If, on his enlistment, a student who has had three or four years of training is placed in the same category as other recruits who have had no military training whatever, it is hard for him to think that military training at universities serves any useful purpose … the University Air Training Corps and the newly-created University Naval Training Division have proved more attractive than the C.O.T.C. to many of the more enterprising students. Both of these units have attempted to integrate their programmes of training with that of the regular service personnel, so that the student who joins them can be sure that he will qualify for combat duty earlier than would otherwise be the case, while there is the added advantage that the Air Force and the Navy hold out brighter prospects that the student will be able to qualify for a commission.89

President Cody of the University of Toronto agreed the COTC had become more of a

“pre-Brockville course” (a reference to one of the OTCs), placing less emphasis on qualification and instead almost entirely focusing on work preparatory to an OTC.90

On 9 July 1943, Clark R. Hopper, the officer commanding the University of

Manitoba COTC, wrote Sidney Smith, the president of the same institution, to report on the proceedings of a conference discussing the future of the COTC that had been held at the OSAC in Chilliwack, British Columbia, and chaired by Brigadier Reginald E.G.

Roome, the Director of Personal Services and chair of the Chilliwack Officers Selection and Appraisal Board. Hopper reported that based on the discussion at the conference and opinions expressed privately, NDHQ “recognized and appreciated” the potential worth of

COTC candidates and was anxious to “get more rather than less from university sources.”

Nonetheless, he worried, that while the new system for training potential officers did not

“envisage doing away with the C.O.T.C.,” the change in promotion policies created a

“first-class problem” for officers commanding of COTCs:

89 James qualified that these developments and general student morale needed to be considered within the larger context of wartime stress, anxiety, frustration, and pessimism. See Annual Report for the Year 1942- 1943 (Montreal: McGill University, 1943), 7-8. 90 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0003, Box 008, War Diary 1940-1943 (2 of 2), “Canadian Officers’ Training Corps University of Toronto Contingent,” n.d., 224. 166

We had agreed thoroughly with the need for more training, more instructional experience, more toughening, and agreed with the desirability of having C.O.T.C. candidates live with and know the men for a period. However, regardless of the valuable training we needed to have a programme and a proposal that we could sell in face of the competition from R.C.A.F. and R.C.N.V.R. Outwardly it appears that they [the army] do not want them [COTC candidates] or need them any more than a recruit coming in from the street.

Hopper reported that he expressed his concerns at the conference and attempted to reassure army officials that university students were not averse to more training but rather were disturbed by how long they would need to train before reaching the OTC. Brigadier

Roome had agreed with his assessment, Hopper concluded, and said that serious thought was being given to the issue of making the army more attractive to COTC candidates.91

Appraisals of student opinion were accurate and reflected the myriad questions students considered before choosing the form of their compulsory service training. The editor-in-chief of the McGill Daily, James G. MacLeod, argued that since there was “no likelihood of their being required to repel a Japanese invasion, and since they received no credit for their training,” students felt they could spend their time “to better advantage studying.” On the other hand, McGill students, MacLeod reported, “enthusiastically” supported the UNTD and the UATC because they were more closely associated with the active forces.92 A student editorial for the University of Western Ontario’s UWO Gazette fiercely criticized the procedures of the OSACs: “The state of affairs [psychological testing]—where the university student is given no credit for his college training than a private with no higher education—should not be tolerated. It is an entirely arbitrary and

91 UBCA, N.A.M. MacKenzie Fonds, Box 30, Folder 30-2, University Conferences, Clark R. Hopper to Sidney Smith, 9 July 1943. 92 James G. MacLeod, “The Fifth Year,” Old McGill 47 (1944), 279. 167 senseless system, badly in need of a change.”93 Students at other universities, in particular the University of British Columbia and Dalhousie University, offered more balanced appraisals, but they still noted the COTC was no longer commensurate with the UATC and UNTD. COTC training, they remarked, had been “cut to a minimum” and there was now “very little difference between the basic and officer group.”94

The new regulations for officer appointments frustrated students, particularly those studying subjects that they rightly believed were providing them with knowledge and skills in crucial demand by the army. The change in regulations seemed especially unjust to engineering students, particularly in comparison to the policies governing the appointment of medical and dental graduates, who received commissions upon graduation. On 29 March 1943, President Cody wrote Ralston to report that during the past two weeks, the graduating class of engineers at his institution had been “greatly disturbed” by orders received by the COTC regarding the proposed procedure for the training and selection of officers for the army:

We understand that young men who have graduated from the professional faculty of engineering after a long and rigorous training are required to spend what may be many months in the preliminary training and appraisal centres as cadets, that is, with rank and pay inferior to that of an officer. Young professional engineers are unable to understand the difference between this procedure and the much more favourable treatment accorded to graduates in medicine and dentistry, who receive commissions immediately on graduation. This disappointment experienced by students of the final year in engineering is intensified by the knowledge that the Navy offers to acceptable men the rank of probationary sub-lieutenant and the Air Force offers the rank of pilot officer to those approved for technical appointments. The case is made all the more difficult by the realization that science students are being urged by the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel as a matter of national duty to remain in their courses for the present, lest the supply of engineers and scientifically-trained persons be reduced to a dangerously low level. Tremendous emphasis has

93 UWO Gazette, 21 November 1943, quoted in Theobald, 63. 94 “OTC Lectures Cut; First Parade Sat.,” The Ubyssey, 22 September 1942, 1. 168

been placed on the importance of such young men to the war effort—an emphasis which seems to be overlooked in the proposed training and selection plan. Much uncertainty appears to exist in the minds of the students as to the time during which they might be held in a selection and appraisal centre and as to their status while there. Some of them might be kept a long time away from urgent tasks in war industry, despite the excellence of their technical qualifications and might even be accorded no more than non-commissioned rank.95

Cody reported that because of these “apparent inequalities of treatment,” many students changed their declaration forms from the Department of Labour—which they had signed weeks earlier—and listed the navy or air force as their first choice and moved the army to their second or third choice.96 Given this situation, Cody suggested the army adopt “some form of procedure” whereby recent engineering graduates considered potential officer material be given their preliminary training with the status of provisional officers in recognition of the professional and military training they had already received.97

Ralston replied on 16 April 1943. He explained that following his receipt of

Cody’s letter, further study had been made of the question by the appropriate officials and it had been decided that “in order that there could be no question of a breach of faith on the part of the National Defence Headquarters,” instructions were given to all

Commands and Districts on 3 April that the existing regulations would remain in effect until 16 July 1943. Ralston reported, however, that it had been decided that in the future,

NDHQ would adhere to the policy adopted in regards to engineering graduates seeking a commission. They would be required to enlist in the army, to continue their training at an appropriate training centre, and then appear before a selection board to determine their suitability as an officer. This change, Ralston defended, was “considered necessary”

95 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 051, File 4, H.J. Cody to J.L. Ralston, 29 March 1943. 96 Any student was allowed to alter their declaration at any time before being called up for military service. 97 H.J. Cody to J.L. Ralston, 29 March 1943. 169 because experience had demonstrated that the granting of commissions directly to engineering students caused “considerable embarrassment to the individual” and was

“detrimental to the Service” in cases where the candidate did not qualify as an officer.

The number of failures and repeats at OTCs, he reported, had been “considerably higher”—in fact double the percentage—amongst COTC candidates entering with provisional commissions than amongst candidates who had completed both basic and advanced training. Academic standing, argued Ralston, did not “compensate for the training, experience and military knowledge which can only be acquired by the potential officer having had some service in the ranks of the Active Army, including training as an

N.C.O.” Moreover, he argued, with regards to doctors and dentists, military proficiency and the “handling and leading of troops in the field” did not play as important a role in officer qualification. Ralston assured Cody the new procedure would continue to take into full consideration the military training received at universities. Those who passed the required military examinations would be sent to the OSAC as “rapidly as circumstances warrant.”98

On 6 May 1943, Cody again wrote Ralston and explained that he felt there might be “some danger in some quarters of underestimating the value of the C.O.T.C. as a source of supply for officers.”99 If there were any weak spots in the training program,

98 UTARMS, Officer of the President, A1968-0006, Box 051, File 4, J.L. Ralston to H.J. Cody, 16 April 1943. 99 Cody also attached a letter written by Lieutenant-Colonel F.S. Milligan, the District Engineer Officer of Military District No. 2 and one of the instructors of the University of Toronto COTC. In the letter, Milligan called Ralston’s calculations “valueless” and reported there was not a single record of failure of a COTC candidate from RCE from Military District No. 2, nor had he heard of any cases where COTC candidates had to repeat. This was particularly significant given that approximately fifty percent of all RCE reinforcement officer candidates sent to all OTCs in Canada had been from this military district. Milligan explained there had been two cases of failures of two university graduates but that these candidates had been given no COTC training. See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 051, File 4, F.S. Milligan to H.W. Tate, 26 April 1943. 170

Cody explained to Ralston, university authorities wished to “speedily” strengthen them in the interest of providing the army with its “fair share of the best of our trained university students.”100 This concern should be considered in the context of the perceived competition between the COTC and the UATC and the UNTD for potential officer candidates who would eventually enlist for active service. University officials continued to be concerned that the new policies on the granting of commissions would result in the army missing the opportunity to secure highly qualified university graduates, particularly those with science and engineering backgrounds, for service as officers. Cody attached a letter written by Colonel H.H. Madill, the officer commanding of the University of

Toronto COTC, to further emphasize his arguments. Madill reported that most believed the work of COTC contingents was not being “fully appreciated” because there was no survey of the results achieved.101 The UATC and the UNTD were now on campus for the purpose of recruiting students, and as such, argued Madill, the COTC must perform a vital role for the army in making this service as “attractive” as possible by identifying the opportunities for “the best men.” “It is strongly urged that the regulations of other services be taken into account when making regulations with regard to officers in the army,” Madill recommended. “Otherwise the army will get only those who cannot get into the other services.” This, reported Madill, was already the situation in regards to the technical branches. He concluded with two recommendations. First, NDHQ obtain a

100 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 051, File 4, H.J. Cody to J.L. Ralston, 6 May 1943. 101 Madill explained that no official report had been made to COTC contingents as to the success of their candidates, but that they had “been led to believe by various classes” that the standing of their candidates had been excellent. He reported that since the OTCs had been opened, he had heard of only three cases of candidates from the University of Toronto who had failed in any arm and that none of them were engineers. Madill posited that perhaps those from university centres or university graduates had been misidentified as having taken COTC training, as members of the staff at Brockville had discovered the previous year. See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 051, File 4, H.H. Madill to H.J. Cody, 5 May 1943. 171 report on the number of failures at OTCs in all arms according to the place of their training, and that the list separate cadets by COTC contingent.102 Second, NDHQ agree to give “every possible assistance” to the COTC “to enable it to retain an adequate proportion of the best men for service in the Army.”103

In a letter to Cody dated 22 May 1943, Ralston rejected any proposal to change the regulations affecting officer selection. He insisted engineering students should not be given special consideration and argued that the high academic standing of army officers was insufficient. “More and more it is being borne out that training in the ranks is essential in developing a high calibre regimental officer,” he contended. “The experience gained in the fundamentals of soldiering, obedience and discipline, working with others as a team and the management of men can only be gained by the great majority, while serving in the ranks.” Ralston defended his evaluation, explaining the statistics on failures amongst COTC candidates had been based on a calculation of the COTC as a whole. “It is recognized that all contingents are not equal in the standard of candidates produced,” he wrote, and explained that figures were being secured so that comparisons could be made across contingents. Nonetheless, Ralston acknowledged that Madill’s concern over competition between the services for COTC personnel was a subject of special consideration. He asked Cody for a “definite suggestion” on how to encourage young men to “make the Army their first choice.”104

By 1943, the COTC was in a difficult position. The organization’s mandate had altered significantly. With the institution of compulsory military training, the COTC had

102 Madill recognized that a survey would be difficult given that the COTC did not get credit for numerous cases where candidates were supplied to fill quotas allotted to various units in all arms throughout the year. 103 H.H. Madill to H.J. Cody, 5 May 1943. 104 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 055, File 5, Ralston to H.J. Cody, 22 May 1943. 172 transitioned from a relatively small cohort providing high-level training to future army officers to a massive organization providing basic training to a diverse group of men, some of whom wanted to ultimately join the RCAF or the RCN and others who had little interest in, or intention of, enlisting in any branch of the armed services. It remained by far the largest university training program and had to shoulder the most significant burdens of the government’s student mobilization policies. The program’s resources were stretched as it strived to provide as high a level of military training as possible to students on campuses across the country. Additionally, the establishment of the UATC and the

UNTD created competition for the COTC in terms of resources and securing the best recruits. Changes to army policies regarding the granting of officer commissions to

COTC trainees also undermined the prestige and perceived benefit and therefore the appeal of the program. The COTC was not in danger of being identified as irrelevant, but army officials and university authorities were becoming increasingly concerned that

Canada’s war effort, and particularly the Canadian Army, was not sufficiently benefitting from the program. By 1943, discussions were already underway to reform the COTC and the entire program of university service training.

III: Efforts to Improve and Reform University Service Training

Greatly increased demands on the COTC and competing needs for university graduates prompted university, government, and military officials to propose a reorganization of university service training. The first critical proposal emerged from a conference held in Ottawa from May 11-12, 1942, between the NCCU Executive

Committee, deans of engineering and science, representatives of the three armed services,

NSS, the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel (WBTP), and other interested 173 government departments. It signaled the early concern of university and army officials about the status of the COTC, calling for extensive changes to university military training, including that the armed services stop “direct recruiting” in universities, that compulsory military training be made mandatory for no more than two years, and that the

COTC be dramatically reduced in size by redirecting it to its original purpose of preparing potential officer material.105 This effort to reform the COTC was ultimately unsuccessful, in large part because mobilization officials opposed resolutions included in the proposal that called for NSS to assume control over the allocation of university students to armed services and war industries.106 Subsequent discussion about the reorganization of university service training was further delayed pending the transfer of

Canada’s mobilization machinery from the Department of National War Services

(DNWS) to NSS in the fall of 1942. On 1 December 1942, the National Selective Service

Mobilization Regulations replaced the National War Services Regulations to reflect this transfer. As already discussed in chapter one, these new regulations imposed more comprehensive and stricter measures on university students. The regulations did not, however, address the status of the COTC. Efforts to reorganize university service training resumed.

On 10 January 1943, officers commanding of the COTC met in Ottawa for a conference with military officials to discuss the status of the COTC.107 A number of high

105 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche to G.R. Benoit, 7 April 1942; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” n.d., 2-3. 106 See chapter one. 107 In attendance were the following representatives: Lieutenant-Colonels Eric Harold (Andy) Anundson, Directorate of Military Training; R.O. Earl, Queen’s University; LeRoy Fraser Grant, General Staff Officer, Military District No. 3; Harold Seymour Gamblin, Mount Allison University; T. Guerin, Loyola University; F.L. Henderson, McMaster University; Clark Reid Hopper, the University of Manitoba; Ernest Légaré, Université Laval; Clarence A.J. Miller, the University of Ottawa; J.M. Morris, McGill University; 174 ranking officials joined the conference at various points in its proceedings, including:

Ralston; Major-General Kenneth Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff; Brigadier Orville

M.M. Kay, Deputy Adjutant-General; Brigadier Jonathan C. Meakins, Deputy Director

General of Medical Services (and former Dean of Medicine at McGill University); and

Colonel B.J.W. Spink, Deputy Paymaster General.108

At the meeting, all officials agreed the inclusion of basic training in the programme of the COTC “had materially altered its function.” The conference discussed changing the name of the COTC to the Canadian University Training Corps, given the program’s new focus, but several representatives argued the status suggested by officer training should not be so easily discarded. Nonetheless, the committee insisted the COTC was no longer a reserve unit but rather a type of training centre. R.O. Earl, the Officer

Commanding of the Queen’s University contingent, reported military districts treated

COTC contingents differently than other reserve units and that “the letter of the law was worse than the interpretation.” All officers emphasized that the lack of uniformity exacerbated the situation; while some contingents provided basic training, others offered basic training, COTC, and reserve officer training. Brigadier O.M.M. Kay, the Deputy

Adjutant-General, maintained there was an essential difference between those enrolled in the COTC and the students undergoing compulsory basic training, but the officers

H.H. Madill, the University of Toronto; P. Ranger, Université de Montréal; G.M. Shrum, the University of British Columbia; Percival Sidney Warren, the University of Alberta; and W.S. Wilson, the University of Toronto; Majors C.H.M. Church, University of Bishop’s College; H.H. Ferns, University of Saskatchewan; O.B. Rexford, McGill University; L. St. Pierre, Mount Saint Louis University; and Captains J.E. Lamontagne, Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf; Clement H. Stearn, McMaster University; and F. Stiling, the University of Western Ontario. Earl chaired the meeting and Rexford acted as secretary. 108 See UTARMS, B1993-0045, Box 2, File COTC 2, “Minutes of the Conference of O.C’s Contingents held in Woods Building, Ottawa, Sunday 10th January, 1943,” 10 January 1943. 175 commanding disagreed and insisted this was not obvious given that contingents used a variety of methods of enrolment in the COTC.109

Conference participants emphasized that competition from the air force and navy made it necessary to attract good cadets to the army, and in particular, were concerned that the introduction of ground crew training in the UATC would intensify competition for students in medicine, engineering, and science. They argued that the greater competition for recruits studying certain subjects brought into question the “proper proportion of students” in each training branch. While the members agreed each university should make their own arrangements with the RCAF to control the number of candidates in each type of training, the conference unanimously resolved to ask NDHQ to consider the question of coordinating all service training on university campuses, including the courses being offered to already enlisted service personnel such as the

Canadian Army Course. They also resolved that competition for recruits now necessitated the appointment of directors of service training at all university campuses.110

On 31 August 1943, the COTC Committee of the NCCU met and appointed a sub-committee to study the syllabus of training for the COTC and to make recommendations to NDHQ. Appointed to the sub-committee were: Lieutenant-Colonel

H.H. Madill, the Officer Commanding, University of Toronto contingent (chair);

Lieutenant-Colonel P. Ranger, Université de Montréal contingent; Lieutenant-Colonel

J.M. Morris, McGill University contingent; Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Shrum, Officer

Commanding, the University of British Columbia contingent; Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.

Hopper, Officer Commanding, the University of Manitoba contingent; and Lieutenant-

109 “Minutes of the Conference of O.C’s Contingents held in Woods Building, Ottawa, Sunday 10th January, 1943.” 110 Ibid. 176

Colonel H.S. Gamblin, Officer Commanding, Mount Allison University contingent. The syllabus sub-committee met at the conclusion of the meeting and decided that owing to the geographical distance between their locations, they would send their views on the syllabus by correspondence. All members recognized the importance of basic training and agreed to prioritize it in their deliberations.111

The report of the syllabus sub-committee recommended changes in light of the evolution of the role of the COTC over the course of the first four years of the war.

During the 1939-1940 and 1940-1941 academic years, COTC training emphasized preparing candidates for the written and practical examinations for officer qualification certificates; in 1941-1942, certain optional courses were suggested in the policy of training for senior students; and during the 1942-1943 academic year, the “pre-

Brockville” syllabus was required for senior students. The report recommended that training for advanced groups be included in the authorized syllabus of training. Gamblin insisted the present basic training syllabus was “suitable” for first- and second-year students, but a more advanced syllabus of training than was currently being used should be applied to those in third and fourth year, particularly in map reading, fieldcraft, and tactics. He also recommended cadets be given more than ten days of training at summer camp. Hopper made a number of recommendations calling for the expansion of existing training and the introduction of new courses, such as expanding battle drill to include all of the drills on the section level and some in the platoon level and providing advanced groups expecting to go into artillery units with gun drill, elementary gunnery, and lectures on artillery organization. By the same token, Shrum suggested the syllabus

111 UTARMS, B1993-0045, Box 2, File COTC 1, H.H. Madill, “Report of the Syllabus Sub-Committee of the C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities,” 28 October 1943. 177 should allot more time to battle drill, marching, and toughening exercises and that fieldcraft and section leading needed to be carried on to platoon leading level. Hopper even recommended that the most advanced students conduct tactical exercises without troops (TWET) to help students develop their personal tactical thought.112 Madill insisted a syllabus based on the 1943-1944 “Policy of Training for the Reserve Army” seemed the

“best suited for the present requirements” of the COTC and also asked for permission to teach select subjects for senior students, a practice, he pointed out, recognized in the

1941-1942 COTC syllabus.113

The sub-committee justified its recommendations based on six developments.

First, the pre-OTC syllabus was obsolete given that candidates no longer proceeded directly to an OTC. Second, the COTC was in competition with the UATC and UNTD and both air and naval service training had a more interesting and engaging syllabus for instruction and took advantage of the training facilities of the local ships and air training schools. Third, some universities found it very difficult to adhere to a rigid syllabus given that they were not as well equipped to give instruction in a number of subjects and suffered from a lack of accommodation and equipment. Fourth, the 1943-1944 “Policy of

Training for Reserve Units” required that new recruits be given the first month of basic training and trained recruits be given a second month of basic training and some special to arm training. Fifth, many freshmen had two years of training in the reserve army. And

112 For information on the TWET, see Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd., 2000), 26-28. 113 UTARMS, B1993-0045, Box 2, File COTC 3, H.H. Madill to the Secretary, DND, 19 June 1944. 178 sixth, the secondary school syllabus of defence training included many subjects in the basic training syllabus and therefore most first-year students had previous training.114

In April 1944, the DND notified all general officers commanding and district officers commanding that the policy of training for the COTC for the 1944-1945 academic year had been reviewed and modified in order to “relieve the monotony of trg

[training]” for third- and fourth-year students. First- and second-year students would still be required to undergo the equivalent of fifteen days of basic training during the course of the academic year and an additional fifteen days of training in a summer camp in accordance with the Standard Infantry Basic Training Syllabus. Third- and fourth-year students, on the other hand, would be allowed to follow Part 2 of the syllabus for such arms as those for which suitable instructors and equipment could be provided within the district without any increase in establishments and scales of issue.115

Military officials agreed action still needed to be taken to reduce competition for candidates between the COTC and the UATC and the UNTD. They recommended the formation of a committee that would help improve standards by coordinating the plan of training for all three services on university campuses and working out an equitable distribution of students to help reduce competition. This led to the creation of the Joint

Services University Advisory Committee, renamed the Joint Services University Training

Board (JSUTB) at its first meeting held in Ottawa in the office of the Director of Military

Training on 16 August 1944. The board, chaired by Brock, was initially comprised of

114 H.H. Madill, “Report of the Syllabus Sub-Committee of the C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities.” 115 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, C.A.J. Miller for Chief of the General Staff to G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command, all district officers commanding, 13 April 1944. 179 military representatives.116 However, after the JSUTB’s 30 October 1944 meeting, James

Sutherland Thomson, the President of the NCCU, was appointed to represent universities.

In response to the forthcoming suspension of Section 12 of the National Selective Service

Regulations and at the request of the NCCU, at its 27 June 1945 meeting the JSUTB agreed to increase the university representation on the board to three members.117

The JSUTB’s mandate was substantial.118 The board was empowered to (1) develop and implement policy in connection with armed services training within universities and more specifically, to make recommendations for the appointment of officers commanding for submission to the proper authorities; (2) coordinate the administration and use of training space for units; (3) review recommendations for the payment for training space; and, perhaps most importantly, (4) allocate incoming first- year students to the units of the three services in accordance with three factors: the requirements of their board, the wishes of the student, and the capability and previous training of the student. In other words, the JSUTB was tasked with carrying out any duties that arose in connection with university service training units and, in order to

116 Appointed to the board were the following representatives: Commodore Ernest Reginald Brock, the Commanding Officer of the RCNVR; Pay Lieutenant E.A. Gunn of the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS); Colonel A.J. Creighton, the Director of Military Training; Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Anundson, the Deputy Director of Military Training; Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.J. Miller of the Directorate of Military Training; Commander J.J. Connolly of the RCNVR; Wing-Commander Ewart Campbell Cross of the RCAF; and Squadron Leader W.J. Sargeant of the RCAF. 117 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, the Secretary, Naval Board, to the Secretary, Department of National Defence (Army) and the Secretary, Department of National Defence for Air, 6 December 1944; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Services University Training Board held in H.M.C.S. ‘Carleton’ Ottawa,” 17 November 1944, 1; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Services University Training Board held in R.C.N.D.H.W., Toronto 27th June, 1945, at 1000,” 27 June 1945. 118 The JSUTB reported through normal service channels rather than directly to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Its chair forwarded copies of the minutes to the secretary of each service who then notified the chair as to whether or not the minutes had been approved. If acceptance of JSUTB recommendations necessitated the issuing of Minister’s Order or Orders-in-Council, the service the chair belonged to was responsible for initiating action to have the regulations prepared and submitted for approval. 180 reduce competition for recruits, the board was also empowered with some oversight authority to direct the placement of first-year students in specific training units.119

At its first meeting, the JSUTB formed local Joint Services University Training

Committees (JSUTC) at each university to coordinate with the larger JSUTB and carry out the board’s mandate at the local level. Approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on

29 September 1944, these committees were tasked with (1) coordinating the training of all three services with the academic syllabus; (2) considering matters affecting the joint interests of military units; and (3) establishing policies with respect to the recruiting and transfer of students in accordance with the requirements of the JSUTB, the student’s wishes, and the capabilities and previous training of the student. JSUTCs did not have the power to reallocate students who had already enrolled in training programs but it is significant that this attempt to reform the mobilization of university students included stipulations to address disparities between the perceived appeal of the three training programs to new students.120

Initially, the JSUTB proposed that the JSUTCs also make recommendations for appointments of OCs to all three services. At the meeting of the JSUTB, officers commanding of COTC contingents, and the Executive Committee of the NCCU in

Ottawa on 8 September 1944, however, university authorities argued that this was the function of the university authorities. The universities, who had actively and

119 The Secretary, Naval Board, to the Secretary, Department of National Defence (Army) and the Secretary, Department of National Defence for Air, 6 December 1944; and LAC, RG24, Volume 11459, File ND 1282-77, Volume 1, “Minutes of Meeting held Saturday morning, 2nd September, 1944, at the office of Director of Military Training, N.D.H.Q.,” n.d. 120 LAC, RG24, Volume 11459, File ND 1282-77, Volume 1, A.J. Creighton, to district officers commanding, all military districts, 18 October 1944; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, Inter-office correspondence, Department of National Defence (Army), Re: Joint Services University Training (CSC 181), 2 October 1944; and Brigadier H.D. Graham, Inter-office correspondence, Department of National Defence (Army), Re: Training in Universities, 21 September 1944, Appendix A [c. 8 September 1944]. 181 enthusiastically cooperated with the armed services since before the outbreak of the war, wanted to retain some control over the management of military training on their campuses. They agreed only to consult the JSUTC if necessary. Nonetheless, it was significant that the new JSUTCs replaced existing military committees that had already been established on campuses across the country, such as the McGill University

Committee on War Service Training and the University of Manitoba Committee on

Military Education. JSUTCs were in operation on most campuses by the end of the 1944 fall term.121 Initially, membership consisted of at most nine individuals: three nominees of the university Board of Governors, the commanding officer of each of the services on campus, and one member each nominated by the district officer commanding (army), the air officer commanding (air force), and the area commanding officer (navy) provided the service concerned was represented by a unit in the university.122 Subsequently, at the recommendation of officers commanding of COTC contingents and the JSUTB, the respective university head was appointed as an additional member to serve as each committee’s executive head and chair.123

While the creation of the JSUTB and the JSUTCs reflected a significant effort to address deficiencies in the mobilization of Canadian university students, this reform did not address all of the difficulties associated with the dramatic expansion of the COTC or the consequences of the changes to army officer promotion regulations. On 8 June 1944,

Lieutenant-General John Carl Murchie, the Chief of the General Staff, wrote Ralston to

121 H.D. Graham, Inter-office correspondence, Department of National Defence (Army), Re: Training in Universities, 21 September 1944, Appendix A, [c. 8 September 1944]. 122 LAC, RG24, Volume 11459, File ND 1282-77, Volume 1, “Minutes of Meeting of the Joint Services University Training Board, held in the Office of the Director of Military Training, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Ontario 16th August, 1944,” 16 August 1944. 123 H.D. Graham, Inter-office correspondence, Department of National Defence (Army), Re: Training in Universities, 21 September 1944, Appendix A, [c. 8 September 1944]. 182 request authority to reorganize the COTC.124 Murchie’s concerns echoed discussions from earlier in the war, including criticisms that the COTC was being made to shoulder too great a burden and that its resources were not being efficiently employed to prepare men to lead. The prestige of the COTC, he insisted, had been undercut by the commissioning policies of the UATC and the UNTD. The inability of the program to proceed beyond basic training and provide a progressive training program to students through their four years of study meant that the Canadian Army was not adequately benefitting from the costly program.

Murchie’s plan called for three significant actions: (1) a reduction in the existing establishment and training strength of COTC detachments; (2) changes to the methods by which candidates were selected for the COTC; and (3) provision for the establishment of

Auxiliary Training Battalions (ATB). According to Murchie’s plan, all physically fit, first-year male students would carry out military training in ATBs. University committees consisting of representatives from all detachments would select and allocate students in their second year for training in the COTC, UATC, and UNTD. Those not selected would continue training in the ATB. Murchie appended two charts to his proposal, one consisting of enrolment figures in 1939 and 1943 and the other depicting the proposed reorganization of the COTC establishment (see Appendix 10 and Appendix 11).125

124 Murchie was born in Edmundston, New Brunswick, and graduated from the Royal Military College in 1915. He went overseas as an artillery officer and was seriously wounded during the First World War. Murchie served as Director of Military Operations at NDHQ during the Second World War until he was appointed Chief of the Canadian General Staff in May 1944. He left the command in August 1945 and until his retirement in 1947, worked as Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) overseeing the repatriation of Canadian troops. See “John C. Murchie, Ex-Chief Of Canadian General Staff,” New York Times 8 March 1966, 39; and “Lt.-Gen. J.C. Murchie: Former chief of army staff,” The Globe and Mail, 7 March 1966, 4. 125 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 8 June 1944. 183

As justification for his plan, Murchie emphasized that the COTC had been formed for the purpose of training university students “with their higher standard of education” as potential officer material for the army. He argued, however, that since the war broke out, COTC establishments had grown to meet the increased need of providing military training to students, specifically the basic training required under the NRMA. They did this by absorbing NRMA personnel to the capacity of COTC contingents and then forming auxiliary units for the remaining students. There were, however, Murchie explained, no authorized establishments for these auxiliary units and instructors were obtained through the employment of additional officers in the COTC detachments and thus the burden of military training fell almost entirely on the COTC. Moreover, COTC standards of training had decreased because students were enrolling in the COTC simply to comply with mobilization regulations. Compulsory military training in the COTC,

Murchie insisted, discounted “to a large degree, the value, from both the training and morale stand point, of time spent in such a unit by men who are keenly anxious to fit themselves for officer appointments in the army.” These men, he insisted, were delayed in their progress by being “compelled to undergo a monotonous repetition of Basic

Training by virtue of the lack of interest on the part of those not too military minded.”

The last few years of the war, Murchie concluded, had demonstrated university students were not officer material solely based on their academic qualifications; leadership qualities were essential to success.126

126 For a list of the members in attendance, see J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 8 June 1944. 184

On 12 June 1944, the Standing Committee of the COTC Committee of the NCCU met at McMaster University to discuss possible reforms to the COTC.127 The committee’s discussion focused on a consideration of two proposals. In the morning session, Lieutenant-Colonel H.H. Madill, the officer commanding of the University of

Toronto contingent, and Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Anundson, the Deputy Director of

Military Training, presented and explained the details of Murchie’s plan. In the afternoon session, Anundson requested the committee consider the recent request by Ralston to change the name of the COTC to the University Training Corps, given that the current name had become “a misnomer and might lead to misunderstanding both with its members and with the public.” The meeting adjourned in the late afternoon to join the larger NCCU conference where Madill presented the committee’s recommendations.

Madill explained that while a strong minority argued against changing the name of the

COTC, the committee had agreed to recommend that for the duration of the war, the corps be renamed the Canadian Army University Corps (CAUC), a name recommended at a recent meeting of the NCCU. He reported the COTC Committee did not, however, agree with the establishment of two army units in each university as recommended in

Murchie’s proposal. This opposition was based on learned experience. Many institutions, particularly larger universities like the University of Toronto and McGill University, had introduced auxiliary training units to accommodate compulsory military training but had since largely discontinued the plan. The consensus of opinion amongst the officers commanding was that there were “more disadvantages than advantages” in the operation of auxiliary training units and that army training could be carried out “more effectively”

127 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, H.H. Madill to the Secretary, National Defence Headquarters (Army), 19 June 1944. 185 through the current organization. “It has been the general experience of all Contingents that a higher state of efficiency and morale is possible when men are trained progressively in one unit,” Madill explained. “It would be difficult to obtain good officers and NCOs to give instruction in an auxiliary unit which was not part of a progressive scheme of training.” The NCCU agreed to hold a meeting of the Executive Committee and all officers commanding of all services in each university before the beginning of the next session to discuss the issue further.128

Despite initial opposition from the COTC Committee of the NCCU, Murchie’s proposal gained the support of army training officials in Ottawa who were most concerned with increasing the output of officers, particularly from the new Director of

Military Training, Colonel A. James Creighton.129 On 23 June, Creighton, Anundson,

Lieutenant J.P. Dewis of the navy, and Squadron Leader W.J. Sargeant of the RCAF met to discuss Murchie’s memorandum. They agreed with most of the changes, but recommended students be selected for training in one of the three services upon entrance to the university. In was impractical, they argued, for potential air and naval cadets to undergo army training during their first year in university. They proposed selection could be done by the creation of special military committees to be named Joint Services

Committees consisting of two representatives from the faculty and the officers commanding of the COTC, the UATC, and the UNTD.130 Those not selected in one of

128 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, “Minutes of meeting of the Standing Committee of the C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities McMaster University, Hamilton, 12 Jun 44,” 12 June 1944; and H.H. Madill to the Secretary, National Defence Headquarters (Army), 19 June 1944. 129 NDHQ announced Creighton’s appointment as Director of Military Training on 22 June 1944. He succeeded J.G.K. Strathy. 130 They proposed that Joint Services Committees replace military committees already in existence at some universities. 186 the three service units could undergo military training in an auxiliary unit as organized by

NDHQ.131

With the firm support of the Director of Military Training, Murchie continued to advance his reorganization proposal. On 31 August 1944, he wrote Ralston to report the

Chiefs of Staff Committee had approved the formation at NDHQ of the JSUTB to coordinate the plan of training in the three services and to work out an “equitable distribution of students and so obviate the competition now existing among the three services where they conflict in the same university.” He recommended JSUTCs be established at each university to ensure “a proper standard” in the COTC. Murchie appended to his letter a revised proposal for the reorganization of university military training, a five-page document that included explanations and justifications for these changes. The main details of his plan were slightly revised based on the response of

Creighton and Anundson, recommending that (1) on entrance to a university all students selected for army training by their respective JSUTC would be posted to ATBs in their first year; and (2) at the end of the first year or in any following year, students would be enlisted in the COTC if considered potential officer material by the JSUTC and they agreed to sign an honourable undertaking to enlist for general service upon leaving the university.132

Murchie emphasized that the legislation supported the organization of auxiliary training units. First, he referenced Section 33 of Order-in-Council P.C. 7978, the 1943

NRMA (Army) Regulations, which read: “Training to be given to ‘students’ … will be

131 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, E.H. Anundson, minutes of meeting on military training in universities held in office of Director of Military Training 23 June 1944, 24 June 1944. 132 Murchie pointed out that suggestions to change the name of the COTC would be unnecessary under his plan. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 31 August 1944. 187 provided by the Dept. of National Defence … The Training to be provided other than to members of Contingents of the C.O.T.C. will be such as can reasonably be given after the needs and requirements of the Canadian Army have been met.” Second, he referred to

Section 12 of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, which read: “At the beginning of each year every student shall submit himself … for a medical examination … and if … physically fit, he shall enroll in a C.O.T.C. if acceptable thereto and a vacancy exists therein, or an auxiliary training unit of his university … if any, or in such other military unit as the D.O.C. may direct” (Emphasis in Original). Murchie explained the regulations provided a student entrance to a COTC if he was found

“acceptable,” meaning suitable for officer training. They also allowed for the establishment of two army training groups: an auxiliary training unit for those not found acceptable and a COTC contingent composed of potential officer material for the “corps d’élite.” The first, he argued, would receive no pay for intramural training undertaken at the university during the academic year while the second would receive fifteen days’ pay at $1.20 per day.133

Murchie requested permission to discuss the plan with the Executive Committee of the NCCU at their 8 September meeting in Ottawa. He acknowledged it was “known” that universities disliked the idea of forming two training groups, but insinuated such opposition had less to do with the desire to have only one group of training and more to do with financial considerations. “The fact is that most universities have all their students doing Army training in C.O.T.C.,” he argued, and this allowed them to build up a large payroll in COTC funds. This, he insisted, could not be given priority; the UATC and the

133 Both groups would be paid for summer training. See J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 31 August 1944. 188

UNTD were threatening the standard of membership in the COTC, making necessary the immediate reorganization of university service training.134

From September 7th to 8th, 1944, A.J. Creighton, the Director of Military Training, met with representatives of the armed services, representatives of the COTC, the UATC, and the UNTD, and the COTC Committee and the Executive Committee of the NCCU in

Ottawa to discuss the status of service training in universities. He first met with the

COTC Committee on 7 September.135 He outlined Murchie’s proposal in detail and explained that he hoped the plan would help the COTC regain “some of the prestige which it had lost through being saddled with the responsibility of carrying out compulsory military training.” An extensive discussion followed, lasting a number of hours. In his report on the meeting, Creighton reported the COTC officers commanding explained that while they considered the plan “good in principle,” they felt it was too late in the war to be “workable in practice.” The report listed the committee’s five objections, which Creighton listed in order of importance: (1) students would find the plan unacceptable because it would create “bad feeling” between those in and those not in the

COTC, leading to a general lowering of morale; (2) parents would object if their children were not admitted to the COTC; (3) it would be too difficult to organize staff to train two units, particularly because non-commissioned officers would have to do “double duty”;

(4) the present system was working well and it was too late in the war to make any changes; and (5) there was insufficient time before the start of the fall 1944 semester to reorganize training. In their minutes of the meeting, the COTC Committee reported they

134 J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 31 August 1944. 135 In attendance were twenty-four representatives. For a list of these representatives, see LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, “C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities Ottawa 7 Sep. 44,” 7 September 1944, 1. 189 had unanimously agreed Murchie’s reorganization plan would be “a retrograde step” because “practically every Contingent reported that this scheme had been tried out in

1940 and subsequent years and that it did not work and in every Contingent had been abandoned as being bad from a University standpoint.” The COTC Committee countered with three resolutions. First, they favoured the retention of the same organization for university service training for the coming 1944-1945 academic year. Second, there should be no change in the name of the COTC. And third, all students undergoing training on campus should be paid for that training. Creighton concluded these resolutions “in effect flatly rejected the plan placed before the meeting” by the

Directorate of Military Training and the meeting was adjourned.136

On 8 September, a combined meeting of the Executive Committee of the NCCU, the JSUTB, and representatives of the COTC, the UATC, and the UNTD was held in the

National Research Building. Creighton placed the reorganization plan before the university representatives, explaining that while officers commanding of COTC contingents had found it unacceptable, he nonetheless desired the opinions of university heads. He strongly emphasized the need and advantages of having a COTC consisting of a “corps d’elite of men who were NOT only able but anxious to serve in the army overseas” (Emphasis in Original). After some discussion, President Thomson of the

University of Saskatchewan, the chair of the meeting and President of the NCCU, explained that the Executive Committee would give the plan “its earnest consideration” but did not think it was “practical to comply strictly” with mobilization regulations and have two units on campuses. If requested, he argued, over ninety percent of students

136 “C.O.T.C. Committee of the National Conference of Canadian Universities Ottawa 7 Sep. 44;” and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, A.J. Creighton, HQ 54-27-35-60, “Training Universities: Report of Meetings 7-8 Sep 44,” 11 September 1944, 2. 190 would give an honourable declaration to join the armed services for active service upon leaving the university.137

Creighton was disappointed when his recommendations were not accepted. He concluded that from these discussions it was evident university authorities and officers commanding of service units in universities supported the JSUTB’s recommendation for closer cooperation between the three services in universities in that they agreed that standard of the COTC needed to be raised. They were, however, “loath to make any change in the status quo at present” because they believed the war would soon be over and the present system was functioning well enough to be left alone. They also believed the existence of two army units on campus would lower student morale; worried it would be difficult to finance administration and training if waived pay from large COTC establishments was unavailable; expressed concern about securing training cadre of instructors for two units; and noted there existed a dislike of having to train men who would not give an honourable undertaking to volunteer for active service.138

In light of this opposition, Creighton recommended the reorganization proposal be applied to universities with two modifications. There would only be one army training unit within universities. This unit would continue to be known as the COTC and all members admitted would be required to give a written honourable undertaking to enlist in the army for active service upon leaving the university. Additionally, all physically fit students not enrolled in the COTC, the UATC, or the UNTD would be posted and trained by a unit of the reserve army as directed by the district officer commanding. Creighton explained this would result in a change of procedure. On entrance to university, all

137 “Training Universities: Report of Meetings 7-8 Sep 44,” 6. 138 Ibid., 6-7. 191 students selected or recruits for army training would sign an honourable undertaking to enlist for active service and would then be enrolled in the COTC. They would be paid for intramural and camp training. Students allotted to the army who refused to sign an honourable undertaking would not be enrolled in the COTC. Their names would be forwarded to the district officer commanding and they would be posted to a “suitable” reserve unit.139

*****

The reform efforts discussed in this chapter were reflective of the extensive efforts of university authorities to collaborate with military and government officials in the development and implementation of university student mobilization policies and service training programs. Ultimately, the Second World War ended before Canada had the opportunity to perfect its university service training programs. In the absence of a uniform standard and in the context of competing recruiting efforts, university authorities made sincere efforts to use the resources available to them to prepare as many men as possible for service in the armed services. Efforts to reform and coordinate university service training to reduce competition and maximize the utility of university graduates with specialized and professional skills were ultimately less consequential than the needs of the armed services. As the war progressed, Canada’s armed services did not suffer from a lack of qualified men to assume leadership positions. Despite concerns that the

UATC and the UNTD were poaching the best candidates, by 1944 this perceived threat to the quality of COTC training and the quality of COTC candidates had declined. Between

1942 and 1943, the personnel needs of the RCAF diminished significantly and by the spring of 1943, it was unclear how many UATC squadrons would continue to function in

139 “Training Universities: Report of Meetings 7-8 Sep 44,” 7-8. 192 the coming academic year.140 By the end of the 1943-1944 academic year, enlistments in the RCAF were suspended indefinitely due to a surplus of aircrew.141 As a result, the

RCAF began disbanding UATC squadrons. In September 1944, AFHQ began reducing the RCAF establishment for the UATC.142 RCAF Organizational Order No. 506 disbanded university squadrons effective as of 31 December 1944 and legislated that the officer commanding of the squadron would be responsible for discharging all students according to university air squadron procedure. RCAF personnel were returned to their units and UATC officers retired.143 Given all of the attention paid to how the allure of the air force was drawing students away from joining the COTC, it is perhaps ironic that the

COTC absorbed the majority of students discharged from the UATC. The UNTD, which was always the smallest of the university service units, was unable to absorb discharged

UATC candidates because they had already met their established quotas.144

It is perhaps also ironic that because of the decrease in demand for naval officers, by the 1944-1945 academic year students who had completed UNTD training could not appear before an officer selection board unless they qualified for appointment as technical officers. In other words, only graduate students in mathematics, physics, and mechanical or electrical engineering were eligible for officer selection. All other

140 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, W.M. Graham, File Memorandum, 215-3-1 (D. of M.5), 12 March 1943. 141 Ibid., Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 2, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Services University Training Board held in DMT Office HDHQ, Ottawa 13th Nov 1945, at 1700 hrs,” 13 November 1945, Appendix A. 142 Ibid., Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, A.M. Haig to Air Officer Commanding, No. 3 Training Command, 16 October 1944. 143 Ibid., R.S. Cross, Wing Command for A.O.C., Nc. 2 A.C., to the Secretary, Department of National Defence for Air, 23 February 1945. 144 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Services University Training Board held in H.M.C.S. ‘Carleton’ Ottawa 25th January, 1945 at 1000,” 9 January 1945. 193 successful UNTD ratings went on active service as ordinary seamen instead of as officer candidates, making the UNTD on par with the COTC.145

Even before the war in the Pacific was over, the government began to deescalate its mobilization policy, including policies regulating the compulsory training of male university students. On 7 May 1945, the government suspended military call up of eligible men. While all of the reform efforts discussed in this chapter represented serious efforts to improve the quality of the training received by students in the COTC and increase the appeal of the unit, ultimately the course of the war had the most substantial impact on the mobilization of Canadian university students. The COTC reverted to its original function of preparing students for qualification as officers for the 1945-1946 academic year and army officials began to develop a new post-war program.

145 Report of the President of the University of British Columbia for the Academic Year Ended August 31st, 1945 (Vancouver: the University of British Columbia, 1945), 127.

194

Chapter Four

Producing Essential Personnel, Part I: The Debate over the Acceleration of University Courses, 1939-1943

Suddenly, our country has realized that the universities are really the only institutions that are training men and women for professions without which our whole war effort would come to an abrupt and tragic end. The call has gone out for scientific workers, physicists heading the list, for professional engineers, for medical practitioners and dentists, for chemists, for accountants, for teachers, for ministers of religion—and in every region of the armed and civilian services, for men and women with trained intelligence and disciplined minds. Those responsible for directing the war effort have come knocking at the doors of the universities for more and still more men. From all they demand both fundamental and specialized training…The universities are recognized as key institutions for a country at war.1

The mobilization and utilization of Canada’s industrial, scientific, and technological resources during the Second World War made evident the vital importance of enlisting the expertise and skills of university-trained personnel. In anticipation of these demands and in response to existing and predicted shortages, government officials informed university authorities that they should encourage university students— particularly those in courses regarded as essential to the prosecution of the war: medicine, dentistry, engineering, and science—to complete their training. As the war progressed, the government increasingly regarded universities as essential to solving what Arthur

MacNamara, the Director of National Selective Service (NSS), termed the “total manpower problem.”2

1 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1941-42 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1942), 8. 2 The Department of National War Services (DNWS) administered the country’s mobilization regulations until the government established NSS in March 1942. After military mobilization was also allocated to NSS in September 1942, NSS administered both national registration and mobilization. For more on NSS, see chapter one. See Department of Labour, “Selective Service and the Universities,” The Labour Gazette XLIII, no. 1 (January 1943): 31. 195

In the summer of 1940, government and university officials began discussing accelerating university curricula in essential fields as part of a larger effort to increase the number of skilled graduates in high demand by the armed services, war industries, and essential civilian services. The initial debates, which concerned a perceived deficit in the number of required doctors, eventually broadened to encompass dentistry students as well as students in a variety of engineering and science programs. Of utmost concern to university authorities was how accelerated programs would be financed and how their implementation might impact the quality of graduates. They also worried about how an expedited curriculum might affect the ability of students to finance their education; accordingly, questions about providing student aid through loans or grants informed discussions about the merits of such a scheme. Ultimately, acceleration was implemented for medical and dental programs across the country but university and government officials agreed accelerated engineering and science curricula would not be to the advantage of the war effort. Despite this decision, in 1942, the government instituted a student aid program for university students in all courses considered essential.

*****

After the outbreak of the war, university heads met with government officials in

Ottawa to discuss the role of university students in the country’s war effort. Government officials insisted that under current conditions students were to be encouraged to finish their course of study as “thoroughly and as speedily as possible” before enlisting for active service. In particular, university administrations, they argued, should urge students in medicine, dentistry, engineering, and science to complete their professional training. 196

The “well-trained man” would be of greater value to the “cause,” they insisted, whether he ultimately served in industry or in one of the branches of the active services.3

According to Principal Frank Cyril James of McGill University, Andrew George

Latta McNaughton was the “leading spirit” in convincing the government the war would be a battle of technical and scientific innovation necessitating graduates in the scientific branches of learning.4 Known as the “soldier-scientist,” McNaughton was the president of the National Research Council (NRC) from 1935 to 1939—the government’s general advisory body on science and industrial research and policy—until he was selected to command the First Canadian Infantry Division, a position he held until he was appointed the Minister of National Defence in 1943.5 On 16 September 1939, McNaughton wrote the heads of twenty universities to report that in the opinion of the NRC, since the war was likely to be of a long duration, students should continue in their university courses until fully qualified, especially those in scientific and technical subjects:

It is the view of the Council that, owing to the possibility of the present war extending over a very long period and the need that there will be for large numbers of well trained men in all branches of pure and applied science, including medicine, dentistry and agriculture, students now pursuing successfully university courses in these fields will serve their country in a most valuable way by continuing their university training until graduation, and that specially able students should be encouraged to continue their studies in post-graduate courses in all branches of science, especially along the lines required to meet national requirements as they develop…the Council, at the instance of the military authorities, wishes to point out that under the conditions of modern war, both in the military forces and in essential civil industries, there will be a very large and increasing need for a steady supply of fully trained men in all branches of

3 McGill University Archives (MUA), RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 111, File 2999, H.J. Cody, “Report of Universities Conference Re Athletics,” 3 January 1942. 4 Ibid., Container 122, File 3024, F. Cyril James to S.H. Carsley, 28 February 1942. 5 “Soldier-scientist of many parts, General McNaughton dies at 79,” The Globe and Mail, 12 June 1966, 3. For more on McNaughton, see John Nelson Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). For more on the history of the NRC, see Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: the NRC, 1916-1966 (Toronto: Clark, Irwin, & Co., 1978). 197

science. It is their hope that the universities of Canada will continue to meet this need.6

McNaughton explained that through such a course of action, needed students could be better directed into the most appropriate branches of the services “where their knowledge and skill would be most useful.”7 In the same correspondence, he also advised university heads to minimize changes to the ordinary curricula until given further advice from the

NRC. Since the NRC was “closely in touch” with the requirements of industry and the armed services for “men of special scientific training,” he argued the council should act as the intermediary body, bringing to the attention of university authorities particular needs as they developed “in the hope that they may find it possible to provide the special instruction required.”8

In October 1939, Chalmers Jack Mackenzie became Acting President of the NRC.

Mackenzie and McNaughton were good friends and held similar views, both having been influenced by their experiences during the First World War. McNaughton, in fact, had recommended Mackenzie’s appointment. In many ways, Mackenzie was a good pick.

From 1918 to 1939, he was a professor of civil engineering at the University of

Saskatchewan and from 1921-1944, dean of the institution’s College of Engineering. In

1935, he had been appointed a member of the Advisory Council of the NRC. Described as steady and cautious in his judgments, Mackenzie’s success in organizing and directing the scientific work of the nation was attributed to his “personal charm, technical abilities,

6 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0006 Correspondence, 1939-1940, Box 043, File 3, A.G.L. McNaughton to H.J. Cody, 16 September 1939, 1-2; and Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, Distribution of Letter dated 16 September, 1939, to University Presidents, n.d. 7 F. Cyril James to S.H. Carsley, 28 February 1942. 8 This sentiment was repeated at the 5 July 1940 conference of university presidents in Ottawa where government officials told university heads to continue in all university departments as normally as possible. See Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, A.G.L. McNaughton to Lyman T. Chapman, 22 September 1939. 198 and gift for administration.”9 Mackenzie firmly believed modern war was a struggle between machines and insisted on the importance of the application of pure and applied scientific research to the winning of the war. As such, like McNaughton, he advised university heads to ensure that their teaching staffs did not disintegrate, to encourage students to finish their courses before enlisting, and to let nothing interfere in the work of their institutions.10 Mackenzie also similarly believed the NRC could play an essential role in disseminating information and ideas to university authorities that would help guide institutions of higher education in their efforts to increase and accelerate the training of essential personnel needed to meet anticipated wartime demands.11

The NRC had no formal authority over the role of universities in the war effort but it desired to assume the responsibility of advising universities. To do so, it established a special committee under the direction of Principal Robert Charles Wallace of Queen’s

University to consider the question of adapting university curricula to meet wartime needs.12

At its first meeting in mid-August 1940, the special committee met with several officers of the Department of National Defence (DND), including Brigadier-General

Kenneth Stuart, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and Colonel Allen A. Magee, the

Executive Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. Those present discussed what needs of the armed services could be addressed by the nation’s scientific and educational institutions and how best to meet these needs with the “least possible dislocation of the

9 Annual Report for the Year 1940-1941 (Montreal: McGill University, 1941), 19. 10 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Box 326, File 6, Secretary to the President, 2 November 1941, Untitled statement by President Carleton Stanley to students, n.d., 1. 11 LAC, RG77, Volume 134, File 17-15-9-4, Grant Dexter, “He Directs Our Science in War,” Leader Post, [c. December 1940]. 12 LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, C.J. Mackenzie to the Presidents of Canadian Universities, 20 August 1940. 199 normal work of the organizations concerned.”13 In attendance was a group of the most influential and prominent scientists in Canada, whose top-secret wartime research included work on poison gas, high explosives, aviation, radar, and the atomic bomb.

These included C.J. Mackenzie; Robert William Boyle, the director of physics at the

NRC from 1929 to 1948; John Tasker Henderson, the head of the NRC’s radar development program who had previously served as the head of the NRC’s radio section;

Otto Maass, the assistant to the president of the NRC and the head of the Department of

Chemistry at McGill University; Eli Franklin Burton, a council member of the NRC and director of the McLennan Laboratory and the head of the Department of Physics at the

University of Toronto; and Frederick Banting, the world-famous researcher known for his role in the discovery of insulin who was then head of the NRC’s Associate Committee on

Medical Research and the liaison officer between the Canadian and British medical services until his death in February 1941.14 These men belonged to what historian Donald

Avery called the nation’s “core group of military science mandarins” and were responsible for mobilizing the country’s scientific resources in support of the war effort.15

Wallace opened the meeting by explaining that aside from information received on the needs for mechanical draftsmen and shortwave radio training—in which institutions of higher learning were already devising special courses—universities had thus far received very little advice on how they could assist the war effort by providing university training and specialized courses of instruction. Since universities wished to

13 C.J. Mackenzie to the Presidents of Canadian Universities, 20 August 1940. 14 LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, “Minutes of a Meeting of a Special Committee of the National Research Council to consider Special Training of Technical Men for the probable needs of the Military Services and War Industries,” August 1940, 1. 15 Donald Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), ix. 200 know what “useful work” they could do, Mackenzie insisted the committee discuss the ways in which these institutions could help reduce personnel shortages through changes and additions to curricula.16

The committee considered a number of recommendations. Burton reported he believed universities would be pleased to give courses “of any kind necessary” to enlisted men, if military authorities wished to have them do so. Stuart agreed the armed services would benefit from universities helping to train officer specialists. Boyle suggested adapting existing courses to make them more applied and utilitarian through the addition of short courses in practical work. Henderson insisted radio courses at universities— needed to produce personnel for Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF)—should be made a primary subject.17 Maass made a number of recommendations concerning courses in chemistry, including that analyses with a “military value” could be substituted from those normally applied in course work and that officials from the armed services and war industries could visit universities to give lectures on military subjects such as decontamination, gas warfare, and explosives. The most ambitious recommendation came from Banting. He called for a “unification of the war science forces,” even though the provisions of the British North America Act regarding education prevented direct action by the Dominion Government in university affairs. Germany, he pointed out, had been giving medical students special courses applicable to war for at least two years but little

16 “Minutes of a Meeting of a Special Committee of the National Research Council to consider Special Training of Technical Men for the probable needs of the Military Services and War Industries,” 1. 17 The need for such training was particularly critical since Britain’s Royal Air Force was urgently in need of radio mechanics and radio direction finding personal. This will be discussed further in chapter five. 201 had been done in Canada to advise medical faculties on wartime modifications to course work.18

The members of the NRC’s special committee insisted all plans needed to permit and empower universities to assist in the war effort without reducing the academic value of courses. As such, there was consensus that changes to curricula and the addition of new specialized courses would vary based on an institution’s resources, abilities, and strengths. Maass recommended, for example, that the University of Toronto be specially fitted to offer courses in meteorology relating to chemical warfare required by the signals corps and the RCAF, given the institution’s close association with the Dominion

Meteorological Service, located in Toronto. The committee also proposed that the NRC interview university heads and faculty to determine which institutions could modify their courses for specific war purposes. All stressed the importance of Canadian universities in light of the difficulties facing the science departments of British institutions, where the system of teaching had been disrupted and professors had been pressed into the services.

This situation, the committee anxiously agreed, would quickly result in a shortage of trained young scientists and it would be left to Canadian universities to fill the gap.19

The special committee regarded the training of needed technical personnel as equal to the service of enlisted men and women and was anxious to promote the idea and importance of a “scientific corps.” Maass, for example, recommended doctoral students be enlisted and then seconded to continue their scientific work and insisted they should be compensated by the government in case of injury resulting from accidents occurring

18 Banting attributed this, in part, to the fact that the work of the NRC’s Associate Committee on Medical Research focused on medical research and not training or curriculum development. See “Minutes of a Meeting of a Special Committee of the National Research Council to consider Special Training of Technical Men for the probable needs of the Military Services and War Industries,” 2-8. 19 Ibid., 8, 10-11. 202 during what was often dangerous research. The committee agreed Mackenzie should approach the Minister of the Department of National War Services (DNWS) to suggest that men in essential subjects be “called” to do the specific work for which they had been trained rather than enter uniformed forces.20

As agreed upon by the special committee of the NRC, Mackenzie wrote the heads of eighteen universities to inform them of the ideas expressed at the meeting, hoping that such information “might serve as a useful guide in planning for the coming academic year.”21 He explained the committee had agreed technical schools should undertake the training of men who would follow trades in the armed services but that universities might be encouraged to integrate into engineering courses practical training in subjects such as internal combustion engines and tractors, navigation, and elementary theory of flight.

Moreover, he reported, the committee had suggested that courses on radio and communications could be given as the primary subjects to students in engineering and engineering physics, since they had both practical and academic value. Mackenzie advised that the work of graduate students in science be continued due to the need for research workers and demonstrators. He also reported that the Royal Canadian Army

Medical Corps (RCAMC) would supply information to deans of medical faculties on the various phases of medicine relating to wartime activities and recommended that this information be used in determining course work. Arrangements, he explained, had been made to have these deans meet with Banting and Brigadier Raymond Meyers Gorssline,

20 “Minutes of a Meeting of a Special Committee of the National Research Council to consider Special Training of Technical Men for the probable needs of the Military Services and War Industries,” 10-11. 21 Mackenzie wrote to the following institutions: the University of Toronto, Acadia University, the University of Alberta, the University of Bishop’s College, the University of British Columbia, Dalhousie University, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, the University of Manitoba, Mount Allison University, McGill University, McMaster University, the University of New Brunswick, the University of Ottawa, Queen’s University, the University of Saskatchewan, St. Francis Xavier University, and the University of Western Ontario. 203 the Director General of Medical Services (DGMS) for the Canadian Forces, to further discuss medical curriculum in relation to the war effort.22

In addition to informing university authorities of the work of the NRC’s special committee, Mackenzie forwarded a copy of a speech made by Frederick Donald

MacKenzie, the Liberal Member of Parliament for Neepawa, Manitoba.23 Colonel Jack

Layton Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, had indicated his interest in the address, Mackenzie explained, and was “anxious that it be drawn to the attention” of university heads.24 In the House of Commons on 2 August 1940, F.D. MacKenzie recommended that the DND and universities collaborate to adjust curriculum to enable students to obtain credit in their academic course while at the same time obtaining

“military credit, knowledge and training” that would make them “more valuable” to the country in war and peace. In engineering faculties and schools, F.D. MacKenzie asserted,

“it is quite apparent to everyone what could be done in turning curriculum towards this end, so that the majority of courses could be made applicable, in lecture room and shop, to military training.” Other courses, he argued, could be utilized in much the same way to the benefit of all three services, particularly the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the army’s engineering and artillery corps. In trigonometry and calculus, application could be made to gunnery in laying out lines of fire, working out range tables, and calculating target positions on the map or in the field; in physics and chemistry, application could be made to chemical warfare, explosives, and ballistics; and in history,

22 Gorssline was the DGMS from 1939 to 1942. See C.J. Mackenzie to the Presidents of Canadian Universities, 20 August 1940. 23 MacKenzie served as the MP for this riding from 1936 to 1945. 24 C.J. Mackenzie to the Presidents of Canadian Universities, 20 August 1940. 204 students could study campaigns and battles to learn tactics and strategy. F.D. MacKenzie insisted this would benefit the students as well as the nation’s war effort.25

The information forwarded by Mackenzie on the deliberations of the NRC’s special committee and the positive reception by Ralston to the ideas proposed by F.D.

MacKenzie for DND-university collaboration was some of the first advice given to university authorities. Prior to this date, university officials from several institutions had suggested to the NRC they would be willing to make needed changes to existing courses, run summer courses, and provide special instruction in needed subjects but they had found it difficult to obtain specific information on the requirements of the armed services.

Meanwhile, military authorities were also examining the possibility of providing suggestions as to how universities could help meet their needs. While universities had received virtually no information from government officials on how to best adapt curriculum, officials at the DND and the Department of National Defence for Air had been informed that the government was anxious to make the contribution of universities

“as full and effective as possible.” As such, these departments arranged for officers of the navy, army, and air force to present important facts and recommendations at a special meeting of the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU) held on 5 July

1940 in the boardroom of the NRC in Ottawa. In attendance at the conference were the heads or representatives of thirteen of the nation’s universities.26

25 LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, F.D. MacKenzie, “Co-ordination of Military Training as Between the Department of Defence and the Universities,” speech in the House of Commons, 2 August 1940, 1-2. 26 These were: the University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta, the University of Saskatchewan, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster University, the University of Toronto, Queen’s University, the University of Ottawa, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, Bishop’s University, and Dalhousie University. 205

The recommendations of these armed services officials were largely aimed at universities providing instruction to armed service personnel and adapting curriculum to prepare potential future enlistees. Captain Leonard Warren Murray, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, suggested that it might be useful if universities could introduce special evening courses in navigation and seamanship for officers, courses in mathematics for officers and men, and provide training in the use of semaphore and Morse lamp for signalmen and in the International Morse Code for wireless ratings.27 In addition, Murray reported that any preparation which could be undertaken by universities to prepare men wishing to join the navy—either through the ordinary curriculum or the introduction of special classes—would be a “distinct advantage.” He explained, for example, that the navy would have need for engineers and these men could be made more suitable if they had been taught some theories that would better fit them to understand the practical side of the handling and refitting of engines and reciprocating or diesel turbines. Captain John

Kelburne Lawson, the Director of Military Training at National Defence Headquarters

(NDHQ), did not offer any recommendations for how universities could help alleviate shortages, but reported that in addition to technical officers, the army required a large number of technical personnel in other ranks, since the supply of such personnel had been greatly reduced by the demands of the air force and war industries. Colonel Norman

Clarence Sherman, the Chief Ordnance Mechanical Engineer of the Royal Canadian

Ordnance Corps (RCOC), stated his branch required mechanical and electrical engineers

27 The International Morse code was a small modification of the Continental Morse code developed by Friedrich Clemens Gerke, which eliminated the spaced dots and in their place applied dashes of constant length. In 1938, the International Morse code was adopted worldwide for submarine, radio, and all international communication. See Anton A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons/IEEE Press, 2003), 143-144. 206 as well as some chemists and architects.28 Technical staff for military purposes, he insisted, were the most difficult to obtain because even though the supply of engineers had been adequate, first class mechanical draftsmen were scarce, and he recommended that universities try to help alleviate this shortage. Sherman also suggested the creation of an organization representing the NRC, universities, scientific societies, and the DND to deal with shortages and problems. Finally, Terence Sheard, representing Samuel

Laurence de Carteret, the Deputy Minister of Air, reported that as far as air force personnel was concerned, there was not as of yet an emergency situation. As such, he suggested universities might presently be able to help by assisting in the selection of graduates to serve as instructors for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

(BCATP). Sheard proposed universities establish a “co-operative” organization to which the RCAF could apply for suitable instructors, those possessing a bachelor of science or pure science and the “special aptitudes” required.29

Despite the proposals put forth by the NRC’s special committee and officials from the DND and DND for Air, as of early 1941, university officials still had yet to receive any firm directives or advice regarding how the government wished universities to proceed or on the requirements of the armed services and war industries. There was as of yet no clear, coherent government policy aimed at directing the pedagogical resources and capabilities of universities towards winning the war.30 In fact, for the first year of the

28 For information on Sherman’s military career, see Murray C. Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: The Story of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Forces (Borden: EME Officers’ Fund, 1997). 29 DUASC, UA-3, Box 256, File 4, NRC, “Meeting of the Conference of Canadian Universities, Ottawa, 5 July 1940,” n.d., 5-8, 9, 12-13. 30 This was the result of other government priorities. Until the fall of France, the nation’s leaders remained uncertain about the role the country would play in the war and did not act to significantly mobilize university resources. Once it became clear that Canada would have to play a larger role, the collaborative energies and deliberations of university and government officials focused on mobilizing university 207 war, university authorities largely acted on their own accord in implementing new programs and changes to curricula. They based such action on the little information they could glean from their various correspondences with the NRC and government and military officials. Despite the efforts of university officials to expand their existing efforts, they were often unable to secure the necessary guidance and many were hesitant to make any substantial adaptations or additions without being fully informed of the requirements of the military and war industries. In December 1940, for example,

Clarence Richard Young, the Dean of the Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto, wrote Mackenzie to report that while his institution was making a “considerable effort” to provide specialized training for students in engineering arts physics, he anticipated there might be a similar need for training in other “special techniques” for war service. Young explained American engineering colleges had begun cooperating with the United States Office of Education to provide specialized courses ranging in length from one to eight months that were “particularly fashioned to suit the needs of war industry.” He thought it “undesirable to embark” on similar courses at

Canadian institutions unless and until Ottawa authorities felt there was a very real need but, he believed, if such a need existed, it was “quite probable” university authorities would accept the “dislocation of existing programmes to carry on” such work.31

research, the obligations of university students under the 1940 National War Services Regulations, and the development of the first university service training program, the Canadian Officers Training Corps. Moreover, government efforts to regulate labour supplies were slow to develop. It was not until 25 October 1940, for example, that the Dominion Government established the Interdepartmental Committee on Labour Coordination through Order-in-Council P.C. 5922 in order to “define the jurisdiction of several departments of the Dominion Government ‘in matters affecting labour as related to the war effort’ and to facilitate unified planning and co-ordination in the work of these various agencies.” For more on the National War Services Regulations, see chapter one. For more on the establishment of university service training units, see chapter two. See Department of Labour, “Establishment of Inter-departmental Committee on Labour Co-ordination,” Labour Gazette XL, no. 11 (November 1940): 1101. 31 LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, C.R. Young to C.J. Mackenzie, 13 December 1940. 208

Mackenzie, however, was unable to offer any firm recommendations. Like Principal

Wallace had earlier explained, Mackenzie reported the government had yet to issue any directives regarding the modification of courses to make them more applicable to war service or the introduction of new types of training. It “has been impossible to date,”

Mackenzie wrote, “to get any exact information as to the requirements of the Services or to obtain any commitment that if students are given special courses, they will find employment in the Services … [U]nless such information can be obtained the only course possible for us is to give advice on the problem as we see it.”32

On 24 February 1941, university authorities met in Ottawa with DNWS and DND officials to discuss the position of university students under the 1940 National War

Services Regulations.33 In addition to passing a number of key resolutions concerning compulsory military training, which were forwarded to the DNWS, representatives agreed to forward an additional resolution to Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie

King. It requested that the Dominion Government advise, “as soon as possible,” universities on the need to accelerate courses by continuing instruction during the summer vacation months for students in engineering, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, and pure and applied sciences. University heads insisted the various departments of the government needed to meet and, as a body, decide what they expected of universities.

“At present we simply do not know where we are,” President Carleton Stanley of

Dalhousie University later summarized in a letter to Principal James.34

Ultimately, as will be shown, the development of acceleration programs in medicine and dentistry, and the decision not to impose a similar program for engineering

32 LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, C.J. Mackenzie to C.R. Young, 18 December 1940. 33 See chapter one. 34 DUASC, UA-3, Box 256, File 4, Carleton Stanley to F. Cyril James, 4 March 1941. 209 and science courses, reflected the degree of collaboration between university and government officials in negotiating how Canadian universities could best contribute to the nation’s war effort. These discussions also reveal the degree to which officials privileged university interests and exigencies. Throughout the negotiations on acceleration, discussions of the implementation of these programs centered almost entirely on medicine, dentistry, science, and engineering.35 While they addressed many of the same issues, two acceleration discussions occurred almost simultaneously. The first concerned medical and dental education and involved R.M. Gorssline, the DGMS, senior medical officers, the Adjutant General, officials in the DND and the DNWS, university deans of medicine and dentistry, and professional associations. The second focused on engineering and science programs and involved officials in the Department of Labour, the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel (WBTP), the DNWS and later NSS, military officials, deans of science and engineering, and university heads. These discussions focused on whether or not the acceleration of courses would be necessary to the prosecution of the war and how such programs would be financed if implemented.

I: The Acceleration of Medical and Dental Programs

By early 1941, pressure was mounting from the armed services to accelerate university medical curricula. After consulting with Air Commodore R.W. Ryan, the

Director of Medical Services (Air), and Surgeon Commodore A.A. McCallum, the Senior

Naval Medical Officer, in early 1941, Gorssline, the DGMS, estimated the three services would require an additional 420 medical officers during the current year and another 550

35 Some university heads, including Principal James, suggested arts courses might also be accelerated. Government and military officials never gave such proposals consideration. 210 in 1942.36 These were significant numbers. As of 30 April 1942, the number of medical officers serving in the armed services totaled 1,243, roughly ten percent of all physicians in Canada. While 3,007 students were enrolled in all years of medicine at universities across the country during the 1939-1940 academic year (see Figure 5), only 543 and 538 students graduated from medical faculties in 1941 and 1942 respectively (see Figure 6).

In other words, according to Gorssline’s estimate, the armed services would require ninety percent of all graduating students during these years.37

On 3 May 1941, Gorssline wrote Major-General Beverly Woon Browne, the

Adjutant General of the Canadian Army, to inform him there was increasing cause for concern as it was becoming “more and more difficult to obtain suitable medical officers for the Services.”38 Gorssline attached his breakdown of the requirements for medical officers for the current year.39 He cautioned that while the army required 130 young men for overseas service, he was “very doubtful” if even 100 young doctors could be secured for duty with the RCAMC. It was more probable, he wrote, to expect only fifty would be secured during the coming summer.40

36 The Senior Naval Medical Officer later became known as the Director of Naval Medical Services. 37 Of those required in 1941, the majority (220) were needed for service overseas. An additional 50 were required for loan to the British Royal Army Medical Corps. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 18 March 1941, “Estimated Requirements in Medical Officers for Year 1941 Navy, Army, and Air Force,” n.d.; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, E.G. Davis for the DGMS to the Adjutant General, 11 August 1941; and DUASC, UA-3, Box 257, File 2, E.L.M. Burns to A.B. Fennell, 14 September 1946, Table 14. 38 A veteran of the First World War, Browne was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff at army headquarters in 1940. He served as Adjutant General from 1940 to 1942 and then as Director-General of the reserve army until his retirement in 1943. See “Held high Posts In Reserve Army And General Staff,” The Globe and Mail, 18 March 1948, 8. 39 These estimated the three armed services would require 210 medical officers for overseas service under the age of forty in medical category “A” and another 140 medical officers for service in Canada over the age of forty in medical category “B” or “C.” 40 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 3 May 1941, “Estimated Requirements in Medical Officers for Year 1941, Navy, Army and Air Force,” n.d. 211

In order to prepare to meet current and future demands, Gorssline requested authority to communicate with the deans of the country’s nine faculties of medicine to discuss a proposal to graduate medical students six months in advance of the usual time.41

Under the plan, the class due to graduate in June 1942 would be required to attend a special summer session in 1941 which would enable them to graduate that December.

This class would then be able to enter hospitals as interns in January 1942, releasing approximately 300 interns that same month, similarly six months ahead of schedule. Such an arrangement, he argued, could be made without curtailing the instruction given to students.42 Gorssline stressed the pressing nature of the problem. He explained that after close discussions with two special consultants to his office, Duncan A. Graham, the Chair of the Department of Medicine at the University of Toronto and the President of the

Canadian Medical Association (CMA), and Allan Coats Rankin, the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Alberta, he understood that immediate action needed to be taken if a program of acceleration was to be instituted in time to enable medical schools to continue teaching during the summer months.43

On 5 May, Gorssline telegraphed deans of medical faculties to request their attendance at a conference with army medical authorities to discuss the introduction of an

41 During the war, there were nine medical schools located at the following institutions: the University of Toronto, the University of Western Ontario, Queen’s University, McGill University, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, University of Manitoba, Dalhousie University, and the University of Alberta. All had pre-medical programs comprised of two years of basic training but the courses varied in length from four to six years. A four-year course had been put in place at McGill University in 1936. Five-year courses were in place at the University of Manitoba, Dalhousie University, Université de Montréal, and Université Laval. The remaining universities followed a six-year curriculum. The curricula for medical schools had been under review in the years leading up to the war, with a focus on consolidating the curriculum by curtailing the number of lectures, providing more opportunities for clinical work, revising methods of instruction, simplifying honours courses, and improving pass courses. Therefore, deans of medicine were already well prepared to hear recommendations on speeding up their courses. 42 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 3 May 1941, attached memorandum to the Adjutant General, 18 March 1941. 43 R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 3 May 1941. 212 accelerated program.44 Nine delegates representing every Canadian university with a medical school except Dalhousie University attended the conference, held on 16 May.45

Gorssline presented a memorandum on the number of medical officers required by the services for 1941 and 1942 and attendees subsequently discussed a number of potential schemes, including the shortening of teaching sessions, the shortening of the time required for graduation, and the continuation of training during the summer months.46 All agreed there was a “definite need for the provision of more doctors” for the armed services and civilian requirements.47

The meeting resulted in the adoption of four resolutions recommending how medical schools could more rapidly produce graduates. The first called on all medical schools to speed up graduation during the present war emergency. The second requested that hospitals in Canada be asked to accept eight-month internships instead of the regular twelve months. The third requested that provincial regulations be modified to permit medical curricula to be completed in a shorter period than presently required, provided this was done “without prejudice to a sound medical training.” The last recommendation

44 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the deans of medical faculties, 5 May 1941. 45 The delegates assembled at the conference were: Dean Frederick Etherington, Queen’s University; Dean J.C. Simpson, McGill University; Vice-Dean Georges Baril, Université de Montréal; Dean Charles Vezina, Université Laval; Assistant Dean Edward Stanley Ryerson, University of Toronto; Dean William Edward Gallie, University of Toronto; Dean Frederick J.H. Campbell, University of Western Ontario; Dean Alvin Trotter Mathers, University of Manitoba; and Dean Allan C. Rankin, University of Alberta. Dean H. G. Grant of Dalhousie University was unable to attend the meeting. Despite Vice-Dean Baril’s participation at the 16 May conference, he was not authorized to make any decisions regarding a program of acceleration being instituted at his university and was therefore unable to vote on matters brought before the meeting. In fact, both Baril and Dean Albert Lesage of the Université de Montréal were of the opinion that their medical course could not be shortened. This was later communicated to Gorssline in a letter from the Director of Military Operations at Military District No. 4. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.H. McGibbon to G.M. Gorssline, 26 May 1941. 46 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3072, “Memorandum from D.G.M.S. Presented at Meeting in Ottawa, 16th May 1941.” 47 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942 (Toronto: s.n., 1942), 85-86; and “Medical Colleges Consider Speed- Up,” Montreal Gazette, 20 May 1941. 213 was arguably the most significant for future university-government relations. It proposed that the Dominion Government be asked to assist in the financing of students and instructional staff in order to allow training to continue during the summer months given that it had been agreed medical courses should be sped up and medical students depended on their summer earnings to pay for their education and living expenses during the regular academic year.48 Despite these agreed upon proposals, the delegates did not set a definite schedule to speed up medical programs; instead, NDHQ reported that universities had been “presented with the problem and left to work out the immediate remedy.”49 The deans returned to their institutions to discuss the resolutions with their administrations and faculty members.

University heads supported the introduction of a program to accelerate medical education and they agreed with their deans that the Dominion Government should make arrangements to reimburse universities for the extra expenses incurred given the government’s interest in increasing the supply of medical officers. The reorganization of the medical term was academically feasible but they maintained it would impose a “very much greater burden” on teaching staff and laboratory facilities, which would increase university expenditures. Additionally, they reiterated that the removal of the summer vacation would impose significant financial burdens on students since most relied on their summer earnings to finance their academic year.50

48 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, F. Etherington, “Minutes of a meeting of the deans of the faculties of medicine and the DGMS,” 16 May 1941; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 86-87. 49 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, “Medical Schools Will Speed Up Graduations,” Ottawa Citizen, 21 May 1941. 50 Ibid., F. Cyril James to R.M. Gorssline, 20 May 1941. 214

University heads proposed various methods whereby the government could address these financial issues. Principal James, for example, recommended that all medical students who expressed their willingness to serve in the RCAMC be medically examined and, if found physical fit for military service, be immediately enlisted in the

RCAMC and paid a per diem allowance. If the government was not willing to enlist students until after graduation, James suggested students could alternatively be given grants to pay the cost of their university fees. This sum could be treated as a loan unless a student served for two or more years in which case it should be regarded as a direct grant.51 President Henry John Cody of the University of Toronto suggested a similar grant program. He fully endorsed the proposal of his institution’s Council of the Faculty of Medicine calling on the Dominion Government to lend, at three percent interest annually, an amount equal to the aggregate annual university fees to any medical student registered at a Canadian university. This was necessary to cover the costs of the student’s subsistence during the academic session, up to $60 per month.52 Regardless of the form such financial assistance took, university heads insisted they needed to know immediately whether the government was willing to make arrangements to assume the financial burden of accelerated courses. If the scheme were to be put into effect, arrangements would need to be made to continue courses during the current summer and most institutions would need to announce the plan by the end of May.

51 F. Cyril James to R.M. Gorssline, 20 May 1941. 52 This plan was based on the rehabilitation legislation introduced after the First World War for students who had enlisted during their academic courses. Under the program, when undergraduate students returned to complete their education, they were given government grants to cover their living expenses and university fees for each year of active service in the armed services. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, H.J. Cody to R.M. Gorssline, 4 June 1941; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 88. 215

On 21 May 1941, Gorssline telegraphed the deans of medical faculties to inform them that it was “impossible to give [the] financial undertaking requested” until the government was able to “reasonably estimate [the] amount involved for all Canadian universities.” He asked each university to estimate the cost to finance students and the amount required to reimburse the extra expenses associated with securing the appropriate instructional staff. He also requested an approximation of the number of students that would be involved.53

By 7 June, Gorssline had received estimates from three institutions: Université

Laval reported it would require $20,000 in assistance; the University of Manitoba

$50,000; and Queen’s University $166,240.54 In his report to B.W. Browne, Gorssline advised that since the estimates were so different and, in some cases, involved large sums of money, he considered it “inadvisable to proceed any further at present” given that it would be impossible to arrive at a suitable recommendation in time to formulate a plan for 1941.55 On 10 June, Gorssline wrote all concerned university heads to inform them that any reorganization of medical courses would be postponed until the following year.

He explained the estimates had varied greatly and indicated other difficulties. The “total expenditure involved,” he concluded, “would be so large that the urgency for doctors in the Army was not sufficient to justify the Department in incurring such a heavy annual

53 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, G.M. Gorssline to Deans of Medical Faculty, Université de Montréal, Université Laval, the University of Manitoba, and Dalhousie University, 21 May 1941; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 88. 54 Queen’s University officials estimated that the program would increase the cost to the university by approximately $80,615 per year, based on the need to hire one additional full-time staff and two additional part-time staff and to furnish supplies for two extra periods of cover instruction. The total assistance for students, based on an enrolment of 255 for two years and 215 for four years, would amount to $85,625 per year. This calculation was based on students requiring at least half of the cost of tuition and living expenses, or $250, per year. The cost would therefore amount to $655 per student per year. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, Spencer Melvin to R.M. Gorssline, 4 June 1941, “Cost of proposed acceleration of medical work,” 1-3. 55 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 7 June 1941. 216 expense.” Plans could not be arranged for the summer, given that the holding of a conference with university officials would be necessary to further discuss a scheme to financially assist students. Gorssline hoped, however, that the acceleration of the medical course could be arranged for the next year.56

University heads expressed their disappointment at Gorssline’s decision.

President Cody wrote that he was “sorry that a general plan for expediting the medical course could not be instituted this year.”57 Principal James wrote he was “sorry that this decision had to be reached” especially given that to him, “too many questions concerned with University training of technical men for the war effort have been postponed already, and each postponement merely impairs by that much the immediate contribution that

Canada is able to make.”58 They began to put pressure on the government to provide financial assistance. In an interview with the Montreal Star, for example, James emphasized that the apparent need for a large number of men trained in medicine, engineering, physics, and chemistry necessitated that the government “immediately arrange to facilitate training” students working in these fields by allowing nothing to interrupt their course.59

Despite failing to obtain a government commitment for funds, some plans to implement expedited medical programs were not delayed by the government’s indecision. McGill University immediately began developing a program to institute a special summer medical course in 1942. Four universities went ahead with their own

56 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, F. Cyril James to R.M. Gorssline, 17 June 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, H.J. Cody to R.M. Gorssline, 11 June 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, J.L. Ralston to Edward B. Campbell, 11 December 1941; and MUA, RG2, Container 114, File 3072, Gorssline to the President, McGill University, 10 June 1941. 57 H.J. Cody to R.M. Gorssline, 11 June 1941. 58 F. Cyril James to R.M. Gorssline, 17 June 1941. 59 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3072, “Plans to Speed Medical Course Not Approved,” Montreal Star, 18 June 1941. 217 schemes to hasten the graduation of medical students in their final year by continuing training during the summer of 1941.60 Insisting upon the importance of taking a “long range view of the situation,” Dean F.J.H. Campbell of the Faculty of Medicine at the

University of Western Ontario reported that in addition to introducing a special summer session, his institution had decided that all years would begin the next session in August

1941 and continue instruction until the end of June 1942, eliminating two-and-a-half months of the summer vacation and thereby making it possible to condense the five-year medical course into four years.61 By the same token, the University of Toronto instituted a program whereby medical students would attend classes for ten months per year instead of the regular seven-and-a-half months, which made it possible to reduce the course from five to four years.62 President Cody insisted that the question of government assistance should not deter them; “steps must be taken,” he argued, to meet the “definite need for more doctors for the Armed Forces and for civilian needs.” Moreover, he reported, “staff and students feel that they would like to be in the fight even in their period of preparation.”63

Deans of medicine continued to exert pressure on the government for a definite statement that the country required a program of acceleration and would therefore commit to providing financial assistance to aid its undertaking. On 24 June, representatives of the nation’s nine medical schools met in Winnipeg with the Joint

Relations Council of Medical Education, Hospitals and Licensure of the CMA to

60 These were the University of Alberta, the University of Manitoba, the University of Western Ontario, and the University of Toronto. 61 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, F.J.H. Campbell to R.M. Gorssline, 20 November 1941. 62 “Urges Ottawa Aid Students by Loan Fund,” The Globe and Mail, 8 September 1941, 4. 63 H.J. Cody to R.M. Gorssline, 11 June 1941; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 89. 218 summarize the current demand for doctors and explain the various problems threatening the introduction of accelerated programs. As a result of these discussions, the Joint

Relations Council unanimously passed two resolutions, which it forwarded to Mackenzie

King, Ralston, and Gorssline on 8 August:

WHEREAS, a considerable number of students who are attending medical courses in Canadian universities depend upon their vacation earnings for the payment to the university of their tuition and other incidental fees and for their living expenses, and WHEREAS, the lengthening of the session from seven to ten months being instituted in the medical schools to provide for the present shortage of doctors, both for the armed forces and for civilian needs, seriously impairs their earnings during the short vacation period, Now, therefore, be it resolved THAT, the Dominion of Canada shall lend, at 3% interest annually, to any medical student registered in a Canadian university, an amount equal to the aggregate annual fees customarily collected by that university from each student proceeding to a degree in the Faculty of Medicine, such aggregate fee to include student activity and other incidental fees, where these are stated separately from the tuition fee. THAT, the Dominion of Canada shall lend, at 3% interest annually, to each such individual, an amount necessary to cover the costs of his subsistence during the academic session up to but not exceeding sixty dollars a month. THAT, a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Dominion Government with the recommendation of this Council that this method be adopted by the Government in order that students in need of financial assistance may be able to continue their medical courses and graduate as soon as possible.

The terms of the resolutions, which urged the government to institute a medical student loan fund, paralleled those proposed by President Cody at the 16 May conference. The resolutions were subsequently endorsed by the nine deans of medicine and the Medical

Council of Canada (MCC), the latter of which argued that the establishment of this fund would allow medical schools to introduce a “scheme for the more rapid graduation of their students.”64

64 The MCC drafted its own proposal based on the resolutions passed by the Joint Relations Council. The recommendation was the same: that the government institute a medical student loan fund and lend medical students the necessary funds at three percent annually. The MCC also forwarded its proposal to Mackenzie King, Ralston, and Gorssline. See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, G. Harvey Agnew to J.L. Ralston, 219

On 11 August 1941, Colonel Evan G. Davis, the Deputy Director General of

Medical Services, writing on behalf of Gorssline, asked B.W. Browne to discuss the recommendations of the CMA, the MCC, and the deans of medicine.65 He reported that his branch had under consideration a plan to implement the first resolution for students in their final year. Most significantly, Davis pointed out the proposed loan program did not guarantee that recipients of the loan had to offer their service upon graduation or on completion of internship to the medical services of the army. In addition, Davis argued that while the memorandum stated the deans of the nation’s medical schools had further discussed the matter, there was no assurance that universities would agree with the proposal and would not request financial aid for the additional expenses required to accelerate medical courses. Davis concluded that it “would appear advisable that this whole subject be given further consideration at an early date so that if any decision relative to recommendation be arrived at, that such could be taken up with the universities in sufficient time prior to their 1942 arrangements.”66

Military officials agreed the recommendations should not be introduced and that the government should not be compelled to provide funding for accelerated university courses. They insisted the armed services should focus on its own requirements and be interested solely in facilitating the graduation of medical students who would be sure to

8 August 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, J. Fenton Argue, “Proposal Regarding Government Loan to Medical Students,” 3 September 1941. 65 Davis had a noteworthy career. During the First World War, he went overseas as second-in-command of the No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital, which he had been instrumental in raising. He then went on to command fifty-eight imperial hospitals in England. In 1917, he returned to Canada and became assistant director of medical services in Saskatchewan and later director of medical services in the department of Soldiers’ Civil Reestablishment. During the interwar period, Davis returned to his medical practice in London, Ontario, and was appointed a member of the University of Western Ontario Senate. In September 1939, he was called to active service to supervise the medical boards evaluating recruits in Western Ontario units. From October 1939 to 1942, he served as Deputy Director General of Medical Services in Ottawa. See “Dr. E.G. Davis Canadian Army Medical Officer In Two Wars,” The Globe and Mail, 25 May 1951, 4. 66 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, E.G. Davis for the DGMS to the Adjutant General, 11 August 1941, 2-3. 220 join the RCAMC after graduation. They failed to acknowledge the larger interconnected problem of both defence and civilian demands. Senior military officials worried it would be difficult to defend the use of public funds given that money would be spent on men who, in a large number of cases, would not enlist. The repayment of the loan, they argued, would relieve such graduates of any obligation to the government. Ralston, for example, wrote that his department could not favourably consider the resolutions because they dealt with the acceleration of all medical students regardless of their eligibility for military service. He insisted that since his department was “concerned principally with the Army needs,” it was only interested in students who expressed their intention to join the RCAMC. “Any alteration to the program of the Universities,” Ralston concluded,

“must rest with the Universities individually, without regard to the apparent needs of this department.” Military officials also contended that if the government agreed to a loan fund, a similar demand would be made by men in dentistry, engineering, and the pure sciences, who had as “good a case” for subsidized education. The “door would have to be thrown open likewise” to students in other faculties, argued Brigadier G.H. Cassels, the

Deputy Adjutant General, “in order that no discrimination be shown” and would result in a “great rush of young men to the Universities.”67

On 6 September, Gorssline wrote Browne to report that after a “thorough review of the question,” it was considered inadvisable to agree to the Joint Relations Council’s proposal. Instead, Gorssline proposed an alternative plan, one that made suggestions similar to those Principal James first brought forward. Medical students in their two final

67 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3072, J.L. Ralston to Harvey Agnew, 22 November 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, DAG (M) to the Adjutant General, 20 September 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, H.A.C. Breuls to the Deputy Adjutant General (B), 12 November 1941. 221 academic years under forty-five years-of-age and in medical category “A” or “B” who agreed to join the Canadian active forces would be taken on strength as privates in the

RCAMC and posted to a district depot.68 During any regular or special university session, they would be shown as on command with their unit, wear a uniform, be subject to military duty, perform military training as arranged by the district officer commanding, and receive pay and subsistence allowances. When not in session, they would be required to perform duty with their unit or be posted for duty as an intern in a hospital or institution. The university head would report on their academic and military conduct and progress. Upon successfully completing training and obtaining a license to practice medicine, graduates would be recommended for a commissioned rank in the RCAMC. At any time, the DND would have the authority to terminate the arrangement. Gorssline recommended the particulars be discussed with deans of medicine and suggested the

Director of Dental Service also consider the suggestions be applied to dental students.69

Gorssline’s proposal assuaged many of the concerns of military officials.70 DND officials acknowledged the best source of supply for medical officers was to be found in the medical schools, given that these men were more likely to enlist than established doctors. The plan would secure sufficient medical officers and therefore leave military authorities less uncertain about the future supply of medical officers and allow them to

68 For information on the system of classifying physical fitness during the Second World War see W.R. Feasby, ed., Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945, Volume One: Organization and Campaigns (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1956), 495-503. 69 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R.M. Gorssline to the Adjutant General, 6 September 1941. 70 Some university heads also expressed their support for the program. After receiving notice of the new plan in November, Acting President Robert Newton of the University of Alberta, for example, wrote Gorssline: “We fully agreed with the implication… that any such assistance provided by the Department of National Defence should be accorded only to students who have signified their willingness to join up immediately upon graduation. If the question should be raised again at a later date, we would like to see it dealt with on this basis.” See LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, R. Newton to Gorssline, 3 December 1941. 222 control this supply based on shifting wartime demand. The use of public funds could also be justified on the grounds of military necessity. Since the objective would be to get students through medical schools as quickly as possible, some even argued students should not be required to undertake the required military training on campus for the entirety of their course, which was compulsory under the country’s mobilization regulations.71 In fact, by the end of October, the DND had “accepted in principal” a proposal whereby medical students in their final or clinical years of study would be exempted from military training in university service units provided they spent an equivalent number of hours in a course entitled “Military Medicine,” which consisted of subjects that would better suit them to becoming serving medical officers.72

If instituted, Gorssline’s proposal would thus not only solve the question of financial assistance for medical students taking an accelerated course, but also address compulsory military training regulations for medical students. By the fall of 1941, medical students were actively organizing and expressing their discontent with the nation’s mobilization regulations, insisting that compulsory military training was disruptive to their studies and that their time could be put to better use. University heads and deans of medicine wrote mobilization and military officials to discuss revisions to the legislation, arguing that the government needed to decide whether it was more important to quickly produce doctors or for medical students to receive military training that would

71 H.A.C. Breuls to the Deputy Adjutant General (B), 12 November 1941. 72 The army was also looking into whether the last year of engineering courses could be adapted to be more in line with military needs but no proposal was yet under consideration to relieve engineering students of their military training responsibilities. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, L.R. LaFlèche to J.P. McIsaac, 3 October 1941. 223 be unlikely to better fit them for service as medical officers.73 For example, Principal

James wrote to Gorssline in June 1941:

It seems to me obvious that if we are to accelerate the course of training of these students, giving them more intensive instruction in medical subjects, it is absolutely essential that the Government should exempt them from time-wasting military training during the next twelve months. From personal observation, I am sure that our medical graduates could within a very few weeks after being taken in the Army obtain all of the training that is necessary for the performance of their military duties, so that it would be an unconscionable waste of time for them to take time out either for the four months which is now demanded or for the six hours a week which is at present required of all other students.74

Gorssline did not have authority to revise the regulations and forwarded the letter to the

DNWS.

While military and government officials deliberated on the details of Gorssline’s proposal, university heads and deans of medicine continued to exert pressure. On 20

November, Dean F.J.H. Campbell reported to Gorssline that his faculty had recently surveyed student needs arising from its recently instituted accelerated program and that this survey had revealed medical students were already suffering under the new demands: forty-one students required approximately $13,000 in aid during the current session and the university loan fund was inadequate to meet this need. “If some measure of assistance is not rendered,” warned Campbell, “it is possible that twenty-eight of our students may be compelled to withdraw from the medical course at the end of this current session.”

Campbell was quite critical in his appeal: “It seems that there is lavish Government support for training radio technicians, motor mechanics, etc., etc.,” he concluded. “The medical students are left to qualify at their own expense, with the implication that the

73 For more on medical students and compulsory military training, see chapter one. 74 MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 114, File 3072, F. Cyril James to R.M. Gorssline, 3 June 1941. 224

Government has no interest in the creation of an increased supply of this type of officer, and that there is no real need of an additional number of doctors in the country.”75

Medical students also increased their campaigns for government aid. On 2

December 1941, Edward B. Campbell, the chair of the Canadian Association of Medical

Students and Internes at the University of Toronto, forwarded a petition to Mackenzie

King requesting the Dominion Government immediately establish a loan or bursary fund for the duration of the war to provide medical students at his institution with the necessary financial assistance. According to the petition, signed by sixty-one students,

156 students in the faculty would be unable to continue their accelerated course without some form of funding. The amount required for the current academic year totaled

$43,000. After Ralston replied on 11 December that it would not be possible to “accede to their request for financial assistance,” the association held another meeting and sent a petition to the government proposing that students found medically fit be allowed to enlist in the medical services and, as enlistees, complete their education and internships before becoming automatically eligible for commissions in these forces.76

The question of instituting a medical student aid program was largely delayed by the differences of opinion that existed regarding the need for medical officers for the armed services. Ralston, for example, remained uncertain if any action was necessary.

After receiving numerous appeals from professional bodies, on 17 December, Ralston wrote Gorssline and Major-General H.F.G. Letson, the Adjutant General, for clarification

75 F.J.H. Campbell to R.M. Gorssline, 20 November 1941. 76 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, Edward B. Campbell to William Lyon Mackenzie King, 2 December 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, J.L. Ralston to Edward B. Campbell, 11 December 1941; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 94. 225 on the present situation.77 Ralston explained that Letson had regularly given him letters to sign that indicated “considerable confidence” in the supply of doctors for the armed services. It was not until speaking with both Browne and Letson by telephone in mid-

December that he was alerted to the possibility that this may not be the case. Ralston asked Browne and Gorssline to investigate requirements since it was “a matter in connection with which we cannot gamble.”78 Gorssline reported he would give the question further study and report his findings in a memorandum.79

By the end of 1941, despite the lack of financial commitment on the part of the government, it was clear that programs of acceleration would be introduced at most universities for medical and dental students. In December, Brigadier Frank M. Lott, the

Director General of Dental Services, reported to Brigadier Orville M.M. Kay, the Deputy

Adjutant General, that negotiations were under way to shorten the final year of the dentistry course in order to make dental graduates available for service with the CDC at an earlier date. Four of the five dental schools in Canada had already agreed to implement the plan and Lott predicted the last institution would likely also cooperate.80 In early

1942, the nine deans of Canada’s medical schools agreed to a national program of acceleration. They still continued, however, to press their case for financial assistance for both their institutions and students. In February 1942, in a meeting with Ralston and other stakeholders, the deans recommended the government provide financial aid to students who would be unable to work during the regular summer vacation as a result of the new

77 From August 1940 to February 1942, Letson was the Military Attaché to Washington before being appointed Adjutant General in 1942. He served as Adjutant General until September 1944. From October 1944 to March 1946, he was the Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. 78 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8797, J.L. Ralston to the Adjutant General, 17 December 1941. 79 Ibid., Gorssline to the Adjutant-General, 28 December 1941. 80 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, Orville M.M. Kay to L.R. LaFlèche, 13 December 1941. 226 program. They also requested that the Dominion Government assume the increased university expense for staff and materials in order to prevent an increase in student fees.81

II: The Acceleration of Engineering and Science Programs

Government officials began to discuss the acceleration of courses in engineering and science during the summer of 1940. As C.R. Young, the Dean of the Faculty of

Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto, later explained, with the fall of France and the “grave interference with wartime production resulting from this and from the intensive bombing of British industries, Canada was suddenly confronted with the need of enormously expanding its war industry.”82 Rapidly expanding industries required all available chemical engineering graduates. The mechanization of the army and the expansion of the air force and navy only increased demand for engineers and technical personnel. The RCE required civil engineering graduates and to a lesser degree mining engineering graduates; the Signal Corps required electrical engineering graduates and researchers; and mechanical engineers were in constant demand by the navy, air force, and ordnance corps. Government and armed service officials insisted it was imperative every graduating engineer carefully consider the wartime needs of the nation.

The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel (WBTP) was the critical advisory body in facilitating the cooperation of university, government, and military officials in the implementation of programs to increase the output of graduates in scientific and technical fields. At the prompting of professional engineering and science organizations, the Department of Labour established the WBTP on 12 February 1941 through Order-in-

81 Annual Report for the Year 1941-1942 (Montreal: McGill University, 1942), 15. 82 Young was dean from 1941 to 1949. See NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 102. 227

Council P.C. 780 to coordinate the increased demands for semi-skilled and skilled labour.83 It was a small office comprised of a director—a position held by Elliott M.

Little until the spring of 1942 and then by H.W. Lea for the remainder of the war—and an advisory body composed of representatives of the Canadian Manufacturers

Association, universities, and professional associations. In its initial year of operation, the

WBTP registered all technical personnel and developed a “system of manpower controls” for scientists and engineers to ensure their “most efficient utilization.”84 Over the course of the war, it also determined from the armed services, war industries, and government war departments their respective needs for different classes of scientific and technical personnel and calculated labour deficiencies.85 If a deficiency was detected or predicted, the board would determine “in what classes and to what extent” training of required personnel could be increased or accelerated.86

The WBTP established close relationships with the various technical branches of the armed services, the NRC, the nation’s major war industries, the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom of Canada, and various other concerned government departments to determine requirements for university graduates. The body also maintained close contact with university heads and deans to regularly communicate requirements and survey relevant enrolment and graduation figures.87 During one phase of its work, an executive

83 Engineering and science organizations had advised the government to “secure the most efficient possible use of the technical personnel of the Country [sic] in support of the war effort.” See “Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel,” Canadian Journal of Comparative Medicine and Veterinary Science 7, no. 3 (March 1943): 83. 84 WBTP, Annual Report (1944), 1. 85 Until the establishment of the WBTP, the Department of Labour’s contacts with professional workers in engineering and science were limited. 86 WBTP, Annual Report (1944), 1. 87 Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour, had, in fact, tasked the WBTP with addressing university concerns. A special division of the WBTP actually aided in the staffing of university departments and 228 of the bureau and a scientific personnel officer visited every university in the country to help develop plans for the “possible improvement in the use of the potential technical personnel who were enrolled in the universities in applied or natural sciences.”88 Once the WBTP determined requirements for university graduates, the Training Branch of the

Department of Labour would cooperate with the provincial governments and the universities to develop the “necessary plans” and to arrange the “appropriate agreements” between universities and the Dominion and provincial governments.89

During the late winter of 1941, in consultation with concerned government departments and the armed services, the WBTP began working with university authorities to devise and implement methods for meeting requirements, in particular focusing on strategies to maximize the use of university facilities, enlarge enrolments in required fields, and accelerate essential courses. E.M. Little ultimately decided on the necessity of implementing a program of acceleration for students in engineering and science. Since the country was facing a shortage of trained men, he advocated the “absolute necessity” that nothing be allowed to interfere with the work of institutions of higher learning. The

“finished product,” he insisted, “is essential to the successful prosecution of the war.”90

On 17 March 1941, Little wrote university heads to review the nation’s urgent requirements and requested that the relevant authorities consider implementing an acceleration scheme.91 In April 1941, the WBTP called a conference of university administrators and officials from the Department of Labour and the DNWS to discuss surveyed requirements for additional research personnel. See DUASC, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, Humphrey Mitchell to Carleton Stanley, 21 January 1942. 88 “Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel,” Canadian Journal of Comparative Medicine and Veterinary Science, 84. 89 WBTP, Annual Report (1944), 1; and Department of Labour, “Selective Service and the Universities,” The Labour Gazette for the year 1943 XLIII, no. 1 (January 1943): 34. 90 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, L.R. LaFlèche to J.F.L. Embury, 26 September 1941. 91 Ibid., C.H. Mitchell to the President, University of Toronto, 25 March 1941, 1-5. 229 continuing training for third-year engineering students during the summer months in order to allow them to graduate in the fall instead of the following spring.92

At the time, the need of military industries for more personnel with engineering skills was acute. In response to communicated demands from the Department of Labour, several engineering and science faculties released some students before the normal spring

1941 completion of their course for work in war industries.93 In January, for example, both the Faculty of Engineering and the Faculty of Arts and Science at McGill University permitted selected students to leave their final year of studies for industrial positions vital to the war effort on the understanding that these students would later be granted their degrees provided their practical work during the intervening months was deemed satisfactory by their employer.94 University heads also continued to discuss the role their institutions could play in helping to meet demands and began to more seriously consider implementing plans to accelerate courses for the duration of the war in consultation with their deans of engineering and science. Deans in turn deliberated on the potential advantages and disadvantages of such a scheme with their department heads and faculty.

While all university, government, and military officials recognized and confirmed the need for technical graduates, university authorities doubted the value of introducing accelerated courses in engineering and science. After carefully considering acceleration, deans of engineering and science unanimously resolved against such action. A year-round program, they agreed, would be unwise and would have more significant ramifications

92 “Plan to Speed Graduations,” The Globe and Mail, 17 April 1941, 13. 93 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 102. 94 The Faculty of Engineering arranged for a group of fourth-year students with high academic standing to leave the university early. They were to be granted their degrees the coming October. The Faculty of Arts and Science made arrangements for male students in chemistry to leave the university. They were to be granted their degrees the following summer. See MUA, RG2, Accession 0000-0016, File 2252, Press Release, 22 January 1941. 230 for their programs than it would for medicine and dentistry. Their stance was based on a number of arguments. University authorities were initially most concerned with how their students would finance their education without summer employment. Even before receiving Little’s proposal to speed up the output of graduates in engineering and science, they began compiling reports on the financial needs and requirements of their students to determine the impact of continuous instruction. Like deans of medicine and dentistry, they insisted students would be unable to continue in their courses unless given some type of financial assistance. At the request of his institution’s president, Charles L.

Bennet, the registrar of Dalhousie University, for example, evaluated the number of students depending on their summer vacation earnings. Bennet reported the majority of male students were employed during the summer to at least “lighten the burden of expenses upon relatives.” The number whose work produced earnings “definitely reducing the amount of their college expenses,” he estimated, could be set at more than one-half and even as high as two-thirds of all male students. The number completely self- supporting was very small.95

Most significantly, university authorities argued the call for accelerated engineering and science programs arose from a “misconception of the problem.” The theoretical principles learned in the classroom, they explained, had to be applied through practical experience in industry. Knowledge and experience could not simply be

“pumped into the students as oil is pumped into tanks and barrels”; work during the summer vacation months was essential to the production of good engineers and scientists.

Students required “maturity of judgment” and time to assimilate knowledge and gain

95 DUASC, UA-3, Box 256, File 4, C.L. Bennet to Carleton Stanley, 18 February 1941. 231 practical experience.96 “Young minds need time to develop the power of thought,”

President James Sutherland Thomson of the University of Saskatchewan insisted. “In the language of our prairie agriculture, they require to be summer-fallowed.”97 Most agreed any attempts to accelerate training—in particular engineering training—would result in a lowering of standards. “An all-out war,” argued William George McBride, the head of the Department of Mining and Metallurgy at McGill University, “requires the services of highly trained engineers for designing improved equipment of all kinds, for providing substitutes, for planning, and for many other occupations where broad experience, sound judgment, and profound technical knowledge are indispensable.” “Accelerated training, with its almost complete elimination of practical experience during the college course,” he concluded, “does not tend to produce such men.” Graduates would be young, immature, lacking in practical experience, and “ill-prepared to solve the knotty problems of the war or the peace that must come ultimately.”98

University authorities resolved acceleration was not the best solution to solving current and future shortages of engineers and technical personnel. Instead, many proposed the introduction of short courses ranging from one to three years to train men and women to meet the technical requirements of the war, insisting required personnel did not need to complete a degree to fulfill the needs of the armed services and war industries. Short courses would not only allow their institutions to meet technical

96 W.G. McBride, “Accelerated Training for Engineers,” Transactions of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy XLV (1942): 456; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 102-103. 97 Thomson insisted the “domination of all university teaching by pragmatic considerations” had a “narrowing effect,” and reported that for this reason his institution had “resisted” speeding up education. “Even for the war effort,” he concluded, “we may defeat our own ends by attempting to force growth in mental life.” The main function of university education, he insisted, needed to continue to be to “introduce” men and women to “the realm of ideas.” See Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1941-42 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1942), 8. 98 McBride, 457. 232 demands, they argued, but would also prevent the lowering of academic standards.

Additionally, graduates of short courses could be given academic credit for their work and return to university after the war to complete their studies and qualify for their degrees; hence, short courses would not only help produce required personnel but could also ease a soldier’s reintegration to civilian life. Such a scheme, they acknowledged, would require some financial assistance from the government but as McBride later explained, the problems presented by special short courses would be “simple” in comparison to those resulting from the acceleration of courses leading to degrees. Short courses would not “seriously hamper the work of turning out adequately trained engineers.”99

Take, for example, the response of Charles Hamilton Mitchell, the Dean of the

Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering at the University of Toronto.100 After receiving Little’s proposal, Mitchell consulted with his faculty’s department heads and reported to President Cody that his faculty felt the “rapid training of young engineers for war purposes” could be attempted through two courses of action: a shortened regular program or the introduction of special short courses, for which credit might be given when students returned after their service to complete their course. For Mitchell, the introduction of shortened regular courses posed too many problems. First, it was already too late in the session to arrange to continue instruction during the coming summer.

Second, it was “manifestly impossible” to cover a seven-month program in a four-month period. Third, many staff members had already assumed important summer obligations connected with war industry and would be unavailable to provide instruction. Fourth, at

99 McBride, 458. 100 Mitchell was dean from 1919 until his death in August 1941. 233 least fifty percent of engineering undergraduates would be unable to continue their course during the summer months without “very substantial financial assistance.” Finally, a summer session would require “special financing” to cover the costs of instructional and administrative staff.101

Mitchell recommended the second course of action and proposed the introduction short intensive courses in vital engineering subjects. His plan was based on the specialized training being introduced in engineering colleges in the United States under the Engineering Defense Training (EDT) program, which later became the Engineering,

Science and Management Defense Training (ESMDT) program. Provided with nine million dollars in initial funding, the EDT program offered short, intensive, college-level courses in a number of engineering subjects to produce required technical and scientific personnel.102 Under Mitchell’s program, students entering their third or fourth year of study at an approved engineering college would take a course in one of eight to ten subjects, which would run for two to three months during the summer of 1941. Short courses of several months’ duration, Mitchell argued, would be adequate to produce the trained personnel required for many tasks in specialized fields. “It is probable,” he explained, “that short, intensive courses confined to a somewhat narrow front might serve to make available for specialized technological tasks a considerable number of persons who might otherwise be unavailable for a year or two.” He suggested such courses could also act as a refresher for past graduates no longer working in an engineering field. In

101 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 1, C.H. Mitchell to the President, University of Toronto, 25 March 1941, 1-5. 102 Courses were offered in subjects such as engineering mechanics, engineering drawing, structural design, machine design, tool and die design, production management and supervision, materials inspection and testing, metallurgy and metallography, analysis and design of airplane structures, aircraft engines, electronics, communication, and chemistry. For more on the ESMDT, see V.R. Cardozier, Colleges and Universities in World War II (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 168-179. 234 defending his program, Mitchell compared such training to military training, in that it was “essentially narrow” and might “meet the needs of the present emergency much better than the full, but slower, normal training.” The only major problem to be encountered would be in retaining suitable instructors. Mitchell believed the program could be instituted for the coming summer session providing the WBTP determined the scheme to be “in the national interest” and that the government agreed to “cooperate generously” to provide financial assistant to enable students to take such courses.

Provision should also be made, he instructed, for remuneration of staffs. If the WBTP wished to pursue this scheme, Mitchell suggested that the bureau “strongly urge this requisite assistance upon the Government.”103

A handful of university heads continued to press for the introduction of accelerated engineering and science courses. Acting President Robert Newton of the

University of Alberta, for example, insisted this “engineer’s war” necessitated the acceleration of engineering training:

A fully trained professional engineer doubtless requires the practical experience now gained through inter-session employment. But if the universities, by operating continuously, with courses of different lengths adapted to fill various special needs, could speed the war effort, the gaps in general training might well be left to be filled during the rehabilitation period after the war. This could not be done without some financial assistance to students. Let us hope the national service plans now being drafted at Ottawa provide for using the universities.104

But even Principal James, who called on Canadian universities to completely adapt their resources to the winning of the war and ardently supported the acceleration of all university courses, recommended the introduction of short courses of intensive training in

103 C.H. Mitchell to the President, University of Toronto, 25 March 1941, 1-5. 104 “Acting President, Sciencemen, Tell of Engineer’s Wartime Role,” The Gateway, 6 February 1942, 1. 235 particular skills for men and women needed for work in war industries and courses providing intensive training in required subjects for enlisted personnel.105

In addition to the opposition of faculty administrators, professional associations did not support acceleration. The Dominion Council of Professional Engineers, the body representing all provincial engineering associations, insisted graduates produced through an accelerated program would be “immature, without experience or judgment, and very much inferior to the normal output of the engineering colleges.” After its deliberations, the Ontario Association of Professional Engineers, which regulated the practice of engineering in Ontario, also concluded acceleration would be “unwise.”106

The WBTP closely reviewed the situation, assessed demands, and consulted with war industries and armed service officials. By the fall of 1941, Little had come to agree with the arguments expressed by university authorities and concluded it was in the

“public interest” for students in engineering and science to continue pursuing their normal course of study. While the WBTP disregarded concerns over the financial needs of students, its officials recognized practical training in industry during the summer

105 In his 1941-1942 annual report, for example, James extolled the virtues of accelerated programs: “…the experience of accelerated training seems to suggest that its obvious disadvantages are in certain respects more than outweighed by its contribution to the supply of technically trained man-power. There is also evidence that acceleration tends to reduce somewhat the restlessness of mind of those students who, while convinced of the need for technical training as a prerequisite for combatant activity, grow impatient at the long intervals of idleness which adherence to the pre-war academic schedule still provides.” In a letter to Humphrey Mitchell in February 1942, James again proposed acceleration: “Although I do not pretend, as a layman, to take issue with the Engineering experts on the value of practical experience versus theoretical academic training, my own feeling is that merely to use these students on special war work in the summer may not achieve the main purpose of the Government—that of accelerating the graduation of completely trained men… You may be interested in the attached statement which I have this week received from the United States showing what is going on there. One of the largest gatherings of university and college presidents ever held… voted a resolution approving of the acceleration of the college programmes…In conclusion… this University is willing, even eager, to accelerate its programme, and if necessary would remain open all year, with a minimum of Government financial aid to the students who would need to be assisted if the opportunity for remunerative work in vacation times were removed.” See Annual Report for the Year 1941-1942 (Montreal: McGill University, 1942), 18; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, F. Cyril James to Humphrey Mitchell, 5 February 1942. 106 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 103. 236 months was essential to scientific and technical education and decided that students should be encouraged to “engage to the utmost degree possible in summer employment in an essential industry related as closely as possible to their courses.”107 In late 1941, the

WBTP began working on a plan to ensure that all available undergraduates in engineering and applied science secured employment for the coming summer months.

Officials canvassed war industries to request that students be given the best possible opportunities to advance their professional training through various employment opportunities. “It is desirable that all graduates during the war,” wrote Leroy Egerton

Westman, the Assistant Director of the WBTP, “be as seasoned in industrial experience as possible.”108 The importance of work experience became so supported that eventually the government agreed to exempt engineering students from summer camp training if they could show that they were “advancing their professional experience as engineers in a war industry.”109

By early 1942, the WBTP and Department of Labour had informed university officials that they should carry on work as usual in engineering and science courses. The acceleration of courses in engineering and science was not necessary at the present time.

It would be “much more valuable,” explained Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of

Labour, for students to spend their summer vacation working in “appropriate capacities in the various industries of the war where they will obtain practical shop experience.”110

107 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 102. 108 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche to Orville M.M. Kay, 17 December 1941. 109 Ibid., L.R. LaFlèche to Orville M.M. Kay, 7 January 1942. For more on the exemption of students from compulsory military training, see chapter one. 110 The University of British Columbia Board of Directors had, in fact, decided to suspend action to speed up the graduation of students in their final year of mechanical engineering after receiving word that the WBTP had decided work should be carried on normally as much as possible. See University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Board of Governors Fonds, Minutes Series, Box 1, “The University of British 237

Although they did not choose to accelerate programs in these courses, like medical and dental students, engineering and science students were ultimately offered financial assistance under a national student aid program to fund their studies. This was done in an effort to ensure that students in engineering and science had the financial resources to complete their studies.

III: The Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Schedule

The question of implementing accelerated programs for medical, dental, engineering, and science courses was thus largely decided by early 1942 but university officials remained uncertain whether they would receive financial aid to support accelerated medical and dental programs. On 5 March 1942, the deans of the nation’s medical schools met with Letson and representatives of the medical services to discuss three matters: how best to create an “adequate supply of doctors for the Armed Forces” at the “earliest possible time;” a method for providing financial assistance to medical students; and the condensing of the medical course to graduate doctors at a faster rate.111

The deans recommended two alternative plans for aid, both of which had already been proposed: the enlistment of students with pay and allowances and the granting of scholarships. They indicated they were not in favour of the first plan for three reasons: first, sixty percent of students did not require assistance; second, it would cost $1.5 million per year compared to the estimated $350,000 per year necessary under the loan scheme; and third, it would discourage those who did not require financial aid from

Columbia Board of Governors Minutes of Meetings January 1, 1941 to December 31, 1941, Volume 20,” 27 October 1941, 853; and MUA, RG 2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 111, File 2996, Humphrey Mitchell to F. Cyril James, 29 April 1942. 111 DUASC, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, DND to the President, Dalhousie University, 26 February 1942; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 94. 238 enlisting. The deans also resolved that it would be “impossible” for most medical schools to fund an accelerated program without “some measure of assistance” given that a large number of staff members supplemented their income by working during the summer months. They estimated the additional teaching costs across all institutions “should not” exceed $50,000 per year.112

The efforts of the deans of medical schools were eventually successful. On 27

April 1942, deans of medical schools received a notice from Letson informing them that the enlistment of medical and dental students into the active army during their two final sessions at university or during their internships had been authorized. He informed them the acceleration of courses was “much appreciated” and that their “cooperation enabling this matter” had now been brought to a conclusion.113

Plans were also well underway to institute a national student aid program. By the end of 1941, the Department of Labour had initiated discussions with various provincial governments on a proposal to advance “considerable sums” to help students in medicine and dentistry in financial need finish their university course. Under this plan, which became known as the Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Schedule, the Dominion and provincial governments would equally share the costs.114 By April 1942, most provinces had agreed to the plan and the parameters of the program had been revised to include aid for engineering and science students.

112 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 94-96. 113 Ibid., 96. 114 L.R. LaFlèche to Orville M.M. Kay, 17 December 1941. 239

New Brunswick and Ontario declined to participate in the program.115 According to the Ontario Minister of Education, Duncan McArthur, the Provincial Government of

Ontario decided against the scheme because the conditions making it necessary to provide aid arose from the government’s “war time programme”; therefore, the responsibility rested “properly with the Federal authority.” The shortening of the summer vacation in medical programs, reasoned McArthur, was the result of the desire of the

DND to secure doctors required for the RCAMC as early as possible. The province had already relinquished part of its “customary revenues” to the Dominion Government for the purpose of aiding in the national war effort, he concluded, and was thus “disinclined to embark on expenditures which definitely seem to provide for war services.”116

Given the significant number of universities in Ontario, Humphrey Mitchell attempted to persuade the government to reconsider and wrote McArthur and Norman

Otto Hipel, the Minister of Labour for Ontario, for support. In his correspondence,

Mitchell pointed out that the province had pledged $300,000 during the coming year to the Aircraft Mechanics Training School in Galt (established as a result of Hipel’s efforts) and that this was clearly an expenditure provided for war services. He proposed that the contribution to the school be reduced and an equivalent amount given by the province for student aid. When his negotiations failed, Mitchell reported to McArthur that as far as the

115 Ontario did eventually participate in the program. On 14 March 1944, Thompson wrote the Deputy Minister of Labour to report that at his recent meeting with George A. Drew, the Premier of Ontario, and officials of the province’s Department of Education, he had been informed that the province wished to cooperate with the Dominion Government during the coming fiscal year in the student aid program. Unlike the terms established in other provinces, however, assistance would be limited to $200 per student per academic year. See LAC, RG27, Volume 703, File Y12-2-6, Part 20, R.F. Thompson to the Deputy Minister of Labour, 14 March 1944. 116 LAC, RG27, Volume 701, File Y12-2-6, Part 8, Duncan McArthur to Humphrey Mitchell, 10 April 1942. 240

Department of Labour was concerned, the matter of provincial cooperation in student aid was closed.117

On 27 April 1942, Mitchell informed McArthur that it was the intention of his department to provide student aid in Ontario through direct negotiations with each concerned university.118 The money, he explained, would be given in the form of a loan and would be restricted to students in medicine and dentistry who expressed their intention of enlisting in the armed services when they entered the final years of their course. Mitchell warned that the need of the armed services during the coming year was so large that it might result in certain sections of the province being deprived of medical assistance owing to a shortage of doctors. He stated his regret that the province had not

“seen fit to cooperate” in student aid, given that the scheme had been designed to prevent such shortage.119

On 29 April 1942, officials of the Department of Labour, including Robert F.

Thompson, the Supervisor of Training, met with representatives from the University of

Toronto, Queen’s University, and the University of Western Ontario to discuss financial aid for students and staff “necessitated by the acceleration of the medical curriculum.”

Given that the province was unwilling to participate in the program, Thompson explained that his department was willing to consider an “alternative plan” for assisting Ontario university students. He proposed that aid be given in the form of a loan for fulltime

117 LAC, RG27, Volume 701, File Y12-2-6, Part 8, Humphrey Mitchell to Duncan McArthur, 27 April 1942. 118 The Department of Labour also obtained a special appropriation in order to finance, at the Dominion Government’s expense, certain categories of students in other provinces who were not eligible for aid under the Joint Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Schedule. Provincial governments were unwilling to assist residents of other provinces, so these students were largely out-of-province students. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 660 to all chairmen and divisional registrars, 12 August 1942, Appendix B, “Student Aid.” 119 Humphrey Mitchell to Duncan McArthur, 27 April 1942. 241 students in their second or subsequent year of study in medicine and dentistry who agreed to sign a written witnessed agreement to enlist in the active armed services when they entered the final years of their course. He also recommended aid be given to students in physics, chemistry, mathematics, and electrical, mechanical, chemical, civil, or metallurgical engineering who signed a written witnessed agreement that on graduation they would make their services available to the national war effort where needed “in the capacity for which they have been trained.” In addition, under the terms of Thompson’s proposal, where a university accelerated its medical course by shortening the summer vacation period, the Department of Labour would reimburse this institution for the “direct additional costs.” University administrations would be responsible for providing

Thompson with estimates of the funds required in loans for students and for the payment of part-time teachers to cover the lengthened academic session.120

The Student Aid program was not without precedent. The proposal for granting financial aid was based on legislation introduced after the First World War for university students who had enlisted during the course of their studies. When such students returned to complete their courses, the Dominion Government gave them grants to cover the cost of university fees and living expenses based on the time spent in active service.121 More recently, the Dominion and provincial governments had cooperated in other training programs. In 1937, under the Unemployment and Agricultural Instruction Act, the government introduced the Dominion-Provincial Youth Training Plan, a Depression- fighting measure that provided training and apprenticeship courses for young men and

120 Universities were also required to submit a register listing the name, year, faculty, and loan amount granted to each student participating in the program. See NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 96-98. 121 Ibid., 88. 242 women between the ages of sixteen and thirty “without gainful employment and in necessitous circumstances.”122 One million dollars of Dominion funds was given to the provinces in an effort to keep youth off public relief, prepare young people to eventually secure employment, and reduce pressure on the labour market.123 Beginning in April

1940, the Youth Training Program was expanded, streamlined, and redirected towards the industrial training of young people for war work and eventually evolved into the War

Emergency Training Plan (WETP). Under the WEPT, the Dominion and Provincial governments cooperated to provide various types of training, namely: (1) pre- employment classes in vocational schools for men and women about to enter war industry; (2) part-time classes, principally for the up-grading of persons already employed; (3) training in plant schools; (4) special classes for foremen and supervisors;

(5) training of enlisted men as tradesmen for the armed services; (6) rehabilitation training for discharged personnel referred for training by the Department of Pensions and

National Health; and (7) assistance to certain categories of university students whose services were needed in connection with the war effort.124 While the program was largely recognized for offering vocational training, as of 31 October 1943, 4,053 university students had been enrolled in training through its courses.125

122 Provincial Archives of New Brunswick, Department of Education, RS116, File A1b, Fletcher Peacock to A. Paterson, 3 February 1938, 2, quoted in Cynthia Comacchio, The Dominion of Youth: Adolescence and the Making of Modern Canada, 1920 to 1950 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), 153. 123 Comacchio, 153; and Amber Lloydlangston, “Applying to be ‘Industrial Soldiers’: The Letters of Young Women Wanting to Train as Chemistry Laboratory Technicians, 1942-1944,” Historical Studies in Education 26, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 34-37. 124 Department of Labour, “War Emergency Training: Summary of Program—Progress of Enrolment during July—Additional Plan Schools Approved,” The Labour Gazette XLIII, no. 9 (September 1943): 1264. 125 Department of Labour, “War Emergency Training: Progress of Enrolment During October—Training in Industry—Rehabilitation Training,” The Labour Gazette XLIII, no. 12 (December 1943): 1703. 243

The details of the Student Aid Schedule evolved amidst growing concern surrounding the demand for scientific and technical personnel. In early 1942, the WBTP issued a report on the availability of engineers and scientists. The results were disarming: the government had been unsuccessful in increasing its reserve of engineers and scientists

“to any extent” since 1939. Graduating classes were no larger than they would have been had the war not occurred. This failure made the work of the WBTP all the more pressing.

For L.E. Westman, who was responsible for surveying the requirements for engineers, chemists, and science workers, it revealed the need to collaborate more effectively with university authorities to develop a more aggressive course of action to address personnel shortages. It also demonstrated the importance of more closely regulating the current supply of technical personnel, given that numbers were unlikely to increase in the immediate future. In a letter to Leo R. LaFlèche, the Associate Deputy Minister of the

DNWS, Westman reported a number of questions still needed to be considered in consultation with university authorities, including those of accelerated training for engineering and science students, the diversion of university students from one course to another, and how best to maintain the correct number and types of students in classes. He expressed the hope that officials would finally develop “co-ordinated procedures between all departments of Government concerned and the universities in such a way that clear cut objectives could be reached in our planning.”126

LaFlèche agreed the situation was becoming more aggravated and that at present,

“no one has a clear idea of what should be done in the National Interest.” In his view, all interested parties needed to address the “intelligent” distribution of essential university

126 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.E. Westman to L.R. LaFlèche, 9 April 1942. 244 graduates amongst the armed services, war industries, and essential civilian services.127

He organized a conference between university presidents, deans of engineering and science, and representatives of the armed services, the WBTP, the Department of Labour,

NSS, the DNWS, and the NRC in Ottawa from May 11-12, 1942, to discuss the supply and regulation of technical personnel, in particular graduating engineers and scientists.

Over 150 officials attended the conference, which was scheduled to coincide with a special meeting of the NCCU.

In anticipation of the conference, representatives of the DND, DMS, Department of Labour, WBTP, NRC, DNWS, NSS, and the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada met at a preliminary meeting on 5 May to “facilitate the coordination” of their interests.128 Those present considered and agreed upon eight proposals to be presented at the larger conference.129 Among them was a proposal to extend to engineering and science students a plan similar in principal to that adopted by the DND for students in the last two years of medicine and dentistry. They also discussed whether

127 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche, Memorandum to Major Benoit, 7 April 1942. 128 Formed in October 1940 to undertake the increased work in armament inspection, the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada was the representative inspecting authority of the UK’s Ministry of Supply and the Canadian DMS. 129 These proposals were: (1) the possible extension to engineering and science students of a plan similar in principal to that adopted by the DND for students in the last two years of medicine and dentistry; (2) the granting of aid by the Department of Labour to students in their second or consecutive year of engineering and science; (3) the formulation of a plan by the NRC designed to utilize exceptional students in research; (4) the clarification of requirements of the DNWS with regard to the mandatory military training of engineering and science students; (5) the DNWS’ acceptance of a joint plan of the DND, DMS, NRC, and NSS under which graduating students in engineering and science would be utilized either in war industries or in the armed services; (6) the calling up by the DNWS of all graduates and undergraduates of identified university faculties for early physical examination and tentative allocation for the armed services or war industries; (7) the possibility of universities providing continuous teaching during the calendar year and of increasing the number of first-year students in engineering and science courses, with financial assistance to be given where needed; and (8) the advisability of placing any required coordination of scientific and technical personnel under the direction and authority of the Director of NSS. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “Minutes of pre-Conference meeting of representatives of the following departments to be held at New Supreme Court Building, Room 59, Tuesday, May 5th, 1942, at 10.30 o’clock,” n.d. 245 the Department of Labour would be prepared to support, under its proposed student aid scheme, students in engineering and science in their second or consecutive year of study, despite the decision to not accelerate these courses. Officials also recommended that the coordination of scientific and technical personnel be placed under the direction of a single authority: the Director of NSS.130

According to the WBTP’s report to the Deputy Minister of Labour, the key theme throughout the larger May conference was the “manifest desire on the part of all present to have centralized direction and co-ordination which would unite all sectional interests and make them subservient to the all-important national interest in matters pertaining to the best utilization of technical power.”131 Talks began with an effort to more accurately measure the need for technical personnel. Government and military representatives presented reports estimating their requirements for personnel.132 University representatives submitted enrolment figures for students in all classes in engineering and

130 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche to E.M. Little, 1 May 1942; “Minutes of pre-Conference meeting of representatives of the following departments to be held at New Supreme Court Building, Room 59, Tuesday, May 5th, 1942, at 10.30 o’clock,” n.d; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2- 133-6, Part 2, “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 1-2. 131 “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 5. 132 The army estimated that based on the existing organization and expansion presently predicted, it would require approximately 479 personnel graduating in engineering and science for the remainder of 1942 and another 793 in 1943. The navy estimated it would require 75 mechanical and electrical engineers and an additional 75 undergraduate students for training during their third summer holidays. The RCAF estimated over the course of the next twelve months it would require 120 radio engineers, 176 pilot navigation instructors, and 180 aeronautical engineers. The DMS reported civilian requirements totaled an estimated 1,284 engineers, 582 scientific personnel, and another 1,962 architects and naval architects, tool designers, and technical and structural draftsmen. Additionally, the NRC conservatively estimated it would require between 130 and 170 professional men and women during the coming year and made a special call for electrical, radio, and mechanical engineers. The NRC had forwarded a report of their requirements to L.R. LaFlèche in anticipation of the conference. See DUASC, UA-1, Box 357, File 3, L.E. Westman to Carleton Stanley, 2 June 1942, “Estimated Requirements for Technical Personnel Equivalent to Graduation in Engineering and Science – Military and Civilian,” n.d., 1-3; LAC, RG27, Volume 580, File 4-U-2-21, L.E. Westman to Robert Newton, 28 May 1942; and LAC, RG77, Volume 46, File 17-15-9-2, “Memorandum for the Conference of University Presidents, Deans of Science and Engineering, and Representatives of Government Departments on the Provision of Professional Men and Women for War Work – New Supreme Court Bldg., Ottawa, May 11th and 12th, 1942,” n.d., 2-3. 246 science graduating between 1942 and 1944 and estimated the maximum number of students that could be enrolled in first-year courses in engineering and science, assuming complete use of available facilities. They also presented reports on the extent to which each institution was in a position to undertake continuous teaching in courses identified as needed by the armed services or government departments, with it being understood that such a course of action might necessitate the granting of financial aid to universities and students.133 As had already been anticipated by the WBTP, based on these figures, it was clear the university supply of students was far from sufficient to meet the varied immediate and future technical requirements of the nation.134

During the afternoon of 12 May, delegates divided into three groups to consider the issues more carefully. H.W. Lea, the Director of the WBTP, and David A. Keys, the research personnel officer of the WBTP, presented the results of these deliberations and the recommendations of each group along with reports from other earlier meetings at the evening general meeting that same day. After much discussion of these presentations, the conference representatives unanimously agreed upon nine resolutions:

1. The number of engineers and science workers at present enrolled at the universities is not a sufficient reserve for all known and probable requirements. 2. All civil and military departments of Government should undertake to submit their requirements for members of graduating classes in engineering, science, and agriculture (including veterinary science) to the Director of National Selective Service, and he should be the sole authority to guide undergraduates destined either for the Armed Forces or war industries, with the prespective [sic] employer not in any way obliged to accept any individual sent to them by the above named Director…

133 “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 2-3. 134 DUASC, UA-1, Box 357, File 3, “Urge More Authority Be Given Selective Service Director,” unidentified newspaper clipping, n.d.; and DUASC, UA-1, Box 357, File 3, “Agenda of the Conference of University Presidents, Deans of Science and Engineering, and Representatives of Government Departments to be held in the New Supreme Court Building, Exchequer Court Room (West side) on Monday and Tuesday, May 11th and 12th, 1942,” n.d. 247

3. The Department of National War Services might require the early physical examination of all students and graduates in the faculties of engineering and science, and begin orientation of such men at as early a date as possible (for either the Armed Forces or industry)… 4. The Conference endorsed the action of the Department of Labour in its undertaking to aid students in engineering and science, according to their necessities either through a joint Dominion-Provincial arrangement, or by other direct means. 5. If the Director of National Selective Service determines that the number of students in engineering and science should be increased in the first year by giving direction to those students in the High Schools who have attained a satisfactory standing of matriculation level, the Department of Labour should be asked to extend financial aid, according to their needs, to a sufficient number of top ranking students to utilize fully teaching facilities during the first and successive years of their university course. 6. The National Research Council should be requested to submit a plan to the Director of National Selective Service whereby, with the agreement of the Department of National Defence and the Department of National War Services, those students who in the opinion of the Council show exceptional capacity for research be allocated for such work on war projects. 7. The Director of National Selective Service should consult with the Department of Munitions and Supply, as required, with respect to the needs of war industries for engineering and science graduates, and that he be authorized to safeguard the interests of contractors producing war materials when allocating graduates and planning reserves in training. 8. The Department of National War Services and the Department of National Defence should consider possible modifications of military training of undergraduates and graduates of engineering and science, who should be guided either to the Armed Forces or to war industry by such plans as may appear to be essential from time to time to the Department of Munitions and Supply, National Selective Service, and the National Research Council. 9. The Director of National Selective Service should institute a study of the need for refresher courses among graduate engineers and other classes of professional scientific personnel, with a view to establishing such courses should the needs of war industries and the Armed Services, in his opinion, require such action.135

135 Four additional recommendations were also brought forward during the meeting and were referred to the attention of the Director of National Selective Service: (1) the institution of special short courses; (2) the immediate production of specially trained personnel who would have received instruction equivalent to two years of the engineering course, with or without additional intensive specialized short training; (3) the consideration of two twenty-six-week terms, one in university followed by one in industry; and (4) the increased use of specialists in the biological sciences. See “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 4-5. 248

All nine resolutions addressed the need for science and technical personnel and the regulation of such personnel. Attendees agreed upon the desirability of offering guidance from one central authority and therefore supported the decision to increase coordination by granting the Dominion Government, through the Director of NSS, authority over the regulation of science and technical personnel. This may not have been as palatable to university authorities had they not experienced such uncertainty during the first two years of the war over how best to mobilize their teaching resources. Not only did the resolutions seek to ensure the full and utmost use of university facilities and to present clear guidelines on the regulation of graduates in essential fields; they also provided universities with the much-requested additional government aid needed to increase enrolment and accelerate curricula. Similarly, these resolutions revealed an effort to develop a comprehensive training program for universities, one that answered a perceptive question previously asked by Principal James, namely: whether it was more important for students to work, attend military camp, or continue their academic studies during the summer months?136 It was evident from these resolutions that government and military officials had decided it was imperative that the wartime policies affecting the mobilization of universities aid in the production of required personnel for service in the armed services and war industries. Compulsory military training for all male students was secondary to personnel demands.137

136 James had argued these three questions could not be considered separately “since they are all part of the same general problem.” The government, he insisted, needed to develop a comprehensive training program in conjunction with the universities to achieve a broad solution to these interconnected problems. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, F. Cyril James to L.R. LaFlèche, 11 February 1942. 137 “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” 4-5; and LAC, RG77, Volume 26, File 17-15-9-2, “Resolutions Passed Unanimously by Delegates at Interdepartmental Conference with University Presidents, Deans of Engineering and Deans of Science – May 11th, 1942,” n.d., 1. 249

The conference resulted in two key developments relevant to discussions on how universities could best help meet personnel needs. First, despite the proposal recommending that NSS be appointed the “co-ordinating authority,” the Director of NSS did not assume direct authority over the regulation and placement of engineering and science graduates.138 Instead, the government passed the University Science Student

Regulations, which granted the Minister of Labour authority over the regulation and direction of male students in engineering, science, and technical courses.139 This legislation required students in these courses to make a declaration indicating whether they intended to volunteer for service in the armed services. If the number indicating their intention was at any time deemed insufficient, the Minister had authority to request any such student accept status in the reserve army. The university was compelled to dismiss students if they refused to accept this condition. In addition, universities had to provide the Minister with statistics on science student enrolment and if at any time the Minister believed the number of science students should be increased, he would recommend to universities the steps to be taken to increase the output of technical persons.140

Second, the resolutions revealed that government, military, and university officials had finally reached a consensus on the need for granting financial aid to all students registered in courses deemed essential to the prosecution of the war. As a result of the conference, at the request of NSS, Mitchell resumed discussions with the provincial governments to expand the proposed Dominion-Provincial Student Aid

138 Department of Labour, “Director of National Selective Service to be co-ordinating authority in placement of engineering and science university graduates,” The Labour Gazette XLII, no. 5 (May 1942): 507. 139 Under the regulations, science students were loosely defined as students in courses that would, on completion, qualify the student as a technical person. 140 For more on the University Science Student Regulations see chapter one. 250 program. On 27 May 1942, Mitchell sent a memorandum to the Treasury Board recommending that the government allot $300,000 to the Department of Labour for the purpose of providing loans to students in essential fields and for reimbursing universities for the increased costs associated with accelerating courses in medicine and dentistry.

Mitchell justified this request on the basis of five key points. First, it was in the national interest to increase the graduation of doctors, dentists, engineers, and scientists “whose services would be available to the war effort.” Second, universities had agreed to accelerate medical and dental courses as requested by the DND. Third, students with good academic standing, particularly those in medicine and dentistry, could not continue their courses without financial assistance due to the acceleration of their programs and the increased cost of university fees. Fourth, seven provinces had agreed to cooperate in a student aid program by funding half the cost of aid to students under the existing plan.

And fifth, it was “expedient” that the Dominion Government reimburse the increased costs of accelerated courses and provide financial assistance to students in Ontario and

New Brunswick where the governments were not participating in the program.141

The purpose of the aid program was to (1) safeguard the production of a sufficient number of essential personnel to meet the nation’s need for qualified persons during the war and immediate postwar years; and (2) to ensure that “ability and diligence” were the determining factors in whether a student would be exempted from other forms of national service in order to continue in their university studies. Under the terms of the plan, the province determined the universities eligible and the number of students to participate from each institution. A committee in each institution selected students in consultation with the Regional Director of the WETP. The WBTP assisted in the selection of

141 Order-in-Council P.C. 27/4430, 27 May 1942, in Pilkington, 319-321. 251 individuals; the types and number of students was determined based on their recommendations. To be eligible, a student had to possess sufficient academic standing, prove they could not continue or commence their course without financial aid, and sign an agreement that they would make their services available to the war effort “when and where required in the capacity for which they have been trained.” The Training Branch of the Department of Labour administered the financial details of the program but the province determined the timetable for payment. The allotment of money was to be proportionate to the number of students enrolled in the participating faculties.142

Ontario had declined to participate in the aid scheme. Since the province was home to four universities, including the University of Toronto, which possessed the largest medical school in the country, the Dominion Government deemed it necessary to enter into separate agreements directly with the province’s universities.143 Students made applications to the faculty of the university they attended. A committee representing the university, the WBTP, and the WETP selected students in each university. In Ontario, aid was given as a loan to students receiving help for the first time. Where students had received help in the previous fiscal year and where their standing on examinations was satisfactory to university authorities, fifty percent of the assistance was given as a loan and the other fifty percent as an outright grant.144

142 LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 2, G.R. Benoit for L.R. LaFlèche, to all chairmen and divisional registrars, Circular Memorandum No. 660, 12 August 1942, Memorandum from the Supervisor of Training, Department of Labour, “Student Aid,” n.d.; and Department of Labour, “Government Assistance to University Students,” The Labour Gazette XLIII, no. 3 (March 1943): 315. 143 These were: Queen’s University, the University of Toronto, McMaster University, and the University of Western Ontario. 144 For the 1943-1944 academic year, the Dominion Government allotted $170,000 to Ontario universities: $90,000 to the University of Toronto, $45,000 to Queen’s University, $30,000 to the University of Western Ontario, and $5,000 to McMaster University. The number of students reported as assisted during the 1943- 1944 academic year totaled 263: 114 in medicine, 27 in dentistry, 15 in first-year engineering, 92 in subsequent years of engineering, 1 in first-year science, 12 in subsequent years of science, and 2 in forestry. 252

In an effort to stimulate the recruitment of promising students into scientific fields, in the summer of 1942, the Director of NSS made provision to extend the student aid plan to help high school students with high standing in science and mathematics enter university in the fall. The potential of such a move had been widely supported at the May

1942 conference between university, government, and military officials and a recent

WBTP report confirmed its necessity. Some 4,000 qualified engineers were needed annually whereas universities were graduating only approximately 1,000. NSS and the

Department of Labour hoped the extension of the aid program would secure an additional

500 to 600 technical personnel who would otherwise be unable to attend university. “This step,” reported the Department of Labour in July, “has become necessary in order to maintain the necessary reserves of technical personnel in training for the requirements of the armed forces and war industries.”145 Current shortages, Westman explained at the

June 1942 NCCU conference, were one of the most pressing issues confronting an “all- out war effort” and could only be decreased by getting “larger numbers of men… into the universities.”146 Moreover, since the callable age had been reduced, it was imperative that these students not be conscripted before being sent to university.147 The move was

Students received on average $279 in loans and grants from the Dominion Government for the academic year. See LAC, RG27, Volume 703, File Y12-2-6, Part 16, R.F. Thompson to F.S. Duncan, 15 June 1943; LAC, RG27, Volume 703, File Y12-2-6, Part 20, R.F. Thompson to F.S. Rutherford, 14 March 1944; and Department of Labour, “Financial Aid for Medical Students in Ontario Universities,” The Labour Gazette, XLII, no. 5 (May 1942): 507. 145 Department of Labour, “Extension of assistance to science students entering Canadian universities,” The Labour Gazette XLII, no. 7 (July 1942): 757. 146 NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 50-51. 147 Because students were in the process of being selected in August 1942, Westman asked L.R. LaFlèche to inform all registrars that they should postpone the call up of any student who claimed to have made an application for a grant to attend university in engineering or science until NSS had a chance to advise if the student was, in fact, required. “I realize that this is a rather complicated and somewhat indefinite arrangement,” Westman acknowledged, “but we have been advised…that we are about to lose some of the very people we want if we do not make this attempt to guard against having these top ranking students drafted.” LaFlèche informed all chairs and divisional registrars of the new policies affecting the 253 strongly supported by university authorities who had long advised that efforts be made to encourage high school students possessing the “proper aptitudes” for essential subjects to pursue post-secondary education.148

The terms of aid, known as the National Selective Service Bursaries, were consistent with the larger established program. A maximum of $300 per year was given in the form of a loan or grant depending on the province in which the student studied.

Students had to demonstrate they would be unable to attend university unless offered assistance and were required to sign the same declaration that they would “make their services available in the war effort as required in the capacity for which they have been trained.”149 Candidates were requested to submit applications by 1 September and were notified they would be accepted or rejected by the respective university by approximately

21 September, when the fall term commenced. On their application, students identified the institution they wished to attend and listed their first and second choice of course, both of which were subject to the approval of the Director of NSS. Preference was given to students applying for physics, engineering physics, and mechanical, electrical, or civil engineering, where the country had the greatest need. A limited number of students were also admitted to first-year courses in chemistry, mathematics and physics, and chemical or metallurgical engineering. The selection of candidates was made by a committee in

postponement of prospective university students under the student aid program on 12 August. See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 660 to all chairmen and divisional registrars, 12 August 1942, Appendix A, “Certain Prospective University Students.” 148 DUASC, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, G.H. Henderson, “Memorandum for Ottawa Delegation Representing Dalhousie University,” [c. May 1942]. 149 “Extension of assistance to science students entering Canadian universities,” 756-757. 254 each province comprised of representatives of the Department of Education, NSS, and the

WETP. An unspecified number of students selected could be women.150

To oversee the program, the government established committees in each province comprised of representatives of the Regional Director of the WETP, the Department of

Labour, the Director of NSS, the provincial Department of Education, and the respective universities. These committees used examination records to contact top-ranking students but students who had shown good standing and required aid could also apply to their department of education to qualify, or in the case of Quebec, to the office of the provincial secretary. Students in Ontario applied directly to the office of the Director of

NSS.151

As a result of the collaboration of university, government, and military officials, by the fall of 1942 financial assistance was available for three groups of students. The proposals on acceleration made by the deans of medicine at the 16 May 1942 conference had been adopted and were being carried out across the country. As Edward Stanley

Ryerson, the Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Toronto, later reported, a compromise of sorts had been reached whereby students in their final two years of medicine and dentistry were enlisted in the RCAMC or CDC and given pay and subsistence allowances and medical and dental students in all other years could obtain loans from funds afforded to universities under the Student Aid Schedule, provided they signed a declaration stipulating they would enlist in the active armed services upon

150 L.R. LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 660 to all chairmen and divisional registrars, 12 August 1942, Appendix B, “Student Aid,” 1-4; LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “Application for Aid to Attend Certain First Year Courses in Engineering and Science at Canadian Universities”; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 661 to all chairmen and divisional registrars, 18 August 1942, 2. 151 “Extension of assistance to science students entering Canadian universities,” 757. 255 reaching the second last year of their course. Students in all years of identified programs in science and engineering could receive aid under the Student Aid Schedule if they signed the witnessed declaration stating they would make their services available to the war effort. In addition, 500 selected high school students were given aid to enter engineering and science courses in the fall of 1942.152

The Student Aid Schedule was regarded as a success. At the June 1942 NCCU conference, Ryerson reported the accelerated medical program would result in the production of 2,500 medical graduates for the army within the next four years. The

“method of acceleration” was such, he said, that a return to the former curriculum could be carried out “without difficulty” over a period of two years.153 “The financial difficulties of our students caused by acceleration of the course have been completely overcome by the establishment of the Dominion-Provincial Student Aid Scholarships and

Bursaries,” reported William Edward Gallie, the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the

University of Toronto, in the spring of 1944. “They enable any needy student in the first year, of good health and character, who has obtained an average of 66 per cent in the senior matriculation examination to receive financial assistance.”154

As of January 1943, the aid program was furnishing loans or grants to 400 students in medicine, 84 in dentistry, 805 in science and engineering, 432 training to become teachers, and 178 in other faculties. The expenditure involved amounted to approximately $200,000 a year in outright grants, shared equally between the Dominion

152 LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, L.R. LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 660 to all chairmen and divisional registrars, 12 August 1942, Appendix B, “Student Aid, 3-4; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942, 98. 153 Ibid. 154 President’s Report for the year ending 30th June, 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944), 26. 256 and provinces, and $180,000 in loans, of which the Dominion furnished approximately

$140,000. The number of students reported as assisted during the 1943-1944 academic year in Ontario alone totaled 263.155 Arthur MacNamara called the program “a notable development in co-operation between the Dominion and provincial governments and the universities which may contain promise of fruitful future development.”156

By early 1943, however, government officials had already begun considering curtailing the program. The tide of war was turning in the Allies favour. Predictions about the military’s need for specially trained personnel were beginning to be revised. At the 9

January 1943 conference of the NCCU, MacNamara reported that while it was necessary to “take a long view and to make provision for possible contingencies,” government officials had raised the question as to whether to extend assistance to first-year students whose training may not be completed in time to participate in the war effort. Of the 805 students in engineering and science being assisted under the program, he reported 537 were in their first year of studies. He asked university officials for their advice on the matter.157 At the 25 February meeting of the University Advisory Board, established to advise MacNamara on aspects of mobilization applicable to universities and their student bodies, the board decided to discontinue financial aid to first year students in engineering

155 The Dominion Government allotted $170,000 to the four Ontario universities for this year. See LAC, RG27, Volume 703, File Y12-2-6, Part 16, R.F. Thompson to F.S. Duncan, 15 June 1943; Department of Labour, “Financial Aid for Medical Students in Ontario Universities,” The Labour Gazette XLII, no. 5 (May 1942): 507; and LAC, RG27, Volume 703, File Y12-2-6, Part 20, R.F. Thompson to F.S. Rutherford, 14 March 1944. 156 DUASC, UA-3, Box 257, File 1, “Minutes of the Special Meeting of the National Conference of Canadian Universities held in Ottawa on January 9th, 1943,” Appendix A, 3-4. 157 “Minutes of the Special Meeting of the National Conference of Canadian Universities held in Ottawa on January 9th, 1943,” Appendix A, 4. 257 and pure sciences because they would likely not graduate in time to contribute to the war effort.158

*****

During the first year of the war, the government did very little to address the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers that would be required by the armed services, war industries, and essential civilian industries. H.H. Kerr, the Regional

Director of Ontario for the WEPT, later explained the country had been afflicted with a

“Blockade Complex” and “lulled into a false sense of security by the belief that the blockade alone would bring Germany to her knees.”159 Despite the lack of formal directives, university authorities were eager to mobilize their pedagogical resources towards the winning of the war. They discussed, proposed, and implemented new programs and changes to curricula based on the little information that could be gleaned from their correspondence with NRC officials and government and military leaders. By late 1940, the demand for graduates in essential fields brought about the collaboration of university, government, and military officials. Acceleration of essential university courses was advanced as a viable solution to acknowledged skilled personnel shortages.

University officials were comprehensive in their deliberations about the potential impact of implementing an accelerated program, in particular the financial consequences for their institutions and students. They also recognized the extent to which the discussions around acceleration were intermixed and informed by other key debates affecting the contributions of universities to the war effort, most importantly whether or not the

158 LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, UAB, “Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 453, Confederation Building, Ottawa, on Friday, February 25th, 1944,” 2-3. 159 LAC, RG27, Volume 701, File Y12-2-6, Part 8, H.H. Kerr, “The Dominion-Provincial War Emergency Training Programme,” [c. May 1942], 2. 258 production of essential graduates was more important than students fulfilling their obligations under the nation’s mobilization legislation. 259

Chapter Five

Producing Essential Personnel, Part II: The Introduction of Specialized, Short- Term Training Programs, 1940-1944

Throughout the negotiations between university, government, and military officials on the acceleration of university courses considered essential to the war effort, university authorities had also been participating in the organization and development of short-term programs to provide specialized training for enlisted service personnel. This effort was part of the larger recognition that universities could play an essential role in producing the skilled and technical personnel required for the winning of the war.

Specialized training courses, however, can be distinguished from other on-campus university wartime efforts because they were not arranged according to a national strategy and involved far less negotiation and collaboration with the Dominion

Government. The military requested university authorities mobilize their facilities and resources to provide service personnel with specialized technical training and the records reveal that university officials were eager to collaborate with the military to develop and implement short-term programs. The discussions surrounding how to implement these programs were also far less complicated than the protracted debates and negotiations surrounding the mobilization and acceleration of enrolled students because the candidates in these programs were not students in the conventional sense—as in the case of service training and accelerated courses—but were active enlistees.

Candidates in these programs were soldiers, stationed on campuses to receive specific technical training. They were trained using university instructors, facilities, and resources. University authorities, however, did not feel the same obligations towards 260 them as their enrolled students. In the case of short-term programs, university authorities did not work to ensure that enlistees could enter post-war careers based on the provided training. They acknowledged the training would constitute credit towards a degree that could be completed after the war but this was much less of a priority than it was in negotiations surrounding the mobilization of enrolled students. The main objective of these programs was to provide enlistees with much-needed specialized training. The potential benefit to the trainees after the war was secondary to this goal.1

The arrangements negotiated between university and military officials provided enlisted personnel with much-needed training and technical knowledge required to meet the demands of modern war. The short-term nature of the training resulted in an expedited turnaround between training and active duty. In other words, short-term courses were especially useful because they could produce required personnel more efficiently and speedily than regular university courses. Still, these programs produced mixed results. While some were considered successful, others were increasingly regarded as too expensive. Yet, throughout the negotiations between university and army officials, considerations about long-term financial aid and the future needs of the country sometimes appeared subordinated to the immediate needs of the war effort. In common with accelerated curricula and in contrast to service training units, the three specialized training programs discussed below were discontinued when wartime exigencies no longer justified their operation.

1 Short-term training programs can also be distinguished from the policies developed to provide university education for returning veterans. As the discussion in the following chapter will reveal, university officials were clearly concerned that the education they provided veterans would facilitate their reintegration into civilian life by preparing them to secure gainful employment. 261

I: Royal Canadian Air Force University Training Organization Detachments

On 4 October 1940, Gerald Campbell, the United Kingdom High Commissioner to Canada, reported to the Canadian Department of External Affairs that the Royal Air

Force (RAF) was in desperate need of an estimated 2,500 radio direction finding (RDF) personnel to become radio officers and radio mechanics. Later known as radar, RDF was a “system of radio detection” used to determine the location, direction, and range of aircraft and ships. Throughout the Battle of Britain, RDF-trained personnel proved vitally important to Britain’s detection and interception of incoming raiding aircraft.2 A week after receiving Campbell’s appeal, the Canadian government authorized the RCAF to recruit up to 100 officers and 1,000 radio mechanics for service in the United Kingdom.3

Government officials initially anticipated 500 mechanics could be recruited from trained radio personnel and an additional 2,000 trained under the direction of the RCAF.

By late November 1940, however, it was apparent the country lacked the necessary personnel and all recruits would require additional training. When Campbell wrote Prime

Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in January 1941 requesting Canada assist the

RAF enlist volunteer radio mechanics from the United States, Mackenzie King readily agreed. King also proposed the establishment of a technical training program for radio technicians to be undertaken along similar lines as the British Commonwealth Air

Training Plan (BCATP), a joint aircrew training program that placed Canada at the centre of one of the most significant examples of wartime Commonwealth cooperation.4 The

2 W.E.K. Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada, 1939-46 (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012), 14. 3 Robert F. Linden, “Policies and Politics in RCAF Radar – World War II,” in Canadians on Radar: Royal Canadian Air Force, 1940-1945, ed. Robert F. Linden (Ottawa: Canadian Radar History Project, 2000), I- 4. 4 For more on the history of the BCATP, see Brereton Greenhous and Norman Hillmer, “The Impact of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan on Western Canada: Some Saskatchewan Case Studies,” Journal 262 program, through what would become known as University Training Organization

Detachments (UTOD), would provide technical training to prepare enlisted service personnel for radio work.5

The British Air Ministry approved the scheme on the condition that recruits would be enlisted in the RCAF and undertake training within institutions of higher learning, two stipulations that proved critical to future RCAF-university collaboration.6 It also agreed that ten percent of the trained radio mechanics might be commissioned after completing the university course. The RCAF appointed a special committee to design the training program and invited university representatives to Ottawa to discuss its implementation.

At their meeting on 25 February 1941, university officials unanimously agreed to undertake this work.7 Eli Franklin Burton, a council member of the NRC and the head of the Department of Physics and the Director of the McLennan Laboratory at the

University of Toronto, was essential to this collaboration. Based on the detailed instructions given to university officials on the types of experiments the RCAF wished to see included in the radio classes, Burton discussed the details of the new course in consultation with other faculty from his department and representatives of McGill

University, Queen’s University, the University of Western Ontario, McMaster

of Canadian Studies 16, no. 3/4 (1981): 133-144; F.J. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (Ottawa: Directorate of History, 1983); Norman Hillmer, “Vincent Massey and the Origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 16, no. 4 (April 1987): 49-54; and Peter C. Conrad, Training for Victory: The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in the West (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1989). 5 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. de Niverville, to A.F. Baird, University of New Brunswick, D.G. McGregor, Mount Allison University, H.R. Theakston, Dalhousie University, and D.A. Keys, McGill University, 26 March 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1- 3, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191, 6 May 1941. 6 For more on RCAF-university collaboration, see chapter two. 7 Linden, I-5, I-6; A. de Niverville to A.F. Baird, D.G. McGregor, H.R. Theakston, and D.A. Keys, 26 March 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. de Niverville to the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, 25 March 1941. 263

University, and the Ontario Agricultural College. All agreed that it would be impossible to run such a course at a cost less than $200 per student.8

On 30 April 1941, Charles Gavan Power, the Minister of National Defence for

Air, reported the Cabinet War Committee had approved the recruiting and training of

2,500 radio mechanics in Canada for service in the United Kingdom, the cost of which would be borne by the Government of Canada until after embarkation to the United

Kingdom at which time the British government would accept “financial responsibility” for the graduates.9 Order-in-Council P.C. 3086 of 1 May 1941 (see Appendix 12) and

Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191 of 6 May 1941 (see Appendix 13) authorized the training scheme and contracts between universities and the Minister of National Defence at a rate not exceeding $200 per trainee. The approved estimated expenditure for the program, including four weeks of training at a manning depot, thirteen weeks at university, and three weeks of additional training before embarkation, totaled $2,351,125.10

According to the regulations governing the program, each university would be responsible for providing training and living accommodations for candidates either in university dormitories or approved boarding houses. The university would receive fifty percent of the fees for the minimum number of trainees at the commencement of the course, twenty-five perfect of the total cost of training after six weeks of training, and the remaining balance upon completion.11 Applicants required junior matriculation (or its equivalent based on provincial standards) and had to be between eighteen and forty-five

8 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, H.J. Cody to C.G. Power, 1 April 1941. 9 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 3086, 1 May 1941. 10 P.C. 3086; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191, 6 May 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, W.J. Macdonald to the Director of Air Force Manning, 20 May 1941. 11 P.C. 42/3191. 264 years-of-age, with preference given to those between twenty-two and twenty-seven. As in the case of BCATP aircrew recruits, candidates would be enlisted in the RCAF with the rank of aircraftsmen second class. On completion of the course they would be given the rank of leading aircraftsmen. Following training, they could be attached to any of the three British services.12

In a speech on 8 April 1941, C.G. Power emphasized the importance of the new program:

The British Air Ministry expects great things of this invention … I do not like to overstate the case, yet I can say that it is of vital importance that we get these men and that we get them immediately … The need is urgent. We are looking for 2,500 Canadians of good common sense who are ready this minute to volunteer for overseas service in a new service, one that will develop and grow and one to which we are harnessing the initiative and zest of Canadian youth.13

RCAF officials insisted this work was important but they also recognized the recruitment of technical personnel for radio work would be in direct competition with efforts to enlist personnel for other wireless trades, since the same type of candidates were suitable for training as radio mechanics, wireless ground operators, and wireless electrical mechanics.

Given the competition for suitable candidates, the urgent demand, and the educational qualifications required, officials feared they would be unable to attract enough applicants.

In an effort to ensure the program’s success, they advised all commands to recruit suitable candidates from amongst discharged training aircrew willing to remuster to this trade and initiated a publicity campaign through radio and newspaper announcements, advertising that successful graduates would immediately proceed overseas, a major

12 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” n.d.; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Robert Leckie to the Minister of National Defence for Air, 13 August 1941; and Linden, I-7. 13 Linden, I-14. 265 inducement for enlistment. In addition, the RCAF promised top graduates would be commissioned immediately.14 Group Captain Albert de Niverville, writing on behalf of the Chief of the Air Staff, also encouraged each university to issue statements

“emphasizing in greater detail the part that your University is playing in this important undertaking.” De Niverville forwarded recent news bulletins to assist in the preparation of press releases.15

After being accepted for training, candidates were enlisted, given one day’s pay and allowances, and sent on leave without pay until required for posting at a manning depot or RCAF base where they were taken on strength and received four weeks of basic training. They then headed to a university for the academic portion of their instruction.16

Course No. 1 began at the end of May and beginning of June 1941 at fifteen universities.17 University faculty provided instruction in accordance with a syllabus prepared by a committee of representatives of the three armed services, which consisted primarily of lectures and laboratory work on electricity and radio.18 The number of enlistments totaled 2,502, with just over 500 each taking training at McGill University and the University of Toronto.19

The RCAF appointed an officer at each university to command the detachment and oversee the “discipline and welfare” of personnel under his command. Where the

14 Linden, I-7. 15 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. de Niverville, to All Commands, 30 March 1941. 16 Ibid., F.W. Long, Group Captain for Chief of the Air Staff, Organizational Order No. 144, 8 April 1941. 17 These institutions were: the University of Toronto, Dalhousie University, Mount Allison University, the University of New Brunswick, McGill University, École Polytechnique, the University of British Columbia, the Ontario Agricultural College, the University of Manitoba, the University of Saskatchewan, the University of Alberta, Royal Military College, Queen’s University, McMaster University, and the University of Western Ontario. Polytechnique and McGill students were trained as part of the same detachment. 18 A. de Niverville to All Commands, 30 March 1941. 19 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, “R.D.F. Mechanics Analysis of Enlistments Required to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics,” [c. August 1941]; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, W.E. Lovell to Officer Commanding, R.C.A.F. Detachment, 4 August 1942. 266 strength of the training detachments was no less than fifty trainees, the RCAF appointed one administrative officer with the rank of flight lieutenant, one disciplinarian with warrant officer class one rank, and one administrative clerk with the rank of flight sergeant. If under fifty trainees, only one administrative clerk was posted. Institutions with over one hundred trainees received additional disciplinary and administrative staff.

Each detachment issued daily routine orders and detachment orderly room staff maintained the records of the airmen.20

The results of the course varied significantly by institution (see Figure 7). On 15

September 1941, Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ) estimated 1,795 of the enlisted trainees would pass the program. The highest rates of failure were at École Polytechnique (50%), followed by Mount Allison University (36%), the University of Toronto (35%), the

University of Saskatchewan (31.33%), and Dalhousie University (31%), while the lowest rates were at the Royal Military College (2%), the University of Alberta (16.53%), and the University of British Columbia (21.33%).21 In actuality, wastage was even higher than predicted, reaching almost 40%.22

Meanwhile, in June 1941, an urgent request from the RAF for additional trained radio technicians prompted C.G. Power to appeal to Canadian universities for their continued cooperation. The universities, explained Power, had successfully enlisted 2,500 airmen for training during the summer months and the “most excellent standard of training” being undertaken by university faculty had “led to the natural conclusion that it

20 LAC, RG24, Volume 3244, File 215-3-1, B.F. Wood, Memorandum, 10 November 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, R.F.C. Metcalfe, Memorandum, 3 April 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, E.E. Middleton, Memorandum, 4 April 1941. 21 “R.D.F. Mechanics Analysis of Enlistments Required to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics,” [c. August 1941]. 22 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, File 17, C.G. Power to H.J. Cody, 27 June 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, K.G. Nairn, “Memorandum Re Radio Mechanics – Accommodation at University of Toronto,” 20 November 1942. 267 would be most beneficial to continue this training on a somewhat reduced scale.” Power asked each participating university whether they could continue radio training during the academic year. If so, he requested information on the number of students that could be accommodated, the estimated start date for the beginning of a second course, and the cost per student for this training. Power was anxious for universities to agree to continue radio training. “The important part that radio will play in our ultimate victory cannot be overemphasized,” he insisted, “and participation by our Universities in the training of men for the operation and maintenance of radio equipment is a patriotic undertaking, the value of which cannot even be estimated.”23

Before university authorities could prepare their response to Power’s request, there was another crucial development. Less than three weeks after receiving Power’s letter, university authorities received a letter from H.F. Gordon, the Assistant Deputy

Minister of National Defence for Air. Writing on behalf of Samuel Laurence de Carteret, the Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, Gordon informed university officials of a vital change to the RCAF’s policies affecting radio training.24 Despite the RCAF’s initial guarantees, Gordon explained, the 2,500 radio technicians currently in training would not immediately proceed overseas on completion of their course. At the time of the program’s establishment, the British Air Ministry was considering plans to build an additional radio school in Northern Ireland and intended to finish the training of

Canadian recruits at this location. The Ministry had abandoned this plan, however, in favour of building a radio school in Clinton, Ontario. A Canadian school would provide advanced instruction in RDF while also acting as a type of “insurance policy” against the

23 C.G. Power to H.J. Cody, 27 June 1941. 24 Gordon succeeded de Carteret as Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air, serving from 1944 to 1947. 268 bombing of schools in the United Kingdom. Under the revised training scheme, before proceeding overseas, candidates would complete their advanced radio training at No. 31

RDF School at Clinton, scheduled to open on 15 September 1941.25

Because of the change in the location of advanced training for RDF recruits,

Gordon requested that university officials not only agree to undertake additional radio training but also to adapt the course to accommodate a more complicated enrolment schedule. Gordon explained that because of the RCAF’s pledge at the time of recruiting to immediately send radio technicians overseas, it proposed to send 800 trainees overseas as soon as possible for their final training in “partial fulfillment” of this promise. A proportionate number of the strongest candidates would be selected from all universities.

In addition, approximately 100 candidates would be commissioned and likely another

300 trainees would be unsuccessful in their course and would not qualify for advanced training. This would leave 1,300 candidates in need of additional training at Clinton.

Since RCAF officials anticipated No. 31 Radio School would be able to accept approximately 100 trainees per week, Gordon asked university officials to provide additional training to candidates who had successfully completed the radio course while they awaited their transfer. These students, known as “holdover” candidates, would be withdrawn from the various university programs and sent for advanced training at Clinton when space became available. At the anticipated rate this “holdover” source of trainees would be depleted by 8 December 1941. In order to provide a continuing supply of trainees for Clinton after this date, Gordon proposed that universities begin accepting

25 In July 1943, No. 31 RDF was designated No. 5 Radio School. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990- 1-3, Part 1, Robert Leckie, Memorandum, 990-1-16, to the Minister of National Defence for Air, 13 August 1941. 269 new candidates starting on 15 September 1941 at a rate of 125 candidates per week.26

This would provide the Clinton school with 100 students per week beginning on 5

January 1942. In other words, between 1 September and 8 December 1941, universities would have a decreasing population of holdover students and a correspondingly increasing population of new students.27

Anticipating that a “number of difficulties” would have to be “surmounted” before the plans could be put into effect, Gordon proposed the holding of a conference between representatives of all concerned universities and RCAF branches.28 On 23 July

1941, RCAF and university officials met at AFHQ to arrange the details of the program for the 1941-1942 academic year. Group Captain D.C.M. Hume, the Director of

Technical Training for the RCAF, chaired the meeting.29 In attendance were eighteen university officials representing fourteen of the original participating universities and fourteen air force officials including representatives of the Director of Air Force

Manning, the Director of Airmen Personnel Services, the Director of Air Organization, and the Director of Training Plans and Requirements.30

26 New candidates were also referred to as “ab initio” recruits, which means from the beginning. 27 By early 1942, No. 31 Radio School was producing approximately sixty-five radar mechanics per week, much less than anticipated. See UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 053, File 5, H.F. Gordon for S.L. de Carteret to E.F. Burton, 16 July 1941, 1-2, Appendix A; and Linden, I-7. 28 H.F. Gordon for S.L. de Carteret to E.F. Burton, 16 July 1941, 2. 29 For a biography of Hume, see chapter two. 30 These were: Donald Gordon MacGregor, professor of physics, Mount Allison University; Principal Norman A.M. MacKenzie and Albert Foster Baird, Chair, Department of Electrical Engineering (University of New Brunswick); Principal F. Cyril James and David Allen Keys, professor of physics, (McGill University); J.A. Villeneuve, professor of engineering (École Polytechnique); Major C.C. Cook, head of the radio technicians’ course (Royal Military College); Arthur Lewis Clark, Dean of Applied Science, and Harold Huston Stewart, professor of electrical engineering (Queen’s University); Eli Franklin Burton, Chair, Department of Physics (University of Toronto); George Milne Henry, Secretary and Bursar, Board of Governors (McMaster University); President G.I. Christie (Ontario Agricultural College); Raymond Compton Dearle, Chair, Department of Physics (University of Western Ontario); E.P. Fetherstonhaugh, Dean of Engineering and Architecture (University of Manitoba); Charles Alexander MacKay, professor of physics (University of Saskatchewan); G.M. Smith, Dean, Faculty of Arts, and E.G. Cullwick, Chair, Department of Electrical Engineering (University of Alberta); George Merritt Schrum, Chair, Department of Physics (University of British Columbia); Terence Sheard, representing S.L. de 270

Since the regulations and policies governing the future of radio training at universities were unsettled, officials had much to discuss. Hume opened the meeting by outlining the history of the program and noting the satisfactory results expediently produced by universities in the first round of training. He then called attention to the proposed set capacities of each university outlined in the “transition schedule” for the radio course. After some discussion, university representatives made commitments to train a fixed number of trainees. The commitments varied, with some universities agreeing to provide training to significantly larger numbers of recruits.31 By and large, university representatives indicated their willingness and desire to continue the program and in some cases, offered to increase their capacities if the RCAF agreed to certain conditions.32 They were less concerned with the rolling enrollment and more with the anticipated challenges in providing living and training accommodations during the

Carteret, Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air; Wing Commander D.G. Williams, representing the Director of Air Signals; Wing Commander Herbert Philip Crabb, Deputy Director of Air Force Manning; Wing Commander J.B. Boyd, representing the Director of Airmen Personnel Services; Wing Commander F. C. Seavill, representing the Director of Air Organization; Squadron Leader John V. Sorsoleil, representing the Director of Training Plans and Requirements; Flight Lieutenant Granton E.H. Brandon, representing the Air Member for Training; Flight Lieutenant J.C. Martin, Command Instructor, No. 31 Radio School; Wing Commander A.H.W.J. Cocks, Officer Commanding, No. 31 Radio School; Group Captain A.F. Lang, British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, D.C.; Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Jemmet, liaison officer between the RCAF and the universities; Squadron Leader B.M.J. Davis, D.ofT., U.K.; G.W. Dyke of the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission (UKALM); and Henry Albert Jones, the senior civil officer of the UKALM best known for being Britain’s official First World War historian and the author of five of the six-volume history The War in the Air. See “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” 1. 31 The participating universities made the following commitments: the University of Toronto 450, Mount Allison University 50, the University of New Brunswick 50, McGill University 400, École Polytechnique 25, the University of British Columbia 100, the Ontario Agricultural College 75, the University of Manitoba 100, the University of Saskatchewan 100, the University of Alberta 60, the Royal Military College 50, Queen’s University 150, McMaster University 120, and the University of Western Ontario 120. The quota for Mount Allison University was later reduced to 25. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990- 1-3, Part 1, Donald G. MacGregor to S.L. de Carteret, 26 February 1942. 32 The University of New Brunswick indicated it could increase capacity to 75 and at most 100, the Royal Military College to at most 75, and McMaster to at most 180. The University of British Columbia representative indicated his institution could increase the capacity of its course to 200 if courses were undertaken in two shifts. See “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty- Third, 1941,” n.d., 2. 271 regular academic year. Nonetheless, most agreed that “no insurmountable difficulties” would arise in meeting their “individual capacities” so long as the government granted approval for the second course within the coming days, which would enable university administration to increase the number of instructional staff and arrange and organize accommodations. Technical accommodation at the University of Alberta and Dalhousie

University, however, was reported to be inadequate, with the former recommending the government pay for the construction of an additional forty-by-seventy-foot laboratory.

Subsequent correspondence between both institutions and RCAF officials was necessary to iron out the particulars.33

Ensuing discussion focused on the various challenges confronting the program in an effort to arrange the details of the second course, including the problem of supplying new personnel, the limitations of the maximum capacities of participating universities, the cost of tuition for both holdover and regular students, and the availability of instructors, training facilities, and housing accommodations. For RCAF officials, it was of paramount importance that the cost of the program be reduced. They debated with university officials whether the $200 fee per student was necessary given that most programs had been established and operated the previous year. Representatives from

McGill University and the University of Toronto intimated they might be able to accept a lower rate. Subsequent discussion resulted in an agreement that these two institutions would carry out a second course on the basis of $200 per student for the first 100 trainees and $125 for each trainee thereafter. Other institutions would retain the rate of $200 per student for the second course in order to establish the program at the smaller universities

33 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Robert Leckie, Memorandum to Minister (Air), 13 August 1941. 272 on a firm financial basis. Each university would be required to submit a report to AFHQ documenting incurred expenses and recommending an acceptable fee for future courses.34

Of utmost concern to all was the anticipated high wastage rate of the first course.

These rates, university officials argued, were in part due to misinformation. Students enrolled in the course under the assumption that they would immediately proceed overseas. Rumours already circulated that many would be assigned to Clinton. There was also no doubt that new policies needed to be introduced to improve the selection and instruction of candidates. In anticipation of the meeting, the RCAF had already prepared a revised syllabus to distribute to university representatives that extended the course of training from thirteen to sixteen weeks. Subjects considered “superfluous” were omitted from the previous program of training. Universities were still free to continue teaching these phases of the course if they regarded them as necessary for the granting of academic credit but RCAF officials hoped the time might instead be devoted to additional practical wireless instruction. Additionally, at the recommendation of Group Captain A.F.

Lang from the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, D.C., officials agreed university instructors would meet at Clinton during the first week of September to familiarize themselves with the objective of the course and to receive training in methods of instruction and instructional equipment.35

34 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, S.L. de Carteret to all concerned universities, 15 February 1942; and “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty- Third, 1941,” 3. 35 The British Joint Staff Mission (JSM) in Washington was established as a result of a series of Anglo- American meetings in London during the summer and fall of 1940 to discuss methods of developing close military cooperation between Britain and the United States should the latter enter the war. It represented the British Chiefs of Staff and served as a vital link between the British and American Chiefs of Staff. See “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” 7, 9; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, S.L. de Carteret to the Director of Personnel, 12 February 273

Academic standards posed additional problems for the success of the program.

University authorities insisted that what recruiting authorities considered comparable to junior matriculation was often not the case. Some recruits had undertaken little to no mathematical training.36 This had led to dissatisfaction and discouragement amongst RDF trainees who, without the required mathematical background, felt disadvantaged in their training. To alleviate the problem, E.F. Burton recommended recruits be given information on what would be required of them, the nature of their training, and “what was going to become of them” to reduce “disillusionment.” All new recruits, RCAF officials agreed, needed to be well informed of the parameters of the course and given information about what would be required, particularly with respect to mathematics

Those present decided to revise the regulation “junior matriculation or its equivalent” and provide recruiting officers with instructions outlining more specific entrance requirements. It was further decided that Hume should prepare a memorandum for universities indicating how they should conduct their “propaganda campaign,” with a view to not discouraging potential recruitment. Candidates might also be encouraged to

“read up” on technical radio work. Finally, university representatives agreed that where educational qualifications were stated to be equivalent to junior matriculation, they would

1942. For more on the JSM, see Sally Lister, “Attendant Lords: A Study of the British Staff Mission in Washington, 1941-1945” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Maryland, 1984); and David Rigby, “Chapter Two: Organization, Anatomy of a Summit Conference, and Home Base” in Allied Master Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012). 36 In Saskatchewan, for example, grade eleven was considered equivalent to junior matriculation by recruiting authorities. Charles Alexander MacKay, a professor of physics at the University of Saskatchewan, pointed out, however, that the junior matriculation year in the province was in actuality grade twelve. 274 assist in the trade testing of recruits on enlistment to ensure the candidate possessed sufficient mathematical knowledge.37

The situation of holdover students was of particular importance. In addition to students waiting transfer to No. 31 Radio School, holdover students included trainees who had failed their first examinations but not identified as “useless for further training.”38 This latter group was given the opportunity to remain in training and graduate from the course. RCAF and university representatives agreed the curriculum for these students was a matter for the universities to decide since they were most familiar with a candidate’s training. Generally, however, all felt the curriculum should be developed to provide “a recovering period for the weak students” and “an improving period for the good students” to ensure that all graduates were of an equal standard. Holdover candidates would proceed to Clinton after passing their finishing examination, RCAF officials explained, but if a candidate did not pass the exam, he would be discharged or absorbed into another air force trade.39

At the close of their conference, university and RCAF officials adopted a proposal for the establishment of a committee to act as a liaison between the RCAF and the universities providing RDF technician training. Appointed to the committee were E.F.

Burton as chair; David Allen Keys, a professor of physics at McGill University; Harold

Huston Stewart, a professor of electrical engineering at Queen’s University; and J.A.

Villeneuve, a professor of engineering at École Polytechnique. The committee was tasked

37 “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” 6. 38 If identified as useless for further training, they were sent to manning depots for remustering or discharge. 39 “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” 7. 275 with acting as a representative body of the universities “through which problems affecting the training of these students could be collectively dealt with.”40

The plan for future radio training in universities was revised on 11 August 1941 but the decision to continue the plan and the official authorization of its implementation were left to the last minute. The Minister of National Defence for Air was overseas and the Department of National Defence (DND) could make no departmental commitment until his return. Henry Albert Jones, the senior civil officer of the United Kingdom Air

Liaison Mission (UKALM), requested an early answer from the British Air Ministry but throughout August, RCAF officials were still deliberating with the British Air Ministry on whether to continue radio training in light of the problems confronting the program.41

University officials became increasingly anxious for an answer since this delay amplified their problems and made securing accommodations and instructors all the more difficult.42 It was not until 28 August that official authorization arrived that the training of radio technicians would “continue indefinitely” at universities in accordance with the provisions of AFHQ.43 AFHQ estimated it would need an additional 1,364 graduates of the radio course to meet its quota of 4,000. To accomplish this goal, RCAF officials informed universities they required an intake rate of 75 candidates per week between 5

40 “Minutes of a Conference with University Representatives Regarding Radio Technicians Training for 1941-1942, held at R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, on Wednesday July Twenty-Third, 1941,” 9. 41 Ibid., 3; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, D.C.M. Hume to air officers commanding, all commands, 6 August 1941. 42 Principal James of McGill University made “several insistent personal approached” to Hume for a decision. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, D.C.M. Hume, Memorandum Re Housing McGill University R.M.’s U/T, 5 September 1941. 43 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, No. 3 Training Command Organization Order No. 9, 29 August 1941. 276

September 1941 and 30 March 1942 and 125 candidates per week between 30 March

1942 and 12 October 1942 (see Figure 7).44

Course No. 2 commenced at ten institutions between September 1941 and March

1942. Authorities at Dalhousie University, the University of Manitoba, and the University of Alberta decided not to offer the second course, reporting they lacked the resources to accommodate the course during the regular academic session in light of other commitments to train personnel for the navy and army.45 The start dates depended in large measure on each institution’s ability to organize the necessary accommodations and teaching staff. As of 17 February 1942, Course No. 2 had been running for at least six weeks at four institutions (McMaster University, the University of Western Ontario, the

University of Saskatchewan, and Queen’s University), had almost been completed at

Mount Allison University, and had been completed at four universities (the University of

British Columbia, the University of New Brunswick, McGill University, and the

University of Toronto). École Polytechnique was scheduled to start the second course on

2 March 1942 owing to a delay resulting from difficulty recruiting bilingual men. Since both institutions possessed significantly larger resources and were able to operate courses

44 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, R.D.F. Mechanics Intake to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics,” [c. fall 1941]. 45 Dalhousie University could not carry out the radio instruction portion of the course because the engineering faculty required the quarters used for instruction during the regular academic year and there were no residences to house trainees in the fall. On 20 July 1941, Harold Raymond Theakston, a professor of engineering in charge of buildings and grounds and head of the RTC Committee at Dalhousie, wrote S.L. de Carteret to explain that to offer the course during the regular academic year, the RCAF would need to finance the construction of a temporary forty-by-sixty-foot building to use as new quarters for engineering and living accommodations for trainees. While in many cases it was necessary for the RCAF to make arrangements for living accommodations for trainees—it paid $12,000 per year to rent facilities at the United Theological College as housing facilities for trainees at the University of Toronto—the construction of facilities was beyond the resources of the program. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, H.R. Theakston to S.L. DeCarteret, 20 July 1941; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Minister of National Defence for Air to the Governor-in-Council, 17 November 1941. 277 concurrently, Course No. 3 had already started at the University of Toronto and McGill

University on 17 November and 24 November 1941 respectively.46

On 22 December 1941, Hume wrote all principal instructors of UTODs to describe a proposed alteration to the program and invite suggestions and comments. “As experience accumulates,” he explained, “various imperfections establish themselves and suggestions for improvements are bound to occur to all concerned.” There was a “flaw in the present system,” he argued, because the RCAF was contracted to pay for the training of all men who began the course whether or not they finished. This had two negative results: first, there was a tendency to carry on students who ultimately failed the course and who should have been discarded after the first examination, known as the bar examination; and second, since not all enrollees completed the course, the universities’ estimates of their maximum intake were no longer accurate.47

Hume proposed universities should “discard sub-standard students” as soon as they were identified and replace them with “students of promise” in order to ensure the steady production of trained personnel. The bar examination should be taken after only four weeks of study before the course became “too consolidated” and only a few

“borderline” cases should be allowed to join the next cohort and retake the examination.

A small number of universities could offer a makeup program for candidates who failed.

Assuming an earlier bar examination was introduced, Hume asked university instructors to offer their advice on what portion of the lectures and laboratory work could be covered during a preliminary four-week period. In addition, Hume hoped instructors might offer some insight into criticisms of the program. The British Air Ministry had reported some

46 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, D.C.M. Hume to the AMAF, 17 February 1942. 47 Ibid., D.C.M. Hume to Chief Instructors, Radio Mechanics (U.T.), Detachments, R.C.A.F., 22 December 1941. 278 men sent directly overseas were “weak in soldiering and shopwork training.” Colonel

F.C. Wallace, in charge of the radio branch at the NRC, had suggested “cut and dried experiments” needed to be substituted with practical exercises, such as the dismantling and rebuilding of old radio sets. Similarly, some university faculty argued students required more elementary experiments.48

Directors and head instructors of university radio technician training programs overwhelmingly supported the holding of the bar examination at the end of the fourth week of training to eliminate weak candidates. They recognized that it had been

“extremely unsatisfactory” to attempt to carry “sub-normal trainees” throughout the entire radio mechanics course. Henry Franklin Dawes, D.A. Keys, and E.F. Burton, the heads of the programs at McMaster University, McGill University, and the University of

Toronto respectively, all saw tremendous merit in Hume’s proposal. Dawes agreed four weeks of training was sufficient “to show up an incompetent man” and “enable” instructors to determine whether a student could repeat pre-bar work “to advantage.”

Keys suggested students achieving below thirty percent at the end of the first four weeks of training should be “turned out” and those exhibiting weaknesses be asked to repeat the first portion of the course if the instructor believed the student could “make good if given

48 A British army officer, Wallace had previously been in charge of anti-aircraft radar with the British Expeditionary Force and had arrived in North American in 1940 as a member of the Tizard mission, which established a system for Allied technical and scientific cooperation. He joined the radio section of the NRC in the spring of 1941 on loan from the Canadian Army. In her work on the development of radar in Canada, Middleton attributed the success of the country’s radar program “in a large measure” to Wallace. See Middleton, 21; David Zimmerman, “The Organization of Science for War: The Management of Canadian Radar Development, 1939-45,” Scientia Canadensis 10, no. 2 (1986): 98-99; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, D.C.M. Hume to Chief Instructors, Radio Mechanics (U.T.), Detachments, R.C.A.F., 22 December 1941. For more on the Tizard Mission, see David Zimmerman, Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996). 279 another chance.” Keys insisted this would eliminate “repeaters” who were “not interested” in training and became “centres of bad influence on the other men.”49

Burton, Dawes, and Keys also proposed that each detachment entering a university for training be enlarged by between ten and twenty-five percent on the understanding that those who failed or performed in the bottom of their class would be withdrawn after the bar examination. This would ensure each detachment was kept up to strength without having to transfer students from other universities to take the place of those who failed the bar examination, as originally proposed by Hume. As Burton and

Dawes explained, university instructors preferred to have their courses up to full strength in order to “maintain a steady flow and use our facilities to full capacity” but transferred candidates would have to readjust to a new university, which would surely place these trainees at a disadvantage.50

Hume was confident the suggestions by Dawes, Keys, and Burton would mitigate the impact of high wastage rates and allow universities to operate at maximum strength.

He readily accepted their proposal. After consultation amongst RCAF and universities officials, in March 1942 the RCAF agreed that each UTOD would increase its strength by twenty percent more than their minimum quotas for the period up to the bar examination with the understanding that this surplus would allow for the “elimination of unsatisfactory trainees” and maintain the detachments at or above the minimum guaranteed strength.51

49 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, H. Franklin Dawes to D.C.M. Hume, 29 December 1941; LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, David A. Keys to D.C.M. Hume, 2 January 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, E.F. Burton to D.C.M. Hume, 8 January 1942. 50 Ibid. 51 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, G.M. Henry to the Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence for Air, 5 March 1942. 280

In another effort to improve the operation of the program, Hume wrote S.L. de

Carteret to recommend the lowering of tuition fees. Hume explained that based on the agreement reached at the 23 July 1941 conference between representatives of the universities and the RCAF, the Directorate of Technical Training believed universities should be asked to accept payment for training for a third radio course at a rate of $8 per week or $128 per course per trainee for the actual number of trainees under instruction.52

Based on Hume’s recommendation, de Carteret wrote all concerned universities on 12

February 1942 and proposed the reduction of tuition fees to $8 per week per trainee for a total enrolment of 1,150 men.53 De Carteret reasoned participating universities should

“now be prepared to accept this lower rate” given that they had benefited from the higher

$200 rate for two consecutive sessions (with the exception of McGill University and the

University of Toronto), which had been put in place to enable them to purchase the necessary training equipment.54

Larger institutions like McGill University and the University of Toronto with quotas of 300 candidates were in a better position to accept the change of fees under the terms proposed by de Carteret. However, the reduced tuition fees posed a larger problem for smaller universities with more modest enrollments. Armand Circé, the director of

École Polytechnique, explained to de Carteret that it was not possible for his institution to give training to such a small number of students (25 trainees) on the basis of $8 per week.

52 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, D.C.M. Hume, Memorandum to D. of P., 30 January 1942. 53 Total enrolment was based on the following guaranteed minimum quotas: the University of Toronto 300, Mount Allison University 25, the University of New Brunswick 75, McGill University 300, École Polytechnique 25, the University of British Columbia 75, the Ontario Agricultural College 75, the University of Saskatchewan 100, Queen’s University 75, McMaster University 50, and the University of Western Ontario 50. Subsequently a contract was also entered into with the University of Alberta for 50 trainees. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, S.L. de Carteret to all concerned universities, 12 February 1942. 54 Ibid.; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, R.J. Beaumont to D. of P., 19 May 1942. 281

For universities receiving “some three hundred trainees,” he argued, the proposed rate was “ample,” but for his institution, which had paid over $5,000 in salaries to instructors for the first course, it was insufficient. If his institution was to offer additional courses, there were only two options: the government could either increase the number of assigned students to 60 or adjust the weekly rate to bring the total to $5,000.55 For the same reason, Donald G. MacGregor, the director of the radio program at Mount Allison

University, and G.M. Henry, the Secretary and Bursar of McMaster University’s Board of Governors—at institutions with quotas of 25 and 50 respectively—both wrote de

Carteret to report that the reduced fees would not cover their expenses. Like Circé, they offered alternative solutions: the RCAF could (1) increase their quotas; (2) pay for the training of smaller groups based on the sliding scale model proposed at the July conference; or (3) increase the rate to $9 or $10 per trainee per week. These criticisms of the reduced fee scheme were not the result of a desire to cease offering radio training.

MacGregor assured de Carteret that his university was “most anxious to continue with this contribution to the war effort” and insisted there were “some real advantages” to the men receiving training within a smaller group. Similarly, Henry explained his institution was willing to accept the reduced rate if there was no possibility of an increase given that his institution was “very desirous of cooperating with your Department and of doing our share in this very necessary work.”56

RCAF officials handled these funding concerns very differently. They acquiesced to the request of Mount Allison University on the basis that the institution deserved special consideration given that its yearly report demonstrated financial difficulty. For

55 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Armand Circé to S.L. de Carteret, 31 March 1942. 56 Ibid., Donald G. MacGregor to S.L. de Carteret, 26 February 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, G.M. Henry to S.L. de Carteret, 5 March 1942. 282

Course No. 3 alone, the university was guaranteed a minimum number of fifty trainees at a rate of $9 per trainee per week. No special provisions were made for McMaster

University. The university was guaranteed a minimum of fifty trainees for Course No. 3 and 60 trainees for Course No. 4 at the standard rate. Very likely the decision to not offer any concessions was due to the fact that Henry had agreed to offer the course even without an increase in the rate of pay. Upon Hume’s recommendation, negotiations for further courses at École Polytechnique were suspended. It was unclear whether the

Director of Air Force Manning would be able to recruit a sufficient number of fully bilingual candidates and the RCAF was considering discontinuing radio training at the university.57

While wastage rates were high at a number of universities, overall the program succeeded in realizing its goals. Its success led to discussions about replacing it with a program to meet different air force personnel needs. By the summer of 1942, RCAF officials were already planning to replace radio technician training with a “general educational scheme” for enlisted personnel. On 26 August 1942, Squadron Leader E.A.D.

Hutton of the Directorate of Technical Training sent a memorandum to the Director of

Plans regarding agreements with universities for radio technician training. He wrote that it was “understood” the Director of Plans was considering “a scheme for the utilization of university training facilities, thrown up by reason of the discontinuance of R.M. [radio mechanics] training, for a general educational scheme.”58 On 10 September 1942, Group

Captain John M. Cohu, the Director of Technical Training, issued a memorandum

57 LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, File 990-1-3, Part 1, E.E. Middleton to Deputy Minister, 29 May 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, R.J. Beaumont to D. of P., 19 May 1942. 58 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, E.A.D. Hutton to F.L. Searth, 26 August 1942. 283 reporting a “definite decision” had been made against the continuation of the radio mechanics course and that all universities were to be notified of the program’s termination at the end of the present schedule.59 On October 6 and 7, 1942, Air Vice-

Marshal John Alfred Sully, the Air Member for Personnel—who was, amongst other things, responsible for overseeing recruiting and manning policies—reported to all air officers commanding that the use of university facilities in radio training was no longer required. The decision, he explained, would not affect courses in progress or those about to commence; the DND’s intention was to make use of university training facilities for pre-aircrew training.60 On 20 November 1942, Air Vice-Marshal Kenneth Gordon Nairn, the Air Member for Accounts and Finance, reported that all universities previously providing accommodation and instruction to radio mechanics, with the exception of

Mount Allison University, the University of New Brunswick, McMaster University, and the University of Western Ontario, would continue to provide facilities and accommodations “on much the same basis for pre-aircrew trainees.” Radio mechanics training, he explained, would “merely give place to pre-aircrew trainees.”61 Order-in-

Council P.C. 75/11590 of 23 December 1942 terminated radio training at universities on the basis that the course had achieved its mandate by producing for enlistment the required number of radio mechanics for the RAF (see Appendix 14). RCAF Organization

59 Cohu was on loan from the RAF. See LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2 J.M. Cohu, Memorandum, 10 September 1942. 60 Ibid., J.A. Sully to Air Officer Commanding, No. 4 Training Command, Calgary, Alberta, 7 October 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, J.A. Sully to Air Officer Commanding, No. 1 Training Command, Toronto, Ontario, 7 October 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, Sully to Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, Halifax, 6 October 1942; LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, Sully to Air Officer Commanding, No. 3 Training Command, Montreal, Quebec, n.d.; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, J.A. Sully to Air Officer Commanding, No. 2 Training Command, Winnipeg, Manitoba, n.d. 61 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-3, Part 2, K.G. Nairn, Memorandum Re Radio Mechanics – Accommodation at the University of Toronto, Attn: Squadron Leader Low, 20 November 1942. 284

Order No. 269 of 19 March 1943 officially disbanded UTODs effective between 6

December 1942 and 12 May 1943. No. 31 Radio School in Clinton would fulfill all future requirements for trained RDF personnel.62

The decision to replace radio training with pre-aircrew training at universities had little to do with the perceived flaws of the radio program or difficulties coordinating the details of radio training with university officials. Certainly wastage rates were high, but university authorities repeatedly assured RCAF officials that their respective faculties were committed to the program and anxious to ensure its success.63 The decision to terminate radio training rather focused on a new reality: the RCAF had fulfilled its commitment to train radio technicians for service in the RAF and at the same time the

BCATP was experiencing an acute shortage of aircrew. By April 1943, over 95% of the

5,000 trained radio technicians would be posted overseas. According to a brief history of the program written by Robert F. Linden, an RCAF radar veteran, Canada’s Air Minister

C.G. Power “categorically refused” to provide the RAF with RDF personnel in excess of the 5,000 agreed upon, despite the British Air Ministry’s request for an extension of the contract. For Power, the urgent need for aircrew was far more pressing. It was essential that Canada privilege the training of aircrew under the BCATP.64

62 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, P.C. 75/11590, 23 December 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, “Organization Order No. 269 Disbandment of University Training Organization Detachments,” 19 March 1943. 63 For example, Donald G. MacGregor, the director of the radio program at Mount Allison University, reported all professors had a “personal interest” in the success of the trainees. C.A. Mackay, the director at the University of Saskatchewan, insisted he and his colleagues desired to cooperate “fully” in the work, which he called “pleasant and valuable to the staff.” See LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Donald G. MacGregor, Professor of Physics, Mount Allison University, to de Carteret, 26 February 1942; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, C.A. Mackay to de Carteret, 2 March 1942. 64 Linden, I-7. 285

II: Pre-Aircrew Education Detachments

From 1941 to 1945, pre-aircrew training was part of the RCAF’s recruiting strategy. As early as 1941, RCAF officials were reporting they would not only need to

“undertake the complete training” of all air force trades personnel but would also have to provide academic training to increase the educational standards of a “large part of our aircrew.”65 Officials recognized the high educational standard required for aircrew training—junior matriculation standing—was eliminating potential recruits who might otherwise make strong candidates. Thus, in November 1941, the first comprehensive pre- aircrew training program was inaugurated under the War Emergency Training

Programme (WEPT).66 The Department of Labour, in collaboration with various provincial governments, made special arrangements to provide a pre-enlistment

“educational refresher” course in mathematics, physics, English, and other subjects requested by the RCAF for potential aircrew recruits lacking the necessary education.67

Under the scheme, suitable candidates selected by RCAF recruiting centres signed an agreement to enlist in the RCAF as aircrew on completion of the course and in turn, the

RCAF agreed to accept as aircrew those who successfully completed their educational training. The Department of Labour provided all books, classroom equipment, and instructional staff and paid trainees a subsistence allowance of $10 per week while they

65 LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, H. Edwards, Memorandum 1019-1-123 (DAFM), 1 October 1941. 66 The course was one of many pre-enlistment classes given under the WEPT for the RCAF that included classes in aero engine and airframe mechanics, radio mechanics, and wireless operating. 67 There were other earlier initiatives providing educational resources that acted as substitutes for formal education. As early as November 1940, the Canadian Legion Educational Services was providing evening classes in mathematics, physics, and English for enlisted personnel wishing to transfer to aircrew or enter a trade in the air force. See W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 239-240; Department of Labour, “Wartime Emergency Training Program,” The Labour Gazette XLI, no. 12 (December 1941): 1535; and LAC, RG24, Volume 6572, File Part 1, R.F. Thompson to O.M.M. Kay, 8 September 1941. 286 were in attendance. The RCAF compiled the syllabus, set the final examinations, and used inspecting officers to supervise training.68

Pre-aircrew training greatly reduced the percentage of failures at Initial Training

Schools (ITS) where aircrew recruits took a variety of lectures on theory and navigation in preparation for flight instruction. This success prompted the RCAF to extend academic training to all types of potential aircrew recruits.69 The RCAF developed a new syllabus comprised of preparatory courses in mathematics, science, and English for pilots, observers, wireless air gunners, and air gunners prior to their entering aircrew training service schools.70 To accommodate the expansion of the program, the RCAF collaborated with university authorities to substitute radio training with pre-aircrew training and established University Pre-Aircrew Detachments, later known as the Pre-Aircrew

Education Detachments (PAED), on university campuses across the country.71

Order-in-Council P.C. 75/11590—the same legislation that discontinued radio technician training at universities—authorized the formation PAEDs at universities for the purpose of providing pre-aircrew education courses for aircrew applicants who

68 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, J.A. Sully to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RCAF Overseas, 29 June 1943. 69 BCATP recruits enlisted at a recruiting centre and then spent approximately four weeks at a manning depot before moving to an ITS for four to ten weeks where they took lectures on theory of navigation, armaments, mathematics, meteorology, aircraft recognition, engines, and Morse Code and underwent physical instruction and drill. Trainee pilots subsequently joined Elementary Flying Training Schools (EFTS) for seven to eight weeks where they began flying instruction before moving to Service Flying Training Schools (SFTS) for ten to sixteen weeks of training on more advanced aircraft. Successful graduates were posted to an Operational Training Unit (OTU) in Canada or Britain. See F.J. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1983), 73-74, 120-128. 70 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, Minister of National Defence for Air, Draft to the Honourable, the Treasury Board, 4 May 1943. 71 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, Sully to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RCAF Overseas, 29 June 1943. 287 needed to make up for their academic deficiencies (see Appendix 14).72 With a total capacity estimated at 1,356, the RCAF projected an annual turnover of 11,830 candidates.

The assessed total cost of the program was $3,107,056, of which $2,087,506 was recurring.73 Air Marshal Lloyd Samuel Breadner, the Chief of the Air Staff, insisted the course would ensure that Canada would be able to meet the requirements of the

Combined Training Organization for aircrew trainees.74

Unlike initial pre-aircrew training given through the WEPT, the new scheme did not operate as a pre-enlistment course and was designed to facilitate direct entry into the air force. All trainees were enlisted and outfitted at manning depots and received full pay, allowances, and other benefits as befitting the rank of aircraftsmen second class.75 The method of conducting training was similar to that employed in the case of radio technicians with one significant exception: universities did not provide instructors and therefore charged no tuition fees. Universities provided classroom space and elementary science equipment required for instruction but the personnel for all schools consisted entirely of RCAF education officers.76

Under the university-based program, each detachment operated a course that was almost entirely educational and not technical in nature, consisting of instruction in mathematics, science, English, drill, and Morse Code. Each course ran on average six

72 The initial plan called for the formation of eight PAEDs with the following quotas: No. 2 PAED at the University of Alberta (75), No. 4 PAED at the University of British Columbia (90), No. 9 PAED at McGill University (360), No. 15 PAED at the Ontario Agricultural College (100), No. 18 PAED at Queen’s University (160), No. 20 PAED at the University of Saskatchewan (120), No. 23 PAED at the University of Toronto (360), and No. 25 PAED at Brandon College (100). See LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, “Schedule A,” n.d. 73 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, Draft letter to the Honourable, the Treasury Board, 4 May 1943. 74 P.C. 75/11590. 75 Ibid.; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, Minister of National Defence for Air, Draft to the Honourable, the Treasury Board, 4 May 1943. 76 P.C. 75/11590. 288 weeks in length and was designed help prepare potential candidates for more specialized training. Much of the work done in the schools was the same as the remuster to aircrew work done in air force units by education officers. Although instruction was not at university level, still the course was considered equivalent to six months of university education.77 To be eligible for further training, candidates had to obtain a pass mark of fifty percent or higher on all of their examination papers. On completion of the course, candidates proceeded directly to an ITS, wireless school, or an air gunner school. Where vacancies did not allow a direct posting, candidates were assigned to units for tarmac duty. There, they received refresher training according to the syllabus for tarmac duty in order to “enable them to maintain their standard.”78

Some problems plagued the program. It was often difficult to secure adequate teaching and living accommodations on or near university campuses. University officials found it difficult to coordinate the timetable for pre-aircrew training with the regular academic schedule. Finally, RCAF and university officials sometimes disagreed on the rate to be charged for accommodation, messing, and classroom space used in pre-aircrew training. For high-ranking RCAF officials the greatest problems confronting the success of the program were the perceived low standards of training, the disparity between the training received in pre-aircrew education programs and the work done at ITS, a lack of conformity in the instruction given to recruits, and the withdrawal of some trainees before the date of completion of their program. L.S. Breadner, for example, insisted the pass mark for the course (fifty percent) was much too low. Students had no “interest or

77 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, A.C. Ritter, Memorandum, “Pre-Aircrew Education Detachments,” 23 November 1942. 78 Ibid., A.L. Paxton to the Air Member for Training, 27 March 1943. 289 incentive,” he argued, to “strive for a higher passing average.”79 Flight Lieutenant R.K.

Purdy, the commanding officer of No. 7 ITS in Saskatchewan, reported that all trainees

“with one accord” felt the routine and discipline of ITS was “too great a change” from that of the WEPT and PAED units. Purdy explained that trainees felt they would be better prepared for the work at ITS if they had “ITS routine and discipline at earlier units.”

Purdy also reported that most wireless trainees felt the algebra and some of the physics studied in pre-training was of “little use” to them at ITS. Purdy advised that uniformity in the method of instruction would “greatly improve the product” of pre-entry schools.80

Some efforts were made to amend the program. On 17 March 1943, Breadner issued a memorandum inviting comments on three suggested amendments to pre-aircrew university training. The first suggested that at the beginning of the course an officer with operational experience overseas should address the class to explain “the responsibilities they have taken upon themselves and why they should put everything into their effort and not just try to get away with everything they possibly can and still obtain a pass.” The second recommended the pass mark of the course be raised. The third proposed that students complete their tarmac duty prior to, rather than following, the academic course, so that when posted to the ITS what they had learned would be more fresh in their minds.81 Other efforts at reforming the program were less successful. Despite Flight

Lieutenant A.C. Ritter, the Air Officer Commanding of No. 1 Training Command, insisting the “premature withdrawal” of wireless air gunner recruits from their training was mitigating “seriously against [the] standard and effectiveness of pre-aircrew training,” J.A. Sully countered that until the flow of pre-aircrew wireless air gunners

79 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, L.S. Breadner to the Air Member for Training, 17 March 1943. 80 Ibid., R.K. Purdy to F/L T.G. Carter, D. of P., 19 January 1944. 81 L.S. Breadner to the Air Member for Training, 17 March 1943. 290 increased, it would be necessary to withdraw these trainees in advance of the required instruction time given wartime requirements.82

There was insufficient time to develop the program further. By November 1943, the Minister of National Defence for Air had already received word that Canada would be asked to reduce its output of aircrew. As Brereton Greenhous and Norman Hillmer explained in their study on the BCATP, the British realized they had “an embarrassingly large surplus” of aircrew, especially pilots.83 The 16 February 1944 Balfour-Power

Agreement authorized a forty percent reduction in the output of the BCATP by 1 March

1945. Rather than reducing enrolment across all schools, the RCAF decided to reduce output by closing training schools.84 All of the RCAF classes for both the technical ground trades and pre-aircrew training through the Canadian Vocational Training program closed early in July 1944.85

III: Canadian Army University Course

The most extensive specialized course introduced at universities for army service personnel was the Canadian Army University Course (CAUC). Anticipating a shortage of officer and technical specialists, in the spring and summer of 1942, the DND collaborated with the University of Toronto to establish an experimental one-year university course in

82 LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, W.L. Farmer for A.C. Ritter, to the Secretary, DND for Air, 2 August 1943; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, J.A. Sully to the Air Officer Commanding, No. 1 Training Command, 28 July 1943. 83 Greenhouse and Douglas, 260. 84 J. MacKay Hitsman, “Manpower Problems of the Royal Canadian Air Force during the Second World War,” Army Headquarters Report No. 67, 15 January 1954, 18, 20-21, Directorate of History and Heritage, Histories, Reports, AHQ Reports, 1948-1959, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep- rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/ahq067.pdf (accessed July 2014). 85 University PAEDs closed between 31 July 1944 and 1 December 1944 and were reestablished at Pre- Aircrew Training Schools at new locations across the country. For details, see Department of Labour, “Canadian Vocational Training,” The Labour Gazette XLIV, no. 7 (July 1944): 873; and LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-1, A. deNiverville, Memorandum, 26 June 1944. 291 mathematics, physics, and engineering to be given to enlisted service personnel. There was no promise that upon successful completion of the course a candidate would be granted a commissioned rank. Still, the objective of the course was to increase the educational standards of enlisted personnel in order to produce potential officers for service in the technical branches of the army, particularly the Royal Canadian Artillery

(RCA), the Canadian Armoured Corps (CAC), the Royal Canadian Engineers (RCE), the

Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (RCOC), and the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals

(RCCS).86

E.F. Burton, the head of the Department of Physics at the University of Toronto, first proposed the plan. Initially, Burton recommended the creation of a course that would utilize the gap between matriculation and call-up for military service to provide valuable training for young men. Candidates, he suggested, could be enrolled in the university as members of the armed services for a year of academic training in technical subjects. This would provide the army with technically trained personnel while also giving young enlisted men university training for which they would receive academic credit.87

Burton’s plan was not without precedent. In fact, his initial proposal was based on a special course in technical physics introduced at the University of Toronto under his direction in February 1941 for approximately fifty naval recruits. At the request of naval authorities, the university had agreed to provide technical training for naval recruits in order to help ease the strain on established Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) training centres

86 “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 8 (May 1943): 227; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, Order-in-Council P.C. 38/9591, 21 October 1942. 87 “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” 227. 292 at Halifax and Esquimalt.88 On 30 December 1940, Commander Kellogg Sinclair

Maclachlan, the Deputy Minister for Naval Service, wrote President Henry John Cody of the University of Toronto to ask for help with training. After Cody discussed the plan and developed a syllabus of training in consultation with Burton, he wrote Maclachlan on 2

January 1941 to report the university had decided to “co-operate in every way with your

Department in this training” and would be “prepared to begin the training immediately.”89 Burton and Commander Arthur Roddy Pressey, the Director of Warfare and Training at Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ), negotiated the particulars of the course. Applicants had to be between eighteen and twenty-two years-of-age and have completed a minimum of two years of high school, including two years of mathematics.

Burton and Pressey agreed that since it was “imperative” the RCN get 500 men in the next twelve months, the university would offer a concentrated course three months in length, instead of the initially recommended six months. The university agreed to undertake the technical training of recruits at a cost of $200 per candidate and recruits began training in the Department of Physics on 3 February 1941.90

After discussion with faculty members and military authorities, Burton developed a proposal for the University of Toronto to offer a special two-year course beginning in

September 1942 for the army. He submitted this plan in a memorandum to Leroy Egerton

Westman, who was the assistant director of the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel

(WBTP) until being appointed assistant director at National Selective Service in March

88 “The University and the War,” University of Toronto Monthly XLI, no. 5 (February 1941): 122. 89 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, File 17, H.J. Cody to K.S. Maclachlan, 2 January 1941. 90 Ibid., E.F. Burton to H.J. Cody, 11 January 1941; UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940- 1941, Box 048, File 17, E.F. Burton, “Memorandum of Discussion Between Commander Pressey and Professor Burton,” 10 January 1941; UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, File 17, H.J. Cody to K.S. Maclachlan, 14 January 1941; and UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968- 0006, 1940-1941, Box 048, File 17, K.S. Maclachlan to H.J. Cody, 27 February 1941. 293

1942. Until the establishment of this program, proposals for government assistance to students in science and engineering envisaged helping individuals enter universities who intended to graduate at the end of four years or in three-year accelerated programs.

Anticipating a “serious crisis” in the need for educated men, Burton explained, the intention of the course, however, would be to “turn out men useful to the armed forces” at the end of two years or even one year, “should a great crisis be imminent.”91 Burton proposed that the first year of the course would consist of thirty hours of “concentrated instruction in the fundamentals” of mathematics, physics, and engineering based on the course for first year engineering physics. In addition, each candidate would take two hours of physical training and drill per week.92 While the university was not prepared to suggest details for the second year, Burton explained, university faculty agreed two or three course options might be offered depending on the demands of the services, such as a course in radio covering similar topics to that given to radio mechanics in the RCAF or a course in mechanical engineering work. Burton recommended that those entering the course should “express their willingness” to enter some form of military service upon completion of the course or sooner if special conditions necessitated their service. Based on revisions to the UOTD, he also proposed that a bar examination be held at the beginning of December 1942 and those failing to reach a satisfactory standing be required to leave the class.93

91 McGill University Archives (MUA), RG2, Accession 0000-0016, Container 111, File 2996, E.F. Burton to A.N. Shaw, 25 July 1942. 92 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Box 326, File 6, E.H. Anundson to the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Pacific Command, and all District Officers Commanding, copy for the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Atlantic Command, 26 January 1943. 93 E.F. Burton to A.N. Shaw, 25 July 1942. 294

Westman submitted Burton’s proposal to the DND. After representatives of the three services conferred, the DND accepted the plan with some small modifications. The government gave final approval in late August 1942 and announced the creation of the

No. 1 Canadian Army Course on 12 September. Classes began on 10 October.94 Thus, with minimal consultation with military authorities, Canadian universities had developed their own program to provide the army with educated men for active service.

On 21 October 1942, Order-in-Council P.C. 38/9591 officially authorized the

CAUC under the War Measures Act (see Appendix 15).95 Under the Order, applicants had to be between seventeen and nineteen years-of-age inclusive and have completed junior or senior matriculation, with preference given to applicants with good standings in algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and physics. Those under eighteen years-of-age required the written consent of their parents. Personnel already serving in the army were eligible to attend provided they already possessed the necessary academic qualifications and were selected by military authorities.96

Initial applications for enrolment were made to Burton. Of the 403 applications received, Burton selected 203 to forward to National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).

Army authorities subsequently interviewed each applicant at a recruiting centre located near the candidate’s location and made the final decision as to their suitability, ultimately accepting 158 individuals. District headquarters then requested the successful applicants report to the nearest district depot where, if they were not already on active service, they were enlisted as privates and taken on strength. No candidate was enlisted unless he

94 “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” 227-228. 95 P.C. 38/9591. 96 “Army University Courses Across Canada,” Blairmore Enterprise, 25 June 1943, 5. 295 satisfied the requirements set by military authorities and was in medical category “A” according to the system of classifying physical fitness for soldiers.97

The course provided a unique opportunity. For many who would otherwise have been unable to enter university, it offered an opportunity to take a year’s university education at the expense of the Dominion Government. According to the agreement between the government and the University of Toronto, the former agreed to reimburse the university for all costs associated with the program, including tuition, textbooks, drafting equipment, lodging, board, and medical and dental care. Candidates under the age of eighteen received boys’ pay at 70 cents per day; otherwise they were entitled to the standard army pay of $1.30 per day. Moreover, the course offered an alternative for young men torn between continuing their education and enlisting for active service.

While attending university each candidate was obligated to take basic training under the direction of the district officer commanding. If a candidate successfully completed the course, he received full academic credit for one year at university if resuming his studies after the war.98 Since successful candidates would receive academic credit, the curriculum was devised to include subjects that would be of value to the army but also fundamental to additional university studies. Those who entered the course with junior

97 For information on the system of classifying physical fitness during the Second World War see W.R. Feasby, ed., Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945, Volume One: Organization and Campaigns (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1956), 495-503. 98 After the course was extended to other institutions, Colonel George G.D. Kilpatrick, the Director of Army Education, asked the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU) to consider a proposal whereby the academic credit granted by one university to a candidate following the successful completion of the CAUC would be recognized in all Canadian universities. This proposal was not accepted by the NCCU. After a discussion of his proposal at a conference in August 1943 between the NCCU and the Director of NSS, Kilpatrick intimated he would withdraw his request and indicated he would leave the matter to the member institutions on the hope that they would “deal as liberally as possible with students who would complete this course satisfactorily.” See LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, George G.D. Kilpatrick to Sidney Smith, 7 May 1943; and LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “Minutes of a Conference between Representatives of the Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and the Director of National Selective Service held in Ottawa on August 30th, 1943,” 4. 296 matriculation were eligible to enter second year science or first year engineering whereas those with senior matriculation or first year arts were eligible to enter third year science or second year engineering. On successful completion of the course, candidates proceeded to Advanced Training Centres (ATC) where they were identified as potential officer material and completed training in the service branch for which they had indicated as their choice and had shown special aptitude.99

The majority of students identified their preference for the RCA, followed by the

CAC, the RCE, and the RCCS.100 Those who failed the academic course could be chosen for specialist training in technical arms or proceed to basic training centres and go through the normal training channels for enlisted personnel.101

Army and university officials regarded the No. 1 Canadian Army Course as a success. Major General Charles Francis Constantine, the Officer Commanding of

Military District No. 2, reported the successful candidates were as “well-trained a unit as any in the District” and that all inspecting officers had “spoken very highly of the calibre of the boys.” President Cody called the course one of the most “valuable ideas” developed to train men for technical positions in the armed service.102 This perceived success encouraged the expansion of the CAUC. In late 1942, military authorities

99 “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 8 (May 1943): 227; and Annual Report for the Year 1943-1944 (Montreal: McGill University, 1944), 16. 100 Under the training system introduced in Canada in March 1941, every new recruit spent two months at a basic training centre and received elementary common-to-all-arms training before moving to an advanced training centre for two months of special-to-arm training. See DUA, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, R.F.G. Letson to GOC-in-C Atlantic Command, GOC-in-C Pacific Command, All District Officers Commanding, Commandant RMC, and Commandant Petawawa Camp, 17 September 1942; and “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” 228. 101 P.C. 38/9591. 102 This did not surprise most associated with the program. The students had been handpicked first by university officials and then by army authorities and all expected wastage rates to be low. See “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 8 (May 1943): 227-228; and UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 062, File 04, H.S.M. Carver to H.J. Cody, 1 March 1944, forwarded letter from H.M.S. Carver to the Director of Personnel Selection, NDHQ, 25 February 1944. 297 contacted university heads to discuss a plan under consideration by NDHQ to extend the scheme to other universities.103

The heads of most institutions responded favourably to the training plan. Some universities, however, did not possess the resources to participate in the scheme.

President Carleton Stanley of Dalhousie University, for example, reported that his institution did not have any available quarters to accommodate additional students. “The

Canadian Navy took away all that we had,” Stanley explained to Lieutenant-Colonel F.C.

Hanington, general staff officer, first grade, at Military District No. 6, “and there is such housing congestion in Halifax that our own regular students are living in a most unhealthy way, and scores of them are not getting sufficient food.”104 Ultimately, at the request of military and government authorities, a second course was held at twelve universities across Canada during the 1943-1944 academic year for 1,272 candidates.

Due to the limited number of officers and non-commissioned officers available to provide military supervision and training, each university had to enroll a minimum of fifty candidates.105 Order-in-Council P.C. 129/6181 of 4 August 1943 authorized the No. 2

Canadian Army University Course under the War Measures Act and allotted quotas to eleven of the participating institutions (see Appendix 16). The Order also authorized an additional 40 candidates in the event that any of the participating universities received applications outnumbering their individual quotas. This number was ultimately allotted to

103 DUASC, UA-3, Box 326, File 6, F.C. Hanington to the Presidents of Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia Technical College, Acadia University, St. Francis Xavier University, St. Dunstan’s University, St. Mary’s College, and St. Anne’s College, 18 December 1942. 104 Ibid., Carleton Stanley to F.C. Hanington, 18 January 1943. 105 “No. 1 Canadian Army Course,” University of Toronto Monthly XLIII, no. 8 (May 1943): 227. 298

Université Laval and authorized by Order-in-Council P.C. 73/9868 of 29 December 1943 after the institution agreed to participate in the program.106

The maximum age of applicants for the second course was raised to twenty-one and candidates were given ordinary pay when they reached seventeen-and-a-half years- of-age instead of eighteen. As in the case of the first course, the Dominion Government reimbursed the universities for all costs associated with the program. While no formal contracts had been drawn up between the DND and the University of Toronto for the first course, P.C. 129/6181 authorized the Minister of National Defence to enter into contracts with each participating university, guaranteeing the terms and conditions upon which expenses would be reimbursed. This is because universities had indicated their

“unwillingness to undertake financial commitments in respect of university instructional staff and equipment” for the course. The course lasted thirty-five weeks and began between 1 September and 14 September 1943, with the exception of McGill University where training commenced on 15 August. All universities completed instruction between

1 May and 15 June 1943.107

Instruction was continued and extended along similar lines to the previous year but was adapted to each institution’s resources. The curriculum consisted primarily of classes in physics, chemistry, mathematics, English, and some basic engineering subjects such as surveying, mechanical drawing, engines, and engineering problems. All candidates completed basic training consisting of a minimum of five hours of military training per week under the instruction of the district officer commanding while in

106 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, Order-in- Council P.C. 73/9868, 29 December 1943. 107 P.C. 129/6181; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, “Dates of Completion of No. 2 C.A.U.C. from Point of View of V.T.S. Administration,” 15 March 1944. 299 attendance. All candidates wore army battle dress and were given special shoulder flashes in the colours of their university with “No. 2 Canadian Army Course” embroidered on the flash.108

The success of the CAUC varied by institution and was measured by rates of attrition, failure, and the number of candidates accepted for commission. 140 of the 158 candidates of the No. 1 Canadian Army Course took the final examinations on 28 May

1943 and of these 120 (76% of those originally registered) graduated from the academic phase of the course and advanced to the ATC for special-to-arm training.109 As of 19

January 1944, 1,145 of the original candidates for No. 2 CAUC—90%—remained in training. 39 had been removed because they were declared “academically unsatisfactory,”

76 had failed their midterm exam, and 9 were identified as “physical casualties.” The largest rates of attrition were found at McGill University (22.80%), the University of

British Columbia (17.65%), and the University of Alberta (13.33%) (see Figure 8).110 Of the 85 candidates registered in the second course at the University of British Columbia

(33 in the senior group and 52 in the junior), 20 withdrew during the session. 64 of the 65

(98.5%) who wrote the final examinations passed or passed with supplemental examinations.111 By comparison, of the 250 men enrolled at McGill University (113 with

108 UTARMS, Office of the President, A1968-0006, Box 057, File 06, Ernest P. Weeks, Memorandum, “Canadian Army University Course 1943/44,” H.Q. 8679-1-10, 12 March 1943. 109 Sixteen candidates had been unable to continue the course after performing poorly on the January examinations. See H.S.M. Carver to H.J. Cody, 1 March 1944, forwarded letter H.M.S. Carver to the Director of Personnel Selection, NDHQ, 25 February 1944. 110 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, H.Q.S. 8679-1- 10, “Return Re No. 2 Canadian Army University Course,” 19 January 1944. 111 Report of the President of the University of British Columbia for the Academic Year Ended August 31, 1944 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1944), 8. 300 senior matriculation and 137 with junior), 189 wrote the final examinations, 48 failed, and 141 passed or passed conditionally.112

By the 1943-1944 academic year, there was no longer a shortage of officers in the technical corps and instead of immediately proceeding to the ATC, successful graduates of the CAUC were required to appear before the Officers Selection and Appraisal Boards

(OSAB), which had been established in 1943 in an effort to introduce a more uniform officer selection process.113 Those accepted by the OSAB immediately proceeded to an

Officer Training Centre (OTC) under special quota upon completion of corps training.

Personnel not considered officer material had three options: (1) be considered for technical and specialist training (survey, RDF, signals) and given the opportunity to immediately commence such training; (2) transfer to the RCAF as aircrew; or (3) immediately return to the reinforcement stream and be dispatched overseas on completion of corps training. If brought before the boards, a candidate had to be prepared to accept commission in the infantry.114 In January and February 1944, 97 graduates of the No. 1 Canadian Army Course appeared before the OSAB at Brockville. 49 were approved as officer candidates to enter the OTC and 48 were found unsuitable. This number represented 31% of the original 158 enrolled in the course, 41% of the 120 graduates of the academic portion of the course, 51% of the 97 who finally appeared before the board, and 70% of the 71 who had been trained up to that time as potential officer material. These were not impressive figures.115

112 Annual Report for the year 1943-1944 (Montreal: McGill University, 1944), 16. 113 For more information on the OSAB, see chapter three. 114 C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 139-140. 115 H.S.M. Carver to H.J. Cody, 1 March 1944, forwarded letter H.M.S. Carver to the Director of Personnel Selection, NDHQ, 25 February 1944. 301

Principal James of McGill University blamed army officials for the high wastage rate at his institution, insisting announcements made by military authorities that candidates would have to appear before the OSAB had “tended to create a good deal of uncertainty” and encouraged many men “to drop out and return to the units from which they had been seconded.”116 High-ranking army officials attributed some failures to mistakes made by army examiners who, impressed by the academic standing of candidates, passed men who “subsequently revealed they were students and nothing more.” Graduates needed to possess more than the ability to study, officials argued, and if they did not, course objectives would not be achieved.117 Certainly, the results of the No.

2 CAUC and the additional figures on the progress of graduates of the first course made evident that the costs of the program outweighed its merits. The estimated cost of the first and second courses respectively totaled $136,480 and $1,266,879, with non-recurring costs amounting to $43,700 and $263,512. In other words, in its first year, the course cost approximately $864 per student and in its second $996 per student.118 The costs of the program become even more outrageous when divided by the number of successful graduates: $2,785 per graduate.

On 4 January 1944, army and government officials met in Ottawa to discuss the future of the CAUC. After careful consideration of the program’s merits and shortcomings, the committee unanimously decided the army would not enter into

116 Annual Report for the year 1943-1944 (Montreal: McGill University, 1944), 16. 117 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, “Points for Discussion on a 3rd. Army University Course – Notes,” 2. 118 P.C. 38/9591; and P.C. 129/6181. 302 contracts with universities to operate a third CAUC during the 1944-1945. Such a move, officials argued, was unnecessary and inadvisable.119

The reasons for this decision were most clearly articulated in the minutes of the

10 February 1944 meeting of the committee. First, the present supply of reinforcement officers was sufficient to cover estimated battle casualties “for some time.” Additionally, certain technical services, such as the RCE and RCOC, had recently limited commissions to university graduates, ruling out the possibility of securing for such branches potential officer material from the CAUC. The CAUC would produce few officers for the remaining technical services and potential infantry officers did not require such specialized courses of instruction. Second, army officials considered it undesirable that attendance in the course would prevent students from entering the reinforcement stream until 1946. This they regarded with the utmost concern. Members of the course spent a minimum of fifteen months in training—eight months at the university and seven months training—before they could take their place in the stream. This was justifiable in the case of those who attained commissioned or non-commissioned rank but for the remainder there was a loss of approximately eight months between the time of enlistment and availability as reinforcements. Third, non-commissioned officer specialist training could be carried out “more efficiently” than through the use of CAUC graduates. The expense incurred, army officials insisted, was not justifiable. Fourth, NDHQ had made no commitments to universities regarding the possibility of securing commissions or incurring capital expenditures. Fifth, enlisted personnel who planned to begin or continue university training would not suffer as a result of the cancellation of the course because

119 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, “Minutes of a Meeting Re Canadian Army University Course,” 4 January 1944, 1. 303 the government had already established a university training program for ex-service personnel under the Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order (PDRO) of October 1941.120

And finally, it was considered impracticable to operate the course with a reduced quota, fewer participating universities, or by placing service personnel in the first year of a regular university engineering physics course.121

On 24 February 1944, the DND instructed all district officers commanding to advise universities that, after careful consideration, it had been decided to discontinue a third CAUC.122 The program was largely unsuccessful. It was too expensive, did not turn out candidates in a short enough time period, and the army could train candidates more efficiently through other training sites.

*****

Specialized wartime university courses were significant examples of the cooperation between university and military authorities and further illustrate the determination of university officials to cooperate with the government and military in support of the war effort. In addition to the long-term programs instituted at universities across the country during the war, this training proved effective in supplying the armed services with skilled and technically trained personnel. Although largely not as expensive as other university training initiatives, the government devoted significant resources to organize specialized training courses. Short-term specialized training programs involved less coordination between the Dominion Government and university and military

120 For more on the PDRO, see chapter six. 121 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, H.Q. 8679-1- 12, “Minutes of Meeting,” 10 February 1944; and LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, RE.G. Roome, H.Q. 8679-1-12, Memorandum to the Adjutant-General, 10 February 1944. 122 LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1 Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, E.H. Anundson for Chief of the General Staff to all general officers commanding in chief and all district officers commanding, 24 February 1944. 304 authorities. The records reveal that the military and universities negotiated the development of the curriculum and evaluated its costs without the direct intervention of government officials. Essentially, the military and the universities were left to negotiate agreements to establish and maintain these courses and the Dominion Government, after the fact, used Orders-in-Council to appropriate funds for this on-campus training. These programs were developed to satisfy perceived needs and were discontinued or modified when it became evident that Canada’s armed services would be able to meet its requirements for personnel with technical training. 305

Chapter Six

Education for Reestablishment, Part I: The University Training Plan, 1939-1954

From a long range standpoint this is perhaps the best investment in the whole rehabilitation programme. It is an investment in Canadian lives and the future of Canada and we must see to it that everyone is trained to the limit of their talents and capacity for here it the greatest national resource of all.1

Canada’s First World War rehabilitation plan could at best be described as incomplete and undeveloped.2 As Desmond Morton explained, during the First World

War there was no planned reestablishment policy on the part of the government.3 This had much to do with precedent. Prior to this war, veteran administration was regarded as a “minor adjunct of the military forces” and not the obligation of government.

Hospitalization was the responsibility of the Army Medical Corps and Army pay officers administered pensions. Other types of assistance were unheard of, with the exception of land grants.4 The creation of the Military Hospitals Commission (MHC) by Order-in-

Council on 30 June 1915, and the Board of Pension Commissioners a year later, however, were the first recognition of “civil responsibility for the care of former members of the

1 LAC, RG35, Vol. 1, File Misc Speeches, etc., Walter Woods, “Address on Rehabilitation,” [c1945], 2. 2 Peter Neary provides a succinct explanation of the rhetoric surrounding the veteran: “‘rehabilitation,’ ‘reconstruction,’ and ‘re-establishment’ were closely linked concepts … Getting people ready for work— rehabilitation—assumed a simultaneous effort—reconstruction—to ensure that jobs would be available for those who completed training courses. And only if these two pieces fitted together could the smooth outcome everyone hoped for—re-establishment—be realized.” See Peter Neary, On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2011), 117. 3 Desmond Morton, “Canadian Veterans’ Heritage from the Great War,” in The Veterans Charter and Post- World War II Canada, ed. Peter Neary and J.L. Granatstein (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 15-31. 4 Veterans of the South African War (1899-1902) received 160 acres of free land in Western Canada. See Walter S. Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation): Being a History of the Development and Carrying Out of a Plan for the Re-establishment of a million young veterans of World War II by the Department of Veterans Affairs and its predecessor the Department of Pensions and National Health (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1953), 11-12. 306 armed forces.”5 The former cared for the sick and wounded and the latter allocated compensation for injuries. They acted as the government’s dual approach to veterans until the Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-Establishment replaced them in early 1918.

The MHC emphasized training and education as a means of rehabilitating veterans but it focused on disabled veterans almost exclusively, providing free vocational training in an effort to ensure their productivity in civil life.6 The first training courses began at MHC hospitals and homes in the spring of 1916, but by the end of the year the program was making wide use of local schools, colleges, and universities.7 Not only did it use the resources of educational institutions, the MHC also asked principals and presidents to develop “retraining programs” to help facilitate their plan.8 The results of this collaboration were twofold: one application used vocational training therapeutically while the other focused on the teaching of new technical skills to disabled veterans unable to return to their pre-war occupations.9 The MHC’s plan identified the advantages of occupational therapy and vocational training for veterans. Their “pioneer experiment” would become the centre of rehabilitation policy in Canada.10

5 The MHC established hospitals, rehabilitation programs, vocational schools, and social services to help disabled veterans. See Desmond Morton, “‘Noblest and Best’: Retraining Canada’s War Disabled 1915- 23,” Canadian Studies 16, no. 3 (Fall 1981): 75-85. 6 Vocational and university education were made available to disabled veterans and to veterans who had enlisted before the age of eighteen. See Shaun Brown, “Re-establishment and Rehabilitation: Canadian Veteran Policy – 1933-1946” (Ph.D. Diss., the University of Western Ontario, 1995), 216; and Morton, “‘Noblest and Best’: Retraining Canada’s War Disabled 1915-23,” 82. 7 The MHC training program began as fairly rudimentary, offering a wide range of instruction serving the interests of everyone from the most serious students to those “more interested in a few hours of occupational therapy.” When Samuel Armstrong became the new director of the MHC in December 1916, however, he visited universities and colleges to request use of their resources. The program rapidly expanded from there. By the end of 1917, over 3,000 veterans were in training course through the MHC. See Morton, “‘Noblest and Best,’” 78, 81. 8 A prime example is the MHC collaboration with Principal Frederic Sexton of the Nova Scotia Technical College. See Janet Guildford, “Coping with De-industrialization: The Nova Scotia Department of Technical Education, 1907-1930,” Acadiensis 16, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 69-84. 9 Ibid., 77. 10 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 132, [c. October 1945], 1-2. 307

Despite the success of the MHC program and limited requests by the Great War

Veterans Association after the armistice, no organized training or education program for non-disabled veterans was made available to this war’s generation. In fact, in 1918, Prime

Minister Robert Borden outright refused the National Conference of Canadian

Universities’ (NCCU) proposal to offer a “loan-grant program” to help veterans enter university.11 This, in effect, was a reflection of government priorities. Vocational training for disabled veterans, as Morton explained, “was not a reward for valour but a businesslike investment.”12 The rehabilitation programme available for “able-bodied” veterans of the First World War therefore did not include training or educational benefits.

It consisted of a clothing allowance, a war service gratuity based on length and zone of service and dependents, and the opportunity to qualify to borrow money to settle land in

Western Canada.13

By and large this war’s generation, including hundreds of thousands of veterans, believed the government did not “fully discharge its obligations” to those who had enlisted.14 Unemployment amongst veterans “distressed” the country and despite a number of patchwork measures instituted to combat the problem, the situation for veterans remained acute throughout the interwar period.15 In 1936, the newly formed

11 Jeffrey Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 275. 12 Morton, “‘Noblest and Best,’” 77. 13 In his book on Canada’s Second World War rehabilitation plan, Walter S. Woods summarized the features of the First World War veteran program in seven points: (1) “Pensions and hospital treatment for those who incurred wounds or disease during service, and pensions for the dependents for those who died”; (2) vocational training or “modest” assistance towards university training for those whose disability prevented them from returning to their previous occupation or for those who enlisted as minors; (3) a clothing allowance; (4) a war service gratuity based on length and zone of service; (5) financial assistance in settling land; (6) an opportunity to purchase Returned Soldiers’ Insurance; and (7) a preference for employment in the civil service. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 12-13. 14 Ibid., v-vi. 15 For example, in 1923 the government provided payment for unemployment assistance to supplement the pensions of unemployed veterans and in 1930, it instituted the War Veterans’ Allowance Act which 308

Veterans’ Assistance Commission undertook a survey of all unemployed veterans, numbering approximately 35,000. It found most were unskilled and identified this very factor as the source of veteran unemployment. In response, the Commission initiated several measures, including the creation of the Veterans Workshops, the introduction of

“probational training”, and a campaign to encourage employers to give preference to the hiring of veterans.16 The government had learnt two valuable lessons from its first great war: first, it had a responsibility to ensure that all of the nation’s veterans were fitted for their return to civilian life; and second, it would do so by ensuring veterans had the adequate skills to find employment.

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was determined to avoid the perceived failures of the previous war. Within three months of the declaration of war on

10 September 1939, Mackenzie King initiated studies to prepare post-war policies in relation to the rehabilitation and re-establishment of demobilized members of its armed services by authorizing the creation of the Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and

Rehabilitation (see Appendix 17).17 The Committee’s early research resulted in the passing of Order-in-Council P.C. 7633 on 1 October 1941 (see Appendix 18).18 Known as the Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order (PDRO), it established the first group of provided cash allowances for veterans who had served in a theatre of war and had reached the age of 60 or were permanently incapacitated. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 3. 16 Woods, Rehabilitation, 3. 17 This research was undertaken at the direction of the Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation authorized and constructed by Order-in-Council P.C. 4068½ of 8 December 1939. The Committee was created in response to recommendations from Ian Mackenzie and Walter Woods, the Minister and Associate Deputy Minister respectively of the Department of Pensions and National Health (DPNH). It consisted of the Ministers of Pensions and National Health (Convener), Public Works, National Defence, Agriculture, Labour, and the Honourable J.A. MacKinnon. Its mandate was to “procure information respecting and give full consideration to and report regarding the problems which will arise from the demobilization and the discharge from time to time of members of the Forces during and after the conclusion of the present war, and the rehabilitation of such members into civil life.” See LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 4068½, 8 December 1939; and NCCU, Nineteenth National Conference of Canadian Universities Held at University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, June 9-11, 1942 (Toronto: s.n., 1942), 77. 18 LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 7633, 1 October 1941. 309 benefits for all discharged members of the armed services and provided an opportunity to take training either on the job, in a technical or vocational school, or at university. The

PDRO would act as the foundation for all subsequent veteran policy and planning. Ian

Alistair Mackenzie, who became Canada’s first Minister of Veterans Affairs, identified it as “the foundation stone” and “backbone” of the “whole Canadian plan for re- establishment.”19

The PDRO was a watershed in the history of veteran policy and planning. The legislation reflected a changing philosophy, one that emphasized the importance of providing all returned personnel with benefits. With few exceptions, all believed the government had an obligation to rehabilitate and reestablish soldiers in everyday life and to help ease their transition. Public opinion supported the equitable and fair treatment of ex-service personnel, namely that all veterans had rendered an essential service to the country and merited—in fact, were entitled—to a program that would grant them the means to re-establish themselves.20 In his 1953 book Rehabilitation, Walter Edwin

Sainsbury Woods, a key architect of Canada’s Second World War rehabilitation plan, explained the provisions of the program acted as a “compensation measure designed to

19 Ian Mackenzie was born in Scotland in 1890 and immigrated to Canada in 1914. He served in France during the First World War as a lieutenant with the 72nd Battalion. He was elected to the British Columbia legislative assembly in 1920. He served as Minister of Immigration (1930) and Minister of National Defence (1935-1939) before being named the Minister of the DPNH from 1939 to 1944 and the first Minister of Veteran Affairs from 1944 to 1948. In 1948, he was appointed to the Imperial Privy Council and the Senate. He died a year later. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 78, 29 March 1945, 1; and Back to Civil Life (Ottawa: Department of Pensions and National Health, June 1, 1944), 13. For more on Mackenzie, see Martie A. Hooker, “Serving Two Masters: Ian Mackenzie and Civil-Military Relations in Canada, 1935-1939,” Journal of Canadian Studies 21, no. 1 (April 1986): 38-56; David MacKenzie, “The Bren Gun Scandal and the Maclean Publishing Company’s Investigation of Canadian Defence Contracts,” Journal of Canadian Studies 26, no. 3 (1991): 140-162; and W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978). 20 As Woods argued, rehabilitation was “regarded as a preferred charge on the country’s reserve; an obligation that must be fulfilled; part of the cost of Freedom.” See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, "Department of Labour, University Advisory Board, Minutes," November 27, 1944, 5; Neary, On to Civvy Street, 22; and Woods, Rehabilitation, 3. 310 make good … for losses … attributable to war service” and would “provide opportunity to enable each discharged person to fit himself to earn his living.”21 The PDRO was a programme of “opportunity combined with security,” explained Woods; opportunity to learn and develop a new profession and security against unemployment, “fear and want.”22

The PDRO afforded discharged persons with unemployment insurance benefits by stipulating military service constituted insurable employment under the

Unemployment Insurance Act of June 1940. It also provided all veterans with a clothing allowance, transportation to place of enlistment or home, a rehabilitation grant, remedial medical treatment, vocational training facilities, reinstatement or preference in employment, guidance and placement services, and a pension for disabilities.23 The

PDRO offered payment of benefits to veterans while unemployed, taking vocational training, resuming higher education, temporarily incapacitated, or “awaiting returns from private enterprise” such as farming.24 The theory behind the legislation was to offer significant government grants in the initial years following discharge in order to “prevent

21 Woods was born in 1884 in England and came to Canada as a young man. He went overseas with the First Contingent of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 1914 and served throughout the war. He thus knew firsthand the difficulties of readjusting to civil life. As Neary explains, Woods understood demobilization would be “messy” and a “complex process of readjustment.” Woods joined the Soldiers’ Settlement Board of Canada following the war and worked there until 1930 when he was appointed to sit on the committee that created the War Veterans’ Allowance Act. He was later appointed Chair of the War Veterans’ Allowance Act. Thus, in 1941, when he was appointed Associate Deputy Minister of the DPNH, Woods had both the experience and position to develop rehabilitation policy. As Associate Deputy Minister he focused entirely on problems relating to the rehabilitation of ex-service personnel of the First World War and current war. In October 1944, veteran rehabilitation came under the purview of the newly created Department of Veterans Affairs and Woods became Deputy Minister. He served in this capacity until his retirement in 1950. In 1953, Woods published Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation), a history of the rehabilitation and re-establishment in civil life of the men and women who served during the Second World War. In 1956, he published The Men Who Came Back, a Book of Memories. See Woods, Rehabilitation, vi, 21, 60; Back to Civil Life, Third Edition, (Ottawa: King’s Printer, April 1, 1946), 3; and Walter Woods, The Men Who Came Back, a Book of Memories (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1956). 22 Department of Veterans Affairs, Charlottetown, Unpublished Report Call No. 3SS.114 W425 1943, G.M. Weir, “A Survey of Rehabilitation”; and Woods, “Address on Rehabilitation,” 1-2. 23 P.C. 7633, 1. 24 Woods, Rehabilitation, 18. 311 dependency on the government in the long term”; hence, the PDRO afforded a number of provisions intended to allow service personnel to “effectively plan for their re- establishment.”25

Sections 6, 8, and 9 of the PDRO promised training benefits to ex-service personnel with an honourable discharge accepted into a regular university course.

Section 8 allowed the Minister of Pensions and National Health to approve the granting of training fees and allowances to any discharged person with the “aptitude and inclination” to enter an academic or professional undergraduate course at a university who (1) resumed or commenced a course required to qualify for admission to a university

(i.e. pre-matriculation classes) within fifteen months of discharge; (2) resumed or commenced a course to which he or she was regularly admitted within fifteen months of discharge; or (3) because of ill health, or “any other good reason shown to the satisfaction of the Department,” delayed resumption or commencement of a course beyond the fifteen month period.26

Section 9 provided training benefits to veterans who began a postgraduate course in a university before enlistment or who proceeded to postgraduate studies following post-discharge undergraduate training, providing the ex-service person (1) resumed or commenced the postgraduate course within one year of discharge; (2) entered a course no more than one year from commencement of the university year if discharge preceded the commencement by not more than three months; or (3) entered as soon as possible in the case of a discharged person entering postgraduate studies following completion of an undergraduate course commenced or resumed after discharge. As in the case of

25 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 86; and P.C. 7633, 1. 26 P.C. 7633; and LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, “Educational Training Benefit 5,” n.d., 1. 312 undergraduate training, the Minister retained the right to grant benefits past the stipulated timeframe in cases of ill health or another satisfactory reason.27

Section 6 of the PDRO outlined the provisions for maintenance grants intended to help veterans pay their living expenses while undertaking training. Initially, it set this rate at $9 per week for a single person and $13 per week for a married person, with additional allowances in lieu of a spouse and for children and dependent parents.28 These amounts corresponded to out-of-work benefits provided for all ex-service personnel. The PDRO authorized the Minister to diminish the amount of the grant due to a spouse’s income and

“any pension, wages, salary, or other income” received during the period of training.

Deductions were also made based on income from work directly related to the training program and from scholarships, fellowships, and special grants intended to provide a similar type of assistance to that granted under the PDRO. Self-employed veterans had to cease their activities during the course of training or forfeit their allowance.29

Like all rehabilitation benefits, the Department of Pensions and National Health

(DPNH) administered the PDRO under the direction of Minister Ian Mackenzie and

Associate Deputy Minister Walter Woods until October 1944, when it was divided into

27 P.C. 7633; and “Educational Training Benefit 5,” n.d., 1. 28 In May 1943, the rates increased to $10.20 per week for a single person and $14.40 for a married person. Rates for dependents were set at $18.20 per month for a person in lieu of a wife, $12 for one child, $12 more for second child, $10 for third child, $8 for each subsequent child (not in excess of three), and $15 for a dependent parent. In July 1944, Order-in-Council P.C. 5210 increased allowances to $60 and $80 per month for single and married veterans respectively. In 1947, the rate increased to $18 for the first dependent child, $14 more for the second, $12 for the third, and $10 for each additional child. The rate for dependent parent(s) was fixed at $25. Allowances remained at $60 per month for single veterans but increased to $90 per month for married veterans. See P.C. 7633; 1943 Office Consolidation of the Post- Discharge Re-establishment Order (Ottawa: Department of Pensions and National Health, 1943), 6-7; and Woods, Rehabilitation, 24-25, 92-93. 29 On 1 June 1948, the restriction on a veteran’s wife’s income was removed, as was the limitation on income and casual earnings of fulltime undergraduates. For those training on the job, the income restrictions were raised from $40 to $75. The $75 limitation for part-time demonstrators, internes, etc., remained in effect. Veterans in postgraduate training were limited to an income not exceeding $100 per month. See P.C. 7633; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 19 November 1947, 2. 313 two departments: the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and the Department of

National Health and Welfare. The former became the principal government agency responsible for the re-establishment of ex-service personnel of the Second World War.

Formed to “deal exclusively with veterans,” it consisted of the Rehabilitation Branch,

Treatment Branch, the Directorate of the Veterans’ Land Act, and the War Veterans’

Allowance Board. Mackenzie and Woods became the first Minister and Deputy Minister respectively of the new DVA.30

The correspondence of rehabilitation officials and DPNH and DVA legislation, circulars, memorandum, and press releases all emphasized the university training benefits of the PDRO were intended not as “a reward for service” but rather “a compensation measure to overcome losses of normal opportunity to acquire or improve skills.”31 In a letter to Woods, Harold Williams Jamieson, the DVA Superintendent of Educational

Training, reiterated the purpose of training benefits under the rehabilitation program was to “assist the veteran in preparing himself for the position in civil life that he would have attained or might have attained if his career had not been interrupted by service.”32 In addition, officials hoped the benefits would encourage young men who were

“apprehensive as to the resumption of their education on their discharge” to enlist.33

The PDRO granted training benefits for as many months as a veteran served in the armed services on condition the veteran attained sufficient academic standing.

Allowances and fees were discontinued if the veteran had “unnecessary absenteeism,”

30 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, "Department of Labour, University Advisory Board, Minutes," 27 November 1944, 5. 31 “Educational Training Benefit 5,” n.d., 1. 32 Ibid.; and LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, H.W. Jamieson to W.S. Woods, 16 April 1947. 33 Dalhousie University Archives and Special Collections (DUASC), UA-3, Box 326, File 6, H.F. McDonald to Carleton Stanley, 7 October 1941. 314 illness exceeding a two-week period, or negative reports from university officials.34 By the same token, if he or she failed in more than two classes or subjects in any academic year or failed in either one or two subjects and also failed either or both of the supplementary examinations, the individual would no longer be eligible for a university training grant. The veteran could carry one condition after supplementals were written, but only for one year, after which he or she would be ineligible for training benefits. If, however, the veteran ranked in the upper quarter of the class or at least obtained second- class honours standing, and the Minister deemed it in the “best interest” of both the veteran and the public to continue benefits, he or she was eligible for an extension on a year-to-year basis.35 Postgraduate extensions were granted on an individual basis and dependent upon “outstanding progress” and recommendations of university officials.36

By 1952, 9,000 veterans had commenced university training without sufficient service entitlement to continue them through to graduation. Of these, 6,500 (72 percent) received extensions for one or more academic years.37

Like all veteran legislation, the government initially passed amendments to the

PDRO through Orders-in-Council under the authority of the War Measures Act, a precedent set in the First World War. Mackenzie argued this allowed them to make amendments quickly in response to “new situations” or to “correct weaknesses

34 Woods, Rehabilitation, 98. 35 This was not the case for a pensioner. He or she simply had to pass the examinations in order to qualify for an extension of training allowances beyond the period of entitlement. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001- 01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Milton F. Gregg to Ralph Maybank, 13 February 1948; LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Part 1, A.E. Hounsom, “Department of Veterans’ Affairs Information Bulletin for Undergraduate Veteran Students who are now Completing the 1948-49 Academic Session in University,” April 1949, 1-3; and LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-2, Part 2, H.W. Jamieson, "Training Programme for Veterans, Superintendent's Annual Report, March 21, 1952,” 1. 36 Woods, Rehabilitation, 92. 37 Jamieson, "Training Programme for Veterans, Superintendent's Annual Report, March 21, 1952,” 1. 315 discovered through administrative experience.”38 It did, in fact, offer a freedom to revise quickly, but it necessitated consolidation for easier interpretation of policies. This was done in 1944 with the repeal of P.C. 7633 and reissuing of its regulations under Order-in-

Council P.C. 5210.

By October 1945, Mackenzie was calling to have the rights and privileges of the

PDRO “confirmed and ratified” by Parliament and embodied in the statutes of Canada.

“The point has been reached where that step can now be taken,” he declared, “and it is proposed that this shall be done in a bill … not as detailed as the order-in-council. Room is left for flexibility by regulation. But it is only right and proper that Parliament should place the stamp of its approval upon a measure of such vital importance, and should pass upon the merits of the various principles embodied in it.”39 In December 1945, the PDRO and all supplementary Orders-in-Council concerning vocational and educational grants were further consolidated and approved by the Senate as a bill entitled the Veterans

Rehabilitation Act (VRA).40 The VRA covered university and vocational training, awaiting returns allowances, out-of-work benefits, and temporary incapacitation grants.

The VRA was ultimately revised and consolidated with the country’s other veteran legislation and reissued in 1946 as a single volume entitled the Veterans Charter.41

*****

38 DVA News Release No. 132, 1. 39 Ibid., 11. 40 Neary, On to Civvy Street, 163-164. 41 The Charter included all thirteen Acts of Parliament, including the VRA, as well as all other measures already on the statute books. All amendments to these acts were consolidated in the original acts for convenience of use. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 237, [c. Spring 1946], 1; and Brown, 308. For a summary of the legislation contained in the Veterans Charter and a history of the development of the Veterans Charter see Brown, 109-162, 308-326; and Don Ives, “The Veterans Charter: The Compensation Principle and the Principle of Recognition for Service,” in The Veterans Charter and Post-World War II Canada, eds. Neary and Granatstein, 85-94. 316

While recognizing the “unparalleled demand” the PDRO would place upon their institutions, universities overwhelmingly supported the government’s provision for educational benefits.42 Almost all administrations repeated the motto: “When at war prepare for peace.” Presidents and faculty recognized the opportunity to play a vital role in facilitating the country’s transition to the post-war order and regarded education as a transformative agent in rehabilitation. By preparing the nation’s veterans, their institutions would help usher in post-war peace and prosperity. Universities had already offered their intellectual resources to the government, educating much-needed war service personnel and providing training to members of the armed services.43 The veteran education training plan, however, would be undertaken on a scale much larger than all of the other wartime activities of these institutions and required the coordination of material and intellectual resources. This was not a scheme universities could undertake individually; together they had to negotiate with government to construct a system of grants and funding that would meet anticipated financial burdens.

The NCCU, consisting of representatives of universities and colleges from across the country, played an essential role in matching the post-war plans of universities with government priorities. The contributions of its members to wartime policy development had already proved tried and tested. Since the initial years of the war, the NCCU had

42 President Thomson of the University of Saskatchewan, for example, later wrote: “…from the very beginning of their growing involvement with national policies, a mutual respect was established between the universities and the government. The prevailing spirit was one of co-operation, and to promote liaison, the Conference now acquired a new significance and importance as providing a medium of discussion and communication with governmental authorities.” See NCCU, Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1944), 9. 43 During the Second World War, education and training were essential to the successful prosecution of the war. Faculties of science, engineering, medicine, and dentistry increased enrollment to meet the wartime demand for their skills. Universities collaborated with the Department of National Defence (DND) to create specialized war-related courses for university students and armed services personnel and altered the content of existing courses (i.e. electrical engineering) in order to provide well-trained men for the active forces. See chapters four and five. 317 distinguished itself by collaborating with military and government officials to develop mobilization policies for students and this marked its members as major stakeholders and experts on crucial wartime policy decisions.44

To study post-war problems, the Executive Council of the NCCU appointed a special Committee on Post-War Problems in the fall of 1942 comprised of twelve senior university administrators.45 The committee met three times: in Ottawa on 31 August

1943; in Kingston from January 2-5, 1944; and in Hamilton from June 12-13, 1944.

Members discussed problems likely to arise from the PDRO under the headings of

“number and distribution of ex-service students”, “finance”, and “physical problems.”

They emphasized veteran education would further strain university resources and necessitate additional teaching and administrative staff, buildings, equipment, and programs and services specific to such a unique cohort. In initial discussions, the committee quickly agreed to accommodate the mass influx of veterans, admission requirements would have to be adjusted for veterans, with non-essential courses being

44 Mobilization officials of the Department of National War Services (DNWS) and later National Selective Service (NSS) met with university officials, consisting primarily of presidents and deans, as early as January 1940 to discuss the conditions under which deferment would be granted. Indeed, university officials played a vital role in these negotiations and by and large the government ceded to their opinions and interests. Take, for example, the case of the deferment of theology students. Despite some opposition from key mobilization officials, university presidents successfully pressed their case that religious freedom was essential in the context of a war against fascism. See chapter one. 45 The members of the committee were: Norman A.M. MacKenzie, President, University of New Brunswick (Chair); Robert Newton, President, University of Alberta; D. Buchanan, Dean, Faculty of Arts and Science, University of British Columbia; Abbé Arthur Maheux, Professor of History, Université Laval; Thomas H. Matthews, Registrar, McGill University; G.P. Gilmour, Chancellor, McMaster; Sidney Smith, President, University of Manitoba; Danel J. Macdonald, President, St. Francis Xavier University; Philippe Corneillier, Rector, University of Ottawa; Harold A. Innis, Professor of Economics, University of Toronto; A.B. Fennell, Registrar, University of Toronto (Secretary-Treasurer); and William Everett McNeill, Vice- Principal, Queen’s University. Also in attendance at meetings of the committee were Reverend St.-Denis of the University of Ottawa, Principal R.C. Wallace of Queen’s University, and Reverend H.J. Somers of St. Francis Xavier University. 318 omitted. Special courses for ex-service personnel would also be necessary in addition to

“the integration of veterans into regular university courses.”46

Following its deliberations, the committee prepared a report entitled Report of the

National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems to “inventory” the

“most important” challenges arising from the university training plan. Adopted by the

NCCU on 13 June 1944, and subsequently published in English and French, the report made a number of key recommendations. The thrust of these recommendations was a request for additional financial assistance to supplement veteran education:

The Order [P.C. 7633] will … greatly increase beyond the normal number of university students, and since the fees of students at the present do not meet more than one-half of the cost of their college education it is probable that the total cost of each university’s operation will increase by an amount greater than the fees received from demobilized students. The Conference therefore represents to the Dominion and to the Provincial Governments that financial help through the appropriate channels be granted to the universities to cover this net increase beyond the fees…47

The report insisted universities would do their utmost, “but you cannot expect to squeeze a quart into a pint pot.” The committee explained the cost of veteran education was not only about tuition fees and allowances for living expenses; it was also about the expenditures associated with the expansion of their institutions. “An essential corollary to the Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order,” the report summarized, “is therefore a correspondingly generous contribution by the Dominion Government to the universities so that they may provide the educational facilities offered in the Order to demobilized

46 NCCU, Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems, 5, 7-23. 47 Ibid., 6, 30. 319 men and women.”48 The NCCU continued to press its case during the 1944-1945 academic year as veteran demand for university training increased.

In April 1945, James Sutherland Thomson, the President of the NCCU and the

University of Saskatchewan, met with Woods to discuss additional funding for universities and the possible establishment of a committee to oversee university training.

Thomson took the idea of a committee before the meeting of the NCCU Executive

Committee held on 30 April 1945 in Toronto. Thomson reported to Woods that it was met with “favourable reception” and would likely “help towards the end which we all have in view.”49

Order-in-Council P.C. 3206 of 3 May 1945 established the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans (see Appendix 19). The committee was tasked with advising the Minister of Veterans Affairs on “matters relating to the university training provided under The Post Discharge Re-Establishment Order.” Appointed to the committee were: Woods (Chair); Sperrin N.F. Chant, Director General of Rehabilitation,

DVA; Philippe Cornellier, Rector, the University of Ottawa; Cyrille Gagnon, Rector,

Université Laval; Milton F. Gregg, President, the University of New Brunswick; Frank

Cyril James, Principal, McGill University; H.W. Jamieson, Superintendent of

Educational Training, DVA (Secretary); N.A.M. MacKenzie, President, the University of

British Columbia; W.A. Mackintosh, Director General of Economic Research,

Department of Reconstruction; J.L. Olivier Maurault, Rector, Université de Montréal;

John E. Robbins, Department of Trade and Commerce; Sidney Smith, President-elect, the

48 NCCU, Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems, 9; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, W.S. Woods to W.C. Clark, 23 May 1945. 49 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Volume 1, James S. Thomson to W.S. Woods, 4 May 1945. 320

University of Toronto; James S. Thomson, President, the University of Saskatchewan;

Henry Marshall Tory, President, Carleton College; and Robert C. Wallace, Principal,

Queen’s University.50 As Woods pointed out, for most of these members it was not the first time they had served as advisors to the government on wartime matters. A number had been members of the University Advisory Board (UAB), a committee established in

1942 to advise the Minister of Labour on labour relations.51

The creation of the committee was recognition by Mackenzie and Woods of the need to consult and collaborate with university heads on veteran training.52 Mackenzie, however, was more hesitant to commit to additional funding. He agreed “in principle” to an additional payment to universities based on the “extraordinary difficulties and expenses” but he requested time to consider the proposal and asked universities to submit material in support of their request. Other DVA officials, particularly those in the

Department of Finance, cautioned a grant would be a significant investment.53

Woods, on the other hand, agreed with the proposal. On 23 May 1945, he wrote

Deputy Finance Minister W.C. Clark supporting additional grants. The request by university officials for a subsidy was fair, wrote Woods, given the extent of the

50 Originally, the Nova Scotia educational institutions were not represented on the committee. Criticism of this, combined with the realization that the Advisory Committee was composed primarily of provincially supported or state institutions, led to the appointment of Alexander Enoch Kerr, President of Dalhousie University, the largest of the region’s universities. Dalhousie University, Acadia University, and St. Francis Xavier University, like McGill University, received no direct support from the province. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 2, H.W. Jamieson to W.S. Woods, 16 October 1947. 51 See chapter one. 52 At the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, Woods argued: “As we gain experience in administering the Order, there are certain problems arising that require the consideration not only of our Administration but also of the Universities. It is obvious we must work in close cooperation to the extent of being a partnership.” Woods pointed to a number of concerns already arising regarding university training and argued “that all these things require the experience and judgment of the Canadian universities, as well as of our Administration, and for that reason we hope to have the advantage of your advice and experience through the medium of this Committee.” See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 28 May 1945, 1. 53 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, R.B. Bryce, “Memorandum for Dr. Clark Re: Meeting with University Presidents on Veterans’ Benefits,” 28 May 1945, 1-2. 321 undertaking. In exchange for additional payments, universities would arrange admission dates to permit veterans to enter university within three months of discharge; provide counselling and advisory services that would cooperate with the DVA on the suitability of veterans for university training; provide special summer sessions; avoid “excessively large” classes because they would impede the “effectiveness of instruction;” provide a housing service to aid veterans in finding accommodations; establish loan funds and other help for veterans to finance their education beyond the period of entitlement; and adapt courses to meet the “special needs” of adult veterans seeking to enter the professions.54

“It is desirable,” concluded Woods, “that Canadian universities be in a position to make arrangements to meet the needs of the large numbers of veterans who, within the next few months, will be seeking admission to university.”55 Woods asked R.B. Bryce of the

Department of Finance to attend the first meeting of the new Advisory Committee so that

Bryce could adequately relay to Clark additional arguments in favour of the grants.56

The first meeting of the Advisory Committee was held on 28 May 1945 in Ottawa and the first item on its agenda was the question of additional fees for educating veterans.

The Advisory Committee began by immediately appointing a sub-committee consisting of Thomson, Smith, Gregg, Robbins, Maheux, Jamieson, and later John Everett Robbins, the director of the education division of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, to assess the financial records of seven “typical” universities submitted for review: Université Laval,

54 The collaboration of DVA and university officials in the education of veterans resulted in the expansion of counselling and advisory services in universities. Before the war, counselling services existed in very few institutions. Universities officials quickly recognized the value of extending these services to non- veterans students as well and agreed they should be continued after the university training program came to an end. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, “University Advisory Services Conference, Quebec City, June 17-21, 1947,” n.d. 55 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, W.S. Woods to W.C. Clark, 23 May 1945. 56 R.B. Bryce, “Memorandum for Dr. Clark Re: Meeting with University Presidents on Veterans’ Benefits,” 1. 322 the University of Saskatchewan, McGill University, the University of Toronto, the

University of British Columbia, the University of New Brunswick, and Queen’s

University.57 Members recommended the creation of a subsidy to be called a supplementary grant to provide for the increased cost of educating veterans resulting from the special services being provided under the PDRO.58 The Committee resolved that the government be asked to pay a supplementary grant at a rate of $150 per academic year per veteran receiving university training benefits under the PDRO for the purpose of contributing to the additional instructional, counselling, and administrative costs.59

Members agreed this would ensure that adequate service would be given to discharged men and women commencing university training. A grant was required, the Committee argued, to supplement the costs associated with the individual attention and instruction required by veterans, the provision for special counselling and advisory services, the establishment of three admission dates, added supplies and equipment, additional instructors’ salaries, and the preference of discharged men and women for engineering and professional courses.60 At its second meeting in Ottawa on 18 June 1945, the

Advisory Committee re-endorsed the request for supplementary grants and approved a recommendation that the grant be effective for the period ending 30 June 1946.61

57 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 28 May 1945, 2-3. 58 Ibid., 1; and R.B. Bryce, “Memorandum for Dr. Clark Re: Meeting with University Presidents on Veterans’ Benefits,” 1-2. 59 This was one of two major resolutions. The second requested that “immediate action be taken to facilitate the release from the Armed Services of designated staff for Canadian Universities” in order to provide instruction for ex-service personnel under the PDRO. See LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, Volume 1, “Resolution Passed by Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 28 May 1945, 1; and LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 18 June 1945, 1. 60 “Resolution Passed by Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans.” 61 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 18 June 1945, 1. 323

The recommendation of the Advisory Committee was based on a number of key figures. An estimate of expenses and tuition fees for the 1945-1946 academic year assuming a 75 percent increase in the student population over the previous year due to the influx of veterans reported McGill University would incur approximately $2.8 million dollars in expenditures, the University of Toronto $4.6 million, the University of British

Columbia $1.6 million, the University of Saskatchewan $1.2 million, Queen’s University

$1.1 million, and the University of New Brunswick $250,000 (see Figure 9).62 Another survey for the same academic year concluded on average additional expenditures minus the cost of tuition fees per veteran averaged $111 for the 1945-1946 academic year but varied greatly by institution (see Figure 10).63 Figures for the University of Toronto reported additional expenditures of $202 per veteran per year. The Ontario Agricultural

College reported $233, the University of Ottawa $452, and Mount Allison University

$658. Some institutions reported a surplus of funds: the University of Alberta at $55 per veteran per year, the University of Bishop’s College $28, and Dalhousie University

$80.64

Based on the figures presented by the Advisory Committee, the DVA agreed to a supplementary grant not exceeding $150 per veteran. Provision was made for universities to receive up to $75 per student veteran in advance of the final payment to be based upon the District Supervisor of Training’s estimate of veteran enrolment. The legislation also stipulated the supplementary grant would be reduced or discontinued if provincial grants

62 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Table 11. Estimated expenses and tuition fees in dollars assuming 75 per cent increase of student population over 1944-45, due to veteran enrolment,” [c. May 1945]. 63 Including tuition fees, expenditures per veteran per year averaged $310 according to the report. See LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Committee on University Requirements Additional expenditure on behalf of veterans enrolled by Canadian Universities per veteran Academic year 1945-46,” n.d. 64 Ibid. 324 to universities were reduced as a consequence of the federal money.65 Order-in-Council

P.C. 215/4940, dated 13 July 1945, recommended the DVA be authorized to pay supplementary grants in an amount not exceeding $150 to be effective for the period 1

July 1945 to 30 June 1946.66 The total payment to universities on behalf of one veteran per academic year, including the supplementary grant, tuition, and others fees covered under the PDRO, could not exceed $500.67 The Order legislated all universities receiving grants must provide information about the additional expenditures incurred in the education of veterans, including the cost of tuition; administrative costs; operating and maintenance costs including supplies, counselling, and special services; capital expenditures for equipment; and capital expenditures for buildings including alterations, construction, and renovations (see Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13). They also had to report the extent to which these costs were being met by tuition fees and provide any additional information that could help in determining required funds.68

On 14 November 1945, the Advisory Committee met for the third time in

Ottawa.69 On the agenda was a discussion of interim recommendations nos. 54 and 41 of

65 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Rehabilitation Branch Instructions,” 31 July 1945, 1-2. 66 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, Order-in-Council P.C. 215/4940, 13 July 1945, 1. 67 The supplementary grant was not payable on behalf of students in the summer sessions or in university courses not leading to a diploma or degree. Moreover, where tuition fees were paid for only part of an academic year, the grant was recalculated to reflect the time spent in training. In other words, if the student was in training for nine of the twenty weeks of a course, he or she would receive $67.50. Tuition fees for a student per academic year were less than $350 with a few exceptions, such as for the faculties of medicine and dentistry. Additionally, in the case of some institutions whose revenue from tuition and other fees exceeded estimated expenditures, no supplementary grant was paid. See P.C. 215/4940, 1; LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, DVA, Confidential Letter No. 163, 30 November 1945, 1; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), H. Sloman to all district treasury officers, 10 March 1948. 68 P.C. 215/4940, 1; and LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-2-3, Robert England to all universities and affiliated colleges, 26 January 1946. 69 Two new members were present at this meeting: Major-General E.L.M. Burns, Director-General of Rehabilitation, and W.R. Wees, Director of Training. Chant, Maurault, John E. Robbins, and Wallace were absent. Georges Baril (representing Université de Montréal) and A. Maheux (representing Université Laval) observed in place. Harry Low of the War Assets Corporation and Lieutenant Colonel O.B. Rexford of the Directorate of Army Education also observed. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 325 the Royal Commission on Veterans’ Qualifications. No. 54 was a brief on the rehabilitation of aircrew prepared by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) that predicted the educational preferences of the air force in general and aircrew more specifically. No. 41 concerned temporary aid to universities and made eleven recommendations, the seventh of which proposed the creation of an independent committee or commission composed of “impartial financial experts” with “thorough knowledge of university affairs” to evaluate the financial needs of each educational institution.70 The Commission argued the Advisory Committee was not a suitable body to undertake this task because it consisted “mainly of a number of University heads each of whom is faced by his own problems and is not suited to deal with specific cases in specific institutions where it is essential to protect the interests both of the taxpayers and of the institution.”71

The Advisory Committee disagreed with the Commission and resolved that it was inadvisable to set up a separate organization independent of the DVA and unrelated to the

Advisory Committee. They suggested instead the creation of a board within the DVA to be composed of a full-time Chair and four part-time members appointed by the Minister of Veterans Affairs, two of whom would be nominated by the Advisory Committee from among its members who were university heads. On 13 November 1945, they formalized this recommendation in a resolution. The Committee would be mandated with investigating and reporting to the Minister of Veterans Affairs on the needs of

66-38-2, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 13 November 1945, 1. 70 Recommendations 1(iv), 3, 8, 10(i), 11(ii), and 11(iii) also requested and provided evidence in support of the creation of a special committee or commission. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66- 38-2, Part 1, Commission on Veterans’ Qualifications, “Interim Recommendation No. 41 Temporary Aid to Universities,” [c. 1945], 1-7. 71 Ibid., 4. 326 universities and colleges in respect to accommodation, equipment, and other matters in connection with veteran education and be empowered to review and recommend financial and other assistance required from the Dominion Government.72

The Minister of Veterans Affairs brought the recommendations before the Privy

Council on 27 November 1945. On 4 December 1945, Order-in-Council P.C. 7129 created the Committee on University Requirements and on 15 December 1945, Order-in-

Council P.C. 430/7354 appointed Robert England as fulltime Chair.73 Since the outbreak of the war, England had gained vital experience on matters concerning rehabilitation. He served a brief stint as Director of Educational Services for the Canadian Legion before being appointed the Executive Secretary of the General Advisory Committee on

Demobilization and Rehabilitation (GACDR) in 1940. He was then special assistant in the Department of National War Services and special executive assistant in the DVA from 1944 to 1945.74 R.B. Bryce of the Department of Finance and L.J. Mills of the DVA were appointed to the Committee on 26 December 1945, and Cornellier and Wallace on nomination of the university members of the Advisory Committee. The Committee nominated Jamieson as Secretary and Mills as analyst of university financial statements.

By letter to the universities on 26 January 1946, England requested financial estimates for

72 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 13 November 1945, 6. 73 See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 7129, 4 December 1945, 1; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, (2), “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” [c. 1946], 1. 74 England was one of the architects of the Veterans Charter and wrote the very influential book Discharged. See Robert England, Discharged: A Commentary on Civil Re-establishment of Veterans in Canada (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1943). 327 the years 1945-1946 and 1946-1947. He also immediately visited eighteen institutions in order to ascertain the required assistance.75

This research resulted in the release of the “Interim Report of the Committee on

University Requirements.” It argued that in light of the “wide variation in costs and fee scales, the differences in sources of other income, and also by the wide variety of needs” in terms of accommodation, a fixed per capita supplementary grant only accentuated

“existing wide differentials in respect of costs and income in the institutions concerned.”

The report noted the supplementary grant was made before “any experience had been gained as to the individual requirements of universities” but that the “differences in the situation now are so great as to require a change in the basis on which grants are determined.” Thus, the Committee on University Requirements recommended that grants should be based on the “individual requirements of universities with a view to meeting costs of training of veterans.” The report recommended two regulations which should

“constitute the main provisions governing further financial aid” through supplementary grants: (1) the supplementary grant should not exceed $150 per veteran per year; and (2) the grant should be determined from “a basis of claim” called pro forma “B” certified by the university head and accompanied by a certified audited statement showing expenditure and revenue at the end of term. Expenditures included administration, tuition, equipment, operating and maintenance costs, and “other current expenditure.” Revenues included investments, provincial grants, and “other revenue and sundry grants.” The expenditure for room and board for veterans was to be excluded from the basis of claim

75 England also met with six university representatives in Ottawa: Maheux, Université Laval; Georges Baril, Université de Montréal; Patterson, Acadia University; Hesler, Mount Allison University; Norris, Sir George Williams College; and Tory, Carleton College. See P.C. 7129, 1; and “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” 1-3. 328 as was the revenue and expenditure of the university from “grants or trust funds designated … for scholarships, research, prizes, and such like purposes, for specific persons or objects, and not for the general purposes of the university.” In sum, the report recommended the grant per veteran per academic year be based on the amount corresponding to the difference between the total revenue and the total expenditure on behalf of all student veterans divided by the total number of veterans enrolled in the respective institution.76

Additional federal funding was justified, argued the report, for two reasons: first, the Dominion Government was “directly involved” in veteran re-establishment; and second, because veterans constituted a large proportion of science and professional students, the Dominion Government had “a further direct interest in their entry into its corps of technical and professional workers, so much needed on account of internal economy and external defence.” The Committee concluded the DVA should “intervene” to help universities “in every way possible” to guarantee the availability of laboratory and clinical facilities, “otherwise, the rehabilitation of these veterans will be jeopardized and the scientific progress of the Dominion will suffer irreparable damage.” It recommended, therefore, that the Crown Assets Allocation Committee be asked to assign to the DVA for the use of universities the “top priority for purchase of chemical, scientific and engineering materials, instruments and equipment declared surplus, and clinical, medical, surgical and dental materials, instruments and equipment declared surplus, provided all such materials, instruments and equipment are of a character to be useful in scientific, engineering, medical and dental laboratories or clinics in the instruction of students.” The

DVA, they further recommended, should become the intermediary for the universities to

76 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” 7-9. 329 purchase materials, equipment, and instruments as described above from the War Assets

Corporation.77

On 28 May 1946 at its twenty-second meeting in Toronto, the NCCU endorsed the recommendations of the Committee on University Requirements. Their implementation, the NCCU argued, would ensure universities could continue to accommodate and train veterans. One resolution called on the government to immediately take action in order that universities may know the “general extent and nature of the financial assistance they may expect to receive in 1947, 1948, and 1949 from the

Government of Canada.” In the coming months universities, they contended, would be confronted with another large influx of student veterans and it was essential they know what funding would be provided so they could make the “necessary plans and commitments” in the hiring of staff and securing of accommodations and equipment.

“None of these recommendations if accepted and made effective,” read the resolution,

“need occasion any greater expense or obligation than the Government is now meeting and accepting. It will mean, however, intelligent and effective action can be taken in place of the hasty ‘ad hoc’ measures that are now necessary.” While the NCCU reaffirmed its appreciation of the policies authorizing veteran training, it threatened that without this financial guarantee, university training for veterans would “fall short” of its intended purpose. “In this event the responsibility for this failure will in large measure be that of the Government,” the resolution concluded, “and the people of Canada will no doubt be made aware of this fact by these student veterans themselves.”78

77 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” 5; and P.C. 7129, 1. 78 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Resolution Adopted at Toronto, May 28th, 1946,” n.d., 1-3. 330

The language of the resolution was provocative but university heads were desperate to plan for the coming academic year. “[T]he universities have done everything in their power to cope successfully” with the influx of veterans, argued the NCCU.79 The

Committee on University Requirements agreed. The grant, they argued, “encouraged the universities to act vigorously and mitigated much of the uncertainty resulting from the unprecedented enrolment.”80

The debate over the continuation of the supplementary grants continued until the passing of Order-in-Council P.C. 4060 on 1 October 1946. This legislation repealed P.C.

215/4940 and reissued supplementary grants retroactively for the period 1 July 1946 to

30 June 1947 under the guidelines outlined by the Committee on University

Requirements. Each year a new Order-in-Council was enacted revoking and replacing the last year’s supplementary grant legislation until the program’s end.81

The debates over supplementary grants reveal the dedication of universities to the program and the efforts of university officials through the NCCU, the Advisory

Committee, and the Committee on University Requirements to collaborate with government officials to determine adequate financial support for the extensive efforts of their institutions. Like the DVA, universities were committed to offering training to veterans, but this was no easy task. An expansion of their facilities and resources necessitated additional financial support from the Dominion Government.

*****

79 “Resolution Adopted at Toronto, May 28th, 1946,” 1. 80 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” 7. 81 For example, Order-in-Council P.C. 1235 of 1 April 1947 revoked P.C. 4060 and established new regulations for the provision of the grants within the same period as the previous legislation. Order-in- Council P.C. 3799 of 23 September 1947 reissued regulations for the period of 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948 and Order-in-Council P.C. 1190 of 30 June 1950 for the 1950-1951 year. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001- 01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 4060, 1 April 1947; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, Order-in-Council P.C. 3799, 23 September 1947. 331

During the pre-discharge and post-discharge periods, in-service and ex-service counsellors assisted service personnel with planning their readjustment to civil life. In- service counsellors supplied rehabilitation information and assisted in planning civilian careers, while DVA counsellors of the Rehabilitation Counselling Service were responsible for evaluating and implementing these plans. If employment was the chosen path, National Selective Service oversaw reinstatement, but if the individual wanted to claim benefits under the PDRO, he or she would be assisted through the DVA

Rehabilitation Board.82

To qualify for university training benefits, veterans first had to receive admission to a regular university course.83 Each respective university had control over admission and assessed an applicant’s academic ability and granted acceptance based on the requirements of their institution. Upon acceptance into a course, veterans wishing to make application for benefits were asked to provide the following information to District

Rehabilitation Boards Veterans’ Welfare Officers: the date, location, and period of their service; reason for discharge; marital status; general fitness for the proposed training; educational background including the highest grade or year completed and if entering university for the first time, a reference from the former high school principal; pre- enlistment occupational experience; and a list of reasons for undertaking the proposed course. DVA counsellors explained the terms and conditions of university training, including that there was no provision for repeating a year’s work and that pass grades would not qualify for assistance beyond the period of entitlement. They also had to

82 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, A1968-0007, Volume 007, File 09, “Discharge Procedure,” 7 February 1945. 83 DVA medical officers also assessed each individual’s physical and psychological capabilities for their proposed rehabilitation plan before granting approval. 332 ensure the veteran had a plan for financing his or her education after training benefits expired, particularly in the case of individuals with a brief period of service. The veteran was then requested to sign a certificate attesting to his or her understanding of these conditions. After the Board prepared the application, it was submitted to and approved by the Head Office. The secretary notified the applicant and the university registrar of the approval. When the veteran commenced fulltime study, the university invoiced the Board for the cost of tuition and miscellaneous fees. To receive allowances, the veteran had to complete a set of forms at registration locations each fall.84

The government did not exert any direct control over the particular university course pursued by veterans or in any way assume authority over their distribution amongst the institutions concerned. The university “prescribes the conditions under which a student may be promoted,” explained Jamieson, while the DVA “prescribed the conditions under which allowances and fees are paid.”85 The administration of veteran training under the PDRO and later the VRA was organized regionally, separated into districts responsible for informing and reporting on the activities of the universities and colleges in their designated area (see Appendix 20).86 Despite the agency granted to

84 If the veteran had dependents, he or she also had to complete Form W.D. 24 claiming for wife, children, or parent. If a veteran claimed a parent as a dependent for the first time, he or she would have to complete Form 185-3. If a veteran switched from single to married status, he or she also had to complete Form 185-A and provide the signature of the spouse and marriage certificate. Veterans with no further entitlement were requested to complete registration forms to enable the DVA to follow their progress through university. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 1, “Observations on the Representations of the National Conference of Student Veterans Held in Montreal in December, 1946,” n.d., 2; LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, H.W. Jamieson to District Rehabilitation Boards Veterans’ Welfare Officers, 16 August 1943; and Hounsom, “Department of Veterans’ Affairs Information Bulletin for Undergraduate Veteran Students who are now Completing the 1948-49 Academic Session in University,” 1-2. 85 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, 66-20-2, Part 1, H.W. Jamieson to A.F. Malone, 22 July 1946. 86 By 1946, there were nineteen districts: Charlottetown, Halifax, St. John, Quebec, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, London, North Bay, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton, Calgary, 333 them, university officials were encouraged to do all that they could to enable veteran success. Jamieson explained to London District Supervisor A.F. Malone that each university was “a law unto itself” and a veteran should not undertake university studies unless they were “likely to be successful in graduating.” He hoped, nonetheless, that district officials would be effective in “persuading the University to give a promising student veteran an opportunity of removing conditions” impeding his or her progress. “In every instance” administrations and faculty were to be directed to take “the most liberal view of the veteran’s case.”87 By the same token, universities were advised that they should not deny enrolment to any qualified veterans in any faculty or course, provided that instructional facilities were “reasonably adequate.”88

The NCCU willingly collaborated to encourage a policy of flexibility. At a meeting of the NCCU Committee on Post-War Problems held in Kingston from January

3-5, 1944, Vice-Principal Walter E. McNeill of Queen’s University presented the report of the sub-committee appointed to draft a special War Matriculation Programme for discharged persons wishing to qualify for admission to English-speaking universities and normal schools. “Returned men and women,” the report read, “are entitled to whatever concessions are regularly made to ‘mature students’, and their experience, when relevant, should be taken into account.” “Since returned men, as a rule,” the report continued, “will not be willing to go back to school, and since they cannot be expected to comply with the minutiae of existing regulations, Universities and Normal Schools should make their

Vancouver, London, England; and the “FR” District. Note that the Montreal District was not included in the Quebec District. 87 H.W. Jamieson to A.F. Malone, 22 July 1946. 88 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 25 February 1946, 5. 334 admission as simple and as flexible as possible.”89 The Committee agreed each university would admit ex-service personnel at three times throughout the calendar year (instead of waiting for the start of the September session) in order to allow for veterans to use their educational benefits within the timeframe stipulated by the PDRO.90 The report also outlined the qualifying studies suggested. Candidates with full matriculation were to be given preference over those with partial matriculation, but “intellectual quality and ability to proceed with the course selected” were to be the main considerations.91 The report suggested and the Committee agreed that the Educational Officers of the navy, army, and air force should examine service personnel in order to recommend the granting of certificates of standing to students.92

At the same meeting, the NCCU adopted an important resolution concerning academic allowances for returned personnel:

Whereas the Federal Committee on Rehabilitation expressed the hope that the financial provisions contained in P.C. 7633 would enable the universities to maintain their academic standards in dealing with returned men and women, and whereas the experience of conditions following the last war shows that it is not in the best interests of discharged men to grant them academic credit for military service; Therefore, the Committee recommends to the Conference that departures from normal undergraduate requirements be granted only in exceptional cases, such as the wiping out of old conditions, or the granting of standing for examinations missed because of enlistment, and the giving of credit for such courses taken on active service as might be considered equivalent to undergraduate courses.93

89 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-3, NCCU, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on Post-War Problems,” 21 January 1944, Appendix C. 90 Universities returned to their normal peacetime practice of admitting students only at the opening of the university year for the fall 1947 session. See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, "Department of Labour, University Advisory Board, Minutes," 27 November 1944, 5; and LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 266, 31 January 1947, 1. 91 NCCU, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on Post-War Problems,” Appendix C. 92 Ibid., 4. 93 Ibid., 4-5. 335

In discussing accelerated courses, Principal Wallace of Queen’s stated that while it might be possible to introduce a three-term session in the Faculty of Arts, the Faculties of

Medicine and Applied Science and Engineering were opposed to accelerated courses as a

“general practice” after the war. NCCU President Norman MacKenzie argued accelerated courses were “not altogether desirable, as maturity cannot be hastened.” Despite these protests, however, the Committee “agreed to the principle that the universities should be prepared, within the limits of their resources, to provide accelerated courses for returned men and women, if such should be asked for.” Veterans, they argued, would be eager to quickly enter and finish their course of study.94

*****

Government and university officials recognized early on the important role counselling would play in veteran education. The policy of the DVA was to work towards disseminating the “fullest and most accurate information possible” to service personnel and Jamieson attested university instructional staff could be of great assistance in this measure since all prospective students would need to approach the university to discuss details relevant to their prospective studies anyways.95 University officials unanimously agreed. At the meeting of the NCCU in June 1944, members discussed the condition of the veteran. They predicted it would be difficult for the more mature returned students to be acclimatized amongst the young, “frivolous” student body.96

Members argued there would be difficulties associated with providing education to young men and women with varying lengths and types of service, many of whom had “walked

94 NCCU, “Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on Post-War Problems,” 4-5. 95 This included information on entrance qualifications and dates of enrolment. See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, "Department of Labour, University Advisory Board, Minutes," 27 November 1944, 6. 96 “Post-war Plans Are Discussed At Kingston,” McGill Daily XXXIII, no. 56 (13 January 1944), 1. 336 with death and danger as their daily companions and assumed the carried responsibilities of leadership and command.” It took no “educational expert,” one official argued, “to realize that no stereotyped or standardized program can be devised to deal with this group.” “It will often be difficult to determine precisely where a returned man will fit into our somewhat rigid system to his own greatest advantage,” the NCCU reported.

“Each man will, to a considerable extent, be a separate problem needing an individual solution, and universities will without doubt establish suitable procedures for sympathetic diagnosis and careful prescription.” Two prominent members proposed each institution develop counselling resources and advisory services to help guide veterans towards the

“regular courses that will suit him best.”97 These would vary according to the size of the institution, course offerings, and veteran enrollment, but it would be necessary at the very least to establish a panel of members of the staff, each tasked with discussing a particular branch of university training to prospective students.98 At their 27 November 1944 meeting, the University Advisory Board advised universities supplement existing arrangements at once with “some definite machinery for counseling and discussion.” The

Board reiterated the NCCU suggestion that one member of each university staff be tasked with receiving prospective students and given a panel composed of other members of the staff each charged with officially discussing with ex-service personnel a particular branch of university training.99

The pressure for counselling and advisory services mounted in response to reports circulated in the fall of 1945 that many veterans were having difficulty adjusting to their

97 NCCU, Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems, 22. 98 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-3, "Department of Labour, University Advisory Board, Minutes," 27 November 1944, 5. 99 Ibid., 6. 337 courses. The DVA attributed this to a lack of counselling at the time of discharge. They pointed to an early service policy that granted discharge to service personnel who presented a certificate of admission to a university or college. These individuals entered their course without advisement from DVA rehabilitation officers. Thus, Jamieson argued academic difficulties had less to do with a veteran’s ability and more to do with poor course placement. He mandated that if during a veteran’s first term of the first year of university training it became clear “to the veteran, the university authorities and the

Supervisor of Training” that the individual’s “interest” would best be served by a transfer, “without appreciable loss of time or additional cost, to a more appropriate course in which he is likely to succeed,” then such a transfer would be permitted. These transfers could only be made, however, with the agreement of the Supervisor of Training.100 If deemed unlikely to succeed, vocational training or employment was recommended.

The DVA urged universities to offer counselling services and ultimately this was agreed upon as a condition of the supplementary grants.101 The Advisory Committee encouraged institutions to provide and extend these services as quickly as possible. Most institutions established advisory bureaus in addition to offering counselling services in order to address the wide variety of concerns of student veterans. The mandate of the

Bureau of the University of Toronto, for example, stipulated that its primary function would be to provide “assistance” in the “processes of self-discovery, self-assessment, self-mastery and self-fulfillment.” The Bureau was to strive to be a “neutral zone,”

University of Toronto President Henry John Cody argued, where the student veteran may

100 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, H.W. Jamieson, “Adjustment of University Courses in Special Cases at the End of the First Term of First-Year Work,” 18 January 1946. 101 University counselling services offered a variety of assistance, including educational and vocational guidance; help with personal adjustment; advice on study habits; interpretation of policy and other relevant materials; and referrals for medical, psychiatric, or legal aid. 338 discuss “in freedom and in confidence any personal matter of importance to his successful development as a student, as a worker, as a citizen and as a fully effective person.”102 Universities reported counselling services were in high demand and of great value to student veterans.103 These bureaus also became vital conduits for the distribution of pertinent information including changes to regulations and legislation.104

*****

Veteran education was a tremendous undertaking. In 1940, 26,710 undergraduate students were enrolled in Canadian universities; by 1950 this had increased to 50,170.105

Between 1942 and 1953, Canadian universities educated over 54,554 ex-service personnel (see Figure 14).106 Initial enrolment of veterans was small, with only 24 attending university in December 1942, 73 in December 1943, and 554 in the following

102 University of Toronto President’s Report, for the year ending June 1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1948), 78. 103 While counselling services were popular, university counsellors and advisers reported student veterans were reluctant to see psychiatrists. At the University Advisory Services Conference held in Quebec City from June 17th to 21st, 1947, T.E. Dancey, the Advisor in Psychiatry to the DVA, speculated this was because of the “popular association of psychiatry with insanity” and also the “unfortunate experience” of some veterans with army psychiatrists. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, “Discussion following paper on Student Adjustment by Dr. T.E. Dancey,” n.d. 104 For example, see Hounsom, “Department of Veterans’ Affairs Information Bulletin for Undergraduate Veteran Students who are now Completing the 1948-49 Academic Session in University,” 1-3. 105 Statistics Canada, Table W340-438a, “Full-time university enrolment, by sex, Canada and Newfoundland, selected years, 1920 to 1975.” 106 Measuring enrolment of veterans under the university training program is difficult because there was a constant change in the number of trainees receiving benefits under the PDRO and later the VRA. Often, the DVA used statistics from November of the academic year to refer to the entire year and the DVA had a tendency to round its figures off to the nearest hundred. The figures presented here have been referenced from reports of the DVA, Statistics Canada, the NCCU, the Advisory Committee, and the Committee on University Requirement and cross-referenced with statistics from university president and registrar reports. A number of sources support the lower number. Woods, for example, reported that 55,000 veterans took advantage of the program. There is one source that provided estimates of veteran enrollment far above any other source. This report, entitled “Preliminary Figures on University Enrolments, Autumn 1948,” can be found in the DVA archives but there is no author or source given for the statistics. The statistics indicate 69,692 veterans were enrolled in Canadian universities for the 1946-1947 academic year; however, there are no other statistics to substantiate a number of this size. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 286 [c. 1947-1948], 2; LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 2, H.W. Jamieson, “Summary of the Training Programme,” 27 December 1948; Woods, Rehabilitation, 75; and LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Part 1, “Preliminary Figures on University Enrolments, Autumn 1948,” n.d., 3. 339 year, but in 1945 the numbers swelled to over 20,000 (see Figures 15 and 16). The first surge in enrolment came in the summer of 1944 as a result of a surplus in the supply of trained aircrew. The RCAF arranged for the temporary discharge of trained aircrew wishing to undertake university training under the PDRO with the stipulation that the men would be recalled if their services were required. By January 1945, over 2,000 discharged aircrew were enrolled in special accelerated courses.107 At UBC, for example, the accelerated course for the forty-five airmen enrolled by January 1945 gave them one year’s credit for three courses lasting from January to April and another two courses undertaken during either May and June or July and August.108 222 airmen entered arts, science, and commerce courses under the program at McGill University.109 The

University of Saskatchewan held a special session from May to June in 1945 for airmen and discharged service personnel. With attendance in the normal January session and the ordinary summer session, these students were in a position to complete the “required studies” for the entire academic year.110

By its peak in 1946-1947, enrolment at some institutions more than tripled that of the pre-war years and veterans outnumbered civilian students on most campuses (see

Figures 17, 18, and 19). In December 1946, 36,000 student veterans were enrolled under the VRA with 7,000 undertaking pre-university training, 18,000 in their first, 13,000 in their second, and 14,000 in their third and fourth years, and 2,000 in graduate studies.111

107 Woods, Rehabilitation, 89. 108 “45 Register For Shortened Varsity Course,” The Ubyssey, 4 January 1945, 1. 109 Annual Report for the Year 1944-1945 (Montreal: McGill University, 1945), 11. 110 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1944-45 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1945), 9. 111 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-2-2, "Distribution of Student Veterans Under Sections 8 & 9 of the V.R.A. for all or part of the 1951-52 Academic Year,” 1 March 1952; LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 1, "Report of National Conference of Student Veterans 340

In February 1947, Mackenzie announced 44,685 veterans had received university and pre-university assistance.112 This surge coincided with the rate of discharge. By the spring of 1946, more than 90 percent of Canada’s service personnel had been discharged and the

DVA organizational staff required for administrative purposes had swelled to approximately 16,000.113

Veteran education became synonymous with the overcrowding and growth of

Canada’s universities. Take, for example, the situation at the University of British

Columbia (see Figure 20). The university was built to accommodate a maximum of 2,500 students. To make room for the over 7,000 students enrolled in 1945-1946, the administration purchased 112 wood huts from army training camps, coastal defensive stations, and aerodromes. The huts littered the campus and were used for every conceivable purpose connected with the activities of the institution: lecture rooms, laboratories, staff offices, reading rooms, clinics, the newly-established law faculty, a library, book store, snack bars, and living quarters. President Norman A.M. MacKenzie insisted by “hook or by crook we’ll make it possible for every ex-service man and woman to come to the university if he seriously wants higher education.”114

Veteran enrolment was concentrated at seven institutions: the University of

Toronto, McGill University, the University of British Columbia, Queen’s University, the

University of Manitoba, the University of Saskatchewan, and the University of

McGill University, Montreal, December 27-29, 1946,” n.d; Woods, Rehabilitation, 78; and LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 256 [c. November 1946], 1. 112 A DVA press release from 3 January 1947 reported approximately 40,000 veterans were pursuing higher education under the rehabilitation program and that the previous year, 20,882 were attending Canadian universities or qualifying for them. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 269 [c. February 1947], 1; and LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 259, 3 January 1947, 1. 113 DVA News Release No. 237, 1. 114 “Varsity Goes Boom-Town As 3500,” The Graduate Chronicle 8, no. 1 (March 1946): 14; and Harold W. Helm, “The University’s New Classes,” The Graduate Chronicle 8, no. 2 (July-August 1945): 22. 341

Alberta.115 In 1946-1947, these institutions contained seventy-five percent of all veteran enrolment. Five institutions reported veteran populations of 500-1,000 students:

Dalhousie University, the University of New Brunswick, Osgoode Hall, the University of

Western Ontario, and the Ontario Agricultural College/Ontario Veterinary College.

Smaller populations (100-500 students) were recorded at Acadia University, St. Francis

Xavier University, Mount Allison University, Université Laval, Sir George Williams

College, Université de Montréal, Carleton College, the Ontario College of Optometry, the

Ontario College of Art, McMaster University, Assumption College, Victoria College, and the Ontario College of Pharmacy. The very smallest numbers (under 100 students) were recorded at the Prince of Wales College, St. Dunstan’s University, Nova Scotia

Agricultural College, Nova Scotia Technical College, Ste. Anne’s College, Ste. Mary’s

College, St. Joseph’s College, St. Thomas College, Sacred Heart College, the University of Bishop’s College, Loyola College, St. Patrick’s College, the University of Ottawa,

Waterloo College, and Mount Royal College. In 1946-1947, 12 percent of veterans were enrolled in universities with veteran populations of 500-1,000; 11 percent in institutions with 100-500; and 2 percent in universities with less than 100.116

By far the Toronto District educated the largest number of veterans. In 1946, the

Advisory Committee reported nearly one-quarter of all student veterans were enrolled at the University of Toronto.117 By 31 March 1947, the district had provided undergraduate

115 In a sample of between 5,000 and 6,000 veterans taken in July 1945 by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, more were living in British Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, and Nova Scotia than had enlisted from those provinces. Prince Edward Island’s veteran population was the same as its enlistment figures, while the remaining provinces showed a decrease of veterans as compared to enlistments. British Columbia showed an increase of more than 16 percent in veterans as compared to enlistments from that province. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 255, 21 November 1946, 1. 116 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Distribution of Student Veterans in Canadian Universities,” n.d. 117 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” Appendix II. 342 and graduate education for 12,128.118 In comparison, by this same date the Vancouver

District had educated 4,459 veterans, Montreal 3,772, Winnipeg 2,705, and Halifax

1,799. Toronto and Montreal provided pre-university education to the largest number at

6,342 and 2,064 respectively (see Figure 19).119

In November 1948, 23,941 veterans were undertaking university training in

Canada: 2,100 in first year, 5,275 in second, 8,146 in third, 6,529 in fourth and subsequent years, and 1,891 in postgraduate studies.120 Veteran enrolment began to quickly decline following the 1948-1949 academic year, decreasing from 23,941 to 6,969 in 1950-1951, 2,813 in 1951-1952, 1,236 in 1952-1953, and 580 in 1953-1954.121

Undergraduate enrolment first began to decrease in the Prairie Provinces. Manitoba decreased by 10 percent and Saskatchewan by 13 percent from 1946-1947 to 1948-1949.

A few institutions saw their enrolment increase as the program progressed. Between 1947 and 1949, enrolment increased at Carleton College by 35 percent, St. Dunstan’s

University by 29 percent, St. Mary’s College by 19 percent, Trinity College by 18 percent, the University of Western Ontario by 17 percent, the University of Ottawa by 17 percent, and Université Laval by 12 percent.122 The peak year in graduation was 1949

(approximately 7,000).123 The proportion of veteran to non-veteran students decreased

118 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 2, “Comparative Figures in University Training Sections 8 and 9, V.R.A. to 31 March ’47,” n.d., 1. 119 “Comparative Figures in University Training Sections 8 and 9, V.R.A. to 31 March ’47,” 1. 120 H.W. Jamieson, “Summary of the Training Programme.” 121 Jamieson reported different enrolment figures: 7,900 students (1,300 postgraduates and 6,600 undergraduates) in February 1951 and 3,341 in March 1952. See E.J. Rider to R.D. Mitchener, 19 January 1954; and Jamieson, “Training Programme for Veterans Superintendent’s Annual Report,” 21 March 1952, 1. 122 Trinity College and the University of Western Ontario showed no appreciable change from 1948 to 1949. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Part 1, “Preliminary Figures on University Enrolments, Autumn 1948,” n.d. 123 LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 20 November 1948, Appendix A, 4. 343 from 21 percent in 1949-1950, to 11 percent in 1950-1951, and to 7 percent in 1951-

1952.124

The original university training legislation required all training grants and benefits be payable only with respect to a Canadian university. Order-in-Council P.C. 775 of 8

February 1944, however, approved the payments of grants “where in the opinion of the

Department training elsewhere than in Canada is deemed advisable” (Emphasis in

Original).125 The interpretation of the amendment under Confidential Letter No. 80 stipulated training outside of the country would be advised under three exceptional circumstances: (1) the resumption of undergraduate or postgraduate training for Canadian citizens who were attending universities outside of the nation at the time of their enlistment; (2) the resumption of undergraduate or postgraduate courses for citizens of other countries whose training was interrupted by enlistment in the Canadian Forces; or

(3) the commencement of postgraduate training where suitable facilities were unavailable in Canada and where such training was deemed “in the public interest.”126

124 Jamieson, “Training Programme for Veterans Superintendent’s Annual Report,” 21 March 1952, 1. 125 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, “Policy Governing Post-Discharge Training Outside of Canada,” [c. 1945], 1-2. 126 A sub-committee of the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans was appointed to act as a board of review for special applications. Tory, Cornellier, Robbins, and W.A. Mackintosh were appointed to the board. In August 1945, Confidential Letter No. 127 further amended the categories under which training outside of Canada would be deemed advisable. For residents of Canada, it identified four categories: (1) the resumption of undergraduate or postgraduate training in a university where training was interrupted by enlistment; (2) the commencement of university or vocational training that would enable the trainee to earn a living in Canada if it was established that no facilities for such training existed in Canada; (3) the completion of an approved university or vocational course begun in Canada where the full training required for establishment in the respective occupation was unavailable in Canada; and (4) the commencement of university or vocational training by a seriously disabled veteran whose rehabilitation required training outside of Canada. The amendment also provided benefits for residents of other countries if they resided and made use of their benefits within Canada or were Canadian citizens discharged in Britain and intending to take up permanent residence in the United Kingdom. The DVA reviewed any other exceptional cases. See “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 18 June 1945, 3; and LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, DVA, Confidential Letter No. 127, 24 August 1945, 1-2. 344

Enrolment in universities in the United States and overseas was comparatively small. In the fall of 1946, 800 Canadian veterans were studying in the United States and another 200 in Great Britain.127 Of the 883 veterans studying in the United States on 15

February 1947, a little over half (448) were enrolled in postgraduate studies and the majority were concentrated in arts, engineering, and medical faculties (see Figures 21 and

22).128 By 8 February 1950, 1,892 Canadian veterans had been trained along specialized lines in the United States.129 Later reports recorded 670 veterans enrolled in programs outside of Canada for the 1950-1951 year, 266 in 1951-1952, 98 in 1952-1953, and 39 in

1953-1954.130

The majority of student veterans receiving training benefits in the fall of 1945 had an average period of service of 32 months. This increased to 41 months in January

1946.131 Approximately 16,000 of the 25,000 veterans who entered pre-matriculation classes proceeded to university education.132 The majority of veterans who received university training benefits were single men. An analysis of 9,119 student veterans on 30

November 1945 reported 75 percent (6,811) of single veterans were in receipt of allowances. As training continued, the proportion of married to single veterans increased as veterans matured and settled back into civil life. Between spring examinations and the beginning of the fall term in 1947, for example, more than 1,200 veterans changed their

127 In November 1947, 1,112 Canadians were studying under the VRA outside of Canada. See DVA News Release No. 256, 1; and “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 19 November 1947, Appendix A. 128 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix B, Appendix C. 129 LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release 334, 8 February 1950, 1. 130 E.J. Rider to R.D. Mitchener, 19 January 1954. 131 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 25 February 1946, Appendix I. 132 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Part 1, H.W. Jamieson to J.S. Thomson, 4 February 1949. 345 marital status from single to married. In November 1947, the Advisory Committee reported approximately 50 percent of university veterans were married.133

Woods reported approximately 2,600 female veterans took university training or 5 percent of the total number of veterans trained.134 DVA officials were particularly intent on reporting the progress of ex-service women. Mackenzie regularly commented on their

“remarkably fine” rehabilitation progress, drawing attention to the variety of occupations they were training to enter. On 16 October 1946, Mackenzie reported that of the women taking university or professional training, 713 were enrolled in arts and science, 204 in undergraduate training as nurses, 75 in public health nursing, 54 in household science and home economics, 33 in occupational therapy, and 39 in normal schools. Varying numbers were training in medicine, engineering, law, commerce and finance, industrial relations, pharmacy, music, art, agriculture, and other professional and semi-professional fields.135

National statistics for 1946 revealed that the majority of female student veterans were very similar to their male counterparts: 63 percent enrolled in arts and science.136 These trends varied slightly by institution. At Queen’s University in 1947-1948, 511 of the female veterans were enrolled in arts, 8 in arts and physical and health education, 2 in applied science, 18 in medicine, and 27 in nursing.137 At McGill University, of the 208 female veterans enrolled in a degree course in March 1947, 70 were enrolled in arts, 32 in

133 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 25 February 1946, Appendix I. 134 More than 25 percent of female veterans opted for training benefits, a higher ratio than that of male veterans. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 255-256. 135 LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 247, 16 October 1946, 1. 136 LAC, MG31-K13, Volume 1, File 1, “Report on University Training for Ex-Service Women,” April 1946, cited in Brown, 266. 137 Of the 502 female veterans enrolled at Queen’s University in 1948-1949, 425 were enrolled in arts, 21 in arts and physical and health education, 3 in applied science, 23 in medicine, and 30 in nursing. See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-02-2, R.A. Berry to all District Administrators, 20 October 1948. 346 nursing, 31 in science, 16 in physical education, 15 in social work, and 13 in graduate studies.138 Of the 106 enrolled in a diploma course, 60 were enrolled in graduate nursing and another 25 in physiotherapy.139 At the University of New Brunswick in 1946, 34 percent enrolled in home economics and arts, 33 percent in nursing science, 15 percent in social work, 6 percent in physical education, and 4 percent in science.140

According to G.M. Weir, the Acting Director of Training for the DPNH, veterans and service personnel were enthusiastic about the education plan from its early stages.

His 1943 report, “A Survey of Rehabilitation,” contained detailed information about the opinions of 50,000 Canadians, including 18,700 members of the RCAF, 10,000 members of the army, 4,000 of the navy, and 3,750 women in the services.141 Given the interest in the scheme, Weir accurately predicted 50,000 veterans might enter universities through government grants. The sampling revealed men in the air force were most interested in courses in business administration, followed by engineering, arts, education, medicine, agriculture, dentistry, law, and pharmacy. Those in the navy showed interest in pursuing courses in business, followed by engineering, law, medicine, teaching, arts, dentistry,

138 An additional 9 female students were enrolled in library school, 8 in commerce, 6 in household science, 3 in medicine, 3 in law, 1 in music, and 1 in engineering. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 272, File 66-34-10, “Registration Figures,” 21 March 1947. 139 Ibid. 140 LAC, MG31-K13, Volume 1, File 1, “Report on University Training for Ex-Service Women,” April 1946, cited in Brown, 266. For more on female veteran rehabilitation, see Shaun Brown, “Re-establishment and Rehabilitation,” Chapter VI: Women Veterans and Re-establishment, 1941-1946; Shaun Brown and Peter Neary, “The Veterans Charter and Canadian Women Veterans of World War II,” British Journal of Canadian Studies 9, no. 2 (1994): 249-277; J.L. Granatstein and Peter Neary, eds., The Good Fight: Canadians and World War II (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1995), 387-415. 141 In formulating their rehabilitation plans, the DPNH and DVA also developed statistics on the reinstatement prospects of service personnel. These statistics were useful for officials in determining the number of service personnel likely to take advantage of training benefits following discharge. In a 1942 survey of 347,900 members of the armed services, age, marital status, level of education, and employment status at time of enlistment were all used to determine reinstatement prospects. Based on this survey, the DVA concluded that of the 700,000 men currently in the armed services in 1943, approximately 23,000 would wish to complete their unfinished university education and another 9,000 had junior or senior matriculation standing and would likely proceed to university. This estimate of 32,000 prospective student veterans became widely used by university and DVA officials in formulating their plans. LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, “Summary of Occupational History Forms,” n.d. 347 pharmacy, and agriculture. Individuals serving in the army also placed business administration first, followed by engineering, arts, medicine, pure science, law, dentistry, journalism, pharmacy, medicine, library science, and meteorology. These choices reflected veteran desire to secure good employment.142

In November and December of 1944, the Research and Information Section of the

Adjutant-General Branch distributed a questionnaire to 12,000 men in the Canadian

Army, a 2.4 percent cross-section (see Appendix 21).143 The survey asked men to answer questions relevant to what they would “expect and hope to do after the war and what educational or vocational training you would like to take up both during the period before discharge and after your return to civil life.”144 The men were informed of rehabilitation legislation prior to completing the questionnaire. The results of the questionnaires were published and analyzed in the 1945 Special Report No. 180, “Rehabilitation 1945: A

Survey of Opinions in the Canadian Army.” The statistics pertaining to those interested in educational training found that 15 percent were considering a return to school or university, with 10.5 percent specifying university. The report concluded that a desire for further education was more common among personnel who had progressed further in their schooling than the average soldier (who had no more than a public school education). While 25-50 percent of those desiring university courses wanted to study engineering— regarded as “the most ‘practical’ degree course”—only half of this number

142 Department of Veterans Affairs, Charlottetown, Unpublished Report Call no. 3SS.114 W425 1943, G.M. Weir, “A Survey of Rehabilitation,” 340, 334-360; and Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems, 11. 143 The survey resulted from the desire of the DND, DVA, and the Department of Labour to gather information about the “post-armistice intentions” of army personnel in order to provide a “factual foundation for broad planning” within the three departments. See LAC, RG24, Volume 34170, File 4248-5, “Rehabilitation 1945: A Survey of Opinions in the Canadian Army,” 1945, 2. 144 Ibid. 348 possessed the necessary admission standing.145 The report predicted engineering courses would attract between 25-50 percent of those interested and 12-25 percent would enter arts courses. It also argued medicine and commerce would be less popular than engineering and arts.146

In 1945, the RCAF prepared a brief with similar suggestions respecting the rehabilitation of their personnel. From their personnel counselling reports they concluded that approximately 25 percent of the air force intended to pursue university training.147

The report estimated 7,500-8,000 members of the aircrew would desire university training and of these 40 percent would likely enter engineering, 10 percent commercial courses, 10 percent accounting, 5 percent agriculture, 6 percent medicine, and 3 percent each for law, forestry, education, and dentistry.148

These early-identified preferences were closely monitored by the DVA and reflected in ensuing enrolments. Arts, engineering, and medicine were by far the most popular courses amongst student veterans. In 1945-1946, veterans disproportionately entered science, engineering, and professional courses. Of those veterans attending universities and colleges in the Halifax District, 25.49 percent were enrolled in pre- engineering or engineering, 14.12 percent in pre-medicine or medicine, and 11.57 percent in arts.149 In early 1946, the Committee on University Requirements estimated veterans

145 “Rehabilitation 1945: A Survey of Opinions in the Canadian Army,” 7, 35. 146 Similar surveys were conducted from August to October 1945 amongst officers and men awaiting discharge in depots. Their findings were considered consistent with the earlier report. See Ibid., 37-38. 147 30 percent indicated vocational training, 15 percent indicated use of the re-establishment credit, 6 percent full-time farming, 9 percent indicated small holding and other employment, and 15 percent were undecided. See LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, “Interim Recommendation No. 54 Rehabilitation of Aircrew,” [c. 1945], 1-2. 148 Ibid. 149 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 1, R.A. Baxter to H.W. Jamieson, 25 October 1946, 6, “B District University Preliminary Report as of 31 August 1946.” 349 would constitute nearly 80 percent of all science and professional students.150 31.61 percent of students wrote the 1946 spring arts exam at the University of Toronto and

21.72 percent wrote in engineering.151 Statistics were similar at other universities. For

1946-1947 at the University of Saskatchewan, 28.5 percent of veterans were enrolled in the Faculty of Engineering, 24.2 percent in arts and science, and 15.4 percent in commerce.152 Veterans at the institution represented 83.2% of all students enrolled in commerce, 78.95% in law, 73.5% in agriculture, 66.2% in pharmacy, and 63% in engineering.153 In March 1947 at McGill University, 23.23 percent of the 3,991 student veterans were enrolled in engineering, 21.07 percent in science, 16.79 percent in commerce, and 11.83 percent in arts.154

This interest in specific fields of study was a reflection of a desire on the part of veterans to secure good employment. Veterans were very practical in their choice of studies. They had heard much about how the post-war order would require a large number of highly trained personnel for work in engineering, science, medicine, and dentistry.

DVA and university officials regularly remarked on the interest of student veterans in medicine, dentistry, and engineering. Concentration in these fields placed larger burdens on universities because they required a higher ratio of instructors to

150 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” Appendix II. 151 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, 66-20-2, Part 1, "University of Toronto, Results of Examinations - Veterans training under the D.V.A. - Spring Exams, 1946," n.d., 1. 152 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-48, "University of Saskatchewan Student-Veteran Registration for the 1946-47 Session," n.d. 153 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1946-47 (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1947), 126. 154 These numbers were 25.13 percent, 22.80 percent, 18.16 percent, and 12.79% respectively if one takes into consideration student veterans enrolled in degree courses. The percentages were slightly lower than trends in total enrolment at McGill University: 18.09 percent of all students were enrolled in Engineering, 18.41 percent in Science, 10.37 percent in Commerce, and 15.35 percent in Arts. See “Registration Figures,” 21 March 1947. 350 students and the use of laboratories and specialized equipment. During the influx of veterans, heavy demand for entry to medicine and dentistry created a backlog of several hundred qualified students lasting until 1951.155 The Committee on University

Requirements recommended university administrations study why veterans were more interested in these courses and its impact. They argued it would create a “disadvantage” for the “needs of the teaching, legal, journalistic and theological professions, and the needs of commerce and social welfare work.”156

There were other noteworthy trends. Looking more closely at the registration figures by faculty at the University of Toronto, one sees that the percentage of veterans enrolled in the Faculty of Arts steadily declined (see Figures 23 and 24). In 1946-1947,

36.64 percent of veterans enrolled in arts; in 1949-1950 this dropped to 18.95 percent, in

1950-1951 to 14.17 percent, and in 1952-1953, the last date veteran enrolment figures are available, to 11.46 percent. By comparison, enrolment in applied science and engineering was more consistent, hovering between 30-40 percent until 1951-1952 when it dropped to a little under 20 percent. As veterans completed their undergraduate training, the number pursuing graduate studies increased. Between 1942 and 1948, the percentage taking graduate studies remained under 5 percent but in the 1949-1950 academic year enrolment increased to 10.10 percent and remained at this level until the end of the veteran education program. The percentage of veterans enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine

155 This problem was largely addressed by 1950. That year, only 62 candidates who had qualified for entry to medical colleges and 12 who had qualified for dental schools were awaiting admission. See DVA News Release No. 334, 2. 156 “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” 2. 351 hovered around 4 percent until it quickly increased from 8.85 percent in 1949 to 26.67 percent in 1953, reflecting the backlog in enrolment.157

Woods viewed the program as especially “gratifying” because “nearly twice as many veterans as had been anticipated elected university training as the means of rehabilitation.”158 Why did so many ex-service personnel pursue higher education as part of their rehabilitation plan? There is evidence to suggest veterans and civilians viewed the benefits of higher education in a similar light. In a survey of veteran and civilian students at the University of British Columbia, for example, 25.3 percent of veterans and

22.3 percent of civilians identified a “better chance of a good job” as the most important benefit to be gained from their education, compared to 25 percent and 28.6 percent who identified an “improve[d] ability to think” and 18.3 percent and 20 percent who cited a

“better chance to be of service to one’s fellow man.”159

For Woods, the answer was simple. The level of basic education was

“considerably higher” amongst Canadians during the Second World War than it had been in the First.160 A higher degree of education, training, and technical skill was needed to efficiently prosecute this more modern war of “highly mechanized services.” The importance the war placed on academic and technical skills thus contributed to the desire among veterans for education upon discharge. Additionally, a large number of university

157 University of Toronto President’s Report, for the year ending 30th June, 1946 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1946), 128; UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors Fonds, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Fourth and Final Report on Registration for the Session 1947-1948,” 27 November 1947; UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors Fonds, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Second Report on Registration for the Session 1950-51,” 26 October 1950; and UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors Fonds, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Third and Final Report on Registration for the Session 1952-53,” 25 November 1952. 158 Woods, Rehabilitation, 74. 159 Herbert Orville Hayes, “A Comparative Study of Three Hundred Non-Veteran Students and Three Hundred Student Veterans in the Faculty of Arts at the University of British Columbia,” (M.A. Thesis, the University of British Columbia, 1949), 34. 160 Thirteen percent of First World War enlistees attended high school compared to 47 percent of those in the Second World War. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 74. 352 students interrupted their education or postponed post-graduate training to enlist. By

1941, the call for recruits with at least matriculation standing encouraged an even larger number of high school graduates—who would normally have proceeded to university—to enlist. Enrolment also reflected the veteran’s desire for betterment. The Great Depression had deprived many of the opportunity of higher education and a notable number were determined to take advantage of the training grants. In the words of Woods, veterans with less education “discovered in themselves, through their war experience, new ambitions and innate abilities which made them determined to set goals which they had not dreamed of in their earlier school days.”161

*****

How successful was the program? Following the spike in veteran enrolment in the fall of 1945, Mackenzie issued a statement extolling the “remarkable” progress of veterans in their studies: “The Canadian people may well be proud of the way their sons and brothers now out of uniform are buckling down to the task of re-fitting themselves for their peacetime contribution to their country.” Theirs, he argued, was a “remarkable record” indicative of veteran commitment to make “every use” of the “extensive” benefit program afforded to them. Large numbers, it was reported, were winning scholarships.

Canada’s ex-service personnel were as versatile in peace as they were in war, or

Mackenzie said: “The men who won this country’s battles in war are winning their own battles in peace.”162

Anecdotally, professors and heads of universities reported veterans were better students than civilians and approached their studies with maturity, seriousness, and intent

161 Woods, Rehabilitation, 75. 162 LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 143 [c. November 1945], 1. 353 towards “a definite goal.” Early reports upheld the veteran was working hard and displaying “superior quality, industry, and achievement.”163 In his statistical analysis of the progress of student veterans at his institution, Frank Leslie West, Director of the

School of Applied Science at Mount Allison University, testified there was no doubt veterans were “a conscientious, hard-working group, endeavouring to obtain as much as they can from the opportunity offered; and that no college teacher can ask for, or expect to find, a finer group of young men and women than these student veterans.”164

President Walter P. Thompson of the University of Saskatchewan argued there were several reasons for the veterans’ strong academic success: their maturity, experience,

“definiteness and suitability of … aims,” and a strong incentive to work due to family responsibilities, a desire to start making a living, and a recognition by many that without

DVA benefits they would have been unable to attend university.165 Thomson reported that all faculty members were in agreement: veterans applied themselves to their studies more seriously than civilians. “A professor whose class included veterans had no problems of discipline; the veterans were too serious about their work to permit any disturbance by their young civilian class mates,” he argued.166

Analysis of student veteran results for the 1946-1947 examinations revealed that of the 31,841 writing exams, 77 percent passed with no condition, 10 percent with one condition, and 15 percent failed. These percentages improved during the 1947-1948 session: of the 29,003 veterans writing examinations, 81 percent of veterans passed

163 C.L. Bennet, “What the Veteran Student is Teaching the Universities,” Dalhousie Review 27 (1947-48): 313-314. 164 LAC, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, F.L. West, “Academic Achievement of Veterans,” The University Services Conferences, June 1947, 1. 165 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1949-50, (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1950), 9. 166 Ibid. 354 without conditions, another 8 percent passed with only one condition, and 8 percent failed.167

The statistics by institution showed that rates of failure differed widely amongst universities and programs of study (see Figures 25 and 26). For the 1945-1946 terms,

10.12 percent of veterans failed at Dalhousie University, 9.29 percent at the University of

Toronto, 4.85 percent at Acadia University, and 3.05 percent at St. Francis Xavier

University.168 Results submitted to Jamieson for the spring examinations reported the percentage of outright failures as 10 percent at Manitoba, 10 percent at Queen’s, 3 percent at Alberta, and 3 percent at UNB.169 For the 1948-1949 year, failures were highest at McGill University, the University of British Columbia, Dalhousie University, and Queen’s University (11 percent, 10 percent, 10 percent, and 10 percent respectively) and lower at the Universities of Toronto, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta (7 percent, 7 percent, 6 percent, 3 percent respectively). At some institutions, the percentage of failures decreased in subsequent years, but at others it increased. For example, at the

University of Toronto it decreased from 9.29 percent in 1945-1946 to 7 percent in 1948-

1949 while at the University of Dalhousie it rose from 4.85 percent to 10 percent.170 The percentage of those passing outright and those passing with supplemental exams also varied greatly. The results of the 1946 spring examinations showed 80 percent of veterans passed outright and 17 percent passed with supplementals at the University of Alberta, while at the University of Manitoba 46 percent passed outright and 39 percent with

167 “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 20 November 1948, Appendix A, 5. 168 "University of Toronto, Results of Examinations - Veterans training under the D.V.A. - Spring Exams, 1946," 1-4; and R.A. Baxter to H.W. Jamieson, 25 October 1946, 7. 169 LAC, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 1, “Results of Examinations – University Training,” 11 July 1946. 170 R.A. Baxter to H.W. Jamieson, 25 October 1946, 7; and President's Report, 1945-1950 (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1950), 102-103. 355 supplementals.171 In 1950, only 8 percent of all student veterans were reported as having failed to pass their last promotional examinations, a lower failure rate than that of non- veteran students.172

There are some discernible patterns. The percent of failures were higher amongst students undertaking professional training (i.e. law and medicine). The results of the spring 1946 exams at the University of Toronto showed the largest percentage of failures

(41.67 percent) occurring in the School of Physiotherapy. Next was the School of

Institutional Management at 25.44 percent, followed by the School of Optometry at 17.48 percent, the Faculty of Law at 17.35 percent, and the Department of Physical and Health

Education at 16.05 percent. The rate of failure in engineering (12.18 percent) was also higher than the rate of failure amongst all student veterans (9.29 percent). The lowest percentages were found in the School of Graduate Studies (3.63 percent) and the Faculty of Arts (4.95 percent).173

Failures were blamed on a number of factors. Some officials believed smaller universities were better able to educate veterans because the strain on their resources was less and veterans were given more personalized learning. Others argued the divergences were the result of different standards of testing. Moreover, they pointed out entrance requirements differed by institution. McGill admitted discharged persons on the condition that they could meet the entrance requirements existing at the time of enlistment while

Francophone universities admitted solely on the basis of the classical college

171 For the same year, 50 percent passed outright and 17 percent passed with supplementals at Queen’s University, 77 percent and 11 percent at the University of New Brunswick, and 60 percent and 22 percent at Mount Allison University. See DVA News Release No. 334, 2. 172 DVA News Release No. 334, 2. 173 "University of Toronto, Results of Examinations - Veterans training under the D.V.A. - Spring Exams, 1946,” 1-4. 356 baccalaureate.174 In 1947, the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans argued that on the whole veterans were maintaining “the reputation established during the preceding academic years” but that it was not to be expected that veteran results would remain as strong. Veterans were “in competition with a more highly selected group of students than was the case in previous years. While the students and staff continue to devote their best efforts, the novelty and glamour is wearing off.”175 While established to offer assistance in career planning and postgraduate training, the Advisory Bureau at the

University of Toronto found that more often than not, veterans required advice in study habits.176

For their part, veterans identified a number of factors detrimental to their academic success: poor study habits and methods, an inability to concentrate, crowded classrooms, financial difficulties, poor living accommodations, a lack of textbooks, inadequate academic preparation, “uninteresting” courses, poor university instruction, meager library facilities, ill-health, homesickness, and too much time spent on entertainment and extra-curricular activities. 51 percent of veterans studying in arts at the

University of British Columbia in 1946-1947 identified poor study habits as the most significant impediment to their success. 29.6 percent of the same group also indicated the shortage of housing created additional and significant difficulties. Married veterans identified financial difficulties as having a larger impact on their studies than single

174 Dorothy McMurray, Four Principals of McGill: a Memoir 1929-1963 (Montreal: The Graduates’ Society of McGill University, 1974), 59; E. Clifford Knowles, “When the Veterans Returned to McGill,” in The McGill They Knew: An Anthology of Memories, 1920-1960, edited by Edgar Andrew Collard (Don Mills, Ontario: Longman Canada Limited, 1975), 40-42. 175 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2-1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, 3. 176 Ibid., 79. 357 veterans.177 Student veterans at the University of Toronto found a pamphlet on study habits issued by the University Advisory Bureau particularly useful in their readjustment to academic life. It included advice on effective reading and note taking, tips on studying and preparing for and writing examinations, as well as a sample timetable with identified hours for dining and relaxing and additional reading materials. In addition, student veterans wanted courses that were “more direct and practical in nature” and desired to understand the application of their studies to their intended employment.178

Under the VRA, student veterans failing in two classes or subjects in a given academic year were no longer eligible for benefits. In 1946, however, the University

Advisory Committee decided student veterans should have a second chance to complete a failed year. They agreed “a number of young men of university caliber, after long meritorious service, rushed into courses to which they have not readily adjusted.”179

Those students who had repeated their original year or transferred to another course at their own expense and demonstrated strong academic progress should, they decided, be reinstated under the university training program. The procedure would be simple: the

Scholarship Committee at each university handling extensions beyond the period of entitlement would deal with cases of failure individually. The District Training Office would collaborate with the Advisory Service to review, interview, and inform each student veteran of the change in policy, and then the case would be submitted to the Head

Office before final authority was granted for reinstatement. The new policy was by and

177 Hayes, 42-53. 178 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, “Study Habits,” n.d.; and LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, Margery R. King, Bulletin No. 3, 23 September 1946. 179 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2-1, H.W. Jamieson to District Administrators, 21 March 1947, 1. 358 large a success. Of the 332 veterans reinstated under university training grants in

September 1947, 90 percent were successful in the 1947-1948 year.180 In 1951-1952,

2,826 veterans qualified under this plan and of those, 2,396 successfully graduated (see

Figure 27).181

Due to the pressure associated with growing costs of living in the post-war period and resulting veteran complaints about the costs of attending university, DVA and university officials worried financial burdens might lead veterans to discontinue their education. There was, in fact, some cause for concern: the percentage of veterans who discontinued their education during the course of their term was alarmingly high at some institutions. 161 of 620 (25.97 percent) of veterans enrolled for the 1945-1946 academic year at the University of Western Ontario, for example, discontinued their education.

District offices undertook intensive follow-up surveys of student veterans when they left university, particularly those who withdrew before graduation. Among other things, they wanted to determine whether these withdrawals were as a result of failures, expiration of entitlement, employment opportunities, or personal reasons. As of 15 February 1947, the

DVA reported that of the 7,375 veterans no longer in receipt of university training allowances, 1,780 reported having failed in their work, 1,749 that their entitlement had expired (563 of which were granted extensions), 1,203 that their course was completed,

180 Despite this success, the Advisory Committee cautioned that the 10 percent who had failed in their courses for a second year in a row posed a real problem for rehabilitation and required careful consideration. See “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 20 November 1948, Appendix A, 4. 181 Provision was also later made for the reinstatement of veterans who had done a year or two in university and whose grades were good but who were forced to withdraw for reasons beyond their control. See Jamieson, “Training Programme for Veterans, Superintendent’s Annual Report,” 21 March 1952, 2; and DVA News Release No. 334, 2. 359

290 that they had transferred to vocational training, while 2,916 indicated “other reasons”

(see Figures 28 and 29).182

Overall, however, the percentage of veterans leaving their education was small.

During the 1945-1946 academic year, only 4.02 percent of students enrolled in universities and colleges in the Halifax District withdrew. DVA statistics on discontinuations found that only 9.4 percent and 4.9 percent of veterans undertaking undergraduate and graduate training respectively had discontinued their studied as of 30

June 1946 (see Figure 15).183 When compared with civilian students, the percentages were even less significant. At the University of Saskatchewan during the same term, 57 veterans and 78 civilians discontinued during their term, 3.11 percent and 4.18 percent of their total populations respectively.184 In 1947-1948 at Carleton College, 7 student veterans and 14 non-veteran students withdrew out of 265 and 255 respectively.185

Comparing veteran and civilian student achievement provided one of the best ways to measure veteran success. West’s survey at Mount Allison reported that 20.8 percent of veterans failed in the 1945-1946 summer semester, compared to 35.4 percent of non-veteran students. For the 1945-1946 and 1946-1947 academic years, 37.2 percent and 38.4 percent of veterans and 51.6 percent and 47.6 percent of non-veterans failed respectively. West concluded veterans achieved “considerably more” than non-veteran

182 3,827 veterans were recorded as no longer being in receipt of university training allowances for pre- university training as of 15 February 1947. 295 indicated they failed in their work and 167 that entitlement expired. See “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix E. 183 LAC, RG28, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, “Training Allowances by Universities from W.D.1’s Recorded at Head Office up to 30 June 1946,” n.d., 2. 184 I. MacLean to H.W. Jamieson, 25 June 1946. 185 In 1948, Milton F. Gregg, the Minister of Veterans Affairs, reported that of the veterans withdrawing, one had left due to financial difficulties, one because he had left to enlist in the armed services, two because they had received “excellent opportunities” for immediate employment, and three because of illness with their training deferred until the next year. See LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 304, [c. 1948], 1. 360 students and “probably” obtained “more benefit” from their studies.186 For its 1946-1947 year, the University of Saskatchewan found the veteran average was slightly higher in arts, agriculture, education, and law, but slightly lower in commerce, engineering, and household science. The overall average of both groups, however, was virtually the same.187

In an effort to assess the reasons for veteran achievement, in January 1947, master’s student Herville Hayes distributed a questionnaire to over 1,600 veteran and civilian students in the Faculty of Arts at the University of British Columbia. The responses showed that 45.6 percent of veterans indicated service discipline aided in their academic work, 34 percent felt their education benefited from service training courses, 63 percent believed correspondence courses taken during their service were helpful to their studies, and 30 percent identified counselling as a “definite asset to them in the pursuance of their studies.” 60 percent of veterans also identified being married as a contributing factor to their success because their spouse worked or took care of the children.188

DVA officials were preoccupied with demonstrating the success of student veterans under their program and wanted the results to “warrant favourable publicity.”189

This had its roots in early efforts to publicize the program amongst service personnel.

The education program was by far the most high profile scheme and “popular feature” of the country’s rehabilitation legislation and received significant attention from the media and education officials. It was also one of the more easily quantifiable rehabilitation schemes. The publicizing of the success of veterans often came in response to reports that

186 F.L. West, “Academic Achievement of Veterans,” 3, Appendix A. 187 Hayes, 17. 188 Ibid., 24-31. 189 LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 1, C.R. Wiseman to H.W. Jamieson, 25 June 1946. 361 ex-service personnel were finding it difficult to settle back into their studies after the excitement of fighting. Mackenzie, for example, pointed to the low percentage of veterans discontinuing their education between October 1941 to September 1945: “… only 45 ex-service personnel discontinued their studies because of inadequate progress.

This is a remarkable record.” It indicated, he argued, that there need be no serious public concern that veterans would fail to make adequate use of the benefits being afforded to them.190

The best-regarded indicator of the program’s success was ultimately whether the majority of student veterans became satisfactorily reestablished in civilian employment.

Upon exiting university, the DVA asked veterans to complete a survey to indicate their reasons for leaving and their future plans. The survey was particularly interested in veteran plans for employment and asked if the individual had secured employment, had originally entered the university with “this type of work” as their objective, and whether university training was a “deciding factor” in their obtaining employment. Most veterans stressed the correlation between education and employment.191 Of the 44,063 surveyed, representing 81 percent of all veterans who received benefits under the university training program, 91.5 percent identified being “satisfactorily re-established in civil life” as of

October 1951.192 57.8 percent were employed directly in line with the training they received (see Appendix 22).193

190 DVA News Release No. 143, 1. 191 Ibid., Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 2, DVA, “University Training Memorandum,” n.d. 192 A similar survey of veterans who received vocational training benefits reported the percentage satisfactorily re-established at 89.8 percent, slightly lower than the university percentage. 81,418 trainees, representing more than 96 percent of all veterans who received vocational training benefits, however, completed the vocational survey. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 109. 193 Ibid., 108. 362

Despite the regarded and reported success of the program, the experiences of some student veterans, and the efforts, findings, and requests made by their representatives, at times contradicted the perspectives reflected in government statements. The following chapter provides an account of student veterans who were critical of the program and their efforts to lobby for changes to the legislation. 363

Chapter Seven

Education for Reestablishment, Part II: Student Veteran Criticism of the University Training Plan and Veteran Organization on Campus, 1945-1950

Student veterans displayed a significant appreciation for the training allowances provided under the government’s rehabilitation program. They by and large took their studies seriously, as evidenced by the many reports on their progress, and were anxious to earn their degree and secure suitable employment. Many, however, complained the allowances provided under the Veterans Rehabilitation Act (VRA) were insufficient. A vocal minority argued the success of student veterans—and by extension the success of the entire rehabilitation program—was being hindered by a number of problems: financial burdens, shortage of summer work, difficulty securing accommodations, and educational standards. These criticisms of the university training program and the realization that the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS) could not adequately lobby for their interests, encouraged student veterans to organize, resulting in the establishment of the National Conference of Student Veterans (NCSV) in

December 1945.1

The NCSV was formed in the Canadian Officer Training Corps building of the

Université de Montréal. The McGill Veterans Society led the “organizational work” in

1 Initially, there were recommendations from some institutions that the interests of student veterans be represented through the NFCUS. The University of British Columbia, for example, suggested the NCSV seek federation with the NFCUS as a subsidiary organization. The NCSV struck down the proposal at its first meeting arguing the NFCUS was “not in a position to adequately campaign for the needs of student veterans.” The NFCUS offered its “fullest co-operation” to the NCSV and in 1945 recommended the appointment of a liaison officer to attend NCSV conferences in order to facilitate cooperation. For a history of student movements in the post-war years, see Nigel Roy Moses, “Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield, 1944-1954,” Histoire sociale/Social History 39, no. 78 (2006): 363-403. See Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, S. Roger G. Beaufoy, ed., A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, n.d., 7, 15, 19. 364 cooperation with student veterans from other institutions in Montreal.2 The NCSV was intended to be a non-partisan organization composed of delegates from universities and colleges across the country. Its mandate was to defend and further the interests of student veterans and in so doing aid them in “re-establishing themselves and securing the best results from the educational plans of the government.”3 At the meetings of the

Conference, student veteran representatives identified necessary provisions and proposed policies “vitally affecting the interests” of ex-service personnel on campus.4

The First Annual Convention of the NCSV was held in Montreal from December

27-29, 1945, and was attended by veterans from twenty-six universities and colleges and three technical schools. Representatives agreed it would be necessary to form a National

Council to represent the NCSV when the conference was not in session, consisting of at least six delegates: four from central Canada, one from the West, and one from the

Maritimes, at least one of which should be from a training school.5 The Council was to be the “executive instrument” of the NCSV and was empowered to convene the conference

“when it considered it in the interest of Student Veterans to do so.”6 Its policies were to be a direct reflection of the ideas embodied in the final reports of the Conference or the general student veteran opinions acquired through national polls. Its mandate was to act as a “referee” in determining the sense of student veteran opinion, to draw up proposals to aid in obtaining these opinions, and to provide information on polling to educational

2 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-46, Volume 1, E.C. Knowles, “Student Veteran Organizations,” Address given to the University Advisory Services Conference, Quebec City, June 1947, n.d. 3 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 17. 4 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, J. Schierbeck, letter appended to the “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 14 March 1947. 5 Ibid. 6 The council had to convene a conference within fourteen months of its election. 365 institutions.7 The Council also organized and operated a central office for communication between educational institutions.8

Elected to the Council were J. Leonard Starkey of McGill University; G.P.

Laganiere of the Université de Montréal; J. Testart of the University of Western Ontario;

N. Wright of the University of Manitoba; William Rorke of the University of Alberta; A.

Hart of Dalhousie University; and G. King of the Ontario Training and Reestablishment

Institute (OTRI).9 New delegates were to be elected at each subsequent conference.

Starkey was named council chair and NCSV president. He was, in many ways, suited to this leadership role. He had been a cadet with the McGill Reserve Training Battalion, had served with the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals in the Canadian Army overseas, and upon returning to university to finish his studies, was elected president of the McGill

Student Veterans’ Society. His militant nature also reflected the left-leaning political views of the well-organized Montreal student veteran contingent. Comprised of representatives from veteran groups at McGill University, Université de Montréal,

Loyola College, Sir George Williams College, MacDonald College, and the Commercial

College of Rehabilitation, the Montreal contingent was the most active student veteran assembly. These students believed their interests could best be promoted through organized political activity and their efforts did not stop with the formation of the NCSV.

In January 1946, Montreal student veterans organized to form the Committee of Montreal and District Student Representatives. Indicative of the divisions amongst the student

7 For example, the National Council would write universities and vocational schools regarding polling logistics, including the majorities necessary to carry questions. 8 Beaufoy was the delegate from the Canadian Vocational Training Centre No. 8 in Red Deer, Alberta. See Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 8-9. 9 The OTRI was a vocational training centre established by the Dominion Government and the Ontario Department of Education. It had three major divisions: matriculation, commercial, and technical. See Department of Labour, “Vocational Training at Ontario Training and Re-establishment Institute,” The Labour Gazette XLV, no. 7 (July 1945): 1026. 366 veteran population, the main function of this body was to consider NCSV decisions and communicate with local members of parliament regarding their views on NCSV recommendations.10

The NCSV’s 1945 deliberations resulted in the submission of a brief to the

Dominion Government on 19 January 1946. It contained four sections: general resolutions, proposals on housing, proposals on financial matters, and proposals on education. The general resolutions addressed the rehabilitation program’s emphasis on full employment and the various conditions impeding this ultimate goal. The brief urged the government to create a public works program, to subsidize industries, and to undertake any other measures to ensure the “full employment” of veterans. It also requested a survey be made in conjunction with the Dominion and provincial governments to “determine the extent to which suitable employment can be made available” and to determine available employment specifically for married men.11

The report’s findings on accommodations argued housing problems had “local variations” and were “peculiar” to single and married veterans.12 In all cases, the problem was one of finding accommodation “conducive to study” in proximity to the educational institution at a reasonable price.13 The lack of suitable low-cost housing, the brief argued,

10 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, n.d., 15; and “Montreal Vets Organize, Act,” The Ubyssey, 29 January 1946, 1. 11 Ibid. 12 In 1946, the housing crisis was reported as less pronounced at the University of Saskatchewan after the provincial government purchased a two-story R.C.A.F. building and converted it into a housing centre providing reasonable rental rates. Similarly, delegates from Dawson College, Macdonald College, St. Dunstan’s University, and Sir George Williams College reported fewer housing problems. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Report on Housing Panel,” n.d., 1-2. 13 At the 1946 conference, Loyola reported 75 percent of its single student veterans were boarding at a monthly cost of approximately $75 per month and married veterans at around $120 per month. Université Laval reported single students were paying room and board at approximately $75 per month, while married veterans were paying between $30-50 per month in rent. St. Dunstan’s University reported single students were paying an average board of $40-45 per month and married students $120. The University of Toronto 367 was forcing “an increasing number” of student veterans to doubt their ability to continue their studies.14 The NCSV concluded housing was of the “utmost concern” and recommended the government introduce “immediate emergency measures” and a long- term policy.15

The brief also made eight recommendations regarding educational standards and requirements, many of which emphasized the authority of university officials: (1) in all cases the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) defer to the recommendation of the university or school as to whether a veteran should be allowed to continue his or her course of study; (2) when a veteran’s eligibility for benefits ended, an average mark of 65 percent (or a standing amongst the first 50 percent of the class where the average mark is below 65 percent) be the “sole condition in determining” the continuation of benefits under the VRA; (3) the time allowance be extended to permit veterans to apply for all types of rehabilitation training up until 36 months from discharge; (4) veterans be allowed to pursue post-graduate studies at whatever institution they elect if suggested by the university; (5) the DVA appoint representatives to act as liaison officers between its

reported 12 percent of married veterans were paying $60-65 per month and 11 percent as high as $105 per month for rent alone, with the remainder averaging between $45-50. See “Report on Housing Panel,” 2. 14 The reasons given for this doubt were: the “detrimental effect on student veterans’ peace of mind and on studies” resulting from constant search; the separation of those married from their families; and the “necessity … to supplement present benefits by the use of gratuities, Victory Bonds, and personal savings, to such an extent that these will in many cases be used up before the student graduates.” Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 1-3. 15 Recommended immediate measures consisted of: (1) complying with the request of universities and vocational schools for the use and renovation of government-owned buildings for housing; (2) expanding the Wartime Housing Program by specifying a much larger quota and allocating more materials and labour to the project; (3) creating a housing registry on each campus listing accommodation and the sharing of information with local emergency shelter registries; (4) assistance of the DVA in setting up student veteran co-operative housing; and (5) inclusion of board rates and room rentals under the government’s rental control policy. The long term policy recommendations included a request that the government recognize the housing crisis was the result of high rentals, a lack of housing at low rentals, and the lack of low-rental buildings. Therefore, it could only be fixed by increasing the number of low-rental accommodations and that the government should immediately undertake a long-term building program for low-rental permanent housing. See Ibid. 368 officials and student veterans; (6) a student veteran who failed the first year and repeated that year at his or her own expense be reinstated under the rehabilitation training benefits;

(7) veteran vocational students be allowed to purchase instruments and tools for their trade directly from the War Assets Corporation on a “veteran priority basis”; and (8) courses for trades in vocational schools be extended where applicable from six months to at least one year in order to enable students to “acquire a high degree of skill.”16

The recommendations of the January 1946 brief were extensive and addressed a wide variety of issues related to the university training program, particularly in regards to its policy and implementation. The primary emphasis of the brief and the focus of the

NCSV 1945 campaign more largely, however, concerned maintenance grants. Delegates agreed maintenance grants (or allowances) were “inadequate to meet present-day conditions” and constituted one of the more pressing threats to student veteran success. A great deal of urgency characterized discussion of the grants. Representatives argued that each day veterans were being forced to leave university because of inadequate financial assistance under the government’s program. The report recommended an immediate increase of $20 and $40 per month for single and married veterans respectively to address financial problems.17

A number of arguments were put forth in support of this increase. First, sample surveys taken of student veterans showed approximately one-third would be unable to complete their course at their present income. Second, “present conditions of unemployment” prevented student veterans from earning sufficient income during the

16 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 6. 17 In July 1944, the government had increased allowances to $60 and $80 per month for single and married veterans respectively. The report therefore recommended that allowances be increased to $80 and $120. See Ibid., 4; and LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” n.d., 1-3. 369 summer months to return to their studies in the fall.18 Third, the present scale of grants prevented students from accelerating their courses and this delay “is an unhealthy condition” because it prevented eager veterans from gaining employment quickly. Fourth, the program disadvantaged married veterans; thus, married veterans were electing to leave university rather than “inflict hardship” on their families and unmarried veterans were delaying marriage. And finally, it was recommended that maintenance grants should correspond with a private’s pay and allowances, amounting to $83.60 and $118.60 for a single and married serviceman respectively. Delegates argued an increase could best be gained by the formation of a special committee to study the regional living costs of student veterans, and therefore the NCSV further suggested the formation of a committee to be comprised of student veterans and DVA and university officials.19

The report made a number of other related requests for financial support: the creation of a loan scheme at a low rate of interest whereby a student veteran might obtain funds to purchase technical equipment required during and following professional study; a plan to reduce the cost of textbooks; the removal of deductions from maintenance grants for student veterans receiving a pension; the approval of the cost of living

18 Fears of unemployment had merit. In British Columbia, for example, logging and foundry strikes prevented student employment. The Employment and Placement Bureau of the University of British Columbia, established on 1 March 1946 to take over for the Student Employment Bureau, reported that registration for summer employment in 1946 was much lower than expected: 1,865 men and 358 women registered for employment. They attributed this to the lack of a central place for registration, the large number of student veterans attending the special spring session, and veteran difficulty in coming to the Bureau offices while examinations were in process. Moreover, registrations and placements for graduates were relatively small, in part, the Bureau argued, because their initial activities concentrated on vacation employment. For the same year, total registration for part-time employment numbered 480 men and 75 women and for permanent employment 71 men and 12 women. Only 28 men and 19 women were placed in permanent jobs. Low employment, however, was not solely attributed to the Bureau and the government. Student cooperation “has not been all that can be desired,” argued the Bureau. Students failed to turn up at jobs and to report when they secured positions, causing a “lack of confidence in the Bureau and impairing the contact with the employers.” See Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 25. 19 Ibid., 4-5. 370 questionnaire; and the establishment of a cost of living bonus based on the results of this survey.20

The request for an increase in financial assistance was supported by the efforts of individual university veterans groups. In 1945, for example, the veterans associations of the University of Western Ontario, Queen’s University, and the University of

Saskatchewan, facilitated a survey of all student veterans receiving maintenance benefits to determine their expenditures (see Appendix 23). According to the University of

Saskatchewan Veteran’s Association, the results were such as to warrant immediate action. The survey found the average fixed and occasional monthly expenditure for single student veterans was $90.90, $123.89 for married veterans, $130.21 for married veterans with one child, and $184.70 for married veterans with two or more children.21

In response to the demand for increased allowances, the DVA undertook their own study on the cost of living. In conjunction with universities educating veterans, DVA officials tasked the Dominion Bureau of Statistics with researching the financial difficulties faced by student veterans. The preliminary report of the Bureau included two estimates. The first examined the costs of food and lodging based on the location of the educational institution and the type of institution (i.e. ex-service university, ex-service vocational, and civilian university). The second was a larger estimate that examined the costs of food and lodging but also expenditures incurred for books and supplies, school

20 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 4-5. 21 A similar survey was undertaken by Dawson College veterans to evaluate the extent of housing, employment, and financial issues on their campus. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66- 49, “Brief on Inadequacy of Maintenance Benefits for Veterans’ Continuing Education,” 28 May 1945, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, Appendix E; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Brief on Inadequacy of Maintenance Benefits for Veterans’ Continuing Education,” 28 May 1945, 1. 371 socials, clothing, and transportation at various universities and colleges (see Figure 30).22

The report also compared the expenditures of students at various institutions to those of the average Canadian family. After a preliminary review of the data, the DVA concluded student veterans spent more than civilian students, allowances for single veterans were more than adequate, and some married veterans were facing financial difficulties because they were undertaking studies in university centres where the cost of housing constituted a larger proportion of their maintenance grant.23

On 8 March 1946, Ian Mackenzie wrote a letter to Starkey in reply to the 1945 brief. He reported DVA officials had studied the brief and the Advisory Committee had discussed some of the recommendations and he was now in a position to make an

“interim reply” to the NSCV’s “propositions.”24 In response to recommendations on employment, Mackenzie argued “general arrangements” for placing veterans through the

National Employment Service (NES) were available and effective. Preference for work could not be given to student veterans over other veterans, he argued, and married veterans would have to be prepared to accept summer work that might separate them from their families. Mackenzie agreed to further discuss only one of the recommendations on employment: his office would “study the possibilities of facilitating student veteran employment.”25

In regards to housing, Mackenzie reported emergency measures were already under discussion with the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) to

22 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-49, “Preliminary Report of Dominion Bureau of Statistics Student Cost-of-Living Survey,” n.d. 23 They did not, however, consider the costs of living associated with specific university centres, such as Montreal and Toronto. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 25 February 1946, 2. 24 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 10-11. 25 Ibid., 10. 372 coordinate all housing policy for the federal government, not specific to that of student veterans.26 He responded directly to each of the NCSV’s ten proposals on veteran education and struck down six of the recommendations outright.27 Three of the recommendations he reported were already being explored and instituted in some measure. The remaining recommendation regarding the question of professional fees was not under the jurisdiction of the government, Mackenzie contended, and should thus be taken up with the professional body in question.28

Mackenzie took exception to many of the NCSV’s justifications for their financial recommendations, in particular, the report’s assertion the government should “underwrite our [veteran] rehabilitation as they underwrote the war effort.”29 He fervently struck down this claim:

Student veterans who are no longer in the service of Canada can hardly claim that the people of Canada are obliged to support them in the same way as those in the public employ (including military). What the people, through their representatives in Parliament, have agreed to do is to assist a veteran to complete his education; in the same way as certain students are assisted by scholarships. This being so, it is a question of how much assistance, in terms of direct allowance, and facilities to universities, can be given.

26 The postwar housing crisis was widespread and not limited to student veterans. In general, the government did very little in the area of public housing, focusing instead of stimulating housing by improving conditions for private construction through measures such as low interest rates. For more on postwar housing, see John R. Miron, Housing in Postwar Canada: Demographic Change, Household Formation, and Housing Demand (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1988). For a study of the involvement of the CMHC, see Morris Henry Trevithick, “Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation as a Strategic Factor in Canadian Federal Housing Policy: A Historical Case Study” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1976). 27 He struck down the six recommendations with the following justifications: the University Advisory Committee believed that no change should be made to the regulations regarding eligibility for allowances; there was no argument to support an extension of the time allowance for veterans rehabilitation training to 36 months; there was similarly no reason to approve post-graduate work outside of Canada when suitable courses could be undertaken within the country; the purchase of tools by veterans directly from the War Assets Corporation was too impractical; and an extension of the length of time of school courses for vocational students would likely not ensure adequate training. Moreover, the decision had already been made that re-instatement after failure would not be included in the VRA. Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 12. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., 4. 373

Mackenzie also contended that “present indications” based on an early analysis of the cost of living surveys of the Bureau of Statistics did not necessitate a flat increase in maintenance grants. Moreover, he argued, an increase in allowances would demand similar increases to other allowances under the VRA, such as hospital allowances and the

War Veterans’ Allowance. Mackenzie did agree with the NCSV on the situation for married veterans. This cohort, he wrote, particularly those not living with relatives or in low-cost housing or whose wives were not working, were “subject to such expense” that it was doubtful they would be able to complete their courses. The Advisory Committee, he reported, agreed that some form of assistance should be given to married veterans on a

“need-to-need” basis.30

Mackenzie concluded his reply to the 1945 brief by ensuring NCSV officials their proposals would be given “careful consideration” but he reported the DVA could not

“accede to the majority” of the requests. “It is realized,” he wrote, “that real self-denial and struggle are involved for many student veterans if they are to complete their education.” If necessary, he continued, the DVA would “endeavour to modify” regulations so that no veteran “whose abilities warrant it will have to forego university education because of his economic circumstances.” In other words, the goal of the maintenance grants was to prevent a lack of access to higher education on the sole basis of financial means.31

The debate over allowances resulted from a different understanding of their intended purpose. Student veterans argued the maintenance grants should completely

30 Ian Mackenzie also pointed out that the DVA was already studying the possibility of creating an additional grant to provide for books, commuting costs for married veterans, and the setting up of loan funds to provide any other needed assistance to be operated and administered by the universities. See Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 11. 31 Ibid., 12. 374 cover their expenses while undertaking educational training under the provisions of the

VRA. The DVA, on the other hand, maintained the grants were intended to assist veterans in undertaking training. At the 13 November 1945 meeting of the Advisory

Committee, DVA members explained that the purpose of the maintenance grant was to

“assist the veteran in preparing himself for the position in civil life that he would have attained or might have attained if his career had not been interrupted by Service”

(Emphasis in Original).32 This principle, they argued, was not clearly understood by student veterans.33 In response to the 1945 brief, DVA officials maintained it was not the responsibility of the government to “underwrite” the costs of non-essential expenditures such as recreation. The original allowance was intended to meet the costs of board and lodging and in so doing promote the rehabilitation of veterans.34

From December 27-29, 1946, NCSV delegates met at McGill University for the

Second Annual Convention of the NCSV. Seventy-three delegates and twenty observers from thirty-three educational institutions attended along with an observer from the

Canadian Legion. Delegates at this conference focused on two key issues: the increase in

32 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 275, File 66-38-2, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 13 November 1945, 6. 33 The Advisory Committee recognized the variation in living costs in different university locations and acknowledged the legislation did not consider this, but argued the applicant had to take this into consideration in planning which institution to attend. Moreover, the Advisory Committee concluded payment of cost-of-living and transportation grants in larger university centres such as Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver was inadvisable because it would encourage “an even heavier flow of veterans from outside areas to the larger centres.” See Ibid., 6-7. 34 Walter S. Woods, the Deputy Minister of the DVA from 1944 to 1950, explained the misunderstanding over the purpose of the maintenance grants in his 1953 work, stating that veteran criticism of the allowances “arose from the misconception that training allowances were, in fact, living allowances intended to support the veteran and his dependents during the training period. Actually, the allowances were grants in aid which, together with savings in the form of War Service Gratuity, supplementary earnings for part-time and summer employment and any earnings on the part of the wife, would make it possible for any veteran to resume or commence a rehabilitation training programme without undue hardship.” See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 25 February 1946, 2; and Walter S. Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation): Being a History of the Development and Carrying Out of a Plan for the Re-establishment of a million young veterans of World War II by the Department of Veterans Affairs and its predecessor the Department of Pensions and National Health (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1953), 95. 375 the cost of living and problems associated with finding employment during training.

Their deliberations resulted in the publication of a report entitled “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student

Veterans.” It was presented to Walter A. Tucker, chair of the House of Commons special committee for veterans’ affairs.35 The report, adopted unanimously, put forth nineteen recommendations for consideration.36

The recommendations were the direct result of the deliberations of three NSCV- appointed panels tasked with addressing the most significant issues concerning finances, employment, and housing.37 Almost all of the recommendations of the financial panel were included in the final report. Delegates requested increased financial assistance through the establishment of a cost of living bonus to supplement the maintenance grants; university discretion in the granting of extension of benefits; a commuters’ allowance; assistance in purchasing textbooks; and an extension of the student loan scheme to include the granting of loans to veterans not identified as “being in direct need.”38 It also

35 The committee was comprised of sixty members, including Mackenzie, and was formed to “make recommendations to the Cabinet on all major matters pertaining to demobilization and re-establishment policies.” See Veterans Affairs Canada, records of the Department of Veterans Affairs, 65-10-5, volume 1, Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Re-establishment, Minutes of Meeting, 24 October 1945, quoted in Peter Neary, On to Civvy Street: Canada’s Rehabilitation Program for Veterans of the Second World War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011), 161. 36 The recommendations discussed the following: cost of living bonus, employment for graduates, student veterans who are pensioners, book allowances, commuters’ allowances, student loans, outside income, equipment from the War Assets Corporation, information, housing, rent control, employment services, medical treatment for dependents, essential equipment for professional practice, diplomas for graduates of vocational training, favouritism of non-NRMA recruits, business loans for vocational students, student veterans with adult dependents, and the Veterans Land Act. See “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 1-4. 37 In addition, the NCSV appointed the Canadian Vocational Training Panel under the chairpersonship of George Swinton of the Montreal Art Association to study the problems of vocational students. 38 The recently instituted Order-in-Council P.C. 4061 of 1 October 1946, known as the Veterans University Loans Regulations, provided any university with funds to make small loans to meet emergency conditions amongst veterans being paid allowances under Sections 8 and 9 of the VRA. To review loan applications, the regulations dictated each university would establish a student-veteran loan board with membership from the university head or their representative, the dean of the faculty concerned, the university veteran advisor, and the District Supervisor of Training. The student veteran had to prove that his or her financial position 376 asked that no deductions be made from the educational grant if a male veteran or his wife earned over $75 per month.39 In addition to these recommendations, many of which reiterated proposals from the 1945 brief, the 1946 final report requested that undergraduate and graduate student veterans receiving benefits under Sections 8 and 9 of the VRA—which approved the granting of training fees and allowances to eligible discharged persons—also be entitled to benefits under the Veterans’ Land Act (VLA).40

Opportunity for employment was at the heart of the Employment Panel’s recommendations.41 The concern for financial stability prompted an increased emphasis on the importance of job opportunities and security but more than this, student veterans— like the government and the DVA—regarded both temporary and graduate employment as evidence of the successful reintegration of veterans in civil life. The problem did not lie with a lack of motivation amongst student veterans, members argued; in fact, veterans were “anxious to assist themselves in every way possible to not only meet the financial obligations encountered during their courses” but also to secure positions “remunerative to themselves and at the same time of maximum benefit to Canada.” Student veteran

was such that a lack of financial assistance threatened the continuation of training, that he or she did not have other financial resources, and that his or her past records and future earning capacity would enable the veteran to meet the repayment requirements. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, Order-in-Council P.C. 4061, 1 October 1946. 39 “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 1-3. 40 For more on Sections 8 and 9 of the VRA, see chapter six. An amendment to the VRA on 30 June 1948 made it possible for veterans who had received university training benefits under the VRA to be reinstated under VLA benefits. This was conditional on the repayment of allowances and “all other costs incurred by the Minister in respect of the course so taken.” The supplementary grants were included in the “definition of costs.” See LAC, RG38, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Resolutions Submitted by Financial Panel Second Annual Convention National Conference Student Veterans,” n.d., 2; “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 4; LAC, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 602, File 5932-04-00, Part 2, R.A. Berry to O.C. Elliott, 9 August 1948; and LAC, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 602, File 5932-04-00, Part 2, “Department of Veterans Affairs Rehabilitation Branch and Veterans Land Act Instructions,” 20 July 1948. 41 The Employment Panel consisted of nineteen members, A. Jordon as chair, and Helen Beveridge as secretary. 377 employment was suffering, argued the panel, from a lack of coordination between local and national employment bureaus and industry.42

The NCSV final report included two of the Employment Panel’s recommendations. First, it asked for coordination between local and national employment bureaus and industry in order to facilitate summer employment opportunities and employment for graduates. Temporary employment, they recommended, should also be commutable to permanent employment following completion of training or studies.

Second, the report recommended nationally operated employment bureaus receive larger appropriations for publicity activities to facilitate a “closer liaison” between the DVA, the

NES, and student employment bureaus.43

The Housing Panel divided accommodation problems into two separate categories: housing in general and housing for married veterans.44 Members argued there needed to be a three-prong approach that would take into account what the NCSV could accomplish by collaborating with the Canadian Legion, what could “reasonably” be asked of the Dominion Government, and what the NCSV and student veterans could do themselves. They concluded veterans should join forces with the Canadian Legion and

“go on record as being wholeheartedly in accord” with the Legion’s 28 February 1946 housing brief (see Appendix 24). The largest discussion focused on what veterans could do to help alleviate the emergency. The chair of the panel, M.L. McIntyre of Dalhousie

42 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Report of the Employment Panel to N.C.S.V.,” n.d., 1. 43 Ibid., “Observations on the Representations of the National Conference of Student Veterans Held in Montreal in December, 1946,” [c. Winter 1947], 1, 3. 44 The housing panel for the 1946 conference was comprised of the following delegates: M.L. McIntyre, Dalhousie University (Chair); Livingstone, University of British Columbia; Couture, Laval Université; Joseph Testart, the University of Western Ontario; Newman, Dawson College; Dillon, Loyola College; Cole, St. Dunstan’s University; Richardson, Sir George Williams College; MacDonnell, University of Toronto; Hill, University of Saskatchewan; Henneberry, MacDonald College; Munn, University of New Brunswick; and McVee, University of Bishop’s College. 378

University, recommended student veterans organize a publicity campaign, create a room registry listing needed and available accommodation in the area, undertake a survey of graduate students, and encourage the “re-erection” of army huts for use as homes. Taking into consideration these recommendations, the NCSV report requested financial aid for veterans’ dwelling improvement and rental control legislation. It also reminded student veterans to continue to make recommendations to the Canadian Legion and individual university administrations in order to urge immediate action.45

The 1946 final report contained an additional three key recommendations. First, it drew attention to the inequality between the treatment of ex-NRMA (National Resources

Mobilization Act) veterans and volunteer veterans. Ex-NRMA veterans were allowed to retain their reestablishment credit while receiving benefits under Sections 8 and 9 of the

VRA while veterans who had volunteered for military service received the payment of tuition fees and allowances but lost their reestablishment credit. Second, it requested emergency medical treatment for veterans’ dependents. Finally, the report stressed the importance of information dissemination by government officials and requested the publishing of a pamphlet specifically discussing all available benefits for student veterans.46

The government was more supportive of the 1946 report, which they argued

“more accurately” reflected the opinions of student veterans. Delegates from Montreal institutions, they contended, overwhelmingly influenced the first conference and larger

45 LAC, RG38, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, M.L. McIntyre, “Final Report on Housing Panel,” n.d. 46 The DVA was already distributing a pamphlet called Back to Civil Life, which outlined and explained the rehabilitation benefits available to members of the armed services. Three editions of the pamphlet were published. See “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 3; Back to Civil Life (Ottawa: Department of Pensions and National Health, June 1, 1944); Back to Civil Life, 2nd Edition (Ottawa: Department of Pensions and National Health, August 25, 1944); and Back to Civil Life, Third Edition (Ottawa: King’s Printer, April 1, 1946). 379 universities outside of the city, most notably the University of Toronto, were inadequately represented.47 According to Jamieson, for example, the poor representation of larger universities had a significant impact on the NCSV’s early initiatives and policies. He argued many of the recommendations of the 1945 brief were pushed forward as a result of the “unduly high proportion of delegates from the Montreal area” associated with Starkey and “his extramural activities.” Jamieson contended that “a very small minority” dominated the conference and its recommendations to the DVA. “The great majority,” he concluded, “appreciate the measure of assistance to those who are willing and able to help themselves.”48

The support articulated by Jamieson for the NCSV was the direct result of a change in the organization’s leadership.49 Opposing political opinions divided NCSV delegates in the year following its creation. This resulted in the resignation of Starkey during the second session of the 1946 Conference, which was closed to the public and the press. According to the Conference report, early in the session it “became very evident that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among the delegates with regard to the conduct of the affairs of the National Council” (Emphasis in Original).50 When Starkey began the meeting, William Rorke, a member of the National Council and former vice- president of the University of Alberta’s Canadian University Returned Men’s

47 Both NCSV and DVA officials attributed the success of the second conference to the participation of student veteran representatives from the University of Toronto. For example, see Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 15; and “Montreal Vets Organize, Act,” 1. 48 Jamieson also argued some of the opinions formed by NCSV delegates resulted from “a lack of understanding of policy and procedure.” He immediately set to remedy the situation, urging District Supervisors of Training in conjunction with university veterans advisory services to increase their efforts in order to ensure a clear understanding of the “extent and limitations” of the VRA. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, Jamieson to T.J. Rutherford, 2 January 1947. 49 On 2 January 1947, Jamieson reported to T.J. Rutherford, the Director-General of Rehabilitation, that the “great majority” of student veterans now realized their interests would not be “well served by continuous requests for unlimited assistance.” See Ibid. 50 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, "Report of National Conference of Student Veterans McGill University, Montreal, December 27-29, 1946,” n.d., 1. 380

Association, stood up and resigned from the Council. Three other Council members quickly followed. They all argued they were unable to act under Starkey’s leadership.51

Dissatisfaction focused on Starkey’s communist affiliations. Most delegates affirmed

Starkey’s right to his own political views but felt that he had “betrayed the trust of the

Conference in making use of his position as president, to further the ends of his own political party.” Delegates accused Starkey of seeking to “embarrass” the Dominion

Government and of “misrepresenting” the position taken by the DVA at the Canadian

Legion Convention. Starkey was asked to resign several times and when he refused, delegates initiated a motion of non-confidence. The result was a vote by closed ballot: forty-three voted in favour and fourteen against the motion.52

Grant B. Livingstone, the University of British Columbia’s student council president and executive member of the institution’s Canadian Legion branch, argued

Starkey’s ousting resulted from “the spontaneous reaction of the majority of student vets” against the “irresponsible communist minority” that dominated the first year of the

NCSV. It signaled, he contended, the “end” to the “communistic prostitution of the veterans group last year.”53 In Starkey’s stead, delegates immediately elected John

51 Dave Bell, “Report on N.C.S.V. Conference,” The Gateway, 14 January 1947, 2. 52 Starkey was empowered to act as a delegate. See "Report of National Conference of Student Veterans McGill University, Montreal, December 27-29, 1946,” 1-2. 53 Livington had previously attacked Starkey for statements made at the Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) held in Prague during the summer of 1946. Livingstone claimed Starkey overstepped his authority by accrediting Gordon McLean, a third-year law student at the University of Toronto, as a delegate to the Congress when he was only entitled to be an observer. This enabled McLean to vote on issues addressed at the conference. Livingstone argued this allowed McLean to promote a “Communist rather than a Canadian point of view at the conference” to the detriment of Canadian student veterans who would have expected the “Canadian viewpoint” to be furthered by their NCSV representatives. Livingstone later guided a motion through the NFCUS pledging the NFCUS to join the “communist-tinged” IUS on a two-year “conditional” basis. It included a provision that if the political leanings of the IUS were not abandoned, Canada would withdraw entirely. This led to a heated debate between Livingstone and Roland Penner, the leader of a communist group at the University of Manitoba (and later Dean of Law at the university and a Manitoba Cabinet minister), which played out in student newspapers. Livingstone was also known for being opposed to the student veteran demand for a cost of 381

Schierbeck, a thirty-three year old naval veteran who served as a radar officer during the war. Schierbeck was undertaking postgraduate studies in horticulture at Macdonald

College and had previously been chair of the NCSV committee on rules and procedure.54

Division amongst NCSV delegates was not limited to the Starkey affair. Student veteran representatives at the 1946 Conference heatedly debated whether the NCSV should continue to press the government to increase maintenance grants.55 The Standard of Montreal reported the debate evolved into two schools of thought: the first promoted the continuation of the existing policy to campaign for an increase, and the second argued the government should be asked to maintain existing allowances, to distribute these on a sliding scale according to individual need, and to make loans to student veterans more easily obtainable.56

In reality, there were three schools of thought. The first believed maintenance grants should be raised by a set sum of money and recommended the original request for an increase of $20 and $40 for single and married veterans respectively. They argued that some—if not many—veterans were leaving their studies due to financial difficulties.

They felt the present system penalized veterans not yet enrolled in university because they were unable to commence studies for financial reasons. These delegates, like

Starkey’s 1945 cohort, believed the university training benefits provided under the VRA

living bonus to supplement allowances. See “McLean Lays Charges; Livingstone Sends Reply,” The Ubyssey, 30 January 1947, 3; “Manitoban’s Accusations Denied By Livingstone,” The Ubyssey, 7 January 1948, 1; and “Livingstone Under Attack For Actions At Conference,” The Ubyssey, 7 January 1948, 1. 54 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 42, 45. 55 The debate over maintenance grants played out at the institutional level. In preparation for the 1946 conference, the McGill Student Veterans’ Society held a referendum on the issue (see Appendix 25). This was necessary, they argued, given the contentiousness of the issue and need to obtain a “fairer and more representative idea” of the views of their members. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66- 27-4, Part 1, “Referendum,” n.d. 56 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 42. 382 were intended to cover all expenses rather than solely offer assistance. Based on this interpretation, they argued the basic principle of the Act was being nullified.57

The second cohort was of the opinion that an across the board increase was

“neither necessary nor commendable.” This faction argued a large proportion of student veterans were living with parents and paying little or no rent and therefore an increase would simply be more “gravy.” Juxtaposed again this, they explained, were married veterans and single veterans forced to pay high and exorbitant rents. These delegates argued the introduction of a sliding scale would offer the best compensation. Each veteran should be categorized based on need: single veterans paying little or no rent, single veterans paying rent, and married veterans.58

A third faction upheld that in general the grants were sufficient and that attention should be paid only to “individual cases who are suffering under some hardship.” They argued the government had already made “generous provision” for student veterans above and beyond that given to other veterans, elevating them to a superior financial situation. The taxpayer should not be asked to take on an increased burden. The grants, they continued, were originally intended to offer assistance rather than provide a

“complete underwriting of education.”59

The argument to end the campaign for allowances pivoted on a number of key points. First, many delegates pointed to the consistent refusal of government officials to make increases.60 The government had already indicated its refusal to increase the

57 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “McGill Student Veterans’ Society Referendum,” n.d., 1. 58 Ibid., 2. 59 Ibid. 60 In fact, in his guest speech at the 1946 conference, Jamieson informed those present that the current rates would remain in effect. Student newspapers also regularly commented on the government’s refusal to increase grants. For example, the McGill Daily reported that at separate meetings between a delegation 383 amounts and argued there was “no use butting against a stone wall.”61 More importantly, student veterans acknowledged the 1945 campaign for increased allowances had injured them in the eyes of the public and believed without public support there would be no hope of swaying government. In particular, student veterans at the University of British

Columbia vehemently opposed the campaign for a straight increase. They submitted a separate proposal for consideration at the 1946 Conference in which they argued a new campaign “should be opened only in the event of radically altered circumstances, such, for instance, as mass withdrawals for financial reasons, or a greatly increased cost of living.” A campaign such as this, they argued, would “do us no good but could do us a great deal of harm” because its demands lacked public support and would only serve to further antagonize the government and a large section of public opinion. The Canadian

Legion president, Major-General Basil Price agreed: “We must not put ourselves in the position of asking for more than the conscience of the nation will regard as reasonable.

We must regard our service as merely apprenticeship to more worthily serve the nation.”

The public must feel, he argued, that veterans were being reasonable in their requests.62

In the end, the Conference decided the government should be asked to create a cost of living bonus, rather than renew its campaign for an outright increase in grants.63

from the McGill Student Veterans’ Society, Mackenzie, and Finance Minister J.L. Ilsley held in Ottawa on 28 November 1946, both Ministers “categorically stated that the government could not entertain the possibility of … an increase” for two reasons: first, because educational grants were originally intended and still considered to be an aid to education; and second, because the government was already “providing more generously for student veterans than for any other discharged group.” See Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 43; and “Ministers Meet Vet Delegates,” McGill Daily XXXVI, no. 43 (29 November 1946), 1. 61 McGill Student Veterans’ Society Referendum,” 2. 62 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 21-24, 43. 63 University of Toronto delegates strongly campaigned for the cost of living bonus. In anticipation of the 14 March 1946 meeting of the Advisory Committee, they had presented a brief to the University of Toronto president Sidney E. Smith requesting the creation of a cost of living bonus based on a general increase in the cost of living of $8 per month. See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, “Ex-Service Committee Brief to President of University of Toronto,” n.d., 2. 384

In addition to forwarding their 1946 report to the government, the NCSV distributed the publication amongst educational institutions, hoping to attract additional backing. In the report’s cover letter, Schierbeck attempted to solicit more support from student veterans. The letter was very much a defence of the Conference. Schierbeck emphasized the democratic element and process of their deliberations and argued NCSV efforts were vital to the welfare of the nation and would further the interests of student veterans and “inspire all ex-service personnel.” More than this, his letter was a call for support and unity. Schierbeck recognized that to further their objectives, the NCSV required the support of all student veterans and he asked for help in realizing their goals.

“It is quite apparent from the atmosphere in Ottawa that we are not going to receive a single concession which involves expenditure of public funds,” he concluded, “unless we make it quite clear that we not only have a good case but that we are united and determined to further the interests of Student Veterans. The National Council is your mouthpiece; it speaks only as loudly as your support enables it to.”64

Schierbeck was committed to revitalizing the organization. On 14 October 1947 he wrote the presidents of student veteran groups across the country calling for their help in maintaining a united front. While student veterans on some campuses were facing less critical conditions than those in the major cities, he argued, the Conference needed the support of all student veteran communities. If they could only realize “the urgency of this matter,” he wrote, “your National Council is certain that unstinted support for its efforts to have it corrected would be forthcoming; and the voice with which we speak would carry the weight called for by the gravity of the situation.” Schierbeck continued to

64 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Part 1, J. Schierbeck, cover letter for “Recommendations to the Dominion Government From the 1946 Session of the National Conference of Student Veterans,” 14 March 1947. 385 emphasize the important role of the NCSV in addressing student veteran issues and offered numerous justifications. The NCSV, he argued, was the only organization with a mandate to serve the interests of student veterans.65

The Third Annual Conference of the NCSV was held at the University of Toronto from December 27-29, 1947.66 Schierbeck and the National Council worked to remake their public image and shift focus away from the campaign to increase maintenance grants.67 The Conference’s main brief continued to press for the creation of a cost of living bonus on the basis of the difference in the cost of living since the establishment of the present level of grants in October 1944. It recommended an adjustment of 5 percent for every 6 points change in the Dominion Bureau of Statistics’ cost of living index.68

Delegates defended this new recommendation, however, by explaining it was not asking for an amount “anything like that necessary to completely cover the cost of their years of training.”69

65 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 2, J. Schierbeck to Presidents, Student Veterans Organization, 14 October 1947, 1-2. 66 The 1947 National Council delegates were: Schierbeck; Livingstone, the University of British Columbia; Joseph Testart, the University of Western Ontario; Clare Dean, Sir George Williams College; George Swinton; Art Association of Montreal; Edmund Bernard, Université Laval; and Leo McIntyre, Dalhousie University. 67 Student veterans recognized this new focus, however sensible and justified, would be shadowed by the activities of the first council. An editorial in The Varsity, the student newspaper of the University of Toronto, explained the problem: “It is unfortunate that [the request] comes after a campaign which … was scarcely designed to create the maximum amount of sympathy toward student veterans from the general public … There is always a very great danger that veterans will, through their action and attitude, establish themselves in the public mind merely as agitators out for what they can get. The only result of such feeling can be complete lack of sympathy for even thoroughly justified grievances. Student veterans are a very privileged group in the eyes of the public and they must be even more careful to indicate by their methods of procedure that they are worthy recipients of public confidence.” See “NCSV,” The Varsity, 9 January 1948, 2. 68 Delegates were split on whether a distinction should be made between categories of students (i.e. single, married, married with dependents, and married with employable dependents). In the end, they compromised by acknowledging that married student veterans with children suffered the greatest hardship. 69 The 1947 subsidiary brief made seven additional requests: (1) it urged the government to extend medical and dental benefits to dependents of student veterans; (2) stipulated that the NSCV supports the opinions of the Canadian Legion with regards to the housing crisis as laid out in the Legion’s 1946 brief; (3) expressed “satisfaction” with the efforts of Government agencies in regards to employment and urged the program be 386

In particular, University of Saskatchewan delegates campaigned for the index.

The University of Saskatchewan Veteran’s Society had recently undertaken a survey of the cost of living among 582 student veterans on campus and found the monthly total expenditure for single veterans averaged $87, $124 for married veterans, and $135 for those married with dependents (see Figures 31, 32, and 33). Accommodations incurred the largest expense at $71, $96, and $106 per month respectively. The results of the survey provide an example of student veteran expenditures. As expected, marital and family status was the determining characteristic. The percentage of monthly expenditure going towards food and lodging varied by group: 63.38 percent for single veterans, 76.04 percent for those married, and 78.03 percent for those married with dependents.

Recreational activities unsurprisingly constituted a larger proportion of single veteran expenses (11.27 percent compared to 6.25 percent and 3.77 percent for single, married, and married with dependents veterans respectively). Living with relatives reduced monthly expenditures, but this was most pronounced amongst single veterans. Married veterans with dependents living with relatives saved $8 per month while single veterans

“continued and intensified”; (4) recommended the government set up training benefits for children of war dead; (5) asked the government to alter the written loan regulations to permit loans to be underwritten by the DVA, to give provision for special loans to students whose training grants have expired and who wished to continue at their own expense, and to add a representative of the student veteran body to each university loan board, and also that the “policy of interpretation” of the written regulations be made clearer, more available, and enforced uniformly; (6) expressed that the Council remained firm in its stance that veterans who were officially led to expect VLA benefits in addition to university training benefits should not be allowed to suffer because of a reversal in DVA policy; and (7) requested that consideration be given to continuing training grants during hospital internships because no income was available during such period and the internship was a requirement for the medical degree.69 See “NCSV,” 2; and LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Resolutions Passed at the National Conference of Student Veterans, held at the University of Toronto, December 26th to 29th, 1947, Main Brief,” n.d. 387 saved $14.70 Expenses over and above the cost of room and board also varied greatly by living arrangement.71

Efforts to refocus the organization were largely unsuccessful and increases in financial assistance remained the focus of NCSV deliberations. When the NCSV met for a fourth time at Queen’s University from December 28-30, 1948, Jamieson again attended as an observer. In a letter to all District Administrators, he reported the NCSV still seemed determined to continue to press for increased allowances. In light of this pressure, he reminded each administrator to maintain thorough and up-to-date records on individuals who dropped out of university training and on student veterans undertaking university studies at their own expense. He argued it was this latter group that made up a large portion of the “pressure group” advocating for increased grants. The NCSV, he insisted, had a tendency to look at the government to solve “purely local” problems that required attention from individual universities. Moreover, there was still a “measure of misunderstanding” due to the “natural complexity of a programme which involves dealings with so many institutions.” Many of the requests, he reported, were already in effect.72 Jamieson wished the NCSV would discontinue the discussion of an increase in grants, and suggested they focus on their more “appropriate” resolutions, such as their endorsement of a plan whereby individual university veterans groups would establish

70 Based on the Bank of Canada’s Inflation Calculator, $8 in 1947 would be worth approximately $100 in 2015 and $14 would be worth $179. See Statistics Canada, Consumer Price Indexes for Canada, Monthly, 1914-2006 (V41690973 series). 71 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 2, “Brief Presented at the National Conference of Student Veterans on Behalf of the Student Veterans of the University of Saskatchewan,” n.d., Appendix A. 72 For example, business and professional loans, conditions governing extension of benefits, and internships in medicine. 388 scholarships for children of war dead. This, he argued, was “most constructive and commendable” and deserving of “encouragement and publicity.”73

On 12 March 1949, the NCSV presented a 15-page brief resulting from the 1948

Conference. The report made two main requests. The first recommended an unspecified increase in allowances for all student veterans. It referred to the rising cost of living, which had increased forty-one points since the amount of the grant was fixed. This time, the delegates based their arguments on the government’s increase to the salaries of civil servants and members of the armed services. The report recognized the privileged position of student veterans and the fact that allowances under the university training plan were never intended to completely cover the costs for student veterans. It maintained, however, conditions had “altered radically since the inception of the Plan” and therefore student veterans were no longer receiving the full benefit intended by the VRA.74

The report used surveys of veterans at Queen’s University, the University of

Manitoba, Macdonald College, and the University of New Brunswick as evidence. The

Queen’s University questionnaire found on average single student veterans saved $305 out of their summer earnings, whereas married veterans saved approximately $103 but the wives of four out of six married veterans worked and their average monthly income was $75. The University of Manitoba questionnaire asked 58 percent of single and 55 percent of married veterans whether they might be forced to withdraw from university if their training grants were not increased. 37 percent responded affirmatively. The

Macdonald survey reported 24 of the 41 single veterans who answered the questionnaire said their savings were completely exhausted. Their average annual income including

73 LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 2, Jamieson to District Administrators, All Districts, 4 January 1949. 74 Ibid., “Brief of the National Council of Student Veterans,” [c. March 1949], 1-2. 389 monies from grants and part-time and summer employment was $681 while their average annual living cost during eight months of college was $879, equaling a deficit of $198.

Lastly, at the University of New Brunswick, 25 out of 46 married veterans with no children or one child stated their savings had been completely exhausted.75

Quite significantly, based on this data the NCSV no longer claimed the situation for married veterans was more difficult than that of single veterans. Both groups were

“facing a crisis” and at risk for discontinuing their studies, argued the report. On average, single veterans faced annual deficits of $86, married veterans with one or no children

$126, and married veterans with more than one child $84.76 The University Loan Fund, the report argued, was serving its purpose, but too many student veterans were being burdened with loans that would cause distress following completion of their studies. A total of 244 student loans were granted for the 1946-1947 academic year, the report summarized, amounting to $67,054; from September to December 1948, 211 loans were granted totaling $47,687.77

The report’s second request asked for the extension of loans through the

University Loan Fund to veterans who previously were ineligible because they were no longer drawing DVA allowances since they were past their period of eligibility or had failed to meet academic requirements. This recommendation was supported by a brief prepared by the University of British Columbia branch of the Canadian Legion in 1948. It

75 “Brief of the National Council of Student Veterans,” 3. 76 The NCSV attributed the discrepancy between single and married veterans to the wives of married male veterans being able to work part- or full-time during the academic year whereas single veterans had to rely solely on their summer earnings. This does not, however, explain the discrepancy between married veterans with one or no children and married veterans with more than one child. One would assume veterans with more children would report the greatest economic problems. It is possible that older children in larger families were able to relieve mothers of childcare responsibilities to enable them to leave the home for work. 77 “Brief of the National Council of Student Veterans,” 2, 4. 390 had been presented the previous year and refused by Mackenzie. The University of

British Columbia brief had requested that student veterans no longer eligible for university training benefits be allowed financial assistance to continue their education through the University Loan Fund. The problem, the brief explained, had come to a fore because during the 1947-1948 academic year, DVA allowances had expired for many veterans. From April 1947 to April 1948, for example, the Scholarship Committee for extension considered 450 University of British Columbia students but only 125 were granted. The following year, 230 of the 505 were accepted.78

On 15 March 1949, G.H. Parliament, the Director General of the Veterans

Welfare Services, wrote Walter Sainsbury Woods, the Deputy Minister of the DVA, about the 1949 brief. He argued the extension of the student veteran loan scheme could not be instituted because the loans were authorized under Section 11 (3) (2) of the VRA which only enabled the government to grant loans to veterans being paid allowances under the Act.79 He reported the extension had been considered in 1947 but was opposed by a representative of the Treasury. The legislation, Parliament maintained, would not be altered. Loans could be granted under Section 11(5) (a) to meet emergency conditions only and government aid as well as private funds of universities was available in the form of bursaries and financial assistance, which, he argued, would provide adequate help for any “worthy student.” The resolution had been thoroughly discussed with officers of the

78 “Brief of the National Council of Student Veterans,” 8-12, 14. 79 Section 11 (3) (2) read: “The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council and subject to regulations, provide any university in Canada with moneys, whereby and wherefrom the university may make small loans to meet emergency conditions among veterans who are being paid allowances pursuant to sections eight and nine of this Act.” See LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 2, G.H. Parliament to the Deputy Minister, DVA, 15 March 1949. 391

Training Division, he concluded, and they did not feel that they were in a position to recommend “favourable consideration of any change in our present loan regulations.”80

The Minister of Veterans Affairs, Milton F. Gregg, responded to the brief on 18

March 1949 in a letter to NCSV president J.P. Kohl of McGill University. Gregg reported the DVA had undertaken “exhaustive surveys” in an effort to determine whether an increase in allowances was warranted. The results revealed very few, if any, student veterans had been obligated to leave their studies solely because of financial difficulties.

Gregg further explained that those who had discontinued their studies had found permanent employment “of a suitable nature.” Employment opportunities and higher wages were more than sufficient to offset the issues identified by the Conference. In response to the request for an extension of loans, Gregg agreed the question needed more study, but contended further assistance under the VRA might be regarded as preferential treatment to a small group of veterans. Assistance might be better rendered, he suggested, through university loans, bursaries, and other sources of financial aid.81

Student veterans met one last time with DVA officials in December 1949, but their organization was diminishing. The university training program was winding down and with it, the number of student veterans. A number of veterans had enrolled past the fifteen-month deadline due to deferments, but in 1949 the DVA set up a special board to consider each application individually and to tighten requirements. “In order to bring the training programme to an end within a reasonable time,” reported Woods, “it was decided to amend the legislation so that all such cases were deemed to have been discharged not

80 G.H. Parliament to the Deputy Minister, DVA, 15 March 1949. 81 Ibid., Milton F. Gregg to J.P. Kohl, 18 March 1949. 392 later than 30 June 1948.”82 By the 1951-1952 academic year, even the Advisory

Committee recognized it was no longer necessary to convene its regular winter meeting.83

*****

Certainly the opinions and arguments presented by the NCSV did not reflect the entire veteran population, but their deliberations and recommendations reveal some of the challenges faced by student veterans. Negotiations between the NCSV and the DVA also emphasized the responsibility of veterans in their own rehabilitation. The success of the program, as the second report of the NCSV read, was dependent upon the “initiative and energy of the individual student veterans themselves.”84 The university training plan thus illustrates the agency of veterans in their own rehabilitation.

The university training plan provided many veterans with a means of reestablishing themselves in society. Within the university veterans were offered a safe and quiet community in which to readjust to the demands of civil life. Through their student veteran communities, they found like-minded individuals and were given the support and resources to adapt themselves to the post-war world. Student veterans organized politically on campus, occupied leadership roles in student clubs and societies, were venerated as athletic heroes, and stood as examples of all that the nation had sacrificed in its fight against Nazism and fascism. It was no small undertaking to leave the fields of battle and enter the university lecture hall, for many for the first time.

Through their studies, veterans reintegrated themselves into Canadian society, with government assistance and the full support of their university administrators, professors, and fellow students. Woods’ explanation was apt: the university training plan was

82 Woods, Rehabilitation, 91. 83 Jamieson, “Training Programme for Veterans Superintendent’s Annual Report,” 21 March 1952. 84 Beaufoy, A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans, 24. 393

“perhaps the best investment in the whole rehabilitation programme … an investment in

Canadian lives and the future of Canada.”85

The university training program was characterized by its longevity and magnitude. Between 1941 and 1952, the number of veterans in receipt of university benefits increased in proportion to all other VRA benefits. In April 1946, 31,366 veterans received benefits for university or pre-matriculation courses out of a total of 119,630 in receipt of allowances under the VRA. By January 1948, this number had increased to

32,963 out of a total 52,769.86 The cost of the scheme amounted to over $145 million.87

University training was one of the most costly rehabilitation measures. Compared to other VRA benefits, higher education incurred by far the largest expenditure, even after adjusting for the fact that university education stretched over several years whereas other

DVA programs were more focused in time or provided a one-time compensation. During the 1946-1947 fiscal year, the DVA gave assistance to veterans taking university training at an average cost of $603 per veteran. By comparison, the average cost of pursuing vocational training per veteran for the same year was $361, $154 for out-of-work allowances, and $371 for awaiting returns grants.88 By 31 March 1951, the university training program had trained 53,788 veterans, costing the DVA $85,413,561 in allowances, $31,238,004 in fees, and $17,810,092 in supplementary grants, for a total of

85 LAC, RG35, Volume 1, File Misc Speeches, Walter Woods, “Address on Rehabilitation,” [c. 1945]. 86 LAC, RG38, Volume 372, DVA News Release No. 306, [c. 1948], 1. 87 Woods, Rehabilitation, 81. 88 Awaiting returns grants provided an allowance to veterans who started their own businesses, went into farming, or opened professional practices. See DVA News Release No. 286, 1. 394

$137,801,657 (equivalent to over $1.3 billion in 2015).89 In the same period, 80,110 veterans undertook vocational training at a total cost of $75,260,723.90

The university training plan was expensive and highly successful. This was the result of early government planning and the close collaboration of major stakeholders.

Woods argued the success of rehabilitation could not be attributed to one individual; rather, it was the result of a “combined operation” involving parliament, the government, parliamentary committees, the civil service, the Canadian Legion and other veterans’ organizations, veterans themselves, and hundreds of men and women serving on committees across the country.91 Certainly without the cooperation and efforts of

Canadian universities and colleges, this program would not have been possible; nor would it have been possible without generous financial support from the Dominion and provincial governments and the extensive administrative structures of universities, the

DPNH, and later the DVA.

The program was, by and large, a response to the veteran legislation of the Great

War and a realization that the planning of a rehabilitation program could not wait until an armistice. “It was obvious that this time we must not wait until the closing of the war and then hastily patch together a programme for the re-establishment of those who had served—injured and able-bodied alike,” argued Woods. Mackenzie and Woods had the advantage of hindsight. They were very conscious of the “imperfections” of pioneering efforts and sought to “profit by those past mistakes” in planning their program.

Mackenzie identified his experience “gained through years of critical observation of the

89 Statistics Canada, Consumer Price Indexes for Canada, Monthly, 1914-2006, (V41690973 series). 90 The cost of allowances and fees alone came to $52,227,148 for vocational students and $116,741,565 for university students, or an average of $652 per vocational student and $2170 per university student. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 107. 91 Ibid., xi-xii. 395 effectiveness of the legislation and administrative measures” pursued with respect to the veterans of the Great War as “perhaps the greatest of all our assets.” “Our problem,” argued Mackenzie, “was not one of creating something out of nothing but of expanding and improving existing services and existing legislation.”92 Unlike in 1914, they entered the Second World War with a Pension Act, with a civilian department “trained and experienced” in the administration of veterans’ affairs, and with a medical organization able to accommodate casualties and care for the sick and wounded.93

University and DVA officials stressed the importance of their work. “There can be no doubt,” argued Thomson, “that the training of this large number of young men and women … will be of great value to the nation.”94 In a speech made in the House of

Commons on 22 February 1951, the Honourable George A. Drew, the Premier of

Ontario, said of the university training program: “I am sure no investment was ever better made and no money ever better spent than that which gave to the young men and women education to equalize their opportunity for the years ahead. It did more than anything else could have done.”95

What was the effect of the provision for free higher education? For universities, the entrance of veterans transformed their institutions and stimulated the “tremendous growth” of the “physical plant” of the universities.96 New subjects were added to the

92 DVA News Release No. 132, 3. 93 Ibid., 2. 94 Annual Report of the President Academic Year 1949-50, (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1950), 9. 95 The support for the program is particularly striking because Drew was a member of the opposition, the Progressive Conservative Party. Throughout the war, he was outspoken in his criticism of the Mackenzie King government, particularly during the Conscription Crisis of 1944. See Woods, Rehabilitation, 84. 96 Dorothy McMurray, Four Principals of McGill: a Memoir 1929-1963 (Montreal: The Graduates’ Society of McGill University, 1974), 51. 396 curriculum as a result of the demand amongst veterans for specific types of training.97 It also increased the public profile and perceived importance of universities to national reconstruction and the maintenance of peace. “The war has publicized the work of the universities,” wrote President Henry John Cody of the University of Toronto. “The university has justified its existence by its services, and is one of the few institutions in which youth whole-heartedly believes.”98

By the same token, an examination of post-war planning highlights the collaboration of government and university officials and provides another example of how war enabled and encouraged the Dominion Government to intervene in educational affairs, which were the constitutional purview of provincial governments. The PDRO was

Canada’s first major provision of student assistance for post-secondary education. Still, post-war planning reveals the agency of university officials; from the very beginning they were instrumental in the development of reconstruction policies and programs.

It is also clear that negotiations with government altered the form of university representation. The NCCU, formerly relegated to organizing a series of annual meetings to discuss topics of common interest, took on a new prominent role, acquiring significance and importance as a medium of collaboration with government authorities.

By the post-war period, the NCCU was recognized as the primary means for agreement on policies amongst universities that would inform and shape federal involvement in higher education.

97 In particular, the veteran demand for medical training led to the establishment and expansion of faculties of medicine in Canada. In 1944, for example, the pre-medical students at the University of British Columbia initiated a campaign for the establishment of a medical school. They argued that the return of veterans to the campus had “made the need for a med school more imperative.” See “Pre-Medical School Campaign Successful,” The Ubyssey, 10 February 1950, 3. 98 University of Toronto President’s Report, for the year ending 30th June 1945 (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1945), 21-22. 397

Conclusion

The negotiations between university, government, and military officials concerning how to best mobilize university students and utilize the facilities and resources of institutions of higher learning altered the traditional role of university leaders in Canada. University administrators became important organizers and coordinators of the nation’s effort to train personnel for the armed services and essential wartime industries. The National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU), the national representative body that had been founded before the war, took on a leading advisory role, acquiring new significance as a means of collaboration between university heads and as an effective interest or advocacy group. The NCCU lobbied and pressured the

Dominion Government to tailor mobilization and demobilization policies and set goals that Canadian universities were capable and prepared to meet. It also maneuvered to secure the necessary financing for the training schemes that the military was counting on to provide the much-needed educated men, trained officer candidates, and scientific and technical personnel with highly specialized knowledge and skills.

As this study shows, all of the training schemes that were developed during the

Second World War on university campuses reflected perceived wartime needs and, when those needs evolved over the course of the war, existing programs were modified (or abandoned) and new ones inaugurated. These programs were unquestionably historically significant and reveal a substantial shift in how universities were perceived by civilian politicians, military leaders, and school administrators. The scope of student mobilization policies, university service training units, accelerated curricula, smaller specialized training programs, and the university training plan, which provided free higher education 398 for veterans, illustrate how the role of Canadian universities was redefined to meet the exigencies of modern war. During the First World War, enthusiastic volunteers, recruitment campaigns, and conscription deprived Canadian universities of a substantial percentage of their students and faculty. Still comparatively small, even the largest

Canadian universities operated throughout the First World War only at a subsistence level. By the earliest phases of the Second World War, these same institutions had become important training grounds and had evolved, at least in effect, into extensions of

Canada’s unprecedented effort to effectively mobilize its natural and human resources for the war effort.

The development of wartime training programs at Canadian universities kindled a new appreciation of how institutions of higher learning could be martialed to help achieve victory. Thousands of Canadian students and enlisted personnel from all service branches enrolled in the various training schemes. Gauging the ultimate success of these programs, however, is difficult. Even before the Allies’ victory, the initial optimism about the potential impact of these programs, in particular military training and specialized courses for service personnel, was tarnished due to changes in the course of the Allies’ war effort, which impacted earlier estimates of human resource requirements, and, perhaps more significantly, by fiscal realities. Some programs, such as the Canadian

Army University Course (CAUC), became regarded as too expensive and inefficient. In the case of officer training, government and military officials came to the conclusion that the training of service personnel could be better undertaken by the military itself.

Throughout the war, numerous attempts were made to reform and improve existing training programs even as new training programs were being developed on 399

Canadian campuses. The question of how to improve existing programs was consistently discussed by the executive of the NCCU and university advisors as well as by civilian and military leaders. Despite the substantial efforts to coordinate training and the desire of university officials to view all of their efforts as successful, before the war ended it was clear that much of the wartime training at universities had been too disorganized, with too many regional variations in programs, unequal capabilities amongst the numerous and geographically dispersed campuses, and a significant number of smaller, highly technical training programs exhausting resources that could have been earmarked for larger, more ambitious, and more general training schemes. In the case of university service training, the war ended before there was time to fully address problems and institute reforms. What is most evident in a comparison of the training efforts undertaken by universities during the Second World War is that the training programs given to students and service personnel and the varied efforts to increase and encourage the production of graduates in essential fields were much less successful than the veteran education program. The reason is simple: the government devoted the most time and resources to ensuring the success of the university training plan. University officials did not need to work to gain government support for veteran training.

This study of Canadian universities during the Second World War confirms

Michael Bliss’ observation about “how desperately hard it was to organize for total war.”1 University administrators and government and military officials made substantial efforts to utilize institutions of higher learning to meet the human resource needs of the nation’s armed services and essential war industries. In these efforts, university heads

1 Michael Bliss, “Canada’s Swell War,” Saturday Night 18, no. 4 (May 1995), 41, quoted in Michael D. Stevenson, “National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War” (Ph.D. Diss., the University of Western Ontario, 1992), 363. 400 were willing participants who collaborated with both the Dominion Government and the various service branches to develop programs and accelerate curriculums to meet the demands of a modern army, navy, and air force fighting a modern, and historically unprecedented, war. This was a constant process of negotiation and adaptation, made further complicated by changes on the ground, the unpredictable progression of the

Allies’ land, air, and sea campaigns, shifting conceptions of labour needs, greater demand for personnel with specific knowledge and skills, and the extraordinary costs and administrative challenges of mobilizing a large and geographically dispersed country’s economy and population for total war.

The first chapter of this dissertation examined the development of policies and regulations affecting the mobilization of university students in Canada during the Second

World War. As already noted, the mobilization of students was accomplished through the close collaboration of university and government officials. The NCCU was at the center of this cooperation. The university heads and representatives that comprised this group shaped regulations affecting university students and the wider role of universities in the country’s war effort. Dominion Government officials requested NCCU representatives at major policy meetings, consulted with university authorities about policy implementation, and appointed university officials to key advisory positions and committees.

Early student mobilization regulations emphasized the view—shared by university and government leaders alike—that students would be more useful to the war if they finished their degrees before enlisting. This policy reflected lessons learned during the First World War, where significant numbers of students abandoned their studies to 401 enlist before completing their educations and acquiring the vital knowledge and skills that would have allowed them to better contribute to the country’s war effort and postwar reconstruction. There was consensus that the waste of the nation’s brainpower should not be repeated.

Over the course of the Second World War, student mobilization regulations became increasingly stringent. University and government officials engaged in prolonged discussions about how best to ensure that students who were being permitted to complete their studies would ultimately fulfil their wartime obligations. Throughout these debates, the NCCU continued to be vital to the development of new policies and strove to exercise as much influence as possible. Both university and government officials had high expectations that university graduates would play an important role in winning the war.

Inasmuch as mobilization policies allowed students to continue their studies, university and government officials saw these policies as a success. The regulations were the product of a reciprocal relationship: the government urged universities to continue their activities and in return, universities agreed to introduce compulsory military training on campus and to use their facilities and resources to their maximum capacity. The close nature of this cooperation was abetted by the scope of the government’s financial commitment to the universities. Universities were not expected to fund, on their own, the training programs that were being implemented on their campuses. Financial reimbursement from the Dominion Government, which had been diligently negotiated by the NCCU, funded the majority of the training programs that were instituted on campuses throughout the Second World War. 402

The government needed university authorities to cooperate in its plans.

Legislation and regulations could be used to mandate the appropriation of university facilities for the sake of the war effort but the government also required the expertise of university leaders as administrators. Negotiation and compromise characterized the interactions between politicians and university heads throughout the war. The armed services’ human resource and training needs were legitimate and pressing but all parties throughout the negotiation of mobilization policies sought to balance the needs of the county’s military and economy with the goal of ensuring that Canadian universities continued to educate both future service personnel and the next generation of professionals that the country would need after the war. The ultimate compromise, produced through protracted debate and negotiations, was relatively straightforward.

Under the government’s mobilization regulations, university students could remain in their studies if they joined a university service training unit such as the Canadian Officers

Training Corps (COTC).

As discussed in chapters two and three, mandatory university service training was initially overseen by the COTC. The COTC was established well before the war; however, due to the government’s mobilization policies, it was now given a substantially larger command. The dramatic growth of the COTC on Canadian campuses, and the later establishment of the University Air Training Corps (UATC) and the University Naval

Training Detachments (UNTD), as well as the implementation of other service training schemes on campuses, would not have been possible without the support of university authorities. Through the NCCU and various other university-government coordinating committees, university authorities negotiated with government and military officials to 403 ensure that students could fulfill their training obligations under the country’s mobilization legislation while completing their academic course and preparing for eventual service. For some students, these programs also afforded the opportunity to work towards a commission. The introduction of compulsory military training increased the responsibility and size of the COTC. In effect, during the first years of the Second

World War, the government’s mobilization regulations mandated a dramatic expansion of the COTC. This initially undermined the organization’s ability to provide recruits with the highest quality of training. The COTC trained by far the largest number of university students throughout the war. Although the other service branches inaugurated their own officer training corps, the introduction of these comparatively small training schemes did not reduce the COTC’s training burden.

Service training on campus became more complex as the war progressed. The introduction of compulsory training for male students intensified discussions about the wartime responsibilities of female students and encouraged universities to independently develop war service training programs for women. The establishment of air and naval units also created competition between the three services for “suitable” recruits.

University service training units were important recruiting programs, designed to harness students to supply the armed services with highly qualified, specially trained personnel.

COTC officers commanding feared their contingents would be left with the UATC’s and the UNTD’s rejected candidates. As discussed in chapter three, a change in the army’s policy for the training of officers exacerbated the situation. With an officer commission no longer guaranteed, there was concern that the COTC would not appeal to the most motivated potential recruits and would only attract candidates who were not interested in 404 eventual active service or were only participating in the program to fulfill the training requirements mandated under the country’s mobilization regulations. In addition, expansion resulted in the inefficient use of limited resources, the duplication of efforts, and bureaucratic wrangling over how to reform programs.

The need to address the status and mandate of the COTC and reduce competition between the three services prompted extensive discussion amongst representatives of the

NCCU, officers commanding of COTC contingents, senior army officials, and officials of the DND. These debates led to the creation of the Joint Services University Training

Board (JSUTB) to oversee the coordination and scope of training. The establishment of this organization was the culmination of extensive collaboration between university, government, and military authorities. Despite extensive negotiations and concerted efforts, ultimately the war ended before university service training programs could be perfected.

In addition to the mobilization of their students, university authorities were also eager to utilize their pedagogical resources in support of the war effort. As covered in chapters four and five, the demand for graduates in essential fields prompted government officials to collaborate with university officials in the development of accelerated programs. University officials were comprehensive in their deliberations about the potential impact of accelerated courses. They insisted that the government bear the financial burden of such programs and that the students enrolled in them be provided with financial aid because they would be unable to work during the summer vacation. Amidst the debates on the development of accelerated curricula, university officials kept an eye on the bigger picture. The deliberations over acceleration were informed by other key 405 discussions regarding the contributions of universities to the war effort, most importantly whether the education of graduates in fields that were perceived to be essential to the war effort was more important than compulsory military training.

University authorities also readily collaborated with military officials to organize and develop specialized short-term programs for enlisted service personnel. These training schemes reflected the larger recognition that universities could facilitate the provision of additional training to produce skilled and technical personnel essential for the winning of the war. Specialized short courses differed from other university wartime training efforts because they were not arranged according to the national strategy and therefore involved less collaboration with government officials. Their development was also far less complicated because the candidates were active service members and not enrolled students (or civilians). In most cases, these courses could be described as local efforts; a specific branch of the military made a request for a university to mobilize their facilities and resources to provide short-term training to a limited number of enlisted personnel. Often, the university providing the course already had the facilities and faculty needed to provide the training. As discussed in chapter five, extensive correspondence between university heads and faculty and military leaders reveals that university officials were eager to collaborate with the military to implement these programs.

The most successful collaboration between universities and the government was the creation of the university training plan, which provided free education to veterans. As discussed in chapters six and seven, this program was the result of early government planning and the close cooperation of university and government officials. In common with national mobilization policies, the veteran education program was developed in 406 response to the failures of the First World War. This program had the most significant and lasting impact on Canadian campuses. Returning veterans transformed campuses and stimulated the largest institutional growth in the history of Canadian universities.

Despite calls for reform, the turn of the war in the Allies’ favour, and substantially revised estimates of the human resource needs for the army, navy, and air force, university students were required to take military training under the country’s national mobilization policies. Many university students were at military training camp when news arrived on 7 May 1945 that Germany had unconditionally surrendered. Seventeen science students from the artillery wing of the University of Toronto COTC were undertaking special to arm training in Petawawa, Ontario, when they heard the news.

According to the Petawawa war diary written by Irwin Blackstone and H. Shanfield, around 1500 hours an “unusual incident took place” interrupting their lectures on artillery organization:

The door was opened and an officer appeared. A knowing glance passed between Lt. Warburton and this man, and the latter simply announced “Normandy.” It was only later that we were to learn the hidden meaning of this word. A visible hush had fallen over the camp and we were caught in its spell. The answer, when it came, released suddenly the tension which had been upon us for five and a half years. With severe nonchalance V-E day was proclaimed. Our hearts sang with joy, intermingled with sorrow for those who had made this day possible but who would never participate. That was the meaning of the code word “Normandy.”

After forming a large parade square flanking instruction headquarters, cadets were formally told the war had ended in Europe. “There was no wild cheering from the men,” recalled Blackstone and Shanfield, “One could only surmise that the reason for such a reaction lay in the manner in which we had been slowly prepared for this ‘day of days.’”2

2 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services (UTARMS), Office of the President, Accession 1968-0003, Box 006, Petawawa War Diary, Irwin A. Blackstone and H. Shanfield, “Petawawa Diary,” 15 June 1945, 24-25. 407

The mobilization policies affecting university students during the Second World

War were developed by the Dominion Government in cooperation with university officials. In contrast to the First World War, these policies reflected the understanding that institutions of higher learning were an integral part of the war effort. Government officials encouraged universities to “maintain their establishment” and, so long as students made good progress in their studies and participated in mandatory training, they were permitted to remain in their courses until graduation. As Walter Edwin Sainsbury

Woods, a key architect of Canada’s Second World War rehabilitation plan, later remarked: “Canadian manpower policy served to keep the universities in full operation.”3

Throughout the discussions surrounding the mobilization of institutions of higher learning, university, government, and military officials considered the functions of universities and their importance to both the war effort and the future social and political health of the country. University heads were at the forefront of these debates. Far from pacifists, this study reveals that pragmatic concerns about the potential usefulness of their graduates to the war effort, the viability of their institutions, and the postwar future of the country were at the heart of their concerns. University leaders made considerable efforts to orient their institutions to meet the human resource needs and training requirements of

Canada’s war effort while remaining committed to the belief that students in essential subjects should complete their education. Their advocacy on behalf of this agenda was considerable and continuous and the records show that they exercised significant influence on the ultimate outcome of crucially important policy debates.

3 Walter S. Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation): Being a History of the Development and Carrying Out of a Plan for the Re-establishment of a million young veterans of World War II by the Department of Veterans Affairs and its predecessor the Department of Pensions and National Health (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1953), 75-76. 408

Figures

Figure 1: Full-Time University Enrolment in Canada by Gender and Select Years, 1920-1960

Year Undergraduate Graduate Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

1920 19075 3716 22791 315 108 423 19390 3824 23214 1925 19580 5272 24852 625 221 846 20205 5493 25698 1930 24148 7428 31576 998 352 1350 25146 7780 32926 1935 26028 7494 33522 1198 388 1586 27226 7882 35108 1940 26710 8107 34817 1243 326 1569 27953 8433 26386 1945 48991 12870 61861 2240 630 2870 51231 13500 64731 1950 50170 13866 64036 3857 702 4559 54027 14568 68595 1955 54545 14765 69310 2970 457 3427 57515 15222 72737 1960 80582 26629 107211 5532 986 6518 86114 27615 113729

Source: Statistics Canada, Series W340-438, Table W304-338a.

409

Figure 2: Full-Time University Enrolment in Canada by Province and Select Years, 1920-1960

Province Year BC AB SK MB ON QC NB NS PE NL

1920 1065 1030 657 1674 9240 7270 493 1678 107 -- 1925 1651 1151 899 2279 9170 8292 566 1582 108 -- 1930 2353 1574 1817 2658 12047 9459 908 2008 102 -- 1935 2111 1829 1834 2743 12817 10634 889 2158 93 -- 1940 2887 2023 1994 2551 12410 11349 1020 2024 128 -- 1945 7004 3097 4043 5486 21741 17455 2159 3478 268 -- 1950 6762 3254 2743 4585 23207 21284 2052 3998 270 380 1955 6886 3980 3095 4309 22642 23997 2544 4444 263 577 1960 13067 7163 5648 6259 32175 37843 4063 5710 563 1238

Source: Statistics Canada, Series W340-438, Table W304-338a. 410

Figure 3: Number of Male Students who Failed or were in the Lower Half of the Class at Close of 1943-1944 Academic Session

University Registered Failed % Lower % Total % Half

UBC 1401 112 8 78 5.6 190 13.6 Alberta 894 38 4.3 14 1.6 52 5.8 Saskatchewan 843 61 7.2 121 14.4 182 21.6 Manitoba 1366 63 4.6 203 14.9 266 19.5 Western 777 53 6.8 41 5.3 94 12.1 OAV 227 7 3.1 -- -- 7 3.1 OVC 103 3 2.9 -- -- 3 2.9 McMaster 402 15 3.7 60 14.9 75 18.7 Toronto 3590 307 8.6 160 4.5 467 13 Queen’s 1280 68 5.3 84 6.6 152 11.9 Ottawa 308 11 3.6 37 12 48 15.6 Montreal 1895 123 6.5 -- -- 123 6.5 Beaux Arts 112 ------Laval 717 25 3.5 14 2 39 5.4 McGill 1645 98 6 132 8 230 14 Sir George Wm. 165 17 10.3 15 9.1 32 19.4 Bishop’s 53 4 7.5 3 5.7 7 13.2 Acadia 253 6 2.4 1 0.4 7 2.8 Dalhousie 480 24 5 11 2.3 35 7.3 Mount Allison 213 18 8.5 11 5.2 29 13.6 UNB 308 26 8.4 54 17.5 80 26 NS Agricultural 28 1 3.6 -- -- 1 3.6 NS Technical 65 0 0 ------St. Dunstan’s 69 2 2.9 23 33.3 25 36.2 St. Francis Xavier 401 21 5.2 58 14.5 79 19.7 St. Joseph’s 125 ------St. Mary’s 152 12 7.9 18 11.8 30 19.7 Total 17,872 1,115 6.2 1,138 6.4 2,253 12.6

Source: LAC, RG27, Volume 3008, NSS – Mobilization Section, University Advisory Board,” Minutes of Meetings and Correspondence Re Mobilization of Students 1943- 1945, Report – Numbers of Students Who Failed or were in the Lower Half of the Class at Close of Session 1943-44,” n.d. 411

Figure 4: Enlistment in University Naval Training Divisions by Division, 1943-1945

Division University 1943-1944 1944-1945 April 1945 November 1945

HMCS Discovery – Vancouver UBC 142 180 155 32 HMCS Nonsuch – Edmonton Alberta 56 105 98 120 HMCS Unicorn – Saskatoon Saskatchewan 80 92 70 33 HMCS Chippawa – Winnipeg Manitoba 157 103 66 52 HMCS Prevost – London Western Ontario 45 59 48 51 HMCS Star – Hamilton McMaster 32 44 42 30 HMCS Star II – Preston OAC 57 71 61 90 HMCS York – Toronto Toronto 284 294 252 36 HMCS Cataraqui – Kingston Queen’s 102 97 80 17 HMCS Carleton – Ottawa Ottawa 43 58 60 49* HMCS Donnacona – Montreal McGill 85 129 113 10 HMCS Cartier – Montreal Montréal 55 113 100 55 HMCS Montcalm – Quebec Laval 88 107 86 40 HMCS Haligonian – Halifax Dalhousie 38 39 31 113† HMCS Haligonian – Halifax St. Francis Xavier 42 56 50 Total 1,306 1,547 1,312 728

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 1, Department of National Defence, Naval Service, untitled chart on enrolment in UNTD divisions, n.d; LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 2, Department of National Defence, Naval Service, “Estimate Number of UNTD Ratings Under Training 271607 November, 1945,” n.d; and LAC, RG24, Volume 11458, File ND1000-186, Volume 2, Brock to the Secretary, Naval Board, Naval Service Headquarters, 28 April 1945.

* This is an estimated figure. † This figure includes enrolment in UNTD units at Dalhousie and St. Francis Xavier. 412

Figure 5: Enrolment of Medical Students at Canadian Universities, 1939-1940

University Length of First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Total Course Year Year Year Year Year & Year (years) Intern

Alberta 6 38 40 34 43 42 38 233 Manitoba 5 58 49 50 61 46 264 Dalhousie 5 50 48 40 45 37 220 Queen’s 6 42 45 46 42 45 58 278 Western Ontario 6 58 38 31 37 30 29 223 Toronto 6 148 125 117 118 137 132 777 McGill 4 97 94 90 87 76* 444 Montréal 5 51 49 50 55 49 254 Laval 5 85 46 68 57 58 314 Total 627 534 526 545 520 255 3,007

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8787, “Session 1939-1940,” [c. June 1941].

* McGill University discontinued the fifth year beginning with the class of 1940. One year of internship was still required to be eligible for licensing examinations. 413

Figure 6: Graduates of Canadian Medical Faculties, 1934-1945

Year Dalhousie Laval McGill Montréal Queen’s Toronto Western Manitoba Alberta Total

1934 30 46 79 51 45 174 25 73 24 547 1935 24 40 106 37 47 110 33 44 29 470 1936 26 38 92 42 45 126 27 56 21 473 1937 28 36 105 54 46 109 46 52 32 508 1938 32 40 97 41 52 119 34 46 31 492 1939 37 40 98 27 45 129 29 56 32 493 Total 177 240 577 252 280 767 194 327 169 2983 1940 35 49 162 48 58 138 29 45 35 559 1941 42 51 86 53 44 138 30 62 37 543 1942 42 57 89 51 39 114 36 54 46 538 1943 73 101 191 103 93 209 61 51 69 951 1944 33 66 96 45 40 127 37 62 36 542 1945 43 65 101 56 44 120 33 110 32 604 Total 268 399 725 356 316 846 226 384 255 3777

Source: DUASC, Box 257, File 2, E.L.M. Burns to A.B. Fennell, 14 September 1946, Table 14. 414

Figure 7: Analysis of Enlistments Required at Canadian Universities to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics, 1941

Course No. 1

University

1. Enlistments of 2. Graduates Course 3. Failures 4. Holdovers 5. Estimated Holdover Graduates 6. Estimated Failures Holdover Failures Total 6) (3 and Graduates Total 5) (2 and

Toronto 500 228 118 154 97 57 175 325 Dalhousie 100 51 19 30 18 12 31 69 Mount Allison 50 24 14 12 8 4 18 32 UNB 101 42 41 18 11 7 48 53 McGill 505 259 83 163 103 60 143 362 École Polytechnique 46 13 17 16 10 6 23 23 UBC 150 88 15 47 30 17 32 118 OAC 75 45 10 20 13 7 17 58 Manitoba 250 159 40 51 32 19 59 191 Saskatchewan 150 71 29 50 32 18 47 103 Alberta 121 85 10 26 16 10 20 101 RMC 50 47 3 2 1 1 49 Queen’s 149 92 22 35 22 13 35 114 McMaster 135 88 23 24 15 9 32 103 Western Ontario 120 71 13 36 23 13 26 94 Total 2,502 1,363 454 685 432 253 707 1,795

* Prior to 15 September 1941. 415

Course No. 2†

University

5. Estimated Failures Total Graduates Total

1. Enlistments of 2. Graduates Course 3. Failures 4. Holdovers Failures Holdover 6. Estimated Failures Holdover 6) (3 and 5) (2 and

Toronto 300 210 90 ------90 210 Mount Allison 25 18 7 ------7 18 UNB 75 53 22 ------22 53 McGill 300 210 90 ------90 210 École Polytechnique 25 18 7 ------7 18 UBC 75 52 23 ------23 52 OAC 75 52 23 ------23 52 Saskatchewan 100 70 30 ------30 70 RMC 50 35 15 ------15 35 Queen’s 75 53 22 ------22 53 McMaster 50 35 15 ------15 35 Western Ontario 50 35 15 ------15 35 Total 1,200 841 359 ------359 841

† Commencing 22 September 1941. 416

Additional to Graduate 4,000

University

5. Estimated Failures Holdover Failures Total Graduates Total

1. Enlistments of 2. Graduates Course 3. Failures 4. Holdovers 6. Estimated Failures Holdover 6) (3 and 5) (2 and

Toronto 550 385 165 ------165 385 Mount Allison 25 18 7 ------7 18 UNB 75 53 22 ------22 53 McGill 550 385 165 ------165 385 École Polytechnique 42 30 12 ------12 30 UBC 175 122 53 ------53 122 OAC 75 52 23 ------23 52 Saskatchewan 166 116 50 ------50 116 RMC 50 35 15 ------15 35 Queen’s 75 52 23 ------23 52 McMaster 84 59 25 ------25 59 Western Ontario 83 57 26 ------26 57 Total 1,950 1,364 586 ------586 1,364 Total (All) 5,652 3,568 1,399 685 432 253 1,652 4,000

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, “R.D.F. Mechanics Analysis of Enlistments Required to Produce 4,000 Trained R.D.F. Mechanics,” [c. August 1941]. 417

Figure 8: Progress of No. 2 Canadian Army University Course as of 19 January 1944

University Quota Remaining % Wastage Casualties Physical Academically Failed Transferred Total Unsatisfactory Mid-Term to other Exams services

Western Ontario 60 57 5.00% -- 3 -- -- 3 Toronto 250 227* 9.20% 2 19 2 -- 23 McMaster 50 47† 6.00% -- -- 3 -- 3 Queen’s 135 131 2.96% -- 4 -- 1 4 McGill 250 193 22.80% -- 8 48 -- 56‡ Montréal 100 98 2.00% -- 2 -- -- 2 Laval 40 40 0.00% ------Acadia 70 70 0.00% ------Mount Allison 50 48 4.00% 5 2 -- -- 2 UBC 85 70 17.65% 2 1 12 -- 15 Saskatchewan 120 112 6.67% 5 -- 3 1 8 Alberta 60 52 13.33% -- -- 8 -- 8 Total 1270 1145 9.84% 9 39 76 -- 124

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1, Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, H.Q.S. 8679-1-10, “Return Re No. 2 Canadian Army University Course,” 19 January 1944.

* Includes six on one month’s probation. † Includes six on one month’s probation. ‡ One candidate unaccounted for in the total. 418

Figure 9: Estimated Expenses and Tuition Fees for 1945-1946 Academic Year due to Veteran Enrolment Assuming a 75% Increase in Student Population over the 1944-1945 Academic Year at Select Universities

UNB McGill Queen’s Toronto Saskatchewan UBC

Student enrollment 700 6,933 2,632 11,025 2,497 5,250 Total expenditures (excluding research and extension) $264,000 $4,399,938 $1,171,453 $4,650,000 $1,321,000 $1,599,187 Total tuition fees 133,000 1,603,992 491,172 1,800,000 299,000 782,476 Deficit (1-2) 131,000 2,795,946 680,281 2,850,000 1,022,000 816,711 Cost of salaries of instructors 143,000 1,388,043 699,462 2,790,000 957,000 882,635 Cost of administration 46,000 285,808 225,350 627,000 90,000 352,420 Cost of maintenance and operation of buildings and grounds 45,000 600,133 172,930 870,000 110,000 249,921 Cost of supplies and consumable equipment 15,000 521,952 40,330 363,000 60,000 114,211 Total expense items $249,000 $2,795,946 $1,138,072 $4,650,000 $1,217,000 $1,599,187

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Table 11. Estimated expenses and tuition fees in dollars assuming 75 per cent increase of student population over 1944-45, due to veteran enrolment,” [c. May 1945]. 419

Figure 10: Additional Expenditures on Behalf of Veterans Enrolled in University per Veteran, 1945-1946

University # of veterans Tuition, operating Capital Total additional Tuition fees per Additional and maintenance, expenditures for expenditures veteran expenditures special services, buildings and minus tuition counseling equipment fees per veteran

Acadia 227 $145 $68 $211 $205 $6 Alberta 1342 88 24 112 167 -55* Bishop’s 45 104 18 122 150 -28 UBC 3310 160 131 291 177 114 Dalhousie 508 67 41 108 188 -80 McGill 2700 294 111 406 260 146 Mount Allison 150 300 533 833 175 658 UNB 425 226 69 295 181 114 OAC 300 119 160 279 46 233 OVC 169 856 -- 856 85 771 Ottawa 52 291 288 579 127 452 Queen’s 1500 87 16 103 212 -109 Saskatchewan 1950 136 32 167 118 49 St. Francis Xavier 187 84 31 115 148 -33 Toronto 5535 215 214 428 226 202 Western Ontario 765 117 206 322 235 87 Average per veteran 19,166 $185 $126 $310 $199 $111 per year (total)

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Committee on University Requirements Additional expenditure on behalf of veterans enrolled by Canadian Universities per veteran Academic year 1945-46,” n.d.

* The minus (-) symbol under additional expenditures minus tuition indicates a surplus of funds. 420

Figure 11: Additional Expenditures on Behalf of Veterans Enrolled in University per Veteran, 1946-1947

Acadia 411 $134 $28 $162 $205 $-43* Alberta 1,960 102 61 163 167 -4 Bishop’s 83 57 17 72 150 -78 UBC 4,800 168 108 277 177 100 Dalhousie 837 119 51 170 188 -19 McGill 4,100 ------Mount Allison 280 2,644 179 443 175 268 UNB 650 240 152 392 181 211 OAC 495 72 444 516 46 470 OVC 276 524 -- 524 85 439 Ottawa 82 366 2,012 2,373 127 2,251 Queen’s 2,500 73 41 114 212 -98 Saskatchewan 2,800 177 84 261 118 143 St. Francis Xavier 271 ------Toronto 8,620 166 70 236 226 10 Western Ontario 1,275 189 133 322 235 87 Average per veteran 25,069 $158 $93 $251 $189 $62 per year (total)

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Committee on University Requirements additional expenditure on behalf of veterans enrolled by Canadian Universities per veteran Academic year 1946-47,” n.d.

* The minus (-) symbol under additional expenditures minus tuition indicates a surplus of funds. 421

Figure 12: Information from Supplementary Grant Claims, 1946-1947

†

University Average Per Expenditure Student Revenue Average Student Per Deficit Operating Student Per Veteran Special Per Expenditure Student

Toronto $398 $363 $35 $208 UBC 297 344 47 (S)‡ 269 McGill 430 413 17 189 Alberta 351 374 23 (S) 157 Saskatchewan 431 366 65 93 Manitoba 322 337 15 (S) 70 Queen’s 427 440 13 (S) 57 Western Ontario 498 432 66 98 UNB 375 362 13 140 Ontario College of Art 244 194 50 46 United College 148 117 31 51 McMaster 354 279 75 132 Acadia 353 309 44 157 St. Francis Xavier 217 192 25 170 Mount Allison 315 294 21 71 Carleton College 163 148 15 79 Laval 694 560 134 17 Victoria College 188 192 4 (S) 132 Ottawa 345 178 167 38 St. Patrick’s College 243 122 121 0 St. John’s College 411 320 91 0 St. Dunstan’s College 169 101 68 42 St. Paul’s College 196 111 85 30 Total average $329 $285 $35 $98

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Information from Supplementary Grant Claims for year 1946-47,” n.d.

* Excludes special veteran expenditures. † Excludes DVA supplementary grants. ‡ “S” denotes surplus. 422

Figure 13: Information from Financial Statements Regarding Supplementary Grant Claims, 1946-1947

University Year Total Total Deficit Provincial DVA Supp. Grant Expenditure Revenue Grant

Toronto 1946-47 $8,362,089 $6,201,752 $2,160,337 $1,914,583 $1,100,00 UBC 1946-47 3,677,071 2,755,632 921,439 920,050 695,944 1945-46 1,751,975 1,647,726 104,249 552,922 432,857 1944-45 977,732 1,038,678 60,946 (S)* 498,159 -- McGill 1946-47 4,273,692 3,414,769 858,923 238,500 500,000 (approx.) 1945-46 3,226,539 2,746,135 480,404 239,550 310,965 1944-45 2,124,655 2,099,028 25,627 213,853 -- Saskatchewan 1946-47 2,099,529 1,588,548 510,981 620,000 357,085 1945-46 1,899,007 1,729,363 169,644 579,167 248,748 1944-45 1,336,377 1,229,098 107,279 554,167 -- Manitoba 1946-47 1,684,006 1,602,030 81,976 388,025 123,718 1945-46 1,358,112 1,340,811 17,301 396,800 175,104 1944-45 1,007,471 1,032,689 25,218 (S) 359,300 -- Queen’s 1946-47 1,430,864 1,369,201 61,663 278,000 67,000 (approx.) 1945-46 1,100,595 1,027,490 73,105 280,500 140,398 1944-45 803,100 825,977 22,877 (S) 280,500 -- Western Ontario 1946-47 1,136,024 908,794 227,230 295,000 136,375 1945-46 913,838 806,193 107,645 305,000 84,541 1944-45 671,775 653,897 17,878 301,000 -- UNB 1946-47 623,885 487,913 135,972 172,125 122,720 1945-46 323,466 256,373 67,093 43,496 68,039 1944-45 137,933 138,429 496 (S) 56,453 --

* “S” denotes surplus. 423

University Year Total Total Deficit Provincial DVA Supp. Grant Expenditure Revenue Grant

Ontario College of Art 1946-47 $144,060 $101,027 $43,033 $50,000 $32,424 1945-46 108,873 89,867 19,006 46,655 31,735 1944-45 52,957 58,053 5,096 (S) 38,248 United College 1946-47 173,069 118,091 54,978 42,089 1945-46 94,718 61,066 33,652 7,914 1944-45 79,440 53,533 25,907 McMaster 1946-47 457,934 317,152 140,762 59,204 1945-46 344,632 276,412 68,220 36,459 1944-45 248,196 241,930 6,266 Acadia 1946-47 370,162 274,092 96,070 52,856 1945-46 259,766 235,725 24,041 31,500 1944-45 200,637 183,100 17,537 St. Francis Xavier 1946-47 226,528 157,170 69,358 42,075 1945-46 135,338 114,569 20,769 20,925 1944-45 110,486 88,122 22,364 Mount Allison 1946-47 299,247 260,647 38,600 25,000 (approx.) 1945-46 238,561 195,345 43,216 27,580 1944-45 176,863 143,278 33,585 Carleton College 1946-47 122,430 88,402 34,028 30,000 (approx.) 1945-46 73,854 84,587 10,733 (S) 54,697 1944-45 20,913 20,579 334 Victoria College 1946-47 156,170 119,021 37,149 44,939 36,341 1945-46 80,761 80,968 207 (S) 20,289 27,436 1944-45 56,823 46,913 9,910 17,998 Laval 1946-47 1,150,413 923,821 226,592 468,303 24,024 St. Patrick’s College 1946-47 38,954 19,512 19,442 7,500 (approx.) 1945-46 29,039 14,875 14,164 4,754 1944-45 25,692 8,646 17,046 424

University Year Total Total Deficit Provincial DVA Supp. Grant Expenditure Revenue Grant

St. Paul’s College 1946-47 30,291 16,166 14,125 7,674 1945-46 21,439 9,678 11,761 3,040 1944-45 14,794 4,654 10,140 St. John’s College 1946-47 29,971 23,395 6,576 2,414 1945-46 20,534 22,551 2,017 (S) 3,294 1944-45 12,852 12,821 31 St. Dunstan’s College 1946-47 23,846 13,620 10,226 2,444 1945-46 21,618 12,443 9,175 1,337 1944-45 17,616 9,021 8,595

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Information from Financial Statements Schedule & Supplementary Grant Claims, 1946-1947,” n.d. 425

Figure 14: Total Veteran Enrolment at Canadian Universities from December 31st of Indicated Year, 1943-1953

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-2-2, "Distribution of Student Veterans Under Sections 8 & 9 of the V.R.A. for all or part of the 1951-52 Academic Year,” 1 March 1952." 426

Figure 15: Statistics of the Committee on University Requirements for University Training of Veterans, 1945-1946

University Up to Dec. 31, 1945 In January 1946 Total

UBC 2129 1067 3196 Alberta 859 457 1316 Saskatchewan 1059 592 1651 Manitoba 1485 543 2028 Western Ontario 628 145 773 McMaster 154 61 215 Toronto 3048 1244 4292 OAC 237 63 300 OVC 131 38 169 Ontario College of Pharmacy 73 -- 73 Ontario College of Optometry 104 4 106 Osgoode 328 21 349 Ontario College of Art 228 -- 228 Queen’s 1030 -- 1030 Ottawa 42 10 52 St. Patrick’s College 60 1 61 Carleton College 385 234 619 McGill 2376 700 3076 Montréal 236 45 281 Loyola College 44 -- 44 Bishop’s 45 -- 45 Laval 90 13 103 UNB 288 138 426 Sir George Williams College 128 63 191 Mount Allison 108 52 160 Dalhousie 396 121 517 St. Mary’s College 18 1 19 Acadia 211 6 237 Nova Scotia Technical College 21 -- 21 Nova Scotia Agricultural 58 -- 58 College St. Francis Xavier 120 80 200 St. Joseph’s University 4 -- 4 Prince of Wales College 4 -- 4 Overseas 252 -- 252 In the United States 57 -- 57 Total 16,446 5,699 22,145

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2, “Interim Report of Committee on University Requirements,” [c. 1946].

427

Figure 16: DVA Statistics on Receiving University Training Benefits Recorded at Head Office up to 30 June 1946

In Training Discontinued University Undergraduate Postgraduate Undergraduate Postgraduate

UBC (including Victoria College) 2876 86 213 7 Alberta (including Mount Royal College) 1283 54 100 -- Saskatchewan (including Regina College) 1742 17 79 2 Manitoba (including United College and 1849 30 113 1 Brandon College) Western Ontario (including Assumption 773 33 45 2 College) McMaster 227 9 10 -- Toronto 4572 459 180 26 OAC 310 -- 12 -- OVC 124 1 6 -- Ontario College of Pharmacy 158 -- 1 -- Ontario College of Optometry 97 -- 7 -- Osgoode 369 3 38 -- Ontario College of Art 253 -- 7 -- Queen’s 1332 41 79 2 Ottawa 54 1 4 -- St. Patrick’s College 64 -- 4 -- Carleton College 343 -- 4 -- McGill 2306 205 193 10 Montréal 165 35 12 -- Loyola College 22 -- 2 -- Sir George Williams College 151 -- 10 -- Bishop’s 42 4 5 -- Laval 124 10 9 3 Kemptville Agricultural College 18 ------428

In Training Discontinued University Undergraduate Postgraduate Undergraduate Postgraduate

UNB 490 8 15 -- Mount Allison 213 3 3 -- Dalhousie (including King’s College) 424 16 15 -- St. Mary’s College 21 -- 2 -- Acadia 205 4 7 -- Nova Scotia Technical College 24 2 1 -- Nova Scotia Agricultural College 68 -- -- St. Francis Xavier 165 -- 4 -- St. Joseph’s University 7 ------Prince of Wales College 5 ------Overseas 35 87 -- -- Total 20,911 1,106 1,180 53

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, “Training Allowances by Universities from W.D.1’s Recorded at Head Office up to June 30, 1946,” n.d. 429

Figure 17: Enrolment of Undergraduate Veterans Under University Training Benefits by Program and Year of Study as Reported by the DVA, November 1946

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Post Total Year Year Year Year Year Grad

Arts* 7124 2238 810 304 -- 377 10852 Engineering 2866 544 238 138 -- 83 3869 Commerce & Finance 1345 515 148 71 -- 15 2094 Agriculture 691 133 71 29 -- 37 961 Law 467 65 31 18 7 7 588 Medicine 391 74 12 3 2 336 818 Dentistry 222 32 3 -- 2 10 269 Pharmacy 312 34 6 -- -- 4 356 Optometry 107 4 2 ------113 Veterinary 63 45 9 9 -- 2 128 Education 208 26 7 6 140 35 422 Theology 88 8 12 2 -- 10 120 Public Health 58 ------21 80 Social Science 121 16 3 1 -- 13 154 Architecture 77 5 2 7 -- 1 92 Forestry 179 31 9 7 -- -- 226 Health & Physical Ed. 72 6 1 ------79 Journalism 38 13 6 ------57 Art 236 7 9 1 -- -- 253 Library 11 ------1 12 Music 265 4 1 2 -- -- 272 Physiotherapy 10 ------10 Industrial Relations 23 ------1 24 Occupational Therapy 38 2 ------40 Total 15,012 3,802 1,340 599 151 953 21,890

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 279, File 66-53, “Distribution by Faculties of Current Training in Canada Recorded at Head Office up to June 30, 1946,” n.d.

* Arts includes students in pre-medical, pre-dental, and pre-engineering courses. 430

Figure 18: Distribution of Veterans Enrolled under University Training Benefits as at 15 February 1947

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Post Year Year Year Year Year Grad Total

Arts* 5422 4663 1976 691 61 444 13257 Engineering 4027 2963 751 290 1 61 8093 Commerce & Finance 1149 1406 588 185 1 9 3338 Agriculture 553 650 173 69 3 29 1477 Medicine 486 185 46 9 2 584 1312 Law 629 416 111 13 -- 17 1186 Education 401 323 90 25 -- 36 875 Forestry 385 263 40 12 -- 3 703 Pharmacy 271 269 37 2 -- 4 583 Art 178 135 34 18 -- 3 368 Dentistry 221 61 5 7 -- 13 307 Nursing 188 ------14 77 279 Veterinary 124 93 12 7 -- -- 236 Health & Physical Education 111 103 11 2 -- -- 227 Architecture 154 52 6 2 2 1 217 Optometry 108 74 4 ------186 Social Work 106 40 2 -- -- 31 179 Theology 69 63 27 5 -- 14 178 Journalism 74 66 19 1 -- -- 160 Music & Dramatics 49 64 24 3 -- 4 144 Therapy – Physio 36 10 ------46 Therapy - Occupational 39 16 ------55 Home Economics 42 27 5 8 -- 1 83

* Arts figures include students in pre-medical, pre-dental, and pre-engineering courses. 431

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Post Year Year Year Year Year Grad Total

Industrial Relations 43 7 ------50 Library 26 2 15 43 Others 178 68 ------246 Total (Canada) 15,069 12,019 3,961 1,349 84 1,346 33,828 U.S.A. 210 109 65 39 1 448 872 U.K. & Europe ------218 Total (Universities) ------34,918 Pre-matriculation classes† ------5,225 Total 40,143

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” Appendix A, 17 March 1947.

† Pre-matriculation enrolment was as of 31 January 1947. 432

Figure 19: Cumulative Figures in University Training by District to 31 March 1947

Total Approved Total Approved Total Approved by District Office and Training in District but Transferred out of Training Pre-Univ Undergrad Post-Grad Pre-Univ Undergrad Post-Grad Pre-Univ Undergrad Post-Grad Charlottetown 7 244 7 138 2 0 106 5 0 Halifax 759 2214 104 737 1772 27 64 494 77 St. John 686 1489 32 641 1205 16 0 277 16 Quebec 194 250 41 171 190 24 23 60 17 Montreal 2095 3743 425 2064 3523 249 4 186 173 Ottawa 769 1848 35 300 1252 11 469 596 24 Kingston 516 646 28 494 549 28 22 97 0 Toronto 7523 11935 815 6342 11373 755 539 457 58 Hamilton 1302 829 36 1251 306 14 51 504 23 London 1636 1856 162 1557 1224 80 60 616 80 North Bay 58 11 0 51 0 0 7 11 0 Winnipeg 2252 2915 171 2347 2589 116 5 326 15 Regina 1263 2781 15 1203 431 0 0 0 0 Saskatoon 1100 1555 38 1010 1379 17 90 176 21 Edmonton 1305 1262 54 1284 1127 29 58 98 25 Calgary 1451 634 23 1421 150 2 10 480 18 Vancouver 1858 4527 70 1858 4401 58 0 126 12 London, Eng. 1 31 97 3 38 0 0 0 “Fr” Dist. 20 617 733 20 597 683 0 0 8 Total 24,795 39,387 2,886 22,658 32,209 2,149 1,402 4,610 627

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2, Part 2, “Comparative Figures in University Training Sections 8 and 9, V.R.A. to 31 March ’47,” n.d. 433

Figure 20: Enrolment of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of British Columbia by Year, 1944-1952

5000 4796 4339

4000

3200 3230 3000

2084 2000

1005 1000 424 366

0 1944-45 1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52

Source: The President’s Report 1949-50 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1950), 23. 434

Figure 21: Distribution of Canadian Veterans by Faculty in American Universities as of 15 February 1947

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Post Year Year Year Year Year Grad Total

Arts (including pre-med, dental, & eng) 38 24 11 16 129 218 Engineering 56 37 23 10 1 34 161 Commerce & Finance 19 9 9 4 -- 38 79 Agriculture 4 -- 1 -- -- 18 23 Law 5 2 -- -- 3 10 Medicine 9 2 3 -- -- 129 143 Dentistry 21 2 3 -- -- 5 31 Pharmacy -- -- 1 ------1 Optometry 4 ------1 5 Veterinary 1 ------1 2 Education 2 1 1 -- -- 31 35 Theology 20 10 2 -- -- 11 43 Public Health Nursing 3 -- 1 -- -- 6 10 Social Science 1 1 -- 2 -- 11 15 Architecture 3 5 3 2 -- -- 13 Forestry 2 1 1 1 -- 4 9 Health & Physical Education 3 2 -- 1 -- 2 8 Journalism 5 4 2 1 -- -- 12 Art 2 -- 1 -- -- 2 5 Library ------2 2 Music 1 5 1 -- -- 2 9 Physiotherapy 1 ------1 Industrial Relations ------1 1 Occupational Therapy ------

435

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Post Year Year Year Year Year Grad Total

Household Science & Economics -- 1 1 1 -- 6 9 Political Science 3 1 1 -- -- 8 13 Horticulture 1 ------2 3 Language (Chinese) -- 1 ------1 2 Osteopath 6 1 -- 1 -- 1 9 Total 221 109 65 39 1 448 883

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix B. 436

Figure 22: Distribution of Canadian Veterans in Training in American Universities as at 15 February 1947

University Number

University of California (Berkeley) 29 University of Southern California (Los Angeles) 9 Columbia University 64 Cornell University 35 Harvard University 59 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 18 University of Michigan 17 University of Minnesota 32 University of Minnesota (Mayo Foundation) 11 University of Oregon 21 University of Pennsylvania 10 University of Pittsburg 7 Stanford University 12 University of Washington 32 Wayne University 10 University of Wisconsin 13 Yale University 16 University of Chicago 28 Others (135 institutions in total) 460 Total 883

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix C. 437

Figure 23: Registration of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of Toronto by Faculty and Year, 1945-1947

1945-1946 1946-1947 Faculty/School XS Total % % of Vets XS Total % % of Vets Arts 1300 5652 23.00% 23.95% 3221 7714 41.76% 36.64% Medicine 183 914 20.02% 3.37% 352 962 36.59% 4.00% Applied Science and Engineering 1940 3071 63.17% 35.74% 3063 4263 71.85% 34.84% Household Science 2 7 28.57% 0.04% 3 15 20.00% 0.03% Education 119 447 26.62% 2.19% 172 404 42.57% 1.96% Forestry 122 183 66.67% 2.25% 208 260 80.00% 2.37% Music 11 36 30.56% 0.20% 39 71 54.93% 0.44% Graduate Studies 242 945 25.61% 4.46% 253 1043 24.26% 2.88% Dentistry 167 386 43.26% 3.08% 365 512 71.29% 4.15% Law 0 55 0.00% 0.00% 24 67 35.82% 0.27% Physical and Health Ed. 87 228 38.16% 1.60% 145 303 47.85% 1.65% Social Work 20 120 16.67% 0.37% 68 156 43.59% 0.77% Nursing 47 282 16.67% 0.87% 127 332 38.25% 14.45% Hygiene 29 41 70.73% 0.53% 3 3 100.00% 0.34% Chinese Studies 2 9 22.22% 0.04% 2 5 40.00% 0.23% Child Study 2 20 10.00% 0.04% 3 18 16.67% 0.34% Extension 454 761 59.66% 8.36% 668 943 70.84% 76.00% Summer Special Session 701 -- -- 12.91% ------Correspondence Course ------76 -- -- 8.65% Total 5,428 8,792

Source: President’s Report, for the year ending 30th June, 1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 128; and UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Fourth and Final Report on Registration for the Session 1947- 1948,” 27 November 1947. 438

Figure 24: Registration of Ex-Service Personnel at the University of Toronto by Faculty and Year, 1947-1948 and 1949-1950

1947-1948 1949-1950 Faculty/School XS Total % % of Vets XS Total % % of Vets Arts 2972 7739 38.40% 35.44% 852 5437 15.67% 18.95% Medicine 388 1010 38.42% 4.63% 398 1297 30.69% 8.85% Applied Science and Engineering 3325 4513 73.68% 39.65% 1581 2904 54.44% 35.16% Household Science 3 10 30.00% 0.04% -- 17 -- 0.00% Education 144 380 37.89% 1.72% 222 497 44.67% 4.94% Forestry 236 286 82.52% 2.81% 143 251 56.97% 3.18% Music 41 84 48.81% 0.49% 25 105 23.81% 0.56% Graduate Studies 321 1198 26.79% 3.83% 454 1349 33.65% 10.10% Dentistry 356 561 63.46% 4.25% 334 579 57.69% 7.43% Law 32 75 42.67% 0.38% 36 92 39.13% 0.80% Physical and Health Ed. 164 333 49.25% 1.96% 35 195 17.95% 0.78% Social Work 82 167 49.10% 0.98% 80 201 39.80% 1.78% Nursing 55 278 19.78% 0.66% 27 280 9.64% 0.60% Hygiene 4 14 28.57% 0.05% 17 27 62.96% 0.38% Chinese Studies 1 2 50.00% 0.01% ------Child Study 2 15 13.33% 0.02% 2 24 8.33% 0.04% Architecture ------123 241 51.04% 2.74% Pharmacy ------151 322 46.89% 3.36% Extension 259 467 55.46% 3.09% 16 152 10.53% 0.36% Total 8,385 4,496

Source: UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Fourth and Final Report on Registration for the Session 1947-1948,” 27 November 1947; and UTARMS, Office of the Board of Governors, A1973-0025, Box 66, File 11, “Second Report on Registration for the Session 1950-51,” 26 October 1950. 439

Figure 25: Analysis of Veteran Student Results by University, 1946-1947

No. Veterans No. Veterans Wrote Who Examinations Passed % No Conditions Passed % 1 Condition Failed %

Junior Colleges, P.E.I. 96 87 8 5 Acadia 330 81 11 8 Dalhousie 680 78 8 14 St. Francis Xavier 270 82 10 8 Misc. Nova Scotia Colleges 135 86 4 10 UNB 765 68 10 22 Mount Allison 259 65 20 15 Misc. New Brunswick Colleges 27 96 -- 4 Laval 263 79 -- 21 McGill 2904 78 10 12 Montréal 244 80 1 19 Misc. Montreal Universities & Schools 671 76 8 16 Carleton College 262 77 10 13 Ottawa 81 81 4 15 Misc. Ottawa Schools 55 76 13 11 Queen’s 1682 79 5 16 Toronto 7831 78 7 15 Osgoode 580 78 2 20 Misc. Toronto Colleges 703 90 3 7 McMaster 379 69 19 12 Western Ontario 923 85 4 11 OAC 451 89 3 8 OVC 234 94 1 5 Misc. London District Colleges 201 85 10 5 Manitoba 2656 62 24 14 Saskatchewan 2203 75 11 14 Regina College & Others 127 69 9 22 Alberta 2103 78 10 12 Mount Royal College 93 55 20 25 UBC 4410 81 10 9 Victoria College 223 70 24 6 All Canadian Universities 31,841 77% 10% 13%

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 19 November 1947.

440

Figure 26: Analysis of Veteran Student Results by University, 1947-1948

No. Veterans Wrote Who Examinations Passed % No Conditions Passed % 1 Condition Failed %

Junior Colleges, P.E.I. 76 76 8 16 Acadia 295 83 10 7 Dalhousie 721 79 8 13 St. Francis Xavier 255 81 13 6 Misc. Nova Scotia Colleges 129 93 2 5 UNB 712 74 12 14 Mount Allison 244 63 11 26 Misc. New Brunswick Colleges 24 92 -- 8 Laval 189 95 -- 5 McGill 3264 74 13 13 Montréal 248 85 -- 15 Misc. Montreal Universities & Schools 688 90 5 5 Carleton College 254 72 15 13 Ottawa 86 74 7 19 Misc. Ottawa Schools 55 80 11 9 Queen’s 1346 77 6 17 Toronto 6297 82 6 12 Osgoode 590 76 2 22 Misc. Toronto Colleges 692 92 3 5 McMaster 338 74 11 15 Western Ontario 900 86 8 6 OAC 418 94 2 4 OVC 331 88 1 11 Misc. London District Colleges 186 83 6 11 Manitoba 2196 72 11 17 Saskatchewan 2201 81 12 7 Regina College & Others 57 65 10 25 Alberta 2230 85 6 9 Mount Royal College 15 40 40 20 UBC 3858 84 11 5 Victoria College 108 80 12 8 All Canadian Universities 29,003 81% 8% 11%

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 20 November 1948.

441

Figure 27: Percentage of Reinstatements Failing by District, 1951-1952

District Reinstated Again Failing % Failing

Winnipeg 261 36 13.79% Montreal 268 11 4.10 Vancouver 591 107 18.10 Toronto 868 163 18.78 Kingston 208 26 12.5 Halifax 162 18 11.11 Saskatoon 125 24 19.2 Edmonton 125 12 9.6 London 101 18 17.82 Ottawa 18 1 5.56 St. John 75 9 12 Hamilton 24 5 20.83 Canada 2,826 430 13.62%

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 276, File 66-38-2, Part 2, H.W. Jamieson, “Training Programme for Veterans, Superintendent’s Annual Report,” 21 March 1952. 442

Figure 28: Analysis of Veterans no Longer in Receipt of University Training Allowances (Undergraduate and Post-Graduate), as of 15 February 1947

–

District Course Completed Entitlement Expired Ent. Expired extension granted in Work Failed to Transfer Vocational Reasons Other Total

Charlottetown -- 2 1 -- -- 3 5 Halifax 34 69 31 116 -- 119 338 Saint John 35 38 21 43 5 87 208 Quebec 13 2 5 2 -- 18 35 Montreal 122 207 65 60 126 480 995 Kingston 84 65 23 146 5 92 392 Ottawa 18 39 3 27 3 112 199 Toronto 385 302 172 381 25 644 1737 Hamilton 23 32 9 22 3 44 124 London 67 52 56 92 12 102 325 Winnipeg 63 91 30 395 49 203 801 Regina -- 3 3 24 6 23 56 Saskatoon 79 53 54 189 24 231 576 Edmonton 82 60 41 51 2 135 330 Calgary 9 1 -- -- 1 5 16 Vancouver 189 170 48 232 29 618 1,238 Total 1,203 1,186 563 1,780 290 2,916 7,375

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix E. 443

Figure 29: Analysis of Veterans no Longer in Receipt of University Training Allowances (Pre-University) as of 15 February 1947

District Entitlement Failed in Work Other Reasons Total Expired

Charlottetown -- 3 8 11 Halifax 5 -- 130 135 Saint John -- -- 67 67 Quebec 3 4 32 39 Montreal 41 53 378 472 Kingston -- 4 73 77 Ottawa 8 -- 72 80 Toronto 10 -- 583 593 Hamilton 1 3 140 144 London 13 58 339 408 North Bay 1 -- 14 15 Winnipeg 9 51 341 401 Regina 9 11 149 169 Saskatoon -- 33 155 188 Edmonton 4 -- 282 286 Calgary -- -- 350 350 Vancouver 63 77 252 392 Total 167 295 3,365 3,827

Source: LAC, RG19, Volume 441, File 108-V.A.-2 (2), “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans,” 17 March 1947, Appendix D. 444

Figure 30: Estimated Costs of a Year’s Attendance at Various Universities and Colleges for a Single Person Based on the Preliminary Report of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics on the Student Cost of Living Survey, 1946

Institution Specified Course Books and Supplies SocialsSchool Shelter Food and Clothing Transportation of Term Length (in months) Total

Acadia $50 $30 $280 $100 8 $460 Engineering 100 Dalhousie 25 30 315 100 37.50 7 ½ $507.50 Medicine 45 St. Francis Xavier 35 20 270 100 8 $425 Engineering 50 Nova Scotia Agricultural College Farm Course 15 15 180 100 5 $310 Degree 30 30 270 6 ½ $430 Nova Scotia Technical College 40 30 360 100 37.50 8 $567.50 UNB 30 30 300 100 7 ½ $460 Mount Allison 30 30 290 100 7 ½ $450 Bishop’s 30 30 360 100 8 ½ $520 McGill 50 30 500 100 40 7 $720 Medicine 60 Dentistry† 187.50

* Totals shown do not include fees or personal expenses. † The original figure gave the cost of books and supplies as $750 for four years of study. 445

Institution Course Specified Books and SocialsSchool Shelter Food and Clothing Transportation of Term Length (in months) Total

Supplies

Montreal School of Social Work 40 30 480 100 50 8 $700 Montréal 75 30 400 100 40 8 ½ $645 Dentistry 260 Macdonald College Diploma 15 15 180 100 10 5 $320 Degree 30 30 250 15 7 $425 Sir George Williams College 20 30 400 100 40 7 $590 Ottawa 30 $20 $425 $100 $25 8½ $600 Queen’s 30 21 285 100 20 7 $456 Medicine 50 Engineering 70 Toronto 30 30 360 100 25 8 $545 Medicine 90 Engineering 50 Dentistry‡ 175 Ontario College of Pharmacy 25 25 350 100 25 7 ½ $525 OAC 25 20 270 100 10 6 ½ $425 OVC 30 20 280 100 20 7 $450 McMaster 30 30 305 100 25 8 $490 Western Ontario 50 25 300 100 25 7 ½ $500 Medicine 100

‡ The original figure gave the cost of books and supplies as $875 for five years of study. 446

Institution Course Specified Books and SocialsSchool Shelter Food and Clothing Transportation of Term Length (in months) Total

Supplies

Manitoba 30 25 245 100 35 7 ½ $435 Medicine 80 Engineering 55 Saskatchewan 30 25 300 100 20 7 $475 Medicine 50 Alberta 40 25 260 100 25 7 $450 Medicine 75 Dentistry 120 Engineering 50 UBC 30 30 320 100 25 7 ½ $505 Average (Total) $57 $26 $316 $100 $28 7 ½ $496

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-49, “Estimated Costs of a Year’s Attendance at the Various Canadian Universities and Colleges – Single Persons,” n.d. 447

Figure 31: Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Single Veterans at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

Monthly Expenditure Sub.Gp.1* Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 Sub.Gp.4 General†

Board and Lodging $44 $44 $40 $52 $45 Recreation 9 7 7 8 8 Laundry etc. 5 4 3 4 4 Personal 3 3 3 2 3 Tobacco and Candy 4 4 4 4 4 Transportation 3 3 3 3 3 Donations 2 1 1 1 1 Other Expenses 2 1 1 3 2 Total Monthly $72 $67 $62 $77 $71

Annual Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 Sub.Gp.4 General

Transportation $30 $28 $11 $30 $24 Books and Sty. 43 54 43 40 45 Clothing 100 85 77 85 87 Insurance 38 30 31 30 32 Medical ------Other Misc. 16 10 9 28 18 Total Annual $227 $208 $171 $213 $206 Average Annual $19 $17 $15 $20 $16 Monthly

Total Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 Sub.Gp.4 General

Average Monthly $72 $67 $62 $77 $71 Living Only Average Monthly $19 $17 $15 $20 $16 Other Expenses Average Monthly $91 $84 $77 $97 $87 Total Expenses

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, vol. 2, “Brief Presented at the National Conference of Student Veterans on Behalf of the Student Veterans of the University of Saskatchewan,” n.d., Appendix A.

* Subgroups refer to living arrangements: Sub.Gp.1 was board and room under one roof, Sub.Gp.2 dormitory, Sub.Gp.3 living with relatives, and Sub.Gp.4 living away from home and eating in restaurants. † The chart title “General” refers to a general sample. 448

Figure 32: Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Married Veterans at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

Monthly Expenditure Sub.Gp.1* Sub.Gp.2 General

Board and Lodging $76 $70 $73 Recreation 7 5 6 Laundry etc. 3 3 3 Personal 3 3 3 Tobacco and Candy 4 5 4.50 Transportation 4 5 4.50 Donations 1 1 1 Other Expenses 1 1 1 Total Monthly $99 $93 $96

Annual Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 General

Transportation $28 $32 $30 Books and Sty. 44 48 46 Clothing 138 150 144 Insurance 62 67 64 Medical 23 32 27 Other Misc. 28 13 41 Total Annual $323 $342 $352 Average Annual $27 $29 $28 Monthly

Total Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 General

Average Monthly $99 $93 $96 Living Only Average Monthly $27 $29 $28 Other Expenses Average Monthly $126 $122 $124 Total Expenses

* Subgroups refer to living arrangements: Sub.Gp.1 was a man and wife obtaining board and room and Sub.Gp.2 living with relatives or maintaining a light housekeeping establishment. 449

Figure 33: Monthly, Annual, and Total Cost of Living Expenditures for Married Veterans with Dependents at the University of Saskatchewan, December 1947

Monthly Expenditure Sub.Gp.1* Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 General

Board and Lodging $83 $75 $91 $83 Recreation 4 4 5 4 Laundry etc. 3 3 2 3 Personal 3 3 3 3 Tobacco and Candy 3 4 4 4 Transportation 4 4 4 4 Donations 1 2 1 1 Other Expenses 5 4 5 5 Total Monthly $106 $99 $114 $106

Annual Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 General

Transportation $21 $23 $26 $23 Books and Sty. 39 44 42 42 Clothing 133 110 149 127 Insurance 70 77 75 74 Medical 54 42 40 45 Other Misc. 29 45 48 41 Total Annual $347 $341 $380 $352 Average Annual $29 $28 $32 $29 Monthly

Total Expenditure Sub.Gp.1 Sub.Gp.2 Sub.Gp.3 General

Average Monthly $106 $99 $114 $106 Living Only Average Monthly $29 $28 $32 $29 Other Expenses Average Monthly $135 $127 $146 $135 Total Expenses

* Subgroups refer to living arrangements: Sub.Gp.1 man, wife, and dependents obtaining board and room, Sub.Gp.2 man, wife, and dependents living with relatives, and Sub.Gp.3 man, wife, and dependents living in their own home as owner or renter. 450

Appendices

Appendix 1: Representatives and Member Institutions of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1939-1950

Source: NCCU, Reports of National Conference of Canadian Universities, 1939-1950

Eighteenth Meeting, McGill University, May 29-30, 1939

Executive Committee (1939-1942): President Henry James Cody (President); President Sidney Smith (Vice-President); Dean K.P.R. Neville (Secretary-Treasurer); Chancellor H.P. Whidden; Monseigneur A. Vachon; Dean Harold W. McKiel; Dean C.W. Hendel

Representatives: Dean G.M. Smith and Professor J.W. Campbell (Alberta); Dean J.W. Finlayson (UBC); Monseigneur Camille Roy and Professor Adrien Pouliot (Laval); Principal L.W. Douglas, Dean C.W. Hendel, Professor W.D. Woodhead, Mrs. W.L. Grant, and T.H. Matthews (McGill); President Sidney Smith, Principal W.C. Graham, Dean H.P. Armes, Dean E.F. Featherstonhaugh, and Dr. W.J. Spence (Manitoba); Chancellor H.P. Whidden and Dean K.W. Taylor (McMaster); Dr. J. Nolin and Professor Pierre Lanctot (Montreal); President G.J. Trueman (Mount Allison); Chancellor C.C. Jones (UNB); Reverend Henri Saint-Denis (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Vice- Principal W.E. McNeill, and Dean J. Matheson (Queen’s); Professor L.N. Richardson (RMC); President J.S. Thomson, Dean Arthur Collingwood, and Professor Margaret Cameron (Saskatchewan); President H.J. Cody and Professor Norman McKenzie (Toronto); Professor Cecil Lewis (Trinity); Professor H. Bennett (Victoria); Dean K.P.R. Neville and Professor H.R. Kingston (Western); Dr. R.W. Boyle (NRC); President A.G. Crane (National Association of State Universities); Dr. Grant Lathe and Madeleine Parent (Canadian Student Assembly)

Member Institutions: Acadia, Alberta, Bishop’s, Brandon, UBC, Dalhousie, King’s, Laval, McGill, McMaster, Manitoba, Montreal, Mount Allison, UNB, NSAC, NSTC, Ottawa, Queen’s, RMC, St. Dunstan’s, St. Francis Xavier, St. Joseph’s, Toronto, St. Michael’s, Trinity, Victoria, Western, OAC, St. Anne de la Pocatiere, National Research Council

Nineteenth Meeting, University of Toronto, June 9-11, 1942

Executive Committee (1942-1944): S. Smith (President); K.P.R. Neville (Vice- President); A.B. Fennell (Secretary-Treasurer); H.J. Cody; N.A.M. MacKenzie; F.C. James; A. Maheux

Representatives: President Frederic William Patterson (Acadia); President Robert Newton, Professor J.W. Campbell, and Professor E.W. Sheldon (Alberta); Principal A.H. McGreer (Bishop’s); President J.R.C. Evans (Brandon); President L.S. Klinck, Dean J.W. Finlayson, Professor M.Y. Williams, and Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Shrum (UBC); President Carleton Stanley (Dalhousie); L’Abbé Arthur Maheux and Dean Adrien Pouliot 451

(Laval); President Sidney Smith, Dean H.P. Armes, Dean B.G. Argue, Dr. W.J. Spence, and Professor Andrew Moore (Manitoba); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean Jonathan Meakins, Dean Cyrus Macmillan, Professor David A. Keys, and T.H. Matthews (McGill); Chancellor G.P. Gilmour, Chancellor Emeritus H.P. Whidden, Associate Dean W. Burton Hurd, and Dean C.E. Burke (McMaster); Dean Armand Circé (Montreal); President G.J. Trueman and Dean H.W. McKiel (Mount Allison); President Norman MacKenzie (UNB); Principal R.C. Wallace, Vice-Principal W.E. McNeill, Dean J. Matheson, Jean Royce, and Lieutenant-Colonel R.O. Earl (Queen’s); President J.S. Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Thompson, Dean Emeritus G.H. Ling, Professor Hope Hunt, and Professor Kathleen W. Ellis (Saskatchewan); President J.A. Murphy (St. Dunstan’s); President D.J. Macdonald (St. Francis Xavier); President Henry John Cody, Dean J.G. Althouse, Dean S. Beatty, Dean E.S. Ryerson, Dean C.R. Young, Principal M.W. Wallace, Professor E.F. Burton, and Professor J.F. McDonald (Toronto); President G.I. Christie (OAC); Provost F.H. Cosgrave and Professor Cecil Lewis (Trinity College); President Walter T. Brown (Victoria College); Dean K.P.R. Neville, Dean F.J.H. Campbell, Professor H.R. Kingston, and Helen Allison (Western); Dr. Guy E. Snavely (Association of American Colleges); President Alexander G. Ruthven (National Association of State Universities and University of Michigan); Dr. H.C. Bazett (University of Pennsylvania); Dr. Henry James and Dr. R.B. Robbins (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association); Brigadier-General H.F. McDonald (Pension Commission, Ottawa)

Member Institutions: Acadia; Alberta; Bishop’s; Brandon; UBC; Dalhousie; King’s; Laval; McGill; McMaster; Manitoba; Montreal; Mount Allison; UNB; NSAC; NSTC; Ottawa; Queen’s; RMC; St. Dunstan’s; St. Francis Xavier; St. Joseph’s; Saskatchewan; Toronto; St. Michael’s; Trinity; Victoria; Western; OAC; Collège Sainte-Anne-de-La- Pocatière Agricultural College; National Research Council

Twentieth Meeting, McMaster University, June 12-14, 1944

Executive Committee (1944-1946): President J.S. Thomson (President); Dean K.P.R. Neville (Vice-President); A.B. Fennell (Secretary-Treasurer); Principal S.E. Smith; President N.A.M. MacKenzie; Principal F. Cyril James; Abbé A. Maheux; Dr. Léon Lortie

Representatives: President F.W. Patterson (Acadia); President Robert Newton (Alberta); President J.R.C. Evans (Brandon); Dean D. Buchanan, Dean J.N. Finlayson, Professor W.N. Sage, and Professor G.M. Shrum (UBC); President Carleton W. Stanley, Professor H.L. Stewart, and Professor W.W. Woodbury (Dalhousie); Professor A.K. Griffin (King’s); Monseigneur C. Gagnon, Monseigneur A. Labrie, Abbé A. Maheux, and Dean A. Pouliot (Laval); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean Cyrus Macmillan, Dean J.R. Fraser, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean W.H. Brittain, Dean D.L. Thomson, Professor D.A. Keys, and T.H. Matthews (McGill); Chancellor G.P. Gilmour and Dean C.E. Burke (McMaster); President S.E. Smith, Dean D.S. Woods, Professor H.N. Fieldhouse, Dr. W.J. Spence, Principal W.C. Graham, United College, and Reverend Martial Caron, St. Boniface College (Manitoba); Professor Léon Lortie and Professor A. Saint-Pierre (Montreal); 452

Professor Herbert Tucker (Mount Allison); President N.A.M. MacKenzie (UNB); Professor Spencer Ball (NSTC); Reverence A. Caron (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Vice-Principal W.E. McNeill, Dean R.O. Earl, and Dean D.S. Ellis (Queen’s); Reverend R.V. MacKenzie (St. Dunstan’s); Reverend P.J. Nicholson (St. Francis Xavier); President J.S. Thomson and Professor J.R. Scott (Saskatchewan); President H.J. Cody, Dean S. Beatty, Dean C.R. Young, Assistant Dean E.S. Ryerson, Professor H.A. Innis, and Professor W.R. Taylor (Toronto); Chancellor W.T. Brown and Professor H. Bennett (Victoria); Professor R.K. Hicks (Trinity); Reverend T.P. McLaughlin (St. Michael’s); President W. Sherwood Fox, Dean K.P.R. Neville, Professor R.C. Dearle, and Professor H.R. Kingston (Western)

Others Present: President John C. West, University of North Dakota (National Association of State Universities); Instr. Comdr. L.N. Richardson, Director of Naval Education, Commander A.W. Baker, Major O.B. Rexford, Directorate of Education (Army), and S/L G. Buxton, Royal Canadian Air Force Educational Services (DND); H.W. Lea, Director, WBTP and Secretary, UAB (Department of Labour); Dr. G.M. Weir, Acting Director of Training and H.W. Jamieson, Superintendent of Educational Training (DPNH)

Twenty-first Meeting, Université Laval, June 14-16, 1945

Representatives: President F.W. Patterson and Professor R.S. Longley (Acadia); Professor M.H. Long (Alberta); Dean G. Basil Jones and Professor A.V. Richardson (Bishop’s); President J.R.C. Evans (Brandon); President N.A.M. MacKenzie and Dean J.N. Finlayson (UBC); Dean V.C. MacDonald, Professor C.B. Weld, Professor C.L. Bennet, and Professor C.V. Douglas (Dalhousie); Professor A. Kent Griffin (King’s); Monseigneur Cyrille Gagnon, Abbé Maurice Laliberté, Abbé A.M. Parent, Abbé Arthur Maheux, M. le Dr. Charles Vézina, Dean Adrien Pouliot, Le R. Père G.H. Lévesque, M. le Dr. Paul E. Gagnon, and Le R. Frère Stanislas (Laval); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean D.L. Thomson, Professor D.A. Keys, Professor H.E. Hoff, Professor R. Summerby, and T.H. Matthews (McGill); Chancellor G.P. Gilmour, Professor C.H. Stearn, and Professor Watson Kirkconnell (McMaster); President H.P. Armes, President- Elect A.W. Trueman, Dean H.H. Saunderson, Dean. E.P. Fetherstonhaugh, Dr. W.J. Spence, Reverence Dr. W.C. Graham, United College, and Reverend Canon R.J. Pierce, St. John’s College (Manitoba); Monseigneur Olivier Maurault, Dr. Léon Lortie, Dr. Lionel Lemay, and Dr. Arthur Saint-Pierre (Montreal); President-Elect W.T.R. 453

Flemington and Dean H. Tucker (Mount Allison); President Milton F. Gregg, Professor A.F. Baird, Professor A.G. Bailey, and Professor J.W. Sears (UNB); Pressor S. Ball (NSTC); Reverend Dr. Arthur Caron and Reverend L.M. Danis (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Vice-Principal W.E. McNeill, Dean R.O. Earl, Dean D.S. Ellis, Dean G. Spencer Melvin, and Jean I. Royce (Queen’s); Reverend G.A. MacDonald (St. Dunstan’s); President P.J. Nicholson and Dean Malcolm MacLellan (St. Francis Xavier); Reverend Clement Cormier (St. Joseph’s); President J.S. Thomson and Professor M.M. Cameron (Saskatchewan); President-Elect Sidney Smith, Dean S. Beatty, Assistant Dean E.S. Ryerson, Professor F.C.A. Jeanneret, and A.B. Fennell (Toronto); President W.T. Brown (Victoria); Professor C. Lewis (Trinity); Reverend T.P. McLaughlin (St. Michael’s); President W. Sherwood Fox, Dean K.P.R. Neville, and Dean G.E. Hall (Western); Dr. J.O. Wilhelm (NRC)

Others Present: President A.C. Willard, University of Illinois (President of the National Association of State Universities); Professor H.N Fieldhouse (Manitoba); Professor J.B. Brebner (Columbia University); M.P. Philippon (President of l’Union Scientifique et Technique France); Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Rollit, Assistant Director Education, Canadian Military Headquarters, Canadian Army Overseas

Member Institutions: Acadia; Alberta; Bishop’s; Brandon; UBC; Dalhousie; King’s; Laval; McGill; McMaster; Manitoba; Montreal; Mount Allison; UNB; NSAC; NSTC; OAC; Ottawa; Queen’s; RMC; St. Dunstan’s; St. Francis Xavier; St. Joseph’s; Saskatchewan; Toronto; St. Michael’s; Trinity; Victoria; Western; National Research Council

Twenty-second Meeting, University of Toronto, May 27-29, 1946

Executive Committee: President N.A.M. MacKenzie (President); Principal F. Cyril James (Vice-President); Professor H.F. Angus (Secretary-Treasurer); President J.S. Thomson; Monseigneur F. Vandry; President A.E. Kerr; Dr. Léon Lortie; Professor W.A. Mackintosh

Representatives: President F.W. Patterson and Professor R.S. Longley (Acadia); Professor J.W. Campbell, Professor M.H. Long, Professor J.W. Porteous, Professor F.M. Salter, and Professor R.F. Shaner (Alberta); Professor D.C. Masters (Bishop’s); President J.R.C. Evans (Brandon); President N.A.M. MacKenzie, Dean G.F. Curtis, Dean J.N. Finlayson, Professor H.F. Angus, Professor H.J. McLeod, Professor W.N. Sage, Professor G.M. Shrum, and Professor M.Y. Williams (UBC); Presient A.E. Kerr, Dean G.E. Wilson, Professor H.R. Theakston, Professor E.G. Young, and Professor C.L. Bennet (Dalhousie); Professor A. Kent Griffin (King’s); Monseigneur Ferdinand Vandry, Abbé A.M. Parent, Abbé Arthur Maheux, M. le Dr. Charles Vézina, Dean Adrien Pouliot, M. le Doyen Charles de Konick, and M. le Dr. L.P. Dugal (Laval); Professor C.A. Dawson, Professor R.E. Jamieson, and Professor D.A. Keys (McGill); Chancellor G.P. Gilmour, Dean C.E. Burke, and Professor C.H. Stearn (McMaster); Dean H.P. Armes, Dean H.H. Saunderson, Dean. E.P. Fetherstonhaugh, Principal W.C. Graham, Professor Roy Daniels, Professor S.J. Holland, and Professor W.J. Waines (Manitoba); 454

M. le Captaine Lucien Clermont, M. le Professor Thomas Greenwood, M. Jules Labarre, Dr. Léon Lortie, Dr. Lionel Lemay, M. Guy Vanier, M. le Doyen Ignace Brouillet, Polytechnique, and M. Henri Gaudefroy, Polytechnique (Montreal); President W.T.R. Flemington and Dean H.W. McKiel (Mount Allison); President Milton F. Gregg, Professor A.F. Baird, Dean J.M. Gibson, Dean J.W. Sears, Professor G.F.M. Smith, and Professor R.H. Wright (UNB); Professor A.E. Flynn (NSTC); Mr. A.M. Porter (OAC); President J.C. Laframboise, Reverend Dr. Arthur Caron, and Professor P.J. Dufour (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Dean R.O. Earl, Dean D.S. Ellis, Dean G.S. Melvin, Jean I. Royce, and H.K. Hutton (Queen’s); Professor L.F. Grant (RMC); President R.V. MacKenzie (St. Dunstan’s); President P.J. Nicholson, Professor W.P. Fogarty, Professor W.T. Foley, and Professor J.H. Gillis (St. Francis Xavier); Reverend Clement Cormier (St. Joseph’s); President J.S. Thomson, Dean S. Basterfield, Dean R.A. Spencer, Professor U.C. Fowke, Professor N.B. Hutcheon, Professor J.F. Leddy, Professor Allan McAndrew, Professor G.W. Simpson, and Professor W.H. Watson (Saskatchewan); President Sidney Smith, Principal W.R. Taylor, Dean S. Beatty, Dean C.R. Young, Assistant Dean E.S. Ryerson, Assistant Dean T. Cowling, Professor H.M. Cassidy, Professor A.R. Gordon, Professor H.A. Innis, Professor L.M. Pidgeon, Professor H. Wasteneys, Professor A.S.P. Woodhouse, and A.B. Fennell (Toronto); President W.T. Brown and Dean H. Bennett (Victoria); Provost R.S.K. Seeley and Professor R.K. Hicks (Trinity); Reverend T.P. McLaughlin and Professor L.J. Bondy (St. Michael’s); President W. Sherwood Fox, Vice-President F. Landon, Dean K.P.R. Neville, Professor R.C. Dearle, Professor H.R. Kingston, H.M.B. Allison, and President V.J. Guinan, Assumption College (Western); Dr. E.W.R. Steacie (NRC)

Others Present: President John C. West (University of North Dakota); Major-General E.L.M. Burns (DVA); H.W. Jamieson (DVA); Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes (DND); Colonel E.F. Schmidlin (DND); Colonel W.R. Sawyer (DND); Air-Commodore F.R. Miller (DND); Group Captain Alan Walmsley (DND); Commander A.W. Baker (DND); Professor N.C. Hart (Western); Professor M.F. Timlin (Saskatchewan); O.E. Ault (Universities Board Adult Education); Professor Watson Kirkconnell (McMaster)

Twenty-third Meeting, McGill University, May 22-24, 1947

Executive Council: President N.A.M. MacKenzie (President); Principal F. Cyril James (Vice-President); Professor H.F. Angus (Secretary-Treasurer); President J.S. Thomson; Monseigneur F. Vandry; President A.E. Kerr; Dr. Léon Lortie; Professor W.A. Mackintosh

Representatives: President F.W. Patterson and Professor B.N. Cain (Acadia); President R. Newton, Professor J.W. Campbell, Professor W.H. Johns, and Professor G.O. Langstroth 455

(Alberta); Professor A.H. McGreer (Bishop’s); President N.A.M. MacKenzie, Dean G.F. Curtis, Dean G.C. Andrew, Professor J.N. Finlayson, Professor C.E. Dolman, Professor H.F. Angus, Professor A.H. Hutchinson, Professor W.K. Lamb, Professor G.M. Shrum, and Professor F.H. Soward (UBC); Presient A.E. Kerr, Dean G.E. Grant, Dean G.E. Wilson, Professor H.R. Theakston, Professor E.G. Young, and Professor C.L. Bennet (Dalhousie); Professor A.K. Griffin (King’s); Monseigneur R. Gingras, Monseigneur Alphonse-Marie Parent, Monseigneur F. Vandry, M. Avila Bedard, M. Paul-E. Gagnon, M. Guy Hudon, and M. Adrien Pouliot (Laval); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean W.H. Brittain, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean J.C. Meakins, Dean D.L. Thomson, Professor H.N. Fieldhouse, Professor A.H.S. Gillson, Professor G.H. Kimble, Professor R.B. MacLeod, Professor H.D. Woods, and Mr. T.H. Matthews (McGill); Chancellor G.P. Gilmour, Professor H.S. Armstrong, Professor W.B. hurd, and Professor E.T. Salmon (McMaster); President A.W. Trueman, Dean H.P. Armes, Dean E.P. Fetherstonhaugh, Dean A.T. Mathers, Dean H.H. Saunderson, Professor R.F. Argue, Professor G. DesJardins, Professor W.C. Graham, Professor M.K. Setton, Professor A.L. Wheeler, and Mr. D. Chevrier (Manitoba); Professor G. Baril and Professor L. Lortie (Montreal); President W.T.R. Flemington, Dean H.W. McKiel, Professor R. Fraser, Professor D.G. MacGregor, and Professor F.L. West (Mount Allison); Dean C.W. Argue, Dean F.J. Toole, Professor A.G. Bailey, and Professor Desmond Pacey (UNB); Professor Spencer Ball and Professor G.H. Burchill (NSTC); Reverend F.E. Banim, Mr. L. Cloutier, Reverend J.C. Laframboise, Professor Rene Lavigne, Reverend E. Pagé, Reverend R.H. Shevenell, and Professor C.A. Young (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Dean R.O. Earl, Dean W.A. Mackintosh, Dean D.S. Ellis, Dean G.S. Melvin, Professor R.G. Sinclair, Professor H.C. Tracey, and Jean I. Royce (Queen’s); Reverend W.P. Fogarty, Professor Cecil MacLean, Reverend Dr. M.A. MacLelland, and Reverend Dr. H.J. Somers (St. Francis Xavier); President J.S. Thomson, Dean W.S. Lindsay, Professor M. Cameron, Professor H.B. Collier, Professor E.M. Jones, and Professor J.F. Leddy (Saskatchewan); President Sidney Smith, Principal W.R. Taylor, Dean S. Beatty, Dean C.R. Young, Professor R.G. Ellis, Professor A.R. Gordon, Professor G.R. Lord, Professor L.M. Pidgeon, Professor J.W.B. Sisam, Professor A.S.P. Woodhouse, and Professor A.M. Wynne (Toronto); Dean H. Bennett and Professor J.A. Surerus (Victoria); Provost R.S.K. Seeley, Professor R.K. Hicks, Professor C. Lewis, and M.E. White (Trinity); Reverend L.J. Bondy and Reverend B.F. Sullivan (St. Michael’s); President J.H. O’Loane, Assumption, Dean G.E. Hall, Dean-elect H.R. Kingston, Dean K.P.R. Neville, Professor R.J. Rossiter (Western); President C.J. MacKenzie (NRC)

Others Present: President J.S. Mills, University of Vermont; Air Commodore D.M. Smith, DND; Brigadier S.F. Clark, DND; Colonel R.W. Moncel, DND; Commander H. Little, DND; A.W. Crawford, Director of Training, DVA; McAlister Lloyd, President, Teachers’ Insurance and Annuity Association; W.H. Cobb, Vice-President, Teachers’ Insurance and Annuity Association; Dean J.A. MacFarlane, University of Toronto; Professor H.A. Innis, University of Toronto

Saskatchewan; Toronto; St. Michael’s; Trinity; Victoria; Western; National Research Council

Twenty-fourth Meeting, University of British Columbia, June 10-12, 1948

Executive Council: Principal F. Cyril James (President); Monseigneur F. Vandry (Vice- President); Mr. T.H. Matthews (Secretary-Treasurer); Dr. Léon Lortie; Father P.J. Nicholson; Professor J.F. Leddy; President G.E. Hall

Representatives: Dr. Watson Kirkconnell and Dean Ronald S. Longley (Acadia); Dr. J.W. Campbell, Dr. G. Hunter, Dr. P.S. Warren, and Mr. F.M. Salter (Alberta); Professor D.C. Masters (Bishop’s); President N.A.M. MacKenzie, Dean D. Buchanan, Dean J.N. Finlayson, Dean F.M. Clement, Dean B.F. Curtis, Professor H.F. Angus, Professor S.N.F. Chant, Professor W.H. Gage, Dean M.D. Mawdsley, Professor G.C. Andrew, Professor Blythe Eagles, and Dr. H.J. McLeod (UBC); Dr. A.E. Kerr, Dr. G.E. Wilson, Dr. J.H.L. Johnstone, Dr. G.C. Coffin, and Dr. E.G. Young (Dalhousie); M. l’abbé A. Maheux, R.P. G.-H. Levesque, Dr. Louis Berger, and Dr. George Maheux (Laval); Dean W.J. Waines, Dean E.P. Fetherstonhaugh, Professor A.N. Campbell, Professor H. Steinhauer, Mr. D. Chevrier, Reverend R.J. Pierce, and Reverend J.P. Monaghan (Manitoba); Mr. Léon Lortie (Montréal); Dr. H.W. McKiel and Dr. H. Tucker (Mount Allison); Principal F.C. James, Dean D.L. Thomson, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean F. Smith, Professor G.I. Duthie, and Mr. T.H. Matthews (McGill); Dr. C.H. Stearn, Dr. H.G. Thode, and Professor W.B. Hurd (McMaster); Dr. A.F. Baird, Dr. C.W. Argue, Dr. A.G. Bailey, Dr. F.J. Toole (UNB); M.L. Baker (NSTC); Reverend Professor R.H. Shevenell (Ottawa); Dr. R.O. Earl, Dr. G.B. Read, Professor J.A. Corry, and Dr. J.A. McRae (Queen’s); President J.S. Thomson, Professor I.M. Fraser, Professor J.W.T. Spinks, Professor J.F. Leddy, Dean Steward Basterfield, Professor E.L. Warrington, and Dean J.H. Thompson (Saskatchewan); Reverend J.A. Sullivan (St. Dunstan’s); Reverend Dr. P.J. Nicholson and Reverend Dr. J.H. Gillis (St. Francis Xavier); Reverend Rector Leger and Reverend Rene Baudry (St. Joseph’s); Dean S. Beatty, Professor J.R. Dymond, Professor H.S. Jackson, Professor E.S. Moore, Professor V.W. Bladen, Professor G.A. Elliott, Professor D.G. Creighton, Professor F.H. Underhill, Professor W.J. McAndrew, Mr. A.B. Fennell, and Mr. C.T. Bissell (Toronto); Reverend R.S.K. Seeley (Trinity); Professor A.G. Dorland (Western); Dr. David Keys and Dr. R.W. Boyle (NRC)

Others Present: Dean M.A. Stewart, Association of American Universities; Dean J.D. Regester, Association of American Colleges; Commander C.H. Little, DND; Brigadier W.J. Megill, DND; Air Commodore J.G. Kerr, DND; Mr. H.W. Jamieson, DVA

Member Institutions: Acadia; Alberta; Bishop’s; Brandon; UBC; Dalhousie; King’s; Laval; McGill; McMaster; Manitoba; Montreal; Mount Allison; UNB; NSAC; NSTC; OAC; Ottawa; Queen’s; St. Dunstan’s; St. Francis Xavier; St. Joseph’s; Saskatchewan; Toronto; St. Michael’s; Trinity; Victoria; Western; National Research Council

Twenty-fifth Meeting, Dalhousie University, June 13-15, 1949

457

Executive Council: Principal F. Cyril James (President); President N.A.M. MacKenzie (Retiring President); Monseigneur F. Vandry (Vice-President); Mr. T.H. Matthews (Secretary-Treasurer); President G.E. Hall, Professor J.F. Leddy, Professor L. Lortie, Reverend P.J. Nichsolon

Representatives: President Watson Kirkconnell, Dean R.S. Longley, Professor E.L. Curry, Professor W.H.R. Vernon, and Ruby M. Thompson (Acadia); President R. Newton, Professor J.W. Campbell, Professor R.W. Collins, Professor W.H. Johns, Professor M.H. Long, Professor H.B. Mayo, Professor O.J. Walker, Professor T.F. Wise, and Mr. F.M. Salter (Alberta); Principal A.R. Jewitt (Bishop’s); President N.A.M. MacKenzie, Dean G.F. Curtie, Dean J.N. Finlayson, Professor G.C. Andrew, Professor A.F. Barss, Professor R. Daniells, Professor W.N. Sage, Professor G.M. Shrum, Professor G.M. Volkoff, and Professor M.Y. Williams (UBC); President A.E. Kerr, Dean J.S. Bagnall, Dean V.C. MacDonald, Dean G.E. Wilson, Professor C.L. Bennett, Professor F.R. Hayes, Professor J.H.L. Johnstone, Professor H.R. Theakston, Colonel K.C. Laurie, and Dr. H.L. Scammell (Dalhousie); President A.S. Walker (King’s); Monseigneur F. Vandry, Monseigneur Alphonse-Marie Parent, Professor Jean-C. Falardeau, and Professor Paul-E. Gagnon (Laval); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean W.H. Brittain, Dean H.N. Fieldhouse, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean F. Smith, Dean D.L. Thomson, Professor J.B. Kirkpatrick, Reverend E.C. Knowles, Mr. W. Bentley, Mr. R. Pennington, and Mr. T.H. Matthews (McGill); Professor H.S. Armstrong, Professor A.B. McLay, and Professor R. McK. Wiles (McMaster); President A.H.S. Gillson, Dean H.P. Armes, Professor G. Desjardins, Professor W.C. Graham, Professor A.E. Macdonald, Professor J.B. Rollit, and Mr. D. Chevrier (Manitoba); President W.T.R. Flemington, Dean J. Tucker, Professor D.G. MacGregor, Professor W.W. McCormack, Professor H.D. Southam, and Professor F.L. West (Mount Allison); Monseigneur O. Maurault, M. l’Abbé R. Llewellyn, and Professor L. Lortie (Montréal); President A.W. Trueman, Professor J.O. Dineen, Professor W.C.D. Pacey, Professor J.R. Petrie, and Professor H.E. Videto (UNB); Mr. P. Cox (NSAC); President A.E. Cameron and Professor A.E. Flynn (NSTC); Mr. A.M. Porter (OAC); Very Reverend J. Laframboise, Reverend S. Marion, Reverend H. Saint-Denis, Reverend R.H. Shevenell, and Reverend Zachary (Ottawa); Principal T.C. Wallace, Dean D.S. Ellis, Dean W.A. Mackintosh, Professor F.L. Bartlett, Professor J.A. Corry, Professor A.M. Laverty, Professor R.G. Trotter, and Jean I. Royce (Queen’s); Colonel W.R. Sawyer and Professor G.F.G. Stanley (RMC); President R.V. MacKenzie and Reverend J.A. Sullivan (St. Dunstan’s); President P.J. Nicholson, Reverend E.M. Clarke, Reverend E.J. Ginivan, Reverend M. MacDonell, and Reverend J.C. Tobin (St. Francis Xavier); Reverend C. Cormier (St. Joseph’s); Professor I.M. Fraser, Professor W.R. Graham, and Professor J.F. Leddy (Saskatchewan); Principal W.R. Taylor, Professor F.H. Anderson, Professor H.A. Cates, Professor H.J.C. Ireton, Professor W. Line, Professor E. McInnis, Professor I.R. Pounder, Professor K.F. Tupper, Professor F.E.W. Wetmore, Professor W.J.T. Wright, and Mr. J.C. Evans (Toronto); President H. Bennett (Victoria); Professor C. Lewis (Trinity); Reverend L.J. Bondy and Reverend E.J. McCorkell (St. Michael’s); President G.E. Hall, Dean J.B. Collip, and Professor R.A. Allen (Western); Dr. D.A. Keys (NRC)

458

Others Present: Professor L. Penson, Vice-Chancellor, University of London; Very Reverend J. Lowe, Vice-Chancellor, University of Oxford; Sir Raymond Priestly, Vice- Chancellor, University of Birmingham; Sir David Lindsay Keir, Vice-Chancellor, The Queen’s University, Belfast; Professor D.B. Copland, Vice-Chancellor, Australian National University; Professor W. Prest, University of Melbourne; Professor P.N. Banerjee, Vice-Chancellor, University of Calcutta; Dr. Robert S. Aitken, Vice- Chancellor, University of Otago; Dr. S.M. Hossain, Vice-Chancellor, University of Dacca; Dr. G.E. Malherbe, Principal, University of Witwatersrand; Dr. T.W.J. Taylor, Principal, University College of the West Indies; Sir William Hamilton Fyfe, Honorary Treasurer, Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth; Mr. J.F. Foster, Secretary, Association of Universities of the British Commonwealth; Dr. J.A. Brumbaugh (American Council on Education); Dr. C.F. Fraser (Canadian Council on Reconstruction Through UNESCO); Mr. S.H. Stackpole (Carnegie Corporation of New York); Mr. O.M. Solandt (Defence Research Board); Mr. G.V. Haythorne (Department of Labour); Commander C.H. Little, Colonel R.W. Moncel, and Air Commodore R.C. Ripley (DND); Mr. H.W. Jamieson (DVA); Dr. J.E. Robbins (Dominion Bureau of Statistics); Commander C.H. Little (H.M.C.S. Royal Roads); Mr. D.J. Shank (Institute of International Education); Mr. W.H. Cobb (Teachers’ Insurance and Annuity Association of America); Mr. G.M. Morrison (Unemployment Insurance Commission)

Member Institutions: Acadia; Alberta; Bishop’s; Brandon; UBC; Dalhousie; King’s; Laval; McGill; McMaster; Manitoba; Montreal; Mount Allison; Mount St. Vincent; UNB; NSAC; NSTC; OAC; Ottawa; Queen’s; RMC; St. Dunstan’s; St. Francis Xavier; St. Joseph’s; Saskatchewan; Sir George Williams; Toronto; St. Michael’s; Trinity; Victoria; Western; National Research Council

Twenty-sixth Meeting, Royal Military College, June 1-3, 1950

Executive Council: P.J. Nicholson (President); F. Cyril James (Retiring President); Léon Lortie (Vice-President); T.H. Matthews (Secretary-Treasurer); G.P. Gilmour; W.A. Mackintosh; J.-M. Martin; G.M. Shrum

Representatives: President Watson Kirkconnell, Dean B.M. Cain, and Dean R.S. Longley (Acadia); Professor H. Grayson-Smith, Professor W.H. Johns, Professor H.B. Mayo, Professor R.E. Phillips, Professor Andrew Stewart, Professor O.J. Walker, and Mr. G.B. Taylor (Alberta); Professor D.C. Masters (Bishop’s); President J.R. Evans (Brandon); President N.A.M. MacKenzie, Dean H.F. Angus, Dean J.N. Finlayson, Professor G.C. Andrew, Professor R. Daniells, Professor J.C. Hooley, Professor G.D. Kennedy, Professor H.J. MacLeod, Professor E.D. MacPhee, Professor G.M. Shrum, Professor F.H. Soward, Professor M.Y. Williams, and C. Black (UBC); Dean J.H.L. Johnstone, Dean G.E. Wilson, Professor W.J. Chute, Professor W.R. Lederman, and Dr. H.L. Scammell (Dalhousie); Professor A. Griffin (King’s); Monseigneur Ferdinand Vandry, Monseigneur A.-M. Parent, Dean Adrien Pouliot, Professor Jean Bernier, Professor P.-E. Gagnon, Professor A. Latreille, Professor J.-M. Martin, and Professor J.-E. Morin (Laval); Principal F. Cyril James, Dean W.H. Brittain, Dean H.N. Fieldhouse, Dean J.J. O’Neill, Dean D.L. Thomson, Dean J.S. Thomson, Dr. R.P. Vivian, Mr. William Bentley, 459

Mr. Richard Pennington, and Mr. T.H. Matthews (McGill); President G.P. Gilmour, Dean H.S. Armstrong, Professor A.B. McLay, and Professor C.H. Stearn (McMaster); Dean J.W. Lawson, Professor G.G. Blake, Professor Vincent Jensen, Professor S. Johnson, professor W.F. Riddell, Professor B.G. Whitmore, Reverend J. d’A. Richard, and Dr. J.B. Rollit (Manitoba); President W.R. Ross Flemington, Professor D.G. MacGregor, and Professor H.W. McKiel (Mount Allison); Sister Frances Carmel and Sister Francis d’Assissi (Mount Saint Vincent); Professor Thomas Greenwood, Professor Léon Lortie, Professor Albert Mayrand, and Reverend Father Louis M. Regis (Montréal); President A.W. Trueman, Dean C.W. Argue, Professor W.S. MacNutt, Professor A.P. Stuart, and Professor E.E. Wheatley (UNB); Professor D.S. Nicol (NSTC); Professor A.W. Baker, Professor R.S. Brown, and Professor J.D. MacLachlin (OAC); Very Reverend J.C. Laframboise, Reverend F.E. Banim, Reverend Dr. A. Caron, Reverend R.E. Lavigne, Reverend S. Marion, Reverend A.-M. Morriset, Reverend R.H. Shevenell, and Reverend Dr. H. St. Denis (Ottawa); Principal R.C. Wallace, Dean A. Vibert Douglas, Dean D.S. Ellis, Dean G.H. Ettinger, Dean W.A. Mackintosh, Professor R.L. Jeffery, Professor Hilda Laird, Professor H.L. Tracy, and Jean I. Royce (Queen’s); Colonel W.R. Sawyer and Dr. P. Lowe (RMC); Reverend Edmund Roche (St. Dunstan’s); President P.J. Nicholson, Professor C.H. Bauer, Professor W.P. Fogarty, and Professor A.J. MacEachen (St. Francis Xavier); Reverend Rene Baudry (St. Joseph’s); President W.P. Thompson, Dean J.F. Leddy, Dean R.A. Spencer, Dean J.W.T. Spinks, and Professor D.J. Conacher (Saskatchewan); Principal K.E. Norris, Dean H.F. Hall, Professor C.W. Thompson, and Mr. D.B. Clarke (Sir George Williams); President S.E. Smith, Dean H.A. Innes, Dean J.A. MacFarlane, Dean J.W.B. Sisam, Dean D.K. Tupper, Professor C.T. Bissell, Professor G.W. Brown, Professor M.F. Crawford, Professor R.S. Knox, Professor T.R. Loudon, Professor N.E. Sheppard, Dr. C.D. Gossage, and Mr. J.C. Evans (Toronto); Provost R.S.K. Seeley and Dean R.K. Hicks (Trinity); Dean H. Bennett and Professor M. St. A. Woodside (Victoria); Reverend L.K. Shook and Reverend C.J. Lavery (St. Michael’s); Professor R.A. Allen and Dr. J.J. Talman (Western); Dr. C.J. Mackenzie and Dr. D.A. Keys (NRC)

Others Present: Dean Claude E. Puffer (American Council of Education); Dr. S.S. Stratton (Association of American Colleges); Dr. Lloyd W. Shaw (Canadian Education Association); Dr. S.H. Stackpole (Carnegie Corporation of New York); Dr. O.M. Solandt and Mr. W.H. Barton (Defence Research Board); Mr. Leon Mayrand and Mr. J.B. Seaborn (Department of External Affairs); Brigadier W.J. Megill, Commander C.H. Little, and Air Commodore J.G. Kerr (DND); Mr. H.W. Jamieson (DVA); Anne Besanson (Rockefeller Foundation); Commander C.H. Little (Royal Roads); Mr. J.M. Gray (Toronto Board of Trade Publisher’s Section); Mr. G.M. Morrison (Unemployment Insurance Commission); Dr. R.N. Stanforth (UNESCO); Dr. J.C. Smail (Heriot-Watt College, Edinburgh)

Appendix 2: Proposals Discussed at the Preliminary Meeting of Government Officials on 5 May 1942 Regarding the Coordination of Estimated Requirements for Engineering and Science Graduates

Source: Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2, “The Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel Report to the Deputy Minister for the Month of May 1942,” n.d.

1. The possible extension to engineering and science students of a plan similar in principle to that already adopted by the Department of National Defence for students in the last two years of Medicine and Dentistry. 2. Granting of aid by the Department of Labour to students in engineering who have completed first-year university. 3. Formulation of a plan by National Research Council designed to utilize certain exceptional students in research. 4. Clarification of requirements of the Department of National War Services with regard to military training of engineering and science students. 5. Acceptance by the Department of National War Services of a joint plan of the Department of National Defence, Munitions and Supply, National Research Council, and National Selective Service whereby graduating students in engineering and science be utilized either in war industries or in the Armed Forces. 6. Calling out by the Department of National War Services of all graduates and undergraduates of certain university faculties for early physical examination and tentative allocation for the Armed Forces or war industries. 7. Possibility of continuous teaching in the universities and of increasing the numbers of first-year students in engineering and science courses by bringing in students of exceptional academic standard with financial assistance to be given where needed, thus assuring the most complete use of the existing teaching facilities in each university. 8. The advisability of placing any required co-ordination under the direction and authority of the Director of National Selective Service.

461

Appendix 3: National Selective Service Questionnaire Regarding Administration of NSS Mobilization Regulations, 1943

Source: LAC, RG27, Volume 1481, File 2-133, Part 4, Charles Henry to all registrars, 23 July 1943.

SCHEDULE A

QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 12 OF THE NATIONAL SELECTIVE SERVICE MOBILIZATION REGULATIONS AND THE PROMPT SERVICE OF “ORDERS MILITARY TRAINING” ON “STUDENTS” WHO FAIL TO PASS REQUIRED TERM OR YEARLY ACADEMIC EXAMINATIONS.

POSTPONEMENT OF STUDENTS – SUBSECTION 10 OF SECTION 12

1. Does your Board make it a practice to deal with each postponement application for each “students”, issuing a Postponement Order in the event that postponement is granted?...... Yes…..No….. 2. Does your Board require each “student” applicant to file an individual application? ...... Yes…..No….. 3. Where there are no C.O.T.C. or Reserve Army Training facilities available, does your Board grant postponement to “students” under Section 12? ...... Yes…..No….. 4. Does your Board require that the university, college or school authorities provide any supporting material in connection with an application files by a “student” for postponement? ...... Yes…..No….. 5. If the answer to any of the questions 1 to 4 inclusive is no, then give particulars of the practice which your Board does follow in connection with those questions answered no.

SCHEDULE B

OF POSTPONEMENT FOR “STUDENTS” – SUBSECTION 7 OF SECTION 10

6. Does your Board make it a practice to grant postponement to a “student” in the first instance for a period covering the first school term of the “student’s” course, plus a further period of time required for publishing results of term academic examinations? ...... Yes…..No….. 7. Does your Board make it a practice to grant postponement to a “student” in the first instance for a period covering the first school year of the “student’s” course, plus a further period of time required for publishing results of yearly academic examinations? ...... Yes…..No….. 8. Upon reviewing a postponement order granted to a “student” by your Board, does your Board make it a practice to require from the “student” evidence that he has not failed to pass any term or yearly academic examination required by his university, 462

college or school authorities, and that he has complied with Section 12(3)(c)? ...... Yes…..No….. 9. Upon reviewing a postponement order granted to a “student” by your Board, does your Board make it a practice to grant postponement to a “student” covering the next succeeding school term plus a further period of time required for publishing results of term academic examinations? ...... …………………………………...Yes…..No….. 10. If the answer to any of the questions numbers 6 to 9 inclusive above is no, then what practice does your Board follow in connection with the period during which postponement is granted to “students” in the first instance or upon reviewing of a postponement order?

SCHEDULE C

PROMPT SERVICE OF “ORDER MILITARY TRAINING” ON STUDENTS FAILING TO PASS TERM OF YEARLY ACADEMIC EXAMINATIONS REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 12(3)(c)

11. Are you in possession of a list of all universities, colleges and schools located in your Administrative Division and specified in Section 12? ...... Yes…..No….. 12. If the answer to Question 11 is no, can you procure such list from the Deputy Minister of Education of your Province, and when will this be available to you? ...... Yes…..No….. 13. Do the university, college and school authorities mentioned in question 11 comply with the provisions of Section 12(3)(c) in your Administrative Division? …………………………………………………………………………..Yes…..No….. 14. Do you make it a practice to issue “Order-Military Training” promptly to all men who fail to comply with the terms of Subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 12(3)? …………………………………………………………………...……...Yes…..No….. 15. What administrative steps do you take to ensure that there is immediate service of “Order-Military Training” on “students” who fail to comply with the provisions of Section 12(3)(c)?

SCHEDULE D

CHANGE OF ADDRESS – SUBSECTIONS 12 AND 14 OF SECTION 6

16. For purposes of the school year, do you require “students” to file notice of change of address in the event of their homes being outside your Administrative Division if their universities, colleges or school are within your Division?...... Yes…..No….. 17. For purposes of the school year, in the event that a “student’s” home address is outside your Division but his university, college or school is within your Division, do you require the transfer of his file from his home Division? ...... Yes…..No….. 18. Where “students” have their homes outside your Division but their universities, college or schools are within your Division, do you require the authorities in charge of the universities, colleges or schools of such “students” to notify the Registrar of the home Divisions as to all matters relating to Section 12? ...... Yes…..No….. 463

19. Where “students” have their homes outside your Division but their universities, college or schools are within your Division, do you require the authorities in charge of the universities, colleges or schools of such “students” to notify you as to all matters relating to Section 12? ………………………………………….Yes…..No….. 20. Do you take any steps to ensure that, upon graduation or failure on the part of the “student” to return to school, you will be notified that such “student” has ceased to be a “student”? ...... Yes…..No….. 21. If any answer to any question numbered 16 to 20 inclusive is no, then with respect to the matters covered by such questions answered no what practice do you follow in your Division?

464

Appendix 4: Consolidated Responses to the 1943 National Selective Service Questionnaire Regarding Administration of NSS Mobilization Regulations

Source: LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-6, Part 2a, Charles Henry to Arthur MacNamara, H.J. Riley, and S.H. McLaren, 28 August 1943, Schedules A, B, C, D, E, F, G.

Division Question No.*

1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 “A” London Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y NA Y Y N N Y Y Y “B” Toronto Y Y Y Y NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA “C” Kingston Y Y Y Y N Y Y N N NA Y Y N N N N Y “D” Port Arthur Y Y N Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N NA NA NA Y “E” Montreal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y NA Y Y N N N Y Y “F” Quebec Y Y Y Y Y NA Y Y Y NA Y Y Y Y Y Y Y “G” Halifax Y Y Y Y NA NA NA NA Y NA Y Y N N N N Y “H” St. John Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y NA Y Y Y N Y Y Y “I” P.E.I. Y Y Y Y N N N N Y NA Y Y N N Y N N “J” Winnipeg Y NA NA Y NA NA NA N Y N Y Y Y N NA NA Y “K” Vancouver Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y NA Y Y N N N Y N “M” Regina Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N NA Y Y Y N N Y Y “N” Edmonton N Y Y Y N N N N N Y N Y Y N N Y Y

* Y signifies “Yes,” N signifies “No,” and NA signifies “No Answer.” 465

Appendix 5: Universities and Colleges Providing COTC or Basic Military Training by Military District as of 9 May 1941

Source: LAC, RG27, Volume 1482, File 2-133-4, A.A. Bell for J.K. Lawson to Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, DNWS, 9 May 1941.

Military District University or College

No. 1 Ontario Agricultural College University of Western Ontario (including Waterloo College, Assumption College, and St. Peter’s College) No. 2 University of Toronto McMaster University Osgoode Hall No. 3 Queen’s University University of Ottawa No. 4 McGill University (including Macdonald College) Université de Montréal (including affiliated colleges) Loyola College Collège Jean-de-Brébeuf Collège Mont-Saint-Louis Sir George Williams College Collège Saint-Alexandre No. 5 Université Laval (including Collège de Rimouski, Collège Sainte-Anne-de-la- Pocatière, Collège de Lévis, and Collège de Chicoutimi) No. 6 Nova Scotia Technical College Dalhousie University and King’s College Acadia University St. Francis Xavier University St. Dunstan’s University No. 7 University of New Brunswick Mount Allison University St. Thomas University Université Saint-Joseph (including Collège du Sacré-Coeur) No. 10 University of Manitoba (including Brandon College) No. 11 University of British Columbia No. 12 University of Saskatchewan No. 13 University of Alberta 466

Appendix 6: Women’s National Service Training Syllabus at the University of Toronto, 1942-1943

Source: “Women’s National Service Training,” The Varsity, 21 September 1942, 4.

Course Instruction By Who May Enrol Registration Hours Value 1. Canadian Red Cross Corps, 60 hours instruction and II, III and IV Total University of Toronto 200 practical work Years requirement Detachment Extends through both terms 20 hours lectures and 60 Preference 2. Training as Hospital Nursing hours hospital ward duty Total School of Nursing given to III and 200 Aids Course completed within requirement IV Years one term Preference 15 hours instruction with 3. Training as volunteers in Institute of Child One-half total given to III and 100 additional practice Civic Day Nurseries Study requirement IV Years One term 20 hours instruction with Faculty of II, III and IV One-half total 4. Lecture Course in Nutrition 50 additional field observation Household Science Years requirement One term School of Physical 5. Training Recreation II, III and IV 30 hours practical work One-half total and Health 150 Leadership Years One term requirement Education Universtiy II, III and IV 30 hours practical work One-half total 6. Red Cross Sewing Women’s War 25 Years One term requirement Service Committee 7. Civilian Defence (A.R.P.) Civilian Defence Combine to Preference 15 hours and 15 hours and Home Nursing (Certificate Organization; Red 150 make one-half given to II Year One term Course) Cross Society total requirement 8. Civilian Defence (A.R.P.) Civilian Defence Combine to Preference 15 hours and 15 hours and First Aid (Certificate Organization; to be 150 make one-half given to II Year One term Course) arranged total requirement 467

Appendix 7: Order-in-Council P.C. 2983 Establishing the UATC, 13 May 1942

Source: LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 2983, 13 May 1942.

P.C. 2983

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA Wednesday, the 13th day of May, 1942. PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL - -

WHEREAS by Order in Council P.C. 2677 dated the 14th September, 1939, the Permanent Active Force, the Auxiliary Active Air Force, and the Special Reserve Royal Canadian Air Force, and all Officers and Airmen thereof, were thereby placed on Active Service in Canada also beyond Canada for the defence thereof as, of and from the 13th day of September, 1939;

AND WHEREAS the Minister of National Defence for Air recommended that a further component of the Royal Canadian Air Force entitled the “UNIVERSITY AIR TRAINING CORPS”, be formed in which it is proposed to enlist, instruct and train university students during the period of their university courses, who while on the strength thereof shall not be on Active Service.

NOW, THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, under and by virtue of the provisions of the Royal Canadian Air Force Act, being Chapter 15 of the Statutes of Canada, 1940, is pleased to order and doth hereby order:

1. That there be formed forthwith a component of the Royal Canadian Air Force entitled the “UNIVERSITY AIR TRAINING CORPS”, to be comprised of such Officers and Airmen as may be appointed thereto or enlisted therein under such conditions as to service training and pay, not inconsistent with this order and/or with the provisions of the King’s Regulations and Orders for the R.C.A.F. as may be prescribed by the Minister of National Defence for Air. 2. That the said University Air Training Corps shall be comprised of such units, detachments and formations as may be from time to time named by the Minister of National Defence for Air. 3. That the said University Air Training Corps shall not be deemed to be on Active Service, but Officers and Airmen thereof may be placed on Active Service by being transferred to the Special Reserve, Royal Canadian Air Force, under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Minister of National Defence for Air. 468

Appendix 8: Organizational Chart for the UATC

Source: LAC, RG24, Vol. 3244, File 215-3-1, Organizational Order No. 227, “Formation of the University Air Training Corps of the Royal Canadian Air Force,” 10 September 1942, Appendix “C.”

469

Appendix 9: Order-in-Council P.C. 4453 Establishing the UNTD, 6 June 1943

Source: LAC, RG2, Order-in-Council P.C. 68/4453, 1 June 1943.

P.C. 4453

The Committee of the Privy Council having had under consideration the attached Minutes of a Meeting of the Honourable the Treasury Board, dated the twenty-seventh day of May 1943, No. 2, submit the same for approval.

Government House, Approved Ottawa. 1.6.43

JOBL/DW (NAVAL SERVICE)

Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, 17th April, 1943

T. 243088 B. DRAFT ORDER NO. 315

(For the approval of the Governor-in-Council)

UNIVERSITY NAVAL TRAINING DIVISIONS

1. It is approved to form Naval Training units in Universities in Canada in cities where there are R.C.N.V.R. Divisions. 2. They will be known as University Naval Training Divisions of the University to which attached, short title U.N.T.D. 3. (1) The administrative authority of the U.N.T.D. will be the Commanding Officer, Reserve Divisions. (2) A member of the faculty nominated by the University acceptable to Commanding Officer, Reserve Divisions may be appointed Commanding Officer of the Unit. (3) The Commanding Officer of the U.N.T.D. will be responsible to the Area Commanding Officer for the discipline and training of his Division. (4) The Commanding Officer of the U.N.T.D. will receive uniform allowance and annually the pay of his rank for 40 days as compensation for his services in the training of the unit. (5) In the first year of his enrolment he will be required to do a disciplinary course and will be taken on Active Service for this period. (6) At all other times except for the 40 days for which he receives pay and allowances, 3 (4) above, he will be on Divisional Strength only. 470

4. (1) Students enrolling in the U.N.T.D. will be attested as ratings on the special attestation form, N.V.5 (b). (2) Science students in whatever course of study may be enrolled and trained in the U.N.T.D. but will be subject to the provisions of Order-in-Council P.C. 246 of 19th January, 1943 (National Selective Service Civilian Regulations). (3) University students enrolled in the U.N.T.D. will be classed for pay as ratings on divisional strength not on Active Service.

(N.S. 21-2-30) BY ORDER.

(Sg’d) (R.A. Pennington) A/Paymaster Captain, R.C.N.V.R., Secretary, Naval Board.

471

Appendix 10: COTC Reorganization as Proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, 25 April 1944

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 8 June 1944, Appendix B.

Institution Pre War Present Proposed Proposed ATB* Total Proposed Latest Strength Establishment Establishment COTC COTC & ATB Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs

Western 19 344 31 404 12 124 18 360 30 484 31 423 OAC 5 91 21 277 9 64 5 91 14 155 16 146 McMaster -- -- 19 244 9 64 6 120 15 184 14 191 Toronto 21 306 79 1444 31 484 48 1072 79 1556 107 1511 Queen’s 14 215 43 724 13 153 18 360 31 513 39 930 Ottawa -- -- 31 484 11 95 12 240 23 335 81 509 McGill 21 346 49 844 18 244 50 600 48 244 44 819 Montreal 25 368 67 1204 24 364 65 1250 87 1614 52 1366 Bishop’s 6 120 5 91 1 29 1 29 2 58 -- 43 Brébeuf -- -- 8 170 3 60 5 91 8 151 9 158 Loyola 29 424 26 368 9 64 8 176 17 242 21 229 Mont-Saint-Louis -- -- 19 244 11 95 8 176 19 273 17 290 Laval 15 186 41 610 18 244 30 600 48 844 45 840 Dalhousie & Kings 9 124 20 275 9 64 7 149 16 213 11 206 NS Technical 11 155 6 120 1 29 1 29 2 58 8 39 St. Francis Xavier 6 120 7 149 3 60 5 91 8 151 5 143 Acadia -- -- 6 120 3 60 6 120 9 180 6 159 St. Mary’s -- -- 19 244 3 60 6 120 9 180 10 161 St. Dunstan’s -- -- 5 91 1 29 3 60 4 80 4 88 St. Anne’s -- -- 3 60 1 29 1 29 2 58 2 53

* “ATB” stands for Auxiliary Training Battalion. 472

Institution Pre War Present Proposed Proposed ATB Total Proposed Latest Strength Establishment Establishment COTC COTC & ATB Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs Offrs ORs

UNB 13 186 18 215 9 64 6 120 15 184 17 165 Mount Allison -- -- 19 244 1 29 5 91 6 120 12 121 St. Thomas -- -- 5 91 1 29 5 91 6 121 4 109 Saint-Joseph -- -- 6 120 3 60 5 91 8 151 6 134 Sacré-Coeur -- -- 5 91 1 29 3 60 4 89 4 89 Manitoba 21 302 55 964 20 295 35 745 55 1043 34 1089 UBC 9 124 60 1055 18 240 30 600 48 840 39 809 Saskatchewan 15 186 32 513 13 149 18 360 31 509 37 533 Alberta 29 484 31 484 9 64 8 178 17 242 20 224 Total 268 4,081 736 11,944 265 3,374 418 8,099 683 11,473 695 11,577

473

Appendix 11: COTC Reorganization as Proposed by the Chief of the General Staff, 25 April 1944

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File 8679-1-14, Volume 1, J.C. Murchie to the Minister of National Defence, 8 June 1944, Appendix B.

Institution Present Organization Proposed COTC Proposed ATB Organization Organization

Western Bn HQ 4 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 4 Pls 3 Coys 4 Pls OAC Bn HQ 3 Coys 3 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 3 Pls McMaster Bn HQ 2 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 4 Pls Toronto Bn HQ 12 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 4 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 6 Coys 6 pls Queen’s Bn HQ 6 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 5 Pls 3 Coys 4 Pls Ottawa Bn HQ 4 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 3 Pls 2 Coys 4 Pls McGill Bn HQ 7 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 2 Coys 4 Pls 5 Coys 4 pls Montreal Bn HQ 10 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 3 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 7 Coys 6 Pls Bishop’s 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Pl 1 Pl Brébeuf 1 Coy 6 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 3 Pls Loyola Bn HQ 4 Coys 3 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 6 Pls Mont-Saint-Louis Bn HQ 2 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Coy 6 Pls Laval Bn HQ 7 Coys 3 Pls Bn HQ 2 Coys 4 Pls 5 Coys 4 Pls Dalhousie & Kings Bn HQ 3 Coys 2 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 5 Pls NS Technical 1 Coy 4 Pls 1 Pl 1 Pl St. Francis Xavier 1 Coy 5 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 3 Pls Acadia 1 Coy 4 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 4 Pls St. Mary’s Bn HQ 2 Coy 4 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 4 Pls St. Dunstan’s 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Pl 1 Coy 2 Pls St. Anne’s 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Pl 1 Pl UNB Bn HQ 1 Coy 4 Pls Bn HQ 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 4 Pls 1 Coy 5 Pls Mount Allison Bn HQ 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Pl 1 Coy 3 Pls St. Thomas 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Pl 1 Coy 3 Pls Saint-Joseph 1 Coy 4 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 3 Pls Sacré-Coeur 1 Coy 3 Pls 1 Pl 1 Coy 2 Pls Manitoba Bn HQ 8 Coys 4 Pls Bn HQ 2 Coy 4 Pls 5 Coys 5 pls 8 Coys 4 Pls UBC Bn HQ 1 Coy 3 Pls Bn HQ 2 Coy 4 Pls 5 Coys 4 Pls 4 Coys 4 Pls Saskatchewan Bn HQ 1 Pl Bn HQ 1 Coy 5 Pls 3 Coys 4 Pls Alberta Bn HQ 4 Coy 4 Pls 1 Coy 2 Pls 1 Coy 6 Pls

474

Appendix 12: Order-in-Council P.C. 3086, 1 May 1941

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 3086, 1 May 1941.

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 1st May, 1941.

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated 30th April, 1941, from the Minister of National Defence for Air, representing that the recruiting and training of 2,500 radio mechanics by this Royal Canadian Air Force has been approved by the Cabinet War Committee.

That provision has already been made by way of Supplementary Estimate and approved by the Treasury Board for the cost of each recruiting and training; and

That it is considered expedient that contracts be entered into with the Universities concerned to carry on the aforesaid training, at a cost not exceeding $200.00 per pupil.

The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence for Air, advise that authority be granted to execute agreements on the attached form with the following Universities:

Dalhousie 100 pupils McGill 500 pupils Queen’s 150 pupils University of Toronto 500 pupils University of Alberta 120 pupils University of British Columbia 150 pupils

1,520

“A.D.P. Heeney” Clerk of the Privy Council

Copy of agreement attached to original.

The Honourable The Minister of National Defence for Air.

475

Appendix 13: Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191, 6 May 1941

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 3560, File 990-1-3, Part 1, Order-in-Council P.C. 42/3191, 6 May 1941.

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the 6th May, 1941.

National Defence for Air

The Board has had under consideration a submission of the Honourable the Minister of National Defence for Air reporting that:

1. The Cabinet War Committee approved the recruitment and training of 2500 Radio Mechanics in Canada for service in the United Kingdom, the cost of recruiting and training to be borne by the Government of Canada and after embarkation the United Kingdom Government to accept financial responsibility on the same basis as for graduates of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.

2. It was originally anticipated that 500 of these would be recruited from trained radio personnel and 2000 would have to be trained under the direction of the Royal Canadian Air Force, but it now is apparent that all will have to be so trained.

3. Universities in Canada have agreed to provide tuition for such personnel at a cost of $200 per person.

4. The estimated cost of this programme at Recruiting Centres, Manning Depots and at Embarkation Depot prior to embarkation for the United Kingdom to be borne by the Government of Canada is $2,351,125.

In conformity with Order in Council P.C. 6695 of November 19th, 1940, the Board approved the estimates of expenditure involved chargeable to funds to be allotted from the War Appropriation and recommend that the programme detailed herein be approved.

(Sg’d) (A.D.P. Heeney), Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Honourable The Minister of National Defence for Air.

476

Appendix 14: Order-in-Council P.C. 75/11590, 23 December 1942

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 3561, File 990-1-7, Order-in-Council P.C. 75/11590, 23 December 1942.

P.C. 75/11590

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the 23rd December, 1942.

National Defence for Air

The Board has under consideration a memorandum from the Honourable Minister of National Defence for Air reporting:

“1. (a) THAT Order in Council P.C. 42/3191 dated 6th May, 1941, as amended by Orders in Council P.C. 42/450 dates 20th January, 1942 and P.C. 59/1038 dated 9th February, 1942, provided for the training of five thousand radio mechanics at Canadian Universities and for this purpose training facilities and domestic accommodation were provided by the Universities.

(b) THAT the required number of radio mechanics now having been enlisted, the contracts with the Universities will be terminated on conclusion of the current courses of training.

(c) THAT insofar as it is not possible to obtain sufficient number of aircrew applicants with the necessary standard of education to meet the requirements of the Combined Training Organization, it is necessary to provide pre-aircrew education courses for those aircrew applicants whose education requires to be raised to meet the standards of aircrew training.

(d) THAT the training facilities at Universities made available by the cessation of radio mechanics’ training have been offered by the Universities for the purpose of pre-aircrew education courses.

2. THEREFORE subject to satisfactory arrangements being made and because a most efficient means of educational training is provided, it is proposed to take advantage of the training facilities at the following universities and colleges for pre-aircrew education courses:—

University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C. University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Sask. University of Toronto Toronto, Ontario Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario McGill University Montreal, Quebec 477

Brandon College Brandon, Manitoba Ontario Agricultural College Guelph, Ontario

3. The pre-aircrew education courses at the Universities will be of six week’s duration and the number of trainees contemplated for training annually will be approximately 10,920. The instructors at the pre-education courses will be R.C.A.F. personnel and the students will be enlisted potential aircrew trainees.

4. The Chief of the Air Staff considers that the pre-aircrew education courses will enable the requirements of aircrew trainees in the Combined Training Organization to be met and that advantage should be taken of the offer of the Universities to provide the necessary training facilities. He therefore recommends approval of the proposals outlined above.

5. The increased expenditure is estimated to be $475,000.00 for the balance of the present fiscal year and $1,685,000.00 annually thereafter.

6. The Deputy Minister of National Defence for Air has considered and concurs in the above recommendation.

7. The undersigned concurs and recommends accordingly.”

The Board concur in the above report and recommendation, and submit the same for favourable consideration.

(Sgd.) A.D.P. Heeney. Clerk of the Privy Council.

478

Appendix 15: Order-in-Council P.C. 38/9591 Establishing the No. 1 Canadian Army Course

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1, Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, Order-in-Council P.C. 38/9591, 21 October 1942.

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the 21st October, 1942.

P.C. 38/9591

NATIONAL DEFENCE

The Board had under consideration a memorandum from the Honourable the Associate Minister of National Defence reporting that:

(a) It has been decided by the Department of National Defence in consultation with the University of Toronto, to provide a special one-year course in the elements of certain scientific subjects for 160 selected candidates possessing the requisite educational qualifications. (b) The said course is to be conducted by the University of Toronto which shall also provide the accommodation and messing for the candidates, the whole at public expense. (c) Candidates who satisfy the educational requirements of the University of Toronto and are acceptable to the Military authorities are to be enlisted into a unit of the Canadian Army and be subject as soldiers to military discipline. They will undergo Basic Training at the University and upon successful completion of all phases of the course, both academic and military, will proceed to Advanced Training Centres where they will be regarded as potential officers to be sent to Officers’ Training Centres should their individual records so warrant. (d) The University of Toronto has undertaken to give due academic credit to successful candidates who may desire to complete a course at that University at some future date.

2. The Adjutant-General therefore recommends that appropriate action be taken to give effect to the foregoing proposal.

3. The estimated cost of the foregoing proposal for six months of 1942-1943 amounts to $136,480, of which $43,700 is non-recurring. Funds are available in the several Allotments concerned of Army Estimates.

4. The Deputy Minister (Army) has examined and concurs in the financial aspects and implications of the foregoing proposal.

5. The undersigned concurs in the recommendations of the Adjutant-General and to that end has the honour to recommend that Your Excellency-in-Council under and by virtue 479 of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, and notwithstanding any other Act, Law or Regulation be pleased to order that

(a) A special one-year course in the fundamentals of mathematics, physics and engineering shall be conducted by the University of Toronto commencing 10th October, 1942. This course shall be known as No. 1 Canadian Army Course and shall be open to 160 selected candidates within the ages of 17-19 years inclusive possessing the necessary educational qualifications to be determined according to standards set by the University of Toronto. (b) Initial application by candidates shall be made to the University of Toronto and the names of those possessing satisfactory academic qualifications shall be submitted to National Defence Headquarters. Applicants shall then be requested to report for enlistment in the normal manner, it being understood that the final decision as to acceptability rests with the military authorities and no candidate shall be enlisted unless he satisfied the requirements set by the military authorities. (c) Successful candidates shall be enlisted into an active unit or formation of the Canadian Army subject only to the following conditions: i. Enlistments shall only be permitted between the ages of 17-19 years inclusive. ii. The written consent of parents must be given in the case of boys under 18 years. iii. Until a boy reaches the age of 18 years he shall receive boys’ pay (70 cents per diem), after which he shall receive the standard rate ($1.30 per diem). iv. Boys 18 years of age and over shall receive standard rates of pay upon enlistment. (d) Personnel presently serving in the Canadian Army shall be eligible to attend the course provided they possess the necessary academic qualifications and are selected therefor by the proper military authorities. (e) Candidates who have been accepted and properly enlisted shall be housed in University of Toronto residences and be subject to military supervision and discipline. Each student shall receive free tuition and text books, board, lodging, medical and dental attention in addition to his pay. (f) All candidates while in attendance at the University shall undergo Basic Training under the direction of the Department of National Defence. (g) On successful completion of the course, candidates shall proceed to Advanced Training Centres to complete training in the area for which they have shown special aptitude. (h) During the period of the course candidates who are found to be below the desired standard or who are otherwise unsatisfactory may be removed and sent to Basic Training Centres to proceed through the normal training channels as enlisted soldiers. (i) Successful candidates shall, on proceeding to Advanced Training Centres, be regarded as potential officers, it being clearly understood however, that no 480

undertaking exists that all or any candidates shall be granted vacancies on quotas proceeding to Officers’ Training Centres.

The Board concur in the above report and recommendation and submit the same for favourable consideration. (Sgd.) A.D.P. Heeney Clerk of the Privy Council.

481

Appendix 16: Order-in-Council P.C. 129/6181 Establishing the No. 2 Canadian Army University Course

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 122, File Part 1, Army – No. 3 Canadian Army University Course, Order-in-Council P.C. 129/6181, 4 August 1943.

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the 4th August, 1943.

P.C. 129/6181

NATIONAL DEFENCE

The Board has under consideration a memorandum from the Honourable the Minister of National Defence reporting that:

(a) By Order-in-Council, P.C. 38/9591, dated 21st October, 1942, authority was granted for No. 1 Canadian Army Course which was open to 160 selected candidates at the University of Toronto within the ages of 17 and 21 years inclusive. (b) As this course has proved highly successful, it is now proposed that authority be granted for No. 1 Canadian Army University Course which will be open to 1,270 selected candidates who on August 1st, 1943, are over 17 and under 22 years of age and which will be extended to several Canadian Universities. (c) Quotes have been allotted to the following Universities as indicated:—

University of Western Ontario 60 candidates University of Toronto 250 McMaster University 50 Queen’s University 135 McGill University 250 University de Montreal 100 Acadia University 70 Mount Allison University 50 University of British Columbia 85 University of Saskatchewan 120 University of Alberta 60 Surplus Allotment 40 1,270

A surplus allotment of 40 candidates is proposed which will be available to any of the Universities concerned in the event of applicants outnumbering the individual quotas. (d) Tuition, messing and accommodation will be provided by the universities concerned, except in the case of Queen’s University where the Army will provide 482

messing and in the case of the University of British Columbia where the Army will provide both accommodation and messing. (e) Candidates who satisfy the educational requirements of the Universities concerned and who are acceptable to the military authorities are to be enlisted in accordance with instructions issued from time to time by the Adjutant-General. Upon successful completion of all phases of the course, both Academic and Military, candidates will proceed to Advanced Training Centres where they will be regarded as potential officers should their individual records so warrant. (f) Up to the age of 17 and one-half years, candidates will receive boys’ pay and between 17 and one-half and 21 years inclusive, they will receive the ordinary pay and allowances of their rank.

2. The Deputy Minister concurs in the foregoing proposal and in order to give effect thereto recommends that appropriate action be taken.

3. The estimated cost of the foregoing proposal for 8½ months of 1943-1944 amounts to $1,366,879, of which $263,512 is non-recurring. Funds are available in the several Primary Allotments concerned of the 1943-44 Annual Army Estimates. Included in the above estimate is provision for text-books, and drawing instruments.

4. As the universities concerned have indicated their unwillingness to undertake financial commitments in respect of university instructional staff and equipment for the above courses, without guarantee of adequate compensation, it is considered necessary that the minister of national Defence be authorized to enter into contracts with any or all of the universities, enumerated in para 1 (c), guaranteeing upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, the reimbursement to any or all of the said universities of financial commitment in connection with the above courses.

5. The undersigned concurs in the foregoing recommendations of the Deputy Minister and in order to give effect thereto further recommends that Your Excellency-in-Council, under and by virtue of the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 1927 and notwithstanding any other Statute, Regulation or order be pleased to order that:—

(a) A Special one year course in the fundamentals of mathematics, physics and engineering shall be conducted by certain Canadian Universities, such courses to commence not earlier than 1st September nor later than 15th September, 1943, except that the course at McGill may be commenced on 15th August, 1943, provided the full quota of candidates is available. Quotas are allotted to the following Universities as indicated:—

University of Western Ontario 60 candidates University of Toronto 250 McMaster University 50 Queen’s University 135 McGill University 250 483

University de Montreal 100 Acadia University 70 Mount Allison University 50 University of British Columbia 85 University of Saskatchewan 120 University of Alberta 60 Surplus Allotment 40 1,270

This course shall be known as No. 2 Canadian Army University Course and shall be open to 1,270 selected candidates within the ages of 17 and 21 years inclusive, possessing the necessary educational qualifications to be determined according to the standards set by the aforementioned universities.

(b) Initial application by candidates shall be made to the university concerned and the names of those possessing satisfactory academic qualifications shall be forwarded to Headquarters of the Military District in which the University is situated. Applicants shall then be requested to report to the nearest District Depot for enlistment in the normal manner, it being understood that the final decision as to acceptability rests with the military authorities and no candidate shall be enlisted unless he satisfies the requirements set by the military authorities. (c) Successful candidates shall be taken on strength of the District Depot to which they report and upon completion of attestation, documentation and outfitting, etc., shall be transferred to the Vocational Training School of the district in which the university concerned is situated and attached for all purposes to the Basic Training Centre designated by the D.O.C. during the period in which Basic Training is undertaken. All enlistments shall be subject to the following conditions. i. Enlistment shall be permitted to boys who have reached the age of 17 and are under 22 years of age. ii. The written consent of parents must be given in the case of candidates under 18 years. iii. Until a candidate reaches the age of 17 years and 6 months, he shall receive boys’ pay (70¢ per diem), after which he shall receive the standard rate. iv. Candidates 17 years and 6 months of age and over will receive standard rates of pay upon enlistment. (d) General Service personnel presently serving in the Canadian Army shall be eligible to attend these courses, provided they possess the necessary qualifications and are selected therefor by the proper military authorities. (e) Candidates who have been accepted and properly enlisted shall be provided with tuition, accommodation and rations and be subject to military supervision and discipline. In addition to his military pay and allowances, each candidate shall receive text-books and medical and dental attention. (f) All candidates while in attendance at the university shall undergo Basic Training under the direction of the Department of National Defence. 484

(g) On successful completion of the course and Basic Training, candidates shall proceed to Advanced Training Centres to complete training in the Arm for which they have shown special aptitude or have been selected. (h) During the course at the respective universities, candidates who fail to maintain a satisfactory standard shall be withdrawn from the course and be required to continue normal military service. (i) Successful candidates shall in proceeding to their Advanced Training Centre be regarded as potential officers, it being clearly understood, however, that no guarantee exists that all or any such candidates will be granted vacancies on Officers’ Training Centre quotas. (j) The Honourable, the Minister of National Defence, is hereby authorized to enter into contracts, on behalf, of the Department of National Defence, with the universities enumerated in sub-para (a) hereof, guaranteeing, upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, the reimbursement to the said university or universities of financial commitments made by the universities in respect of instructional staff and equipment for No. 2 Canadian Army University Course.

The Board concur in the above report and recommendation, and submit the same for favourable consideration.

(Sgd.) A.D.P. Heeney Clerk of the Privy Council

485

Appendix 17: Order-in-Council P.C. 4068½ Authorizing Appointment of Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation, 7 December 1939

Source: LAC, RG2, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 4068½, 8 December 1939.

P.C. 4068½

The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report, dated December 7th, 1939, from the Right Honourable W.L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, representing, with the concurrence of the Ministers of Pensions and National Health and National Defence, that it is expedient that early and thorough consideration be given to questions which will arise from the demobilization and the discharge from time to time during and after the conclusion of the present war of members of the Forces. The Committee, therefore, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, advise that there be hereby constituted a special Committee of the Cabinet composed of the following members, namely:

The Minister of Pensions and National Health (Convener), The Minister of Public Works, The Minister of National Defence, The Minister of Agriculture, The Minister of Labour, The Honourable J.A. MacKinnon, and that the duties of such Committee shall be to procure information respecting and give full consideration to and report regarding the problems which will arise from the demobilization and the discharge from time to time of members of the Forces during and after the conclusion of the present war, and the rehabilitation of such members into civil life, and in that connection, but without in any way restricting the generality of the foregoing

(a) to consider the adequacy, adaptability and full utilization of the existing governmental machinery which is available to deal with such problems either separately or in conjunction with other activities, and particularly the Department of Pensions and National Health, the Department of Labour, the Canadian Pension Commission, the War Veterans’ Allowance Board, and the Civil Service Commission; (b) to consider the necessity or advisability of any expansion or additions or readjustments which may seem to be advisable in connection with any of the activities of such Departments or agencies; (c) to appoint Advisory Committees selected from the personnel of Government Departments or agencies; (d) to consult from time to time Provincial and Municipal Governments and public service organizations and Canadian citizens interested in such problems; 486

(e) to make recommendations as to the organization and composition of representative national and local Committees to co-operate with the Government in meeting the problems of rehabilitation and re-establishment; (f) generally to procure information respecting and give full consideration to the problems above mentioned and the formulation of preparatory plans in connection therewith; and (g) to submit from time to time to the Governor in Council such reports respecting the information received and consideration given and the plans formulated as may seem to the Committee advisable to keep the Governor in Council informed in respect thereto.

The Committee further advise that, for the aforementioned purposes, the said Committee of the Cabinet shall, subject to the approval of the Governor General in Council, have power to engage and remunerate such officers, clerks and employees as may in their view be necessary, and that all expenditures incurred by the Committee be charged to funds provided under the War Appropriation Act.

487

Appendix 18: Order-in-Council P.C. 7633, The Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order, 1 October 1941

Source: LAC, RG1, A1a, Order-in-Council P.C. 7633, 1 October 1941.

P.C. 7633

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA Wednesday, the 1st day of October, 1941

PRESENT: HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

WHEREAS the Minister of Pensions and National Health reports that it is advisable that provision should be made to facilitate the orderly re-establishment in civil life of persons who may be discharged from the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada after serving in the present war; That, as The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, came into active operation on July 1, 1941, persons who may be employed in insured industry during the war period will enjoy protection under that Act based on their employment during that period; That it is advisable that, as nearly as may be, parity should be established between discharged persons who may return to insurable employment, whether in insurance employment before enlistment or not, and those in insurable employment during the war period, and that substantially the same standard of protection as under the Unemployment Insurance Act should be afforded to discharged persons until they become re-established in civil life, whether in insurable employment or otherwise; That, as unemployment insurance benefits are payable out of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, it is advisable that contributions should be made to that Fund on behalf of discharged persons who return to insurance employment to the end that time served by persons in the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada subsequent to July 1, 1941, may count as employment in insurable employment under The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940; That it is advisable that persons now in the said forces should know as soon as possible, and that persons who enlist in the future should know when they enlist, the further provisions thereinafter proposed for their orderly re-establishment in civil life on discharge in completion of the programme already established for that purpose namely, (i) clothing allowance, (ii) transportation to place of enlistment or home, (iii) rehabilitation grant, (iv) remedial medical treatment, (v) vocational training facilities, (vi) re-instatement or preference in employment and placement and guidance services, and (vii) pension for disabilities, with ancillary hospital treatment. 488 in order that such persons may effectively plan for their re-establishment in advance of discharge; That, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of The War Appropriation Act, 1941, chapter 11 of the Statutes of Canada, 1941, the Governor in Council may authorize expenditures during the year ending the 31st day of March, 1942, for the carrying out of any measure deemed advisable in consequence of the existence of the state of war; and That, pursuant to the provisions of the War Measures Act, chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, the Governor in Council may make such orders and regulations as may, by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, be deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada; THEREFORE His Excellency the Governor-General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Pensions and National Health and under and pursuant to the provisions of the War Appropriation Act, 1941, chapter 11 of the Statutes of Canada, 1941, and the War Measures Act, chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, is pleased to make the following order and it is hereby made and established accordingly:—

PART I

1. This order may be referred to as “The Post-Discharge Re-establishment Order”. 2. In this order, unless the context otherwise requires: “discharge” means discharge or retirement from, or the ceasing to serve on active service in, the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada subsequent to July 1, 1941; “discharged person” means any person who, having been in receipt of either active service rates of pay or of Permanent Force rates of pay while serving in the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada during the present war, subsequent to July 1, 1941, is discharged or retired from, or ceases to serve on active service in, the said forces; “enlistment” means enlistment or enrolment in, or appointment to a commission in, the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada; “married person” means – (i) a man whose wife is being maintained wholly or mainly by him, or (ii) a married woman who has a husband dependent on her, or (iii) a married person, widow or widower, who maintains wholly or mainly one or more children under the age of 16 years; and for the purpose of this definition “child” includes any child of the discharged person, a stepchild, adopted child, or illegitimate child; “Minister” means the Minister of Pensions and National Health; “non-pensionable disability” means a disability in respect of which no pension has been granted under The Pension Act; “pension” means a pension under The Pension Act; “rehabilitation grant” means a grant made pursuant to the provisions of Order-in- Council P.C. 7521 dated December 19, 1940, as amended; “service” means service in the Naval, Military or Air Forces of Canada during the present war; and 489

“university” means a Canadian University or College, of educational standards approved by the minister. 3. The Minister may make regulations which, in his opinion, are necessary or advisable for carrying out the provisions of Parts II and III of this order. 4. This order shall into force on the 1st day of October, 1941.

PART II

5. (1) The Minister May, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, order that a discharged person by paid an out-of-work benefit at the rate of $13 per week if he is a married person, and at a rate of $9 per week if he is not a married person, for any week or part thereof during he (i) is capable of and available for work but unable to obtain suitable employment, and (ii) follows such course of training or instruction, if any, as the Minister may have prescribed to fit him or to keep him fit for employment or for re- employment. (2) A deduction shall be made from the out-of-work benefit of a discharged person for any period equal to the amount of the benefit, if any, which he is qualified or able to qualify to receive for the period under The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940. (3) A discharged person shall not be deemed to be disqualified for out-of-work benefit by reason only that he has declined an offer of employment under conditions as described in paragraph (b) of Section 31 of The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, or by reason of his refusal of employment the acceptance of which would involve the consequences described in Section 32 of the said Act, and he shall not be deemed to be unemployed for any period or day as described in Section 33 of the said Act, but he shall be disqualified for out-of-work benefit in the circumstances defined in Section 43 of said Act. 6. (1) The Minister may, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, order the payment of a grant to a discharged person at a rate not exceeding $13 per week if he is a married person and $9.00 per week if he is not a married person, if (i) such person is pursuing vocational, technical or other educational training; (ii) the Minister approves such training as being training which will fit him or keep him fit for employment or re-employment or will enable him to obtain better or more suitable employment, and (iii) he makes progress in such training to the satisfaction of the Minister. (2) The Minister may diminish the grant aforesaid in any case by such amount as to him seems right by reason of any pension, wages, salary, or other income such person may have received or may be entitled to receive for such period, and in no case shall the amount of the grant, together with his income from all sources, including any pension, exceed the rate of training allowance under Clause 20 of Order in Council P.C. 91, dated January 16, 1936, as amended. 7. The Minister may, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, order that a discharged person be paid a grant for any week or part thereof during which 490

(i) he engaged in agricultural or other enterprise on his own account and is awaiting returns from such enterprise, or he is temporarily incapacitated from accepting work or from taking training by reason of a non- pensionable disability, and (ii) the Minister is of the opinion that, having regard to the special circumstances of the case, the grant will prove effective in re-establishing him, at a rate not exceeding $13 per week if he is a married person and $9 per week if he is not a married person, diminished by such amount, on account of any pension, wages, salary or other income such discharged person may have received or be entitled to receive in respect of such person, as to the Minister seems right. 8. In case any discharged person (a) has been regularly admitted to a university before his discharge, or is regularly admitted to a university, either within (i) one year from his discharge, or (ii) one year from the commencement of the university year, or of the course which he is pursuing next following his discharge, if such discharge precedes such commencement by not more than three months, and (b) resumes a course, academic or professional, interrupted by his service or commences any such course, in such university, within one year and three months after his discharge or within such longer period as may be necessary to enable him to complete his university matriculation or as may arise on account of his ill-health or on account of other good cause shown to the satisfaction of the Minister, the Minister may, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, order that he be paid a grant for any week or part thereof during which he pursues such course, at a rate not exceeding $13 per week if he is a married person and $9 per week if he is not a married person, diminished by such amount, on account of any pension wages, salary, or other income such person may have received or be entitled to receive in respect of such period, as to the Minister seems right, but the grant shall not be continued to any such person who fails in more than two classes or subjects in any academic year, nor to any such person who having failed in either one or two classes or subjects also fails in either or both supplementary examinations next offered by the university in such classes or subjects. 9. In case any discharged person (a) has entered upon a post-graduate course, either academic or professional, in a university before enlistment, or was about to do so at the time of his enlistment, or, having completed his under-graduate course in a university after his discharge, enters upon a post-graduate course as aforesaid, and (b) resumes or commences such post-graduate course within (i) one year from his discharge, or (ii) one year from the commencement, next following his discharge, of such course in such university, if his discharge precedes such commencement by not more than three months, or 491

(iii) in the case of a discharged person who completes his undergraduate course after his discharge, as soon as may be after such completion, if the Minister having considered such person’s attainments and his course, deems it in the public interest that he should continue such course, the Minister may, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, order that he be paid a grant for any week or part thereof during which he continues such course at a rate not exceeding $13 per week if he is a married person and $9 per week if he is not a married person, diminished by such amount, on account of any pension, wages, salary or other income such person may have received or be entitled to receive in respect of such period, as to the Minister seems right. 10. (1) No person shall be paid out-of-work benefit under paragraph 5 hereof for his first nine days of unemployment whether continuous or not, after any period for which he may have been paid a rehabilitation grant. (2) No grant shall be paid to any discharged person under paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 hereof for any period or periods (i) for which he may have been paid a rehabilitation grant, or (ii) more than 18 months after his discharge, and the total period for which he may receive out-of-work benefit or grants hereunder, together with any period for which he may have received or be entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefit under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, within the said period of 18 months, shall not exceed his period of service nor shall it in any case exceed fifty-two weeks. (3) No grant shall be paid to any discharged person under paragraphs 8 and 9 hereof for any period or periods for which he may have been paid a rehabilitation grant, nor shall he be paid any grant under the said paragraphs if the total period for which he has received out-of-work benefit or grants hereunder, or unemployment insurance benefit under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, exceeds in all his period of service, unless (i) in the case of a person who has been in receipt of a grant under paragraph 8 hereof, his progress and attainments in his course are such that the Minister deems it in his interest and in the public interest that the grant should be continued, and (ii) in the case of a person in receipt of a grant under paragraph 9 hereof, his progress and achievements are so outstanding that, in the Minister’s opinion, it is important in the public interest that the grant should be continued. 11. Where a grant is being paid to a discharged person under the provisions of paragraph 6,8 or 9 hereof, the Minister may order that a payment be made on his behalf not exceeding the tuition fees, students’ fees and athletic fees or other charges and costs of his course. 12. Not more than one grant may be paid to any person under this Part for any period, nor shall any grant be paid to any person for any period for which he is paid out- of-work benefit hereunder or unemployment insurance benefit under The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940. 492

13. Any payment under this Part during the year ending March 31, 1942, shall be made from and out of the War Appropriation of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, and any such payment thereafter shall be made out of moneys provided for the purpose. 14. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Part contained the Minister may, for any reason which he deems sufficient, refrain from ordering that any payment be made under this Part. (2) On new facts being brought to his attention, the Minister may make an Order under this Part in a case where he has previously refused to do so, or he may rescind or amend any order which he has made under this Part. Otherwise, his decision shall be final.

Part III

15. Any discharged person who completes fifteen weeks in insurable employment under The Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, within any period of twelve months, whether continuous employment or not, shall, for the purpose of the said Act, be deemed (a) to have received unemployment insurance benefit under the said Act for a continuous period (hereinafter in this paragraph referred to as “benefit period”), immediately prior to the commencement of such fifteen weeks, equal to the period, if any, for which he received out-of-work benefit under Part II hereof, together with the proportion of any period for which he received a grant under Part II hereof which the amount of such grant per week bears to $13 if he is a married person and $9 per week if he is not a married person, but not exceeding in total in any case three-fifths of his period of service after July 1, 1941, and (b) to have been in insurable employment immediately prior to the commencement of the said benefit period for a period equal to his service after July 1, 1941, and the said insurable employment shall be deemed to have been continuous as nearly as may be without being contemporaneous with any period during which the said person actually was in insurable employment under the said Act prior to the said benefit period. 16. As soon as may be, after The Unemployment Insurance Commission ascertains that a discharged person has completed fifteen weeks in insurable employment as aforesaid, there shall be credited to the Unemployment Insurance Fund out of the War Appropriation of the Consolidated Revenue Fund if such credit is made during the year ending March 31, 1942, and out of moneys appropriated for the purpose if such credit is made thereafter, the amount of the combined employer’s and employed person’s contribution under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, for a period equal to the difference between his period of service after July 1, 1941, and one and two-thirds of the period for which, under sub-paragraph (a) of Paragraphs 15 hereof, he is deemed to have been in receipt of unemployment insurance benefit, and the rate of the said combined contribution shall be the average of the contributions shown by such person’s unemployment book to have 493

been paid by him and on his behalf for the said fifteen weeks; and for the purpose of the said Act, the said discharged person shall be deemed to have been bona fide employed in insurance employment during the said period of service and all contributions shall be deemed to have been paid under the said Act in respect of the said discharged person during the said period of service. 17. If on making any report on the financial condition of the Unemployment Insurance Fund the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee finds that the said Fund has been adversely affected by reason of the provisions of paragraphs 15 and 16 hereof, the Committee shall in its statutory report state the amount and the manner in which the said Fund has been adversely affected as aforesaid, and the Governor in Council may on receipt of said report take into consideration immediate measures to remedy any depletion of the said Fund due to the operation of this Order which depletion shall have been established by the aforesaid report of the Unemployment Insurance Advisory Committee.

494

Appendix 19: Order-in-Council P.C. 3206 Establishing the Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans, 3 May 1945

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 272, File 66-38-2, Part 1, Order-in- Council P.C. 3206, 3 May 1945.

P.C. 3206

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA THURSDAY, the 3rd day of MAY, 1945.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL

WHEREAS the Minister of Veterans Affairs reported that there is an ever increasing demand by veterans for the university training provided under The Post- Discharge Re-Establishment Order; and

That it is deemed expedient that there be appointed an advisory committee, to consist of citizens experienced in educational affairs, for the purpose of advising the Minister of Veterans Affairs on matters relating to such university training;

NOW, THEREFORE, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Veterans Affairs and under and by virtue of The Department of Veterans Affairs Act and the War Measures Act, is pleased to order and doth hereby order as follows,-

1. There shall be an Advisory Committee on University Training for Veterans for the purpose of advising the Minister of Veterans Affairs on matters relating to the university training provided under The Post Discharge Re-Establishment Order, being Order in Council P.C. 5210 of July 13, 1944;

2. Such Advisory Committee shall consist of

S.N.F. Chant, Director General of Rehabilitation, Department of Veterans Affairs; Rev. Dr. Philippe Cornellier, Rector, Ottawa University; Mgr. Cyrille Gagnon, Rector, Laval University; Dr. Milton F. Gregg, President, University of New Brunswick; Dr. F. Cyril James, Principal, McGill University; Mr. H.W. Jamieson, Superintendent of Educational Training, Department of Veterans Affairs; Dr. Norman A.M. MacKenzie, President, University of British Columbia; Dr. W.A. Mackintosh, Director General of Economic Research, Department of Reconstruction; 495

Mgr. J.L. Olivier Maurault, Rector, University of Montreal; Dr. John E. Robbins, Department of Trade and Commerce; Dr. Sidney Smith, President-elect, University of Toronto; Dr. James S. Thomson, President, University of Saskatchewan; Dr. H.M. Tory, President, Carleton College, Ottawa; Dr. R.C. Wallace, Principal, Queen’s University; Mr. W.S. Woods, Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs;

3. Mr. W.S. Woods, Deputy Minister of Veterans Affairs, or his representative, shall be the Chairman of the said Committee.

4. Mr. H.W. Jamieson, Superintendent of Educational Training, Department of Veterans Affairs, shall be Secretary of the Committee.

5. Members of such Advisory Committee shall be paid their actual and necessary expenses when absent from their places of residence in connection with the work of such Committee.

6. Expenditures required to be made hereunder shall be charged to “Rehabilitation Services”.

(Sgd.) A.D.P. Heeney. Clerk of the Privy Council. P.R. 16688

496

Appendix 20: Veteran Rehabilitation Training Supervisory Districts, 1945-1946

Source: Compiled using correspondence in LAC, RG38, BAN 2001-01151-2, Box 267, File 66-20-2.

District Supervisor Universities and Affiliated Colleges

Winnipeg F.G. McGavin University of Manitoba Toronto A.R. Whitten University of Toronto; Osgoode Hall; Ontario College of Art; College of Education; College of Pharmacy and Optometry; Canadian Memorial College of Chiropractics Kingston C.R. Wiseman Queen’s University Halifax R.A. Baxter Acadia University; Dalhousie University; King’s College; Nova Scotia Agricultural College; Nova Scotia Technical College; St. Francis Xavier University; St. Mary's College Saskatoon I. MacLean University of Saskatchewan Edmonton University of Alberta Ottawa University of Ottawa St. John University of New Brunswick Mount Allison University London A.F. Malone University of Western Ontario; Waterloo College; Assumption College; Ontario Agricultural College; Ontario Veterinary College Vancouver Blair M. Clerk University of British Columbia Hamilton C.W. Johnson McMaster University Montreal R. Dupuis St George Williams University; Loyola College; Bishop's University; Université de Polytechnique; McGill University; Université de Montréal

497

Appendix 21: Rehabilitation of Members of Canadian Armed Forces Survey, 1944

Source: LAC, RG24, Volume 34170, File 4248-5, “Rehabilitation 1945: A Survey of Opinions in the Canadian Army,” 1945.

REHABILITATION OF MEMBERS OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

SURVEY

PURPOSE This questionnaire is to get information to assist in completing plans to help members of the Canadian Army when the time comes for them to return to civil life. It is being distributed on a limited basis for the purpose of securing a cross-section picture similar to a “Gallup Poll”. As soon as the operational situation permits, every individual will be given an opportunity to complete a similar questionnaire so that his own particular needs may be known and, so far as possible, provided for. This form has been prepared so that your views may be known on these points. You are asked to state what you expect and hope to do after the war and what educational or vocational training you would like to take up both during the period before discharge and after your return to civil life. The answers will be studied carefully and the greatest possible weight will be given to them when making final plans. The beneficial results to be derived from this questionnaire will depend in large measure upon the extent to which you indicate clearly your own views and wishes.

Most of the questions can be answered by marking an “X” in the space next to the answer you wish to make.

1. If, at the end of the war, you were offered a choice of the following, which would you prefer: 1. Join the Permanent Force as a career. 2. Remain in the Army for a term of years. 3. Return to civil life as soon as circumstances permit. 4. Undecided.

2. During the period between cessation of hostilities and discharge, do you want the Army to help you improve your general education? 1. Yes. 2. No. 3. Not sure.

3. During the period between cessation of hostilities and discharge, do you want the Army to help you train for a civilian occupation? 498

1. Yes. 2. No. 3. Not sure.

4. After discharge could you do any of the following if you wanted to? (Show your answer with an “X”. If you could return to more than 2 of the following, mark only the 2 most probable.) 1. I could return to work for my old employer. 2. I could return to the business I own. 3. I could return to farming. 4. I could return to school or college. 5. I have no occupation I am sure I can return to.

5. After discharge, what would you want to do? (Mark no more than three answers with an “X”.) 1. I want to return to my old employer. 2. I want to return to my own business. 3. I want to return to farming. 4. I want to get a job. What kind of job? 5. I want to go to full-time school. 6. I want to go to college or university. What course? 7. I want training for a civilian occupation. What occupation? 8. I want a farm under the Veterans’ Land Act. 9. I want to engage in Commercial Fishing under the Veterans’ Land Act. 10. I want to set up a business on my own. What kind of business? 11. I have no definite idea what I want to do.

6. (a) After discharge, in what province do you expect to live? 1. Alberta 2. British Columbia 3. Manitoba 4. New Brunswick 5. Nova Scotia 6. Ontario 7. Prince Edward Island 8. Quebec 9. Saskatchewan 10. Outside Canada 11. No idea (b) Where in that province do you expect to live? a. On a farm b. In the country but not on a farm c. In a village or town of 5,000 population or less d. In a town or city Name of town or city

499

7. (a) Before enlisting in what province did you live? 1. Alberta 2. British Columbia 3. Manitoba 4. New Brunswick 5. Nova Scotia 6. Ontario 7. Prince Edward Island 8. Quebec 9. Saskatchewan 10. Outside Canada (b) Where in that province did you live? a. On a farm b. In the country but not on a farm c. In a village or town of 5,000 population or less d. In a town or city Name of town or city

8. What was the last job you had before you joined up? (State just what you did or name your trade.)

9. Was this your regular job? 1. Yes. 2. No.

10. If it was not, what was your regular job or trade?

11. What is your rank? 1. Pte. 2. Cpl. 3. Sgt. 4. S/Sgt. 5. W/O 6. 2nd Lt. 7. Lt. 8. Capt. 9. Maj. 10. Lt.-Col. 11. Col. and above

12. (In the case of officers.) What was your rank on appointment or enlistment? 1. Pte. 2. Cpl. 3. Sgt. 4. S/Sgt. 5. W/O 500

6. 2nd Lt. 7. Lt. 8. Capt. 9. Maj. 10. Lt.-Col. 11. Col. and above

13. How long have you been in the Army? 1. Less than 6 months 2. 6 months to 1 year 3. 1 to 2 years 4. 2 to 3 years 5. 3 to 4 years 6. 4 to 5 years 7. 5 to 6 years

14. How long did you serve outside Canada? 1. Less than 1 year 2. 1 to 2 years 3. 2 to 3 years 4. 3 to 4 years 5. 4 to 5 years 6. 5 years or more

15. In which of the following countries have you served? 1. Canada 2. Newfoundland 3. England 4. France 5. Italy 6. Belgium 7. Holland 8. Others (which)

16. How old are you? 1. Under 19 2. 19 to 23 3. 24 to 28 4. 29 to 33 5. 34 to 38 6. 39 to 43 7. 44 to 48 8. 49 or over

17. What is your marital status? 1. Single 501

2. Married 3. Widowed 4. Divorced 5. Separated

18. What languages do you speak? 1. English 2. French 3. Others (which?)

19. What languages do you read? 1. English 2. French 3. Others (which?)

20. What languages do you write? 1. English 2. French 3. Others (which?)

21. How old were you when you left school or college? 1. Under 12 2. 12 or 13 3. 14 or 15 4. 16 or 17 5. 18 or 19 6. 20 or 21 7. 22 or 23 8. 24 or older

22. What type of school did you attend last? 1. Public (or elementary) 2. Commercial High 3. Technical High 4. Matriculation Course 5. General High School 6. Agricultural School 7. Trades School 8. College or University

23. What was the last grade or class you completed at school?

24. In what province did you last attend school or college?

25. What did you do just before you entered the Army? 1. Worked 502

2. Looked for work 3. Attended night school 4. Went to day school or college

26. While in the Army, have you qualified for trades pay? 1. Yes. 2. No. (If yes) In what trade? In what group? 1. A. 2. B, 3. C.

27. While in the Army, have you completed any spare time correspondence courses? 1. Yes. 2. No. (If yes) Name the courses

28. Many laws, as outlined in “Back to Civil Life” have been passed to help returned soldiers. In which of the following do you think they will help you personally? (Show your answers with an “X”.) 1. In getting my old job. 2. In getting a Government job. 3. In getting some other job. 4. In getting more education. 5. In getting training for a trade or a particular occupation. 6. In starting a business of my own. 7. In building a house for my family. 8. In buying a small holding. 9. In buying a farm. 10. In starting commercial fishing for a living. 11. I don’t know.

29. Do you need more information about rehabilitation? 1. Yes. 2. No. (If yes) About what do you need to know more?

503

Appendix 22: DVA Summary of Final Follow-up for University Training, October 1951

Source: Walter S. Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation) (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1953), 108.

SUMMARY OF FINAL FOLLOW-UP TRAINEES OCTOBER, 1951 UNIVERSITY TRAINING TABLE “B” Number of follow-ups completed—44,063—representing more than 81 per cent of all trainees. Note three thousand of the remaining 19 per cent are still training under D.V.A.

Classification of completed follow-up: Number Percentage Employed directly in line with training………………………… 25,488 57.8 Self-employed in line with training…………………………….. 2,933 6.7 Rejoined Armed Services………………………………………. 1,459 3.3 Employed—not directly in line—but satisfied……...... 4,519 10.2 Continuing training at time of follow-up……………………….. 5,024 11.4 Female veterans married………………………………………... 472 1.1 Awaiting placement at time of follow-up………………………. 428 1.0

Sub-total satisfactory result………………………………. 40,323 91.5

Unknown…………………………………………..……………. 2,657 6.0 Insufficient training to assist in placement……………………… 363 0.8 Deceased……………………………………………………… 132 0.3 Left Canada—follow-up incomplete……………………………. 130 0.3 Unsuitable for training or failed………………………………… 458 1.1

Sub-total unsatisfactory result……………………………. 3,740 8.5

Grand Total……………………………………………….. 44,063 100

504

Appendix 23: Questionnaire Distributed to Student Veterans by the University of Saskatchewan Veteran’s Association

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 278, File 66-49, “Brief on Inadequacy of Maintenance Benefits for Veterans’ Continuing Education,” 28 May 1945, Appendix A.

University of Saskatchewan Veteran’s Association

The purpose of this questionnaire is to ascertain possible inadequacies in Maintenance Benefits for Veterans resuming or commencing education at University; and, if the results justify the information will be used as a basis for petitioning the Government to remedy the situation. All information will be regarded as confidential and no names of persons will be used in submissions made. It should be accurate in all possible details where a definite expenditure is involved and estimated expenditure should be conservatively given, and they should be able to stand up under investigation. Your co-operation in an early return of this survey is requested so that, should facts demand an adjustment, your Executive may be in a position to take steps as soon as possible in preparing a brief. It would of course be submitted to a General Meeting for approval before being passed on to the authorities. Please sign your name in the space provided on this portion of the sheet so that if it becomes necessary we may be in a position to identify any particular case.

…………………………………….. Signature of Veteran

Monthly Maintenance Benefit (including Pension if any) $...... Married or single ……………… Number of Dependents (Exclusive of wife or person in lieu of wife for married benefit). ……………… Age of Dependents ……………… Are Insurance Premiums, Annuity payments, Pension contributions or similar expenditures and pre discharge or post discharge commitment. If maintaining a domicile elsewhere while yourself resident in Saskatoon for the purpose of attending University specify with details.

Expenditures (To be filled in where applicable)

Monthly Board and Room $...... Additional board where above covers two meals only ……………… Laundry ……………… Rent ……………… Light and water ……………… Fuel ……………… 505

Groceries (Elaborate if necessary) ……………… Taxes ……………… Other Household Expenditures (Enumerate such as furniture, payments, telephone, radio license, etc.) ……………… Personal Necessities (toilet articles, hairdressing for entire family) ……………… Street Car and Bus Transportation ……………… Recreation – clubs, Ass’n. dues, shows, dances ……………… Donations ………………

Occasional (On basis of seven months period) Books and supplies for course, school equipment for dependent ……………… Clothing (including dependents – delete this bracketed portion if not applicable) ……………… Medical (for dependents) ……………… Dental (Self and dependents) ……………… Dependents not recognized under Rehabilitation Scheme (details) ……………… Insurance Premiums, Annuities etc. ……………… Rail or bus transport for non residents ……………… Other incidental or special expenses ………………

For monthly expenditure total, seven months ……………… Total Actual Monthly and Occasional Monthly Expenditure ………………

506

Appendix 24: Canadian Legion Brief on Housing Control

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 1, S. Roger G. Beaufoy, ed., “A report on the 2nd National Conference of Student Veterans,” n.d., 33-34.

Legion Brief on Housing Control

“Subversive elements are fishing in troubled waters, especially among veterans, and good men may suffer due to desperation if sometimes [sic] drastic is not done to alleviate the housing shortage", Major General C. B. Price told Prime Minister Mackenzie King when the Dominion Executive Council presented briefs on housing, pensions and rehabilitation. The Dominion President requested the Prime Minister to have the government use its emergency powers to bring about a quick solution to the housing problem. He told the government that due to the critical housing conditions young veterans recently married were having the chances of a successful marriage destroyed, and in many cases young children were taking ill. The Prime Minister, with his cabinet ministers, listened intently as General Price continuing said, "We know that the present housing targets cannot be achieved due to the shortage of material and labor. It was a major disaster when authority for building was handed back, to the municipal authorities, it is too heavy for them to handle. There is far too much unnecessary building going on and we strongly urge a control on supplies. Following the presentation of the housing brief, members of the Council then had an opportunity to tell the government of the terrible housing conditions in their provinces. In reply Prime Minister King thanked the Legion for it's [sic] interest in preparing the briefs and assured them that they would be given careful consideration. Said Mr. King, "It is a great source of comfort to the government to have a body of men such as the Legion who act in these troublesome times as a steadying force throughout Canada. The government is prepared to give all its co-operation to the Legion." The following are the briefs presented to the government: HOUSING The entire program of rehabilitation and reconstruction devised by the Government, with the co-operation of the Legion, is in imminent danger of complete failure unless the Dominion Government make as great and urgent an effort to remedy the need for housing as it made to win the war. Housing is a major problem in Canada to-day, and likely to become worse before getting better. It is the low income citizens who are suffering acutely and among them there is a very large proportion of veterans and their families. The lack of adequate control of building and the shortage of building supplies have resulted in much construction being undertaken by those who can command the greatest financial resources, and in consequence buildings are being erected that could, and should, have been postponed. The diverting of much building material away from housing for this type of construction, coupled with the delay in getting low income housing built is causing bitterness and unrest. Result will inevitably be disasterous [sic] unless drastic steps are soon taken— First to increase the production of building materials and supplies in certain critical lines 507

— Second to increase building trades apprenticethip [sic] training as the means of increasing the supply of skilled labour and — Third to temporarily ban non-essential building in favour of essential building as the only practical means of ensuring a balanced programme of operation for the construction industry as a whole. It is trite to say that the emergency aspect of the problem will diminish only as large numbers of houses are built. The Legion believes that the emergency conditions will continue to exist for the next five years because we cannot regard the overcrowding of families and the type of much of the living space now being occupied as being anything but emergency accomodations [sic] that must give place to real homes. During this intervening period the Government must provide emergency shelter. The Legion believes that the expansion of wartime housing is the practical answer to the low income groups’ problem and that it should now be increased to double its present proportions as quickly as possible. In addition, the Legion requests the Government to establish easier terms for veterans who aspire to home ownership in urban areas, under Part 1 of the National National Housing Act. This should be amended to provide—for the benefit of veterans— mortgage loans amounting to 95 percent of actual cost, amortized over over 30 years, at a 3½ percent interest rate (i.e. the rate originally established for veterans acquiring homes under the Veterans’ Land Act), the average monthly carrying charges, including amortization and interest, normal municipal taxes (estimated at 3 percent per annum on an assumed assessed value equal to two-thirds of the total cost of land and building), plus an adequate allowance for fire insurance, would work out to within a few cents of $6.00 per month for each thousand dollars of capital expended. This means that a $5,000.00 home could be carried for $30.00 per month, a $6,000.00 home for $36.00 per month, a $7,000.00 home for $42.00 per month and so on. It will be noted that these monthly carrying charges are fully one-third less than the average rentals, which are today being asked in most cases throughout Eastern Canada, for newly built, privately owned housing accomodation [sic] of comparable size and cost. The complexity of the problem is realized, involving as it does provincial and municipal co-operation, and the Legion pledges, through its branches, to actively press for this co-operation where housing of this nature is required. Our views have already been presented to The Hon. Mr. Howe, Minister of Reconstruction, in some detail, but we do want to impress upon the Government the necessity for greater effort in the low rental or purchase field, and therefore emphasize the folowing [sic] points among those previously submitted:— (1) That the Federal Government immediately take control of building in Canada; (2) That the Government use its emergency powers to control, divert or acquire materials for building low income houses under wartime housing, and to enable other government approved plans such as Housing Enterprises and Integrated Housing, to develop more rapidly; (3) The expansion of wartime housing to include also a purchase plan; (4) Develop a veteran housing project under the National Housing Act with mortgage loans amounting to 95 percent of actual cost amortized over 30 years at 3½ percent interest.

508

Appendix 25: McGill Student Veterans’ Society Referendum on Maintenance Grants, 1946

Source: LAC, RG38, BAN2001-01151-2, Box 270, File 66-27-4, Volume 1, Report of National Conference of Student Veterans McGill University, Montreal, December 27- 29th, 1948, n.d.

REFERENDUM

KINDLY INDICATE YOUR CHOICE OF ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR ALTERNATIVES BY MARKING “X” IN THE APPROPRIATE BOX.

I feel that the delegates should support a resolution by the Conference that:—

(1) THE GOVERNMENT BE REQUESTED TO INCREASE THE PRESENT MONTHLY MAINTENANCE GRANTS TO STUDENT VETERANS BY THE SUM OF TWENTY DOLLARS FOR SINGLE STUDENTS AND FORTY DOLLARS FOR MARRIED STUDENTS. or (2) THE GOVERNMENT BE REQUESTED TO REVISE THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRANTS AND PROVIDE FOR A “SLIDING SCALE” OR SYSTEM OF CATEGORIES UNDER WHICH PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE. or (3) THE CONFERENCE DISCONTINUE ITS CAMPAIGN FOR A REVISION OF THE GRANTS AND CONCENTRATE ITS ATTENTION ON INDIVIDUAL CASES WHICH MIGHT BE GIVEN ASSISTANCE THROUGH LOANS OR BURSARIES IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THEIR COURSES. or (4) YOUR OWN IDEAS ON THE QUESTION OF MAINTENANCE GRANTS (Please use reverse side).

KINDLY INDICATE YOUR REACTION ON BOTH THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY MARKING “X” IN EITHER THE “YES” OR “NO” BOX.

The policies of the Executive on such questions as commuters allowances, pensions, wives earned income, advertising by the Department of Labour and Veterans Affairs, book allowances, loans and employment have been published, and it is hoped to press these views.

(1) KINDLY INDICATE YOUR REACTION AS TO WHETHER YOU FEEL THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE PRESSED, AND IF NOT, PLEASE GIVE US YOUR VIEWS ON THE RESERVE SIDE OF THIS SHEET

Yes. No. 509

(2) I FEEL THAT THE DELEGATES SHOULD SUPPORT A LOW-RENTAL HOUSING PLAN AND THROUGH THE CONFERENCE PRESS THE GOVERNMENT FOR A PRIORITY SYSTEM ON BUILDING MATERIALS FOR USE IN VETERANS’ HOMES. (If no kindly indicate your views on the reverse side of this sheet)

Yes. No.

…………………………………………… SIGNATURE

THE DELEGATES WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD RETURN THIS REFERENDUM IN THE ENCLOSED STAMPED ENVELOPE AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE.

510

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Hyatt, A.M.J. and Nancy Geddes Poole. Battle for Life: The History of No. 10 Canadian Stationary Hospital and No. 10 Canadian General Hospital in Two World Wars. Waterloo, Ontario: Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2004.

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Johnston, Murray C. Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: The Story of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Forces. Borden: EME Officers’ Fund, 1997.

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---. “They’re Still Women After All”: The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

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Place, Timothy Harrison. Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day. Cornwall: MPG Books Ltd., 2000.

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Rudin, Ronald. Making History in Twentieth-Century Quebec. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.

Rudy, Willis. Total War and Twentieth-Century Higher Learning: Universities of the Western World in the First and Second World War. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991.

Rutherdale, Robert. Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada’s Great War. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004.

Sangster, Joan. Dreams of Equality: Women on the Canadian Left, 1920-1950. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989.

Saxe, Robert Francis. Settling Down: World War II Veterans’ Challenge to the Postwar Consensus. New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007.

Smyth, Elizabeth, Sandra Acker, Paula Bourne, and Alison Prentice. Challenging Professions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Women’s Professional Work. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

Spencer, Robert A. Review of McGill University at War, 1914-1918, 1939-1945, by R.C. Fetherstonhaugh. The Canadian Historical Review, June 1948, 202-203.

Stacey, C.P. The Canadian Army 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1948.

--. Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume I, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1955.

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---. Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945. Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1970.

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Stephen, Jennifer A. Pick One Intelligent Girl: Employability, Domesticity and the Gendering of Canada’s Welfare State, 1939-1947. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007.

Stevenson, Michael D. Canada’s Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001.

Stewart, Lee. “It’s Up to You”: Women at UBC in the Early Years. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990.

Stone, C.G. and F. Joan Garnett. Brandon College: A History, 1899-1967. Brandon, Manitoba: Brandon University, 1969.

Stortz, Paul and E. Lisa Panayotidis, eds. Cultures, Communities, and Conflict: Histories of Canadian Universities and War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Talman, James. “Western” 1878-1953. London: University of Western Ontario, 1953.

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Thompson, James Sutherland. Yesteryears at the University of Saskatchewan, 1937- 1949. Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1969.

Thomson, James S. Yesteryears at the University of Saskatchewan: 1937-1949. Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1969.

Tucker, Gilbert Norman. The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History, Volume II: Activities on Shore during the Second World War. Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952.

Vance, Jonathan. Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997.

---. Unlikely Soldiers: How Two Canadians Fought the Secret War Against Nazi Occupation. Toronto: Harper Collins, 2008.

Waite, P.B. The Lives of Dalhousie University, Volume One: 1818-1925, Lord Dalhousie’s College. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994.

Waite, P.B. The Lives of Dalhousie University, Volume Two: 1925-1980, The Old College Transformed. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997. 527

Waite, P.B. Lord of Point Grey: Larry Mackenzie of U.B.C. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987.

Ward, W. Peter. White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy toward Orientals in British Columbia. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978.

Zimmerman, David. Top Secret Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War. Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996.

Zimmerman, David. “The Organization of Science for War: The Management of Canadian Radar Development, 1939-45.” Scientia Canadensis 10, no. 2 (1986): 93-108.

II: Articles/Chapters

Axelrod, Paul. “Spying on the Young in Depression and War: Students, Youth Groups and the RCMP, 1935-1942.” Labour 35 (Spring 1995): 43-63.

Axelrod, Paul. “The Student Movement of the 1930s.” In Youth, University, and Canadian Society: Essays in the Social History of Higher Education. Edited by Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid. Montreal: 1989, 216-246.

Bennet, C.L. “What the Veteran Student is Teaching the Universities.” Dalhousie Review 27 (1947-48): 311-322.

Bernard, Elaine. “A University at War: Japanese-Canadian Students at UBC during World War II.” BC Studies 35 (1977): 36-55.

Borys, David. “For the Empire, the Nation and the West: The University of Alberta’s Contribution to World War I.” Past Imperfect 14 (2008): 3-28.

Byers, Daniel. “J.L. Ralston and the First World War: The Origins of a Life of Service.” Canadian Military History 22, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 3-16.

Cameron, James D. “The Ordeal of War and its Aftermath, 1936-54.” Part 5 in For the People: A History of St. Francis Xavier University. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996.

Cook, Tim. “From Destruction to Construction: The Khaki University of Canada, 1917- 1919.” Journal of Canadian Studies 37, no. 1 (2002): 109-143.

528

Ferguson, Barry and Douglas Owram. “Social Scientists and Public Policy From the 1920’s Through World War II.” Journal of Canadian Studies 15, no. 4 (1981): 3-17.

Frost, Stanley B. McGill University: For the Advancement of Learning, Volume II, 1895- 1971. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1984. See 219 (211-246)

Gorssline, R.M. “The Medical Services and the War.” Canadian Medical Association Journal 47, no. 2 (August 1942): 116-119.

Greenhous, Brereton and Norman Hillmer. “The Impact of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan on Western Canada: Some Saskatchewan Case Studies.” Journal of Canadian Studies 16, no. 3 (Fall 1981): 133-144.

Guildford, Janet. “Coping with De-industrialization: The Nova Scotia Department of Technical Education, 1907-1920.” Acadiensis 16, no. 2 (Spring 1987): 69-84.

Hadley, Michael L. “From ‘Wavy Navy’ to ‘Jolly Green Giants,’ 1945-68.” In Citizen Sailors: Chronicles of Canada’s Naval Reserve, 1910-2010. Edited by Richard H. Gimblett and Michael L. Hadley. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010.

Hamelin, Christine. “A Sense of Purpose: Ottawa Students and the Second World War.” Canadian Military History 6, no. 1 (1997): 34-41.

Heap, Ruby. “Training Women for a New “Women’s Profession:” Physiotherapy Education at the University of Toronto, 1917-40.” History of Education Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1995): 135-58.

Hillmer, Norman. “Vincent Massey and the Origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan.” Canadian Defence Quaterly 16, no. 4 (April 1987): 49-54.

Hooker, Martie A. “Serving Two Masters: Ian Mackenzie and Civil-Military Relations in Canada, 1935-1939.” Journal of Canadian Studies 21, no. 1 (April 1986): 38-56.

Horn, Michiel. “Students and Academic Freedom in Canada.” Historical Studies in Education / Revue d’histoire de l’éducation 11, no. 1 (1999): 1-32.

Horn, Michiel. “Response to a review essay by David Cameron.” Canadian Public Administration / Administration publique du Canada 42, no. 3 (Fall), 222-225.

Jeffery, E.S. “The Responsibility of the Canadian Medical Professional in National Defence.” The Canadian Medical Association Journal 29, no. 2 (1933): 195-199.

Keshen, Jeffrey. “Revisiting Canada’s Civilian Women during World War II.” Social History/Histoire Sociale 30, no. 60 (1997): 239-266.

529

Lloydlangston, Amber. “Applying to be be ‘Industrial Soldiers’: The Letters of Young Women Wanting to Train as Chemistry Laboratory Technicians, 1942-1944.” Historical Studies in Education 26, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 30-47.

Loss, Christopher P. “‘The Most Wonderful Thing Has Happened to Me in the Army’: Psychology, Citizenship, and American Higher Education in World War II.” The Journal of American History 92, no. 3 (December 2005): 864-891.

MacKenzie, David. “The Bren Gun Scandal and the Maclean Publishing Company’s Investigation of Canadian Defence Contracts.” Journal of Canadian Studies 26, no. 3 (1991): 140-162.

MacMechan, Archibald. “Canadian Educational Institutions in the Great War: Dalhousie College.” Canadian Defence Quarterly V, no. 3 (1927): 345-346.

Massolin, Philip A. “Academic Modernization and the Decline of Higher Learning: The University Question in the Later Scholarship of Harold Innis.” Canadian Journal of Communication 23, no. 1 (1998). Available at: . Date accessed: 17 June 2014.

McLean, Scott. “Working with the President: Extension and Continuing Education at UBC, 1935-1983.” Canadian Journal of University Continuing Education 35, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 43-62.

Morton, Desmond. “’Noblest and Best:’ Retraining Canada’s War Disabled, 1915-1923.” Journal of Canadian Studies 16, no. 3-4 (1981): 75-85.

---. “McGill’s Contingent of the Canadian Officers’ Training Corps (COTC), 1912- 1968.” Canadian Military Journal 10, no. 3 (Summer 2010): 37-47.

Morton, Desmond and Glenn Wright. “The Bonus Campaign, 1919-1921: Veterans and the Campaign for Re-establishment.” Canadian Historical Review 64, no. 2 (1983): 147- 167.

Moses, Nigel Roy. “Canadian Student Movements on the Cold War Battlefield, 1944- 1954.” Histoire sociale/Social History 39, no. 78 (2006): 363-403.

Myers, Hugh B. “Profile of a Patriot: Msgr. Arthur Maheux.” Queen’s Quarterly 76, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 11-17.

Neary, Peter and Shaun Brown. “The Veterans Charter and Canadian Women Veterans of the Second World War.” British Journal of Canadian Studies 9, no. 2 (1994): 249-277.

Neatby, Nicole. “Preparing for the Working World: Women at Queen’s during the 1920s.” Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de l’éducation 1 (1989): 53-72.

530

Panayotidis, E. Lisa and Paul Stortz. “Visual Interpretations, Cartoons, and Caricatures of Student and Youth Cultures in University Yearbooks, 1898-1930.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 19, no. 1 (2008): 195-227.

Pierson, Ruth Roach. “Women’s Emancipation and the Recruitment of Women into the Labour Force in World War II.” In Neglected Majority: Essays in Canadian Women’s History. Edited by Susan M. Trofimenkoff and Alison Prentice. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

Pierson, Ruth Roach and Marjorie Cohen. “Educating Women for Work: Government Training Programs for Women before, during, and after World War II.” In Modern Canada, 1930-1980s: Readings in Canadian Social History. Volume 5. Edited by Michael Cross and Gregory Kealey. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

Quiney, Linda J. “‘Bravely and Loyally They Answered the Call’: St. John Ambulance, the Red Cross, and the Patriotic Service of Canadian Women During the Great War.” History of Intellectual Culture 5, no. 1 (2005): 1-19.

Spencer, Robert A. Review of McGill University at War, 1914-1918, 1939-1945, by R.C. Fetherstonhaugh. The Canadian Historical Review, June 1948, 202-203.

Stewart, Lee Jean. “Women on Campus in British Columbia: Strategies for Survival, Years of War and Peace 1906-1920.” In Not Just Pin Money: Selected Essays on the History of Women’s Work in British Columbia. Edited by Barbara K. Lathan and Roberta J. Pazdro. Victoria, B.C.: Camosun College, 1984.

Stortz, Paul. “‘Rescue Our Family From a Living Death:’ Refugee Professors and the Canadian Society for the Protection of Science and Learning at the University of Toronto, 1935-1946.” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 14, no. 1 (2003): 231-261.

Teagarden, E.M. “Lord Haldane and the Origins of the Officer Training Corps.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 45, no. 182 (1967): 91-96.

Theobald, Andrew. “Western’s War: A Study of an Ontario Canadian Officers’ Training Corps Contingent, 1939-1945,” Ontario History XCVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 53-67.

The University of Manitoba. “Rejuvenating the Avenue of Elms.” University of Manitoba Annual Report 1999-2000. Winnipeg: The University of Manitoba, 2000.

Tremblay, Mary. “The Right to the Best Medical Care: Dr. W.P. Warner and the Canadian Department of Veterans Affairs, 1945-55.” CBMH 15 (1998): 3-25

Worthington, Ian. “Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officers Training Corps.” Military Affairs 43, no. 2 (April 1979): 90- 96.

531

III: Theses

Brown, Frederick Thorburn. “A Study of the Selection of University C.O.T.C. Candidates.” Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 1950.

Brown, Shaun. “Re-establishment and Rehabilitation: Canadian Veteran Policy, 1933- 1946.” Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Western Ontario, 1995.

Burke, Garry J. “Good for the Boy and the Nation: Military Drill and the Cadet Movement in Ontario Public Schools 1865-1911.” Ph.Ed. Dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, 1996.

Byers, Daniel Thomas. “The Canadian Officers’ Training Corps: support for military training in the universities of Canada, 1908-1935.” M.A. Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1993.

--. “Mobilizing Canada: The National Resources Mobilization Act, the Department of National Defence, and Compulsory Military Training in Canada, 1940-1945.” Ph.D. Dissertation, McGill University, 2000.

Campbell, John R. “James Layton Ralston and Manpower for the Canadian Army.” M.A. Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1986.

Chaktsiris, Mary Georgina. “The Varsity Man: Manhood, the University of Toronto and the Great War.” M.A. Thesis, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, 2009.

Hayes, Geoffrey W. “The Development of the Canadian Army Officer Corps, 1939- 1945.” Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Western Ontario, 1992.

Hayes, Herbert Orville. “A Comparative Study of Three Hundred Non-Veteran Students and Three Hundred Student Veterans in the Faculty of Arts at the University of British Columbia. M.A. Thesis, the University of British Columbia, 1949.

Kiefer, Nancy. “The Impact of the Second World War on Female Students at the University of Toronto, 1939-1949.” M.A. Thesis, the University of Toronto, 1984.

Leatch, James W.N. “Military Involvement in Higher Education: A History of the University of Toronto Contingent, Canadian Officers’ Training Corps,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, 1995.

Lister, Sally. “Attendant Lords: A Study of the British Staff Mission in Washington, 1941-1945.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1984.

532

Lund, Wilfred Gourlay Dolphin. “The Rise and Fall of the Royal Canadian Navy, 1945- 1964: Critical Study of the Senior Leadership, Policy and Manpower Management.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Victoria, 1999.

Moss, Mark, “Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Men for War in the Province of Ontario, 1867-1914,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto, 1998.

Rivard, Jeffrey R. “Bringing the Boys Home: A Study of the Canadian Demobilization Policy After the First and Second World Wars.” M.A. Thesis, University of Windsor, 1996.

Smith, Nathan F. “Comrades and Citizens: Great War Veterans in Toronto, 1915-1919,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012.

Stevenson, Michael D. “National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War.” Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Western Ontario, 1992.

Trevithick, Morris Henry. “Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation as a Strategic Factor in Canadian Federal Housing Policy: A Historical Case Study.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1976.

Wilson, David Allan. “Close and Continuous Attention: Human Resources Management in Canada during the Second World War.” Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of New Brunswick, 1997.

IV: Films

National Film Board of Canada. Universities at War. Ottawa: National Film Board of Canada, 1944.

V: Unpublished Reports

Directorate of History and Heritage, Histories, Reports, AHQ Reports, 1948-1959

Hitsman, J. MacKay “Manpower Problems of the Royal Canadian Air Force during the Second World War.” Army Headquarters Report No. 67, 15 January 1954. Directorate of History and Heritage, Histories, Reports, AHQ Reports, 1948-1959 . Accessed July 2014.