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Stanford Journal of EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

THE CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES STANFORD UNIVERSITY VOLUME 5 | NUMBER 1 | WINTER 2005 SJEAA_042005_all 4/20/05 8:53 AM Page 1

Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs

About Us The Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs (SJEAA) is dedicated toward addressing compelling issues in the East Asian region in a manner accessible to a general audience. SJEAA showcases undergraduate and graduate work on East Asia in all academic disciplines. We receive submissions from leading universities both in the United States and from abroad. Copies of the SJEAA are distributed to East Asian studies departments and libraries across the nation.

Article submissions can focus on any topic pertaining to East Asia. Our work is roughly divided into the following sections:

Greater China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) Japan Korea Southeast Asia

If your department, library, or organization is interest- ed in subscribing to the SJEAA, please contact us at [email protected]. Subscription is free and editions come out twice a year.

For more details, please visit our website at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa.

Volume 5 | Number 1 | Winter 2005 Center for East Asian Studies | Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 SJEAA_042005_all 4/20/05 8:53 AM Page 2

Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs

Editors-in-Chief Andrew MacDonald Stella Shin

Editorial Board Greater China Adam Kwok Shameel Ahmad Japan Julie Gibson Korea Sheena Chestnut Gloria Kim Southeast Asia Victor Marsh

Production Board Business Manager Dan Cho Asst. Business Manager Shiho Watabe Publicity Director Ming Zhu

Assistant Editors David Chang John Lim Anna Ji Sun Cho Shaw Yea Lim Philbert Fan Max Neostroev Joon Seok Hong Ginny Skye Nicholson Jenwa Hsung Shiho Watabe Anne Kim Katy Yan

Faculty Advisory board Gordon Chang History Jean Oi Political Science Daniel Okimoto Political Science Haun Saussy Asian Languages and Comparative Literature Gi-Wook Shin Sociology Andrew Walder Sociology

Special Thanks to Asia/Pacific Research Center at Stanford Associated Students of Stanford University Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford Prodigy Press and KGN Graphics

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Contents

4 contributors

6 editorial

China Albert Chang 9 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image from Both Sides of the Lens

Ching-fen Hu 26 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan

Diana Fu 45 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity: A Study on the Portrayal of Sexual Harassment in Chinese Media

Japan Marcus Willensky 58 Japanese Fascism Revisited

Sean Fern 78 Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute

Korea Yun-Jo Cho 90 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from Democratization Theory Min-Dong Paul Lee 100 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity through Historical Reappropriation among Korean Minorities in China

Southeast Asia Andrew Hall 113 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO

Tai Wei Lim 133 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry

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4 Contributors

Contributors Ching-fen Hu is currently a graduate student at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. He received his B.A. in Political Science from National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan in 1981. He has also received an M.A. in Journalism from Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio, 1983. His primary research interest is China’s democratic movement.

Diane Fu is a junior at the University of Minnesota- Twin Cities who is currently studying abroad at Beijing University, China. She is majoring in Global Studies and Political Science with a minor in Psychology. She has received the Undergraduate Research Opportunities Grant sponsored by the University of Minnesota College of Liberal Arts. This grant provided her the opportunity to collaborate with Political Science Professor Daniel Kelliher on this research project. She would like to thank Professor Kelliher for his encouragement and his incredible mentoring. Her paper was also chosen for presentation at the 2004 National Undergraduate Research Conference held in Indianapolis last spring.

Albert Chang is a junior majoring in Political Science at Stanford. He has also worked for the Defense Policy Team in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs for the United States Department of State and has served as a US-Asia Foreign Policy Analyst, Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society. He has also conducted independent interview/survey research in Hong Kong regarding youth political activism and censorship post-1997 and has completed interview research in Beijing and Shanghai regarding the future of U.S.-China relations as viewed by China’s next generation of leaders. He is interested in diplomacy and international security studies, particularly with regards to U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.

Marcus Willensky is the Director of the International Research Department (Kokusai Chousa Bu) of FORMULATION K.K. This company provides research and support for the Japanese television industry. Marcus specializes in Film and Video Licensing of overseas footage for broadcast in Japan. He received his B.A. in the winter of 1987 from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Department of Asian Studies with a concentration in Burmese [now Myanmar] history and was awarded his M.A. in the fall of 1999 from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in the Center for Japanese Studies with a concentration in Japanese Language. "Japanese Fascism Revisited" was originally Chapter 4 of his graduating thesis, "Sonnou Toukan: Revere the Emperor, Destroy the Traitors." His primary research interest is in early Showa Era history, with special focus on the Japanese prewar right-wing (uyoku).

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5 Contributors

Sean Fern will receive his B.S. in Foreign Service (with a major in International Politics) from Georgetown University. Next year he plans on attending Cornell Law School. For this paper, Sean worked closely with Victor Cha, who is an assistant professor of Government at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. Sean’s main research interests include international law and organizations, human rights, and national security. He is currently working on his senior thesis, which is on regime change theory and how it relates to the Internet.

Yun-Jo Cho latest position was most recently as an intern at the International Atomic Energy Agency. He earned his B.S. in Foreign Service in May 2004, majoring in International Political Economy with a certificate in Asian Studies, from the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His article is a condensed version of his undergraduate thesis written during his senior year. His academic interests include democratization in East Asia and ROK-DPRK economic integration.

Min-Dong Paul Lee is pursing a Ph.D. in Political Science at Cornell University. He received his B.A. with honors in 1996 and his M.A. in 2000, both from the University of Toronto in 1996 and his MA from the same school in 2000. He is currently working on China's education inequality, which also touches upon differential educational attainment between minority ethnic groups. Writing of his article was partly supported by the University of Toronto Fellowship. His primary field of study is economic sociology and social stratification. He is particularly interested in the role of education in producing social and economic inequality.

Tai-Wei Lim is completing his Ph.D. at Cornell University in the Marion and Frank Long Fellow, Peace Studies Program. He has also been an Overseas Research Fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, a Hong Kong Policy Research Institute Fellow and a Tan Kah Kee Foundation Sub-committee member. He received his B.A. from the National University of Singapore, with a major in Political Science and Japanese Studies with a minor in History, and also received an M.A. in Japanese Studies (Political Economy) from the National University of Singapore in 2001. He has also worked extensively for NGOs and has given speeches, interviews and been published widely on pressing issues in East and Southeast Asia. His research interests include China’s oil industry, ASEAN relationship with China and Japan, and East Asian regionalism.

Andrew D. Hall is a senior at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He expects to graduate in May 2005 with a Bachelor's Degree in Foreign Service and a Certificate in European Studies with a concentration on the European Union. His major is International Politics with a concentration in International Security Studies. His piece was written while spending the 2003/04 academic year abroad at King's College London, part of the University of London in their War Studies Department. Andrew’s main academic interests are in international law and security studies as well as Europe and Southeast Asia; he plans on a career in the U.S. Foreign Service.

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6 Editorial Editorial Winter 2005

As time slips into 2005, East Asia continues to be unsettled. The Japanese people are still struggling with their wartime past, Japan’s role in the region and its relations with its neighbors. North Korea’s nuclear program is an ongoing worry to countries in the region. Taiwan and Beijing shared a brief moment of better relations with the first commercial cross- strait flights in nearly 50 years, but Beijing’s soon to be passed anti-secession law will no doubt heighten tensions. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia continues to be buffeted by the effects of one of the world’s worst disasters, the Christmas Tsunami. The sixth edition of the Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs includes articles that highlight some of the issues that contribute to this uncertainty.

In “Revisiting Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image from Both Sides of the Lens,” Albert Chang carefully examines conflicting claims about the number of casualties that occurred on the fateful morning of June 4th 1989 in Beijing. Using a variety of primary and secondary sources, he attempts to provide context to the Tiananmen Square incident.

“Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan,” by Ching-fen Hu, reviews the chronology of Taiwan’s democratization process and the role that Chiang Ching-guo played in that development process.

Exploring a growing internal issue in China, Diana Fu, in her article “China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity: AStudy on the Portrayal of Sexual Harassment in Chinese Media,” uses Chinese media sources to determine government policy and attitudes towards sexual harassment in China.

An article that contributes to understanding the historical basis for modern thinking in Japan is “Japanese Fascism Revisited” by Marcus Willensky. He argues that under the commonly understood definition of fascism, pre- war Japan must be called a fascist power.

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7 Editorial

In “Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute,” Sean Fern explores the legal issues surrounding a disputed island located between the two countries. Fern compares the competing claims for the island with other, similar international legal conflicts and finds the Korean case to be more strongly rooted in international law.

In “The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from Democratization Theory,” Yun-Jo Cho uses recent research into how and why countries democratize to attempt to predict whether North Korea might begin moving towards a democracy.

Min-Dong Paul Lee, in his article, “Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity through Historical Reappropriation among Korean Minorities in China,” examines the controversy over identity surrounding the Korean minority group, Chaoxianzu, in Northwestern China. Lee uses the issue as a way to explore differing conceptions of identity between various factions inside China.

Andrew Hall walks through the negotiation process that created SEATO in his piece, “Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO.” He pays particularly close attention to the negotiations between Anthony Eden, Eisenhower, and Dulles, emphasizing the restraining role that the British played. Perhaps the most complicated foreign relations question in East Asia is that of ASEAN relations with major powers, a subject discussed in “ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry,” an article by Tai Wei Lim. He examines various strategies, as seen through recent incidents, which ASEAN has used to balance the major players in East Asia.

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Albert Chang 9 Greater China Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident: A Distorted Image from Both Sides of the Lens

Albert Chang

Overview Why is it important to deal with controversial On June 4th, 1989, the Chinese details and why is it, if we indeed ought to Communist Party (CCP) employed military concern ourselves with details, important that force to suppress a student-led demonstration we deal with these specific issues of number that had been gathering strength in Beijing’s and location? Tiananmen Square since April 15th, 1989. As I would posit that such an investigation is a result, the crackdown on important for three distinct the Tiananmen Square reasons. First, accepting a Movement resonated “ DOES THE SPECIFIC NUMBER casualty number that is across the world as an AND LOCATION OF DEATHS drastically smaller than the egregious act, with CHANGE ANYTHING ABOUT true number is immeasurably countries and humanitar- THE EVENT OR HOW WE significant to those who ian groups openly SHOULD FEEL ABOUT IT? actually perished on that June castigating the CCP’s ” morning and to those who still actions. In the United mourn for them. Not being States in particular, a wide range of sources counted in the history books is ultimately started to appear shortly after the event, equivalent to being denied an existence, thus dedicated to exposing the details of the forever eradicating her from history. Second, Tiananmen Square Incident. underreporting the death toll gives the However, these journalistic reports, Tiananmen Square Incident an air of books and eyewitness accounts are all tied uncertainty, ingraining in the historical record together by a common thread of inconsis- a sense of ambiguity. As a result, the event tency, presenting conflicting accounts of the seems vague, its shape incomplete, and its military crackdown in two main areas: the impact lacking full gravity because of the number of casualties and whether the influences of misinformation. A definite People’s Liberation Army (PLA) killed number lifts the Tiananmen Square Incident students inside the square (as opposed to only out of the category of the merely alleged, those blocking the army’s path on the main making the event concrete and providing roads leading to the square). objective evidence on which the Chinese and In searching for factual answers that are American public can solidify their desires for not plagued by clouds of doubt, the questions reconciliation, rooted not in contested myth ultimately arise: Does the specific number but in factual information. And third, an and location of deaths change anything about indefinite number risks over-reporting the the event or how we should feel about it? death toll. Professor Robert Lee of American

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10 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident Civilization at Brown University articulates deaths at twenty-three students and three that searching for a more exact number is hundred soldiers.1 important “because the numbers will However, this official government report continue to grow depending on who we listen is widely contested in many prominent to. The ability to grasp the exact number may sources, with some suggesting that the death Greater China prevent this.” The impact of this argument toll was around one thousand. In Harry draws on geopolitical implications. If in the Harding’s book entitled, A Fragile long-term future the United States decides to Relationship, Harding discusses the political take an aggressive containment stance toward repercussions of the Tiananmen Square China, then the US could garner domestic Incident on Sino-American relations, support by citing an exaggerated version of focusing less on the number but more on an the Tiananmen Square Incident to demonize objective evaluation of the political impacts the CCP. of the event. Nevertheless, Harding reports The inherent problems of over and that “Although the casualty figures are still underreporting the casualty figures invites the uncertain, the best estimates are of perhaps a academic community to attempt to settle the thousand dead and several thousand controversies that spread across the sources. injured.”2 Other sources are more exact in Yet, perhaps the difficult process of searching their estimates, putting the total figures at for a more exact number and location of roughly three thousand. For example, Scott casualties will lead us to conclude that Simmie and Bob Nixon report in their book looking for answers in a historical framework Tiananmen Square, that “when contacted by is inevitably subject to distortions. What we the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation early will be left with, then, is a lesson of infinitely Sunday morning, the Red Cross said that more meaning and impact than had originally 2,600 people had been killed that night. An been expected — that the construction of inconceivable 60,000 more were reported history, no matter how thorough and seem- wounded.”3 Moreover, Liu Binyan, Ruan ingly objective, is never black and white. Ming, and Xu Gang write in Tell the World: What Happened in China and Why, a book Two Sources of Unresolved Controversy whose authors were all dismissed from the In order to reconcile the conflicting Party in different fashions, reported that “As reports regarding the Tiananmen Square the sun rose on June 4, the morning clouds Incident, one must first examine where the were red. . . More than 3,000 people were controversy exists. The first area of killed in Tiananmen Square and on the streets controversy is the number of casualties that of Beijing.”4 All three authors have resulted from the incident, with sources proclaimed that they are eager to see the available presenting widely conflicting disintegration of “the old social structure, the pictures of the event’s casualty figures. When old political system, the old social relations, looking at official Chinese government and the old ideology.”5 And lastly, Nan Lin reports, official CCP State Council writes in The Struggle for Tiananmen that spokesman, Yuan Mu, put the number of “On June 7, Dragon Daily, a pro-China Hong

1 Kwang Hwa Company, The Peking Massacre (Taipei: Kwang Hwa Company, 1989), 5. 2 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992), 223. 3 Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Tiananmen Square (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), 194. 4 Liu Binyan, Ruan Ming, and Xu Gang, Tell the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 62. 5 Ibid.

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Kong newspaper that had become Mark, and Marjorie H. Li, an eyewitness Greater China sympathetic to the movement, also reported statement by student demonstration leader 4,000 deaths.”6 Wu’er Kaixi offers an even more dramatic Further prominent sources expand upon account of the figures. Kaixi, an influential the numbers, placing total casualty figures for and later exiled leader states, “I cannot say at June 4 to June 6 at more than a few thousand this time exactly how many people were deaths. For example, A Chronicle of the killed. But I can tell you that the number Chinese Democratic Uprising, a report by a killed on Tiananmen Square must be at least Hong Kong publishing house critical of the a thousand. As to the number killed total CCP, stated, “It is estimated that, among the during the bloody suppression, I would people treated in the hospitals (June 4) of estimate it without exaggeration at about Beijing, the death toll came to over 2,600. . . 10,000. This is a conservative estimate.”10 The death toll on June 5 was over 5,000 and Upon examination, there exist wide 30,000 injured. On June 6, the death toll discrepancies over the number of casualties exceeded 7,000. These figures do not include that resulted from the event. Sources place those who disappeared.”7 Furthermore, figures anywhere between one thousand to Gordon Thomas in his book Chaos Under ten thousand deaths. But perhaps of even Heaven: The Shocking Story of China’s more importance, the sources disagree Search for Democracy, a book that draws overwhelmingly with the CCP’s official from personal testimonies, states that “In the casualty report (twenty-three students and months after the massacre Amnesty three hundred soldiers). International and other human rights groups The second source of conflict is whether estimate that 10,000 had died and perhaps the PLA intentionally killed students inside twice that figure had been injured in the Tiananmen Square or whether the deaths massacre in Beijing. The figures for the rest occurred solely on the streets leading into the of China were put at 20,000 killed and around Square. This is a major point of contention 40,000 injured.”8 Along similar lines, Yi Mu among prominent sources. Some sources and Mark V. Thompson report in their book, claim that the students were allowed to Crisis at Tiananmen, a book that draws on peacefully exit the Square on the morning of testimonials from traumatized students, that June 4 (corroborating the CCP’s account) “there were reports from students who whereas others report that the PLA shot claimed that at least 6,000 people were killed directly at the students on the Monument in and 20,000 were wounded. Some put the the Square, not allowing some students to death toll as high as 15,000. Some students exit the Square. Tiananmen Square, by Scott also claimed that 1,000 to 2,000 students died Simmie and Bob Nixon, reports the in Tiananmen Square alone.”9 government’s official account that at 4:30 And lastly, in the book entitled Culture AM on June 4, the government broadcasted and Politics in China: An Anatomy of an announcement on loudspeaker declaring Tiananmen Square, edited by Peter Li, Steven that the army had agreed to allow the students

6 Nan Lin, The Struggle for Tiananmen (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 118. 7 Ming Pao News, June Four: A Chronicle of the Chinese Democratic Uprising (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1989), 149. 8 Gordon Thomas, Chaos Under Heaven (New York: Carol Group, 1991), 281. 9 Mark V. Thompson and Yi Mu, Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals Inc., 1989), 97. 10 Peter Li, Steven Mark, and Marjorie H. Li, Culture and Politics in China (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc., 1991), 35.

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12 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident to peacefully evacuate the Square. Upon reacted to internal conflicts and how they hearing this, the government claims, “the reached critical decisions regarding the students joined hands and started to leave the ‘turmoil’ and its termination,”14 also Square in an orderly manner. At about 5:00 corroborates this account, reporting that AM troops vacated the wide corridor in the “Negotiations between students and troops Greater China southeast part of the Square to allow the produced an agreement that the encamped students to withdraw unhindered. A few students would be allowed to leave. At 4:30 students who refused to leave were forced to AM, troops announced that they would enter leave by policemen.”11 the Square. At around 5:00 AM, students This official government account is began evacuating the Square through a supported by many other prominent sources. southeast path left opened by the troops. By For example, Peter Li, Stephen Mark, and 5:30 AM, tanks and soldiers retook the entire Marjorie H. Li in Culture and Politics in Square.”15 Additionally, Dingxin Zhao reports China, a book that claims to offer an in The Power of Tiananmen, a book that objective report of the events that unfolded focuses on the prevalence of rumors that were on Tiananmen Square, also report that spread during the student movement against students were allowed to evacuate the Square the CCP, that “students started to leave (the peacefully.12 Additionally, a number of square), dragging along with them those who eyewitness accounts take the side of the refused to go. . . Yet at the very rear there government’s official report, claiming that were still about a hundred or so people who there was no direct confrontation between refused to go further. Gao Xin, one of the four CCP soldiers and the students in the Square. hunger strikers, happened to be there. For instance, in the book Children of the According to Gao. . . when they shouted Dragon by the organization Human Rights in ‘Fascist!’ the soldiers rushed forward and China, an eyewitness named Lao Gui, who started to shoot. They all ran to hide. Soldiers was on the Monument the morning of June 4, actually shot at the sky, but one student was stated, “In fact, there was no conflict between still wounded.”16 the student and the troops. It was a peaceful But, perhaps the most influential report to retreat, and the students were calm. Some corroborate the official government account have said that when the students left the is the New York Times. On June 13, 1989, the Square they ran like crazy, and that some New York Times’ Beijing correspondent were even trampled to death. But this is only Nicholas Kristof, basing his argument on a rumor. Because many students crowded eyewitness accounts, stated, “armored together on the monument, it was a little vehicles did not surround the monument - chaotic for a moment, but then order was they stayed at the north end of the square - restored.”13 and troops did not attack students clustered Nan Lin’s The Struggle for Tiananmen, a around the monument.”17 Kristof stresses in book that focuses on “how the authorities his reports that the PLA did not shoot at engaged in the process — how they acted and students in the Square and that reports which

11 Simmie and Nixon, 187-188. 12 Li, Mark, and Li, 18-19. 13 Human Rights in China, Children of the Dragon (New York: Macmillan Company, 1990), 174. 14 Lin, 7. 15 Ibid., 117. 16 Zhao Dingxin, The Power of Tiananmen (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), 206-207. 17 Nicholas Kristof, New York Times, June 13, 1989.

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indicate such shootings are exaggerations. Chai Ling does. In Timothy Brook’s book Greater China Other sources such as Harry Harding’s A entitled Quelling the People, purportedly Fragile Relationship and Gordon Thomas’ written to offer an objective evaluation of the Chaos Under Heaven do not even address the events of the Tiananmen Square Incident and issue of army killings inside the Square; they whose general bias is only against the CCP simply assume that soldiers did not directly government, Brook offers several eyewitness shoot at students in the Square. Most of the accounts which claim that the CCP did above sources maintain that the killings indeed kill students inside of the Square. mostly took place as soldiers were advancing Drawing from his interview of June 4 to the Square, blocked by worker and Chinese survivors, Timothy Brook writes, “Another citizen blockades. (student) standing at the base of the monu- There are, however, sources that directly ment recalls the moment the guns went off contradict the government’s account, with disturbing clarity. ‘Immediately the claiming that the PLA did indeed shoot troops surrounding the Square began firing students inside the Square. For example, Chai indiscriminately. Stray shots flew around the Ling, a proud and oftentimes power hungry Square. A girl who was about three meters leader of the student movement, reports in a away from me suddenly went down with a secret eyewitness interview given on the bullet in her head.’. . . The telltale signs of Sunday after the massacre that armored repaired bullet holes I found four months personnel carriers drove in and began later on the west and south sides of the crushing the bamboo and canvas tents. platforms and balustrades around the base of Although the government claims that only the Monument warn that she may not have bedding and clothing were destroyed by the been the only casualty.”19 tanks, Chai Ling claims that many students Brook’s use of eyewitness accounts had stayed in their tents, harboring the belief contradicts the reports that there were no that they would merely be led away by the student deaths in the Square. Brook further army. “But they were still in their tents,” she comments on the use of tanks to crush sobbed, “the tanks drove over their bodies students still in their tents (as reported by and crushed them to meat.”18 However, Chai Chai Ling).20 He writes “Many (students) had Ling does agree with the government that a vowed to remain where they lay to the bitter path was cleared for the students to leave the end. . . A Beida student did photograph what Square peacefully at the southeast corner of appeared to be the corpse of a crushed the Square. demonstrator in a tent. He displayed the Yet, while some eyewitness accounts and picture at Beida at 7:30 that morning. ‘It was sources agree with the government’s claim the most horrible photograph,’ as someone at that the students exited the Monument from Beida who saw it told me later. ‘It showed a the southeast corner of the Square, other student lying under a quilt in one of the tents sources report something completely on the Square. The picture was so clear. different. These sources disagree with the There was no doubt about it.’”21 Brook government’s account to a greater extent than further reports, “One student source insists

18 Chai Ling, "I’m Chai Ling. I’m Still Alive," in Mark V. Thompson and Yi Mu, ed., Crisis at Tiananmen (San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals Inc., 1989), 265-269. 19 Timothy Brook, Quelling the People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 146. 20 However, as Chai Ling herself reported, many students had come out of the tents at around 9 PM the previous evening and had gathered around the monument. Therefore, even if there were students who stayed in the tents, the number would have been low. 21 Brook, 147.

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14 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident that some students from Qinghua University soldiers wearing helmets. Some of them had refused to leave the Monument and were already set up a line of more than a dozen shot. Another says that students at the tail end machine guns, aimed at the students. Other of the file coming out the Southeast were soldiers rushed in among the students and shot.”22 beat them with electric cattle prods and Greater China But perhaps the most controversial rubber covered steel clubs. They tore their eyewitness account to challenge the way up the base of the Monument to the government’s side of the story was published People’s Heroes, and forced the students just days after the incident in the Hong Kong down, beating them until their heads were newspaper called Wenhui Pao Daily. In the bleeding. As they reached the ground level, Wenhui Pao Daily article, someone who the machine guns opened fire.”24 claimed to be a Qinghua University student that had experienced first-hand the events on The Attempt to Uncover an Objective June 4 reported that soldiers started to beat Truth the students clustered around the monument How then, does one resolve these on the morning of June 4. The eyewitness inconsistencies? Many have tried to uncover then recalls, “When the students from the the details of the Tiananmen Square Incident, third level had moved to the but despite their efforts, the ground, the submachine matter is still largely guns started firing. Some “ . . . NO MATTER HOW unsettled; a consistent soldiers shot from a kneeling DRAMATIC AND COMPELLING statistic and version simply position, and their bullets AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT does not exist. With that, this flew over our heads. Some MAY BE, IT CAN ONLY paper will seek to uncover an shot from a lying position; CAPTURE ISOLATED EVENTS objective version of the their bullets hit students in IN POCKETS. truth, while recognizing that the chest and head. We ” such a task may be more regrouped and tried to move complicated than it appears. back up to the higher platforms of the In order to trace the actual casualty monument. The machine guns ceased firing, figures, one must examine which sources are but the clubs and rods forced us back to the reliable and which are not. Although ground level. As soon as we were off the eyewitness accounts are plentiful, they are monument, the guns started firing again.”23 not suitable sources from which to draw a This account has become the major total casualty figure; no matter how dramatic controversial source for many other similar and compelling an eyewitness account may reports. be, it can only capture isolated events in For instance, Liu Binyan, Ruan Ming, pockets. It cannot account for the sum total and Xu Gang write in their book entitled Tell that we are looking for. It is also obvious that the World “At 4:40 AM, just as the students adding up the total eyewitness accounts to were starting to retreat out of the square, a red come up with a total casualty figure is signal flare ripped the night sky. Students illogical because most witnesses did not give found that they were surrounded by armed eyewitness accounts. And lastly, eyewitness

22 Ibid., 148. 23 Qinghua student, "What Happened at Tiananmen?" Wenhui Pao Daily, June 12, 1989. 24 Liu, Ming, and Xu, 62.

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accounts often contradict each other as we than those listed in Brook’s study? To help Greater China have seen above; some claim to have seen answer this question, eyewitness accounts people die and others claim that they did not may help. Eyewitnesses stressed that see people die. Although eyewitnesses such hospitals all over Beijing on Sunday “were as Chai Ling and Wu’er Kaixi may venture full of wounded and dying people. Even guesses at the number of deaths that resulted Haidan hospital, fifteen kilometers from the from the Tiananmen Square Incident, their Square, was full.”26 Various sources also estimates are ultimately unreliable. report that the number of casualties was so The most reliable method of investi- high that hospitals had to turn people away. gation, then, is to go back to a relatively Brook reports that “A doctor at People’s objective source: hospital records. Hospitals Hospital told Jasper Becker in the early hours were giving out casualty figures to of June 4 that over three hundred had come to investigators on the morning of June 4 but his hospital that night but that ‘most were so were then quickly silenced by the CCP. bad we sent them on elsewhere.’ People’s Timothy Brook, author of Quelling the was able to handle only a third of those who People, offers an objective and systematic showed up.”27 This leads one to believe that examination of the figures given out by there were many more casualties that ended Beijing’s different hospitals. In tracking the up in the hospitals but were not included in reports (some by doctors, some by students, the eleven hospital reports. and some by foreign journalists) taken at Brook conscientiously accounts for this different times on June 4, Brook provides factor. He writes, “Not all of the 124 medical casualty statistics (albeit incomplete) from facilities listed in the 1989 city telephone twelve civilian Beijing hospitals and one directory received casualties, nor in the same military hospital. The Beijing hospitals that numbers that those in Table 6-1 (table of he tracked down were Capital (40 dead), eleven hospitals and death reports) did. But Chaoyang (not available), Children’s (55 many did receive large numbers of dead and dead), Erlonglu (not available), Friendship wounded. We can generate an estimate by (43 dead), Fuxing (59 dead), Number Three using as a base figure the thirty-two hospitals (95 dead), People’s (4 dead), Posts and in the city that ministered to the hunger Telecommunications (28 dead), Railway strikers in May. Suppose these thirty-two General (85 dead), Second Artillery (4 dead), handled casualties on Saturday night, and Xuanwu (50 dead), and an unnamed hospital suppose that on average they handled them at (16 dead). What these figures add up to is that the same rates as those for which we have eleven Beijing hospitals received at least 478 reports/estimates. That would give figures of dead on June 4. Brook notes that “The figure fourteen hundred dead and thirty-seven fits with what a Beijing doctor found when he hundred wounded by dawn Sunday. Add to contacted eleven hospitals Sunday morning; this base almost a hundred smaller facilities he calculated a death toll in those hospitals of and clinics, as well as the many military over 500.”25 hospitals in Beijing, and the totals could rise The next question then becomes, how to twice that.”28 many casualties ended up in hospitals other However, even this is not the extent of

25 Brook, 161-162. 26 Ibid., 162. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.

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16 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident the numbers. Brook notes, “A corpse could be directed by Richard Gordon and Carma just as incriminating for his relatives. The Hinton, Taiwan pop star Hou Dejian gave an family of a counter-revolutionary rebel faced eyewitness account that corroborated the political sanctions and hefty fines. As much government’s story. Hou, one of the hunger as possible therefore, bodies were disposed of strikers who remained in the Square until the Greater China privately or taken out to the countryside for very end, claimed that he was one of the last burial.”29 Therefore, using rudimentary but people to leave the Square and that everyone logical extrapolations can lead one to had decided to leave relatively peacefully. conclude that there were at least 3,000 deaths Whereas other accounts claim that people in that resulted from the Tiananmen Square the north side of the monument refused to Incident (This figure is most likely an leave, Hou himself explicitly states that he unknown number larger because it does not went to the north side of the monument where include those deaths that were covered up by the machine guns were supposedly lined up families and those that were taken away off and dragged each person that was sitting in the street by the PLA before they could be protest off the ground and pushed them to the counted in the hospitals). In the end, the true southeast exit. In the documentary, Hou number seems to be somewhere far above the appears genuine, his demeanor sincere and official figure of 300 dead his expression moving. The and perhaps somewhere traumatized Hou even states below the reports of tens of “ THE TRAUMATIZED HOU EVEN in the documentary, “if we thousands dead. STATES IN THE DOCUMENTARY, start to exaggerate and The controversy over "IF WE START TO EXAGGERATE falsify the facts, then we are whether the PLA killed AND FALSIFY THE FACTS, THEN no better than the students inside of the Square WE ARE NO BETTER THAN THE government.”30 Hou’s is more difficult to resolve. GOVERNMENT." account is supported by a The reason is that there are ” large number of foreign no objective sources like journalists who were in hospital records from which one can draw Beijing at that time; these journalists also information. Instead, the controversy is reported that there were no killings inside of rooted in conflicting eyewitness accounts. the Square. Different people in the same place at the same Conversely, the accounts that claim there time give accounts that completely contradict was a massacre inside of the Square comes each other. To take the side of one eyewit- from sources that draw information from the ness’s account is to deny the account of one eyewitness account published in the another eyewitness. The problem is that the Hong Kong Wenhui Pao Daily newspaper. To consequence of being wrong on such an issue take a firm stance on an issue such as this one potentially denies that the deaths of innocent is problematic because there is no way to people. corroborate what one thinks is the truth. Nevertheless, one student account seems Whereas casualty figures rely on objective to be especially reliable. In the documentary sources like hospitals to report accurate video entitled “The Gate of Heavenly Peace,” information, the question of a massacre inside

29 Ibid. 30 Hou Dejian, "Blame Me if You Want!" in Richard Gordon, dir., The Gate of Heavenly Peace, videocassette (Long Bow Group, 1995).

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of the Square is subject to conflicting Margaret Herbst in Scott Simmie’s and Bob Greater China eyewitness reports. In the end, regardless of Nixon’s book, Tiananmen Square, reports, “‘I how compelling Hou’s account is or how was just numb. Twenty people were lying in authoritative New York Times correspondent this corridor. I talked to ambulance drivers, Kristof seems, one is simply left to believe for and they said one of those shot in the head herself the side that is most instinctively was a colleague who had gone to pick up the compelling. injured. Eight people were in the morgue at four thirty, and a number of them were The Barriers to a Transparent pedicab drivers who had been shot while Understanding trying to bring wounded back.’”32 Although efforts thus far have focused on Contributing to the unknown number of revealing a more exact number and location uncounted people, the CCP did not permit of deaths, it seems as if there is still no way to any ambulances, or people for that matter, to stand firm in our findings without enter the Square on the morning of June 4, reservations. When viewed through a pure preventing not only the discovery of an veil, it seems almost absurd that the event that accurate casualty figure but also any has had the most lasting negative impact on possibility of discovering what the soldiers China’s image over the past decade is still had done to the students inside of the Square. such an impenetrable mystery. The question, Brook reports, “Two ambulances approached then, ultimately becomes, “Why is it so almost immediately but were prevented from difficult to settle on an accepted version of fetching bodies. The soldiers ambushed one what happened on June 4, 1989?” The and set it on fire at 10:20 AM. Over the next answer, it would seem, lies in the actions half hour, two men who tried to drag the taken, both intentionally and unintentionally, wounded to safety were gunned down.”33 by both the CCP and the student eyewitnesses Furthermore, Chai Ling reports in her secret to distort and skew the facts of the event. eyewitness statement, “Later we learned that A large number of sources agree that troops collected the bodies that had fallen to during the Chinese army’s crackdown on the the ground while they had forced their way Square, CCP soldiers shot at ambulances forward. The bodies, some still alive, were trying to save the wounded. In the book, dumped onto buses or tricycles, leaving no Children of the Dragon, by the organization chance for the injured people to survive.”34 Human Rights in China, a Capital Steel Mill Efforts to collect bodies in hospitals worker recalls, “ ‘A makeshift ambulance before they could be counted continued tried to enter the square to take the wounded throughout the days following the away, but it was stopped by several rounds of crackdown. Brook continues to report, gunshots that completely destroyed its “Some corpses left in the open were collected windshield. A real ambulance was also and removed by truck. On Sunday at 11:20 stopped. . . Off and on, the soldiers continued AM, a foreign diplomat watched troops in the to shoot at the wounded.’”31 Also, an Jianguomen area load bodies onto trucks; eyewitness account by American journalist other soldiers kept the crowd away from the

31 Human Rights in China, 149. 32 Simmie and Nixon, 188-189. 33 Brook, 164-165. 34 Thompson and Yi, 269.

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18 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident bodies to prevent them from being observed. degree that these sources suggest. Brook Also on Sunday morning, at least one truck notes, “Because the number of people who with Capital Iron and Steel markings carrying died on the Square was limited — and many men in yellow hard hats was sighted on the of them were removed by ambulance — the western side of the 3rd Ring Road removing image of corpses bulldozed and burned is far- Greater China human remains and taking them westward. fetched. Most of the evidence of immediate Sunday and Monday nights, the work of cremation is circumstantial; plus there are removing new corpses from public places practical reasons that incineration did not was done by unmarked white morgue trucks occur. A human body does not burn quickly. that prowled the streets after dark. These Incinerating a body takes several hours at trucks did not deliver their contents to civilian high heat. . . Strong burn marks on the hospitals.”35 concrete paving stones on the Square behind Furthermore, various eyewitness reports the Martyrs’ Monument could also have been including Chai Ling’s and the Qinghua made as a result of burning pulped bodies. student’s (published in Wenhui Pao Daily) Other burn marks on the Square, however, allude to the burning of bodies in the Square. suggest the lower heat needed to burn tents Brook also reports, “At 5:58 AM, almost as and other flammable objects, not bodies.”38 soon as the last students were leaving Thus we are left with a sense of ambiguity. Tiananmen, a column of smoke began to rise But given the logistical aspects, it seems that from the Square. Another fire started at 6:40. if the army did burn corpses, then the number A Beida student watching the Square from a would have been comparatively low. building to the south saw the flames rise and Further controversy obfuscates one’s fall as new debris was tossed on. The smoke ability to grasp the facts. Brook states, “from was thick and black, suggesting that gasoline two separate sources I have heard that was used to soak whatever was being burned. students were executed inside the Workers’ It thickened three times between 6:45 and Culture Palace. . . From several firsthand 7:30 AM, for about five minutes each time.”36 sources, we know that the Culture Palace Rumors of burnings were circulated served as a temporary detention center for among a wide range of sources. Brook notes people rounded up Sunday morning. . . It has that a Qinghua student perched in a tree at the been alleged that PLA soldiers not only south end of the Square stated that at about tortured but executed by rifle butt close to 6:45AM, he could see soldiers throwing two thousand people on Sunday morning. plastic body bags together and covering them The story is attributed to the grandson of a with a tarpaulin. He did not, however, say that prominent Army general, who was among the they were then burned. Brook further reports students taken into the Culture Palace but that a Beida student leaflet reported that the who was spared when police supervisors “Army used bulldozers to shovel bodies into learned of his identity. A completely different piles and burn them.”37 source tells the same story, but says that the However, there is controversy over soldiers used knives to execute the whether this act of cremation occurred to the detainees.”39 This presents a troublesome

35 Brook, 165. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 165-166. 39 Ibid., 167.

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account. It is difficult to imagine that soldiers but to count the casualties. People simply Greater China could have sustained systematic executions wanted to know, and medical staff were of two thousand people by hand. Once again, sometimes willing to share what they knew, CCP efforts to carry out actions behind a often against the objections of hospital black veil give way to controversies that authorities and the police. A history student cannot be settled with certainty. from Beida was apprehended by police and In addition to harboring these unclear detained for about ten days for collecting allegations, the CCP took conscious and casualty statistics from hospitals.”42 Brook systematic actions to keep the facts from later notes, “There was, finally, one other surfacing in three ways. First, the government way to obscure the scale of human damage used its Public Security Bureau to infiltrate after it was over. That was to get rid of any institutions that had the ability to give out sort of paper trail. This was done. information about the Tiananmen Square Radiologists in one Beijing hospital were told Incident. Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson write to destroy all X rays they had taken that night in Crisis at Tiananmen that “On June 4, of bullet wounds. There would be no shortly after the shooting began, the official evidence left behind.”43 Radio Beijing reported that ‘thousands of Second, efforts were made after the people’ were murdered, crackdown to silence those ‘including our colleagues at in charge or in support of the Radio Beijing.’ However, the “ THE CCP TOOK CONSCIOUS AND movement. The Kwang Hua announcer who broadcast the SYSTEMATIC ACTIONS TO KEEP Publishing Company’s book report was quickly removed THE FACTS FROM SURFACING IN entitled The Peking from his anchor post and THREE WAYS. Massacre states, “a substituted by another ” frightening wave of arrests individual who repeated the has already begun, ordered government’s account.”40 by Chinese Communist premier Li Peng. Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon write in Mass media reports indicate that Li has Tiananmen Square that “A few hospitals ordered the arrest of 20,000 people. The which had earlier released figures were atmosphere of a ‘great clean-up’ and a ‘great saying nothing. There were reports that some purge’ accordingly has plunged the people of facilities had been infiltrated by agents of the Peking into a state of insecurity and terror.”44 Public Security Bureau. Unknown men Harry Harding’s A Fragile Relationship also wearing white lab coats were said to be reports that, “The demonstrations in wandering the halls of several hospitals, Tiananmen Square were officially depicted as looking carefully — but not examining — a counterrevolutionary riot that resulted from student victims.”41 Brook writes that “Many an antigovernment conspiracy. Police people tramped around to the hospitals combed the country for leaders of the Sunday morning not to find missing relatives protests, many of whom were seeking to flee

40 Thompson and Yi, 97. 41 Simmie and Nixon, 194. 42 Brook, 151. 43 Ibid., 167. 44 Kwang Hua Co., 5-6.

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20 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident abroad. By October, at least 12, and perhaps this ‘counterrevolutionary rebellion’ and as many as 100, demonstrators had been corrected their mistaken conceptions.”46 executed.”45 Furthermore, in an April 3, 2003 Interview The arbitrary nature of these arrests was with Brown University Political Science epitomized in Beijing’s decision to arrest Professor Su Fubing, Su recalls that “students Greater China Xiao Bin, a forty two year old factory official; were all required to write written statements Xiao Bin, was sentenced to a ten-year prison of their involvement in the movement. These term for “rumor mongering.” He had been reports were then all reviewed and interviewed on ABC news and had ‘suspicious’ reports were further investigated. spontaneously told ABC that solders had We all underwent reeducation in Communist killed thousands in the June 4 crackdown and and Marxist lessons and lessons on the that students had been run down by tanks. counterrevolutionaries.” It would seem, then, This type of persecution of anyone who that constant surveillance and punishment by spread a story inconsistent with the the government cast a shadow of suspicion government’s account effectively silenced over anyone whose story conflicted with that those whose views conflicted with the of the government, dissuading a large number government’s. In an interview conducted on of people from coming forward with more April 10th, 2003, with Ma Jia, Professor of facts and making it even more difficult to East Asian Studies at Brown University, Ma resolve the controversial areas of the states (translated from Mandarin to English Tiananmen Square Incident. by author), “During that time, no one would publicly say, ‘Oh yes, I don’t believe the The Motives for Distortion from Both government’s account. I think 1,000 died, not Sides of the Lens 300.’ The only time people would talk about Why did the CCP, a Party that has made their personal feelings about the incident such a concerted effort in becoming a would be in private. But even then people sophisticated and respected regional power, avoided talking about it for fear of what feel it was necessary to hide the facts so might happen to them.” Third and finally, the systematically and punish/silence the government implemented strict regulations to demonstrators so severely? Yi Mu and Mark have all people “study” the nature of the Thompson write in Crisis at Tiananmen, “As Tiananmen Square movement in a manner Mao Zedong explicitly put it, the Party had to consistent with the government’s view. In Liu have two ‘barrels’ in its hand — namely the Binyan’s book entitled Tell the World, Liu barrel of the gun and that of the pen — if it writes that “All college students and were to establish and consolidate its political graduates were forced to ‘study’ Deng’s powers.”47 In the context of political face, speech and other such documents. All those historical experience and the confidence that who work in government institutions and the Party could effectively contain public social organizations have to spend two hours opinion as it had done since the 1950s, the each day ‘studying’ such documents, and CCP chose to squash and cover up the furthermore, have to speak about what ways movement for three reasons. they have enhanced their understanding of First, partial CCP power remained in the

45 Harding, 224. 46 Liu, Ming, and Gang, 146. 47 Thompson and Yi, 111.

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hands of the first-generation revolutionaries. of life they helped build was being torn down. Greater China These old revolutionaries were those who Second, the revolutionary veterans’ own were present during the glory stories of the experiences with protests also painted the CCP’s triumph over the Nationalist Party Tiananmen Movement as a deadly force that during the famous Long March in 1933-1934. needed to be crushed. They arrested and These were veterans who believed that they silenced eyewitnesses because the CCP were the true founders and revolutionaries of leaders understood the implications of the Communist party in China and believed revolutionary movements. Nan Lin continues themselves to be the true revolutionaries. to write, “Many of these veterans were Although Deng Xiaoping declared in 1982 students during the 1920s through the 1940s that it was time for the veteran revolutionaries when they were underground Communists to retire from the front line of power and give agitating against the Nationalist government. authority to the second line, ceremonial and They were proud of the fact that their advisory posts in the Party and government agitation and leadership in student marches were nonetheless created for the retiring and demonstrations significantly contributed veterans.48 Because the first generation to the eventual downfall of the Nationalist revolutionaries still held power and influence government and the coming to power of the within the Party, their attitudes toward the Communist Party.”50 In the end, past Tiananmen Square protests had a big impact experiences compelled the CCP to suppress on the crackdown that ensued afterwards. the facts and demonize a threatening Nan Lin writes in The Struggle for challenging party. Tiananmen, “The veterans saw their Third and finally, the new leaders, or (protestors) demands as direct challenges to second-generation leaders, played a individual leaders and the foundations of significant role in the silencing of the leadership and authority. They concluded that Tiananmen Movement ideas and leaders as these marches and demonstrations were well. Not only did these leaders share the intended to eventually to overthrow the veteran revolutionaries’ perception that the regime and the political system. . . Once Deng student movement threatened the stability of became alarmed, the old veterans openly the Party, but they also lived through the reinforced Deng in his judgment and Cultural Revolution in the 1970s and equated determination. They feared that the ideology the Tiananmen Movement to it. In an and the system they helped establish were interview with Brown University visiting now being challenged and on the verge of lecturer Huang Zhao Yu on March 20th, being overthrown. Seeing a genuine threat, 2003, Huang commented on the state of they were not about to let the system and state social conditions during the movement. they helped create vanish.”49 Thus, the efforts Huang, an intellectual in China who supports to suppress the ideas and legitimacy of the the actions of the CCP in its decision to use Tiananmen Square movement after the force to clear the Square recalls (translated crackdown were driven largely by the first from Mandarin to English by author) that “the generation revolutionaries’ fears that the way situation was out of control. People were

48 Such veterans, according to Nan Lin in The Struggle for Tiananmen, were Chen Yu, Wang Zheng, Peng Zheng, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo. 49 Lin, 135-136. 50 Ibid., 139.

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22 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident noisy and out of hand. It looked like it was of the student movement. There are three impossible to solve. People were riding factors that contribute to the exaggeration of motorcycles through the crowds cheering. both the casualty figures and the brutality of There were two groups of people: the rational the PLA under the CCP. The first factor is a and the crazy. Those who were crazy greatly rational exaggeration of the facts. It is Greater China outnumbered those who were rational. conceivable that, in the face of traumatizing Outside of the Square people were robbing events, victims of abuse would want to fully stores. Street vendors were taking advantage convey the immorality of the acts to third of the situation by raising their prices very parties through dramatization or high. The rational people were becoming exaggeration. Such rational exaggeration greatly influenced by the crazy emotional would also help build support for the people. Taxis were not charging people movement and its ideals by emphasizing the anymore to show their support for the brutality of the party that opposes said ideals. movement. All transportation shut down. These exaggerations spread through a People could not get to work. People were specific avenue of communication: rumors. concerned about international affairs In the interview with Su Fubing, Su (referring to Gorbachev’s visit).” states, “Inherently, it was difficult to The link between Huang’s views and that determine the truth during the movement. of the leaders of the CCP is explained by his While in Tianjin, I heard news of the protest peers. In an interview with Su Fubing on movement on loudspeakers. We didn’t know April 3, 2003, Su states, “Huang’s comments where the news was coming from but it was are shaped by his position in China. always biased toward the movement. This is Currently, he is working for the understandable because people needed to Modern/Contemporary International amplify the news as well as pass it on. This is Relations Research Institute in Beijing, an inherent dynamic to mass organization China. This is a think tank for the Communist because there is a lack of organization. I do Party and State Council. One of the most not know any one that was killed nor do my secretive organizations in the Chinese friends know anyone that was killed. Rumors system, the Research Institute goes through were the most powerful weapon for the serious security checks. Political correctness movement. There were no checks on the is definitely an issue among its workers.” information getting through. It was chaotic Therefore, one can take Huang’s views as news.” Su’s stance on rumors as a powerful more or less the views of the CCP towards the mode of communication is supported by movement. Thus, Huang’s description of the Dingxin Zhao is his book The Power of social turmoil in Beijing indicates how the Tiananmen. Zhao argues, “Now that the Tiananmen Square movement likely triggered public was concerned about and sympathetic flashbacks of the Cultural Revolution in the to the movement and dissatisfied with the minds of the second-generation leaders who news in the official media, the public turned experienced first hand the horrors of the to other communication channels. Much of 1970s chaos. the news in these channels turned out to be However, while the CCP had powerful unfounded rumors and deliberate fabricaions. motives to muddle the facts after the Yet because the public was unhappy about the crackdown, it should be noted that part of the situation and distrustful of the government, distortion of facts is due to the political rumors that could create an image of an motives of the student protestors and nature unreasonable government tended to be

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believed and passed on regardless of their sources have toward the Tiananmen Square Greater China truth value.”51 Zhao continues, “Active Incident. Specifically, certain scholarly participants in a social movement usually sources seem to avoid giving full weight to believe what they are fighting for. Therefore, the CCP’s limited options in dealing with the the fabrication of rumors may not be student movement, ultimately skewing the considered as immoral in itself so long as the tone and nuances of the event against the participants believe that this will increase the CCP. While the limited options in no way chances of obtaining the collective goods for absolve the CCP of culpability, they do reveal which they are fighting.”52 an interesting dynamic which puts into The second factor is a subconscious or perspective the manner in which the CCP unintentional distortion of the figures and acted, a perspective consistently overlooked location of deaths. This can be attributed to in a large number of the sources. genuine uncertainty on the part of First, the CCP was not equipped to deal eyewitnesses. When eyewitnesses were asked with protest demonstrations; China had a to estimate how many deaths resulted from police force and a military, but neither was the crackdown, they were being given an trained to deal with displacing large masses utterly impossible task. Even if an eyewitness of people out of a location the masses were sees first hand a brutal act not willing to leave. The carried out by the PLA, what police were not trained to he/she is seeing is only an “ A DISTORTION OF THE EVENT’S deal with this type of protest isolated event. She cannot NUANCES MAY BE DUE TO THE movement so it was unlikely possibly put together a BIASES THAT WESTERN SOURCES for them to be called in. The number that accounts for the HAVE TOWARD THE TIANANMEN People’s Liberation Army entire incident. But, having SQUARE INCIDENT. was trained only to use guns just witnessed a traumatizing ” and perhaps tear gas, and event, she would be more was not equipped with the likely, due to the dramatic nature of his or her tools necessary to deal with protests (e.g. experience, to overestimate rather than water canons, rubber bullets, etc.). During the underestimate. These genuine estimations are Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, the subsequently passed on as first hand sources United States depended largely on such tools for other second hand sources to cite. Dingxin as water canons to force large groups to Zhao reports that many exaggerated rumors disperse from a location, but China did not were floating around immediately after the have this type of weaponry or training during crackdown. Such rumors included, “Over the months of the Tiananmen Square twenty thousand civilians died in the Incident. The CCP viewed its choices as massacre.”53 Thus, the distortion of the facts binary in terms of having the army either use may also be partially attributed to real guns and force their way into the Square unintentional exaggerations arising from or refrain from using guns and remain on the genuine uncertainty. periphery, unable to enter the city. And third, a distortion of the event’s Second, the CCP leadership and PLA nuances may be due to the biases that Western were caught by surprise when the people

51 Zhao, 326. 52 Ibid., 328. 53 Ibid., 319.

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24 Revisiting the Tiananmen Square Incident blocking the entryways into the Square began however, are rarely the focal points in major attacking the PLA on the days before and sources covering the Tiananmen Square after June 4. Original government statements Incident. Whereas the CCP blurred the truth claim that the majority of deaths that resulted by consciously hiding the facts, eyewitnesses from the incident were PLA soldiers at the and various scholarly sources critical of the Greater China hands of violent demonstrators. The fact that CCP employ a less extreme form of bias, even some soldiers died introduces an exaggerating the details and skirting away interesting dynamic. Traditionally, the PLA from topics which may very well draw was thought of as the People’s Army, an army unexpected empathy towards or reluctant that performed civil service acts such as the understanding of the CCP’s actions. building of dams and providing flood disaster relief. The fact that the demonstrators began Conclusion: Challenging a Distorted to attack the soldiers must have come as a Picture very big shock to the army. According to In light of the inconsistencies and Professor Robert Lee, not even during the distortions on both sides, it seems as if the Cultural Revolution was the PLA viewed CCP is winning the “war on numbers and with such disdain as they were during the location” in Mainland China. Most Chinese Tiananmen Square Incident. This new generally believe that the CCP’s official condition forced the CCP to alter its decisions figures and accounts are more truthful than in dealing with the movement, causing them the Western sources that contradict the CCP’s to be more aggressive in light of the account. This was not always the case. unexpected conflict. This argument is Immediately after the crackdown, Chinese highlighted by the fact that the CCP probably students believed that the death tolls were in had no specific plan to deal with massive the thousands.54 Only after the movement’s resistance. Professor Robert Lee suggests that defeat and the CCP’s crackdown on the CCP may have originally planned to use dissenters did the views change. In the the army merely as a political presence to interviews conducted with Brown University symbolically compel the students to leave the professors Su Fubing and Huang Zhao Yu Square. It thought that the mere presence of (from Mainland China), both remarked the PLA would be enough because of the separately that they did not think the death PLA’s reputation as keepers of the peace. toll was any higher than 300 people. Su When the student demonstrators began to act Fubing stated that he believed most soldiers out against the PLA, this most likely had a simply fired into the sky. Huang Zhao Yu very big impact on the army commanders. stated that because he did not personally see The incorrect assumptions that the PLA anyone die, and because he did not see would be met peacefully by the soldiers armed, he believed the government’s demonstrators forced the PLA to react figures. Professor Ma Jia and Lingzhen Wang spontaneously, resulting in a more aggressive of the East Asian Studies Department both approach than what was originally intended. declined to venture a guess at the numbers Although these conditions in no way because they said they simply did not know. excuse the CCP of its actions, they help to But, all professors seemed to express doubt in offer both sides of the story. These conditions, their earlier speculations as young adults and

54 Brook, 168-169.

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felt that their initial guesses immediately after China,” he said, “we are not told anything Greater China the event were wishful thinking. They say about this, except that we should not talk that they, having all participated in the event, about it. I don’t learn about it in the schools. were a bit foolish and did not realize the Even my parents and grandparents. . . they enormity of their actions. experienced it. . . even they will not talk to Brook quotes a Chinese student in anyone about it.” In ignorantly assuming that Beijing as stating, “‘you have to believe the any report which contradicted that of the government’s statistic. The Chinese CCP’s had a good chance of being accurate, I government never lies when it states facts. confidently “taught” my friend all the things What it tries to do is hide the facts. But when he did not know because of CCP efforts to it says that something happened, then it hide the facts. However, as I look back now happened. You have to believe it’. . . People on the days when we sat in the Stanford Oval, recognize that they do not have the evidence trying to reconcile our conflicting versions of to verify the death count they feel is right. events, I have come to the realization that Private estimates become subject more and what I myself claimed to know against the more to doubt. This doubt, combined with the backdrop of supposed legitimate sources was deep-seated conviction among Chinese that as subject to historical distortion as that the government never lies about facts but which my Chinese friend claimed to know only misrepresents them, has induced many against the backdrop of suppressed to err on the side of caution and accept information. hundreds over thousands. Even the In the end, we, as scholars in search of international press has bowed to the shift in truth, must internalize the lesson that the the decimal point: the dead are construction of history will always be skewed conventionally referred to now as numbering by vested players. When formulating an in the hundreds, not the thousands.”55 image of a country such as China, one must In the past year, through a student realize that its history is never black and organization at Stanford University called the white. What ends up in interviews, books and Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at eyewitness accounts is often subject to acts of Stanford, I have become close friends with a distortion from both sides, acts that ultimately small group of intelligent Chinese students bias the interpretation of historical events in from Universities in Beijing and Shanghai. the eyes of wholly different people from On one occasion, my conversation with one vastly different parts of the world. Moving such friend regarding the question of US forward, therefore, requires that each of us foreign policy towards Taiwan turned to the recognize the distortions and where they subject of the Tiananmen Square Incident. exist, that each of us proceed to study, The more I spoke about what I thought I internalize and convey with the knew (at the time), the more my friend understanding that the objective truth we seek became both immensely confused but may very well be the one that is hidden layers uncontrollably anxious to hear more. “In beneath what is readily apparent.

55 Brook, 169.

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26 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Greater China Democratize Taiwan

Ching-fen Hu

Taiwan’s successful transition from to realize that a democratic solution would authoritarian regime to democracy suggests benefit the KMT, and that failure to liberalize that neither a Leninist party structure nor a the system could result in violent conflict.4 Confucian cultural heritage is a bar to However, little research has been done on democratization. Taiwan’s experience also CCK’s political learning process.5 The link clearly illustrates that democracy can be between Taiwan’s geopolitics and CCK’s achieved through political leadership, a decision to ease the political system onto a mode of democratic transition that has been path of liberalization and finally democracy is emphasized in recent scholarship by Samuel the primary focus of this research paper. I Huntington,1 Bruce Dickson,2 and Steven argue that Taiwan’s growing diplomatic Hood, the lattermost of whom argues that isolation was the driving force behind CCK’s democratic transitions are brought about by transformation from head of the feared secret political elites who have changed their police in the 1950s to political reformer in the attitudes about democracy. This process has 1970s and 1980s. Since Taiwan could not been described by Nancy Bermeo as hope to compete with the PRC for power, “political learning,” meaning the process by CCK opted to secure Taiwan’s foreign which “authoritarians come to realize the relations by building a relatively free and benefits, or in some cases their only option prosperous Taiwan, putting Taiwan on the for survival, is to move towards a democratic road to reunification on its own terms. So solution.”3 long as CCK was confident in the US As the paramount leader of the commitment to defend Taiwan, there was Kuomintang (KMT), the decision to move little incentive to change the political system. forward with Taiwan’s democratization in Once President Nixon made clear his 1986 ultimately belonged to Chiang Ching- intention to play the China card, and kuo (CCK). Although CCK initially international support for his regime began supported the status quo, he eventually came rapidly eroding, CCK took decisive steps to

1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 316. Huntington suggests that “economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real.” 2 Bruce Dickson, Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 203. In his analysis of the adaptability of Leninist parties, Dickson argues that “how party leaders interpret their environment determines their willingness to adapt.” 3 Steven Hood, The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan (Westview Press, 1997), 9. 4 Ibid. 5 Although many studies on Taiwan’s democratization consider the international environment to be a key factor, few have linked it directly to CCK’s decision to move toward a democratic system.

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Taiwanize the regime and to move toward a China (GRC) had enormous leverage over the Greater China more representative government. The US de- United States. In 1954, under President recognition of Taiwan in 1978 and Deng Eisenhower, the United States and the GRC Xiaoping’s reform and open door policy signed a mutual defense treaty covering reaffirmed CCK’s belief that Taiwan must Taiwan and certain islands immediately pursue a democratic path in order to survive. adjacent to it. This treaty formally My examination of the process of CCK’s incorporated the ROC into the US’s collective political learning will be organized into three security system in Asia. For the next two distinct phases based on Taiwan’s changing decades, the United States would recognize geopolitical conditions: the strong US-ROC the KMT regime on Taiwan as the sole alliance (1950s-mid 1960s); the new world legitimate Chinese government. order of the 1960s; the US de-recognition of During the 1950s, CCK, as the chief of Taiwan and Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (1979- Taiwan’s secret police and intelligence 1987). agency, came to be identified as the enforcer of the White Terror. Wu Kuo-cheng, a former Strong US-ROC Alliance (1950s - mid governor of Taiwan and a standing member 1960s) of the KMT central committee, accused CCK From 1950 to the first half of the 1960s, of establishing a spy network that created fear Taiwan’s security rested solely on the military not only throughout the society, but within the and economic aid provided by the United KMT as well. Wu claimed that only 18 out of States. The outbreak of the Korean War in 998 arrests made by the secret police in 1952 1950 was perceived by the Truman were for serious crimes. The rest were made administration as a general communist to intimidate and root out opposition to the offensive in the Pacific region by the newly party.6 In July 1950 the CIA reported a formed Sino-Soviet alliance between Mao noticeable increase in repressive activities and Stalin. As such, the Truman and a resultant “popular [Taiwanese] administration decided to defend South revulsion against the regime.” The American Korea and simultaneously reversed its earlier chargé d’affaires before Rankin called it a decision not to defend Taiwan. On June 27, “reign of terror,” suggesting that even mild 1950, President Truman dispatched the criticism of the regime could result in arrest seventh fleet of the United States naval force and disappearance.7 Such allegations to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, or in other reinforced CCK’s growing reputation for words, to prevent either side from attacking ruthlessness, and raised concerns in the other. In practice, considering the Washington. Although Secretary of State enormous disparity in size between the two Dulles commented on CCK’s “roughness” in sides, this meant protecting Taiwan from the handling security matters during the mainland. During the Korean War, the US intelligence chief’s first visit to the United considered Taiwan to be strategically States in 1953,8 CCK remained convinced important to its security in the Pacific, and as that repressive action was necessary to a result the Government of the Republic of combat communist infiltration and

6 Hood, 35. 7 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Harvard University Press, 2000), 211; source: American Embassy Taipei, cable Sept. 6, 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, 48. 8 Ibid., 220; source: Memo for the files, MacConaughy, Nov. 13, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, vol.14, 253.

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28 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan subversive activity, and that an open Secretary Dulles and the Chiangs, the democratic society such as the one he government of the United States and the GRC witnessed in the US was a distant goal for his signed a joint communiqué on October 24, country.9 It was also clear to CCK that US 1958, in which Chiang Kai-shek renounced support for his government would continue the use of force to recover the mainland. Greater China whatever the degree of “roughness” in his Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) stated in the methods.10 According to US Ambassador communiqué that the GRC “considers that Rankin’s 1957 report, since mid-1950, the restoration of freedom to its people on the combined US economic and military aid to Mainland is its sacred mission...and that the Taiwan amounted to approximately US$2 principle means of successfully achieving its billion.11 In early 1958, about one-third of the mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat- cost of the ROC’s military establishment of sen’s ‘Three People’s Principles’ (national- 650,000 men, one of the largest in the world, ism, democracy and social well-being) and was being met by US aid.12 not the use of force.”15 It was during the However, as CCK and his father would Quemoy crisis that CCK first came to realize soon learn during the Battle of Quemoy in that military return to the mainland was a 1958, most Americans and United Nations distant, if not impossible, dream, and that the members favored a two future of his regime rested Chinas solution that was on the wellbeing of people in unacceptable to both the “ …SO LONG AS THE KMT Taiwan. According to Ray GRC and the CCP. The LEADERSHIP WAS CONFI- Cline, CIA representative in Chiangs learned from Dulles DENT ABOUT THE US Taiwan from 1958 to 1962, that most UN members COMMITMENT TO DEFEND CCK was convinced that the supported the withdrawal of TAIWAN, THERE WAS LITTLE only way to win back the ROC forces from the INCENTIVE TO CHANGE THE mainland was to preserve POLITICAL SYSTEM. offshore islands, adding that Taiwan as a free society, the KMT’s military buildup ” improving and perfecting it on its offshore islands was perceived abroad into a showcase for democracy that would as “militaristic...apt to precipitate a world entice the people of mainland China.16 war.”13 Dulles had made it clear to the However, so long as the KMT leadership Chiangs that most Americans favored a de was confident about the US commitment to facto if not de jure two Chinas solution, and defend Taiwan, there was little incentive to that even a conservative Republican change the political system. CCK was fully administration in Washington would not aware that a free and democratic election easily be drawn into a war with China.14 After would likely result in a Taiwanese, non-KMT three days of intensive consultations between and even pro-independence government.

9 Ibid., 221; source: American Embassy Taipei, dispatch, Oct. 13, 1954. NA-box 4218. 10 Ibid. 11 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 16. 12 Ibid., 14; source: US Mutual Security Agency Report to Congress. 13 Taylor, 245. 14 Ibid., 247. 15 Stephen P. Gibert and William M. Carpenter, ed., America and Island China: A Documentary History (University Press of America), 97-99. Contains full text of the 1958 joint communiqué. 16 Ray Cline, Chiang Ching-kuo Remembered: The Man and his Political Legacy (Washington, DC: United States Global Strategy Council, 1989), 70.

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Chiang Kai-shek and his regime paid little his invasion of Hungary and grew as the war Greater China more than lip service to the party’s in Vietnam escalated in 1965. After the democratic claim. One-party local elections Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the in which independent candidates were summer of 1968 and the subsequent allowed to run for office were the only statement of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which concession CKS made towards creating a effectively allowed the Soviet Union to democratic system, the minimum the KMT overthrow any communist government of leadership considered necessary to engage the which it did not approve, as well as a massive Taiwanese and placate the Americans.17 build-up of Soviet forces on the Chinese CCK’s attitude toward political rights at this border, Beijing now considered the Soviet time was best reflected in his tough position Union to be a major threat to China’s national against Lei Chen, a well-known KMT critic security. The growing tension between who announced his intention to form the Beijing and Moscow was further increased China Democratic Party. Lei and his business by a frontier clash between Chinese and associate, Liu Tzu-ying were arrested and Soviet forces on Damansky Island in March sentenced by military court to 10 years in 1969. The rising tensions put serious military prison on charges that they had conducted constraints on the PRC, forcing it to defend communist activities. While there were its northern border, thus reducing its threat to different opinions within the KMT on how to the region. In the 1950s, Taiwan’s security react, CCK took a tough position, arguing (and more importantly, the survival of the that “if an effective political opposition KMT as the ruling party on the island) was should ever be able to organize, it would guaranteed only by the US commitment to inevitably devolve into a Taiwanese organ defend the island as part of its policy of and portray the KMT as a mainlander containing Chinese communist expansion- dominated party...in honest elections, the ism. The geopolitical shift caused by the KMT would almost certainly be doomed.”18 rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in CCK did not believe it was wise to promote the early 1960s would severely undermine any democratic changes under the Taiwan’s strategic importance to US security circumstance, and showed no sign of in the region. loosening up its control over dissidents; independent political thinking remained Changing U.S-China Relations and dangerous in Taiwan. Taiwan’s Growing Isolation Meanwhile, the United States began to The New World Order of the 1960s reconsider its China policy, in part because of Sino-Soviet Breakup Nixon’s desire to promote détente with the By 1960, the Sino-Soviet alliance was Soviet Union, and in part because of the need deteriorating rapidly. Sino-Soviet hostility to end US involvement in Vietnam. Playing first became evident after 1956 when the CCP the China card could be a means of leadership began to distrust Khrushchev, accomplishing both objectives.19 In an especially after his denunciation of Stalin and October 1967 article in Foreign Affairs,

17 Taylor, 203. 18 Ibid., 259; this quote is not from CCK but from Ambassador Drumright’s analysis of the situation, though Taylor believed CCK assuredly held the same view (see Taylor’s reference note #14 on page 487). 19 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Thomas S. Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, John Martinez, ed., China and the United States; From Hostility to Engagement, 1960 - 1998 (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1999), 19.

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30 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan Nixon wrote: United Nations passed a resolution by a large “ . . . [A]ny American policy toward majority to “restore all its rights to the Asia must come urgently to grips with the People’s Republic of China and to expel reality of China . . . There is no place on forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai- this small planet for a billion of its shek from the place which they unlawfully Greater China potentially most able people to live in occupy at the United Nations and in all the angry isolation . . . The world cannot be organizations related to it.”24 The UN’s safe until China changes. Thus our aim . . decision clearly suggested that the . should be to induce change. The way to international community rejected the KMT’s do this is to persuade China . . . that its claim to rule over the local Taiwanese as the own national interest requires a turning head of a temporarily-exiled Republic of away from foreign adventuring and a China representing all of the Chinese people. turning inward toward the solution of its In February 1972, Washington and Beijing own domestic problems.”20 issued a joint communiqué, known as the Soon after Nixon entered the White House in Shanghai Communiqué, as a result of January 1969, his administration relaxed President Nixon’s historical visit to Beijing. restrictions on travel and trade with China, In this communiqué, both sides agreed that and ended US naval patrols of the Taiwan “progress toward the normalization of Strait and reconnaissance flights over relations between China and the United States Chinese territory, suggesting the administra- is in the interests of all countries.” The PRC tion’s strong desire to improve relations with reaffirmed its position that “the Taiwan the PRC. In 1970, CCK made his last visit to question is the crucial question obstructing the United States to find out what concessions the normalization of relations between China President Nixon was preparing to offer and the United States . . . Taiwan is a province Beijing.21 CCK met with President Nixon and of China . . . the liberation of Taiwan is Henry Kissinger. Nixon reportedly “listened China’s internal affair in which no other to Ching-kuo very closely but did not make country has the right to interfere; and all US any promises” regarding US relations with forces and military installations must be Beijing.22 Kissinger tried to get CCK’s withdrawn from Taiwan.” The United States, reaction on moving Sino-American talks while acknowledging that there was only one from Warsaw to Washington or Beijing, an China, stated that it was in the US’s interest to indication of the seriousness of their resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. With this discussion.23 Having acted as chief negotiator in mind, the US affirmed its ultimate goal of with the US on behalf of his father since the “the withdrawal of all US forces and military 1950s, CCK understood the serious installations from Taiwan.”25 On the one implications of the geopolitical shift for US- hand, the Shanghai Communiqué suggested Taiwan relations. He also understood that the that the normalization of relations between issue of Taiwan was the key to a breakthrough Washington and Beijing was just a matter of in US-PRC relations. The following year, the time. On the other hand, however, it linked

20 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs, Oct, 1967, 121. 21 Taylor, 296. 22 Ibid., 297, citing James Shen, “The US and Free China: How the US Sold Out Its Ally”. 23 Ibid., 298. 24 Gibert and Carpenter ed., 109. 25 Ibid., 111-114; text of Shanghai Communique of 1972.

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US-ROC military relations to a peaceful but symbolically significant first step toward Greater China settlement of the Taiwan issue.26 Later that a more representative government. The year, Japan, Taiwan’s most important election was held in 1969, the year that CCK supporter and trading partner after the US, finally assumed a formal leadership role as switched its diplomatic relations from Taipei the vice premier. During the December to Beijing. More countries would soon follow election, CCK permitted unprecedented suit. It was reported that of the states with criticism of the regime by non-KMT formal diplomatic relations with the ROC in candidates, including charges of 1971, 45 percent had switched ties to the PRC discrimination against native Taiwanese, from 1971 to 1973.27 Taiwan’s growing governmental corruption, and complaints that diplomatic isolation brought home the reality the lion’s share of government spending went that “whatever the differences Taiwanese and to the military. Some even suggested that the mainlanders once had or still have, they are vice-presidency be held by a Taiwanese and sharing the lifeboat of Taiwan.”28 The KMT martial law lifted. One of the non-party leadership finally realized the task candidates Huang Hsin-chieh went so far as confronting them was that of survival. to say that return to the mainland was hopeless and the country would suffer if CCK’s Pragmatic Approach president CKS remained in Faced with dwindling office much longer.30 Huang international support, CCK “ TAIWAN'S GROWING DIPLO- received a warning to tone began to take concrete MATIC ISOLATION BROUGHT down his attack, but was measures towards building a HOME THE REALITY THAT allowed to continue his more representative govern- “WHATEVER THE DIFFER- campaign. Three non-party ment that allowed for a much ENCES TAIWANESE AND candidates including Huang wider range of dissident MAINLANDERS ONCE HAD were elected, with the KMT OR STILL HAVE, THEY ARE views. In 1966, CCK pushed winning 23 out of all 26 new SHARING THE LIFEBOAT OF the National Assembly to TAIWAN.” seats. The harsh criticism of approve a constitutional the regime made by the amendment that allowed a ” Taiwanese candidates supplementary election be held in Taiwan to suggested a deep resentment of mainlander add a number of new legislative seats to dominance on the island, underscoring the reflect Taiwan’s population growth: 11 new dilemma faced by the Nationalist party as seats to the Legislative Yuan, 15 seats to the CCK embarked on a path to gradually open National Assembly and 2 seats to the Control up the system without losing the party’s grip Yuan. While the number of new seats was on power. Following Taiwan’s expulsion insignificant vis-à-vis the total number of from the United Nations in 1971, another legislative representatives required by the amendment to the temporary provisions to constitution (3,045 seats for the National add additional new seats to the legislative Assembly, 773 for the Legislative Yuan and bodies was passed, further broadening 223 seats for the Control Yuan),29 it was a tiny, political participation on the island and

26 Martin L. Lasater, “Military Milestones,” Gibert and Carpenter ed., ch.4, 29. 27 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC (Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 222. 28 From C.K. Yen’s inauguration speech quoted in Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), April 18, 1975, 21. 29 Tien, 146, Table 6.1. 30 Sheldon Appleton, “Taiwan: Portents of Change,” Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No.1, A Survey of Asia in 1970, Part I (Jan., 1971), 68-73.

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32 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan adding another 119 new members to the three In marked contrast to his tough stand against legislative bodies. As one analyst suggested, Lei Chen in 1960, CCK now perceived “each time the ROC suffers a major political reform as a means to strengthen the diplomatic setback, it takes an additional step KMT’s ruling position abroad and at home. to liberalize the pattern of representative Meanwhile, CCK stepped up his effort to Greater China government to quiet critics and enhance co-opt young, talented Taiwanese into the political harmony on Taiwan.”31 As before, leadership ranks. Beginning in 1969-1970, the result of the 1972 election was growing numbers of Taiwanese were predictable; the KMT candidates won a appointed to chair the party’s local majority of the new seats. One American committees, a direct result of CCK’s efforts to observer of the 1972 election reported that weed out older and incompetent cadres. “The elections, despite their shortcomings, Between 1968 and 1971, 641 older enabled candidates to present controversial functionaries, or 37 percent of the total staff ideas directly to the public and performed the in the party’s provincial headquarters retired function of electing outspoken critics of the or left office.34 By 1977, about one third of all Nationalist Party . . . The permissible range county and city chairmen were Taiwanese, for constructive dissent has been considerably and by 1984, half were Taiwanese.35 Lee broadened.”32 Soon after the election, CCK Huan, who held various important party posts addressed the National Assembly in its annual and was instrumental in carrying out CCK’s Constitution Day meeting. He said: recruitment policy, described CCK as eager “After careful consideration, Ching- to promote Taiwanese to the party’s kuo felt strongly that, under the difficult provincial offices, describing CCK’s criteria circumstance [the rapidly deteriorating as “Taiwanese, with advanced degrees, international condition], we must begin possessed new ideas.”36 CCK also made clear with political reform in order to bring to Lee Huan his plan to appoint younger and about the overall reform necessary to better educated Taiwanese to central build a strong and incorruptible leadership positions in the future. In 1976, government . . . The successful comple- CCK instructed Lee Huan to select several tion of the supplemental election two dozen young party leaders for the highest- days ago was not only a major step level cadre training program at the party toward realizing our goal of school. Among the 60 individuals chosen for constitutional democracy, but also a the training, half were Taiwanese, including major test to our nation’s stability and Lien Chan (a CSC member and minister of unity . . . the high voter turnout . . . could foreign affairs), Wu Po-hsiung (a CSC be viewed as the best indication of our member and mayor of Taipei), Shih Ch’i- citizen’s support for the government.”33 yang (a CSC member and vice premier).37

31 Chiu 1986a, 9-10, quoted in Tien, 145. The first time a supplementary election was authorized was in 1966 in response to the 47-47 tie vote in the UN to expel the ROC; the 2nd time was after the ROC lost its UN seat, and the 3rd time was after the US-PRC normalized their relations in 1978. 32 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession” Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 1 January 1974, 22-29.28. 33 Selected Statements of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, May 1972-Jan.1973 (Central Daily Newspaper), 47-49. 34 Tien, The Great Transition, 70. 35 Ibid., 69-70. 36 Lin Yin-ting, Forty-four Years with President Chiang Ching-kuo: Lee Huan’s Memoirs (Zhui sui ban shiji: Li Huan yu Jingguo Xian Sheng) (Commonwealth Publishing, 1998), 120. 37 Tien, The Great Transition, p. 69-70.

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When CCK assumed the premiership in 1972, developing Taiwan today, we must Greater China he appointed six Taiwanese to cabinet posts, strengthen our democratic political including the vice-premiership that was system to ensure that everyone in Taiwan previously held by CCK himself. Three of the enjoys a freer and more prosperous life in remaining four Yuans, the Judicial, marked contrast to the miserable life Legislative, Examination and Control, had under the Communist regime.”39 Taiwanese vice-presidents. Also, for the first Once CCK was elected party chairman time a Taiwanese, Hsieh Tung-min was after his father’s death in 1975, additional appointed governor of the province of steps were taken to include Taiwanese in the Taiwan. CCK’s appointments of native party’s central organ where the real power Taiwanese were hailed by Ta-hsueh ta-chih, resided. Taiwanese membership in the party’s Taiwan’s most outspoken independent Central Standing Committee (CSC) grew journal at the time, as “fully reflect[ing] the from 2 out of 21 seats in 1969 to 5 out of 22 realities of the political situation.”38 During in 1976, 9 out of 27 in 1979 and 16 out of 31 the inaugural ceremony of Taiwan’s new in 1988.40 However, the expansion in the size Taiwanese governor, CCK emphasized the of the CSC was a compromise to avoid the importance of societal harmony (ren-he) in perception that the Taiwanese were achieving national unity, and squeezing mainlanders out outlined his vision of of key posts,41 showing the developing Taiwan into a “ THIS RISE IN POLITICAL delicate line that CCK democratic society as a CONCESSIONS TO NATIVE walked in his effort to fold means to recover the TAIWANESE FOLLOWED Taiwanese into the political mainland. CCK stated: TAIWAN'S LOSS OF ITS UN process. “ . . . national unity SEAT IN 1971 AND THE The increasing number can only be achieved SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ IN of Taiwanese admitted to 1972 through ethnic harmony the party elite reflected (jen-he). The union of ” CCK’s willingness to adapt Taiwan’s 15 million to political reality and shift people is strong enough to not only the party from a temporary government in guarantee Taiwan’s security, but also to exile to the ruling party of Taiwan. This rise achieve our historical mission of second in political concessions to native Taiwanese Northern Expedition [return to the followed Taiwan’s loss of its UN seat in mainland]. In the past, Guangzhou was 1971 and the Shanghai Communiqué in the base for the victorious Northern 1972, suggesting that a shift in the Expedition, and Chongqing was the base geopolitical balance coupled with Beijing’s for our victorious resistance against the aggressive efforts to win Taiwanese Japanese invasion; now Taiwan is the sympathy convinced CCK of the urgency of base for victorious return to the making some political concessions. In his mainland. To make greater strides in memoir, Lee Huan suggested that CCK’s

38 Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (University of Michigan, 1976), 89; source: Ta-hsueh, no. 54, June 1972, 6-7. 39 Translated from CCK speech in Taiwan’s provincial governor inauguration ceremony, June 6, 1972, Selected Statements of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, May 1972 to January 1973, (Central Daily Newspaper), 88-89. 40 Dickson, 114 and Tien, 77. 41 Ibid., 115.

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34 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan decision to Taiwanize the regime was remains intact, and the jails still hold influenced by both external and internal considerable numbers of political developments. “Internationally, support for prisoners.”45 the ROC as China’s legitimate government To further develop Taiwan’s economy, was rapidly eroding. Domestically, the party CCK’s government undertook the “Ten Greater China was under growing pressure from a younger Major Development Projects” to improve generation of opposition leaders to open up Taiwan’s economic infrastructure, focusing its political system. To consolidate its power on transportation and the capital-intensive as the ruling party, the KMT had to seek petrochemical, iron, and steel industries. support from, and identify itself with the Despite their astronomical cost, CCK insisted island’s majority Taiwanese population.”42 that the development projects must proceed, Years later, CCK told Hao Pei-ts’un, his noting that “if we don’t do it today, tomorrow chief military advisor, that he chose Lee we will regret it.”46 The success of the ten Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, as his major projects played a key role in sustaining constitutional successor simply because of Taiwan’s economic growth during the global the political reality; “it [the next vice economic slowdown and energy crisis of the president] has to be a Taiwanese.”43 P’eng 1970s, and at the same time, enabled the GRC Ming-min, a prominent dissident supporting to maintain foreign relations through trade Taiwanese independence whom CCK and cultural ties. repeatedly tried to co-opt into working Additional evidence of CCK’s changing within the system in the 1960s, explained political agenda can be seen in the gradual that “CCK realized his regime would not be reduction of government spending on able to return to the mainland, and his only defense, beginning with the CCK era in 1969. hope for survival is to develop Taiwan and to Net government expenditures in general take every measure to ensure that Taiwanese administration and defense as a percentage of gradually come to accept his government.”44 GNP decreased from around 60 percent On the other hand, CCK was careful to throughout the 1950s and 1960s, to 48.7 ensure that all sensitive posts remained in the percent in 1969 when CCK became vice- hands of mainlanders. As Jonathan Unger premier, down to 43.8 percent in 1972 when pointed out in his March 6, 1975 report for he assumed the premiership, 39.1 percent in Christian Science Monitor, “The KMT has 1976 when he was elected the party chairman shown little intention of sharing its power and 37.1 percent in 1978 when he took over with the Taiwanese.” Furthermore, Unger the presidency.47 For years, critics of the KMT reported, “political controls have lessened government had attacked the high percentage only slightly since Chang Ching-kuo attained of military spending as coming at the expense power. The press, books, films and TV of Taiwan’s social and economic develop- remain heavily censored; the island’s large ment. The progressive reduction of govern- network of secret police and informants ment spending on defense under CCK’s

42 Lin, 113. 43 Wang Li-hsing edited, Hao Pei-ts’un Diary (Hao zhong zhang riji zhong di ching-kuo xian shen wan nian), (Commonwealth Publishing, 1995), 317. 44 Wakabayashi, Masahiro, Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, translated by Xiang-ing Lai, (Yûan-liou Publishing, 1998), 137. 45 Jonathan Unger, “Taiwan Today: Shrinking Expectations,” Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1975, 5. 46 Taylor, 314. 47 Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1987, 173.

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leadership suggests a major priority shift Taiwan issue voiced its expectation “that the Greater China from recovering the mainland militarily to Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the addressing the needs of the people in Taiwan. Chinese themselves.” Meanwhile, the PRC in its statement reiterated its one-China position US De-Recognition of Taiwan and China and stated firmly that the return of Taiwan to under Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms its motherland was “entirely China’s internal CCK’s political reforms during the 1970s affair.”50 The normalization terms reached were best described by Edwin Winckler, who between Washington and Beijing raised characterized them as a gradual transition serious questions about the future of Taiwan. from hard to soft authoritarianism.48 Two On the one hand, the PRC refused to make an major forces, the US de-recognition of explicit commitment not to use force, which Taiwan in 1978, and Deng Xiaoping’s they regarded as a matter of sovereignty. On reforms in China, would serve as the catalysts the other hand, the United States had publicly for hardening CCK’s view on Taiwan’s expressed its intention to supply Taiwan with democratic future. selected arms of a defensive character.51 As Senator Jesse Helms put it, “the PRC and the The Normalization of US-PRC Relations United States hold the ultimate levers: the On December 15, 1978, President Carter PRC retains its right to use force, and the announced the establishment of diplomatic United States retains the right to supply [or relations with the PRC, effective January 1, withhold sales of] defensive weapons.”52 1979, and the termination of the US-ROC Although Secretary of Defense Harold mutual defense treaty one year after. In his Brown assured the members of the Senate announcement, President Carter made it clear Foreign Relations Committee during the that in recognizing the People’s Republic of Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) hearings that China as the sole legal government of China, “for a variety of reasons PRC military action “we are recognizing simple reality.” The against Taiwan is extremely unlikely for the United States also stated that it would be foreseeable future,” that probability could withdrawing its remaining military personnel increase should China gain a decisive from Taiwan within four months, and would military advantage, or should Taiwan move maintain future commercial, cultural and toward independence.53 In terms of total other relations with Taiwan “without official military capabilities, Taiwan was vastly government representation and without outnumbered in most crucial categories, diplomatic relations.”49 In addition, the frequently by a ratio of 10 to 1.54 Since United States reaffirmed its continuing Taiwan could not match the PRC in quantity, interest in the peaceful resolution of the it had to maintain its military advantage by

48 Edwin Winckler, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism?” The China Quarterly, No. 99 (Sep., 1984), 481-499. 49 Gibert and Carpenter, ed., 203. Diplomatic Relations between the US and the PRC, US Statement, Dec. 15, 1978. 50 Ibid., 206, statement by the PRC. 51 Ibid., 216, comments by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Senate hearing on Taiwan, Feb 5-22, 1979. 52 Ibid., 219, Senator Jesse Helms: Comments on President Carter’s Taiwan Policy (excerpts). 53 Hu Yaobang during an interview with Pai Hsing director Lu Keng on May 10, 1985 on the Taiwan issue stated that once China has developed its national defense, “if the broad masses of the Taiwan people wish to return and a small number of people do not wish to return, it will be necessary to use some force”; full text of Hu’s interview in Gibert and Carpenter, 378; Deng Xiao-ping told Secretary of Defense Weinberger in September 1983 that “if some movement happens on Taiwan, we will have to react”; source: State Dept Bureau of Intelligence and Research Report 1173-AR, Sept. 19, 1985, included in China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960-1998. 54 Lasater, 31.

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36 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan modernizing its forces, particularly its fighter close relationship be perpetuated, so we must aircraft. CCK, in his interview with René swallow the bitter and handle the situation Viénet of L’Express, stated: “We need better with all the fortitude at our command.”58 The and faster planes and vessels to strengthen need to retain US congressional support our air and sea defenses,” emphasizing provided an important impetus for CCK to Greater China Taiwan’s need to “continue obtaining the continue his political reforms, promoting a latest model weapons from the United States favorable image of a freer and more modern so as to increase our defense capability.”55 Taiwan that contrasted with China. Therefore, Taiwan’s deterrent capability depended heavily on its ability to acquire CCK’s Political Reform advanced weapons from the United States. On December 20, 1978, less than a week In 1979, the US Congress passed the after President Carter’s normalization Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to spell out in announcement, CCK instructed the party’s considerable detail the US security policy CSC to establish a work committee to concerning Taiwan and instructions on its examine various areas for reform, including implementation. Section 2 of the TRA made party affairs, politics and foreign relations, it clear that the US decision to normalize social affairs, culture and propaganda, relations with the PRC “rests upon the finance and economics, and military affairs. expectation that the future of Taiwan will be One of the important decisions based on the determined by peaceful means,” and that any recommendation from the politics and effort to determine the future of Taiwan by foreign relations subcommittee was to move other than peaceful means would be “of grave the law courts from the executive branch concern to the United States.” The TRA (yuan) to the judicial branch, thus further specified that the US would “provide institutionally separating judges from Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” prosecutors and facilitating the move towards adding that “the President and the Congress judicial independence.59 CCK believed legal shall determine the nature and quantity of reform was “not only the foundation for such defense articles and services based realizing democracy, but also the primary solely upon their judgment of the needs of task of political reform.”60 According to Taiwan.”56 Furthermore, in TRA Section 2c, Huang Shao-ku, who chaired the Politics and an assertion stated the United States Foreign Relation Subcommittee and was later maintained an active interest in “the human appointed by CCK as the head of the judicial rights of all the people on Taiwan.”57 With branch, CCK “had made up his mind with Taiwan’s national security hinging on regard to political reform, at least at the time continued support from the United State of the diplomatic break between Washington Congress, CCK stated plainly that “reality and Taipei.”61 Huang said CCK instructed the requires that this time-honored and extremely Politics and Foreign Relation Subcommittee

55 Dialogue with René Viénet of L’Express, January 2, 1979, Perspectives: Selected Statements of President Chiang Ching-kuo, 1978- 1983, (Taiwan ROC: GIO, Sept. 1984), 156. 56 Full text of the TRA in Gibert and Carpenter, ed., 223-229. 57 Ibid., 14. 58 CCK’s statement after establishment of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, February 15, 1979, Perspectives, 136. 59 Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979: ‘Normalcy’ after ‘Normalization,’” Asian Survey, Vol.20, No.1, January 1980, 84-93. 60 CCK’s report as the Premiere to the Legislative Yuan in September 25, 1973, Selection of CCK speech, from 1/73 - 12/73, Central Daily Publishing, vol.2, 69; CCK was also quoted as saying “democracy equals rule of law (fa zhi); democracy and rule of law are the two sides of a coin; there will be no democracy without rule of law,” in Huang Shao-ku’s urology of CCK included in Jiang Zongtong Jingguao xian sheng ai si lu, 378. 61 Huang Shao-ku’s eulogy of CCK included in Jiang Zongtong Jingguao xian sheng ai si lu, 378.

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to study many reform proposals. “Some of demands to the streets, leading to a violent Greater China them, such as the separation of judges from clash with the police at Kaohsiung in 1979, prosecutors, the expansion of central known as the Formosa Incident. Under legislative organs, were implemented right pressure from the party’s conservatives, CCK away while others were subject to appropriate ordered the arrest of most leaders of the circumstance before putting into effect,” radical Formosa Group and banned the according to Huang. CCK was convinced that magazine. To mitigate the adverse impact of “Democracy must be cultivated and not the Kaohsiung incident on Taiwan’s public transplanted and that democracy must be image, particularly amidst the US Congress’s adapted to our own national environment so it debate on the Taiwan Relation Act, CCK can strike root in our own soil.”62 In May decided to make public the military trial of 1980, a more liberal election law was the jailed Formosa leaders in 1979. Taiwan’s promulgated, followed by an election in opposition forces would soon link up with December that allowed an unprecedented overseas Taiwanese organizations, such as number of seats in the legislative organs to be the Formosa Association for Public Affairs filled. The increase meant that the legislative (FAPA), who were actively involved in bodies were at least coming closer to being lobbying congressional support for Taiwan’s truly representative. independence movement. By joining forces, Taiwan’s Taiwan’s Opposition “ TAIWAN’S DIPLOMATIC SET- opposition found an arena Movement BACKS HAD MOBILIZED THE (the US Congress) through Meanwhile, non-party ISLAND’S YOUNG INTELLEC- which the KMT regime opposition led mainly by TUAL ELITES TO RECONSIDER could be indirectly THEIR ROLE IN DETERMINING young, well-educated influenced.63 In 1984, the TAIWAN’S FUTURE. Taiwanese elites had gained opposition in Taiwan strength as a result of CCK’s ” formally established an political liberalization in the 1970s. Taiwan’s organization called the Association for Public diplomatic setbacks had mobilized the Policy (APP) to coordinate a political agenda island’s young intellectual elites to reconsider for democratic reform among the various their role in determining Taiwan’s future. opposition factions. The APP advocated the They became increasingly dissatisfied with principle of self-determination, meaning that CCK’s slow pace of political reform, the future of Taiwan could only be particularly with regard to the martial law that determined by the people in Taiwan without had been in effect on the island since 1949, any outside pressure or threats.64 While and the legislative organs that had not faced publicly threatening to ban the group, the reelection since 1947. The Chungli riot during regime encouraged bargaining and dialogue the 1977 local election marked the beginning through unofficial channels, namely a small of violent confrontation between Taiwanese independent group of liberal professors.65 By opposition and the KMT. The more radical the early 1980s, Taiwan’s opposition opposition leaders called the Formosa Group movement had emerged as a formidable (FG) began to mobilize support and took their political force, and CCK made it known that

62 Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979, Ibid. Perspectives, 28. 63 Tun-Jen Cheng, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” World Politics, Vol.41, No.4, (Jul., 1989), 487-488. 64 The definition of “self-determination” was taken from the FAPA website. 65 Tun-jen Cheng, 488-489.

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38 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan he was “personally pushing for a policy of and economic system.67 In September 1981, dialogue.”66 National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairman The new non-governmental relationship Ye Jianying gave a formal nine-point between the United States and Taiwan proposal for peace talks between the CCP and implied that both Beijing and Taipei had the KMT (rather than between the two Greater China accepted a de facto one China, one Taiwan governments) on a reciprocal basis, preceded arrangement. Faced with the new political by informal discussions and exchanges.68 A reality, CCK now perceived political reform month later, at a rally on the eve of the 70th as the only viable means of strengthening anniversary of the 1911 revolution led by the Taiwan’s position against the PRC and KMT, CCP chief Hu Yaobang personally retaining US support, especially in light of offered to meet with CCK to discuss growing congressional support for Taiwan’s reunification. In July 1982, Liao Chengzhi, a opposition movement. prominent official with family ties to the Chiang family, wrote a letter to CCK offering Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Reunification special treatment for the KMT involving Campaign coexistence and mutual supervision between Meanwhile in China, Deng Xiaoping the two parties as they cooperated in building reemerged as the paramount leader of the China. In December 1982, the NPC adopted a CCP. His economic reforms and open door new State Constitution to “establish special policy would soon capture the world’s administrative regions (SAR),” the legal attention. Abroad, Deng was elected “Man of framework for Deng’s one country, two the Year” by Time magazine in January 1979, systems formula of reunification with Taiwan and his six-day whirlwind tour of the United and Hong Kong. The SARs were guaranteed States captivated the American public. At a high degree of autonomy, including control home, Deng’s pragmatic reform policy would over their existing economic, political, social soon lift millions of Chinese out of poverty and judicial systems. and put China on the path to modernization. The PRC’s peaceful reunification Meanwhile, the PRC stepped up its reunifica- campaign had serious implications for US tion campaign soon after it normalized arms sales to Taiwan. As stated by John H. relations with the United States. On January Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asian 1, 1979, the PRC announced the cessation of and Pacific Affairs, “China’s peaceful policy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bombard- bore directly on the defense needs of Taiwan. ment of offshore islands, and asked for So long as that policy continued, the threat to contacts and exchanges to begin. It promised Taiwan would be greatly diminished.”69 In to respect the status quo on Taiwan so as not January 1982, the Reagan administration to cause any injury to the people of Taiwan. decided not to sell the advanced FX fighter jet During the same year, Deng Xiaoping on to Taiwan for fear of jeopardizing Sino- various occasions suggested that Taiwan American relations; the PRC had threatened could maintain autonomy and its own armed to downgrade relations if the arms sales issue forces as well as its present capitalist social was not resolved satisfactorily. In its

66 Taylor, 348, based on interview with Fred Chien and AIT Taipei, cable 03836, Oct.23, 1979. 67 US State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, China: Important statement on Taiwan reunification since normalization of US-China relations: a chronology, September 19, 1985; included in China and the United States: From Hostility to Engagement, 1960 - 1998. 68 Gibert and Carpenter, ed., 228 - 290. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report; Full text of Yeh’s nine-point proposal and Taiwan’s point-to-point response is included. 69 Ibid., 310. Statement by John Holdridge before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 18, 1982. Volume 5 | Number 1 | Winter 2005 SJEAA_042005_all 4/20/05 8:53 AM Page 39

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explanation of the decision, the State considered the option of developing nuclear Greater China Department concluded that “...no sale of weapons, CCK stated that Taiwan had the advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan is capability to produce nuclear bombs, but required because no military need for such would never use it against Chinese on the aircraft exists.”70 In his letter to Deng in May mainland.74 With regard to negotiating with 1982, President Reagan stated: “we fully the PRC, CCK continued to reject China’s recognize the significance of the nine-point call for peace talks, which he insisted was proposal of September 30, 1981.”71 In a simply “a united front conspiracy for separate letter, Reagan told the PRC Premier swallowing up Taiwan.”75 To combat Deng’s Zhao Ziyang, “we expect that in the context increasingly aggressive reunification of progress toward a peaceful solution [of the campaign, CCK called for Beijing to begin Taiwan-mainland issue], there would by “learning from Taipei in politics.”76 In naturally be a decrease in the need for arms 1981, CCK relayed his four-point program to by Taiwan.”72 In the joint communiqué signed James R. Lilley, the new AIT director, by Washington and Beijing on August 17, through a private envoy: democratization, 1982, the Chinese government reiterated its including comprehensive elections; fundamental policy of pursuing peaceful Taiwanization Ð the days of mainlander means to resolve the Taiwan issue; the United control were coming to an end, and States, having in mind China’s peaceful Taiwanese must take an increasingly policy and the consequent reduction in the prominent role; continued economic military threat to Taiwan, stated that the US prosperity, which was key to achieving arms sales to Taiwan “will not exceed, either democratization and Taiwanization; and in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the finally, the development of working relations level of those supplied in recent years since with China.77 Premier Y. S. Sun stated the establishment of diplomatic relations publicly in February 1983 that “. . . If the between the United States and China, and that political, economic, social and cultural gaps it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms between the Chinese mainland and free to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a China continue to narrow, the conditions for final resolution.”73 peaceful reunification can gradually Reassured by President Reagan’s mature.”78 In May, CCK told Wulf Küster of personal commitment, however, CCK Der Spiegel that Taiwan’s success “in continued his policy of patience and restraint implementing democracy and in pursuing toward the United States while instructing economic development has enabled the Hao Pei-ts’un to step up Taiwan’s weapons people as a whole to enjoy the blessings of development programs. When asked by freedom, progress and prosperity in Taiwan. foreign media whether Taiwan had All Chinese have therefore pinned their

70 Ibid., 293. State Department statement on no sale of advanced fighter aircraft to Taiwan. 71 Ibid., 296. Letter from President Regan to Deng Xiao-ping, July 4, 1982. 72 Ibid., 297. Letter from President Regan to Zhao Ziyang, April 5, 1982. 73 Ibid., 312-314. US-China Joint Communiqué, August 17, 1982, paragraph 6, full text of the Communiqué. 74 CCK’s interview with Larry Rohter, Newsweek, November 1, 1982; also interview with Wulf Küster of Der Spiegel, May 16, 1983, Perspectives, 48. 75 “Answers to Questions Raised by Edward Neilan, Assistant Foreign Editor of Washington Times,” December 19, 1982, Perspectives, 224. 76 CCK’s interview with Evan Galbraith on June 15, 1980, Perspectives, 200. 77 Taylor, 370, based on interview with James Lilley. 78 Ibid., 373. Quote from David Jenkins, FEER, Feb. 10, 1983, 31.

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40 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan hopes on Free China.”79 The development in matter that revealed details of extensive the mainland had convinced CCK that surveillance of Chinese in the United States “China would have a great future” if Taiwan by KMT agents. The committee warned the and the mainland could reunite under a Taiwan authorities that intimidation of people democratic political framework.80 from Taiwan in the United States by the KMT Greater China On September 26, 1984, the PRC and agents could result in restriction of arms sales Britain reached a settlement on Hong Kong to Taiwan.83 In October 1984, Henry Liu, a under Deng’s one country, two systems mainland-born, Taiwan-educated US citizen formula. During their meeting, Deng asked who had written a rather unflattering British Prime Minister Thatcher to pass a biography of CCK, was shot to death in his message to President Reagan asking that the garage in Daly City, near San Francisco. It Americans “do something” to promote was later revealed that Taiwan’s Intelligence contact between Taiwan and the mainland.81 Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense On January 19, 1985, Deng stated that now (IBMND) was involved in arranging Liu’s that agreement had been reached on Hong murder without CCK’s knowledge. With Kong, “our next step is to solve the Taiwan strong evidence from the FBI implicating problem. Our terms are more than generous: Wang Hsi-ling, the head of IBMND, as Taiwan can retain its army.”82 CCK was now personally directing the murder, CCK ordered racing against time to complete his political the dismissal of Wang and his two associates reform, knowing fully that Taiwan could not and their trial by military court for Liu’s compete with China for economic power in murder. CCK was clearly disturbed by the the long run. IBMND’s involvement in the case. CCK was primarily concerned about the potential The Final Push for Democracy impact of Liu’s case on US arms sales to Domestic Scandals and Setbacks Taiwan, especially on the sale of the much Meanwhile, the regime suffered a series desired advanced fighter plane promised by of scandals that seriously tarnished the President Reagan.84 During the FBI’s KMT’s image abroad as well as at home. In investigation of Liu’s case, the House February 1980, the family of Lin Yi-hsiung, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs one of the eight Kaohsiung defendants, was held a hearing to determine whether this act brutally murdered. The case was never of terrorism in America warranted the solved. In July 1981, Ch’en Wen-cheng, a suspension of arms sales to Taiwan.85 The Chinese scholar at the Carnegie-Mellon Washington Post described the Taiwan Institute in Pittsburgh, was found dead in government as “a favored friend acting like a Taipei after a lengthy interrogation by thug.”86 CCK was compelled to permit FBI security police. The US House of agents to come to Taipei to interview the Representatives Subcommittee for East Asia accused gang members, and eventually and Pacific Affairs held hearings on this approve their request to interview Admiral

79 Interview with Wulf Küster of Der Spiegel, May 16, 1983, Perspectives, 230-231. 80 Taylor, 384, interview with Yu Chi-chung on March 9, 1998. 81 Martin L. Lasater, US Interests in the New Taiwan, 22, quoted in Jay Taylor, 384. 82 State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research Report, 5. 83 Ralph N. Clough, “Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Policies,” Shao-Chuan Leng, ed., Chiang Ching-kuo’s Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan (University Press of America, 1993), 386-388. 84 Hao Pei-ts’un Diary, 214; also Jay Taylor, 389. 85 Taylor, 388. 86 Taylor, 389.

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Wang Hsi-ling, to whom they administered a CCK’s Political Breakthrough Greater China polygraph test. While the scandals of the In February 1985, CCK appointed Ma early 1980s did not seriously damage Taiwan- Shu-li Secretary General of the party, and US relations, they had a profound impact on told Ma that he was determined to implement the dynamics of domestic politics. The a full range of democratic reforms over the revelation of government involvement in the next year or two.87 In an interview with Time Liu case, and most likely the Lin and Ch’en magazine published in September 1985, cases as well, caused many people to question CCK stated that the Republic of China was a the integrity of the KMT as a ruling party. constitutional democracy, and as president, How could people trust a regime that relied he intended to safeguard the constitution and on criminal gangs to terrorize their enemies? to maintain democracy and the rule of law. As The regime’s image was further tarnished by to the succession to the presidency by a the collapse of the Tenth Credit Cooperative, member of the Chiang family, CCK said “I Taiwan’s largest savings and loan institution, had never given any consideration to it.”88 In and its sister investment outfit, Cathay his address to the National Assembly on the Investment & Trust Co. in 1985. The case Constitution Day the same year (December involved almost US $200 million in illegal 25, 1985), CCK stated unambiguously that a loans, and a number of high ranking successor to the President would be produced government officials were implicated in the according to the constitution, and members case. While the scandals prompted CCK to of the Chiang family “could not and would take measures to revamp the intelligence and not” (pu-neng ye pu-hui) run for president. financial systems, they also severely Furthermore, CCK declared that the ROC undermined public confidence in the regime. “could not and would not” have military rule.89 At the KMT’s third plenum in March China in 1985 1986, CCK announced that a new political Spurred by Deng’s pro-market reforms, reform committee of 24 people, divided into China’s economy was overheating and two task forces of 12 each, would study three inflationary pressures were mounting; major issues: the ending of martial law; corruption among party officials and parliamentary reform; and the legalization of bureaucrats, particularly by children of high- opposition parties. According to James ranking party leaders, was rampant. A rising Soong, CCK seemed determined to achieve tide of resentment over economic abuses had political breakthrough after the party’s third led to mass protests and demonstrations by plenum. “He (CCK) seemed rather anxious students and workers in the cities. For the first and precise,” said Soong.90 Moreover, Ma time, one could hear Chinese openly criticize Ying-jeou, CCK’s English-language Deng’s reform policies. As China began to secretary, suggested that the Henry Liu transform itself economically and politically scandal and the collapse of the Tenth Credit under Deng’s reform policies, CCK realized Cooperative contributed directly to CCK’s it was time to act decisively to achieve a decision to hold the party’s third plenum in political breakthrough. March 1986. “While ‘reform’ was not

87 Taylor, 396, interview with Ma Shu-li. 88 Time, Sept 16, 1985, 46. 89 Taylor, 399; Hao Pei-ts’un Diary, 285. 90 Interview with James Soong, Hsin hsin-wen (HHW), January 2-8, 1989, 17.

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42 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan explicitly declared, it was the substance of the this very well.” third plenum, and everyone in the party knew In July 1987, CCK appointed his old that,” said Ma. On September 28, 1986, the confidant Lee Huan as the new party’s opposition members formally announced the secretary. CCK told Lee Huan he had three establishment of its own party, the goals he would like him to fulfill:95 96 to Greater China Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When reform the party; to move towards informed of the news, CCK called a meeting democracy; and to move towards of the core group of senior officials and told reunification. Taiwan had been separated them “times are changing; the environment is from the mainland for more than forty years; changing and the tide is also changing.”91 In CCK felt that Taiwan now had the ability and October, CCK announced his intention to lift strength to effect China’s reunification.97 the martial law during an interview with CCK told Lee “We have to take initiatives to Katherine Graham of the Washington Post. put us on the road to reunification,” adding CCK said that a longstanding desire to that “Taiwan and the mainland must democratize as well as improve economic eventually unify. If they do not, Taiwan will conditions on Taiwan had led to the decision find it harder and harder to exist to end the decrees.92 CCK also told Graham independently.”98 In September, Lee Huan that the KMT was studying addressed the KMT’s the question of legalizing Kaohsiung headquarters, and new political parties “very “ TAIWAN HAD BEEN SEPARAT- declared that the party’s goal vigorously” and expected to ED FROM THE MAINLAND FOR of retaking the mainland was come to a conclusion “very MORE THAN FORTY YEARS; no longer to replace the soon.”93 When asked CCK FELT THAT TAIWAN NOW communist party, but to push whether CCK’s decision to HAD THE ABILITY AND for “democracy, freedom of lift the martial law was the STRENGTH TO EFFECT press, and an open economy CHINA’S REUNIFICATION. result of pressure from in the mainland so as to rid international public opinion, ” China of Communism and to Ma Ying-jeou said CCK felt “the conditions move it toward a democratic modern state.”99 at home had ripe[ned], and the strengthening Lee argued that democracy meant people of democracy was an important part to should be allowed to choose which improve Taiwan’s international image and to government they want, and “the KMT would entice Chinese on the mainland.”94 Ma said be violating the principle of democracy and “we talked about learning from Taipei in would not have the support from Chinese if it politics, and yet what did we expect the simply insisted on replacing the Communist mainland to learn from us? If our democracy Party.” While Lee Huan’s speech was remained on a shaky ground, we certainly did criticized by the party’s right wing as not mean to suggest that they learn from our betraying the party’s historic commitment to martial law experience, and CCK understood destroy the communists, it had the support of

91 Taylor, 406; interview with Ma Ying-jeou, HHW, January 2-8, 1989, 17. 92 Chiang Ching-kuo interview with Katharine Graham, Washington Post, Oct 7, 1986, A18. 93 Ibid. 94 Interview with Ma Ying-jeou, 28. 95 Lin Yin-ting, 247. 96 Ibid., 247. 97 Ibid., 247. 98 Taylor, 414, based on his interview with Lee Huan. 99 Lin Yin-ting, 251.

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the CCK who instructed Lee to have his election to add another 119 new seats to the China speech published in its entirety in the party’s legislative bodies was another symbolic step official journal. Lee Huan’s democratic view CCK took “to liberalize the pattern of of China’s future clearly reflected CCK’s representative government.” It was, in CCK’s political thinking during the time the reform own words, “a major step toward realizing decisions were made. our goal of constitutional democracy.” On July 15, 1987, martial law was CCK’s tolerance for unprecedented criticism formally lifted. On November 2, the during the election was a good indicator of government opened up legal travel, mainly his changing views. CCK felt strongly that in family visits, to the mainland; on January 1, Taiwan’s difficult diplomatic circumstances, 1988, bans related to the organization of his regime “must begin with political reform political parties and the freedom of the press in order to bring about the overall reform were lifted. Taiwan was on its way to a true necessary to build a strong and incorruptible democracy. Twelve days later, on January 13, government.”100 CCK’s effort to Taiwanize CCK passed away. the regime became more evident after Taiwan lost its seat in the United Nations, suggesting Conclusion that the GRC’s dwindling foreign relations From enforcer of the White Terror to may have impressed upon CCK the urgency benevolent political reformer, CCK had of making political concessions. As CCK demonstrated extraordinary adaptability to stated in June 1972 during the inaugural political reality. The first political realization ceremony of Taiwan’s first Taiwanese for CCK came during the 1958 Battle of governor, “To make greater strides in Quemoy when he realized return to China developing Taiwan today, we must strengthen could only be achieved through political our democratic political system to ensure that means, namely the implementation of Dr. Sun everyone in Taiwan enjoys a freer and more Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles” as prosperous life in marked contrast to the stated by his father, Chiang Kai-shek in the miserable life under the Communist October 24, 1958 joint communiqué. regime.”101 CCK now perceived a more However, so long as the United States democratic system as not only beneficial to remained a strong ally and the KMT his party, but necessary to secure his regime’s leadership was confident in Taiwan’s security, long-term survival. CCK showed no sign of loosening up its The final push for CCK’s break from the control over the island’s dissidents. CCK’s KMT’s authoritarian past came when the tough position against Lei Chen in 1960 was United States announced the normalization of a strong indicator of his attitude toward a relations with the PRC, and severed its democratic system at the time. relations with Taiwan in 1978. With Taiwan’s The second turning point for CCK’s security hinged upon continued support from political learning came when the ROC was the US Congress, CCK stated plainly that expelled from the United Nations, forcing “reality requires that . . . we swallow the CCK to confront the regime’s legitimacy bitter and handle the situation with all the crisis head on. The 1972 supplementary fortitude at our command.”102 CCK wasted no

100 See note 35. 101 See note 41. 102 See note 64.

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44 Taiwan’s Geopolitics and Chiang Ching-Kuo’s Decision to Democratize Taiwan time in laying the ground work for his are changing; the environment is changing democratic reform agenda. Less than a week and the tide is also changing,” after learning after President Carter’s normalization that Taiwan’s opposition had formally announcement, CCK instructed the party’s announced the establishment of its own party, CSC to establish a work committee to study the DPP. Clearly, Taiwan’s changing Greater China various areas for reform. His pragmatic geopolitics had shaped CCK’s view on reform program during this time, including Taiwan’s democratic future. legal reform, a more liberal election law, and While CCK revealed very little of his allowing unprecedented number of new seats political thinking in public or to his close in the legislative organs to be filled by associates during his nineteen years reign election in 1980, suggested that CCK had since he assumed the vice-premiership in made up his mind toward a democratic 1969, evidence presented here suggests a system based on rule of law and a true strong linkage between Taiwan’s geopolitics representative legislative body. CCK was and CCK’s changing attitude from hard to convinced then that Taiwan must pursue a soft authoritarian and eventually leading to democratic path in order to remain viable as Taiwan’s democratization. Confronted with an independent political entity. The final the task of his regime’s survival, CCK took settlement reached between the PRC and additional steps to liberalize the political Britain on Hong Kong’s return to China, system each time Taiwan suffered a major compounded by a stream of domestic diplomatic setback. Taiwan’s changing scandals that seriously tarnished the KMT’s geopolitical circumstance had forced CCK image abroad and at home, would compel time and again to adapt to harsh political CCK to achieve political breakthrough in reality by broadening political participation order to rejuvenate his party and to by Taiwanese. His strategy of developing a strengthen Taiwan’s bargaining position with freer and more prosperous Taiwan was the the PRC. As CCK confided to Lee Huan in only viable means to secure Taiwan’s foreign 1987 “we have to take initiatives to put us on relations in light of China’s aggressive effort the road to reunification.” Otherwise, Taiwan to isolate Taiwan internationally. Knowing would find it “harder and harder to exist fully that Taiwan could not hope to compete independently.”103 CCK’s sense of urgency with China for power under Deng’s reform during and after the party’s third plenum in and open door policy, CCK opted for a March 1986 was a clear indication that he democratic alternative to entice Chinese on was determined to move forward with the mainland to overthrow the communist democratization. CCK’s political thinking regime. As CCK often said, “Small nations during the time his democratic reform have to adjust to international geopolitical decision was made was best captured by his circumstances and protect themselves the philosophical remarks on September 28, best they can.”104 1986 when he told his senior staff that “times

103 See note 93. 104 Cline, 124.

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Diana Fu 45 Greater China China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity: A Study on the Portrayal of Sexual Harassment in Chinese Media

Diana Fu

Introduction Beginning in the 1990s, Chinese mass In October of 1949, Mao Zedong led the media including newspapers, films, Red Army into Beijing, founded the All- magazine, journal articles, and television, China Women’s Federation, established a began inundating the Chinese public with constitution that promised to protect the rights stories of sexual harassment. Daily, national and interests of women, unbound women’s newspapers publicized the status of the feet, and trained them to Capital’s first sexual become party cadres so they harassment lawsuit, law “ …IT IS PERPLEXING THAT could “hold up half the sky.” THE CHINESE MEDIA OFTEN experts’ debates, and the Almost half a century later, FRAMES SEXUAL HARASS- possibility of a counter- the muddy, cloudless sky that MENT WITH RIGHTS-BASED sexual harassment law. This domes Beijing is still in RHETORIC DESPITE CHINA’S deluge of reporting is place, but the women who FIRM DODGING AND EXPLICIT interesting for several struggle to hold up their REJECTION OF WHAT IS reasons. First, the Chinese share of it need to hurdle an REGARDED AS A WESTERN- term for sexual harassment, additional bar: eating tofu, a IMPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS xing sao rao, is a foreign Chinese colloquial term WATCH. notion that was transported which refers to sexual ” into China only in the early harassment. Having passed the 1992 Law of 1990s, contemporaneous with the flourishing the PRC on the Protection of Rights and of Deng Xiaoping’s open reforms and Interests of Women, launched the 1995 to China’s emergence onto the world stage. 2000 Program for the Development of Second, the Chinese government and media Chinese Women, and held the 1995 UN devotes overwhelming attention to sexual Convention on Women’s Rights in Beijing, harassment while the country is plagued with the Chinese government seems determined to other atrocious social ills such as the project an all-new image of China as not only trafficking of women, infanticide, widespread a burgeoning global economic power, but also poverty, enormous income disparity, and as a modern socialist nation that is undergoing terrorism in the northern provinces. Third, it tidal periods of rights-based social reform, the is perplexing that the Chinese media often most exceptional of which is women’s rights. frames sexual harassment with rights-based Within this broad umbrella, the government rhetoric despite China’s firm dodging and has most recently turned its attention to explicit rejection of what is regarded as a cracking down on sexual harassment. Western-imposed human rights watch.

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46 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity Finally, news coverage of sexual harassment China Women’s Movement, and Society. In almost exclusively revolves around urban, analyzing Chinese news and journal articles, professional women, thereby marginalizing I was primarily interested in the origin of the an entire section of the working population: term, xing sao rao, the legal standing of migrant female workers who are arguably the sexual harassment, recent cases, statistics on Greater China most defenseless and disadvantaged sexual its prevalence, government measures, the harassment victims. In other words, it is official attitude, references to sexual ironic that the Chinese government should harassment abroad, linkages to rhetoric of choose to focus on combating sexual harass- modernity/development, and both expert and ment. This irony, in turn, makes it worthy to public opinions. question exactly which social, economic, and One limitation to this methodology is that political factors push the Chinese government its reliance on the written media in combina- to address sexual harassment, as well as its tion with some published statistics on sexual implications for the Communist party. harassment in China in order to draw the Through analyzing numerous Chinese factors and implications of the Chinese newspaper sources, academic journal articles, government’s crackdown on sexual harass- and magazines articles, I argue that the ment. The most direct method would be to Chinese government is launching a serious, conduct statistical analysis on the prevalence wide-scale campaign against sexual of sexual harassment before and after the harassment to secure international government implemented its counter-sexual recognition for its modern rights reforms, harassment measures, and to compare it with trumpet women’s rights as a socialist the Chinese government’s published results in achievement, and strike at a pervasive social order to see if there is a gap between what is ill which not only threatens the national actually happening and what the government economy but also permits transnational reports is happening. However, my primary companies operating in China to take goal in this paper is not to study the effective- advantage of a gap in Chinese law. ness of the government’s counter-sexual harassment measures (partly because the Methodology People’s Congress is still in the process of In conducting this research, I have drafting a counter-sexual harassment bill), but translated and analyzed over eighty Chinese to deduce some possible motivations behind language newspaper articles from a wide the Chinese government’s actions through variety of sources including The People’s analyzing the factors that push it to pay Daily, Xinhua News, the Beijing Youth Daily, overwhelming attention to sexual harassment. China Economic Times, The Southern Daily, In looking for these factors in newspaper Xing Xi Shi Bao, Business Times, Youth articles, a clear link between the Chinese Reference (Qing Nian Can Kao), New Fast media and the Chinese government needs to News (Xing Quai Bao), The China Youth be established. Daily, The China Morning Post, Life Times (Shen Huo Shi Bao), Xingming Evening The Chinese Media: From Propaganda News, Sichuan Huaxi Du Shi Bao, and the Machine to a State-Market Complex Zhengzhou Evening News, in addition to In any transitioning state, the media plays numerous Chinese language academic and an important role because it is both a mirror magazine journal articles from journals such reflecting society and a channel guiding the as the Women’s Research Periodicals, the flow of society in a certain direction. Since

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1949, the Chinese media has served as the the Chinese media is hardly free from the Greater China voice of the Communist Party until recently, government’s entanglement. when the government’s withdrawal of state Mass media coverage of sexual harass- subsidies has forced the press to ment began in the early 1990s but did not commercialize.1 Although this commercial- provoke a nationwide sensation until China’s ization unleashed a relatively decentralized first sexual harassment lawsuit in July of forum for entertaining, educating, and 2001, in which a female worker, Ms. Tong, informing the masses, the state still maintains lost her case against her boss on grounds of a strong censorship of any news that affects insufficient evidence.6 According to a 2002 the party’s image. For instance, in 1996, the newspaper article in Xinhua News, “The government launched a Legal Awareness Internet, television stations reported this Campaign in which it used various media, incident in the most prominent sections, such as radio, television, and newspapers, to declaring that ‘China’s first case of sexual publicize the Ten Basic Laws of the People’s harassment has surfaced’. . .All of a sudden, Republic of China, which included the 1992 the sexual harassment lawsuit became a street Law Safeguarding Women’s Rights and topic. . .”7 Since then, sexual harassment Interests.2 In 1994, the Informational Office stories have deluged the nation’s newspapers, of the State Council of the People’s Republic with at least four or five new articles daily of China explicitly stated that mass media and appearing on the Xinhua News Agency research institutes “play an important role in website. Although it is not known exactly safeguarding the rights and interests and how these stories get into the Chinese media, promoting the advancement of women.”3 a common trend emerged in numerous Thus, the Chinese media is still obligated to articles: the news agency receives phone calls be in tune with the Chinese government’s or reader letters and then dispatches journal- agenda. The dual role of the media as both an ists to investigate scenes where the alleged ideological apparatus and a commodity has sexual harassment took place and also been termed the “state-market complex,” interview the victims. Although these types of which “works in and through the media to reporting demonstrate that the government form a contingent and shifting alliance for does not directly handpick particular sexual winning popular support.”4 In the end, semi- harassment incidents that the media covers, commercialization does not amount to the very fact that the government allows so freedom of the press but a transference of the many sexual harassment articles to appear in media into the hands of the wealthy and print implies a form of media guidance. In powerful, which, in China, are the same party other words, because the Chinese press is members, journalists, and businessmen who semi-market controlled, the Chinese govern- are supposed to regulate the media.5 In short, ment still has power (as demonstrated in the

1 Kit-Mai Eric Ma, “Rethinking Media Studies: The Case of China,” in James Curran and Myung-Jin Park, ed. De-Westernizing Media Studies (London: Routledge, 2000), 21. 2 “Comments On: the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests,” Women’s International Network (Winter 1993, v19 n1, p. 53 [1]), 1. 3 State Council Information Office, June 1994 Report on the Situation of Chinese Women, . 4 Ma, 28. 5 Ibid., 27-29. 6 Mao Haifeng and Li Liang, “China’s First Case of Sexual Harassment: Quan Chen Hui Fang,” trans. Diana Fu, , 1. 7 Ibid., 1-3.

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48 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity media campaigns mentioned above) to steer company called Fang Zhen Ao De. Ms. Lei media coverage in a certain direction by Man was not China’s first tofu to turn sour.9 making sexual harassment trials public, Two years ago, Ms. Tong of Xi’an, located in releasing state-directed television series about Hebei province, lit the spark on a nationwide sexual harassment, funding social scientists Greater China debate about sexual harassment when she who then publicly discuss sexual harassment, filed China’s first sexual harassment lawsuit and allowing state officials to talk about the against her manager. On October 24th, 2001, drafting of a counter-sexual harassment bill. the Xian City Lian Hu District Court ruled All of these activities provoke mass media’s against Ms. Tong on the grounds of insuffi- attention and coverage. Here, I am not cient evidence. Of the four other publicized suggesting a vast conspiracy on the part of the sexual harassment lawsuits since Ms. Tong, Chinese government, but only that these are only two were successful, and in both cases, some of the ways through which any govern- the plaintiffs had provided overwhelming ment can influence media coverage. In a one physical evidence such as cassette tapes and party system like China’s, the effects of this documents of reprimand. In all five cases, influence or steering are greatly magnified female plaintiffs suffered enormous social because there is no opposition party vying for pressure, as embodied by the popular saying, media control. Thus, in this paper, I make the “The fly never lands on the un-cracked egg.” assumption that the Chinese media is an ade- Xing sao rao, the Chinese term for sexual quate, although not perfect, medium through harassment, was transplanted from the West which one can construe government attitudes, in the early 1990s. It is not clear how or why public opinion, official actions, legal issues, the term transferred to China, and most and various other factors surrounding sexual Chinese academics credit the radical harassment. With this understanding, one can American feminist, Catherine MacKinnon, now look at how the term xing sao rao with coining the English term in the 1970s.10 penetrated China. However, despite the entry of this Western The Origin and Evolution of Xing Sao term, China lacks a legal definition of sexual Rao in China: Tofu Turned Sour harassment. Because of this, a myriad of “Beautiful women really are like tofu in definitions has emerged, almost all of them many respects: white skin, shinning smooth borrowing the ideas of gender discrimination yet also elastic, delicate souls, gentle as and unequal power relations. In the meantime, jade...and now, one Beijing Tofu is angry. . .” sexual harassment runs rampant in China, writes a man in a June 2003 column for with numbers matching those from the United Xinghua News, one of China’s largest news States, France, Belgium, and Eastern Europe. portals.8 This “Beijing Tofu” is Ms. Lei Man, A 2002 article in the Information Times (Xing a twenty-five year old college graduate who Xi Shi Bao) reports that 50 percent of China’s recently filed Beijing’s first sexual harass- sexual harassment occurs in the workplace, ment lawsuit, for 200,000 yuan, against her with 36 percent coming from superior and 14 employer, Mr. Jiao, at a computer technology percent from co-workers (Expert 1).11 A study

8 David, “Sexual Harassment: Bribery or Swindle?” trans. Diana Fu, . 9 Mao Haifeng and Li Liang, 1. 10 Zhong Chun, “Present Situation of Sexual Harassment and Countermeasure in Law,” trans. Diana Fu (Journal of Radio and T.V. University, No. 1, 2003 [sum no. 124], Chinese Academic Database), 92. 11 Zhou He, ed., “Expert: Amendment Addressing Sexual Harassment Should Be Attached to the Law on the Protection and Interest of Women,” trans. Diana Fu. Xing Xi Shi Bao, June 7, 2003, .

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done by sexual harassment expert Tang Can after China’s open reforms, which began in Greater China revealed that 84 percent of 186 women the early 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. In a reported having been sexually harassed, and Chinese academic article titled, “Workplace 90 percent have known of a woman who was Sexual Harassment and Precautions,” sexually harassed.12 Although these figures researcher Guo Huiming argues, “In our appear atrocious enough to draw any country, due to economic reforms, conceptual government’s attention, I am interested in the openings, and the sudden, multi-faceted underlying dynamics that push these figures change in workplace organizational structure to the surface, allowing sexual harassment to in combination with the flood of unmarried be widely publicized in Chinese media, women into the work force, sexual harass- discussed in televised debates, and written ment has been on the rise. . .”13 In a 2002 about in academic journals. In the following newspaper article titled, “Unable to Tolerate sections, I expound on the three central her Superior’s Sexual Harassment, Hubei factors that lie behind the Chinese Teacher Goes to Court in Anger,” a journalist government’s crackdown on sexual writes, “They [Chinese law experts] believe harassment in conjunction with their that as society develops, men and women will implications for the Communist Party. interact more and more, and the term xing sao rao will appear more Casting An Image of the 14 “ BY LEAVING OUT SEXUAL frequently.” Researcher Modern China to the HARASSMENT DURING THE Tang Can also writes, “Since International Audience MAO ERA, THE CHINESE MEDIA china’s open reforms are One of the primary EFFECTIVELY IMPLIES THAT contingent with economic, underlying motivations SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS AN structural changes, these propelling the government’s APPENDAGE TO SOCIO- types of behaviors [sexual recent crackdown is that ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT harassment] have risen sexual harassment is a global ” dramatically.”15 While corre- problem which, if handled appropriately, can lating sexual harassment with China’s serve as the perfect leverage for the socioeconomic development may seem government to cast an image of China as a perfectly rational, the piece missing from the socially developed and essentially modern written media is that sexual harassment was country. This is evident through the media’s rampant during the Mao era, before the term juxtaposition of sexual harassment with xing sao rao was even coined. In fact, it is China’s socioeconomic development, the widely known that many Communist cadres citing of other industrial nations’ efforts, and sexually harassed their female counterparts, depicting the modern, professional woman as threatening dismissal if they did not comply. primary victims. By leaving out sexual harassment during the First, an overwhelming number of Mao era, the Chinese media effectively sources suggest that sexual harassment imples that sexual harassment is an emerged as a prevalent social problem only appendage to socioeconomic development

12 Tang Can, “Workplace Sexual Harassment and Preventive Measures,” trans. Diana Fu, Nu Xing Quan Yi, vol. 1 (2002), 43. 13 Guo Huiming, “Workplace Sexual Harassment and Precautions,” trans. Diana Fu, Journal of Northwestern Polytechnical University, March 2003, 48. 14 Teacher 2, “Unable to Tolerate her Superior’s Sexual harassment, Hubei Female Teacher Goes to Court in Anger,” trans. Diana Fu, . 15 Tang, 51.

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50 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity and depicts it as a common social problem in highlighted by mass media’s overwhelming all industrial countries, including China. This depiction of the harassed victim as the latter part of the claim is even more evident “modern Chinese woman” rather than the when one analyzes how often sexual migrant female worker. Although there is no harassment is discussed in the context of an set definition of what it means to be a modern Greater China international problem that China shares with or civilized woman, it can be inferred from many other advanced nations such as the Chinese magazine and newspaper articles United States, France, Belgium, Japan, that the modern Chinese woman or mo dun nu Spain, Denmark, Great Britain, and Canada. lang is an urban professional who, above all, For example, researcher Yang Aiping, in her is confident, courageous, and defiant of the paper, “Counter-Sexual Harassment “three obediences” (namely, to one’s father Measures in China and Abroad,” states, before marriage, to one’s husband after “Anyhow, sexual harassment isn’t restricted marriage, and to one’s son during to China; it is also a prominent problem in the widowhood). Chinese scholar Hai Guanzen international community. Although many suggests that the changing image of the countries such as the United States, Australia, women can be detected in slang terms. For Canada, France, Belgium, and Spain have instance, qun cha, feng dai, e-mei are olden sexual harassment laws, it still has not been day terms for women that all describe stopped. . .”16 In a transcript of an interview women’s physical appearance, whereas with Chinese law experts, the journalist modern terms such as “half the sky,” “Miss begins by asking, “Will Professor Zhang and Public Relations,” and “Airlines Lady” Professor Tan please discuss the situation of emphasize women’s active roles in society.19 sexual harassment in other industrial nations In newspaper articles, an overwhelming and also in China?”17 In a publicized number of female victims are described as interview with several law experts, sexual working women-secretaries, academics, harassment expert Tang Can said, “The teachers, technocrats, recent university problem of obtaining evidence for sexual graduates- who are often called zhi ye nu harassment is not solely a Chinese problem; xing, and who are sexually harassed by their it is an international problem.”18 These male superiors. All of these examples paint a references clearly show that the Chinese very particular image of the sexual government sees its efforts as a part of an harassment victim that is in line with China’s international movement spearheaded by emerging modernity. Specifically, in the industrial nations. Implicit in this framework eighty-some newspaper articles reviewed is that China must be on-par (at least socially) from 2002 to 2003, none mentioned the plight with the United States or other advanced of female workers who flock to the cities for nations if is also cracking down on the scrub work in restaurants and other service modern problem of sexual harassment. sectors, only to be taken advantage of by their The Chinese government’s efforts to link bosses and co-workers. Instead, xing sao rao sexual harassment to modernity is further is almost exclusively an urban affair. For

16 Yang Aiping, “Counter Sexual Harassment Measures in China and Abroad,” trans. Diana Fu, Fujian Jiao Yu Xue Yuan Xue Bao, vol. 7 (2002), 32. 17 Li Shiyong, “The Boundary Between Criminal and Non-Criminal Behavior-Experts Discuss Sexual Harassment,” trans. Diana Fu, Zhong Guo Jian Kang Yue Kan, 11. 18 “Opposites Attract or Violation of Rights? Can the Law Effectively Address Sexual Harassment?” trans. Diana Fu, Beijing Youth Daily, January 22, 2002, . 19 Hai Guanzen, “Discourse on Feminist Rhetoric,” trans. Diana Fu, Journal of Louyang Technology College, vol.10, no. 3 (2000), 37.

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instance, one 2002 article titled, “Definitions women workers are uniquely disadvantaged Greater China of Sexual Harassment and Other Preventive due to the hukou system, which denies the Measures” states, “recently, a female Ph.D floating population permanent residency, so student reported to the court after being that they become a transient source of capital sexually harassed by her advisor. . .”20 In for local economies.22 Indeed, if these another article in the Beijing Youth Daily, migrant workers do not write to the press, titled, “The Pressure and Dignity of Survival: there are other ways to publicize their Professional Women Discuss Sexual situation, such as through academic research. Harassment,” the journalist interviews three Yet most Chinese academic articles victims: a secretary in a Guangzhou addressing sexual harassment hardly mention Company, a real estate agent for a private migrant women workers as a target company, and a marketing representative for population. The Zhu Jiang San Jiao Zhou a pharmaceutical company.21 Ms. He, China’s investigation of female migrant workers in first victorious sexual harassment lawsuit the service industry is an exception. plaintiff, was a schoolteacher in Wuhan; Ms. According to this report, numerous female Lei Man, the plaintiff in Beijing’s first sexual migrant workers have reported being harassment lawsuit, worked at a computer sexually harassed by liumang on the streets technology firm; Ms. Tong, who filed China’s near their workplace, and they see it as first harassment lawsuit, was an office worker workplace sexual harassment. Locals report at a state-owned company in Xian. that these liumang are afraid to harass city Given the Chinese government proposal girls, so they take advantage of female to improve the conditions of all Chinese migrant workers. If it is hard to secure hard- women, it seems perplexing that stories on fact stories about the plight of migrant sexual harassment of migrant workers are workers and sexual harassment, their absent from Chinese mainstream media. Of situations can be illuminated through films or course, one could argue that the absence of televisions series regarding sexual female migrant workers in the Chinese media harassment. Yet China’s most popular state- may stem from the fact that they are often too produced television series, “Women Must uneducated to file sexual harassment Not Remain Silent Any Longer,” only lawsuits, too illiterate to write into the reinforces the image of the sexual harassment newspapers, and too afraid to call hotlines. victim as a young, urban professional. Film While this argument is plausible, it is widely and television are only a few of the ways in known in China that these migrant workers which Chinese media can effectively are the most vulnerable and defenseless publicize the plight of Chinese female victims of sexual harassment and other rights migrant workers.23 abuses. In his article titled, “Migrant Women The fact that there has been little effort Workers and The Emerging Civil Society in on the part of media to publicize sexual China,” author Zhang Ye states that migrant harassment of female migrant workers sheds

20 Xia Yelian, “Definitions of Sexual Harassment and Other Preventive Measures,” trans. Diana Fu, China Economic Times, , 1. 21 An Tung, “The Pressure and Dignity of Survival: Professional Women Discuss Sexual Harassment,” trans. Diana Fu, Beijing Youth Daily, January 18, 2002, 1-5. 22 Zhang Ye, “Migrant Women Workers and The Emerging Civil Society in China,” . 23 “Television Series ‘Females No Longer Remain Silent’ Lacks Rational Psychological Explanation,” trans. Diana Fu, , 1.

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52 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity substantial light onto the Chinese infanticide, sex selection, the floating government’s casting of a modern image to population, and domestic abuse prevail. By the international community. According to linking sexual harassment to other advanced the State Council Information Office of the nations, rights reform rhetoric, and the urban PRC, “The press, radio, and television professional woman, the Chinese government Greater China publicize state laws and regulations establishes China as a modern nation that upholding women’s rights and interests and champions women’s rights, values civilized and progressive views on women”24 international standards, and imposes a strong (emphasis added). From this statement, one legal system. can see that not only does the Chinese government steer the media into “promoting A Message to the West: Trumpeting the advancement of women” but more Women’s Rights as a Socialist importantly, that it seeks to propagate Achievement “civilized and progressive views on women.” If one of the underlying goals of the The latter is significant because migrant Chinese government is to establish China as women workers represent a part of the being in the midst of a modern rights reform, enormous floating population whose very then the implication for the Communist Party existence reflects a layer of social turmoil, involves sending a message to the economic backwardness, and political international community that a socialist instability that can hardly be considered system is not inferior to Western democracies progressive. Thus, it follows that media in the realm of women’s rights. Through the coverage depicting sexual harassment as an examination of Chinese government laws that integral problem to the migrant working address issues relating to women, as well as population would be a direct blow to casting the literature on the 1995 UN Convention on China as a socially developed, industrial Women’s Rights, it can be inferred that sexual nation bent on combating a global social ill. harassment is being portrayed in a serious On the other hand, urban professional women manner by the state, which is using the working in office buildings, schools, Chinese media as a tool to trumpet women’s computer firms, and other businesses and rights as a socialist system’s achievement. By suffering sexual harassment reinforce China’s doing so, the state is sending a message to socioeconomic development, thereby Western powers that China can be a thrusting it onto the same platform as other developed, rights-based country while advanced nations, such as the United States. maintaining a communist leadership. In 1995, Here, I am not suggesting that the primary the Chinese government launched the objective of the Chinese government’s Program for the Development of Chinese crackdown on sexual harassment is to Women, stating, propagate an image of China’s modernity but The development level of women is rather that it is one of many underlying an important yardstick to measure social factors that may motivate the Chinese progress. Over the forty-six years since government to strike especially hard at sexual the founding of the People’s Republic of harassment while many other related China, great achievement has been made problems such as trafficking women, in the cause of Chinese women that

24 State Council Information Office.

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attract world attention . . . the broad democracies do not have a monopoly on Greater China masses of women have actively plunged human rights. This rhetoric of associating themselves into open-and-reform efforts human rights with the socialist system is and the modernization drive and made pronounced in the speeches of government tremendous contributions to economic officials. For example, Chen Muhua, Vice- growth and social progress. All of these Chairwoman of Standing Committee of the have shown the superiority of the NPC, President of All-China Women’s socialist system... Women’s Rights are an Federation and NPC Deputy representing the indispensable part of China’s Liaoning Province, declared, “The approval development and women’s issues have of the Women’s Law shows that China has become the focus of international once again made a stride forward in the attention.25 perfection of a socialist democracy, and its The language of this documents sheds light legal systems, and in paying attention to the on several aspects of the Chinese protection of human rights. . .”26 This rights- government’s motivations. First, the based discourse is also reflected in connection of women’s rights to social newspaper articles addressing sexual progress, modernization, and open-and- harassment, such as when one Chinese law reform efforts reveal how the expert commented, “Sexual Chinese government may harassment violates four WOMEN’S RIGHTS ARE see sexual harassment as a “ basic rights: the right of ESSENTIALLY A CHINESE sub-issue to the ISSUE BECAUSE ITS BIRTH IS one’s physical well-being, advancement of women’s SIMULTANEOUS TO THE the right of one’s rights, which are crucial to BIRTH OF THE COMMUNIST psychological well-being, projecting China as a PARTY IN 1949. the right to good health, and progressive and modern ” the right of personal nation. Second, the freedom. It also violates a connection of women’s rights to international citizen’s basic human rights.” Here, one may attention further reinforces the fact that the question, if the Chinese government is so Chinese government is concerned about concerned about projecting itself as an securing international prestige and world advanced rights-based country, why does it recognition for its social reforms, the most choose to champion women’s rights in recent of which is the crackdown on sexual particular, while neglecting the right of free harassment. Third, by juxtaposing women’s press, the right to religion, or the right to free rights with “the superiority of the socialist assembly? I propose that it is because government,” the Chinese government is, in women’s rights are essentially a Chinese effect, trumpeting women’s rights issue because its birth is simultaneous to the (particularly in dealing with the problem of birth of the Communist Party in 1949. It was sexual harassment) as the ultimate the socialist system that emancipated Chinese achievement of the Communist Party. women from feudal society more than five Essentially, it is sending a message to the decades ago, and the same socialist system international community that Western will liberate them from sexual harassment in

25 “The Program for the Development of Chinese Women,” . 26 “Comments,” 1.

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54 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity 2003. In effect, by dealing with sexual argument that the Chinese government does harassment (or at least giving the impression not intend to model after the West but instead of doing so through the media) and women’s is seeking to frame the sexual harassment rights as part of a larger agenda of human crackdown as a twenty-first century socialist rights as defined by a socialist system, the triumph of women’s rights. Greater China Chinese government is directly challenging the constant bantering of Western Sewing Up Loopholes for Sly democracies on China’s poor human rights Transnational Companies record. Finally, a third and perhaps most Still, one may further ask, isn’t the very immediate factor pushing the Chinese concept of sexual harassment a Western government to address sexual harassment is notion? If so, how can it be rendered a China’s position as an emerging trade capital Chinese socialist achievement? I argue that, of the world. Currently, loopholes in the while the notion of sexual harassment may be Chinese legal system effectively permit borrowed from the West, evidence clearly foreign bosses of transnational companies shows that the Chinese government does not operating in China to sexually harass Chinese intend to mirror the approaches of Western workers without penalty. Both China’s entry countries. Instead, it uses the into the World Trade media to reveal the failures Organization and its [THE GOVERNMENT] USES of US systems in dealing “ emergence as a prominent THE MEDIA TO REVEAL THE international player press the with sexual harassment, FAILURES OF US SYSTEMS IN thereby recreating space for DEALING WITH SEXUAL Chinese government to the eventual socialist HARASSMENT, THEREBY reform its lax legal system to triumph on this issue. For RECREATING SPACE FOR meet world standards. As instance, one article in the THE EVENTUAL SOCIALIST author Zhong Chun, in her China Economic Times TRIUMPH ON THIS ISSUE. journal article, “Present discussed the United States ” Situation of Sexual definition of sexual Harassment and Counter- harassment, while following it up with a Measure Law,” writes, “a lack of regulations recent case at New York State University that regarding sexual harassment after our the government failed to act upon. As a result, country’s entry into the WTO is inconsistent the victim was forced to drop out of school. with the effort to depict China’s image as a In another academic article titled, “Present socialist country with a strong legal system to 28 Situation of Sexual Harassment and the international community.” Countermeasure Law,” the author suggests China’s legal blind spots regarding sexual that although the United States has a zero harassment became apparent ever since tolerance policy for sexual harassment, China’s open reforms unleashed a flourishing sexual harassment still runs rampant, of small, privatized companies, as well as a 27 especially as Internet usage increases. This host of transnational companies that finally pattern of coverage that points out the wedged themselves into the rusted, forbidden failures of the US system in dealing with doors. In 1999, the International Labor sexual harassment further reinforces the Organization did a study on fourteen

27 Zhong, 93. 28 Ibid., 94.

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transnational companies and reported that especially in terms of sexual relations. As a Greater China 100 percent of them had sexual harassment management person in a state-owned policies in place, with 70 percent outlining enterprise commented, “mistakes at one’s specific instructions for paying indemnities to work can be corrected, but one’s moral victims.29 The problem is that once these attitudes are hard to rectify once gone companies set foot in China, they abandon astray.”32 In this system, a cadre accused of these regulations, much to the dismay of sexual harassment may not be legally many Chinese workers. As one journalist in persecuted, but he or she is definitely the Beijing Youth Daily writes, “At first, we penalized in terms of job promotion and other thought these transnational companies were benefits. discriminating against us. Why don’t Chinese In contrast, newer privatized industries as workers enjoy the same rights as the other well as transnational companies rely on a workers in your company? But after hearing merit-based system in job competency, and their explanation, we could say nothing.”30 management skills take priority over one’s The reason is simple-management codes of moral characteristics. Thus, Tang argues that foreign companies operating in China have to sexual harassment runs rampant mostly in be set under the framework of the Chinese poorly organized, privatized industries that Labor Law, which currently value profit above moral does not contain any characters and the well- SEXUAL HARASSMENT RUNS regulations prohibiting “ being of their employees. If RAMPANT MOSTLY IN sexual harassment. Sexual POORLY ORGANIZED, this is true, then it follows harassment expert Tang Can PRIVATIZED INDUSTRIES that sexual harassment will suggests that there are three THAT VALUE PROFIT ABOVE only become a more deeply holes in the current codes for MORAL CHARACTERS entrenched social ill as the transnational companies ” Chinese economy becomes operating in China: an more privatized and an enforceable counter-sexual harassment increasing number of transnational, joint- system, an independent monitoring venture companies are ushered into the department, and a societal monitoring country. In effect, the Chinese government is system.31 According to Tang, state-owned forced to enact a counter-sexual harassment enterprises are not breeding grounds for law if it wants to hold transnational sexual harassment because corporations must companies accountable for sexually abide by the 1989 and the 1997 “Ji Lu Chu Fa harassing Chinese workers. Not only would Tiao Lie” or “Disciplinary Punishment the Communist Party lose face Clause,” which strictly prohibits insulting internationally if its legal system fails to women and other such actions. In these penalize sexual harassment, the national companies, cadres being considered for a economy as well as social stability would promotion are evaluated not only in terms of also be jeopardized. For example, author their job competency but also for their sheng Wang Xingjuan states, “Most sexual huo zue feng or life’s moral attitudes, harassers provide scholarly, promotional,

29 Tang, 54. 30 “Opposites,” 2. 31 Tang, 54. 32 Ibid.

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56 China’s Paradox Passage into Modernity financial incentives or threaten removal in harassment. In the first section, I established order to force compliance. This causes many the relationship between the Chinese women to lose their jobs, suffering financial government and the media as a state-market losses.” Although Wang is primarily complex in which market forces compete concerned with personal losses, the financial with government censorship to influence the Greater China incentives that are embroiled in the messy media. Although the Chinese government no business of sexual harassment become a longer dictates the media, it still maintains a national economic concern when nearly 70 fair amount of indirect control through percent of Chinese women have been bureaucracies such as the Information sexually harassed.33 Another magazine article Council, journalist training sessions, and the relates several anecdotes which reveals how All-China Women’s Federation, all of which sexual harassment has become an integral serve as unofficial mouthpieces for the part of doing business in China. In one case, government. Next, I briefly outlined the twenty-year-old businesswoman Ah Feng background of sexual harassment, addressing seduced a successful fashion merchandiser, its Western origins, China’s first case of Mr. Li Cheng Ye, who sold her 500 articles of sexual harassment, current laws on women’s clothing rather than his old customer. In rights, and the changing Chinese public another case, Ms. Lee, the owner of an home opinion on this once taboo subject. The appliances company, could not get her following three sections extensively shipment of colored television sets until she discussed and provided evidence for the three permitted the seller, Mr. Wang, to touch her main components of the thesis that the in inappropriate places. The author concludes Chinese government’s crackdown on sexual that sexual harassment both “pollutes societal harassment is part of a broader effort to 1) morals, disturbs normal business secure international recognition for its proceedings” and also “results in inestimable modern rights reforms, 2) trumpet women’s economic losses.”34 In this way, sexual rights as a socialist achievement, and 3) strike harassment not only impacts the at a pervasive social ill which not only psychological health of Chinese women, but threatens the national economy but also it is also a vice intertwined with corrupt permits transnational companies operating in business practices, which the Chinese China to take advantage of a gap in Chinese government must prevent by enforcing its law. labor laws to meet the criteria of other As previously mentioned in the industrial nations. methodology section, the major limitation to this study is its reliance solely on written Concluding Remarks media, in combination with some published This paper began by questioning the statistics on sexual harassment in China. recent inundation of sexual harassment Although newspaper articles are considered coverage in the Chinese media and sought to primary materials, they are not the most direct analyze which social, political, and economic sources. Ideally, I would conduct public factors pushed the Chinese government to opinion polls in China before and after the launch a campaign to crackdown on sexual government implemented its counter-sexual

33 Wang Xing Juan, “The Present State of Sexual Harassment and Research,” trans. Diana Fu, Fu Nu Yan Jiu Lun Cong, vol. 3 (1998), 43. 34 Xia, 1-2.

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harassment measures, compare it with the some possible motivations behind the Greater China Chinese government’s published results, and Chinese governments actions through see if there is a gap between what is actually analyzing the factors that push it to pay happening and what the government reports overwhelming attention to sexual is happening. Furthermore, I would establish harassment. Thus, this paper provides the the extent to which the Chinese media has an theoretical foundation for future empirical impact on the Chinese public. However, as research in China, which may include previously mentioned, the main purpose of interviewing migrant women and female this paper is not to examine the effectiveness victims of sexual harassment, visiting local of the government’s counter-sexual women service centers, and collaborating harassment measures but rather to deduce with sexual harassment expert Tang Can.

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58 Japanese Fascism Revisited Japanese Fascism Revisited

Greater China Marcus Willensky

Impact of the IMTFE a “conspiracy to wage declared or undeclared On June 4, 1946, the International war or wars of aggression. . .in violation of Military Tribunal for the Far East, IMTFE1, international law. . .with the object of convened in the former Imperial Japanese securing military, naval, political and Army Ministry Building in Tokyo. In the economic domination of East Asia. . . and course of his opening address, Chief ultimately the domination of the world”4 Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan2 pronounced implicates all Japanese 5 in the prewar era as the following: accomplices in a sinister plot. The evidence will show that [Japan’s] This analysis, while not without an militaristic cliques and ultra-nationalistic element of truth, hopelessly obfuscates the secret societies resorted to rule by actual train of events and their broader global assassination and thereby exercised great and historical context, impeding deeper influence in favor of military aggression. understanding of what happened in Japan. Assassinations and threats of revolt Western historians, journalists and authors of enabled the military branch more and all types, whether consciously aware of the more to dominate the civil government specifics of the IMTFE’s indictment or not, and to appoint new persons favorable to have been responding to it in one form or them and their policies. This tendency another for nearly 60 years. For these people, became stronger and more entrenched the IMTFE has had a lasting impact until on 18 October 1941 the military completely disproportional to its effect on the assumed complete and full control of all rest of the world. branches of the government, both civilian In 1946, the idea that Imperial Japan, like and military.3 Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, was a Keenan’s indictment continues to fuel criminal nation that had engaged in a debate within academic circles over prewar conspiracy to take over the world was, in the Japan and the nature of its imperial wake of the dropping of two atomic bombs, a government. The prosecution’s contention reassuring contention to the victorious Allies. that the Japanese government participated in In 2005, however, the IMTFE’s indictment

1 The IMTFE, otherwise known as the “Tokyo Trials,” May 1946 to November 1948. 2 Keenan made a name for himself in the 1930s as the man who prosecuted “Machine Gun” Kelly. His appointment, some have contended, signaled that the United States felt the IMTFE was dealing with nothing more than hardened criminals. Indeed, Keenan himself stated: “It is the contention of the prosecution that the positions held by these accused is no bar to their being considered as ordinary criminals and felons . . . ” International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, 1946-1948, “Record of Proceedings, Exhibits, Judgement, Dissenting Judgements, Preliminary Interrogations, Miscellaneous Documents,” Proceedings, 434. 3 Ibid., 442 and 443. 4 Ibid., 435. 5 Keenan explained that under the usual law of conspiracy, “. . . it is always held that every member of the conspiracy is equally liable for every act committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of the common plan . . . All are liable who incited, ordered, procured or counseled the commission of such acts or have taken a consenting part therein.” Ibid., 434.

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Marcus Willensky 59 need not dominate discussions of Imperial prewar era fascist. In the intervening 50 Japan Japan. The current accessibility of documents years, consensus has seesawed on the issue at the National Archives in the US and the and today there are as many scholars who use National Diet Library and National Institute the term as reject it, both in Japan and the for Defense Studies’ Military Archival west.6 Library in Japan give the modern scholar a Fascism was an important and vast array of information from which to draw, controversial topic in the early Showa period. all of it free from the taint of victor’s justice The reformist right wing, kakushin uyoku, and the need to find Japan’s wartime leaders exhibited more than a passing fascination guilty of crimes against humanity. with the concept and many of its members, One critical aspect of the IMTFE’s legacy notably Nakano Seigo,7 made no secret of that has never been satisfactorily dealt with is their admiration for Mussolini and the the issue of fascism in prewar Japan. A fresh successes of his Fascist Party, the Fascio di analysis of the issues and the establishment of Combattimento. The idealist right wing, a dialogue by which the topic can be kannen uyoku, on the other hand, rejected approached anew, without the biases of either fascism as they rejected all things of obvious the IMTFE or the Cold War, is sorely needed western origin. Broad gray areas existed, for by the closed and insular example the Great Japan world of scholars writing in Production Party, Dai THE IDEALIST RIGHT WING, English on the topic of “ Nippon Seisan To, Imperial KANNEN UYOKU, ON THE OTHER Imperial Japan. HAND, REJECTED FASCISM AS Japan’s preeminent self- THEY REJECTED ALL THINGS OF declared fascist party, was Imperial Japan, Fascism OBVIOUS WESTERN ORIGIN. founded with the help of and the Right Wing ” Toyama Mitsuru8—without In the late 1920s, 30s question the most powerful and 40s the Japanese press was filled with member of the idealist right wing. Modern discussions of fascism and hundreds of books scholars are often left with the unenviable written both before and after World War II task of merely concluding that the Japanese discussed its applicability, either pro or con, right wing was aware of, and influenced by, to Imperial Japan. For the IMTFE and the the existence of Fascism in Italy. This paper victorious Allies there was never any question will largely avoid the debate over the that Imperial Japan was a “fascist” nation cast meaning of fascism—a debate that has raged from the same mold as Nazi Germany and since Benito Mussolini coined the term in Fascist Italy. It was only in the immediate 1919—and instead focus on whether or not post-trial era that Japanese authors, like elements of Imperial Japan were consistent Maruyama Masao, began to discuss seriously with the theory of Fascism as envisioned by the implications for historians of labeling the Mussolini.

6 Abe Horozumi, Nihon Fascism Kenkyuu Josetsu [Preface to Japanese Fascism Research] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1975), 209. Nihon Gendai- shi Kenkyuu-kai, Nihon Fascism (2) Kokumin Tougou to Taishuu Douin [Japanese Fascism (2) The Unity of the People and Public Mobilization] (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1982), 13Ð15. Nishi Yoshiyuki, Dare ga Fascist ka [Who is a Fascist?] (Tokyo: Goma Shobou, 1975), 160. 7 Nakano Seigo: 1886 to 1943; leader of the Eastern Society, Toho Kai, and onetime secretary-general of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, Taisei Yokusan Kai. Following the 1942 elections Nakano came into conflict with Prime Minister (General) Tojo Hideki and in 1943 he was forced to commit suicide by the Kempeitai. 8 Toyama Mitsuru: 1855 to 1944; undisputed doyen of the prewar Japanese right wing.

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60 Japanese Fascism Revisited What is Fascism? overwhelming condemned Imperial Japan as Any cursory perusal of prewar Japanese a fascist nation and Japanese writers often Japan newspapers, political tracts, diaries, and denied it, choosing to describe events in periodicals of all types confirms the common terms of Japanism or Nipponshugi. Members use of the term fashizumu. One important of the right wing were routinely accused of aspect of this phenomenon was the lively being fascists, even in the Japanese press, but debate over the meaning of fascism in for reasons that remain unclear they often Europe, and the implications for its rise in denied any connection. Why do modern Japan, that raged in the prewar Japanese scholars neglect this interesting media.9 Beginning in the early 1930s phenomenon?12 Japanese writers increasingly gave vent to a One trend in research, especially in the gnawing fear that fascism might have already west, is to dilute the issue and talk of isolated arrived in Japan. One example is a 1932 examples of fascism having existed, hence Trans-Pacific article titled “Conflict of avoiding the bigger question of whether the Fascism and Parliamentarism,” which said: prewar Japanese system of government was Japan is inordinately afraid of what is itself fascist. Acknowledging fascism’s implied by the term Fascism, but in reality existence in prewar Japan, however, is much of it has arrived. The Saito Cabinet different, and much easier, than saying that itself may be said to be the Imperial Japanese one such instance in so Government itself was “ ACKNOWLEDGING FASCISM’S far as it has suspended EXISTENCE IN PREWAR JAPAN, fascist. On this question, many of the functions of HOWEVER, IS DIFFERENT, AND there exists at least the Diet as a machine for MUCH EASIER, THAN SAYING reasonable doubt, and this the discussion of THAT THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE doubt justifies a more careful national plans.10 GOVERNMENT ITSELF WAS analysis of the government Postwar Japanese discussion FASCIST. of Imperial Japan. It also of Imperial Japan embraces ” requires a working definition the basis for these fears and of the term fascism. generally acknowledges the applicability of In any attempt to explain fascism, care the term fascist to the period. This is not the must be taken to differentiate between case with western scholars, and perhaps no definitions of fascism as theory, as political single topic—with the possible exception of movement and as a form of government. It is the Nanjing Incident—so squarely divides one thing to say that prewar Japanese research of current historians and social institutions, groups or even the bureaucracy scientists in Japan and the west.11 In general, were preaching a form of fascism and quite a western scholars reject the use of the term, different thing to say that they were while their Japanese counterparts largely practicing fascism as we understand it to have embrace it. been applied in Italy and Germany. There In the prewar era, the situation was exist great discrepancies between what almost the exact reverse; western writers Mussolini and Hitler preached before they

9 Miles Fletcher “Intellectuals and Fascism in Early Showa Japan,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, (November 1979), 41. [Fletcher, however, argues that Fascism never existed as a system in Imperial Japan.] 10 Baba Tsunego, “Conflict of Fascism and Parliamentarism,” The Trans-Pacific, September 1, 1932, 4. 11 McCormack, 32. 12 Nishi, 159-160.

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Marcus Willensky 61 came to power and what are generally Alfredo Rocco’s 1925 work The Political Japan recognized to have been the policies their Doctrine of Fascism. Both are oblivious to Fascist and National-Socialist governments concepts of fascism as a pejorative and both put into practice. Therefore, at the very outset purport to be blueprints for fascism in theory. I wish to postulate that fascism as theory and Since neither attempts to draw parallels fascism in application may be so glaringly between their discussion and the actual infra- different as to render them unrelated for all structure of the Italian government, they also practical purposes. neatly avoid the problem of how fascism in When Ivan Morris writes, “‘Fascism’ has application and theory may differ. It is lost much of its semantic value since it came important to bear in mind, however, that by to be bandied about as a pejorative to describe 1932 the Italian Fascist Party, Fascio di unpopular people or ideas,”13 he unwittingly Combattimento, had existed for more than 13 outlines the overwhelming problem with years, and Mussolini had been in power for many postwar discussions of the term. In nearly ten years, three as prime minister and 2005 “fascist” is often an epithet for any seven as dictator. One would assume then that group perceived as reactionary or it is possible to connect fascist theory with authoritarian. Hence, we see left-wing groups fascism as a form of government, and referring to the United States Government as Mussolini appears to do just that when he fascist at the same time that we find members writes, of the government referring to hate groups Fascism is today clearly defined not only such as the Aryan Nation and the Ku Klux as a regime but as a doctrine. And I mean Klan as fascist. This tendency has rendered by this that Fascism today, self-critical as many postwar discussions of fascism well as critical of other movements, has inapplicable, bringing to mind Hannah an unequivocal point of view of its own, Arendt’s assessment of the earliest attempts a criterion, and hence an aim, in [the] to articulate fascism: face of all the material and intellectual It is one of the oddities of the literature of problems which oppress the people of the totalitarianism that very early attempts by world.15 contemporaries at writing its “history,” Nevertheless, this article may have been a which according to all academic rules source of later confusion since Mussolini were bound to founder on the lack of keeps the discussion on a theoretical level and impeccable source material and never links Fascist doctrine with his own emotional over commitment, have stood regime. Instead the article limits itself to the test of time remarkably well.14 bombastic and high-sounding guidelines for This situation has prompted the current intel- Fascism in theory. lectual revisiting of fascism through primary Despite this shortfall, the use of source material, specifically Benito Mussolini’s work—as the founder of the Mussolini’s 1932 article “The Doctrine of Fascist movement and the originator of the Fascism” and the Fascist Minister of Justice term Fascismo16—is without question valid.

13 Ivan Morris (Editor), Japan 1931-1945: Militarism, Fascism, Japanism? (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), vii. 14 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), xxix. 15 Carl Cohen, Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1972), 333. (Hereafter quotes from Mussolini’s “The Doctrine of Fascism” will be marked with M:DF) 16 Derived from the Italian word fasciare which means to bind or envelop. The intent being that Fascism would bind Italy into an organic entity. The symbol of the Fascisti being the fasces: a bundle of rods bound about an ax with projecting blade, carried before ancient Roman magistrates as a symbol of authority.

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62 Japanese Fascism Revisited Rocco’s The Political Doctrine of Fascism is liberal ways, now democratic means and cited because it is one of the earliest at times even socialistic devices. This Japan published attempts to codify what was meant indifference to method often exposes by the term and because Mussolini Fascism to the charge of incoherence on wholeheartedly approved of the content as the part of superficial observers, who do presenting “in a masterful way the doctrine of not see that what counts with us is the end Fascism.”17 Fascism, in its original form, was and that therefore even when we employ a movement of action not formulae—the the same means we act with a radically Italian Fascist regime’s earliest slogan was: different spirit and strive for entirely “No dogma! Discipline suffices!”18 As a different results.21 result, confusion over the meaning of fascism It is clear from this passage that Rocco has existed from the very start. Angelo Tasca, embraces the idea that Fascism was multi- a prewar Italian Marxist, in attempting to faceted and at times contradictory22 and this define Fascism acknowledged the has far-reaching implications for the current impossibility of the task and finally debate. concluded that, “Fascism is a dictatorship; If we accept Rocco’s admission that for such is the starting point of all definitions that fascism the goal and not the means is the key have so far been attempted. Beyond that there to any understanding of the term, then we is no agreement . . . Our way of defining accept the idea that fascism might assume fascism is to write its history.”19 many forms in different countries and Writing at the beginning of Fascism’s situations. The end toward which Rocco and history, Mussolini and Rocco20 had no need to Mussolini were striving was the creation of monitor consistency between theory and an all-powerful State that would play the practice whether in Italy or in any other central role in organizing the lives and society. They were therefore able to avoid livelihood of all its citizens. How this was one of the more vexing questions now facing achieved was less important for them than its modern scholars—how to define Fascism so realization. This dispels many of the most that it can be used as a comparative term. ubiquitous complaints about the application Rocco begins by identifying the salient points of the term fascism to Imperial Japan, that the found in the political doctrines against which political realities of Nazi Germany, Fascist Fascism would position itself and then Italy and Imperial Japan defy a common contrasts them with his vision of the definition. The position of many Japanese movement: scholars that “sometimes incidental Fascism never raises the question of differences add up to an essential methods, using in its political praxis now difference”23 is a failure to come to grips with

17 Introduction by Mussolini to Rocco’s The Political Doctrine of Fascism. In Cohen, 315. 18 Ibid., 314. 19 Angelo Tasca, The Rise of Italian Fascism, 1918-1922 (New York: H. Fertig Co., 1966), 337. As quoted in McCormack, 22. 20 Both men were admirers of Niccolo de Bernardo Machiavelli, 1469-1527, and perhaps this can explain Fascism’s expediency, craftiness, and duplicity of thought between theory and application. 21 Cohen, 321. (Hereafter quotes from Rocco’s The Political Doctrine of Fascism will be marked with R:PDF) 22 Peter Duus and Daniel Okimoto, writing in the Journal of Asian Studies, comment that, “Definitions of fascism come in all shapes and sizes, some precise and some diffuse, some mutually contradictory.” This is stating the obvious and—given Rocco’s comments— falls far short of justifying their argument that the term fascism doesn’t apply to Imperial Japan. Peter Duus and Daniel I. Okimoto. “Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept,” Journal of Asian Studies, vol. XXXIX, no. 1 (November 1979), 65. 23 Ibid., 66.

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Marcus Willensky 63 the intentions of fascism’s creators. intensely nationalist, racialist, militarist and Japan Giovanni Gentile, Mussolini’s Minister imperialist.”27 Obviously this is of Education and a prominent Fascist oversimplified, but this definition certainly theoretician, commented that Fascism, “by applies to Fascist Italy; similarly, Japanese virtue of its repugnance for ‘intellectualism,’ writers in the 1930s seem to have understood prefers not to waste time constructing abstract fascism in this light. Writing in 1932, the theories about itself.”24 Given this reticence, same year that Mussolini’s article was modern scholars are misguided when they published, Yoshino Sakuzo28 wrote, attempt a definition that depends on To define Fascism is an extremely specificity of political methods and difficult task. We can, however, say in structures. It seems clear that the government general terms that it implies the rule of of Fascist Italy exhibited a preference for the disciplined and resolute few as pragmatic political action unfettered by against that of the undisciplined and political principles. François Furet, noted irresolute many. It is anti-democratic, French historian, writes in The Passing of an and particularly anti-parliamentarian; it Illusion about the Machiavellian nature of is national rather than international; and fascism and even goes so far as to draw it tends to dignify the State as against the tentative comparisons to individual, or any group of Soviet Communism—its individuals, except of course …THERE SEEMS NO REASON political and intellectual “ the resolute group in whose WHY FASCISM COULD NOT TAKE opposite—when he says that VERY DIFFERENT FORMS IN hands power is concentrated. both embraced the “concept EUROPEAN AND ASIAN These are the ideas which that anything that served the COUNTRIES. animate the various groups cause was good.”25 ” in Japan [. . .] and therefore, If Fascists saw their in spite of their occasional movement as one that was free to draw from repudiation of the title, they can myriad political resources and apply them to reasonably be called Fascists.29 fit specific situations, then there seems no Yoshino’s comment poses an interesting reason why fascism could not take very question: why was it necessary for prewar different forms in European and Asian Japanese, not only members of the uyoku but countries. Although Gentile insisted that members of the military, the bureaucracy and Fascism, “. . . is not a political theory which the even the political parties—most notably may be stated in a series of formulae,”26 the Seiyukai—to deny that they were fascist? modern analysts generally understand And if these groups and individuals weren’t fascism in application to be “. . . the fascist, why did so many writers describe totalitarian organization of government and them as such? What motivated the prewar society by a single-party dictatorship, media to discuss Japan’s political dynamics

24 Cohen, 341. 25 François Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 170 and 172. 26 Cohen, 340. 27 William Ebenstein, Today’s ISMS: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 105. 28 Yoshino Sakuzo: 1878 to 1933; Yoshino is considered to have been the foremost democratic theorist in the Taisho and early Showa Eras. 29 Yoshino Sakuzo, “Fascism in Japan,” Contemporary Japan, vol. I, no. 2 (September 1932), 185.

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64 Japanese Fascism Revisited in terms of fascism? In 1936, The Trans- Was Imperial Japan Fascist? Pacific ran an interview with Colonel Prewar Japan exhibited many of the traits Japan Hashimoto Kingoro30 under the title “Head of that modern scholars ascribe to fascism. New Party Denies He’s Fascist:” Japan in the early Showa Era was intensely Some people say that I am a Fascist or a nationalistic, racialist (including the semi-Hitler made in Japan, they do not pervasive belief on the part of the Japanese understand my intentions. I am no that they were racially superior both to ordinary retired soldier . . . Look at our westerners and other Asians), militaristic and party flag. It is a white sun against a red also imperialistic.32 What seems to be missing ground. In the white heat of the sun, we is, in Ebenstein’s words, a “totalitarian are to serve the Emperor with blood-red organization of government and society by a patriotism. Just watch me! Hashimoto is single party dictatorship.”33 no man to sit still and just talk!31 If, however, we accept that by 1940, Hashimoto’s flowery denial aside, following the disbanding of the Minseito, the contemporaries often described him as a Seiyukai and prewar Japan’s other political National-Socialist and a Fascist. His Great parties,34 the Imperial Rule Assistance Japan Young Men’s Party, Dai Nippon Association (IRAA) or Taisei Yokusan Kai, Seinen To, affected the imagery of was the only political party in existence,35 and Mussolini’s black-shirted Fascists with black if we acknowledge that the Meiji Constitution versions of the Imperial Japanese Army’s accorded the Emperor broad discretionary uniforms and a flag that was little more than powers36 and granted him de facto a copy of Hitler’s Nazi flag minus the commander-in-chief status over both the swastika. Moreover, Hashimoto’s politics Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, in focused on a strong centralized government addition to awarding him the power to initiate at home and an aggressive policy of and institute legislation, then the basic conquest overseas. Should Hashimoto’s framework for fascism appears to have been denials be believed? What quality other than firmly in place in Imperial Japan in the the fact that he was Japanese, and not Italian immediate prewar period.37 or German, distinguished his agenda from Some writers, notably John Holiday in fascism? his Marxist study of Japanese capitalism,

30 Hashimoto Kingoro: 1890 to 1957; Hashimoto was a militant xenophobe and one of the founders of the Cherry Blossom Society, Sakura Kai. He was tried and convicted by the IMTFE as a Class “A” war criminal in 1948. 31 Staff, “Head of New Party Denies He’s Fascist,” The Trans-Pacific, October 29, 1936, 14. 32 Ban Hou, Nihon Fascism no Koubou [The Rise and Fall of Japanese Fascism] (Tokyo: Rokkou Shuppan, 1989), 146. Nakamura Kikuo, Tennou-sei Fascism-ron [Fascist Emperor Worship Theory], (Tokyo: Hara Shobou, 1967), 68-74. 33 Ebenstein, 105. 34 Gordon Berger writes, “…by 1940, all political party organizations had disappeared from Japanese politics.” Gordon Mark Berger, Parties Out of Power in Japan 1931-1941 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), viii. 35 Clearly, the absence of other political parties did not mean that the IRAA was an all-powerful totalitarian-style party. As Edward J. Drea says: “The IRAA, despite superficial appearances reinforced by strident new order rhetoric, was not a locus of authority or even of significant influence.” Nonetheless, the absence of other political parties cannot be overlooked when discussing the degree of change that took place in the Japanese government from the Meiji Era through the end of World War II. Edward J. Drea, The 1942 Japanese General Election: Political Mobilization in Wartime Japan (Lawrence: Center for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas, 1979), 18. 36 Granted, Emperor Hirohito may have exercised these powers sparingly; however, The Japan Year Book: 1934 states, perhaps slightly facetiously, “The actual power of the Emperor at the present time is much greater than that of other constitutional monarchs.” Inahara K. (Editor) [The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan’s] The Japan Year Book: 1934 (Tokyo: Kenkyusha Press, 1934), 129. (Hereafter referred to as JYB:34) Or as confirmed by the IMTFE’s prosecution team: “Basically, all executive power is vested in the Emperor.” IMTFE, 663. 37 Nihon Gendai-shi Kenkyuu-kai (Editor), 34-35.

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Marcus Willensky 65 have even argued that we need not focus on Mussolini’s vision existed in Imperial Japan Japan the period immediately prior to the start of on many levels. World War II concluding that, “If Japan was The Imperial Japanese military and ‘fascist’ in 1941, it should perhaps be called bureaucracy placed great emphasis on ‘fascist’ in 1915.”38 And yet, the consensus collective belonging and a shared past. that Imperial Japan was not fascist includes Starting in the Meiji, Taisho and certainly in virtually every western writer on the topic of the early Showa Era there was no lack of Imperial Japan, including Gorden Berger, government-sponsored propaganda designed James Crowley, Peter Duus, Richard to help the average Japanese citizen to see Mitchell, Daniel Okimoto, Mark Peattie, his place in terms of the “family,” the Ben-Ami Shillony, Richard Smethurst, “household,” the “nation,”42 and their George Wilson and even the writers of relationship to the Emperor in an unbroken general histories of Japan.39 line through history.43 This process stressed What quality of fascism as practiced in the sacred importance of Japanese language, other countries was so glaringly different that culture and history. Part of this western scholars reject it so universally when indoctrination was an emphasis on the applied to Imperial Japan?40 Could it merely importance of the kokutai, literally the “body be that there has been a failure to understand of the State,” in which the concept of the the spirit of fascism; a failure to understand individual must be subsumed. This is an that fascism in theory and practice might be important element of Fascism as Mussolini quite different; a failure to understand the saw it: Machiavellian nature of fascism? Abe For the Fascist, everything is the State, Horozumi states in the conclusion to his and nothing human or spiritual exists, Nihon Fashizumu Kenkyu Josetsu much less has value, outside the State. In (Introduction to Japanese Fascism Research), this sense Fascism is totalitarian, and the One cannot escape the impression that Fascist State, the synthesis and unity of research on Japanese fascism is very all values, interprets, develops and gives divided and confused on the theoretical strength to the whole life of the people.44 level. Confusion in fascism theory is not The leaders of the Imperial Japanese confined to Japan but … since the late bureaucracy, notably Hiranuma Kiichiro,45 1960s is a worldwide phenomenon.41 saw the relationship of Japanese citizens to This needn’t be the case. If we return to the kokutai in very similar terms, and it can primary sources, it becomes clear that be argued that this is what Prime Minister

38 John Halliday. A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 139. Halliday, however, argues against the applicability of fascism for Imperial Japan because of what he terms its “Eurocentric resonance.” 39 McCormack, 28. 40 It has been suggested that these writers reject the term fascism because it limits their ability to recast Imperial Japan as an emerging democracy that was sidetracked by the rise of militarism in the 1930s. 41 McCormack, 32. Abe, 5. 42 See: Robert King Hall (editor), Kokutai No Hongi: Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 97-98. 43 For a more in-depth discussion, see: Drea, 3. Drea in turn is working from Ishii Kinichiro’s “Nihon Fuashizumu to Chido Seido” (Japanese Fascism and the Regional System) Rekishigaku Kenkyu, no. 307, (December 1965), 2. 44 Cohen (M:DF), 330-331. 45 Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro: 1867 to 1952; founder of the National Foundation Society, Kokuhonsha; president of the Privy Council from 1936 to 1939 (and again in 1945); prime minister January to August 1939; home minister and minister of state in both the second and third Konoye Cabinets 1940-1941; convicted as a Class “A” war criminal by the IMTFE in 1948.

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66 Japanese Fascism Revisited Konoye Fumimaro46 was attempting, at the Doctrine of Fascism” in the 19th century, the instigation of the Imperial Japanese military, Meiji oligarchs might well have used it as a Japan with the passage of the National General blueprint for their vision of Imperial Japan, Mobilization Law, Kokka Sodoin Ho.47 This since it so closely parallels what they law aimed not merely to create an all- attempted. As Carol Gluck writes, “It was not encompassing war economy but also to enough that the polity [kokutai] be coalesce the Japanese citizenry into obedient centralized, the economy developed, social and awe-inspired subjects of the State. For classes rearranged, international recognition what was the kokutai supposed to represent if striven for—the people must also be it wasn’t the sum total of all that existed in ‘influenced,’ their minds and hearts made Japan—a State that included every subject of one.”49 the Empire under the divine rule of the Fascism may not have existed in 1868, Emperor. Not merely an absolute ruler, the but the ideals that form the core of Emperor was a divine ruler, and in his will Mussolini’s vision are concepts and values was found the raison d’etre of the Japanese that the nation-building Meiji oligarchs nation. This is fascism as Mussolini shared. They saw Imperial Japan not in the envisioned it: light of democratic European nations, not in Individuals form classes according to the the light of a nation of individuals like the similarity of their interests, they form United States, but as a nation of one heart and syndicates according to differentiated mind. 50 As Hiranuma Kiichiro outlined in a economic activities within these interests; speech in 1932: but they form first, and above all, the Our nation is constituted of one ruler, in State . . . Not a race, nor a geographically an unbroken line of Imperial descent, and determined region, but a community his subjects. It is a nation based upon the historically perpetuating itself, a centralization of the Imperial Family, multitude unified by a single idea, which with the entire people assisting the ruler is the will to existence and to power.48 in the realization of national ideals. In In the case of Imperial Japan this will to other words, it is the duty of the people, existence and power was understood to be the under the Emperor, to exert their best will of the Emperor and the kokutai that he efforts towards the accomplishment of embodied. Had Mussolini written “The the tasks allotted to them.51

46 Konoye Fumimaro: 1891 to 1945; Konoye was prime minister three times during the critical period leading up to the start of World War II (1937-1941). In late 1945, following the end of the war, the Occupation Headquarters of SCAP (Supreme Command of the Allied Powers) issued an order for Konoye’s arrest as a possible war criminal. On the last day for his voluntary appearance before the authorities, he committed suicide. 47 Yanaga Chitoshi describes the National General Mobilization Law, Kokka Sodoin Ho, by saying that it “. . . was a carte blanche delegation of wartime legislative powers to the Cabinet, empowering the government to legislate by ordinance even in those areas of individual rights and freedom that were provided by the Constitution. It constituted a statutory suspension, if not virtual death sentence, of parliamentary government. In effect, the legislative body was superseded by the bureaucracy, which achieved a position of supremacy in the wartime structure created by the National General Mobilization Law.” Yanaga Chitoshi, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949), 534. 48 Cohen (M:DF), 331. 49 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3. 50 Tetsuo Najita says of Ito Hirobumi’s search for a model for the Meiji Constitution that British, American, Italian and French models were rejected for various reasons and that finally the constitution of newly unified Germany was chosen as a model specifically because Germany, “had written a constitution explicitly to accord with the realization of national unification.” Clearly, unification of the nation-state, not the establishment of popular-rights, was the goal of the Meiji oligarchs in adopting the constitutional form that they chose. Tetsuo Najita, The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 83. 51 Staff, “Hiranuma Outlines Nationalist Ideals,” The Trans-Pacific, April 28, 1932, 12.

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Marcus Willensky 67 It didn’t matter that, like puppet masters, the educational system that glorified the military Japan Meiji oligarchs told the Emperor what his and was designed to place Fascism vision would be; what mattered was that they uppermost in the minds of Italian youth, created a particular cornucopia of modern Araki promoted Kodo through a highly myths and values that with the passage of centralized educational system. Mussolini’s time created the foundation for a “fascist” schools, with four-year-olds in Fascist nation. Imperial Japan was fascist not uniform and eight-year-olds drilling with because it successfully copied what was scale models of army rifles, certainly would happening in Italy and Germany but because not have seemed out of place in Imperial that is what the Meiji oligarchs intended it to Japan in the 1930s. For Alfredo Rocco and be, though at the time they lacked the the Italian Fascist State he described, particular word to describe it as such. education was part of the process by which the government ensured the guided Kodo as Fascism development of the masses: It is generally taken for granted that For Fascism, society is the end, following General Araki Sadao’s52 ousting individuals the means, and its whole life from the position of Army Minister in 1934, consists in using individuals as and certainly following his instruments for its social forced retirement in the ends. The State therefore IMPERIAL JAPAN WAS FASCIST wake of the February 26th “ guards and protects the NOT BECAUSE IT SUCCESS- Incident, that Araki had not FULLY COPIED WHAT WAS welfare and development of only fallen from favor, but HAPPENING IN ITALY AND individuals not for their had also been expelled from GERMANY BUT BECAUSE THAT exclusive interest, but the halls of power. Nothing IS WHAT THE MEIJI OLIGARCHS because of the identity of the could be further from the INTENDED IT TO BE… needs of individuals with truth. Araki never ceased to ” those of society as a whole.55 influence developments, and Araki echoes these he used his frequent calls for Kodo53 as a way sentiments when he explains that the to stay in the public eye. Certainly by the late Emperor’s will is the will of the nation: 1930s, with his ascent to the position of Here in Japan the Emperor represents the Minister of Education in the first Konoye and highest welfare of the nation. We regard then Hiranuma cabinets, Araki was assured a him much as Christians regard Christ and vocal role in the government, and he used his God. We are only doing his will; there is position aggressively to shape the minds of no room in any subject for his own Japanese youth as he saw fit.54 selfish activities!56 Much as Mussolini established an Clearly both Kodo and fascism sought to

52 Baron Araki Sadao: 1877 to 1966; chief ideological exponent of the Imperial Way, Kodo; Army Minister in the Inukai, 1931-1932, and Saito Cabinets, 1932-1934; Minister of Education in the first Konoye, June 1937-January 1939, and Hiranuma cabinets, January- August 1939; tried and convicted as a Class “A” war criminal by the IMTFE in 1948. 53 Kodo, literally the “Way of the Emperor,” or Imperial Way, was a popular movement in Japan during the Showa Era that loosely traced its origins to the Chinese philosophy of Wun Tao, the Kingly Way, which preached the benefits of emulating the—theoretically— pure and enlightened way of the King. 54 Ban, 69-71. Nakamura, 71-72. 55 Cohen (R:PDF), 323. 56 Charles Hodges, “In Japan—The Imperial Way: An Authorized Interview with War Minister Araki,” Asia, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, (February 1934), 86.

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68 Japanese Fascism Revisited subordinate the needs of the individual to the commanded. Accordingly, the soldiers needs of the state, and both saw the state belong directly to the Emperor; none is Japan benevolently protecting the individual in responsible to any but the Emperor. This return for his or her commitment to the is a direct relationship of profound greater good. importance to our country; it expresses In his attempt to explain the difference the true spirit of the Japanese Army!58 between fascism and Kodo, Araki reveals that The spirit of Araki’s statements is reflected in he doesn’t clearly understand the way Fascist the Ten Commandments of the Italian Soldier, Italy operated, and at the same time he 59 which states, “One thing must be dear to attributes to the Showa Emperor political you above all: the life of the Duce.”60 Much as power out of all proportion to his actual the Imperial Japanese Army owed its role.57 Araki does succeed, however, in allegiance directly to the Emperor, the Italian showing that in many respects the role of the military was to owe its allegiance directly to Army in Fascist Italy and its relationship to Mussolini, bypassing any aspect of the Mussolini were synonymous with Kodo ‘s legislature. In return the State, in the person view of the Imperial Japanese Army’s role of Mussolini, was understood to embody the and relationship to the Emperor: spirit of the nation. Allegiance to Mussolini Here is the fundamental difference was allegiance to the State. And in duty to the [between Fascism and Kodo]! In Italy the State, the Fascist found the highest goal Black Shirts go to their King with certain possible for the individual. As Mussolini said, demands; then they put them into Fascism is a religious conception in execution and carry them out. In Japan which man is seen in his immanent the initiative is taken by the Emperor. relationship with a superior law and with The Emperor gets his inspiration an objective Will that transcends the divinely. Unless you have studied the particular individual and raises him to principles known to the Chinese as wun conscious membership in a spiritual tao—the kingly way—you can never society. Whoever has seen in the religious understand the spirit of Japan’s politics of the Fascist regime nothing but government and defense institutions . . . mere opportunism has not understood The position of the defense institution is that Fascism besides being a system of historical. Japan’s soldiers at present are government is also, and above all, a inspired by the same spirit that moved system of thought.61 them two thousand years ago . . . But we Kodo, as explained by Araki, ascribed this in the army wish to correct the errors same quasi-religious status to concepts of which have crept into the actual duty to the State, in this case the Japanese operation of the government . . . If there state and Emperor. The loftiest goal for the is any obstacle in the way of its individual was the sublimation of their will to realization, it is the duty of soldiers to that of the Emperor. This was an ideal to remove it. But the Emperor has always which all Japanese, and eventually all people,

57 For a recent discussion of just how much power the Showa Emperor wielded, see Herbert P. Bix’s Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000). 58 Hodges, 87. 59 Cohen, 363. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 330.

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Marcus Willensky 69 were supposed to subscribe.62 This is entirely odd disclaimer: Japan consistent with Fascism as Mussolini Fascism, which has become popular of describes it: late, is the product of a foreign country Fascism faces squarely the problem of resulting from national circumstances in the right of the State and of the duty of that country. Our country has its [own] individuals. Individual rights are only independent object and its [own] recognized in so far as they are implied in independent mission.65 the rights of the State. In this Hiranuma doesn’t seem to be denying any preeminence of duty we find the highest similarities between Kodo and fascism, nor ethical value of Fascism.63 does he seem to reject fascism; rather he In 1932, the same year that Mussolini made merely suggests that Kodo is indigenous and this statement, Hiranuma Kiichiro, a vocal fascism is foreign. What then was Kodo if not proponent of Kodo, made a speech explaining fascism for the Japanese? Mussolini said, the position of the National Foundation Life as conceived by the Fascist, is Society, Kokuhonsha. The speech contained serious, austere, religious: the whole of it the following: is poised in a world supported by the The Japanese race loves life, and its moral and responsible forces of the spirit. national life is the greatest of all that it The Fascist disdains the “comfortable” loves. The individual Japanese never life.66 hesitates to sacrifice his life for the Couldn’t Araki or Hiranuma have said the maintenance of that great national life . . same thing? One need only substitute . In our country, militarism from time “practitioner of Kodo “ for Fascist and the immemorial has been considered one of quote could have come from any number of the most important national practices, patriotic Japanese in the prewar era. Speaking because it is necessary for the realization in his capacity as Foreign Minister in the of that morality which is the highest second Konoye Government (July 1940 to object of this nation. It is apparent that we July 1941), Matusoka Yosuke67 said: must use militarism as a means of self- . . . the mission of Japan is to proclaim defense against any force obstructing the and demonstrate Kodo throughout the attainment of our highest ideal.64 world. Viewed from the standpoint of Hiranuma ends his speech by specifically international relations, this amounts, I mentioning fascism and offers the following think, to enabling all nations and races to

62 On August 1, 1940 the Imperial Japanese Government released the following official announcement, “The world stands at a great historic turning point, and it is about to witness the creation of new forms of government, economy, and culture, based upon the growth and development of sundry groups of states…The basic aim of Japan’s national policy lies in the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of Hakko Ichiu [The Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof], in which the country was founded, and in the construction, as the first step, of a new order in Greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.” When this announcement speaks of “the firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of Hakko Ichiu” it is referring to an eventual peace that will come to the world after the establishment of a new world order that recognizes Imperial Japanese hegemony in Asia and ultimately over the entire world. Documentary Material. “Japanese Government Announcement, August 1, 1940 (Tentative Translation),” Contemporary Japan, vol. IX, no. 9 (September 1940), 1223. 63 Cohen (R:PDF), 324. 64 The Trans-Pacific (April 28, 1932), 12. Quote by Hiranuma) 65 Ibid., 12. Quote by Hiranuma. 66 Cohen (M:DF), 330. 67 Matsuoka Yosuke: 1880 to 1946; in addition to being the director of the South Manchurian Railway, Matsuoka had a long and successful affiliation with the Foreign Ministry culminating in his appointment as Foreign Minister in the second Konoye Cabinet. The IMTFE charged Matsuoka as a Class “A” war criminal but he fell ill and died soon after the trial began in 1946. See Matsuoka Yosuke, “Dissolve the Political Parties,” Contemporary Japan, vol. II, no. 4 (March 1934), 661-667.

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70 Japanese Fascism Revisited find each its proper place in the world . . spiritual or moral . . . For Fascism the . The immediate aim of our foreign tendency to Empire, that is to say, to the Japan policy at present is to establish in expansion of nations, is a manifestation accordance with the lofty spirit of Kodo, of vitality.71 a great East Asian chain of common Why debate the form that fascism took in prosperity with the Japanese- different nations when it is clear that Imperial Manchukuo-China group as one of the Japan subscribed to a theory and policy links. We shall thus be able to largely consistent with Mussolini’s vision? demonstrate Kodo in the most effective Indeed, when Hiranuma Kiichiro became manner, and pave the way toward the Prime Minister in January 1939, many feared establishment of an equitable world that it signaled Japan’s abandonment of peace.68 constitutional monarchy.72 So serious was this When Matsuoka spoke of the need to fear that Seiyukai Diet members required “proclaim and demonstrate Kodo,” he meant Hiranuma to explain why Kodo was not invasion. When he spoke of “enabling all synonymous with totalitarianism during a nations and races to find each its proper place session of the Diet on January 24.73 The in the world,” he refers to the imposition on Trans-Pacific’s January 12, 1939 editorial these nations of a subordinate status to that of commented, Imperial Japan.69 Kodo on the international Leaders in the principal Tokyo journals level was a colorful euphemism for Japanese stressed that installation of Baron imperialism. When Araki, Matsuoka, Hiranuma as Premier only means [an] Hashimoto, Nakano, and others spoke of extension of the Konoye Cabinet, not the Kodo enlightening the Japanese people and opening of a new stringent period of eventually all of Asia, were they not speaking Fascism, and attempted to assuage public of a commitment to a racialist and misgivings by loud-pedalling [the] belief imperialistic concept predicated on the belief that the baron has forsaken much of his that it was Imperial Japan’s duty to militarize former reformist ideals.74 and eventually dominate all of Asia?70 Isn’t Kodo may never have been the official policy this consistent with Mussolini’s view of the of the Imperial Japanese Government, but it Fascist State? was cited so often by officials that it is The Fascist State is a will to power and to unclear at what point it deviated from official government . . . In the doctrine of policy. Following the beginning of the war in Fascism Empire is not only a territorial, China in 1937, Kodo suddenly joined “holy military or mercantile expression, but war”75 in the average Japanese vocabulary.

68 Documentary material, “Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke’s Statement, August 1, 1940,” Contemporary Japan, vol. IX, no. 9 (September 1940), 1225. 69 See: Chapter 10 “Global Policy With The Yamato Race As Nucleus” in John Dower’s War Without Mercy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 262-290. 70 As Chief Prosecutor Keenan said in his opening address: “By the military alliance with Germany and Italy it was sought to create a new world order in which Japan was recognized as the leader in Greater East Asia, and Germany and Italy as the leaders in Europe.” IMTFE, 448. 71 Cohen (M:DF), 339. 72 The Trans-Pacific reprinted an article from the Asahi Shimbun, which attempted to allay these fears. See: “Shift to Right Unlikely,” The Trans-Pacific, January 12th 1939, 1. 73 Yanaga, 536. 74 Editor. “Japanese Press Views,” The Trans-Pacific, January 12, 1939, 5. 75 See: “Hiranuma Seeks Greater Strength for Nation; Pledges to Surmount Crisis Confronting Orient,” The Trans-Pacific, January 12, 1939, 8.

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Marcus Willensky 71 Newspapers and official statements from the to any similarities between Imperial Japan Japan Cabinet Information Board became inundated and a foreign country like Fascist Italy. with both terms and by 1941, no official statement of foreign policy was possible The Question of Democracy without some reference to Kodo. When William Ebenstein, a noted political officials like Hiranuma denied that Imperial scientist and expert on totalitarianism, argues Japan was fascist they often said that Japan’s that “Fascism is postdemocratic and motives and theories were wholly Japanese in postindustrial: Fascism is impossible in origin and in so doing they cited Kodo as the countries with no democratic experience at guiding light of Imperial Japanese foreign all.”76 If we accept Ebenstein’s view it raises and domestic policy; but what was Kodo? important questions about the validity of Many attempted definitions, notably Araki holding up the democratic character of the Sadao, but the sum total of these explanations prewar Japanese constitutional monarchy as is such that no meaning of any substance proof that fascism could not, or did not, exist. results. When George M. Wilson argues that the I would suggest that Kodo, like fascism, concept of “Japanese Fascism” is mistaken was a doctrine of action; a movement that because Japanese constitutional authority freely drew from many remained nominally intact,77 different political, cultural, he seems to be following an ….KODO SUPPORTED THE TREND religious and social sources; “ intellectual dead end. TOWARD JAPANESE TOTALITARI- Ebenstein does not hesitate that it largely defied ANISM IN ITS GLORIFICATION OF definition and, as an anti- EMPEROR WORSHIP. to disagree; he states quite intellectual force, resisted ” clearly that “[Imperial] codification. Nevertheless, Japan became Fascist in the certain characteristics may be ascribed to 1930s, gradually evolving totalitarian Kodo: it believed in the subordination of the institutions out of its own native heritage.”78 individual to the will of the kokutai; it spoke Maruyama Masao agrees with Ebenstein of the superiority of the Japanese race; it when he argues that, stressed Japan’s ancient origins and spoke of . . . there is no a priori reason for thinking a historical mission that harked back to that the existence of legal provisions for traditional Japanese concepts of militarism a constitution and for a parliamentary and expansion abroad. Kodo taught that duty system is of itself proof of the absence of and discipline came before freedom of fascist forms of control. The political thought and action; and perhaps most forms of single-party dictatorship or the importantly, Kodo supported the trend toward corporate state are only the clothes in Japanese totalitarianism in its glorification of which fascism has chosen to dress itself Emperor worship. Kodo was in fact a form of in particular circumstances—the most fascism. The only thing stopping prewar effective organizational means it can find Japanese from saying this directly was a for the forcible suppression of stubborn sense of pride and a glaring case of revolutionary forces.79 ethnocentrism that didn’t allow them to admit Ebenstein expands on his discussion of the

76 Ebenstein, 106. 77 As cited by Stanley G. Payne in A History of Fascism 1914-1945 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 329. 78 Ebenstein, 105. 79 Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 163.

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72 Japanese Fascism Revisited prerequisites to fascism and raises further large and vocal body of subjects supporting questions about how scholars should portray the rise of ultra-nationalism and sympathetic Japan Imperial Japan’s democratic experience. He to overseas expansion—at the same time that writes, they were committed to a more active role in . . . no fascist system can arise in a political decision-making—is consistent with country without some democratic Ebenstein’s argument concerning the experience (as in Germany and Japan), prerequisites for the rise of fascism. Without [however] there is not much likelihood of the existence of a mobilized and engaged fascist success in countries that have population, one that has experienced the experienced democracy over a long benefits of democratic representation, there is period . . .80 little chance that fascism will arise. From Ebenstein’s point of view the rise and The general consensus that in the period fall of Taisho democracy, or what Andrew after 1931 the movement for imperial democ- Gordon calls “the movement for imperial racy was crushed by the rise of militarism and democracy,” was a prerequisite to the ultra-nationalism82 describes a scenario that, establishment of fascism in Japan. from the point of view of the political Democracy in Japan was not necessarily an scientist, is a ripe breeding ground for the emergent movement that was interrupted by growth of fascism. Tetsuo Najita, in The the rise of militarism and World War II, but Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese rather the movement for imperial democracy Politics, explains the backlash against was a necessary but transitory stage in the democracy by pointing out that although the evolution of Imperial Japan toward fascism.81 existence of party politics gave hope to many Fascism, as a popular movement, elements of society, it also whether initiated from above by the . . . created great confusion and bitterness government, or below by the masses, requires among bureaucrats, the military, and that the subjects of the nation-state be intellectual leadership. For a nation mobilized and engaged in order for the whose security had barely been achieved movement to be maintained. The and whose cultural autonomy was still at establishment of a literate society, access to a issue, partisan politics appeared an lively pluralistic mass media and the indefensible luxury, reflective of a crass awakening in the masses of a desire for more insensitivity to the wishes and needs of tangible benefits of citizenship—in return for the people.83 their active participation in the State—are Japan’s power elite had no desire to see the critical factors for the creation and movement for imperial democracy proceed maintenance of a fascist state. Andrew unchecked and wished to channel this Gordon’s argument that the movement for dynamic toward something else. Ebenstein imperial democracy was typified by concludes that in this type of environment the contradictions that explain the existence of a military, which is particularly vulnerable to

80 Ebenstein, 106. 81 Tetsuo Najita, in discussing Minobe Tatsukichi and his impact on how Imperial Japan interpreted and contextualized the Meiji Constitution, reminds us that Minobe’s writings, “pointed the Japanese constitution in a liberal direction quite unintended by Ito [Hirobumi] and the other [Meiji] oligarchs who built the Meiji order.” Najita, 109. 82 Robert A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1953), 389. 83 Najita, 114.

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Marcus Willensky 73 fascist propaganda due to its belief in the Japan has a historical precedent of Japan virtues of discipline and unity, becomes a change coming through the agency of a “political menace.”84 In the case of Imperial dedicated few. This political ethic fueled the Japan, he writes, “fascism developed with the multi-faceted Japanese right wing for much active and enthusiastic support of the army, of the early Showa Era, as small groups of which had every reason to be the main pillar visionaries sought change through bold of a regime committed to imperialist action. This is termed “fascism from below” expansion.”85 by Maruyama Masao, who wrote that “. . . the Ebenstein sees fascism as a movement Japanese fascist movement from below that is typified by adherence to the following remained to the last a movement of a small tenets: distrust of reason, denial of basic number of patriots—visionary, fanatic, and human equality, a code of behavior based on lacking in plan.”87 lies and violence, government by the elite, In order for us to use the term fascism, totalitarianism, racialism, imperialism, and need we be describing violent change at the opposition to international law and order.86 In hands of a mass movement such as the case of prewar Japan, much as it was a Mussolini’s March on Rome? Many Japanese constitutional monarchy with, at the very scholars fully acknowledge that this never least, the potential for a democratic political happened in interwar Japan and yet they hold culture, Ebenstein’s list of fascist on to the notion that Imperial Japan was characteristics largely applies. fascist in the 1930s and 40s. Western scholars reject this notion for various reasons; Fascism by Any Other Name however, Maruyama Masao argues Many historians, who have chosen to use persuasively that there are at least two types the term fascism in their discussions of of fascism and that we must differentiate Imperial Japan, have sought to avoid . . . between fascism that comes mainly criticism by calling it something else. Hence as a result of the seizure of power by a we see O. Tanin and E. Yohan’s “military fascist party with some kind of mass fascism,” Herbert P. Bix’s “emperor-system organization, and fascism that succeeds fascism,” Andrew Gordon’s “imperial largely by permeating the existing power fascism” and any number of “other fascisms.” structure from inside. Germany, Italy and Those who deny the existence of fascism in Spain are obvious pre-war examples of Imperial Japan often point to the fact that the former type, and Japan of the latter unlike Fascism in Italy and National- type.88 Socialism in Germany, no mass movement The popular Western contention that we thrust a fascist party into power in Japan, cannot apply the term fascism to Imperial hence the need to refer to what happened in Japan because there was no mass movement Imperial Japan by terminology specific to the in support of it, nor was there a radical situation. But must fascism come to power in disjuncture between the Meiji and the Showa only one manner? Eras, may rest on a superficial understanding

84 Ebenstein, 108. 85 Ebenstein, 109. 86 Ebenstein, 115. 87 Maruyama, 57. 88 Maruyama, 167. Nishi, 162-163, 168. 89 McCormack, 31.

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74 Japanese Fascism Revisited of the degree of change that took place during affected by the Cabinet change. It is the this period.89 While the façade of the Imperial intention of the Army to pursue its fixed Japan Japanese Government remained largely course and concentrate on attainment of unchanged from the Meiji through the early the objectives in the holy war.92 Showa era, the growth in power and prestige This is not the kind of statement that of party politics during the late Meiji and subordinate ministers made. This statement Taisho eras was largely eradicated by clearly shows that the Army considered itself, changes to the composition of the Justice and as a result of its right of direct access to the Home Ministries, the death of the genro, and throne, iaku joso,93 free to influence not only the gradual alteration in the relative roles of domestic government policy but also to the bureaucracy and the Diet during the early institute and initiate foreign policy outside of Showa Era. The result was a return to a the jurisdiction of the constitutional power structure more in keeping with the government. This is not indicative of a authoritarian and bureaucratic inclinations of democratic constitutional monarchy but the statesmen in the early Meiji period. rather of totalitarianism and a fascist State. The passing of the National General Itagaki’s statement is evocative of one of Mobilization Law, in 1938, gave the govern- two things: either a systematic breakdown in ment power out of all proportion to what it the legislative process as developed and had exercised during the Meiji and Taisho practiced from the late Meiji through the eras. And while Yamagata Aritomo90 was a Taisho and into the early Showa era, or a powerful champion of the Army, by the 1930s return to the type of authoritarian bureaucracy the Army no longer needed a single champion 94 as it exerted great control over every aspect of that existed at the beginning of the Meiji era. both the Imperial Japanese Government and In either case, Itagaki’s statement highlights the daily lives of its citizens. How great were the fact that by the late 1930s and early 1940s these changes? At the time of Hiranuma Imperial Japan’s façade of constitutional Kiichiro’s ascent to the premiership in 1939, monarchy actually concealed a government Itagaki Seishiro,91 the Army Minister, made controlled by the military and a sympathetic the following official statement, civilian bureaucracy. Imperial Japan in this The new Cabinet will adopt the policy of period was a state committed to its own the previous Cabinet in order that it may preservation and aggrandizement, operating deal effectively with the new stage of the without any need for accountability to the China Incident, and it will carry it out masses, an elitist authoritarian and with a fresh vigor. The basic policy imperialistic government committed to a regarding disposal of the China Incident denial of basic human equality and a code of has been established with Imperial behavior based on lies; in other words, a approval. It is immutable and will not be fascist State.

90 PrinceYamagata Aritomo: 1838 to 1922; powerful member of the Genro; founder of the Imperial Japanese Army; twice prime minister 1889 to 1891 and 1898 to 1900; president of the Privy Council until his death. 91 Itagaki Seishiro: 1885 to 1948; vice-chief of staff to the Kwangtung Army, Kantogun; Army minister in the first Konoye, 1937 to 1939 and Hiranuma Cabinets, January to August 1939; tried and convicted by the IMTFE as a Class “A” war criminal and sentenced to death. 92 The Trans-Pacific, January 12, 1939, 8. 93 An important aspect of the military’s independence of supreme command. 94 As The Japan Year Book: 1934 states, “Up to the first half of the Taisho era the political parties could not make much progress as independent bodies, and were almost always made use of by the clan statesmen or military leaders, not having enough power of their own to form a party cabinet, but allowing themselves to become tools of [the] bureaucracy.” JYB:34, 159.

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Marcus Willensky 75 Scholarship and the Meaning and Kita, not Mussolini, first articulated a theory Japan Origins of Fascism of fascism.98 Mussolini, after all, convened For Marxist scholars such as Karl Radek, the Fascio di Combattimento on March 23, there has never been a question about the 1919 and, as previously cited in “The fascist credentials of Imperial Japan. Marxist Doctrine of Fascism,” freely admitted that at theory, unlike any other, defines fascism that time Fascism was a movement without concisely as the final stage in the decay of formulae. Kita, on the other hand, had been monopoly capitalism. As such it was possible writing and developing his ideas for years. I for Marxist writers to point to certain don’t mean to endorse this theory, nor does objective facts and conclude that they proved Wilson; however it does raise interesting the existence of Japanese fascism. Radek questions about fascism’s origins. explains fascism by saying, Japanese writers, unlike their western Fascist dictatorship is not simply a counterparts, have long seriously entertained reactionary dictatorship, like the regimes the possibility that the Japanese case may of Horthy or Tsankov.95 It is a dictatorship represent a truer model of the fascist State of finance capital, which has been able, than either Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. by employing a number of new methods, They argue that the mass mobilization of the to secure for itself the support of the population to serve the needs of the state, at petty-bourgeoisie by means of a the hands of the military and the demagogic policy and mass bureaucracy—what Hasegawa called “cool organizations. Do these two features of fascism,” that Imperial Japan experienced in fascism—(1) the domination of a the 1930s may be the yardstick against which monopoly capitalism, which has already we must measure the meaning of fascism.99 been shaken, which fears a proletarian Why do the majority of US scholars on revolution, which is seeking an escape Japan generally ignore this issue? Why from it by way of a fascist state doesn’t anyone ever seriously entertain the organization within the country, and a idea that Imperial Japan might have invented new war with the object of a redivision of fascism, and merely called it Kodo? When the world, and (2) a striving to create, as Peter Duus and Daniel Okimoto ask the a bulwark for capitalism, a mass petty- rhetorical question, “Was the fascist strain in bourgeoisie movement, hoodwinked by Japanese thought during the 1930s anything Social-Democratic slogans—exist in more than a manifestation of cultural Japan? Undoubtedly these two features continuity?,”100 aren’t they unwittingly do exist.96 confirming this suspicion? As Ebenstein George Wilson jokingly points out that since points out, Kita Ikki’s97 Plan For The Reconstruction of In countries like Germany and Japan, the Japan or Nippon Kaizo Hoan Taiko was first clue to the understanding of fascist published in 1919 one might suggest that tendencies lies in broad social forces and

95 In Hungry and Bulgaria. 96 Tanin/Yohan, 14. 97 Kita Ikki: 1883 to 1937; author and right-wing ideologue. Kita had ties to the Young Officer’s Movement, Seinen Shoko Undo; executed in 1937, ostensibly for his role in the February 26th Incident. 98 Abe, 59. Ban, 62-65. Eguchi Keiichi, editor, “Nihon Fascism” Ron [“Japanese Fascism” Theory] (Tokyo: Kousou Shobou, 1977), 165. 99 Abe, 13. McCormack, 32. 100 Duus/Okimoto, 68.

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76 Japanese Fascism Revisited traditions. In those countries, the Ministry and the Cabinet Information Bureau authoritarian tradition has been seriously curtailed freedom of the press, Japan predominant and democracy is still a very newspapers continued to give vent to the frail plant. As a result, a German or public’s fear of a collapse of the Japanese with fascist tendencies is no constitutional monarchy and the declaration outcast and may be considered perfectly of a full-blown fascist state. By the time that well adjusted to his society.101 prewar western writers were announcing the Fascists don’t have to wear black or brown fait accompli existence of just such a fascist shirts. Maruyama Masao reminds us that, Japanese State—one allied to Fascist Italy “Just as God created man in his own image, and Nazi Germany103—it was too late for so fascism often disguises itself in the image anything to be done. of its enemies.”102 Ebenstein confirms this: By the late 1930s the basic structure of A politician with fascist leanings who the Imperial Japanese Government had denies that he is a fascist and who already developed beyond its democratic emphasizes his patriotism can do much phase into one defined by its reliance on more harm than the admitted fascist who authoritarian and bureaucratically instituted is not permitted to work within the legislation that often originated with the institutional framework Army. Indeed, Imperial of public life. The Japan’s attack on Pearl …MOST IF NOT ALL JAPANESE danger of not “ Harbor only served to ACCUSED OF BEING FASCIST, OR recognizing this HAVING FASCIST TENDENCIES, confirm what certain writers prefascist attitude is that, WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO in Contemporary Japan, should it become full- DENY ANY CONNECTION. Asia and other periodicals fledged fascism (as it ” had been predicting for well might in an years. It wasn’t until the economic depression or in some other Cold War Era rehabilitation of Japan required disaster of the sort that periodically that historians recast their interpretations of shakes men’s faith in democracy), prewar events to explain Japan’s recognition of it as a threat may come too development into one of the mainstays of the late for those whose earlier judgment was capitalist block in Asia that suddenly a new too lenient. generation of western writers began to Parallels certainly exist between Ebenstein’s challenge Imperial Japan’s brand of fascism, warning and what actually happened in which until then had been assumed to be an Imperial Japan. As the media backlash immutable fact. against fascism—and fascists in government—gained momentum, most if not Conclusion all Japanese accused of being fascist, or The IMTFE’s casual grouping of having fascist tendencies, went to great Imperial Japan with Nazi Germany and lengths to deny any connection. Even as Fascist Italy was a position based on Japanese society took on more and more convenience and not a scholarly analysis of obvious fascist overtones, even as the Home events. Today we can look back at early

101 Ebenstein, 111. 102 Maruyama, 166. 103 1936, Anti-Comintern Pact; 1940, Tripartite Pact.

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Marcus Willensky 77 Showa Japan and conclude that this promulgation of the National General Japan indictment was correct regardless of the taint Mobilization Law, Kokka Sodoin Ho, in of victor’s justice and despite the intervening 1938; the New Structure Movement, Shin 60 years during which Cold War scholarship Taisei Undo, and the dissolution of the led academics to misinterpret and recast political parties in May 1940; the signing of events to fit the geopolitical realities of the the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and world. In 2005, with the Cold War long over, Fascist Italy in September of the same year; it is time for this backlash to be questioned and then the inauguration of the Imperial anew. It is clearly based on an overly narrow Rule Assistance Association, Taisei Yokusan interpretation of political theory, an overly Kai, in October.104 During this entire period narrow interpretation of events, and it was the Imperial Japanese Government used fueled by a generation of scholars whose ubiquitous calls for service to the state and research and interpretations were shaped by allegiance to the ideal of Kodo to shape and the dynamics of the Cold War Era, all of which made it difficult for them to admit mold the population into just the sort of what the Japanese had know all along—that motivated yet servile populace that Mussolini Imperial Japan was fascist. and his Fascio di Combattimento were In fact, the steps in Imperial Japan’s working toward in Fascist Italy. Members of evolution into a fascist state are clear: the Japanese right wing, the military and the Imperial Japan’s withdrawal from the League government may have vehemently denied of Nations in 1933; the controversy over the that they were fascists but this doesn’t in any Emperor Organ Theory, Tenno Kikan Setsu, way change the political realities of what in 1935; the signing of the Anti-Comintern prewar Japan had become by the early Pact with Nazi Germany in 1936; the 1940s—a fascist state.

104 Maruyama, 72.

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78 Tokdo or Takeshima?

Japan Tokdo or Takeshima? The International Law of Territorial Acquisition in the Japan-Korea Island Dispute

Sean Fern

Disputes over offshore territory in East historically and under international law,” Asia are commonplace and have proven noted the South Korean Foreign Ministry in a difficult to resolve. The region’s seas are press release dated February 9, 1996.2 In relatively small in comparison to the size of response to that assertion, in June 1997 the the 11 bordering states, and complicating this Japanese countered that Liancourt belonged fact is the existence of a number of small to Japan. “Takeshima Island is an integral part rocky islets that are the subject of competing of Japanese territory and this has been our claims to offshore sovereignty. For example, long-standing position on Takeshima Island. Japan’s territorial disputes with the Soviet There is no question about this,” said Foreign Union over the Kurile Islands and with China Ministry Spokesman Nobuaki Tanaka.3 over the Senkaku Islands, are well known. Japan’s claims to Liancourt are based Japan, however, has an equally long-standing, mainly on historical documentation and inter- and perhaps even more entrenched, dispute national law as evidenced by twentieth with South Korea over two tiny rock islets in century agreements with Korea, formal the Sea of Japan. To the Japanese, these rocks declarations of ownership and protests are known as Takeshima. To Koreans, they against Korean activities on the islands. are Tokdo. Conversely, South Korea claims that it Since the end of World War II, Korea and originally discovered Liancourt and Japan have contested ownership of these continues to administer and maintain a islets, given the name Liancourt Rocks by presence on the islands.4 Moreover, the South French whalers in the mid-1800s and called Korean government argues that following its that by neutral observers to this day.1 The area liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Japan is currently occupied by South Korea, which returned Liancourt as a result of bilateral and maintains that it has always belonged to the multilateral treaties, including the two states’ Republic of Korea. “Tokdo is our territory, normalization agreements.

1 For objectivity, in this paper Tokdo/Takeshima Island will be referred to as the Liancourt Rocks. 2 Zeno Park, “South Korea Brushes Off Japanese Protests Over Disputed Islands,” Agence France Presse, February 9, 1996. 3 “Press Conference by the Press Secretary June 3, 1997,” Japanese Foreign Ministry, June 3, 1997. . 4 Benjamin Sibbett, “Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute Between Japan and Korea,” Fordham International Law Journal 21 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1606 (April 1998), 1611.

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Concomitant with these historical claims, both sides, South Korea establishes a stronger Japan economic interests also dominate any claim to the Liancourt Rocks because it has discussion of the Liancourt Rocks. With the manifested greater affirmative acts of introduction of the 1982 United Nations sovereignty Ð as necessitated by principles of Convention on the Law of the Sea international law Ð on and around the (UNCLOS), sovereignty over offshore disputed area. Given the islands’ ambiguous territory has become increasingly important past, the dispute turns on which country has and complicated. Parties to UNCLOS are demonstrated affirmative ownership as set entitled to as much as 200 nautical miles of out by historical precedents. Nevertheless, the maritime and jurisdictional exclusivity. States two sides are considered unlikely to bring this that have established sovereignty over dispute before an arbitrator as such direct offshore territory are granted an exclusive involvement would risk renewed hostilities economic zone (EEZ) around the area, giving and further divisions. the state exclusive fishing rights and mining This paper sets out to demonstrate why access to the seabed.5 Both sides, therefore, South Korea has a stronger claim to the serve to gain economically from formal Liancourt Rocks. First, it provides a brief ownership of the islands. history of the islands in the context of Japan- This dispute recently Korea relations. Second, the came to a head when South paper sets out the SOUTH KOREA ESTABLISHES A Korea began printing “ international legal standards STRONGER CLAIM TO THE postage stamps showing LIANCOURT ROCKS BECAUSE IT required for formal territorial pictures of flowers and HAS MANIFESTED GREATER acquisition and sovereignty seagulls. On January 16, AFFIRMATIVE ACTS OF over an island. Then, the 2004, South Koreans arrived SOVEREIGNTY… paper analyzes each state’s en masse at post offices ” claims and sets out why around the country to Korea has a stronger title purchase the stamps. The series, “Nature of claim. Lastly, it concludes by assessing the Tokdo,” included a painting of a lonely gray security implications of Korea’s possession of island, topped with vegetation like a green Liancourt. toupee.6 After three hours, 2.2 million stamps were sold, setting off a diplomatic row in Historical Perspectives on the Islands which Japanese and South Korean leaders Contemporary Japanese-Korean relations showed renewed hostility toward one another. reflect the past to a large degree. Koreans feel Japanese officials said the issue violates the an emotional need to anchor their modern day cooperative spirit of the Universal Postal policies to recollections of former Japanese Union and proposed that Japan counterattack occupation and conduct. This view is with a “Takeshima” stamp.7 The dispute set manifested in the idea of han, which off a rash of nationalist sentiment in both represents a combination of resentment, countries, demonstrating the continued regret and renewed suffering. Han influences sensitivity of the issue. how Koreans reflect on the past and often Considering the evidence presented by stimulates the desire to revive past events as

5 Article 55 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea defines the exclusive economic zone as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,” which provides coastal states with various sovereign rights over living and non-living resources. 6 James Brooke, “A Postage Stamp Island Sets Off a Continental Debate,” The New York Times, January 27, 2004, 4. 7 Ibid.

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80 Tokdo or Takeshima? bargaining chips when dealing with Japanese to recognize Korea’s independence. Instead, businesses and government officials.8 Japan, the treaty provided that “Japan, recognizing Japan on the other hand, prefers to concentrate on the independence of Korea, renounces all the present and replace the past with a new, right, title, and claim to Korea, including the fruitful relationship. islands of Qualpart, Port Hamilton, and The dispute over Liancourt serves to Dagelet.”11 The Supreme Commander for the illustrate these antithetical approaches. Japan Allied Powers then a1removed the Liancourt and Korea are similar geographically and Rocks from Japanese jurisdiction and put culturally yet their pasts cast a dark shadow them under US armed forces control for use on the present. Michael Lev, a renowned as a bombing range. international correspondent for the Chicago Shortly thereafter, on January 18, 1952, Tribune, attributes the Liancourt dispute to South Korean President Syngman Rhee historical differences rather than a desire for issued the Korean Presidential Proclamation money or territory. While the disagreement at over the Adjacent Sea. The proclamation first glance appears to be economic, in a declared Korean sovereignty over a portion of deeper sense, Lev writes, it is “about history, the Sea of Japan, including the Liancourt a previous war, and what Koreans Rocks, by creating the so-called Rhee Line. emotionally consider to be unfinished The text of the proclamation asserts “Korean business with Japan.” In this sense, Korea’s jurisdiction over waters within a line running status as a former Japanese colony has 60 nautical miles from the Korean coast,” complicated efforts to resolve the dispute.9 thereby staking a direct claim to the disputed territory.12 Japan responded by protesting Aftermath of Japan’s Occupation of Korea Korea’s claim and by declaring its non- Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan recognition of the Korean claim to the rocks, annexed Korea in a series of forced agree- thus sparking the modern controversy. ments made between 1905 and 1910. During Despite disagreement over the ownership this period, Japan laid claim to the islands by of the Liancourt Rocks, in June 1965 the two officially incorporating them into Shimane claimants signed the Treaty on Basic Prefecture. A notice issued on February 22, Relations, which normalized their diplomatic 1905 declared, “The island should be relations. No mention was made of the status designated as ‘Takeshima’ and placed under of Liancourt Rocks within the treaty’s text. the jurisdiction of Oki Islands.”10 Instead, both sides agreed to disagree and The end of World War II and the Japanese deleted all direct mention of the islands from occupation of Korea did little to resolve the the final document.13 The two sides did, issue. The status of the Liancourt Rocks was however, pledge to seek a peaceful settlement not addressed in Article 2(a) of the 1951 San of any future disputes through diplomatic Francisco Peace Treaty, which forced Japan channels.14

8 Victor Cha, Georgetown University, lecture, February 17, 2004. 9 Michael Lev, “A Point of Contention in the Sea of Japan: Seoul Testily Asserts Old Claim,” Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1996, pg. Lexis-Nexis. 10 “Mark Lovmo, “The Territorial Dispute Over Tokdo,”. 11Seokwoo Lee, “The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty With Japan and the Territorial Disputes in East Asia,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 11 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 63 (2002), pg. Lexis-Nexis. 12 Brian Bridges, Japan and Korea in the 1990s (Cambridge, UK: University Press, 1993), 65. 13 Ibid. 14 Kwan Bong Kim, The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 69.

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The International Law of Territorial Rocks.16 Among its other benefits, sovereign Japan Acquisition title to Liancourt would offer unilateral The sea has always been a source of food, access to lucrative fishing areas in the Sea of travel, communication links and trade. With Japan. modern technological innovations in offshore drilling and shipbuilding, the natural Economic Value of the EEZ resources of the sea have become increasing- There is little information on fish catch ly important. International law has thus and the status of stocks in the area focused on creating mechanisms for the surrounding the Liancourt Rocks. In 1985, equitable exploitation of marine resources. before the Korea-Japan fisheries agreement Subsequent international agreements, such as of 1998 in which both states agreed to regard the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the waters around Liancourt as neutral the International Maritime Organization and territory, total fish production was about 12 the International Seabed Authority, aim to million tons. Under the 2002 Korea-Japan govern the international use of the seas in Fishery Agreement, South Korea was allowed order to prevent overexploitation and to set to catch 149,200 tons of fish while Japan was rules for the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) limited to 94,000 tons. In January 2002, the of states. actual fishing industry As of 2004, UNCLOS output by Koreans was … SOVEREIGN TITLE TO boasted 157 signatories, “ 149,218 tons, while the LIANCOURT WOULD OFFER Japanese caught 93,773 including Japan and the UNILATERAL ACCESS TO 17 Republic of Korea. The LUCRATIVE FISHING AREAS IN tons. The East-West Center convention entitles coastal THE SEA OF JAPAN. projects that the total catch states to 200 nautical miles ” could be increased to about of sovereign access to living 13 million tons if the quotas and mineral resources within an exclusive were eliminated.18 Furthermore, the species economic zone. In addition, any islands and composition of the catch from Liancourt’s in some instances rocks that are capable of waters has changed over time. This may be sustaining human life, over which states due in part to the use of different fishing gear establish sovereignty, are also accorded but it also implies changes in the ecosystem. individual maritime zones.15 Within the EEZ, Coastal fisheries stocks are in reasonable the coastal state has sovereign rights for the shape but there is specific concern about the purpose of exploring and exploiting, stocks of flying fish, Pacific herring, conserving and managing the fish stocks of sandfish, halibut, Alaska pollack, and the zone. Concurrent with the convention Japanese sardine.19 entering into force in February 1996, Japan and South Korea created economic exclusion Rightful Claims to Territory zones around their respective territories, and International legal scholars do not have a each of these zones included the Liancourt consensual standard for determining

15 Article 121(3) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) states: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 16 Peregrine Hodson, “Tokyo’s Island Dispute with Seoul Worsens,” The Daily Telegraph, February 21, 1996, pg. Lexis-Nexis. 17 Kunwoo Kim, “Korea-Japan Fish Dispute,” Inventory of Conflict & Environment Case Studies, April 23, 2002, . 18 Mark Valencia (East-West Center) “Ocean Management Regimes in the Sea of Japan: Present and Future,” ESENA Workshop, July 12, 1998 . 19 Ibid.

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82 Tokdo or Takeshima? legitimate territorial acquisition. “Once Prescription is the process of acquiring granted, however, sovereignty, in relation to a territory through a “continuous and Japan portion of the surface of the globe, gives a undisturbed exercise of sovereignty lasting state a legal right to include such a portion long enough to create a widely held into its territory,” writes Douglas Shaw in conviction that the possession conforms to International Law.20 Customary international the standards of the international law provides the following five principles by community.”24 No general rules govern the which international tribunals can resolve length of time required to create this sovereignty disputes. conviction, but if many other states protest Cession of state territory is the peaceful the claim, the prescription standard is transfer of territory by the owner to another generally questioned. state. According to R.Y. Jennings in The Occupation is a state’s intentional claim Acquisition of Territory in International Law, of sovereignty over territory treated by the “The cession of a territory means the renunci- international community as terra nullius, or ation made by one State in favor of another of territory that does not belong to any other the rights and title which the former may have state. It is, Jennings write, “the appropriation to the territory in question. This is affected by by a state of a territory, which is not at the a treaty of cession expressing agreement to time subject to the sovereignty of any other the transfer.”21 International treaties or state.”25 Acquiring states substantiate their bilateral agreements in which the ceding state claim by establishing administration over the must intend to relinquish and pass territory. In the Eastern Greenland case, the sovereignty to the other state conclude these International Court of Justice stated that transfers. Furthermore, the receiving state claims to sovereignty “based not upon some must willfully accept the territory. particular act or title such as a treaty of Agreements imposed by force are void cession but merely upon continued display of because Article 52 of the Vienna Convention authority, involve two elements, each of on the Law of Treaties nullifies treaties which must be shown to exist: the intention procured by the threat or use of force.22 and will to act as sovereign, and some actual Related to this standard is the principle of exercise or display of such authority.”26 subjugation, which refers to title by conquest. It is the act by which one state acquires Empirical Examples and Case Law territory by annexation following military In addition to the prescribed rules for victory. Acquisition of territory following establishing justified and legal claims to armed conflict, however, requires further territory, a number of similar disputes shed action of an international nature in addition to light on the South Korea-Japan dispute. domestic legislation to annex, including a Resolving the Liancourt claims necessitates a treaty of cession or international comparison of the existing facts with relevant recognition.23 legal precedent, and several decisions by

20 Douglas Shaw, International Law (Cambridge, UK: Grotius Publications Limited, 1991), 278. 21 R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (New York, NY: Oceana Publications, 1963), 16. 22 Article 52 states: “A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” 23 Shaw, 288. 24 Jennings, 21. 25 Ibid., 20. 26 “Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case” P.C.I.J (1933), quoted in Shaw, 299.

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international adjudicatory bodies provide a establish the title by which territorial Japan framework for this analysis. sovereignty was validly acquired at a The Island of Palmas dispute between the certain moment; it must also be show that United States and the Netherlands involved a the territorial sovereignty has continued case similar to Liancourt. The issue to exist and did exist at the moment concerned ownership of the island of Palmas, which for the decision of the dispute must located off the Philippine coast. The United be considered as critical. This States based its title to Palmas on discovery demonstration consists in the actual and Spain’s subsequent cession of the display of State activities, such as Philippines to the US pursuant to the Treaty belongs only to the territorial sovereign.28 of Paris, which concluded the Spanish- Thus the court held that effective American War. Spain had sovereign rights occupation completed title of the territory over the Philippines until the war, thus claimed to have been part of the Netherlands. enabling the cession. The Netherlands, on the Mere discovery of land cannot compete other hand, based its claim on the against the continuous and peaceful display colonization of Palmas by the Dutch East of sovereignty by another state. India Company and on its subsequent In another case, the Clipperton Island uninterrupted and peaceful exercise of dispute between France and Mexico, the sovereignty over Palmas. The Netherlands court applied the Palmas rules to Clipperton, claim that this sovereignty arose out of an unpopulated island in the Pacific Ocean. conventions entered into with the island’s In the dispute, Mexico claimed that Spain native princes.27 originally discovered the island and as the In the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s successor of the Spanish state, Mexico decision, rendered by Justice Max Huber, the should be awarded full title to the land. court stressed the importance of continuous France, for its part, argued that it obtained and peaceful displays of sovereignty. Clipperton in November 1858 as a result of a Rejecting the United States’ claims of French Navy lieutenant’s discovery of the discovery, the court awarded Palmas to the island and the subsequent proclamation, Netherlands, concluding that discovery is declaration, and notification of the French insufficient to establish sovereignty over an consulate.29 island. The court decided: The arbitrator found no decisive proof If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty that Spain discovered Clipperton. It over a portion of territory, it is customary concluded that even if one assumes that Spain to examine which of the States claiming discovered Clipperton, Mexico did not sovereignty possesses a title Ð cession, support its claims with the requisite conquest, occupation, etc. Ð superior to manifestations of sovereignty. Consequently, that which the other state might possibly Clipperton Island was terra nullius when bring forward against it. However, if the France staked its original claim. Therefore, contestation is based on the fact that the the question posed to the court was whether other party has actually displayed either claimant had completed its ownership sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to claims by actual manifestations of

27 Sibbett, 1625. 28 Jennings, 92. 29 Shaw, 296.

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84 Tokdo or Takeshima? sovereignty as determined by the Palmas only acquired title to the island during its case. illegal occupation of the Korean peninsula Japan According to Shaw’s International Law, and that Korea’s subsequent liberation gives “The arbiter concluded that the actual, and it a legal claim to the land. not the nominal taking of possession was a necessary condition of occupation.”30 Since Japan’s Claims to Takeshima Mexico engaged only in the symbolic act of The earliest Japanese records hoisting its flag, it did not display the documenting the existence and ownership of requisite peaceful and continuous acts of Takeshima date to 1650 and indicate the sovereignty. In granting Clipperton to France, granting of the territory to what is known the arbiter found that France manifested its today as Tottori Prefecture. Japan also asserts sovereignty over the island by a formal that numerous pre-nineteenth century proclamation of sovereignty, a formal protest documents provide a sound basis for its to Mexico’s assertions of title, a formal naval historical claim. The Japanese Ministry of landing on the island and the creation of a Foreign Affairs, for example, points to a 1779 guano procurement station. As such, Shaw map by Sekisui Nagakubo, which represents writes, both the Palmas and Clipperton the location of Takeshima as part of Japan. decisions demonstrate that Furthermore, the Foreign “in the case of uninhabited Ministry points to historical THE ARBITER CONCLUDED THAT areas, little is required by “ documents dating to 1618, THE ACTUAL, AND NOT THE way of displaying actual NOMINAL TAKING OF which purport to provide physical authority over the POSSESSION WAS A evidence of Japanese territory to effectuate NECESSARY CONDITION OF fishermen’s use of the possession.”31 These acts, OCCUPATION Liancourt Rocks. Japan also however, are necessary to ” contends that it occupied complete a state’s title to any Takeshima during the Seven territory. Years’ War and the Russo-Japanese War. Most important for Japan’s case, International Legal Claims to the however, was its annexation of Korea Liancourt Rocks between 1905 and 1910. The Japanese claim As noted above, Japan’s claims to to have incorporated Liancourt Ð land they Takeshima are based on historical considered to be terra nullius Ð into Shimane documentation and international law. The Prefecture on February 22, 1905. After Japanese government points to agreements having declared Takeshima as a part of with the Korean government, formal Imperial Japan in February 1905, Japanese declarations of ownership, and formal officials registered the island in the State protests against Korea’s activities on the Land Register for Okinokuni, District 4.32 island. In response, Korea argues that it Japan contends that as part of its originally discovered Liancourt and annexation of Korea, all Korean territory continues to administer and maintain a became Japanese. It asserts, “the measures to presence on the island. It contends that Japan incorporate Takeshima reaffirmed the

30 Ibid., 296. 31 Ibid., 297. 32 Lovmo.

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intention of the Japanese government to claim South Korea’s Claims to Tokdo Japan territorial rights as a modern nation over The South Korean claim to Tokdo is Takeshima. In addition, the incorporation of based on earlier, more numerous precedents Takeshima was reported in the newspapers than that of Japan. Korean experts claim that and was not undertaken secretly, hence it was numerous eighth-century historical records implemented validly.”33 Accordingly, in prove that the area was first incorporated into Japan’s view the annexation of Korea the Korean Shilla Dynasty in 512 A.D. In consisted of a peaceful, voluntary, and addition, Korea asserts that numerous maps, negotiated merging of both countries. including one by Japanese cartographer Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Dabuchi Tomohiko, verify its title to Tokdo.35 the Allied Powers invalidated Japan’s title to “The Japanese government cites the Takeshima. The Supreme Commander for the Onshu Shicho Goki (Records on Observation Allied Powers (SCAP) issued SCAPIN 677, in Oki Province) edited by Saito Hosen in which outlined Japanese territory and 1667 as the first record on Tokdo,” writes specifically instructed that the disputed islets Yong-Ha Shin in A Historical Study of were to be excluded from Japanese Korea’s Title to Tokdo. “Saito was a retainer administrative authority. The directive of the daimyo of Izumo and at his lord’s included a caveat, however, stating that the behest made an observation trip to Oki Island. document would not represent a final In Saito’s report, Tokdo and Ullungdo were decision regarding the attribution of Japanese both ascribed to Korea and Oki to Japan as its sovereign territory.34 Japan therefore westernmost border. This first Japanese maintains that Takeshima rightfully belongs record on the islands clearly places Oki to it and ought to be returned. within Japan’s territory and Tokdo within During negotiations over the 1951 San Korea’s.”36 Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan tried to regain Korea also maintains that it was in a administrative ownership of Takeshima. weakened position vis-à-vis Japan in 1905, These efforts were unsuccessful, however, when Tokdo was incorporated into Shimane and the issue remained off the table largely Prefecture. The South Korean government because of Syngman Rhee’s announcement argues that Korea was unable to protest the of the “Rhee Line” just months before the San Japanese move at the time because Japan had Francisco talks. forcibly taken control of Korea’s foreign Japan’s confidence in its position affairs under the Protectorate Treaty. resurfaced in September 1954 when it Furthermore, South Korea claims that after threatened to refer the matter to the World War II, Japan returned Tokdo as part of International Court of Justice. Since then, the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Japan dispatches an annual notice to Seoul to Potsdam Proclamation, which ended remind the Korean government of Japan’s Japanese control of Korea. The Cairo claims to the island. It also regularly sends Declaration pledged that Korea would be free Maritime Safety Agency vessels to the area in and independent after declaring, “Japan shall order to hoist the Japanese flag. be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific

33 “The Issue of Takeshima,” The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2004 . 34 Ibid. 35 Lovmo. 36 Yong-Ha Shin, “First Japanese Record on Tokdo,” from A Historical Study of Korea’s Title to Tokdo .

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86 Tokdo or Takeshima? which she has seized or occupied . . . Japan campaign to make the South Korean will also be expelled from all other territories government’s claims to territory clear and to Japan which she has taken by violence and greed.”37 establish a permanent presence on Tokdo. In 1946 SCAP issued Directives No. 677 and No. 1033, in which Japan is defined as Superior Claims Under International Law including the four main islands and In order for either state to gain the approximately a thousand smaller adjacent exclusive economic zone afforded by islands. The directive, however, specifically Liancourt, it must first establish excluded Ullungdo, Chejudo and Tokdo. internationally recognized sovereignty over Given that the directive was made without the the island. Considering the claims of both participation of Korean diplomats, Tokdo was sides to the Liancourt Rocks, Korea has clearly recognized as Korean territory by the established the stronger claim because it has international community.38 Furthermore, the manifested greater acts of sovereignty in the Treaty of Peace with Japan stated in its area. While Korea offers limited arguments territory clause that Japan, “recognizing the that it acquired Liancourt as a result of a independence of Korea, renounces all right, particular method of territorial acquisition, it title and claim to Korea, including Chejudo, has demonstrated ownership by manifesting Komundo and Ullungdo.”39 The names of the relevant, affirmative acts of sovereignty as islands were cited as illustrations but necessitated by the Palmas and Clipperton obviously not as an exhaustive enumeration. decisions. Therefore, all other small islands around the Despite Japan’s reliance on the 1905 and Korean Peninsula, including Tokdo, were not 1910 annexation treaties by which it argues mentioned but should not be considered as that all Korean territory became Japanese, it excluded. is questionable whether Korea intended to Subsequent to the end of the Japanese give up its title and pass sovereignty to the occupation, Tokdo saw its first Korean Japanese, as is required for a valid cession. inhabitants. Since then, there has been a Indeed, Korea resisted the annexation period continual Korean presence of at least one or with uprisings, protests, and a continual two fishing families and a permanent coast struggle to gain independence. Additionally, guard. The South Korean government has when news of Japan’s incorporation of Tokdo also taken steps to develop the area. In 1995 reached Korea, the Minister of Home Affairs for example, the government began building rejected the Japanese claim, stating, “it is harbor facilities and announced plans to totally groundless for the Japanese to lay install a desalinization plant to provide claim to Tokdo and I am shocked at the drinking water for Tokdo’s inhabitants. report.”41 The Korean State Council Beginning in March 1996, tourists were responded by issuing Directive No. III on allowed to visit the island and upgraded April 29, 1906, wherein the council navigational facilities made access to Tokdo denounced the Japanese claim as groundless. easier.40 Such measures are part of a larger Japan points to the absence of any action

37 “Cairo Declaration of 1943,” from the National Diet Library of Japan . 38 Sun Myong Kim, “Tokdo,” University of Tennessee-Knoxville, 1996. . 39 Ibid. 40 “Lighthouse Planned on a Disputed Islet,” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1996. 41 Yong-Ha Shin, “Korean Government’s Reaction,” from A Historical Study of Korea’s Title to Tokdo .

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on the part of the Korean government when cede Liancourt to Japan, such an act would be Japan the area was annexed but does not cession rather than subjugation. As noted acknowledge that the Japanese Resident- earlier, since Korea did not intentionally General in Korea was responsible for foreign relinquish title to Japan, Japanese claims affairs, leaving the Korean government no based on cession are likely to fail. diplomatic channel for disputing the Japanese Japanese claims to sovereignty based on claim. Protestations of a peaceful transfer occupation are also weak. Occupation reflect more on the harsh control of the presumes that the occupied territory did not Japanese over Korea during the occupation already belong to a state. Liancourt’s history, period than on actual events. Finally, any however, appears to show that the island argument that Korea voluntarily merged into initially belonged to Korea. Furthermore, Japan as a result of peaceful negotiations has Japanese claims to sovereignty based on the been refuted repeatedly by a variety of annexation treaties negate any claim to have documentary sources. As such, Japanese discovered Takeshima because the treaties claims to title based on cession fail. concede a lack of initial ownership. If, on the Japan and South Korea would have other hand, South Korea can prove that it had difficulty propounding any claims under the original title based on discovery, then it has a prescription standard. South good chance of establishing Korea continually protests complete title by effective JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA Japan’s annexation rule and “ occupation as set out by the WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY Japan continuously protests PROPOUNDING ANY CLAIMS Palmas decision. Under the South Korea’s presence on UNDER THE PRESCRIPTION Palmas and Clipperton Takeshima. These protests STANDARD. standards, Korea’s manifes- undermine prescription’s ” tations of sovereignty, requirement of an undisturb- including permanent Korean ed exercise of sovereignty and a general inhabitants and the construction of conviction that the claim conforms to the infrastructure, should prove sufficient to international order. While Japan could argue demonstrate effective occupation.43 Japan’s that the international community did not occupation, by contrast, was not continual protest its occupation of Tokdo or the entire and only occurred during times of unrest. peninsula between 1905 and 1945, Japan There is no indication of a Japanese presence cannot demonstrate that its sovereignty on the island since World War II ended. remained undisturbed after granting Korea South Korea has an enormous advantage independence.42 over Japan because it has de facto possession Japan has a strong claim to acquiring of the islands and has undertaken a variety of Liancourt by subjugation. By issuing a formal infrastructure projects and improvements. As annexation order following its conquest of the Palmas decision shows, international Korea, Japan established sovereignty over the judicial bodies highlight establishing peninsula and its holdings. An international sovereignty through positive acts, especially adjudication body might consider this a when occupying a territory. Effective handover of title to Japan. If, however, South possession of the Liancourt Rocks generally Korea can prove that Japan forced Korea to entitles Korea to the claim.

42 Sibbett, 1641. 43 Ibid.

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88 Tokdo or Takeshima? Japan may claim that formal protests cooperate. Negotiations, including such as hoisting the Japanese flag on the agreements granting the Japanese access to Japan island and sending ships to the area are Tokdo’s fishing areas, are one way in which sufficient signs of sovereignty, but a judicial the South Korean government is trying to body might find otherwise. In the Clipperton mend relations with its former colonizer. case, Mexico tried to substantiate its claim by Flare-ups do occur periodically, however, raising a Mexican flag on the island and by as in the 1999 example in which Tokyo and sending a warship to defend the island from Seoul tried to register permanent addresses on takeover. Nonetheless, the court in the case the islands. Seoul reacted by sending a letter found these acts insufficient to substantiate to Tokyo calling for “immediate cancellations Mexico’s claim. of the registrations.” Tokyo responded by Ultimately, South Korea has a stronger stating it “cannot bar its residents from claim to Liancourt than does Japan. Japan’s shifting census registrations, as the island is claims rest largely on numerous agreements part of its territory.”44 Despite this exchange with the Korean government, implying that of letters, neither country was willing to the islands originally belonged to Korea. escalate tensions and each dropped the issue Accordingly, assuming Korea originally within days. possessed Liancourt and can Additionally, after South prove that it completed its Korea announced plans to ULTIMATELY, SOUTH KOREA HAS original claim by subsequent “ construct a lighthouse and A STRONGER CLAIM TO affirmative manifestations of LIANCOURT THAN DOES JAPAN. permanent coast guard sovereignty, a judicial body stations on the Liancourt should find in its favor. ” Rocks, Japan protested by sending a formal letter to Seoul but quickly An Atmosphere of Compromise dropped the issue. The postage stamp dispute Throughout the post-World War II history mentioned above, while initially a matter of of Korea and Japan, the two governments contention, has subsided; both sides have have been embroiled in disputes over essentially agreed to disagree. Thus, while Tokdo/Takeshima. Central to this dispute are both states maintain their claims to the islands the economic implications of access to the and are angered by measures to assert title by island’s exclusive economic zone. Both states the other side, they are willing to believe that the area is one of their most compromise. important fishing fields given the size of fish In November 1998, South Korea and stocks in its waters. For this reason, the Japan agreed to renew a 1965 treaty that set a longstanding issue will likely feature in provisional fishing zone around the islands. bilateral discussions and cause frictions in the Under the agreement, fishing boats from years to come, although neither country Japan and South Korea were allowed to seems willing to break off relations over a operate in each other’s 200 nautical mile minor territorial dispute. Despite a history of exclusive economic zones if they obtained tensions related to the island, none has risen permits, while fishing quotas and conditions to the level of extreme discord. Instead, both for such operations were to be decided by the states appear willing to compromise and two countries every year.45 This agreement

44 Roger Dean Du Mars, “Address Registration Revives Islands Dispute,” South China Morning Post, December 28, 1999. 45 “South Korea, Japan Agree Fisheries Treaty,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, November 28 1998.

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laid the foundation for a subsequent 2002 bilateral relationship between Japan and Japan fisheries accord in which each state agreed to South Korea, the two sides will likely resolve lower its catch quota in order to preserve any remaining disputes related to Tokdo by depleting fish stocks around the islands. compromise and agreement. Korea will likely Despite this paper’s conclusion that maintain possession of the islands in order to South Korea has a better legal claim to protect its historical claims. Since Japan is Tokdo, the two states are unlikely to bring the mainly concerned with its economic interests, issue before an international arbitrator. however, it will continue to pursue fishery Instead, Japan will likely remain adamant in agreements similar to the 2002 pact to ensure its claim but not push the issue formally as its continued access to the lucrative waters of long as other, more important territorial the Sea of Japan. disputes exist. Given the need for a close

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90 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea

Korea The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea: Insights from Democratization Theory

Yun-Jo Cho

The continued presence of authoritarian evaluate the potential political ramifications rule in the Democratic People’s Republic of of the reforms, a systematic understanding of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) represents an the sources of the current regime’s stability is outlier in the post-Cold War political crucial. histories of former Soviet bloc countries. This study will therefore focus on Despite undergoing major socioeconomic identifying the key variables to which the distress caused by close to a decade of DPRK regime’s survivability in the post-Cold economic stagnation following the end of the War period can be atttributed. It concludes Cold War, the death of the country’s that factors relating to North Korea’s social personality cult Kim Il-Sung in 1993, and structure, leadership strategies, regime type, heavy international pressures, the Kim Jong- and external environment have effectively Il regime has nonetheless demonstrated a obstructed the impact of some key causal capacity to sustain itself politically. Yet a forces for democratization. systematic account of the sources of regime stability in the DPRK that engages the The DPRK Case as an Anomaly in broader literature on democratization is at Democratization Theory? present lacking. At first glance, the North Korean case A comprehensive theoretical explanation appears to represent an anomaly in the is critical for several reasons. The issue of democratization literature of the past decade regime change has occupied one of the central because it has successfully maintained its themes in the policy-debate towards North totalitarian polity despite undergoing many Korea. On one end of the policy spectrum, of the causal factors often associated with hardliners argue for a policy of containment or democratic transitions. In particular, two isolation, whereas others propound a more outstanding variables form the basis of conciliatory approach based on variants of an expecting a regime collapse in the DPRK. engagement policy. Both approaches, The first of these is economic crisis. The however, demand vital assumptions regarding 1990s represented a decade of severe domestic political stability for assessing their economic decline for North Korea. National viability and impact. Moreover, this issue has output was reduced roughly to half over the taken on tremendous importance as a result of period, coupled with food shortages that the DPRK’s economic reforms since July afflicted over a quarter of the population in 2002, which have set the country on a path of mid-decade.1 The single-most important slow but unprecedented change. In order to proximate cause was the massive trade shock

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Yun-Jo Cho 91 resulting from the disintegration of the performance, an economic crisis is equivalent Korea Soviet Union and the collapse of the Eastern to a loss of legitimacy. An example is the bloc in the early 1990s. As Marcus Noland transition case of Indonesia, in which the points out, “the fall in imports from Russia in country’s dramatic economic downturn 1991 was equivalent to 40% of all imports, during the Asian financial crisis was a major and by 1993 imports from Russia were only cause of the end of Suharto’s dictatorship.5 10% of their 1987-90 average.”2 This meant On the other hand, economic that North Korea lost access to most of the predicaments can create tensions within the subsidized oil and coal (in addition to a third ruling elite that may increase the likelihood of its steel imports) for which it had come to of reforms, coups, and other stimulants of rely almost exclusively on the USSR since regime change. In the particular case of the 1960s. What followed was a plummeting highly personalistic dictatorships such as of the DPRK economy, which in turn led to a North Korea, economic crises can inhibit the drastic fall in its agricultural output. distribution of benefits to supporters and Combined with such exogenous shocks, allies of the dictator, whose loyalties are unsustainable agricultural practices largely a function of personal patronage.6 As implemented since the late 1980s resulted in Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman note, heavy soil erosion and “economic downturns affect ultimately famine.3 the loyalty of the political- …ECONOMIC CRISES CAN The mainstream “ military elite by reducing INHIBIT THE DISTRIBUTION OF literature on democratization BENEFITS TO SUPPORTERS the ability of the posits that poor economic AND ALLIES OF THE DICTATOR, government to deliver 7 performance raises the WHOSE LOYALTIES ARE material benefits.” Such probability of regime LARGELY A FUNCTION OF tensions have the potential collapse. There are two main PERSONAL PATRONAGE. to drastically alter the causal chains through which ” political landscape. Splits this relationship is expected generated within the elite to hold. The first is through the possibility may interact with developments from that negative economic shocks can induce a below—i.e., regime softliners can seek and mass mobilization of protest (e.g. strikes, find support among the masses.8 Moreover, demonstrations, etc.) that effectively raises new coalitions can emerge within the domain the cost of coercion precisely in a time when of civil-military relations, as the military economic conditions severely limit a may either find new allies within the regime’s coercive capacity.4 In short, for an government, stage a coup of its own making, authoritarian regime that bases a significant or simply its withdraw support of the present portion of its legitimacy on economic regime.9

1 Noland, Marcus, “Famine and Reform in North Korea,” Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 03-5, (July 2003): 4. 2 Ibid., 5. 3 Ibid., 4. 4 Haggard, Stephan and Robert R. Kaufman, “The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3 (April 1997): 266-269. 5 Uhlin, Anders, Indonesia and the “Third Wave of Democratization: The Indonesian Pro-Democracy Movement in a Changing World (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997): 45. 6 Geddes, Barbara, “What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2 (June 1999): 139. 7 Haggard and Kaufman (1997), 268. 8 Ibid., 267.

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92 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea The second variable associated with the In the case of personalist authoritarian DPRK’s collapse is the death of Kim Il-Sung regimes, the autocrat’s heavy reliance on Korea in 1994. As the founding father of the nation, informal (and often unstable) networks of Kim Il-Sung’s near-deification had rendered personal patronage for political capital him virtually immune to any opposition to his means that the loss of such a figure can—in legitimacy. Over 40 years of continued the absence of a stable succession of the autocratic rule had made his cult of personality cult—lead to a political vacuum personality permeate throughout the entire in which previously latent forms of political North Korean polity and society. In short, the opposition and factionalism may emerge. late Kim’s personality cult had been what Empirical evidence in the democratization defined the DPRK as a highly personalistic, literature suggests that the death of the neopatrimonial variant of authoritarianism, in dictator is a major cause of regime collapse which “the chief executive’s maintenance of in such political settings. Geddes, for state authority [is] conducted through an example, finds that only four of the 51 extensive network of personal patronage personalist regimes included in her data set rather than impersonal law.”10 The sudden survived for more than a short time following death of the late Kim thus mounted to a major the leader’s death.14 domestic political crisis, in addition to the economic crisis that had befallen the nation. Accounting for the Anomaly One of the most fundamental factors that In order to provide a systematic account affect regime longevity for authoritarian for the DPRK regime’s resilience to systems is the type of non-democratic pressures for change, it is worthwhile to governance employed by the regime.11 approach the issue from the structural and Although there is no universal classification transactional (i.e. actor-oriented) variants of scheme, most studies distinguish broadly democratization theory. The task is thus to among personalist (or sultanistic, identify the presence or absence of any neopatrimonial, etc.), military, and single- mediating variables—on both the societal party forms of authoritarianism. Regime-type and leadership levels—that condition the is distinguished in terms of the control over causal effects of the aforementioned factors access to power and influence in the polity, on the likelihood of regime transition. and the relative roles that formal institutional On the leadership level, the sources of structures and personal authority play in regime durability in the DPRK can be found exercising that control.12 In practice, differing in the very nature of the regime itself as a regime types entail varying incentive highly personalist variant of authoritarian structures facing key actors within the dictatorship. As noted above, economic governing elite, and thereby bear critically on downturns may adversely affect the a given regime’s capacity to sustain domestic distribution of material benefits; at the same political and economic crises.13 time, however, the incentive structure facing

9 Snyder, Richard, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, Issue 4 (July 1992): 383 10 Ibid., 379. 11 Geddes (1999), 116. 12 Ibid., 121. 13 Bratton Michael, and Nicholas van de Walle (1994). “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, World Politics, Vol. 46 (July 1994): 462. 14 Geddes (1999): 132.

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Yun-Jo Cho 93 supporters of personalistic regimes renders lower-left cell because the minority Korea the leadership highly resistant to internal (assuming that it desires a transition to splits. As Michael Bratton and Nicholas van democracy) has fewer opportunities to line de Walle point out: their pockets and exercise influence when the “Insiders in a patrimonial ruling coalition majority faction is out of power. are unlikely to promote reform… Psychological factors heavily influence the recruited and sustained with material perceived payoffs of the minority faction. inducements, lacking an independent That is, the high degree of uncertainty political base, and thoroughly compro- involved in such plotting (the probability of mised in the regime’s corruption, they are success and getting caught, the eventual dependent on the survival of the outcome of a regime transition, etc.) and the incumbent. Insiders typically have risen lack of trust inherent in such political settings through the ranks of political service and, may inhibit the occurrence of effective apart from top leaders who may have cooperation even within a minority clique. As invested in private capital holdings, for the majority faction, its payoffs are higher derive livelihood principally from state when the minority is out of power, since the or party offices. Because they face the material benefits emanating from the autocrat prospect of losing all visible means of are not as widely shared and also because it support in a political transition, they have has eliminated potential internal sources of little option but to cling to the regime, to instability from the ranks of government. In sink or swim with it.”15 the normal state of affairs, then, the DPRK These dynamics are best illustrated using a regime is expected to exhibit a high degree of game-theoretic approach.16 Suppose the regime unity (as indicated by cooperation status quo is characterized by two factions between the majority and minority factions). surrounding the autocrat: a majority As Victor Cha observes, in present-day North (including Kim Jong-Il, the military and Korea “the elite seek only to ensure their other influential members of the Kim clique) relative share of the sparse gains that could be and a minority faction (e.g. discontented had from the system rather than contemplat- bureaucrats, some military generals, etc.). ing a change of it.”18 Then, the incentive structure facing both With respect to the possible dynamics factions is given by: triggered by an economic crisis on regime Minority Faction stability, therefore, the causal effect of crisis in power out of power on triggering splits within the regime is Majority in power 1017, 8 12, 0 mediated by the condition that the crisis is Faction out of power 0, 4 0, 0 bad enough to the extent that the minority faction’s payoff in the upper-left hand cell is For the minority faction, the payoff is highest equal to or lower than the expected payoff of (8) when both factions are in power. The an attempt at overthrow. In North Korea, it is payoff in the upper-left cell is higher than the presumable that this has not yet occurred.

15 Bratton and van de Walle (1994): 464. 16 The game below is an application of the payoff structure facing personalist regimes that appeared in Geddes (1999). 17 This first number represents the payoffs to the majority faction. 18 Cha, Victor, “North Korea’s Economic Reforms and Security Intentions”, Testimony for U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 108th Congress, 2nd Session, March 2, 2004. Available online at: http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/transition/ChaTestimony040302.html [29 Sept. 2004].

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94 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea Besides legitimate economic channels, it is assumed power in 1998, he was not well known that the country is engaged in a inaugurated as the President (which was left Korea host of illicit economic activities such as vacant in reverence of his father as the drug trafficking, arms sales, and private “Eternal President”), but as the Chairman of remittances from Japan.19 The international the National Defense Commission (a group aid North Korea receives can also serve to of 10 men that includes the heads of air force, cushion the adverse impact of poor economic army and navy), which was designated as the performance on maintaining regime unity. highest post of the state. Furthermore, during Moreover, for the discontented elite, there the transitional period of 1994-1997, Kim’s always exists the more appealing option of formal political capacity was based wholly defecting to another country should the status on his standing as the Supreme Commander quo become unbearable. In fact, the number of the Armed Forces, a title that he had of defections from the country in the 1990s assumed in 1991. increased by more than three-fold compared Indeed, there appears to be sufficient to the previous decade.20 evidence that Kim Jong-Il has increasingly In addition to the underlying incentive relied on the military to govern. Marcus structure, Kim Jong-Il’s regime has exhibited Noland cites a study which observes that durability by virtue of “more than half of Kim’s various leadership tactics public appearances in 1996 IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE employed following (and “ and 1997 were military- COUNTRY IS ENGAGED IN A perhaps even before) the HOST OF ILLICIT ECONOMIC related, and military figures death of Kim Il-Sung. The ACTIVITIES SUCH AS DRUG have become increasingly most important aspect to TRAFFICKING, ARMS SALES, prominent in the Kim’s adept management of AND PRIVATE REMITTANCES government hierarchy.”23 succession politics has FROM JAPAN More recently in 2001, as undoubtedly been his ” Victor Cha and David Kang successful cooptation of the point out, ex-military military as a key supporting institution of his officers have been assigned as directors of regime. Control over the military and factories or enterprises in an attempt to holding its absolute loyalty has been one of convert them from military to economic the key sources of political power in the elites.24 This suggests the heavy influence of DPRK.21 In a time of major uncertainty the military in Kim’s support network.25 following his father’s sudden death, Another notable dimension of Kim Jong- therefore, Kim Jong-Il’s strategy was to Il’s succession strategy has been to consolidate his political power primarily by consolidate his legitimacy through ideology. means of securing the military’s absolute His military-first policy, also known as the loyalty.22 In fact, when Kim formally “Red Banner Spirit,” introduced around

19 Hwang, Balbina, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” The Nautilus Institute, DPRK Briefing Book: Terrorism, (August 2003): 4-5. Available at: http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/terrorism/bg1679.html [29 Sept. 2004]. 20 Kihl, Young-whan, “North Korea’s Political Problem”, The Nautilus Institute, NAPSnet Forum #12, 1997: 1. Available at: http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/12a_Kihl.html [29 Sept. 2004]. 21 Kihl (1997): 4-5. 22 Kihl (1997): 5. 23 Noland, Marcus. Avoiding the Apocalypse (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 334. 24 Cha, Victor, and David Kang, Nuclear North Korea (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), 111. 25 This may also be interpreted as a political move to gain support of the military for economic reforms.

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Yun-Jo Cho 95 1995, elevates the military—even above the revolutionary fervor and nationalism among Korea Korean Workers Party (KWP)—as the most the masses, and thereby serves the function patriotic, creative, and effective institution in of a coping mechanism at times of hardship.28 society most capable of realizing the juche The military-first policy also further ideology.26 Some excerpts from a 1996 reinforces the military’s loyalty to Kim, speech by Kim Jong-Il upon the 50th while at the same time consolidating his own anniversary of Kim Il-Sung University cult of personality as both a chief national exemplify this philosophy: theoretician and Supreme Commander of the “The revolutionary army has a very Armed Forces.29 Finally, and most important role in the building of pragmatically, by elevating the Korean socialism and in manning the People’s Army as the supreme institution fatherland’s defence line. Therefore, our within the nation, Kim can find an adequate great leader… emphasiz[ed] the great scapegoats for present-day ills. Another importance he attached to our armed quotation from the aforementioned speech is defence forces… specifically there illustrative: should be measures to guarantee rice for “I cannot solve all the problems while I the military, to protect and complete the have the duty of being in charge of socialist structure… it is unjustifiable practical economic projects as well as that we cannot supply food to our army the overall economy, as I have to control that has been victorious for over sixty important sectors such as the military years since our great leader was an anti- and the party as well… The great leader Japanese freedom fighter… the told me when he was alive never to be responsibility for the trouble today can involved in economic projects, [to] just be blamed on the party workers… main concentrate on the military and the party reason for this is that party workers… and leave economics to party are not doing their work in a functionaries. If I do delve into revolutionary manner… All of the party economics then I cannot run the party workers and party organizations should and the military effectively… The party learn the military revolutionary spirit and workers should develop the correct make changes in all their projects, there solution to our food shortage… The should be a fundamental change in their anarchic situation that this shortage is way of thinking… ”27 now creating is to be blamed not only on This type of ideology serves multiple the administrative and economic workers functions for Kim. First, it reinforces his in government, but also the party legitimacy as a dynastic successor by workers”.30 maintaining a core element of ideological continuity between the past and present. On the societal level a combination of Second, it incites both a renewed sense of social, historical, and cultural factors has

26 Kihl (1997): 4. 27 Kim, Jong Il, “On the 50th Anniversary of Kim Il-Sung University”, Monthly Chosun, Speech by Kim Jong-Il, (April 1997). Available at: http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/kji-kisu.htm [29 Sept. 2004]. 28 Noland (2000): 95. 29 Kihl (1997): 2. 30 Kim, Jong Il, “On the 50th Anniversary of Kim Il-Sung University”, Monthly Chosun, Speech by Kim Jong-Il, (April 1997). Available at: http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/kji-kisu.htm [29 Sept. 2004]

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96 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea obstructed the emergence of demands for In addition, as Marcus Noland points political change. Although there have out, North Korean society neither possesses Korea reportedly been some sporadic incidents of nor has ever experienced institutions capable food riots and uprisings, these were all of translating mass discontent into political limited to certain localities and nothing has action.34 Although limited networks of civic occurred on the mass level to challenge the association exist in the country (primarily in authority of the government. Why not? the form of local “committees of public First, North Korea’s level of security,” around which much of everyday socioeconomic development is so low that it life is organized), society at large is heavily lacks the structural conditions necessary for infiltrated by the state as both a means of an economic crisis to translate into mass social surveillance and indoctrination.35 To uprisings. Typically cited conditions include ease the government’s monitoring of society, those such as a large middle-income class, since 1967 the government has imposed a civic networks of association or any other three-tier classification system on the modes of civil society, high levels of population based on their political loyalty: a education, and urbanization. In addition, a ‘core’ class of about 28% of the population minimum income per capita level of at least loyal to the KWP; an ‘unstable’ class of $1000 is necessary for those conditions to about 45% that include ordinary workers; take effect as incomes grow—in countries and a ‘hostile’ class of about 27% that with income levels below that threshold, comprise of political dissidents and their dictatorships are almost always stable.31 families.36 Moreover, the Kim Jong Il regime Though the DPRK is a relatively well- maintains an effective political monitoring educated and urbanized country, with the surveillance system through two primary literacy and urbanization rates comparable to institutions—the secret police and public those of South Korea as of 1992, its GDP per security ministry—to monitor citizens’ capita in 2002 was estimated to be around political behavior.37 $1000 (down from approximately $2284 in The dire socioeconomic circumstances 1990).32 Thus, under conditions of low- in the DPRK also shed light on the income levels coupled with major shortages importance of cultural factors in reinforcing of food, it is difficult for citizens to concern the weaknesses of ‘people power’ in bringing themselves of anything beyond basic daily about political change in the country. The needs. As Victor Cha points out, “[the North masses’ immediate concerns of economic Korean] masses are preoccupied with basic and physical security renders matters relating subsistence… [and thus] the overturning of to post-materialist values (such as quality of systems like North Korea occur not when life and political liberty) as peripheral issues things are at their absolute worst, but when in their daily lives—and such an emphasis on they begin to get better.”33 ‘survival values’ over values of ‘self-

31 Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. “Modernization: Theories and Facts”, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 2 (January 1997): 13. In other words, at very low levels of income, dictatorships tend to be highly stable. 32 For detailed data, see Noland (2000): 74-78. 33 Cha, Victor, “North Korea’s Economic Reforms and Security Intentions”, Testimony for U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 108th Congress, 2nd Session, March 2, 2004. Available online at: http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/transition/ChaTestimony040302.html [29 Sept. 2004]. 34 Noland (2000): 334 35 Ibid., 333. 36 Ibid., 73. 37 Kihl (1997): 5.

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Yun-Jo Cho 97 expression’ has been found to be years—as did Mao Zedong in China in the Korea significantly tolerant of authoritarian forms late 1950s.39 of government.38 Furthermore, over a The DPRK government’s total regulation quarter-century of indoctrination in the juche of the flow of information—both within the state ideology—with its emphasis on self- country and between its borders—along with reliance, national pride, and perhaps most its broader mechanisms for social control, importantly, on the leadership of the have prevented the dissemination of “Suryong”(the leader)—has reinforced the discontent. Marcus Noland asserts that “the traditional Confucian virtues of obedience to state has near perfect monopoly of mass authority, social harmony and consensus media and completely regiments everyday over divergence, and the family, to produce a life.”40 The control over information within political-cultural norm of stable authoritarian the country means that it is almost governance. In light of such value systems, impossible for people of one locality to know the political turmoil in the mid-1990s may of organized protest in areas beyond its have thus, paradoxically, served to enhance immediate surroundings. Moreover, as a support for the succeeding regime. result of its national isolation, North Korean In conjunction, North Koreans not only citizens lack a sense of collective ‘relative lack any historical deprivation’; i.e., because experience with democracy, they have nothing to THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE but they have experienced “ compare their present MID-1990S MAY HAVE THUS, no other type of political PARADOXICALLY, SERVED TO situation other than their rule but one that rests its ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR THE own history (and perhaps legitimacy on dynastic SUCCEEDING REGIME. China), it is difficult for continuation (with the ” North Koreans to merely exception of the Japanese ‘imagine’ political change.41 occupation). At the same time, the almost Thus, the government, with its control over total isolation of the DPRK masses from the information, may find it advantageous to rest of the world, combined with government isolate regions and localities from each other, propaganda’s emphasis on the threats posed akin to a ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy. Hence, by “foreign imperialists,” have reinforced “starvation may be relatively localized and cultural stability by maintaining high levels falling disproportionately on certain of fear among the populace and dependence socioeconomic groups, particularly rural on the current regime. As Sue Lautze notes, non-farm workers, and could reflect the very nature of the North Korean system conscious decision-making by the political in which ones security is found only in elite.”42 trusting strong leadership supports the Finally, North Korea’s external contention that Kim Jong-Il will be able to environment is a key structural variable that endure periods of famine for several more applies to both the leadership and societal

38 Inglehart, Ronald (2000). “Culture and Democracy”, in Harrison, and Huntington, ed.s, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, (Basic Books: New York, 2000): 86. 39 Lautze, Sue, “The Famine in North Korea: Humanitarian Responses in Communist Nations”, The Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University (June 1997): 10. 40 Noland (2000): 334. 41 Based on a discussion with Dr. Dennis McNamara, Sociology Department, Georgetown University (April 13, 2004). 42 Noland (2000): 337

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98 The Sources of Regime Stability in North Korea levels of analysis. National security concerns lower quality foodstuffs on world markets. are helping to sustain the current regime. Korea Given the status of the Korean War as one Conclusion that is held on hold through an armistice (as Despite undergoing two powerful causal opposed to a peace treaty) and the presence forces for democratization of US troops in the South, the war is far from contemporaneously, the Kim Jong-Il regime forgotten in the DPRK. As one prominent has displayed a remarkable degree of scholar on Korean security has pointed out, stability in the post-Cold War era. Regime North Korea possesses legitimate security stability in the DPRK has been a function of concerns.43 Such concerns in turn lend an various structural and transactional variables enormous amount of credibility to the radical that have mediated the causal impact of those government propaganda that preaches an “us forces on three levels of analysis: the vs. them” mentality. At the same time, for the leadership, societal, and external dimensions. military these concerns are translated into a On the leadership level, a tight heightened priority on domestic political personalist network of political elites, stability, which may be a significant force combined with a set of strategies employed driving their support for the regime. by Kim Jong Il—of which those relating to Moreover, for varying reasons the maintaining military loyalty to the status quo interests of neighboring countries such as seem most important—have the overall China and South Korea dictate an explicit degree of regime unity, thereby insulating the priority of avoiding the collapse of the current regime from pressures for change. At DPRK regime. Such interests stem from the societal level, poor socioeconomic economic and geostrategic concerns conditions, as well as the state’s full-blown regarding the tremendous costs incurred to penetration of society through political both countries in the event of a regime surveillance and control over the flow of breakdown.44 Given these interests, as well as information, have obstructed the emergence international humanitarian concerns, aid of demands for political change from below. flows numbering in the hundreds of millions The DPRK’s traditional Confucian cultural (approximately 1/3 as large as the DPRK’s base and ideological indoctrination in the total exports) have entered the DPRK in the juche ideology have also heavily influenced form of bilateral assistance, humanitarian the masses’ perception of Kim Jong Il’s assistance, UN aid (mainly the World Food legitimacy as a dynastic successor to the Program), the Korean Peninsula Energy nation’s original founder. Externally, the Development Organization (KEDO), and geostrategic calculations of neighboring other channels from at least 49 countries as countries have in effect raised the threshold of the late 1990s.45 In turn, as noted above, of economic pain needed to induce tensions foreign aid can be diverted for military use, within the elite, while the security used to support Kim’s patronage networks environment facing the DPRK has further and raise hard foreign currency by, for reinforced the military’s support for the example, selling high quality food aid for current regime.

43 Kang, David. “Rethinking North Korea”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35 No. 3 (March 1995): 253. 44 Shambaugh, David, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term”, Washington Quarterly, Vo. 26 No.2 (Spring 2003), 44-45. 45 See Noland (2000) for more detailed data on aid flows.

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Yun-Jo Cho 99 The conclusions reached in this study negative cases (i.e. non-transition) of the Korea have significant academic as well as policy independent variable, and an analysis of the implications. For future studies on North DPRK case can thus help to shed more light Korea, it may be of particular interest to on how authoritarian regimes are sustained. examine the relative importance of the As for policy, a systematic understanding of variables pointed out in this paper by regime stability in North Korea provides an examining cases of both transitions and non- adequate starting point from which to transitions from personalist variants of evaluate the potential political ramifications authoritarian rule. Democratization theory of the country’s July 2002 economic reforms. has yet to benefit from studies concerning

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100 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity

Korea Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity through Historical Reappropriation among Korean Minorities in China

Min-Dong Paul Lee

During the last two decades, the concept changes constantly through interactions of nationalism has been repeatedly put under among members within and outside of the spotlight by both the media and academics. nation. Yet, few studies explicate what the This heightened attention has produced a dynamism of nationalism entails. How is plethora of theories and applications of the nationalism dynamic? Are the forces that concept. However, there is little agreement shape nationalism endogenous or among scholars on what “nationalism” exogenous? What are the mechanisms of means and how it came about. Gellner and change? What is the locus of the dynamism? Hobbsbawn regard it as a political principle This paper attempts to address these that reflects cultural and voluntary questions by examining the contentious commitment of individuals within a national politics of symbolic boundary maintenance political boundary, where as Anderson between the Chinese government and Korean describes it as an imagined collective minorities in China. identity.1 Breuilly offers yet a different The dynamism of nationalism denotes definition by identifying nationalism with that national identity is, in essence, fluid and political movements seeking or exercising changeable. Prasenjit Duara contends, state power.2 Recently, even the long-held “nationalism is rarely the nationalism of the consensus on the relatively recent historical nation, but rather represents the site where origin of the concept has been challenged.3 very different views of the nation contest and In spite of such wide range of negotiate with each other.”4 Through the disagreements on various aspects of contestation and negotiations among various nationalism, however, most scholars agree members of the group/nation, national on its dynamic and fluid nature. Nationalism identity constantly evolves. Therefore, no is not a fixed ideology or identity, but ethnic groups or nations have fixed identity

1 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and the Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism. 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983). 2 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 3 Philip S. Gorski. “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of Natinalism,” American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 105, No. 5 (March, 2000): 1428-68. 4 Prasenjit Duara, “De-Constructing the Chinese Nation,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 30, (July, 1993): 2.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 101 or completely rigid membership boundaries. reasons why historical narratives are Korea In fact, it is not uncommon for individuals emphasized in this study. First of all, as and ethnic groups to change their Anderson argued, if a nation is an imagined membership or allegiance depending on their community, then the central force that ever-fluctuating socio-political relations and maintains the imagination is shared surroundings. For instance, some minority memories embedded in historical narratives. nationalities in China have witnessed Historical narratives not only sustain shared explosive population growth—the memories, but also make “a social identity population of Manchus doubled between explicit, not so much in the way it is ‘given’ 1982 and 1990. While some of the cause can or held as stable, as in the ways it is be attributed to the CCP’s more relaxed child differentiated from a former period or birth control policy in minority areas, the another society,” as Michel de Certeau more significant reason is the switching of argued.6 Secondly, empirical evidence from national identity by many who were formerly China indicates that there have been a registered as “Han” Chinese. The nationality number of attempts by both central switching occurred partly because government and minority groups to re- individuals made rational choices based on evaluate the history of the ethnic minority. new institutional privileges This paper will document given to minorities, but also how the process of THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT because the meaning of “ contention and negotiation THE MAIN CHANNEL THROUGH being a Manchu changed WHICH NATIONAL IDENTITY IS unfolded during the last 20 dramatically during the ACTIVELY CONTENDED AND years since the reform began reform era. The fluidity of NEGOTIATED IS THROUGH in China by taking the national identity also makes HISTORICAL NARRATIVES. Chaoxianzu/Korean7 possible for politically ” national minority group as powerful groups to the sample case. manipulate and exploit individuals.5 The On the occasion of the 30th anniversary question, then, is not whether national (1994) of the Yanbian8 Institute of Historical identities change, but how they are Research (Yanbian Lishi Yanjiusuo/Yonbyon constructed and manipulated, and whether Yoksa Yon’guso), Prof. Pak Munil, the we can conceptualize the process. president of Yanbian University, wrote a This paper argues that the main channel dedicatory article for this event.9 The article through which national identity is actively ardently calls for a complete renewal of contended and negotiated is through historical research among Chaoxianzu10 historical narratives. There are two main historians in order to adapt to the rapidly

5 Stevan Harrell ed., “Introduction,” in Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 10. 6 Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 45. 7 “Chaoxianzu” is the official title for the Korean minorities living in China. In this paper, the term is used interchangeably with “Koreans in China,” “Chinese Koreans,” or simply “Koreans.” 8 Yanbian is the officially designated autonomous prefecture for Korean minorities in China. It is located in southeast corner of Jilin province, one of the three northeastern provinces of China. To the south it faces North Korea, and to the east it conjoins the Russian border. It is a home of almost 1 million Koreans in China. 9 Pak Munil, “Concernng the Research Direction of Yanbian’s Historical Scholarship in this New Historical Era [Sae Yoksa Sigi Yonbyon Sahakkye ui Yon’gu Panghyang e Taehae],” in Pak Munil and others, A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], vol. 2, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 3-12. 10 “Chaoxianzu” is the official nationality title for Koreans in China. In this article, I will use the two terms (Koreans and Chaoxianzu) interchangeably.

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102 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity changing social and historical milieu. Prof. the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Thus, Pak suggests that this renewal of historical historical scholarship became the most Korea research must begin by concentrating on virulent contending arena for national social functions of history, instead of blindly identity between Chaoxianzu historians and fulfilling its political functions. Furthermore, CCP in the Reform Era. he emphatically articulated that Chaoxianzu historians must invest their efforts in The Beginning of Contention researching the national and regional history On June 4th, 1979, The Yanbian of Chaoxianzu nationality, because Historical Research Institute (Yonbyon Yoksa “strengthening the national and regional Yon’guso), which was forcibly closed down historical research has significant during the Cultural Revolution, reopened. implications for developing national culture The Institute has since been publishing and home-consciousness (Kohyang assiduously. Beginning with the publication Kwannyom)” and “for wholly revealing the of The General Situation of the Yanbian real face/truth of history.”11 His desire to Autonomous Prefecture [Yanbian make use of historical research to revitalize Chaoxianzu Zizhizhou Jiekuang] in 1984 and nationalistic spirit is unmistakably clear. A Study on the History of Yanbian [Yonbyon Chaoxianzu historians, in effect, have Yoksa Yon’gu] (Vols. 1-5) in 1985, the been rewriting their history prolifically ever Institute has published over 60 monographs since the inception of the Reform Era.12 The and 90 miscellaneous historical research majority of their works were not innocuous papers to date.13 In addition to their own academic papers divulging some publications, the researchers at the Institute undiscovered aspects of the past, but rather a have assisted in the publications of many myth-making project recreating the image of CCP-sponsored minority studies and the nation and re-establishing Chaoxianzu reference books. This refurbished zeal for people’s roots and pride. In doing so, many historical research is one of the most Chaoxianzu historians had to directly or significant stepping stones for the revival of indirectly contend with the official historical Chaoxianzu nationalism. Through fervent discourse formulated and imposed upon by writing and publishing of historical the central government in Beijing. There are narratives, Chaoxianzu historians are ample evidences of how Chaoxianzu recreating their own national identity on the historical narratives try to construct new one hand, and differentiating themselves national image of Chaoxianzu by often from both the Han national identity and the undoing the official narratives constructed by official projected image of Chaoxianzu

11 Pak, 10-11. 12 Although Koreans in China are relatively small in terms of population (1.9 million according to 1990 census, 13th largest in China), they publish more literatures and studies in their own language than any other minority nationalities. Many of their literatures and other publications deal specifically with history and identity. Especially, since the beginning of improved relations between China and South Korea, academic symposiums on “Korean immigrant societies” sponsored by Korean government or Korean academic institutions gave them more opportunities to reflect on their own identity and publish the results. Notably, the Hanguk Chongsin Munhwa Yonguso (The Academy of Korean Studies) has been sponsoring yearly symposium on overseas Korean culture. The Center for Korean Studies at University of Hawaii also sponsored an International Conference on Koreans in China in 1988. These symposiums and conferences contributed significantly in understanding Chaoxianzu nationalism and culture. Seoul National University has also established sisterhood relationship with Yanbian University since 1992, and has been sponsoring publications of many Chaoxianzu historical and social studies by Yanbian University professors. 13 Chon Chunja, “The Development of the Yanbian Historical Research Institute and the Major Fruits of its Research [Yonbyon Yoksa Yon’guso ui Yonhyok mit Chuyo han Haksul Songgua Sogae],” in Pak Munil and others, A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], vol. 2, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 357-364.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 103 identity on the other hand. Chinese Minority or Korean Émigrés? – Korea Interestingly, the characteristics of this The Origin and Cultural Boundary of renewed effort of constructing new historical Chaoxianzu consciousness for Chaoxianzu share many The Dictionary of the History of China’s similarities with the “colonial nationalism” of Minorities (Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzushi the early 20th century. Generally, “colonial Dacidian), published in 1995, introduces the nationalism” is taken to refer to the history of Chaoxianzu nationality as the assertiveness of local autonomy and interest following: as well as the desire for self-rule and self- They are one of China’s minority respect within a changing set of connections nationalities…. Their origin is closely to the empire.14 In a likewise manner, related with the ancient kingdoms of Chaoxianzu historians are now re-excavating Guchaoxian (Kochoson) and Gaojuli their historical roots in order to reappropriate (Koguryo). Their ancestors originally their own history and to reassert their local resided in the Liaodong area and the autonomy within the People’s Republic of northern part of Chaoxian (Choson) China (PRC). Having gone through what peninsula. After the fall of Gaoli resembles a colonizing experience during the (Koryo), many of those who were living Cultural Revolution, Chaoxianzu historians in the Liaodong area either moved attempt to de-colonize their cultural and inward or remained in Liaodong, and intellectual realms and construct new national gradually integrated (ronghe) into the identity. They do so by reclaiming the right to Han nationality. Some of them went back articulate their own past and correcting some to the Chaoxian (Choson) peninsula and of the false images of their identity created by joined (jiehe) the Xinluo (Silla) the Beijing government. Consequently, their nationality to form a new Gaoli (Koryo) historical narratives often display significant nationality, and renamed themselves as and sometimes even confrontational Chaoxian (Choson) around the disparities from the official state narratives. beginning of Ming dynasty in China.15 This article will discuss how these There are two extremely significant points contentions unravel in their interpretations on that the article posits. First, it argues that defining who the Chaoxianzu are and re- Manchuria (or Liaodong Area) is the establishing Chaoxianzu’s place in the birthplace of Chaoxianzu nation. According Chinese history, and argue that, during the to the article, the ancient history of last two decades, Chaoxianzu historical Chaoxianzu indicates that they are, in fact, scholarship has been laying the foundation descendents of the ancient kingdoms of for building a strong and distinct historic Kochoson and Koguryo and are closely culture-community among Chaoxianzu related to the ancient inhabitants in minority with deep sense of affinity with Manchuria, most of whom are now Koreans in the Korean peninsula. “integrated” into the Han nationality.

14 John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder eds., The Rise of Colonial Nationalism: Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa first assert their nationalities, 1880-1914, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 7. 15 “Chaoxianzu,” in Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzushi Dacidian [The Dictionary of the history of China’s Minorities], (Changchun: Jilin Jiaoyu Chupanshi, 1995), 2174-2175.

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104 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity Secondly, the article implies that there are characteristic as migrant (Chonyip) or several sub-national groups with different crossed-over (Wolkyong/Kwakyong) people. Korea origins within the all-encompassing category One of the reasons why they wish to “Korean” ethnic group, and the present dissociate with the ancient Korean Chaoxianzu nationality in China has closer inhabitants in Manchuria is clearly and more ancient affinity to the original articulated by Prof. Han of Yanbian Kochoson and Koguryo nations of Liaodong University in his article: “I do not deny the area than the southern Silla nationality which fact that there are descendents of Koguryo in it “joined” much later. By shrewd choice of the northeastern region of China. However, words, the article attempts to link the they have been already completely Chaoxianzu nationality more closely to the assimilated into Han or Manchurian “integrated (ronghe)” ancient nations and nationalities, and have been converted into thus to the Han nationality than the southern those nationalities.”18 What this statement nation of Silla which now stands as Korea. purports is that Prof. Han’s understanding of The intention of the article, which aims to Chaoxianzu national identity takes strong locate the roots of Chaoxianzu national independent national and cultural identity in China by manipulating its ancient distinctiveness as a prerequisite. In other history, is subtle but words, if an originally ethnic unmistakable. Korean is culturally TODAY, MANY CHAOXIANZU Today, many “ assimilated, he/she is no HISTORIANS VEHEMENTLY Chaoxianzu historians vehe- REJECT THIS OFFICIAL longer a Korean or mently reject this official VERSION OF HISTORICAL Chaoxianzu, regardless of 19 version of historical narrat- NARRATIVE REGARDING his/her genealogical roots. ive regarding Chaoxianzu’s CHAOXIANZU’S ORIGIN. In order to build their origin.16 Rather, most of ” distinct national identity Chaoxianzu scholars apart from that of Han particularly stress that the history of identity, Chaoxianzu historians have also had Chaoxianzu properly began in the mid-19th to clarify the boundary-line for their national century.17 They try to distance themselves membership. It was important to make sure from earlier Korean settlers in China as much that the Chaoxianzu identity was as they can, and emphasize this aspect of unequivocally defined, not left arbitrary, so recent historical immigration in order to that any Chaoxianzu individual could endow Chaoxianzu with a unique identify himself/herself as a member of the

16 Most of the Chaoxianzu scholars who attended the Conference on the Migratory History of Chaoxianzu sponsored by the Chaoxianzu Historical Society of China in 1988 rejected the theory of aboriginality of Chaoxianzu in Manchuria. 17 Chon Susan, “Immigration of Koreans near the end of Qing dynasty [Ch’ongmal sigi Chosonjokui yiju],” in Kim Chongguk and others ed., A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 49-79; Han Chun’gwang, “Discussing ‘The history of Koreans in Beijing Area [‘Bukkyong Jiyok Hangukin Yiminsa’ e Taehan Toron],’” in Korean Culture in the World: Life and Culture of Overseas Koreans [Saegyesokoi Hanguk Munhwa: Jaeoe Haninui Saenghwalgua Munhwa], Papers form the 1st Conference on Koreans in the World, (Seoul: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1991), 91-97. 18 Han Chun’gwang, 92. 19 This added emphasis on cultural distinctiveness is a quite recent development. Even until 1984, Korean historians did not completely reject the idea of the historical association between Chaoxianzu nationality and the ancient kingdoms of Kochoson and Koguryo. It was only in 1988 that the academic consensus has been completely turned around. Since the Conference on the Migratory History of Chaoxianzu sponsored by the Chaoxianzu Historical Society of China (Zhongguo Chaoxian Minzu Shixuehui Qianrushi Xueshu Taolunhui) in 1988, hardly any Chaoxianzu historian makes the connection between Chaoxianzu and ancient kingdoms of Kochoson and Koguryo.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 105 nation without perplexity. Contrary to the Benjie County were denied the change by the Korea efforts of CCP to blur the national government due to the lack of substantial distinctions,20 Chaoxianzu leaders strove to genealogical evidence, all the others ascertain Chaoxianzu membership succeeded in changing their nationality boundaries. They understand ‘nation’ as a registration. This incident caused enormous cultural and political community that retains controversy among Chaoxianzu scholars. common cultural characteristics and national The reason why it became an issue is because consciousness.21 ‘National Consciousness’ is these members of Pak clan became a further defined as “realizing the dignity of prototype of what the members of one’s own nation and recognizing that the Chaoxianzu are most afraid of—ethnic members have the supreme right to decide assimilation. the destiny of their own nation; and thus it According to Chaoxianzu historians, the does not allow the members to succumb to ancestors of the Pak clans came to China at oppression and humiliation caused by other least 600 years ago during Koryo dynasty in nations and induces them to fight for the Korea or even earlier. However, after several prosperity of their fatherland even to centuries of living within Chinese and death.”22 It is apparent that their endeavor to Manchu communities, they had totally lost define their cultural boundary carries a any Korean cultural traits. None of them are strong nationalistic agenda. This agenda is capable of speaking the Korean language, most clearly revealed in the so-called Pak and there is no trace of traditional Korean clan controversy. customs in their lifestyle. The only sign of In 1982, approximately 350 members of their Koreanness is that they have Korean Pak clan from Qinglong County in Hebei last names and somehow remember Province applied for change of their themselves as descendents of Koreans. The nationality registration from ‘Han’ to Pak clan is a perfect example of an ‘Chaoxianzu.’ Following their example, assimilated nationality, and according to the more members of Pak clan who were socialist ideals, this is where all the ethnic previously registered as ‘Han’ applied for the groups are supposed to be headed. The change: 1,234 from Benjie county and 277 national “community” imagined by the Pak from Gai county in Liaoning Province, and clan is wholly in line with the CCP minority 60 from Shunan County in Jilin Province. policies. However, this is precisely what They all claimed that they are descendents of Korean intellectuals are striving to prevent at Korean immigrants from medieval period. all costs. Consequently, many Korean Drawing on this claim to blood relations, scholars have become uneasy about the these thoroughly assimilated members of whole situation and thus began to strongly Pak clan sought to re-convert to Chaoxian deny the validity of Pak clans’ claim to nationality. Although the applicants from Chaoxianzu nationality. They not only

20 CCP’s dexterous practice of blurring national distinctions have most effectively carried out in the southwest. Especially, their work of mashing several ethnic groups into one nationality called Zhuang for political purpose is a case in point. See Katherine E. Palmer, Creating Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in the Peoples Republic of China, Ph. D. Dissertation, (University of Virginia, 1997). Even among the officially recognized ethnic groups, the government often focuses on the most salient division that is drawn between Han and minorities instead of giving each ethnic group comparable weights and attention. 21 I Tuman, “National Consciousness of Chaoxianzu [Chungguk Chosonjok ui Minjok uisik],” in Koreans in the World [Segaesok ui Hanminjok]. Papers form the 2nd Conference on Koreans in the World, (Seoul: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1993): 431- 442. 22 From The Dictionary of Chaoxian Cultural Language [Chuson Munhwao Sajon] as guoted in Kim Sung-ch’ol, 443.

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106 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity suspect the truth of their claim to Korean for change were rather small in number in genealogical origin, but also reject their their communities. In the same county in Korea claim to membership in Chaoxianzu Hebei, only some 350 have applied for nationality even if their genealogical claim change while more than 1,500 others with proved to be true. the same last name decided to remain An Bong, a Chaoxianzu historian, ‘Han.’27 carefully argues that there is no guarantee Chaoxianzu scholars conclude that the that these Pak clans are really from the only reason that some members of Pak clans Korean peninsula. The mythological stories changed their nationality registration is to of Pak clan’s origin23 are not restricted to benefit from the favorable nationality Korean peninsula. An Bong argues that policies of the government toward similar stories can be found in China and minorities. As members of minority Japan, so it is not academically plausible to nationalities, they can have more than one limit Pak clan’s origin to only Korean child and gain a bit more political leverage. peninsula.24 Furthermore, he contends that Even after the government approved their there were several clans with last name applications, none of them attempted to learn “Pak” in ancient China. Using Chinese Korean language or culture, and still live in historical sources, he proves predominantly Han or that “Pak” was a rather Manchu communities. FOR THEM, ASSIMILATED common Chinese last name “ This incident re- KOREAN IS NO KOREAN AT ALL. even before the Yuan awakened Chaoxianzu dynasty.25 Just the fact that ” scholars to the reality of they have the last name “Pak” does not ethnic integration in Chaoxianzu guarantee that they are descendents of communities. An Bong is particularly Koreans. concerned about the status quo of Another Chaoxianzu scholar, Han Chaoxianzu culture and society. The Chun’gwang, presents a different argument population of Chaoxianzu is hardly growing, against allowing Pak clans to obtain while the Han population in Yanbian is Chaoxianzu nationality: in spite of their increasing rapidly. Moreover, young claim to blood relations, none of the Pak clan generation of Koreans in Yanbian feels no really has Korean blood in them. All of them urgency to learn Korean language. In this have only one side of their parentage related socio-cultural environment of already to Korean ancestors, or some of them have degenerating national spirit, the presence of none at all. Among the 45 households that assimilated Pak clans among Chaoxianzu applied for change in nationality registration adds even more threat to Chaoxianzu from the Qinglong county in Hebei, 12 national identity. The Chinese government, household heads had both parents who were on the other hand, readily approved these either Han or Manchu, and 33 household applications. However, Chaoxianzu heads had one parent who were either Han or intellectuals even reject the validity of the Manchu.26 Furthermore, those who applied government’s approval. Consequently, they

23 Pak clans in Korea claim that their original ancestor was born out of an egg. He became the first king of Silla kingdom. 24 An Bong, 39. 25 Ibid., 41. 26 Han Chun’gwang, 95. 27 Ibid., 95.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 107 do not hesitate to express very strong manipulative historical practice is no longer Korea feelings regarding this matter. For them, acceptable to Chaoxianzu historians. The assimilated Korean is no Korean at all. dissatisfaction with the official narrative is most conspicuously expressed in their re- Henchman or Equal Partner?: Reclaiming evaluation of the works of the CCP’s the National History of Chaoxianzu Manchurian Provincial Committee (1927.10- The official state narrative of 1936.6). Chaoxianzu history normally characterizes Because of Manchuria’s undeniable the Chaoxianzu as eager participants of strategic significance in the CCP’s struggle CCP’s glorious struggle against the four against Japan and KMT during the first two “anti-”s: anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, decades of its history, the CCP called for the anti-Kuomintang and anti-America.28 Instead establishment of the Manchurian Provincial of writing the stories of Chaoxianzu’s own Committee (MPC - Zhonggong independent historic journey, the official Manzhousheng Weiyuanhui) in 1927. In order account of Chaoxianzu history is always to consolidate the position of the party in incorporated into the history of CCP Manchuria and bring organization, the CCP revolution.29 All the official accounts sent one of its Central Committee members, invariably stress that most of the armed Liu Shaoqi, as the first secretary of MPC in resistance against Japanese was led by CCP.30 1929; note that the work and role of the MPC Although Koreans were active participants of were significant enough for the CCP to send the anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese the head of its Labor Department. The MPC’s struggles, the ultimate victory was influence over Koreans in Manchuria was accomplished only through the guidance of particularly significant, because Korean the CCP.31 In order to justify their claim, CCP communists all joined the CCP in complying historians selectively chose historical events with the Comintern’s directive calling for and narrated everything around the center “one party for one country” in 1930, and thus represented by the party.32 They effectively came under the authority of the MPC. When eliminated any account of conflicts between the Manchurian incident broke out on Sept Han Chinese and Koreans, and highlighted 18, 1931, the MPC played a critical role in several instances when the two groups had organizing anti-Japanese guerilla armies. worked together. Through these “model” In spite of the Committee’s historical narratives, they attempted to reconstruct importance, Chinese historical scholarship is Chaoxianzu history to fit within their own astonishingly silent on the subject. Most of ideological and political framework. Such the historical dictionaries do not even contain

28 The National Publishing Committee on Minority Issues, China’s Minority Nationalities [Zhongguo Shaoshu Minzu], (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1981), 43-56. 29 Having examined many literatures on the official discourse of Chaoxianzu history, Heh-Rahn Park concludes that the state narratives characterize Chaoxianzu as the “liberated subjects” instead of common liberators. Park, 76. 30 Chen Lian, A History of the Development of Bases for Anti-Japanese Operations [Kangri Genjudi Fazhan Shilüe], (Beijing: Jiefangjung Chupanshi, 1987), 539, 541, 543; Wen Zhengyi, “Chaoxianzu Righteous Army during Anti-Japanese Struggle [Kangri Zhanzheng zhongde Chaoxian Yiyongjun],” in Ethnic Unity [Minzu Tuanjie], No. 290, (July, 1995), 20-24. 31 Chou Wanhong and others, Records of Chinese Communist Party Led Anti-Japanese Warfare [Zhoungguo Gongchandang Lingdao Kangri Zhanzheng Jishi], (Jilin: Jilin People’s Press, 1995), 8-9. 32 Craig Calhoun contends that China has always engaged in a selective appropriation and reconstruction of Chna’s past, and used those exemplary narratives in educational practices to foster loyalty and other values in the mind the Chinese public. Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 33-34. 33 Zhungguo Lishi Cidian, (Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshi, 1991); Zhungguo Jindaishi Cidian, (Shanghai: Shaghai Cishu Chubanshi, 1982); Jindai Zhongguo Bainian shi Cidian (Hangzhou: Zhejiang Renmin Chubanshi, 1987); Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu (Beijing: Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chubanshi, 1978-1991).

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108 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity an article with the title “Zhonggong the MPC.38 Another study on Liu Shaoqi’s Manzhousheng Weiyuanhui (or Manzhou works in the MPC also praises the its Korea Shengwei as a short form),”33 and the official achievement: “Under extremely difficult history of CCP’s anti-Japanese struggle conditions, MPC restored the organization of mostly ignores the MPC or simply makes the party and allowed the workers’ perfunctory remarks. The silence is equally movement, peasants’ movement, soldiers’ dominant among Chaoxianzu historical movement, and all the other mass patriotic narratives at least until the 1980s, except for anti-imperialist movements to rapidly a few typical party-controlled propagandistic develop under the leadership of the party.”39 historical accounts that praise anything that These superb achievements of the MPC, the Communist Party did.34 Only in the new presented in party literatures, are not how historic era has renewed historical most of the Chaoxianzu people remember the investigation of the MPC been initiated, and Committee. Despite the universal familiarity a few research reports published by both of the MPC and its historic significance, its CCP and Chaoxianzu scholars.35 story is often not talked about in Yanbian. The A few available CCP accounts of the sensitivity of the subject is uncanny, a puzzle MPC’s works unanimously elevate the MPC whose centerpiece resides in what is known for providing crucial as the Minsaengdan (or leadership in Yanbian’s Minshengtuan) incident NEW HISTORICAL NARRATIVES struggles against feudalism “ which resulted in the BY CHAOXIANZU SCHOLARS and Japanese imperialism. PLACE KOREANS AT THE massacre of more than one They do mention the role of CENTER OF MANCHURIA’S thousand Korean Koreans occasionally, but STRUGGLE AGAINST THE Communists. Recently, the entire narrative is JAPANESE IMPERIAL FORCES. Chaoxianzu scholars focused around the heroic ” revisited the works of the works of CCP.36 For instance, MPC and the Minsaengdan a study of the CCP’s anti-Japanese operations incident with much caution.40 In these studies, by the People’s Liberation Army highly the MPC is no longer an object of encomium; acclaims the MPC’s leadership in guiding the its policies and works are analyzed with independent anti-Japanese military opera- moderate objectivity, and some of its tions and organizing party structures in mistakes are brought out to the surface. Most Manchuria.37 It stresses that the military importantly, the role of Koreans in the anti- operations in the northeast after the 9.18 (or Japanese struggles in Manchuria is radically Manchurian) incident was heroically led by re-evaluated, and their relationship with the

34 A Chaoxianzu historian writes that there were hardly any study on the subject of MPC’s policies toward Koreans. Ch’on Ryo, “Concerning the basic policies of the MPC toward northeastern Chaoxianzu,” in Kim Chongguk and others ed., A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 3. 35 Ch’on Ryo, 3-21; Yanbian University Journal [Yanbian Daxue Xuebao], No. 2-3, (1987): 148-160; The General Situation of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture; Institute of Party School and Party History of Liaoning Provincial Committee, Biography of martyrs of the Manchurian Provincial Committee [Manzhou Shengwei Lieshi Chuan], (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chupanshi, 1981); Liaoning Social Science Institute, Comrade Shaoqi at the Manchurian Provincial Committee [Shaoqi Tongzhi Zai Manzhou Shengwei], (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshi, 1981). 36 Chen Lian, A History of the Development of Bases for Anti-Japanese Operations [Kangri Genjudi Fazhan Shilüe], (Beijing: Jiefangjung Chupanshi, 1987), 539-558; Chou Wanhong and others, Records of Chinese Communist Party Led Anti-Japanese Warfare [Zhoungguo Gongchandang Lingdao Kangri Zhanzheng Jishi], (Jilin: Jilin People’s Press, 1995), 8-9. 37 Biography of martyrs of the Manchurian Provincial Committee [Manzhou Shengwei Lieshi Chuan], 1-2. 38 Chen Lian, 539-558. 39 Comrade Shaoqi at the Manchurian Provincial Committee [Shaoqi Tongzhi Zai Manzhou Shengwei], 110-111. 40 Ch’on Ryo, 3-21.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 109 CCP is carefully re-examined. Central Committee’s decision, it interpreted Korea New historical narratives by Chaoxianzu the concept of “self-determination” scholars place Koreans at the center of differently. MPC intentionally ignored the Manchuria’s struggle against the Japanese clause in the Constitution stipulating the imperial forces. They stress that most of the right of secession, and argued that “self- northeastern regions’ CCP members were determination” only promises “equal Koreans: in 1930, over 90% of all CCP political power.”43 The committee ceaselessly members were Koreans; 93% of the emphasized “unity,” and harshly condemned Communist Youth Organization members the “leftist tendency of mechanically were Koreans; and virtually all of the 10,000 applying the principles of nationality organized peasant families were Korean relations in Lenin’s writings.”44 Therefore families.41 Even as late as 1934, more than theMPC allowed Koreans to participate in half of all CCP members in Manchuria were the People’s Revolutionary Government with Korean, and over 95% of guerilla armies only limited political power. Although Ch’on consisted of Koreans. Chaoxianzu historians Ryo, the author of the study, does not make note that even the MPC Chinese leaders any interpretative statements in this issue, his recognized the fact that “Koreans constitute resentment is clearly expressed by his the basic revolutionary force in Manchuria” cursory comment that the MPC did not fully in its report to the central CCP leadership.42 follow the directives from the center. Furthermore, it is evident from the remaining According to Ch’on, the Committee was documents from MPC archives that there heavily influenced by the leftist ideology of were hardly any Han Chinese Communists in the Sixth Comintern Conference, and labeled Manchuria and that the MPC encouraged Korean anti-Japanese nationalist groups as Koreans to convert their neighboring Han “dogs of Chinese bourgeois and Japanese Chinese to Communism. It gave directives to imperialists; and thus purely anti- Koreans to produce propagandistic revolutionary fascist groups.” Such radical literatures and posters in Chinese and go into leftist ideology seriously impaired the Chinese communities to spread Communist process of bringing together all the Korean ideology among Han nationalities in anti-Japanese forces in unity. The gravest Manchuria. Despite such critical roles played mistake the Committee made, however, was by Koreans, the MPC gradually moved concerning the thousands of original Choson against Koreans, which reached its peak with Communist Party members who joined the the Minsaengdan incident. MPC in 1930. Initially, the MPC welcomed In 1931, the central CCP leadership the Choson Communist Party members as guaranteed the full right of self- potential catalysts of advancing determination to Koreans, Mongols, Hui, revolutionary movement of the Committee. Tibetans, Miao and Li in the Constitution of They were interviewed and examined the Chinese Soviet Republic, a right which carefully before they were admitted to the also included the right of secession. While party. However, soon after, the Committee the MPC recognized the authority of the CCP came under the influence of Wang Ming’s

41 Ibid., 12. 42 “A report by MPC organization department (1930),” as quoted in Ch’on Ryo, 12. 43 “Announcement of the MPC to the People (Sept 20, 1931),” as quoted in Ch’on Ryo, 13. 44 Ch’on Ryo, 13.

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110 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity ultra-leftist line, and began to call the China, its size and influence was minimal. original Choson Communist Party members Between 1927-1929, there were only 100- Korea as “elements causing factional strife” and 200 CCP members in Manchuria, all in the persecuted them. Many of these Korean city. Even as late as April 1930, it had only party members had participated in the 208 members. Consequently, when the Minsaengdan (the People’s Livelihood Korean Communists joined the MPC in Organization) activities from October 1931 1930, its membership suddenly rose to over to July 1832. According to a Japanese 2,000, and Koreans dominated the consulate report, Minsaengdan was Committee. Koreans played an extremely organized by some Koreans for the purpose important role in establishing the party’s base of relieving economic hardships of Koreans in Manchuria. Yet, in spite of Koreans’ in Kando, but the organization did not last central role in its development, the MPC long because it failed to obtain general encouraged Koreans to allow Chinese support from the public.45 However, because members to take leadership.46 Their of the alleged pro-Japanese stance of the reasoning behind the suggestion was to organization, Korean Communists who attract more Han Chinese to join the party, joined the organization came under direct but the desired eventual consequence was attack from their Han comrades in the MPC. pushing Koreans out of leadership positions. The situation quickly deteriorated, and As Park suggests, the Han Chinese leaders eventually caused the execution of more than were threatened by the sudden influx of one thousand Korean Communist members many Korean party members, so the Han during the next three years. The incident Chinese leaders eliminated the Korean permanently marred the relationship between Communist leaders and senior Koreans and Hans, and brought calamities on revolutionaries in order to have complete the anti-Japanese campaign in northeastern control over the Korean population.47 China. The research in this area is still in its Although all the wrongfully accused infancy. However, it has come a long way Minsaengdan members were re-declared from merely parroting the official discourse innocent and posthumously rehabilitated in that indiscriminatingly praises the 1981 by the government of Yanbian Korean achievements of the MPC and hides all its Autonomous Prefecture, no one dared to get mistakes. Chaoxianzu historians have broken to the bottom of the issue. Why did the MPC new grounds and dared to venture into the so viciously attack Korean revolutionaries? “forbidden zone.”48 They proudly stress that Ch’on Ryo’s study does not directly answer Koreans led the anti-Japanese struggles in this question either, but a subtle implication Manchuria, and that most of the leaders of can be detected in his presentation. When the rebellion in Yanbian were Koreans.49 They CCP first established its MPC in northeast even unhesitatingly state that anti-Japanese

45 Park, 35. 46 “A Letter form the central MPC to southern MPC branch,” as quoted in Ch’on, 12. 47 Park, 32, 36. 48 Kwon Rib, “On the Function of Historical Studies and the Reformation of Chaoxianzu Historical Scholarship [Sahak ui Kongnung kwa Chosonjok Sahak ui Kaehyok e Taehayo],” in Pak Munil and others, A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], vol. 2, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 14. 49 Unlike most of the CCP publications that stress the leadership of the party, Ch’on emphasize the leadership of Koreans in their anti-Japanese struggles. Ch’on, 16.

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Min-Dong Paul Lee 111 struggles by Koreans had no direct link with actively negotiated between Chaoxianzu Korea the resistance movements of other intellectuals and the central government. The nationalities in Manchuria, but more closely national identity of Chaoxianzu that came out related to the independence movement in of the negotiation is markedly different from Korea.50 Such new developments in historical the ones that these two parties once dreamed interpretation rose out of an effort to of creating. The CCP’s revolutionary vision carefully balance the official party-centered of creating a true socialist society into which worldview with a new Chaoxianzu-centered the Chaoxianzu is supposed to be gradually worldview. Without using hostile and integrated, has been heavily compromised by exclusive language, Chaoxianzu scholars its own mistakes as well as by the counter- have constructed a nationalistic account of narratives created by Chaoxianzu leaders. their past which, to a certain degree, counter- The newly emerging picture of Chaoxianzu balances the official narrative. This fresh national identity seems to favor neither of way of history-writing reflects Chaoxianzu these two efforts of construction, thus historians’ effort to link an interpretive providing all the more reason for continued practice to a social and cultural praxis. For fervency in ethnic negotiation. Chaoxianzu historians in the new historic It is not possible to accurately predict the era, history is not just about final outcome of the recounting the past. Rather, negotiations, because there …NATIONALISM IS NOT A history functions as a way of “ are various complex FIXED IDEOLOGY OR IDENTITY, reconstructing distorted BUT A DYNAMIC FIELD OF networks of domestic and national identity and SHARED MEMORIES. international relationships evoking national spirit to ” that affect Chaoxianzu unite its members. They national identity. fully understand that the driving force of Furthermore, it seems that there is another nationalism lies in its historical powerful influence that affects the outcome: embeddedness. By reclaiming their own the process of globalization and the post- history, they want to refuel the Chaoxianzu modern wave of cultural pluralism and collective imagination and rebuild the liberalization. Nevertheless, there is culture-historic community of Chaoxianzu. apparently a growing longing for historical The experiences of Chaoxianzu consciousness and a search for roots among illustraute that nationalism is not a fixed members of Chaoxianzu nationality. As a ideology or identity, but a dynamic field of Chaoxianzu professor at Liaoning University shared memories. It constantly changes (predominantly Chinese University) through interactions among various actors confesses: inside and outside of the nation. The present The relationship between motherland “nationalism” of Chaoxianzu is still being and its people abroad is like the

50 Piao Changyu in Koreans in China, 58. Unlike the official historical discourse that characterize the anti-Japanese movements of Koreans as struggles for “liberation of China,” Chaoxianzu historians often link them with the broader Korean national independence movement. For example, one of the earliest anti-Japanese demonstrations in Yanbian, the March 13th Movement, is retold by Chaoxianzu historians as a Manchurian extension of the March 1st Independence Movement that began in Korea. An Hwach’un, “Concerning the special characteristic of 3.13 anti-Japanese Movement [3.13 Panil Undong ui T’ukjom e Taehayo],” in Kim Chongguk and others eds., A Study on the History of Chinese Koreans [Chungguk Chosonjok Yongu], vol. 1, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993), 202-213. The fundamental aim of the Korean anti-Japanese resistance movement is also re-articulated as it was originally expressed in Declaration of the Korean Fatherland Liberation Society in Machuria [Jaeman Hanin Choguk Kwangbokhoe Sonon] which was published in June 10, 1936: “Let us fight for the true autonomy of the Koreans in Manchuria and the liberation and independence of Korea.”

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112 Contested Narratives: Reclaiming National Identity relationship between roots of a tree and obtained by ardently cherishing the the branches; therefore when the roots roots.52 Korea are healthy, the branches will naturally Chaoxianzu nationalism has divested itself be fecund. By the same token, in order of the political and territorial connotations for the roots to reach deeper, it needs to that are often associated with nationalism of receive nutrients from branches and the modern era. At the same time, it has taken leaves. The leaves are bound to return to up stronger cultural and ethnic national the roots (Luo Ye Gui Gen). identity as an historic culture-community Consequently, if Koreans abroad forget that shares its deepest roots with Koreans in their language and history, even if they the Korean peninsula. With the cultural and would succeed in foreign soil their conceptual roads paved, their pilgrimage of success is limited by their banana searching for national identity continues. A identity.51 True success can only be Chaoxianzu singer, Cui Jian, sings:

I have heard it, but never saw the 25,000 li.53 Much to say, but nothing to do, it is really difficult to know. Burying heads, walking forward, we are all seeking self. Coming and going, there is still no place to finally settle. …. I ask the heaven and the earth, “how much more must I travel?” I beseech the wind and the rain, “please, go far away from me!” Many mountains and many rivers, I can’t even distinguish east from west. Many people and many mouths, no one clearly speaks the truth. How should I say and how should I act to truly become myself? How should I sing and how should I chant to finally feel satisfaction? …. - Rock and Roll on the New Road to Long March Ð Cui Jian

51 “Banana” is a nickname for Koreans who are completely assimilated to western (white) culture in terms of their inner sentiments, worldview, cultural inclination and philosophy; the only remaining feature of their “Koreanness” is the yellow skin color. 52 Ch’oe Chongsok, “The Reality and Task of Chaoxianzu Education in China,” in Koreans in the World [Segaesok ui Hanminjok]. Papers form the 2nd Conference on Koreans in the World. (Seoul: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1993), 253-254. 53 “li” is a Chinese measurement of distance. 1 li is equivalent to approximately 400m.

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Andrew Hall 113 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation Southeast Asia of SEATO

Andrew Hall

Introduction 1949, pitting the communist bloc and the The relationship between the United capitalist democracies against each other in States of America and the United Kingdom the Cold War. In that same year, Communists has long been considered unusually special, overthrew the Nationalist Kuomintang encompassing strong cultural, economic, and government of China and renewed the Sino- political ties. After being born out of Soviet Alliance soon after. The major powers victorious collaboration in two world wars in on each side of this ideological divide, in the less than half a century, the Anglo-American years that followed, continued to conclude a alliance faced a number of challenges in the series of alliance treaties. The United States mid-1950s, culminating in the Suez crisis of reached agreements with Japan, the Republic 1956. A major undertaking of this period was of Korea (ROK), Australia and New Zealand, the promulgation of a treaty for the collective while the Soviet Union negotiated treaties defense of Southeast Asia in September 1954, with an array of Eastern European countries, the creation of which required close the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea transatlantic co-operation and agreement. The (DPRK), and communist Vietnam. The establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty SEATO alliance was yet another of these Organization, dubbed SEATO, proved to be a plentiful alliances, though multilateral in strenuous task for the United States and Great scope. Britain, one where contrasting regional The mid-1950s also saw the beginnings strategies were exhaustingly reconciled. This of the decades-long process by which the paper will examine the relations of the European powers granted independence to American and British governments from their colonies around the globe. By the March to September 1954 in pursuit of a conclusion of the Second World War the comprehensive security arrangement for process of complete de-colonization was all Southeast Asia. The nature of their but inevitable. By 1954, however, only a disagreements will be analyzed first and handful of states had been created in the followed by a determination of how they preceding decade. In July 1946, the United were overcome. States at last granted its sole major overseas Shaping the domestic and international possession, the Philippines, its independence political climates for these negotiations were after years of delay. French and British a number of contextual events and trends. League of Nations mandates in the Middle Most broadly, the SEATO negotiations took East were granted independence between place in the post-Second World War period 1943 and 1948 while in South Asia, Britain when a new system of alliances was formed, reluctantly released India from its empire in the United Kingdom, together with a host of 1947. The territory immediately split into other Western powers, formed the North Muslim Pakistan and Hindu-dominated, but Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in secular, India. Finally in Southeast Asia,

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114 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO Indonesia secured its independence from the the climate of domestic politics in the United Netherlands in a four-year struggle ending in States. The prevailing national obsession was 1949, but Britain retained its possessions in fear of communist encroachment abroad and Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, and infiltration at home. Firstly, the idea of Brunei. Most significantly to the develop- communist victories likened to “falling Southeast Asia ment of SEATO, France struggled to re- dominoes” was a widely accepted establish its authority in its Indochinese justification for American involvement in colonies of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos Indochina. Even if Indochina was not after the Japanese withdrawal; it was considered intrinsically valuable, its collapse ultimately forced to relinquish these could threaten allies or possibly the United possessions by the Geneva Conference in States itself. Secondly, the anticommunist 1954. This conflict occurred in the wider hysteria whipped up by Senator Joseph context of the de-colonization, of which the McCarthy had a profound affect on the United States was a primary champion, and formulation of government policies. The was a key impetus for the creation of SEATO. paranoia he induced in American politics In Indochina, France was unable to between 1948 and 1956 limited the ability of control the tumultuous internal forces the government to moderate its policies demanding independence. regarding combating The opposition forces, led by communism; having one’s EVEN IF INDOCHINA WAS NOT Ho Chi Minh, promoted both “ patriotism questioned by CONSIDERED INTRINSICALLY nationalism and VALUABLE, ITS COLLAPSE Senator McCarthy was the communism, and thus COULD THREATEN ALLIES OR death knell of any political garnered the support of the POSSIBLY THE UNITED STATES career in those extraordinary Soviet Union and China. The ITSELF. times. These political trends United States aided its ally ” weighed heavily in the France through sizeable domestic political climate in military aid and moral support, hoping not to which the United States sought to contain preserve France’s colonial possessions, but to communism through SEATO. prevent the spread of communism in The final principal element of the Southeast Asia through independent and political environment in which the SEATO democratic states. Like in the Korean War of negotiations took place was an ongoing 1950-1953, the two sides were divided by debate in Europe over the creation of a fundamental and unwavering ideological European Defense Community (EDC). The opposition, pitting each superpower against proposal rose out of the insistence by the the other in proxy wars that epitomized the United States to rearm Germany in order to Cold War. An implied corollary of these bolster the defense of Western Europe against conflicts was the staunch support of each a newly nuclear Soviet Union. French Prime side’s allies in the stand-offs; however as the Minister René Pleven first proposed an EDC case of SEATO will show, this was not whereby Germany would be allowed to always the case. rearm, considered quite a dangerous prospect A further characteristic of the 1950s at the time, within the formalized structure of international system that bared a great a European Army under the aegis of the influence on the formulation of SEATO was NATO alliance.1 Furthermore, it appeared to

1 Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden (London: Cassell, 1960), 31.

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Andrew Hall 115 be a natural complement to the nascent government. The precipitous decline of the Southeast Asia economic integration of Western Europe, prospects for French victory and the such as the European Coal and Steel establishment of the Geneva Conference in Community (ECSC) of 1951. Despite a April 1954, charged with reaching a peaceful successful treaty summit at Bonn in 1952 and settlement to the conflict, largely mooted the the support of the American government, the idea in the end. In this first part of the EDC proposal failed to be ratified by the very analysis, there will be an examination of the government that proposed it. Concerned various aspects of the proposal and the about being overburdened by both the war in motives behind it. Following this will be a Indochina and requisite military look at the responses this controversial idea commitments of the EDC, as well as elicited from within the US government and objecting to the provision that French troops from its allies, and how each came to reject would be placed under foreign command, the the possibility of any joint military French National Assembly declined to ratify intervention to assist the French forces in the treaty creating the EDC on 30 August Indochina. 1954.2 Both the British and American The second part of the paper will cover government found this deeply disappointing the creation of an alternative, long-term and frustrating, representing a major internal system for halting the spread of communism split among the Western alliance’s three in Southeast Asia. Though an immediate leading members. The ensuing “EDC crisis”, military response to this regional crisis was which raised fears of American withdrawal impossible, the United States and Great from the Continent, was ended in late Britain each sought a means to protect their September by a British proposal for the vital interests there in line with their foreign creation of the Western European Union policy strategies. One the hand, there will be (WEU). The elements of French reluctance to a review of the various conferences and adopt the EDC played significant roles in the meetings of government representatives that evolution of the SEATO proposal. eventually put forward a study on the treaty Having set out a broad outline of the creating SEATO. On the other, there will be a political climate and the major ongoing thorough analysis of the key areas of debate debates of the mid-1950s, a thorough that dominated the conferences and examination of the formation of the Southeast intergovernmental communications between Asian Treaty Organization is now possible. In April and September of 1954. These salient pursuit of exploring and analyzing the natures and contested aspects to the collective and causes of the rift in Anglo-American defense organization were the timing of relations in the establishment of this body, announcing and creating the body, its this paper will first look at the failure of a membership, the obligations and proposal for “united action” to rescue the commitments it required, and its very French forces from imminent defeat at Dien purpose. It was in these numerous debates Bien Phu in Vietnam. This short-lived option, that the deep rifts in American and British offered by US Secretary of State John Foster perspectives and priorities manifested Dulles in March 1954, failed to garner the themselves. support of America’s allies and even its own From these areas of contention will be

2 Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950-55 (Bakingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 5.

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116 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO drawn a set of themes that characterize the despite its similar name, was much less nature and roots of Anglo-American discord ambitious and articulate than NATO, owing in these negotiations. The most fundamental to the disparate goals and limited aims of its of these themes is the fundamentally members.3 As stipulated by the treaty, the divergent positions each had in relation to organization’s consultative council met Southeast Asia communist China. The US and British annually in Bangkok, Thailand until 1977 governments were dissimilar in their relations when it was officially disbanded following with the communist government as well as Pakistan’s withdrawal in 1968, the defeat of the possible threat it posed to regional and the United States in its war in Vietnam in national security. A second source of 1973, and France’s suspension of its transatlantic friction was the contentious membership in 1975. relationship of each state’s chief diplomats, the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony “United Action” Eden and American Secretary of State John This chapter will track the rise and fall of Foster Dulles. Though both men worked Secretary Dulles’ proposal for “united together frequently, their divergent styles of action”, from its inception in March 1954 to diplomacy posed a real a hurdle for the its becoming futile a month or so later. There achievement of compromise solutions to the will be an in-depth analysis of the various issues at hand. A third theme to be examined aspects of the proposal the rationale behind it. will be disparate regional strategies of the two Finally there will be an analysis of how and allies in Southeast Asia. America was firmly why “united action” failed to garner the committed to stemming the spread of support of the British and French communism and seeing an end to governments and fell from favor within the colonialism; Great Britain, on the other hand, American government. “United action”, due was concerned with the security of its to its intentional vagueness and the regional territorial interests and maintaining a presumption of belligerence, rendered itself good working relationship with its fellow dead on arrival. This idea failed to bring the Commonwealth members. Western powers closer to an acceptable Despite these issues, the United States solution to the crisis at Dien Bien Phu and and Great Britain were able to agree to a only caused substantial political damage to compromise text for a treaty. Honest the Anglo-American relationship in the compromise and the desire to remain close process. It was promoted for its expediency allies allowed them to overcome their major but drowned in uncertainty and anxiety. obstacles. Joined by Australia, France, New The perilous situation of the French Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and military struggling to preserve its tenuous Thailand, they signed the Southeast Asia control over Indochina prompted the United Collective Defense Treaty in Manila on 8 States to reconsider its existing policy of September 1954. In a document annexed to financial support in March of 1954. The the treaty, protection was extended to South status quo whereby France received Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but they were unconditional military aid, though not not themselves allowed to join the through direct allied intervention, was organization in accordance with the deemed insufficient to prevent the collapse of agreements reached at Geneva. SEATO, its garrison at their fort in Dien Bien Phu. In

3 Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1964). 37.

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Andrew Hall 117 order to bolster French morale and inspire unacceptable outcome for the US Southeast Asia allied support for the French cause, Dulles government.9 Broadly speaking, Secretary declared in a speech to the Overseas Press Dulles, with the President’s blessing, was Club of America on March 29, 1954 that “the preparing the path for a war in Indochina imposition on Southeast Asia of the political leaving immediate surrender as the sole system of communist Russia and its Chinese acceptable option for the Viet Minh.10 communist ally…should be met by united At the time, the prospect of “united action.”4 He added that such a course “might action” appeared for Dulles to be the most involve serious risks” but urgency required straightforward method by which the United immediate action to save the French forces States government’s two goals for Southeast from collapsing under the Viet Minh Asia could be met. The American pressure.5 government sought both the independence of Dulles aimed to achieve a number of France’s Associated States, as Vietnam, things in his provocative speech. Firstly, he Cambodia, and Laos were then called, and the sought to send a clear warning to the Viet purging of communism from the region.11 Minh and communist Chinese that the United Continuing to fight the war by proxy through States was willing to intervene on behalf of France compromised the prospects of the the French. Dulles believed former while letting the that China had thousands of French seek a negotiated …DULLES HOPED TO troops ready to intervene on “ settlement made the latter CONVINCE THE FRENCH TO the side of the Viet Minh and CONTINUE FIGHTING INSTEAD impossible. The exact means a superior threat of force OF OPTING FOR A NEGOTI- to achieve these goals 6 would be a useful deterrent. ATED SETTLEMENT. through “united action” were Secondly, he hoped the ” quite unclear, however. speech might muster Dulles, it appears, purposely domestic support for the possible deployment chose the vague term so as not to commit the of troops in Indochina.7 The American people United States to any specific course of action, had yet to appreciate the value of Indochina but to nonetheless suggest that a coalition of to the national interest of the US to the extent willing states must make a collective effort, their government did, though increasing talk with the option of military intervention, to of the “domino theory” and widespread anti- stem the spread of communism.12 The press communist sentiment helped. Thirdly, Dulles and others instead met the vagueness with hoped to convince the French to continue immediate suspicion and confusion.13 It was fighting instead of opting for a negotiated believed, however correctly, to be a settlement.8 Such a course would no doubt euphemism for military intervention, the involve ceding territory to communists, an viability of which had not been established.

4 John Foster Dulles. “The Threat of a Red Asia,” Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, (YEAR), 400. 5 Ibid. 6 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955,” in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud and Mark R. Rubin, eds., Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990), 87. 7 Ibid., p. 86. 8 Dulles to the United States Delegation (Geneva), FRUS, 1952-54, XVI, 731. 9 Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision Against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 61. 10 Ibid., p. 62. 11 Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to Dulles, 8 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, 405. 12 Kaplan, 87. 13 Billings-Yun, 64.

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118 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO Members of Congress also entered the possibility of reaching a suitable settlement at debate, adding their own interpretations of the Conference. the term, but generally expressed confusion In putting the proposal before the French, about the proposal. Senators and Dulles made two key stipulations to the Congressmen demanded clarification from proffering of American military forces. The Southeast Asia the White House regarding Dulles’ intentions first required that France push for greater when he called for “united action;” the best independence of the Associated States, the White House could offer was to define it retaining only a measure of control over their as “such action as might become security and defense lest they fall necessary…as circumstances indicate.”14 This immediately into communists’ hands.18 The unhelpful response added to the claim that second required that the military operations in American intentions were being kept defense of Indochina must no longer be decidedly ambiguous, but it is unclear comprised solely of French troops and whether out of secrecy, uncertainty or self- commanders. The United States government doubt. was consistently frustrated by their inability In the ensuing days and weeks, Dulles to influence their French counterparts in the was charged with the task of gathering allied execution of the war in Vietnam.19 Dulles support for the “united action” proposal. hoped the lure of complete victory, not British Foreign Secretary Eden writes in his partition or withdrawal, would be enough to memoirs that he “had no objection to strong convince the French to overcome their American words, but [he] wanted to make reservations with the plan.20 sure that they meant what they appeared to At the same time as this diplomatic effort say.”15 The British government had been was being undertaken, a debate within the promised the United States had no intention Eisenhower administration was also taking of intervening in Indochina, and Eden feared place. The President and Secretary Dulles that Dulles’ speech might have implied that consulted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Britain, as America’s most important ally, regarding the status of the French garrison at would intervene in Indochina too.16 Eden Dien Bien Phu and the prospects for a counseled Dulles to avoid taking any quick military victory. They, like Congress, were decisions in favor of military action writing, quite concerned with the price at which such “Allied intervention, military or otherwise, or a victory might come. The proposed method of any warning announcement before [the] of intervention, dubbed Operation Vulture, Geneva [Conference]…would require would rely substantially on air and naval extremely careful consideration.”17 His power, and was thus expected to be supported reservations about premature action before or by the US Air Force and Navy, finding the during the upcoming Geneva Conference increased prestige and budgets quite became the hallmark of British policy with favorable. The chiefs of the Army and Marine regards to “united action”. Eden predicted Corps, however, were less favorable toward that such a course would surely jeopardize the the plan fearing a high price in human costs

14 Ibid., 65 (quoting the New York Times). 15 Eden, 91. 16 Ibid.,103. 17 Ibid., 96. 18 Billings-Yun, 77. 19 Dulles to Embassy of the Philippines, 9 April 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, p. 409. 20 Special Adviser to the United States Delegation (Geneva) to Dulles, FRUS, 1952-54, XVI, p. 653.

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Andrew Hall 119 of any land component.21 increasing domestic pressure to find a way Southeast Asia When Admiral Radford, Chairman of the out of the costly fighting in Indochina. It Joint Chiefs of Staff, a key proponent of clung to the hope that America would offer “united action”, called a special meeting military support, if necessary, but was regarding the issue on March 30, he failed to ultimately unable to swallow the conditions get the support of any of his colleagues.22 In the US government required. For Laniel, retrospect, it is surprising that both Radford allowing the American military to command and Dulles had such great confidence in the and fight its war, considered an internal ability of the American armed forces to struggle, would be far too embarrassing to achieve victory in such unfavorable accept.24 They instead chose to cut their losses circumstances in the wake of the less-than- and put their stock in the upcoming Geneva decisive end to the Korean War just a year Conference, previously agreed to at the prior. In Radford’s meeting, each service Berlin Four-Power Conference in February of chief rejected the plan for intervention in that year. A negotiated settlement had been a Indochina. Air Force Chief General Nathan long-term goal of the French government, but Twinning, though supporting the idea of it had hoped to enter the peace negotiations eventual intervention, balked at the haste with on the most favorable of military terms.25 which Radford desired action.23 The other The British government, never very chiefs were more forceful in their supportive of seeking a military solution to disapproval, failing to be convinced that the crisis, also declined to support “united victory was achievable in Indochina and wary action” worrying about the wider of the interference by French military implications and consequences of expanding commanders. The chiefs also cited the the war.26 The government felt Britain could possible expansion of the conflict to a full- not, and would not, be able to contribute any scale international war, further worsening the forces to allied initiative finding its troops prospects of achieving the objective. The already overextended around the empire and professional opinion of the American in NATO commitments. Moreover, the military, shunning both the precipitations and American government had even assured cost of intervention, did not bode well for Prime Minister Churchill that intervention securing Congressional approval for the would not happen, and he expected his ally to employment of “united action”. keep to its word.27 The British government In the end, neither the French, nor the favored a negotiated settlement for other British, nor the American governments came reasons as well, not least of which was Eden’s down in favor of “united action” as the preference for diplomatic engagement and appropriate response to the Dien Bien Phu compromise.28 Additionally, Eden’s central crisis. By April 1954 the French government role in the Geneva Conference as co-chair of Prime Minister Joseph Laniel was with the Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav perilously weak. The government was under Molotov, led him be optimistic, some say

21 Billings-Yun, 69. 22 Ibid., 70. 23 Ibid. 24 Kaplan, 51. 25 National Security Council, 20 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, p. 499. 26 Eden, 105. 27 Billings-Yun, 67. 28 Undersecretary of State to Department of State, 5 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, pp. 450-451.

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120 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO overly, about the prospects for finding a colonialist aggression. Despite requesting widely acceptable settlement there.29 exploratory findings on various forms of The British also had a vested interest in intervention, President Eisenhower decided avoiding an antagonistic relationship with against the proposal in favor of giving the communist China. The precarious location of Geneva Conference a chance. Full-scale Southeast Asia Hong Kong made the colony reliant on access armed intervention did not fit with to food and raw materials from the Mainland Eisenhower’s leaner “New Look” policy, essential to its survival, which could easily be which favored more efficient use of military jeopardized by an overly bold policy choice force in protecting America’s national like “united action”.30 Furthermore, the large security.34 He even managed to avoid making Chinese populations of its colonies of Malaya any explicit decision by sending the matter to and Singapore, if seriously agitated, could Congress while letting situation at Dien Bien threaten the internal stability of these areas.31 Phu deteriorate unabated.35 Intervention by the United States, with or Privately, President Eisenhower was not without allied support, Britain feared might as fundamentally opposed to the conclusion lead communist China to invoke the Sino- of peaceful negotiations at Geneva as Dulles, Soviet alliance precipitating a third world war viewing “united action” as a bit of a bluff in a century.32 For Eden, rather than actual intent.36 Dulles’ proposition was far Any agreement would THE ADMINISTRATION DULY too risky and unlikely to “ certainly have guaranteed CHANGED ITS FOCUS FROM produce any valuable results. THE UNSALVAGEABLE FORT… the independence of the Britain’s concern of its three Associated States, regional interests likely ” fulfilling at least one major agitated American policy-makers for being goal there. Furthermore, the alternative of short-sighted, self-interested, and failing to continuing to operate solely through the appreciate the importance of saving French military was unacceptable and already Indochina to the survival of the free world. proving unproductive. As the French hold of Arguably the most important Dien Bien Phu worsened, a military victory government’s position regarding “united seemed an ever more distant possibility. The action” was that of the United States, for even administration duly changed its focus from if France, Britain, and others supported the the unsalvageable fort to the long-term initiative, it would have been meaningless. As security of the non-communist peoples of it turned out, the Europeans were not willing Southeast Asia. to adhere to the US plan, and the US was not keen on the idea of going in alone.33 A “United action” as a viable foreign policy unilateral intervention by the United States, option never got its legs. The furor and while marginally different militarily from a confusion surrounding its announcement multilateral one, would have smacked of neo- mired the initiative in controversy and

29 Ruane , 199. 30 Eden to Minister of Defence, 1 Oct. 1952, Prime Minister’s Office: Minutes and Papers, 1951-64 (PREM 11), PREM 11/648. 31 T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 89. 32 Eden, 94. 33 Ibid. 34 Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World? (Houndmills, Bakingstoke: Palgrace Macmillan, 1996), 95. 35 Billings-Yun, 82-83. 36 Kaplan, 96.

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Andrew Hall 121 suspicion. Its principle elements, first the irritating to the American government and Southeast Asia ceding of French control of the military reins affected its conduct at Geneva. The problem to the Americans and second the was skirted by carefully wording the determination that a decisive victory was agreement in Berlin.37 possible, were never realized. For the British, Also meeting around this time were the its mere suggestion made them worry the Prime Ministers of five newly independent United States would not follow up on its Asian countries, namely India, Pakistan previous commitments. Eden was alarmed by (comprising both current-day Pakistan and Dulles’ choice of the word united implying he Bangladesh), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), spoke for America’s allies when he had not Burma (now Myanmar), and Indonesia, in been briefed on the idea. The haphazard Colombo from 28 April to 2 May 1954. Each manner in which Dulles handled the situation was steadfastly neutral in the Cold War, and placed his relations with his allies on a poor all save Indonesia were former British footing for the commencement of the Geneva colonies though Burma was not a member of Conference. His numerous reincarnations of the Commonwealth. The views held by the an intervention plan, even as the Geneva Colombo Powers, whose meeting is viewed Conference got underway, continued until the as the genesis of the non-aligned movement, complete defeat at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May were of the utmost importance to and a 1954. He would immediately thereafter need guiding principle for the British government their support in the negotiations for a long- regarding SEATO. term security organization for Southeast Asia. Though the negotiations for the creation of SEATO took place separately from the Formation of a collective defense Geneva Conference, the debate there had a organization great impact on the relations among the allies On 26 April 1954, representatives of the and with their communist counterparts. Thus, United States, the United Kingdom, France, by extension, the progress of the conference the Soviet Union, communist China, and and the ongoing EDC debate were important from each of the Associated States began factors in shaping Anglo-American during negotiations in Geneva to reach a settlement the SEATO negotiations. For example, the on the war in Indochina, concurrent with a British disapproval of many US proposals at parallel conference on the question of Korea. Geneva was often the result of being deemed This conference was in fulfillment of a unlikely to be accepted by the Soviets; this compromise plan agreed to by the major disapproval was not, as the Americans may powers at Berlin in February of 1954. The have believed, out sympathy for the United States was worried that agreeing to communists, but instead a more realistic negotiate with China at Geneva would approach to achieving a compromise. The involve implicit recognition of the British were far more committed to communist government; the United States, compromise whereas the Americans until January 1979, only recognized concerned themselves with appearances. diplomatically the Nationalist government in The beginnings of drawing up a proposal Formosa as the government of China. This for the collective defense of Southeast Asia tension with Chinese inclusion, and the Great began before “united action” had been Power status it implied, was continually completely discarded as a policy option.

37 Eden, 89.

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122 Terrorism in Southeast Asia Eisenhower had originally envisaged an collective self-defense if an armed attack organization with this express purpose before occurs against a Member of the United the announcement of the interventionist Nations.”42 Seeing as Cambodia and Laos did alternative.38 On the other hand, Sir Anthony not join the United Nations until 1955 and Eden points to a discussion with French Vietnam not until 1977, the United States Southeast Asia Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in June government must have been willing to 1952 in which he “proposed the creation of a suppress its anti-colonialist principles in permanent military organization [sic] considering Chinese interference as an armed to…plan the measures which could be taken attack against France by way of her overseas for the defense not only of Indo-China but of possessions. the whole region.”39 Nevertheless, at a US The British government expressed its National Security Council meeting on March strong opposition to this proposal. While 25, 1954, just four days before Dulles’ speech recognizing the benefits that such a security at the Overseas Press Club, Eisenhower agreement would bestow on its regional suggested a means by which the long-term possessions, such an action was deemed security of Vietnam could be guaranteed. He “unlikely to help [Great Britain and her allies] suggested that Vietnam could appeal to its militarily, and would harm us politically.”43 A neighbors and Western powers to form a set premature threat of employing armed force in of defensive alliances. This would have the Indochina, Eden feared, would jeopardize the added benefits of removing the “taint of Geneva Conference before it even began and French colonialism” and allowing the United could easily provoke China into war, not States to share the burden of protection with deter her from it. By the time Dulles and Eden its allies.40 As the utility of “united action” discussed the matter in person on 11 April, faded, the proposal returned to the fore and Eden was relieved to hear that the Americans began to take shape. had softened their stance and backed away The first detailed initiative resembling a from a pre-Geneva announcement multilateral security organization was put threatening to use force. It was then too that forth just weeks prior to the commencement Dulles confided in Eden the reasoning of the of the Geneva Conference. The US American government regarding Indochina, government proposed the formation of an ad and again pitched “united action” to him. The hoc coalition of countries to act together, in US government judged France incapable of accordance with the Article 51 of the Charter handling the situation in Indochina and of the United Nations, to end Chinese immediate allied action must be sent to interference in the war in Indochina.41 Dulles reinforce French forces. In rebuffing “united envisaged the participation of the United action” on the grounds that immediate action States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New was unnecessary in light of the Geneva Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and the Conference, Eden nonetheless gave his three Associated States in this group. support to studying a collective defense Interestingly however, Article 51 of the organization. It must be emphasized Eden Charter upholds the “right of individual or only wish to endorse “the most careful

38 Ibid., 84. 39 Ibid. 40 Billings-Yun , 53-55. 41 Eden, 92. 42 Charter of the United Nations (1945), Chapter VII, Article 51. 43 Eden, 93.

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Andrew Hall 123 thought and study” of such an organization, of French morale and sought Eden’s support Southeast Asia finding no need to hurry things.44 in making a gesture of some kind to boost The first formal meeting of interested their spirits. Eden rejected making any threat parties to discuss the creation of SEATO took of force or even giving “moral support” to place on 20 April 1954, just less than a week such an American move.48 While he before Geneva was set to open. Dulles sympathized with Dulles’ pleas, he could not convened the meeting, comprising the support any action that would hinder their ambassadors of the group of countries from negotiating position. Dulles switched his his aforementioned ad hoc coalition, to gauge efforts to a swift formation of SEATO as the their willingness to join such an organization most feasible means of aiding the French, but and to discuss the methods its creation.45 again Eden urged patience and supported Again, Eden wrote in his memoirs of his only secret negotiations on the matter.49 discomfort with the haste with which Dulles During a visit to Washington in late June pushed this initiative. Dulles had not 1954 by Churchill and Eden to their consulted him before the meeting was American counterparts, the structure of the announced, and Eden was dismayed that it planned organization took shape. In meetings was too late to be cancelled. Moreover, he he had with Dulles, Eden suggested that found it troubling that SEATO be a collective and drawing up a select list of reciprocal defensive AGAIN, EDEN WROTE IN HIS countries this early would “ arrangement, whereby MEMOIRS OF HIS DISCOMFORT make others, particularly WITH THE HASTE WITH WHICH members guaranteed the India, feel excluded from DULLES PUSHED THIS security of others in the expressing her views. Eden INITIATIVE. event of attack. Its would have preferred ” membership would be open informal and secret to those willing to commit to preparatory discussions among the interested take military action in the face of aggression. parties regarding possible members before Eden said the organization would be like the any official public announcement. In an Locarno Pact of 1925, in which a coalition of attempt to soften the negative impacts, Eden European countries, including Great Britain, was able to convince Dulles to recast the France, and Germany, guaranteed each meeting as “a general briefing conference on other’s territorial integrity in the wake of the the coming negotiations at Geneva.”46 For First World War. Unfortunately for Eden, Eden, the damage had already been done, the however, the use of Locarno evoked the membership all but crystallized.47 memories of appeasement among the In these early weeks of the Geneva Americans; he did leave Washington Conference when both Eden and Dulles were confident his intended meaning was in attendance, Dulles repeatedly approached understood and even supported, however.50 his counterpart about the need to help the Also convening in late June was the study French cause. Dulles lamented the poor state group proposed two months earlier by the

44 Ibid., 96. 45 Eden to Cabinet, 14 June 1954, PREM 11/649. 46 Eden, 98-99. 47 Eden to Cabinet, 14 June 1954, PREM 11/649. 48 Eden, 135. 49 Eden to Cabinet, 14 June 1954, PREM 11/649. 50 Eden, 132-133.

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124 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO United States. They again met in Washington Even before the failure of “united to prepare a report on the key aspects action”, the United States government began regarding the structure and competencies of pushing for the rapid formation of a coalition the collective defense initiative. A month later as a bulwark against communist aggression in on 17 July, the working group submitted its Southeast Asia. The immediacy for its Southeast Asia findings to their governments for review and creation was only enhanced by the rejection further negotiation. This was also the point at of “united action” and the desire to which the agreement that would bring a demonstrate Western unity and support for successful end to the Geneva Conference was the French. Meanwhile, the British position in sight; it did finally come on 21 July 1954. regarding the timing of creating SEATO was The United States, Great Britain and their always one of caution, patience, and allies continued negotiations on the SEATO hesitation. Essentially, the disagreement proposal through the summer. The British between these transatlantic allies centered on focused their energy on securing the support the appropriateness or necessity of of the Colombo Powers, and if not, prevent- establishing SEATO while negotiations for a ing their outright disapproval. The peace settlement were proceeding, and to a Americans, on other hand, were most intent lesser extent on garnering the most on selling the organization as an effective widespread support. measure of containment. For their efforts, The driving force behind American only Pakistan, beyond those at the Washing- position on this issue was largely diplomatic ton meetings, agreed to join SEATO; the vanity. First, the US had no intention of other Colombo Powers found joining the subscribing to whatever agreement the parties organization a violation of their professed at the Geneva Conference reached. Doing so neutrality. would in effect have meant that the US Throughout these negotiations between government consented to the ceding of the US and Britain, the primary authors of the territory to communists.51 Such an act was SEATO treaty, there were a number of key, unacceptable in the domestic political climate interrelated debates that dominated their of the 1950s. Thus, if an immediate correspondence. Rather than give a detailed announcement were to negatively affect the chronological account of these negotiations, a outcome of Geneva, so be it. In fact, Eden more concise and coherent understanding can reported to the Cabinet in July 1954 that the be achieved through a thematic analysis of US delegation at Geneva “attempted to each. The four prominent areas of discussion interfere with the successful completion of were the timing, composition, commitments, the Conference’s work.”52 and purpose of the organization, each of Second, Dulles was consumed by the which has been touched upon already. desire to show Western solidarity in the face Though the first two dominated the volume of of the communist threat. A Five-Power Staff the correspondence between London and Conference was convened in early June 1954 Washington, the latter two dealt with more by the United States, the United Kingdom, fundamental aspects of the alliance, affecting France, Australia, and New Zealand in this what type of grouping SEATO would vein; its purpose was not only to discuss become. SEATO, but also to show a united front,

51 Anita Inder Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo American Relationship, 1947-56 (London: Pinter, 1993), 177. 52 Eden to Cabinet, 24 July, 1954, PREM 11/650.

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Andrew Hall 125 however fictitious it was.53 The creation of a delay action on the initiative.56 Though the Southeast Asia multilateral anti-communist alliance would Americans “let the cat out of the bag”, so to be an excellent demonstration of speak, in their April announcement of a cohesiveness and determination. Finally, Washington conference on SEATO, the Dulles repeatedly prodded Eden about British successfully delayed the actual making some symbolic gesture to help the formation to approximately six weeks after French in their political and military the conclusion of peace settlements in predicament. The ongoing debate in France Geneva. regarding the ratification of the EDC raised The debate regarding the composition of serious doubts about their abilities to the collective defense system, in addition to participate in so many arenas simultaneously. being closely related to its timing, was in As Dulles desired both French ratification itself quite complex. The inclusion of certain and a continuation of the effort in Indochina, countries, by some logic, would imply the he figured a gesture by France’s allies could necessary inclusion of others or be boost morale and guarantee the detrimental to existing ones. The ultimate aforementioned goals. The immediate determinant in the selection of which formation of SEATO would, Dulles surmised, countries would, or could, be included in the lessen the military burdens of France in the arrangement was the value their participation region.54 offered to the strategy of the US or Britain. The British government, by contrast, did Each found particular members to be not feel bound to act by this same sense of especially advantageous to their regional and urgency. Instead, the guiding principle of global foreign policy strategies. their policy on the timing of SEATO was to The core and undisputed members of the wait until the Geneva Conference had run its SEATO alliance were the three Western and course, after which the situation could then be democratic stalwarts of the United States, the reassessed. Any premature action was sure to United Kingdom, and France. The form and hamper the negotiations, in which Eden was purpose of the alliance was almost wholly investing a great deal of time and diplomatic their design, which at the very least kept the effort. Another negative impact of a hastily negotiations much simpler and contrived organization would be the inability straightforward. This arrangement, however, to expand membership beyond the core group posed a serious problem for the way in which the US originally envisioned. Britain knew it the rest of the world would perceive the would take considerable time and organization; a Western-dominated alliance consultation to get India and the other appeared to many critics to be an act of neo- Colombo Powers to agree to the colonialism. The American and British organization.55 Their exclusion from all of the governments took seriously this image preliminary conferences effectively problem and sought, though with varying guaranteed their exclusion. For the degrees of commitment, to secure the Americans, this tactic of deferring to Asian membership of as many Asian countries as opinion was merely a ploy by the British to possible. As Eden noted, it is necessary

53 UK Geneva Delegation to Foreign Office, 22 May 1954, PREM 11/648415. 54 Kaplan, 126. 55 Inder Singh, 178. 56 Kaplan, 129.

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126 Terrorism in Southeast Asia “because the United States cannot subscribe allying themselves with the US over their to a white man’s club in Asia.”57 traditional partner in Britain. In a letter to the British participation in the security pact Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in was both significant and necessary due to its July 1954, New Zealand’s Foreign Secretary colonial holdings in the region. Great Britain justified this move. He wrote, “neither alone Southeast Asia had troops stationed in their colonies of nor together are the United Kingdom, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, and Australia and New Zealand in any position to Singapore; there were also large naval bases meet the threat that might develop in South in Singapore and nearby Hong Kong.58 The East Asia. We need the help of the creation of SEATO would contribute Americans.”62 For the British government, the significantly to the defense and security of creation of SEATO was effectively an these possessions as well as provide the expansion of the ANZUS alliance in which it alliance with potential bases.59 Like France, now had both a voice and an ear. The United Britain was feeling the pressures of being States was pleased to have such eager and extended militarily around the globe and such reliable partners. a defensive system would allow for crucial The two remaining members that the burden sharing. Furthermore, Britain United States had originally intended to intended that, upon independence, these participate in SEATO were Thailand and the territories would themselves join the alliance Philippines, who were crucially themselves in their own right; none of them, however, actually in Southeast Asia. Thailand, the only ultimately chose to do so.60 country in the region never to have been Adding to the unfortunate dominance of colonized by a Western power, had a reliably Western countries were the memberships of anti-communist and Western outlook. After Australia and New Zealand, former British the Second World War, the US provided colonies and newly formalized allies of the assistance to the recently occupied country United States. Their membership was and supported its independence. Bordering ostensibly for the sake of providing a Cambodia and Laos, Thailand was arguably southern anti-communist bulwark for the the most strategically important member of region and in deference to the intimate SEATO, being the front line against the flow concern they had with the spread of of communism. Similarly, the Philippines, a communism in their neighborhood. Britain former a colony the United States to which found their membership especially independence was granted in 1946, is located advantageous which “would remove the just several hundred miles from Vietnam anomaly of [British] exclusion from the across the South China Sea. Subic Bay Naval A.N.Z.U.S. Pact,”61 the alliance formed by the Base and Clark Air Field, vestiges of its United States with the Australia and New colonial past, were key US military Zealand in September 1951. This treaty installations in the region and would be marked an important shift for these countries, integral to the defense of Southeast Asia.63

57 Eden to Cabinet, 6 Oct. 1953, PREM 11/404. 58 George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne: Cheshire for the Australian National University, 1962) 4. 59 Eden, 93. 60 T.B. Miller, International Security in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Region (New York: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 267. 61 Eden, 93. 62 UK High Commission in New Zealand to CRO, 21 July 1954, PREM 11/650239. 63 Peter Lyon, War and Peace in South-East Asia, (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs - Oxford University Press, 1969), 148.

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Andrew Hall 127 The Philippines, like Thailand, would benefit contribution India, Pakistan or Ceylon could Southeast Asia from the economic and military aid from the make to the SEATO alliance.66 It is also true US that accompanied SEATO membership.64 that while they were symbolically important The most controversial and troubling as both Asian and neutral powers, their potential memberships were those of the participation always seemed an unlikelihood Colombo Powers, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, in the face of America’s unabashed anti- Indonesia, and Burma. Though the US found communism. Ceylon’s government for their participation generally advantageous, example, cited “the spirit in which [SEATO] the British government’s preoccupation with has been…conceived” when objecting to their opinion, and the delay this required, was participation in the agreement.67 Another a serious thorn of contention between these curiosity is that in spite of the negative allies. The eventual inclusion of Pakistan comments the British Foreign Office tended appears to have proved more detrimental to to receive from these countries on the SEATO the alliance than its absence would have been. proposal, Eden more often categorized their Throughout the negotiations regarding the responses as “on the whole encouraging” or formation of SEATO there was a very large something similar.68 In fact, the more volume of correspondence between the significant symbolic gesture was Britain’s British Foreign Secretary apparent concern with the and his High Commissioners priorities of its THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL in New Delhi, Karachi, and “ Commonwealth partners; AND TROUBLING POTENTIAL Colombo. Eden was MEMBERSHIPS WERE THOSE perhaps this was a means to committed to keeping these OF THE COLOMBO POWERS… demonstrate this relationship Commonwealth govern- ” could be friendly and ments abreast of the productive despite their proceedings at Geneva and the development colonialist past. The alternative of acting in of the SEATO proposal. He was reaffirmed in merely Britain’s own self-interest risked his preference for patience and thoroughness alienating these countries, countries that from these governments, and often acted as a remained in many other ways of great spokesman for their views to the United importance to Great Britain.69 States.65 To further complicate this matter of This relationship, whereby Eden gave so Colombo Group membership was the lone much deference to the opinion of the accession of Pakistan to the organization. Colombo Powers, seems somewhat odd in First, its hostile relationship with India and its light of the actual correspondence. Indeed explicit desire to acquire Western arms seems while Burma was considered on the front line to have precluded any eventual membership of the defense in that it bordered Vietnam as by India.70 Second, many member well as China and thus was a strategically governments expressed concern about desirable member, the British government Pakistan citing its SEATO membership in itself admitted the limited military calling for help in the event of an armed attack

64 Kaplan, 157. 65 UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to CRO (undated), PREM 11/650266. 66 UK Geneva Delegation to Foreign Office, 22 May 1954, PREM 11/648415. 67 UK High Commissioner in Ceylon to CRO, et al., 10 September 1954, FO 371/111888. 68 Eden to Cabinet, 14 June, 1954, PREM 11/649. 69 Kaplan (1990), 129. 70 Inder Singh (1993), 179.

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128 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO by India.71 For all of Britain’s diplomatic commitments, functions, and purpose, were efforts, the results were much less than in fact the least disputed. Due to the relatively satisfactory for all concerned. In any event, little correspondence or significant mention Pakistan left the SEATO treaty in 1968. in Eden’s memoirs one must assume that The expansion of membership to the there was a quick consensus reached on these Southeast Asia South Asian countries also posed a problem more substantive matters. The treaty calls for for the United States, which figured there maintenance of peace and security in the would be pressure to similarly extend the region through the employment of several treaty area east and north to Formosa, or even means. Beyond the mere military solidarity Japan and South Korea.72 This widening of and commitment to the common defense, the the scope of membership and the area of treaty also stipulates that the parties promote concern, surmised the US, would democracy through the rule of law and unnecessarily complicate and overburden the individual liberty in addition to economic alliance. Eden correctly noted that these development through mutual assistance.75 To countries were not comparable; Formosa’s the cynic this merely reads that the wealthy attitudes toward China and communism, for Western powers would be buying the co- example, were of a vastly different scope and operation of and access to the countries in the intensity than India’s.73 Nonetheless, this region; Thailand and the Philippines were problem posed the question of determining legitimately and rightly concerned with their where to limit the area in which countries security and the threat of communism, would be committed to act in the event of however. communist aggression. Article VIII of the The only question of concern regarding SEATO Treaty, in rectifying this problem the commitments that members were obliged says, “the ‘treaty area’ is the general area of to meet was when and the extent to which Southeast Asia, including the entire territories military forces would be employed. For all of the Asian Parties, and the general area of members including even the United States, the Southwest Pacific not including the the creation of SEATO was a means to share Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes the military burdens of defending the region. north latitude.”74 The prescribed line of Great Britain and France were especially latitude effectively excluded all of Formosa, concerned about having to commit a as well as Hong Kong, from the treaty area dedicated portion of their military forces to and kept the focus on Southeast Asia alone. the body, much like those required by NATO, This debate over membership had little to do but the United States made no such insistence with the practicalities of defending Southeast in this case.76 As stipulated in the treaty, a Asia and more to do with politicking. member is required to act only upon Those aspects of this Southeast Asian unanimous agreement of the members and in collective defense system, which were “accordance with its constitutional arguably the most important, namely its processes.”77 Thus the arrangement was left

71 UK High Commissioner in Australia to CRO, 16 Sept. 1954, Foreign Office Information Policy Department Files (FO 371), FO 371/111888. 72 Eden to Cabinet, 14 June, 1954, PREM 11/649. 73 Eden (1960), 97. 74 South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 8 Sept. 1954, Foreign Office Protocols of Treaties (FO 93), FO 93 1/515. 75 Ibid. 76 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain the United States and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 21. 77 South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 8 Sept. 1954, FO 93 1/515.

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Andrew Hall 129 loose and flexible, keeping the costs of with the formation of a string of military Southeast Asia membership relatively low. alliances around it from Japan and South From this litany of disagreements and Korea, down through Formosa and differences of opinion, several themes can be Indochina, to India and Pakistan. With no observed that point to the roots of this trans- imminent threat of a war with China in atlantic discord. The most important issue that Indochina, the creation of SEATO could affected these allies was their divergent views continue at a careful and slow pace in pursuit on the threat posed by communist China to the of Britain’s long-term strategies for the security of Southeast Asia. Britain, on the one region. The judgment of the United States hand, took the position that China must be dictated that delay was a perilous risk and dealt with diplomatically. This was in part due immediate, demonstrative action was of the British reliance on Chinese benevolence with utmost importance to the containment of regard to Hong Kong as previously mentioned, communism in Southeast Asia. but also its government’s preference for peace A second source of discord in the through engagement. Thus at Geneva, Eden transatlantic relationship during the welcomed Chinese participation in the formation of SEATO was the poor personal Conference and held many private talks with relationship of John F. Dulles and Sir Chou En-Lai to reach a Anthony Eden, each compromise on Korea and country’s chief diplomat. EDEN OFTEN WROTE OF HIS Indochina. The United States, “ These two men, though FRUSTRATION WITH DULLES’ on the other hand, was loath FREQUENT DISREGARD FOR forced by their government to associate with the commu- BRITISH OPINION… positions to work closely nist regime, especially due to ” together on a wide range of China’s Korean War aid to global issues, simply did not the North, allowing the US to disregard the get along; this is in surprising contrast to the Geneva Conference out of hand.78 affinity of their respective superiors, The crux of this issue, however, was the President Eisenhower and Prime Minister threat that China posed to the peace and Churchill, dating from co-operation in the security of Southeast Asia. While the aid it Second World War. Eden, a seasoned British provided to the Viet Minh was no secret, the diplomat, had a very astute and gracious United States government judged full-scale manner in the conduct of his duties as Foreign intervention to be imminent and inevitable. Minister. This, unfortunately, did not mix This was the reason behind advocating both well with Dulles’ more haphazard manner of “united action” and the SEATO alliance as speech and hawkish tendencies. “My measures to deter the Chinese from entering difficulty in working with Mr. Dulles,” writes the conflict. The British government judged Eden, “was to determine what he really meant the situation to be almost exactly the and in consequence the significance to be opposite. Such provocative and hasty actions attached to his words and actions.”80 Eden would certainly, in its opinion, draw China often wrote of his frustration with Dulles’ into the conflict that could then rapidly frequent disregard for British opinion, as well escalate into a global war.79 The speedy as that of the Commonwealth, and being out- creation of SEATO might also alarm China maneuvered by his secret dealings and

78 Bell, 36. 79 Foreign Office, ‘Draft Basis for Discussion by Military Committee’, 28 June 1952, PREM 11/648. 80 Eden, 63.

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130 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO machinations.81 For example, while at States to take a firm, if not provocative, Geneva, Eden read of deal reached between stance against communism, to keep the the American and French governments on the dominoes standing as it were. Britain was terms of a possible intervention in Indochina incentivised to create the SEATO system for in the Swiss newspapers and not from their a series of individual goals and was less Southeast Asia governments; this clearly insulted him moved by any grand motives. The deeply.82 organization would improve the security of On the other hand, Dulles was frustrated its regional possessions, lessen the pressures by Eden’s all too frequent citing of the of its global military reach, correct the Commonwealth’s opinion in his reasoning for anomaly of its ANZUS exclusion, underwrite delay and his stubborn commitment to the the Geneva Accords, and provide an Geneva Conference which the latter was co- institutionalized means to influence the chairing.83 It seems rather evident that such a formation of US policy in the region.84 The poor relationship would hamper the ability of six months of negotiations and diplomatic these two men to reach a consensus when wrangling were the reconciling of these such important issues were at stake. On the different approaches. other hand, it is possible that this animosity In addition to these broad influences on was the result of each advocating conflicting Anglo-American relations were two promi- policy choices in their negotiations, thus nent international issues that contributed to automatically setting them at odds. In either strained diplomacy. First, the continued case, the Dulles-Eden relationship was an debate concerning the creation of the EDC integral aspect of political dynamic in which consumed a great deal of time, energy, and SEATO was created, and was a manifestation diplomatic effort. Its failure and the scramble of the troubles in the Anglo-US relations to develop an alternative disappointed the during this period. American government adding to transatlantic The disparate strategies that Great Britain tensions and requiring a strategic reappraisal and the United States employed for Southeast of American military strategy with regard to Asia in the post-Second World War world Europe.85 Second, Anglo-American relations were a third basis for diplomatic friction in were further strained by the developments in the formation of SEATO. The United States Guatemala, which had a government with had a grand strategy to tackle the menacing communist leanings. The US government spread of communism, namely the principle threatened to search any ship heading for of containment. The creation of a mutual Guatemalan ports, including British ones, defense system for Southeast Asia followed without warning if necessary to prevent its previous bilateral relationships with a host Guatemala’s government from amassing of Asia-Pacific states that shared the weapons. This possibility outraged the British commitment to anti-communism. SEATO government demanding that no “forcible was also fully in accordance with the action” be taken against British ships by their domestic political pressure in the United American allies.86 Later in the crisis, Britain,

81 Ibid., 98-99. 82 Ibid., 119. 83 Kaplan, 129. 84 Dockrill, 20. 85 Bell, 29. 86 Eden, 135.

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Andrew Hall 131 together with France, abstained from a key This process of forming a lasting defense Southeast Asia vote in the UN Security Council keeping the arrangement for Southeast Asia proved long situation off of the Council’s agenda at the and arduous for both British and American request of the United States who preferred diplomats. The number and significance of handling the crisis through the Organization their disagreements were rather unusual for of American States (OAS). These additional would-be allies. “In fact,” writes Coral Bell, events put further pressures on the Anglo-US “if one had to base one’s estimate of the relationship during their SEATO negotiations. strength of an alliance on the degree of consensus between the parties as to the nature Manila Conference and Conclusion and seriousness of the threat…one might On 8 September 1954, the representatives have difficulty in establishing the existence of of eight countries met in Manila, capital city an Anglo-American alliance in this part of the of the Philippines, to sign the Southeast Asia world despite the formal legal tie of Collective Defense Treaty establishing SEATO.”88 Radically different views on the SEATO, as well as the Pacific Charter, which threat posed by communist China led to promoted economic and cultural co-operation contradictory assessments on the necessity and respect among the signatories. The final for “united action” and an immediate topic of debate to be sorted out was the defensive coalition; Britain feared determination of which threats would invoke provocation with it and America intervention the alliance. This issue epitomized the core without it. Contrasting appraisals for the differences in British and American security needs of the region, based on disagreement over SEATO. The British interests and responsibilities for different government argued against making restric- areas, affected the shape and scope of the tions on the types of aggression, which would defense system. Britain sought to secure its surely undermine the broadly defensive nature colonial possessions and curry favor with the of the treaty. America’s insistence on Colombo Powers, whereas America was most narrowing the threshold to just communist imminently concerned with the advance of aggression, the organization’s raison d’être, communism in Indochina. was based on a desire neither to mince words To further muddle this debate was the nor to be drawn into other regional conflicts, abrasive relationship of each side’s chief which were of less concern. The British negotiator and spokesman. The personal correctly predicted that such a move would rapport of Eden and Dulles was consistently most certainly preclude any neutral countries poor and unproductive with neither taking from subscribing to the treaty. The resulting much stock in the other’s priorities. Each was compromise reached relegated the specifi- consumed by the image perceived by others cation of communist aggression to an adden- in the formation of SEATO; the groups they dum of the treaty as an “Understanding of the sought to please were vastly different. The United States of America.”87 In essence, the American government, above all else, had to British capitulated to the Americans for the remain staunchly anti-communist in its sake of the alliance. For all their foot-drag- diplomatic activities, for both domestic and ging, the British mostly fostered animosity international reasons. It sought demonstrative with the US as well as suspicion from India. and immediate overtures to this end through

87 South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, 8 Sept. 1954, FO 93 1/515. 88 Bell, 37.

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132 Anglo-US Relations in the Formation of SEATO intervention proposals and Western solidarity entire ordeal was Britain’s seat at the in its support of France. Secondly, it had to negotiating table, Eden having Dulles’ ear. maintain is support for the independence of Recognizing the unequal nature of their Europe’s colonies and the establishment of alliance, the British could best maximize their democracies in them; Britain’s were no doubt influence through fiercely defending their Southeast Asia a source of embarrassment for the US position, but at the end of the day striking the government.89 In contrast, Britain sought no best compromise possible so as not to be immediate end to those colonial ties and deemed unnecessary. So, for as long as moreover sought to placate its Britain remained the ally to which America Commonwealth partners through regular turned first for advice, consultation or co- updates and negotiating in their interests. operation, than there would at least one goal Britain strove to preserve her status as a was achieved, the preservation of the alliance. world power, being actively engaged around SEATO provided for Britain “an informal the globe, and acted as force for peace power base by means of which it could exert through its negotiating position at Geneva. its influence over world affairs alongside the In spite of these disadvantages and US the Soviet Union.”90 If Britain were to hurdles, Britain and the United States were have a grand strategy to match America’s able to agree in a matter of months to a containment of communism, it would be the mutually acceptable organization. Britain was maintenance of Anglo-American solidarity successful in delaying the actual formation of and ever-close co-operation. As Eden writes, the pact until after the completion of Geneva, “If allies are to act in concert only when their but the form and composition of the views are identical, alliances have no organization was mostly what America had meaning.”91 The United States and Great intended all along. What bridged the gap was Britain spent much of 1954 with differing largely British acquiescence to the demands views but eventually were able to find of its more powerful ally. Beyond the satisfaction in a compromise. This would not inclusion of certain states or the timing of be repeated a mere two years later in the initiative, the most important aspect of the dramatic Suez Crisis of 1956.

89 National Security Council, 20 May 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, XII, Pt. 1, p. 499. 90 Dockrill, 10. 91 Eden, 138

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Tai Wei Lim 133 Southeast Asia ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry

Tai Wei Lim

Introduction Japan and treat its relations with both of them As the US gets involved in the post-War in a neutral manner. At the same time as on Iraq reconstruction and is bogged down by ASEAN wants to maintain economic ties with the escalating postwar violence there, a quiet the Japanese, some leaders prefer to see the but new equilibrium is emerging in East Asia. Chinese card as an option to place less The regional powers of China and Japan are reliance on the developed West (traditionally aligning vis-à-vis themselves to achieve a new including Japan), particularly the US in terms power structure and equilibrium in East Asia. of trade as well as political leadership. Some The new equilibrium may ASEAN leaders have posi- not necessarily mean more tioned US priorities in issues WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION instability for the region but “ like terrorism and rebuilding ITSELF, THE MEMBERS ARE might impose some EQUALLY DIVIDED IN THEIR Iraq as minor ones compared adjustment discomforts for AFFILIATIONS TO THE TWO to other regional economic all East Asian states and POWERS. developmental issues that are organizations like ASEAN ” more closely aligned with (Association of Southeast Chinese interests. Thus, in Asian Nations). The need to accommodate some sense, for these ASEAN leaders, China new players and maintain ties with old ones is more of a natural ally than the Americans, will require delicate rebalancing of interests especially in issues like the regional economy. and realignments of positions. Part of this new By this logic, since Japan is closely aligned equilibrium entails resolving Sino-Japanese with US interests, Japan might be perceived to rivalries over regional security organizations, be veering away from ASEAN interests in including that of ASEAN. Overall, from comparison with the Chinese. ASEAN’s point of view (both military and Because of its traditionally interwoven economically), they have to deal with the interests with both countries, ASEAN may simultaneous presence of two increasingly then be located as a neutral medium for assertive regional powers, a Japan that is still balancing the two countries militarily and the world’s second largest economy and economically, performing an unofficial increasingly muscular militarily and a China function as a security organization that that is becoming a formidable economic force perpetuates peace in the South China Sea, a on top of being the traditional nuclear power delineating line between Japan and China. in East Asia. Within the organization itself, the members are equally divided in their affiliations to the Conducive for Neutrality two powers. Myanmar is a traditional close ASEAN as a grouping wants to achieve ally of China, buying arms from China (for equilibrium in its ties with both China and e.g. Myanmar is one of the largest customers

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134 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry of the Chinese export F-7M fighters) and another claimant to the disputed islands, has even reportedly hosting some of China’s a former strongman leader, Mahathir military equipment. Vietnam is a socialist Mohamed, who is a close admirer of country that switched from being a close Japanese economic development, enjoys his communist comrade of China to an adversary friendship with Japanese nationalist Shintaro Southeast Asia during the era of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Ishihara (both co-authored books on becoming a Soviet client state. speaking up against the US) and instituted Indonesia, a close ally of China during the “Look East” policy of learning from the Sukarno years during the 1960s, became Japan. However, under Mahathir, Malaysia fiercely anti-communist during Suharto’s took a strong position against what it sees as years and only established formal relations neo-Western imperialism (especially US with China many years later. The irony is that policies towards Israel and the Middle East), Sukarno’s daughter is now back as the creating friction between her and the US president of Indonesia after the fall of the (sometimes US allies such as Japan and Suharto regime during the 1997 Asian Australia as well). Therefore, taken as a financial crisis. Thailand, which some in whole, ASEAN is rather balanced and ASEAN now see as the next leader of neutral towards both China and Japan, with ASEAN, is a strong ally of the US and the some members tilting towards either one of only ASEAN state that was not formerly them on different issues. Japanese colony during WWII. It receives Because of the disparate makeup of the large amounts of investments from Japan organization, ASEAN is able to reconfigure a (the main production facility for Japanese variety of Japanese and Chinese interests automobile manufacturing in Southeast Asia) purely into its own interests through the and was involved in hosting Japanese bargaining and internal aggregation of warships on their way to the Gulf recently. interests within the organization. The end Singapore is the most economically products of this give-and-take bargaining to advanced country in ASEAN, serving as a come up with a common ASEAN position regional headquarters for many Japanese takes into consideration the sensitivities and multinational companies (MNC) and a interests of both Japan and China, making it strong US ally. Singapore hosted Japanese suitable as a regional security buffer Self-Defense Force (SDF) C-130 military organization. In this manner, Japanese and planes when Japan evacuated her citizens Chinese interests, be it sea lane or air space from Cambodia in the 1990s. At the same access, Southeast Asian raw materials, or time, however, she remains the only ASEAN even territorial disputes, can be country to be populated mainly by overseas accommodated. Chinese whose older denizens bore the brunt of Japanese brutalities during WWII. ASEAN as a Military Buffer Zone The Philippines remains another strong However, this does not mean that ASEAN ally of the US and is generally friendly to the is only capable of being a passive player in the Japanese and has been traditionally one of region, only reactive to Japanese and Chinese the stronger voices against Chinese naval maneuvers. In terms of military issues, activities in the South China Sea because of ASEAN is able to provide a reasonably her island disputes in the Spratlys (of which sizable role in the region, even regarding the the Philippines is a claimant). Malaysia, fact that the military budgets of both China

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Tai Wei Lim 135 and Japan are set to become even more arms. She, however, lacks manpower for Southeast Asia formidable. In March 2002, China announced military projection. Manpower is something that it was going to increase its military that Indonesia (maintains a 200,000 strong budget by 17.6 percent percent to 20 billion land force)4 and Vietnam (one of the world’s US dollars, which will dwarf the budget of the largest standing armies) are abundant in. next comparable East Asian power Australia There are also some little publicized by almost 3 times.1 Japan, the other dominant military facts outside ASEAN, for example, East Asian power, earmarked US$40 billion Thailand is one of the few countries in the (officially third in the world tally) for its world to possess a helicopter carrier for defense spending in 2001, overshadowing power projection while the Philippines can Australia’s defense budget by a factor of 5 claim ownership to one of the most times - nearly the entire combined budgets of prestigious officer cadet schools in the world. countries in the region. Taken together, these strengths can serve as a ASEAN, as it were, is being squeezed credible deterrence to any temptations by between two great powers.2 If ASEAN states bigger regional powers to act irresponsibly. were to confront China or Japan individually, Simultaneously, the individual weaknesses the inequity of such exchanges would be of the ASEAN states is also sufficient to overwhelming. Individually, many ASEAN ward off any Japanese or Chinese fears of the states (with the exception of perhaps organization becoming a military threat to Singapore and Malaysia) have seen their harm their interests. As the organization military capabilities decline considerably matures, it may want to develop a collective since the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, defense mechanism to activate regional especially the hitherto Southeast Asian big military cooperation when the interest of one brother of Indonesia.3 However, with state is transgressed, along the lines of strength in numbers and differentiation of NATO. Although this is far from realization roles, ASEAN as a whole can stand a better and the organization remains loosely chance. Differentiation in strengths between constituted, the already established different ASEAN members means that there individual links with the regional powers is potential for them to participate in through Japan-ASEAN friendship treaties collective security. For example, Singapore and free trade agreements or multilateral is advanced in telecommunications links with all of the regional powers like the technologies and early warning systems. In ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN- some areas of armaments, the CISCO China Security Dialogue will serve as a industries of Singapore were, at one time, starting point for ASEAN’s role in mediating one of the world’s largest producers of small regional security.

1 CICC (Taiwanese government website), “Beijing’s Defense Spending Could Double by 2005: CIA Chief,” http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:N2PcEwYnI4IC:www.taipei.org/teco/cicc/news/english/e-03-21-02/e-03-21-02- 1.htm+Japanese+defense+spending&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 2 People’s Daily, “Japanese Government Approves Defense Buildup Plans,” http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:M5jTtEYoW14C:english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200012/25/eng20001225_58717.htm l+Japanese+SDF+budget&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 3 Mark Lawson, “Might Budget Makes Australia a Big Spender in Financial Review,” AFR, November 16, 2002, http://afr.com/specialreports/report1/2002/07/04/FFXSQOO123D.html. Singapore which allocates 25 percent of its military expenditure on the military. (Lawson, http://afr.com ) In addition, Malaysia (almost similar in size in terms of population with Australia) is rapidly catching up with Australia in defense spending. For example, Malaysia intends to spend US$3-4 billion for its military in the period 2002-2005. (Gershman, John, http://pgoh, free.fr) 4 Ibid.

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136 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry Coping with a Muscular Japan terrorism laws that allowed her to deploy 5 to Ever since WWII, Japan has had a pacifist 6 7,250-ton destroyers to the Gulf region in a existence. Under Article 9 of Japan’s bid to be more internationally involved in the Constitution, it “renounces war as a sovereign conflict.5 right of the nation and the threat or use of The neo-conservative movement in Southeast Asia force.” For many years, Japan concentrated on power in the US as well as an increasingly economic recovery and fast growth. However, confident Japan led by a right-leaning faction she is now concentrating on augmenting her of the conservative Liberal Democrat Party military contribution to the world. ASEAN (LDP) facilitated this deployment with the views of a more muscular Japan are ambiva- bill to dispatch the troops to the combat lently tinged with awe, fear, support and region on Christmas day. On 140 different caution. Perhaps, of particular concern to occasions, within the one year period, the ASEAN is the advancement of Japanese MSDF supplied a total of 234,000 kl of oil military power in the agendas of anti- worth US$70 million on Japanese tab.6 terrorism, anti-piracy and peacekeeping Although MSDF activities are limited to rear operations. areas external to the combat zone, the refueling duties is a major support role to US Anti-terrorism and British combat operations. The ongoing Terrorism is now the call for a fighting in Iraq complicates international strengthened Japanese presence in the region peacekeeping operation as the SDF, if fired and the world. The 2001 Antiterrorism law upon, would have to defend themselves. The following 9-11 allowed Japan to send the law, however, presumes that SDF activities Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to an area near an will be restricted to non-combat zones in actual combat zone, in this case the Indian sensitivity to constitutional and legal Ocean, to refuel to coalition ships as part of constraints. However, with Iraqi insurgents’ the military campaign against the Taliban in attacks on the U.N. and Red Cross, the SDF Afghanistan and provide relief for Afghan may face direct fire and forced to respond, refugees. Ironically, part of the reason behind making combat and non-combat zones Japanese military rejuvenation is the foreign indistinguishable. pressure (gaiatsu) imposed by recent US Japan’s deployment of an Aegis administrations. In the first Gulf War, Japan destroyer to the Gulf represents a major step was criticized for giving too little too late. At in Japan’s growing confidence in its military that time, Japan was controlled by what role in the world. The frank admission by many saw as a liberal-leaning weak coalition Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda that government. But in the recent Gulf War, this decision was made independently of the things had changed. The Iraq law legislated US is in fact more important than the actual following the US-led war in Iraq permits deployment. Moreover, this assertion was Japanese direct deployment in a foreign backed up by Prime Minister Koizumi who state. To steer clear of the postwar peace reiterated that Japan could deploy its constitution, Japan introduced counter- destroyers whenever it wants. Deployment of

5 The Aegis-equipped destroyer Kirishima left for the Gulf on December 16, 2002 and replaced the 5,050-ton Hiei destroyer already in the Gulf with petrol supplying duties. Before Iraq was occupied by the US, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) sent two refueling ships and three destroyers to the Indian Ocean to supply petroleum to US and British naval ships. Japan’s navy is regarded by many to be the second most advanced navy in the world after the US. 6 Keizo Nabeshima, “Japan Must Do its Part in War,” Japan Times Online, December 2, 2002, www.japantimes.co.jp

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Tai Wei Lim 137 Japanese forces will inevitably involve step out of any existing Japanese Southeast Asia ASEAN countries. Southeast Asia was peacekeeping restrictions, citing Australia’s involved in an indirect manner when successful example of intervention in East Japanese warships pass through ASEAN Timor as a case study for securing peace in states on the way to the Gulf area. For the region (despite the fact that Australia’s example, a Japanese destroyer and a naval move was viewed angrily by some of its transport ship escorted heavy machinery ASEAN neighbors including Indonesia in from Thailand to Qatar. particular and the controversial Howard Other than dealing with the presence of doctrine of Australia as the US’s deputy in the Japanese ships in the region, ASEAN also region). At a high point in the immediate has to cope with the presence of Japanese post-911 period, some Southeast Asian peacekeeping troops in places including leaders like Prime Minister Mahathir even Southeast Asian countries. The deployment clumped the US and her allies like Australia of Japanese troops overseas originated from and Japan together, criticizing the travel alerts a series of laws beginning in 1992. The PKO issued to their citizens traveling to Southeast (peacekeeping operations) cooperation law, Asia. The crux of the issue here, perhaps, is legislated in 1992, led the way for the SDF’s the level of interventionism that is perceptu- role in United Nations (UN) ally permissible in the East peacekeeping operations in Asian region, especially by DEPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE Cambodia with the “ Japan’s neighbors and FORCES WILL INEVITABLY condition that such missions INVOLVE ASEAN COUNTRIES. ASEAN. are only permitted under a This is only the state of ceasefire agreed ” beginning of a more between warring parties. This condition muscular Japan although it is likely the Japan arises from international law as UN will operate within perimeters defined by the peacekeeping efforts are limited under the US-Japan Security Treaty for the foreseeable United Nations 1992 International Peace future. If Japan’s military activity, for any Cooperation Law. Under this law, a ceasefire reason, turns out to be a little more than what between warring parties is necessary before is comfortable for the region, ASEAN has a UN military personnel can step into the fray. precedent to fall back on. Australia’s self- A hint of future Japanese proactive stance proclaimed role as the US’s deputy sheriff in in multilateral military operations can also be the region announced in 1999 entrenched in discerned from their mindset change. On 19 a government White Paper released in 2000 Dec 2002, a prominent government advisory calling for a military interventionist doctrine panel on defense under Yasushi Akashi drew flak from her neighbors who accused (former UN undersecretary general and head Australia of being arrogant.8 This of this panel) argued that Japan’s involvement subsequently led to greater clarification of in international affairs was a “fundamental” the position from Australian government and duty.7 The panel also argued that Japan should sympathetic voices amongst the Australian

7 The Japan Times, “SDF Should be Able to Join Peace Operations More Readily: Panel,” December 19, 2002, Japan Times Online, www.japantimes.co.jp 8 James Conachy, “US-Australian Military Exercise Rehearses for Gunboat Diplomacy in the Pacific,” November 14, 2002, http://216.239.51.100/search?q=cache:zaJbnKouTbQC:www.wsws.org/articles/2001/may2001/mil- m10.shtml+Australian+US+sheriff++&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 and Mike Head, “Australian Government Unveils New Interventionist Doctrine,” December 16, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/dec2000/mili-d16_prn.shtml

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138 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry opposition and members of the public for comes to China’s space program, and worry greater restraint. about its impact on regional security. In the same way, if the Japanese military The emergence of Chinese economic, role in the region is perceived to be counter- political and military strength is contributive productive, the same pressures can be to the current policies found in many Southeast Asia applied, especially since Southeast Asia countries of accommodating the rise of serves as a resource base for Japanese China rather than countering it and ASEAN companies and is an attractive export is no exception. Many are also aware of destination (500 million people strong) China’s complex and wide array of domestic contributing to Japan’s export drive out of issues that need to be resolved such as recession recently. Looking back to recent income disparity, corruption issues, state- history for specific Southeast Asian owned enterprises, western China pressures (gaiatsu) on Japan, the outbreak of development, SARS, etc. Most would still strong anti-Japanese sentiments in ASEAN want to see a stable China as they believe capitals in the mid-1970s had also produced that it is in the region’s best interest for that similar pressures on Japanese foreign policy, to happen. Through WTO, multilateral and strong enough to bring about the 1976 bilateral engagements, China has begun to do Fukuda doctrine. The doctrine preached its part in trying to allay East Asian fears closer cultural and educational links with over its rise, given the historical dominance ASEAN countries, including the that China had over the rest of East Asia establishment of Japanese studies throughout history. departments in ASEAN universities. Because of China’s size, history and economic potential, ASEAN’s relationship Coping with a Rising Dragon - The with China is rather different from ASEAN’s Emergence of China working relationship with Japan. While Symbolically, China’s emergence is seen China is seen as more or less an autonomous as an opportunity, a challenge and a threat to singular entity, ASEAN perceives Japan as different people in various quarters, being embedded within the complex network depending on what their interests are. The of regional US defense alliances. glimmering development of China in its Collectively, the US Pacific Fleet and its ability to launch a man into space, operate staunch allies in Australia (hosting US forces the world’s first Maglev, operationalize the at Shoalwater Bay and coordinated exercises initial generators in the world’s largest like Tandem Thrust), Singapore, Thailand hydroelectric dam, host Olympics and Miss (Cobra Gold) and the Philippines may be World, enter WTO - all taking place at about depended upon by ASEAN to limit the the same period of time are highly Chinese navy’s reach. China, on the other impressive to many in East Asia. While most hand, does not enjoy the far-flung, wide- East Asians see Chinese development as a ranging network that Japan enjoys within the positive sign, a minority view (including US orbit. Within the ASEAN region, China some Japanese and Southeast Asians) has a major ally in the form of the military sometimes regards these achievements as regime in Myanmar and is a major arms having military potential, especially when it exporter there.9 There are reports that

9 Tai Wei Lim, “Analysis of China’s Strategic Power,” Globalsecurity.org, December 2002, www.globalsecurity.org

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Tai Wei Lim 139 Myanmar is also hosting some Chinese negotiated a free trade agreement (FTA) with Southeast Asia military installations as well in exchange for ASEAN countries Ð a highly welcomed close Chinese friendship. However, this is a initiative since China is perceived by comparatively minor alliance within the ASEAN as sucking away external whole Southeast Asian security rubric. investments destined for the latter - a region While this may seemed unfair to the still recovering from the 1997 financial Chinese and may even make ASEAN an economic crisis. Such economic ties will indirect accomplice to a US containment increase interactions within the region and strategy towards China in the Asia-Pacific, possibly enhance China’s leadership role in China enjoys the advantage of being the regional economy as well. In other non- perceived as an independent power relatively traditional regional security areas, China is free from superpower influence. When there also working with ASEAN to make the are ill-feelings towards the US, for example in region safe. Some are highlighted below. the War on Iraq, some Islamic states in ASEAN may associate Japanese interests with Security cooperation the US. Similarly, in economic issues like the The security aspects of the ASEAN- proposed Asian Monetary Fund during the China relationship have expanded to non- height of the 1997 Asian traditional fields like Financial Crisis, some counter-terrorism after 9-11. CHINA ENJOYS THE ADVAN- ASEAN states associated the “ ASEAN and China have TAGE OF BEING PERCEIVED AS Japanese position with that AN INDEPENDENT POWER jointly approached the issue of the US in her reluctance to RELATIVELY FREE FROM of terrorism which was set up the Fund or to exclude SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE. previously regarded as an the US from it. China, on the ” individual burden of other hand, is relatively countries in the region e.g. unencumbered by such perceptions and is the joint declaration of counter terrorism in seen to be more autonomous comparatively. the “10 plus 3” meeting in 2001.10 In terms of Thus, China may then enjoy her position island disputes and the management of as a more clarified and independent entity offshore oil under the East Asian continental when it comes to regional cooperation shelf, China also participated in the involving ASEAN. She is also fast becoming ASEAN+1 (China) meeting in 2000 to work an alternative to turn to whenever there are with ASEAN to draw up a regional code of ASEAN positions that do not coincide with conduct in the South China Seas around the US interests, especially for its newer socialist disputed Spratlys Island.11 ASEAN countries CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and seemed to agree on the approach to manage Vietnam) members or its Islamic-majority China by engagement through rule-based members (Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei). institutions such as ASEAN Regional Forum Its role as an independent working partner (ARF) and the ASEAN Post Ministerial for ASEAN comes across very clearly in Conference (PMC), to ensure that China regional economic cooperation. In the becomes a responsible member of the economic sphere, the Chinese have region.12

10 Tai Wei Lim, “ASEAN-China Dialogue A Summary Report,” Singapore Institute of International Affairs, April 16, 2002, www.siiaonline.org 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

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140 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry Economic Cooperation region may be real, China may not become the In the economic sphere, bilateral trade only hegemonic production base in the region between the respective ASEAN countries or the world (the so-called “World Factory” and China has improved considerably. Trade argument). Southeast Asia’s resource- between the original members of ASEAN, processing and raw materials industries may Southeast Asia namely Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, be able to complement the Chinese economy. Thailand and Singapore and China expands Besides overall ASEAN trade, China is also almost 15 percent yearly.13 During the targeting specific ASEAN countries in its ASEAN China Dialogue “The Challenges of drive for economic cooperation with the Cooperation” (15-16 April 2002), it was region. This includes looking at increasing revealed that in numerical terms, Sino- economic cooperation in the greater Mekong ASEAN trade had jumped tremendously sub-region (Yunnan, Myanmar, Laos, from US$7.1 billion in 1990 to almost Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). At this US$29.6 billion in the year 2000.14 Capital moment, China is intensely involved in the and cross-regional investments between quadrilateral cooperation (Thailand, Laos, ASEAN and China have also accelerated South China and Myanmar), promoting river with ASEAN’s Foreign Direct Investment trade and constructing physical roads from (FDI) in China growing by 57 percent each South China to Thailand via Myanmar and year in one decade between 1990 and 2000.15 Laos (known as North-South Axis). Simultaneously, China’s investments in the Most significantly, however, is an open region have also increased tremendously. Chinese market that will make it easier for Specific niche industries in ASEAN like ASEAN manufactured products to reach the tourism have benefited greatly from the burgeoning Chinese middle class as China increased economic ties between the two seeks to increase her consumption of goods countries. In the year 2000, Chinese travelers produced by regional countries. Existing became the region’s second largest source of cooperation between ASEAN and China tourists.16 Most importantly for ASEAN and looks set to grow if the ASEAN-China Free perhaps the region, China can be a stabilizer Trade Area (ACFTA) is implemented. In the of regional currencies by holding fast to its same ASEAN-China Dialogue “The reminbi (Chinese yuan) peg, lessening the Challenges of Cooperation” (15-16 April risk of a financial crisis in the region sparked 2002), it was estimated that ASEAN’s off by currency fluctuations. exports to China would grow by 48 percent However, with greater Chinese economic and China’s exports to ASEAN by 55 percent prowess, there were also fears of Chinese or by 0.9 percent (for ASEAN) and 0.3 competition overwhelming ASEAN’s percent (for China) per year.18 The ACFTA industries. China is taking in 50 percent will cover a 1.7 billion people market, gross percent of foreign FDI to the East Asian domestic product of almost US$2 trillion region as opposed to ASEAN’s 20 percent (S$3.7 trillion) and bilateral trade of (figures exclude Japan).17 Though the US$1.23 trillion.19 If implemented, the challenges posed by China’s economy to the ACFTA can help to cushion the fallout in the

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.

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Tai Wei Lim 141 region from China’s growing economy by market for Singapore, South Korea and Southeast Asia allowing ASEAN countries to have a useful Taiwan almost at the same time while it is the head start in exporting goods to China. second largest market for Japan and third largest for the Philippines, Malaysia and Non-traditional Security Thailand. Her economic clout is growing at Economic Rivalry an enormous pace in Southeast Asia. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is Meanwhile, China is seen to be the shining not the only vehicle that can ensure regional star of East Asia with her tourism potential as economic security. Regional and bilateral well as demand for raw materials stimulating free trade agreements (FTAs) are other Southeast Asian economies. devices that ASEAN can utilize as institutions for enhancing rule-based Japan and Regional Economic Cooperation regional trade and commerce. On the Some seasoned watchers and diplomats economic front, there is perception in some would even go to the extent of arguing that quarters that Japan is losing its polish as the Japan had wasted her chances at displaying economic leader of East Asia. Within East regional economic leadership and put Asia, she has only so far concluded a Free forward the perception that Japan is now led Trade Agreement (FTA) by Chinese initiatives.20 with Singapore, a country Japan’s perceived weakness JAPAN HAS HAD MORE without agricultural “ in economic diplomacy is SUCCESS AT LESS AMBITIOUS industries to complicate BILATERAL ECONOMIC contrasted against her large such negotiations. There is AGREEMENTS. economy (still world’s some basis for ” second largest) and the vast disappointment with Japan’s array of technologies and free trade initiatives. Japan’s widely management skills she offers for ASEAN. In anticipated and closely-watched FTA deal 1997, during the last Asian financial crisis, with Mexico fell through, diminishing hopes an event which somewhat affected her image for FTAs with regional ASEAN powers such as the economic leader in the region, Japan as Thailand and Indonesia, two countries actually pledged US$80 billion fund to help with formidable agricultural resources. Southeast Asian economics. On its side, ASEAN is careful not to veer excessively China and Regional Free Trade towards China and, thus, has accepted In contrast, China has revved up her Japanese offer to foster security and engine for a comprehensive FTA with friendship ties.21 In December 2003, the ASEAN within ten years with negotiations ASEAN leaders congregated in Tokyo for a already started. The former even proposed a summit to strengthen non-economic scheduled mechanism that gives advantages (including military) ties.22 to ASEAN countries by granting favorable Japan has had more success at less export conditions for their exports to China ambitious bilateral economic agreements. A for a few years before full implementation of case study of the JSEPA (Japan-Singapore the ASEAN-China FTA. With little fanfare, Economic Partnership Agreement) is China has quietly become the largest export demonstrative of this. The successful

20 Weng Kin Kwan, “China’s Star Rises. . . Japan’s Star Sets,” Straits Times Online, November 2003, straitstimes.asia1.com.sg 21 Weng Kin Kwan, “Japan Set to Strengthen ASEAN Ties,” Straits Times Online, November 2003, straitstimes.asia1.com.sg. 22 Ibid.

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142 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry conclusion of the JSEPA was announced in sciences, aided by a stronger framework to Shanghai on 20 Oct 2001 by the leaders of protect intellectual property rights. Other both Japan and Singapore .23 The purpose of than developing human capital between both the JSEPA is to enlarge the size of both countries in high tech industries, they will countries’ markets, institutionalize the policy also co-provide training to other developing Southeast Asia reforms in both countries and expand free countries. In addition to benefits between trade between them. The areas of policy two states, the JSEPA also benefits regions reforms include freeing up bureaucratic within Japan. In pursuant to the JSEPA, procedures for movement of goods, services Singapore’s Productivity and Standards and people through electronic systems for Board (PSB) and Kumamoto (a city in the customs clearance and standardization, Southern part of Japan) signed a MOU to product testing and certification.24 To allay increase their trade relationship.27 Kumamoto any fears of non-participating countries to has been identified by Singapore as a hub for the JSEPA, the Prime Ministers of both Japan Singaporean companies to invest in the and Singapore affirm that the JSEPA rules Kyushu region where Kumamoto contributes will be consistent with any WTO USD46 billion to Japan’s GDP and about 10 multilaterial rules and with ASEAN Free percent of the GDP of Kyushu island while Trade Area (AFTA) domestic contents rule.25 Kumamoto intends to use Singapore a Besides free trade, JSEPA initiatives also springboard for Kumamoto companies that target the Information and Communications want to do business in Southeast Asia Technologies (ICT) industry, promoting the through Singapore’s business contacts and mutual recognition of skills standards of knowledge database.28 Infocomm project managers in Singapore In conclusion, it is the mutual interests and Japan through skills certification and between the two countries that had propelled enhanced security measures in e-commerce ratification of the JSEPA. For Japan, the through cross-recognition of data protection signing of the JSEPA would be the first models.26 At the government levels, both policy precedent in bilateral trade agreement. governments will work with each other to Besides mutual benefits for Japan and promote the development of e-Governments. Singapore, the JSEPA will also benefit other Other sectors that the JSEPA will liberalize countries in the region, especially for include human capital management, ASEAN as the JSEPA will help lock in financial services, tourism, media/ Japan’s economic engagement in Southeast broadcasting and development of SMEs. Asia for the long term. It may also stimulate These sectors can be promoted through a other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) joint sharing of databases for these industries between Japan and other ASEAN countries, between the trade agencies of both countries. and serve to engender regional and global In terms of human capital management, trade and investment liberalization efforts. both countries will co-develop startup Japan is likely to extend such agreements to incubators and research manpower in life other ASEAN countries in a way to

23 Tai Wei Lim, “Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (JSEPA),” Singapore Institute of International Affairs, www.siiaonline.org/article/JSEPA%20500%20words.doc 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.

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Tai Wei Lim 143 circumvent its difficulties with bilateral the fight against global terrorism, ASEAN is Southeast Asia FTAs due to a strong domestic farm lobby also beefing up its own terrorism deterrence and traditional bureaucratic resistance to to shake off the image of being soft on liberalization. terrorism and to promote greater autonomy in handling terrorists in their own backyard The Issue of Piracy in a bid to ward off interventionism by Outside military issues, coastal security regional powers. While ASEAN’s greater has also been a focus for both China and resolve does not exclude cooperation with Japan, especially in the vital but what is either Japan or China in anti-terrorism perceived to be the inadequately policed sea- cooperation, ASEAN also wants to draw lanes of the Straits of Malacca. Because limits on foreign participation in issues of Japan lacks oil, it has to import oil mainly terrorism within Southeast Asia. from the Middle East and this oil inevitably The Bali bombing in Indonesia has has to pass through the Straits of Malacca. awoken ASEAN to the dangers of terrorism With a greater desire to bolster ASEAN in the region. The danger is further (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)’s exacerbated by the large number of people efforts in combating piracy within their own (nearly 200) killed in Kuta beach, a popular territory, Japan announced its intentions to resort beach in the famous tourist island of sent Coast Guard vessels to Southeast Asia to Bali. This has prompted ASEAN to rethink conduct joint patrol exercises with ASEAN their strategies towards terrorism that has nations. been seen as disparate and not far-reaching In an effort to beef up their already enough. The long-term solution to the formidable coast guard and naval presence, problem of terrorism cannot rely only on war Japan is integrating its Coast Guard into the against terrorists. A sustainable long-term Maritime Self-Defense Force.29 The new solution is needed to address the problem of Japanese naval posture includes piracy in its terrorism and its seeds that sprouted the purview. To add strength to their new movement in the first place in Southeast attitudes towards piracy, the Japanese Coast Asia. These reasons that gave rise to Guard has also dispatched coastal patrol terrorism can be summarized in two main vessels to Singapore to conduct bilateral areas Ð poverty and social ostracism. exercises with the Singapore Coast Guard. Poor economic conditions breed Similarly, the Chinese navy has recently radicalism that may foment terrorist causes. conducted exercises there to combat piracy Economic problems are deep and would and familiarize themselves with the waters in require substantial help to remedy it. The the Straits’ sea-lanes that connects the South second problem is that of social ostracism. China Sea to the Indian Ocean. The terrorists, including the Al Qaeda sympathizers in the Philippines, are able to Terrorism capitalize on the feelings of isolation from Terrorism is a new focus in non- the general landscape in that country to get traditional security matters. Along with the more recruits for their causes. As such, greater involvement of China and Japan in unless the Muslim minority in the South is

29 Rodger Baker, “Japan, China Both Newly Ambitious in Asian Waters,” ABC News.com, April 5, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/stratfor_000602.html

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144 ASEAN’s Role and its Management of the Sino-Japanese Rivalry reintegrated back into the national orbit, the emanated strongly from all regional leaders, problem may worsen. Though some fearful that the bombing might give the compromises were made on the part of the wrong impression to international investors Filipino government to offer amnesty to the that the region is a hotbed for terrorists. The rebels but, with the subsequent terrorists acts ASEAN region may run into being labeled as Southeast Asia the kidnapping of Germans tourists, these that with a string of incidents such as the efforts were stalled. kidnappings in the Philippines, arrests of cell The quest to tackle terrorism may be members in Malaysia and Singapore, momentous for each individual country in insurgencies in Mindanao and other Southern Southeast Asia but, collectively, they may be Philippines territories, crowned by the highly able to work towards a solution. ASEAN destructive bomb blast in Bali. While post- (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Bali bombing has created a greater must work together to prevent further awareness of the threat of terrorism, more proliferation of terrorism in the region. For needs to be done as the recent jailbreak of the example, Singapore initiated proposals to get top terrorist suspect in the Philippines as well tourist dollars back into the region again. The as the Marriott bombing indicate. ASEAN is leadership in Singapore went down to the determined to show greater resolve in specifics of working handling issues of terrorism together in projects that can and, for now, the outbound THE CALL FOR ASEAN UNITY boost confidence in the “ markers on regional SEEMS TO HAVE EMANATED region. One of these projects STRONGLY FROM ALL cooperation with non- could be in tourism where REGIONAL LEADERS ASEAN partners permits Southeast Asian nations can ” cooperation with all regional promote the diversity of the powers including Japan and region to attract tourists back again. China to instill greater confidence in One of the worst outcomes of the bringing tourists back to Southeast Asia but terrorist label were the travel advisories disallows unilateral attempts at preemptive issued by advanced nations for their citizens intervention in ASEAN territory such as that intending to visit Southeast Asia. Besides advanced by Australia’s Howard doctrine. affecting one of the most important industries in the region, tourism, these travel Conclusion advisories can similarly deter international Overall, some of Japan’s neighbors investors from coming into the region. To (including ASEAN) may feel the jitters over fend off this negative development, a new Japanese remilitarization and growing tourism agreement took effect between confidence in international affairs. This is ASEAN countries to introduce a coordinated coupled with the popularity of hawkish approach in introducing smoother visa politicians like Tokyo Governor Shintaro processing, more comprehensive upgrade of Ishihara who periodically makes remarks on tourism sites, faster and less bureaucratic air Japanese nationalism during WWII or services, lower travel taxes and the co- arguing for stronger postures against Japan’s promotion of Southeast Asia as a travel neighbors, namely China and the Koreas and destination. Through such initiatives, a tendency to blame foreigners (including perhaps the badly needed foreign currencies other Asians) for the rise of crime in Japan. can come back to the region again. Other reasons cited by observers for The call for ASEAN unity seems to have Japanese shift towards stronger

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Tai Wei Lim 145 militarization are the loss of economic in the region, the focus is shifting to China as Southeast Asia direction after the collapse of Japan’s bubble a regional economic power, a second engine economy in the late 1980s and a dilemma of growth in addition to Japan who has between accommodationist and fuelled much of Southeast Asia’s postwar confrontational attitudes towards China’s growth in East Asia. This new construct of an emergence as an economic power in the economically vibrant China complements region. the ASEAN’s treatment of Japan as a defense Japanese efforts at multilateralism may partner. In other words, Japan is no longer also contribute a more balanced security seen only through economic terms while situation in East Asia. Although many see Chinese power is no longer solely conceived Japan’s intentions to deepen defense ties with in military terms. If managed well, ASEAN the Association of Southeast Asian Nations could find a partner in both military and (ASEAN) as a challenge to China’s own economic aspects in both China and Japan. efforts to draw closer to Southeast Asia, it To achieve this, ASEAN needs to ensure simultaneously represents the Japanese neutrality in managing these two powers intention to engage regional organizations in without giving them the impression that it defense matters. It is this form of leans on one more than the other. multifaceted, multilayered complex This buffer neutrality performed by the interlinks between states in the region that organization can contribute to peace in the will draw East Asian closer together in a region. It may even play bigger roles in delicate security interdependence, perhaps mediating other non-ASEAN related the precursor that will foster greater security political disputes, such as serving as a in the region, much like the European dialogue facility for the North Korea nuclear situation. issue as it has done in the past. As ASEAN Finally, East Asia’s war apology issues derive benefits from managing the two with Japan are losing its tenacity in the powers and also serving as a neutral zone for region, outside the sporadic protestations both of them, it also has to be proactive in over remarks by certain rightwing quarters in ensuring that any interventionist tendencies Japan. This may also facilitate Japan’s on the part of Japan or China must be position in the region not just as an economic carefully monitored. In this way, moves to leader but also a military power, something create spheres of influence within ASEAN to that its highly advanced defense forces and the detriment of other great powers should be sizable military budget is capable of offering. countered readily. In other words, ASEAN This can seen in Japan’s decision to deploy should not play the regional power game planes to Cambodian crisis to withdraw her subjectively in order to serve as a neutral nationals during the Cambodian crisis, the region in East Asia. For now, its deployment of troops overseas and her simultaneous economic and military increasing desire to get into security partnerships with both China and Japan serve arrangements with ASEAN. this purpose well. As for China, while acknowledging China as a traditional regional military power

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