No. 578 September 20, 2006 �������

Iran’s Nuclear Program America’s Policy Options by Ted Galen Carpenter

Executive Summary

Although it is possible that negotiations strikes against ’s nuclear installations. That between the leading powers in the international is the most unwise strategy. At most, such strikes community and Iran may produce a settlement to would delay, not eliminate, Tehran’s program. the vexing issue of Iran’s nuclear program, it is There is also a grave risk that Iran would retaliate more likely that those negotiations will fail. If that with the full range of options at its disposal, happens, U.S. policymakers face a set of highly including attacks against U.S. forces in and imperfect options. through proxy organizations. Attacking Iran One option—and the most likely initial would also further alienate Muslim populations response—is to seek a UN Security Council reso- around the world, creating the very real prospect lution imposing economic sanctions on Tehran. of a war of civilizations. However, sanctions have a poor record of getting Option four is to reluctantly accept Iran as a regimes to abandon high-priority policies. Even member of the global nuclear weapons club and rely if Russia and China can be induced to overcome on the deterrent power of America’s vast nuclear their reluctance to endorse sanctions, it is unlike- arsenal. While that strategy is not without risk, the ly that such measures would halt Iran’s quest for United States has successfully deterred other volatile nuclear weapons. and unsavory regimes, most notably Maoist China A second option is to intensify efforts to sub- during that country’s Cultural Revolution. vert Iran’s clerical regime. Washington already has The best option, though, is to try to strike a a modest program to do that under the Iran grand bargain with Iran. Washington should offer Freedom Support Act. Unfortunately, such a to normalize diplomatic and economic relations strategy may backfire, undermining the domestic with Iran in exchange for Tehran’s agreement to legitimacy of Iranian dissidents. Moreover, there is open its nuclear program to rigorous, on-demand no certainty that a democratic Iran would choose international inspections to guarantee that there to be nonnuclear. is no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful Option three is to launch preemptive air purposes to building weapons.

______Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of seven books on international affairs, including Peace and Freedom: Foreign Policy for a Constitutional Republic.

PA Masthead.indd 1 2/9/06 2:08:34 PM The bulk of Introduction might sell Tehran a bomb or two.6 Those expert opinion who advance that thesis present little evi- Iran would be at or near the top of a list of dence that Pyongyang would take such a now concludes countries Americans would least like to see step, knowing that not only the United States that Iran is still a have nuclear weapons, and the reasons for but other countries in the international com- long time away apprehension have deepened dramatically in munity (including North Korea’s principal the past year with the election of President allies, Russia and China) would be most dis- from having a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran under the pleased with such reckless proliferation. nuclear arsenal. mullahs since the revolution of 1979 has Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. Al- been a weird and ominous country. With Rodhan, scholars at the Center for Strategic Ahmadinejad’s new prominence, the weird- and International Studies, note that most ness quotient has reached new levels. Iran is government and independent analyses of now headed by an individual who expresses Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s predict- the hope that Israel be wiped off the map and ed that the country would be able to build denies that the Holocaust ever occurred. nuclear weapons by 2000. That clearly did Those are sentiments not found in civilized not happen. The reason for the faulty esti- circles anywhere in the world. mates, according to Cordesman and Al- If one could wave a magic wand and elimi- Rodhan, is that they “often were based on the nate Iran’s nuclear program, all responsible unrealistic assumption that Iran’s nuclear governments would be grasping for that program would evolve without interrup- wand. Alas, in the real world such magical tions, technical difficulties, or voluntary sus- solutions do not exist. U.S. policymakers have pensions.”7 only a choice among problematic options. Given that track record, we should be Some choices, though, are clearly better than doubly skeptical of newer predictions that others. Tehran is on the brink of becoming a nuclear Above all, as policymakers consider the power. The bulk of expert opinion both various options, they need to avoid a sense of inside and outside the U.S. government now panic. U.S. intelligence agencies have con- concludes that Iran is still a long time away cluded that Iran will not be able to build from having a nuclear arsenal. When a poten- nuclear weapons for another 5 to 10 years.1 tial threat is measured in years, it allows poli- Prominent independent experts agree with cymakers to carefully consider alternative that assessment.2 Even the Israeli govern- ways of addressing the problem. There is no ment, which has an obvious interest in pre- need for precipitous action. senting a worst-case scenario of the Iranian nuclear threat, concedes that Tehran will not be able to build such weapons for another 3 Prelude to Confrontation: years.3 Based on recent information, some The European-Led Bush administration policymakers now Negotiations embrace a similar conclusion, although the intelligence community has not changed its There has been a diplomatic effort under- official estimate.4 Yet even 3 years is a signifi- way for more than three years to dissuade Iran cant amount of time to craft a response. Only from trying to become a nuclear power. That the most intense members of the faction effort began in 2003 when Britain, , and pushing war with Iran argue that the danger —the so-called EU-3—became suffi- is more imminent.5 Their most recent thesis ciently worried about Tehran’s apparent objec- is that, although Iran might not be able to tives that they decided to address the problem build nukes on its own in the immediate through engagement and negotiations. They future, there is a very real danger that North urged the United States to join that effort, but Korea, whose program is more advanced, the Bush administration spurned the over-

2 tures of its allies and decided to remain on the more supportive and cooperative, those con- sidelines. That posture did not prevent cessions reportedly came at a price. At the President Bush and other U.S. officials from urging of Vice President Cheney’s office, the issuing periodic statements stressing that a administration insisted that the foreign min- nuclear-armed Iran was “intolerable.” Indeed, isters of the EU-3 sign a letter stating that, if from the earliest stages of the European diplo- the talks failed, they would support U.S. matic initiative, Washington urged that Iran efforts to refer Iran to the Security Council be referred to the UN Security Council for pos- for possible sanctions.10 sible sanctions.8 The crisis turned more intense in August Russia and China (especially the former) 2005, when Ahmadinejad took office. A few have from time to time offered proposals from days later, Iran rejected the European pro- the diplomatic sidelines. Indeed, the most posals, which included the concessions promising initiative has been Russia’s proposal agreed to by the United States. Indeed, Iran’s to have Iran enrich uranium for power-genera- new chief nuclear negotiator declared that tion purposes on Russian soil, with the product his country would never halt its conversion then being returned to Iran. That method of uranium. A month later, the International would (at least in theory) prevent Iran from pro- Atomic Energy Agency found Iran in non- ducing highly enriched uranium—which is the compliance with inspection requirements From the raw material for building nuclear weapons. that were part of the country’s obligations earliest stages of Tehran has given conflicting signals regarding under the NPT. In February 2006, the IAEA the European Moscow’s proposal.9 On some occasions voted to report Iran to the Security Council. Iranian leaders have expressed interest in the A Security Council vote on sanctions seemed diplomatic offer and have even indicated that it could be just a matter of weeks or a few months away. initiative, the basis of a settlement to the crisis. On other Washington made another significant Washington occasions, however, they have criticized the pro- shift in policy. At the end of May, the Bush posal and emphasized that Iran has a right administration agreed to join the EU-3 nego- urged that Iran under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty tiations as an active participant.11 Shortly be referred to the (NPT) to have a nuclear program on Iranian thereafter, negotiators made a new offer to soil for peaceful purposes. Iran, providing a number of concessions UN Security The EU-3 effort has achieved little. Iran (including the previous concessions offered Council for did suspend its uranium enrichment pro- indirectly and informally by the United possible gram from November 2004 to August 2005, States) if Tehran agreed to put its uranium but for the most part the negotiations pro- enrichment activities on hold. The offer sanctions. ceeded in a desultory fashion. European pres- apparently included a provision for Western sure on the Bush administration did lead to a aid to build proliferation-resistant light modest shift in U.S. policy in the spring of water reactors in Iran, which would allow 2005. Washington finally agreed to endorse Tehran to have a peaceful, nuclear power- the EU-3 negotiations and to authorize the generation program.12 Washington and its Europeans to offer the Iranians some infor- allies pressed the Iranian government for a mal U.S. concessions if Tehran agreed to prompt response to the offer, at one point abandon its uranium conversion process per- demanding an answer by mid-July. The manently. Those concessions included Iranians refused to be pressured in that man- Washington’s agreement to end its blocking ner, instead telling the Western powers that of Iran’s admission to the World Trade they would provide an answer by late August. Organization. The Bush administration also On August 22, Tehran did reply, indicating agreed to consider licensing the sale of spare that it would undertake “serious negotia- parts for Iran’s aging fleet of civilian airliners. tions.” There was no indication, though, that Although the Europeans were gratified Iran was prepared to halt the enrichment of that the U.S. administration had become uranium—the key demand of the United

3 States and other powers.13 Indeed, as the the wording of a resolution actually impos- August 31 deadline imposed by the UN ing sanctions to be even more contentious Security Council resolution expired, the than in the first round. Iranian government remained as defiant as Moreover, even if the United States ulti- ever on the issue of enrichment.14 Given the mately gets the Security Council to pass apparent failure of the EU-3-led negotia- something other than a watered-down sanc- tions, the United States faces a set of highly tions resolution, there is reason to doubt imperfect options. whether it would have much impact on Iran’s nuclear program. Sanctions have a less than stellar record of inducing regimes to change Option 1: policies—especially to abandon high-priority, Impose Multilateral high-prestige projects. And Iran’s nuclear Economic Sanctions program clearly belongs in that category. Washington will now seek a resolution The Dismal Record of Sanctions from the UN Security Council imposing an Unilateral U.S. economic sanctions have a array of sanctions against Tehran. Most of poor track record of inducing policy change.18 those sanctions would focus on three areas: Washington has maintained a comprehensive curtailing transfers of technology, impeding embargo on trade with and investment in Cuba financial flows to and from Iran (including for more than 45 years. Yet the Castro govern- freezing Iranian assets worldwide), and ment remains entrenched in power, and Havana restricting the ability of Iranian officials to still pursues retrograde communist economic travel abroad. How restrictive these sanctions and social policies—much to the annoyance of are likely to be remains an open question. the United States. Washington’s attempt to iso- When it agreed to end its policy of boycotting late North Korea has entered its seventh decade, talks with Iran and join the EU-3 negotia- again without having much discernible impact tions, the Bush administration clearly on Pyongyang’s policies.19 In both cases, U.S. believed that it had a commitment from all efforts have been badly undercut by the refusal five permanent members of the Security of other nations to go along with policies of eco- Council to impose serious sanctions if those nomic coercion. That problem is even more pro- negotiations failed. nounced with Washington’s sanctions against Even if the United Since then, however, signs have emerged Iran, which date from the 1979 Islamic revolu- States ultimately suggesting that Russia may not be on board, tion and the subsequent seizure of the U.S. as the Putin government expressed reserva- embassy in Tehran and the resulting hostage cri- gets the Security tions about key wording of the U.S.-backed sis. Today, Russia, China, Japan, and several Council to pass draft resolution merely to put Iran on notice members of the European Union conduct sig- that the UN might impose sanctions if nificant trade with Iran and have important something other Tehran did not respond by the end of August investments in that country. Those actions ren- than a watered- to the diplomatic offer that was on the der the U.S. sanctions largely ineffective except 15 down sanctions table. There are also questions about how with respect to a few sectors, most notably spare firmly committed China is to imposing parts for aircraft. resolution, there meaningful sanctions on Iran.16 Indeed, resis- Even when sanctions are imposed on a is reason to doubt tance from Moscow and Beijing required comprehensive multilateral basis, they have a Washington to accept diluted language in mixed record at best. The most highly touted that it would have the preliminary resolution that the Security success story was the decision of South much impact on Council passed at the end of July.17 If Iran Africa’s white minority government to aban- Iran’s nuclear continues its refusal to comply, one can don the policy of apartheid and turn over expect the negotiations among the perma- political power to the black majority. Most of program. nent members of the Security Council over the other apparent success stories involve far

4 more limited policy changes by the target in Iran’s oil industry.25 Some smaller coun- According to regime. But even the transformation of South tries may also defect from any sanctions enthusiastic Africa was a highly complex process, and eco- regime. Australia, for example, has already nomic sanctions were merely one factor voiced reservations about its participation.26 proponents of among many that led to political change.20 The fact that Iran is a major oil producer regime change, a Moreover, the process took decades. We don’t is another factor reducing the probable effec- U.S. propaganda have the luxury of that amount of time with tiveness of any UN sanctions resolution. regard to Iran’s nuclear program. Theoretically, the Security Council could offensive The most detailed study on the coercive authorize an embargo on Iranian oil and combined with power of sanctions remains Gary Hufbauer, establish a blockade of Iran’s ports to execute Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Elliott’s Economic that edict. Given Tehran’s dependence on oil financial and Sanctions Reconsidered.21 The authors examined revenues, sanctions directed against its oil logistical 115 cases in which sanctions were imposed exports might force the country to the brink assistance to and determined that, in 41 cases, or approxi- of bankruptcy and create powerful pressures mately 36 percent of the time, sanctions were to alter course on the nuclear issue. But with prospective the primary reason that a target state shifted global crude oil prices already approaching insurgents would its behavior. Other scholars have challenged $70 a barrel, it strains credulity to imagine a that assessment, however, contending that major oil consumer like China approving be sufficient to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott substantially such a measure. Indeed, it is not certain that topple the overstated the effectiveness of economic sanc- even the United States would be willing to regime. tions.22 Even if those criticisms are not valid, it endure the resulting economic pain. Some is clear that sanctions were in only a minority experts predict that such an embargo would of cases—and the vast majority of successes likely send oil prices well above $100 a barrel, involves a combination of broad cooperation with highly unpleasant consequences for the by important countries and relatively narrow global economy.27 policy changes or low-priority objectives for Yet without an embargo on Iranian oil, the target regime. there is almost no chance that economic sanc- One of the major problems with multilat- tions will cause Tehran to abandon its nuclear eral sanctions is the incentive for some sanc- program. If the United States and the other tioning parties to defect. As political scientist powers are determined to keep Iran nonnu- Daniel Drezner notes, that phenomenon clear, they must look to other strategies. occurs repeatedly.23 For example, during the U.S.-led grain embargo against the Soviet Union following that country’s invasion of Option 2: Afghanistan, the defection of grain-rich Orchestrate Regime Change Argentina fatally undermined the campaign.24 A strategy of regime change is the favorite Why Iran Is a Poor Target for Sanctions panacea of most neoconservatives, and they Iran is an especially unpromising candi- usually argue that it is possible to orchestrate date for a successful campaign of economic an overthrow of the clerical regime without an coercion. Even if the United States can extensive U.S. military role. According to induce the major EU powers, Russia, China, enthusiastic proponents of regime change Japan, and India to impose serious sanctions such as American Enterprise Institute activist against Iran, the defection of one or more of Michael Ledeen, there is so much Iranian pub- those countries is very likely. All of them have lic opposition to the mullahs that a U.S. prop- important investments in Iran. Japan, for aganda offensive combined with financial and example, is extremely worried that if it goes logistical assistance to prospective insurgents along with a sanctions regime, China will would be sufficient to topple the regime. swoop in and displace Tokyo’s investments Ledeen has boasted, “I have contacts in Iran,

5 fighting the regime. Give me twenty million become apparent that the INC never had [dollars] and you’ll have your revolution.”28 more than a meager domestic following. Proponents of regime change were active (Chalabi’s party garnered less than 0.5 per- even before the Iranian nuclear crisis became cent in the December 2005 parliamentary prominent; most hawks during that earlier elections in Iraq.) period emphasized Tehran’s support for ter- There are manipulative (and in some cases rorist organizations as the principal justifica- utterly unsavory) Iranian exiles waiting in the tion for seeking to oust the clerical govern- wings to pull the same con game on Washing- ment.29 Calls for regime change have become ton.34 They include notorious arms dealer even more pronounced since ’s , a shadowy figure in the attack on northern Israel in July 2006 and the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan admin- resulting conflict.30 Increasingly, the counter- istration.35 Perhaps the most unsavory opposi- terrorism justification has melded with argu- tion group is the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK), ments about the need to thwart Tehran’s which even the U.S. State Department considers nuclear ambitions. a terrorist organization.36 The initial stage of the regime-change The MEK , an organization founded on a strategy is already underway with congres- combination of Islamism and Marxism, has a The argument for sional passage of the Iran Freedom Support long history of terrorism and cult-like behav- regime change Act in the spring of 2005, and a dramatic ior. The MEK is the military wing of the and the strategy boost in funding for anti-regime activities National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the following year. As outlined by Secretary regarded by many neoconservatives as a key embodied in the of State Condoleezza Rice, the expanded pro- ally in the effort to overthrow the Iranian cleri- Iran Freedom gram funds radio broadcasts and other prop- cal regime. After moving its base of operations Support Act are aganda activities and provides modest sup- from France to Iraq in 1986, the MEK was port for trade unions and other dissident reportedly funded by Saddam Hussein’s eerily reminiscent groups.31 The Bush administration proposed Baathist regime and sent into combat against of the approach an infusion of an additional $75 million for Iran. It has also been implicated in the killing the campaign (augmenting the $10 million of American citizens.37 Currently led by a mar- adopted with that had previously been appropriated for ried couple, Masoud and Maryam Rajavi, the respect to Iraq democracy support activities); Congress ulti- organization has increasingly become a cult of 38 between 1998 mately approved $66 million. personality. That reputation does not discourage some and 2003. Dubious Exile Allies neoconservative proponents of regime change The regime-change thesis might seem from making common cause with MEK more plausible if we had not heard similar activists.39 In May 2003, scholars Daniel Pipes arguments in the years leading up to the Iraq and Patrick Clawson of the Washington war.32 Indeed, the argument for regime Institute for Near East Policy recommended change and the strategy embodied in the Iran that “when the secretary of state next decides Freedom Support Act33 are eerily reminiscent whether or not to re-certify the MEK as a ter- of the approach adopted with respect to Iraq rorist organization,” that official “should between 1998 and 2003. Congress also come to the sensible conclusion that it poses passed and funded an Iraq Liberation Act no threat to the security of the United States during that period. American policymakers or its citizens.” Pipes and Clawson went on to swallowed the self-serving propaganda of praise the MEK as a potential U.S. ally, citing Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National the organization’s “key information” about Congress, which said that with just modest Iran’s nuclear program and other activities of U.S. financial and logistical support Iraqi fac- the Iranian regime.40 In November 2005, tions opposed to Saddam Hussein would be Raymond Tanter, a senior fellow at the able to overthrow his regime. It has since Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

6 stated that an effective U.S. policy minds yet about whether to support the cur- rent ruling elite or back the challengers. requires working with Iranian opposition Many of those moderates seem increasingly groups in general and with the main disillusioned with the mullahs, but they are opposition in particular. The National not necessarily fond of the United States.43 Council for Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and Moreover, it is a nearly universal trait in Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) are not only world affairs that populations resent pres- the best source for intelligence on Iran’s sure and interference from foreign powers. potential violations of the nonprolifera- The typical reaction is to rally around the tion regime. . . . The NCRI and MEK are incumbent domestic regime and reject those also a possible ally of the West in bringing opposition figures tainted by foreign influ- about regime change in Tehran.41 ence—even if the public might normally be sympathetic to the reformers’ political val- He declared, with little evidence, that the ues. In other words, nationalism usually MEK and the NCRI were the only opposition trumps allegiance to abstract principles. groups the clerical leaders feared. Some Iranian dissidents seem to under- In addition to the dubious wisdom of stand that point and are very nervous about a supporting groups like the NCRI and the U.S. political embrace. Iranian human rights MEK, the assurances that significant U.S. activist Emad Baghi complained, “We are military assistance would be unnecessary to under pressure from both the hardliners in effect regime change in Iran should be greet- the judiciary and that stupid George Bush.” ed with skepticism. In the case of Iraq, such Vahid Pourostad, editor of the pro-reform assurances were quietly buried when regime- National Trust newspaper, noted that whenever change advocates became impatient with the United States “supported an idea publicly, Saddam Hussein’s continuing ability to cling the public has done the opposite.”44 to power. Saddam’s overthrow was carried Popular resentment against a heavy-hand- out by a massive application of U.S. military ed U.S. role is especially likely in Iran.45 A power, with the much-touted exiles playing good many Iranians remember that the the role of embarrassing hangers-on. If the United States interfered once before in their United States adopts a strategy of regime country’s internal affairs, and the outcome change in Iran, it is likely that an even greater was not a happy one. It was a coup orches- military effort will be required.42 trated by the CIA in 1953 that ousted a There is little democratic government and restored the Why a Regime-Change Strategy Might autocratic shah to power. His corrupt and doubt that a Backfire repressive rule for the next quarter century growing number Aggressive democracy promotion is a paved the way for the Islamic fundamentalist of Iranians are strategy that is likely to backfire in another revolution.46 Any hint of U.S. meddling today way. There is little doubt that a growing num- would probably cause Iranian moderates to fed up with the ber of Iranians (especially young Iranians) are make common cause with the ruling reli- repressive rule of fed up with the repressive rule of the mullahs gious elite. and want a more open society. But outspoken the mullahs. But U.S. endorsements of their resistance cam- Would a Democratic Iran Remain outspoken U.S. paign could be the kiss of death. U.S. support Nonnuclear? endorsements of gives the religious hierarchy the perfect pre- Moreover, in the unlikely event that the text to portray even cautious advocates of United States and the Iranian exiles were able their resistance political reform as traitors and American to bring a secular, democratic regime to power campaign could stooges. in Tehran, that would not necessarily mean be the kiss of We must remember that there are mil- the end of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons. lions of Iranians who have not made up their Proponents of regime change seem to assume death.

7 The drumbeat that Tehran’s nuclear program is the pet ini- comments of Weekly Standard editor William among American tiative of the Islamic elite, while most Iranians Kristol epitomize those recommendations. He are indifferent or hostile. Regime change, suggests “countering this act of Iranian hawks for air according to that logic, would not only aggression with a military strike against strikes against remove an odious regime, it is the ultimate Iranian nuclear facilities.” And he is in a hurry, Iran has solution to the nuclear problem. asserting that it “would be easier to act sooner That is yet another dubious assumption. than later.” Kristol is sanguine about the con- redoubled since Tehran’s nuclear ambitions date back to the sequences. “Yes, there would be repercus- war broke out in 1970s when Iran was still ruled by the shah.47 sions—and they would be healthy ones, show- The bulk of the evidence suggests that a ing a strong America that has rejected further July between “peaceful” nuclear program has widespread appeasement.”50 Israel and the support in Iran for reasons of national pride 48 Iranian-support- and regional prestige. The goal of a nuclear- Problems with the Air Strikes Option weapons arsenal is more controversial, but There are numerous problems with the ed Hezbollah in given the dangerous neighborhood in which strategy of preemptive air strikes whether Lebanon. Iran is located, support for that objective they are conducted by Israel or the United extends well beyond the mullahs and their States.51 Iraq’s Osirak facility was one easily staunch supporters. Washington could be identified, above-ground site. There are making a serious miscalculation if it assumes numerous nuclear-related sites in Iran— that a democratic Iran would be content to many of which are in or near major popula- remain nonnuclear. tion centers, maximizing the probable num- ber of civilian casualties in an attack. Indeed, thousands of innocent Iranians would likely Option 3: perish in a campaign of air strikes. Preventive Air Strikes Moreover, there is no certainty that we have identified all of the relevant targets. There Proponents of preventive military action could be many other covert facilities, since typically cite the successful Israeli strike on Tehran has had nearly three decades to pursue Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 as a model for its nuclear activities. Worst of all, some of the derailing the Iranian nuclear program. Some installations may be in reinforced, under- suggest that the United States undertake ground locations. Taking out such sites with that mission on its own; others suggest that conventional weapons would be problematic Washington encourage Israel to do so—a at best. Although some ultra-hawkish types form of security outsourcing. In terms of the have apparently mused about using nuclear larger geopolitical consequences, it would be “bunker busters” for the required strikes,52 a distinction without a difference. Even if crossing the nuclear threshold is a momen- Israel undertook the task (either with U.S. tous step that could come back to haunt the encouragement or on its own initiative), the United States in multiple ways. United States would be blamed, given the Even launching conventional strikes would close political ties between Washington and be extremely dangerous. Contrary to Bill Tel Aviv. The perception of collusion would Kristol’s optimistic assessment, there are likely be deepened because to reach targets in Iraq, to be highly negative repercussions. At the very Israeli planes would probably have to overfly least, Tehran would be tempted to cause even U.S.-controlled Iraq.49 Clearly, they could not more trouble than it is already doing for U.S. do that without Washington’s approval. and British occupation forces in Iraq. The infil- The drumbeat among American hawks for tration of a few thousand dedicated Revolu- air strikes against Iran has redoubled since war tionary Guards, working with tens of thousands broke out in July between Israel and the of Iraqis in Shiite militias, could accomplish that Iranian-supported Hezbollah in Lebanon. The goal. The Iranian regime would also be tempted

8 to unleash its terrorist ally, Hezbollah, on the clerical regime, likely expressed the views American targets throughout the Middle East. of most of her fellow citizens when she And there is always the risk that an attacked and warned Washington not to attack Iran: “We humiliated Iran might do something incredibly will defend our country till the last drop of rash, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or blood.”55 If that is the attitude of a pro- launching attacks against Israel, triggering a Western liberal Iranian, one can only imagine massive regional crisis. what the attitude would be of Iranians less hostile to the current government. Bomb Iran to Win the Support of the Finally, there is the probable impact on the Iranian People? rest of the Muslim world. If the United States Perhaps the most bizarre incarnation of attacks yet another Muslim country (which the air strike thesis is the argument made by would make three in the last five years), most some American hawks that it would serve as Muslims from Morocco to Malaysia will the needed catalyst for regime change. believe that Washington is out to destroy their According to that thesis, the Iranian people culture and religion. America’s troubles with would be so enraged at the clerics for bring- the Islamic world do not yet constitute a war ing destruction upon them that they would of civilizations, but attacking Iran could well overthrow the regime. , once produce that result. The military option is one Bombing Iran again, is the most explicit with that rationale. that no rational U.S. policymaker should would almost Asserting that “the Iranian people dislike embrace. certainly be their regime,” he predicts that “the right use of military force . . . could cause them to counter- reconsider whether they really want to have Option 4: productive for 53 this regime in power.” Acceptance and Deterrence the goal of The notion that populations will rise up against their government and make common An alternative to sanctions, forcible regime regime change. cause with the country that is bombing them change, or air strikes is simply to grudgingly Iranians, like and killing their loved ones is based on high- admit Iran into the global nuclear weapons ly dubious logic. Moreover, the historical club. The United States would then rely on its most other record lends little support to the thesis. own vast nuclear arsenal to deter Iran from people, could be Despite massive bombing of Germany and contemplating an attack on American targets expected to “rally Japan in World War II, the fascist regimes or threatening important American interests. remained in power to the bitter end in both Admittedly, the presence of Ahmadinejad around the flag” cases. U.S. bombing of North Vietnam dur- makes the deterrence option more nerve- if their country ing the 1960s and early 1970s did not dis- wracking than it would be otherwise. Having lodge Ho Chi Minh or his successors from such an emotionally volatile and hate-filled comes under power. NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 individual as Iran’s head of state understand- attack. actually caused Slobodan Milosevic’s popu- ably makes people wonder whether deterrence larity to increase for a time. It was not until would work in this case. much later—and the election that drove him That is a legitimate concern. It is worth from power was based on largely domestic remembering, though, that Iran’s political issues—that the democratic opposition was system is fairly diffuse, and Ahmadinejad is able to get rid of him.54 only one actor among many. Indeed, despite Bombing Iran would almost certainly be his lofty title of president, he had to submit counterproductive for the goal of regime several candidates before he induced the par- change. Iranians, like most other people, liament to approve his nominee for oil min- could be expected to “rally around the flag” if ister. Other Iranian officials have openly dis- their country comes under attack. Nobel lau- agreed with his policies, not only on the reate Shirin Ebadi, an Iranian liberal critic of nuclear issue, but on other foreign policy

9 matters as well.56 Iran, under Ahmadinejad, is launch retaliatory strikes with pinpoint accu- not a tightly centralized system like Germany racy. Any government in Tehran, whether under Hitler or the Soviet Union under headed by Ahmadinejad or some other figure, Stalin, where one man’s decision could would know that an attack on America would plunge the nation into war. be a regime-extinguishing event. Such an attack would be suicide, both politically and America Has Deterred Other Odious literally. And while nonstate actors that Regimes embrace terrorism may sometimes be suicidal, The experience of dealing with Stalin is political leaders seldom are. We have little relevant in another way. The United States credible evidence that the Iranian leadership is has successfully deterred other repugnant an exception to that rule. and bizarre regimes. Stalin was a genocidal Most people who reject a strategy of psychopath, yet he was never so reckless as to acceptance and deterrence tacitly acknowl- attack a nuclear-armed America or even U.S. edge the improbability that Iran would allies in Western Europe. Washington’s expe- launch a suicidal attack on the American rience with China in the 1960s and early homeland. Instead, a majority of the objec- 1970s is perhaps even more pertinent.57 tions focus on other fears about Iranian mis- China became a nuclear power under Mao conduct. Those objections are based on sev- Zedong, a leader who exceeded even Stalin’s eral assumptions of varying plausibility. record of genocide. Mao’s publicly enunciat- ed views on nuclear warfare also were alarm- Would a Nuclear Iran Attack Israel? ing in the extreme. His boast that China Advocates of a hard-line policy toward could outlast the United States in a nuclear Tehran argue that if Iran acquires nuclear war of attrition so disturbed the other com- weapons, it will use those weapons against its munist giant, the USSR, that Soviet leaders hated adversary, Israel. Fears of such a scenario hastened to assure their American counter- have risen sharply in the past year following parts that such thinking in no way reflected comments by Ahmadinejad that it would be a the Kremlin’s views.58 good thing if Israel were wiped off the map. China also emerged as a nuclear power on Such a comment is certainly reprehensible, the eve of the Cultural Revolution. China dur- but does it invalidate the long-standing reali- ing that orgy of fanaticism makes today’s Iran ties of deterrence? Israel has between 150 and look like a normal, even sedate, country. U.S. 300 nuclear weapons of its own. Even if Iran policymakers were understandably very can go forward with its nuclear program, it uneasy about China joining the ranks of will not be able to build more than a dozen or nuclear-weapons states. Yet they rejected the so weapons over the next decade—even assum- advice of those inside and outside government ing the most alarmist predictions of the cur- who advocated military action to take out rent state of the program prove valid. Beijing’s nuclear program. Given the construc- Moreover, Israel is moving to expand its sub- Any government tive changes that have taken place in China, marine fleet to have at least one nuclear-armed and the important relationship that has submarine on station at all times, giving the in Tehran would grown up between Washington and Beijing in country a secure second-strike capability.60 know that the past three decades, history has vindicated Once that process is complete, Tehran could an attack on a policy of restraint. A similar policy of caution not hope to launch a “decapitation” sneak and deterrence may also pay off with Iran. attack based on the (already remote) possibili- America would In any case, the obnoxious nature of the ty that Israel would be unable to retaliate. As in be a regime- Iranian regime (or other rogue regimes) does the case of contemplating an attack on the not negate the underlying realities of deter- United States, it would be most unwise for extinguishing rence.59 The United States has an enormous Iran to contemplate attacking Israel. The same event. nuclear arsenal and the delivery systems to realities of deterrence apply, albeit on a small-

10 er scale. Iranian rhetoric about wiping Israel Would a Nuclear Iran Engage in The message to off the map is so much ideological blather. Blackmail? Tehran should be Israel has more than a sufficient capability to Prominent hawks insist that an Iran armed deter an Iranian nuclear attack. with nuclear weapons would seek to establish that any transfer its hegemony in the Persian Gulf region and of nuclear Would Iran Pass Along Nuclear Weapons would seek to undermine U.S. interests there material or to Terrorist Groups? and elsewhere in the world whenever possible. This concern has slightly greater plausibili- Edward Luttwak, a scholar at the Center for weapons to non- ty. Tehran does have a cozy relationship with a Strategic and International Studies, states that state actors will number of terrorist organizations in the thesis starkly: “Given what Iran’s regime is Middle East, most notably Hezbollah. The per- now doing to attack American interests world- be considered an vasive assumption among American hawks is wide from Venezuela to Iraq even without the act of war, and a that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, sooner or shield of nuclear weapons, it is irresponsible to regime-ending later it will pass one along to a terrorist ally. do nothing and merely wait to see how they But how likely is it that Iran would make will behave when they feel more secure.”61 event. such a transfer? At the very least, it would be American Enterprise Institute scholar Reuel an incredibly high-risk strategy. Even the Marc Gerecht makes a similar argument. most fanatical mullahs in Tehran realize that “We—America and Europe—have done an the United States would attack the probable awful job confronting the clerical regime for supplier of such a weapon—and Iran would its terrorism when the Islamic Republic wasn’t be at the top of Washington’s list of suspects. a nuclear power.” Given that record, he pre- It is significant that Iran has possessed dicts that “the Europeans (certainly) and the chemical weapons for decades, yet there is no Americans (probably) would be likely to blink indication that it has passed on any of those and give way to Iranian intimidation backed weapons to Hezbollah or to Palestinian groups by a nuclear threat, especially one that had a that Tehran supports politically. Why should terrorist edge to it.”62 one assume that the mullahs would be more There may be some truth to the blackmail reckless with nuclear weapons when the thesis. Iran might become more assertive in prospect of devastating retaliation for an attack the geopolitical arena—especially in the would be even more likely? The more logical Persian Gulf region—once it had a secure conclusion is that Iran, like other nuclear pow- nuclear deterrent. The prospect of at least ers, would jealously guard its arsenal. subtle blackmail becomes more likely if Just in case the mullahs might entertain Tehran’s neighbors choose to remain nonnu- thoughts of transferring such weaponry, clear, perhaps counting on the U.S. nuclear though, U.S. leaders should be explicit about umbrella to shield them from Iranian pres- the consequences, making it clear that such a sure. That would create a dilemma for the transfer is a very bright red line that no United States. Extended deterrence (protect- regime can cross and hope to survive. The ing third parties from attacks) has always reason for such an uncompromising posi- been more problematic than primary deter- tion on that point is that al-Qaeda and its ilk rence (protecting the United States from are not deterrable; they are not rational attack), since a challenging power might nation-state actors, and they have no fixed doubt that the United States would really “return address” for the purposes of retalia- risk adverse consequences by putting its own tion. The message to Tehran should be that security on the line for an ally or client. we can tolerate Iran in the global nuclear Extended deterrence is especially prob- club, albeit reluctantly, but any transfer of lematic if the country being protected is only nuclear material or weapons to nonstate a marginal ally or client of the United States. actors will be considered an act of war, and a Although Israel (and probably Saudi Arabia) regime-ending event. would not fall into that category, other

11 nations in the region do. Tehran might won- Whether additional proliferation would der whether the United States would really reach epidemic proportions and create the risk a major war with a nuclear-armed Iran nightmare scenarios forecast by some ana- merely to prevent some modest muscling of, lysts is uncertain. It is important to recall say, one of the small Persian Gulf states. that pundits and even international relations Nevertheless, one can overstate both the experts have tended to overestimate both the probability and the effectiveness of blackmail. probability and the extent of proliferation in It is again useful to recall that analysts the past. The conventional wisdom in the expressed similar fears about China when it 1960s was that there would be as many as acquired nuclear weapons, yet Beijing’s behav- two dozen nuclear-weapons powers within a ior for the most part did not validate those generation.64 Similar predictions were made fears. Although China did attack Vietnam in in the late 1970s and early 1980s.65 1979, the PRC’s conduct since the late 1960s Moreover, it is not an established fact that has generally been less, rather than more, bel- nuclear weapons in the hands of a larger licose than it was when China lacked a number of nations would necessarily be a nuclear capability. That episode illustrates the bad development. Indeed, a few respected larger point that nuclear weapons are much international relations scholars have argued We should make more useful as a deterrent against possible that nuclear proliferation might be stabiliz- every reasonable adversaries than they are as a mechanism for ing rather than destabilizing.66 Given its effort to dissuade intimidating those adversaries, much less for volatile political makeup, though, the Middle war-fighting purposes.63 There are indica- East is probably not the best region to test Tehran from tions over the past several years that the two that thesis. proceeding down newest nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, Admittedly, acceptance and deterrence are the nuclear path. have reached that conclusion. As in the case of not an easy or comfortable course to advo- China after the 1960s, New Delhi and Islama- cate, but that course is more realistic and less The best way to bad appear to have become more cautious dangerous than the confrontational options. do that is to and restrained since they built nuclear arse- On balance, though, we should make every nals. One cannot guarantee that Tehran reasonable effort to dissuade Tehran from propose a “grand would follow that pattern, but by the same proceeding down the nuclear path. The best bargain” to the token it is unwarranted to assume that the way to do that is to propose a “grand bar- Iranian Iranian regime would engage in rampant gain” to the Iranian government. blackmail. government. Would a Nuclear Iran Lead to Further Option 5: Nuclear Proliferation in the Region? Try for a Grand Bargain Finally, those who favor a more con- frontational policy toward Iran warn that if We should make a serious diplomatic Tehran succeeds in its quest for nuclear effort to get Iran to give up its quest for weapons, other nations in the region will nuclear weapons—and that means going sub- quickly do the same, creating an especially stantially beyond the scope of the EU-3-led dangerous security environment. As do con- negotiations. Washington should propose a cerns about possible blackmail, this fear has grand bargain to Tehran. That means giving some validity. Because of the uncertain relia- an assurance that the United States will not bility of the protection afforded by the U.S. use force against Iran the way we did against umbrella for some U.S. allies and client states such nonnuclear adversaries as Serbia and in the Middle East, there is a very real Iraq.67 It also means offering restored diplo- prospect that if Iran develops a nuclear arse- matic relations and normal economic rela- nal, sooner or later such countries as Saudi tions. In return, Iran would be required to Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey might follow suit. open its nuclear program to unfettered inter-

12 national inspections to guarantee that the states, and a sixth, India, is likely to become a program is used solely for peaceful power-gen- permanent member of the council in the next eration purposes. few years. Countries that have nuclear The strategy of offering a grand bargain weapons are treated differently than are non- also attempts to understand why Iran might nuclear powers. Before they became nuclear be pursuing a nuclear-weapons program and powers in 1998, India and Pakistan were what it is likely to take to get that country to treated with less than a great deal of respect choose a different course. Why would Iran by other international actors. India was con- want to build nuclear weapons? In attempt- sidered a chronic Third World underachiever, ing to answer that question, we need to look and Pakistan was viewed as a problem state— at why the vast majority of countries decide if not a potential failed state. Consider how to remain nonnuclear. Only a small number those countries are treated now, since they have ventured down the path of creating a have joined the nuclear weapons club. It is nuclear capability, and some of them have markedly different. turned around while on that path. South Another motive for going nuclear is to deter Africa is a notable example. or possibly intimidate a regional adversary. That appeared to be a consideration for both Why Nations Choose to Build Nuclear India and Pakistan. India had long sought to Weapons overawe its smaller neighbor, and possessing a There are important reasons why most nuclear arsenal eventually became part of that nations choose not to acquire a nuclear- strategy. Pakistan, in turn, concluded that it weapons capability. For one thing, it is very had to neutralize India’s growing conventional expensive. The opportunity cost to most soci- military advantage as well as its new nuclear eties is regarded as prohibitive. Occasionally, capability. A nuclear deterrent was the most a poor country such as North Korea will be decisive and cost-effective way to achieve that willing to make a nuclear-weapons program goal. Beyond its regional rivalry with Pakistan, the highest priority, but most governments India was also concerned about the rising mil- will not make that sacrifice. A decision to go itary power of China. There was no question nuclear has important adverse diplomatic the perceived Chinese threat was a factor in repercussions as well. Trying to build a India’s decision to go nuclear, as then–minister nuclear arsenal is not the way to win friends of defense George Fernandes has empha- 68 in the international community. The majori- sized. The strategy of ty of governments become extremely agitated In addition to the motive of deterrence when a country seeks to break out of the within a region, there is a potential motive of offering a grand nonproliferation system and become a broader deterrence—especially to deter the bargain attempts nuclear weapons state, and any would-be United States. With regard to that factor, we to understand nuclear power has to take that hostility into need to be realistic about the unintended con- consideration. Finally, by trying to acquire a sequences of some U.S. actions. The United why Iran might nuclear arsenal, a country may trigger or States has taken major military action on nine be pursuing a exacerbate a regional arms race, and at the occasions since the end of the . end of the process end up no more secure Although many Americans may think that nuclear-weapons than it was at the beginning. In fact, it might those episodes were justified, other countries program and be even less secure. don’t necessarily see it the same way. In partic- what it is likely to On the other hand, there are some impor- ular, countries such as Iran and North Korea tant reasons why a country might decide to have seen how the United States has treated take to get that go nuclear. One reason is prestige. The glob- nonnuclear adversaries such as Serbia and country to choose al nuclear weapons club is a very exclusive Iraq, and that may have led them to conclude association. All five permanent members of that the only reliable deterrent to U.S. coercion a different the UN Security Council are nuclear weapons was a nuclear arsenal. course.

13 Countries such as Why Iran Might Want to Be a Nuclear It is possible, though, that Tehran would Iran and North Power spurn a proposed grand bargain, despite the So what are Iran’s possible motives for attractiveness of the incentives. The Iranian Korea have seen going nuclear? Prestige is certainly one consid- political elite still seems uncertain about how the United eration—that was a factor even when the shah whether even to seek a rapprochement with 70 States has treated was in power. But prestige does not appear to the United States. Those who propose a be the dominant reason in Iran’s case today. grand bargain also have to acknowledge that nonnuclear adver- Deterrence, both regional and extraregional, Iran may be unalterably determined to join saries such as seems to be a more important consideration. the global nuclear weapons club for reasons Iran is located in a volatile region, surrounded of prestige and security. But we will never Serbia and Iraq, by hostile neighbors. Russia, Israel, Pakistan, know unless we make the offer. and that may have and India all have nuclear weapons already, so led them to con- regional deterrence issues probably loom large Signs That Tehran Might Want an for Tehran.69 Iran very likely is also reacting to Improved Relationship with Washington clude that the U.S. actions. President Bush’s “” There are intriguing signs that at least only reliable speech, linking Iran to Iraq and North Korea, some portions of the clerical regime would came as a prelude to an invasion and occupa- like an improved relationship with the deterrent to U.S. tion of Iraq. A policymaker in Tehran (or United States. According to the Washington coercion was a Pyongyang) seeing his country linked to Iraq Post, the Iranian government approached the nuclear arsenal. in that fashion might well assume that his Bush administration in 2002—after Bush’s country will also be on the U.S. hit list at some hostile “Axis of Evil” comment in his State of point. the Union address—and proposed cooperat- In addition to President Bush’s hostile ing with the United States against Al Qaeda. rhetoric, the United States has deployed its As a gesture of good faith, they informed forces in ways that many Iranians find menac- Washington of the identities of 290 members ing. U.S. troops are already in several Persian of Al Qaeda that Iran had captured and sent Gulf states, and have been in the region since back to their home countries. The Bush the first Persian Gulf war. Additional forces administration spurned that overture. Aides have now been deployed to some of the to Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary Central Asian republics, to Afghanistan, and, of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that any of course, most recently to Iraq. To leaders in diplomatic engagement would “legitimate” Tehran, those moves look suspiciously like an Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism.71 encirclement strategy with Iran as the next tar- In the spring of 2006 Ahmadinejad sur- get for U. S. military action. Iran’s apparent prised Washington and the rest of the interna- response in wanting to build nuclear weapons tional community by sending a lengthy letter is not irrational; it is quite logical. to President George Bush—the first communi- A grand bargain is the one offer that cation to an American chief executive from an might induce Iran to abandon the quest for a Iranian head of state in decades. It was a curi- nuclear arsenal, despite the various powerful ous document—a rambling 18-page treatise incentives to pursue that goal. Normalized on history, religion, politics, and world affairs. relations, an end to economic sanctions, the As a foundation for serious, substantive nego- removal of any threat of a campaign of tiations on the Iranian nuclear crisis, the letter forcible regime change, and a settlement of was decidedly inadequate. Nevertheless, it was Tehran’s multi-billion-dollar financial claims a sign that even the hardest of the Iranian are very appealing carrots that Washington hardliners was interested in some dialogue can offer. But it is hard to imagine Iran giving with Washington. up its long-standing effort to build a nuclear Ahmadinejad’s letter was not the only arsenal for much less than that package of feeler for negotiations. A few days later, Time incentives. magazine published an open letter from

14 Hassan Rohani, representative of Iran’s from, regimes that most Americans would One of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini. prefer did not exist. Unfortunately, that is an great challenges That letter was considerably more focused unpleasant reality that seems to elude recent and substantive than Ahmadinejad’s mis- generations of U.S. policymakers. Since the of effective sive.72 The former speaker of the Iranian par- days of Woodrow Wilson, Washington’s typ- diplomacy is to liament, Mehdi Karroubi, has been perhaps ical response to unfriendly, repressive govern- deal with, and get the boldest of all in favoring a rapproche- ments (especially of small countries) is to try ment with the United States. “This silence to isolate and berate them. Before Wilson, the results from, between the two countries cannot go on for- general U.S. practice was not to apply a moral regimes that ever,” he said. “The ice should be broken and litmus test for diplomatic relations. That pol- the walls of mistrust should fall.”73 icy was far more realistic and productive. The most Americans Although those initiatives may have been current approach is akin to the maturity level would prefer did a factor that finally induced Washington to one would expect from an elementary school not exist. join the EU-3-led negotiations with Tehran,74 student: “I don’t like you, and I’m not going U.S. leaders still avoid any suggestion of to speak to you.” We need a far more sophis- bilateral negotiations with the Iranian gov- ticated, flexible, and mature approach to deal ernment. Indeed, Secretary of State Rice went with Iran. out of her way to stress that U.S. participa- If Iran turns down the proposal for a grand tion in the multilateral talks in no way bargain, Washington’s fall-back position implied that Washington was willing to con- should be to rely on deterrence, despite the sider a grand bargain.75 That attitude needs limitations of that strategy and its unpleasant to change. Bilateral negotiations will be nec- side effect of creating incentives for greater essary to pursue the strategy of a grand bar- nuclear proliferation. The one thing we gain, because the United States holds most of should not do is start yet another war that the carrots that Iran desires. The European would further destabilize the Persian Gulf powers (and Russia and China) might be able region and threaten the lives and welfare of to facilitate such negotiations, but progress millions of people. will be unlikely unless there are direct talks between Tehran and Washington. And we have little to lose by making the Notes offer of a grand bargain—unless we were to 1. Steven R. Weisman and Douglas Jehl, “Estimate let negotiations drag on endlessly. Proposing Revised on When Iran Could Make Nuclear the grand bargain to Tehran and indicating Bomb,” New York Times, August 3, 2005. See also that the offer would remain on the table for a comments of Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte, “Iran Still Years Away from maximum of six months would have no sig- Having Nukes: U.S. Intelligence Chief,” Agence nificant downside. If the Iranians rejected the France Presse, April 20, 2006. proposal—or if they simply stalled—all of the other options would still be available. 2. See, for example, the views of former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix. “Blix: Iran Years Away from Nuclear Bomb,” Associated Press, The Need to Deal with Obnoxious April 3, 2006. The most detailed independent Regimes assessment of Iran’s nuclear potential can be To create the possibility of achieving a found in Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The grand bargain, however, the United States Real and Potential Threat (Washington: Center for has to overcome an entrenched reluctance to Strategic and International Studies, 2006). negotiate with repressive and obnoxious regimes. We simply do not have the luxury of 3. Abraham Rabinovich, “Tehran Found Even Closer to Nukes,” Washington Times, May 1, 2006. confining our diplomacy to friendly govern- 76 ments. One of the great challenges of effec- 4. Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, “Iran tive diplomacy is to deal with, and get results Closer to Producing Nuclear Weapons Fuel, U.S.

15 Officials Worry,” Knight Ridder, March 23, 2006. Drafting Sanctions As Iran Is Defiant.” New York Proliferation expert David Albright concludes that Times, August 31, 2006. See also Nasser Harimi, the three-year timetable could prove accurate, but “Iran’s President Defies UN on Deadline,” Associated only as a worst-case scenario. See David Albright Press, August 31, 2006. and Corey Hinderstein, “The Clock Is Ticking, But How Fast?” Institute for Science and International 15. George Jahn, “Russian Opposition Threatens Security, March 27, 2006, http://www.isis-online. Unity on Iran,” Associated Press, July 22, 2006. org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf. 16. Qin Jize, “China Urges Restraint in Iran Nuke 5. For examples, see Michael Rubin, “Nuclear Standoff,” China Daily, August 2, 2006, http:// Hostage Crisis,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2006, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-08/02/con and the views of Ilan Berman of the American tent_655005.htm. Foreign Policy Council. Monisha Bansal, “Iran Will Have Nukes Soon, Says Policy Expert,” 17. Warren Hoge, “UN Sets Aug. 31 Deadline for Cybercast News Service, May 22, 2006. Iran to End Nuclear Work,” New York Times, August 1, 2006, p. A3; and Nick Wadhams, “Weaker UN 6. “A Korea, Iran Link?” editorial, Investor’s Business Resolution Sets Iran Deadline,” Associated Press, Daily, July 26, 2006; and Jack Kelly, “Apocalyptic July 31, 2006. Visions,” Washington Times, July 27, 2006. 18. Richard N. Haass, ed., Economic Sanctions and 7. Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, p. 210. For a list of American Diplomacy (Washington: Council on the vague or faulty estimates since the early 1990s, Foreign Relations, 1998). see ibid., pp. 210–13. 19. Gary Hufbauer, “Confronting the ‘Dear 8. Lionel Beehner, “Iran: Nuclear Negotiations,” Leader,’” Los Angeles Times, July 15, 2006. Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2005, http: //www.cfr.org/publications/7730/iran.html. 20. For a discussion of South Africa’s special cir- cumstances, see Ian Bremmer, The J Curve: A New 9. Paul Hughes, “Iran Sounds Positive Note on Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall (New Russia Atomic Plan,” Reuters, December 28, 2005; York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 149–66. and “Iran Insists on Right to Enrich Uranium at Home,” Agence France Presse, January 2, 2006. 21. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 10. Connie Bruck, “Exiles: How Iran’s Expatriates History and Current Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington: Are Gaming the Nuclear Threat,” New Yorker, Institute for International Economics, 1990). March 6, 2006, p. 60; and conversation with for- mer Heritage Foundation senior fellow John 22. See especially Robert Pape, “Why Economic Hulsman, one of the intellectual architects of the Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, U.S.-EU-3 deal. no. 2 (Fall 1997): 99–105; and Robert Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” 11. Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Makes Offer to Meet International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): Iranians on Nuclear Plan,” New York Times, June 1, 66–77. For somewhat more positive views of sanc- 2006. tions as a tactic, see David A. Baldwin, “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice,” 12. The text of the offer remains secret, but some International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 1999–2000): provisions, outlining both concessions and possi- 80–107; and Hossein Askari, John G. Forrer, Hildy ble penalties, have leaked to the news media. Teegen, and Jiawan Yang, Economic Sanctions: George Jahn, “Diplomats: Package Gives Iran Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy (London: Some Leeway,” Associated Press, June 7, 2006; Praeger, 2003). Helene Cooper, “U.S. Is Offering Deals on Trade to Entice Iran,” New York Times, June 6, 2006; Elaine 23. Daniel Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement, Sciolino and William J. Broad, “Iran Quietly Learns and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation of Penalties in a Nuclear Incentives Deal,” New York Counterproductive?” International Organization Times, June 16, 2006; and Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran 54, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 73–102. Calls Western Incentives Acceptable,” Associated Press, July 16, 2006. 24. Ibid., p. 85.

13. Michael Slackman, “Iran Won’t Give Promise to 25. Anthony Faiola and Dafna Linzer, “Japan Wary End Uranium Effort,” New York Times, August 23, of Plan for Sanctions against Iran,” Washington Post, 2006. June 13, 2006.

14. Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, “U.S. 26. David Nason, “Australia May Not Join U.S. on

16 Iran Sanctions,” The Australian, August 2, 2006, New York Sun, March 3, 2006. http://theaustralian.news.com.au/printpage/ 0,5942,19990909,00.html. 34. For a detailed discussion of the Iranian exiles and how they are exploiting Washington’s fears of 27. “Iran’s Oil Could Reach $200 on Sanctions,” Iran’s nuclear program to advance their own Reuters, August 3, 2006; and Jeffrey Schott, political agendas, see, Bruck, pp. 48–63. “Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, Hearing on ‘Energy and 35. Jay Solomon and Andrew Higgins, “Exiled the Iranian Economy,’” July 25, 2006, http://www. Iranian Has Another Run as a U.S. Informant,” iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchI Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2006. =649. 36. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on 28. Quoted in Bruck, p. 50. Only slightly less ebul- Terrorism, 2004 (April 2005), pp. 104–5. lient is Ledeen’s AEI colleague, Michael Rubin, who recommends that the United States adopt the 37. Council on Foreign Relations, “Mujahadeen- “Gdansk strategy”—supporting independent trade e-Khalq (Iranian rebels),” October 2005, http:// unions and other potential opposition groups in www.cfr.org/publication/9158/. Iran. Michael Rubin, “Diplomacy Is Not Enough,” Prospect, June 2006, http://www.aei.org/publica 38. Human Rights Watch, “Human Rights tion24497. Abuses in MKO Camps,” May 2005, http://hrw. org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/4.htm. 29. For extreme examples of that argument, see Michael Ledeen, The War against the Terror Masters: 39. For a discussion of the MEK and its activities in Why It Happened, Where We Are Now, How We’ll Win the United States, see Bruck, pp. 54-56. (New York: Truman Talley Books, 2002); and , An End to Evil: How to Win 40. Patrick Clawson and Daniel Pipes, “Mujahedeen- the (New York: Random House, e-Khalq (MEK): A Terrorist U.S. Ally?” New York Post, 2003), and Kenneth R. Timmerman, Countdown to May 20, 2003, http://www.danielpipes.org/article/ Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran (New 1100. York: Three Rivers Press, 2005). 41. Raymond Tanter, “Iran Building Nuclear- 30. Examples include Michael Ledeen, “The Same Capable Missiles in Secret Tunnels: Options for War,” NationalReviewOnline, July 13, 2006, http:// the International Community,” Statement to the www.aei.org/publications/filter/foreign,pubID.246 National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 51/pub_detail.asp; and , “Now Isn’t 21, 2005, http://www.nci.org/05nci/11/Tanter- the Time for Restraint,” USA Today, July 18, 2006. Statement-Nov-21.htm. In fairness, not all neo- conservatives flirt with the MEK. Both Michael 31. Glenn Kessler, “Rice Asks for $75 Million to Rubin and Michael Ledeen have given the organi- Increase Pressure on Iran,” Washington Post, February zation a wide berth. 16, 2006. 42. Some hawks are already suggesting that the 32. See, for example, the optimistic comments of United States and other “like-minded” nations do Richard Perle. “Military Airstrikes against Iraq: A whatever is necessary to take out the Iranian Show of Power or an Exercise in Futility?” CNN’s regime in the wake of the new war between Israel Crossfire (featuring Richard Perle and Ted Galen and Hezbollah/Lebanon. See James Lyons Jr., Carpenter), February 16, 2001, http://transcripts. “Proportions . . and Motivations,” Washington cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0101/16/cf.00.html. See Times, July 23, 2006. Admiral Lyons is the former also the comments of President Clinton on signing commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. the Iraq Liberation Act. White House, “The Iraq Liberation Act, Statement by the President,” 43. Zogby International, “Poll of Iran—May/June October 31, 1998, http://www.library.cornell.edu/ 2006,” June 2, 2006, http://www.rd.com/images/ coodev/mideast/libera.htm, and the comments of content/071306/iranpollresults.pdf. various members of Congress who supported the legislation. U.S. Congress, “Debate on the Iraq 44. Quoted in James Bovard, “Defining Democracy Liberation Act of 1998,” H.9486, October 5, 1998, Down,” American Conservative, April 24, 2006. See http://www.house.gov/paul/congrec98/cr100598. also Golnaz Esfandiari, “Iranian Democrats Tell htm. U.S. Where to Stick Its $85 M,” Asia Times, April 6, 2006. 33. Compare the comments of Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) on Iran to the earlier comments of support- 45. Karl Vick and David Finkel, “U.S. Push for ers of the Iraq Liberation Act. Meghan Clyne, Democracy Could Backfire Inside Iran,” Washington “Congress Outbids Bush on Iran Democracy Aid,” Post, March 13, 2006.

17 46. For a concise history of the troubled U.S.- Time, April 20, 2006; and Abbas Milani and Iranian relationship, see Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Michael McFaul “Inside Iran’s Fractured Regime,” Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and , June 25, 2006. Next Great Conflict in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006). 57. For a discussion of that episode and its rele- vance to today’s concerns about nuclear-armed 47. Chris Quillen, “Iranian Nuclear Weapons “rogue states,” see Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from Policy: Past, Present, and Possible Future,” Middle the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 2 (June International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004–5): 2002):17–18; and Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, pp. 100–35. 100–107. 58. Author’s conversation with Walt W. Rostow, 48. Nasser Karimi, “In Iran, Even Critics Back national security adviser to President Lyndon B. Nuclear Stance,” Associated Press, March 8, 2006; Johnson. and Michael Slackman, “Nuclear Dispute Arouses Patriotism among Iranians,” New York Times, 59. See Jeffrey Record, “Nuclear Deterrence, February 5, 2006. Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 519, July 8, 2004. 49. Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney, now a Fox News consultant, concedes 60. Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Israel Buys 2 Nuclear- that the United States would have to grant the Capable Submarines,” Associated Press, August 25, Israeli attack force the right to overfly Iraq. “They 2006. really can’t do this without us.” Quoted in Rowan Scarborough, “Israel Capable of Air Strike on Iran,” 61. Edward Luttwak, “The Three Options,” Cato Washington Times, July 18, 2006. Unbound, July 2006.

50. William Kristol, “It’s Our War: Bush Should 62. , “Another Round,” Cato Go to Jerusalem—And the U.S. Should Confront Unbound, July 2006. For contrary views, see Barry R. Iran,” Weekly Standard, July 24, 2006. Posen, “We Can Live with a Nuclear Iran,” New York Times, February 27, 2006; and Christopher Layne, 51. For a detailed discussion of those difficulties, “Iran: The Logic of Deterrence,” American Conserv- see Justin Logan, “The Bottom Line on Iran: The ative, April 10, 2006. Costs and Benefits of Preventive War versus Deterrence,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, forth- 63. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear coming. Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic 52. Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” New Yorker, Studies, 1981). April 17, 2006. Hersh cites a “senior Pentagon official” who asserts that the Pentagon drew up a 64. In March 1963, President John F. Kennedy nuclear option against Iran. Several high-level said that he was haunted by the fear that some- military officials reportedly threatened to resign, time in the 1970s the United States would “face a however, unless that option was tabled. world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations” possessed nuclear weapons. Quoted in Scott Sagan, “How to 53. Interview on Fox News, July 19, 2006. Keep the Bomb from Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 85, no. 5 (September–October 2006): 49. 54. International Crisis Group, “Yugoslavia’s Presidential Election: The Serbian People’s 65. Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, “Trends in Moment of Truth,” Balkans Report. no. 102, Nuclear Proliferation,” Report prepared for the September 19, 2000. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Hudson Institute, May 1976; Ashok Kapur, “And 55. Quoted in “Nobel Winner: Iranians Would Where We Go: Nth Powers of the Future,” Annals of Defend Country to ‘Last Drop of Blood,’” Chicago the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sun-Times, April 22, 2006. March 1977, p. 84; and William Epstein, “Why States Do—and Don’t—Go Nuclear,” Annals of the 56. Paul Hughes, “Mixed Views in Iran on Nuclear American Academy of Political and Social Science, Strategy,” Reuters, February 5, 2006; John R. March 1977, pp. 17–19. Bradley, “Tehran Elite Turning on Extremist Presidency,” Washington Times, March 14, 2006; 66. See Waltz; and Scott Sagan and Kenneth Michael Slackman, “In Iran, A Chorus of Dissent Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Rises on Leadership’s Nuclear Strategy,” New York Revisited, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2002). See Times, March 15, 2006; Tony Karon, “Iran’s also John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss President’s Bark May Be Worse than His Bite,” the Cold War,” Atlantic, August 1990, pp. 39–40.

18 67. That is likely to be a key point in any bargain- Vick, “Ayatollah’s Moves Hint Iran Wants to ing with Iran. Sagan, p. 59. Engage,” Washington Post, July 5, 2006.

68. In a February 2004 lecture, Fernandes admit- 71. Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, “Afghanistan, ted that in the past he “had qualified China as Iraq: Two Wars Collide,” Washington Post, October 22, ‘potential threat number one,’” Since India 2004. became a nuclear power, he noted that Indo- Chinese relations had warmed considerably. 72. Adam Zagorin, “A New Gesture from Iran?” Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, “India Rethinks China Time, May 9, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/ Policy,” The Hindu, February 26, 2004. world/printout/0,8816,1192578,00.html.

69. There are also reports that Iran’s neighbor, 73. Quoted in Brian Murphy, “Iranian Politician Pakistan, is building a large reactor that would Urges U.S.-Iran Ties,” Associated Press, May 27, enable the country to significantly expand its 2006. nuclear arsenal. Such a reactor could generate enough plutonium to build 40 to 50 weapons a 74. A more likely explanation, though, is that the year. Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Bush administration came under growing pres- Program,” Washington Post, July 24, 2006. U.S. gov- sure from prominent Republicans to adopt a dif- ernment officials, however, contend that the reac- ferent strategy. Laura Rozen, “GOP Heavy Hitters tor in question will be “substantially smaller and Pressuring White House to Talk with Iran,” New less capable than reported.” Quoted in William York Times, May 27, 2006. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Disputes Report on New Pakistan Reactor,” New York Times, 75. “Condoleezza Rice Holds News Conference on August 3, 2006. Even the addition of a smaller Iran, Transcript,” Washington Post, May 31, 2006, reactor, though, could enhance Pakistan’s nuclear http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con capabilities. tent/article/2006/05/31/AR2006053100937.html.

70. Sometimes even the same leader gives con- 76. A few experts have recently pointed out that flicting signals within the span of a few days. See important reality. John McLaughlin, “We Have to the comments of Iranian supreme leader Talk to Bad Guys,” Washington Post, July 23, 2006; Ayatollah Al Khamenei. “Khamenei Dismisses and Leslie H. Gelb, “Time to Talk (to the Bad Iran-U.S. Talks,” Reuters, June 27, 2006; and Karl Guys),” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2006.

19 OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES

577. The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency by Jeffrey Record (September 1, 2006)

576. Is the Sky Really Falling? A Review of Recent Global Warming Scare Stories by Patrick J. Michaels (August 23, 2006)

575. Toward Property Rights in Spectrum: The Difficult Policy Choices Ahead by Dale Hatfield and Phil Weiser (August 17, 2006)

574. Budgeting in Neverland: Irrational Policymaking in the U.S. Congress and What Can Be Done about It by James L. Payne (July 26, 2006)

573. Flirting with Disaster: The Inherent Problems with FEMA by Russell S. Sobel and Peter T. Leeson (July 19, 2006)

572. Vertical Integration and the Restructuring of the U.S. Electricity Industry by Robert J. Michaels (July 13, 2006)

571. Reappraising Nuclear Security Strategy by Rensselaer Lee (June 14, 2006)

570. The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, and Anti-Democratic by Dale Carpenter (June 1, 2006)

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