No. 578 September 20, 2006 ������� Iran’s Nuclear Program America’s Policy Options by Ted Galen Carpenter Executive Summary Although it is possible that negotiations strikes against Iran’s nuclear installations. That between the leading powers in the international is the most unwise strategy. At most, such strikes community and Iran may produce a settlement to would delay, not eliminate, Tehran’s program. the vexing issue of Iran’s nuclear program, it is There is also a grave risk that Iran would retaliate more likely that those negotiations will fail. If that with the full range of options at its disposal, happens, U.S. policymakers face a set of highly including attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and imperfect options. through proxy organizations. Attacking Iran One option—and the most likely initial would also further alienate Muslim populations response—is to seek a UN Security Council reso- around the world, creating the very real prospect lution imposing economic sanctions on Tehran. of a war of civilizations. However, sanctions have a poor record of getting Option four is to reluctantly accept Iran as a regimes to abandon high-priority policies. Even member of the global nuclear weapons club and rely if Russia and China can be induced to overcome on the deterrent power of America’s vast nuclear their reluctance to endorse sanctions, it is unlike- arsenal. While that strategy is not without risk, the ly that such measures would halt Iran’s quest for United States has successfully deterred other volatile nuclear weapons. and unsavory regimes, most notably Maoist China A second option is to intensify efforts to sub- during that country’s Cultural Revolution. vert Iran’s clerical regime. Washington already has The best option, though, is to try to strike a a modest program to do that under the Iran grand bargain with Iran. Washington should offer Freedom Support Act. Unfortunately, such a to normalize diplomatic and economic relations strategy may backfire, undermining the domestic with Iran in exchange for Tehran’s agreement to legitimacy of Iranian dissidents. Moreover, there is open its nuclear program to rigorous, on-demand no certainty that a democratic Iran would choose international inspections to guarantee that there to be nonnuclear. is no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful Option three is to launch preemptive air purposes to building weapons. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ Ted Galen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of seven books on international affairs, including Peace and Freedom: Foreign Policy for a Constitutional Republic. PA Masthead.indd 1 2/9/06 2:08:34 PM The bulk of Introduction might sell Tehran a bomb or two.6 Those expert opinion who advance that thesis present little evi- Iran would be at or near the top of a list of dence that Pyongyang would take such a now concludes countries Americans would least like to see step, knowing that not only the United States that Iran is still a have nuclear weapons, and the reasons for but other countries in the international com- long time away apprehension have deepened dramatically in munity (including North Korea’s principal the past year with the election of President allies, Russia and China) would be most dis- from having a Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran under the pleased with such reckless proliferation. nuclear arsenal. mullahs since the revolution of 1979 has Anthony Cordesman and Khalid R. Al- been a weird and ominous country. With Rodhan, scholars at the Center for Strategic Ahmadinejad’s new prominence, the weird- and International Studies, note that most ness quotient has reached new levels. Iran is government and independent analyses of now headed by an individual who expresses Iran’s nuclear program in the 1990s predict- the hope that Israel be wiped off the map and ed that the country would be able to build denies that the Holocaust ever occurred. nuclear weapons by 2000. That clearly did Those are sentiments not found in civilized not happen. The reason for the faulty esti- circles anywhere in the world. mates, according to Cordesman and Al- If one could wave a magic wand and elimi- Rodhan, is that they “often were based on the nate Iran’s nuclear program, all responsible unrealistic assumption that Iran’s nuclear governments would be grasping for that program would evolve without interrup- wand. Alas, in the real world such magical tions, technical difficulties, or voluntary sus- solutions do not exist. U.S. policymakers have pensions.”7 only a choice among problematic options. Given that track record, we should be Some choices, though, are clearly better than doubly skeptical of newer predictions that others. Tehran is on the brink of becoming a nuclear Above all, as policymakers consider the power. The bulk of expert opinion both various options, they need to avoid a sense of inside and outside the U.S. government now panic. U.S. intelligence agencies have con- concludes that Iran is still a long time away cluded that Iran will not be able to build from having a nuclear arsenal. When a poten- nuclear weapons for another 5 to 10 years.1 tial threat is measured in years, it allows poli- Prominent independent experts agree with cymakers to carefully consider alternative that assessment.2 Even the Israeli govern- ways of addressing the problem. There is no ment, which has an obvious interest in pre- need for precipitous action. senting a worst-case scenario of the Iranian nuclear threat, concedes that Tehran will not be able to build such weapons for another 3 Prelude to Confrontation: years.3 Based on recent information, some The European-Led Bush administration policymakers now Negotiations embrace a similar conclusion, although the intelligence community has not changed its There has been a diplomatic effort under- official estimate.4 Yet even 3 years is a signifi- way for more than three years to dissuade Iran cant amount of time to craft a response. Only from trying to become a nuclear power. That the most intense members of the faction effort began in 2003 when Britain, France, and pushing war with Iran argue that the danger Germany—the so-called EU-3—became suffi- is more imminent.5 Their most recent thesis ciently worried about Tehran’s apparent objec- is that, although Iran might not be able to tives that they decided to address the problem build nukes on its own in the immediate through engagement and negotiations. They future, there is a very real danger that North urged the United States to join that effort, but Korea, whose program is more advanced, the Bush administration spurned the over- 2 tures of its allies and decided to remain on the more supportive and cooperative, those con- sidelines. That posture did not prevent cessions reportedly came at a price. At the President Bush and other U.S. officials from urging of Vice President Cheney’s office, the issuing periodic statements stressing that a administration insisted that the foreign min- nuclear-armed Iran was “intolerable.” Indeed, isters of the EU-3 sign a letter stating that, if from the earliest stages of the European diplo- the talks failed, they would support U.S. matic initiative, Washington urged that Iran efforts to refer Iran to the Security Council be referred to the UN Security Council for pos- for possible sanctions.10 sible sanctions.8 The crisis turned more intense in August Russia and China (especially the former) 2005, when Ahmadinejad took office. A few have from time to time offered proposals from days later, Iran rejected the European pro- the diplomatic sidelines. Indeed, the most posals, which included the concessions promising initiative has been Russia’s proposal agreed to by the United States. Indeed, Iran’s to have Iran enrich uranium for power-genera- new chief nuclear negotiator declared that tion purposes on Russian soil, with the product his country would never halt its conversion then being returned to Iran. That method of uranium. A month later, the International would (at least in theory) prevent Iran from pro- Atomic Energy Agency found Iran in non- ducing highly enriched uranium—which is the compliance with inspection requirements From the raw material for building nuclear weapons. that were part of the country’s obligations earliest stages of Tehran has given conflicting signals regarding under the NPT. In February 2006, the IAEA the European Moscow’s proposal.9 On some occasions voted to report Iran to the Security Council. Iranian leaders have expressed interest in the A Security Council vote on sanctions seemed diplomatic offer and have even indicated that it could be just a matter of weeks or a few months away. initiative, the basis of a settlement to the crisis. On other Washington made another significant Washington occasions, however, they have criticized the pro- shift in policy. At the end of May, the Bush posal and emphasized that Iran has a right administration agreed to join the EU-3 nego- urged that Iran under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty tiations as an active participant.11 Shortly be referred to the (NPT) to have a nuclear program on Iranian thereafter, negotiators made a new offer to soil for peaceful purposes. Iran, providing a number of concessions UN Security The EU-3 effort has achieved little. Iran (including the previous concessions offered Council for did suspend its uranium enrichment pro- indirectly and informally by the United possible gram from November 2004 to August 2005, States) if Tehran agreed to put its uranium but for the most part the negotiations pro- enrichment activities on hold. The offer sanctions. ceeded in a desultory fashion.