Extensions of Remarks
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October 3, 1985 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 26111 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS HOW TO SUPPORT THE ments that challenge totalitarian and au certainly prefer democratic regimes to anti DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION thoritarian regimes. Not only should this be democratic ones, we should by now also our objective, in a sense it must be our ob have learned that many of the world's worst jective, for without this organizing principle tyrants <Stalin, for one) wrap themselves in HON. NEWT GINGRICH and central theme, even the most brilliantly the mantle of democracy, while some of OF GEORGIA conceived Realpolitik will fail. those we have viewed as hopelessly repres IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Such is the power of our own traditions sive have actually paved their countries' Thursday, October 3, 1985 and of our commitment to the universal way from dictatorship toward democracy value of democracy that Americans will not, <Generalissimo Franco providing perhaps Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, as this for example, support a long-term friendship the most interesting example>. All too often body considers the policies toward such na with a repressive dictatorship; our basic alli in the recent past, moreover, we have seen tions as Chile and South Mrica, this recent ances must be with democratic countries, or dictators friendly to the United States re advice by Michael Ledeen supplies some with countries that are seen to be moving placed by hostile totalitarians, to the bene very good advice for us. It should be read toward greater democracy. There is an im fit of our enemies and the detriment of our carefully by every Member: portant corollary to this axiom: except in own interests and those of our allies. extraordinary circumstances, the American Some American policy-makers and intel How To SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC people will not long give their approval to a lectuals have concluded from this circum REVOLUTION foreign policy based purely or even primari stance that forthright, universal support for <By Michael Ledeen> ly on abstract considerations of the balance the democratic revolution is in fact a dan The streets and campuses of our cities of power. gerous and counterproductive policy, one once again resound with the voices of dem Some decry this American characteristic, that will bring us into conflict with some of onstrators calling for the United States to arguing that it makes it impossible to con our most important allies, in areas vital to "get tough" with its allies. Whether de duct a (presumably more effective> foreign our national security. The objection is a se manding that we sever all economic ties policy, one based on a traditional conception rious one. How can we continue to maintain with the Union of South Africa, or that we of the national interest. Such criticism, close friendships with foreign leaders when pressure Philippine strongman Ferdinand however, is misguided, for the spread of de we are simultaneously intruding into their Marcos to share power with his opponents, mocracy is the most basic of our geostrate internal affairs, trying to get them to dilute many Americans are clearly unhappy with gic interests. If the democratic revolution their authority and significantly change the close embrace between their country should succeed, our security will be greatly their political system? More ominously, if and such regimes. In short order we can enhanced; if the democratic revolution is de we start demanding that South Africa end expect similar calls concerning our relation feated and rolled back, our security will be apartheid or that Marcos share power with ship with General Pinochet's dictatorial diminished. his opponents, are we not inviting a reprise regime in Chile. These principles are often less well under of the North Vietnamese takeover of the Such protests are by now a standard fea stood by ourselves than by our enemies, who South and the replacement of the Shah of ture of public life in this country, but the recognize only too clearly that the existence Iran by the Ayatollah Khomeini, two cases issues raised by the protestors-which have of free societies threatens them. The vitali in which a mildly repressive <and friendly) to do with the nature of our alliances and ty of democracy, its appeal to human crea ally was defeated and a far more evil force the objectives of our foreign policy-remain tivity, and the unlimited range it gives to <both from the point of view of the people among the most controversial in our nation human development, strike fear into the living in those countries and of American in al debate. The persistence of confusion hearts of those whose power depends upon terests> soon came to dominate the scene? about the basic purposes of American for shackling free people and insisting upon a Yet our having failed in the past does not eign policy, above and beyond the latest tac single "truth." The most aggressive of our mean that we must continue the pattern in tical wrinkle <"Nixon Doctrine," "Reagan enemies, the Communist totalitarians, aim the future. Our various errors of judgment Plan," or whatever>, suggests that we have to remove democracy from the earth, in and omission should not lead us to abandon yet to come to terms with the requirements order that they may finally feel completely a policy essential to our interests and of a for America's proper role in the world. secure. This point was driven home by the piece with our national traditions. In part, What, then, are those requirements? Central American leaders interviewed by the Vietnamese and Iranian disasters oc In recent years we have seen a remarkable the Kissinger commission. Every head of curred precisely because we lacked the cour series of transformations from dictatorship government testified that so long as the age and wisdom to fight for those traditions. to democracy, in countries ranging from Sandinistas were in power in Nicaragua, all Our failure to support the Shah during the Turkey and Spain and Portugal to Argenti chance for democracy in the area would be crisis of 1979 was criminal, but we could and na and Honduras. There is no question that mortally jeopardized. should have acted in such a way over the these examples encourage other countries, The implication is clear enough: if we are preceding quarter-century as to have made especially those with a Spanish or Portu serious about the democratic revolution in the crisis unnecessary. That would have re guese tradition, to move in the same direc Central America, we must challenge Nicara quired years <not just months> of steady tion <Brazil, Uruguay, and El Salvador are guan <and Soviet-sponsored Cuban> totali pressure on the Shah to undertake a gradu instances>. In addition, there is the encour tarianism there; if we are serious about the al liberalization of his regime, to share aging story of Grenada, where armed Amer democratic revolution in general, we must power with the emerging new middle class ican intervention overthrew a Marxist dicta challenge Communist totalitarianism in <mostly trained in the United States>. and to torship and returned the country to democ general. Indeed, our struggle with Commu limit his own authority. In this sense intelli racy, representing the first time that the nist totalitarianism-like our previous war gent American "meddling" in the internal Brezhnev Doctrine <according to which the with fascist totalitarianism, and like our affairs of other countries is fully justified, Communist takeover of any country is irre struggle with dictatorships of all stripes-is for if we encourage allies to become more versible> has been actively challenged. And, unavoidable, a matter of political principle democratic, it is in order to make their own in Eastern Europe, there is the most ambig which is simultaneously a strategic national governments more stable and our alliances uous but perhaps ultimately no less hopeful interest. It is not the other side of the coin, more durable. case of Poland, where, despite all efforts to it is the same coin as our support of the That having been said, one must add im suppress it, Solidarity lives on. democratic revolution. mediately the qualification that it is exceed If there is one central theme and organiz Needless to say, however, solid unflinch ingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a ing principle of our foreign policy, it should ing support for the democratic revolution successful transition from dictatorship to be to support this movement-which some does not mean the abando1UJ1ent of good democracy in the midst of a violent crisis. observers have called a democratic revolu sense. American policy-makers cannot be de When one of our undemocratic allies is tion-around the world. Our task is actively prived of such essential tools as the choice under attack from anti-democratic forces to encourage non-democratic governments of the lesser of two evils, the strategic that are also hostile to us, our first obliga to democratize, and to aid democratic move- pause, and the wait-and-see. Although we tion is to support the ally, and only then to e This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member of the Senate on the floor. Boldface type indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor. 26112 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS October 3, 1985 address the question of greater democracy. the Ayatollah's "revolution," which at the had fallen prey to a violent wave of terror In Vietnam, we often acted as if its leaders time was mistaken for a movement of the ism, but urged the generals to restore power <and perhaps even the system of govern Left and defended as such.