DOCSLIB.ORG

America's Alleged Intelligence Failure in The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
America's Alleged Intelligence Failure in The University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2017 America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors Cake, Timothy Cake, T. (2017). America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/24784 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3688 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors by Timothy Cake A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 2017 © Timothy Cake 2017 ABSTRACT In the prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), notables in the G. W. Bush administration declared Iraq to be an existential threat as it had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and connections to transnational terrorist groups. After the 2003 invasion of that state, coalition forces engaged in a search effort that found no significant evidence of WMD. Investigatory committees subsequently judged Iraq had no WMD or terrorist group connections. This situation is broadly regarded as a failure by America’s intelligence community (IC). The initial hypotheses driving the research for this dissertation focused on four sets of factors: (1) a lack of fresh and accurate data; (2) a series of analytical and intellectual pathologies in the intelligence analysis process; (3) a dependence on scientistic, technology-driven methods of data collection and analysis; and (4) a serendipitous denial and deception (D & D) campaign mounted by Iraq’s government. However, the research undertaken did not support this initial line of argument. Instead, it suggested that the working-level members of the IC in the broad sense, correctly analyzed the Iraqi situation. The intelligence failure thus arose from other factors. These initial results pointed to factors in organizational and bureaucratic politics especially at the upper levels of the IC, in its relationship to senior levels of the G. W. Bush administration, and to channels for the assessment and movement of information that bypassed the established intelligence apparatus. Drawing on a detailed examination of the analyses and handling of claims regarding Iraqi WMD and its connections with terrorist groups, combined with considerations drawn from organizational and bureaucratic theories, the dissertation concludes (a) that there was no intelligence failure at the non-executive levels of the IC, but (b) there were distortions or suppressions of situationally-correct intelligence analytic products at the executive levels of the IC to support the policy preferences of certain G. W. Bush administration elites. In contrast to ii this, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department not only was outstandingly accurate in its assessments of the Iraqi situation but also, bolstered by its executive team, was able to resist downward-facing pressures to generate policy-palatable analytic products. iii Dissertation Approval Form This page redacted from electronic document. iv Table of Contents ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... ii Dissertation Approval Form ...................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________1 Introduction, Thesis Question, and Research Hypothesis ...........................................1 Previous Studies Related to the Thesis Question ........................................................2 Organization of the Research ......................................................................................3 Contribution .................................................................................................................6 Research Method and Sources .....................................................................................6 Overview of Interviews and Surveys ..................................................................7 Respondent Identification, Approach, Recruitment, and Consent ......................8 Dealing with Respondents and their Data .........................................................14 Information Verification and Crosschecking Processes ...................................15 CHAPTER II CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS __________________________19 The Foundations of the Neoconservative Weltanschauung ......................................20 Alberta and Roberta Wohlstetter .......................................................................21 Bernard Lewis ...................................................................................................22 Richard Pipes ....................................................................................................24 Second-Generation Neoconservative Intellectuals ....................................................26 Paul Wolfowitz..................................................................................................26 Richard Perle .....................................................................................................31 Abram Shulsky ..................................................................................................35 Zalmay Khalilzad ..............................................................................................38 William J. Luti ..................................................................................................42 v Douglas J. Feith .................................................................................................43 Laurie A. Mylroie..............................................................................................44 A Brief History of the Neoconservatives ..................................................................46 The Relationship between the President, Vice President, and the IC........................51 The Intelligence Hierarchy in the Prelude to OIF .............................................51 The President, Vice President, and the IC.........................................................52 Perceptions of Iraq’s Connections to Transnational Terrorism and WMD ...............54 Colin Powell’s Dissenting Perspective .............................................................67 The Ambiguous Intelligence Environment after ODS ..............................................68 A Note on Uranium Enrichment Technologies .........................................................77 The U. S. Government’s Relationship with Ahmad Chalabi and the INC ................79 Dick Cheney’s Adversarial Relationship with the IC ...............................................83 The Imbroglio of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate .........................88 The Origins and Cultures of the IC ...........................................................................96 The Origins and Cultures of the CIA and INR .................................................99 The INR’s Accurate Analytic Products...........................................................104 Information Technology Problems in the Prelude to OIF ...............................110 Summary ..................................................................................................................113 CHAPTER III DUBIOUS DATA ENTERS THE IC __________________________114 The INC’s Pseudo-Intelligence Supports the Iron Triangle’s Policies ...................114 Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes and Zippe Centrifuges..............................................115 The Iraqi Aerial Drone Controversy ...............................................................122 Iraqi Missile Programs ....................................................................................123 Ahmad Chalabi’s Machinations ......................................................................123 Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami and Iraq’s Support of al-Qaeda ..........141 vi Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri’s Statements ...........................................142 Khidhir Hamza and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program ..........................143 Allegations about Iraq’s BW Program ...................................................144 The INC’s Assertions about Iraq’s Links to Terrorists ..........................147 The Habbush Data Feed ..................................................................................151 The Habbush Memorandum Controversy ..............................................153 The Niger Yellowcake Affair and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons ...........................155 Colin Powell’s Dilemma .........................................................................................168 Summary ..................................................................................................................171
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003
    THE REGIME CHANGE CONSENSUS: IRAQ IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1990-2003 Joseph Stieb A dissertation submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences. Chapel Hill 2019 Approved by: Wayne Lee Michael Morgan Benjamin Waterhouse Daniel Bolger Hal Brands ©2019 Joseph David Stieb ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Joseph David Stieb: The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003 (Under the direction of Wayne Lee) This study examines the containment policy that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and argues for a new understanding of why the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. At the core of this story is a political puzzle: Why did a largely successful policy that mostly stripped Iraq of its unconventional weapons lose support in American politics to the point that the policy itself became less effective? I argue that, within intellectual and policymaking circles, a claim steadily emerged that the only solution to the Iraqi threat was regime change and democratization. While this “regime change consensus” was not part of the original containment policy, a cohort of intellectuals and policymakers assembled political support for the idea that Saddam’s personality and the totalitarian nature of the Baathist regime made Iraq uniquely immune to “management” strategies like containment. The entrenchment of this consensus before 9/11 helps explain why so many politicians, policymakers, and intellectuals rejected containment after 9/11 and embraced regime change and invasion.
    [Show full text]
  • “What Could Possibly Go Wrong?”
    “WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG?” SECRET DEAL ALLOWS COMPANY TIED TO SADDAM’S NUCLEAR BOMBMAKER, IRAN AND U.A.E. TO MANAGE KEY FLORIDA PORT FACILITIES An Occasional Paper of the Center for Security Policy By: Alan Jones and Mary Fanning 23 December 2016 1 Gulftainer’s Port Canaveral cargo container terminal (left), Saddam Hussein awarding a medal to Iraqi nuclear physicist Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, considered the “father of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program” (right) In 2015 President Barack Obama’s Administration quietly approved the hand-over of cargo container operations at Florida’s Port Canaveral to Gulftainer, a Middle Eastern ports company owned by the Emir of Sharjah of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iraqi businessman Hamid Dhia Jafar. Hamid Jafar is the brother and the business partner of Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar -- the Baghdad-born nuclear physicist who masterminded Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program. UAE-based port operator Gulftainer, a subsidiary of The Crescent Group, was awarded the 35- year no-bid lease at Port Canaveral in 2014 following two years of secret talks in a deal code-named “Project Pelican.” Treasury Secretary Jacob “Jack” Lew declined1 to conduct a Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS) National Security Threat Analysis that, under the Foreign Investment & National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), is required for transactions affecting America’s critical infrastructure and U.S. national security. Port Canaveral is in close proximity to a U.S. Navy nuclear submarine base, two U.S. Air Force Space Command bases, and NASA’s Kennedy Space Center. Gulftainer has port operations in the UAE, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Brazil, and Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    NOTES Introduction 1. Robert Kagan to George Packer. Cited in Packer’s The Assassin’s Gate: America In Iraq (Faber and Faber, London, 2006): 38. 2. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neoconservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004): 9. 3. Critiques of the war on terror and its origins include Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (Routledge, New York and London, 2004); Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America At the Crossroads (Profile Books, London, 2006); Ira Chernus, Monsters to Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin (Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, CO and London, 2006); and Jacob Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons (Doubleday, New York, 2008). 4. A report of the PNAC, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000: 76. URL: http:// www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (15 January 2009). 5. On the first generation on Cold War neoconservatives, which has been covered far more extensively than the second, see Gary Dorrien, The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture and the War of Ideology (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1993); Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America’s Politics (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1979); Murray Friedman, The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005); Murray Friedman ed. Commentary in American Life (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2005); Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars (Madison Books, Lanham MD; New York; Oxford, 1997); and Maria Ryan, “Neoconservative Intellectuals and the Limitations of Governing: The Reagan Administration and the Demise of the Cold War,” Comparative American Studies, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • 2003 Iraq War: Intelligence Or Political Failure?
    2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Dione Brunson, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April, 2011 DISCLAIMER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OR POSITIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL INFORMATION AND SOURCES FOR THIS PAPER WERE DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS. ii 2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? Dione Brunson, B.A. MALS Mentor: Ralph Nurnberger, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you God for continued wisdom. Thank you Dr. Nurnberger for your patience. iv DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Mom and Dad for their continued support.
    [Show full text]
  • The New Iraq: 2015/2016 Discovering Business
    2015|2016 Discovering Business Iraq N NIC n a o t i io s n is al m In om in association with vestment C USINESS B Contents ISCOVERING Introduction Iraq continues as a major investment opportunity 5 Messages - 2015|2016 D - 2015|2016 Dr. Sami Al-Araji: Chairman of the National Investment Commission 8 RAQ HMA Frank Baker: British Ambassador to Iraq 10 I Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Executive Chairman, Iraq Britain Business Council 12 EW N Business Matters HE Doing business in Iraq from a taxation perspective - PricewaterhouseCoopers 14 T Doing business in Iraq - Sanad Law Group in association with Eversheds LLP 20 Banking & Finance Citi has confidence in Iraq’s investment prospects - Citi 24 Common ground for all your banking needs - National Bank of Iraq 28 Iraq: Facing very challenging times - Rabee Securities 30 2005-2015, ten years stirring the sound of lending silence in Iraq - IMMDF 37 Almaseer - Building on success - Almaseer Insurance 40 Emerging insurance markets in Iraq - AKE Insurance Brokers 42 Facilitating|Trading Organisations Events & Training - Supporting Iraq’s economy - CWC Group 46 Not just knowledge, but know how - Harlow International 48 HWH shows how smaller firms can succeed in Iraq - HWH Associates 51 The AMAR International Charitable Foundation - AMAR 56 Oil & Gas Hans Nijkamp: Shell Vice President & Country Chairman, Iraq 60 Energising Iraq’s future - Shell 62 Oil production strategy remains firmly on course 66 Projects are launched to harness Iraq’s vast gas potential 70 Major investment in oilfield infrastructure
    [Show full text]
  • Table of Contents
    Chapter 4 Building International Will and Capacity to Counter Terrorism The Department of State engages diplomatically with for- eign governments and in international and regional fora to accomplish the US Government’s first priority — protect- ing Americans at home and abroad. The Department of State’s diplomatic efforts help build the political will and operational skills of foreign governments to combat terror. Many countries are committed allies in the global war on terrorism. Some, however, need train- ing and resources to develop stronger institutions and capabilities. The Department of State’s counterterrorism efforts are an essential component in the success of US military, law enforcement, intelligence, and financial ac- tivities in the global fight against terrorism. Multilateral and regional organizations are also a key plat- form for developing broad international support for the adoption and implementation of policies, strategies, and “best practices” in combating terrorism and financing of terrorist activities. The Department of State works actively with foreign governments to urge adoption of all 12 inter- national counterterrorism conventions, as well as adherence to and implementation of UNSCR 1373, which imposes binding obligations on all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement coop- eration, suppress terrorist recruitment, and deny terrorists safe haven. Antiterrorism Assistance Program Ambassador J. Cofer Black, former US State Department Coordinator Congress authorized the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Pro- for Counterterrorism, during a news conference at the IV Regular gram in 1983 as part of a major initiative against international Session of the Organization of American States Inter-American terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 22. Case Study
    CHAPTER Case Study 22 A Tale of Two NIEs he two cases discussed in this chapter provide contrasting insights into the pro- Tcess of preparing intelligence estimates in the United States. They are presented here as the basis for a capstone set of critical thinking questions that are tied to the material discussed throughout this text. In 1990, the National Intelligence Council produced a national intelli- gence estimate (NIE)—the most authoritative intelligence assessment pro- duced by the intelligence community—on Yugoslavia. Twelve years later, the National Intelligence Council produced an NIE on Iraq’s WMD program. The Yugoslavia NIE • Used a sound prediction methodology • Got it right distribute • Presented conclusions that were anathema to U.S.or policymakers • Had zero effect on U.S. policy The Iraqi WMD NIE, in contrast, • Used a flawed prediction methodologypost, • Got it wrong • Presented conclusions that were exactly what U.S. policymakers wanted to hear • Provided supportcopy, to a predetermined U.S. policy This case highlights the differences in analytic approaches used in the two NIEs. Both NIEs now are available online. The full text of the “Yugoslavia Trans- formed” NIEnot is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1990- 10-01.pdf. In 2014, the CIA released the most complete copy (with previously redacted material) of the original “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” NIE. It is available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/ _general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm.Do The Yugoslavia NIE The opening statements of the 1990 Yugoslavia NIE contain four conclusions that were remarkably prescient: 420 Copyright ©2020 by SAGE Publications, Inc.
    [Show full text]
  • The Path to 9/11 | Vanity Fair
    The Path to 9/11 | Vanity Fair https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/11/path-to-9-11-200411 Sign In Subscribe The Price of Failure THE PATH TO 9/11: LOST WARNINGS AND FATAL ERRORS By the time the hijackers made their way into the U.S., memos, photographs, and intercepts had sounded alarms inside the C.I.A., White House, F.B.I., and European intelligence services. Could better cooperation have stopped the attacks? Ned Zeman, David Wise, David Rose, and Bryan Burrough show how the hideous “Planes Operation” took shape as the C.I.A.’s bin Laden point man, Mike Scheuer, counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke, the F.B.I.’s John MacGaffin, and others fought—yet couldn’t work together—to prevent it. BY NED ZEMAN, DAVID WISE, DAVID ROSE, AND BRYAN BURROUGH ! " # DECEMBER 19, 2008 12:00 AM ith his salt-and-pepper hair, white shirt, and sensible shoes, Mike Scheuer, 44, looked like a rumpled academician, or maybe a consultant for one of the many defense contractors [#image: /photos/54cbf62044a199085e88c698]sprinkled around the W Washington Beltway. In reality, his job was considerably more interesting. Starting in 1996, he was the man the C.I.A. had assigned to hunt down, capture, or kill Osama bin Laden. Of all the agency’s far-flung stations—from Moscow to Prague to Beijing—Scheuer’s was unique. Known among the spooks as a “virtual station,” it was not overseas but near the C.I.A. headquarters, in Langley, Virginia, eight miles west of Washington. 3 ARTICLES LEFT Subscribe Sign In 1 of 53 11/11/18, 17:18 The Path to 9/11 | Vanity Fair https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2004/11/path-to-9-11-200411 The station was the first to target an individual rather than a country.
    [Show full text]
  • Curveball Saga
    Bob DROGIN & John GOETZ: The Curveball Saga Los Angeles Times 2005, November 20 THE CURVEBALL SAGA How U.S. Fell Under the Spell of 'Curveball' The Iraqi informant's German handlers say they had told U.S. officials that his information was 'not proven,' and were shocked when President Bush and Colin L. Powell used it in key prewar speeches. By Bob Drogin and John Goetz, Special to The Times The German intelligence officials responsible for one of the most important informants on Saddam Hussein's suspected weapons of mass destruction say that the Bush administration and the CIA repeatedly exaggerated his claims during the run-up to the war in Iraq. Five senior officials from Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, or BND, said in interviews with The Times that they warned U.S. intelligence authorities that the source, an Iraqi defector code-named Curveball, never claimed to produce germ weapons and never saw anyone else do so. According to the Germans, President Bush mischaracterized Curveball's information when he warned before the war that Iraq had at least seven mobile factories brewing biological poisons. Then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell also misstated Curveball's accounts in his prewar presentation to the United Nations on Feb. 5, 2003, the Germans said. Curveball's German handlers for the last six years said his information was often vague, mostly secondhand and impossible to confirm. "This was not substantial evidence," said a senior German intelligence official. "We made clear we could not verify the things he said." The German authorities, speaking about the case for the first time, also said that their informant suffered from emotional and mental problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Indien – China – USA: Das Neue Mächtedreieck Asiens
    Indien – China – USA: Das neue Mächtedreieck Asiens Heinrich Kreft1 1 Die Entstehung eines neuen Mächtedreiecks in Asien seit Ende des Kalten Krieges Das Ende des Kalten Krieges führte nicht nur in Europa zu erheblichen politischen Veränderungen und Machtverschiebungen, sondern auch in Asien. Hinzu kam, dass zeitgleich mehrere Länder und Regionen Asiens einen beispiellosen wirtschaftlichen Boom erlebten. 1.1 Der Untergang der Sowjetunion Der wichtigste Einzelfaktor für die Veränderung der politischen Landschaft in Asien war der Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und das sich daran anschließende Schwin- den des russischen Einflusses in Südasien. Die UdSSR war lange Zeit der wichtigste Verbündete Indiens gewesen, festgeschrieben im indisch-sowjetischen Vertrag von 1971, in dem Moskau Indiens Schutz garantierte. Allerdings wurde dieses Abkom- men bereits Ende der 1980er-Jahre durch die Bemühungen Gorbatschows unter- höhlt, die sowjetischen Beziehungen zu China zu verbessern. Die Russische Förde- ration als Rechtsnachfolger der Sowjetunion war Anfang der 1990er-Jahre kaum noch in der Lage, den sowjetischen Einfluss in Südasien aufrecht zu erhalten. Der ökonomische Niedergang Moskaus ging auch nach dem Zusammenbruch der UdSSR weiter, die russische Marine war nie in der Lage, die Rolle ihrer sowjeti- schen Vorgängerin im Indischen Ozean zu übernehmen. Die indisch-russischen Beziehungen laborieren auch heute noch an den Folgen der Auflösung der Sowjetunion, mit der Indien seinen bis dahin wichtigsten politi- schen und auch ökonomischen Partner verloren
    [Show full text]
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-69
    EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: POST-PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS, 1961-69 1961 PRINCIPAL FILE Series Description Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Post-Presidential Papers reveal the wide range of contacts and the busy schedule which he maintained during the 1960s. A large volume of mail kept his small secretarial staff busy, and he was in great demand as a public speaker. Correspondence in the Post-Presidential Papers offers some interesting insights into Eisenhower’s thinking on numerous issues. No longer burdened by the responsibilities of public office, he felt freer, perhaps, to express himself on various topics. Among the issues discussed in documents found within the 1961 Principal File are the space program, the Berlin situation, Republican party politics, the U.S. economy and monetary policy, and the 1960 elections. Additional topics discussed include Cuba and the Bay of Pigs disaster, foreign aid, taxes, the alleged missile gap, the 1952 campaign, the U.S.I.A.’s mission, the Electoral College, Laos, Latin America, and public housing. Eisenhower’s correspondence in the 1961 Principal File reflects a virtual Who’s Who of both foreign leaders and prominent Americans. Konrad Adenauer of Germany, John Diefenbaker of Canada, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Queen Elizabeth of Great Britain, Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, President Mateos of Mexico, and King Saud of Saudi Arabia are among the foreign leaders who stayed in touch with the ex-president. Many prominent Americans maintained contact with the former president as well. He corresponded with numerous former members of his administration, including Dillon Anderson, Ezra Taft Benson, Arthur F. Burns, Andrew Goodpaster, James Hagerty, Bryce Harlow, Gabriel Hauge, C.D.
    [Show full text]
  • The Abu Ghraib Convictions: a Miscarriage of Justice
    Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal Volume 32 Article 4 9-1-2013 The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice Robert Bejesky Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Robert Bejesky, The Abu Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage of Justice, 32 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 103 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bpilj/vol32/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ABU GHRAIB CONVICTIONS: A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE ROBERT BEJESKYt I. INTRODUCTION ..................... ..... 104 II. IRAQI DETENTIONS ...............................107 A. Dragnet Detentions During the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq.........................107 B. Legal Authority to Detain .............. ..... 111 C. The Abuse at Abu Ghraib .................... 116 D. Chain of Command at Abu Ghraib ..... ........ 119 III. BASIS FOR CRIMINAL CULPABILITY ..... ..... 138 A. Chain of Command ....................... 138 B. Systemic Influences ....................... 140 C. Reduced Rights of Military Personnel and Obedience to Authority ................ ..... 143 D. Interrogator Directives ................ ....
    [Show full text]