University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2017 America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors Cake, Timothy Cake, T. (2017). America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/24784 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3688 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY America’s Alleged Intelligence Failure in the Prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Study of Analytic Factors by Timothy Cake A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY, SECURITY, AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA APRIL, 2017 © Timothy Cake 2017 ABSTRACT In the prelude to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), notables in the G. W. Bush administration declared Iraq to be an existential threat as it had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and connections to transnational terrorist groups. After the 2003 invasion of that state, coalition forces engaged in a search effort that found no significant evidence of WMD. Investigatory committees subsequently judged Iraq had no WMD or terrorist group connections. This situation is broadly regarded as a failure by America’s intelligence community (IC). The initial hypotheses driving the research for this dissertation focused on four sets of factors: (1) a lack of fresh and accurate data; (2) a series of analytical and intellectual pathologies in the intelligence analysis process; (3) a dependence on scientistic, technology-driven methods of data collection and analysis; and (4) a serendipitous denial and deception (D & D) campaign mounted by Iraq’s government. However, the research undertaken did not support this initial line of argument. Instead, it suggested that the working-level members of the IC in the broad sense, correctly analyzed the Iraqi situation. The intelligence failure thus arose from other factors. These initial results pointed to factors in organizational and bureaucratic politics especially at the upper levels of the IC, in its relationship to senior levels of the G. W. Bush administration, and to channels for the assessment and movement of information that bypassed the established intelligence apparatus. Drawing on a detailed examination of the analyses and handling of claims regarding Iraqi WMD and its connections with terrorist groups, combined with considerations drawn from organizational and bureaucratic theories, the dissertation concludes (a) that there was no intelligence failure at the non-executive levels of the IC, but (b) there were distortions or suppressions of situationally-correct intelligence analytic products at the executive levels of the IC to support the policy preferences of certain G. W. Bush administration elites. In contrast to ii this, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department not only was outstandingly accurate in its assessments of the Iraqi situation but also, bolstered by its executive team, was able to resist downward-facing pressures to generate policy-palatable analytic products. iii Dissertation Approval Form This page redacted from electronic document. iv Table of Contents ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... ii Dissertation Approval Form ...................................................................................... iv Table of Contents ........................................................................................................v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ____________________________________________1 Introduction, Thesis Question, and Research Hypothesis ...........................................1 Previous Studies Related to the Thesis Question ........................................................2 Organization of the Research ......................................................................................3 Contribution .................................................................................................................6 Research Method and Sources .....................................................................................6 Overview of Interviews and Surveys ..................................................................7 Respondent Identification, Approach, Recruitment, and Consent ......................8 Dealing with Respondents and their Data .........................................................14 Information Verification and Crosschecking Processes ...................................15 CHAPTER II CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS __________________________19 The Foundations of the Neoconservative Weltanschauung ......................................20 Alberta and Roberta Wohlstetter .......................................................................21 Bernard Lewis ...................................................................................................22 Richard Pipes ....................................................................................................24 Second-Generation Neoconservative Intellectuals ....................................................26 Paul Wolfowitz..................................................................................................26 Richard Perle .....................................................................................................31 Abram Shulsky ..................................................................................................35 Zalmay Khalilzad ..............................................................................................38 William J. Luti ..................................................................................................42 v Douglas J. Feith .................................................................................................43 Laurie A. Mylroie..............................................................................................44 A Brief History of the Neoconservatives ..................................................................46 The Relationship between the President, Vice President, and the IC........................51 The Intelligence Hierarchy in the Prelude to OIF .............................................51 The President, Vice President, and the IC.........................................................52 Perceptions of Iraq’s Connections to Transnational Terrorism and WMD ...............54 Colin Powell’s Dissenting Perspective .............................................................67 The Ambiguous Intelligence Environment after ODS ..............................................68 A Note on Uranium Enrichment Technologies .........................................................77 The U. S. Government’s Relationship with Ahmad Chalabi and the INC ................79 Dick Cheney’s Adversarial Relationship with the IC ...............................................83 The Imbroglio of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate .........................88 The Origins and Cultures of the IC ...........................................................................96 The Origins and Cultures of the CIA and INR .................................................99 The INR’s Accurate Analytic Products...........................................................104 Information Technology Problems in the Prelude to OIF ...............................110 Summary ..................................................................................................................113 CHAPTER III DUBIOUS DATA ENTERS THE IC __________________________114 The INC’s Pseudo-Intelligence Supports the Iron Triangle’s Policies ...................114 Iraq’s Aluminum Tubes and Zippe Centrifuges..............................................115 The Iraqi Aerial Drone Controversy ...............................................................122 Iraqi Missile Programs ....................................................................................123 Ahmad Chalabi’s Machinations ......................................................................123 Sabah Khalifa Khodada al-Lami and Iraq’s Support of al-Qaeda ..........141 vi Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri’s Statements ...........................................142 Khidhir Hamza and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program ..........................143 Allegations about Iraq’s BW Program ...................................................144 The INC’s Assertions about Iraq’s Links to Terrorists ..........................147 The Habbush Data Feed ..................................................................................151 The Habbush Memorandum Controversy ..............................................153 The Niger Yellowcake Affair and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons ...........................155 Colin Powell’s Dilemma .........................................................................................168 Summary ..................................................................................................................171