DOCSLIB.ORG

Transatlantic Brinksmanship: the Anglo-American

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Transatlantic Brinksmanship: the Anglo-American TRANSATLANTIC BRINKSMANSHIP: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY, 1953-1956 by DAVID M. WATRY Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON December 2011 Copyright © by David M. Watry 2011 All Rights Reserved ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people have helped me in the preparation of this dissertation. I wish to personally thank and acknowledge Dr. Joyce S. Goldberg, who chaired the dissertation committee. Without her support, encouragement, and direction, this project would have been impossible. Dr. Goldberg fought for this dissertation in many ways and went far beyond the call of duty. I will be forever in her debt and forever grateful for her expertise, passion, patience, and understanding. I also wish to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Dr. Kenneth R. Philp and Dr. Stanley H. Palmer. Their critiques, evaluations, and arguments made my dissertation a much more polished product than what it would have been without their significant help. Their wealth of knowledge and expertise made the writing of the dissertation a pleasurable experience. I would also like to thank the Dean of Liberal Arts, Dr. Beth Wright, the Associate Dean, Dr. Kim Van Noort, and Assistant Dean, Dr. Eric Bolsterli for providing me with the Dean’s Excellence Award for Graduate Research Travel. With this award, I was able to travel overseas to do research in London, Cambridge, Oxford, and Birmingham. Moreover, I wish to thank Dr. Robert B. Fairbanks, the former Chairman of the History Department at the University of Texas at Arlington. He provided me with much needed teaching jobs and additional traveling money for my trip to Princeton in 2010. I would also like to thank Dr. Steven G. Reinhardt, the Chairman of the Committee on the Completion of Dissertation Fellowship and the Graduate School Dean, iii Dr. Philip Cohen, for the Graduate Dissertation Fellowship and Scholarship, in providing much needed scholarships. With the assistance of these individuals, the research and writing of the dissertation became a reality. A special word of thanks goes to Chris Abraham, Archivist, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Almarie Ehlers, Conference Coordinator, Churchill College, Cambridge; Caroline Herbert, Archives Assistant, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Allen Packwood, Director, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge; Claire Nicholas, Administrative Assistant, Woodbrooke Quaker Study Centre, Birmingham; Jenny Childs, Archivist-Special Collections, University of Birmingham; Colin Harris, Superintendent-Special Collections, Bodleian Library, Oxford; and Amanda K. Hawk, Assistant for Public Services, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton. A very special word of thanks goes to those who gave me permission to access valuable papers and documents, which include Duncan Sandys giving me permission to access the Sandys Papers. Baroness Soames, (Mary Churchill Soames), who gave me permission, in a handwritten note, to review her late husband’s papers, Christopher Soames. Let me express my deep appreciation to the Countess of Avon, (Clarissa Churchill Eden), in allowing me to review her late husband’s papers. The Avon Papers were absolutely essential for the writing of my dissertation. A special thank you goes to Dr. Marvin Dulaney, Chairman of the History Department, Dr. John Garrigus, my Ph.D. advisor, and Dr. Stephen Maizlish, my M.A. advisor. I would also like to thank the History Department staff, Wanda Stafford, Robin iv Deeslie, and Ami Keller. In addition, I want to thank Dr. Gene Rhea Tucker, who gave me technical assistance and advice throughout the writing of my dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my late father, Earl N. Watry, and my mother, Ruth E. Watry, they have inspired me and contributed so much to me. I also recognize the many contributions from my family, Debra Weidenfeller, Dianne Bilbrey, Don Weidenfeller, Karl Bilbrey, Ross Nichols, Michael Weidenfeller, Rachel Weidenfeller, and Erin Nichols. Thank you all for what you have done. November 7, 2011 v ABSTRACT TRANSATLANTIC BRINKSMANSHIP: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY, 1953-1956 David M. Watry, PhD The University of Texas at Arlington, 2011 Supervising Professor: Joyce S. Goldberg The purpose of this transatlantic dissertation is to produce a new post-revisionist history of Anglo-American relations from 1953 to 1956 that seriously re-assesses Eisenhower's “middle path” foreign policy and the differing responses to it from Churchill and Eden. This reexamination challenges the notion that Eisenhower’s foreign policy represented a mere continuation of Truman’s containment policy or a “middle path” between Democrats and far-right Republicans. Instead, Eisenhower intentionally adopted a distinctly far-right Republican foreign policy that overwhelmed two Conservative British prime ministers and accelerated the end of the British Empire. vi This transatlantic history argues that American foreign policy went from one of accommodation and cooperation with the British to one that proved intrinsically hostile to the British Empire. The Eisenhower administration’s anti-communist ideology set aside a balance of power model of diplomacy, in favor of a policy of rolling back communism, while severely undermining British national security and economic interests in both the Middle East and the Far East. Eisenhower and Dulles engaged in a new confrontational “brinksmanship” that diametrically opposed long-term British diplomacy and interests. Their unilateral use of American power against perceived communist threats and their new anti-colonial policies in the Third World put them on an inevitable collision course with Churchill and Eden. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... vi Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................1 2. ANGLO-AMERICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY .....................................................7 3. CONSERVTIVE IDEOLOGY AND BRINKSMANSHIP ...............................41 4. ATOMIC BRINKSMANSHIP: KOREA, INDOCHINA, AND FORMOSA ......................................................90 4.1 Korea ....................................................................................................91 4.2 Indochina............................................................................................108 4.3 Formosa..............................................................................................125 5. COVERT BRINKSMANSHIP: IRAN AND GUATEMALA ........................143 5.1 Iran .....................................................................................................143 5.2 Guatemala ..........................................................................................162 6. THE SUEZ CRISIS AND ECONOMIC BRINKSMANSHIP ........................178 7. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................240 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................250 BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ...............................................................................287 viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Few historians have discussed the significant differences between Dwight D. Eisenhower, Winston Churchill, and Anthony Eden during the Cold War. John Lukacs, an eminent Hungarian-born American historian known for his admiration of Winston Churchill, observed that “in none of the numerous biographies of Eisenhower is there a substantial description of how this seemingly simple (though in reality rather complex) military man, with his easygoing and liberal reputation, shed his pro-Russian and sometimes pro-Democratic opinions to become a rigid anti-communist, a Republican, and eventually even a self-styled conservative.”1 Lukacs, like Churchill, believed that Eisenhower missed a great opportunity to end the Cold War with the death of Stalin in 1953. Eisenhower’s conservatism actually exceeded the conservatism of the “Old Right.” This study challenges the notion that Eisenhower’s transatlantic foreign policy represented either a continuation of Truman’s containment policy or a “middle path” between Democrats and far-right Republicans. If Eisenhower had been a mere continuation of Truman or a “middle path” Republican president, as many historians contend, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden would have easily anticipated and adapted 1 John Lukacs, “Ike, Winston, and the Russians,” The New York Times, 10 February 1991, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CED91430F933A25751C0A9679582... (5 July 2008). 1 their pragmatic foreign policy to mesh with the foreign policy of the new president. Instead, Eisenhower intentionally adopted a distinctly far-right Republican foreign policy that overwhelmed two Conservative British prime ministers and accelerated the decline of the British Empire. In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower introduced a new, radical, and dangerous U.S. foreign policy called “brinksmanship” that fundamentally altered the special relationship between the United States and Great Britain. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Covert Action to Prevent Realignment by Cullen Gifford Nutt
    Sooner Is Better: Covert Action to Prevent Realignment by Cullen Gifford Nutt September 2019 ABSTRACT Why do states intervene covertly in some places and not others? This is a pressing question for theorists and policymakers because covert action is widespread, costly, and consequential. I argue that states wield it—whether by supporting political parties, arming dissidents, sponsoring coups, or assassinating leaders—when they fear that a target is at risk of shifting its alignment toward the state that the intervener considers most threatening. Covert action is a rational response to the threat of realignment. Interveners correctly recognize a window of opportunity: Owing to its circumscribed nature, covert action is more likely to be effective before realignment than after. This means that acting sooner is better. I test this argument in case studies of covert action decision-making by the United States in Indonesia, Iraq, and Portugal. I then conduct a test of the theory’s power in a medium-N analysis of 97 cases of serious consideration of such action by the United States during the Cold War. Interveners, I suggest, do not employ covert action as a result of bias on the part of intelligence agencies. Nor do they use it to add to their power. Rather, states act covertly when they fear international realignment. 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 1. The Puzzle and Its Importance In April 1974, military officers in Portugal overthrew a right-wing dictatorship. A caretaker government under a conservative officer, Antonio Spínola, set elections for March of 1975. But Spínola resigned at the end of September, frustrated with menacing opposition from the left.
    [Show full text]
  • Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil Mcelroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961
    Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of MassiveSEPTEMBER Retaliation 2012 Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense IN THE ERA OF Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Special Study 3 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Cover Photos: Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, Thomas Gates, Jr. Source: Official DoD Photo Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Evolution of the Secretary OF Defense IN THE ERA OF Massive Retaliation Charles Wilson, Neil McElroy, and Thomas Gates 1953-1961 Special Study 3 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense September 2012 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 3 Evolution of the Secretary of Defense in the Era of Massive Retaliation Contents Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Historical Office of the Office of Foreword..........................................vii the Secretary of Defense, Larsen Consulting Group, or any other agency of the Federal Government. Executive Summary...................................ix Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.
    [Show full text]
  • Wishful Thinking Or Buying Time? the Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930S
    Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? Wishful Thinking or Norrin M. Ripsman and Buying Time? Jack S. Levy The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s The “lessons of the 1930s,” based on British and French appeasement of Germany, have pro- foundly inºuenced U.S. security policy for a half century. Presidents have invoked these lessons in decisions for war in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq in 1990–91 and 2003, and in presidential campaigns.1 Among policymakers and publics, and among many scholars as well, the futility of appeasement has ac- quired the status of a lawlike generalization.2 The implicit assumption is that the Western allies’ primary aim was to secure a lasting peace with Germany through concessions to resolve Adolf Hitler’s grievances. If that was the aim, the policy clearly failed. But, as we shall demonstrate, that was not appease- ment’s primary aim. Scholars need to rethink both the concept of appeasement and the goals of appeasement in the 1930s. The popular image of appeasement was fueled by the scholarship of tra- ditional historians, who condemned British and French appeasement of Germany as politically naïve and morally bankrupt. In their view, the policies Norrin M. Ripsman is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Concordia University. He is the author of Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post–World War Settlements (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002). Jack S. Levy is Board of Gover- nors’ Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Senior Associate at the Arnold A. Saltzman Insti- tute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and past president of both the International Studies Association (2007–08) and the Peace Science Society (2005–06).
    [Show full text]
  • FUTURE WARFARE Anthology
    FUTURE WARFARE Anthology Revised Edition Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. U.S. Army War College Carlisle barracks, pennsylvania ***** The views expressed within this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** ISBN 1-58487-026-5 ii CONTENTS Foreword General Donn A. Starry U.S. Army, Retired ............................. v Prologue Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr . .............. ix Revised Acknowledgements ........................ xi Introduction to the First Edition Dr. Williamson Murray ....................... xiii Preface to the First Edition Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. ............. xix 1. Speed and Power: Primal Forces in the New American Style of War .......................... 1 2. Cycles of War ................................. 9 3. Preparing For War in the 21st Century with Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, Retired ............................... 23 4. Adaptive Enemies: Dealing with the Strategic Threat after 2010 ............................. 41 5. A Sword with Two Edges: Maneuver in 21st Century Warfare .............. 65 6. From Korea to Kosovo : How America’s Army Has Learned to Fight Limited Wars in the Precision Age: ......................... 89 7. Clashes of Visions: Sizing and Shaping Our Forces in a Fiscally Constrained Environment .......... 111 8. America’s Army: Preparing For Tomorrow’s Security Challenges ......................... 125 9. The Dawn of a New Age of Warfare: And the Clarion Call for Enhanced Maneuver Capabilities ........................ 145 iii 10. The Annual Report for The Army After Next Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army ......... 153 11. The Army After Next: Intertwining Military Art, Science, and Technology Out to the Year 2025 with Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Wilson, MI5 and the Rise of Thatcher Covert Operations in British Politics 1974-1978 Foreword
    • Forward by Kevin McNamara MP • An Outline of the Contents • Preparing the ground • Military manoeuvres • Rumours of coups • The 'private armies' of 1974 re-examined • The National Association for Freedom • Destabilising the Wilson government 1974-76 • Marketing the dirt • Psy ops in Northern Ireland • The central role of MI5 • Conclusions • Appendix 1: ISC, FWF, IRD • Appendix 2: the Pinay Circle • Appendix 3: FARI & INTERDOC • Appendix 4: the Conflict Between MI5 and MI6 in Northern Ireland • Appendix 5: TARA • Appendix 6: Examples of political psy ops targets 1973/4 - non Army origin • Appendix 7 John Colin Wallace 1968-76 • Appendix 8: Biographies • Bibliography Introduction This is issue 11 of The Lobster, a magazine about parapolitics and intelligence activities. Details of subscription rates and previous issues are at the back. This is an atypical issue consisting of just one essay and various appendices which has been researched, written, typed, printed etc by the two of us in less than four months. Its shortcomings should be seen in that light. Brutally summarised, our thesis is this. Mrs Thatcher (and 'Thatcherism') grew out of a right-wing network in this country with extensive links to the military-intelligence establishment. Her rise to power was the climax of a long campaign by this network which included a protracted destabilisation campaign against the Liberal and Labour Parties - chiefly the Labour Party - during 1974-6. We are not offering a conspiracy theory about the rise of Mrs Thatcher, but we do think that the outlines of a concerted campaign to discredit the other parties, to engineer a right-wing leader of the Tory Party, and then a right-wing government, is visible.
    [Show full text]
  • How Should the United States Confront Soviet Communist Expansionism? DWIGHT D
    Advise the President: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER How Should the United States Confront Soviet Communist Expansionism? DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER Advise the President: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER Place: The Oval Office, the White House Time: May 1953 The President is in the early months of his first term and he recognizes Soviet military aggression and the How Should the subsequent spread of Communism as the greatest threat to the security of the nation. However, the current costs United States of fighting Communism are skyrocketing, presenting a Confront Soviet significant threat to the nation’s economic well-being. President Eisenhower is concerned that the costs are not Communist sustainable over the long term but he believes that the spread of Communism must be stopped. Expansionism? On May 8, 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower has called a meeting in the Solarium of the White House with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey. The President believes that the best way to craft a national policy in a democracy is to bring people together to assess the options. In this meeting the President makes a proposal based on his personal decision-making process—one that is grounded in exhaustive fact gathering, an open airing of the full range of viewpoints, and his faith in the clarifying qualities of energetic debate. Why not, he suggests, bring together teams of “bright young fellows,” charged with the mission to fully vet all viable policy alternatives? He envisions a culminating presentation in which each team will vigorously advocate for a particular option before the National Security Council.
    [Show full text]
  • Crusade in Europe Dwight D
    Crusade in Europe Dwight D. Eisenhower Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York, 1948 Signed by Dwight and Mamie Eisenhower, Churchill, Truman, Marshall, MacArthur and fifteen other iconic wartime leaders with an extraordinary correspondence archive chronicling the campaign to secure the signatures between 1949 and 1957 This ranks among the most compelling pieces of Second World War memorabilia we have seen – a truly singular copy of the limited edition of Eisenhower’s war memoirs, signed by two American presidents, two British prime ministers, three U.S. secretaries of state, a first lady, thirteen legendary U.S. generals (one of whom became a president), and a British Field Marshal. Among the twenty-one signatories are two Nobel Peace Prizes recipients, two Congressional Medal of Honor recipients, and more honorifics and awards than can plausibly be enumerated. Equally extraordinary is the accompanying archive of correspondence detailing how these signatures were collected by a Second World War veteran with remarkable persistence, resourcefulness, and no small amount of luck over a period of nearly a decade. ______________________________________________________________________________ Churchill Book Collector San Diego, CA, USA www.churchillbookcollector.com [email protected] 619-384-7992 The Signatures The signatures gathered in this book come from an unprecedented assemblage of civilian and military leaders who made the history that this book chronicles. ______________________________________________________________________________ Churchill Book Collector San Diego, CA, USA www.churchillbookcollector.com [email protected] 619-384-7992 The signatories include: Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold Bernard Mannes Baruch Omar Nelson Bradley James Francis “Jimmy” Byrnes Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill Mark Wayne Clark Lucius DuBignon Clay James Harold “Jimmy” Doolittle Robert Anthony Eden, 1st Earl of Avon Dwight David Eisenhower Mamie Doud Eisenhower Leonard Townsend Gerow Cordell Hull Douglas MacArthur George Catlett Marshall, Jr.
    [Show full text]
  • Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Post-Presidential Papers, 1961-69
    EISENHOWER, DWIGHT D.: POST-PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS, 1961-69 1961 PRINCIPAL FILE Series Description Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Post-Presidential Papers reveal the wide range of contacts and the busy schedule which he maintained during the 1960s. A large volume of mail kept his small secretarial staff busy, and he was in great demand as a public speaker. Correspondence in the Post-Presidential Papers offers some interesting insights into Eisenhower’s thinking on numerous issues. No longer burdened by the responsibilities of public office, he felt freer, perhaps, to express himself on various topics. Among the issues discussed in documents found within the 1961 Principal File are the space program, the Berlin situation, Republican party politics, the U.S. economy and monetary policy, and the 1960 elections. Additional topics discussed include Cuba and the Bay of Pigs disaster, foreign aid, taxes, the alleged missile gap, the 1952 campaign, the U.S.I.A.’s mission, the Electoral College, Laos, Latin America, and public housing. Eisenhower’s correspondence in the 1961 Principal File reflects a virtual Who’s Who of both foreign leaders and prominent Americans. Konrad Adenauer of Germany, John Diefenbaker of Canada, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and Queen Elizabeth of Great Britain, Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, President Mateos of Mexico, and King Saud of Saudi Arabia are among the foreign leaders who stayed in touch with the ex-president. Many prominent Americans maintained contact with the former president as well. He corresponded with numerous former members of his administration, including Dillon Anderson, Ezra Taft Benson, Arthur F. Burns, Andrew Goodpaster, James Hagerty, Bryce Harlow, Gabriel Hauge, C.D.
    [Show full text]
  • ROBINSON, WILLIAM E.: Papers, 1935-69
    DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY ABILENE, KANSAS ROBINSON, WILLIAM E.: Papers, 1935-69 William E. Robinson held positions as a newspaper executive with the New York Evening Journal (1933-36) and the New York Herald Tribune (1936-54), directed his own public relations firm of Robinson-Hannegan Associates (1954-55), and served as president and chairman of the board of Coca-Cola, Inc. (1955-61). In addition to having a long and distinguished career in business, Mr. Robinson also enjoyed a long and close personal friendship with Dwight D. Eisenhower, dating from their first meeting in World War II until their deaths in 1969. Mr. Robinson’s papers reflect both his business career and, especially, his association with Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mr. Robinson first met General Eisenhower in 1944 when the former was in Europe to reestablish publication of the Herald Tribune’s European edition. Their association became more intimate in 1947 when Mr. Robinson prevailed upon the General to write his World War II memoirs. According to arrangements worked out by Mr. Robinson, General Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe came out in the fall of 1948, published in book form by Doubleday and syndicated to newspapers worldwide by the Herald Tribune. The two men were drawn together by a great admiration and respect for each other’s ideas and judgments, and an abiding common passion for playing bridge and golf. It was Mr. Robinson, in the spring of 1948 after the General had finished drafting his memoirs, who first introduced the Eisenhowers to Augusta National Golf Club. When General Eisenhower became president of Columbia University in New York City, the two had frequent occasions to play bridge together and to enjoy a game of golf at Blind Brook Golf Club where Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Orme) Wilberforce (Albert) Raymond Blackburn (Alexander Bell
    Copyrights sought (Albert) Basil (Orme) Wilberforce (Albert) Raymond Blackburn (Alexander Bell) Filson Young (Alexander) Forbes Hendry (Alexander) Frederick Whyte (Alfred Hubert) Roy Fedden (Alfred) Alistair Cooke (Alfred) Guy Garrod (Alfred) James Hawkey (Archibald) Berkeley Milne (Archibald) David Stirling (Archibald) Havergal Downes-Shaw (Arthur) Berriedale Keith (Arthur) Beverley Baxter (Arthur) Cecil Tyrrell Beck (Arthur) Clive Morrison-Bell (Arthur) Hugh (Elsdale) Molson (Arthur) Mervyn Stockwood (Arthur) Paul Boissier, Harrow Heraldry Committee & Harrow School (Arthur) Trevor Dawson (Arwyn) Lynn Ungoed-Thomas (Basil Arthur) John Peto (Basil) Kingsley Martin (Basil) Kingsley Martin (Basil) Kingsley Martin & New Statesman (Borlasse Elward) Wyndham Childs (Cecil Frederick) Nevil Macready (Cecil George) Graham Hayman (Charles Edward) Howard Vincent (Charles Henry) Collins Baker (Charles) Alexander Harris (Charles) Cyril Clarke (Charles) Edgar Wood (Charles) Edward Troup (Charles) Frederick (Howard) Gough (Charles) Michael Duff (Charles) Philip Fothergill (Charles) Philip Fothergill, Liberal National Organisation, N-E Warwickshire Liberal Association & Rt Hon Charles Albert McCurdy (Charles) Vernon (Oldfield) Bartlett (Charles) Vernon (Oldfield) Bartlett & World Review of Reviews (Claude) Nigel (Byam) Davies (Claude) Nigel (Byam) Davies (Colin) Mark Patrick (Crwfurd) Wilfrid Griffin Eady (Cyril) Berkeley Ormerod (Cyril) Desmond Keeling (Cyril) George Toogood (Cyril) Kenneth Bird (David) Euan Wallace (Davies) Evan Bedford (Denis Duncan)
    [Show full text]
  • Soldiers and Statesmen
    , SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.65 Stock Number008-070-00335-0 Catalog Number D 301.78:970 The Military History Symposium is sponsored jointly by the Department of History and the Association of Graduates, United States Air Force Academy 1970 Military History Symposium Steering Committee: Colonel Alfred F. Hurley, Chairman Lt. Colonel Elliott L. Johnson Major David MacIsaac, Executive Director Captain Donald W. Nelson, Deputy Director Captain Frederick L. Metcalf SOLDIERS AND STATESMEN The Proceedings of the 4th Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 22-23 October 1970 Edited by Monte D. Wright, Lt. Colonel, USAF, Air Force Academy and Lawrence J. Paszek, Office of Air Force History Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and United States Air Force Academy Washington: 1973 The Military History Symposia of the USAF Academy 1. May 1967. Current Concepts in Military History. Proceedings not published. 2. May 1968. Command and Commanders in Modem Warfare. Proceedings published: Colorado Springs: USAF Academy, 1269; 2d ed., enlarged, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972. 3. May 1969. Science, Technology, and Warfare. Proceedings published: Washington, b.C.: Government Printing Office, 197 1. 4. October 1970. Soldiers and Statesmen. Present volume. 5. October 1972. The Military and Society. Proceedings to be published. Views or opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the authors and are not to be construed as carrying official sanction of the Department of the Air Force or of the United States Air Force Academy.
    [Show full text]
  • Spy Culture and the Making of the Modern Intelligence Agency: from Richard Hannay to James Bond to Drone Warfare By
    Spy Culture and the Making of the Modern Intelligence Agency: From Richard Hannay to James Bond to Drone Warfare by Matthew A. Bellamy A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (English Language and Literature) in the University of Michigan 2018 Dissertation Committee: Associate Professor Susan Najita, Chair Professor Daniel Hack Professor Mika Lavaque-Manty Associate Professor Andrea Zemgulys Matthew A. Bellamy [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6914-8116 © Matthew A. Bellamy 2018 DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to all my students, from those in Jacksonville, Florida to those in Port-au-Prince, Haiti and Ann Arbor, Michigan. It is also dedicated to the friends and mentors who have been with me over the seven years of my graduate career. Especially to Charity and Charisse. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Dedication ii List of Figures v Abstract vi Chapter 1 Introduction: Espionage as the Loss of Agency 1 Methodology; or, Why Study Spy Fiction? 3 A Brief Overview of the Entwined Histories of Espionage as a Practice and Espionage as a Cultural Product 20 Chapter Outline: Chapters 2 and 3 31 Chapter Outline: Chapters 4, 5 and 6 40 Chapter 2 The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 1: Conspiracy, Bureaucracy and the Espionage Mindset 52 The SPECTRE of the Many-Headed HYDRA: Conspiracy and the Public’s Experience of Spy Agencies 64 Writing in the Machine: Bureaucracy and Espionage 86 Chapter 3: The Spy Agency as a Discursive Formation, Part 2: Cruelty and Technophilia
    [Show full text]