Incentives and Disincentives for Proliferation
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Chapter IV . Incentives and Disincentives for Proliferation . 4 Chapter IV Incentives and Disincentives for Proliferation An analysis of proliferation suggests a number ot broadly applicable incen- tives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The useful- ness of those generalized incentives (or disincentives) for gaining insights into the motivations of specific Nth countries varies from country to country. Moreover, such a list can be representative, but not exhaustive. In the majority of instances, however, the decision to proliferate will, explicitly or implicitly, be based on some composite of the factors listed below. This composite varies over time with the unique characteristics of each country and the evolution of its na- tional affairs. Before examining general incentives and disincentives it may be helpful to identify specific countries of particular importance in assessing the past and future course of proliferation. This includes states in three categories: weapon states, major refrainers, and Nth countries. The list of countries under the latter two headings is necessarily selective. Selected Selected Weapon States Potential Weapon States Major Refrainers (Nth Countries) Us. Sweden Argentina U.S.S.R. Japan Brazil UK Fed. Rep. of Israel a France - Germany South Africa China Iran Indiab Pakistan Taiwan South Korea a Widely reputed to already possess one or more weapons. b Ha5 exploded a nuclear device but apparently has not converted that device into an actual WeaPOn. A 93 GENERAL INCENTIVES Deterrence the wealth, power, and expertise, the rest struggle for economic independence, self- The primary incentive for many states to -respect, and a place in the sun. Nuclear acquire nuclear weapons would be to deter ex- weapons may serve to bolster a nation’s self- ternal efforts to undermine or destroy the ex- -confidence and win respect from or engender isting regime or governmental system. A state fear in neighbors, adversaries, and the world’s would have a particularly strong incentive to great powers. By some readings, though not acquire a nuclear capability if it feared it could all, the single Indian explosion contributed not succeed in sustaining its independence by materially to many of these objectives. conventional military or diplomatic means. Aside from its symbolic significance, a Several countries on every list of potential nuclear weapons capability may also be an ac- new nuclear weapons states (e.g., South tual source of power. Over time a new nuclear Korea, Israel, and South Africa) have had state could probably increase its influence reason to fear direct attack or long-term within regional security arrangements, in deterioration of their security vis-a-vis non- U.N. Security Council and General Assembly nuclear neighbors or regional adversaries. On deliberations, and other international forums. the same list are other countries (e.g., Taiwan This would probably not happen rapidly or by and Pakistan) that are concerned about threats conscious choice of other participating states, to their security from states that have demon- Instead, it would be a rather natural evolu- strated a nuclear weapons capability. tionary result of enhanced prestige and subtle For many Nth countries, the effectiveness of alterations in the psychological orientation nuclear weapons as a deterrent to adversaries toward the emergent nuclear nation. The seem questionable. This is because of the translation of military power into political likelihood that a small number of nuclear power may be gradual and subtle, but it is real weapons would have limited effectiveness in nonetheless. regional conflicts between Third World states. This would seem particularly true where the bulk of the population is dispersed in rural Domestic Political Requirements villages and where the terrain lends itself to small unit guerrilla-type operations. This point is closely related to the preceding Despite such considerations, the relatively in that international status can serve to bolster less sophisticated political and military a government’s domestic political standing. strategies of the majority of Nth countries Moreover, the demonstration of technological do not preclude the acquisition of a capability and administrative achievement associated for deterrent purposes, one that U.S. analysts with the construction of nuclear weapons may would judge as ineffective by Western stand- offset or distract from the frustrations of na- ards. tional poverty and the difficulties of economic and political development. Benefits of a nuclear program might range from enhanced Increased International Status political stability to the retention of qualified scientists (not only in the nuclear field) who There can be little doubt that a nuclear would otherwise be tempted to emigrate to weapons capability is an important symbol of countries with stronger scientific establish- modernity, technological competence, and ments. Many analysts have interpreted the In- thus a source of status and prestige. In a world dian detonation as being motivated in large in which a minority of states control most of part by domestic political considerations. 94 Economic Considerations weapons as a hedge against such an apprehen- sion. Concerns about the cohesiveness of Western alliances have increased during the In the past, a nuclear weapons program has past decade, as there has been less con- sometimes been characterized as having a vergence of political interests and increased technology-forcing function, in that it stimu- lated the development of related economically stress due to differing economic situations and beneficial technologies. This proposition car- policies. The nuclear parity of the United ries less weight today because of the enlarged States and the U.S.S.R. has seemingly lowered global commitment to civilian nuclear energy, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee in i.e., the commitment to nuclear energy is ade- many Western capitals. quate by itself to realize any technology spinoffs. “A Weapon of Last Resort” Economic concerns generate pressures toward proliferation in another way. In the In an extremely adverse situation where a future, some states that are unwilling to rely nation is on the verge of defeat, a limited on the United States or the Soviet Union for number of nuclear weapons could be used as a security may develop global or at least conti- “weapon of last resort.” The objective would nental economic interests. They may conclude be to terminate hostilities on terms other than that the protection of expanding economic in- total defeat or, perhaps, to employ punitive terests requires enhanced military ca- measures at the moment of defeat. Nuclear pabilities —including nuclear weapons. weapons are valued not only for their deter- Paradoxically, the success of the development rent effect, but also for their actual battlefield programs of some large Third World states utility. Isreal is often cited as a country which could provide proliferation incentives as. might desire (or have) nuclear weapons not to strong as those caused by their present prevent the outbreak of a conflict as much as frustrations. to place ultimate limits on military operations. The “weapon of last resort” concept may be the most broadly acceptable rationale for Increased Strategic Autonomy nuclear weapons because it is directly related to the survival of the nation in a specific and It is a truism that sovereign states seek to clearly defined situation. achieve and maintain freedom of action, even with regard to allies. Within an alliance, a nuclear-armed nation may perceive itself (or As an Instrument of be perceived by others) as having more op- the Third World tions for pursuing national objectives than a non-nuclear state, This relative autonomy Frustrated Third World nations may view differs by situation and objective. It can be nuclear weapons as “equalizers” in their rela- argued, however, that a nuclear capability tions with the industrialized world. The generally contributes to the enhancement of emergence of additional nuclear weapons strategic autonomy. This is one of the central states will complicate the ability of existing reasons ascribed to the development of nuclear countries to calculate political out- France’s nuclear force. comes, tending to make them more restrained when pursuing their national interests, Moreover, it is argued, concern about the Strategic Hedge Against Military escalation of a regional nuclear conflict into a and Political Uncertainty global conflict will make developed countries more receptive to the economic development Uncertainties concerning the capabilities concerns of the Third World. and intentions of both adversaries and allies No one would pretend or expect a nuclear can generate a sense of political and military explosion to actually solve any of the very vulnerability y. States may seek nuclear serious economic and social problems of the 95 less developed countries or remove the basic echoed in the Soviet Union. These statements inequity of the world’s economic system. Still, by the superpowers, coupled with the conclu- the acquisition of nuclear weapons might be sions of several international conferences dur- perceived by some governments and political ing the 1960’s and early 1970’s on the peaceful elites as a means of commanding the attention uses of atomic energy, fueled the expectation of the industrialized world. The frustrations of numerous developing nations concerning of national poverty