UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AIR U N I V E R S IT Y

THE PSOFESSIONA1 JOURNALreview OF THE AIR FORCE

T he Impa c t of Locxstics upon Stratecy...... 2 Maj. Gen. Jonas L. Blank, USAF

T he Transformation of World Poutics...... 22 The Honorable Curtis W. Tarr

U.N. Pea c ekeepinc and U.S. National Sec u r ity...... 28 Dr. Raymond J. Barrett

E pit .aph to the Lady—30 Yea r s After ...... 41 William G. Holder

T he “New ” C iv il -M il it a r y Rel a t io n s: R et r o spec t and Prospect...... 51 Dr. Adrian Preston

Ho r sesh o e Najl...... 54 Brigadier General Heinz Waldheeker, Luftwaife

T he Need for Mil it a r y O fficers as Strategic Thinkers...... 56 Lt. Col. Riehard D. Besley, USAF

Air Force Review B est Hit 72—NATO’s Southern Rec ion Fig h t e r Wea pon s Meet ...... 65 Lt. Col. Harold A. Susskind, USAF

Human Co mmun ic a t io n s and Air Force Supervision...... 78 Dr. Sterling K. Gerber

Books and Ideas R e VISIONISM AND THE CoLD W.A R...... 85 Hermari S. Wolk

G er ma n y .and European Dét en t e...... 90 Lt. Col. E. W. Giesecke, USAF

T he Contributors...... 95

the c<>ver

Vidresn 111411UM riptA Io Editor. \ir CnfVfcnfty The: long annals of warfurc ahound in HrMrw DtviskNi. Bl

IVING dangerously is an inherent part of tary victory but also because of the magnitude every military man s life. We accept per- of its logistics. Looking back, one finds it sonal risk when we accept our eommis- difficult to realize that the losing side had such sions.L We may have to face danger dramati- early momentum that it seemed assured of vic- cally in combat or, more subtly, in suggesting tory. No other conqueror ever gained control that logistics must be considered on an equal over so much of Europe as did the Germans, plane with tactics and strategy. nor over so vast an area of the Pacific as that I shall begin my defense of this premise with taken by the Japanese. What turned these early a general discussion of the role logistics plays in victories into a military collapse? military planning and operations, support that Clashing tank armadas and infantry, spectac- with some lessons learned in World War II and ular sea and air battles, courage and determi- Korea, then review our logistics experiences in nation, brilliant and awesome strategic plan- Southeast Asia, and conclude with some obser- ning and taetical execution—all played their vations about logistics discipline. part. But it was no coincidence that victory I have no intention of downgrading strategy went to the nations that organized an over- and tactics. Militarily, I consider those two and whelming superiority in materiel. This recur- logistics to be very much like the legs of a ring theme is echoed by many World War II three-legged stool. But that part of the stool historians. supported by the logistics leg gets sat upon the Materiel superiority is obviously not the most heavily and has to struggle the hardest for whole story. Economic potential and effective recognition. However, that only applies to military strength are not synonymous. Cam- peacetime planning and the early stages of a paigns and wars are won or lost on the basis of conflict. When the war gets hot and heavy and military strength in existence and effectively logistics needs become urgent, no one has to be used at the time of conflict. Germany proved reminded of their importanee. If there is time, that lesser resources effectively organized for frantic efforts by hastily trained support per- war can produce impressive victories. As sonnel can rnake up the shortages. They have World War II started, the combined armies of in the past, although sometimes at a fearful , England, Holland, and Belgium were cost. At worst, military disaster may be the numerically larger than that of the Germans price of logistics neglect. but were defeated by newer weapons imagina- We in the military have the reputation of tively applied. They could not cope with the learning too much from history. We are ac- blitzkrieg led by Stuka dive bombers, fast ma- cused of always preparing to fíght the last neuverable tanks, and motorized infantry. war—only better next time around. Risking the Germany then turned east and plunged a thou- charge of perpetuating that reputation, I shall sand miles into Rússia, and Rommel swept cite some factual accounts of the cost of logistic across North África, but final victory continued oversights in recent wars. Perhaps a historical to elude the Germans. perspective might encourage military planners At this point in 1942, three years after the to give logistics a fair share of their attention. start of the war, Germany finally totally mobil- ized her industry for a sustained war effort. Her World War II leaders had gambled against a prolonged war. Had they started sooner, one wonders if the Probably, there can never again be a war simi- Allies could ever have caught up. lar to World War II, but that one merits spe- In North África the Germans frittered away cial attention, not only because it was the last their earlv gains after coming within an evelash major conflict that ended with a decisive mili- of making the Mediterranean a German lake.

4 IMPACT OF LOGISTICS UPON STRATECY 5

Again. brilliant tactical execution was undone neously with the Normandy landing, had to be by inadequate logistic support. Onlv about 10 postponed for two months until the landing percent of Rommel’s fuel requirements for his craft used in Normandy could be sailed to the tanks was delivered during the criticai days Mediterranean and assembled for that assault. when the fate of North África hung in the bal- In general, planning for logistics iinmediately ance. What he needed could have been deliv- preceding World War II, in both the United ered. This was proved the next year when States Army and Navy, was grossly inadequate. German equipment and supplies poured into The only reason it was not grossly inadequate in response to the American landings in in the was that a sep- .África, but by then it was too late. Field Mar- arate .Air Force did not exist at that time. shal Kesselring, the German commander in As we started to mobilize for World War II, chief in ItaJy, and Rommel disagreed on many only 11 percent of the Army consisted of Ser- aspects of the . They vice troops, compared to 34 percent at the end did agree, however, after it was over, that it of World War I. Instead, we needed more sup- was primarily a logistics battle and that their port forces than ever before, basically because promising opportunitv for decisive victory evap- mechanization of combat equipment of our orated because transportation had been badly armed forces had leaped forward between the planned and clear organizational channels for two World Wars. logistics support had never been established. The unrealistieally low ratio of Service troops Certainlv neither side had a monopoly on to combat troops made itself felt almost at logistics mistakes. Let’s examine just a few of once. In the spring of 1942, few trained Service ours, but of course there were many others. troops were available for overseas duty; and When the Japanese attacked the Philippines. Service troops, beyond all others, were required the defenders of Bataan fought on half rations, in the earlv phases of the war. It was impera- criticai shortages of munitions, and a scarcity of tive that they prepare depots, receive equip- medicai supplies in a malaria-infested area. In ment and supplies, and establish the essential the words of the division commander whose Services for the combat troops. outfit was the last to stop fighting: By any yardstick the invasion of Europe was By March 1942, every officer, enlisted man and the largest amphibious operation ever at- civilian on Bataan was logistics conscious, and tempted. Despite its success, it may also have realized that in 26 vears of planning for this cam- been, at least in retrospect, the most chaotic paigri, its logistics side had not been as thoroughly from a logistics standpoint. nor as carefully planned as its strategic and tacti- In analyzing transportation during the Nor- cal side.1 mandy invasion, an Army study concluded that Later in the war, the strategic plan for the gross failures in marshaling and moving forces invasion of Europe listed four requirements on through the British ports tlueatened the col- which its success depended. One of them was lapse of the operation. It stated flatly: an adequate number of landing craft. And yet, There was an almost universal lack of logistical despite prolonged planning and a compelling discipline on the part of units to be inoved. There need for an earlier date, D-Day had to be post- was a marked tendency for eoinmanders at all lev- poned for thirty days because of a shortage of eis to disregard logistical orders. In many cases, landing craft. Bad weather encountered be- these units failed to comply with published direc- cause of the delay added greatly to the prob- tives and brought excesses of both personnel and equipment into the marshaling areas in direct vio- lem of Crossing the English Channel. Further- lation of instructions. The resultant congestion more, the invasion of Southern France, which withiri these areas created a bottleneck that was a

was originally scheduled to occur simulta- ContinueiI on jHigii' 9 World War II

The Ju H7 Stuka (live hotnber leil Germanys hlitzkriegs that at firsl exceedetl the Allies' capa- bility. . . . German punzer and motorized infanta/ cross an im- pravised hridge, during the fíul- kan campaign in sununer o f 19-11. North American R-25s head mil Ia a largei somewhcre in Nortli África, pari o f lhe force lhat softened up Rommel 's Mareth Une and helped force the Afrika Korps s rctreal in Tunísia. . . ■ Heavy bornbing raids Inj lhe V. S. and lhe RAF greatly re- duced the flow o f supplies to Rommel and Von Arnim through the Tunisian seaport of Sonsse.

Allied suppltj Inicks towing lieavtj guns roll in u steiuhj stream to reach troops that luul landed in Southern France on D-Dmj. . . . Troops sandbag antiaircruft po- sitions on the heach as Seventh Fleet men and equipment pour ashore during MarArthur's return to the Philippines. Octoher 1944, hut onltj luter, ut Okinawa, did we properly coordinate the land- ing o f men and materiel on an en- emy beachhead that was defended.

major factor in the threateqed collapse of the op- know which ships carried what cargoes. They eration.2 called forward a large additional quantity of Six days after D-Day, the English ports were these shells from Engliuid. Even when the spe- so badly scrambled that troops could not be cial shipments were made, a ship-by-ship sorted into the landi ng craft to which they search was required to find the desperately were assigned. The situation became so disor- needed munitions. ganized that even available ships could not be Huge quantities of supplies were unloaded loaded. Onlv extraordinary measures, such as from ships and piled up in such disarray that indiseriminate shipment of troops without re- they could not be identified and issued to com- gard to craft-loading plans, plus an absence of bat forces. Ports became so cluttered that enemy interference, allowed us to straighten identifiable supplies in the holds of other ships out the chãos. could not be moved ashore. Many vessels arrived in France with contents Eyewitness accounts verify the confusion, completely unknown to shore personnel. One which in a sense is understandable in the midst consequente was a frantie search for 81- of a massive invasion. The point is that most of millimeter mortar shells, needed in the hedge- it was unnecessary. It was not that we did not row fighting, liecause shore troops did not know better, but that we did not apply what

9 10 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW

we knew. And it could have spelled the same idea was used, with trains moving almost differenee between victory and defeat if the nose to tail. Bombers were converted to cargo defenders had had the wisdom and ability to planes and helped flv 2000 tons of supplies a day concentrate their defenses quickly. Fortunately, to the lead columns. the Gerinans believed, as we hoped they When the advance finally ground to a halt, it would, that the main thrust would come later was not because of enemy opposition but a lack directly across the English Channel, so they did of logistics support at the front. We had ample not commit their reserves to stop the Nor- supplies, but they were in Normandy, 300 miles mandy landings until it was too late. away. We simply ran out of transportation

The breakout from the NormandvJ beachhead capability to continue supplying the lengthen- was followed by an amazingly rapid pursuit ing pipeline, and fuel trucks became more across France despite logistic difficulties that important than tanks. mounted as our armies outraced their supplies. An Army historian, R. G. Ruppenthal, in dis- This period has been the subject of bitter con- cussing the shortage of gasoline during this pe- troversy over shortages experienced by the riod, made this observation: eombat troops, but perhaps a more impartial overall evaluation was made by leaders of the The Third Army even resorted to commandeering the extra gasoline which the Red Bali trucks car- Russian army. General Eisenhower commented ried for their return trips to the base areas. As a on this in his book, Crusade in Europe. In the result of this shortsighted practice some convoys months following the conclusion of hostilities, were stranded and available transportation facilities he had many conversations with Russian lead- were consequently reduced. . . . at least one divi- sion, the 5th Armored, admitted resorting to hijack- ers, including Generalissimo Stalin. Without ing gasoline, a practice of which other units were exception, the Russian officers asked him to also guilty.4 explain the supply methods that enabled the Allied armies to cover all of France, Belgium, Here we have an extreme example of a break- and Luxembourg in one rush. down in logistics discipline and its painful con- sequences. Thev suggested that of all spectaeular feats of the Ruppenthal was referring to this halt in the war, even including their own, the Allied suecess advance toward Germany when he wrote: in the supply of the pursuit across France would go down in history as the most astonishing.3 For the next two months, supplv limitations were to dominate operational plans and the Allies were now to learn the real meaning of the “tyranny of Despite this high praise by an ally from whom logistics.” 5 compliments carne grudgingly, there was tre- mendous room for improvement. After the war General Eisenhower made the The supply of the armies racing across broad statement: “You will not find it difficult France was made possible by improvised but to prove that battles, campaigns and even wars, effective measures that temporarily overcame a have been won or lost primarily because of lo- shortage of transportation facilities. The Red gistics.” 6 About the same time, Field Marshal Bali Express was created by simply clearing the Sir Archibald Percival Wavell wrote: “I have narrow French roads of local traffic and making soldiered for more than 42 years, and the more half of them one-way roads leading to forward I have seen of war, the more I realize how supply dumps and the other half one-way roads much it all depends on administration and trans- returning to the Normandy staging area. Sup- portation, which our American friends call ply trucks rolled over these roads around the logistics.” 7 Hopefully, it will not take evervone clock. As French railroads were repaired, the 42 years to leam that lesson. IMPACT OF LOGISTICS UPON STRATECY 11

As our needs became clearer from 1940 Korean War through 1945, we increased the U.S. Navy s The lessons we leamed at so great a cost in combat ships to eight times the number in the World War II were soon forgotten. Five years peacetime fleet. But, significantly, logistics ves- later in Korea we had to learn many of thein sels increased to 28 times the prewar number, over again. and vessels with a combined combat and logis- Within three weeks after the start of the tics capabilitv surged to more than 200 times Korean War, the backlog of top-priority ship- the number in existence before the war. Stated ments had built up to more than could be air- another way, before the war 75 percent of all lifted in two months. More than half the requi- our naval vessels were combat ships; as the war sitions received from Korea were listed as top ended, this ratio was almost reversed: fewer priority and designated for air transportation. than 30 percent were combat craft. It was this Yet our air cargo capability could accommo- mix of combat and logistics vessels that cleared date only a small fraction of that amount. the Pacific all the way to the Japanese main- Flooding the supply system with top-priority land. requisitions was self-defeating. Cargo jammed This is not to say that our conduet of the war aerial ports of embarkation and sat there for in the Pacific was logisticallv superior to our months, although it could easily have been de- performance in Europe. Repeatedlv, Army and livered in less time by surface transportation. Navy supplies were landed in such excess ton- nage over capabilities of local logistics organiza- Two years after the start of the Korean War, tions that soon things could not be found at all. an Army general inspected the port of Pusan. Special shiploads of some items that were He reported that, despite prolonged hard work, “somewhere around but lost” had to be rushed one-fourth of the supply tonnage stored there to the combat theater, and at a time when had still not been sorted out. As supply person- ships were worth their weight in gold. nel did not know what these supplies were, Ammunition specialists have estimated that obviously they could not be issued. onlv 30 percent of the ammunition sent to the Ironically, some of our logistical ineptitude Pacific was ever used. And while no planning in World War II paid an unexpected bonus can hope to kill the last enemy with the last during the Korean War: some of the equipment bullet, the abrupt end of the war does not fully and supplies abandoned on the Pacific islands explain such a low percentage of consumption. were gathered up, renovated, and put to use. Most of it was in the piles of equipment and That sometimes happens in our unpredictable supplies that were lost in island depots and left business. An anecdote by a British officer about behind as the U.S. pushed its combat operations the Boxer Rebellion in China described the ever closer to Japan. advantage they enjoyed through lack of Com- It was not imtil the last battle of the war, at munications: He told of the desperate plight of Okinawa, that we properly coordinated the their scattered forces, who were unaware of landing of men and materiel on a defended how ghastly everything was and so fought on to enemy beachhead. The ship from which direc- a happy conclusion. In his opinion, half a dozen tions were issued for the landing of materiel radio transmitters would have brought about a remained alongside the commanders Hagship. catastrophe. Close communication among operations and Logistics discipline, a perennial problem, logistics officers was maintained throughout the also left much to be desired in Korea. Lieuten- landings, and a relatively orderly flow of men ant General W. B. Palmer, who served there and materiel onto the shores of Okinawa re- and witnessed waste at close hand, wrote in sulted. exasperation: 12 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW

It appalls me to think how many failures occur in Vietnam the very last link of the logistic chain. Equipment is manufactured at great expense, shipped 5,(X)0 Before drawing any profound conelusions based miles by train, ship and truek. It is issued to troops on the incidents here presented, let’s take a and, eventually, with great labor, carried to the look at our experiente in supporting operations top of a mountain in Korea. How many times, at in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. For that last point, has this whole enormous effort been thrown away, as carelessly as a burnt match, brevity’s sake, I will skip a detailed description bv the happy-go-lucky negligente of the very of our materiel support organizations and people whose lives depend upon keeping the stuff procedures, relying on the reader’s general fa- in shape.8 miliarity with the logistic support structure of How many times have we all seen similar the Department of Defense and the individual incidents of callous disregard for the produets Services. of a carefullv eonceived and executed System? At the outset, let me say that we have tried

Korea

Desperately needed supplies pile up at a U.S. Fnr Eiist Air Force base in Japan before being loaded aboard Combut Cargo Command planes and ftown to units cut off near Choshin reservoir in Korea. IMPACT OF LOCISTICS UPON STRATEGY 13

verv hard to record honestly our logistic By all odds, the major logistics problem was experiences—good and bad—as well as lessons inadequate port facilities and/or a shortage of learned from Southeast Asia. Some judgments self-sustaining vessels that carry their own un- have alreadv been made by independent study loading equipment on board. During the early groups. This is great and, hopefullv, will pay years of the escalation, before we made large- important dividends. But, personally, I am in- scale improvements to fixed port facilities, an clined to believe it is premature to draw any average of 100 oceangoing ships a day were performance comparisons with prior military either in the harbors or anchored off the coast. operations. It must be recognized, however, At the same time, other ships en route to Viet- that logistics svstems had improved dramati- nam were held up at the Philippines, Okina- cally by the time of our big buildup in 1965. wa, and Japan, to avoid further congestion. Much of our svstem was computerized and Sixty percent of the supplies Howed through oriented toward sophisticated communication Saigon, where the average wait for a ship to hookups unknown during World War II or unload was 22 davs. The average waiting times Korea. However, early in Southeast Asia we did at two other major ports were 31 and 40 days. not have established bases with computers and Understandably, inadequate unloading of the advanced communication hookups to take ad- sealift added to the strain on airlift. Congestion vantage of the latest in logistic technologv. We and clogged harbors forced our cargo planes to had to revert to manual operations, using mes- carry items normally supplied by vessel. Repair sages and mail Service to requisition supplies. parts were used at an excessive rate because of Except for the earlv stages, there was no greatly increased flying hours, and as a result massive push of equipment and supplies into some criticai shortages of aireraft parts devel- the combat zone. By “push” I mean the process oped. Airlift transported only four percent of of shipping items without waiting for requisi- the tonnage delivered to Vietnam, but that four tions from the combat forces. The principal percent consisted of criticai items, either muni- exceptions were one-time shipments to provi- tions or parts urgently needed to keep weapon sion new bases that were being built. Gener- systems and equipment operational. Also, most ally, from that point on, requirements were personnel were transported to the combat the- requisitioned as needed. Asset visibilitv and ater by air, and practically all wounded were stock control were better than ever before in evacuated by air as soon as they could be past conflicts. Despite some scandalous excep- moved. Internally, within Vietnam, in 1970 tions, we generally knew what we had, where alone we airlifted close to three quarters of a it was, and the stock leveis required to prevent million tons of cargo and over four tnillion pas- shortages. The principal difference this time sengers. No other air force in the world has was that trained personnel handled logistics anything approaching this capacity. operatioas. It is true that the Army had diffi- The Army made extensive use of prepack- culty in maintaining an even flow of trained aged shipments, which were “pushed” to build logistics personnel to Vietnam for their one- up initial stocks of supplies for deploying year tours. Their problem was that, in their troops. These were discontinued in 1966. The Wholesale supply depots in the United States, Army also used special “super-high" priorities the Army employed large numbers of civilians, but limited their use to requisitioning parts who were not generally available for employ- required to return criticai equipment to opera- ment in depots which they set up in Vietnam. tional status. They set up focal points for indi- The Air Force does not use overseas depots; we vidual weapon systems and funneled all requisi- supply bases directly from stateside depots and tions for parts needed on those weapon systems so did not encounter this problem. through the focal point. A third special system 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW

Vietnam

]et-age successor to the Red Bali Express o f World War II, Military Airlift Communds fieet o f Lock- heed C-14I Starlifters speeds criticai equipment from Travis AFB. Califórnia, to South east Asia. . . . The offlo a d in g of materiel from a hurge at Tuy Hoa Air Base in South Vietnam dramatizes the inadequacy of unloading and port facilities.

was used to track items closely through eaeh the beginning of the buildup in Vietnam, the step of a repair cycle and insure prioritv trans- number and quality of bases required to sup­ portation and repair scheduling so as to guar- port flying operations just plain did not exist. antee rapid return of repaired items. We deeided to build six new bases and upgrade The Navy did not use “push" paekages or thirteen others. Construetion on that large a varv their svstem, but they instituted a number scale would take two to three vears to com­ of speeial projects to insure expedited supply plete. support and used several speeial codes to get As Air F o r c e t a c t ic a l units are deploved, preferential treatment for their requisitions they carry kits of spares and repair parts for 30 from Vietnam. days of operations, bv which time we hope to establish normal supply channels to support them. This presumes deployment to an operat- T he Air Forces experienees in ing base that can provide fuel, ammunition. liv­ Southeast Asia vividly illustrate the interdepen­ ing quarters, and personal necessities. dente of military operations and logistics sup­ To provide temporary quarters and support port. An air force fights from fixed bases. In the deploved squadrons at inadequate bases, we shipped portable kits designed to provide tailored to the special needs of each of the temporary housíng and operational accommo- bases in the combat zone. There were 234 dations for increments of 1100 men. These are different kinds of packages, each one for a called “Harvest Eagle” kits. They contain tents specifíc purpose, such as support of a particular and equipment for food Services, materiel han- kind of aircraft, a maintenance shop, an office, dling, power generation, and field maintenance. or any other function performed on an air base. We delivered twelve of these sets to Vietnam Each group of packages was assembled for a to support our deployed units until more per- specifíc base and forwarded in one shipment as manent structures could be built. They did the construction neared completion. job, but we found that some were in terrible This group also monitored deployment of condition, a result of the lack of attention mobile civil engineer repair squadrons to bases which often afflicts war readiness materiel dur- requiring their Services. ing peacetime. Then, to assist in making a base operational To further equip these bases, we established after construction was completed, we brought a group at Hq Air Force Logistics Command to in teams of supply, maintenance, and transpor- assemble packages of equipment and supplies tation specialists to assist base personnel. These A USAF supply sergeant processes a parts request from mainte- nance through a Computer ut Bien Hoa Air Base, South Vietnam, one o f 17 eomputers at SEA bases hij 1969. . . . The Air Forre built a mobile Computer in three vaus to fill a crucial need. IMPACT OF LOG1ST1CS UPON STRATECY 17

teams stayed at the base as long as required to tankers in 2(K) feet of w'ater as much as two get their part of the operation functioning miles offshore. smoothly. They were also available to return Our vehicle fleet in Southeast Asia grew to when base personnel required assistance be- about 10,000 units, of two principal kinds: (1) cause of peak workloads. those built to military specifications and ob- In 1965 we laeked munitíon storage facilities tained through the Army, which furnishes fol- in sea and suffered from inadequate munition low'-on supply support; and (2) commercial ve- unloading facilities at the ports. We solved hicles. Prior to Vietnam we had removed repair both bv a “special express" system, consisting parts for the latter category from our supplv of a fleet of ships chartered exclusively to trans- network and instead supported commercial port munitions to Vietnam. Upon arrival there, vehicles through purchase of parts from local these ships served as floating warehouses. vendors. There being no vendors in Vietnam, Twentv percent of their cargo space was de- we experienced rising out-of-commission rates voted to aisles, so they could be selectively on the commercial vehicles in the eombat zone unloaded. Shore personnel had manifests of and had to bring parts for them back into the their contents, to enable them to call for Air Force supply inventory. The point is that specific quantities of particular munition items. we had to relearn a lesson learned many times The ships remained in the area until their before: that the system we develop in peace- cargoes were exhausted and then returned to time in the conus must be workable in a war- the United States for reloading. After two time environment overseas. years, as munition storage facilities were built In 1965, at our conus bases, we were im- and port capacities enlarged, we phased out plementing a standard base supply system, the “special express" svstem and began a nor- designed to operate from idêntica! computers mal resupplv of munitions. installed at our bases. Programs for the comput- From 1965 to 1968 our monthly requirement ers were designed at Headquarters usaf, assur- for aviation fuel grew from three million to 180 ing uniformity of operations. It was the most million gallons per month. A great deal of im- advanced retail supply system in existence at provising was required to handle that large an the time. Although nothing that sophisticated increase. We had neither the time nor re- had ever been employed in a eombat environ- sources to build permanent storage facilities, so ment before, we decided to install the system, we had to rely heavilv on air-transportable re- with its advanced computers, at our major fueling Systems, aerial bulk delivery, and eol- bases in Vietnam. lapsible bladder storage tanks at the bases. One advantage of standardization is that our Some of the bladder tanks had a capaeity as supply personnel all use the same system. Once high as 420,000 gallons. Air-transportable fuel trained, they are able to transfer to any of our svstems have almost unlimited mobilitv. During worldwide bases and start functioning immedi- the Puehlo crisis, we dispatched enough of ately. This gave us an ample reservoir of these systems to Korea in a matter of hours to trained personnel to manage our base supply support aircraft deployed there. accounts in the eombat area. Where we could, in protected areas, we built By 1969, we had installed the last of seven- some underground and overland pipelines, but teen computers at Southeast Asian bases, and these served onlv to transport fuel over short they have served us well. We use a nors (not distances. Special piers for unloading ocean- operationally ready supply) rate as a key indi- going fuel tankers were built. Where we did not cator of the effectiveness of supply support to have deep-water ports, we built a device re- our operating units. This rate in the eombat sembling a buoy. which was used to unload area has eonsistently been better than has our Continuai on jxigfl 20 The R-14 air-transportable hy- drant refueling system module can Service fuel at 600 gallons per minute when the two 50,000- gallon rubber fuel storage tanks, encased on top o f the unit, are spread out. . . . The module in use, servicing two F-4 Phantoms. . . . T w o ta n k s be i n g ba l a n c e d , Phu Cat Air Base, South Vietnam.

20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW average worldwide rate since we installed the through 1969. They carne up with many con- computers. clusions concerning lessons that we can profit To guard against the possibility that one of by in the future. From my standpoint, perhaps the base supply computers might become inop- the most important eonclusion reached was: erative through enemy action, natural disas- “that the standard logistics systems functioned ter, or maintenance breakdown, we designed a satisfactorilv in their first exposure to a combat mobile Computer that could be quickly trans- test.” ported to replace a Computer that was out of Andrew Wilson, an English writer familiar commission. We built it in three vans; it is with the Computer simulation for war-gaming air-transportable and can be hauled by rail or used in designing some of our logistics systems, road. Completely self-sufficient, with its own made this unbiased assessment in his book The power plant and environmental Controls, it can Bomh and the Computer: be in operation six hours after delivery. It has I was seeing, not for the first time, the lessons of been deployed a number of times to replace war games applied in action—and some. I had to computers that were temporarily out of com- admit, had been well and profitably learned. The mission or to precede the installation of a per- logistic apparatus in Vietnam was superlative.9 manent Computer, and each time it proved that the principie of a mobile replacement Comput- E arlier in this article I compared strategy, er was sound. tactics, and logistics to a three-legged stool. I The decision to put computers in the sea think evidence adequately supports the thesis bases has paid big dividends. Earlv in 1968, at that, unless the logistics leg of the stool is care- the beginning of the Tet offensive, direct hits fully conceived. developed, and implemented, from mortar shells destroyed a supply ware- success of the militarv operation it supports is house at the Da Nang Air Base in Vietnam. Six- in jeopardy. teen thousand line items of supply went up in From World War I to World War II, our smoke. Later that dav, we assigned a special forces became more mechanized and sophisti- project code to the Da Nang base supply oper- cated. Between World War II and the present, ation, to guarantee top-priority replacement of that trend has accelerated. The more compli- those supplies. Asset records for the destroyed cated the implements of war become, the more supplies were reduced to zero; consequently, professional support thev require. As a conse- the base Computer automatically printed out quence, we must gear our thinking to accepting stock replenishment requisitions, which were a higher ratio of support forces to combat transmitted to conus depots that afternoon. forces, commensurate with advanees in modern Five days later, 78 percent of the requisitioned weapon systems. stock was in the supply-reeeiving line at Da Finallv, as commanders and future command- Nang. Without the standard base supply Com- ers, vou would do well to ponder the exam- puter, coupled with rapid Communications and ples of breakdown in logistics or supply disci- airlift of high-prioritv requirements, the prornpt pline that I have cited. Poor supply discipline resupply of the destroyed items to Da Nang can cancel out the best logistics system. Supply would not have been possible. discipline, logistics discipline—whichever vou Records of logistical support to Vietnam are choose to call it—is everybodys business, par- undoubtedly the most thorough ever kept in a ticularly the business of the operational com- wartime environment. For a full year, a high- manders who are dependent upon this disci- Ievel Joint Logistics Review Board intensive- pline for the quality of their support. ly studied these records, spanning from 1965 //(/ United States Air Forre IMPACT OF LOGISTICS UPON STRATEGY 21

Notes D.C.: Covemment Pnnting Office. 1953), pp. 505-8, 1. Bngadier General Cliffortl Blueiuel. “Hutaiu», LogUtus. April 1947, p. 6. 5. p. 583. quotcd in Logutics m Strateffc W arfart, The Enginrer School, Fort Belvoir. Ibul. 6. Hawthome Daniel. For Want o f a \'ait The Influent e of ijogi&tics on Virgínia. 1 August 1950. 2. Operatum Oterioad, a histórica) aruüysis by the United States Ariny War (New York Whittloey House. McGraw-Hill. 1948). |> XII Transportation School. Monograph No. 3, p. 2. 7. Ihul.. p. 239. 3. Dwight D. Eisenhower Crusade m Europc (New York: Doubledav. 8. Lieiiteiiant General W. B. PaJiner. "Commandcrs Must Know Lügistk*,' The Quurteniuister fíeview, July-August 1953. reprinted from the April 1953 19481. p. 309. 4. Roland C. Ruppenthol. Ututed States Annj in World War II. The Eunt- issue of the Anny Information Digeat. peon Theater o f Operarions. Logistiivl Sufrport o f Ou Armies. 2 vul.v. Office of 9. Andrew Wilson, lhe Bomh and Ou Computer (New York: Deluuorte the Chiei of Military History. Department ol the Anny. Vol. I (Washington, Press. 1968). p. 210

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If your organization is not presently receiving its authorized copies of the Review, cônsult your Publications Distribution Officer. T he Editor AY I begin by taking you to another place and an- other time, to Áustria in M1945? There I was, a soldier awaiting transfer to the Pacific and reflecting THE upon the combat recently ended in Europe. The Army was sponsoring TRANSFORMATION a tour to the Ice Caves south of Salzburg, so I decided to join friends OF and see some of Austrias natural beauty. WORLD We had Fritz for our guide, a young Austrian who recently had POLITICS been discharged from an elite mountain unit of the Wehrmacht. Fritz, in another day, might have T he Honorable Curtis W. Tarr been a model for Michelangelos “David,” so perfectly proportioned was his powerful body. That night, after we had explored the Ice The Thomas D. White Lectures at Air Univer- Caves, we talked until midnight in sity continued on 15 Novemher 1972 when The the nearby hostel. I will never for- Honorable Curtis W. Tarr, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, presenteei an ad- get one of Fritz’s puzzling state- dress. Air University Review gladly includes an ments. adapted version o f Dr. Tarr s lecture in this issue. “I don’t understand the foolish- T he Editor ness of your government, scattering the proud German Army.”

22 I was surprised. To me, the German Army to Soviet leadership but also other Communist had been a determined and sometimes ruthless nations have become more independent. De- foe. “Why?” I asked. spite the Soviet use of troops to repress the “Because your real enemy is not Germany peoples of East Germany, Hungary, and Czecho- but Rússia. Inevitably you must fight them.” slovakia, the desire for a somewhat more We Americans during the war had consid- independent foreign poliey grows among War- ered the a formidable ally and her saw Pact nations and other Communist powers. people courageous friends. Obviously our narve- During the same period, American influence té prepared us poorly for the that over non-Communist nations also has waned. soon began. Many times later I recalled how This decline is linked, at least in part, to dimin- much better Fritz foresaw problems of the fu- ishèd Soviet influence, but it results from other ture than did I. factors as well. The Common Market has But fortunately we avoided the open conflict gained strength unevenly but increasingly since that Fritz considered inevitable. We have gone its founding in 1957. The European Commu- through the dark uneasiness of the Cold War. nity nations now have a total gross national Now a new pattern of political relationships is product approaching that of the United States. developing among the community of nations, a The suceess of the recent summit talks of Euro- new pattern that calls for fresh thoughts and pean Community nations, with a pledge to imaginative programs during the decade of the work for a common currencv and further politi- seventies. Let us consider some of the condi- cal bonds by 1980, is the latest in a series of tions that will influence those policies. encouraging milestones. First, the bipolar pattern of relationships At the same time, the Japanese people have among blocs of nations, dominant since World emerged from the ashes of war to build one of War II, is attenuating. the strongest economies of the world, a miracle Soviet hegemony over the Communist world of economic growth. With a population about has diminished. Not only has the People’s Re- half of ours, the Japanese already have a gross public of China grown to be a major disputant national product more than one-fourth that of 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the United States, and their economy is grow- upward spiral of a , first by ing more rapidly than our own. consolidating a fair status quo and later, hope- Furthermore, the nations of the third world fully, by scaling down the size of strategic have adopted independent positions in world forces. politics, not subject to the beck and eall of Negotiation has not yet replaced our depen- either the Soviet Union or ourselves. This has dence upon strategic forces, and probably it taken place despite generous assistance from will not do so for many years to come. Both the the major powers. American problems with United States and the Soviet Union are building índia and the Soviet rebuff in both and improving some systems as permitted un- reHect the self-determination of developing na- der the first sa l t agreement. Other nuclear tions. powers, thus far, have not joined the Strategic In many respects America has encouraged Arms Limitation Talks. Likewise, any advanced progress that has eroded bipolarity. We have industrial society now can build its own nuclear given both political and economic encourage- weapons or soon will be able to do so, because ment to nations in Europe and the Orient. the technology is widely understood and mate- Much of the one hundred billion dollars of aid riais are becoming more available. Thus we sent abroad from America since World War II have much work yet to do, to reduce the possi- went to Europe for reconstruction and to stim- bility of nuclear war. But a start has been ulate industrv. We have been vocal propo- made. nents of the Comraon Vlarket. Aid and techni- The era of negotiation has been marked b y cal advice have helped the industrious Jap- the initial sa l t talks, the further ones soon to anese, the Chinese on Taiwan, and the Ko- begin, the scheduled mutual balanced force reans. Following colonialism, doomed by World reduetion negotiations in Europe, and the var- War II, many new nations have taken their ious treaties signed with the Soviet Union at place in the United Nations; most of these, in the time of President Nixon’s visit, including one way or another, have received United those on environment, medicine, space, and States assistance. naval incidents at sea. More recently, trade These factors have changed world politics so treaties have been concluded between the that the old bipolar pattern no longer repre- United States and the Soviet Union. sents the true condition of the political world. The Presidents trip to China brought about It is not likely to do so ever again. In its place, agreements between the two powers for ex- we find a eommunity of independent nations, changes in Science, culture, journalism, tech- sometimes acting in concert, sometimes alone. nology, and sports. This détente has facilitated In this eommunity a nation no longer can as- moves in many parts of the world to bring sume the undivided friendship of another na- mainland China back into normal international tion, despite tradition, when the course of relationships. friendship runs counter to the course of na- Furthermore, antagonists elsewhere have be- tional interest. gun to discuss their differences. VV7e follow Second, we have entered an era of negotia- closely the Government-level and Red Cross tion. talks between North and South Korea: it may For nearly a quarter of a century, the uneasy be many years before substantial achievements peace of mankind has been preserved partly by are realized, but communication has begun. strategic forces, forces that each of the major East and have made gratifying powers has improved and augmented to pre- progress. Throughout the world, national lead- vent a successful “first strike” bv the other. ers are talking to each other in conversations Now the Soviets and ourselves seek to stop the that promise better understanding, increasing TRANSFORMA TION OF WORLD POLIT1CS 25

cooperation, and a more stable peace. mental decisions made at Bretton Woods. What is the reason for this spirít of détente? Those economic arrangements made possible Perhaps no answer will be as important as the reconstruction of old nations and the devel- the one we Ainericans give to that question. I opment of new ones. World trade has expanded believe that diplomacy, coupled with military in vast proportions. strength, has made the era of negotiation possi- But now we have come to a time when the ble. Clearlv, American military strength as- cominunity of nations no longer can rely upon sured that, in sensitive areas of East-West con- an inflexible dollar standard. We have begun a frontation around the world, existing frontiers search for a reasonable balance in our interna- would be maintained. In time, rival nations tional trading relationships that will provide carne to realize that efforts to change the status more opportunities for American firms to ex- quo were not worthwhile, especially in view of port their products. We will be able to main- the pressing problems at home which each had tain our economic and military assistance pro- to face. It was also understood that most local grams—those that go directlv from our govern- conflicts in the third world involved mainly ment to others, those financed partlv by our local or regional interests, which were not of contributions to the multilateral lending agen- great moment for the major powers. Out of cies, and those financed by private credit from these new perceptions of the world situation this country—only if economic changes can be grew new opportunities for imaginative diplo- accepted by all nations. macy. Likewise we will depend upon other nations The era of negotiation produces new prob- to support progress throughout the world. lems for us, just as it buries some of the old Probably we will continue to reduce United frustrations of the Cold War. If my assumption States aid, both economic and military. Other about the criticai role of military force is cor- nations will assume a larger proportion of the rect. then we must continue to be vigilant as a total aid given to the developing nations. I people, to maintain essential military forces, or expect also that the forms of United States as- the pattern for our recent successes will col- sistance will change. We now provide less lapse. Xevertheless, negotiation itselt sets the grant aid than manv Americans assume; we use climate for public relaxation. loans as well as grants for economic and mili- I am not sure what might happen to expan- tary assistance. But eventually we will com- sionist dreams in the future. I do expect in the plete the shift away from grants to loans. years ahead that some of our friends and allies Furthermore, we must search for other stimu- will have greater difficulty guarding themselves lants to the development of a nation. Money against insurgency than they will against out- alone will not guarantee progress. right invasion. Our assistance to these nations As we carrv out this shift in trading relation- must take this new threat into account. But I ships, we becorne aware of the growing depen- believe we are mistaken if we assume that all dence our nation must place upon world trade. the Cold War aims of other major powers have There is no way we can avoid doing so. changed, even though their tactics may well One reason for dependence upon trade is the undergo a major overhaul. crisis that we face in raw materiais. We all The third condition influencing the pattern have talked about the energy shortage that of political relationships in the seventies is that looms in the near future. If we had to rely en- it is a time of economic restructuring. tirely upon domestic reserves of crude oil, we If one considers the economic progress of so would deplete them in a very few years and many nations since World War II, then one still face criticai shortages in the process. Bar- begins to realize the irnportance of the funda- ring utilization of high-cost oil derived from 26 A IR í INI VER SITY R E VIE W

shale, I see no way to provide for our energy volves a matter that few of us understand and needs except looking to the troubled Middle none of us has accepted with sufficient concern. East with its huge oil reserves. Let us first consider pollution. We usually We have encountered other criticai needs as think of pollution in national terms, and indeed well. For instance, the world use of iron and we must continue to do so; but it has an inter- copper has increased four times since 1960, national dimension as well, and perhaps that is while aluminum use has increased five times in the more terrifying. The problems of smog and the same period. The major industrial nations the blight of our cities persist. But if the burn- more and more face shortages in the materiais ing of fóssil fuels charges the upper atmosphere they need to operate their plants; and more with enough carbon dioxide, it will modify the and more thev compete against eaeh other to natural shield surrounding the earth and in- gain what thev require from the nations that erease surface temperatures. Immediately that own resources. would not constitute a major difficulty, espe- In the nineteenth eentury, America grew cially in winter, except that finally it could strong economically for many reasons, includ- cause the polar ice caps to melt, inundating ing our abundance of raw materiais. Then we much of the inhabited world and changing the were a "have” nation. We now have become a climate of the continents. Apparently the earth “have not" nation that must look to the re- has a natural tendency to eliminate its ice caps sources of the world to fill some of our needs. anyway, since it has had no permanent ice Many of our people do not realize how dramat- fields during most of geologic time. But if we ically our requirements have outdistanced our hasten this thawing by tilting a delicate bal- natural wealth. ance, we would invite cataclysmic problems. Another reason for our growing dependence Radioactivity can be harmful to both plant upon world trade is that we have substantial and animal life, the cause for anxious specula- needs for other imports as well. We no longer tion during major weapons tests. Naturally a produee cheaplv some of the manufactured nuclear war would threaten all people every- products that contribute to our high standard where with a cruel fate. But harmful effects are of living. I am sure each of us relies upon the caused also by radioactive waste, a by-product products of other nations to enhance his life of the stations upon which the style and individualitv: e.g., British woolens, industrial nations must increasingly rely for Japanese cameras. Thai silks, French antiques— electricity. the list is a long one. Likewise, we live richer Water pollution also poses giant difficulties. lives because we travei abroad, and some of In 1970 the beaches near Rome were closed by our vouth studv abroad. Both activities, in for- the threat of hepatitis. What happens to the eign exchange terms, are the equivalent of im- sea near Rome can soon happen elsewhere in po rting foreign goods. the Mediterranean, and the oeeans can be con- We can afford these trading transactions in taminated as surely and not long thereafter. the world market only if we export sufficient Oceanic pollution would affect everv nation fjuantities of sophisticated goods, technology, beside the sea: food supply, public health, rec- and ideas in order to balance our payments. It reation, the qualitv of the environment—all is to ensure that we will be able to do so that would suffer. We understand stream and lake we continue the economic restrueturing of our pollution through routine observation, but the relationships with other nations. ocean has a unique quality becaase it lacks anv Fourth, man must control his abuse of the estuary draining elsewhere to help the process environment or he may destroy his chance for of purification. Pollute the ocean sufficientlv survival. That is a sobering admonition. It in- and it cannot cleanse itself. TRANSFORMA TIÜN OF WORLD POLIT1CS 27

All men everywhere have a vested interest in Some people seem to be telling me that preventing pollution. Other examples empha- there is an inevitability about the future, that size even further the blight that environmental there is no use trying to solve problems because contamination brings to the quality of life for the worst will happen anyway. In reply and in men everywhere. Onlv cooperation among na- closing, let me share with you an experience, tions will insure the required protection. again from World War II. Pollution relates inevitably to population, After my unit had finished its combat assign- and we are not making satisfactorv progress ment in the Ardennes, during the winter of toward controlhng the numbers of mankind. 1944-45, a few of us lived for several days in Without population limitation, pollution ean- the home of a Belgian family. I became well not possibly be brought under control. Statistics acquainted with little Lea, a twelve-year-old help us to visualize the coming press of human- child about half my height. We talked endlessly ity. in French, insofar as I could, about her village, The population of the developing world now her home, her friends, about war-torn Belgium. numbers two billion people and is growing at On warmer days we roamed the countryside. the rate of percent per vear. If that growth During storms I read to her while she smiled at rate holds, then the population of the develop- my poor pronunciation. Ours was a friendship ing world will be 5.5 billion in the year 2000, growing out of vicissitude. 28 billion in 2050. Or consider another possibil- The evening before our departure, I told Lea itv: if families in developed nations average that we would be leaving early the next morn- two children by the year 2020 and families in ing and that she should not awaken herself to developing nations do so by 2040, then the bid us farewell. But she did so at four o’clock, world population will stabilize at 16 billion and her large tears were honest ones as she said people. Speeding up the process by twenty goodbye. I promised to write to her after the years will cause the world population to stabi- war, but she shook her head, crying all the lize at eleven billion, three times the present more. When I asked why she did not believe total. Some observers believe that eleven billion my promise, she gave a child s view of war. may be the absolute limit beyond whieh the "Because all soldiers are killed in war.” To Malthusian Controls of war, disease, and famine my remonstrance she explained, “All boys from will reap their grim harvest. But even if this our village who became soldiers now are dead.” many people survive, what hope would remain I did write to Lea a year later, and we eor- for the dignity of the individual? responded for several years. In due time one of It seems clear to me that all nations have her letters brought a picture of a lovely girl of become dependent upon each other, not only eighteen, the bride of a Belgian soldier who did for peace and growing prosperity but for sheer return. What had appeared likely in days of survival. Interdependence requires cooperation. adversity did not transpire for Lea as the future That requirement comes at a time when unfolded. many Americans want to withdraw from world The only thing that is inevitable about the problems. If you walk along the main Street of world s future is that it will be shaped with America, you hear this desire expressed. Many American help or without it. It will be a more of us wish to concentrate on our own criticai promising future for us and for all of mankind national problems, and of course we must do so with the substantial contributions of courage, with dedication. But in undertaking that, we understanding, and wisdom that we can pro- cannot abandon our role as a leader of the na- vide. We have no reasonable choice but to do tions of the world without fearful conse- so. quences. Washington, D.C. U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Dr . Raymond J. Barrett TRENGTHENING United Nations peace- of peacekeeping units and doctrine wòuld have keeping is in the best interests of the United further benefits in many of these countries by S States, as we adjust our national security strengthening their own internai security and policies in a changing world. Clearlv diminish- providing professionally satisíying roles for ing are the American profile in the world and their military. the readiness of the United States to involve United Nations peacekeeping, of course, is itself in crisis situations not directly threatening not a panacea. It has had a checkered history, it. At the same time, episodes of violence and and its present status is dubious. Its role is a instabilitv are likely to continue, and many of limited one. The hmitations are real, but so are them will have worrisome possibilities for dam- the advantages. aging important American interests. Direct U.N. peacekeeping operations have evolved United States involveinent is likely to be in- from emergency situations. Their broad pur- hibited or, worse, counterproductive. A viable pose has been to keep intemational crises from intemational means for dealing with lower- getting out of hand. Three large peacekeeping level violence would thus offer many practical forces have been assembled, at one time or advantages to the United States. It would offer another, under the U.N. banner: the United us a formula that could help contain violent Nations Emergency Force in Egypt (unef); or chaotic situations without imilateral U.S. the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo involvement. It would provide an internationallv (onuc); and the United Nations Peacekeeping acceptable concept, while still being compatible Force in (unficyp). unef was estab- with the security concems of the United States. lished at the time of the 1956 Suez Crisis as a In short, strengthened United Nations peace- buffer between Israel and Egypt, and its with- keeping could provide us with a means to deal drawal in 1967 preceded the Arab-Israeli war with lower-level violence, something we are in of that year. onuc was created in 1960 to danger of losing. protect the territorial integrity and political There are other important advantages of independence of the Congo when chãos devel- U.N. peacekeeping that would also be dis- oped after independence. unficyp, assembled tinctly beneficiai to the United States. A con- in 1964 to help restore order and keep peace structive and realistic peacekeeping ability between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, is still in could revitalize the integritv and utilitv of the being. United Nations, something that is badlv Discussion of U.N. peacekeeping generally needed. The development of peacekeeping refers to this type of complex and quasi-military capabilities and the consequent reinvigoration force. The United Nations has also engaged in of the general concept would also have an a number of smaller operations involving essen- important collateral impact on the interna- tially the dispatching of observer groups. For tional community. Most nations, in a world instance, small U.N. units have reported on dominated by a few superpowers, are uncertain compliance with cease-fires in Indonésia and or anxious about having any meaningful role in Kashmir and on the disengagement agreement intemational affairs. Making peacekeeping vi- in the Yemen and are currently trying to main- able and active could give them a useful and tain the shaky truce between the Arabs and the meaningful purpose. In addition, development Israelis.

29

In India and Pakistan, 1955

A ÚlVguuyan member o f tlie Militunj Ob- \t~ner Group talks witfi vilhtgers in Kushinir.

The U.N. Charter (Artieles 43-45) provides have been able, at least, to achieve conditions for member States to place militarv forces at of “suspended violence” or deter degeneration the disposition of the United Nations. These into chãos. provisions were designed to supply the organi- These are achievements not to be lightly dis- zation with effective sanctions against aggres- missed in todavs changing world. The social sion of the kind encountered in World War II and political turbulence within and between or earlier. The United Nations Command in the many new nations naturally fosters occa- Korea was the only U.N. force of this type, and sional violence or pronounced instahilitv. Such it seems unlikelv that this kind of operation episodes, in and of themselves, are not likely to will ever be repeated. be threats to world peaee or directlv inimical As this background suggests, the role of U.N. to U.S. national security. But if left to fester, peacekeeping is a limited one. The U.N. eould they eould arouse concern in wide areas of the not conduct peacekeeping operations in an area world community. Thev also present the temp- of vital security concern to the United States tation for exploitation by outside elements ie.g., Cuba) or the Soviet Union (e.g.. Hungarv likely to widen the problem substantially or or Czechoslovakia). Nor, in the realities of even to escalate it in terms of big-power con­ world power, are there adequate substitutes for cern. In any such situation, unilateral interven- nuclear deterrence and national power to fore- tion by the United States (or the U.S.S.R. or stall conventional warfare. In talking of peace­ any outside power) is almost certain to make keeping operations, we are clearly referring the problem more complex, tense, and there- only to the lower leveis of the spectrum of vio- fore dangerous. In todays climate of opinion, lence. U.S. intervention is also likely to engender in- Experiente has shown, however, that U.N. tense and debilitating opposition in Congress peacekeeping operations can serve a useful and among the American public. function in certain situations. The United Na­ A U.N. peacekeeping force, with all its com- tions, on several occasions. has been able to plexities and limitations, eould thus be an at- obtain and enforce cease-fires in quarrels and tractive alternative to help keep problems border disputes. U.N. peacekeeping operations manageable. The existence of a U.N. peace­ have also helped to reduce the possibilitv of keeping capability also would increase the like- big-power confrontation or the spread of vio­ lihood that nations would opt to use it. This lente that threatened to draw in outside med- would, among other things, reduce the danger dlers. In other situations the United Nations has of other outside intervention. Not the least of reduced the explosive potential by exposing the advantages for the United States would be subversion and infiltration. In more than a the abilitv to endorse a broadly backed interna- dozen instantes since World War II, the United tional effort as a counterpoise to Soviet or Nations helped to end violente and preserve other outside intervention. order. The present status of the U.N. peacekeeping Lnited Nations peacekeeping operations may concept is cloudy. In recent years the United not "solve problems, but they have, in several States and the Soviet Union have tried to de- very tense and complieated crises, kept bad sit­ velop mutually acceptable models for peace­ uations from getting very much worse. They keeping operations. Some progress apparently In África, 1 960

U.N. Secretarij-General Dag Ham- marskjold (abone) coordinated the withdrawal o f Belgian forces from the Congo and deplotjment of the •'tJ > U.N. Force with Katanga and Bel- gian authorities. . . . Major Gen- eral Cor! con liorn (rigfit. above), Supreme C.ommander of the ten- countrij U.N. Force, with Colonel Hcnry Bijrne, Com m ander of U.N. n n i t s in K a t a n g a a n d Ki t ti. . . . Ghanian troops board USAF C-130. U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND U.S. SECURITY 33

has been made in developing guidelines on ob- One important step now feasible is the devel- server-tvpe operations but little on the larger, opment of a roster of national peacekeeping more complex peacekeeping forces. The central capabilities. The U.N. Secretary General could question at issue has been the degree of ask member nations what type of personnel and flexibility to be left to the U.N. Secretary Gen- equipment they would be prepared to provide eral to adapt operations to the circumstances of for peacekeeping operations authorized by the each case. The United States feels that he needs Securitv Council. The U.S. Representative to considerable latitude in managing an operation. the United Nations, then Ambassador Charles The Soviets have vvanted all major decisions W. Yost, made a proposal along these lines at kept in the Securitv CounciTs hands. where the 1970 General Assembly. The United States thev can use their veto. There seems to be an suggested that a register of availabilities might impasse on this point. include information on the number and type of The financial basis of U.N. peacekeeping has contingents, military observers, and auxiliary also been uncertain. The Soviets and several personnel that member States were prepared to other countries have refused to pay their shares provide. The register, Ambassador Yost added, of the c-osts of the and Congo op- might indicate the State of readiness and the erations. Thev argue that these operations as tvpe of equipment, facilities, and Services that directed by the Secretary General did not take could be made available on short notice. The into account their vievvs and interests and were U.S. proposal also suggested an effort to iden- partial to ours. The small observer missions in tify and fill any potential shortages, whether of Kashmir and on the Suez Canal are being personnel or logistics, that might be revealed in financed out of the regular U.N. budget, with forming the register. If a shortage of a particu- the costs assessed against all members. The lar type of specialized personnel did emerge, larger Cyprus operation. on the other hand, is appropriate member nations could be encour- being sustained by voluntary crontributions from aged to train sueh specialists, or the United about 24 countries, out of a total U.N. member- Nations itself might provide or arrange for such ship five times as large. It has incurred a large training. déficit. These arrears have been an important The lack of concrete progress on these and cause of the United Nations’ currentlv precar- other proposals has been disappointing. Soviet ious financial situation. If agreeinent can be foot-dragging has obviously been a hindrance. achieved with the Soviets, presumablv these So has concern for the United Nations’ troubled financial problems can be eliminated, at least financial status. The difficulty seems to be lack for the future. of a careful and constructive effort to mobilize the considerable potential interest in peace- keeping needed to effectuate those steps that M ea n wh il e, it shouldbe possible are feasible. to take a number of steps toward strengthening The concept of U.N. peacekeeping, on its U.N. peacekeeping. The effort to get Soviet own merits, has considerable attraction for agreeinent should be continued. Soviet concur- many of the developing countries of the world. rence, if it can be obtained without excessive There is also a group of nations, such as Can- constraints, would obviously bolster the U.N. ada and the Scandinavian countries, that has peacekeeping concept. It would also be bene- long been interested in the practical aspeets of ficiai to have a more reliable understanding peacekeeping. There thus seems to be appreci- on ground rules and procedures for the estab- able potential support for inereased U.N. abili- lishment, direction, and conduct of peacekeeping ties in the peacekeeping field if both these missions. groups are adequately encouraged. 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This is clearly an area in whieh a vigorous viable means of dealing with lower-level vio- campaign by the United States would be inap- lence and in a sense foregoing the possibility of propriate. Overidentification of peacekeeping unilateral U.S. intervention. The United States with the United States, one of the superpowers, would also have to be ready to accept and would probably vitiate the whole idea. It work with the initiatives and proposals of oth- would probably arouse strong Soviet suspicions ers. We can encourage viable arrangements by and, perhaps, counterproduetive opposition fos- others, but excessive U.S. activity in proposals tered by the U.S.S.R. Equally inhibiting, U.S. and negotiations would give the concept an dominanee would cause many nations that overly American cast and might well doom it. might otherwise support peacekeeping to shv In the context of active and substantial inter- away, for fear of being caught in a superpower est among U.N. members, the U.S.S.R. might confrontation. moderate or cease its present uncooperative However, clear indications that the United stance. Perhaps the Soviets might not actively States really did favor improved U.N. peace- oppose such measures as the development of a keeping efforts and was prepared to support register of capabilities that would not involve others in developing this coneept might well any eommitments to specific modes of peace- revitalize the interest in peacekeeping. An keeping. effort in this direction was the first recommen- More broadly, the possibilities for developing dation of the Commission set up by the Presi- momentum on the question of U.N. peacekeep- dent to propose measures to inerease the ing seem distinctly improved in today’s chang- effectiveness of the United Nations and of U.S. ing world. There is great interest everywhere in participation therein. The President s Commis- finding modes of accommodation that avoid sion on the Observance of the 25th Anniversary big-power confrontations and strengthen the of the United Nations was chaired by Henry possibilities for an era of negotiation. One con- Cabot Lodge, who had been U.S. Representa- structive area for focusing this interest could be tive to the U.N. The Commission’s first recom- U.N. peacekeeping in a way that produced mendation, in its report dated April 25, 1971. broad support, strong itself and powerful urged that the United States “undertake bold enough to induce the Soviets to go along. new initiatives to revitalize the peacekeeping The prospects for encouraging the develop- and peacemaking capabilities of the UN.” The ment of U.N. peacekeeping would be measura- Commission also recommended that the United bly improved if it were clear that the United States “indieate its readiness to cooperate fully States is prepared to support it in practical with the UN and other countries in developing ways. Measures to create the specific American contingents and specialized units for a UN wherewithal to assist and support peacekeeping Peace Reserve.” would be the most eonvincing demonstration of With a clear indication of American readi- U.S. support for the concept. Unfortunately, ness to cooperate, the countries particularly nothing like this has vet been done. interested in peacekeeping might take the ini- The idea of U.N. peacekeeping has been tiative to develop support from other countries generally blessed in U.S. policy and in initia- and propose practical measures for U.N. con- tives at the United Nations. But implementing sideration. These countries are not prepared to specifics, such as detailed inclusion in the mili- be front men for the United States, nor should tary doctrine of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the we allow them to seem to be. The atmosphere earmarking of American units, have been ab- fostered by the United States would be crucial. sent. The general attitude has been that the America would ha ve to make manifest her sin- U.S. armed forces have a broad spectrum of cerity in strengthening U.N. peacekeeping as a capabilities; if a need should emerge in a U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND U.S. SECURITY 35

specific U.N. peacekeeping operation, the United peacekeeping fully spelled out; they can then States would identify and provide the needed be promptly implemented if this were judged capability from among the manv that it possesses. most advantageous to the United States in a This approach to the problem is hardly ade- particular crisis. More broadly, other countries quate in an era of reducing American military are not going to work to ready their own doc- forces and lowering visibility around the world. trine and capabilities for U.N. peacekeeping Our forces must be multipurpose and carefully unless we demonstrate our seriousness by visi- targeted. We are going to continue to have bly doing so. problems vvith lower-level violence. At a min- Significantlv, the President s Commission on imum, it would be pmdent to have U.S. mili- the United Nations followed its policy recom- tar\' doctrine and capabilities to support U.N. mendations, cited earlier, with several specific

In Cyprus. 1967

By its prrsence in thsptitedureas, the ( V peacekeeping, forcehas helped to atoid neie outbreaks o f fighting and reduced tensions. 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ones. The Commission said that the United rity, which is the priinarv purpose of most U.S. States should “pledge air/sealift facilities for military assistance programs. In most cases the immediate transport of UN peaee troops.” In development of peacekeeping units is a ques- many U.N. peacekeeping operations the U.S. tion of cross-training existing forces to provide has, in fact, supplied the trooplift. But the multipurpose units. The principal mission of Commission recommends that the United the latter is internai seeurity, but they would States take the significant further step of pledg- also be capable of and ready for participation ing the continuai availability of this support. If in international peacekeeping operations. Thus, nothing else, by such action we could highlight without detriment to existing U.S. military as- the peacekeeping value of such uniquely sistance programs (ma p) and procedures, we American capabilities as naval transports and could ineorporate specific advice and equip- resupply and the C-5A aireraft. ment designed to encourage peacekeeping ca- The Commission also recommended that the pabilities. United States “earinark within the U.S. defense Helping other nations develop units ear- forces specialized units in signals, transport and marked for U.N. Service should be an accepted logistics for backstopping UN peacekeeping part of our military assistance programs. We operations and for possible participation in can help train and equip contingents for those such operations." This is an area in which the ma p recipients who desire to earmark units. United States has been deficient. Actuallv pro- We can identifv needs and help develop capa- viding a unit for a peacekeeping operation is bilities to meet them. Perhaps we can help more than a mechanical process; there are these countries devise and carry out exercises manv practical requirements, ranging from to improve their peacekeeping potential. We familiaritv with the special hazards and guide- may be able to help modify equipment or lines of international operations to up-to-date procedures to make them more adaptable to inoculations and passports. Earmarking is essen- peacekeeping operations. In those countries tial to be sure that these requirements are with more preliminary interest in peacekeeping, properlv met. our military assistance personnel can help the Perhaps even more important would be military of their host eountry by furnishing specific U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping in documents or getting for them information from our military assistance program and in our rela- other countries with earmarked units or previous tionships with the militarv of other countries. U.N. experience. The practical ways in which Another recommendation of the President s we can assist are many and varied. Directives Commission on the U.N. was that the United and guidanee to carry them out need to be States “insure through existing and/or new leg- specifícally incorporated in our military assis- islation that the United States is fiilly prepared tance training, planning, and programming. to support UN peacekeeping operations, in- The basic concept of U.N. peacekeeping in- cluding assistance in training and equipping volves national units, appropriatelv trained, contingents for UN Service through use of exist- equipped, and earmarked as available for U.N. ing (but unused) provisions of the Foreign As- Service. Member nations would offer these units sistance Act.” to the United Nations, if they deemed it desir- Our militarv assistance programs can readily able, in response to the U.N.s call to organize be adjusted to assist other countries to develop a peacekeeping force for a particular crisis. It is peacekeeping forces. The capabilities required up to each nation to decide whether to de- in peacekeeping are also needed by these coun- velop such a unit, what its composition should tries in proteeting their own seeurity. Particu- be, and whether to make it available when larly is this tme in maintaining internai secu- requested by the U.N. To date, some 54 coun- U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND V.S. SECURITY 37

tries have assigned personnel to U.N. opera- standby peacekeeping units. Others are partici- tions, and some 27 nations have made major pating in the U.N. force in Cyprus or in other contributions of military imits (over 100 men) to U.N. peacekeeping aetivities, such as the U.N. one or more of the U.N. forces. truee supervisory organization in the Middle Experíence has shown that a great varietv of East. units is needed. U.N. forces have had to do In fact, the development of peacekeeping much more than police and patrol. They have eoncepts, units, doctrine, and equipment would had to disperse rioting mobs, guard kev politi- offer these eountries a significant role in the cal leaders, operate airports and radio stations. world, something they now largely lack be- and exert the utmost in persuasion and diplo- cause of superpower dominance. The problems macv to stop or head off hostilities. They have of peacekeeping, by and large, are similar to had to help civil administration in a multitude those that thev deal with internallv. By concen- of ways in order to prevent disorder or chãos. trating diplomatic and professional talents in Circumstances have often made them de facto the area of peacekeeping and the problems of mediators and quasi magistrates. In addition, a lower-level violente, thev could become the varietv of language capabilities (e.g., French- acknowledged international experts in their speaking personnel in the Congo) has been fields. Their expertise would give them eredibil- needed and not alwavs readily available. ity and confidente in international relations. An Along with regular infantry units, there has intimate awareness of the difficulties involved been a need for such related elements as air would probablv also produce a salutary strength- transport. naval support, river patrol, recon- ening of responsibility and appreciation of naissance, commimications, and logistics forces. feasible arrangements. A sense of leadership for Also urgently needed have been such special- these eountries in peacekeeping should also be ized imits as air traffic controllers, military po- conducive to their constructive participation lice, sanitary engineers, postal clerks, medicai more generally in maintaining world peace on personnel, and pavmasters. In short, the range a realistic basis. of useful capabilities is great. In similar fashion, a leadership role in peace- Most of these capabilities are feasible (in keeping would provide the military of these terms of talents and resources) for most coun- eountries with a legitimate professional role. tries of the world. In fact, manv of them al- Satisfactory outlets for military professionalism ready exist. These capabilities are directly re- now are generally lacking in the developing lated to internai securitv, the principal military eountries. This situation has an important bear- concern of these eountries. With little dif- ing on the proclivitv of the military of these ficultv, it should be possible to suggest

thinking through the doctrine and equipment best adapted to these lower-level situations. There is, for instance, no well-developed or widely agreed doctrine for peacekeeping opera- tions, with their many diplomatic, psyehologi- cal, and other complexities. Peacekeeping forces could conceivably be used in a variety of ways: to re-establish law and order; to backstop local police forces so as to preclude a break- down of order; to evacuate foreigners; to estab- lish or maintain a truce; to police an election; to isolate conflicts from outside influentes, sup- plies, and agitators; or to observe or monitor tense situations. Each of these categories pre- sents a host of special complications. Clearly it would be an important step forward if the likelv problems of peacekeeping were thought through and more specific doctrine or guidance developed. The question of equipment also needs exaini- nation. Presumablv, relatively simple equip- ment would be most appropriate for peace- keeping and internai security. Some random ideas include small boats for riverine or Coastal patrol, a simplifíed jeep-type vehicle for cross- country and trail movements, or perhaps even mule-pack artillery for mountain and jungle use. In relatively undeveloped conditions simple equipment may well be more useful and less costly than trying to adapt advanced equip- ment available from sophisticated military forces. Furthermore, simplifíed equipment is likely to be within the industrial capabilities of many developing countries, thus giving them another interest in peacekeeping. In other words, there is a broad area of mili- tary expertise not now being much used. It is one in which the military of the developing nations are uniquely situated to become the

The United Nations General Assembly, on opening its twenty- seventh regular session 19 September 1972 in New York City, elected as its current president Stanislaw Trepczynski, the incumbent Polish Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

International experts. Sueh International mili- types of International peacekeeping were origi- tary recognition woulcl provide a sense of nally considered during the Cyprus crisis, when professional fulfillment now lacking. it appeared that the Soviet Union might pre- The availability of a wide variety of ap- vent organization of a U.N. force. In short, the propriate peacekeeping units should, itself, he availability of peacekeeping units adds one conducive to dealing with criticai episodes of more possibility for the solution of crises of vio- destructive violence. The likelihood that the lence or instability. Even if the peacekeeping United Nations would agree to deploy a peace- units were never used, the assurance of their keeping force would almost certainly be existence and availability should have some greater if it were well known that effective constructive iinpact on the prospects for world capabilities were regularly available. Past oper- peace. ations have been organized in haste, with a good deal of inefficiency and makeshift arrange- W e have nothing to lose and much to gain by inents. The more earmarked units available, the taking the practical steps open to us to im- more likelv it is that enough will be suitable in prove our own ability to support peacekeeping a particular crisis, both on political and practi- operations and help friendly nations develop cal grounds. The formation of a U.N. peace- their capabilities to meet peacekeeping emer- keeping force would obviously be easier and geneies. Lower-level violence and instability more successful if a number of trained units, are certain to persist. Under present eircum- with a variety of capabilities, are readily avail- stances we do not have an effective way to deal able. Furthermore, a small and effective U.N. with sueh situations so as to preclude their contingent that arrives earlv in a situation may developing into threats to U.S. national seeu- be of much greater benefit than a large force rity. Strengthened, viable U.N. peacekeeping later. offers a means to handle sueh dangers in a Even if the United Nations is ultimately manner compatible with U.S. interests. It unwilling to act, the availability of a wide vari- would, in effect, give us a strategic option to ety of national peacekeeping units may help in contain lower-level violence, an option we are containing a crisis. It would enable like-minded now in grave danger of losing. countries that were prepared to participate to provide peacekeeping assistance to a friendly John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance nation in a crisis. For instante, an Asian coun- Fort Rraga, North Carolina try might form a peacekeeping force and help a neighbor weather a period of instability or violence. The availability of national peace- keeping units in the countries of the western Acknowledgment hemisphere might give the Organization of With one exception (the USAF C-130 photograph American States another useful option in deal- on page 32), all photographs are courtesy of the ing with a crisis of general coneern. Other United Nations Washington Information Center. EPITAPH TO THE LADY-

30 Y ears After WlLLIAM G. Hü LDER HE was jast another B-24, one of thou- some 30 minutes short of the target. .And then sancLs of Liberators that rolled off the the great mysterv begins. production lines during World War II. After all the other planes of Mission 109 had SHer aircraft number was 41-24301, and she been accounted for, there was still hope that was assigned to the 514th Squadron of the the Lady would tnrn up. And by this time her 376th Bomb Group. However, these rather pilot, Lieutenant William Hatton, must have bland statistics belie the story of probablv the realized that he was not on course. Finally, he most fanious B-24 of World War II. But the broke radio silence and contacted the control reason for her fame was not fantastic feats dur- tower at Benina, the master control facility for ing aerial combat. In faet, this brand-new air- the Bengazi area. Hatton probably figured that plane Hew onlv one mission—a mission from he should have seen the African coast by then, which she never returned. Bv now the reader and he wanted a fix on his position. The tower has probably guessed that the plane about gave him a heading of 330 degrees, north by which we speak is the ill-fated . northwest. Since the plane was diseovered in the Libyan The Benina directional finder, unfortunatelv, Desert in 1959, thousands of vvords have been was the tvpe that could reçord the Lady s sig- written about it and the probable reasons for nal from both 330 degrees and the reciprocai its demise. The old tv show, Armstrong Circle position, 150 degrees. The correct fix of 150 Theatre, had a program on what happened to degrees was never considered by the tower, the unfortunate Lady. A final review of the since Hatton thought (erroneously) that he was resultant docuinentation shows some interesting still over the water. (At night, it is extremely and unexplained facts about the accident. Also, diffieult to distinguish between the sea and the some of the facts relating to this incident are desert.) The Lady Be Good was alreadv over shovvn to be untrue, while others remain un- the desert south by southeast at 150 degrees changed and in many cases unexplained. when the pilot radioed the tower. The Lady Most of the facts are well known. The Lady’s was not headed home but exactlv ISO degrees lone mission, designated Mission 109, began away from it. from a makeshift airstrip called Soluch near When the Iuidy took off for her mission, the Bengazi, Libva. The mission objective of the 26 wind had been blowing off the desert. In the B-24s was to strike the port facilities at Naples. Ínterim, though, the wind had shifted to the As was true with many of the B-24 operations opposite direction, and a strong tailwind had out of North África, the gritty sand got into probably been mistaken for a headwind. It is evervthing that moved and caused great therefore understandable why the crew was maintenance problems. And the Lady was probablv not overlv concerned about being so probably a victim of the sand, as her engines long in getting back to Soluch. The ironic part sucked in large amounts of the desert at was that her engines were apparently heard takeoff. It is probably also a good guess that droning overhead by several ground personnel this was a contributing factor to the engine as she Hew south to her end. It was reported problems it faced earlv in the Hight on 4 April that an air-sea rescue was initiated on the same 1943. 330-degree course that had been given the Onlv 11 of the Mission 109 planes ever Lady. reached Naples. One aborted at takeoff, and Since the Lady was heard flving south, why the other 14 turned around and either struggled didn t the search extend south as well as north? back to Soluch or landed at a British strip on The fact that the crew was inexperienced Malta. Of the 14, onlv the Lady was not ac- should have caused a rescue attempt to be counted for. It is known that she turned back made in directions other than the 330-degree

42 EPITAPH TO THE LADY 43

heading. If that had been done, the needless Controls, generator switches, and throttle levers loss of a voung creu probably could have been for engines 1, 2, and 3 were all set in the “off” avoided. position. Also, the propeller Controls for these As the Lady droned on, the fuel began to three engines were set to “feathered.” The deplete, probably causing the engines to die number 4 engine, however, had all switch Con­ one at a time. When the plane had only one trols, generator, propeller, and throttle lever set prop tuming, the crevv bailed out. At the erash for “fu.ll operation.” The wing flaps were not site, three of the Ladys props vvere bent back, extended, and the landing gear had not been indicating that they were dead when the Lady lowered for a pilot s controlled landing. The bellv-flopped onto the desert Hoor. The fourth Form 41-B maintenance record indicated that engine had tom loose, still wheeling with a few the engines each had a total time of only 148 last drops of petrol, and fought its way 50 yards hours. The log also indicated that the Lady had farther through the loose pebbles and sand. previously Hown only a few test Hights, and the Just recently another bit of evidence has fatal Mission 109 was her First combat mission. been added to the mystery. McDonnell Douglas In retrospect, would the Ladys crew have Corporation was loaned one of the Lady s re- survived if they had staved with their plane? covered engines for analysis. Upon examination The chances are that they would have. And the of the engine, McDonnell Douglas technicians chances are that, with their radio, they might discovered a flak hole, probably caused by a have been recovered. At least with the provi- 20-mm cannon shell, in the rocker box cover. sions and water on board, they could have sur­ This evidence suggests that the Lady may have vived for a considerable length of time. made it to the target area and encountered All of the 50-caliber ammunition was intact enemy fire. In fact, that particular engine at each machine-gun position with the excep- might have been feathered once the damage tion of a few rounds that were probably ex- was inflicted. pended when the guns were checked out in In the experience of B-24 pilots. the Lady, flight. According to the olficial Air Force Inves- with only number 4 engine running, would tigation Report, there were no water jugs have fallen in a sweeping are to the left. The aboard the plane as reported in some accoiuits. radius of the turn would have been from 5 to A therinos jug three-fourths full of eoflee was 10 miles. Analysis of the crash site showed that found on the Hoor at the flight engineer’s posi­ the Lady struek the gravei plain in near-level tion. An earlier British party had removed the flight and skidded for about 7(X) yards from east sextant, bombsight, and chronometer. to west, rotating in a clockwise direction. She Both parachutes and Mae West life preserv- cajne to rest with her nose pointing southeast. ers had been worn bv the crew when thev left Her wirigtips were unmarked, indicating that the old girl for the last time. The nine-man she remained fairlv levei during her death skid. crew bailed out, undoubtedly thinking they At the end of the skid. the grinding stresses were over the Mediterranean, but that body ot proved too much for her, and she “broke her water was some 400 miles away to the north. back” just behind the main wing roots. Debris, One can but wonder whether the crew felt any including portions of bomb-bav racks, bits of animosity toward the navigator, who was at tubing, and sections of cowling, inarked the least partially responsible for getting them into Ladys route from initial impact to her final their predicament. The nearly blank navigator s resting place. W 6 sheet for the retum portion of the mission The fact that three engines had been feath­ certainlv indicts him. None of the W6 reflects ered was further verified when searchers exam- the standards that were representative of the ined the engine control positions. The mixture times. All the crew knew was that they had Contintfíl on /mí& /fl A trail of débris marks tlic Lady s f in a l nw vem en ts. . . . N o m a d ic trihesmen liad visitai tlie scene, helped themselves to souvenirs. The inside o f Lady Be Good was in amazingly good condition, considering her long sunbaking. . . . The reur- turret guns were still in excellent condition. copahle o f firing. . . . An Anny helicopter deplanes from a C-130 to join the search operation. 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

landed somewhere in the desert; otherwise, airmen—a trail they probably followed. they had no idea where they were. What a It was not long after taking up the trail that hopeless feeling it must have heen! the search party found their assumption to be The initial Air Force search partv from correct: more Hight equipment was found. A , , was not equipped parachute had been fashioned into the shape of for full-scale search operations and found no an arrowhead, pointing north along the trace of the crevv. It was decided later that an 5-vehicle track. It had been weighted down extensive operation would he carried out to with stones and was still quite visible after 16 find the crew and dose out the still open book years. Still farther along the trail, more para- on the Lady. But the task facing the search chute arrowhead markers were found. partv was awesome—there was just no way of Just north of the last chute the search knowing where the crew had bailed out. reached the sand sea of Calanscio, an area of It was assumed, however, that the crew shifting sand mounds that have been known to probablv parachuted when only one engine was bury cities. Realizing that it must have been a churning and therefore probablv landed within tremendously discouraging sight to the Ladys 8 to 10 miles of the crash site. It was obvious crew, the searchers felt the last chapter could that thev had not found the downed bomber, soon be closed. After an extensive effort, and it is doubtful that they could have found though, the search teams gave up, and the mys- her even if they had tried. It is interesting to tery of the “ghost bomber" lived on. The final wonder whether the possibi lity entered their report of the investigation stated that “the minds. But the searchers theorized, and cor- crew members perished in the sand dunes and rectlv, that the crew would have headed north have been covered by the sands." toward the sea thev probablv thought was so So then the case of the Lady Be Good was near. laid to rest. But the quest for oil in the desert The medicai people with the search partv still continued, and some four months later, in reasoned that it would be impossible to last February 1960, the remains of five bodies were more than a couple of davs, even with water. discovered on a plateau inside the sand sea. The experts also gave the men, each with a The Air Force quickly identifíed them as five of canteen, a chance of going only 25 to 30 miles the nine crewmen. The area was littered with at best. But the experts overlooked one factor canteens, a Mae West life vest, and the diary of the Ladys crew had going for it: the desire to Second Lieutenant Robert Tower, the copilot, survive. And it would be this desire which which told of the last nine davs of heat and would push the men to continue on to superhu- suffering. It was not long until the remains of man feats with the hope that the sea was just three others were found. Only Staff Sergeant over the next rise. Vernon Moore was never found; he still rests in Moving north from the crash site, the search- the desert that had claimed his Lady. ers found the first clue some 19 miles awav, It is generally agreed that the eircumstances where a pair of boots was found pointing north. which took the hidy Be Good to her appoint- The search then concentrated in that general ment with death in the desert were a weird area. Shortly afterward, the wheel tracks of five combination of mistakes and eircumstances, a large, heavy vehicles were found. It was one-in-a-million fatal combination. Unfortu- thought that the tracks were verv old, made nately, the inexperienced crew of the Lady fell before the Lady went down. Therefore, the victim to them on her first mission. searchers speculated that if they were indeed Many have suggested bringing the Lady back present for the crew to see, thev probablv rep- and displaving her at the Smithsonian or Air resented a great ray of hope to the stricken Force Museum. But that will never happen. EPITAPH TO THE LADY 47

She has become an intrinsic part of the desert preciable evaporation of volatile constituents of that claimed her, and there she will remain. The the oil sample appears to have taken place. plane todav, after the ravages of souvenir col- Another equipment analysis was conducted lectors who at one point used axes, is little by the Olin Company of East Alton, Illinois, on more than a shell and has long since ceased to four .45 cartridges from the Lady Be Good. The be exhibitable. tests were conducted in 1962 on ammunition manufactured by the Remington Arms Com- pany in 1942. The 1962 standards for the ammo T he Vic k ebs Div isio n of Sperry (the same as in 1942) were 820 feet-per-second Rand has long been interested in the effeets of velocity, and the average pressure was not to long-term storage on inissile and aircraft com- exceed 19,0(K) pounds per square inch. The ponents. To further this studv, Vickers in Ladys shells averaged 871.5 fps and 18,275 psi. March 1960 procured eleven hydraulic compo- Olin concluded that “from a ballistic stand- nents from the Lady Be Good for examination, point, the ammunition appears safe.” One of including the main svstem pump. relief valve, the searchers also confirmed the adequacy of unloading valve, accumnlator, turret transmis- the Lady s ammo when he checked out one of sion, and various engine components. the bombers machine guns: when he pulled The results were surprising. All components the trigger, tracers went zooming out across were found to be in verv satisfactorv condition the desert. after their 17-year desert sunbath. There was The equipment of the Lady has made its way little or no evidence of corrosion on most of the all over the world. Many small pieces of equip- components. The piston rods moved freelv and ment were stripped off by members of the were coated vvith a film of oil when extended. search parties and kept as souvenirs. The piston surfaces were bright and shiny, Many items of clothing and equipment, in- showing no evidence of corrosion or other de- cluding two government-issue watches that terioration. Both the pump and motor drive would still run, were found with the remains of shafts rotated freely by hand. the crew. These items are on display at the About a quart of red hydraulic fluid was ob- Quartermaster Museum, Fort Lee, Virgínia. tained from the svstem, and although slightly There is also some Lady equipment in the Air discolored, the fluid felt and smelled in verv Force Museum at YVright-Patterson afb, Ohio, satisfactory condition. However. all the aircraft one of the major items being a propeller. All engine oil in the sample had evaporated, leav- the small arms went to the Libvan police, and ing only a black sludge in the engine oil reser- all the rafts were eventually thrown away be- voirs. cause over the years they had been ruined by It was also reported that, as a result of the the heat. crash, the nose gear was broken off the aircraft The first Air Force party at the crash site and stuck in the sand vvith the tire sticking up. found flight suits hanging undisturbed in the The slightest wind would rotate the wheel, in- bent fuselage, and in odd corneis they found dicating that the bearings were free and in cigarettes, gum, and bits of flight rations. The good condition. Significantly, the conditions in butts in one ashtray had been smoked down to the Libvan Desert are considerably better than the last puff, probably slowly and almost those at the usaf aircraft storage area at confídently, the way a young flver might drag Davis-Monthan afb, Arizona. on a weed during his first mission. In another In 1970 Shell Oil Company completed a se- tray they had been crushed out by nervous ries of tests on an oil sample from the recov- hands, the way a man smashes a cigarette when ered engine. It seems remarkable that no ap- he is out of time. Continued on page 50 The Lady Be Good exhibit at the Air Force Museum. . . . It ivas necessaAj to Irreak the top turret in order to release the tremendous h e a t . . . . P a n e i o f ph o t o g r a p h s iright) shows the progress o f the ill-fated crew after parachuting scifeltj from the Lady Be Good. Exhibit S Exhibit F

th Clue--Portíon of harnesa and 7th iarachute xnarker and shroud para chute weighted down in the line cuttings polntlng towards th rs of an arrowhead pointing north- 5 -v e h icle t r a i l and clu ee seen in ard along M U 5-v®kid« trw il. Exhibit D. nd parachute bundled and partlally orered by sand.

8th Rtraebute forming an arrowhead polntlng on a 325 degree heading. farachute harnesa r ls ib le in upper left hand cornar. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The radio set from the Lady was removed after, the Otter crashed into the . and installed in the recovery C-47, where it No trace of its ten-man complement was ever worked perfectly in plaee of a radio that had discovered. Amongst the scattered debris failed on the flight from YVheelus. The story washed up on the Libyan coast by the waves has it, though, that this aircraft some time later was an armrest. went down vvith all aboard lost. Thus began the These incidents have added an air of mystery “jinx” stories. to the old “ghost bomber.” In fact, it is said Several servomotors that had once driven that native caravans skirt the site of the crash some of the instruments on the Lady were in- because they believe it is haunted. And as the stalled in a C-54 assigned to VV’heelus. On a years pass, the haunted aspects of the Lady Be Thanksgiving Day flight to Bengazi, carrying Good will grow more fixed with each repetition mail and Thanksgiving turkeys, one of the of her anguished saga. plane s engines feathered, and even with max- Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio imum povver on the other three engines the crew had to dump all cargo in order to make Acknowledgment Bengazi safely. But the most tragic of the “jinx” incidents In preparing this article I had the help of Lieuten- ant Colonel William F. Rubertus (Retired), of Sum- involving parts from the ghost bomber hap- merville, South Carolina, and Mr. J. W. Walker of pened vvith an Armv Otter observation aircraft. McDonnell Douglas Corporation in St. Louis, Mis- Only the armrests had been removed from the souri. Their assistance is greatly appreciated. Lady and installed in the Otter. Shortlv there- VV.G.H. THE“NEW" CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: Retrospect

Dk . àdrian Preston

ACADEMIC and professional study by the modem defense specialist of con- / \ temporary war, strategy. and national security is the most exacting of / \ the social Sciences. It calls for extraordinarv skills and demands a sense of discrimination. commitment, and perspective that would both electrify and dismav the conventional stndent of economics, jurisprudence, theology, or medicine. If his scholarship is to be balanced and signifícant, accurately reflecting the contradictions. dialectics. and paradoxes of the human condition, the defence specialist must take into account a wide range of variables: variables of a political, financial, psychological, and sociological character, technical as well as theoretical. With the analysis and integration of all these factors, he may not feel entirely comfortable. For this comprehensive approach to the study of war, whether for its preparation and conduct or for its deterrenee, the historian s methodology seems the most sound. The historian, by providing a sheet anchor to the concrete realities of the condition of man—his social, psychological, geostrategic, and demographic environment at

51 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

any chosen period of time—will not be led into in which such a study must take place has par- the fallacy of believing that there is a technical adoxically become at once more confused and solution for every social problem and that by more rational? Is it any longer sufficient to endlessly reconstructíng models and refining explain the democratic condition exclusively in theories of International behavior and organiza- terms of a suspicious civil power, embodying tion it would be possible to banish forever the the protection of individual liberty and justice, inevitability of war from the conduct of human jealously scrutinizing and, if necessary, restrain- affairs. ing a professional leviathan whose accretion of These nuclear age exercises in the construc- power might lead to the insensible and inadver- tion of a positive Science of peace, enscaffolded tent conversion of the classical freedoms into with laws and principies by which it can be an implacably garrisoned state? In an age that immutably governed, are as ludicrously and has blurred the classical distinctions between tragically out of touch with the technological war and peace, strategy and policy, victory and "state of the art" as were those baroque and defeat, fears and threats, does not the politi- didactic theories of the strategic positivists cian, bureaucrat, or industrialist “on horse- of the late nineteenth and early twentieth back” represent at least an equal and perhaps centuries—men such as Hamley, Foch, Fuller, more insidious threat to the constitutional or- and Liddell Hart—whose central dogma of the der of the State as that supposed to have been deeisive battle had, by 1945, brought classical traditionally posed by the man in uniform? 1 warfare to its climax. Admirable though they For where soldiers and politicians disagree, might be to apostolic theologians and other only bureaucracy prevails.2 It is here, in the rulers of celestial societies, these exercises are grey no-manVland of joint Services and inter- potentiallv disastrous in political communities department committees dealing with policy, whose relations, order, and security are deter- manpower, procurement, education, manage- mined by the controlled interpretation of, ment, and research that soldiers are momen- among other things, military power and civil tarily "politicised.” They are brought to realize authority. that, if the balance of freedom and security is Indeed, it can be asked in considering the to be preserved, then armed forces must neces- problem of civil-military relations within an sarilv constitute not the overriding and deeisive age and System of international order and poli- interest to which all others must defer but one tics clouded and suffused by deterrence, disar- which, while signifieant and indispensable, mament, arms control, peace keeping, military must be capable of voluntarv self-restraint and assistance, and alliance structures in which the self-analysis, must efface the arrogance of the military factor must compete with other power which it disposes, and must never con- domestic claims in the formulation of national cede the claims of eompeting, equally urgent goals and policy, and in which the distinctive interests with a slirill or ill grace. image and classical functions of the profession It is here that bureauerats, who often confuse of arms have been eroded and defiled, does the eeonomv with efficiency, are “militarized in traditional dialectical approach—the elear sepa- the sense that thev are brought to realize that ration and strict subordination of military the intangible and contingent factors of na- power to political authority—have any valid tional security and professional expertise (such claim to exist? Should the seientific study of as discipline, judgment, and morale, which civil-military relations continue to turn exclu- condition the equally intangible qualities of sively upon the simple and emotive issue of surprise and stubbornness upon which victory political control over military expertise wlien often depends) are not so susceptible to cost- the politico-strategic-technological environment effectiveness analysis as their economic mod- "N EW CIVIL-MIL1TARY RELATIONS 53

ular theories lead them to dogmatise. It is literate but largely indifferent electorate—an here, too, that politicians—who are not always electorate that confides ever greater degrees of prone to trust their official professional advis- trust to experts charged with the higher direc- ers, who sometinies confuse real power with tion and management of their personal safety furtive popularitv, and who often see in bu- and national security. This must be done while reaucratic consolidation and force reductions a at the same time satisfying that powerful lobby means of emasculating inconvenient advice and of civilian academic defence specialists which, unpalatable initiatives while reasserting their since 1945, has done so much to shape and sovereign political authority—become both influence the nuclear strategic debate, a debate bureaucratised and militarized. to which the armed forces have not provided Here they are forced to weigh the inelucta- an altogether effective response. bility of violence in domestic and intemational Thus a case can be made for the conduet of pohtics (including the vast destructive and civil-military relations in the nuclear-guerrilla repressive potential of which the armed profes- age wherein the various exponents of the in- sion disposes) against the diplomatic—indeed struments and resources of national power have hum anistie—necessity for negotiation and com- been brought into continuous contact, not so promise, for moderation and restraint. It is much for the capricious control of military primarily here that the politician, if he did not power as for its precise and intelligent regula- understand it before. is edueated in the idea tion through a comprehensive system of inter- that the armies for whose direction and control penetration. Such a case would recognize the he is ultimately accountable are no less than incipience of violence in political instability great corporations. whose functioning is limited and the inevitability of organized violence in not only by the frietions engendered bv admin- the orderlv conduct of intemational affairs. It istrative shorteomings, natural hazards, inade- would do so because man, as a political animal quate information, and human fear but also by desirous of promoting the perceived interests of rivalries. ainbitions, and an institutional inertia the State he Controls, must acknowledge that which it reqnires great qualities of eharaeter to the possibility of the use of violence always ex- overcome. To the professional and bureaueratie ists and therefore the instruments of violence arguments of what is militarily, financially, and must be ready at hand. administratively desirable, he must present the W olfville, Nova Scotia case for what is socially acceptable and politi- cal lv possible. Notes But all of this, if it is to be more than a mat- This artirle was largely mspired liv a rercading of E. M. Lyons analysis ot ter of good intentions, high purpose, and rule "The 'New' Civil-Mjlltarv Relations." American Political Science Hcvicw. Vol. of thumb, presupposes that soldier, bureaucrat, 55. March 1961. pp. 53-63. and politician are not onlv talking the same I See. for instunce, Adam Yarinolinsky, "The Military Estahlishment How Political Prohlcnis Become Military Problems)," Eorergn Poticij. No. I. Wintcr language but are able at once to translate their 1970-71. pp. 78-98 2. Morton If flalperin, "Whv Bureaucrats Play Games." Forci^n Policy, Nu. technical jargon into the plain table talk of a II. Spring 1971, pp 70-90

THE NEED FOR MILITARY OFFICERS AS STRATEGIC THINKERS

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Ric h a bd D. Besl ey Who is this that darkeneth counsel hy speaking wonls without knowledge? -Joh 38:2

INCE World War II, there has evolved a the hands of . . . the Army and the Navy." 1 bodv of civilian intelligentsia that has The corollary philosophy was reflected in Gen- S flourished through thinking, writing, and eral George C. MarshalTs remark during World counseling our national leaders on military War II concerning a British proposal to modify strategic- theorv. During a renaissance of mili- Allied strategy: “I would be loath to hazard tary strategic thought which began in the 1950s, American lives for purely political purposes.” 2 civilian scholar-thinkers—militarists in mufti— World War II in Europe was hardly over have built an edifíce of strategic theorv that when the grim realization finallv struck that, still exerts a profound influence on all im- while Germany was being defeated, a new and portant aspects of United States defense policy. growing political threat was introduced by the half ally, Soviet Rússia. The United States The Scholar-Strategists found itselí confronting an expansive power whose conflicting postwar aims had been The advent of thermonuclear weapons and cloaked by the common Allied military strategy intercontinental delivery systems brought Amer- framed during the war.3 Even though the threat ican strategists face to face with a task of un- of Communist expansionism was worrisome, foreseen difficulty. The traditional concepts of the U.S. strategists theorized that a contain- war and peace, which had allowed the United ment policy, backed by the still exclusive States to sally forth from its continental fortress American atomic arsenal, would discourage to engage in peace-restoring crusades and then Soviet incursions beyond the periphery of exist- retum home, were rendered invalid. ing boundaries.4 International confliet used to be viewed as The atomic blasts over Hiroshima and Naga- clearly defined periods of violence which began saki presented the air power strategists a new when diplomacy failed and statesmen handed and presumably ultimate weapon. It heralded the burden of achieving victory over to the mil- the era and the accompa- itary. This mutual exclusion of political and nying drawdown of conventional, or general military considerations in strategic planning purpose, forces. Those explosions were blinding was illustrated a few days before Pearl Harbor to more than the unfortunate Japanese. The in Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s comment apparent economy of mass destruction weapons on the U.S.—Japanese diplomatic situation: “I gave rise to the slogan “More bang per buck,” have washed my hands of it, and it is now in but sole reliance on atomic bombs ignored the

57 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

fact that they might soon be bought with rubles posture, and he carried a host of the civilian as well as dollars.3 neostrategists along to victory and to Washington. The Eisenhower administration took office in After Kennedv’s inauguration, Alain En- 1953 coinmitted to ending the Korean War and thoven and Henry Rowen, former rand ana- taking a new look at U.S. military strategy. The lvsts, were installed in high-level Pentagon po- New Look strategy embodied a long-haul con- sitions. They had both collaborated with Albert cept with an attendant need for economy.6 It Wohlstetter in the early 1950s on a rand proj- disearded the Truman adniinistrations notion ect to study alternatives for basing the strate- of planning toward a crisis year and formalized gic bomber force overseas.9 Wohlstetter and a dominant role for the Air Force as the practi- William Kaufmann became actively involved as tioner of deterrence through the threat of eonsultants to the Office of the Secretary of “massive retaliation.” Defense. Henry Kissinger, of course, has served both the Kennedy and Nixon adniinistrations, massive retaliation strategy demonstrating a remarkably durable and apolit- ical brand of stewardship. Herman Kahn, a The massive retaliation strategy was announced rand product, served both as an adviser to the officially to the world by Secretary of State Atomic Energy Commission and as a consultant John Foster Dulles in 1954, and the Commu- to the Department of Defense. Thomas C. nists were wamed that further aggression in Schelling was a sênior staff member at r .and Korea might lead to a United Nations response and joined the Kennedy camp as an adviser to whieh would “not necessarily be confined to the United States Arms Control and Disarma- Korea.” 7 The massive retaliation concept es- ment Agency. He was probably recmited to the tablished the basic orientation for future de- position on the basis of his 1961 book (with fense policy for many years to come.8 Morton Halperin), Strategy and Anm Control. 10 The storm of criticism over Secretary These civilian scholars, drawn from the varv- Dulless 1954 pronouncement was widespread. ing disciplines of the physical Sciences, eco- It carne not only from Democrat leaders, the nomics, and international relations, are rep- political opposition, but from the scholars of resentative of the relativelv small group of national securitv policy, such as Henry Kissin- neostrategists upon whom a great burden was ger, William W. Kaufmann, and others. placed.11 Beginning at the rand Corporation, The fact that a Republican administration they assumed the task of determining how to espoused the philosophv of massive retaliation think about nuclear weapons under rapidlv gave considerable political flavor to the criti- changing technological and political circiun- cism of that philosophv, so that the scholar- stances. strategists paid court to, and were heard by, Whv have the military professionals been so the Democratic hopefuls. Tliis courtship of ineffective in this area? The answer appears to strategic thinking and politics culminated, circa lie in a paradoxical pair, discipline and disuni- 1961, in the marriage of a number of strategy ty: the discipline of the military in faithfully critics to the Kennedy administration. A large carrying out administration policv and the dis- part of the 1960 presidential campaign battle unity bom of interservice rivalry. between Kennedy and Nixon was waged over defense strategy issues. As Nixon felt duty- foliou' the leader bound to defend the Eisenhower administration, he was thereby linked to the massive retaliation The President is the Commander in Chief of idea. Kennedy, on the other hand, was free to the armed forces. Once he has set the course in pursue new thinking that favored a more flexible American relations with other nations (e.g., the MILITARY OFFICERS AS STRATEGIC THINKERS 59

massive retaliation concept), it behooves the through World War II more or less in harness, uniformed military strategist/planner to steer it was seemingly impossible for them to agree that course. As General Maxwell Taylor on strategic plans for the postwar era.14 They pointed out in The Uncertain Trumpet (1959), soon carne to realize that the seleetion of when President Eisenhower implemented the strategy would hinge largely on the budget. New Look military policy in 1953 all members As the military budget was sharply reduced of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were summarily re- after the war, the most economical strategy placed.12 Th is action made clear the position of appeared to favor the Air Force because the the jcs as workers for the administration team. massive retaliation concept rested largely on Thev were expected to accept public responsi- the Air Force capabilitv to deliver interconti- bilitv for the decisions and actions of their ci- nental nuclear weapons. Henee the Air Force vilian superiors concerning military policy, could expeet the largest share from annual de- regardless of their own views and recommen- fense budgets. The Armv flatly opposed massive dations. retaliation, partlv because it meant a drastic The more immediate results of the puppet- cutback in ground forces and therefore less jcs syndrome were that most military strategy money to develop its desired force structure. planners marched resolutely íorward under Service rivalries became so intense and en- the banner of massive retaliation while the during that, even with a strong chairman, the civilian thinkers raised a hue and cry against it. Joint Chiefs of Staff could not develop a set of By the time the political opposition stormed coherent strategic plans. Indeed. President the White Honse in 1960, the civilian strategists Kennedv in June 1961 was so frustrated by jcs had established themselves as Creative and disunity that he gave them a direct order by innovative, and the military were viewed as un- written inemorandum asking for their “help in imaginative, with little promise of developing fitting military requirements into the overall any forward-looking strategy. context of anvJ situation. . . ." He wanted to It was not until after the Kennedv adminis- consider them as “more than military men” for tration emphasized the concepts of flexible re- the purpose of strategic thinking and plan- sponse and counterinsurgency that objectives ning.15 other than total victorv and means other than The overall result of the Service rivalries and head-on conflict became accepted in principie the attempts by the jcs to tell the boss what bv the military establishment.1! Henceforth, the they thought he wanted to liear concerning jcs and military planners would think through strategy was that nothing new or thought- such concepts bec anse the President, the provoking issued from them.16 In urgent need Commander in Chief, had given them direc- of fresh new approaches to the problems of tion. To have pursued the development of such a world in political Hux, the Kennedy adminis- strategy earlier, during the Eisenhower years, tration installed the civilian neostrategists as would have been unwise from a military profes- the primary thinkers on national security mat- sionabs viewpoint. ters. intenervice rivalry How Civilian Strategists Períormed

Probably of signifieance equal to the diseiplin- In assessing the past performance of the eivil- ary or bureaucratic factor that enhanced the ian strategists, Colin S. Gray, writing in the rise of civilian scholar-thinkers was the lack of Fali 1971 issue of Foreign Policy, observed: “In agreement between the armed Services. Al- 1961 the promise was high. Yet in 1971 it is though the separate Services had fought fair to say that their performance has not lived 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

up to their promise.”17 Another critic com- with his efforts, On Thermonuclear War (1960), mented that the philosophy which evolved Thinking Ahout the Unthinkable (1962), and from “thinking ahout the unthinkable” had Limited Strategic War (1962). caused a widespread tendency to “unthink the It is fact that the most inHuential of the civil- thinkable.”18 To paraphrase, we have spent so ian strategists have been the most prolific much time gaming and analyzing scenarios of publishers.21 It is also factual that the strategy nuclear confrontation between superpowers writers’ tenure with rand and similar agencies that we have failed to consider adequately the has given them aecess to classified information, more likelvJ encoimters. which puts the stamp of authenticity on their Other writers have given the eivilians better works. While it may be beneficiai to communi- marks. Writing in World Politics in July 1968, cate to other nations exactly how we are ap- Hedley Bull, Professor of International Rela- proaching the study of war in the nuclear age, tions at the Australian National University, it could be of more value to cloak our inner- observed that the doctrine evolved by the most thoughts with a semblance of security and scholar-strategists, while not the “last word on thereby deny potential enemies a eheek list of strategy in the nuclear age,” should be viewed our probable responses. Anyone familiar with as at least a clear defínition of the problems we the Pentagon Papers incident, in which a rand faced. Professor Bull gave them credit for employee revealed highlv classified national charting “some reasoned course” when other- security documents to the world, will appreci- wise we might have been adrift; he said that ate the dangers inherent in the scholar s ten- even though history may reject the “intellec- dency toward dual lovalties: to his country and tual fare” which they provided, it should cer- to mankind. tainly applaud the efforts of the scholarly strat- egists to frame and dissect the issues.19 the nonprofessionals The methodologies of the scholar-strategists, such as economic models, game theory, and Because they are essentially men of ideas, the escalation ladders, comprise the Basic reason civilian scholar-strategists tend to be overly for the difficultv in transferring answers from optimistic about the transferability of their model-building to prescriptions for action. Al- theories to the real world. The aspects of spec- though the sincere and vital interest of the ulation and abstractness, characteristic of the scholars in the survival of their country cannot study of nuclear conflict, are the verv sirens be denied, it ean nevertheless be deduced that that lured the scholars to the studv of military their thinking and writing were often as much strategy. Since there has never been a nuclear a bid for reeognition from their peers as they war per se and as time passes that possibilite were an aeeurate reflection on military and seems less likely to rational men, the mere spec- political realities. The shower of articles, ulation about how nations might react as such books, and other publications by the civilian an event unfolded becomes even more of a fan- scholars demonstrated their compulsion to tasy.22 A few of the scholars, on introspection, publish the great American strategic volume. have admitted that, even though speculation on Publication of an acceptable book is a nuclear conflict was a useful development, its significant and much-sought-after career mile- direct application to diplomacv suffered from a stone in the scholarly disciplines. According to fatal defect, and that least of all the academics reliable estimates, over 100,000 pieces of “liter- had anv idea how a nuclear war would be ature” were written on the subjeet of warfare fought or even whether it would favor the in the years just prior to 1967.20 Herman Kahn offense or defense. probably won the strategy publication race This is not to suggest that to qualify for stra- MILITARY OFFICERS AS STRATECIC THINKERS 61

tegic thought one must first enjoy a reputation By minimizing the personal or psychological as a great field general. On the contrary, most element in the pursuit of gaming models and of the world’s recognized military strategists in simulation, the scholars aceept as fixed the uniform never attained the rank of general or goals and interests of the players. They tend to its equivalent. For that matter, few were even disregard the interdependente of goals, means, considered good soldiers. Nevertheless, a histor- personalities, and group arrangements of the ical assumption has been that strategy is essen- opponents.25 tially a practical consideration and that some An indictment of method may seem harsh or experience in the management of forces and unfair, given that the analytical gaming meth- weapons, while not a guarantee of strategic odologists promise nothing more than a reduc- expertise, should certainlv be a prereqnisite to tion of uncertainty. But such an evaluation entering the field.23 seems necessary to offset the claims that the seholar-strategists presided over the birth of a new Science which will eliminate outdated sterile methodology methods and replace them with technically superior and sophisticated Systems analysis An assumption basic to most of the theories techniques. The tools of the scholar are helpful advanced by the seholar-strategists, notably in considering alternative Solutions to criticai Thomas Schelling and Oskar Morgenstern. is problems; but as Bernard Brodie, an eminent that contemporary International conflict can be civilian strategist in bis own right, has admit- analyzed in terms of rational “strategic men. ted, the Systems analysis technique “is not co- This assumption is necessary in order to fit the terminous with strategy, as Mr. McNamara, study of strategy problems into the economic among others, thought it was." Brodie pointed models and gaming scenarios that characterize out that Secretary McNamara, a statistician by the scientific systems-analysis approach. Ac- training, was “plainly in love with it [systems cording to Colin Gray: analysis]" and rejected the “poetrv" of those Apart from natural pride in theoretical ac com- around him who tried to introduce some politi- plishment, the predisposition of American strate­ cal intuition.26 gists to discem a Western tutelage of Soviet stra­ tegic doctrine derives in part from the academic The neostrategists comprised a highly like- backgrounds of many theoreticians and the eco­ minded school which absorbed most of the appro- nomic orientation of the strategists of the rand priate and available talent. Any dissident Corporation. [As a result] . . . a good number of spokesmen from outside were few and easily the leading civilian strategists created a mirror- stifled. Given this enviable position, it is to their image opponent.24 credit and that of the very methods they eni- In a purely theoretical exercise, the assumed ployed that objectivitv and reason have pre- symmetry of opponents is harmless, but the vailed through the years of their doininance in games of strategy played out in the scholarly the field of national strategic thought. literature of the past two decades were not in- tended exclusively for an academic audience. Opportunity and Challenge The simulated “.American nature of the oppo­ nent was transferred to the thinking of advisers During those years when thinking about the to the govemment and to the policv-makers unthinkable was in vogue, the face of the stra­ themselves. The result has been that United tegic enemy was blurred behind satellites, States strategic theory is highly ethnocentric computers, and k .bm launchers. He was per- and diverges from the military professionals ceived to be a single-minded, rational, Ameri- cautious axiom, “Know your enemy.” can-like strategic analyst. Fortunately for the 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Free World, the neostrategists apparently con- professional opportunity knocks vincetl the Soviet of his “genius” and thereby Since the advent of the Nixon administration, lessened the chances of irrational behavior. the door has been opened to military profes- Certainly we should give the civilian strategist- sional advice and eounsel on national security writers credit for inculcating in the Soviets, matters. Whereas Secretary McNamara exer- as well as our own leadership, an appreciation cised virtual autonomy over Defense policy of world stability and a desire to limit and con- trol warfare. decisions, even those with large foreign policy impact, Secretary Laird returned the military The unfortunate result is that our national to a substantial role in policy-making. A sênior military leadership entered the seventies with State Department official has noted that instead twenty-five vears of experience during which of dealing largelv with civilian analysts, as dur- they were seldom afforded opportunity or en- ing the Kennedy-Johnson years, the Foreign couragement to think in broad strategic Service offiees deal increasingly with both the ter ms.27 Joint Staff and the separate Services.29 Since 1970, it has appeared that President Secretary Laird seemed to be granting the Nixon and Dr. Kissinger want to consider a military more autonomy and redueing the role grand new strategic design and have invited of the civilian staffers. At the same time the the military to participate. Concurrently, it is highly structured National Security Council apparent that the game-theory syndrome of the staff and the new Defense Policy Review sixties, which emphasized the symmetrical Committee suggest that President Nixon means structure of possible conflict between mutually to substitute rigorous institutional proeedure perceptive strategic plavers, is at an end. for the systems analyses of his predecessors as Much of the change can be attributed to the the means of assuring civilian control.30 The decreasing preoccupation with a strictly bipo- administration has offered the military profes- lar U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship and a growing sion an opportunity to become involved in de- appreciation of more complex and multipolar veloping national security policy. scenarios that reject nuclear war as a viable The military leadership can no longer com- instrument of national policy. plain before congressional committees that all As a result, the diplomatic situation between their troubles stem from the “whiz kid civil- the two superpowers has changed in recent ians in osd Systems Analysis. The challenge to vears. There is an implied nuclear standoff and the military is obvious: be Creative, imagina- tacit recognition of each others zones of tive, innovative, and responsive. The related influence and vital interests.28 A situation of challenge is to avoid renewal of the harsh inter- this sort, with inherent ambiguity and implied service arguments that have detracted from relationships, does not lend itself to sterile gam- military eounsel so often in the past. ing analysis. The military Services must provide an institu- Morton Halperin, in his Dcfen.se Strategies tional capability to understand political objec- for the Seventies, interpreted the changing tives and to suggest appropriate applications of scene by saying that as we have passed from the armed forces to achieve them. Militaryj the massive retaliation stratagem of the fífties, leaders must comprehend more fullv the rela- and as thermonuclear war has become unthink- tionship of means to ends and appreciate the able as an alternative, the relevaney of civilian moral principies that play a vital role in the strategists has diminished. He observed that, in suceess and aceeptability of military operationsJ the shadow of nuclear stalemate, we are return- Deterrence of war and the attainment of politi- ing to a conventional concept of military pow- cal objectives must be recognized as “victorv, er, where military thinkers are best. eve:i at the lower leveis of conflict.31 MIL1TARY OFF1CERS AS STRATECIC THINKERS 63

strategists and commanders itary professional to step outside the military establishment for a time, look back on it, and It is difficult to generate a bodv of competent view it in relationship to the other elements of strategic thought at high leveis within the Ser- national security. Armed with this perspective vices as they are presentlv structured. In fact, and educated to the ideas and logic of the civil- the misconception that a militarv chief of staff ian strategists and their institutions, the mili- is also a strategist mav be responsible for many tary officer is better equipped to contribute to of our past problems. Often, vvhen civilians did the development of a body of coherent strate- defer to the militarv chiefs on national security gic thought within the military. Moreover, the questions, they were disappointed. very presence of intellectually oriented officers Our armed forces are commanded bv intelli- in the civilian institutions should contribute to gent, competent, and dedicated leaders. But a mutual respect between the disciplines and that does not say that they are strategists.32 could influenee the direction of strategic There are numerous strategists and potential thought generated among civilian scholars. strategists in our armed forces, but that does An expansion of programs such as this can not say that they are in positions of command. satisfy the requirement to select and train mili- Leadership of the forces is not and cannot be tary strategic thinkers; their placement, promo- reserved for strategists. Good strategists are not tion, and reeognition will take more time and always good leaders. But certain key positions effort on the part of all the armed Services, at high levei should be filled bv strategic think- separately and jointly. ers. One thing needed to insure militarv strategic expertise at the proper leveis is a reasonable prospect of promotion for those officers who If the mil it a r y profession is to regain its demonstrate talent in strategy matters yet may rightful position in the design of national not necessarily aspire to command troops. strategy, then the levei of interservice bickering An example of the type of program we need over parochial interests must be depressed. Bv is the Air Force Research Associate Program. the time strategic issues are laid before the This program selects promising .Air Force lieu- National Security Council or the President, the tenant colonels and colonels for one-year tours Joint Chiefs of Staff owe their leader a sem- with civihan organizations engaged in stuches blance of unity. Neither he nor the National of national securitv policy. The places of as- Security Council nor the Defense Policy Re- signment varv from year to year and include view Committee should be put in the position such organizations as the Council on Foreign of arbitrating an interservice squabble. Differ- Relations, New York: Center for International ences in Service Outlook are certain to arise, Studies, Harvard University; the Institute of but they should be resolved in the jcs arena. War and Peace Studies, Columbia University; That is why we need military strategic thinkers the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Re- at all leveis down to major command, to think search, Johns Hopkins University; and the Insti- through the doctrinal differences which impede tute for Strategic Studies, London. Before re- Service unity and thereby reduce damaging porting to their one-year assignments for study, arguments at higher leveis. these officers are given a two-week orientation Our civilian chiefs have offered us a mean- program, consisting of several briefíngs in the ingful role in the formulation of national secu- Pentagon, three days at the rand Corporation, rity strategy. We should answer the call by and sometimes visits to major command head- expanding, in a joint Services effort, programs quarters. like the Air Force Research Associates. Our This type of program allows the selected mil- personnel assignment and promotion policies 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

should be tailored to encourage and reward the opportunity and meet the challenge which career-minded strategists, but the inost telling the current scene affords, lest we once again impetus will siniply be top-level Service inter- abdicate our role in national security affairs. est. N orfolk, Virgínia YVe must identify those with particular ge- nius and place them in key positions in or near the policy power eenters such as the Defense Policy Review Committee, Net Assessment Colonel Besley adapted this article from a studv Group, and National Security Council. prepared as part of his academic work while a stu- It behooves the militarv hierarchv to seize dent in the 1972 class of Air War College.

Notes

1. Roliert S. Gard. 'The Militarv and American Society," Foreign Affairs. 15. President Kennedy quoted in Gard, p. 702. Vol. 49, No. 4. July 1971, p. 699. 16. Brodie, p. 153. 2. Ihid. It is quite possíble that this remark l>v General Marshall deinon- 17. Colin S. Gray. "What Hath RAND Wrought," Foreign Policy. No. 4. Fali strated not so miuh an aversion to politics in general as a distaste for using 1971, p. 111. American troops to help restore portions of the British colonial empire. 18. A. H. S. Candlin. “Unthinking the Thinkable," Journal o f tlu• Rot/ul 3. Mauriee MatlofF. The Evolution of Strategic Thought." The Sational War United Sen iee Institution, Vol. CX1V, No. 653. March 1969, p. 41. College Forum. Spring 1971. I2th Issue. p. 79. 19. Hedley Bull. "Strategic Stndies and Its Critics.” World Politics, Vol. XX, 4. Martin Lichterman. Korea Prohlerns in Limited War," in Gordon B. July 1968, p. 605. Tumer and Bichard D. Challener. eds.. Xatbnal Security iu the Nuclear Age 20. Raymond C. O Connor, "Current Goncepts and Philosophy of Warfare." New York: Frederick A. Praeger. lm.. 1960 . p. 31. Leeture, Naval War College. 12 September 1967. Reprinted in Militanj 5. General Maxwell D. Taylor. The Umcrtain Trumpct New York: Harper Strategy and Aerospacc Power, Vol. IV, Chapter 10. Air War College Associate and Brothers. 1959). p. 13. Program, 1969. p. 27. 6. Morton II Malperin. Defense Stmtegics fo r the Scventies íBoston: Little. 21. Wilson, pp. 8-16. Brown and Coinpany. 1971'. p. 41. 22 James King, "Nuclear Plentv and Limited War," Foreign A ffairs, January 7 Secretarv Dulles was quoted in Beniard Brodie. Strategy in the Missile 1957, p. 239. Age Princeton. New Jersev: Princeton Universitv Press. 1959), p. 249. 2:3. Bull. p. 594. 8. IhiiL A book bv Brigadier General Dale O. Smith. C.S Militartj Doctrinc 24. Gray, p. 111. New York Duell, Sloane& Pearce, 1955). provides one of the few comprehen- 25 KarI W Deutsch. Introduction to Anatol Rapoport. Strategy and Con- sive treatments of inassive retali.ition given bv a militarv writer at that time. seienre (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. x. 9. Emest H May. 'The Influente of Ideas on American Foreign Policy: Ideas 26. Brodie. p. 156. about Militarv Strategy.” a paper presenteei at the 67th Annual Meeting, 27 Vincent Davis. "American Militarv Policy: Decisionmaking in the Execu- American Political Science Association. Chicago, Illinois. 10 September 1971. tive Branch," leeture. Naval War College, 7 January 1970. Printed in Xava! p. 9. War College Review. Vol. XXII. May 1970. p. 16. 10 Ravrnond ] VViLson, Jr. The F-gght atis and the Pentugon: The Influente o f 28 Raymond Aaron. The Evolution of Modem Strategic Thought." Adel> Civtluin Intelh i tuals on Sational Security Policy, Air U ar College Thesis No. phi Papers. Prohlerns o f Modem Strategy. Part I, February 1969. Institute for 2-379. Maxwell AFB. Alabama. 1963. pp. 13-15. Colonel Wilson s thesis, writ Strategic Stndies. London. p. 16. ten nine vears ago is accurate in its implied prophecy that Dr. Kissinger s 29. William Beeeher, "Foreign Policy: Pentagon Also Encounters RebuÉfs,” influenee on strategic policy-making was durable. Xew York Times, January 21. 1971. p. I. 11. Beniard Brodie "Whv Were We So iStrategieally i Wrong?" Foreign Poli- 30. Adam Yarmolmsky, The Militan/ Estahlishment. Its Impaets on American cy. No. 5. Winter 1971-72. p. 153. Socicty (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). p. 33. 12. Taylor, p. 18. 31. Gard. p. 704. 13. Gard. pp. 701-2. 32 Stefan T. Possony and J E. Pounielle. The Strategy o f Technology (New 14. William W. Kaufmann, The MtXamara St rateei/ New York: Harper and York: Dunellen Gompany, Ino.. 1970), p. 80. Row. 1964 . p. 19. Wi í ÍQ S P

Air Force Review

BEST HIT '72 Nato's Southern Region Fighter Weapons Meet NUMBER of factors that became obvious Turkey's Participation A in the 1960s made it necessary for NATO to review and revise its strategic concept of A Turkish Air Force F-104G Starfighter. . . . Tttrkisli pilot rnokes preflight inspection o f Lockheed F-104G. operations. First, the apparent relaxation of tension be- tween the East and West in Central Europe led to the realization that a major attack on that front was not necessarily the main threat that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had to face. Increasing account needed to be taken of the possibility of limited, peripheral, or ill- defined threats in other areas. It was notice- able that the Soviet Union was developing tvpes of forces designed to enable it to deploy a signifieant military capability in any part of the world. In particular, the increasing penetration of the Mediterranean posed a potential threat to s Southern flank. Accordingly, a new and more flexible strate- gic concept was developed and adopted by the Defense Planning Committee meeting at the Defense Minister’s levei in December 1967. The basis of this concept, which retains the principie of forward defense, is that credible deterrence of militarv actions of all kinds is necessary and that this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balaneed mixture of conventional weapons with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main principies. The fírst principie is to meet anv aggression with direct defense at approximately the same levei; the second is to deter through the possibility of escalation. If an attack cannot be contained, the responses must at least be sufficient to convince the enemy of determination to resist and to force a pause, during which the risks of escalation must be considered. The keystone of the new strategy is that an aggressor must be convinced of nato s readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary, but at the same time he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circum- stances in which they would be used. In short, while this flexible strategy involves the possibil-

66 AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

Greece Plays Host ity, ever present in the background, of escala- tion to a nuclear strike, it is based essentially Hellenic Air Force "chuse planes " ftew jticlges observ- on controlling the progress of escalation of any ii,£ niissions. . . . Greek crew readies Northrop RF-5A. conflict rather than on planning to meet any attack with instant and massive nuclear retali- ation. The new strategic coneept, with its increased emphasis on the need to be prepared for at- tacks of varving scales in any region of the nato area, ealls for a coniprehensive range of mobile and well-equipped air forces, conven- tional as well as nuclear. This change of strategy from one of all-out retaliation if somebody stepped across the line s Involvement to the one of today, whieh is to “retain that nuclear capability, but be prepared to fight Italiaii Air Force Fiat C-9I comes in for landing. . . . An IAF ground crew prepares Fiat C-91 for next mission. conventionally,” has had a very significant effect on the air forces of the Southern Region. Now the pilots of the Greek, Italian, and Turkish air forces assigned to the Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe (airsouth), must not only retain their proficiency in nuclear weap- ons deliverv but also become proficient in conventional (bomb, rocket, strafe) weapons deliverv. At the sarne time they must stay adept in air-to-air gunnery. Improving the conventional capability of the pilots equates to improving and increasing the lethality of every mission and every sortie USAF's Guest Role flown by ajrsouth. Lieutenant General Fred M. Dean, Com- A USAFE F-4E rolls dowti runw/ij al Ltirissa AB, Creeie. .. Crouiul cretv watches McDonnell Douglas F-4E warm u/>. mander, ajrsouth from August 1968 to Jiuie 1972, was a firin believer that a tactieal weap- ons meet with its pressures, problems, and re- quirements contributed immeasurably toward increasing the overall ability of a coimnand to accomplish its mission. Soon after taking over as Commander, he directed his staff to look into the possibilities of reviving the airsoi.'th weapons meet competition among the air forces of the three Southern Region nations. The meets, which had been hotly contested and well attended during the mid-fífties, had not known as guest teams. Both aecepted the invi- been held since 1956, even though each nation tation, but the Navv team withdrew before the had vvon a leg on the Air Commanders Trophy competition started. during that period. The 1970 airsouth Tactical Weapons Meet. In September 1969, after much spade work, “Best Hit ’70,” was held at Istrana Air Base, the Italian Air Force was officially asked to Italy, 4-12 September 1970. Tlie Maniago host the meet, reviving the airsouth Weapons Gunnery Range, 70 kilometers northeast of Is- Competition. Upon Italys acceptance, invita- trana Air Base, was used for all ordnance deliv- tions went out to the other Southern Region ery. With the airsouth Commander s Trophy nations asking them to participate. Turkev ac- as top prize, the meet initially took the form of cepted, but the *Greek Air Force, although competition between the Fifth Allied Tactical strongly supporting the meet, could not ac- Air Force and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air tivelv participate the first year. The United Force, with the Italians representing fiveataf States Air Force and the United States Navy and the Turks representing sixa t a f. were each asked to contribute a team to be Poor weather conditions during the competi-

70 .4 USAF F-4E flies over the Ambelon Gunnery Range. . . . An L-T-VA-7B o f the U.S. Navy eleinent nuikes strafing pass.

Southern Region nations, plus a combined U.S. Navy-U.S. Air Force guest team. It also fea- tured for the first time in international gunnery competition five different air weapon systems: Northrop F-5s, Fiat G-91s, North American F-lOOs, ltv A-7As from the usn, and Mc- Donnell Douglas F-4Es from the usaf. Final standings showed the Turks on top with 596 points, the combined U.S. team vvith 538, the Italians with 464, and the Greeks. the first-day leaders, with 422. By winning, the Turks were one up on their Southern Region allies.

r reparations for “Best Hit 7 2 ” started in November 1971, with the selection of an airsouth project officer. In December the tion phase of the meet prevented flying the agreement to host the meet at Larissa Air Base, minimum number of missions required by the Greece, was received from the then Hellenic rules, so a winning team could not be selected. Air Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Although no winner was named, the meet Demetrios Kostakos. was deemed a suceess since many organiza- It was decided that the meet would be open tional procedures were tested and the eompeti- to teams comprised of combat-ready pilots tion did give valuable training to the pilots par- from all Southern Region attack squadrons. Pi- tieipating. It also furthered the close working lots of dual-capable units and pilots assigned to relationship between the ground and air crews staff positions would also be eligible to com- of the nations involved. Most of all, it set the pete, provided they were combat-ready in the stage for “Best Hit 7 1 .” attack role. It was also decided that the meet The 1971 meet was held at Eskisehir, Tur- would be open, on an optional basis, to one key, and hosted by General Mushin Batur, guest team composed of combat-ready pilots Chief of Staff of the Turkish Air Force. It not permanently assigned to the Southern Re- brought together pilots from all three nato gion.

71 Close-up o f bull’s-eye and the Dutch range judge . . . Ju d g e counts hits on the strafing target. Score-keepers record the hits The Arbitration Committee re- counted by the range judgea. views data to rule on a claim.

Invitations were issued by the Hellenic Air erational requirements and accommodations Force to the Italian, Turkish, and United States and to set a firm date for the meet. The Hel- air forces and the U.S. Navy to participate in lenic Air Force officers from the 1 lOth Wing the meet. The usaf and usn were asked to and the 28th Tactieal Air Force had antici- supply elements.*tftat would participate as a pated most of the committee’s desires and ques- combined guest team but be ineligible to com- tions and had prepared a master plan of their pete for the àirsouth Commanders Trophv. own. Hotels in Larissa, a city dating back to However, they would be eligible to compete ancient Greece, had already been contacted. for the high-score team trophv. Ramp parking places for visiting aircraft on In the master plari for the meet, it was esti- Larissa ab, as well as Office space lor the var- mated that 30 milestones would have to be ious eommittees and participating teams, were passed before the meet was concluded, a win- already designated. The Ambelon Gunnery ner crowned, and a final report submitted. Range, approximately 10 miles east of the air In February 1972 the eighth milestone was base, was picked as the site for the delivery of accomplished when a committee team from all ordnance. A “we can do it” spirit seemed to ajrsooth visited Larissa Air Base to check op- be the motto of the Hellenic Air Force hosts. 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Many administrative and operational prob- Ling-Temco-Vought A-7Bs, was Attack Carrier lems had to be solved before the teams could Wing Six from the uss Roosevelt. .And for the depart for the meet. Requests went out to usaf guest element was usafe’s 612th tac qualified weapons meet officials in Allied Fighter Squadron of the 401st Tactical Fighter Forces Northern Europe, Allied Forces Central Wing, Torrejon .ab, Spain, flying McDonnell Europe, and the United Kingdoms Near East Douglas F-4Es. Air Force, requesting their Services for the The uniqueness of the meet in having five meet. Permission to take aerial photographs of different air weapon systems called for some the navigation routes and targets by a Southern unique decisions. The F-4E and F-104G have a Region nation had to be received from the “gatling” gun that, because of its rapid-firing Greek officials. Upon receiving permission, the capability and design characteristics, could not Ministrv of Defense of the be loaded with only the 80 rounds required by was asked to take the photographs. The Royal meet rules. The solution to this problem was to Air Force 13th P.R. Squadron from Akrotiri, load the gun fully, set a limit switch at approxi- Cvprus, accomplished the task. mately 80, and then count the expended rounds On 9 July 1972, milestone 28 was reached after the mission. If more than 80 rounds were with the arrival of the organizing committee fired, the number over 80 was subtracted from and the participating teams at Larissa ab. “ B e st the pilots score. If fewer than 80 rounds were Hit 7 2 “ officially opened at 0900 hours on 10 fired, the number of hits stood. This method Julv as the nato flag and flags of the five na- was agreed to by all participating team cap- tions assigned to the Southern Region were tains. raised in the slight warm breeze blowing across Procedures also had to be set up to score the Larissa ab. Major General Alexandros Papani- Italian Air Force G-91, which uses a ,50-caliber kolaou, Commander of the Greek 28th Tactical weapon system. This was taken care of by mov- Air Force, welcomed the visitors on behalf of ing the foul or firing line up to 1200 feet, Lieutenant General Thomas Mitsanas, Com- whereas the rest of the competitors had to ob- mander, Hellenic Air Force. At 1300 hours on serve a 1600-foot foul line. the lOth, a team captains’ meeting, presided As in the previous year’s meet, each pilot over by the Chief Judge, was held to discuss was required to flv at least two familiarization the local flying procedures and to resolve any flights prior to competition flying. Six competi- last-minute questions regarding the rules of the tion missions were scheduled for each pilot: competition. four range-only missions and two full missions. The 1972 meet brought together pilots from On each range-only mission, the pilot was to three of nato s Southern Region nations, plus a expend one dive bomb, one skip bomb, and 80 combined U.S. Navy and U.S. .Air Force guest rounds of ammunition for a possible perfect team, and again it featured five different air score of 30 points. weapon systems. Representing the Hellenic Air On each full mission, the pilot was to Force and flying Northrop RF-5As was the low-level navigate to an equivalent target, then 349th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron from fly to the range to expend two rockets and 80 Larissa ab, Greece. Competing from the Italian rounds of ammunition for a possible perfect Air Force, flying Fiat G-91s, was the 14th lwar score of 40 points. Squadron from Treviso ab, Italy. Shooting for On 11 and 12 July, 87 familiarization flights the Turkish Air Force, flying Lockheed F-104G were scheduled and 86 actuallv flown; one pilot Starfighters, was the 191st Fighter Bomber had to abort because of sickness. To make the Squadron, Balikesir ab, Turkey. Making up the familiarization flights as meaningful as possible, Navy element of the guest team, flying every pilot flew a practice low-level navigation AIR FORCE REVIEW 75

■ xi* m *■ y % j' '

Alt the teams were well trained and close- ly nuitched, but after six days o f compe- tition, the HeUenic Air Force team won "Best Hit '72." . . . Lieutenant General Richard H. El lis. Commander AIRSOUTH, presents the trophy to the team‘s cuptain. 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

mission, with targeting judges in place, and least three aerial photographs of the target. escorted by chase aircraft. Since six days of competition flying were During the competition phase, everv pilot planned, eight full missions per day were vvas scheduled to fly a Iow-level navigation scheduled. This schedule required a total of route on each of his two full missions. eight different targets for the meet. Low-Ievel navigation rontes and equivalent As in the familiarization flights, at each targets were all located in the Larissa area. equivalent target there were two target judges Fourteen targets and routes were chosen prior to accurately time and position each aircraft. to the meet, and a target folder was prepared Everv full-mission pilot was followed by a for each target. Inclnded in the folder were two-place chase aircraft piloted by the Hellenic maps, a target route description forin, and at Air Force. Chase judges from Hq airsouth and

Flags o f several participating A'ATO nations frame a helicopter o f the Hellenic Air Force flying over Italian Air Force C-9ls at Larissa AB, Greece, "Best Hit ‘72" site. AIR FORCE REVIEW 77

the raf occupied the rear seats. walked off with individual honors in the Competition flying started on 12 Julv. At the dive-bombing and strafing events. end of the first day's competition. the Turkish Speaking to a closing-day ceremonies audi- Air Force teajn found the Ambelon Gunnery ence, General Papanikolaou likened participa- Range much to their Üking and jumped off to a tion in “Best Hit" to competition in the early five-point lead over the Greek teain, 119 to Olympic Games: 114, followed bv the U.S. team with 102. To compete in these Olympic Games was an It became evident that the teams were well honor in itself for the participants. their families trained and evenly matched and that the and the community. . . . Also, a portion of the Commanders Trophy would go to the team wall that encirded the winners’ community was making the fewest mistakes. symbolically tom down to indicate that their brave and able competitors could defend the town Five points down at the end of the first day better than a wall. of competition, the Greek team rallied and Today in our countries, we have no walls for took over the lead early in the morning of the defense, rather we have our Alliance. The achieve- second day of competition. They ended the day ments of all competitors during “Best Hit ’72” with a 14-point margin over the second-place show that a great improvement has been achieved bv the Allied Air Forces of the Southern Region. U.S. team. Each consecutive day saw the Hel- That enables lis. I believe. to be more optimistic lenic team gradually increasing its lead, to 29, for the efficiency of our eommon defense, as well 35, and 39 points, and vvhen the meet ended as more confident of ourselves. they had won bv a 28-point margin and a total score of 714 points. Finishing in second place Lieutenant General Richard H. Ellis, Com- mander, airsouth, in summarizing the meet was the usk- usaf guest team with 686 points. said: In third place was the Turkish team with 671 points, followed closely bv the Italian team The 2733 points scored in this vears meet are 713 with 662. points more than last vear s total of 2020, a tribute The 714 points rolled up bv the Greek team to the training and competitive spirit of the parti- was the highest winning score to date. Besides cipating pilots and ground crews, and concrete evidence that the over-all aim of the meet—“to the “Over-all Top Gun" of the meet, Captain serve as an incentive for internai improvement in G. Papaioannou, who amassed 136 points, all the over-all weapons delivery eapabilitv of the meml>ers of the Greek team scored at least airsouth’s air forces”—has been achieved. 110 points. Tops in the range-onlv missions with 481 “Best Hit 73” will be held in Italy. points was the Turkish team, which also Hill Air Force Rose, Utah

WO concomitant, although not parallel, a trial program established at Fairchild Air T trends over the past several years have es- Force Base, Washington, in July 1970. Because tablished a condition of possible impact and of the large proportion of untrained first ser- change on the internai functioning of modem geants and the realization that getting many of military organizations. them to an nco academy would take consider- The first trend, occurring within the Air able time, an attempt was initiated to provide Force, has been a change in the capabilitv, a short-term, non-TDY, intensive training pro- experience, and maturitv of enlisted men in gram. supervisory positions. Because of policy shifts A two-phase workshop was planned by the affecting the time required to advance from sergeant majors. It included (1) an information enlistee to supervisor—and this constitutes a segment, reviewing knowledge of facts and considerable reduction in time—voung men procedures necessary for first sergeants to func- frequentlv are placed in positions for which tion well, and (2) a communication segment, they lack needed experience and maturitv. imparting skills needed in relating to subordi- Tvpically, they demonstrate sufficient capabil- nates, particularly to first-term enlistees. The ity and perhaps are more highly educated on first phase was taught by speeialists, primarily entering the Service than were previous genera- military, who were especially knowledgeable in tions. This constellation of factors in tum pre- areas such as military justice, payroll, commis- sents unique problems to sênior noncommis- sarv operation, narcoties and dangerous drugs, sioned officers who, themselves often similarly base exchange operation, champus, and educa- affected by relatively swift promotion through tional opportunities. the ranks, must work through their subordi- The second phase required instruction by a nates to gain the high levei of efficiency re- person qualified and experienced in teaching quired increasingly by sophisticated equipment human Communications. A college professor and the complex demands of todays world. was selected, and he helped formulate the pat- Another trend, not occurring within the mili- tern of activities for that phase. As a result, the tary but happening probably as an outgrowth workshop was organized as a college class, for of the business world or other segments of so- which the participants would receive college ciety trving to cope with problems similar to credit. those of the .Air Force, is an increase in knowl- Three objectives were established for the edge and application of improved communica- second phase. Participants should(l) become bet- tion techniques. It has become common for ter aware of themselves as they interact with groups of business managers, foremen, and sales others, (2) become more sensitive to the needs staffs to enlist the aid of Communications spe- and motives of those with whom they interact, cialists in providing training and practice in and (3) learn specific interviewing techniques improved expression, listening, and understand- appropriate for working with people under their ing. supervision. Aceordingly, the participants were given a pilot program some experiences and short lectures focusing on self-awareness, several group interaction exer- The above trends found common expression in cises for studying communication processes and

79 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEXV participant reactions, and an intensive treat- beeome inflexible in relating personally and ment of dyadic interview dynamics. All partici- limited even in playing the same game under pante were given the opportunity to practice, modified rules. Change seemed especially threat- under supervision, the new interview skills with ening to this group of people. Air Force and civilian volunteers. In almost direct contrast to the nature of the Several factors led to the specific formula for participante was the nature of the training the workshop. The above-stated objectives— procedure. Being supervised, receiving feed- difficult to accomplish at best and particularly back, demonstrating skills, and making mistakes in the company of peers—all require a fair de- gree of flexibility, and all entail a certain amount of threat. The need to communicate person-to-person rather than role-to-role works at odds with game playing. The wide range of potential group training experiences presented problems of selection—how to choose those which would insure maximum movement with- out producing damaging resistance on the part of the participante. With these factors in mind, the workshop was organized in two divisions. The first week included activities geared to (1) reduce threat, (2) focus on the peopleness of the participante, (3) encourage self-disclosure, and (4) accept and use productive feedback. The second week was devoted to role play- ing and interviewing with consistent focus on (1) seeing supervisees as people and (2) listening to communication; i.e., ferreting out the mes- sage from the verbiage. The overall pattern of rationale went from reducing threat through tocusing on self-aware- ness, sensitivity to other people, specific inter- so in only a 30-hour format—formed the basic view training to practice of skills with volunteer structure. The participante themselves imposed clients. considerable restraints on the formula. They were career noncommissioned officers, ranging results in age from 32 to 55 years. Having progressed through the military System, they could be de- Somewhat standard participant rating forms scribed as generally capable, accustomed to rigid were administered at the end of the second adherence to rules and regulations, somewhat phase. Responses were verv high: on a scale stereotyped in their approach to people and from -2 through 0 to + 2 thev averaged 0.76 problems, quite dependent upon past procedures, for Phase I and 1.84 for Phase II. Subjective and therefore threatened by variations in per- comments recommended extension of the ex- ception, commiuiication, and action. In some perience to officers and other enlisted supervi- respects, they could be seen as having learned sors. A special endorsement was indicated for to plav the military game so well that they had the usefulness of the workshop in dealing with AIR FORCE REVIEW 8 J problems across the “generation gap, between sampled and the results generalized to the total career supervisors and first-term airmen. return. As a result of the positive feedback from par- The average numerical evaluation was 1.78. ticipants in the initial workshop, personnel There was a combined total of 15 neutral or from Fifteenth Air Force Headquarters (sa c ) negative ratings, constituting 2.8% of the total. carefullv reviewed the program through three Responses to the open-ended questions tended successive trials and then initiated similar train- to reinforce the numerical average rating: ing programs at all bases and tenant wings in Çuestion 1: “Value to supervisor.” All the the Fifteenth Air Force. responses in a random sample of 50 were As with the initial workshop, ratings were affirmative. obtained from participants at other bases. The Çuestion 2: “Recommended changes.” Of the rating questionnaire was as follows for the sec- 50 sampled, 23 (46%) suggested making the ond phase: program longer. A second popular suggestion,

Human Relations Program Questionnaire

Stop Human Re- Shorten or de- Indifferent— Believe Program Strongly favor lations Program emphasize the neither warm should continue Human Relations —“ a w a s t e . ” H. R. Program nor cool to it. without change. Program —expand.

-2 -1 0 1 2

Circle one of the five negative, neutral, or course such as additions or deletions? positive numbers listed above. Then answer Specify. the following, please. 3. Do you recommend another inethod of presentation? 1. Does the course have value to you as an 4. If you disagree with any portion of the Air Force supervisor? course, please specify. 2. Do you recominend any changes to the 5. Other comments.

Responses of .580 participants from the first made by 15 of the 50 (30%), was to extend the year of operation were processed by averaging workshop to all officers; a few thought it should the numerical rating as well as counting “0 ” be made available to all personnel. Several and negative (-1, -2) responses. The 580 forins comments were made relative to deleting or were from 20 workshops. Forms from the other expanding certain activities: however, no strong workshops were not submitted by the time of consistency was shown for any one treatment of initial processing. Because of the large number any activity. and because some forms from each base and tenant wing were included, it was felt that the Çuestion 3: “Method of presentation.” Of results would be representative of all partici- those sampled, all were satisfied, manv pleased, pants. with the methods they were subjected to. Responses to the open-ended questions were Çuestion 4: “Disagreements.” The most con- expansion in 1971-72 and 1972 - 73

The consistently positive response by partici- pants and a feeling expressed by base command- ers of a positive impact on their personnel resulted in an expansion to 74 workshops dur- ing 1971-72. Additionally, nine workshops were conducted in pa c a f : four at Hickam Air Force Base and one each at Kadena, Clark, Yokota, Ching Chuan Kang, and Osan. One workshop was conducted at Kirtland Air Force Base, New México, for a U.S. Navy unit on that base. In a sample (463 participants) of the 1971-72 course, the following ratings were realized: Phase I = 0.99; Phase II = 1.81. For the 1972-73 year, 74 workshops were scheduled for the Fifteenth Air Force and Eighth Air Force, both of the . pa c a f officials, impressed by the results of their initial workshops the previous year, scheduled 50 workshops for the current year. sistent response in the sample indicated that the size of the class was too large. A second concern frequently expressed was that regular dutv requirements competed with class atten- dance. Although neither of these totaled over 10% of the sample, they may be important fac- tors to the ultimate success of the program. Çuestion 5: “Other comments.” Responses to th is item tended to be repetitious of previous items and did not emphasize any one point. The following quotations are tvpical: The most valuable course of instruetion that I have ever attended in my life. It has profound effect in all my dealings with people on the joh—off duty— business and family.

o o o . . . course should be added to the eurriculum of the nco Academv and the Leadership schools.

I believe this course is the most significant single step yet taken by the Air Force to open channels of communication. Please make every effort to continue the program. All personnel stand to benefit. AIR FORCE REVIEW 83

As of Januarv 1973, 180 workshops had been over a two-and-a-half-year period at 22 Air conducted for approximatelv 4000 people, en- Force bases, a total of 180 workshops for ap- listed and offieers. Response has been consis- proximatelv 4000 people. It has received con- tentlv high: 97.2% of the latest sample rated sistently high ratings from the participants and Phase II positive (82% rated it 2), which is considerable support from base commanders, identical to the data from the first-vear ratings; personnel offieers, top-three nco’s , and educa- i.e., 2.8% of the total ratings were neutral or tion offieers. negative. With movement toward an all-volunteer mil- itarv system, programs sueh as this may help the United States to maintain a highly effieient An in n o va t ive training program, arising at a and highly effeetive military force. time of two supporting trends and tailored to Chenetj, Washington the needs of the trainees, has been conducted

VVe Stand Corrected Department

Colonel William C. Ferguson, Chief of the Munitions Division at Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command, writes:

It was with a distinct feeling of frustration that I noted rack (meh ) suspended from the outboard pvlon. The inboard referente to M-117 rather than Ml 17i bombs and LAU-3A pvlon is equipped with a triple ejector rack it e r ) loaded I rather than LAU-3/Ai rotket launchers on page 6 of the with 3 Ml 17 bombs. A mek cannot be used at this station .Vovember-Decemlrer 1972 issue of the Air Universitij Re- because it would extend aft into the landing gear. There- cietv. fore, only 3 bombs can l>e carried on this station, not 4 as The same caption incorrectly descril>es the ordnance load noted. It appears that a mer may be niounted on the een- of the F--IE illustrated on page 7. Three LAU-3/A rocket terline bomb rack, but it is impossible to be sure. launchers are clearly visible on a six-station multiple ejector

Colonel Daniel H. Lufkin, Chief, Space Environment Branch, 12th Weather Squad- ron (mac), Ent Air Force Base, Colorado, writes:

The article "Aerospace Systems and VVeather” by Major starkly literal concept ;ts Manley postulates. By and large, John Manley in the November-December issue of the Air serious discussíon of "all-weather” operations takes plaee in Vniverríty Revieu suffers from a number of sins of both a context sufficient to make clear to the average reader that omission and commLssion which deserve to be airecl if riot "all" means “as much as possible” rather than "the whole rebutted. of. ’ (See Webster’v Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, p. Manley begins by demolishirig the “all-weather” invth, 23.) although I deeplv (íoubt that he could produce a single Air . . . After establishing "solar fiares” as a prime hazard in Force operator or planner who tmlv embraces sueh a space flight, he has captioned the frontispiece (p. 42) as an 84 A IR ( WIVER SITY R E VIE W

example of a "siin flare” invading the cainera lens. Someone Odintsov, eds., Haiulbook of Astronautics, nasa Technieal has confused "fiare = a temporarv outburst of energy from Translation F-500, 1968.) a small area of the sun s surface" with ‘ fiare = light result- Although few readers are likely to be misled bv the cap- ing from reflection (as between lens surfaces) or an effeet of tion on page 45. that remarkable photograph should receive this light (as a fogged or dense area in a photographic nega- proper attribution. It is not a nimbas cloud-cover picture at tive).” (Webster, p. 317) all. but rather a photograph of a solar prominence taken in So mueh for semantics. A more serious error oceurs in hydrogen-alpha light at 1636Z, 4 June 1946. bv Dr. Walter the discussion of the effeets of fiares (in the first sense of the Orr Roberts, then at Climax Observatorv, Colorado. It is word). It is not true that “During . . . Apollo XII. solar particularly interesting to us solar phvsicists because of its Hares ereated 'vveather' that temporarily blacked out all strong suggestion of helical strueture. (See G. P. Kuiper, communication with the astronaut crevv on numerous occa- ed., The Sim. University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 413.) sions." (Manley, p. 44) Sinee the greatest part of the Apollo flights takes plaee outside the ionosphere. and for other technieal reasons, communication with the spacecraft is carried bv radio frequencies mueh higher than those whieh Major Manley replies: are strongly affected bv ionospheric disturbances. During the flight of Apollo XII. our Aerospaee Environmental Sup- port Center, the unit that actuallv performs the spaee Unfortunatelv. Colonel Lufkin missed the main point of this weather function, issued alerts for 44 events connected with philosophical (not technieal) article. By defining the word solar activity. Of these events, seven caused measurable "all" to mean "as tnuch as possible," he has admitted to ionospheric changes whieh could have interfered with being an advocate of the "all weather mvth" himself. conventional radio Communications between elements of He has convinced me that my message needs repeating, the military recovery force. Even in these cases, though. i.e., that the current approach to designing aerospaee Sys- adequate backup communication is available, mostly tems to resist adverse environmental effeets "as mueh as through satellite relav. possible” is not cost effective. Military operators and plan- Let me emphasize that the space weather Services of our ners must become more Creative and explore the alterna- unit do play a useful role in many space-flight operations. tives suggested on pages 49-50. Specifically, svstems design- ers should place greater emphasis on threat. íoree-mix, Both we and the operators we support understand what that role is, and neither of us profits from having it misrep- and climatological considerations. Thev should try to avoid resented in the pages of the Review. the syndrome of continually building svstems that are more Manley is also mistaken in his assessment of the effeets of and more weather resistant but, at the same time, more and changes in the density of the onter atmosphere on the orbi- more expensive. tal meehanics of satellites. Although it seems counter- J.H.M. intuitive to a lavman, the effeet of drag on an orbiting satellite is ulways to speed it up. Sinee the drag brings the Air luiversity Revietv replies: The confusion regarding the satellite into a lower orbit, its velocity mu st increase to bal- captions is regrettable, and we are glad that Colonel Lufkin ance the loss of potential energy with an increase in kinetic- (and others) called it to our attention. energy. (A rigorous discussion of the so-ealled "satellite paradox" will be found in N. Va. Kondrat'ev and V. A. T he Editor Books and Ideas x ( ■ REVISIONISM AND THE COLD WAR

Herman S. W olk m^íi '

tó'fc jxjM TbT UklVklll

7/77% . . . even if as the revisionists suggest, American officials had enjoyed a completely free hand in seeking a settlement with the Soviet Union, it seems unlikely that they would have suc- ceeded. Accomplishment of tliis task required not otdy conciliatory actions by Washington but a receptive attitude on the part o f Moscow. The latter simply did not exist. —J ohn Lewis Gaddis

HE “father” of post-World War II American Acheson and Harry S. Truman (in that order) T revisionist historiography is William Apple- have become almost the demons of twentieth man Williams. His The Tragedy o f American century American diplomacy. Acheson has Diplomacy set the standard for his contempo- been turned into a manipulator of the President raries. Now come Joyce and Gabriel Kolko with he served. The former Under Secretary of a massive revisionist tome, The Limits o f Power.] State—appointed Secretary of State by Truman It has become increasingly clear that the in January 1949—has been portrayed as suave, cold war—Walter Lippmann s term—holds a arrogant, and the man who, by himself, struc- fascination for Amerieans perhaps equal to the tured Américas postwar foreign policy. Presi- fading appeal of the American Civil War. Now dent Truman, according to some revisionists, we even hear mention of “cold war buffs.” merely took whatever policy advice Acheson How to explain this powerful appeal of the offered. post-World War II years for the historian and This is a false seenario. Among American his- the public? I believe there are two major rea- torians, there seems genuine agreement now sons. First, there is increasing awareness that, that Franklin D. Roosevelt papered over the on its own merits, the transformation of Ameri- basic, evolving differences between the Soviet can foreign policy after the Second World War Union and the United States. Despite the fact constitutes one of the most important epochs in that Roosevelt became frustrated and bitter at modem American diplomacy. The second rea- the Soviets in the last few months of his life, son is the . the general thrust of his thinking and policies The faet that the Vietnam war has turned reveals his misunderstanding of Stalins motiva- ont to be the longest and most impopular tions and the basic drives of Soviet foreign poli- conflict in American history has generated a cy, primarilv the Russian concem with security vast amount of research and writing. Much of on the western borders. It then fell to Presi- this is concemed with how the United States dent Truman to reform American foreign pol- got involved in Indochina. This search has icy. Truman and Acheson did work well to- naturally gone back through the decade of the gether, their personalities complementing each 1950s and into the immediate post-World War other nicely. But Truman had his own ideas on II period, the vears that mark the origins of the foreign policy. He learned fast. He had talked cold war. to Stalin and had even berated Molotov, ad- Some American writers and historians, in monishing the Soviets to keep their promise to major works on the subject, have argued that hold free elections in eastern Europe. the post-World War II foreign policy imposed HarrvJ S. Truman faced a difficult choice. In bv American leaders basically is responsible for the wake of Germany s collapse, the Russians the nation s being sucked into the Southeast had gained control over eastern Europe. fo- Asian quagmire. To these “revisionists,” Dean mented rebellion in Greece, and attempted to

f Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, $15.00), xii and 820 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

overthrow the Iranian govemment. Truman We must realize that the building and the mainte- determined that America had a direct interest nanee of peace, requires more patience, more per- in what happened elsewhere in the world. As severance, and perhaps even more moral courage than does the conduct of war itself, for the issues one historian put it: “American leaders did not involved are less clearly defined. and less dramatic, want a Cold War, but they wanted insecurity than the objectives of war.2 even less.” 1 Consequently, the President pro- Truman and Aeheson (also Symington), though mulgated the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall they distrusted the Soviet Union, did not be- Plan was established, and the United States lieve war either necessary or inevitable. The determined to draw the line at the risk of war. best chances for peace lay in helping Europe to To understand what motivated the postwar regain its economic and political stability and leaders of the United States to structure an in- in building an American atomic deterrent force temationalist foreign policy, overturning the to prevent general war. Successful diplomacy, historie .American isolationism, one must at- Aeheson felt, had to be baeked by military tempt to recreate the postwar vears. It is not power. The actions of nations could be re- good enough to begin with Vietnam and then work backwards. Such an approach usually re- stricted only by a balance of power. But the sults in more polemics than historv. objective of statecraft was to avoid atomic war. Given Stalins goals in east-eentral Europe President Truman and his Secretary of State and his understandable obsession with prevent- were confident of the publies understanding, ing Germany’s rearming, it was President Tru- and in retrospect—despite a rockv journey— man’s fate to lead this nation during a period thev carried the day. when events were shattering América s postwar dreams. By 1946, just months after the end of the most destruetive war in historv, it had be- As to po st w a r military policy, come clear that the world situation was far the Kolkos’ treatment proceeds from their con- different from what many had visualized at the viction that President Truman had all along close of the war. faced an planned for military superiority to buttress his economic and political crisis, and Communist postwar global foreign policy. According to this guerrillas were fomenting rebellion in Greece. thesis, by the summer of 1945 American leaders China was tom by civil war. This was not the had come to the conclusion that the Soviet scenario that American leaders and citizens had Union was the potential enemy and that a hoped to find after the war. strong military establishment would be re- Nonetheless, Truman and Aeheson gave quired to deal with the Russians. strong support to the United Nations. The “The preeminent strategic doctrine,” the Truman Doctrine. the Marshall Plan, the Berlin authors note, “was that air power would deter- airlift in 1948, and the birth of the North At- mine the future of modern warfare.” This idea lantic Treaty Organization in 1949 were all they allege, formulated against a backdrop of essential opti- which was not laid to rest for well over a deeade, mism that, once these crises were over, things meant that despite demobilization. the elimination would get better. Stuart Symington, after be- of the mass of the navy, or the like, so long as the coming Secretary of the Air Force, put it this United States retained a far superior air arm, way: equipped with atomic weapons, it could relax its efforts to maintain what it considered to be par- Two vears ago we were hopeful that manv of tially obsolescent land and sea forces, (p. 92) these problems would have been solved by now. " e must still be hopeful. The lack of progress is The Kolkos then proceed on the basis that by discouraging l)ut we must not give way to despair. the summer of 1946 (Bikini atomic bomb tests) 88 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

the United States had “overwhelming offensive ers wanted to foster capitalism on a worldwide air power” based on the atomic weapon. They scale so the United States would have free ac- fail to mention that between the end of the war cess to raw materiais. and the suminer of 1948 the United States had As so-called revisionists, clearly the Kolkos few atomic bombs and atomic-modified B-29 do not accept the standard version of the ori- long-range bombers.3 gins of the cold war, which holds that Soviet- All of this fits their contention that in the American distrust basically grew out of con- postwar world the U.S. attempted to substitute flicting interests and views of the two nations military power for diplomatic initiatives: “The after World War II. The fact is that the origins ahnost continuous American strategy crisis af- of the cold war are complex and surely include ter World War II, with its tortured, unresolved what Stalin considered an unexplained delay effort to substitute the power of machines for in opening a second front in western Europe the appeals of revolutionarv ideology, ulti- and then the Soviets’ hegemony in eastem matelv ended in disaster.” (p. 477) Froni Julv Europe after the vacuum left by the destruction 1946 until late 1949, they say, American de- of Germany. fense expenditures were “probably almost Publication of many revisionist books — the twice Soviet expenditures.” (p. 479) The fact Kolkos' being the most recent—has prompted was that during this period Russian defense scholars to take a fresh look at the cold war. spending outstripped the American.4 The So- This is a timely development, all to the good. It viets, during this period, attempted “to lower seems reasonable to conclude that as a result of the international temperature,” pursuing what revisionism we are going to get a number of the Kolkos term a “conservative course.” (p. 482) well-documented and remarkably objective The difficulty with the Kolkos’ treatment is books on this subject, a kind of backlash against their attempt to fit military policy and force the excesses of revisionism. .As an example, stmctures into their central contention that the John Lewis Gaddis has recently published his United States was at war with “the Left” on a The United States and the Origins o f the Cold global scale because of the requirements of the War 1941-1947, which concludes that revision- American capitalist system. Conse(juently, the ists have relied too heavily on economics, ig- How of cold war events is downgraded. Thus, noring the influence of domestic politics on the the authors think the term “cold war" imposes eonduct of American foreign policy. a burden on “comprehension of the postwar era with oversimplifieations and evokes the wrong questions. At best, that unfortunate phrase de- In summa r y, a consensus has evolved in the scribes United States-Soviet diplomacy in the American historical community which posits narrowest context, as if the relationship sub- that American economic determinism was not sumes most that is crucial in the history of our the primary cause of the cold war, revisionism times." (p. 6) What is most crucial is the man- to the eontrary notwithstanding. Men and events ner in which America pursued world capitalism make history. The origins of major historical and the defeat of the Left (including Rússia). events and epochs are complex. Basically. his- This, contend the authors, “is one of the major torians have rejected the revisionist thesis be- dimensions of postwar history.” (p. 6) cause it relies on a simplistic explanation. One To the Kolkos, the primary American aim might conclude that for a historian to be charged was to remold the world so that American busi- with constructing a simplistic argument is surely ness could profit everywhere. “On this,” they paradoxical—and perhaps also rather uncom- say, "there was absolute unanimity among the fortable. American leaders." Political and business lead- The search for profits does not explain the BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

cold war. It might be some part of the explana- States and the Soviet Union were swept into tion. For centuries, historians have studied the a cold war, primarily because of the bur- interaction of men and events. Which makes den of history. In retrospect, one speculates as historv? It is a complex eombination. As for the to whether it could have been otherwise. cold war, the flexibility of both Stalin and Probably not. But the fact remains that it was, Truman was severely limited. The Soviet Union after all, a cold war. America and Rússia, the had been invaded from the west twice in a two rivais, still have outstanding differences. quarter century. Rússia had been decimated in Nevertheless, an American president recently the Second World War. It would not happen went to Moscow. It is anticipated that soon the again. The western borders would be secured, Soviet leader will come to the United States. and Soviet hegemony would be won in east- One suspects things could have been a great central Europe. American leaders had not deal worse. planned on this. After the war, with an idealis- Silver Spring, Muryland tic belief in the dawn of world peace and free- dom, they felt betraved. Their choices were limited by the consequences of World War II— Notes 1. John Lewis Caddis. Tlu United States aiul the Origina o f the Cold War the destruction, chãos, and economic collapse— 1U41-1M? New York: Coluinbiu University Prev.. 1972. paper p. 353. and by the restrictions imposed by America’s 2. Address by Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Svmington. Navy Dav. Manchester, New Hampshire. 27 October 1947. own historv and ethos. 3. See Gcorge I I. Quester, Nuclear Diphmuinj lhe First Twenttj-Fn c Years (New York: Dunellen. 1970) Men do not operate in a vacuum. The United 4. Ibid.. p. 29.3. GERMANY AND EUROPEAN DÉTENTE

L ieu t en a n t Colonel E. W . G iesec k e

/ prefer the most unjust peace to the justest war that was ever waged.

Cicero

URING the past several years, there has Any listing of the readily apparent reasons- D been a relaxing of tensions in Central for Europe s current significance would include Europe. Concurrently, the use of force to the following: achieve political objectives has been avoided. • It is now widely held that total or The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets large-scale nuclear war is unacceptable. The in 1968 marked the last low point in relations. stated goals of the Soviet Union and of the Converselv, the ratifícation of the “renuncia- United States do not encompass the expected tion of force” agreeinent between West Ger- cost of a nuclear war. Thus the emphasis shifts to many and the Soviet Union in 1972 set the re- conventional forces and to political, economic, c-ent high levei of European détente. and other forms of power. Here, Western Eu- As diplomatic exchanges increased, it re- rope is strong. The defense capabilities of the mained evident that the problem was—and still North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) are is—Germany. As a powerful nation, comprising considerable, and this is not a question here. In two separate States, Germany holds the key to terms of overall power, Western Europe has détente in Europe. In today’s world, a con- been gaining rapidly and now ranks in the top structive relationship between East and West three or four new power centers that have requires the active involvement of Germany. evolved in a multipolar world. Accordingly, what An important and scholarly book has ap- happens to this “pole” becomes more criticai peared recently that presents a crisp analysis of to world stability. East-West relations. In Détente in Europe, Pro- fessor Josef Korbel gives special attention to the • West European strength lies in unitv, and the expansion of the European Economic role of Germany in world power relations.! At Community (eec ) or Common Market from six the same time, however, he recognizes that a to nine nations, as decided in 1972, was fol- lasting détente in Europe is interlocked with developments between the United States and lowed later in the vear by the agreenient of six- the Soviet Union. These developments, he says, teen West European States to create among though sometimes encouraging, are often fore- themselves a single economic region. This agree- boding, and he forecasts the same fluctuations ment, signed in Brussels between the members for the lessening of tensions in Europe. of the eec and the European Free Trade As- Many studies such as Korbel’s do not include sociation, marked that region as the world s a summary as to why Europe is so important largest trading group, accounting for fifty per- today in the struggle for world power—power cent of global trade. in the sense of ability to influence the behavior • A new, all-European culture is grow- of óthers in aecordance with one s own ends. ing, replacing the nationalism of the individual

f Josef Korbel, Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972, $10.00), 302 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91

States. Western politics, culture, and economics remains as one of the fifteen members.) Acting are shovving a propensity to spread. These ideas independently, France created its own nuclear are finding readv takers among the East Euro- deterrent, called the . pean States; and while this was expected as a Though not under nato supervision, this force bv-product of détente, the Soviets have main- could well be a deep thorn in the paw of. any tained a close control over the extent of this aggressor upon the West. influente. Thev have negotiated the first few West Germany’s course to Ostpolitik can best vears of détente carefully, so as to guard against be charted by reviewing the policies of her anv erosion in the posture of their chancellors. World War II in Europe ended allies. with Germany’s unconditional surrender in May 1945. The decisions at Yalta and Potsdam left Germany divided into four zones of occu- background to détente pation, with Berlin reeeiving special status Korbel has traced the changes in mood and imder four-power rule. The Sovietization of the practices between East and West since World eastern zone and the blockade of West Berlin War II. Gone are the tensions of the Stalin era; in 1948 and 1949, as episodes in the cold war, the strategy became rapprochement. This precluded agreement on a general peace treaty. matured graduallv in West Germanv from The constitution of the F.R.G. was adopted in Adenauer to Brandt. Under the latter s tenure, 1949, the same year that Konrad Adenauer was some of the Soviet overtures were accepted and elected chancellor. In his fourteen years of implemented as Bonn’s current Ostpolitik. leadership, West Germany became solidly To a lesser extent, Korbel has reviewed the aligned with the Western States as well as a trend toward rapprochement among some of leading member of nato and eec:. Adenauer the other Western allies. Trade between the felt that the reunification of the east and west eec members and the Eastern bloc gradually halves of his divided nation could best be nego­ increased in the 1960s. While the Federal Re- tiated by strong support from the West. He public of Germanv (F.R.G.) consistently led the hoped that with this backing the U.S.S.R. could Big Four in the overall value of trade between be persuaded to agree to reunification in re- East and West, Great Britain often led in the turn for a peace treaty that would legitimize value of imports from Rússia and Poland. Italy the Soviets westward expansion into what was was also high on the list of Eastern traders, and formerly Polish territorv. In retrospect, it is France generallv placed fourth. \V'hile the now apparent that the West gave more than French cultural détente was impressive, having this but received less in exchange. included the exchange of students, tourists, Adenauer resigned in 1963, favoring Foreign scientific information, and publications, it did Minister Schroeder as his successor. However, not appear to have exceeded the efforts of Ludwig Erhard was elected instead by a major- other Western powers in the East. Nonetheless, ity of the Bundestag. Erhards reputation was President had made a bold built upon creating the “German economic attempt to blend the mutual interests of France miracle ; he maintained the close ties with the with the Eastern States into resurrection of the U.S. and supported the expansion of the Com- grand old Continent. His vision of VEurope des mon Market. patries saw the Continent completelv free of Kurt Georg Kiesinger next served as Federal the hegemonv of the two superpowers, U.S. Chancellor, from 1966 to 1969. He was noted and U.S.S.R. (As is well known, de Gaulle s pol­ as the author of the Grand Coalition, a merger icies led to the withdrawal of France from her of the then goveming Christian Democrats and militarv role in nato, though politicallv she Christian Socialists with the Social Democratic 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Partv (spd), its former opposition. Under the pereentages were 32 and 43; as to France . . ., coalition, Willy Brandt, chairman of the Social 28 and .50, respectively.” Democrats, became Vice-Chancellor and For- Korbel suggests that the U.S. was increas- eign Minister. The rise of the Soeialists was the ingly torn by the war in Vietnam and accorded major event leading to the softening of Bonn’s less concern to European problems: “As nato’s policy toward the East. homogeneity was weakening and its strategy As a prelude to his Ostpolitik, Brandt began constantly changing, [as some members of corresponding with Moscow in 1967 concern- CongressJ pressed for a partial and unilateral ing a nonaggression declaration. This contact withdrawal of U.S. troops from West Europe, was broken off. however, in mid-1968 after So- the Bonn government felt compelled to prepare viet insistente that sueh an agreement must he itself for the possibly grave consequenees of accompanied hy the Federal Repuhlic s accep- this American neo-isolationism. Brandts gambit tance of two separate German States. Under no was to aceelerate the frc. Ostpolitik and to seek eondition was Bonn—at that time—willing to an understanding with the Soviet Union.” concede on a single point leading to interna- In May 1972, the West German parliament tional acceptance of the German Democratic voted to approve the nonaggression treaties Republic (G.D.R.) as a sovereign State. with Rússia and Poland which Chancellor VVhen Willy Brandt assumed the chancellor- Brandt had negotiated in 1970. The voting in ship in October 1969, his Social Democratic the Bundestag seesawed on a razor’s edge, Partv carne into power and dropped the coali­ nearly carrving Dr. Rainer Barzel, the cdu tion with the Christian Democrats. As Professor party leader, into power, for Brandt had plaeed Korbel has written, “By the end of 1969 the his ruling spd/fdp coalition on the line in sup­ majority of West Germans, if not reconciled, port of Ostpolitik. Though Brandt received could see no viable alternative to an indefinite almost no support from the cdu, the treaties existence of two German States and, for the won by a slim margin. benefit to a détente in Europe, they were not The treaties renounced the use of force by all willing to press for reunifícation. At the same sides and recognized German territorial losses time, however, an even larger majority was not from World War II. It gave to Poland all yet ready to go as lar as full recognition of East former German territorv east of the Oder- Germany as a state.” Neisse Line, and it legitimized the present bor- ders of the German Democratic Republic (for- merly the Soviet zone). The meaning was clear: Western interest in Germany reunifícation was a past issue, and Bonn was The spd (in coalition with the Free Democrats) preparing to recognize the existence of two sep­ was not to govern with an illnsory dream of arate German States—one of them a Communist reunifícation when it inaugurated its new ver- regime with a population of 17 million, the sion of Ostpolitik. It was at this juncture that other a republic with 60 million inhabitants. Willy Brandt advanced the idea of “two Ger­ Agreeing with most analysts, Korbel wrote man States of one German nation." He was that “the treatv brings a sense of immediate backed by a majority of West Germans, who no relief to West Germany and to the whole of longer believed that the Western big powers Europe. It has opened the door . . . to settling would support reunifícation. Korbel lists polis Bonns relations” with Eastern Europe as well taken in November 1969 showing that 37 per- as removing the “principal source of tension— cent ot the German respondents thought “the Bonn s quest for reunifícation." United States favorecí reunifícation and 42 per- “However," he added, “all these short-term cent thought it did not. As to Great Britain, the achievements and expectations carrv far-reach- BOOKS AND IDEAS 93

ing, long-term connotations that are at best ward the West and to exploit fuily any indica- uncertain and that inescapably hinge upon the tion of the Wests own weakness.” Soviets real intentions and Bonns perception Détente in the West, from the Soviet view, of Soviet goals in Europe." has also served to give the U.S.S.R. a greater po­ sition of strength in her dealings with China. This marks a significant easing of her geopoliti- objectives of Ostpolitik cal stance since Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the As reported bv Korbel, “Only a few months China border conflicts, when she was agonizing after the treaty had been signed in May 1970, over problems on two “fronts.” Kosvgin appealed to the West European na- According to Korbel s analysis, as détente in tions to seek independence from the United Europe progressed and the European members States.” The Soviets had achieved their initial of the Atlantic alliance saw in it “an opportu­ goal and were following through. On the chess- nity to foster their individual national interests, board of Europe, thev had played masterfully the thrust of nato was quickly weakened.” The and received reeognition of Soviet control over acute concern of the West should be that our East Europe and legitimacy for the East Ger- “experience tells us that democracies rarely man regime. A secondary goal of “full recogni- foresee or plan against crises until they face tion of the gdr” was well on its wav to fniition, them directly and irrevocably.” for bv late 1972 several Scandinavian States and For the F.R.G., Ostpolitik has gained new índia were plaiming initial diplomatic relations markets for trade and commerce in the East. with the G.D.R. Additionally, membership in expanded diplomatic exchanges, and, above all, the United Nations for both the G.D.R. and the fostered an easing of concern over Soviet inten­ Bonn govemment was being actively discussed. tions. The spd/fdp govemment carried out The chief concession bv the Soviets was the talks with the G.D.R. in 1972 léading to formal Berlin agreement of September 1971. Thev reeognition of each other’s sovereignty. A lib­ agreed to preserve Western access into West eral article in the Frankfurter Rundschau Berlin, to Bonn’s right to conduct govemment (August 19, 1972) mentioned the problem of Business and meetings in the divided city, and, “human rights in Germany as a whole . . .” in general, to the existing ties between the and said that “people in both parts of Germany F.R.G. and West Berlin. harbor hopes of deriving personal advantage" West Europe, since 1945 casting an anxious from the intra-German talks. It was apparent eye on the East, accepted Soviet professions of that Bonn, by recognizing an independent détente in good faith and with visible relief. G.D.R., hoped that the latter would be able of Korbel added, however, that "it is exactly th is its own accord to draw closer to the West, re- West European mood of relaxation, which ap- sulting in increased contact between the two proaches complacency, that is the grave danger German peoples. accompanying any further progress beyond The final solution to the problem of a di­ détente.” One could expeet “Moscow to probe vided German “nation has been pushed into into anv avenue that could weaken the West,” the future by some German writers, at a point as evidenced by her changing and sinuous pol- following Ostpolitik’s “third stage’ —the devel- icy toward individual Western states, ‘‘to the opment of a lasting and peaceful order in Cen­ question of European securitv. and her contin- tral Enrope. They have reasoned that the uing attempts to weaken or eliminate the F.R.G. and the G.D.R., each independent, American presente in Europe—[which] indi- should be able to achieve rapprochement in an cates that Moscow will miss no opportunity to environment of a stable peace, the absence of a use detente to strengthen its own position to­ Big Four military presence, and cooperation 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW between the two coexistent groups of the Ger- of Western Europe. This term has unfortu- man people. nately been too widely used to describe a status Author Korbel, too, expresses concern that a of neutrality in Europe resulting from the ac­ permanent and total division could, vvith the tive pursuit of détente by both the East and the fluctuations of Central European politics and West. the emotional potential of the people, produce Some conservative leaders have feared that serious conflicts. Chancellor Brandt, in his State even a status of collective semi-neutrality of the Union address in January 1970, referring would give the Russians an end-position of po­ to the concept of “two German States in one litical supremaey over Western Europe. How- German nation," deseribed a nation as ever, Western statesmen have been alert to more than a common language or culture, more sueh a possibility, realizing that maintenance of than state and societv. The nation is rooted in the a strong nato is required to preclude such a peoples’ lasting sense of solidarity. . . . As long as trend. The U.S. and its allies have resisted uni­ the Germans do not abandon this political will lateral force reduetions and have pushed for . . . the hope remains that future generations will talks on mutual and balanced force reduction live in a Germany in whose political structure all csce Germans can take part. to be held concurrently with the at Hel- sinki. Despi te the current success of détente in European securitij conference Europe, the U.S. should maintain a high levei For years the Soviet Union had been proposing of forces there, at least until gradual reduetions a conference on securitv and cooperation in can be made under a mutual and balanced Europe (csce), to meet jnst this tvpe of need force reduction. The Ostpolitik conducted by for self-realization and stabilitv. The U.S. has Bonn promises manv benefits in international wiselv opted to participate, and the 34-country goodwill. For the present, however. it is best conference was given substantial snpport by carried out with strong snpport from a Western the Nixon-Brezhnev talks of 1972. U.S. partiei- Europe that is rapidly uniting, politicallv as pation is extremely essential, even if one does well as economically, and is backed up by a not aecept the critics’ view that this long-term determined and viable nato. Russian proposal is aimed at “Finlandization” Robins AFB, Geórgia The Contributors

aSTHI% D r . R aymond J. B arretí Ph D.. Trimtv Col- lege. Irelandt is Department of State Advisor. B ricadier Gen er a i Heinz Waldkec ker. John F Kennedy Center for Militaxy Assis- , is Coinmander. .Air Force Depart- tance. Fort Bragg. North Carolina. At State ment. German Armed Forces Staff College. Department he was Deputv Chief. Program Hamburg. During World War 11 he served as Staff. Office of International Conferences. As a pilot and was a unit commander at the end Foreign Service Officer. he served in Nlexico, of the war. He retumed to the Luftwaffe in Man agua. Dublin. , and Madrid; also in 19.56 and served as an Air Traflic Controller the Office of Southern and East African Af- until entering general staff officer trainirig in fairs, as Canadian Desk Officer. and as U.S. M ajor Gen er a l Jonas L Blanx (USMA, 1959. Following staff duties at intermediate- Secretary of the U.S.-Canada Permanent Joint M.B.A . Harvard Business School is Assistam comrnand leveis, he was assigned as an air de- Board on Defense Hc has served an exchange Deputv Chief of Staff. Systems and Logistics. fense instructor at the Staff College. General Hq USAF Dunng World War II he flew 48 tour as Assistant Chief, Global Plans and Pol- Waldhecker served as deputy commander and combat missjons in Europe as B-17 pilot. went icv Division. Directorate of Plans. Hq USAF. chief of staff of an air division until his present down in Yugoslavia. and was a POW until V-E assignrnent in 1969. Day His subsequent assignments have been mainly in the field of resources. materiel. and logistm. in Hq Air Nlatenel Command. Hq SHAPE, and Hq USAF. General Blank is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces and has been Commandant of both Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College

W illiam G. H older i B.S.A.E., Purdue Uni- versity is a space Systems analvst with the For- L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ric h a r d D. B esl ey eign Technology’ Division. .Air Force Systems M.S.. George Washington Universityi is a Command, Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio. He Facultv Adviser at the Armed Forces Staff has worked with the Boeing Company on the College. Norfolk. Virgínia His experience tn- Bom ar c B and the Satum V. As a lieutenant in cludes six years in MATS, flying the C-124. the U.S. Army, he served three years as an air Later he flew the C-47, C-54, C-118, and the defense guided missile instructor. Mr. Holder C-7 in Vietnam. He worked in Range Opera- is the author of a number of tecbnical and his- tions at the .Air Force Eastern Test Range. torical articles and of a book. Satum V—Thc 1960-6.5. and four years on the Air Staff, deal- Moon Rocket .1969) ing with rated officer requirements for the Director. Manpower and Organization. Colo- nel Besley is a graduate of .Air Command and Staff Colíege and Air War College.

Dr . C urtis W. T arr Ph D.. Stanford Univer- sity , until his àppointrnent as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. served as Di- rector of the Selective Service System. He was Assistam Secretary of the Air Force Man- Dr Adrian Pkeston (Ph.D., Uni versity of power and Reserve Affain) in 1969-70. .After London) is Visitíng Professor of Military and combat Service m the U.S. Army. European Strategic Studies at Acadia University. Nova Theater. he eamed degrees and fiíled teaching Scotaa, Canada. He served as captain in the and dean assignments at Stanford and Har- Canadian Army. 1954-62, and is a graduate of vard. Dr. Tarr was President of Lawrence Uni- the Royal Military College of Canada, where he is an Assoe iate Professor of History and versity. 1963-69. and served asChairman. Task L ie u t e n a n t C olonel Harold A. S u sskin d is Force on Local Government Finance and Or- War Studies. He has lectured at defense col- Chief, Information Division. Ogden Air Mate- gjuuzabon. State of Wiscoosin. leges in Canada and índia and is author of riel Area (AFLC), recently assigned there from three books arai numerous articles in profes- similar duty in AIRSOUTH, Naples. Italy. sional joumals worldwidc. He is a Fellow of During World War II hc served as navigator the Royal Ceographical Society and of the witli the Eightli Air Force, and after recai! in Royal Histórica! Society. 1949 he flew' as navigator-lximbardier in air rescuc. .Assigned to Southeast Asia us an infor- mation officer. hc won the Aviation Spac-e Writcrs’ OrVillc Wright Award in 1964. Colo- nel Susskind is a graduate of the Boston Uni- versity public rclations course.

95 Hsr ma n S. W oi.k (M.A.. American Interna- tional College) has been with the Office of Air Force History since 1966. For seven years he was a historiai» for Hq Strategic Air Com- mand. During the Korean War he served in the U.S. Army Information and education pro- gram. Mr. Wolk has taught history and lec- Dh . Sterlinc Cer ueh Ph D., University of tured on strategic nuclear deterrence and mat- L ie i-tenant Colonel E beh h a h o W. G ie s e c k e Utah.) is Assoei ate Professor of Psychology. ters related to the cold war. His articles hasre M.P.S., Auburn University) is Chief of Pro- Eastern Washington State College. Por 2Vi appeared in Air Force and Spare Digest, Mili- grams Division, DCS/Plans. Hq Air Force years he has directed the Huinan Communica- tnnj Review. and Air University Review, Reserve. As an Air Force officer. he was as- tions Training Project, which required his in- among others. signed in Germany for three years in analysis volvement at ull bases and tenunt wings of Fif- work. In civilian capacitv. he was with the teenth Air Force fSACl and seven PACAF State of Washington in govemment analysis bases. Dr Gerber is a licensed psvchologist in functions for a dozen years. Colonel Giesecke the State of Washington and holds the Di- teaches Political Science part-tiine at Middle ploma in Couaseling Psychology of the Ameri- Geórgia College. He Ls a graduate of tiie Air can Board of Professional Psychology. War College.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "Re- source Management, Economic Analysis, and Discounting in the Department of Defense" by Major Richard Zock, USAF, as the out- standing article in the January-February 1973 issue ol the Review.

\ EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF Editor J ack H. Mooney A l una gin" Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Philip M. F l a mmeh, USAF Associate Editor Major Ric h a r d B. C omy.vs, USAF Assoe iate Editor

E dmund O. Barker Financial and Administrativa Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Caston Associate Editor. Spanish Langiuige Edition L ia Mid o si May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguesa Languagc Edition WlLLIAM J. D e Pa OLA Art Editor and lllustrator

ADV1SERS C olonel Sheldon 1. Godkin //

C olonel Vrthuh C. L ynn //(/ Air Force Logisties ('ommanil

Dr . II \ROLIJ M. I I el im w ll

C olonel II. J. Dalton. J r . //(/ Air Training Cononmul C olonel Irvi.no H. B reslaueh //

F ranc is VV. J e .nninos S.\/-' Office ol Information C olonel John \\ W A lton //

C olonel Boone Rose. J r . //

C olonel Arthur S. Haí.en llii Fnitcil States Air Force Acatlcmif

ATTENTION Air ( nuersity He deu: is pnblished Io stiuinlate pro- fessional thought concerning acrospace doclrincs, strategy. tactics. and related techniques. lts contents reflect the opinions of its authors or thc investiga- tions and conclnsions of its editors and are not to be construcd as carrying anv oHicial sanction of lhe Department of lhe Air Force or of Air Uníversitv. Infornied contributions are wclcoined. UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY