Air University Review: March-April 1973, Vol XXIV, No.3
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW AIR U N I V E R S IT Y THE PSOFESSIONA1 JOURNALreview OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE T he Impa c t of Locxstics upon Stratecy........................................................................................2 Maj. Gen. Jonas L. Blank, USAF T he Transformation of World Poutics.................................................................................. 22 The Honorable Curtis W. Tarr U.N. Pea c ekeepinc and U.S. National Sec u r ity................................................................ 28 Dr. Raymond J. Barrett E pit .aph to the Lady—30 Yea r s After .............................................................................................. 41 William G. Holder T he “New ” C iv il -M il it a r y Rel a t io n s: R et r o spec t and Prospect....................................51 Dr. Adrian Preston Ho r sesh o e Najl.............................................................................................................................................54 Brigadier General Heinz Waldheeker, Luftwaife T he Need for Mil it a r y O fficers as Strategic Thinkers..................................................... 56 Lt. Col. Riehard D. Besley, USAF Air Force Review B est Hit 72—NATO’s Southern Rec ion Fig h t e r Wea pon s Meet ........................65 Lt. Col. Harold A. Susskind, USAF Human Co mmun ic a t io n s and Air Force Supervision.......................................................78 Dr. Sterling K. Gerber Books and Ideas R e VISIONISM AND THE CoLD W.A R.....................................................................................................85 Hermari S. Wolk G er ma n y .and European Dét en t e................................................................................................90 Lt. Col. E. W. Giesecke, USAF T he Contributors.........................................................................................................................................95 the c<>ver Vidresn 111411UM riptA Io Editor. \ir CnfVfcnfty The: long annals of warfurc ahound in HrMrw DtviskNi. Bl<is£ 1211 Mantell \FB U. instantes of victory or defeat having tumfid V»M2. Pnnlrd l*> ( ^ivemninjl Pnntmg t MR. r on the one factor of adequate logistic sup- itililrv» mlMcrtpttnm to Superintcndent of por! Major General jonas L Blank. in "The DiHiimmr. f.PO \\ adwogtoo IX 2TM02 vrarlv Impact of Loglvtlcs upon Strategy," dwells fl.V) domcMli. 1175 forrtgn single wpy 75c on nnly the latcst chapters of th.it history, World War II Io Victnam. Imt they, too. |wm* some mcaningfiil lesxoas for today and to- rnorrow One of the logbtical stumliling hlocks in Southcast Asia. for instancc, has Vol XXIV No. 3 Mamh Amn 1973 hecn the dearthof adeqiute ports and harlxirs. THE IMPACT OF LOGISTICS UPON STRATEGY Major Genkr a i. J onas L. Blank IVING dangerously is an inherent part of tary victory but also because of the magnitude every military man s life. We accept per- of its logistics. Looking back, one finds it sonal risk when we accept our eommis- difficult to realize that the losing side had such sions.L We may have to face danger dramati- early momentum that it seemed assured of vic- cally in combat or, more subtly, in suggesting tory. No other conqueror ever gained control that logistics must be considered on an equal over so much of Europe as did the Germans, plane with tactics and strategy. nor over so vast an area of the Pacific as that I shall begin my defense of this premise with taken by the Japanese. What turned these early a general discussion of the role logistics plays in victories into a military collapse? military planning and operations, support that Clashing tank armadas and infantry, spectac- with some lessons learned in World War II and ular sea and air battles, courage and determi- Korea, then review our logistics experiences in nation, brilliant and awesome strategic plan- Southeast Asia, and conclude with some obser- ning and taetical execution—all played their vations about logistics discipline. part. But it was no coincidence that victory I have no intention of downgrading strategy went to the nations that organized an over- and tactics. Militarily, I consider those two and whelming superiority in materiel. This recur- logistics to be very much like the legs of a ring theme is echoed by many World War II three-legged stool. But that part of the stool historians. supported by the logistics leg gets sat upon the Materiel superiority is obviously not the most heavily and has to struggle the hardest for whole story. Economic potential and effective recognition. However, that only applies to military strength are not synonymous. Cam- peacetime planning and the early stages of a paigns and wars are won or lost on the basis of conflict. When the war gets hot and heavy and military strength in existence and effectively logistics needs become urgent, no one has to be used at the time of conflict. Germany proved reminded of their importanee. If there is time, that lesser resources effectively organized for frantic efforts by hastily trained support per- war can produce impressive victories. As sonnel can rnake up the shortages. They have World War II started, the combined armies of in the past, although sometimes at a fearful France, England, Holland, and Belgium were cost. At worst, military disaster may be the numerically larger than that of the Germans price of logistics neglect. but were defeated by newer weapons imagina- We in the military have the reputation of tively applied. They could not cope with the learning too much from history. We are ac- blitzkrieg led by Stuka dive bombers, fast ma- cused of always preparing to fíght the last neuverable tanks, and motorized infantry. war—only better next time around. Risking the Germany then turned east and plunged a thou- charge of perpetuating that reputation, I shall sand miles into Rússia, and Rommel swept cite some factual accounts of the cost of logistic across North África, but final victory continued oversights in recent wars. Perhaps a historical to elude the Germans. perspective might encourage military planners At this point in 1942, three years after the to give logistics a fair share of their attention. start of the war, Germany finally totally mobil- ized her industry for a sustained war effort. Her World War II leaders had gambled against a prolonged war. Had they started sooner, one wonders if the Probably, there can never again be a war simi- Allies could ever have caught up. lar to World War II, but that one merits spe- In North África the Germans frittered away cial attention, not only because it was the last their earlv gains after coming within an evelash major conflict that ended with a decisive mili- of making the Mediterranean a German lake. 4 IMPACT OF LOGISTICS UPON STRATECY 5 Again. brilliant tactical execution was undone neously with the Normandy landing, had to be by inadequate logistic support. Onlv about 10 postponed for two months until the landing percent of Rommel’s fuel requirements for his craft used in Normandy could be sailed to the tanks was delivered during the criticai days Mediterranean and assembled for that assault. when the fate of North África hung in the bal- In general, planning for logistics iinmediately ance. What he needed could have been deliv- preceding World War II, in both the United ered. This was proved the next year when States Army and Navy, was grossly inadequate. German equipment and supplies poured into The only reason it was not grossly inadequate Tunisia in response to the American landings in in the United States Air Force was that a sep- .África, but by then it was too late. Field Mar- arate .Air Force did not exist at that time. shal Kesselring, the German commander in As we started to mobilize for World War II, chief in ItaJy, and Rommel disagreed on many only 11 percent of the Army consisted of Ser- aspects of the North African campaign. They vice troops, compared to 34 percent at the end did agree, however, after it was over, that it of World War I. Instead, we needed more sup- was primarily a logistics battle and that their port forces than ever before, basically because promising opportunitv for decisive victory evap- mechanization of combat equipment of our orated because transportation had been badly armed forces had leaped forward between the planned and clear organizational channels for two World Wars. logistics support had never been established. The unrealistieally low ratio of Service troops Certainlv neither side had a monopoly on to combat troops made itself felt almost at logistics mistakes. Let’s examine just a few of once. In the spring of 1942, few trained Service ours, but of course there were many others. troops were available for overseas duty; and When the Japanese attacked the Philippines. Service troops, beyond all others, were required the defenders of Bataan fought on half rations, in the earlv phases of the war. It was impera- criticai shortages of munitions, and a scarcity of tive that they prepare depots, receive equip- medicai supplies in a malaria-infested area. In ment and supplies, and establish the essential the words of the division commander whose Services for the combat troops. outfit was the last to stop fighting: By any yardstick the invasion of Europe was By March 1942, every officer, enlisted man and the largest amphibious operation ever at- civilian on Bataan was logistics conscious, and tempted. Despite its success, it may also have realized that in 26 vears of planning for this cam- been, at least in retrospect, the most chaotic paigri, its logistics side had not been as thoroughly from a logistics standpoint. nor as carefully planned as its strategic and tacti- In analyzing transportation during the Nor- cal side.1 mandy invasion, an Army study concluded that Later in the war, the strategic plan for the gross failures in marshaling and moving forces invasion of Europe listed four requirements on through the British ports tlueatened the col- which its success depended. One of them was lapse of the operation.