Disarmament -1962 -1965

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items-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - Disarmament -1962 -1965

Date Created 08/02/1963

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Container S-0881-0003: 20/08/1962Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant • PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs)

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DATE: E.D. Kiselev V <+• PSCA/DAG. 433 CONFIDENTIAL g February 1963

The Defence Debate in the British House of Commons

This year's defence debate lasted only two days, January 30 - 31* on the government motion for approval of "The Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems issued following the Bahamas meeting in December 1962." Motion of "No Confidence". An Opposition amendment expressed "no confidence in a government whose defence policy has collapsed and which, at Nassau, entered into an agreement which, by seeking to continue the illusion of an independent British nuclear deterrent, imposes further economic burdens upon the nation and makes more difficult the solution of Great Britain's defence problems," At the conclusion of the defence debate on Thursday, January 31* the Opposition amendment was rejected by 337 votes to 234* while the Government motion was carried by 330 votes to 236, Labour Criticism The Prime Minister was accused of still making the "same kind of mistake as General de Gaulle" in recognizing on the one hand that the world had changed but not realizing at the same time that "this called for new weapons." Britian must "come to terms with her real status in the world," urged the Opposition, and neither past greatness nor "present delusions" would help Britain find her new status* Two recent events came under Labour criticism (a) the more recent episode of Britaints failure to be admitted into the Common Market. "At Brussels," said Labour, "the Opposition resented the position of Britain being humiliated as a country which was exhausted," The failure of the Brussels negotiations had shown that Britain still had friends both in Europe and elsewhere, and so unlike the picture fostered by the Tories, Britain was not an exhausted country; (b) the r esults of the negotiations concluded at Nassau b etween President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in December 1962, Mr, Macmillan was accused of having acted with undue haste innegotiating the agreements..."party political considerations" were said to have dictated Mr» Macmillan*s desire "to bring back quickly something that his backbenchers could call an independent deterrent*" Nassau Agreements Discussion centred largely on the following problems: (l) The question of the necessity for Britain to have an independent nuclear deterrent.The Government posed the problem that without her own credible nuclear deterrent Britain would run the risk of nuclear blackmail, more so when the U.S, itself was increasingly being faced with incalculable costs of Soviet second-strike capability. To Labout?*s charges that an independent British nuclear deterrent tended to upset the precarious nuclear balance between the U.S, and the Soviet Union, lead to the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and thus ruin real hopes for disarmament, Mr. Macmillan -2- *s pointed out that not only was the precise meaning today of conventional as against nuclear armaments unclear, but moreover Britain's role in the nuclear club afforded a hearing in all disarmament negotiations and provided a leverage to pressure the Super Powers for general and complete disarmament; (2) The Prime Minister emphasized the fact that Britain had the capability of remaining a nuclear power with its own, independent deterrent. Reviewing the history of Anglo-American cooperation in the nuclear field, he stressed the fact that Britain had been in the nuclear club from its very inception. Moreover, he added, as regards cost."it would be a great error to suppose that to abandon altogether the nuclear role would make any massive reduction in the burden of defence expenditure over the years," (3) On the question of the merits of Polaris as the proper British independent nuclear deterrent to be built in accordance with the Nassau agreement, Mr, Macmillan argued that Polaris was a better substitute for either the Skybolt missile which the United States had decided to cancel or the Hound Dog missile which had subsequently been offered at Nassau. "Polaris is successful, not only in research and development, but in manufacture* It is operational and the Americans already have about 20 submarines in service...Under our agreement we shall be able to obtain the latest model of Polaris available at the time...any new make of Polaris will have to be designed to fit into the existing submarines, in which so great an investment has been made by the Americans," Labour observed that there would b e "a long gap, a real gap" during which Britain would have no effective nuclear weapon under her command since the United States "was already thinking of a weapon system to replace Polaris altogether and Britain might well find soon after she got these weapons that they were far advanced towards obsolescence and that new systems were being worked out." To this remark Mr. Macmillan replied that to have rejected the U.S. offer of Polaris would have meant not merely a temporary gap, but "that between us and any other nuclear power there will be a great gulf, fixed, final and eternal...»Nor can anyone say with certainty that there is any particular moment, any month or year, at which the Bomber Force, armed with stand-off bombs, can really be written off by an aggressor." Moreover, certain strategic, political and other considerations indicated, on the basis of the 'assumption...that the British deterrent is to be maintained," that Polaris was the correct choice for Britain. "First, in our island there is certainly the great advantage in having a seaborne missile instead of one operating from fixed sites in this country, or even one dependent upon fixed aerodromes. Secondly, there is perhaps the most vital point that a submarine weapon is in many ways the best suited, now that it has been invented, for our purpose. It is a second strike weapon. It is the nearest thing to...indestructibL retaliation." As for problems of command, operational control, anl communications system of the Polaris submarines, Mr. Macmillan reminded Labour that the accords reached at Nassau were in "particular and broad outline," and that many points not elaborated at Nassau remained to be covered in a more formal agreement, "Fortunately", he said, "we have a full knowledge of the design and manufacture of a nuclear-powered submarine. We have one just completing her trials. We have one building, and anoiiiher on order* It will take about a year to -3- *• *s• *• prepare the plans and designs for the new submarines, which naturally have to be specially adapted and are a more advanced type, for the inclusion of the missile..." (4) On the question whether the security provided to Britain by Polaris submarines could be reconciled with the unity of the Western alliance, Labour offered two criticisms; (a) in the first place it questioned whether the U.S. offer of Polaris warheads to British submarines constituted a really independent British nuclear weapon not subject to final U.S. political control. The Bahamas agreement was said to be very ambiguous on this point, drawing a devious line between weapons assigned to NATO and weapons to be included in a multilateral force. In reply both Mr. Macmillan and the Defence Minister assured Labour that "these submarines will be British manned and British commanded, and there are no strings on them." (b) In the second place, Labour was "in favour of strengthening and increasing the share of control within NATO over the Western deterrent, but any ideas of separate European deterrents would be fatal. They would not add significantly to the Western deterrent. They would lead to the spread of weapons and involve the danger of the day approaching nearer when Germany might have nuclear weapons, with the diversion of an enormous expenditure from conventional forces all over Europe." Mr. Harold Wilson, a candidate for Leader of the Opposition, declared that a purely European deterrent could be a nuclear force dominated by Germany. "To endow Germany with nuclear status," he said, "would put an end to any hope of easing East-West tension, and a sudden conclusion to the efforts being made between East and West to make co-existence work.. .NATO must be made the centre of defence policy in Europe." In reply Mr. Macmillan stated, as regards a NATO deterrent, that he fully recognized "the good faith of those who are trying to find a solution to this problem—the problem of maintaining the national traditions of our countries while at the same time working for a more united alliance." In order to make a start on building such a NATO force, he said, President Kennedy had agreed with his proposal at Nassau to allocate to the NATO Alliance "some of the Bomber force now stationed in Britain, already targeted for joint operations in cooperation with the American Strategic bombers,t o a jointly planned undertaking...while remaining in a position to safeguard our national interests and to fulfil our obligations outside NATO." The terms of such an agreement for a NATO multilateral force remained to be carefully worked out, he said, but once such arrangements were made Britain was ready to assign its V-Bomber force for the defence of the Western Alliance, # # ¥f In this defence debate one could note a tendency to concentrate more on the intricacies of alternative weapons systems and the relative merits or disadvantages of Polaris, rather than the real problem of British nuclear options after Nassau in the light of a changing Atlantic Community and rifts within the Eastern and Western alliance systems. Speeches tended to somewhat great length; Opposition speakers offered few alb ernatives—-no doubt wary of seeming to formulate policy before a new Leader had been chosen to succeed Mr. Gaitskell, and experts on defence such as Mr. No'el-Baker did not participate in the debate. The election of a new Parliamentary Leader of the Labour Party which is expected today or within a few days may result in a more definite Labour policy on defence matters. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES >=?~5*^ INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

gr 12

THROUGH: JJr- £. £, KlSCleV FILE NO, . Under-Secretary, PSCA FROM: William Epstein Chiefj Armaments Enforcement Measures /Jiction SUBJECT:

I forward herewith a brief note "The Outlook on the Eve of the Resumption of the Disarmament Confer- ence" (PSCA/DAGA36). This note attempts to assess the situation regarding a nuclear test ban, collateral measures, general and complete disarmament and the role of the non-aligned powers at the Conference which is resuming today. A brief addendum on page 3 contains the remarks of Mr, Kuznetsov and Mr. Godber on their arrival in Geneva, No comments to the press apparently were made by Mr. Foster who did, however, bring a statement by President Kennedy for the opening of the Conference. PSCA/DAG/ij-56 OOHFIPEHTIAL 8 February 1963

The Outlook on the Eve of the Resumption of the Disarmament Conference

Test Ban It is expected that the test ban question will again hold the center of the stage at Geneva. Developments that took place during the reeess will probably change the basis for discussion in the Conference. The Soviet acceptance of the principle of obligatory inspection and its proposal that there should be three of these annually, together with the President's statement that the U.S. proposals for verification were based on 8 to 10 on-site inspections, will mean that the resumed Conference will have to deal with the gap between 3 and 8 on-site inspections. The compromise proposals by the non-aligned powers for interim arrangements, and the proposals for a partial treaty appear now to have been superseded. As to the other substantive differences between the parties, the recent Soviet proposal for three automatic seismic stations, and the offer to work out arrangements for the supplying of data from the 70-odd national seismic stations in the Soviet Union to an international processing center, could be evaluated by the U.S. as a positive contribution to the verification capability of the system since the U.S. system had not provided for automatic seismic stations.-' But, here again, the number and location of automatic seismic stations and the precise number of instruments at each station, as well as the degree of international supervision of national stations, are issues on which the parties disagree. Nevertheless, there is now once again agreement on the basic principle of on-site inspection, and this agreement in principle probably has more significance now than at any time in the past. The differences that are in the forefront of discussion between the parties are mainly on the details of technical matters and on questions of procedure and priorities in the negotiations. The issue of whether priority should be given to the question of the number of on-site inspections or to the question of the details of the verification system was apparently the basic procedural difference between the parties in the recent private talks. It may be expected that at least at the beginning of the Conference, the Soviet Union will continue to demand the prior acceptance of three on-site inspections, while the U.S. will probably demand that all details of a draft treaty be dealt with I/ A "high U.S. official" was reported to have stated after the termination of the private test ban talks in Hew York that the U.S. might conceivably be able to settle for less than 8 inspections per year if the inspections took place "under proper conditions." Associated Press dispatch, 31 January 1963 - 2 - before agreement on the number of inspections. Since there is already tabled the U.S.-U.K. draft treaty of August 27, 19^2, the Western powers may wish to submit draft annexes setting forth the details of the detection and inspection operations which are consistent with their views on the technical capabilities of the proposed system. The Soviet draft treaty of November 1961 was based on the assumption that there would be no on-site inspection and the So\det Union may conceivably wish to submit a new draft which would be consistent with its latest position. Whether new drafts are submitted or not, there are real possibilities for attempting to develop the outline of a new joint draft treaty as was done 2/ between 1958 and 1960, perhaps on the basis of the Eight-Power Joint Memorandum.—' The above considerations regarding the situation at the opening of the Conference must be viewed in the light of the fact that the basic issue remains the political one. The Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection has been interpreted as evidence of Soviet desire to conclude an early test ban agreement. There is considerable evidence that the decision to present the draft treaty of August 27, 1962 represented a very serious judgment of the U.S. that it was in its interest to stop testing now. However, recent international developments may cause both sides to re-assess the time table and negotiating priorities for reaching agreement on a test Collateral Measures U.S. official pronouncements have continued to give very high priority to an understanding with the Soviet Union regarding measures to reduce the risk of war by miscalculation or accident and to prevent the pmlif eration of independent nuclear capabilities. It may be that this interest will be demonstrated again when the Con- ference resumes, since there i-reems to be a feeling in Washington that the Soviet Union may be interested in making progress on such measures. However, to the extent that these and other collateral measures are related to West European problems concerning the establishment of a multi-lateral NATO nuclear force and the building of an independent French nuclear force, they may be even more difficult to negotiate now than they were last year.

2/ For a tabulation of other major issues that would have to be agreed on, see PSCA/DAG/ii-JO, "Mote on the Exchange of Letters between Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy Concerning a Nuclear Test Ban" PSCA/DAG/14-32, "Hote on the Implications of the Sino-Soviet Differences for the USSR Position in Disarmament Negotiations" PSCA/DAG/1^, "Note on U.S, Policy Regarding a Nuclear Test Ban in the Light of Recent Developments" PSCA/DAGA35, "Note on the implications of the Differences between the U.S. and France for the American Position in Disarmament Negotiations" - ,3 - General and Complete Disarmament Since the Soviet Union made the last major move on general and complete disarmament in its proposal for the retention of a limited number of delivery vehicles, it may be that the U.S. will come up with a counter proposal in this field during the forthcoming session. For its part, the Soviet Union may use the opportunity to respond in detail to the many questions that were put to it concerning its latest proposal. Either or both of these moves could lead to a discussion in depth of the first stafee measures of general and complete disarmament and, in particular, on the issue of nuclear delivery vehicles. While no agreement appears to he in sight on any first-stage measures, some progress may he made in reducing the wide gap "between the two positions. Non-Aligned Powers The non-aligned powers can be expected to concentrate again on the nuclear test ban question. In view of the Soviet acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection it may be able to enlist non-aligned support in pressing for further Western concessions. The Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection (in effect accepting the obligatory character of on-site inspection under the Eight-Power Joint Memorandum as interpreted by the U.S.) could lead to a renewed Soviet demand for immediate implementation of the Joint Memorandum. It therefore becomes possible for the non-aligned powers to urge that a new draft treaty be prepared on the basis of the Joint Memorandum, taking into account both the U.S.-U.K. comprehensive draft treaty of 27 August 1962 and the new Soviet proposals for on-site inspection and unmanned seismic stations. It is possible, though not easy, to visualize a substantive role for the non-aligned powers in this regard. However, if the initial difficulties .&& the Conference are over procedure or priority of discussion of the major provisions or of the details of a test ban agreement, the role of the non-aligned powers may become significant in finding compromise formulas for the concurrent discussion of both the basic political issues and the technical details* * * * Addendum 12 February The representatives of the USSR and the U.K. made the following statements on 11 February upon arrival in Geneva. (i) _Mr. Kuznetsov: "The Soviet Union ... made new constructive steps which provide a good basis for reaching agreement. It is important that our partners in the talks also display the same approach to the solution of this question. However, the U.S. has replied ... by the resumption of nuclear weapon tests which, of course, cannot contribute to the success of the talks," (ii) Mr. Godber; "Having accepted the principle _/of on-site inspection/ it should be possible for us to talk seriously on a scientific basis on the actual number ... But numbers are not inviolable. If the Russians were to produce a scientific appreciation which would allow us to reduce our number that would be helpful." CR.13(4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: FROM: UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: U Thant :•/ .n Date: 12 Februar Secretary-General /( •ILE NO.:. THROUGH: Mr» E. D. Kiselev Under-Secretary

FROM: William Epste: Chief} Armaments irol and Enforcement Meas ction SUBJECT:

I forward herewith three analytical notes in partial implementation of the "Proposed List of Special Notes and Memoranda to be Prepared in the Next 2 or 3 Months1* • All of these papers endeavour to analyze various aspects of the nuclear test and disarmament problems in the light of recent developments: 1. Note on the Implications of the Sino-Soviet Differences for the USSR Position in Disarmament negotiations (FSCA/DAG/1^). This paper includes a short Addendum referring to the latest statements in connexion with Sino-Soviet relations, 2, Note on the Implications of the Differences between the U.S. and France for the American Position in Disarmament Negotiations (PSCA/DAGA35). ?• Note on U*S» Policy Regarding a Nuclear Test Ban in the Light of Recent Developments (PSCA/DAG/^*!-) • This note also contains some additional footnotes referring to the latest developments up to date« CONFIDENTIAL FSCA/DAG/U52 6 February 1963 Note on the Implications of the Sino-Soviet Differences for the USSR Position in Disarmament Negotiations I. The main relevant areas of the differences 1. Questions of War and Peace (a) People's Republic of China: (i) "World peace can never be achieved by negotiations alone", it "can only be securely safeguarded in the resolute struggle against imperialism headed by the United States". "...absurd is the allegation that 'a world without war1 can be achieved through peaceful co-existence..." "...only after the imperialist system has been overthrown...will it be possible to eliminate all wars." (ii) A nuclear world war "would inevitably end in the destruction of imperialism and the victory of socialism" and "definitely not in the extinction of mankind." "The emergence of nuclear weapons has not changed and cannot change the fundamental Marxist-Leninist theory with regard to war and peace." (iii) "The possession of nuclear weapons by imperialism has not changed by one iota the nature of imperialism which is rotten to the core and declining, inwardly weak though outwardly strong." Imperialism and all reactionaries are "paper tigers".!/ (b) Soviet Union; (i) "The preaching of the settlement of disputes between states through war is madness." "It is tantamount to denying the significance of international treaties and agreements, denying the principle of peaceful co-existence."2/ (ii) "A modern war cannot be approached with old yardsticks." "Those who do not think over the consequence of a modemwar, who underestimate or simply discount nuclear arms as something secondary to manpower are making a big mistake."3/ "As regards Marxist-Leninists, they cannot conceive the creation of a communist civilization on the ruins of the world's cultural centers upon an earth destroyed and poisoned by thermonuclear fallout." "...the question of socialism would cease to have any meaning at all for many people because they would have physically disappeared from the surface of our planet."ji/ (iii) "...this 'paper tiger1 /imperialism/ has atomic teeth."2/ "As a result of the first /nuclear/ blow alone 700-800 million people would have perished. All the big cities would be wiped out or destroyed not only in the two leading nuclear states - U.S. and USSR - but also in France, Britain, Germany, Italy, China, Japan and many other countries in the world."k

I/Editorial in The Peking People's Daily, 31 December 1962 2/ Report by N. Khrushchev at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, USSR Press Release, 13 December 1962 Pravda's editorial, 7 January 1963 # Premier Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin on 16 January, M.Y. Times Eastern Edition, 17 January 1963 - 2 - 2. Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (a) People's Republic of China; (i) "Hitherto history has not witnessed a single example of peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism." "The bourgeoisie will never step down from the stage of history of its own accord." (ii) "Even when it is possible to secure state power through peaceful means, one must be prepared to deal immediately with armed inter- vention by foreign imperialists and counter-revolutionary armed rebellions supported by the imperialists."!/ (b) Soviet Union; (i) "...the line which the dogmatists are trying to impose is the line of lack of faith in the forces of communism and the forces of the popular masses, the line of lack of faith in the possibility of victory of socialism in new countries without war between states, without a world war." "...socialism can triumph throughout the world without a devastating nuclear war." "The opposite view is nothing but a philosophy of suicide." (ii) The socialist countries"..are successfully developing ±n peaceful conditions and will be victorious in the peaceful economic competition with capitalism, which fact will be of exceptional importance for making the peoples choose the communist way as the only correct one."3/ II. Disarmament Postures 1. The attitude towards disarmament is not directly dealt with in the recent exchange between the People's Republic of China and the USSR, but it is closely related to the ideological issues enumerated above. Pursuant to the divergent views on these issues: (a) The Soviet Union declares that "the entire Soviet policy will be aimed at achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament." (b) 0?he People's Republic of China mentions only nuclear disarmament and states that "...it is possible to achieve a complete ban on nuclear weapons in the following circumstances; the Socialist camp has a great nuclear superiority: the peoples' struggles in various countries against nuclear weapons and nuclear war become broader and deeper; having further forfeited their nuclear superiority, the imperialists are impelled to realize that their policy of nuclear blackmail is no longer effective and that their launching of a nuclear war would only accelerate their own extinction." In this connexion, the People's Republic of China has in view a "total ban on the testing, manufacture, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons..." and "the establishment of an area free from atomic weapons embracing all the countries of the Asian and Pacific region, including the United States." I/ Editorial in The Peking People's Daily. 31 December 1962 2/ Fravda's editorial, 7 January 1963 2. It would appear from the above that for China general and complete disarmament covering "both nuclear and conventional armaments would "be inconceivable in the present situation as a practical policy. And in any event the possibility of nuclear disarmament is made conditional upon attainment of an overwhelming superiority by the socialist countries, obviously including China, Consequently, a separate test ban agreement would not be regarded as favouring this aim* This was confirmed by the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, in bis statement of 19 September 1962 that "the People's Republic of China was engaged in large-scale nuclear experiments." On the other hand, the Soviet Union's views on the possible consequences of a nuclear war, and the victory of socialism under the conditions of peaceful co-existence between the two systems are illustrative of its concepts which form an ideological foundation for espousing general and complete disarmament. III. Possible Impact on Disarmament Negotiations 1. The ideological differences between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union which have been in existence for some years could have constituted in the past an important factor complicating the USSR manoeuvrability in its negotiations with the Western Powers. The fact that the divergencies have now come into the open may to a great extent relieve the Soviet Union from the need of accommo- dating its position with that of its most powerful ally and may thus increase its flexibility in disarmament talks and improve its negotiating capabilities. The recent Soviet acceptance of on-site inspections on its territory to check on the observance of a nuclear test ban agreement may be only one indication of a developing change in this direction. 2. Soviet flexibility could apply only to negotiations on disarmament measures which would not in the first instance affect China directly and therefore would not necessarily require the consent of the Chinese Government for their implementation. This might be true of a nuclear test ban treaty to be signed by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR* While the Sino-Soviet differences may now be an additional factor increasing Soviet interest in reaching a test ban agreement with the U.S. and U.K., the possibility would, however, remain of its being terminated as a result of French or Chinese nuclear explosions. The collateral or confidence-building measures which would not affect China in the first instance would include three items proposed by the USSR: (a) an agreement between the nuclear Powers not to provide nuclear weapons or information on their production to other countries (an unconditional commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture nuclear weapons is under the present circumstances less likely); (b) creation of de-nuclearized zones in different regions (with the exception of the Par East, where China's insistence on the inclusion of the U.S. in such a zone precludes any practical possibility of discussing the subject); (c) a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries; and three items proposed "by the U.S.: (a) the reduction of the risk of accidental war between the USSR and the U.S. (b) the de-militarization of outer space; (c) the cut-off of production of fissionable materials (although the Soviet Union has indicated its opposition to discussing the subject). 5. Whether greater leeway for the Soviet Union in the negotiations with the West would lead to its concentration on any of the above collateral measures, in addition to a test ban, is not possible to forecast in view of the current complicated international political and strategic picture* The USSR may be interested in a speedy achievement of some agreement with the U.S., among other reasons, to demonstrate the effectiveness of its policy of peaceful co-existence and the feasibility of accommodation with the West. The difficulties inherent in achieving agreement on any one of the above measures would seem to raise serious doubts about the possibility of any early agreement, except perhaps with regard to a nuclear test ban.

k9 No concrete progress, however, could at the present stage be expected in the field of more comprehensive disarmament measures and, even less, in the field of general and complete disarmament, where the U.S. and the USSR are, in any case, very far apart in their positions. Moreover, in this field, the position of the People's RepuKLic of China -- with a strong and numerous army and on the way to acquiring nuclear capability — could hardly be disregarded by the other Powers. A change in the attitude of China towards far-reaching disarmament measures seems unlikely in the near future. It may be recalled that on more than one occasion the People's Republic of China stated that it would not be bound by any disarmament negotiations or agreements in which it was not a participant. Moreover, Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated on 19 September 1962 that the People's Republic of China did not intend to participate in disarmament and test ban negotiations at Geneva as long as Nationalist China was a Member of the U.N. 5. Despite the rather unencouraging outlook for general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union, in accordance with its oft-repeated position,may be expected to continue to press for negotiations in this field, perhaps with the hope of making progress on an important, albeit long-range, problem that has special significance for a policy of peaceful co-existence. ~ 12 February 1965 Addendum

In an interview with Canadian and British publisher, Roy Thompson, on 9 February, in response to an inquiry as to whether one day the Soviet Union, Britain and America are going to be "one big happy family opposed to the Chinese Communists", Mr, Khrushchev stated: "That day will not come. We shall always be friends with the Chinese and there will come a time when the workers1 class in Britain and the United States and other countries is victorious. Then we will indeed have one happy family the world over." On 10 February the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated in an editorial in Pravda; "Our party considers it expedient to hold bilateral or broader meetings that would help create better conditions for a conference of all fraternal parties...The Soviet Communist Party declares: If, in reply to this initiative of ours, any party, regardless of how substantial the differences between us may be, displays interest in a bilateral meeting, our party is ready to have such a meeting on any level at any time acceptable to both sides. PSCA/DAG. 435 CONFIDENTIAL 8 February 1963

Note on the Implicationsof the Differences Between the United States and France for the American Position in Disarmament Negotiations

I. The main relevant areas of the differences 1. Reliability of American nuclear force for the defence of Europe (a) France:. . "... no one in the world - particularly no one in America can say if, where, when, how and to what extent the American nuclear weapons would be employed to defend Europe." "... the American nuclear power does not necessarily and immediately meet all the eventualities concerning Europe and France." I/ (b) United. States; "...., the United States can never leave Europe." 2/ "... there may be reasons for a country to wish a nuclear force of its own, and France has put forward its reasons. But in my judgment, it is inaccurate and not really in the Alliance interest to justify it on the grounds that the United States would fail to defend Europe by whatever means are necessary." 3/ 2. Advisability of Establishing a Multinational Huclear Force (a) France: (i) "France intends to have its national defence." "... principles and realities combine to lead France to equip itself with an atomic force of its own." "... for us, in this specific case, integration is something that is unimaginable." (ii) "France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly, no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it." "... in terms of technology this affair is not a question of the moment. But it also does not meet with the principle ... which consists of disposing in our own right of our deterrent force. To turn over our weapons to a multinational force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defence and our policy. It is true that we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how could we do it in practice during the un- heard moments of atomic apocalypse?" I/

I/President de Gaulle's statement of Ik January 19^5> from French Press Release 185, NY 2/ President Kennedy's interview of 31 December, Washington Post, 11 January 1963 3/ President Kennedy's press conference on 2k January, Washlng'Eon Post, 25 January 1963 - 2 -

(iii) "The idea of a multilateral nuclear deterrent is a sad, erroneous theory. The minute you have two fingers on the trigger you have not got a deterrent any more." I/ (b) United States; (i) "... we have consistently stressed the importance of a single, integrated strategic nuclear force responsive to a single chain of command, to be employed in a fully integrated manner against what is truly an indivisible target system." £/ (ii) "The key word in the Nassau agreement was 'multilateral' ... by doing this we will have a chance of stopping needless proliferation of national nuclear capabilities." 3/ (iii) The British deterrent "will be independent in moments of great national peril which is really the only time you consider using nuclear weapons anyway. It will serve as a basis for a multinational force or multilateral force," "Our whole policy has been against the diversion of resources towards independent national deterrents." kj (iv) "... ways must be found without increasing the hazards of nuclear diffusion, to increase the role of our other partners in planning, manning and directing a truly multilateral nuclear force within an increasingly intimate NATO alliance," 5_/ II. Disarmament Positions (a) France: (i) "We will adhere to the decision we have madet to construct and, if necessary, to employ our atomic force ourselves." (ii) "We have no objection to the two great states suspending their nuclear tests; but the fact that they might suspend them would in no way change their arsenals such as they are and would in no way be a disarmament measure." "... so long as nuclear forces exist in the world, as they do, nothing can prevent France from acquiring one itself, but if the day came when those arms would be really destroyed, France would wholeheartedly give up making them on its own account." "... there is close solidarity between the defence of Germany and that of France, but each country is master of its own house." 6/

Statement by General P. Gal-Lois in Newsweek of 10 December 1962 Secretary McNamara's statement of 30 January 1963 before the House Armed Serv. Cmtee. ¥. Under-Secretary Ball's remarks on the Nassau agreement, N.Y.. Herald Tribune, 10 Jan. President Kennedy's Interview of 31 December, Washington Post, 11 Jan. 196 3 President Kennedy's State of th« Union Message, Washington Post, 15 Jan. 1963 President de Gaulle's statement, 14 January from French Press Release 185, N.Y. - 3 -

(iii) "France is not going to be ready to agree to stop testing until we achieve qualitative parity. That won't be until 1970 or thereabouts. We know that the aftermath of Cuba may lead to a test ban. That may put us in an embarrassing position but we don't intend to subscribe to it until our position is equal." \J (b) United States; (i) There is "need for a renewed effort to find some way, if not to eliminate these deadly weapons completely, then at least to slow down or halt their further accumulation and to create institutional arrangements which would reduce the need for either side to resort to their immediate use in moments of acute international tension." 2j (ii) "We do not dismiss disarmament as merely an idle dream. For we believe that, in the end, it is the only way to assure the security of all without impairing the interests of any." "... the areas of agreement can be very wide indeed. A clear understanding about Berlin, stability in Southeast Asia, an end to nuclear testing, new checks on surprise or accidental war, and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament," 3/ It would appear from the above that the issues of immediate interest for the U.S. in the field of disarmament are the cessation of nuclear testing and the reduction of the risk of war by surprise or accident. It may be recalled that at the last session of the Disarmament Conference, the American delegation tabled a working paper on the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation or failure of communication for discussion after the recess. General and complete disarmament is conceived as a desirable though distant goal. On the other hand, France has been disdainful of the Disarmament Conference and seems to be skeptical over the possibility of any disarmament agreement being reached in the foreseeable future between the Powers. In any event, it is not prepared to subscribe t* any partial measure whi«h, while preserving the preponderance of the present main nuclear Powers, would prevent France from becoming a full-fledged member of the nuclear club. Hence, its categorical refusal to adhere to a test ban agreement.

I/ Statement by General P. Gallois in Newsweek of 10 December 1962 West Germany. 2. These considerations might be less apparent in test ban talks than in any other disarmament measure, as it applies in the first instance only to the USSR, U.S. and U.K. However, any agreement for a test ban could be terminated as a result of French or. Chinese nuclear explosions. The U.S. might be more inhibited about such collateral measures as the non- dissemination of nuclear weapons, the creation of denuclearized zones, and a non- aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries (all items proposed by the Soviet Union), which in the first instance affect France and West Germany. Even the idea of the reduction of the risk of accidental war, favoured by the U.S. might in the present situation arouse some French concern, as providing for a particular type of direct liaison between the USSR and the U.S. in which the U.S. allies would not participate. The remaining U.S. proposed item - on the prevention of the use of outer space for military, purposes - would be the only one where no other interests, except those of the U.S. and the USSR were at present directly involved, but it is the least likely to become the subject of discussion because of the USSR's known opposition to divorcing, this problem from the question of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. 3. Whether the period of the U.S. restricted initiative on collateral measures of disarmament or on other political questions would be of short or long duration is not possible to forecast in view of the current complicated international strategic and political picture. One. might presume that failure to reach accommodation with France might not only free the U.S. from its present inhibitions but also create inducement for the U.S. to attempt to make progress in negotiations with the Soviet - 5 -

Union. In any case, this could apply only to disarmament measures (and political settlements) which would not in the first instance involve France and therefore would not necessarily require the consent of the French Government for their implementation. The first and relatively easiest step, apart from a nuclear test ban, could in the U.S. view be the conclusion of certain arrangements to reduce the risk of accidental war between the U.S. and USSR.

kt However, in the field of general disarmament measures, and in particular of complete disarmament, the position of the biggest Western Powers in Europe — France, with a modern army in the process of acquiring independent nuclear capability, and West Germany, with, the largest army in Western Europe - - could in the long run hardly be disregarded. Although the positions of the USSR and U.S. on general disarmament are so far apart that the presence or absence of France or Germany in the negotiations has no great significance at present, their participation will become increasingly important as the parties move towards eventual agreement. CDHFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG/^ -- 8 February 19°3 Hote on United States Policy Regarding a Nuclear Test Ban in the light of Recent Developments

Recent Official Statements When the recent talks in Hew York and Washington were terminated at the request of the Soviet Union, the U.S. official statement on 31 January declared that "negotiations on this subject must be continued and /the U.S./ will therefore give priority attention to efforts to achieve a nuclear test ban treaty.*." At his press conference a week earlier President Kennedy emphasized that "the first problem is to attempt to negotiate the details of the treaty" acceptable to the U.S. Senate. A high U.S. official reported that in the recent talks the U.S. had insisted on 8 to 10 on-site inspections) many "black boxes" (some press reports referred to 10 to 12 unmanned seismic stations and another to "under 100") on Soviet territory; and details concerning the make-up of the inspection teams, the area subject to inspection, etc. This same official was reported to have said that while 3 on-site inspections would not be enough, the U.S. might conceivably be able to settle for less than 8 inspections a year but must know first what kind of on-site inspections would be permitted. On 1 February, President Kennedy ordered the AEG to prepare for underground tests which he had postponed on 26 January for the duration of the recent talks. At that time he had declared: "We have no intention of again accepting an indefinite moratorium on testing..." The latest action preparing for a resumption of underground tests followed Governor Rockefeller fs criticism of the test postponement because it "removes any incentive for agreement on the part of the Soviets." * * Official Reasons for Seeking a Test Ban When the highest officials responsible for disarmament matters testified before a Senate Armed Forces Sub-Committee in September 19^2, they endeavoured to convince the Senators that an agreement was in the U.S. interest for the following reasons: (a) "...weapon tests are apt to produce less of significance to our defense. At the same time, if the Soviet Union is now behind us in certain areas as we believe, unlimited testing will inevitably permit it to catch up. "I/ "The present U.S. strategic advantages would be likely to dissipate more slowly under a comprehensive treaty... "2/ (b) "A nuclear test ban would be a first step to turn down the nuclear arms race«.."3/

I/ Hearings' before the Preparedness Investigating Sub-Committee of the Committee oon Armed Services. U.S. Senate. Eighty-Seventh Congress Second Session on Arms Control i?'1 0 and 19'1962 j Wm- c*Foster 'Director ' *»» *«*«* «* ^fair's/p.^ H'MtZe 'ASSt * S6Cretary °fDefens e for International Security 2J Ibid., Win. C. Foster, p. 7 * * On 8 February 1963, the U.S. resumed underground nuclear tests in Nevada in ranges in the - . intermediate yield or less. - 2 - (c) "The rate of and motivations for diffusion would be dampened considerably by a comprehensive test ban treaty..."k/ (d) "The development of antimissile systems by both sides would be slowed somewhat but would not be prevented."£/ (e) "...a treaty might serve to open the Soviet Union to some extent».."6/ (f) The "Government intends...to maintain a readiness to test..."?/ (g) The treaty "would merely signify that we were prepared, warily and with ample caution, to enter into a period of a trial relationship with the Soviet Union."8/ Secretary of State Rusk noted that"a basic reason" why the U.S. continued to seek a test ban agreement was that "combined with an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons into the national control of non-nuclear powers /it/ would constitute a significant inhibiter upon the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries."2/ While the spokesman for the Defense Department stated that a test ban treaty "is not the most important step to take in the arms control field",10/ all officials emphasised that it was the "very serious judgment...in the executive branch that it would be in /the U.S.J interest /to/ stop testing now." Technical Basis for U.S. Policy The testimony made explicit the technical basis for the latest U.S. policy. Mr. Poster stressed that the latest "technical developments did not eliminate the requirements for a system of effective, reliable, objective, on-site inspections of unidentified seismic events as an essential element of any system of verification."ll/ Mr. Nitze informed the Senators that it was true that even under the system of verification in the U.S.-U.K. comprehensive draft treaty of August 27, 1962, it would be possible to have "clandestine shots up to 2 or 3 kilotons with some confidence that they will not be detected by seismic means. Artificial decoupling (the so-called big hole), though difficult and expensive to employ, would allow yields well in excess of 10 kilotons to take place below the detection threshold. ...Moreover, most of the important scientific principles can be effectively studied below 3 kilotons including what, if anything, might be done about all fusion weapons; and development of improved weapons of greater efficiency and lowered cost are attainable under this 3-kiloton threshold."12/ , Wm. C. Poster, p. 12 5/ Ibid., Paul H. Nitze, p. 13 6/ Ibid., p.13 7/ Ibid., p.13 8/ Ibid., p.llf £/ Ibid., p.82 10/ Ibid., Paul H. Nitze, p.ll ll/ Ibid., Wm. C. Foster, p.6 T2/ Ibid., Paul H. Nitze, p.13 - 3 - However, Mr. Nitze also informed the Senators that "considering all factors, we concluded that the risks of undetected cheating by the Soviets were outweighed by the risks of proliferation and of an unrestricted nuclear weapons race."13/ The Impact of Recent Developments The United States policy on a test ban would seem in large part to be based on its fear that unlimited testing would, within 10 years, give many states nuclear capabilities. While it was recognized that a test ban signed by the three negotiating powers would not by itself prevent additional countries from securing nuclear weapons, continued unlimited testing by the U.S. and the USSfyit was felt, would certainly stimulate other countries to do so. The fact that France and China were not likely to be deterred from testing solely by a tefct ban treaty had apparently been taken into account in formulating U.S. policy. The U.S. seems to assume that even if China were to test in the near future, it would not have a significant military nuclear capability for at least another decade. It also seems to hope that ways might be found to obtain France's adherence. In any event any treaty would have to contain a withdrawal clause implicitly linked to testing by other states* Recent developments in the Western alliance may have introduced an element of uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy towards U.S.-Soviet agreements in general However, U.S. test ban efforts have always had the support of all its allies except France, West Germanyts official attitude has been that a test ban was the most effective partial measure to test Soviet intentions since it did not directly or indirectly affect the status yip in Europe, and the U.K. has appeared very anxious to reach agreement. The recent French actions need not necessarily have a negative effect on basic U.S. test ban policy, but they might perhaps affect the timing of further concessions until the impact of recent developments within the Western alliance are fully weighed. Perhaps the main difficulties for the U.S. Administration are domestic pressures stemming largely from constitutional considerations and from political opposition by ** some Republicans. Barring some new evaluation of the significance of the Soviet tests at the end of 1962-?-and, jto'a.-lesser degree, of the last American tests—the official U.S. position is that there is no over-riding military necessity for further testing. Indeed, as already indicated, U.S. officials testified in September that a test ban would be to the military advantage of the U.S., and the attitude of such influential opponents of a test ban as Dr. Teller and Admiral Strauss would seem to be at the very least balanced by official defense experts. 15/Ibid., Paul H. Nitze, p.lU ** The House Republican leadership on 10 February 1965 endorsed a report by its Committee on - Nuclear Testing criticising the Administration's test ban concessions and, in particular, its reduction of the number of on-site inspections on Soviet territory to 8 to 10 per year. - k . American mistrust of the Soviet Union, however, has apparently increased as a result of the Cuban crisis, making a technically defensible treaty even more important for Senate ratification. The political importance of technical considerations was one of the factors leading the U.S. Government to undertake a $100,000,000 research programme which could provide scientific justification for the reduction of the number of on-site inspections and the modification of the original inspection system. The recent Soviet acceptance of 3 on-site inspections and 3 automatic seismic stations would not seem to affect U.S. insistence on prior agreement on the technical aspects of a verification system, which has in fact a political significance if not motivation. The Soviet approach for a prior political agreement on the number of inspections, if accepted, would seem to require a change in the U.S. negotiating approach which could increase U.S. domestic political difficulties* This need not, however, exclude agreement on some procedural compromise which would take into account the requirements of both sides. The present U«S. negotiating position was developed last summer after a thorough evaluation of all military, technical, and political factors. Recent developments in NATO, Cuba and Sino-Soviet relations may require a reassessment of the political factors, and in particular of the utility and timeliness of a U.S.-USSR detente which a test ban could initiate. Nevertheless, in the light of the President's most recent declarations, the validity of the military, technical and disarmament considerations that led to his judgment that, on balance, a test ban was in the national interest would seem still to be operative. CR.13(4-59) * RO'UTING SLIP

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Attached herewith is a very brief "Note on British Opinion Concerning Test Ban Negotiations" which indicates some interesting developments in the U.K.

DATE: 8/5/63 E. D. Kiselev PSCA/DAG/VH CONFIDENTIAL 8 March 1963

Note on British Opinion Concerning Test Ban Negotiations

The two leading British newspapers this week stated their views on the test ban situation. The Times on k March adopted a "plague on both their houses" approach since the U.S. and USSB positions "no longer mean much in scientific or military terms." It called upon the British representative in Geneva "to make clear to the Americans that to continue to reject the offer of three inspections is to fly in the face of military and scientific logic; and to the Russians that such an acceptance would obviously justify a more reasonable attitude on their side towards the terms of inspection and the number of seismic detection stations*" On 8 March, The Guardian stated that it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the American position was based more on political than on technical grounds. "If President Kennedy is in fact putting domestic political considerations before these international gains, his priorities are badly out of order. To say this does not of course imply that no blame rests with the Russians, Far more blame rests with them than with the Americans, even on the most hostile interpretation of American policy. But the fact that the Russians have acted badly does not mean that the West is entitled to act badly. A test ban is, after all, in the interests of the West as it is in the interests of the world." The head of the British delegation in Geneva, Mr. Godber, issued a statement on 6 March which took issue with The Times editorial. Contrasting the scientific basis of the Western position with the "admittedly purely political" approach of the Russians, he concluded therefrom that "it should be easier for them to make a move than us". "Authoritative British diplomatic sources", were reported from London to have said on March 6 —'that the Russians seem to be marking time because they may be seeking a "package deal" with the West which would link the test ban agreement to a settlement of Berlin and other cold war issues. The report also stated that both Britain and the U.S. have let it be understood clearly that they wanted a nuclear test ban agreement now independent of other outstanding cold war problems. (The Socialist States at Geneva continue to press for an East-West non-aggression pact and a disarmed zone in Europe, which of course have a direct bearing on the German question.)

I/ DPI dispatch, 5 warcb 1963 - 2 -

Comment Though the British continue to give full support to the U.S. position at Geneva, there would seem to be influential currents of British opinion that favour a more independent British position. If the British are engaging in some form of quiet diplomacy in an effort to change U.S. policy, such moves have not yet manifested themselves in the plenary meetings of the Conference. The opinion of The Times and The Guardian may help to crystallize Labour's position on the current test ban issues, which has not yet been declared. The Labour Party in the past has strongly supported a test ban. It is known, however, that Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, who is responsible for disarmament matters in the Shadow Cabinet, while favouring a test ban, attaches much less importance to this than to actual disarmament measures. (4-59> R O fj T I N ( SLIP

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You might find the attached Weekly Note on Main Developments in the Disarmament Conference of interest.

DATE: FROM: 8/3/63 E. D. Ktselev COHFIDEHIIAL 7 March 1963

Weekly Note on Main Developments in the Disarmament.Conference

During the past week the first informal, meeting was held; the Co-Chairmen agreed, to devote this week to the test ban issue; and Mr. Foster left Geneva. No new substantive developments emerged. At the informal meeting India stated the following premises: 1* Both sides desired to reach a test "ban agreement* 2. There was common ground on the structure of a verification system. 3. Each side respected the other's political framework and constitutional procedures, k. International community strongly favoured a test ban, ^JEhe U,S, agreed with these premises^ India asked the following questions: 1, Was it recognized that the present political context favoured the conclusion of a test ban this year (preferably during the first half) while next year's would not? 2. Why wasn't there a shift in negotiating postures following the Kennedy- Khrushchev exchange? 3« Why was the simultaneous consideration of a few selected issues rejected? kf Why should agreement on the number of on-site inspections be blocked while practically k or 5 inspections could provide a solution? 5. Was there a common ground in connexion with on-site inspection modalities? The U.S. saw no particular deadline for agreement, and thought that the modalities of inspection had been broadly agreed upon. At the previous meeting the U»S, asked whether the USSR maintained its 1960-61 position on the following 5 specific questions: the criteria to locate suspicious events; the decision that an event is suspicious; the determination of the area to be inspected; the techniques of on- site inspection and the composition of inspection teams, —' The USSR continued to maintain that the number of inspections and automatic stations should be agreed first, and charged that the U.S. was preventing agreement because of a difference over some 2 or 3 inspections. At the previous plenary meeting the USSR had also spoken of disagreement "simply because of a difference of 2 or 3, or some such figure." (This may be noteworthy since the difference between the parties is k inspections,)

I/ According to press reports, the U«S. is insisting that half of any inspection team to be sent into Soviet territory be composed of U,S, or U.K. nationals. This is a change from the Draft Treaty of August 27, 1962 which left it to the Executive Officer to decide the composition of the team, but is consistent with the Western position of the previous year. - 2 -

According to press reports, during the informal meeting the USSR drew attention to the London Times editorial on k- March which stated that: "It can" do no harm and it might achieve much ^for the U.K. representative/ "to make clear to the Americans that to continue to reject the offer of three inspections is to fly in the face of military and scientific logic; and to the Russians that such an acceptance would obviously justify a more reasonable attitude on their side towards the terms of inspection and the number of seismic detection stations," The U,K» delegation disassociated itself from the editorial and reaffirmed the scientific basis of the Western proposal. This was confirmed by an official statement in London on 6 March, Canada and Italy suggested agendas for the discussion of the main technical issues, including the number of inspections, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland referred to the utility of an early test ban agreement in relation to other political problems especially in Europe, Romania asked whether the U.S. Congress was opposed to a test ban; the U.S. replied that despite individual complaints the President's policy was to seek an early agreement. Burma expressed cautious optimism on the outcome of negotiations, but said it would be hard to reach agreement on the number of on-site inspections without agreement on the "fundamentals" of inspection. It urged adoption of a procedure to overcome the "difficulty and called for the termination of U.S. testing* U.S. was willing to accept the non-aligned suggestions on procedure. Poland thought the procedure suggested by Burma would only increase disagreement. CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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Forwarded herewith is a Note setting out the latest information regarding the non-aligned position on a test ban. It also includes a suggestion for a possible initiative by you.

DATE: 11/3 E. Kiselev f PSCA/DAG/1<42 g fc ID CONFIDENTIAL 11 March 1963 ^ Note On Proposals by the Non-Aligned Countries At the Geneva Conference The non-aligned countries have been drafting a new joint memorandum on the cessation of nuclear tests during the past two weeks. Though the press reports—' "dissension among the eight neutral members of the Conference on the compromise plan", Mr. Loutfi cabled on 11 March that the non-aligned delegations had established a drafting committee but that submission of the memorandum was not expected before the end of this week. Information received in Hew York indicates that the non-aligned countries have agreed on a new compromise memorandum that includes a proposal for "k or 5" annual on-site inspections on each side's territory. It is not yet known however what other substantive or procedural matters are included in the new memorandum. The memorandum is being submitted to Governments for approval. The possibility of compromise on the number of on-site inspections is linked to the question of the method of negotiating. The USSR has insisted that the main technical aspects of the verification and inspection process could only be discussed after there was agreement on the numbe? of on-site inspections and the number of automatic stations. The Western powers on the other hand, have maintained that there is a direct relationship between the number of on-site inspections and the character of the inspection. The non-aligned have made several suggestions regarding the method or procedure for negotiating: India The simultaneous consideration of a few selected issues, such as the number of inspections; the method of initiating inspection; selecting areas for inspection; the number of inspectors and the number of automatic stations. Brazil Discuss the number of inspections and automatic stations alternately with questions relating to the control systems and inspection process. Sweden Study immediately such practical matters as instrumentation of seismic stations and their location; data transmission and methods for data analysis; site of control agency; and the immediate establishment of an interim scientific commission. United Arab One of the parties should submit a new draft treaty or a working Republic paper outlining its approach. The question of quota should be discussed prior to or simultaneously with other components of the treaty and that failing immediate agreement on the quota, the question could be left open and the study of other parts of the treaty could go on for some limited period of time. Burma The procedure should reflect the fact that it would be difficult to come to agreement on numbers without an understanding being reached simultaneously on the fundamentals of the modalities of inspection. I/UPI, 11 March 1963 - 2 - Reaction to the Initiatives of the Non-Aligned Nations Neither the U.S. nor the USSR has commented directly on the compromise figure of k to 5 on-site inspections which the U.A.R. and India had previously mentioned, "but each has used language in defending its present policy which would seem to imply that a compromise between 3 and 7 has not been ruled out. As to procedure, the U«S. has accepted any or all the suggestions made by the non-aligned nations, whereas the USSR oontinued to insist that there could be no discussion of the details of the inspection process until there was agreement on the main issues, namely, the number of on-site inspections and 2.7 automatic seismic stations.-7 Suggestions for Possible Initiative by Secretary-General The Secretary-General may wish to consider the advisability of issuing a public statement immediately after the new eight-nation memorandum is submitted, and before the nuclear powers have an opportunity of formally accepting or rejecting it. If the contents are such that the Secretary-General feels they merit his support, he might also wish to address a private plea to the heads of government of the three nuclear powers urging them to give the proposals their most earnest personal consideration*

§/ At the 105th meeting on 6 March, Mr. Q?sarapkin said, "I should like to emphasize with the utmost clarity that we do not refuse to discuss technical questions. We are prepared to enter into such a discussion immediately or as soon as we can see that the U.S. is moving towards an agreement or towards a compromise solution on the question of the inspection and automatic stations." CR.13 (4-59) 'ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: 26/3/63 CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG.440 20 March 1963

French Muclear Policy and the Western Alliance

Table of Contents

The Nassau deal and France's "force de frappe" and "force de dissuasion" 1 European defence and political integration ..* 2 Credibility of French deterrence ...... 3 French-US differences on the objectives of deterrence ...... * 4 Concluding remarks ...... **...» 5 CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG.440 20 Harch 1963

French Nuclear Policy and the Western Alliance

Developments following President de Gaulle's rejection of the Polaris offer and his veto on the British application for membership in the Common Market would seem to suggest that these two apparently unrelated events were dual aspects of a policy aimed at one definite objective: to check, through strategic and economic concepts, American control over Europe. Whether FranceTs ultimate objective is to secure a European hegemony, currently wielded by the United States, remains a controversial issue. But what seems clear is that the United States plan to establish a nuclear defence system that would respond to its doctrine of the "indivisibility of Western defence" and the French determination to continue with its plan of a nuclear independence are two incompatible positions. This paper is the first of several on the French attitude towards the Western alliance in the light of the changing concept of nuclear defence and strategy. Its purpose is to show the main conceptual elements which appear to have contributed to current French thinking on this matter, The Nassau deal and France's"force de frappe" and "force de dissuasion"-'

Ever since I960, when France's first five-year comprehensive military re-organization plan was approved by the National Assembly, France's aspirations for a leadership role in the political affairs of Europe have been backed up by a determination to carry to the fullest extent her programme for an independent nuclear force. She has considered her "force de frappe" as the only guarantee for the fruition of a plan to restore France's rightful political position in European affairs, From the technical policy viewpoint, the acceptance of the Polaris offer under the 2/ terms of the Nassau agreement-'would compel France to divert from her present plan, which by the end of this year would supply her with at least three of the Mirage IV fighter bombers to deliver th© A-bombs she has produced since May 1961. The production of the nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles, which may not necessarily be along the lines of the production of hydrogen warheads for the ballistic l7"Force de frappe" is a term used to refer to the first generation nuclear force under the French first five-year military reorganization plan (1960-1964); it consists of atom bombs (with a yield three times that of the Hiroshima type) and the supersonic Mirage IV as their delivery vehicles. The "force de dissuasion" is supposed to be established by the end of the second five year plan (1969) and would consist of land, sea, and air-borne ballistic missiles with hydrogen warheads. Although press dispatches tend to think of the French nuclear deterrence in terms of the "force de frappe", publicists generally consider the French concept of deterrence at this stage as a combination of the two. See DAG.3&6 on the French military reorganization plan. 2/ Mr. Menhant's mission to discuss a "multilateral" NATO force would seem to fall in a cateeorv different from the Nassau Polaris nffftr. SPP nnt.e nn nacre 5. - 2 - missiles of the French "force de dissuasion" (to be operational by 1970), may also be a diversion of a carefully thought-out strategic plan. The acceptance of the Polaris offer, furthermore, would not guarantee sharing of technical know-how, granted t* England under the Nassau agreement, for the production of the missiles and submarines. But on top of that, the acceptance of the Polaris offer would place at the disposal of SACEUR all the Polaris force France may own. This arrangement would completely shatter the very raison d'etre of the French nuclear deterrence, which is to make that force a ma.lor political instrument freed of all "dlpendance exberieure."-' It is in this light that President de Gaulle's January 14 press conference should be seen. It must have been obvious to the French that after the successful firing of Skybolt on the eve of the conclusion of the Nassau agreement (reportedly missing its target by only one mile after an 850 mile flight) nothing much could be said about justifying the scrapping of the Skybolt programme for technical reasons. Suspicion has since grown considerably that the Polaris missiles were offered to Britain rather with a view to adjusting the Anglo-American defence arrangements to the McWamara "controlled eounterforcf". The French official view on the reason for rejecting the Polaris offer could not have been letter stated than by the French Secretary of Defence, M. Pierre Messmer, when he told the French National Assembly on January 24, that what should first of all be borne in mind was that attached to this offer were political and military conditions which in practice would assign the French nuclear force to NATO under American command,-' To this extent, then, the rejection of the Polaris offer may be construed as implying a similar French refusal of future American nuclear offers that are likely to impair France's right of control over its own nuclear force. Presumably driving home this idea to the Americans, President de Gaulle at his 14 January press conference stressed the view that France would continue with its present nuclear programme for an independent deterrent. European Defence and Political Integration The France-American differences on the advisability of gearing the French nuclear force to a weapon system such as the Polaris (regardless of whether based on submarines or surface ships) are obviously to be seen in the larger context of the issue of European defence and political integration. Since he first formally enunciated his opposition to

I/ French Armed Forces Bulletin, No. B.I. 37, 20 September 1962, page 3. Emphasis in this and other quotations added. 2/ "Je rappelerai d'abord", said M. Messmer, "que cette offre est assortie de conditions politiques et militaires peu slduisantes, qui conduiraient en pratique a faire passer notre force nucleaire sous commandement americain." (Le Monde, 25 January 1963) - 3 - an integration of European military forces in November 1959* President de Gaulle has in no way relaxed his attempt to convince the world of the validity of his views. On the contrary, his statement at the January 14 press conference has tended to be a more vigorous assertion of that attempt. The motivating factor in taking this attitude has been made clear time and again: the right to be treated as an equal, particularly vis-a-vis the United States. Rationalizing this right in the context of the Polaris offer, President de Gaulle dated: "...For a great power to have the free disposition of itself and the means to struggle to preserve it is an absolute imperative, for alliances have no absolute virtues, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based. And if one spontaneously loses, even for a while, the free disposition of oneself, there is a strong risk of never regaining it»" The Nassau Agreement has evidently been taken as a tangible proof of the long-held apprehension that, tied to an American controlled nuclear defence arrangement, France, like Britain, is to renounce the means by which to back up her claim to free disposition of her will. In the end, such surrender of national will would run counter to the concept of "Europe des patries" President de Gaulle has been advocating. Credibility of French Deterrence One of the basic arguments put forward by United States Defence Secretary McNamara against the concept of a French independent nuclear force has been that such force lacks credibility of a deterrent (cf. similar views by American writers as Paul Doty, Dean Acheson, Malcolm Hoag).-' M. Messmer in his statement before the French National Assembly pointed to an evidently new development in French nuclear thinking. He stated that, without renouncing the French plan for land-based nuclear ballistic missiles with hydrogen warheads, the French deterrent would now rely on sea-borne missiles and that France was now conducting studies of air-borne ballistic missiles. Such sea and land borne launching systems, he pointed out, would give the French deterrent "plus de souplesse et de securite". As it has been generally understood that sea-borne and air-borne delivery systems are much more mobile and, therefore, less vulnerable than land-based ones, it may be assumed that this is a movement towards greater sophistication of the concept of deterrence. I/ In his speech before the French Ecole Militarie on 3 November 1959, President de Gaulle said that a system of military integration "has had its day" (a vecu). See DAG,142, He stressed the view that a future European force should be based on the principle that the individual role of its national components must be recognized: "...notre strategic doit etre conjugee avec la strategxe des autres, Sur les champs de bataille il est infiniment probable que nous nous trouverions cote a cote avec des allies. Mais que chacun ait sa part a lui." (Jean Planchais dispatch, Le Monde, 6 November 1959) 2/ Paul M. Doty, "The Role of the Smaller Powers", in Brennan's Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security; Dean Acheson"s "The Practice of Partnership", January 1963 Foreign Affairs; Malcolm ¥. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence", ibid. - 4 - In this respect, there seems to be a narrowing of gap in the basic concept of'Vulnerability" between the United States and France, The technical subtleties may yet have to be developed, but the basic principle has been equally shared. Raymond Aron, notwithstanding the fact that he is a staunch supporter of the idea of a closely knit European community, already stated in 1961 that the credibility of the French nuclear deterrent could not be seen in the same light as that of the United States. The question of vulnerability, he noted, was a matter of technological development, and there was no reason why smaller powers should not be able to reduce their vulnerability in the 1970's.-^ M. Messmer's statement was in essence a substantiatLor. of Mr. Aron1s view. The trend towards accepting the theory of "hardening" of bases, as seems implicit in M. Messmer's statement, may in time serve as an important bolster for whatever further technical developments may take place between now and early 1970 by which time the French "second generation" of deterrent will have been born, French-US differences on the objectives of deterrence Although not a subject of much debate at the moment, doctrinal differences between the United States and France seem to have taken a more defined and discernible form. To the United States, at least for the foreseeable future, nuclear deterrence would seem to signify a security guarantee against ultimate attack from the Soviet Union and the socialist camp in general; to the French, nuclear deterrence does not seem to be necessarily directed at the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries alone. As indicated by M. Messmer in explaining the mission' of the French armed forces of the 1970's (of which "force de dissuasion" is the most essential part), such force could equally serve as a deterrent against threats coming from a non-Socialist group directed either against French interests or a country having special relationship with France.-' •'•he latest and perhaps the most important and lucid exposition of this basic doctrinal difference was given by M. Nerve1 Alphand, the French Ambassador to the United States, in his March 11, 1963 speech to the World Affairs Council in Lost Angeles. Defending the French policy for an independent nuclear force, he said:13"/ "».«we do not know what the international conditions will be, five, ten or fifteen years from now and whether there will not be the same cases then when France's interests will be threatened while those of her allies may not be involved in the same degree* It therefore seems

I/ Raymond Aron in Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, ed, by Donald G. Brennan, pp. 440 et al» 2/ Pierre Messmer, "LTAm4e de Demain", La Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1962, p. 482, Such threates, he points out, may be directed against the Western community as a whole, but the attack could be limited to one or several countries. He adds: "...dans la form* la menace peut aboutir soit a un conflit ouvert, generalise" (et vraisemblablement atomique) ou localise1, soit a des actions de subversion, soit a une combinaison des deu: 3_/ New York Post. March 14, 1963. Emphasis added. * 5 - normal to us for our own protection to have at our disposal a force which, though limited, would make an eventual adversary think twice before trying to blackmail us," This doctrinal difference in strategy, which seems to be the logical outcome of the more fundamental political view that the French deterrence is a "major instrument of policy", is indicative of the degree of maneuverability within which France could argue her case in the future. At the moment, however, France is in a state of "wait-and-see". After France refused the Polaris offer, without completely rejecting the need of the continuance of the Western alliance in its present form, and without reversing her pre-Nassau view that the French nuclear deterrence could be placed "within the framework"-'of the alliance, the next move for an alternative proposal would seem to have to come from the United States, President Kennedy in his press cfonference, following President de Gaulle's refusal of the United States offer, already made the distinction between a "multi-national" and "multi-lateral" nuclear forcer' Ho official statement, however, has been made as to whether or not an arrangement different from the Polaris formula in paragraph 6 of the Nassau agreement would be offered to France. Neither has the difference been officially defined between a "multi-lat eral" nuclear force based on a multi-nationally manned surface ships equipped with Polaris missiles (as seemed to be the reported objective of the Merchant mission,^') and a multi-national force President Kennedy had in mind. Another paper will deal with the French attitude towards a "multi-national" nuclear force, Concluding remarks If there is a discernible trend in French strategic thinking after the Cuban crisis and the Nassau agreement, it would in all likelihood be that France has become more convinced than ever of the need to keep and develop its own nuclear deterrent and to oppose every measure that would prevent this from materializing,^" I/ French Armed Services Bulletin, ibid., p, 3 2/ Press conference of February 14 j text Washington Posjj, February 15, 1963 3_/ According to press despatches, what Mr. Merchant has been discussing in Rome, Bonn and London is the establishment of a multi-nationally manned surface ships force for NATO with a small political executive in which each of the potential main contributors (US, UK, W»Germany and Italy) would have a veto in the use of this force. The communique issued after Mr. Merchant's London talks on March 13, excerpts of which appears in the March 14 Washington Post does not give a clearer picture of the rather fluid differen- tiation between "multilateral" and "multinational". This is especially true in so far a£ the components of "multinational" force are concerned: what, in the light of the French refusal of the Polaris should a US alternative be that might attract France to join in, y It is in this context that President de Gaulle's veto on the British application for Common Market membership should be seen. Economic considerations no doubt play an important role; but the conviction fostered by the Nassau agreement, that British entry into the Common Market would in the end perpetuate American dominance over ^urope anc therefore thwart what France has been working for, including leadership in continental affairs, must be considered a. determining factor. ~ 6 ~ Ttfhatever alternative arrangements may be offeredto France in the future, the United States will probably have to take this trend into account. President Kennedy has in fact already given some public acknowledgement of it when he stated that, should the present plan prove unacceptable, the United States "will be prepared to consider any other proposals that might be put forward,"—' In retrospect, the French plan for a nuclear deterrent would seem to have been firmly rooted for some time in the French thinking; it is not a policy originating with President de Gaulle, although he has given it a formal framework with the adoption of the French military reorganization plan in I960. Since 1952, when the Saclay plutonium- producing reactor was established and the French first five-year nuclear programme approved by Parliament, French governments have all throughout favoured making France a nuclear power*2 / These included the radicaL-socialist governments under Pierre Mendes France in 1954$ as well as of Felix Gaillard, in the course of whose tenure France decided, in 1957, to explode her first plutonium bomb by 1961, In fact, the French Parliament in 1957 accepted French participation in the then proposed Euratom only on condition that France would thereby not be deprived of her right to embark on a military nuclear programme, It is presumably this continuing trend of opinion that has prompted Raymond Aron to state in a comment on the McNamara Michigan speech of last year that any French 3/ government would be forced by public opinion to continue the French nuclear programme, With the French first generation of nuclear force (A-bombs and Mirage IV fighter-bombers) practically in hand, and with President de Gaulle in office at least until 1966, by which time the second generation of this force (hydrogen warheads and ballistic missiles) would be available, this trend may be considered as irreversible, 'What remains to be a major issue in the Western alliance is the extent to which President de Gaulle would be willing to assign the developing French nuclear force to a NATO or European deterrent. In this respect the question of control, deployment and right of withdrawal may constitute the critical aspects of the issue. These, among other things, would be the subject matters to be dealt with in the note on the French attitude towards the present plan for a NATO multinational force referred to earlier.

I/ February 14, 1963 press conference; text in Washington Post, 15 February. 2/ Bertrand Goldschmidt in an interesting note on the development of the French nuclear programme points out that although the 1952 plan made no mention of the poasible use of plutonium in military applications^ it was certain that this eventuality "was present—if not predominant—in the minds of those who suggested the five-year plan and encouraged its adoption," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1962 issue; see also his note in the October issue. Professor Hoffman in a recent study has pointed out that even those French leaders who have doubted the credibility of the French nuclear force have not come out against the French nuclear programme, Stanley Hoffman and others, In Search of France. Harvard University Press, 1963,pp.412-3 %/ Dispatch by Robert G. Doty in New York Times. Tune 18, 1963. - 7 - In the disarmament debates, the refusal of the Polaris offer would not in itself seem to signify any change in France's hitherto negative position towards disarmament negotiations. But if this refusal is a reflection of a determined effort to continue with the French nuclear programme, then it may be taken as indicative of a hardening of position. For such refusal would in the end mean that France would, in implementing her plan for nuclear independence, test her hydrogen bombs. That she would carry out tests, regardless of the ENDC test-ban negotiations, and of views expressed therein, has been shown by her A-bomb tests conducted in the Sahara this week. Under such circumstances it is unlikely that France would accept any test ban agreement before she could accomplish her concept of deterrence; and then, only on condition that, as an independent nuclear power, she may see fit to accept it. CR.13 (4-59) ROUT'NG SLIP

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APPROVAL XX YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT 1 YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS Status of USA - USSR Bilateral Agreements on Space Projects (21 March 1963)

1. On 5 December 1962, Ambassadors Stevenson and Zorin jointly- announced at the 17th session of the First Committee that agreements had been reached by Dr. Hugh L. Dryden and Academician A.A. Blagonravov regarding certain areas for bilateral cooperative activity for the peaceful uses of outer space. Three areas were specified: (l) meteorology, (2) world magnetic survey, and (3) satellite telecommunication. 2. The first step in implementing these agreements has just been concluded in Rome, where working groups from the two countries have been in session during the period 11-20 March. Initial arrangements were concluded in two of the specified fields (meteorology and satellite telecommunications) which will become definite after a sixty-day waiting period to allow for any changes which either country wishes to propose. Methods for handling the third item (measurement of the earth's magnetic field) were not concluded during the Rome meetings but will probably be re-examined in Geneva during May of this year when the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee of the UK Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space will be assembled, 3» In the field of meteorology, the agreements envisage that each country will launch weather satellites in complementary orbits to provide weather pictures more or less on a continuing basis. Data derived from these satellites would be exchanged via a full-time circuit between Moscow and Washington and would also be made public for world-wide use. Each country will pay for its own satellites and the programme is expected to begin in 1964« 4. In the field of satellite telecommunications, experiments will be conducted using Echo II, a reflective 140-foot sphere, which is expected to be launched by the USA within the next two months. Radio signals between the two countries will be bounced back and forth via the satellite through cooperating ground stations in Western Europe, - 2 -

The results 'of these experiments are expected to contribute to the development of a global satellite network capable of handling telephone and television communications. 5. anticipating an extension of these initial agreements, Drs. Dryden and Blagonravov expressed the hope that their two countries might also collaborate further in the exploration of outer space by sending probes to other planets. They expect to study the possibilities of such probes to Mars and Venus at the forthcoming meeting of COSPAR (Committee on Space Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions) which will be held in Warsaw this June. They also foresee possible participation by other countries in joint space projects as these countries achieve their own satellite capability. Thus, the initial realities achieved at Rome could hopefully lead to further bilateral and multilateral coordination and the avoidance of costly duplication in the exploration and use of outer space. CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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III »*>*•o DATE: FROM?!/ SM 26/3/63 ' E.D. Kiselev r Atomic Energy Section 26 March 1963

Disarmament and the__¥orld Trade and Development Conference

Sonvocation and Composition On 19 December 1961 the General Assembly- set in motion what may result in one of the most important programs of the Decade of Development with its resolution that members be polled on a possible world trade conference. By o 11 December 1962 the General Assembly had endorsed the decision of ECOSOC to convene a Conference on Trade and Development which would contribute to "peace o and an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding among nations...." The Conference, which was set to convene after the Council's 23 July session and no later than early 1964, was to be preceded by a Preparatory Committee which would arrange its organizational details and prepare for its substantive work. The first session of the Preparatory Committee, held from 22 January to 5 February, was attended by the eighteen members of ECOSOC plus 12 nations "chosen with due regard to equitable geographical distribution and an adequate rep- resentation of developing and major trading countries" as provided in Resolution 917 (ZXXIV). It is significant to note the limited attention given to the relationship of a disarmament agreement to the trade and development program of the decade by those preparing the Conference up to this time. Limited References to Disarmament During First Session Throughout the first session of the Preparatory Committee, there were only about fifteen direct references to disarmament's effects on the world's economy, and many of these references indicated the attitude that disarmament was a distant goal and not the responsibility of those represented. Generally, the urgency of the subject, economically and politically, was stressed by the Soviet bloc, while many other delegations gave it low priority on "jurisdictional" grounds. Jurisdictional Dispute At the llth and 12th meetings of the first session, the preparatory committee 7 reviewed its preliminary listing for the Conference Agenda. This document made no reference to disarmament. Mr. Arkadyev, representative of the USSR, claimed at the 12th meeting to be completely unsatisfied with the draft and pledged the USSR to fight to include "an economic program for disarmament" as a separate agenda rt ______„ item for the Conference. But the United States representative called the same document an "auspicious beginning" and was not alone in this regard. The draft of the interim report submitted 1 February had characterized the Soviet Union proposal, for an agenda item on a study of the effects of general disarmament on - 1 - 2 international trade as reflecting the "broader view...of international trade" and pointed to some members' reaction against discussions which "go beyond the specific and urgent priority problems connected with the economic growth of developing countries." With U.S. support, Nigeria stated that "what the developing countries expected from the conference were concrete and immediate results and not a dissertation on the consequences of possible disarmament." The delegate from Yugoslavia pointed out that the "decision to disarm...could only be taken by the two Powers able to do so, and he could scarcely believe that the Preparatory Committee would resolve that momentous question."12 Question of Documentation A similar "disinterest" appeared in discussion of the documentation which governments and the Secretariat and various UN agencies were asked to prepare for the Conference, if possible, by the second session of the Preparatory Committee. During the fourth meeting, the Soviet Union had presented a memo whose proposed agenda included "a thorough study of the trade aspects of an economic programme for disarmament." 13 In introducing this item, Mr. Arkadyev said : "The consequences of general and complete disarmament had been discussed by many delegations at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. At the thirty-fourth session of ECOSOC, the Secretary-General had stressed the importance of releasing resources through disarmament. The subject had also been dealt with by the Under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs...and by the Brazilian delegation in its memorandum....The vast sums which could become available for economic development would benefit the developed capitalist countries, the socialist countries and the less developed countries and under-developed countries, as his delegation had pointed out in the Second Committee. A mighty impetus could thereby be given to the developing countries, particularly so far as power, industry, transport, housing and agriculture were concerned. The solution of the development problem would result in greatly increased activity and generate heavy demand for materials and technical personnel; possible sources to meet that demand should be considered without delay. The effects of disarmament on trade, world markets and the economies of the less developed countries should also be analysed in advance, particularly with a view to the elimination of single-crop economies and the diversification of imports and exports. The Conference should not deal with disarmament and trade, however, to the exclusion of other practical and timely matters. Its agenda should be thor- oughly discussed and all possible means of solving economic development problems should be examined; at the same time due consideration should be given to disarmament and the reconversion to peaceful uses of the resources which disarmament would release...." 14 Mien the United States representative called for consultation with the Secretary- General regarding the "particular documents" the Soviet Union had proposed for preparation, Mr. Arkadyev said the Soviet Union would be satisfied with a compi- lation of extant documentation on the subject,by the Committee "as its factual documentation on the subject; the Soviet Union had asked no more than that." -3 -

Mr. Arkadyev later accepted a further limitation on the scope of the subject by proposing that "his delegation would be satisfied (with paragraph 6 of the proposed agenda) if the word 'economic1 were inserted before the words 'effects of general disarmament'." In the end, no new specific documentation was requested or approved. The Final Text As a result of a decision to include only "facts" rather than controversial material not specifically approved in the Committee's report, the approved text of Item I1 7 of the agenda reads simply: "1. Expansion of international trade and its significance for economic development." In the footnote to this first item is the only explicit authorization to relate disarmament to the Con- ference proceedings: "Moreover, it is agreed that the scope of the general study of international trade mentioned under Item I is broad enough to cover all the short-term and long-term aspects of international trade, including the question of the implications of general disarmament for trade. However, it was generally felt that the Conference should deal primar- ily with problems of immediate practical importance to the development of international trade of the developing countries in conformity with Resolution 1785 (307TI) of the General Assembly."18 Conclusions of the Committee's First Session During the sixth meeting the USSR representative had suggested that, after examining the trade aspects of a disarmament agreement, the Conference should ex- press its views on the need for such agreements1 9 and later he had pointed out that "the Conference would indeed provide an excellent opportunity to remind the countries participating in the negotiations on disarmament that the world was awaiting the results of their efforts and was in need of the resources that would be released by a disarmament agreement."^C1 But there were political implications behind the Committee's reticence on the subject just as there were political explanations for opening it up (in spite of statements denying any political motivation.)2 T The United States representative said "Without wishing to deny the reality of the economic consequences of disarmament or the existence of problems concerning East-West trade (particularly the embargo on strategic materials), the United States delegation hoped that these questions would not be raised at the Conference. A political discussion of that kind would lead the Conference far away from the —, concrete elements of its agenda, without...serving...the developing countries.,B, . The final text with its minimal reference to disarmament was approved with only slight modification after the Polish representative observed that "the committee did not think that in a year's time general disarmament would be one of the problems of more immediate practical importance to the development of international trade."23 The Committee adjourned until its second session, set for Geneva from 21 May to 2B June 1963. A third session and increased membership were recommended to ECOSOC. * Footnotes 1. A Res 1707, 2VI 2. Res. 917, XXXI\r 3. A Res 1785, X7II 4. E/donf. 46/PG/SR 2 5. The twelve were Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Lebanon, Madagascar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic. In E/Conf.46/SR 1 the Soviet Union representative reminded the chairman that the Federal Republic of Germany was present as an Observer, while East Germany had not been invited. In its original proposal for the world conference, A 5219), the Soviet Union had proposed that all interested countries be eligible to participate. This motion was amended to read as in the text of Res. 917. International Labour Organisation was among the organizations represented. 6. See especially pp. 15-16 in E/Gbnf.46/PC/SR. 22, and E/Conf.46/PC/L.ll/Add.l. 7. E/Sonf.46/PC/L.7, 29 Jan., from Argentina, Brazil, India, Lebanon, New Zealand, Nigeria./Rakistaru United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia. oA. jj/uOnl ,fyo/r(j./!xL J.2 9. E/Gbnf.46/PC/SR 11. See SR 11 & 12 for the views of other delegates, characterized in Press Release EC/2176, 30 Jan., as regarding the document as a "satisfactory basis for further discussion.", the U.S. representative is cited as calling it"a highly constructive step forward." 10. E/C:onf.46/PC/L.ll,Add.l 11. E/Cbnf.46/PC/SR 18. 12. E/Conf .46/PC/SR. 21, p.18. 13. E/Gonf.46/PG:/L.l 14. E/Conf .46^C/SR 4~, p.4 15. E/Gbnf.46/PC/SR 20, p.4 16. E/Gbnf.46/PC/SR 20, p.9 £a. E/Conf.46/PC/SR 21, p.12 17. E/Conf. 46/PC./3 18. This resolution contains no reference to disarmament. 19. E/Conf.46/PC/SR 6, p.8 20. E/Conf.46/PC/SR 10, p.8 21. E/Conf.46/PG/SR 4* p. 4» Mr. Arkadyev disclaims any political intention in asking that disarmament be considered a "major factor" on the Conference agenda. 22. E/Conf.46/PC/SR 18, p.9 23. E/Conf.46/PC/SR 22, p.15-16 24. E/Conf.46/PC/3 is the text to be presented to ECOSOC and contains among other items the draft agenda for the second session. For discussion on increased membership, see E/6bnf.46/PC/3R. 21, and items referred to in footnote 5 above. . GR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO- U Thant, Secretary-General

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NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS A concrete suggestion for an initiative by the Secretary-General on general disarmament was made in the House of Commons last Thursday, which seemed to evoke some measure of interest on the part of the Prime Minister. In case it is brought to your attention by one of the delegations or at a press conference, or otherwise, I forward herewith the attached brief note on the matter.

DATE: 2S/3/63 . D. Kiselev CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG/^53 28 March 1963 U.K, Labour Party's Suggestion for Initiative on General Disarmament by the Secretary-General During the question period in the House of Commons on 21 March, Mr. Arthur Henderson (one of the Labour Party's experts on disarmament) and Mr. Harold Wilson both made suggestions for a compromise plan for general disarmament. The gist of the exchange was: "Mr. Henderson; Is it not most unlikely that any progress on general disarmament will be made at Geneva as long as there are two major disarmament plans before the Conference? Would it not be possible to invite the United Nations Secretary-General to produce a compromise plan drawn from the best of both the United States and the Soviet disarmament plans? The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman's proposal would require the agreement of the parties, but I see great merit in what he has suggested and I am quite ready to look into the matter further. What we had rather hoped was that the Conference would make a combination of the agreed elements of the two plans, but if there is other machinery for getting it put in a simple form I will certainly look into it and see whether we can proceed in that way. Mr. H. Wilson; ... Could the Prime Minister say whether Her Majesty's Government have produced a compromise plan which they are prepared to table at Geneva as an alternative to the suggestion made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) for leaving it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations? The Prime Minister; .*. The Conference, rather than Her Majestyfs Government, should select subjects of agreement from the two plans and frame procedures for them. That, unluckily, has not happened, although I think that it ought to be possible* I think that the method suggested by the right hon. Member for Rowley Rigis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) is a method of procedure which might commend itself to the Conference. Mr. H. Wilson; ...Does the Prime Minister not feel that just occasionally the British Government should take an initiative in disarmament which, on the whole, they have not done? The Prime Minister; It is very easy to take an initiative if one wants to strike an attitude, but I am much more interested in seeing whether we can get this settled. The suggestion made by the right hon. Gentleman, which I will study, has the advantage that it appears to come from a neutral source. It has been suggested that if the Secretary-General could not do it, perhaps the eight neutral countries themselves, which have a kind of middle position, could do it* I am only anxious to take whatever course is most likely to promote the ultimate agreement.11 The prospects for agreement on general and complete disarmament in the near future are not very bright. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the non-aligned countries at the Geneva Conference continue to maintain that there is little point in attempting to reach an agreement on, or even discussing, general disarmament until an agreement is first reached on a nuclear test ban. While one or two of the non-aligned countries, in particular India, have occasionally hinted at the - 2 - possibility that the non-aligned countries might attempt to work out a compromise plan for general disarmament, it is hardly likely that they would divert their attention from a test ban to a compromise plan for general disarmament. The current negotiating positions of the parties on both a test ban and general disarmament would also seem to make it most unlikely that either the U.K. Government or the Geneva Conference would in the near future call on the Secretary-General for any initiative in the field of general disarmament. CR«.',3 (4-59) - ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: :: 9A/63 CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG/^ 9 April 1963 French Nuclear Policy and Its Implications for a Test Ban Treaty

The recent underground nuclear test conducted by France —'fiti/f s in with the avowed intention of President de Gaulle to create an independent nuclear deterrent 2/ for France.-7 France's boycott of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference and her refusal to participate in the United States plans for a NATO nuclear force are to a large extent facets of this same policy. The recent test came as no great surprise, although it led to adverse criticism. Immediately after the test, France's determination to continue testing in implementation of her "nuclear program" was reconfirmed by Defence Minister Messmer.-' The French nuclear program is aimed at the establishment of a force that would attain a "qualitative parity" with the forces of other nuclear powers, which is not expected W until about 1970.-' There have been some reports in recent days that the French nuclear program was running behind schedule and that doubts were expressed in some French quarters as to the effectiveness of an independent French nuclear force.—' Since France is committed to continue testing, at least until 1970, it would be fair to assume that she would not sign or adhere to any test ban agreement prior to that time. This raises the question as to whether the other nuclear powers would agree to enter into any treaty without France's signature from the outset. The Soviet Union has asserted on a number of occasions in the past that a test ban agreement without France's signature would be impossible to conclude.-' Soviet disarmament negotiators have argued that if France is left free to test, then the advantages she would gain from testing would also devolve by proxy upon her NATO allies, including the United States. The U.S. position has been that it.is first essential to conclude an agreement among the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., following which attempts should be made to bring France and other potential nuclear powers into the agreement .^/ If this failed, any of the three parties could nullify the agreement under the withdrawal clause.—' It is, however, noteworthy that the Soviet Union has not made the signature or adherence of France to a treaty a major issue in the test ban negotiations. Premier Khrushchev also did not raise the question of France in his exchange of letters with President Kennedy last December. The fact that the Soviet Union has not insisted on prior assurances of French signature or adherence to a treaty would - 2 - indicate its desire to continue the negotiations. It may also indicate that the U.S.S.R. may consider that there are a number of more immediate questions which need to be resolved apart from or prior to the question of French signature or adherence. It may also give rise to hope that the Soviet Union, too, may have in mind that, if and when an agreement is reached, domestic, allied, and world opinion might influence France to reconsider her stand. The recent French test has demonstrated that France has not allowed the threat of adverse world opinion to inhibit the development of her nuclear force. In view of the adamance of her stand, it is doubtful whether France would be willing to accede to any test ban agreement signed by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K. and thus apply a voluntary halt or brake to her progress towards becoming a major nuclear power. If France refused to adhere to a test ban treaty, and continued to test, it is also doubtful whether the Soviet Union would agree to be bound by a treaty. This is even more true now that France and West Germany have concluded a treaty of mutual cooperation which the Soviet Union fears might be a prelude to full- fledged military cooperation between the two powers and an eventual arming of the Bundeswehr with French-supplied nuclear weapons. Thus it would appear that, even though it might be possible to conclude a test ban agreement without France, the chances that such an agreement would.survive continued French rejection are not very encouraging. Unless a way is found to bring about France's accession, any test ban treaty runs the risk of eventual collapse. This raises the problem of obtaining French accession to a treaty. At various times, it has been suggested that a solution to this aspect of the test ban problem is conceivable by the recognition of France as a nuclear power with whom the full sharing of information by its allies would be considered a lesser evil than France's continuation of testing. Such sharing might take the form of (a) the U.S. treating France in the same way as it does the U.K.; or (b) by the creation of an Anglo-French nuclear partnership; or (c) some form of European nuclear force; or (d) some form of NATO nuclear force.—' In exchange for full nuclear partnership in some form, it has been suggested, France might be willing to forego the development of an independent nuclear capability and the carrying out of further, nuclear tests. Whether such a situation would be more acceptable to the U.S.S.R. than the continuation of testing by France, and possibly by others in the future, would depend on Soviet calculations of the political and military advantages to it. The U.S.S.R. has made clear its opposition to the current proposals for a NATO nuclear force and has within the past few days addressed notes to the U.S., U.K., France and West Germany - 3 - warning against the spread of nuclear capabilities especially to West Germany. It can be presumed that the U.S.S.R. would likewise oppose a European nuclear force. It is less clear whether and to what extent the U.S.S.R. would oppose the first two alternatives (full U.S. sharing of information with France or an Anglo-French partnership), which did not include West Germany. It seems fairly clear, however, that as long as the differences over nuclear policy between France and the U.S.-U.K. remain, the chances of France's accession to a test ban treaty appear slim. It has however been suggested unofficially from time to time that French refusal to adhere to a test ban treaty might be balanced by the refusal of the P.R. of China, to adhere. It has even been suggested by U.S. officials that, if a test ban treaty is signed by the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S., the U.S. would undertake responsibility for attempting to obtain French adherence and would expect that the U.S.S.R. would attempt to obtain Chinese adherence.—' Under these circumstances, the major nuclear powers might still elect to be bound by a treaty while they continued their efforts toobtain French and Chinese adherence, and to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear capabilities. (i) Footnotes I/ The test, conducted on 18 March in the Algerian Sahara, was stated by Premier Ben Bella to "be of a detonator for a hydrogen bomb. 2/ In his press conference on 14 January 1963* President de Gaulle stated: "We will adhere to the decision we have made: to construct and if necessary to employ our atomic force ourselves...As long as nuclear forces exist in the world, as they do, nothing can prevent France from acquiring one herself." 3/ On 22 March, Mr. Messmer, the French defence minister, stated: "We are carrying out our nuclear program which calls for a still greater number of tests." k/ In an interview with Newsweek (December 10, 1962) General Pierre Gallois, President de Gaulle's chief defence advisor, stated: "France is not going to stop testing until we achieve qualitative parity. That won't be until 1970 or thereabouts." The New York Times of 9 April reported that Gen. Gallois thought the French program had been delayed by a period of up to 3 years. ]>/ Hew York Times, 9 April 1963 6/ On 23 March 1962, Mr. Gromyko stated the following at the l8-Nation Disarmament Conference:. "The Soviet Government has already stated that an international agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is possible only if it is signed by the Governments of all the nuclear Powers. Wo agreement is possible unless it is signed by the Governments of all these Powers. • • • "We in the Soyiet Union consider that, as nuclear Powers, the U.S., the U.K., and France are members of the same family--the NATO military bloc. Accordingly, the only correct conclusion, and th= one to which the Soviet Government has in fact come, is that an international agreement can be signed only if the obligations for which it provides are assumed by all the nuclear Powers and not by three- quarters of tisese Powers..." (ENDC/PV.8, p.25) On 9 May 1962, Mr. Zorin stated the following at the Eighteen-Hation Disarmament Conference: "If the Western Powers believe that it will be possible to conclude a treaty which will prohibit nuclear weapon testing by the three nuclear powers, whereas the fourth nuclear power, France, an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, will not adhere to this treaty and will not undertake any obligations, then I am bound to say that such a treaty will not come into being, because the Soviet Union will not sign such a treaty. I want this fact also to be taken into consideration. We cannot allow a situation where an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom would quite calmly continue its weapon tests while ignoring completely the demands of world public opinion for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons by all Powers. Therefore, if the United States and United Kingdom representatives consider that it will be possible to conclude a treaty to which France would not be a party, they should not harbour any illusions on this score." (ENDC/PV.3^, p.^5) Again, Mr. Gromyko, talking to newsmen at a reception on 21 January 1963, stated: "We think France is a nuclear power. France must sign. Without France I think an agreement is impossible. I am convinced France must sign. And I believe in the long run France will sign." (ii)

7/ President Kennedy, commenting on Mr. Grcmyko's statement about France, stated In his press conference of 2k January 1963: "I think the first problem is to attempt to negotiate the details of the treaty. Then, if we are successful, if we work out a treaty which we believe gives us assurances, which we believe can provide for an end of testing and security for the countries involved ... then I would hope that other countries would be willing to sign it." And, on 2 February, he said: "... France has been recognized as a nuclear power by the Soviet Union. It would be up to the Soviet Union to make a judgment as to what action they would take on the treaty, if France continued to test. In addition, we are concerned about other countries testing so that we would have to make a judgment ... as to what action we might take if other countries tested." On 1 February, Mr. Dean Rusk stated: "If an agreement could be accomplished, it would be up to the signatories ... to decide for themselves what the result would be for them if anyone else started testing. This is written into the draft treaty itself. But we have felt that it was important to find out whether we and the British and the Soviet Union could take the first step in agreeing on a test ban and then take up other questions as we get to them." On 28 February 1963, Mr. Jacob Beam, Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated: "We are not able, at this time, to predict that either France or Communist China will sign a test ban treaty. But neither do we wish, at this time, to abandon our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons because of uncertainty about the future action of France and Communist China. "Our effort , therefore, has been, first, to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on a nuclear test ban treaty, and, second, to attempt to bring all other important nations in the world into the treaty." 8/ The withdrawal clause included in the U.S. Draft Treaty of 27 August 1962 stipulates that if a party to the treaty can produce evidence that nuclear tests have been conducted by a state, not a party to the treaty, under circumstances which might jeopardize'the national security of the former, it can withdraw from the treaty if it so desires. 9/ See for the most recent examples the article by Kissinger in "RATO's Nuclear Dilemma" in The Reporter 28 March 1963; the report in the New York Times of 8 April 1963 of the statement by Mr. Jean Monnet; and the report by Drew Middleton in the New York Times of 9 April 1963. 10/ Testimony of William Foster at Hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, 11 March 19^3, and testimony of Defense Secretary McNamara at Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 20 February 1963• - i •<•*

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: U Thant Secretary-General , _ . 10 April 196? FROM: William Epstein, Date: Department of Political and Security Council Aff ^f-Zl SUBJECT: JV L^ FILE NO.:

I forward herewith an analytical note: "The Significance of the Current American Test Ban Debate For U.S. Test Ban Policy" (PSCA/DAG/lt-59)- Mr. Kiselev requested that, in view of his absence today, I forward this note directly to you. CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAGA59 10 April 1963 The Significance of the Current American Test Ban Debate For U.S. Test Ban Policy

The intensive domestic debates in the U.S. during the past two months have provided the occasion for the Administration to explain publicly and in detail the military, scientific and political reasons for its decision to continue its attempt to achieve a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union. While these reasons are substantially the same as those put before a Congressional sub- committee in September 1962 (summarized in PSCA/DAG/1^), greater emphasis has been placed on the dangers of the arms race and particularly on the prevention of the spread of nuclear capabilities. For example, at his press conference on 22 March, President Kennedy stated that he regarded the prospect of possibly 15 to 25 nations possessing nuclear weapons by 1970 "as the greatest possible danger and hazard". Though his "hopes are somewhat dimmed" by the Geneva negotiations, he stated "I am not discouraged at all by those who attack every effort we make to get a nuclear test ban". It is also significant that in replying to critics in Congress, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials have used unusually sharp and undiplomatic language.-' They have apparently refused to seek to allay Congressional criticism at the expense of their negotiating position vis-a-vis the USSR, a tactic which might have been convenient domestically but which would have made difficult any further U.S. concessions. Indeed, there have been broad hints by Mr. Foster and Mr. Rusk that, with some additional movement on the part of the Soviet Union, further moves by the U.S. would be forthcoming.—' The President also hinted at this in his press conference on 6 March; in response to a question as to whether the U.S. would maintain its insistence on 7 on-site inspections, he stated, "I believe we will insist on a test ban treaty which gives us assurance that if a country conducted a series of clandestine underground tests that series would be detected." The Congressional Hearings also brought out the following noteworthy facts or attitudes: (l) Government experts are using as a technical basis the assumption that the weighing of all seismic data "from stations outside the USSR" would leave about 30 "most suspicious" unidentified underground events annually in the Soviet Union which the U.S. would want to consider as possible occasions for on-site inspections,3/ (This figure must be viewed in relation to previous U.S. assertions that one on-site inspection for every 5 anticipated significant doubtful underground events would be an effective deterrent against cheating). - 2 -

(2) 'There has also been testimony about an intelligence capability which, when added to the seismic detection and identification capability, would increase still further the ability of the system proposed by the U.S. to identify underground tests.4/ (3) If the Soviet Union would agree to a "high-quality" type of on-site inspection based on the principle that each side would have the right to choose and organize the inspection in the other's territory, the difference concerning the number of inspections might be overcome ,J5/ (4) The U.S. has begun to think of a "package" of a test ban and an early agreement against the transfer of control over nuclear weapons together with an undertaking by non-nuclear powers not to obtain a nuclear capability.6/ (5) U.S. officials have a relatively positive evaluation of Soviet policy on a test ban.T/ (6) The new U.S. draft treaty which is to be submitted shortly, is based on the above considerations. Conclusion There have been unofficial reports that if a treaty were presented for ratification today, it would probably fail to receive the necessary two-thirds approval by the Senate.—' However, the strong stand of Administration officials, as well as the President's statements at his press conference that he was not discouraged by the attacks and that the treaty would be submitted to the Senate for ratification, at which time the Senators could vote for or against it, contain the implication that he thought an agreed treaty would be ratified. In any event, since in the best of circumstances considerable time will be necessary to agree on a treaty containing all the detailed arrangements necessary for the supervision of a test ban, the present debate between the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the U.S. Government is probably only the opening round of what might be a prolonged controversy. It is possible that what Mr. Walter Lippmann wrote on 1J March about the international test ban debate also applies in some measure to the domestic arguments in the U.S., namely that the "supreme question" was whether the U.S. was willing to give up the hope of maintaining (and the USSR the hope of achieving) nuclear superiority^ If there is any truth in this assessment, both the domestic and international debates will be long and hard. An all-out effort by the President to win Congressional approval for a test ban may have to await clearer indications from Geneva that an agreement can in fact be negotiated. At the present time it is far from clear whether, and to what extent, either the U.S. or the USSR would be willing to modify its current position sufficiently to make it acceptable to the other side. Footnotes

I/ For example, the latest reply "by the Agency to Congressman Craig Hosmer, "Chairman of the Republic Conference Committee on Nuclear Testing, contained such statements as "Hosmer's mistake in calculations throw his whole computation into a cocked hat." "The '"big hole' is based on three assumptions, each of which is wholly inaccurate," etc. 2/ For example, when asked by the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee on 11 March whether "We have hit the bottom with this figure of 7 (on-site inspections)?'1 the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. William Foster replied: "No, I don't think so,...But under present circumstances, this is a sufficient number...Until there is some movement of some sort, and acceptance of the provisions on the part of the Soviet Union, I would say it is the bottom." —Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (stenographic transcript) 11 March, pp 766-767 Secretary Rusk was reported to have told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 March that seven was the "bottom" offer unless there is movement by the Soviets to meet U.S. demands (i.e. on the quality of inspections) (Washington Post, 12 March 1963) J5/ Testimony by Dr. Franklin Long, Assistant Director for Research of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Hearings, 8 March 1963, pp 687-689. It was explained that in all there would be about 170 detected but unidentified events above the magnitude of 4.0 on the seismic scale (the equivalent of about 1 kiloton explosion in granite; 2-6 kilotons in tuff and 10-20 in alluvium). But geographic and geological factors would reduce the 170 suspicious events to 30 "most suspicious" events. On 7 March 1963, Senator Humphrey stated in the Senate that "there are at most only a couple of dozen or so each year that are sufficiently suspicious (using the 4.0 threshold) as to require inspection for adequate verification." Using the (previous) threshold of 4.75 (equivalent to a 19 kiloton explosion in tuff) the number of unidentified events was not 70 to 100 as estimated last year "but closer to 12." He also stated that "the fact is that our detection capability is much greater than the press has led us to believe on the basis of the information it has received from the U.S. Government." k/ Mr. Foster stated: "...by placing verification on a more reciprocal basis... it would facilitate greater use of a broad range of intelligence factors..." —Hearings, 11 March p 757 Dr. Long stated: "...any objective discussion of the test ban environment must recognize the strong and pervasive influence of U.S. intelligence on the actions of the other party to the treaty."—Hearings, 8 March, p 685 5/ Secretary of Defence McNamara stated on 19 February 1963: "...the number of on-site inspections is not nearly as important as the quality. It is far more important to have a small number of high quality on-site inspections controlled by the U.S. than it is to have a larger number of inspections over which we have a lesser degree of control." —Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings, p 6 See also President Kennedy's press conference on 6 March 1963 and Mr. Foster, Hearings. 11 March 1963, p 766 s s . u»uci, 6/ Mr. Foster stated: "We would also hope soon to associate with a nuclear test ban treaty a treaty for non-proliferation and for non-acceptance of nuclear weapons, material or technology. This is part of a package. But you have to start somewhere." Hearings, 11 March p 7/ Mr. Foster stated: "It is my belief, Mr. Chairman, that when the Soviet representatives came to New York in January following that exchange of letters that they at least were hopeful of obtaining a test ban agreement with us. And hopeful apparently on the basis of Chairman Khrushchev's letter. I think it is entirely possible that there was a misunderstanding in their minds that the United States would be willing to accept two to three on-site inspections. They have stated, I think this is probably a correct statement — that they had made a major concession to us... in accepting the principle of on-site inspection. They felt that concession on their part might be great enough to enable them to obtain an agreement with us. "I think in some three or four weeks of discussion when we made it perfectly clear that that was in inadequate concession they lost some of their hope concerning that, and in fact they appeared to have somewhat changed their state of mind toward the possibility of such an agreement," pp 760-761 And also: "I think they are attempting to bargain as hard as they can, as are we... But the fact remains that it is to their interest, and I think they have indicated so, by statements of their Chairman, their Foreign Minister, and many others." p 782 8/ For example, The Economist's Foreign Report, 21 March 1963 9/ New York Herald Tribfrne^ Paris edition, 13 March 1963 CR.13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS I attach herewith "Analytical Survey of Statements on General Dis- armament in the First Committee."

DATE: 11/11/63 CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAGA93 11 November Analytical Survey of Statements on General Disarmament in the First Committee

Table of Contents

I. Role of the General Assembly 1 II. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee 1 Prance 1 P.R. of China 1 Summit 2 Future Task 2 III. General and Complete Disarmament 3 Nuclear Disarmament (i) Delivery Vehicles 3 (ii) Nuclear Weapons and Material 3 Conventional Disarmament \ Regional Disarmament 4 Control h Peace-keeping k IV. Collateral Measures 5 Accidental War and Surprise Attack 5 Non-Aggression Pact 6 Non-Dissemination 6 V. Huclear-Free Zones 6 Approach 6 Criteria 7 Areas 7 VI. Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons 7 CONFIDENTIAL BSCA/DAGA93 11 November 1963 Analytical Survey of Statements on General Disarmament in the First Committee

I. Role of the General Assembly The UAR opened the debate by proposing that the Assembly should call upon the Bighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to broaden the areas of agreement on disarmament and to give urgent attention to collateral measures, in particular, measures aimed at reducing the risk of war by accident or surprise attack and at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Similar views, which had been expressed by many delegations, were embodied in draft resolution A/C.1/L.328. Other specific suggestions for Assembly action included that of the Soviet Union for an appeal to convene an ENDC summit meeting; a Bulgarian request for an appeal to all nuclear Powers to respect nuclear- free States or zones; a Nepalese suggestion that the Assembly welcome or request statements by the nuclear Powers that they do not intend to hand over control of nuclear weapons to a country not now possessing them; and a Yugoslav suggestion to condemn war propaganda. II. The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee There was general support for the EHDC to continue as the negotiating body, although the Ukrainian SSR. calling the ENDC a discussion club, stated that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards it would be determined by practical results. Albania criticized the ENDC and recalled the P.R. of China's proposal for a world conference of Heads of State. The USSR complained about the "sterility" of its- work, but tine U.K. called the EMDC one of the best forums; it added, however, that progress on some issues was possible through other negotiating machinery not alternatives to or incompatible with the ENDC. Burma, defending the utility of the EHDC, expressed concern over the trend towards bilateral negotiations. While Jordan was of the view that agreement was more important than whether it was formulated directly or indirectly through the EHDC, it considered the latter as the best forum. Kuwait suggested that unless the EMDC became more active it should be increased to 25 members. grance Burma, Ghana. India, Indonesia. Nepal and Yugoslavia hoped France could be persuaded to take its seat. P.R.of China Burma. Indonesia and Nepal urged that the P.R. of China be invited to take part. Indonesia further suggested that to preserve balance the co-Chairmen, who should take the initiative in inviting the P.R. of China, might wish to invite one additional Western Power and one non-aligned country. The invitation should be extended only when negotiations on collateral measures and a comprehensive test ban were near a successful conclusion. Indonesia might submit a formal resolution to this effect at the 19th session should favourable circumstances prevail. Albania maintained the disarmament problem was insoluable without the participation of the P.R. of China. China thought the arguments in favour of the participation of the P.R. of China ignored recent events and its attitude toward the Moscow Treaty. . - , , - 2 -

Summit A number of countries referred to the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the ENDC at the Heads of Government level. Those who gave it explicit support included Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica. Jordan. Kuwait, Mali, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSRf United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. China said that a summit could serve no useful purpose. The U.K. conceded that it would have some value though a lot of work had to be done "before it would materialize". Ghana said that at an appropriate stage consideration muat be given to a summit meeting* Iran thought it was a matter for the members of ENDC to decide. Future Task In addition to the generally accepted tasks of continuing efforts on a treaty for general and complete disarmament and agreements on collateral measures, Canada, Cyprus. Sweden, U.A.R.. United Kingdom and United States suggested a new task, namely to reach agreement on separate measures of "actual physcial disarmament". The U.S. referred to the implementation of paragraph 8 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (i.e. early implementation of measures of disarmament without prejudice to the total programme) as an intermediate level of agreement between collateral measures and general and complete disarmament* Sweden spoke of the reduction of armed forces, the scrapping of obsolete armaments as well as the elimination of some of the nuclear "overkill" capacity. New Zealand listed the cut-off of fissile material production; armaments and force freeze; and destruction of some existing weapons. Bulgaria maintained that this was not a question of collateral measures and that the only solution was to reach agreement on disarmament as a whole. Brazil, China. Ghana, Nigeria. Sweden. U.A.R, and U.K. called for technical studies or working groups under the ENDC. Another specific task proposed for the Committee was a study of the general rules and criteria for the establishment of nuclear-free zones. This was specifically suggested by Canada and Sweden and referred to in, more general terms by Poland. Some countries including the U.A.R* and Nigeria called upon the ENDC to give "priority" consideration to the new Soviet proposal on retaining a limited number of nuclear delivery vehicles until the end of the third stage. Canada. Cyprus, Israel, the Netherlands and the United States were among those who wanted the ENDC to give thorough and urgent consideration to the peace-keeping provisions of the disarmament plans* (See also subject headings below) III. General, and Complete Disarmament Nuclear The USSR referred to its latest proposal for the retention of nuclear Disarmament delivery vehicles through the third stage, as a "nuclear umbrella", explaining (i)Delivery that the number of such vehicles "should be minimal1*. Brazil. Burma. Cyprus, Vehicles Czechoslovakia . India. Indonesia. Iran, Mali, the Netherlands and the U.A.R. were among those viewing it as a basic change of approach which helped close the conceptual gap between the two plane* The U.S. wanted to explore its implications since it "may represent a further move towards realism". Canada, the Netherlands and the U.K. asked for clarification, especially with respect to verification and balance and its relation to other Stage I measures. The U.K. also maintained that whatever the potential significance of the Soviet proposal, it did not represent any basic change in the Soviet approach to the phasing of disarmament measures* Hungary and Romania hoped that the West would respond with proposals for the liquidation of foreign bases. (il)Muclear The U>S . recalled its treaty language for Stage I nuclear disarmament Weapons and measures, particularly the offer to transfer weapons-grade material on the Material basis of 60,000 kgs. for the U.S. and the U0,000 kgs. for the USSR. The U.S. also expressed willingness to combine the transfer with the cut-off of production as a pre-first stage agreement* The U«A.R> thought the 6 to k ratio method of reduction implfed recognition of the possibility that a State possessing a greater quantity of a certain category of armaments should reduce those weapons more rapidly than other States. This approach drew explicit support from Australia. Brazil. Cyprus, India, Mali and Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Poland criticized the U.S. measures for nuclear disarmament for underestimating the "imminent danger of a nuclear war". The Ukrainian SSR argued that the U.S. plan did not provide for "any strict obligation" to destroy weapons of mass destruction. The U.K. maintained that USSR readiness to transfer nuclear disarmament from Stage II to Stage I was "unrealistic" as it would overload Stage I before the verification and peace-keeping machinery had proven effective. Hoped USSR would reconsider position toward West's proposal to have experts study question relating to reduction of nuclear stockpiles in Stages II and HI. Cyprus suggested that any transfer of nuclear material take place through the I.A.E.A. Pakistan urged that no State should be free to carry out its nuclear power programme without I.A.B.A. inspection. Conventional Poland and the U.A.R. maintained that there were no significant Disarmament divergencies regarding conventional disarmament. India. Iran and Malaysia stressed that any plan for balanced reduction must take into account the huge conventional army" of P.R. of China. Pakistan also emphasized conventional disarmament. All militarily significant States, said In&ja, should be affected by the first stage, but Nepal drew attention to the U.S. approach which would permit first stage to be carried out without all militarily significant States taking part. - Jfr -

Regional Disarmament Brazil urged that the principle of "balance be extended to apply to regional as well as global calculations. Israel stressed the possible contribution of regional disarmament. Control The U.S. and the U.K. stressed the significance of the divergencies of position on verification of retained armaments and forces as well as inspection to detect possible clandestine activity. The USSR, while reiterating that it favoured control over disarmament but not over armaments, pointed out that under its latest proposal on delivery vehicles "international control must be established over the remaining rockets and nuclear warheads beginning with the second stage". The new Soviet position was called a "slight but perceptible shift" by the U.K+ Sweden argued that the most promising control methods were indirect ones such as analysis of national budgets, and called for technical studies to elucidate problems of control* Brazil recalled its proposal for technical studies and suggested psychological and space satellite inspection techniques in addition to zonal inspection* Israel backed an experts study on inspection and Ghana wanted an interim International Scientific Commission established. The United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States observed that the modalities of the verification system aid the proposed International Disarmament Organization had not yet been fully considered at Geneva. Peru felt control must appear as the first subject in a disarmament treaty; the control organ must exist before disarmament begins and not be paralyzed by responsibilities toward the Security Council with its unanimity procedure. Control was not just another part, but the essence of the treaty. Cyprus proposed that the I.D.O. be established now as a specialized agency of the U.N. with responsibilities for collateral measures. Brazil called for a broadening of the verification problem to include responses to violations. i Peace- Keeping The United States stressed the value of developing the United Nations "into a genuine world security system" as the only rational means of protecting the independence of small Powers and of helping to "promote great Power disengagement from dangerous confrontation and prevent brush-fire conflicts from becoming big ones". Progress in the direction of the sound development of the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations, the U.S. said, "is a necessary concomitant for progress toward general and complete disarmament". India, stressing the need to concentrate on peace-keeping, felt that the u.flt. peace-keeping machinery should constitute a regular standing force and not ad hoc contingents* Iran, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the U.S., hoped example of standby forces for the U.N. would be widely followed. The Netherlands regretted that the USSR was "holding back" on the strengthening of the U.N. to maintain peace. Peru called the reliance on Article ^3 for peace-keeping "utopian", and suggested instead building an international force on basis of precedents. Israel suggested the ENDC set up a special working group to examine the existing U.N. institutions for peace-keepiag and pacific settlement with a view to their improvement. Canada and Cyprus, regretting the absence from the resolution of a specific directive to take up peace-keeping, nevertheless.urged the ENDC to give the matter some priority. China wanted the U.N. force established prior to Stage I. Greece. Iraq:. Italy and 'iHarkey. also stressed peace-keeping. " "- "• Romania criticized the U.S. plan for not ruling out the possibility that the international force might possess nuclear weapons. - 5 -

IV. Collateral Measures The US recalled President Kennedy's list of collateral measures during the general debate but stressed its proposal (ENDC/70) for measures to mini- mize the risk of war through accident or miscalculation. The USSR singled out the non-aggression pact, prevention of dissemination and prevention of surprise attack as those measures which required attention. The Netherlands stated that collateral measures which tend to legalize the partition of Qermany, aim at disbanding NATO or disrupt the balance of power would not be suitable for negotiations. Among the previously considered measures mentioned for continued negotiations were the following: Accidental War or Surprise Attack; Burma, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Sweden, UAR, UK, USSR, US, Yugoslavia. Non-Dissemination; Afghanistan, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,. India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mongolia, Nigeria, Ukrainian SSR, UAR, UK, USSR, Yugoslavia^and the Netherlands. t Nuclear-Free Zones; Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burma, Chile, Ecuador, Hungary, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Mongolia, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Yugoslavia. Non-Aggression Pact; Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR. Cutoff of Production and Transfer of Fissionable Materials; Afghanistan, Canada, China, Cyprus, Ecuador, New Zealand, Sweden, US. Military Expenditure; Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, Romania, Yugoslavia. The UAR and Indonesia explicitly stated that the goal of general and complete disarmament could best be attained by a series of partial or collateral measures. The UAR introduced the notion of a pre-stage I package of measures, and Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, New Zealand and Sweden were among those who broadened the "collateral measures" concept to include such measures as a freeze of existing armaments levels; scrapping of obsolete conventional arms; dismantling of some "overkill" nuclear capacity; stop production of arms; demilitarize outer space; partial restrictions on chemical, bacterial weapons; restrictions on the sale of arms by great Powers; reduction of military bases; reallocation of economic resources to help the developing countries; and prohibition of war propaganda.

Accidental The US drew attention to the renewed Soviet interest in its proposal for War and observation posts and hoped that the other measures contained in its working Surprise paper (ENDC/70) would be fully explored. The UK reiterated its view that the Attack establishment of observation posts offered the best prospect for agreement. Italy and the Netherlands hoped that such measures would not be made conditional on disarmament measures. Japan, Yugoslavia, Burma and Iraq also emphasized the opportunity for agreement in this field. Cyprus drew attention to the Pugwash recommendation on this subject.

The USSR stated that It favoured agreements on the prevention of surprise attack on the basis of its proposals of November 1958. - 6 - ^non-aggression pact/ Non- The USSR stated "the basis for such an agreement )could be the state- Aggressiom ment by both contracting parties that they would renounce force or the Pact threat of force and undertake to solve disputes only by peaceful means." Explicit support for the non-aggression pact came from Burma, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, Nigeria, Romania and the UAR, Burma maintained that the Soviet clarification had opened the vay for agreement. Indonesia explicitly stated that Soviet indications of modalities could lead to the side-stepping of the issue of the status of East Germany and strongly urged the West to make the necessary concessions in its turn. Israel and Yugoslavia supported the Brazilian idea of a non-aggression pact open to all countries of the world, but the Ukrainian SSR considered this approach "l«ss timely" than the original proposal. China argued that the discussion of a non-aggression pact in the ENDC would paralyze the body since it was an attempt to perpetuate fche division of Germany. Italy favoured any proposal that would increase confidence. The Ukrainian SSR warned that the non-aggression issue should not be linked in any way with the Berlin question. Non- The USSR, arguing that it was indispensable to agree on preventing the Pis semi - further spread of nuclear weapons, stated that the purpose of the NATO multi- nation lateral force was to disseminate nuclear weapons, and therefore, would have dangerous consequences. Poland defined'prevention of dissemination as meaning "not only renunciation of the direct transfer of such weapons or the expansion of the area of their location, but also avoiding political steps which might lead to an increase in the number of those controlling weapons." Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the Ukrainian SSR warned that the multilateral force would actually give the 3?.R. of Germany a share in the control of nuclear weapons and lead to the transfer of ownership to those not now possessing them* Yugoslavia maintained that the multilateral force would be an obstacle to an agreement on non-dissemination. Burma urged an agreement among the nuclear Powers "not to make available to other parties in any form either nuclear weapons themselves or the knowledge or materials required for their manufacture." It shared the view that the multilateral force would result in the passing of control to countries which do not now possess nuclear weapons. The UK maintained that the multilateral force was compatible with an agreement on non-dissemination. Bulgaria drew attention to the terms used by President Kennedy to describe the US position,namely "to control the transfer of nuclear weapons" which Bulgaria maintained was not the same as measures to prevent the transfer of control. India, Iraq., Netherlands, Nigeria and Sweden urged the timeliness of a binding international agreement to prevent dissemination. V. Huelear-Free Zones Approach Burma, Canada, Malaysia... and New Zealand suggested that the ENDC consider general criteria for the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Poland thought it would be useful to work out general principles. Bulgaria and Romg.nla maintained that attempts tta> -formulate preconditions for a region to claim the status of a denuclearized zone would hamper the free process of establishing such zones. •' . - " 7 • i, As to the role of the Assembly, the US maintained it was premature to attempt to secure endorsements from the United Nations. India's position was that resolutions of the Assembly could not be a substitute for binding agreements, and Australia and Turkey specifically stated that the Assembly's role would usefully begin only when a zonal proposal enjoyed the support of all states in the --region. Greece , too, was against the UN taking any initiative. On the other hand, Bulgaria thought the Assembly should encourage and not set preconditions for nuclear-free zones, and Nigeria would support any approach patterned in the African resolution 1652. Yugoslavia thought the support of the General Assembly wouj.d help establish a Latin American zone. Criteria A number of statements concerning nuclear-free zones included requirements or criteria for their establishment. The following is a list of the requirements mentioned by different delegations: Balance - The creation of zones should not upset the strategic balance including.the whole complex of military forces both nuclear and conventional existing in the area; Australia, Canada, China, Ecuador, Italy, Japan, Malaysia-, New Zealand and US. Verification - Any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone must include adequate provision for verification and control; Australia, Canada, China, India, Iraq., Japan, New Zealand, UK and US. Consent - Arrangements for nuclear-free zones should enjoy the unanimous support of the countries of the region, particularly those whose non-participation would render it ineffective; Afghanistan, Australia, Canada, China, Greece, Iraq,, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Malayasia, New Zealand, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and US, while Ghana felt a majority of states in the area would be sufficient. Initiative - Initiative should come from states in the area; Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, China, Greece, Iraq, Malaysia ^., New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago and US. ' Guarantees by the Nuclear Powers - Bulgaria, Burma, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Trinidad and Tobago, USSR. Among the other requirements or conditions specified by delegations were the absence within the zones of nuclear targets (Australia); each zone should be considered on its merits (US); zones should be outside of the scope of the great military alliances (Italy); the area must be remote^from^Jiuelear powers or free from the deployment of nuclear weapons (Japan); conventional forces would have to be .t affected as well (Chile, Italy, New Zealand); the nuclear powers having direct interest in the area should be included in the agreement (japan). The agreement should take the form of a treaty (Malaysia. )* Areas As to specific areas, favourably mentioned by delegations, these included (l) Latin America - Ecuador, Ethiopia, Japan, Jordan, Nigeria, Trinidad arid Tobago, • UAR, Yugoslavia; (2) Central Europe - Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, UAR, Yugoslavia; T5T The Mediterranean - Bulgaria, UAR; (V) "Arab East - Jordan; and (5) The -Balkans - Bulgaria and Romania; .(6) The Adriatic - Albania. - 8 -

Ghana observed that African States have a vested interest in proposals for denuclearized zones especially if foreign bases and nuclear testing may be eliminated thereby. Asia and the Pacific and Europe were considered as areas not meeting the aforementioned requirements by Australia and US. Albania supported Cuba's position regarding a Latin American zone. VI. Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons Ethiopia was convinced that the signing of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would be a catalytic collateral measure, but was prepared to refer the question to the ENDC. Australia, Liberia and Hew Zealand supported that procedure. Nigeria stressed that it considered such a convention not only useful but highly desirable. China thought no useful purpose would be served by such a conference. 26

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON P.R. OF CHIHA'S POSI2XOH ON DISARMAMENT

position of t&e Peoples RepibXIe of CMna on Sisasmameat is., positioa. i&flue&eed to a large earfcent Igr eosssideratioas of interests. Additionally bsr attitude towards SisaasaaiBent is also

©oaditloned Tbjjf fee? sallitszy policy aad t&e ssasonissg oa tsfeich it reststf &er tfeeoyies osa wa3?$ peace aad peacefsal cc^2d.stsace^ &e^ z-eiatipss with 131© great powers aad tfes aogs«ali^s3d aat:toae» All tlaese factors are of course sot lltse^ to remain gestaaseat so Itfeat witfe evesy change im l^jss caa lie ejroec-ted to ssslse appropriate aSJustssesfcs ia &er disasmaasat

It is uot tbs pisspose of this paper to spscwlate OB EBJ fature e&sages tlaat ffilgtot sjffeet Cfaiias's disaxtiiaaiejat policy feat to taê iato account t£t@ esistisg fs?Jts, as rs'/ealed is tfes available prosotsueemects aad writisags of s CSaissas-s leafters? aad to arj?i% s at scsie sort of coaetesion ffegas^-sag possible ftetase Cliisiase attitudes ©ad tK2ss*/ioi*r to-smrds disar-ffiamaat- A feaeie tesst of OPR*s foreign policy is t&et as losg aa capitslisis ©gists IB this ^?o^ld^ âr is ins^table asad jaccoraiag^, lastisg wrXd peso© ox5 as^ xneaalssf^l clisaraaueBt casjiot bs acMev®4 tmtil cspltalisja Is defeated.22' Tals is so 1s3eai2se Imperialism^ teeaded 1^? ifee United States, is dat to "destroy soeislist Q£®pw in ordes1 to asMeê 'H?orlS Somisatioa" J^ Ths of t&e tepas-lmlists will aevejf daaxsgs &s& i^sysfos?© t&e ?se to geasral sad eoaplete disssssssasat, ^^y aa's oaly iaterested ia " •y j complete asais esâasioa"-^ sssd is^ the profit of "mosopoly cîtalists" ds.JLea iaslie-yss that tte ettalmsat of world peaa^ is possible the "yevolatioaazy struggles" of t&e psopl® of all couatrisa ®ad asot t^g? t tliss-afore reêet,B t&s Soviet Ifiea tlaat cosamsaism aad wrld peace

IK her t«leW:s soci.slist etstss ^joulfi eg^logr 5CD only as a tactical it should act teaosje a past of -t&eir strategy* 3toas it is pesnisaaMe as a tactics! HKJ'/QJ, sad s^ea escssses?^, for soeiallst states to advance proposals for dieffirassaeat so as to "ej^oge aad ccssljat the isapsrislists' aras es-ma&sioa aad Taas? preparations''.-6'/ But it is atosolsstely iiapesmissable to esssplo^- it as a strategy aad t&as liqiiidate -Ste "reirol^tloBa^-^ strog^s" of ths - g

China Is eosrjrisesd t&at tfee Westess Powers So issls want disaaaaaeat. j> she feels "it Is possible to compel &zrperiallsts $0 aeeept some feind of agsaemsat OB flisamameat t&rougb t&@ coabiasd stnsggls of t&e socialist states" Jy IMS $, possible because alt&oi2g$& t&e teerialists s o/ are s "pack of notorious wmosgsrs"*' t&ey aa?e aoastheless afraid of world wasTj, sad as?s "sated wltfe bread sad slsep"*^^ 332® ia^erlalists IQO& t®«a tfee costs of wer with distaste sad t&ela? calcsulatioa of the cost- effectlvesess of a particular t^ps of wss6 at a gi$@& tSae essd plaee tiiem to refrain from s war if it will fiot pay» feisia, feels US a$?oea«j of arms eontstsl esS disssraaasiest is a moSi^riss§ cSisractsylstisa aaeL Is its xso wsj iaSieatlv® of a ci^ liasie ea& &osti2js US olajjectlre. Tiais "ao^t ead Ssespti^s US ia a&weatitsg dis^rso^sent is oa2y aa attest to "maintelB aa positiosa", "to p^e^sat otibsv coaffltTies fS aatioaal positioa'f'=s3^,/7 gag. to preseaft "^se socialist eaiap frosa its por^ff of 8?@sist5ts^ US saeleffis1 felaefesmil".^ 6sse to $&ie hi^ costs of s^ctlsar wasr, 13ae US a local war iKfco a world <»asfc»^' jfe; US strsts^ of l&aiie& asS s^feMiaiteS, wsa? stabilities ia os'deg' to IMSRJB a "c 38. y of sailitsEsr jpaspoase^su/ desnosistj?sts8 US feas? of esealatioa ©at soisf isras its

is eoao5ls«j©& that 't&e IIS wllX s^sfg'aia froa Isââisg a î^ if it pjnaaisss Mâ toesleaa costs ia sea aaS moas^* Fjirt&er. 1fei1; tfce socialist states -île aSoptisg a stroag ®sd militaat tile US,, should cs3?sf?aIS^ avoid eêatiag tlie lE^ressioa of socialist esgesjaess to dsstjroy tfee US isgaedistel^ as 1Ms iroald os&Sj seîre to US i©to a p2fe»eB®iti"/3 aae3@az' trar. !3Sse feesfc eom'SSj aeeorîsis to •wsald fee to Ingress iôs tS&e US -ât -fee socialist feloclE i ss^ strossg essfi 3?et wiHisg to mafea partial eo®g®iagals©3* the US to %a@& a^@,y fôss a s&owdom; t&ioMss tSaat tlae tisse is ripe for euc& astioa3 to mslse eoasessioas to postpone or tssmisat® t&e to settle coafliets at t&e Gosjfereese ta^s^ e«g3 J&srea- &B& to ?ee£smts» H&i© eoislfi eifea lae& ^.e US "to estafelial^ of psaseffel coesisfegBse wL1fe otis®!? coimtffies",^ÎS^/ feels tSsat â Miaviois? pattaâ tûst feast salts iser is i^s-essi©E to t&e US is a poUe^ of asMimited ^&y in Asia calls wars of national liberation or are-volutloaas^1 ciîl târs* £&e reeogaisss tliat be? military vee&aese vis«a-vis i&e US liiait ter ability to asa&e US costs eitSaesr in a nuclear or a massive eoavearfcioaaX TS&S?*, Oa tlsa otfees- of sublimited war- and small scale cosrosntlosal we oa'fesr cans "best serve fear gsispos® siaca it wtalfi toxjisstmts fcea? strength ea& yet it voaM asfe pgwoJse a moeslve US ?sspoa8©« CSsisa's geopolitical position in Asia puts feer at ESI &&r&&£3@@ sad 1st a position to moke the of US isra^Jspaaât to a 8\3&l±Blted wx ia t3ie aa-ea hi^« She believes tSset ths US îll aot c@rsy on a protrscteS sjiiits^ & low pîoall^ asfea off the -KoyM fgiea'e gfea Is at a ailitasgr to preveBt US escalation of wasv Chiisa corabisss such ifes teeJrniipa of tmtlates'allj ISssitissg -Sie duration of conflicts, tha seals of weapoas u@eS« sad, tê @re@ of the cosflict* ecess t&@ Sosmtioa of cossf llets fey ea^l0sris?g tê prinoipl^ of times, 6ue3a lateyaresptioa to yea-sc© Uatted Stmtss conesK-s e£ esaaletioa. SSas 14Mt@ f^s scale of •yeagoae gm«afi«^?arf affe -âpcas so as o&t to tesrpt th@ US to esoalate conflict* ted die sppSles the tae^sjispa of area limitation la a ^@voliation@iy elvl.l ^@£> êrs sh© is co^rtly Mt not

tfee iamssestss for esanplgj ia laos and cotsfiiet to •Ss© "Gtsmjsfisyies of -^at count^^ taJsi^g g£@&t ps-eeesst.loas sot to a t^i^d €otmt?y* HKU& tlae 'WES-O ia X&os and ^letaas

Aad in a %m? ^,@r@ Cfeism is officially sad sfes is careful not 'to ©stead t^@ conflict sigaif icaatl^f »atioaal feowsteries. lêse t©s£rnicgsas of tisasj? -KS^SOBS assd area limitations were effecti7®2^ ias@d &gr Cfelssa te Eier %or€@r âff wiâ Siaee PakiBs'e paXiejr ia eaeourasiag Io«a3, 2ls<%-o3atios3a3^ t?as iavitisag s mssai^s US reôase is bast egsrved Igr tile taekai(pQ of time? aad ores limitation Si©asmaffl@stt aad other fozsal ta^ltU.&tes'sl a£7as control agreeEjeats are aot to lie? &&?asatage« % cotmnittlog feers®!^ to Qaiaa tjould m@&3 herself agpeas* to iasus-gejjts^ fox* esseaiplSj i» as & eelfiâ ©tataa quo poises? r&ê? tên a raôltttioftssy oas* Chiaa l5s?J,»&3. ' @M Ssgiais? position S2©8& agraaseats to e^raet pslitleal g&d militagg- eaxiesssioas frc® US sad pe>ssiM$$ ISoologieal igosseessiosa ffcm tfee Soviet Uiiios as hey pH.ee of to aaj ftatias^ ciisagjsaajsat t^rsat^f » ^.© US @M t^@ USSR tôuld ciS@ if Chisa's aeeessios ia t^rtSi saeh eoscassioas* Hmjever, asesas t?JJl3^sl^ i&efe at tSsis sts^

It* &OBgti C part -fco tisat saeaa atta?astifie to 2^s«>all§3^d catloas tefe % Q «culd coafism of Westesa objectives ss^S asôs© iSie "e^ll It tronalS, also Gsaaoasts?s,te to otfees* soelslist sM 2©Ei«»®Iigaed saljioas that (Msa is 3tiH s-feffuggHsg f&r iâe attslmssfc of GCD ^sile -â Soviet la Has wllî &er "c^ltsSatioalst golicy1* ha© "Set fall the Nasser of prdfeibltlos of ssielsay ^sisapoas" 1^ ©gmeisg to sîs^. partial test Isaa t3?®atj^ tabs aut«âdK of fissils ajatsrial., ete* in Is Siffleislt to foêeast «Siat d^sso^s si£^t> oesw i pogitioa •fciissi §&o tafes aer place isa ths UMted Ifeticas* Bat it eass ts© that is the &Q&t&@ @^^ ê CM viH eoatissae to dasou^se aaS reisala to asgr parti®! aga?eei2sjats reached Isstwssa tlis USSK asfi -âs Ifestj, siaea that suela aisasîras i«oislS h®3^ eosssoSl&te t^si? susSsas? KoaE5ô2^ She esa tss ©^©sted txtm tls® to ~ 5 tliae to proposals of Iser osm., Imt sudi initiatives would fes of a reôlosleal gtatm'e S&@lg8eS to ia aafi to Gcmateraet 02^ atoerse that her dsstmaiatioa SevietÛeetera egreemeats oa partial Footnotes

la In a letter to t&e Soviet Ccraaasalst Iterty OB 1*5- dtoe 1963$ the CMaese

"Certain persoas EOT? actually &ol& t&at it Is jaossi&Ls to abotst *a world t*ittioiafe weaôiasj, uitkout assned fosses wit&oat waT39* Steoii&li 'geiseraX aed coffljplete sMle tiis systea of a^ss1.eliafl ®oS of & •fcloa of toss l>y ciasa still exists* llals is êev £13&sio&en Joa ^"plagj. "Slae Tito Grassg: A Da-feae^sssat of U»3« SjêrlaMsm is its Strategy" of CoiS6t92?«He!iro3,istio%sl

. CC? letter to to Ceaofsl Disa^aCTzesat m& WorM 20.,

spreads tits £13as0ioa that iêsfislisia vilZ its arms and tries to 2J,âldats t£ie revolutionaE^ stamggles of oppressed peoples end mtloBS oa &@ pretosfc of disaymesaentj tSiesa is SeUbarat®^ to ds@eiv& tfee people of t&e tro?ld and be2@ tlie In t&eir policies of ssgreeasioa eaS ver * . « world peaeo cea woxn osil^r s^r 1^0 strwggSes of tê pec^le ia all coKatx-ies aad sot it»" CCF letter to CfSU of

%*s Isaê always ffiaiiitaissd t&atg ia orier to esgiose sad combat * esias eâasloa sad vas° p^^paratloss^ It is sseeessax1^ to 13ae pssôsal for ©sesffal aisssazaassat*" CCF letter to of 7. Ibid, 3«

10« Mao Xse«tUQgj, Selected of 1? 4\il^ 19^3 eatitlefl "U.S. 3&3t&?@s fox1 Seelsijag a n •

13* Jesoia Ji& ?aop editorial entitled "Sj^sose t&e tI«S. Meles? 19 JBSy 19§3*. 15* Mao Tw&f Qg»clt»j p.llo - ii j-23% Chou»@Jt Lai quoted ftjy Beiges' Snow la "Red China's Leaders talk Peace oa âair Tessasj," Igê. Jaiasaa^- 196lP p»93« A recent affiasaatiem of this policy vas given fey Mr« Mao t4r« Ra^siood Gy$ot of ê Fsesa^j Cosaanalst Pas-t^ ia a ^? Plesaia of t3ae Party? maoted M?9 Mao T@e«tîg as hm±ag stsfesd to visiting Gealiisfc Deputies: "I toow ôu bswa outstripped ue^ Mt %re^ too« shell cm? orm bcas'b* Sliis is a mesms of iaswlssg case's

C&0a°1Ms3 statsmaat to a JspaEsse reporter oesri^S over the

OB <3&23f 53.^ 19^3 s&® aSâasafi & proposal othss1 tSiiisgBj tSis riâovsX of all ajiiita , sKieleae •t^ôs® ftrosa a&eoafi# ssts'feXiînîit of various pas^s of 13ae woril iacIsjSisg parts af tfee J&ited State® Soviet U&io% Gsssatlosi of ell sasc3,esff teete lasMdlag ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO A:* The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

Attached is the Summary of the 72nd meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

Date: FROM: April 27, 1965 DE: William Epstein

CR.13(i:U64) DISARMfiMEHE COSaMXSSIQN COWCIL AB3H8 72nd meeting AFFAIRS SUP 2

DAIjg jjjMjjflgy OF MA33BBS RBM33TO (USSR)

DisaMaament CoaBaiB&ioa 12se Bissnaaiasjftt, Commission should (1) support the withdrawal oreign troops sad tfee fiismaatliag of foreign roiiitary basssj appeal egalnst tlae establishment of MUO multilateral nuelaar forees ia axsy form; (3) appeal to all States to conclude aa intersatieaal agreement on basmiog the use of nuclear weapons; and (4) telEe up in all seriousness the qisestion of making possible furl&er dlsaymsaieat ssgotiations. Goaf ereace

ESH3C talks have been eoarpletely uzssatisfactory and have given rise to criticism frcsa asutralist as well as socialist, countries.

Cairo Hon°Aligaed Confei'encells view eoacerning the convenicg of a -world d-lsarmsaaant coiaferenee is ftilly shared by the Soviet 0nion«

Sae Soviet Union takes a positi-ye attitude towards PEC? proposal convsniag a conference of heads of stats of the vorlS to discuss the question of "&s "baanirig and complete destruction ot nuclear France * s Proposal Zt also has a positive attitude toward the proposal that all States possessing auclear weEpoas must participate in futtsre aisarmaiaeat negotiations. Cnggaland A dieeussiea &f GCD should continue. Recalled extension of "nuclear umbrella" until end of the third stage asd asserted that a aumber of aon<-alignsd countries in the EHIXJ also favovired the earliest destruction of all nuclear weapons and the means of delivery. - 2 -

Collateral Measures Recalled USSR's 19th Session memorandvoa (A/5827), and supported the Fellah proposals concerning the freezing of nuclear armaments ia Central Europe and the eoairening of a conference of European States to diseuss measures guaranteeing collective security in Europe* It also supported the approach to partial measures of tie Cairo Conference of Eon-Aligned Countries of October Attention should be foeussed on (l) liquidation of foreign military bases and the stationing of troops on foreign territory! (2) the iasperfflissibility of the establishment in any form ^nstsoewr of multilateral or Atlantic nuclear forces and of access to nuclear weapons by West Genaajr; and (3) prohibition of use of iouclear weapons.

5Sie wsflllingasss of the United States to recognise the fact that national means of detection are adequate to control a ban on underground tests is blocking a solution to that problem.

so-called allied nuclear agreement ie responsible for the failure to sreaeh agreement on the noa-dis semination of auelear weapons. Tise plena for E2u3,tllsteral auclear foree are Inecmpatible wi-i2h. efforts to end the anas pace, GCD and denuclearized sones. (See also above sections I and IV).

VIS. Prohibition n of tise

She USSR, Poland; Homsniaf CaecfeoslovskiE-, Bulgaria and the nQa«»aligEed eounts-ies in the HBC ha%ra spoken in favour of bsmlng the use of nuclear weapons. States possessing nuclear weapons., eves before the conclusion of ea agreement banoiag the use of nuclear -if®aj3ons, should laake statements to the effect that tlsey will not be the first to utilise tkesj. T&® USSE is ready to eueh a pledge if the same ie done by other nuclear powers. JI.I3 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: U Thant Secretary-General

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I send you herewith a note prepared by the Disarmament Affairs Group on "The Possibility for Disarmament Discussions Involving the People's Republic of China". You may find this of interest, although I do not share some of the author's conclusions.

DATE: FROM: 2? Oct. 1964 V.P. Suslov CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG.520 27 October 1964

The Possibility for Disarmament Discussions Involving the Peopled Republic of China

U.S. Views The Secretary-General*s suggestion that a "dialogue" among the present nuclear Powers should take place during 1965 has been the subject of immediate official and editorial comment. Early on Friday, 23 October, a State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, told the press that the existing "channels for a dialogue are open" if the P.R.C, has "anything constructive to say." He noted that "the British, French and Soviet Governments are represented in Peking, and we have periodic talks with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw." He was also reported to have said that, if there was a "consensus" to admit the P.R.C. as a non-United Nations member to the Geneva Conference, "this would be all right with the U.S., of course." Mr. McCloskey also recalled Secretary Rusk's statement that the Chinese position on disarmament "has been persistently negative." The State Department spokesman then continued as follows: "Even so it is obvious that at some stage in the disarmament process all militarily significant nations must participate in arms control agreements, if such agreements are to have any real meaning. In this sense we have never precluded the participation of any country in disarmament negotiations." —' However, on Friday night American officials apparently again briefed Washington correspondents on the subject, after which Mr. Max Frankel reported in the N.Y. Times of 24 October that "the Administration indicated today that it had no interest in any new round of international negotiations with Communist China," There were also reports of a statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the effect that if China were to sign the partial test-ban treaty, Washington might 2/ look more favourably on a five-power conference with the P.R.C.-'

I/ These statements have been pieced together from reports in the N.Y. Times and the Washington Post of October 2k, in AP wire service dispatch of October 23, and the report of the Washington correspondent of Le Monde in the edition of 25-26 October. 2/ Report of speech in Louisville, Kentucky, N,r. Times, 24 October 1964, Le Monde, 25-26 October 1964. - 2 -

While the main "burden of the U.S. objections appeared to be directed at the Chinese proposal for a world summit conference to prohibit nuclear weapons, there was apparently a desire to discourage too much discussion at this time of the idea of a "dialogue", perhaps because of the approaching election. Nevertheless, editorials in the Washington Post of 2k October and in the N.Y. Times of 25 October supported the general idea enunciated by the Secretary-General and criticized the "negative thinking" of the U.S. Mmini st rat ion, What is perhaps of more significance for the future are the matters which at the moment are put forward as U.S. demands in respect of formal negotiations with the P.R.G. These demands would seem to be:(i) the accession of the P.R.C. to the test-ban treaty; (ii) the use of existing channels such as the Warsaw talks, for discussion of "serious" and "constructive" proposals; (iii) that a majority of the EHDC members favour the inclusion of China, if that is to be the body in which the dialogue is to be carried on.*' Although these demands have not been stated as conditions, they do reflect American opposition to the view that Chinese participation is necessary at the present time for further progress on disarmament measures. Views of the P.R.C. An examination of the statements of the P.R.C. over the past few years indicates that their attitude towards prerequisites or conditions for their participation has taken two forms: (i) explicit political conditions stated in 1960 and 1961, and (ii) proposals for specific disarmament conferences and agendas, made after the test-ban treaty was signed in July 1963, The following are some of the noteworthy statements indicating explicit political conditions: (i) On 21 January 1960 the Standing Committee of the National Peopled Congress declared that "any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of the People's Republic of China and the signature of its delegate cannot of course have any binding force on her," (New China News Agency (NONA), Peking, 21 January 1960). (ii) On 10 April 1960 Chou En-lai ruled out a "Two China" approach to such negotiations. (NONA, Peking, 10 April 1960),

3/ According to Jean Schwoebel in Le Monde the non-aligned representatives in Geneva at present believe that China would not join the ENDC unless admitted to the UN. As to a five-power dialogue the non-aligned representatives were said to be irritated because the third world would be excluded. (Le Monde, 25-26 Oct. -3 - (iii) On 11 May 1960 Chou En-lai stated in Rangoon that "if China is invited to take part in the big power disarmament conference while the People's Republic of China is not recognized, we of course cannot consider the matter. How can one who is not recognized go to attend a conference with those who do not recognize him? This is inconceivable." (NCHA, Peking, 11 May 1960). (iv) In an interview with Edgar Snow, in late I960, Chou En-lai stated "it is inconceivable that there can be diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. without a settlement of the dispute between the two countries in the Taiwan region." (Edgar Snow, "Red China's Leaders Talk Peace — on Their Terms," Look. , 31 January 1961). The P.R,C.*s conditions therefore during 1960 were that no treaty would be binding on China without her adherence; that adherence can only be based on participation, and that participation required recognition, including acceptance of its claim to Taiwan. Following the signing of the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, a new approach was indicated in the Chinese note to Heads of State dated 2 August 1963, which proposed a world summit conference on disarmament. No explicit conditions were mentioned; it was envisaged that (l) all countries of the world would be invited; (2) that it would be at the summit level and (3) that it would discuss general and complete disarmament as well as an agenda on specific collateral oasures. The latest Chinese proposals of 16 October 196^ also called for a summit conference of all countries. There is a significant difference, however, regarding the immediate object of the two proposals for a world conference. The 1963 proposal called for a broadly conceived agenda, with step by step measures including an undertaking to "refrain from exporting and importing in any form nuclear weapons and technical data for their manufacture" and to "cease all nuclear tests, including underground nuclear tests." The proposal of 16 October 196k, while calling for a discussion of the prohibition of nuclear weapons,would place on the agenda "as a first step ... an agreement to the effect that the nuclear Powers and those countries which would soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons ..." . It would appear that the latest Chinese disarmament approach makes use of similar tactics ±.SE0S those often used by the great powers in putting forward plausible demands in the form of either procedural or substantive proposals which it was evident would not be accepted by the other side even as a basis for discussion. The latest agenda omits the two subjects of stated interest to «the U.S., namely, an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a comprehensive nuclear test*ban agreement, and includes as the sole subject for immediate discussion an item opposed by the U.S. as a first step. Thus the P.R.G. has prepared the ground, if it so chooses, to reject any U.S. proposals for disarmament discussions on the basis of disarmament considerations rather than the broader political considerations urged in 1960. Conclusion It seems clear that it is no longer a question of whether, but only of when and how the P.R.G. should take part in disarmament negotiations. The questions of the forum and agenda for discussions which would include the P.R.C. are bound to become major international topics in the immediate future. There is in fact already an introduction to a dialogue between the U.S. and P.R.C., although to a very limited extent and only by iunilateran l statements of the two sides at long range. However, the apparent/flexibility of both sides would seem to indicate no agreement is likely in the near future on either a forum or agenda for formal discussions, much less on any question of substance. Nevertheless, as in the past, procedural questions can be made the vehicle for initial political accommodations. In this case, in particular, it may be expected that considerable pressure will be brought on both sides by their W respective allies—'and by the non-aligned countries to find at least a basis for procedural agreements. The Secretary-General's proposal has already served to arouse interest in and to give legitimacy to the discussion. It is too early to attempt to predict what specific efforts may be exerted by the non-aligned countries to bring about such accommodations. It is, however, conceivable that draft resolutions may be introduced in the General Assembly calling for talks among the five nuclear Powers, or for an invitation to the P.R.C. (and France) to participate in the ENDC. As to whether such resolutions might attain their objective, it is also too early to say. It is even more difficult to speculate on whether the P.R.C. might be willing to consider such an invitation before the solution of the question of its seating in the United Nations. ¥/ There are reports that France and the United Kingdom would favour five-power talks. The USSR may also be expected to support such talks. ROUT'IN^BLI: P FICHE DE TRANSMISSION T0: U Thant Aj FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

Attached hereto is the Daily Summary for the 7£rd meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

Date: 28 April

CR. 13 (11-64) BEPAB3ME8? OF POLITICAL MB K&AffiMMENT COJS3SSSZOS3 SSCtmifY COUI^CIL aiBAIBS 75^d meat:! ' "" 26 April SISABMflM^SI? AFfAIBS 8^3UF

DAILY StM&Ig OF MM!;11Ba HSMfflnag TO (USA, ItsOy) tLS-A*. Negotiations

Task of SisaKas^ggbx_C^^,8jBioat While a period of a?slaxatioa of tensions •would improve ths prospects for progress through aegatiation, a period of tensioa such as the present situation could afford opportunities fas? th$ relief of danger by collateral action. Meeting was opportunity to acquaint other Meeibes's with vor& of the M5C, to receive suggestions for overcoming differ®nces.f aad to ponde? in all se^ioasaess tlae prospects for scsae early action, Steirfbaffs could dsclara the iateatioa to foUo«r a policy consistent with resolution 1665 (SSI) on nors-disseaSjaatioB of Kueless? of .JBgEgi In the past tb® E5SDC clarified positions differences. The ©IDC should give the highest priority to the drafting of a foHsal Isgal conEa3.tsieat based on jpaaolutioa 1665 (S^l). Hegotiations en a cosprehenslTe test taa sbould be resumed es soon as possible by the ElfDC.

XI. e-nral aad Co^?leto _Disamament She U.S.A. is detersiiaed to t?ork for GCJD as part of the eossaon long- teym effort to aeMeve a better and safes? woFld throtjgh the application of the principle s of the Chartei" of the M and the steady de/slopmeat of international lasr ssifi effective peace-keeping

So achi07© the goal of GCSa the nuclsar asms racs saist "be halted ©ad tismed "oaclt fi^st, The fact that eigreemeBts in this involve cosiplex matters of military balance^ of scientific technology and, where jaeeessary., of wrificatioa zsast be fsesd. 2his abroach was reflected in the U.S. proposals to tfee SU3C of 21 Jsnuary 190i (iMJC/120). !32ie Soviet proposals for collateral measu?ea do not prssect, unhappily, asay areas for more fi*uitfal diacussioa. Some are not disanaatseat measures so rauch as proposals for bringing about strategic redeplojmeate of forces in a manner ^ich irould bSEQfit the ISSR, given its central location. Soao USSR proposals, hovmre?, are coaaaon to both sides, and, in spite of differences tliat do esists they present a prospect . 2 - . U.S.A. has taken action which resultsd in reduction "of Tnilitai'y expeaditiuresj, in reduction of production of fissionable material and in the reduction of strategic bombers from the active inventory. 3y 19669 29CGQ B-47 bombers will have been inactivated or destroyed. £& 1965, there will be a seduction in the number of B~§2 heavy bombers asd the U.S.A. plans also to forego the construction of some Misaiteaien aissiles. Shers are limits, however, to the restraints that can be taken unilaterally without reciprocity. All nations should exercise restraint in the armaments field and might profitably engage in constructive discussions with their neighbours, either regionally or under other arrangements. (See also "below, VZ.Cut-pff npf Ifrodu&tioa of Fissionable Material for Weapons) Destruction, of Bombers U.S.A.} in ESSSC* proposed tiiet the USSB and the U.S.A. agree to destroy over a two-year period some 720 medium 3®* bombers.*

V. Freeze of Strategic Buclear Salivary Vehicles !The U.S. A* proposed to explore a $i*eese in the cumber end characteristics of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by means of a cassation of production. Siat proposal could be adequately verified with a minimum amount of intrusion. She U.S.A. continues to consider that this measure would bring an accomplishment i&r more si^iificant than any confidence-building measure possible at this time and could be accomplished now through negotiation. Its position is flexible- --the U.S.A. aad the USSR should jointly explore the proposal, for it could open the door to reduction in all types of forces. VI. Cut-Off of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons The U S.A. considers this proposal equally importaat and has submitted a working paper on inspection procedures for this measure. (EH3C/13!0 Pending agreement on such a measure the U.S.A. has taken action in this direction consistent with its security. (Shut-dcwa of reactors). By the U.S.A. will be producing enriched U-235 aft a leva! of production lower than that planned before the cut-backs were aanouaeed, !£he U.S.A. has also proposed to transfer agreed quantities of such material to uses other than treapo&s and has proposed to transfer 60 tons of weapons grade U-235 to non«*?sapoas us09 if the USSR would for its part transfer &> toas. VO. Hoa-ggollgeratioa of She U.S.A. bas declared that it «ould take ao action inconsistent resolution 1665 (XVI) and has encouraged expansion of the IAEA system of safeguards* What is needed now Is a non-proliferation agreement that would record the determination of all nations to avoid ouelear anarchy. She ag?sement should b9 consistent with resolution 1665 (Xvl). In the meaatims, the members of the Dis&m&aenft Cosmission could declare the intentions of thair Governments to follow such a policy pending the time ^hen formal legal coEsaitaient for adherence by all has been drafted in SJUC; this drafting should have highest priority in SHS5C. !33io eoaelrasion of a non» proliferation agreement now would provide reassurance €hat as?y future nuclear as^aagemgats among as^r group of allies would b@ consistent vith the principle of non-dissemination*

In 3KDC, the U.S.A. proposed In the formal, meetings the destruction of some medium ,Jet boiabers (20 per raonth) over a period of 2 yearss or a higher number9 &? possible. - 3 - The principal Nuclear Powers should also consider the question of the security of nations that forego mclear weapons. 32se U.S.A. is sready to support assy such nations against soms threat of nuclear blackmail. Ifeis should be considered 12022 folly by the United Kstioas.

Test Ban While scientific evidence indicates that a sssabey of inspections continues to be necessary to provide vezlficatioa, the U.S.A. coatinues to be milling to explore what wculd constitute an adequate verification systeai in ths light of the recent and prospective developments in detection capabilities If each esploraticei indicates that verification reqT&remeats can be satisfied "by a different number and typo of Inspections from those previously discussed., the U.S.A. will ta&e iai«se facts iato account. Hsgotiatio-is on this subject should be resuasd ae soon as possible by 23OC.

I- Task of the Within a time«limit the DioairasEsnt Ccssmissioa should (i) study the work of 1I23C on iiie basis of its report? (ii) inquire iato the difficulties encoimtei-ed by 1EBC5 (iii) through reco^stendaticna, to encourage EH>0 to pursue its task; (iv) to eneoiaragc the ^SDC to pursue idie proposal for a conaaittee to study the modalities of nuclear redactions. II*

^^gj. Italy regaested tbs Co^Chaismen of EMJCS on S3 Marchj, to reconvene HiBC so soon as possible. Baesusi* of its cosôsitioa aad SiDC yasaiss the nonasl and aatis-al body for sudi negotiations. CcmGi_sgiQg^ Italy trelcoB^d tbe USSR proposal to the Sisamajaesife Ccsaaissioa -aiiicfe has taa^gu&U-^ prestige aad a«tlJO2?ity to sncoisrage and foster agjeeBents oa diaaxsEsaissit. 2Jie fact that it has met •» ponding ffertfesr results - has a yagaykgJsle political mesnissg. General aad Coaplete While ths U.S.A. plaa for 6C9 adheres strictly to the principle of the SJSSE plan ccaipleted by the "nuclear vuabsêlls'f seems to confuse balance and parity by ©liTniaatiag only in the sector of aiclesE vehicles massive ead assfmstîc quantities of arsaaeats OH both sides ia such a «sy that parity might bs established at tlae ead of idle first stage. A f«3?tlisr study of tiio two positions could bring ^bout soa&e Eappstcfeaant. Si© Western delegatioas had proposed that the melear vetoicle should be reduced on both sides to agreed levels, as lew as possible and as ebon as possible. IV It is t£?geat to find a solution along the l&aes of resolution 1665 (3Cf2). Ihe Western Posers already have given assurances that they are opposed to any form of disaeraination of nuclear ?i$apo&3 and the Italian Gavenmeat mads eleas1 end ccsmnitting statesieat to th&t effect to the Italian Parliament. Any agreement should contain Juridical guareatees so that the MEE? under study would not represent any fora of dissemiaatioa; therefore there is no reason f o? the USSR to refuse to sign an agmaneofc eribodying the coaaaitments set forfcin resclutioa 1653 (XPZ)* An sgreemenifc on non«diss@a£sation would tha Huclear ?cw@3€ to reciprocate the ysmmciatloas of the others csm nade&r armamezits.

Coarpgehgaaie lE'est. Baa present situation of tsefenieal pyogreee a might be less diffi@ult thaa before oad sseiprocal teehaieal explanations eoulfi pave the way to aa agreement in Pgoosals go? West ha@ made proposals on W£ree2ing nsssuyas'11 sueh es the freezing of nueleay strategie vi^deles and the frsesiag of the pro&uGtioa of fissloaafeie eateslalo Sliese i^asures are the fiyet logical st^pe twfaM aey disarEaaes* but eamiot fee aseepted vithoub s-eascmafele guarantees0 However; the USSB has opposed aay eoateol over these measures ^Meh do cot iffiply asy destruetion of as-ffiameiitSo It is tofe efeopa dtha i th@ USSR will are^ise its position,, 2?e@et?£»g in exehange positive assurances that inspeetioas will be x-eally limited asd not vexy intrusive,,

¥110 Baekaga-Deal PyoposalB It shottld. fee possible to reach agreeaemt on a f orula eisbodying those eoBHEon or similar elements found in proposals by both sides iafeo a new proposal o*' "paekage-deal" îehp fejr aa agprcpariate dossga of its ôuld ha?@ a satisfastory fealsace 'bstvees the i'eôiôjasats of feoth sides o For exas^SjGj, tha destruetios of feosfees's izdght fee with & freeze offeoafees- s aecox-diag to moralities to be defined Ssyjisgs from is aeeded &ot oa2y to save the world fôa a possible holocaust, but also to pesrnit the allotmszsfe of inereasiEg eeonomie ?esou?@es to some fosna of eolleetive o^gaaisatioao Without GSDj it should b@ egêsd that the fisret savings achieved &y the adoptioa of collateral Bsasas-es of dieas^KiEieat should fee allotted to isufewal aid in SOBS fona of collsfeog-ation sssoagst peoples. ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO: A: U Ihant, Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

Attached hereto is the Summary for the meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

Date: FROM: DE: 30 April William Epstein CR. 13 (11-64) y GjKjgjglli. JP&SSS '" 7^th

. OF MffESSS

To giro new u?gexiC3r ana fcagetus to the ssosfe of t&© 1S3BS especially ia relaftiss to a aoa-digseiaiKattoa agreement; a. ban oa isaSeygrouaa tests and a system of ofcservatioa posts in Costsa! Itarope*

that BiDC voold ^esuiaa negotiations in Gsaeva without ' a mattfiff of ve^ highest priosltsr ths SSBS sboiild havs ds'cailsd discussioa of actual t^ta fo? nos-disseiBisastios agreesaent, Sf common could bs found oa inspection, the MDG could wo£5c oist tha of ant agreessnt on the test

SXS. feilsute to Si&ia for having rsf^sed to eater iato aad the g'ecoâitioa of the dangers by the Gais-o of HonÂligaad States* the ©jjeinsios of a aoa-dlssemiaatioa s^reesasnt should glwa first priority.- As & aatte? of urgssaey t&e H3BS should coasifiss1 the detail^L tesrfc of s. possible agffeejESisfc oa iasese liaess a fina agreesaent ^hlcSi -would bind the nuclear Foaess not t© transfer- control of aaaclsay weapoas or to assist aosi-auolses1 Foê^s in and tMch ôiald bisd the nosa-nuc},©^' P&*rs2« neither to to scssk control of nusles^ ireaposs. SSse "8.K, âolS. feope to make as ea2>l4r aud a positive eoatributioa to solvla^ this psraiblem* i&e Bs«itieh psnopossl for azi';'4fflP *io0M oind the B«e'le?y a^c&ss'S o£ tSie slliacc€i not to dissessidst® c©ati*ol ove? teclear fe-eôas sad the Eoa-Eueleas? lamfee^s of the sllisses not to acquire such wsapoas or eoatrbl owss» them. If the SSSS âa Still not satisfied^ tfeê âs GSirtaiia rsae^r — • ths eonelasios of «tn ijatoâatioaal Esca»d3.sseaiiQati0si ' on all IS". Buelsag Tgst Ban Selssaological tscbaissaes feBtreaUKd could %e fbiind, the co^ld proceed to work out as sooa as possible the det&lls of aa - 2 P. B* C. test of .the P.S.C. does not meaa- that It had "become a auelass? poHrss?. Although it had not upset the .strategic b&lahce of the world, it has created pressures oa to eaSsark oa nuclear weapons grogrsssaes.

U.K. was sesaetiisat dlsappoiatad ia the Soviet me^za&dua C&/5827) especially ths proposals regarding foreign bases %&ich gar® to osse side. As to regions! a^rsjigisaents in Baropa., attei&ion isas drsâ to the British papor (BM5C/130) oa ta»s possibility of establishing observation U*S. representative seggssted the possibility of cos elemsats of oas or tso fiiffersnt partial msas«reg« Sn pEiS? he Ijad ia misS: "tha possifcilitj of a liafc betêea Kreslfient 1 proposals foi? a frsss® oa the production of suGlsaE delivcay vehicles 9 on the oae head., and ai2 «^p?G«KasE,t on the actual destruction of ai^bors of mol3S& dalivcspy trsfeisle&js on th® other. Here. "A?S might make s s'feas't -îth t&3 oonf irs of certain t^rpss of bosi&e?s alreatfy and thea go on to mor© asodfes'a SoUvsry S3fstemsc Sissh aa j 2 fhinlij, coKfeiaasg ^leâts ftom two 'asa 1)3 a first step to«a^ds actual sad real disarasffiments tosss^ds the "begiaaiag of the rosl dastrisetioa of sslstiag auelsas^ weapons systems*"

V2I.

remaias oaa ofi tlie coraeretoast s of British foraigja policy. and 1stabilj,t3' _6'f tfee i'3tjsl€s even aotf^ couia "be asscssd "by a raduction of Baeleas ifeapoas t'o lc«ire?4 sai'sr asd less costly levels, fiss U.K. -•;as aetuaH^ studyijp Isov t&at might ^s asMsifed-«ar:a hopsd is due course to put fos-vaafd constructive proposals to tliat end,

To discuss t&3 issues' of dissnasaent ia ccatext «ith the actual international reality. S&e B.C. should s&gesl to tfee Western Euclsas1 Powers to ®l7e ixp tha idea" of creating amy js^itilateral aueXear la the diS'ecti-TO fos? the EKBCS the Gcasaissioa should call for of seasurss leadiisg to satual coiifielenccj. as well as for ths of a treatj? oa KGSJ. It should also support the world disassaaaieat eon- fersaee proposed fey the ?.E»C» sesS. the Cairo

Called for support of the proposals for a, trorld as wsll as s s-sally effective negotiation as propped bj- Ifrss&e us. Sie aamrsr to tha imcles:? Usages- is sot a f^eess of tbo p of aEffisraesfes sad tfea strategic dellvssy systcra9 fout tha eon™ of aa Kgmsasiat on genial and c^apl«te as proposed

ISf. Measure- s

plans & -efeicfe -sere ia coafliet with nueleas-feee aoses aasS tfee id.«a of pseveatlng the proliferation of nuclear we£p©i3S3 shoisld bs eliffiinato stressed tfce l&i?0rbaEae of the Polish proposals to fx-ea-z© afffiâsieats aad to create a desaelesîsed soae la Cesteal Shss'cpe. OtMs- related ussaaiisres o;? the Soviet MsKoâa-iaa wsre the Eon-agp-essioa paet and ths ^LtMrawal of troops amS aiemantling ef bases ,, Sssie of thess might bs eg^ssaast psohifeitiEg the use of -reaposa #as of special fepoE-tauco acs? when tfee use of s in "vlotnasa Is Issing saentloned as as possibility, S1 ®1S ossified f2?ee.ss of Hzel

U Thant VT M Se^Ly-Oenersl M^^tfiV^ W *». Mft

THROUGH: FILE NO.:

FROM: V.P, SttSlOV Uader-Secretary, SUBJECT: Recent Session of the Disarmament Commission

I forward herewith a "Resume of the Session of the Disarmament Commission" PSCA/DAG/559, which sets out briefly in the style of a Rapporteur's Report, the proceedings during the session of the Disarmament Commission which ended yesterday* I shall also forward to you shortly a comprehensive analytical survey of the discussions as well as an assessment of the significance of the session* PSCA/DAG/539 17 June 1965

gist Appll to iSth J^as 1965

X, Oa 51 S$s2'€& 1965 the of Soviet Soeisu.lst Bspisblies t&s csssisslcs in t ftsst half of April 196^ a l®tt®2? to the of t&s DisasasasDOTt ths Seez^te^y^Ssassal iafosssS th^a of ' of t-bgia" gawssssEasats ssiar^lBg tfe 15 J iafosascl t£te

ef tfe® BiaasmemeEt oa 21 ApsH 1955 tsisich woulS to tSs® oyganisaticaaX ^©stioa of «a.eer&iaa»s sssS. that tba wosfk ^salS oa aS Ap^il 19^5 (BO/212 )«

2. 21 th© ©dsptloa of the tfe« Coraaiesloa to @l@et a Ghssisasaa. fedustsd "bj 'ilt-a of !Mt@£ Steisaaa of ths Oesasiissioa,

) lsnj©rfc of Soaf^ese© of the Cesaltte© ©a 1? 196^ to thes 28 Apsil 1965 ^em th of to t&e WisltM Ifeti©as to tfe© Caseissmss ©f t-ii®

of tli® Uait@cl tetioae Bisa^asaasat Sezasaa-esies •Has- f5«:x;s of s "fesatg-

ftether- s:-@Sae,tion ©f liasitatiosi of the 3/MS..2). (Also iasiasd as eb A/582T oa 7 s.

|c) Letter aetted 29 April 1§65 fyssa tJie ^ice^Chaisssea of 'She ?£uted States delegation to the S&sam&nent Casadssicsa {DG/23&} trg&sraittl^g for ss a d&oiHeeat of the BisaiBjasss&t Ctaassieslon t&e test oi3 a of the tfaitea States csa waaaw&&& to sfce$ tfee sprssd of halt asS -tosn aOTa the i^gass sace^ esad ^sfees

3 ssay 1965 frâ t&e Sssâait Segsreseatativs af to 13ae Ifeitsd latiacs aMresssa to the Chateasa of ttie CSG/^1^) fe^Jssdtting for cireial&tion as a doeuseat of -Si® Satioss Sisasiaasât Ssmaaissloji tte tejst of a "MsaJoraEaus of tlae GorvesssasHt of isialist Bsîi&lic of ff.igaBlsida sa KMacessss^ fessîaâ msasus&s ia the of ti

Cssasaisslsa IseM 33 aseetiags (71st to 103^) frsm SI Ap^il -Us

5. Ob ST m® 1955 two ftcaffc rssolutioss -gers siAmittea ey tiha (1H2/S3B

« ©A 1 J?â© 1965 a Sa'aft resolution -SJBS r^lrslttacl ^ the UaiteaL Ststes in »4iaaas "A*1)* ?fea 10 Jtme 1965 the United States sifeitted a revised AtbsMos C^/§S6/Jfe?*^) âttached in ££•&%& "A"). % ^bs revlsica ta-;/ Staves afided a rsferîce to gcsieral safi eâplets fiiaassaaaseat ISL the fsurtfe pre®ffic-i43^r garagrapa,. ssd aSdefi td 1ê s^ Sssssittss sl»»a3xl "bîr ia Biisid tlje suggestlsms ss duriag the ps^seat sessia?i of

7. ©a 3 ^ae 2.9^5 a draft z-eBolts&te (EC/SSI) "??as suMitted fejr

, CsaaersKsa, le&tssl Africas Sepublic^ Ce^-Isa, Caago (Bs©sse.vlHe5s

^ G'aia^a^ Ssdia^ %£&qt Joa?slanj>

Mo3K8ee», Hspalj 3figeK>ia3 SsMi .tesbia^ Sousalisj Itoited Zxafo Repi&lic.i Hsltsd Bepafelic of SaaSbla. ' Ga T Jtee 1S^5 Bwaafla^'lEplaidaa'aad ftsfcago aaa Yaaea t-ssrs added to tlje list of sp^sors (ISS/Sgl/ASS.!). (Sie teast of the flmft rsssluti^a BS/S21 is 8. te \ aiae 1965 Malt*Bwa3tsatt-j>3a * ssteil&sd eiasa&aents (S5C/223* ) to the cteaft f BO/SSI) tfhieh are

* OB 11 .$283 1365 a renrissa. 36«B3¥®2? d3.°aft resolution (BG/gSl/Rev*!} *ja$

follsrlssg*°* %hlc£h MaltxecdEbias'Baua A tsrltMres- Its s&sacteBts eastai&sS. 5m (SC/223* ) tsrfe §f the rssalutlâ as adog>te3'.?3C/g£^ îeh is IdâtieaX *?itfe the rsvlsecl draft s«se>luti«Bs BS/SSi/Bg^l is, ftttaelied ia

10. Oa 3 Jtme 1965 a a^afft re-ssl.'u.tiss. '

Austria? B^Livia; Se'aail-, Ceylssij ^iler C©Iombias Sssta

Japans Idbssla'., Sfelsari.fl Sfelisyeia^ Msltas j Ifeitsd Sepublic of ^asaala^ ffesgoslsntf-s aaai l as os^spssssoffs wsra 1st? Sea3,aaa^ BjillppiBSs ssS Bi- !.), A^tsalie (UC/aafi/ftfla.a^ aod Oentral Affficasa Hepytolic 5}. 'C^Sie '^^t s? th© sesolufcics?. as adogtea ;sc/225 -^aiea Is

Idoatlcal td.fe tSKs S5?aft sesoluti^i SSG/S22 assa Md0 1 to J $•& attaofced

the 9513i aissfelssg e& 9 la the vatlt3g to the j^^ower clraf-fe r«soluticaa C isg csa 11 i&Efcs .19^5 ^-£ €»i«iaiss'.d.s'A p^acee^.sd t-j ~r-lre- vote a fe rssslntioss. It xjas Moptefi by e. s-sas call "/ate of 89 to nssie mtla 1.6

Su favour i Afs&sfiistsaa AlbsBi®,

Bolivia, Brs«5il5 Bulgaria j Biases , Barsmfll^ ByeXorussias Soviet S > C®Eaag os3a> SasaSa? Central African

P Qxiia^i, feitl., Itmgai^^ lcelsHd.t J&fiia* Is--8a5

^.paaij, J'aaâasif, gfeâj, IfosK!dtt. ôs,

Libya? &isze28)»i32!gs Malssrsla, Msli> ISalta?

Saisii Arabia, Sliss?:-^ ^e^iiej S

Csssgo {Smoez-atie Sepublie sxf )# Casta Biea^ SI SalTOd3rs

Soatfe Africa^ Spain, I&iitea States of

t«3£fe of the resolutism as adapted (BC/gSfe) Is attached in

22. Afe tli© 99t& asetiag as 3A -Jvme 19Sp the a^a?es®ats&ive of fssseallgr sa»\?ea ISiat the Csssaissisa s&suM decide to acetss-d ps?isri% to the draft r@ss3,uti3Q |BO/222/Md«l so 3), Sie ssotiaaa ^fas gut t-o the vst© at the a l'> Jtssg 1965 sc?a -sas adtHsts^. ojr •© -role.^ea'il vots of ^FF to "

Austrls, S^lgitaa^, Brasil^ Bus

Colombia s Sssjgts (Sesssscratic Sepublie Dessasrk, SI Sal'mdo^^ Fisiteid. 0-hasiaa Greece ,

Xj?slsad# ISaitsd States sf

Soviet

Mail, 13. At the 102ad jaestisg sa 15 Jme 1965 the Csaiesatssisa piroceeaed co -fcJie irote

res«Sluta.sa (!30/S22/Ma0l«3)«. 5Sfe® -visfe.lag was ae fc&lr/$sg adopted l^r a roll^sll vate 'jf 71 to 35 , .18 abQeo,tiaa6 as f ollsws i

Aj^®atiaas Australia^ Austxla, Belgiiaa5 Cegrlsa, Chlle^

Greece ., CSuatsffiala^ Haiti P Hs?duras» IcalaauU I'MIa,j Ira Js&siea* fessa* ^brdGBj, Seaya., Sto-SB.it,, Laos.. L^bs esbsisrg. M^la^rsia^ Mslis,, Mexico.? Ms3"«;eo, Ksfc Mgssla* lassisgv Bnismaj Bares-gus^ Pero,. j South /Africa », Spain,-. STOSssj âilsaS , 1'ogo, fr- 7 sad Sd Saaisiaf Ualtecl Aât Begifolic, UBited Eiagdsi: os ©?^?.t Ss'ltala a ISiiteS lîabllc of 'SfeasEaals^ Baitea States of ^

-fc Socialist ?33«ch©slSf?®kl£

Algeria., Fs©ace ., Saudi

jii^^tasoK^ttS Cc)i -m® arlspts•*.••d ^ / a -rats of 7a 1 to 1 vjltfe 2*5 absteatasas. iEt as a ahie vias ailGptea by a yale'-eall vcxfee of 83 to 1 ^d.t 18 abstentiras as f

Afghanistan, Australia,* Aii.str5.a^ ®3lgl-ssa5 Bolivia5

j Cs®J@roiB4. Cssss^aj Ossteall M^lcaii lep&l^r^ S^rlsR. CSille, f?ama: fcagc iBsssc ^atis BepisTslic ssf). Costs Siea, Cyprus j 3aBr£a,;^S; IwaSwi'.,

iisplas, FlslsM^ dsss®,, Si^ecej SuatojKil^.- Haiti ^ Eo;sau2>asf ssfi;? Shdla^ "s?aBa ^ra^,f Sj/«laMj Iss??®!.? StaJy--. X-^rsv:1;" G^ast, ^h-^nlca,. .s^wsi ea^ sys. i\-«ait. i/ass^ Itebansa^

., Peru, ^illl^lsiss^ fcrtiigal, Et-saaQa.? Sfitidi Arabia. Sei'

:a^ Suiissj Si-jsd©;^ Syslaf HhailaM^ logo- ^5,Kidaaf sad fsfe Vgsaifla; Waited Ara"b Begaiblic.? tfeite-cl !Slr;:gasm af dr-sat B?ita:"ii

iad^ United Se^isfclie »f f«Bsa3iia3 'Sfeitecl States of Mes-'icaj

Ssviet Socialist

Socialist Beenlslic. Soviet

tsart. e€ tlas j? as (BJ/SS?) is sttac'aea aa 6,

3&. Sh? si^yessatative o? tfee vSSB amranced tfcat tee -rauld -ante iasist oa a oa his relegatioaas arafii ijesolutioas (S(./21-3 and BG/219) at t'ae eurx-eat c*f -fciJie Caraissisa*

15. 5Sie ^presea^tive Df the imitea S-Jsatos •ysea asaoiHieeS -fast ha too aot iasist -m a irate aa ^se IM^ea States flsaft resolutlcm |BO/220/Reva) at the enryeat t-»ssi£3n sf the C StflB UNITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL DISARMAMENT DC/218 27 May 1965 ENGLISH COMMISSION ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

USSR; draft^ £e solution The Disarmament Corgalasion , Moting with concern that the presence of foreign troops in the territory of other States seriously impedes the normalization of international relations and., as has "been confirmed in particular "by recent events in Asia, Africa and Latin America, aggravates the international situation and creates a direct threat to the peace and security of peoples, loting further that the maintenance or future establishment of foreign military bases in the territory of other States is a threat to the freedom of peoples and to international peace and is a gross violation of the sovereignty of the States in whose territory such "bases are situated, concern that foreign military bases are in reality a means of exerting pressure on countries and retarding their emancipation and development on the basis of their own ideological, political, economic and cultural concepts, Considering that the existence or future establishment of bases in dependent territories is incompatible with the General Assembly Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples (resolution 1514 (XV), since such bases can be used to preserve colonialism or for other purposes, Considering it necessary that, as soon as possible, all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the territory of other States and foreign military bases should be liquidated,, •'" Calls upon all States maintaining military bases in other countries to liquidate them forthwith and refrain henceforth from establishing such bases; ^' Calls upon the States concerned to conclude an agreement providing for the -withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers; J. Ee quests the Secretary-General to observe the implementation of the recommendations contained herein and to report on the results to the next session of the General Assembly.

65-12794 UNITED NATIONS Distr. G-S3SEEEAL DISARMAMENT BC/219 27 May 1965 COMMISSION EWGKCSH ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

Union oj1 Soviet Socialist Republics; draft resolution

The Disarmament Conaniasion, Recalling the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted by the General Assembly in. resolution 1653 (XVT), Proceeding from the fact that the Declaration outlawed the use of nuclear weapons, declaring that it was a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations, that it was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity, that it was directed against mankind in general and that it was to be considered a crime against mankind and civilization, Considering that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be in conformity with the aims of the Declaration and would be an important ..step towards- 'eliminating- tfee -ikr-sat of nuclear war, reducing international .tension, checking the arms race and strengthening confidence in relations between States? Considering further that the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be an important step towards the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and towards general and complete disarmament, Taking into account the fact that most of the States which responded to the inquiry made by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 1653 (XVI) were in favour of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, Having studied, the documents of the Eighteen-Wation Committee on Disarmament relating to the discussion held in the Conmittee in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) on the question of convening such a conference and the report submitted by the Eighteen-Uation Committee to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly at its nineteenth, session,

65-52798 1... IKJ/229 English Page 2

i -. . .••: ,- ajx)n , all States to take steps to "bring about the conclusion of a convention on. the -prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons as soon as possible, ' convening for this purpose a special conference of all States in the world not later than the first half of 1966, 2« Invites State0 possessing nuclear weapons to declare, pending the conclusion of such a convention.," " tnat they vill not use them first . UNITED NATIONS ^ ^-—i—^ Distr, DISARMAMENT «-««•

COMMISSION ?££196 5 ORIGINAL: EtTGLISH

United States of America: _rdraft resolution

The Disarmament Cpmraission, Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere, Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified, Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations, agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security and contribute to the lessening of tension, noting the widespread support for the measures listed below, Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war, Urges the Eighteen-BTation Disarmament Committee to reconvene as soon as possible and to: A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests; B. Undertake without further delay drafting of an international non- proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI); C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

65-13095 UNITED NATIONS Distr. DISARMAMENT <™AL COMMISSION ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

United States of America: revised draft resolution

The Disarmament Commission, Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere, Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified, Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for disarmament negotiations, the goal of general and complete disarmament and agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security, contribute to the lessening of tensions, and facilitate the attainment of that goal, Noting the widespread support for the measures listed below, Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war, Urges the Eighteen-Wation Disarmament Committee to reconvene as soon as possible and, inter alia, to: A. Resume negotiations as a natter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests j B. Undertake without further delay drafting of an international non-proliferation agreement as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) and bearing in mind the suggestions made on that issue during the present session of the Disarmament Commission; C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to . early reductions in such vehicles. ',."-•• UNITED NATIONS ; t^f ^"^ _ii£^*- - v -TS^ J —4.*^* DISARMAMENT ~ COMMISSION "Cj^1965 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

^ Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon^ Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzavilley, Cyprus'/Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea^ India, Iraq., Jordan, Kenya,;Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco^ Hepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic^ United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution

The^Disarmamen t Commission, Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a •world-wide framework, Convinced that a world disarmament conference would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process by formulating proposals and guidelines in the spirit of the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Hon-Aligned Countries, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension; 1. Affirms the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Hon-Aligned Countries in October 196^ for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited; 2. Recommends that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

65-15351 UNITED NATIONS f^\J I\J £ " Distr. DISARMAMENT GENERAL DC/223 COMMISSION h June 1965 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Malta; amendments to the draft resolution sumbittedby Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya» Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia^ Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic., United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia (DC/221) 1. Second preambular paragraph; After the words "a world disarmament conference" replace the existing text "by the following: "might provide a valuable forum in which to seek agreement on steps to facilitate the adoption of specific measures of disarmament in accordance with the agreed principles for multilateral negotiations on disarmament • issued jointly by the USSR and by the United States on 20 September 1961". 2. First operative paragraph; Replace the word "Affirms" by the word "Welcomes". 3- Second operative paragraph; Add at the end thereof the words "in the light of the discussions in the Eighteen-Mation Disarmament Committee".

65-13^31

UNITED NATIONS -

- x i v f '/Cx ^* irCv%Mk ~(""C ATT?'DAT COMMISSION «*^ i965 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AT ITS 98TH MEETING ON 11 JUNE

The Disarmament Commission, Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should "be sought in a •world-wide framework, Convinced that a world disarmament conference as proposed by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries would provide powerful support to the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension, 1. Welcomes the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in October 196U for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited; 2' Recommends that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

65-1^506 UNITED NATIONS _. . = Distr. jid^??^^! GEESSAL DISARMAMENT DC/225 15 June 1965 O/-\iAkAicci/^k M AA I S S i O Ni ^M§^i? C ... . ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

-RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AT ITS 102ND MEETING ON 15 JUNE

The Disarmament Commission, Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament, Noting with regret that during 196^ despite the efforts made by the Eighteen- Nation Disarmament' Committee no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, or halting and reversing the arms race, Deploring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1910 (XVIII), nuclear weapon tests have taken place and also that no agreement has been reached on the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", which is one of the stated objectives of 'the partial test-ban treaty, Considering that the memorandum of 1^ September 196^ submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences, Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

65-1^563 DC/225 English Page 2

Searing in mind the proposals made at its present session for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the meeting of the Organization of African Unity and the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Eon-Aligned Countries, Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will "be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world, 1. Reaffirms the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions; 2. Recommends that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should: (a) reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present session; (b) consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test-ban treaty to cover underground tests; (c) also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures; (d) keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures; 'Requests the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations. COHPIDENTML PSGA/MG/538 29 Juas 1965

Subject Survey of the Deliberations of tag Disajfaaaflaaat Conaaissioa (71st to 103rd Meetings)'

I. Conference Machinery 1 EHDC i World Conferences 3. Bole of PRO 2 5-Power Conference 2 n .Collateral Measasres g Kon-Prolifeg-atioa 2 (i) Besolution l66p (x\n) 2 Cil) Package Approach 3 (ill) Time Limit b, (iv) Guarantee 5 (v) IAM 5 Test Ban 5 Ci) Isjepeetions 5 (ii) Moratorium 5 (iii) Uhiversfiaity I 6 Kuclear Free Zones 6 Elimination of Foreiga Bases 6 Prohibition of Use 7 Other Measures 7 HI. Geperel and Complete Disaaaaateat 7 W. Economic and Social CoasequeBces 8 Subject Sonmy of the Deliberations of the gissrfflaagiat Coamissioa I. Goafegene e Machiaesy Many delegations expressed concern at the lack of progress in the ENDS during the past year. While the Soviet j&doa ead its allies tended to pise© the blaiaa on the policies of th@ United States end SOBS of its allies , otherss including Dantaiarka Ohana, Kesga, Sîis Nepal 3, jfagwaqr and Sweden emphasised the negative iafluenee~of the absence of France sad the People's Republic of China (PBC). E&e Utaited Statess however, dotted Aether composition had affected tae outcome. The early resumption of the ENBC sessions was advocated by a good auaiber of speakers including Aa,stealia» Bragilg Chile9 Coata Rica., Cyprus » Ghaaa, Guatesaalas Haitie Irac^ j^S-j^s ^®S^» iSBIH* î^^&s Megicot Neth@ylaads$ New Zealand9 NigegJaE Norâg'a PhllippiaeaB Sgain, S^jgdea9 ^gia9 Taasaaiag USA. 2^9 OSSR maintalaed that without specific directives feased on substaatiws decisions of the Commission the impasse in the ENBG troisld coatiaus, A eioê general approach to the task of tte© Cosmission in relation to th© 1EBC was adopted by BsmarkgEfchioplas ^gegs Nigeria, and Polaad ^hos@ s-spreaeatati^ss called for general guidelines. Fraaeecs position was that disa^sEasaoat negotiations should be held in a truly appropriate fg$s&3&or£. The final decisions of th© Commission (BG/2£&)ffeeessseade dTs y a Tot® of 83 to 1 îth 18 abstentions that the HH3C should r@coOT®n@ as soon as possible asad coasider as a mattes' of priority a, eomprehsnsl^B test baa an gusstion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of msclear weapons. A 1SS draft s-«sol«tion on the subject (DC/220/Bsv.l) ^ms aot put to the vote, proposal of the Second Conference of Kon-Aliâed Countries for eoBRr@ning of a world disarajameEt conf@?@nae tea-s tjelcoaad by th@ Cotajaisslon and ref@?r@d to the Geo@?al Aasssably fej e vote of 89 to ECSSQ 16 abstentions on the basis of a resolution (DC/225} sgoasoeed by had participated is the Cairo Conference.

tfees0P other thaa spcmeo?0s ^«ho explicitly "ssppoftea a world eonfs2=@Ese .

Utoaiaian SSB9 and USSR. On the other feaad Sen@^si assd United States views, Others , iaetediag Bg®ail9 Caaadag Dafflarka uKaitt Llberia3 Maltaj JJtexicog Netherlandss ^^^^9 Eh a/ad guaiaia either reserved the final position of th@ir as to the advisability of the eosfereffiee until th© Assessbly coasid@?s th© os? qjsalifisd their approval lay reference to seeh requirea^nts as (l) piropes? preparatorr ^ork$ possibly by the HHDC, (2> agE-eeasest ©a the eouatrles to "b ianrit©d9 (?) proper timing in relation to the international situation, prelijadaary agree&ent anong auclear Poweffe^ (5) participation of eJJ. Powerss (6) agreement on agenda and (7) proper > relationship with

> Sthiopia in supporting the proposed world coBf *«*scss astsd that its proposal on a convention for the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons could be considered at such a conference. -ôrld smomit conference proposed by the PRO ms speeif icelly Albania., ^Blorussian SSR9 Cubag Poland9 Rcaaaaia asad Ukrainian Bole of The dssire to have the PEC participate ia disasfflsamt negotiatims PSC was mentioned by some including Albania3 Cgprus, 5&hiopia,8 Staaa, Mali» Hepal9 Moroayg RBaada» Syria9 Tanaaaife and I^ganda as oae of tfee reasons for their support of a world conference. Albania. w&E'saad hotreverj, that no world disarasarasaA conference under United Nations auspices could expect the PBGas participation without prior restoration of its sights in the the latter therefore Should aot be delayed. !Ehe USA wsa of the opinion that world conference was not the the only or the best fceaas of associating all militarily significant States ia disenaament. Chios observed t&afc the He aad had scornfully rejected all previous proposals for its participation ia the talks. idea of a conference of the five nuclear powers was apprmtad fey Con- Bulgaria êlogussian SSH, Hungary eso& Regya. farance s H. Collateral Measures The deliberations in ths Ccssidssioa isere focused oa collateral 35ie paekage approach thereby several measures weuld b@ coraibln©d ia orS@? to facilitate ag?e@9@eat tiget? support frGms @!&bng others, Bgasils fa Kingdom and Yugosl the approach of cosibiniEg ffisss&r&s s©e®ed for IMia, aafl Sweden to ba centred on sara-proliferation regtsireffi®at88 ©timers g<@a,<@s>@l objectives. For exas^le the United Klaadtaa and Italy linked the of strategic deliêsy vshicles -aith their r0duetio339 asd Bgaail's te.dg@t reSisetioaj, catbefik of as the strategic frees® eM to giv© priority to the «p®sti0sa ©f : __ _ __ gggl£^° prswstiBg the spsmi of aiselear weapoms ttes© iaeltid@fl ^mgils Costa 5ticas

IfoiteA Ki&;2dfsa and IMted States. %ere emerged several main approaches to the problem: (1) a® @gr@es@nt 'based an Hesolution 1665 (Irish); (2) integrated or package ag^esaaats inclMiag measures lisiitiag or reduciatg the nuclear capability of the ageless* "Bower8 \ p) agr@®^nt subject to a time limit for purposes of reviewing osi disaraasasnt; and C^> an agreeaent plus security guarantees. .Be- Ipelaiad placed responsibility on the nuclear powers for initiating a uaiwxBally acceptable non-dissemination treaty ^hieh should "provide that the 166g (X^I? nuclear Powers would not give the assistance necessary for making nuclear weapons to non-nuclear States; would retain absolute and exclusive ownership and control of their nuclear weapons; and would not relinquish to one or stcr© non-nuclear states control of such weapons, i.e. either the possession thereof or the power to decide that a nuclear weapon, or weapons, shall be discharged. As a c'srrollary the agraeffi&at should also provide that the not maaufteetureft or otherwise acquire osmerahip or control of«, asd would su^nit to international iaspeetioa to enstar® that th@y keeping their bond. -3 -

Ifaited Statga supported a non«prolif ©ratios a$p»@effient bassd oa Resolution 16^'Khieh woisld provide assuraae® that assy future aKfaaggma among allies trcold be consistent tilth its principles; dselared that ia event it wald tek© ao action contrary to t&at Resolution; and sailed the USSE to give assurances that nuclear warheads for jaissiles in last Swop® under the control of 1&e USSR. The Soyi@t Usipn said that main thing was that aa interaatiottsl mast preclude any direct or indirect access to nuclear weapons by any soa nuclear Potters9 aad called tspoa the Sisas=sseiE®at Coosaissioa to ^scogalse and without reservation that such plaas as the SffiP aad tte MF ^rer-s iascapatafei© with th© principles of aoa~disseiaiaatioa. Aecosdisig to gplasa aa agsrem@at prohibit selincpis&iimt sad scquiaitioa of cosatôl of zmclsa? t-?ss|saas IK disQCtljr ©s? issiirsetl^'j, "oy individual States off groups of Statss; it saust iffitesrdict the sbarisg of ccatrol, esfE©T8hip5 disposition o? to those weapons, as well as the plaaaiag of tfeete us@| it imast ban ssmaufaeture of smclear tfsapoas fey noa-aufilesj? States aafi the tsâsîsslsa the zzaelsar Powers of information needed fa? such Th© plans for ea MIS' or AKF weye deemed iiacosâtifele with a proliferation agreaaent lay Csechosloâkla^ gfoaagolias jfolgjad and Yugoslavia. fh© United Kingdom h9&@?@p» eoatecded that iand^> tha AW all psrfcieipaats be feeuad sot to transfss1 or s®ek coffl&srol of rsmclesg' xâpoas. It saggest-sd if the Soviet Uaioa was not satisfied îth that t^p@ of essusasssSs, th@ ^©st --joisld be as iatesssational aoa-disssadssatiaa a^@@^ât feiadisg ©a all SJaial i!@cerai®aded the MLF 1»© dropped ©ad Cfailg egp®©l©d for © essapecasis®. ^MJ^Bit aM teAco thou^t tte© ms ESO ia3upes>al»l® the pifo^leai ^jaec®s° s to it •&&& eosisistsnt tfl£h th© prlasiple of th@ view that the key cg£©3tioa •&&•£ as,® of of tJa© EM.K d«v©lopâts ia y©latioa to ths -desired to conGenta?ate on is^lîsntitig Itesolutiea ITO| as th@ most. praetical mass of solvizsg the proMemj sad those "(e.g. ^^j£? Swecfea9 Yugoslavia Hô iBtooducedj as more srealistice the idea of a package ©i? iist«g?atad emphasized its "present d9t@7miaationR to us@ isucleej? easr^1 oalj for peaceful purposes, tmt esaissteiaaed t&at oaly an iatsgifated proposal the following elements could actually solve the problem: w(l) ass uaSertaki isy the nuclear Pewsys aot to traasfer nuelsar veapoas off nuclear vsôas techcologjrtD others; (2) an uodertakiag not to use aucleer tmapoas agaiast countries ô do not possess tham; (3) an undertaking througfc the United Nations to eaf egizard the security of countrle a uho laay "be threatened b£r powers havii^ a nuclear ireapons capability or eotoarking on a aucl^r weapons capability; (b) tangible progress towards disamanssnt, including eoBB^rehensive test ban treaty, a coa^lete freeze OB pro&actioa of nuclear weapons end Means of delivery as well as & subst&s&ial seduction i the existing stocks9 aad» (5) an undertaking by aoa-avtcleas* Borers oot to e or «aasm£actur@ nuclear 16«japons." 3MS& laaintaiaed that this " could solws the problem and that isolated £aoasu2?es troiald sst f though observing that the Indian approach vias "a set of conditions' for tfesir undertaking hot to acquire nuclear weapons9 t?as nevertheless convinced tfeat a broad approach ^Saieh would call for similar sacrifices of future potentials for increasing nuele&r strength on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike bad a tetter ehaae® to wia suppoz-fc than mi agreement oa non-dissemination based on Hesolutiea 1665. Sweden's package included e eomprehe&aiv® test baa; a cut-off of fissile mata.rJ.al; and., a Bon-proliferatloa agreement. Australia^ Call® asd tJmida sapportsd Swedish package. Yugoslavia's package consisted of the prohibition of us©; a test ban; assd an agreement prohibiting proliferation in aay form. ifeis tms supported by Ethiopia. Cyprus thought agreement depended on the ability of nuclear Peters to ban a!3 tests and halt the production of nuclear weapons, tfaile favoured t&e linking of a non-dissemiaEtioE egreeiaeiat and the possible destruction of nuclear êapoas3 Hiêria *ms of the vie%? tmt a non»prolif@ration agreement would last only if some destruction of aissllee took place as -well as the prohibition of use of nuclear Malta stated a similar position.

JapaaB tîile fully supporting a non-jjroliferatioa agreement noted must take ffcsllj into aceouat ^Ti'^soat wishful tbis2kiKsgts ^© fasts of contemporary iatersaationgl polities. Ho agreâejat IE its opiaioa wool' I fe© feasible. «al©ss (l) it wotild Kaisstaia the "balance of power in the worM; 1 1 (2) It wsr® adfesrsd tos aot csilsr by si ^® ssacleas pofe-®rs9 tat also % ,-.11 otter ec*mtr!©s îth a potsatial auelear tâposas eaps'bilitî (5) it bad A feti£lt«i& systisa of safagoaras based on adequate issspectioa aad seateolj C^) last 1but aot least, it v@r$ acecmpaoied *ey tagaswes of nuclear la particulsrj, by & cos^reheiasivie axsd universal nuclear tost -ban @tam would call upon mclegr powers to unvtertafce,- as part of a dissemination conventions a phased withdrswal of nuclear wsapsns 3Bd Liastall@,tioBS from territories of other states, and non-aucleai- powers tsould undertake raot to permit the stationing of weapons on their territory. While the United States was of the opinion ttat each eoapoagnt of a Bound programme to halt nuclear proliferation should be pressed 9 it trss-aed that th©r@ ^•ffis a serloias elemant of danger in the vies that unless various cc&dition® are met or certain prior measures iaplemented, neaâuclear Powers auet ecâsider acquiring nuclear weapons j such a view, it was said, would lead to stalemate. Others who wsre nagatively iaclinad to Use package &;»proac'a included gcata Rieas Horway and Pakistan. The Itoited Arab Republic maintained that an agreement on non-proliferation would be meaningless unless all nuclear Bowers including China n@?g party to it. Another approach was suggested by Canada which proposed that the treaty stipulate a "time limit for the abstention of the aon-nucl@ar Powers after âieh their undertaking could be reviewed in the light of the progresB disarmament Bade by the ajiclear Powers". ^S^£ supported & time limit tshleh other agredaaits lacludiag the guarantees would have to be She questios of gu&ra&tges was raised by India waich proposed aa undertaking ttooagb the Ifeited Nations to safeguard the ssOTTity of eoEstri©® ^fe© may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons capability or ®dfe@3?klisg oa a nuclear weapons capability. It was maintained that it would !be ao tas® to merely assure the potential mtelear poas©r that thsl? SQeisritjr would fos safeguarded by one or other of the nuclear Powers unless suea ©ssuraae© could easily b© dependable. Canada^ Chinaa Cypgnis aud HjilippiaQS tôtigfet a guaranty© wo?ild be especially valuables t«her@as the United Arab Higpu^lic thotsght the setter so ecraplex that it Md to be examined cautiously asd Ifeggl aad eiapfoaticslly against such an approach aifguiMgj in psrts that it exfcead the nucloer rivalry into the Indiaa Oceaa area.

As part of a bread program to halt the spx®a& ©f nuclear weaponss the Uaited States cslled for establidsmsnt of iatermtioaal saf@g«iaffds to prewat the diversioE of peaeefal meleaf activities to weapons derelcpasato aotsfi that it bad^lyeady aecepted th© priaelple of XAM safeâstf plsanisig to acc^t the sam® on power reactors producing eleets'ie possr of tfeaa 100 E^gaâtts; P&kiataa s-ogêst©d aa arraiigemsnt •K-fee^sbj all bilatera aid tffoisld be conditional on aceeptaue© of IAM sa£@gtm£ds, r@t?oactlv<3 to cover aid gives in the past. Test Baa The achievement of s coa^Tdieasive test ban me also givea by eaany speaker®, ffiia Ifedted Kiogdca stressed tfeat pôêss IE deteetioa ideatificatioa capabilities liad advacsed to a point ^hese it ôtald fe® aseeptabl© tioas to pyevide for a "sigBifieaatly sraallep mgoibar of osx«-sit« iBSg®Gtiass tfema hod earlier proposed" „ The tfeited States observed tfeat tb© gswgs'esa woisld refeleet isa its efforts in ^je 1EDC. Caaadas Italj, e»l saS. the ©RC0*ss?©ged by this approach ©ad suggested that &a ags'asffieiat was S^%deia felt 'bh@ 'mxt step was to oygsjais® & collect it?© sy@t@ eollectloa aad ewaluatioia. ' 'Higeria îd Paîstaa siaggestsd sreaeti'watioia of 5-poêr subêeaffidtta® in tfea S3SDC. Bgagil ggoposefl a tsetoical of the USS5 maiafcaiasS thgt the difficulties is tsassislag uzs&ergs'Oftad tests ware not-technical but politicals sad that the ujse?illiKga©ss of th® Uaitafi States to sf@eogaig@ tJsat aatioaal means of detection were adequate to gostrol a Isass was blocking a solution to their problem.

' Ssdis3 faadaia and tlie UflB proposed a vol«at@2fy moratoritaR oa tests p©aliag ag?®®K®at ca a cosr^etoeasive test baa. Qgpg^s s&& that the 330£%tGH.t3Q coKld be aided by the ssss of Estioaial meaas of pending a final agreement. Sh@ Uhltsd States position -sras that a on uedesgrouad tests would not coabribute to the solution of the p^eblaa vleir of past experience with sueh an

Braj8jLlt Saredea and Yugoslavia drew attention to ths joist msaioraKda of th© 8 aon-aligned~Pewer«. -6 .. __ Albania called for a total baa OB tests and production., iM.le Guinea Ukiygg- defended its decision not to adhere to the partial treaty because it was sslitsr: neither comprehensive nor universal. Ethiopia, 2Mias Liberia9 Malta, Tunisia aad the UAR dsw attention to the possibility that the failure of France and the PEC to adhere to the partial treaty saagr l©ad to result ion of tests in the atmosphere.

The auelear tests of the &3C were deplored by <3saaa9 G\sate^lag £adiat japanB Ktesr Gain3a» He^ Zealand and the US. speakers sagiported the establishment of meLsas1 free soaes as a of eeatrolling the nuelear SOTIS race. Latin Amesdca ©»i Africa wes1® ©igal-ed Zones by Beagils, Cgaa&daj, Costa Mca» Ghanas Ne1&erlaJfodss Bakigtaa end the US as ia *&ieh progress seezssd possible. The USB noted that it wjuld *b@ fiiffieuit to discuse Africans denuclearization •wteils foreign tessa in aad siôuisd it eoafeinise to exist. It also set forth sosa® more gesaersl points ^felch had to be takes* into account ^hca considering the qu©stioa. l!heg@ were: (l) ths desire for such soises aust come from within the areas esaces^sdj details o: should be discussed by the interested countries throia^& the ^©glossal organisations, as established in aeeordaneig with Artiela ^1 of tfee Uaitsfi Nations Charter; (2) all political, geographicals eeoisosaic and scientific faetoriS related to ai^* particular area should be eeasidos-ed with & *vle^ to tfeetr various implications for the area; (3) deoueleas'isatloB of should take into account th© "situation or situations it". Others ^16 reealled gêviowsly stated eoMitioos for «ones included r@gs?®tt«d that circumstances did saot psralt a ra&elees1 fr®e g©sse :?or the Bsdia Ocean' area âd Australia coasid©rs«i its osâ area sa©t Th® Foligh proposal for' a frees© of Bseleas1 weapons ia Cestr&l aa4 th© Iggg. ggsdoa iaclaSed the proposal as one of th@ ZEeasinree elssest to a|C!?<3©sE©Hfca SiSsiopS,©, sxA 'S0&ZWS&6, coiB3@ssited S&^GO^S^^T on th@ Bap&cfeS.- Mexico noted that &@ far as the Latin As&ricaa eountries &@r@ the tesa "denucle&rigatioa" taea&t Rthe sbse&c® of maelear Ismnchitsg devices'*. aiimi° Tlie TgSR stressed the liquidation of foreiga bases sasd th@ aatioa of foreign troops as a girioîty issue for the Coasedssion., end eufezittad g, of draft rssolutioE on tfee^sutojict (DC/218) tshich vae not pressed to th© ^sts """ Among those ^ho supported moês to eliminate aJ.l foreign base® t?@r© C^â$ @ua»9 Jjaq.a, Malls Boasaniaa Hsmttda, S^rria9 Tunisia, Ifeaada and Yugoslavia* lone other delegations 9 however, opposed the Soviet approach on the that a distinction had been made between bases imposed, and those voluntarily accepted^ or theft the problem could only be solved ia th@ context of general these included Canada« Cblle^ Haiti, Italyt Jjgpgjas jfordaa, Lebaffipsis "aea9 Ifeited Statess and Zambia. .7 = Pro- The oth®r ±&&w givea priority by the USSR *jas the psrohibitica of the hibition use of nuclear weapons. /SiQ draft resolution (DC/219) » Milch TSSS also aot of put to the vot®9 cellsd for the coovenicg of a special eoafereae® &oxt year Us® to conclude a convention prohibiting uses aasd l&vited States to Seelajf© in tte meantime, that they would not use them first. Among those sshe supported the prohibition of use la general were the Byelorussian SSS9 CMl£i £g^> Csechosloyakiac Stfe3.opil&B Guia®&> Mall, Mexicos R|êriag |blaMs te.jaigia.) Sygiftt Tiaaisia and Ytôslavia. Tbe view that this lag.tteg' had to fee dealt la t3se contact of goneiral disasroaiaent was advaneed. "bj Aastgalias Japan« Maltaa Pakistaafl IMted States, tjjrugaag; and Other AiEong the other EIS&SIIPSS discussed (a) Verilfied gyeese oa maabeg ®ad ehagactegjsticsi of Stgategie Proposed by the paj&ed Statess eM supported by Auatgalia» United Kingdom. This was criticised by ggQghoajjgîa sasd tte© USSB as a fsessure of control without (b) Cmt°0ff off Product ion of Fissil® . Proposed by the Ufoited^tatga aad Malta, S"s@d@Bs ^rgia"aad Taaasasia. Reduction of Military Proposed by the tBSBB aasd supported "by Ghaajb Mosieo ead of Bosabars;

(e) 'Kon-Agigg«M38ios Bast | Proposed by the USSR aad st^ported by Caeehoslot^l£ia-•-..- ,e Cf ) Beduetioa of Deliwsgy Vehicles i Ref erencaa to the destruction or redaction of t^hicles as & collateral measure trere sasde by C@nadas Japan, Sweden and Uaited KiBgdom. Cheaiie&l aad Baeteyiological Weapons 5 Cyprus sail Poland called for aa appeal to all poarers to to tlift Geneva protocol of 1925. Cyprus troold also extend it to ben the production of : CM. (h) Regional Araa Reductions; Nigeria, Norway and the United States supposted regioaal affecting conventional weapons. XH. general and Coapleto Disaraaaeat USSR spoke of the need to continue discussion of general ead end recalled its proposal extending the "nuclear umbrella" uatll the end of the third stage. The United States said it v&s detea^iiaed to for general and ccarplete diseunsament as part of the cosaaoa long tssaa . 8 -

Among those wao drew attention to tia© possibilities opened wp by Soviet attitude towards the "nuclear uaajreHa", war© Auatyalia9 Brazil., Italy3 Nigeria end Sweden. Albaniaaoa the other haad9 the concept unacceptable. B»e quesioa of balance, in particular notion of Eaiataining a balace« of potrer was critically reviewed by gyggus8 and the Hetherlaaads. She iaportancs of as well as Ksiclear urns stressed Tyy XBdiaa Malta and Hot? Zealand. Tha settleatent of political issues was listed as & jfequis^ment fb?

IV. Ecoatmic and Social Consequeaces She question of dercsticg i?esouyces released by disafsaaassat to ©eoncsaie and social development vas discussed by taaagr speakers. Bgaail9 CM.l®a Bthiopia9 Haiti and Ital3r»suseested that the link ought to relate to p measures as well as general disarmament. Others HBO stressed the general importance of this aspect of disax&siee&t included Algeria., Guatemala.? Idb8riia.a MaliB Malt&a Rwanda^ Sweden and Tunisia.

Canadaa United Kingdojai and the United States ot^seted to tfog operative paragraph in the resolution adopted (BC/22§5 feeeawse it suggested that the SHBC has reswoasibility for this satteg- or that it rsferrsd to H»' of military @xpeaditi^?es as the source @f the ?@@@ure©s i=ataeg= -ATO. ** The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDS NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

Attached hereto is a copy of PSCA/DAG/548 "Note on the Detection and Identification of Seismic Events".

Date: 6 December William Epstein

CR. 13 (11-64) ££

COKFIDMTIAL " PSCA/DAG/5A8 — 6 D®e«sb@r 196?

Hote on the Detection and Identification

Ever since the beginning of the test ban negotiations , one of ttse main issues of controversy between the US arai the USSR has been over whether it is possible to detect and identify all underground events by existing national techniques alone. The US has claimed that vihile it is possible by existing scientific instrumentation to detect and identify a majority of the events^ there would still remain a residual number of events that could not be identified without on-site inspection. Ills USSR is now of the opinion that all underground events can be detected and identified by national means thus obviating the need for on-site inspection. This USSR position is a shift from her earlier position which recognised that there were saute events itihich could not be identified without cm-site inspection., The US and the USSR had both accepted the report of the 1958 Conference of Experts to Study the possibility of detecting violations I/ of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests. -^ The report had recommended that a control system composed of a world«=Tiide network of 170 land~foased control posts and 10 shipbased control posts could record signals from ©vents of one kiloton yield but couM not identify than* However s for sigmls from a 5~-!ciloton event the system in 90 per cent of the cases , could identify the source of the disturbance „ For the remaining 10 pssr cent of such signals*, varying fsom 20 to 100 natural events annually , on-site inspection would be requinsd for identification „ Following the report of ths experts^ a Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests was convened by the US9 USSR astd UK on 31 October 1958 to negotiate a test ban treaty. However a series of obstacles prevented agreement on a treaty and on 11 February 196Q9 with the conference in virtual deadlock^ ths US, supported by the UK^ proposed a phased treaty that -would circumvent many of the problems %1 / contributing to the impasse ia negotiations o" ' In essoicss the treaty

I/ EXP/HUC/2S« 2/ would prohibit Immediately., all nuclear tests which could be effectively

controlled. This tould include all tests in the atmosphsrej underwater5 in outerspace and all underground tests above a aeisaaic azagnitwde of 4°?5c The US further proposed a research program to improve the detection machinery- with a view to gradually lowering the threshold,, The US estimated that 20 dn-site inspections smiually la the USSR would he required for unidentified events above the seismic aagiiitude of 4=75 o O• n• March 19 ^ the. 1 USSR stated that it would accept the US. proposal although Soviet scientists had never agreed as to the existence of somes sort of threshold, regarding 'identification and detection of underground events.*3^/ -it specified however that the treaty j» in addition to prohibiting t©sts above the threshold saist also call for a of "four to five years" on tests below the threshold,, However^, could .not be reached owing to divergencies between the two sides on the question-of. iasr-c-::^.?".

In a recent background paper prepared by Dr. 3c6villes Scisntific Adviser to the US arais Control and Disamament Agen^. the problsias of detection.:and identification were explained in some detailo^ Hs espls>ined that detection of a seismic event involved the ability to record on a seismometer the signal produced by the event. Identifiestlto ' involved the ability to distinguish betws'sn tlie signals 'from an

. earthquake, and those from, a Eian-nsade sxplosioKc

~ "i "' • ' tsru Sccsville stated 'that' it was possible to identify a large fraction of'earthquakes-as earthquakesj, biat it vs,s not possible thittegh presently kaqwa. sci^ifcific methods to identify an ©splosioa

as sseh0 This was because explosions did not produce signals which ware not,also characteristic of some earthquakes. Identification was more difficult than d^teetioa beeanse it required "the recording of larger seismic 'signals than is needed for pure detection

The paper entitled "B&ekgsotsid lafoi-raation on th?j Dstection and Id®atificatiosi of Seismic Events'! was circulated to the son-aligned m©ubsr3.9 at the 'last session of th© EMDC bj the US dslegatLon,, The papers howevers was not issued ss sii EHDC Identification capability improved as the magnitude of ths signal increased •and if a world-wide system of seismic arrays Trier® established^ the .capability wauld continue to improve up to the magnitude of 4<,0 at T/diich point SO per cent of earthquakes amid be ideaifcifiedo Thereafter the capability became "essentially constant" and additions,! inersases in the nagnitude slwill not pexmit the system to identify much wore than 00 per cent" of natyral events. The resEainii!g 20 per cent of events in addition to any possible explosions could not be distinguished one from another and could be identified only through on sits inspection,,

Elsewhere in his paper} Dr. Scoville' also referred to the problem of translating 'a specific seismic mgnitude into a specific nwabsr of kilotonse He explained that a magnitude of 4*0 ca the seisssie scale could be equivalent to explosions i-jith yields rangiiig beta'sen 1 to 20 kilotons depending oa the type of soil ia.-vtiich ths ©jcplosion was oondueted^' Sisdlar3^yj a seismic magnitude of 4«75 could be equal to explosions in the range of 5 to 50 kilotons'a E|f way of exarapls IK asserted that an explosion of 1 kiloton yield conducted in hard rock5 'sueh as granite and salt would produce a signal equivalent in sise to. that from an earthquake of 4»0 magsiitt;.d@(1 But if the e>solosion wsr© conducted in porus material such as alluvitsas it tjould taks a yield of 10 to 20'kilotoas to produce a sigaal of magnitude 40(X Another difficulty I-, dstossaiaiag ths g^scise acisiaie saa^itiads of a specific ^adergronnd explosioa was that the sise of the sigaal from the explosion. varied at different locations in the world,, This was because the signal" had to travel through the earth along a variety of romtes with different geological, characteristics, to reach the various detection stations scattered around fchs world 0-/ • •

' The US also presented a paper entitled "Notes on United Kingdom . Research on Teetoiques for distinguishing between earthquakes !} and t^MergrourJd e>3?losions. 0 It contained siaiilar coxicl^sions to that of the USo t f » Ij.

Speakiag in ttoe same TOia '5^e US representative &t the

Mr. FosterP stated that the problem of detection and identification of seism!© events had remained the sasss as It was is 1958- Kails detection of ®a underground event was relatively easy it v?as fas* sore difficult to identify it»«7k/ The mala problem of identification -was posed, by events ira the raB@2 of 20 kilotoas or less, siaee it was to distinguish the eharaeteristies of a 20 kiloton earthquake sad a 20 kiloton nuoiear eaplosion. Spewing at tfee 1385th Meeting of the First

Ceasaittee on £5 November9 JS,*. Foster stated that tiia installatiou of a ôrlclîde system of 10 to 12 large seisinie arrays comprising of soajs 525 seisscsse-ters -vjouis Eeê possible tbs detection of seisaie events in tfee rangs of ' &f "hundreds of tons"."' It woiald also snake possible tha identification 'of about; 80 pss* eeat. of eveirbs above fhe rssge of & "few kilotons", Hiis would leaê abstit 20 per c®st of all natural' events., in addition .to any possible s^lossions tjhicsh eoiild not-^©".MfBtified." Streii'-sosis of tlaes® 2Q -per eeat.coiald rbe" ft&tber identified as earthquakes by' using oc'esa-bottOBi seismomgfesr-s^ which would raore precisely z-eveal tlse . loeation and eiharaetes'lstries pf tlse sveat.' Howeyigr^ for all the rest of tlisse events îch will remaia t-xilfiantified on-sits inspaetion -ws,s to determine what caused "feeis. Applied to the Soviet Union laasnt tbatx ia tjje average g'sg? the number of ssismic events occuring in IBSE iîca wouia bs detested'but not'identified without oa=»site iaspestioa was about'4j. Soîat Union restated itrj pos;i<;icr. -&t>' tfee E1DG tlut all >8 [email protected] S^r os.'fciiQSSfcl, jasiîs u?i.tliOQ& nesd £os ou^ CiiR too rsststeS its p:?o£?-osaX originally ss.Se ia 19&-5-?- 'eJiat a partial solution might bs aa' sgreemoat "baaniag xHiasi'groy.ad tests above 'Sa ttessbold of ^-.75 seismic Tcsgai'twcSsg !%biicli the admitted capacities and capabilities of i&e escistiag national equipments are' sbla t-o detest and i s. taoratorium on undsygrouad teats "belta? tSsat aiBgaituSe.

.. A US sasiBoraEdum eis-culated to Ul Members on 12 Oatober X96g (A/G. 1/873) also eoataiaed a similar conclusion. 3todia-»-'aad Brazil--'IH 19^5 also called for a ban on underground tests as acceptable ttoes&old -to "be determined fcgr ese'aeriga of scientific data* Biey did ssot insist Qn a moratorlma for tests "bslxn? the t&reshold. Proposals for establishing a trait-sally acceptable threshold "ers also tr.sxle in the 196^ ESDS sessions by Ilgss'lsy^ Brssilf^ Barma^aad Mesico*^' Sfeey

too? did nefe suggest a moratoriuin for tests below tlis threshold* B^e Soviet Union, aseeptsed -Uae UM prctgosal»~2/ t She US# ©a iSie 6tSi©x -Mad, rejected it., stating that'It was aot possi'ole by imtioaal eqisipEsafc t©: ifiStitify all events afes^a the H.75 magaitttSe and, la .any case., it eoa5.d not agree to as unverified srarfetor&sa of izaSa tests below that

la s-oiamarys there sesa to be four divergent positions at the present time regaraisag a threshold approach, 1, 5&ere is i3se tJB position^ supported by Its allies^, -Khich matess 'Ja distinction lsetee©a a detectloa thrcsfeolS. and as Mesrcifeatios thjeeshold. ISiIIe it reeagaises that-a''detection tSireslioia of 4.0 raagnitude eouM be established bj the use of large seisalc arsfsys- it cloas not agree that aay fei«a;'of sn'identificatioa.'•&hp«s&01£ exists, '; g* Tfeere is ths Sox^et position imich doss sot recognise the esistesee of sitfeer -a detection or idaatifieatioa t&peshQldj asserting t&at all .tests ea^ bs detected and iSeatifisd fey HBtional mesns. liere is -sfee OAF, position tfeat tlere d«es esrist a as '^ell-as aa iSsntifieation threshold of ^»75 magslteas* , Fiaa3,l2r tiers is the position of Br&sil- larma^ India^ Mesieo end aot eatsgari'c&lly esrlor©iBg a t»T5 '^rashold, thesa suggest ^'© possibility .tliat a uaataally'. aeeeptable threshold eo^M. "be upoa. ': • ' ;. .'

l£/ MSC'/F?,18? .and 192. M ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO* ' The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION POUR INFORMATION

Attached hereto is a copy of PSCA/DAG/551 "Survey by Subject of First Committee's Deliberations on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons (Item 30)".

Date: FROMDM:: / \ / 6 December DE: William Epstein

CR. 13 (11-64) CONFIDENTIAL PSCA/DAG/551 6 December 1965

SURVEY m SUBJECT OF FIRST COMMITTEE'S DEIIBERATIQHS OK THE DISCONTINUANCE OF HUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS (ITEM 30)

Underground The need to conclude a treaty banning underground tests and5 pending Test Ban such a treaty? the immediate suspension of all underground tests was the dominant theme of this year's debate. The USSR, Bulgaria and Byelorussian SSR while stressing the urgency for a comprehensive test bap agreement, restated their position that such an agreement could be reacted only by extending the provisions of the Moscow Treaty to underground tests i0e0 on the basis of the use of national means of detection and identification On the othsr hand, the United States., Canada» the United Kingdom and New Zealand asserted that, dispite significant improvements in the techniques" of detection and identification^ it was not yet possible to control an underground test ban by national HE aus alone8 and that some on-site inspection would still be required,,

Taskii of Those supporting specific action by the General Assembly were Nigeria the GA which urged the General Assembly "to give clear directives" on the immediate suspension of nuclear tests 9 Peru which felt that the General Assembly was duty bound to pronounce itself to favour of "absolutes radicals > obligatoryfrpreemptor 2| comprehensive" baa on tests,, and the UAH which called upon the Assembly to reaffirm its previous position and call upon all States to refrain from further testing . Uniyer- The urgency of making the partial test ban treaty universally binding was also pointed out by several delegations,, Mexico suggested that States hot, parties to the treaty should and could accede to it either by formal adherence or ifby practical conduct". Seeking specific 'Gte&srol Assembly action were Task of Australia which loanted the Assembly to call for all counts! es to adhere the GA to the partial treaty and the ITAR which recommended that the Asserably should urge those powers that have not signed the treaty to do so in the immediate future,,

1 Draft The Committee adopted a 35°=Power draft resolution (A/C0l/L0345/Reval) Resolu whereby the General Assembly wuld urge that all nuclear weapon tests be tion suspended^ call tspon all countries to respect the spirit and provisions of the Moscow Test Ban Treatys and request the Conference of the L,345/~ Eightsen-Nation Committee on Disarmasaent to continue with a sense of -urgency its work on a comprehensive test ban treaty aad pa arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments <, taking into aeeotmt the improved possibilities for international cooperation in the field of seisoiic detection* and to report to the Gsaeral Assembly,, Scientific ^° reconcile the conflicting claims on detection and identification and °°°° many speakers called for some form of scientific cooperation among the Technical nuclear Powers0 The Unifc edi States and the United Kingdom favoured a meeting of eapsrtSo Nigeria restated her past suggestion for the reactivation of the three-Power nuclear 3ub»eemmitt®e with the participation of scientific experts,, Nuclear Brazil urged the establishment of a technical sub-committee <> Powers Cyprus called for a. strictly limited conference of seismic technicians to evaluate the latest advances in the art of detection and verification of underground events « China suggested that countries possessing the necessary facilities might undertake 'a year of joint experiments to determine whether national systems alone could detect and identify underground explosions,, Pegu, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands urged the USSR to agree to an exchange of technical informtion,, ^hs Netherlands also suggested the convening of a Second Geneva Conference of Experts, New Zealand hoped that the nuc3sar Powers principally concerned would undertake a review of the "state of the scienc©"0 Nepal, uyged the USSR to 'submit, a technical paper outlining the reasons why it considered on-site inspections unnecessary,, Others that called for scientific cooperation among nuclear powers wsre Pakistan8 ^i§®ej Australias Bglgiujn aad Austria » India9 however9 did not consider that exchange of scientific data was a precondition to a suspension of nuslear tests „ The USSR sad Bulgaria taw® opposed to any technical discussions0 Dgteelign The idea that ssualler countries could also play & useful role in Club facilitating the detection and identification of seismic events , also seemed to be gaining ground0 In this connection Sweden^s proposal for the establishment of a, "detection club" composed of a world—vide network of technologically advanced seismologieal stations was specifically endorsed by Australia^ Bragila Pakistans Peru* Nepals Denmark^ Metherjgndsig Aiu.3t.r3ag Gamdas Kew^ Zealand and

vfiiile not specifying the magnitude of the i&reshold5 also called toratorium for a moratorium on tests below the thresholdo The United Statss stated that it was willing to take short cuts if the" 'pyoblesTbf cSande stine t^sts wers not overloofedo It was opposed to any unverified moratorium., as were New Zealand and Australiae States assented that, the esfeabllehsasafe of a worM-vtd® of 10 to 20 seisini

for the of tssaid«5sfeifisfele e^eata

of a e« s^K@afei iM P?CR! foap @®®s!ts?ie® to_?esiaHe testiago eaid it -K®S < " fhe teehnieal amd political aspectsof a eompTehenBive test were alluS@d to fey several lg%>e@ts .©sly a politi@al decision oa the pafffe of eaS fiia@iawfee& Westena that the teelsnieal not fee igao?«40 £a this @onn@@t: the la©k of poli^ieal td,H on of the ssspes1 to-. @os@Iuge an the US effps-fes of the a fee Sfcekof believed that the ES®g shessld s©sss s«@um@ ©a the pastalaiag to a $>esa e®d t© s^sosrfe to ROUTING SLIP FICHE DE TRANSMISSION TO r; The Secretary-General FOR ACTION POUR SUITE A DONNER FOR APPROVAL POUR APPROBATION FOR SIGNATURE POUR SIGNATURE PREPARE DRAFT PROJET A REDIGER FOR COMMENTS POUR OBSERVATIONS MAY WE CONFER? POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER? YOUR ATTENTION VOTRE ATTENTION AS DISCUSSED COMME CONVENU AS REQUESTED SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE NOTE AND FILE NOTER ET CLASSER NOTE AND RETURN NOTER ET RETOURNER FOR INFORMATION X POUR INFORMATION

Attached herewith PSCA/DAG/560, "The Roman Catholic Churches Dogma and the Question of Nuclear Weapons and War". *

Date: FROM: DE: Dr. o. Frey

CR. 13 (11-64) 13 December 1965

BHB.RCBffiH GAEHOLIC CHURCH'S SQlsaft MD SHE ftUESaSOH OP KUCIEfla WSAPOHS AND WAS £/

2a its final Socim^at, tJia Pastoral Constitution entitle-a. "Ske Qs«r<£h In -the Modern Horldnw mads paTells on 3 December 1965, the Seasaaaieal C0tiasil Vatican II forsmlstedj, -jat^r eJUa» t&e Hoasan Catholic Church's doctrinal attitude with regard to questions of way aad nuclear weapons* that war has not yet beea rcatad, oui from human affairs -fee Secuonent recognises tliat as long as the danger of war remains and there is no and sufficiently ptjwerful authority at t&e intesMiatiosial Ie-ro canatot be denied t&e rigbt to legitimate defence once every means of sattlemeat fea6 baen esfcaasted. At the some t£me the Pastoral Constitution aakee a olear«

TOSH of our tlaa asust realize tât they nill hava .to a sâbar reekortlag of their deeds of uar, fer tlie coufse of futare will depend greatly osa i&e deeisicas tSiey make With t&ese t?atlis In mind, this raost holy syaod maêe Its of total war elrsaay ps*Daouaeed by reseat Popes Issues tJie following dcolaration* Any act of mo? aisaed indiscriminately at the dastruetioa ©f entire clt&es .or of ostecsitre areas along wltJi; their popalatiea ie a cs?iase against God and man M*nsel£. It rasr'Its «ne

I/ Fcif cot^B oa tfcs Eneyelieal ' nPae@a in Iterris** see MG/^52, part It is intendad to ;ps?©Bsre a survey ©f qpia&oa on the subject treistsa in the pyeaeat not© if iîs should be 2/ For releveat '^st. ase Aaaax I. "She !few York 5Ssiesw, 9 end 10 November 1965/ proseribiBg total war and the use of Eiieleay weapons the Constitution found equally deplorable a psaee-tima role assigned to "jjsapons «•» the rele of fistesrentu QSae d$6U3aair& eeesss almost eeass of the argyajents employed in tfee Uaited Nations end poiatiEg to t&e psefesrionisBsss of a peace based solely on nuclear and balance o? poneô St dsplesres 13xs -vraste of iêocarees of an asms ssee at numerous aff3J.etiBg the -8O?ld carmot be attesadod to for lack of available . «- ^ ffiis lasigusge of â dceitaent can T?a iE.terpr;3t&fi. &s giving eêdit to tiie tW.ted Nations for its efforts for peace aad it gives tins UI its blesalug -rfaen it ''Sines peace must ,'bs bora ef mutual trust between cations ead cot 1)3 icrgQsed.on them tliroush a fear of 1£ie available weapons^ everyone tnust labour to put en ecd at last to tbe anas raeef and to aa% a true begijaniEg of disas?mîientA nbt unilaterally indeed; but proaesSiog at en equal pace seceding to egsreament, sad backed up by tine and workable safeguards o . In the zaeaatiicej efforts -Khlch haira already been made and ass etill unds? vay to elimiu&te the danger ef var. are to be xinderrated. to the contrary, support ^sovld be glTsn to the of tbe wry majsy leadars vho >6rk herd to d© sway i*i'th ' problems, of pâca and of diearmement have sl?@ady been the subject of est&nes$ve, stsenqoue end eocistast esamlaationo Toge-Slher vi^ international meetiags dealing with these problems such studies should 'l>e ssgayfied as tfes first steps toward solving tkeee serious queetione^ and should be pmaofced vita evea gffeste? orgsnoy by way of yielding concrete reeulte in "Sie future . «. rt wmx.

Sssee:p|)ts os lfaxs Naelv«a3? tfsapoas9 Bisasffitaaoat,, F©acs ana Delated fsrcm.tlae Pastoral Constitution on "fh@ Church isa the B&sdes-n Wos-ld" tsssaeS ia Rose9 8 Dsessjbe:? 1965.

ct. sf â?s quite © i&5®@ sassfes? ©f ssaftiosss to iatesisstieEsl sgsrseEsnts aSaafi at.ij&SsiHg military actiît^ sa'S its sequeaces less IsSKsaasj. Êae£? stipalGtiose fisal wi1& sueb mat'&e^s as of tioaMsd solSie^s aad prisoners. "Agreenraats o? this scst raast b© hosaosrea. Sadcsd tfee^ sfcsisia upon so that the fs-lgbtfulaess of ^?a? -«aa fes bettes* a&i ssors we in chsdfc. All ineBg" especially Gawamaeaft officials ssa, easerfee s a73"t»oimd to do eyssryKhlBg they esan 'to effect tfccss It &G&8S siît tSsat laus EaJi® tesmes^ psrc^Lsioas fcs- tfe® essa of for reasons ©£ coaseiesi-ss yeJlase to Iseai* arsis 9 gs'oi feat tfeey ages©." to Sssft^'ttea feuaaa corEEKBit^ in ecssa feas iK)t feeen s>offKssi-Ottt of Ssisaaia affairs . As 'long -as a? of t'si? rsam£25c ©sS tfesê is1"^ cssapsteat oM suffieicatly at the "SHtssa'at:tonal l€nrels''"Sbvst3fZS9sats esanot fcs dSElssl to Icgltlsiste' dfef^jsa ©ass e*jasy mssa^"®f psaeeSal settlâssat Ssas skhausted. " . "B*at it is one tMsg to sssassffealsra'ssilitary astloa for i3aa o^ the people p sui4 sosasthSag elss agais to s©sk the 'sKfeû^s aatle&s. Hos-a'ljy tlse ssma tolsea dcfcs ths'spss'® fact that war &as ail is £©ir bat»'?ssa ths âsrixsg pasties. too f3iio- demote thaasslves "to 'the sailitaiv BSSÎGS of ga^d thsiaselTfea as tlio agents 03? sssasdty asfi of peoples. As "long as they fulfill -Sais s-ole properl^j T&GJ are a gsa\3liE2 eontri'totica to the establisSaest of pesos, liy of scicsAifS.G weapcas. For ?icts of t>rau? iffiiralÛ^g tlisse can aosr bs 'found"** '"isat/fes ©szaories of ths gffsst nations ware to "bs to tbeiz* fullest j' an alacst total sjHTaltogetljer reciprocal slatai^tes1 of ©aeb sifie fey tSics othsr t?ould follcsw,, .sist to mejatioa tas ^rldssp:—•" s'™'*—' tbst -^culS tsJ;e place is the t?o?lcl and the Se&dly afteraffeets be spssasS by the'use of treapoas of t&is kiad. thsse eonsidsâtioas eca^sl as to ^.Ms.?t2iie am e^ralisati.on of war *d.t& an eGtirsljr new attituds. She ias-n of our t&sss must sealiae that will have to giâ a sojabss1 yec&GaIng of thei? dee«^3 cf wasr, for the of tlie fut is-© will dspeasl greatly on the cleeisiojjs tSasy ffisê today. • 2 -

these truths ia sain&9 t&ia isost holy synod makes its esaa the of total was" already p2^3sc«uKjeS by reesst ?bpss9 sM issues the fcllewlsg deelasstaoa. ."jtey act of ^ar aisaed i&@isc?i&iaa.t8ly at the aestructloa of cities as- of estesesiva areas along with thei3? pogtslatioa is a sgalnst EoS sad maa Mnsseif. It ssss'its eueqsttivoeol ©a a

asigjse hase3.*5 of aodera '&e®f&&& consists ia this: it «Sio possess isc^ejKi seiontiflc wgapoas witla a fei&d of oceassion fos? ^3$ such ftlscaaasatlcttjs;' E02?s«5ve?s ttoou^ a eo:s?taia issso chain of eveats, it «aa eatspttit E&n isto the most atz-oeious deeisioes. Ifeat sacfe i^r asvei* tsadly happen In the £tetB&Bp tlie Mshops of the -«rald? gathered tcsetfeer., ij^g all BSSBS eBpscialiy Cfovetfarasat officials ©Kfl military leasers to give usreaslttiRg thou^st to their gigantic r before Gofi aad the satire IstiTcsn s-aes. . : fee earaj scientific weapons as-e not amassed sctLely for use i Since tfee deferssiw strength of &s^ nation is ccssiderefi to tipoa its capacity for isaiediis.tG s-etollatloa., this of eafisS;, $hi<& iac^cases each yea?, likewisa ssrvess isa a way uxtettoaas as a d&tsxrent to possifele eiisraar. attack. !5any ?«£&*'& this grooadure as the cttost effective tsay IST vhi

be the facts ©boat this sasthoS of detGST<3ac©s laea should l»s conviaced •what tlie ar*as s'ace in wlJich cai c&readjr consideratile aui^sar of cowatrieB aye cagEgsd is siot a safo 'way to grssesve a etea^y peaoe, is the so-called "bslanee resultJjig fi*caa i^is sfsce a eass sacl

th&s "beiag alinaiaated thereby, the causes of ws£ are in of ^siiag g?adual3y aggravated. Tfeils estsraâsant suas are f OP the fasaisMag of eves' 009 weaponsc aa &Siequat0 1» P®«PBldsd f O5? i^ts sssltiple miseries afflictiag the «Jiol Disag3?Q(3ffisnta: bstrWâ aatioas as's not ^âlly and âdieally fesalsaj ea th@ coatgasy, 'thGy.ppresd th» Satfectioa to othe? garts of the easts*. 'feppsw^hes 'Ims^S' ea ysôafmed attitii3.es' taust ISG takcsa to s^moTO this and to cmiaadpata ' tlie wos*ld f^csn ite el^sliisg esisietsr through the of genutoe geac^. we s^y it asss^ns the iiaSsaS iâce is ^j utterly trap for humaM-tya and ohe t^dch eaâaâs: ' tlsfe poor to an iatolâ^le 2t is nsaeh to be £&a?ai that if this' J?aeo persistss it will Spawn all. tlie lethal znsin tfôse path 'It is aoc? making by the eialeiBitlcs which tlae teaaan race h^ s^

"But before this hoped for aetkcHfity esa fee set up9 the feigfeesfeexistin g aehtes-a easst fievote themselves vigorously to '

$#. t'^4