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Disarmament -1962 -1965 UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 36 Date 17/05/2006 Time 3:35:47 PM S-0881 -0003-07-00001 Expanded Number S-0881 -0003-07-00001 items-in-Political-Security Council Affairs (PSCA) Analysis - Disarmament -1962 -1965 Date Created 08/02/1963 Record Type Archival Item Container S-0881-0003: 20/08/1962Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant • PSCA Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs) Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit CR.13 ROUTING SLIP Comments for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.108 should be used instead. TO: The Secretary-General APPROVAL YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER? AS REQUESTED YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE NOTE AND RETURN PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS DATE: E.D. Kiselev V <+• PSCA/DAG. 433 CONFIDENTIAL g February 1963 The Defence Debate in the British House of Commons This year's defence debate lasted only two days, January 30 - 31* on the government motion for approval of "The Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems issued following the Bahamas meeting in December 1962." Motion of "No Confidence". An Opposition amendment expressed "no confidence in a government whose defence policy has collapsed and which, at Nassau, entered into an agreement which, by seeking to continue the illusion of an independent British nuclear deterrent, imposes further economic burdens upon the nation and makes more difficult the solution of Great Britain's defence problems," At the conclusion of the defence debate on Thursday, January 31* the Opposition amendment was rejected by 337 votes to 234* while the Government motion was carried by 330 votes to 236, Labour Criticism The Prime Minister was accused of still making the "same kind of mistake as General de Gaulle" in recognizing on the one hand that the world had changed but not realizing at the same time that "this called for new weapons." Britian must "come to terms with her real status in the world," urged the Opposition, and neither past greatness nor "present delusions" would help Britain find her new status* Two recent events came under Labour criticism (a) the more recent episode of Britaints failure to be admitted into the Common Market. "At Brussels," said Labour, "the Opposition resented the position of Britain being humiliated as a country which was exhausted," The failure of the Brussels negotiations had shown that Britain still had friends both in Europe and elsewhere, and so unlike the picture fostered by the Tories, Britain was not an exhausted country; (b) the r esults of the negotiations concluded at Nassau b etween President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in December 1962, Mr, Macmillan was accused of having acted with undue haste innegotiating the agreements..."party political considerations" were said to have dictated Mr» Macmillan*s desire "to bring back quickly something that his backbenchers could call an independent deterrent*" Nassau Agreements Discussion centred largely on the following problems: (l) The question of the necessity for Britain to have an independent nuclear deterrent.The Government posed the problem that without her own credible nuclear de- terrent Britain would run the risk of nuclear blackmail, more so when the U.S, itself was increasingly being faced with incalculable costs of Soviet second-strike capability. To Labout?*s charges that an independent British nuclear deterrent tended to upset the precarious nuclear balance between the U.S, and the Soviet Union, lead to the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and thus ruin real hopes for disarmament, Mr. Macmillan -2- *s pointed out that not only was the precise meaning today of conventional as against nuclear armaments unclear, but moreover Britain's role in the nuclear club afforded a hearing in all disarmament negotiations and provided a leverage to pressure the Super Powers for general and complete disarmament; (2) The Prime Minister emphasized the fact that Britain had the capability of remaining a nuclear power with its own, independent deterrent. Reviewing the history of Anglo-American cooperation in the nuclear field, he stressed the fact that Britain had been in the nuclear club from its very inception. Moreover, he added, as regards cost."it would be a great error to suppose that to abandon altogether the nuclear role would make any massive reduction in the burden of defence expenditure over the years," (3) On the question of the merits of Polaris as the proper British independent nuclear deterrent to be built in accordance with the Nassau agreement, Mr, Macmillan argued that Polaris was a better substitute for either the Skybolt missile which the United States had decided to cancel or the Hound Dog missile which had subsequently been offered at Nassau. "Polaris is successful, not only in research and development, but in manufacture* It is operational and the Americans already have about 20 submarines in service...Under our agreement we shall be able to obtain the latest model of Polaris available at the time...any new make of Polaris will have to be designed to fit into the existing sub- marines, in which so great an investment has been made by the Americans," Labour observed that there would b e "a long gap, a real gap" during which Britain would have no effective nuclear weapon under her command since the United States "was already thinking of a weapon system to replace Polaris altogether and Britain might well find soon after she got these weapons that they were far advanced towards obsolescence and that new systems were being worked out." To this remark Mr. Macmillan replied that to have rejected the U.S. offer of Polaris would have meant not merely a temporary gap, but "that between us and any other nuclear power there will be a great gulf, fixed, final and eternal...»Nor can anyone say with certainty that there is any particular moment, any month or year, at which the Bomber Force, armed with stand-off bombs, can really be written off by an aggressor." Moreover, certain strategic, political and other considerations indicated, on the basis of the 'assumption...that the British deterrent is to be maintained," that Polaris was the correct choice for Britain. "First, in our island there is certainly the great advantage in having a seaborne missile instead of one operating from fixed sites in this country, or even one dependent upon fixed aerodromes. Secondly, there is perhaps the most vital point that a submarine weapon is in many ways the best suited, now that it has been invented, for our purpose. It is a second strike weapon. It is the nearest thing to...indestructibL retaliation." As for problems of command, operational control, anl communications system of the Polaris submarines, Mr. Macmillan reminded Labour that the accords reached at Nassau were in "particular and broad outline," and that many points not elaborated at Nassau remained to be covered in a more formal agreement, "Fortunately", he said, "we have a full knowledge of the design and manufacture of a nuclear-powered submarine. We have one just completing her trials. We have one building, and anoiiiher on order* It will take about a year to -3- *• *s• *• prepare the plans and designs for the new submarines, which naturally have to be specially adapted and are a more advanced type, for the inclusion of the missile..." (4) On the question whether the security provided to Britain by Polaris submarines could be reconciled with the unity of the Western alliance, Labour offered two criticisms; (a) in the first place it questioned whether the U.S. offer of Polaris warheads to British submarines constituted a really independent British nuclear weapon not subject to final U.S. political control. The Bahamas agreement was said to be very ambiguous on this point, drawing a devious line between weapons assigned to NATO and weapons to be included in a multilateral force. In reply both Mr. Macmillan and the Defence Minister assured Labour that "these submarines will be British manned and British commanded, and there are no strings on them." (b) In the second place, Labour was "in favour of strengthening and increasing the share of control within NATO over the Western deterrent, but any ideas of separate European deterrents would be fatal. They would not add significantly to the Western deterrent. They would lead to the spread of weapons and involve the danger of the day approaching nearer when Germany might have nuclear weapons, with the diversion of an enormous expenditure from conventional forces all over Europe." Mr. Harold Wilson, a candidate for Leader of the Opposition, declared that a purely European deterrent could be a nuclear force dominated by Germany. "To endow Germany with nuclear status," he said, "would put an end to any hope of easing East-West tension, and a sudden conclusion to the efforts being made between East and West to make co-existence work.. .NATO must be made the centre of defence policy in Europe." In reply Mr. Macmillan stated, as regards a NATO deterrent, that he fully recognized "the good faith of those who are trying to find a solution to this problem—the problem of maintaining the national traditions of our countries while at the same time working for a more united alliance." In order to make a start on building such a NATO force, he said, President Kennedy had agreed with his proposal at Nassau to allocate to the NATO Alliance "some of the Bomber force now stationed in Britain, already targeted for joint operations in cooperation
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