JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND THE FEDERAL

COUNCIL OF CHURCHES,

1937-1949

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

by

Albert N. Keim, B.A., M.A.

*******

The Ohio State University 1971

Approved by

Adviser Department of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Dr. Constant H. Jacquet, Jr.,

Director of the Research Library of the National Council of Churches, for giving me access to the National Council of Churches Archives. I am grateful for the assistance rendered by Mrs. Wanda M. Randall, Assistant to the

Curator of Manuscripts, during my research in the Dulles

Papers at Princeton University Library. Dr. Georgia

Harkness, Dr. Roswell P. Barnes, and Dr. Samuel McCrea

Cavert all provided valuable advice at various stages of the project.

My adviser, Dr. Robert H. Bremner, gave unfailing counsel at every stage of the work, I owe a special debt to my wife, Leanna, who loyally supported the project from beginning to end. VITA

October 31, 1935 Born - Uniontown, Ohio

1963 ...... B.A., Eastern Mennonite College, Harrisonburg, Virginia

1965 M.A., University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia

1965-1969 Instructor, Eastern Mennonite College, Harrisonburg, Virginia

1969-1970 Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1970-1971 Dissertation Year Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Social History of the United States Since 1900. Professor Robert H. Bremner

Political History of the United States Since 1900. Professor K. Austin Kerr

Political and Social History of the United States, 1850-1900. Professor Francis Weisenburger

Renaissance and Reformation. Professor Harold Grimm TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... ii

VITA ...... iii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Chapter

I. FROM OXFORD TO GENEVA, 1937-1939 5

II. THE FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE, 1939-1941 4-1

III. THE COMMISSION SEARCHES FOR A PROGRAM OF ACTION, 1941-1942 ...... 79

IV. THE CRUSADE FOR A WORLD ORGANIZATION BEGINS, 1943-1944 ...... 116

V. THE CAMPAIGN FOR A CURATIVE AND CREATIVE WORLD ORDER, 1944-1945 15^

VI. THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE CONTINUES, 1945-1949 203

CONCLUSION ...... 250

BIBLIOGRAPHY 262 INTRODUCTION

Rain fell intermittently as John Foster Dulles and

Archibald McLeish stepped from an Air Force plane at La

Guardia Airport on June 24, 1945. The two men were re­ turning from the United Nations Organizing Conference at

San Francisco, where McLeish, an assistant Secretary of

State, had served as an aide to Secretary of State Stettin- ius. Dulles was chief advisor to the United States dele­ gation. With a quick handshake the two men parted, McLeish for Washington, D.C. where he began planning the campaign to assure Senate acceptance of the new United Nations

Charter, and Dulles for Manhattan where, on the following day, he met with the executive committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America to report on the conference and to begin plans for a concerted effort by the Federal Council to rally American Protestantism in support of the ratification of the new world organization.

•This episode highlights the role which Dulles played during the 1940's, serving simultaneously as spokes­ man for Protestant world order concerns and as a leader of the American foreign policy establishment. His dual role as churchman and statesman represents a unique chap­ ter in the annals of American church-state relations. Dulles' adult life can be conveniently divided into three chronological segments. Between 1911 and 1937 he established himself as one of the nation's leading experts in international law. During the second period—

1937-1949— he continued his law practice, but devoted a

large share of his time to the churches in his capacity as chairman of the Federal Council of Churches Commission on a Just and Durable Peace. From 1949 to his death in 1959 he served as a public servant, first as a United States

Senator from New York, then as an adviser to the State

Department, and finally as Secretary of State under

Eisenhower. This paper will examine the course of Dulles' church leadership in foreign affairs during the period

1937-1949. —

Dulles' work as a churchman coincided with an era of unusual activism by American Protestantism in the field of international affairs. Much of the activity of those years was centered in the work of the Commission on a

Just and Durable Peace, established in 1940. For most of

the decade of the 1940's the Commission defined the issues, hammered out positions, and lobbied the government on be­

half of the approximately thirty million Protestants

affiliated with the Federal Council of Churches.

The Federal Council of Churches, predecessor of

the present National Council of Churches, was created in

1908 as an agency to represent twenty-five constituent ' 3

Protestant denominations in matters of common concern. The policies of the Federal Council were determined by repre­ sentatives of the member-denominations who met in biennial plenary sessions, and in bi-monthly meetings of the Execu­ tive Committee of the organization. The Executive Com­ mittee was an elective body of about fifty members (two or three delegates from each denomination) with a Presi­ dent, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer. An administrative secretariat, divided into departments rep­ resenting major areas of church concern, and headed by a general secretary, carried out the actual work of the

Council. The Department of International Justice and

Goodwill was responsible for the world order concerns of the organization. The Commission on a Just and Durable

Peace was organized as a special affiliate to the Depart­ ment of International Justice and Goodwill.

Under the leadership of Dulles the Commission became an important adjunct of the World War II internation alist crusade to end American isolationism and to create a new international organization to replace the League of

Nations. After the War such issues as the atom bomb, the

Cold War, and the peace settlements became the objects of

Commission activity. It is the thesis of this paper that the assertive character of the Commission's activity and the relative success which it enjoyed as an advocate of

Protestant world order positions, was to a substantial degree due to the leadership of John Foster Dulles. His

importance lay not in the ideas he projected, for those v/ere largely derived from his clerical colleagues, but in

the strategic position which he occupied as a leader of

the American foreign policy establishment. It was his

access to the instrumentalities of power and influence which provided the churches an unprecedented opportunity

to bring their influence to bear on foreign policy issues

What follows is an effort to recreate the course of

American Protestant world order activity during the decade of the 1940's. CHAPTER I

FROM OXFORD TO GENEVA, 1937-1939

John Foster Dulles devoted his entire life to international affairs. He came to his vocation and avocation naturally. His maternal grandfather, John

Watson Foster, in the course of a distinguished career ' as a lawyer and diplomat, served as Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison; Robert Lansing, an uncle, was

Secretary of State under Wilson. These family connections led to Dulles' first involvements in international affairs.

In 1907, during his junior year at Princeton University, he accompanied his grandfather to the second Hague Peace

Conference where his grandfather represented the Chinese government. Dulles' knowledge of French gained him the post of secretary to the Chinese delegation.^-

After graduation from Princeton Dulles entered law school at George Washington University. He began his career as a clerk in the famous Wall Street law firm of 2 Sullivan and Cromwell in 1911. When the Unxted States entered World War I Dulles obtained a commission as an army major assigned to the General Staff in Washington, D.C.

In 1918 he became an assistant to Vance McCormick, chairman

5 of the War Trade Board. He was assigned to negotiate agreements with the neutral countries in Europe to tighten up the Allied blockade of Germany and make neutral shipping available to the Allies. This work, plus the fact that his uncle was Secretary of State, led to his assignment as a member of the American delegation to the Paris Peace

Conference in 1919. He served as chief American counsel on reparations and other financial matters, and drafted the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which dealt with reparations.

After his experience at the Paris Peace Conference

Dulles was assigned much of the international legal work of Sullivan and Cromwell. In 1924 he became special counsel to the American underwriters of the Dawes loan to

Germany. In 1927 he was counsel to the Polish government in its monetary stabilization problems. On that occasion 3 he worked closely with Jean Monnet of France. He became head of Sullivan and Cromwell in 1927.

By the late 1930's Dulles had achieved financial security and a reputation as a highly successful inter­ national lawyer. He headed a Wall Street law firm of twenty partners and eighty lawyers, and was director of fifteen corporations. Dulles' personal success, however, stood in sharp contrast to the disintegration of world order. The structure he had helped to fashion in 1919 was falling into chaos. 7

The year 1937 was a turning point in Dulles' life

because during that year his faith in the Church as

a vehicle for promoting a peaceful world order was

kindled. He alluded to that experience in a speech

in 1949:

I started as a law clerk in an international law firm and came to work on many international problems . . . During that period it did not seem to me that what I had . learned here in church had much to do with the practical problems of war and peace. That was indeed my state of mind for thirty years, from 1907 . . . until 1937. In that year I presided at an international conference held at Paris under the auspices of the League of Nations, and then went on to attend the Oxford Conference on Church and State. That was a great Christian conference, with representata- tives of almost all the nations and all the races of the world. We discussed there the same critical problems that diplomats were discussing so futilely at the League of Nations. But at Oxford we approached those problems with the guidance of a common standard— the moral law as revealed by Jesus Christ; and we dealt with each other as brothers, irrespective of national or racial differences. Under those conditions we could see how to solve problems that could not be solved in the distrustful atmosphere of national competition. Then I began to understand the profound significance of the spiritual values that my father and mother had taught, and by which they had lived .... From then on I began to work closely with religious groups— Protestant, Catholic and Jewish— for I had come to believe that, of all groups they could make the greatest contribution to world order.4

Dulles' return to the church was natural. He

not only came from a family of diplomats, but also of

churchmen. His paternal grandfather had served as a missionary to India for many years. His father was a

minister in the Presbyterian church, and later a teacher at Auburn Seminary. Dulles' early years were steeped in religious instruction with a rigorous spiritual regimen which included a copious memorizing of Bible verses and hymns. Throughout his life Dulles maintained a formal piety which included Bible reading and prayer. But his religious orientation was markedly non-theological. The modernist-fundamentalist controversy bored him. For

Dulles, Christian faith was essentially ethical and moral.

He was what Kenneth Cauthen defines as an "ethical-social modernist," a point of view which emphasizes the practical and moral aspects of religious faith with but scant con- 5 cern for its theological or metaphysical dimensions.

This was especially apparent in Dulles' conception of the ethical precepts of Jesus. He regarded them not as counsels of perfection, but as basic guides for daily life. Faith must act. "Christ," he said, "did not teach a contemplative religion. 'Go' and 'do' were his constant injunctions.

Despite his disdain for the often raucous modern­ ist-fundamentalist controversy of the inter-war years,

Dulles found himself involved on the side of the liberals.

In 1923 the fundamentalist elements in the Presbyterian

General Assembly of New York sought to block the ordina­ tion of Henry"P. Van Dusen, a young seminary graduate who was later to become President of Union Theological Semin­ ary. Van Dusen was accused of holding "liberal-modernist" ideas. Dulles, apparently through his father, was asked to prepare a brief in defense of Van Dusen. The General

Assembly dominated by conservatives, rejected the appeal.

Subsequently the brief was accepted by the New York City 7 Presbytery and Van Dusen's clerical career was saved.

Throughout these years, although Dulles regularly attended Park Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York

City, he remained, in the words of Henry P. Van Dusen, an

"inactive layman." This was by design for he steadfastly resisted efforts to involve him in church activities.

Thus in 1931, when John D. Rockefeller, Jr. asked him to serve on the Inquiry Commission of the Foreign Mission

Board of the Baptist Church, he declined, much to the chagrin of Mr. Cromwell of Sullivan and Cromwell, who pointed out the benefits which might accrue from serving on a Rockefeller board. Dulles refused to reconsider, g arguing that his legal work required all his time.

By 1936 Dulles was prepared for more involvement, a development prompted primarily by the rapidly deterior­ ating international situation. In an article in the

Atlantic Monthly he expressed his concern about the state g of the world. One result of the article was Dulles' selection by Princeton University to give the Stafford

Little Foundation Series Lecture in 1936. The paper, 10 entitled "Peaceful Change Within the Society of Nations," sought to diagnose the causes for the malaise then grip­ ping the international scene.^

Meanwhile plans were being made to hold an ecu­ menical Christian conference at Oxford, England in 1937.

The conference was to be held under the auspices of the

Universal Christian Council for Life and Work. The chief organizer and planner of the conference was Dr. J. H.

Oldham, Secretary of the Commission of Research of the

Universal Christian Council, and a leading British church­ man. Oldham came to the United States in 1936 to assist the American committee of the Universal Christian Council with its preparatory planning for the conference. In the course of his visit he met Dulles and was so favor­ ably impressed that he asked him to write one of the preparatory papers for the conference. Subsequently,

Dulles also attended a number of the planning sessions of the American committee.^

The Oxford Conference of 1937 stands as a water­ shed, not only in the career of Dulles, but also in the history of twentieth century Protestantism. It proved especially influential in the development of American

Protestant ideas and programs on world order during the

1940's. Oxford represented the crest of the ecumenical movement of the inter-war years. It was the largest and 11 most universal meeting of the entire period. More im­ portant, it was at Oxford that the Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches, which served as the vanguard of the ecumenical movement during the difficult days of World War II, was established.

The ecumenical enthusiasm of Oxford was the result of several converging developments. A key factor was the missionary movement with its strong sense of the universality of the church. The ever-broadening circles of Christian fellowship stood in sharp contrast to the fragmenting international system of the times. The conviction grew, especially among missionary leaders,( that the church not only had a stake in, but a responsi­ bility for promoting a peaceful world order. Part of . that responsibility was to bring Christian judgments to bear on world problems. But the realization also grew that the veracity of Christian judgment on international disorder could be authenticated only by a church which 12 had laid its own divisiveness to rest. Christian unity was a prerequisite for a viable Christian witness on world order.

The new ecumenicity was based on a new view of the church. "Let the church be the Church," was the rallying cry at Oxford. In essence this was a call for a new

"churchly" sociology and politics. The Christian com­ munity ought to exhibit the quality of life which it 12 espoused for society as a whole. Thus it ought to be inter-national, inter-racial, inter-class and inter-faith in its own life. There was also a new emphasis on the church as a vehicle for Christian ethical concern. It should serve as the conscience of society. As John

Mackay put it:

The church should not and cannot elaborate detailed plans . . . but it should remind the nations of the abiding commandments and realities which must be taken seriously if the new order is to be a true order and if we are to avoid the judgment of God . . .

In the area of world order the church now assumed two tasks; it took upon itself the responsibility for formu­ lating those principles upon which a viable world order should be built, and it assumed the right to critically evaluate whether those principles were, in fact, being honored in practice.

Oxford marked the transition of ecumenical

Christianity to what Samuel McCrea Cavert has called *'a 14 new social gospel." It was more sociologically real­ istic, much more theologically profound and far more daring in its criticism of society than the "old” social gospel. It acknowledged that the ideals of Jesus and appeals to follow the way of love were not enough . The church needed to face the stubborn facts of human selfish­ ness and perverse power, not merely within individuals, but in the structures of society as well. The Kingdom of

God could no longer be identified with any institution, 15 not even the religious community. Finally a more pessi­ mistic and critical estimate of secular progress and man's educability emerged.^ The net result was what Reinhold ) Niebuhr has described as "an impressive system of Christ- 17 lan pragmatism."

The new ecumenicity, the new view of the church and the new social gospel were legacies of the Oxford

Conference which became the essential frame of reference for American churchmen in their world order activities during the war years. Probably no group at Oxford was influenced more by these new currents of thought than were the American churchmen. American Protestantism had always been activitst by nature. Now this activism was given a new focus and a formal legitimacy. The source of the great vitality of American Protestantism, in the 1940' especially in its world order concerns, can be traced, at least in part, to the Oxford conference.

The conference was decisive in Dulles' evolution as a churchman. He came away convinced that the church was peculiarly qualified to promote solutions to the outstanding world order problems besetting mankind. The church's common faith and common hope, coupled with its universal character, made it potentially at least, a unique vehicle to challenge the petty particularities of nation and culture. Its vision of world brotherhood 14 provided precisely that unifying principle which the world lacked. The church, properly mobilized, with its loyalty centered on universal and transcendent principles, could become a powerful antidote to the rampaging nation- 18 alism threatening mankind.

Dulles' basic ideas about the relation of church and state were derived from Oxford. A key proposition was an insistence that the primary task of the church was to enunciate the moral principles upon which political action should be based. From Oxford he gained a deep- seated suspicion of any attempt by religious organiza­ tions to advocate particular political solutions.

Political reality of necessity required compromising with Christian ideals. Any assumption by an ecclesi-. astical body that its ideals could in fact be embodied in actual political prescriptions, except in a very tentative fashion, was bound to result in disappoint­ ment. How then could organized religion make its in­ fluence felt on the political front? Primarily through a process of testing actual political measures against stated Christian ideals. Dulles believed that Oxford had performed that task and had demonstrated its utility as a legitimate function of the religious community. In this sense the church carried out a prophetic function, supporting those policies which fostered its ideals, but 15 always remaining free to scrutinize all political expedi­ ents in terms of previously enunciated moral principles.

In this rather negative fashion it could become a force 19 for good, a kind of ombudsman for mankind.

Just as important as the ideas which Dulles garnered at Oxford were the men he met there. No small part of his new enthusiasm for the church was a conse­ quence of the dazzling display of intellect which Oxford exhibited. He learned to know and respect such men as

John R. Mott, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth,

Arnold Toynbee, T. S. Eliot, Nicholas Berdyaev and Arch­ bishop Temple. He was especially impressed by Arnold

Toynbee whose theory of "challenge and response" was later to become a key ingredient in Dulles' perception of the dynamics of the Cold War.

It was also at Oxford that Dulles first met many of the men with whom he would collaborate in the 1940’s.

Among these were Henry P. Van Dusen, William Adams Brown,

Reinhold Niebuhr, Henry Sloan Coffin, and John C. Bennett of Union Theological Seminary; President John Mackay of

Princeton Theological Seminary; President Albert Palmer of Chicago Theological Seminary; Samuel McCrea Cavert,

General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches;

Henry Smith Leiper, Secretary of the American Section of the Universal Council for Life and Work; Walter Van Kirk, 16 President of the National Peace Conference; Charles Clayton

Morrison, editor of the Christian Century; Kenneth Scott

Latourette, Robert C. Calhoun, and H. Richard Niebuhr of

Yale. All of these men were to serve on Dulles' Commission on a Just and Durable Peace a few years later. For them, as for Dulles Oxford stood as a benchmark in their under­ standing of the role of the church in human affairs.

At Oxford Dulles sat in Section V dealing with

"The Universal Church and the World of Nations." He presented a paper entitled "The Problem of Peace in a

Dynamic World" and played an active role in formulating the final Message of Section V. His influence is quite obvious in the stress the Message placed on fostering 20 conditions for peaceful change in the world.

Dulles came to Oxford as an expert in international affairs. When he left he was also a churchman. After

Oxford Dulles' reputation as a statesman and a churchman became inextricably intertwined. By uniting the two roles he gained influence and prestige he could not have enjoyed in any other way. That this new role was apparent to his contemporaries was reflected in several developments immediately after Oxford. Thus in early November, 1937, he attended a two-day meeting called by Assistant Secre­ tary of State Francis B. Sayre. Sayre had sat with Dulles in Section V at Oxford. The meeting was called to discuss the Christian response to the challenges posed by such 17 21 ideologies as fascism and communism. A few weeks later

Dulles was invited to become a member of an international delegation of churchmen the Federal Council of Churches hoped to send to East Asia to act as mediators in the 22 growing Smo-Japanese conflict.

Interestingly enough, Dulles' new involvement with liberal ecumenical Protestantism resulted in a transmuta­ tion of his reputation from a conservative Wall Street lawyer to that of a liberal internationalist. In the spring of 1938 the Nation magazine asked him "as one of a small group of articulate liberals in foreign policy" to write a three hundred word statement on his position vis-a-vis isolation vs. collaboration with respect to the problems of Europe. Dulles refused to label himself, but he did reflect the new perceptions he had gained at Oxford by concluding: "The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually . . . Here is the final challenge 23 to our churches . . .

The generous response to his ideas at Oxford, the deteriorating international situation, and the impression 24 gained from a trip to East Asia in the spring of 1938 prompted Dulles to put his ideas on world order on paper.

The result was the publication of War, Peace and Change 18 early in 1939. The book rather faithfully mirrors the ideas Dulles held throughout the 1940's.

War, Peace and Change was written during the months immediately following Munich. It was, in Dulles' words, "a study of the causes of war and the means of eliminating it." The central theme of the book was the idea that change in international affairs was inevitable and that policies defying that dictum were doomed to failure. Dulles believed the long-term trend of history was progressive, but there were constant threats to pro­ gress, war being the most serious obstacle of all. In

1938 Dulles saw a basic conflict shaping up between the dynamic states— Germany, Italy and Japan— and the static states, in this case the western democracies. The reason for this development seemed clear to him. "There has been a grave misconception of the nature of peace. Peace has been identified with the status quo, stability with rig­ idity. Exponents of force are the inevitable product of a society within which change can occur only through 25 . force." The aim of statesmen should be to find mech­ anisms and policies which would allow change to occur without recourse to violence.

The core of Dulles' view of international affairs was an evolutionary Bergsonianism. In 1908 he had studied at the Sorbonne in Paris and attended a course of lectures by Henry Bergson. For Bergson, evolutionary flux was the 19 essential reality. Fueling that constant flux was an endemic tension between dynamic and static forces. War, for Bergson, was a consequence of the failure of the dynamic and static forces in world affairs to maintain a flexible equilibrium. Dulles had quite clearly taken his 26 distinguished teacher's ideas and made them his own.

Dulles believed that efforts to find mechanisms fostering peaceful change had failed because they dealt with symptoms rather than the causes of international con­ flict. Such hallowed solutions as education, treaties, isolationism, disarmament, non-recognition and balance of power had all proven inadequate. Education had never been a match for nationalism; treaties tended to rigidify world relations; isolationism was patently impossible, because of the economic interdependence of nations; dis­ armament "... will be the result rather than the cause of peace"; balance of power was static; and non-recognition did not work because the judgment was inevitably made on a moral basis, and there was no universally acceptable moral consensus. He found international law inadequate primarily because it required a common ethos to be effect- 27 ive and that the world lacked.

Dulles' skepticism regarding these expedients for promoting world order was rooted in his Presbyterian sense of human selfishness. "Whenever life assumes a form which involves consciousness there is an awareness of needs and a desire to satisfy them. Selfishness in this sense is 2 8 a basic human instinct." But man was also a gregarious creature, who could satisfy his own desires only by coop­ eration with his fellow-men. He believed that ". . . the history of the human race is largely a history of the 29 effort to reconcile selfishness and gregariousness."

Frequently this effort broke down and violence resulted, although this was not inevitable. He pointed out that in the case of the nation-state selfishness and gregarious­ ness had been brought under control by peaceful means. A common history, culture, lav/ and ethos all contributed to that result. Dulles v/as convinced that the next step in the evolution of human institutions was to duplicate this on the international level and he was surprisingly optimistic about the possibilities of achieving such a result. "There is a feeling that mankind is impotent to accomplish a result which is universally desired. It is as though we were in the grip of some evil force which is beyond the power of man to master. Such a conclusion is unwarranted."^ That he could write this late in 1938 was a tribute to his faith that men, properly inspired and dedicated to rational ends, could be nearly invincible.

If selfishness was the cause of violence, rationality and intelligence could become its resolution. 21

Dulles was convinced that the greatest roadblock to world peace was the modern "personified" nation-state.

Twentieth century man had endowed the nation with personal characteristics usually believed to embody the essential nature of its people. This personified nation-state was a product of the imagination. Its emotional quality actually enhanced selfishness, in this case on a national scale.

This national self-consciousness resulted in a worship of the state, a development he believed to be a conse­ quence of the failure of religion to capture the higher loyalties of man. "Most men are conscious of their own finite character .... They crave identification with some external being which appears more noble and more enduring than they themselves. Mankind demands a creed 31 through which to achieve spiritual exaltation." Since religion had failed to fill this need men turned to the nation and although it was not a fit object of devotion, it readily became personified with the perverted hopes of its people. Since the essential motivation of the nation-state was selfishness, and since it existed in an international sphere devoid of either law or a moral consensus, recourse to force became the only real option available to it.

But not all was lost. Dulles posited two possible approaches to facilitate peaceful change. One he termed 22

the ethical solution; the other, the political solution.

The ethical solution dealt with a state of mind. "It

seeks to mould the human spirit so that desires will

either be so diluted in intensity or so metamorphosed in 32 character that conflicts of desire will be minimized."

Unlike the ethical solution which seeks an inward trans­

formation, the political solution attempts tb find an

external substitute for the use of force in satisfying desires. Thus law or an equitable distribution of goods

can serve as political solutions.

While the two solutions are inherently unlike, one seeking to aid man in achieving "a spiritual state conducive to harmony with one's fellows . . . the other a more mechanical manipulation of rules to mediate con- 33 flict, both are used by states in the search for peace.

No state can ever depend entirely on the political

solution. An ethos, either religious or otherwise, must be present if the political solution is to prevail.

Dulles saw fascism and communism as outstanding contem­ porary examples of the skillful combining of the ethical

and political solutions. There was, he believed, an

"inherent interconnection" between the ethical and the political solution in any viable polity. The laws pro­ mulgated by the state, to be obeyed, must not be signifi­

cantly at variance with the mores of ,the group. 23

But the ethical solution had some significant limitations. One area had to do with corporations which

Dulless called "the soulless being." Corporations were essential to modern business, but they were forbidden by law to be unselfish. Corporate managers could only take such steps as "advance the short term material in­ terest of the shareholders." If they failed to do so they could be sued by the stockholders. As a consequence one could not expect corporations to act according to the ethical solution.^ In similar fashion, the ethical solution tended to be obviated by the demands of constitu­ ents on the nation-state. Hence national interest always takes precedence over moral considerations. Since most events in the international arena were consequences of the action of either nations or corporations, the possi­ bility of implementing ethical considerations at this level was bleak.

Another limitation of the ethical solution on the international level derived from the tendency of people to get satisfaction from self-denial mainly when they knew and cared for those benefitted. We want to " . . . see for ourselves the gratification which we cause." Thus propinquity becomes a critical limiting factor on the

international scene for the ethical approach. This limi­

tation was not absolute, for willingness to sacrifice could be fostered by adherence to an ideal. One of the

most effective sets of ideals was religious, especially

when the deity assumed universal authority. Christianity

was one religion which "... has attained the concept of

a god whose interest is universal. This quality of uni­

versality, when it is genuinely accepted and practised,

undoubtedly serves to increase the effective range of the 35 ethical solution." But religion could also pervert the

ethic of self-sacrifice for when the self was placed at

the disposal of a religion or some other "cause," self­

-sacrifice could actually promote the use of force. An

example was the willingness of entire populations to

give their lives and possessions on behalf of total war.

"It [war] is a supreme manifestation of emotional

unselfishness and involves the dedication of life a.id

property to what is believed to be a cause far transcend- 36 ing individual self-interest."

Why does modern man succumb to this disastrous

undertaking? Dulles believed it was primarily because

patriotism was the only cause left which did not hesitate

to call for sacrifice. Religion had failed to draw upon

the inherent qualities of self-sacrifice in man. Thus

the personified nation rather than the church, had cap­

tured the higher loyalties of man. In this context the

ethical solution became virtually inoperative. 25

Since the modern state uses the self-sacrificing

tendencies of individuals to make total war possible, it

follows that some of the usual ways for promoting peace

are irrelevant. To argue that "war does not pay" is to

state a truism, but no one cares whether war pays or not.

It is above all a sacrificial act, and people are eager

to sacrifice. If war has anything to commend it, it

is that people are led to transcend selfish interest for

the good of the whole.

Ultimately Dulles concluded that the ethical

solution and the political solution must be combined if

international peace is to prevail.

. . w e can confidently assert that such progress as has been made in the elimination of individual resort to force is ascribable to one or another or both of these solutions. This must be so. We predicate the fact of human association. This to some extent is inevitable. We predicate the further fact of human desires. This again is the natural, normal state. From these two premises we must proceed— one, by so moulding the human spirit that desires tend to become reconciled and harmonious, and two; by providing some alternative to force as the way of determining which of the subsisting conflict­ ing desires shall p r e v a i l . "37

War, Peace and Change was a diffuse and highly

abstract book. Its analysis of the underlying causes of

international disorder was limited and unoriginal. It was, as several reviewers remarked, a restatement of pre- 38 vailing ideas on world affairs. One reviewer found it 39 far too sympathetic of the Japanese, Italians and Germans 26

But others, notably Dulles' church colleagues, applauded 40 it as an able exposition of a difficult topic.

Despite mixed reviews War, Peace and Change enhanced Dulles' reputation as a foreign policy expert.

Attestations came from various quarters. In early 1939 he was offered the chairmanship of the Department of

International Justice and Goodwill of the Federal Council of Churches. For reasons which are still not clear he declined to serve, but did promise increased financial 41 aid to the department. During March 1939, he addressed both the Foreign Policy Association and the Economic

Club. At the Economic Club— Wendell Willkie, President— he engaged in a debate with James P. Warburg who argued for a more vigorous exercise of American power in the world. Dulles countered with a critique of the United

States as a "status quo" power and the observation that

Warburg's proposals would surely involve the United

States in a war with Germany and Japan. This, he said, would be disastrous for individual freedoms domestically, especially since "... our present political leadership 42 already has a strong collectivistic tendency."

Dulles was also invited to testify before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on neutrality legis­ lation. Quite uncharacteristically he declined the 27

invitation, on the grounds that his thinking on the matter had been philosophical and abstract rather than

practical.^

During 1939 Dulles showed considerable interest

in the peace movement. Early in the year he made a

sizeable financial contribution to the National Council

for the Prevention of War. Several weeks later he be­ came a member of the newly formed National Committee

for a World Conference. This group, created by the

National Peace Conference, was designed to foster public

support for a national policy of negotiation rather than 44 war as means of settling outstanding disputes.

Another interest which Dulles developed at this

point was world federalism. In June 1939 he gave a

speech before the Conference on Canadian-American Affairs at St. Lawrence University entitled "The North American

Contribution to World Order." Here for the first time

he publicly hailed the federal system as a model for

future world government. Subsequently Dulles and Clarence

Streit,. President of Federal Union Now, became good

friends, a friendship which continued over many years,

culminating in Dulles' nomination of Streit for the

Nobel Peace Prize of 1950. Dulles did a considerable

amount of legal and constitutional work for Streit,

even at one point drawing up a draft for an international

federal organization based on the United States model. 28

The plan provided for a provisional Federal Union of the

U.S., U.K., Eire, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, and Canada. Dulles argued that the United States Con­ stitution was open-ended. Just as it provided for the growth of the United States from thirteen to forty-eight states, so it could continue to be extended indefinitely.

In fact, he insisted that was the original intention of 45 the founders.

Dulles attended many Union Now meetings, allowed

Streit to refer to him as his "Advisor on International

Law," and gave substantial financial support to the movement. But he steadfastly refused to become a member of Union Now or to endorse the program publicly. He gave two reasons for this, one being his primary in- 46 volvement in the world order program of the churches, and secondly, his basic skepticism regarding the viability of the federalist program:

I think the educational value of what he [Streit] is doing is very great, but I doubt very much that it is practical or perhaps desirable to attempt a political union as close as he suggests. I would favor economic or financial union, letting political union work out of them if and when this becomes a natural development.47

Dulles' most significant activity in 1939 was his attendance at the Conference of Lay Experts and

Ecumenical Leaders at Geneva in July. The conference was convened to study and formulate recommendations 29 regarding the posture and role of the churches in the period of conflict which appeared to be impending. The conference was a legacy of the inter-war belief, strongly held by pacifists, that modern war was basically economic in origin. In January 1938, the Belgian economist Dr.

Paul Van Zeeland had prepared a plan for a world economic conference, ostensibly with the encouragement of the

British and French governments. Van Zeeland envisioned a conference where all the nations of the world would sit down around a table and negotiate with each other regarding such outstanding economic issues as monetary policy, trade, colonies and economic assistance. Van

Zeeland's plan got nowhere, partly because the British and French failed to promote the idea, and because the international situation continued to erode so dramati­ cally that the holding of such a conference seemed impossible.

But after Munich the idea of a conference again came up. In a ringing appeal in the Christian Century the ardent pacifist, Albert Palmer, President of Chicago

Theological Seminary, called for the churches to help mobilize world opinion for an economic conference on the lines laid down by Van Zeeland. Palmer claimed Munich as a victory for pacifism but argued that having stopped the drift toward war, the pacifists, if they were to 30

remain credible, must try to get the world moving toward

peace. Noting that. ,•the churches were the core of the

pacifist movement, he went on: "Let the American churches,

through the Federal Council of Churches, unite the

churches of the world to combine to urge upon their gov- 48 ernments the calling of such a conference." And if the

governments refused, then let the churches call their

own conference.

Palmer's call caught fire at the Federal Council

of Churches, and within two weeks its president, Edgar

Dewitt Jones, Palmer, and representatives of twenty

Protestant denominations presented the idea of a confer­

ence to FDR at the White House. The President was cordial

and spent over an hour discussing the idea. The delega­

tion came away feeling, as so many delegations in similar

circumstances did after meeting with Roosevelt, that the 49 President would push the idea. They were buoyed a few weeks later by the news that Hitler, in an interview with

George Lansbury, the English pacifist, had agreed to a

conference if it was called by President Roosevelt.

But there was no response from the White House and finally

in December, Palmer returned to the attack in an article

in the Christian Century. The churches must make one

last effort, he said, to mobilize the governments of the

world. If the states failed to act, then "Let the church

be the Church!" Let the churches hold their own international economic conference, summoning the best brains on economics from throughout the world to study the economic situation and publish their findings. The religious community could at least be the conscience of the world. Concretely, he called on the Provisional Com­ mittee of the World Council of Churches to plan for a conference to convene in Europe during the summer of 1939 with as universal a membership as possible.^

At the biennial meeting of the Federal Council of

Churches in December 1938, Palmer made another impassioned appeal for a conference. The Federal Council responded by issuing a call for a conference and setting up a com­ mittee, headed by Roswell P. Barnes, executive secretary of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill of the FCC. This committee drew up a proposal and sub­ mitted it to the Provisional Committee of the World

Council of Churches when it met in Paris in January, 1939.

The Europeans quickly rejected the idea of a conference, arguing that the world crisis was no longer susceptible to economic solutions. The issues had become political and psychological. As an example they cited the fact that any attempt to rectify economic injustices perpetrated by the Allies on the Axis would be interpreted as weakness by the latter. Beyond that, they pointed out that the . success of such a conference would rest on the publicity and consequent public opinion which could be generated. 32

But such a process was almost sure to fail in the totali­ tarian states where the media was controlled by the regimes 52 in power.

The Provisional Committee did agree to sponsor a small informal unpublicized conference of economic experts to study the issues and present them to the churches. The

Americans were bitterly disappointed, but consoled them­ selves by insisting that the best possible people be in­ vited to attend. People, said Morrison of the Christian

Century, who had sufficient "stature" to make their views carry weight.• u*. 53

The Conference convened in Geneva in July for five days of in-depth discussion and study. The tranquil garden of the Hotel Beau Sejour, where the meetings were held, was a sharp contrast to the atmosphere of crisis which pervaded the discussions. "... war psychology enveloped us like a fog of poison gas," remarked Palmer 54 later. Interestingly enough, Palmer had changed his mind about the primacy of economic issues by the time he reached Geneva. The London blackouts and Paris bomb­ shelters had had their effect. In the Europe of 1939, he sheepishly admitted, the idea of an international economic conference was simply absurd.

There were thirty-six participants; sixteen

Europeans, six British, twelve Americans, and two Asians. Pacifists were well represented, though most were from the 33

American delegation. All the Americans were churchmen, except Dulles and Professor Charles Fenwick of Bryn Mawr

College. Dulles was about the only expert on the Ameri­ can delegation and his importance was underscored by newly elected FCC President George Buttrick, who in his instructions to the American delegates wrote: "I assume that all of you have read Mr. Dulles' book War, Peace and

Change, which is, more than any other book, the basic document for your discussions."^

Dulles engaged energetically in the proceedings, and in his own evaluation of the conference he felt he had made two basic contributions. The conference adopted his credo that "... power of any kind, political or economic, must be co-extensive with responsibility,"

This formula was included in Section I of the Conference report in which the basic presuppositions of the partici­ pants were laid down. It was to become one of his most tenaciously held principles throughout the 1940's. In practice, the doctrine meant that on matters such as trade, immigration, and monetary policy, where the national policy of one nation directly affected another nation, an internatioxial authority should be created to monitor policies and mediate disputes. Most of the

Europeans were unwilling to accept an actual international agency. Professor Zimmern of Oxford was especially adamant 34 in his opposition, and he and Dulles engaged in a heated 56 debate over the issue.

A second issue was specifically theoJ. leal.

There was considerable discussion about the question of whether world and political institutions were and would always remain inherently evil. Dulles was instrumental in deleting a statement to the effect that they would always be evil, although he was unable to get the con­ ference to accept his idea of the evolutionary perfecting of human institutions.

He was particularly disenchanted with the Euro­ peans' "complete lack of comprehension of the real sig­ nificance of the federal system" as a possible ultimate 57 solution for international disorder.

The Geneva Conference was more significant as a historic sign-post than as a new departure in the churches' perception of economic problems. It represented the ascendancy of American churchmen to a dominant position in the ecumenical world order concerns of the churches.

It is note-worthy that nearly all ecumenical world order initiatives taken between the Oxford Conference of 1937 and the Amsterdam Assembly of 1948 were American in origin.

One reason for this was the fact that the Europeans, caught in the toils of war, were unable to take action. But equally important was the fact that the Americans were much more optimistic regarding the possibilities of the 35 churches acting in concert to effect change in the world.

The American delegates at Geneva were, for the most part, theologically liberal, pacifist and optimistic about historical possibilities. The Europeans were far more conservative theologically and far less optimistic about the future than the Americans. From the perspective of the present one can only conclude that the Europeans were the more realistic.

Geneva also signaled a retrenchment by the ecu­ menical movement, swept to flood-tide by Oxford, but then retreating as history closed in during 1939. It was the last bonafide ecumenical world order meeting until 1946.

In the intervening years world order concerns became consciously national and activity on behalf of world . order remained generally bounded by national frontiers.

Dulles and the Federal Council leadership were very much aware of this and Dulles' visit to England in 1942 and the Princeton Roundtable in 194 3 were efforts to create a broader-based trans-national movement. But it was not until 1946 that they succeeded, with the creation of the Church Conference on International Relations.

The Conference Message was overwhelmed by the course of world events. Its effect on either the church or world was nil, except perhaps, that it brought several leading American pacifists to Europe and impressed them with the intractibility of international problems. 36

Dulles came away convinced that some kind of supra­

national agency must be created. Writing to Quincy Wright

soon after his return, Dulles outlined his ideas. What was needed was a "consultative" agency, weaker than the

League, open-ended, and geared to deal with specific

functional or technical problems such as trade, law or

finance. He opposed giving any international organization military or economic sanctions, nor should it perform

police chores. In fact Dulles was convinced this would be impossible, at the present evolutionary stage of in­

ternational affairs. Its rationale would be not to end war, but to expedite change. Out of these functional

activities could grow law and institutional arrangements which might eventually approximate some kind of world

polity. Dulles would always insist that world government 58 cannot be created; it must grow in response to need. 37

NOTES

^■John Watson Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston, 1909), II, p. 212. 2 John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1957), p. 78.

^Louis L. Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967), ppV 11-12".------

4Henry P. Van Dusen, The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia, 1960), pp. 6-7.

^Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (New York, 1962), p. 24.

*Van Dusen, The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles, p. 19. 7 Henry P. Van Dusen, Oral History, Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library. g Cromwell to Dulles, Oct. 23, 1931, Box 7, Dulles Papers. g John Foster Dulles, "The Road to Peace," Atlantic Monthly, CLVI (October, 1935) , pp. 492-499.

^John Foster Dulles, Peaceful Change Within the Society of Nations (Princeton, T.936) . 13 Samuel McCrea Cavert, Oral History, Dulles Papers, 12 Henry P. Van Dusen, What Is the Church Doing? (New York, 1943), pp. 94-95; S . M. Cavert, "When Is the Church Free?" Christian Century, LIV (May 26, 1937), p. 676,

■^John Knox, Religion and the Present Crisis (New York, 1942), p. 100.

14Samuel McCrea Cavert, The American Churches and the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-19^B (New York, 1968), pT~T51T.------38 15 J. H. Oldham, ed., Foundations of Ecumenical Thought: The Oxford Conference Report (Phil., 136(5) , p. 79.

^Oldham, Oxford Conference Report, p. 155. 17 Robert C. Mackie and Charles C. West, eds., The Sufficiency of God; Essays on Ecumenical Hope in Honor of W. A. Visser't Hooft (New York, 1963) , p. T24. 18 John Foster Dulles, "As Seen by a Layman," Religion in Life, Winter, 1937-8, p. 9. 19 Oldham, Oxford Conference Report, pp. 4, 14, 26, 114. 20 "Mr. Dulles mind and hand can be seen in the Oxford emphasis on the need for provisions for peaceful change in the international corder." Edward Duff, The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches (London, 1956), p. 261. See also S. M. Cavert, Oral History, Dulles Papers.

2^Sayre to Dulles, October 26, 1937, Box 138, Dulles Papers.

22Van Kirk to Dulles, November 11, 1937, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Nation, March 28, 1938, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 24 The trip to the Far East was made by Mr. and Mrs. Dulles in a private capacity. The delegation of churchmen was never sent, for reasons I have been unable to deter­ mine. Dulles visited political and religious leaders in both Japan and China. He spent several days conferring with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. Beal, Dulles, p. 87. 25 John Foster Dulles, War, Peace and Change (New York, 1939), p. 9. 26 Beal, Dulles, p. 51. 27 Dulles, War, Peace and Change, p. 93. 28 Dulles, War, Peace and Change, p. 6.

2^Ibid., p. 8. 30Ibid., p. 3.

31Ibid., p. 14. 32t, . . Ibid., p. 9.

33Ibid., p. 12, 13.

34Ibid., p. 22.

35Ibid., p. 19.

36Ibid., p. 54.

37Ibid., p. 14. 38 Reviewed by Chest February 5, 1939, p. 16; Also see Vernon Van Dyke, American Political Science Review XXXIII (October, 1939), p. 929. :

■^Christian Century, LVI (February 1, 1939), pp. 157-15F; 40 Buttrick to Delegates, June 13, 1939, Box 7, FCC MSS. 41 Dulles to Barnes, January 5, 1939, Box 7, Dulles Pap'ers. 47 Text of remarks, March 29, 1939, Box 14, Dulles Papers.

43Dulles to Borah, April 3, 1939, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 44 Van Kirk to Dulles, March 22, 1939, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 45 "The North American Contribution to World Order, speech June 20, 1939, Box 138; Dulles-Streit correspon­ dence, 1939-44, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 46 A number of the members of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace were also members of Union Now, among them Frank Aydolotte, Mary Woolley, Francis J. McConnell, G. Ashton Oldham, H. S. Leiper, C. J. Frederick Ralph Sockman.

47Dulles to H. Wilson, June 13, 1941, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 40 48 Albert Palmer, "Call a World Economic Confer­ ence," Christian Century, LV (November 9, 1938), pp. 1368- 1369. 49 Christian Century, LV (November 30, 1938), p. 1453. See also Roswell P. Barnes, A Christian Impera­ tive (New York, 1941), pp. 163-164.

^Christian Century, LV (December 14, 1938), p. 1539.

3^Palmer, "What Should the Churches Do?" Christian Century, OV (December 21, 1938), p. 1575.

^Christian Century, LVI (February 22, 1939), p. 242-44.

53Ibid., (March 8, 1939), p. 312.

3^Ibid., (September 13, 1939), p. 1102. One of the most dramatic moments followed some highly critical comments by Baron Von Asbeck regarding Hitler. The two German delegates thereupon absented themselves from the meeting and returned only after Von Asbeck apologized and retracted his remarks. (Recounted in a letter from Dr. Georgia Harkness, January 1, 1971.) 55 Conference Memoranda, 19 39, Box 138, Dulles Papers. The Americans■were Henry A. Atkinson, Dulles, Charles Fenwick, James H. Franklin, Georgia Harkness, Ivan Lee Holt, G. Ashton Oldham, Albert Palmer, John R. Mott, Henry Smith Leiper, Roswell P. Barnes, Mrs. Graham Spry. All but the last person were to serve on the CJDP later. Buttrick to the delegates, June 13, 1939, Box 7, FCC MSS.

^^Dulles to Lionel Curtis, July 19, 1939, Box 138, Dulles Papers.

57Ibid.

CO Dulles to Wright, December 19, 1939, Box 138, Dulles Papers. CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON A JUST

AND DURABLE PEACE, 1939-1941

As the guns began to boom in Poland the opening shots of the long and acrimonious battle between the interventionists and non-interventionists sounded in the

United States. On the church front the Federal Council of Churches, the National Peace Conference and the Chris­ tian Century all came out for non-intervention and neu­ trality. In a national radio broadcast on September 8,

1939 George Buttrick, President of the Federal Council, issued a plea for neutrality:

We must be neutral from high and sacrificial motives— not for physical safety, not in an attempt to maintain an impossible isolation from world problems, assuredly not for com­ mercial gain, but rather because we know that war is futile and because we are eager through reconciliation to build a kindlier world.*

The Federal Council followed Buttrick with a statement, "The American Churches and the European War," which pronounced war "an evil thing contrary to the mind of Christ" and called on the United States to stay out of the conflict. The FCC executive committee also sent a

41 42

letter to President Roosevelt commending him for keeping

the United States out of the war and urging that all steps be taken to cooperate with other nations in the re­

establishment of the peace. "We urge the development of some form of world order," the letter concluded, "in which certain aspects of the sovereignty of the individual

state would be limited in the interests of the world com­ munity."2

A few days later the National Peace Conference

sent Roosevelt a similar statement.^ By late September

the Christian Century asserted, with considerable satis­

faction, that the American churches had come out nearly

unanimously against intervention. Nevertheless the

editor, Charles Morrison, was worried about the ability 4 of the churches to withstand pressures for intervention.

To help shore up the opposition, the Century began a

serialized version of Ray Abrams' Preachers Present Arms,

a blistering indictment of Protestant chauvinism during

World War I.

Already storm-clouds were on the horizon. Reinhold

Niebuhr, in Scotland to give the Gifford Lectures, was

becoming uneasy. In a series of articles, "Leaves from

the Notebook of a War-Bound American," published in the

Christian Century, Niebuhr articulated his growing fear

that failure of the United States to help defend Britain

and Prance could mean the eclipse of democracy around the 43 world. As the Nazi military machine moved from victory to victory Niebuhr's mood became more and more belliger­ ent. By the time he returned to the United States early in

1940 he was convinced that the United States must be brought 5 to the war.

The interventionist forces went on the offensive in January 1940 with the publication of a statement, written by Niebuhr, entitled "The American Churches and the International Situation." Calling on the churches to eschew the passions of war, the statement argued that

Americans could not be neutral about the European conflict.

The war was more than a battle between rival power groups.

There was a qualitative moral difference between the Finns valiantly defending their soil and freedom and the Axis powers wantonly conquering their neighbors. Victory by the Allies would not usher in a new world order, but it . would preserve the possibilities of freedom. A Nazi victory could only lead to tragedy for freedom everywhere.®

Thirty-two prominent Protestants signed the state­ ment, among them William Adams Brown, Henry Sloan Coffin,

Sherwood Eddy, Arthur E. Holt, John Mackay, Bishop

McConnell, John R. Mott, Justin Wroe Nixon, Bishop Bromley

Oxnam, Charles Taft, Henry P. Van Dusen, and John Foster

Dulles. Dulles signed the statement with reservations and soon regretted having done so. Only a few days after the statement was made public he expressed his 44 dissatisfaction to Quincy Wright. The statement failed to focus enough blame on the Allies for the current tragedy because, after all, it was their failure to provide mechanisms for peaceful change which had led to war. Beyond that, he felt the moral issue was not nearly as one-sided as the statement purported it to be. The war was really little more than a conflict between rival 7 imperialisms.

In February 1940 Dulles attended the FCC sponsored

National Study Conference on "The Churches and the Inter­ national Situation," held in Philadelphia. In addressing the conference Dulles steered clear of the interventionist- non-interventionist controversy. The war, he argued, was a result of international irresponsibility on the part of all the sovereign states. The need now was to attempt to find a new solution to that problem.

We must . . . work and plan on the assumption that we will have another opportunity to create a new world order. But if so, two things seem certain: One is that this second opportunity if it is to be vouchsafed us, will be our last, and the other is that there can be no new world order without the active participation of the United States, which alone combines the resources, intellectual capacity, and prestige to lead the way— in a world which otherwise is distraught and largely ruined.8

The solution was the "Wilsonian" program; international­ izing colonial areas, industrial nations assuming re­ sponsibility for the effect of their monetary and trade activity, the creation of an international court to settle 45 disputes, and the acceptance of the idea of collective security, The obstacles to such a program were twofold: the elevation of the personified state to the level of a quasi-deity and the exaggerated sense of moral superiority held by the contending nation-states. The churches could contribute indispensible assistance to eradicating both obstacles by reasserting the supremacy of God and thereby effectively diluting the rampant statism of the times.

They could also aid in the reduction of moral self- righteousness :

There is an extraordinary parallelism between moral judgments and national self-interest. When imperialist England was carrying out her world empire she was carrying the "white man's burden." When we were aggressively expanding our domain, we were the instruments of "mani­ fest destiny." Now that our objective is to hold what we have, we are the proponents of "law and order."9

He then went on to laud those British churchmen who were refusing to make the war a holy cause.

The knottiest problem faced by the Study Confer­ ence was the question of what position the churches should take on commercial relations with Japan. Many churchmen, alarmed by the destructive bombing of China by the Japanese, favored an embargo of all exports to

Japan. Dulles disagreed. As early as August 1939 he had come out against the Schwellenbach Bill which would have installed an absolute embargo on United States trade with

Japan.Now he reiterated his earlier argument that such 46 a move by the United States would simply fuel the influ­ ence of the Japanese expansionists who were arguing that

Japanese security demanded Japanese control of East and

Southeast Asian raw material sources. The conference finally issued a statement, to which Dulles acceded, calling for a limited embargo on certain specific war materiel, but at the same time urging the government to make every effort to continue ‘'normal" relations with

Japan.^

During the following months Dulles shifted his argument against intervention in the European war.

Whereas before he emphasized the responsibility of the western democracies for the war, citing their inflexi­ bility and callousness regarding the needs of the have- not powers, he now began to stress the futility of force in resolving fundamental human problems. Thus, responding to a peace proposal made by Granville Clark, Dulles argued that Clark had too much faith in the efficacy of force.

I do not think peace is maintained primarily by force, but rather by the creation of sound economic conditions, so that men of violence are kept in the minority instead of becoming the leaders of great mass revolts.12

A few days later he remarked to a friend: "I have always felt that the measure of force necessary to maintain peace was tlie measure of the unsoundness of the social order."^

With his new emphasis on the limitations of force,

Dulles found himself more and more completely in the 47 non-interventionist camp. In April he responded to the argument that the United States should help England and

France with everything short of war, by insisting that no nation should put its prestige on the line without the necessary means to maintain it. The only way to "win" the war was to put a huge American army in Europe, but that, he was sure, would be totally unacceptable to the

American people. The basic problem was war itself and the measures necessary to win a modern victory. He admitted that a victory by the Germans would be deplorable, but he remained unconvinced that this would be worse than war itself:

A major question in my mind is whether the in­ herent nature of modern totalitarian war does not itself jeopardize these objectives— per­ haps even more, so far as we are concerned, than would a German victory. . . . the greatest menace . . . is war itself, and in the means necessary to win a modern war.

Then he made the surprising assertion that if Britain and France were too weak to survive without United States intervention, then perhaps the United States should not undertake to maintain them artificially, because at 14 best their survival could only be temporary.

These increasingly non-interventionist sympathies came under fire from several sources. On the personal level, Allen Dulles became a member of Henry Stimson's. so-called "interventionist group" in April. In June 48

Roger Lamont was killed in France. Lamont, a junior member of Sullivan and Cromwell, had resigned in 1939, shortly after the German invasion of Poland and joined the BEF in France. He was thus one of the first American casualties in the European war. Just six weeks before his death Roger had written Dulles a long letter in an effort to persuade him to join the interventionist cause, arguing that Dulles' abstract rationalizations regarding haves and have-nots, dynamic and static powers, and the need for peaceful change, were morally intolerable and practically superfluous in the face of Nazi tyranny. In answer, Dulles stood his ground, insisting that heroics 15 and patriotism were no substitute for rational thinking.

On the church level he also found himself caught between the hawks and doves. In early May the interven­ tionist churchmen led by Niebuhr and Van Dusen published a statement calling for the United States to provide

"a"- and material support to the British and French.

This was prompted chiefly by the new Nazi successes in

Scandinavia. The statement was signed by most of those who had signed the January statement. Dulles was invited to sign but refused, evenafter a telegram from Henry Van

Dusen, a letter from Henry Sloan Coffin, and an urgent message from William Adams Brown, all urging him to change his mind.^®

The day after Dulles' refusal to sign became known 49 he received a letter from Walter Van Kirk, Secretary of the FCC Department of International Justice and Goodwill, and a pacifist non-interventionist. "I can't tell you how grateful I am for your view," wrote Van Kirk. "I had expected that in a period of international stress

there would be a tendency on the part of some of our preachers to stand where most of them had stood in 1917-

18. I had not supposed, however, that the drift would 17 set in so quickly." In the next several days Dulles received other letters from the non-interventionist camp applauding his decision not to sign the statement. But they were disappointed when Dulles also refused to sign the manifesto they issued in late May. This statement, drawn up by George Buttrick, Harry Emerson Fosdick, and

Ralph Sockman, was designed as a refutation of the earlier 18 Niebuhr-Van Dusen paper. Dulles was clearly attempting to avoid a commitment to either group.

Within the FCC executive committee the cleavage between the two camps was especially critical. After

the German invasion of France the committee met to dis­ cuss what its position should be. The FCC had come out

solidly against intervention in the fall of 1939, but

since that time had become too divided over the question

to be able to issue a new statement. Now the situation appeared so grave that the executive committee felt it

incumbent to attempt at least some kind of public 50 declaration. This was reenforced when a group of church executives, working for the church agencies in Geneva, established an International Consultative Group, which in the week after the invasion of France called on the

United States to consider its responsibility for freedom in the world. The group asserted that an Allied victory could no longer be expected and that Christians everywhere 19 should ponder seriously the implications of Nazi victory.

Throughout June, the FCC executive committee worked doggedly on a statement. The result was clearly a victory for the interventionists. They argued that the churches could not be morally neutral about the eventual outcome of the war. Admitting that an allied victory would not end the world's problems, they asserted that a

Nazi victory would threaten basic human values. They pledged the churches to defend the prerogatives of both pacifists and those who fought, and called on the churches to prepare to aid the victims of the war regardless of which side they might be fighting on. Above all, they promised to preserve the bonds of ecumenical fellowship despite the war. Walter Van Kirk sent Dulles a draft copy of the statement and observed that it was not the kind of position he could support, but "... it is increasingly clear that my views are not the views of a large number of the members of the executive committee."^ 51

As we have seen, Dulles' sympathies were clearly on the side of the non-interventionists, but he stead­ fastly denied that he was either a pacifist or an iso­ lationist. When he was invited to become a member of the executive committee of America First he refused,

21 * because he did not believe in isolationism. Responding to a similar invitation from World Peaceways, Inc., he said: "I myself am not an absolute pacifist, nor opposed absolutely, to aid Britain, but I am opposed to hysteria and cheap emotionalism." Then he went on to say: "It is my impression that, like most pacifists, your organization is against the war after the next war. 22 I enclose my check for $50.00." He was especially vexed by the America First Committee which insisted on calling him its "legal counsel." During the organizing phase of the Committee he had provided some free legal counsel, but he objected to being publicly identified with the group. One of the reasons he gave provides a good insight into at least one factor which led him to seek a middle road between the interventionists and the non-interventionists. "I am making my first interest in these matters my work with the Federal Council of Churches, where I have just become Chairman of an important com­ mittee they are setting up to study international rela­ tions. My ability to achieve the long range objectives

I have in mind and my influence with the group would be 52 hurt if I were publicly identified with one or another of the groups actively involved in the current phases of 23 the problem."

Dulles' attempt to be impartial in the interven- tionist-non-interventionist controversy led directly to his first official assignment by the FCC. By October

1940 the recriminations between the groups had become embarrassing and seriously prejudicial to the work of the

Council. In an effort to restore some semblance of unity, at least on the level of general principles, an informal evening of discussion was held in Dulles' home, attended by leaders of both points of view. Atkinson, Fosdick,

Van Kirk, and Roswell P. Barnes represented the non­ interventionist group. On the other side were Coffin,

Brown, and Cavert. There were also several men who sought to stand above the battle, like Warnshuis, Hatch, J. A.

Franklin, and A. K. Chalmers. Conspicuous by their ab­ sence were the radicals like Van Dusen and Niebuhr on the interventionist side and Palmer, Buttrick, and Morrison on the other side.^

In his role as a mediator, Dulles wrote up a sum­ mary embodying the main points of the discussion and circu­ lated it among the FCC leadership. After collecting additional comments in this way, he rewrote the paper.

This was then submitted to a seminar on international affairs held in connection with the FCC biennial meeting 53 at Atlantic City in December, 1940. Here the paper was the subject of additional discussion and the by now thrice-revised statement was finally published by the 25 executive committee as its own authoritative position.

This statement was far more pacifistic than the earlier one published in June. The Christian Century hailed it as a "remarkable" essay, which "... will stand for a long time as conclusive evidence that as of

December, 1940, the churches of the nation still retained their sanity, and what is more, their Christian faith in God as reconciling love." Actually Morrison was mightily relieved that the statement had not become another interventionist manifesto. For that he had

Dulles to thank. 2 6

As the Nazi's continued to ransack Europe, and the United States geared for war, Arthur Compton, the •

Nobel prize physicist, echoed the question of many thoughtful people:

In the world today millions are toiling over the blueprints of war. The United States* speeding its defense program, is turning out high-speed bombers every few days at a cost of a quarter-million dollars each. Our scientists have been drafted from their peacetime study of new by-products of the soy-bean to the design of submarine detectors. Amid all this vast effort for war, who is there to undertake the de­ signing of blueprints for p e a c e ? " 2 7 54

Actually, there were a number of groups already actively at work on the question of postwar planning.

In the fall of 1939 a group of international relations experts created the Commission to Study the

Organization of the Peace. Beginning in November, 1939, the Commission, headed by James T. Shotwell and Clark

Eichelberger, met monthly in an intensive effort to explore the problems of the postwar peace. At about the same time the Council on Foreign Relations created a series of task-forces to pursue the same ends. Soon 28 other groups would be joining in the effort.

The great interest in postwar planning, which began even before the United States was in the war, grew out of a pervasive notion among internationalists that the war was the result of the failure to plan for a viable peace during World War I. The writing of revisionist historians and the activities of the numerous peace organizations had created a widespread feeling that this was true. Many internationalists were also convinced that a contributing factor in the failure of the peace lay in the American refusal to shoulder its world responsi­ bilities after the war, especially with regard to the

League of Nations. "We see, without self-pity or self- deception," said the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, "that this second world war is partly of our making. Our unwillingness as a nation to accept 55

political and economic responsibility commensurate with

our power contributed to the breakdown of world order, 29 and hence permitted the renewal of aggression."

All the groups involved in postwar planning were

convinced that the American people needed to be educated

regarding the issues of the postwar period. A common

assumption was that a lasting peace could be achieved

only by galvanizing the American public in support of

creative peace-making. Wilson's vision of a new world

order, it was believed, had foundered on popular apathy

and ignorance. It was resolved that this time American

statesmen should have the support of the people in their

peace-making endeavors. Thus while much time was spent

attempting to define a good world order, an even greater

effort was made to foster public interest in and support

for a responsible peace.

The churches came into the war with an especially

strong sense of their mistakes during the first world war. Looking back, many churchmen were convinced that

the churches had contributed to the failure of postwar

peace by their chauvinistic propensities during the war.

They were keenly aware that the churches had done very

little to influence a just and equitable peace. "The

churches," Dulles told the North American Ecumenical

Conference in Toronto in 1941, "exerted absolutely no

influence on its [Paris Peace Conference, 1919] 56 deliberations." The churches, he said, must be present and their presence felt, at the next peace conference.^

This sentiment was underscored by an FCC execu­ tive committee statement drawn up in response to Pearl

Harbor. "The church must be in the vanguard of prepara­ tion for a just and durable peace. The great sacrifices of treasure and of life must not be in vain. We must build now the spiritual foundations for a better world order of the world. The task is immediate and cannot be delayed."31

The churchmen had great confidence in their ability to plan for a just peace. Walter Van Kirk caught the mood of many of his colleagues when he declared that "the

American churches are the only group in American life, with any adequate training in thinking in international terms . . . ." The task of the churches must be to

"create a public opinion which will ensure that the

United States shall play its full and essential part in 32 the creation of a moral way of international living."

The onset of the war thus became an occasion for the world-order churchmen to renew their efforts to forge a new and better world. As Dulles put it: "... let us look upon this war, not as a war of self-defense, not as a war of survival, but as a war for opportunity to 33 lead the world into an era of creative peace." This was not to be accomplished by making the war into a 57 crusade, as had been done in World War I, but by fighting against the passions of war, by supporting rational and creative plans for the post-war era, and by cementing the bonds of the ecumenical church. It was in this strangely optimistic but contrite mood that the FCC created the Commission to Study the Basis of a Just and

Durable Peace (CJDP),

Walter Van Kirk, executive secretary of the FCC

Department of International Justice and Goodwill, broached the idea of a commission early in 1940. His rationale was two-fold. On the practical level, the Department found itself unable to deal creatively with the larger issues of world order because it was understaffed and its resources expended simply to maintain routine re­ sponsibilities. Van Kirk proposed that a group of twenty-five leading churchmen and experts in world affairs be organized to meat whenever the occasion de­ manded, to give the Department in-depth counsel or. world- order issues. The recommendations of this group could then become the basis for FCC world-order position papers.

On a tactical level, Van Kirk argued that such a group could serve as a unifying element in the divisive interventionist-non-interventionist controversy. Writing to Samuel McCrea Cavert and Roswell P. Barnes, respectively, 58 executive secretary and associate executive secretary, of the FCC, Van Kirk noted: "You will observe that the persons whom I have named broadly represent varying views.

Given a fair amount of statesmanship, it should be possible

for us, through a commission of this kind, to prevent the development of what might prove to be an unfortunate 34 division within our ranks in times like these."

During the summer and fall of 1940 Van Kirk's

idea was discussed by the executive committee of the FCC

and the role of the projected commission shifted from

its specifically advisory role to the Department of

International Justice and Goodwill to a more comprehensive

and independent task as a postwar planning agency. This was partially a response to the growing rift between the hawks and doves. It was discovered that though American

churchmen were sharply divided on the issue of the war,

there was a broad consensus about postwar peace planning.

"American Christians have an impressive agreement as to

the kind of world order which they seek after the war,"

observed Roswell Barnes. "The CJDP . . . is to include

in its personnel men who stand at both extremes of the

argument over pacifism and there is good reason to believe

there will be no insuperable difference between them as 35 to the kind of world order they seek." According to

Henry P. Van Dusen, the real genius of the CJDP was 59 that it got the interventionists and non-interventionists 36 to work together on long-range peace issues.

The decision to invite Dulles to serve as chair­ man of the proposed group was another factor which shifted the thrust of the Commission toward postwar peace aims. Dulles had been involved in forming both the Com­ mission to Study the Organization of the Peace and the

Council of Foreign Relations' task-forces. He eagerly grasped the opportunity to help create a church counter­ part to these secular efforts. Ultimately he hoped to make the CJDP into a religious version of such blue-chip international affairs organizations as the Council on

Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the

American Council of"the Institute of Pacific Relations, and the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace.

Dulles' selection as chairman of the new com­ mission was a decisive factor in assuring the success of the new venture. He brought a unique set of qualifi­ cations to the task. He was established as the head of the most prestigious international law firm in the country.

Equally important, he stood, socially and professionally, at the center of the American foreign policy establish­ ment. As such he was a member of all the important foreign policy organizations and was personally acquainted with virtually everyone in foreign policy formation. Through his work as an international lawyer he had come to know 60 many leading statesmen abroad as well. In practise this meant that the churches, through Dulles, were not only

privy to the centers of influence where foreign policy was debated, but had an entree to the corridors of power

as well. Dulles' "Dear Wendell," "Dear Bob" (Taft), or

"Dear Arthur" (Vandenberg) letters, and his ability to

pick up the telephone and speak to Cordell Hull or Sumner

Welles put the American churches into more immediate con­

tact with power than perhaps at any time in their history.

By making the Commission a part of the foreign

policy matrix Dulles clearly enhanced the prestige, per­

haps even the authority of the churches, but in the

process he may have muted their role as critics of pre­ vailing foreign policy initiatives. This, however, became more apparent only after 1945 when the Commission

turned to the more problematical and practical questions

of immediate policy. During the years when the Commission

functioned as an advocate of world organization and an

opponent of isolationism, Dulles' leadership would appear

to have brought advantages to the churches which were

indispensible.

Two factors played a role in Dulles' selection

as chairman of the Commission. One was his careful neu­

trality in the internecine battle over American involvement

in the war. Not many men, lay or clerical, with the

requisite credentials, could have met that qualification 61 in late 1940. His penchant for avoiding controversy and skill as a mediator were key factors in his selection.

The same qualities stood him in good stead during the succeeding years as Commission chairman. The other factor in his selection was his willingness to devote the necessary time to the Commission's work, a not insig­ nificant consideration. In retrospect Dulles appears to have been the right man for the job. Certainly his church colleagues thought so for he was the only man con- 37 sidered for the position.

Van Kirk had originally envisaged the Commission as a small group of twenty-five church leaders with special competence in world order matters. By autumn

1940 it was decided to make the Commission independent of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill and responsible directly to the executive committee of the FCC. With the decision to make the Commission, primarily a vehicle for the churches' post-war peace concerns it became apparent that the group should repre­ sent a broad spectrum of American Protestantism. Each of the twenty-five member-denominations of the FCC were asked to provide several delegates— from two to five— . for membership on the Commission. In addition seven re­ lated agencies— the International Council of Religious

Education, the Foreign Missions Conference of North 62

America, the Home Missions Conference of North America,

the National Council of Church Women, the United Steward­

ship Council, the Church Peace Union, and the World Alli­ ance for International Friendship Through the Churches— were also invited to accredit two delegates each to the

Commission. The projected membership was to total one hundred, although that figure was never reached.■ The 38 Commission normally had from seventy to eighty members.

The homogeneity of the Commission membership was one of its most obvious characteristics. The mem­ bers were overwhelmingly from the Boston-New York-

Washington, D. C. corridor. Highly placed academics

(sixteen presidents and deans of universities, seminaries

and colleges) and professional church executives pre-- dominated. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Union Theological

Seminary, and Colgate-Rochester Seminary all had size­

able numbers of alumni among the members. From nearly

every point of view the members of the Commission repre­

sented the flower of American liberal Protestant church

leadership. From a theological standpoint the members of

the Commission represented what Robert Lee has called

"common-core" Protestantism; that is, a faith and prac­

tise not the exclusive province of any single group, but

shared by a plurality of groups. The major attributes of

American "common-core" Protestantism were activism, 63 pragmatism, faith in the educability of man, humanitarian concern, voluntarism, and disdain for theological dogma­ tism, all contributing to doctrinal consensus, common organizational structure, and easy inter-changeability of 39 membership and ministry. While all the Commission mem­ bers had specific denominational ties, their common theo­ logical orientation was far more pervasive than were any differences among them. This was true even between paci­ fists and non-pacifists. The Rhetorical moralism of

Dulles was to some extent only a more secularized version of the essentially eclectic theological character of his clerical colleages.

Many members of the Commission— -in fact nearly all the active members— were alumni of Oxford and the post-

Oxford conferences. They shared the notion of the church as an institution integral to society and performing an essential function as a moral arbiter of society. . The relatively tranquil character of the Commission's dis­ cussions derived at least in part from that strongly shared consensus. This consensus was further heightened by the fact that many of these men— again the active ones— were former students of William Adams Brown of Union

Theological Seminary.

The nucleus of the Commission was the Committee of Direction. Initially the Committee numbered eighteen 40 but this was later increased to twenty-five. Its 64 membe. ^hip remained basically stable throughout the life of the Commission. The original Committee was carefully handpicked by Dulles and Van Kirk to represent a balance of pacifist and non-pacifist convictions, although during the early years of the Commission the pacifists were probably more active and influential than were the non­ pacifists. Henry P. Van Dusen recalls that early in the fall of 1940 Dulles invited him to luncheon at the Uni­ versity Club in New York City. Dulles told him: "You and I do not view the present international situation and

America's responsibility in it in the same fashion.

Nevertheless, I respect your mind and your judgment and

I want to know whether you will join the CJDP and work 41 with me on the Commission*"

While most of the members of the Commission were selected because of either expertise or position in the church, there were other criteria as w'ell. Thus Harry

Emerson Fosdick recommended Winthrop Aldrich, who, he said, "would be good window dressing," but added "you won't get much work out of him." Aldrich may have detected the ruse, for when Dulles invited him to join the Com­ mission, he declined.^

The original Committee of Direction had only one layman in addition to Dulles. The rest were about equally divided between administrators of church agencies, pastors, and seminary and university administrators and professors. 65

Actually the pastors were added only after June, 1941 when it was discovered that all eighteen original members were either church executives or academics. Two women and 43 a black man provided the only novelty.

The Committee of Direction met frequently. It was only after the Committee had taken action that the rank and file of the CJDP were consulted. The entire

Commission normally met only once or twice each year. At these larger meetings the past activities of the Commis­ sion were discussed and new proposals made.

A Committee of Personnel.assumed responsibility for maintaining the membership of the. Commission at full strength, and a Committee on Publications handled dissemination of reports and statements. A third com­ mittee was added later to oversee Commission finances.

The Commission had a small secretariat, with a full-time secretary and a small office staff. Walter Van Kirk served as co-secretary of the Commission, while continu­ ing as executive secretary of the D U G . The Commission had three full-time secretaries during its existence.

The Reverend Bradford Abernethy, a Baptist and the son- in-law of Albert W. Beaven, President of Colgate-Rochester 44 Divinity School, held the post from 1941 to 1943. He was succeeded by Dr. Luman Shafer, who was "loaned" to the Commission for one year by the Board of Foreign 45 Missions of the Reformed Church in America. In 1945 66

the Reverend Richard Fagley became secretary, remaining

in that position until the dissolution of the Commission

on January 1, 1948. The responsibility of the secretary was primarily that of supervising the day to day operation

of the office. In addition he was in charge of liaison with local churches, councils of churches, and denomina­

tional social action secretaries.

Walter Van Kirk handled Commission affairs on

the national level. While Dulles brought international

expertise and a certain prestige to the Commission,

it was Van Kirk who provided the strategic generalship

which, in the short run at least, determined the course

of the Commission's activity. Van Kirk was a graduate

of Ohio Weslyan University and of Boston University

School of Theology. He served as a Methodist pastor in

Massachusetts during the 1920's and early 1930's. In

1934 he became director of the National Peace Conference,

and later its President. In 1939 Van Kirk, like Dulles

a few years earlier, decided that the best agency through

which to promote peace was the church. He became associ­

ate secretary of the Department of International Justice

and Goodwill in that year.^ Van Kirk, a pacifist, had a great interest in

international affairs, publishing six books on the subject.

From 1935 to 1946 he was also the commentator on a fifteen 67 minute weekly NBC radio program entitled "Religion in the News." The program served as a valuable conduit through which the work of the Commission was interpreted to a nation-wide audience.

Van Kirk and Dulles enjoyed a profound mutual friendship which deepened over the years. After Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953 they carried on a vol­ uminous. correspondence, and Van Kirk frequently visited him at his office at the State Department. The two men shared a common desire to make the churches a force in

American foreign policy formation. Van Kirk's book,

The World of Tomorrow (1941), was a call for the churches to exert their influence on behalf of peace and justice.

"Christians, individually and collectively," he wrote,

"are the custodians of the truth by which nations may be 47 saved." With such a vision it is not difficult to understand why the Commission, in spite of frequent protestations to the contrary, often found itself acting, for all intents and purposes, as a lobby representing a church power bloc. Much of the activism of the CJDP can be traced to the influence of Walter Van Kirk.

The Commission was required to finance its own program. The budget was usually set between twenty and thirty thousand dollars per year. Of this amount the contributions of the churches never exceeded $1250.00.

The remainder of the money was contributed by individuals. 68 foundations and business firms. In the first two years

Dulles gave $5000.00 each year. But he then decided that was too large a share of the financial load and in

1943 he reduced his contribution to $3000.00. Nineteen forty-three was a typical year in which some of the largest contributions were as follows:

John D. Rockefeller, J r . , ...... $2500.00 International Nickel ...... 7500.00 Wendell Willkie ...... 500.00 Harold A. Hatch ...... 1500.00 Mrs. Thomas Lamont ...... 250.00 Henry Luce ...... 2000.00 Mr. Ruetenick ...... 1500.00 M. A. S l a t e r ...... 2000.00

Dulles served as chief counsel for International Nickel.

Usually Mr. Cromwell, retired former head of Dulles' lav? firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, contributed several thousand dollars, although no contributions were recorded from him in 1943. Dulles also frequently turned over the proceeds from his writing to the Commission. Thus in 1944 he received $4000.00 for several articles written for Life, which were also published in Readers Digest. He gave the 48 entire amount to the Commission. Dulles' role in financing the Commission was a critical factor in its success. Without his own contributions and the contribu­ tions of his Wall Street connections, the Commission could not have functioned. 69

The task of the Commission, as outlined by the executive committee in December, 1940, was sweeping:

1) to clarify the mind of the churches regard­ ing the moral, political and economic foundations of an enduring peace;

2) to prepare the people of our churches and nation for assuming their appropriate responsibility for the establishment of such a peace;

3) to maintain contact with the Study Depart­ ment of the World Council of Churches (in process of formation);

4) to consider the convening, as soon as possible after the armistice, of an assembly of Christian leaders, lay and clerical, to mobilize the Christians of all lands in support of a peace consonant with Christian principles.

Recommendations and findings of the Commission were to be submitted to the executive committee for its study and 49 action. In practise, the Commission tried to follow the Oxford prescription, seeking, in a positive fashion, to lay the moral basis for a viable world order, but at the same time serving as a critic of prevailing policy.

The Commission's emphasis shifted over the course of its existence. During the first two years it lacked any very clear sense of direction, confining itself to making rather general pronouncements on the moral prin­ ciples which the postwar peace would need to embody.

In early 1943 it joined the campaign for the creation of a world organization to replace the defunct League of

Nations. After the creation of the United Nations in 70

1945 the Commission turned its attention to more specific issues related to the peace-making and the incipient Cold

War.

Tactically the Commission perceived its role on three levels: as a deliberative or research body; as an agency for educating the public; and as a pressure group speaking to government on behalf of the churches.

The Commission performed its deliberative and research functions in a number of ways. Once in 1942, and again in 1945, it held national study conferences where a broadly representative group of Protestant churchmen met to discuss world order issues and make public recommendations oh policy. Another project was an arrangement between the Commission and the State De­ partment whereby the Commission accredited four of its members to the State Department in order to keep the

Commission abreast of new developments. The Commission also had three study groups— task forces modelled on those established earlier by the Council on Foreign Re­ lations— dealing with specific peace-making problems.

One group, led by Professor Kenneth Scott Latourette, did a series of studies on the East Asia. Another committee under Professor John C. Bennett, studied the problem of

Germany. In 1945 a group was set up to deal with the • problem of United States-Soviet relations. All of these groups prepared papers for study by the Commission as a 71 whole and a number of those papers were later published.

On several occasions the Commission met with refugee leaders from abroad in an effort to get the views of such men regarding the shape of the postwar world.

Throughout the history of the Commission, Dulles provided valuable background information on what was happening in foreign policy areas. Especially after i944, when he served as Dewey's foreign policy advisor, and later, as an advisor at the San Francisco Conference and to the

State Department, Dulles was privy to the basic govern­ mental foreign policy initiatives. During these years nearly every meeting of the Commission began with a back­ ground briefing by him.

On the educational front the Commission sought quite frankly to exorcise isolationism and, in the words of Dulles, attempted "to create a'public opinion which will support a reasonable peace with a de-Nazified Ger- 51 many." To accomplish that objective the Commission published a plethora of material in the form of state­ ments, manuals, handbooks and pamphlets. In 1945, a typical year, over 800,000 pieces of literature were distributed.^

In 1943 the Commission hired the Institute of

Public Relations, Inc. of New York City to handle pub­ licity and public relations. The result was a very sophisticated approach to the whole problem of disseminating the Commission's message. The Commission had a formidable array of information conduits from the national to the local level. The religious press in the

1940's had an estimated circulation of 18,500,000, and throughout its history the Commission had constant and favorable press coverage. Each of the twenty-five denominations had social action secretaries accredited to the Commission who served as invaluable links to the local level. Equally effective were the state and city councils of churches which forwarded Commission materials and concerns to their constituents. Through the social action secretaries and the local councils of churches the Commission sponsored a continuous array“of local world-order seminars in an attempt to spark interest in world order issues.

The educational effort of the Commission was an integral part of its campaign to influence government policy. By creating strong Protestant support for a world organization Dulles believed the Commission would strengthen its own hand in its representations to the government. In 1943, for example, Abernethy and Dulles proposed that the Institute of Public Relations conduct a poll of Protestant opinion on world-order issues.

They argued that if it could be demonstrated that the official statements of the CJDP were shared by a broad spectrum of the church people of the nation, those 73 statements would have far greater impact on government ■j • 53 policy.

A great deal of ambiguity surrounded the whole matter of the Commission's authority to speak for the churches. Did it speak for American Protestantism or only for itself? It was the latter conception which

Dulles embraced, which explains his concern that the

Commission membership be made up of men of some stature who could lend an aura of authority to Commission pro­ nouncements. In practise, however, Commission pronounce­ ments were implicitly, if not explicitly, touted as reflections of the mind of American Protestantism, or at least of the 30,000,000 who were nominally members of the FCC. There.were surprisingly few who criticized this. The question was most often raised at Congressional hearings where church spokesmen were sometimes challenged to produce evidence that they in fact spoke for the Pro­ testant rank and file. From the churchmen themselves perhaps the most cogent critique came from H. Richard

Niebuhr of Yale, who argued that it was "unProtestant" for the will of the churches to be expressed through church officials"rather than through the direct action of the

Christian citizenry. He questioned the honesty of a procedure which claimed greater authority for a pro- 54 nouncement than was warranted by the facts.

In fairness, it must be said that the Commission 74 always indicated on its statements whether the pronounce­ ment was an official Commission statement, an executive committee statement, or, in some cases, a statement by

Dulles. T;i at happened was that almost inevitably the process of publicizing a statement led to an impression that it was a reflection of Protestant,church opinion.

The Commission made every effort to make its views known to the government. Virtually all of its published material was put in the hands of Congressmen and Senators.

Special efforts were made to acquaint the White House and State Department with Commission positions. At least once a year Dulles and several colleagues visited the President at the White House, usually in connection with the publication of a new statement by the Commission.

Dulles was in almost constant contact with Sumner Welles at the State Department until Welles' dismissal by Hull in 1944. There was also a great deal of interaction with

Congressman J. William Fulbright, Senator Ball, and, most significantly, Senator Vandenberg. 75

NOTES

^Christian Century, September 20, 1939, p. 1124

^Ibid., October 18, 1939, pp. 1262-63.

^Ibid., September 20, 1939, p. 1125.

^Ibid., September 27, 1939, p. 1172. 5 Ibid., November-December, 1939, passim.

®Ibid., January 31, 1940, p. 152. 7 Dulles to Wright, January 24, 1940, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

* O The United States and the World of Nations (FCC Pamphlet, February, 1940), p. ST g Ibid., p. 12.

^Dulles to Senator Taft, Aguust 21, 1939, Box 138. Dulles Papers.

^ FCC Biennial■Report, 1940, p. 78. 12 Dulles to Granville Clark, March 4, 1940, Box 138, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Helen Miller, March 7, 1940, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 14 Dulles to Thomas Debevoise, April 30, 1940, Box 138, Dulles Papers.

^Lamont to Dulles, April 31, 1940, Box 138, Dulles Papers. » ^Letters, passim, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Van Kirk to Dulles, May 11, 1940, Box 7, Dulles Papers. ^William Adams Brown to Dulles, May 24, 1940. Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^ N e w York Times, June 9, 1940, 20:1. 76 20 Van Kirk to Dulles, June 28, 1940, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 21 Dulles to America First Committee, August 10, 1940, Dulles Papers.

22Dulles to World Peaceways, Inc., September 3, 1940. 23 Dulles to America First Committee, December 4, 1940, Box 131, Dulles Papers.

3^FCC memoranda, October 1940, Box 207, FGC-MSS.

2 5 "The Churches and the International Situation," December, 1940, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 9 fi Christian Century, December 25, 1940, p. 1623.

3^New York Times, July 13, 1941. 2 8 Robert A. Divine, Second Chance (New York, 1967), p. 31.

29Bulletin of the Commission to Study the Organi­ zation of the Peace, January-February, 1942, p. 7.

■^Speech by Dulles, "The Ecumenical Mission of the Church Today," given at the North American Ecumenical Conference, Toronto, Canada, June 4, 1941, Box 13, Dulles Papers. 31 Quoted in John Milton Yinger, Religion and the Struggle for Power (Durham, N.C., 1946), p. 216.

^ Christian Century, March 11, 1942, p. 330; The Churches and a Just and Durable Peace (Chicago, 1942), p. 5.

• 33FCC Bulletin, October, 1942, p. 2.

3^Van Kirk to Cavert, April 9, 1940, Box 197, FCC-MSS.

33FCC Bulletin, April 1941, p. 4. 36 Van Dusen, Oral History, Dulles Papers.

■^Cavert and Van Dusen, Oral History, Dulles Papers.

38FCC Bulletin, February 1941, p. 13. 77 39 Robert Lee, Social Sources of Church Unity (Nashville, 1960), p. 83. 40 FCC Bulletin, June 1941, p. 9. 41 Van Dusen, Oral History, Dulles Papers. 42 H. E. Fosdick memorandum, February 10, 1941, Box 195, FCC-MSS.

^ F C C Bulletin, June 1941, p. 9. In 1941 the members of the Committee of Direction were:

*Dr. Henry A. Atkinson Dr. Kenneth S. Latourette General Seer., Church Professor, Yale Univ. Peace Union

Dr. E. E. Aubrey Dr. Henry Smith Leiper Professor, Christian Foreign Secreatry, FCC Theology and Ethics, University of Chicago Dr. Elmore M. McKee St. George's Episcopal Church Rev. Roswell P. Barnes Associate Sec., FCC Dr. Harold Nicely Brick Presbyterian Church Dr. John C. Bennett Rochester, New York Professor, Christian Theology, Pacific School Dr. J. W. Nixon of Religion Professor of Christian Theol. and Ethics, Colgate-Rochester Dr. Russell Clinchy Theological Seminary Center Church, Hartford, Conn. Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam Methodist Church Dr. Albert B. Coe First Congregational Church Dr. Albert W. Palmer Oak Park, 111. President, Chicago Theol. Seminary Dr. James H. Franklin President, Crozer Theologi­ Rev. Almon R. Pepper cal Seminary Sec. of Dept, of Christian Social Relations, Protestant Dr. Georgia Harkness Episcopal Church Professor of Applied Theol­ ogy Dr. Harold Cooke Phillips Garrett Biblical Institute First Baptist Church, Cleveland Mr. Harold A. Hatch Vice-President, Deering- Milliken Co. 78

William Ernst Hocking Dr. Luman J. Shafer Professor, Harvard Univ. Sec., Bd. of Foreign Missions, Reformed Church of America Dr. Albert W. Beaven President, Colgate-Roch- Dr. Ernest F. Tittle ester Theological First Methodist Church Seminary Evanston, 111.

Dr. C. H. Tobias Dr. Henry Pitney Van Dusen Sec., Colored Men's Division,Professor, Systematic Theol- National Council, YMCA ogy, Union Theological Seminary Dr. A. L. Warnshuis Sec., International Mis- Dr. Mary Woolley sionary Council President Emeritus, Mount Holyoke College

*A Just and Durable Peace (FCC Pamphlet, 1941), pp. 3-4. 44 FCC Annual Report, 1941, p. 144.

45CJDP Minutes, March 21, 1941, Box 195, FCC-MSS. A C Cavert to Barnes, May 2, 1939, Box 204, FCC-MSS.

A m7 Walter Van Kirk, The World of Tomorrow (New York, 1941), p. 118. 48 Memoranda, CJDP, 194 3, Box 197, FCC-MSS. 49 FCC Annual Report, 1941, pp. 93-94. 50 CJDP Minutes, December 10, 1942, June 25, 1945.

^Dulles memorandum, March 17, 1941, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 52 CJDP Literature Report, November, 1945, Box 195, FCC-MSS. 53 Abernethy-Dulles memorandum to Institute of Public Relations, January 15, 1943, Up-right file, FCC-MSS. 54 Niebuhr to Richard Fagley, April 11, 1946, Box 135, FCC-MSS. CHAPTER III

THE COMMISSION SEARCHES FOR A PROGRAM

OF ACTION, 1941-1942

Riverside, California is a tranquil town set in the midst of large citrus groves. In early 1941 it seemed far removed from the war-torn and violent world of Berlin,

London, Moscow, Tokyo and Washington, D.C. But for five days in April it was the scene of an intense confrontation between nine Americans and seven Japanese. The men were

Christian leaders meeting together in an effort to renew their ecumenical relationships and explore ways in which they might serve as mediators in the escalating tension between the United States and Japan.

The meetings were held at the behest of the Ameri­ cans. Over a period of several years they had grown increasingly concerned with developments in East Asia.

The Oxford Conference of 1937 had been shocked by news of Japanese saturation bombing of Shanghai. In 1938 a number of American churchmen visited East Asia enroute to attend the missionary conference at Madras, India.

Dulles had made a personal trip to the area in 1938. All

79 80 returned sobered by the intractable problems faced by the nations there.

Nearly every church conference thereafter sought to deal with the issue. In February, 1940 the Federal

Council of Churches sponsored a National Study Conference on "The Churches and the International Situation," which devoted a large share of its time to the problem. The most stubborn issue was the question of American trade with Japan. In a statement, "Conflict in East Asia," the conference took a middle course, calling for a limited embargo on war materiel, but urging the United States government to make every effort to maintain diplomatic relations with Japan.'*'

By early 1941 the FCC executive committee decided that more concrete action was necessary and the idea for a conference between American and Japanese churchmen, reminiscent of the Geneva conference of 1939, was born.

Initially Dulles was skeptical of the value of such a conference, primarily because he feared the Japanese might use it as a propaganda ploy and embarrass the

American government. With characteristic caution he first conferred with Secretary of State Hull who was enthusiastic about the plan. Thereupon Dulles changed 2 his mind and the planning for the conference continued.

The Japanese delegation was led by the famous evangelist, Kagawa, whose acquaintance Dulles had made 81 on his trip to the Far East. The members of the American delegation were Bishop Baker, Bishop Stevens, John Mackay,

Roswell Barnes, Walter Horton, Luman Shafer, A. I. Warn- shuis, J. W. Diffendorfer, and Dulles. A surprising unanimity and good fellowship was reached during the meet­ ings, and as a result, the Japanese were invited to pro­ long their stay in order to meet with a larger group of religious leaders on the East Coast. During the second week of May the Japanese met with forty-five representa­ tives of twenty-five mission organizations who had in­ terests in the Far East.^ The chief effect of these meetings was to convince many of the Americans, notably

Dulles, that the United States should take the initiative in breaking the stalemate in Japanese-American relations.

A final chapter in the churchmen's attempt to ameliorate relations came in September 1941 when a cable from Kagawa arrived addressed to Dulles, Van Kirk, and

Roswell Barnes. Kagawa begged them to intercede with the

American government, urging it to avoid any overt act of belligerency against Japan. The churchmen forwarded the cable to Hull and sent a telegram to Kagawa asking whether he could provide them with any evidence that the Japanese authorities would negotiate on the basis of the FCC statement of February, 1940, "Conflict in East Asia," with which Kagawa was familiar. They pledged continued prayer and Christian comradeship.^ Kagawa was unable to reply 82 and the initiative thus came to nought, much to the chagrin of Dulles and his colleagues, who had fervently hoped to make the church a mediating agent between the two bellig­ erents.

Dulles' first formal statement as chairman of the

Commission was made in the context of his encounters with the Japanese churchmen. Entitled simply "Memorandum," it was designed as a trial balloon for one of his most cherished ideas; that peace cannot become a reality un­ til nations recognize that certain domestic policies can have profound international consequences, especially in matters related to access to markets, acquisition of raw materials, emigration and immigration restriction, and monetary policy. To make domestic legislation more sensi­ tive to its foreign ramifications Dulles proposed what appears in retrospect as a novel and rather idealistic innovation. Congress should, he argued:

1 ) recognize, by resolution, the principle that legislative action within the four fields above enumerated may involve international repercussions and a consequent duty to exer­ cise our pox^er with a decent regard for all who may be seriously affected; and accord­ ingly that no such legislative action (other than of a war emergency nature) should be taken until the Congress first obtain a re­ port as to the consequences of the contem­ plated action upon people elsewhere;

2 ) establish a new administrative unit, under the Executive, and correlated with the State and other interested departments, having the duty to study economic interrelations and to make, as occasion demanded, the reports 83

contemplated by the preceding paragraph, which shall be public documents;

3) request the President, insofar as he deems it compatible with the public interest, to invite other nations now to take parallel action, pending the time when it may be practical to take joint action.5

The "Memorandum" was clearly inspired by the issue of Japanese-American relations, although the problem was not explicitly mentioned. Dulles was convinced that

Japanese expansionism was at least partly caused by the peculiar Japanese dependence on world markets and foreign

sources of raw materials. He believed the United States was not sufficiently sensitive to the problems this created for the Japanese.

In March, 1941 Lend-Lease became law and the

pretense of American neutrality came to an end. With the

United States now clearly ranged on the side of Britain

and actual American belligerency only lacking a formal

declaration of war, many internationalists began to call

for a declaration of peace aims by the Allies, an idea which Churchill and Roosevelt both resisted. As early

as January, Dulles had criticized the United States gov­

ernment for its failure to state its postwar aims.** In

June, writing to columnist David Lawrence, he reflected

the mood of his colleagues at the Federal Council when 84

he wrote: "I am rather appalled at what seem to me the

lack of any peace aims which would serve the dual purpose

of giving inspiration to our present military effort,

and also serve to educate and crystallize public opin­

ion ." ^

During the spring and early summer of 1941 the

Committee of Direction debated the wisdom of having the

CJDP formulate what it considered appropriate peace aims.

In early June, while the debate was going on, the Committee

of Direction met with a group of European refugees— Jacque

Maritain, H. K. Hambro, Joseph Hromadka, Adolf Keller— to

gain their views on the matter. Fervently anti-Nazi, they

took a hard line, arguing that winning the war was the most immediately pressing task. As a result the Committee

failed to reach agreement on the matter, even though Dulles,

Van Kirk and Van Dusen were all strongly in favor of a 8 war aims statement by the Commission.

Roosevelt and Churchill deflated the war-aims question with the publication of the Atlantic Charter on

August 14. A vague and benign document, isolationists

could find little of substance to criticize, and the

internationalists tended to find much in it to commend.

Clark Eichelberger of the Commission to Study the Organi­

zation of the Peace praised the Allied leaders for direct­

ing the attention of the world to peace-aims. He was sure 85 that the reference to "a wider system of general security" 9 looked forward to a world organization. In a critique of the Atlantic Charter, entitled Long Range Peace Ob­ jectives , Dulles disagreed with Eichelberger. He pointed out the "striking omission of any proposal for a permanent association of nations. The Declaration seems to reflect primarily the conception of the old sovereignty system.

After a point by point discussion of the Charter, he con­ cluded that it represented, in fact, a very poor begin­ ning, far inferior to Wilson's Fourteen Points, and even inferior to the much maligned Treaty of Versailles. He found it quite unsatisfactory when tested against the principles expressed in the great interwar ecumenical

Christian conferences. The President, he concluded, had dealt boldly and dramatically with domestic problems; one could only hope that he would be equally imaginative in his approach to postwar foreign policy. The task of the churches must be to encourage him in that process by making it politically advantageous to do so. Public opinion must be mobilized to that end.^

Dulles' suspicion that the absence of any direct reference to a postwar international organization was due to Roosevelt's fear of the political consequences was in fact correct. The original draft of the Charter, drawn up by Churchill, had declared that the United States and

Britain would "seek a peace which . . . by effective 86

international organization will afford to all States and

peoples the means of dwelling in security." Roosevelt

struck that phrase out insisting that any reference to

an international organization would create "suspicions

and opposition" in the United States. Hard-pressed by

isolationist criticism of his current policies, he did

not want to invite additional debate over a future inter­

national organization. Beyond that Roosevelt was skeptical

regarding the efficacy of any new "League of Nations." He

really preferred "an international police force composed

of the United States and Britain" to keep order in the world.^

Having criticized the Charter, Dulles then sought,

in the second part of Long Range Peace Objectives, to

project his own vision of a postwar settlement. Europe,

he asserted, should be reorganized into a federated

commonwealth of some type. "The reestablishment of some

twenty-five sovereign states in Europe would be political

folly." In the Far East Japan must be assured of effective

access to markets and raw materials. All colonies ought

to be placed under an international mandate. Above all,

any permanent settlement must include an international

organization designed to foster peace. This would be a

universal federation of nations, bound by common agreement

to the principle that "interdependence" rather than inde­

pendence, especially in economic areas, must prevail. The 87

federation would be administered by an executive organi­

zation staffed with outstanding men committed to the peace and welfare of humanity. The new organization would utilize, as much as possible, the existing machinery of

the League of Nations, especially such functional agencies as the ILO. On the national level each state would estab­

lish an agency to monitor the international ramifications of domestic economic policy. This agency would report to both its national government and to the international organization when irresponsible policies were implemented by a state.

Dulles' prescription for a world organization re­ ceived sharp cirticism from Commission members. Generally there was skepticism regarding the viability of any plan which omitted provision for sanctions against malfeasance.

What good was an agency which lacked the power to enforce

its decisions? On the other hand, critics recognized that any attempt to enforce sanctions would necessarily require an international police force, and none of the members of the Commission believed that national states were prepared to abridge their sovereignty to such an extent. Nevertheless, several members argued that Dulles was actually turning the clock back because his plan appeared even weaker than the defunct League of Nations.

"The weakness of this paper seems to be that it dismisses 88 much that has gone before and starts us off in the search for new things when there is much upon which we can build

.... It . . . takes us back from the League rather than forward .... It is necessary to have a strong inter­ national government, one in which the use of force is taken for granted." Even the pacifist Walter Van Kirk argued that "the use of force for the preservation of law and order by a world society that is heroically and steadfastly bent upon establishing justice is not immoral." On the question of the use of force, the CJDP was to remain divided, with Dulles consistently arguing that any attempt to create an international police force in the absence of international law could only result in making the international organization the handmaiden of whatever powers happened to be dominant at any given time.

Several pro-interventionist members of the Com­ mission pointed out that Dulles assumed that Hitler would be defeated. They questioned whether, until there was concrete evidence for such an assumption, any purpose was served by talking in practical terms about the shape of the peace. As one of them put it: "If the church feels it has a moral responsibility to influence the peace, does it not have a prior moral responsibility to help win the 13 war?" The paper also came under criticism from other sources, notably from the English Protestant scholar, Dr. George Micklem, President of Mansfield College,

Oxford, whose Theology of Politics was a sharp call for what he termed greater "realism" in Christian thinking

about politics. He found the paper far too idealistic

and pacifistic. Dulles, he said, was thinking the way 14 the British were just before Munich. In a letter to

Van Kirk, Dulles complained that Micklem had fallen into

precisely the same trap as the statesmen; they assumed

that force could resolve basic problms when in fact

force was impotent. Far from being realistic, Micklem

reflected the passions of war, and war, he observed, 15 "never enhances good thinking."

Dulles learned two things from the reaction to

his first foray into postwar brainstorming. Postv/ar

plans had to be well thought out and cogently presented.

His paper had been hastily written and his sketch of an

international organization had not sufficiently antici­

pated possible criticisms. The second impression was

more important for the direction the Commission would

take in the future. He learned that any attempt by the

Commission to project an actual blueprint for an inter­

national organization would be seriously disruptive of

Commission unity. Henceforth the Commission would search

for the moral principles of a good world order and test

the blueprints of the politicians by those principles. It 90 would avoid the temptation to draw up blueprints of its own.

Throughout the fall of 1941 the Commission devoted itself to producing a general statement of moral prin­ ciples underlying world order. The Statement of Guiding

Principles which resulted was primarily the work of Dulles,

Van Kirk and Reverend Abernethy, although the entire Com­ mission was involved in its final formulation. The prin­ ciples were designed "to be among those which men of good­ will everywhere might be expected to recognize as part of the moral law." As summarized by Dulles, the twelve prin­ ciples were:

1) Moral law undergirds our world;

2) Disregard of the moral law brings affliction;

3) Revenge and retaliation bring no relief;

4) We must find ways to bring into ordered harmony the interdependent life of the nations;

5) This requires that economic resources be looked upon as a trust to promote the general welfare;

6 ) Also, because the world is living and there­ fore, changing, there must be ways of effect­ ing peaceful change;

7) Colonial government, too, must be administered in the interests of the colonial peoples;

8 ) Military establishments should be internation­ ally controlled. 91

9) There must be personal freedoms and liberties, without discrimination against nation, race or class;

10) The power of the United States carries with it a special responsibility which we have neglected;

11) A supreme responsibility rests upon the church of Christ to proclaim the way of life;

12) Christians should, as citizens, seek to trans­ late their beliefs into realities.

The Guiding Principles were widely distributed. Dulles and several of his colleagues delivered them in person to President Roosevelt.

At the September, 1941 meeting of the Commission it was decided that a National Study Conference on the

Churches and a Just and Durable Peace would be convened.

A number of factors led to the decision. The British had held a highly successful conference on world order at

Malvern in early 1941. Many American churchmen believed that a similar conference would have a salutary effect on American Protestant unity. Dulles and Van Kirk found the idea attractive because a conference could provide valuable contact with a broad spectrum of American

Christians, and if properly led, could enhance the ongoing work of the CJDP with additional legitimacy and authority.

On the other hand, there were risks involved in such a conference. Dulles was keenly aware of the mischief 92 a showdown between interventionists and non­ interventionists could create. With the advent of

Pearl Harbor this danger disappeared, but conflict be­ tween pacifists and non-pacifists continued to present a problem. As a result Dulles, insisted that all questions regarding the war should be excluded. The conference would devote itself entirely to the issue of postwar peace.

The purpose of the conference was to discuss the responsi­ bility of the churches with respect to the postwar settle­ ment and to consider what, if any, recommendations the churches should make for American policy. Four study com­ mittees were formed dealing with the political, social and economic bases of a just peace. They prepared papers designed to help the conference focus on the salient 18 issues.

The conference was held at Ohio Weslyan University in Delaware, Ohio on March 3-5, 1942, with 377 delegates in attendance. Dulles served as chairman of the confer­ ence. The delegates were divided into four sections; each section dealing with one of the study committee reports.

Several plenary sessions then considered and acted on the section papers at the conclusion of the conference. There were some hot debates on particulars, but a general con­ sensus prevailed on most of the big questions. One issue did involve the conference in controversy. Charles Clayton 93 Morrison, editor of the Christian Century, submitted a

statement to the section on the Church and World Peace,

stating that "We declare as the major premise of the

church's responsibility in the present crisis that the 19 Christian church, as such, is not at war." This phrase was deleted by the Message committee of the Conference

and when Morrison attempted to have it reinstated during

the final plenary session, Dulles as chairman, refused

to consider it because it dealt with the war itself.

Many pacifists resented what they felt was a high-handed

parliamentary tactic. Dulles defended his position by

arguing that he was simply enforcing the conference ban

on all discussion of the current church-war problem.

Privately he feared that such a discussion would only

reopen the divisions over the United States involvement

in the war, now temporarily stilled by the attack on Pearl

Harbor.

The Message of the conference was straight-forward,

even blunt. The "... present struggle of the nations is

not just another war in the history of mankind. It is the

upheaval of the old order and the birth of a new. The

relationships of men will never again be the same, nor

should they be the same, for they have not been founded 20 on the eternal truths of God." It categorically re­

pudiated isolationism whether political, social or 94

economic. It called on the churches to exert pressure on

policy-makers to ensure that moral considerations played

a role in policy formation. It explicitly advocated the

creation of a world government with legislative, executive

and judicial powers, including an international police

force. With regard to peace-making at the end of the \ war, there should be no punitive reparations, decrees of

war guilt or arbitrary dismemberment of nations.

In the area of economics the conference called

for courageous "experimentation with various forms of

ownership and control, private, cooperative or public."

The Economic Section was clearly the most innovative group

present. Many of the churchmen in the Section had been

greatly influenced by the British Malvern Conference of

January, 1941, which had taken a strongly collectivistic

anti-capitalistic point of view. Several of Dulles'

business colleagues complained about what they considered

the Section's hopelessly idealistic and radical economic

proposals. It was dominated, complained Jasper Crane of

Du Pont, by an "extremist group, without practical ex- i • perience, and with little advice from accredited econo- 21 mists," Time Magazine was also disenchanted by the

Economic Section report, but consoled itself with the

fact that "... the conference did not veer so far left 22 as the pinko British Malvern Conference of 1941." 95

One question which was repeatedly debated at Dela­ ware dealt with the role of the churches vis a vis govern­ ment policy formation. How explicit should the churches be in their advice to government? The conference took the position that the church should lay down the moral principles for a viable policy, but should eschew any attempt to draw up its own blueprints for presentation to government. The churchmen, perhaps too humbly, con­ cluded that they lacked the expertise and information necessary for fashioning specific policy proposals. The dilemma which this approach posed was a difficult one, for in effect, it left to politicians and bureaucrats the choice of means by which to achieve the moral prin­ ciples prescribed by the religious community. The char­ acter of the politicians and experts thus became a key factor determining the shape of world order policy. In practise the Delaware prescription was impractical, especially in terms of the activist role which Dulles and the CJDP envisioned for themselves. Far more appropriate, and in fact, the one the Commission actually practised, was the Oxford formula which enjoined the churches, in addition to providing moral principles, to serve as critics of prevailing government policy.

Dulles had personally invited a number of- laymen to attend the conference as delegates, and a few of them found the experience exasperating, even distasteful. 96 This was especially true of President Dodds of Princeton, who wrote:

All honor to you and a few others who are trying to steer this miserable crowd into constructive channels. It was my first experience with them and I confess to coming away with a sense of discouragement. I was impressed by the zeal of the pacifists, and the degree to which they had secured key posts in the various organizations, and their complete and blissful ignorance of the simplest concept of government.23

Jasper Crane, the financial Czar of Du Pont, and a Presbyterian delegate to the conference, shared Dodds' sentiments. He was expecially disturbed that the group was made up largely of "church functionaires," with only nine or ten businessmen and no farmers or workers. The liberal cast of the conference, he told Dulles, was a 24 result of that imbalance. Dulles, in his reply, agreed that the conference Message "tends rather unmistakably 25 toward the left." At his ambivalent best, he then went on to argue that in general the conference reflected a cross-section of American opinion, because "clerics, while having little independent critical capacity, and while disposed to accept what sounds humanitarian, nevertheless, to a considerable extent, reflect the viewpoint of idieir communities." He admitted some disapointment with the conference, but this appears to have been an effort to placate his friends Crane and Dodds, for in another con­ text he stated his satisfaction with the results, intimating 97 2 6 that he had feared they might be much less satisfactory.

As a consolation to his conservative friends he assured them that he and the Committee of Direction would edit the final version of the conference Message. Actually

Dulles was very pleased with the Message. Perhaps the world government proposals were more radical than he would have liked, and the critique of capitalism might have been less strenuous if he had formulated it, but overall, in succeeding years, he was to look back on Delaware as the most satisfactory conference of his career.

Another critic of the conference was Dr. Manley

0. Hudson of the Harvard Law School, and a collaborator with Dulles on a study of the problems of creating an international court of justice. Hudson found the Message vague, platitudinous and pacifistic, far too reminiscent of the idealistic pronouncements of the peace societies 2 7 of the interwar era. Dulles did not dispute Hudson's critique, but he defended his own involvement in the peace movement.

It is precisely because I feel as you do, as to the futility of much of the effort of the peace societies that I have devoted much of my time recently to trying to direct their undoubted influence along lines which will be more realistic and because more realistic, more constructive.28

He enclosed his speeches delivered at Delaware with the hope that Hudson would find them more realistic and con- 29 crete. 98

The conference appears to have reflected the senti­ ments of the liberal ecumenical wing of the Protestant church rather faithfully. There can be little doubt,

Dulles' disclaimers notwithstanding, that the churchmen were considerably in advance of their communities on most world-order issues. Most American church leaders of the

1940's had been influenced by the pacifist-internationalism of the 1930's, and while the incorrigibly tragic history of the late 1930's and the early 1940's was rapidly eroding their hopeful assessments of human progress, much of that sentiment still prevailed in March, 1942. The conference emphasis on the supra-national character of world problems,

its disparagement of the sovereignty system of national

states, its espousal of an advanced form of world govern­ ment, its stringent critique of capitalism, and the abso­

lute rejection of isolationism as contrary to Christian principles all pointed to the continued influence of a

liberal ecumenical "common-core" Protestant leadership in

the world order field.

The conference vindicated those who saw the search

for postwar peace aims as a unifying force in a badly

splintered Protestant world-order leadership. Henry P.

Van Dusen, reporting on the conference in Christianity and Crisis, believed the real test of the conference had been whether "... the representatives of American

Protestantism, until three months ago ranged in bitterly 99 embattled camps, could unite on any significant proposals for postwar reordering.The results completely re­ assured Van Dusen.

An interesting adjunct of the conference were the

Merrick-McDowell Lectures, an annual event at Ohio

Weslyan University. The University asked the CJDP to provide the lecturers for the 1942 series, and the Lec­ tures were made an integral part of the conference program.

Seven lectures on various facets of the topic, "A Basis for the Peace to Come," were delivered. The lecturers were Methodist Bishop Francis John McConnell; Dulles;

William Paton, Secretary of the International Missionary

Society, and a leading English churchman; Leo Pasvolsky,

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hu Shih,

Chinese Ambassador to the United States; and C. J. Hambro,

President of the Norwegian Storting, and President of the 31 Assembly of the League of Nations. The lectures provided a valuable cosmopolitan and substantive dimension to the conference proceedings.

The Delaware Message was widely distributed, with

Dulles personally sending copies to the President, Hull and Welles, Governor Dewey, and many other key government figures. The Commission distributed copies to all the organizations listed in George Galloway's Postwar Planning in the United States, as well as attempting to get it into the hands of all Protestant pastors in the country. In 100 addition the Commission held a number of regional con­ ferences— Houston, Detroit, Syracuse, St. Louis— to

"evangelize," in Van Kirk's words, the Message and to 32 educate the local churches about world order concerns.

One of the original assignments of the CJDP was to effect a continuing dialogue with Christians of other lands. Thus late in 1941 the Commission invited the

United Church of Canada to appoint several members to the

Commission. In return Dulles and Van Kirk were made corresponding members of a new postwar-aims commission 33 established in Canada by the United Church. In addi­ tion the Commission met several times in the course of

1941 and 1942 with European leaders who were in exile in 34 the United States. These encounters were mostly of symbolic value although the tough-minded nationalism of these men served as a reminder to the frequently ideal­ istic Americans of the intransigent character of inter­ national relations.

The most ambitious venture in ecumenical dialogue in 1942 was a visit by Dulles and Van Kirk to England in

July. The idea of a visit had intrigued Dulles for some time and when William Paton visited the United States in

March, 1942, the matter was discussed with him. The

British responded favorably to the idea and a formal 101 invitation was tendered by a committee made up of Arch­ bishop Temple, Arnold Toynbee, Professor Zimmern, Lord

Hailey, Canon Cockburn, Professor Lindsay, and William 35 Paton. Nineteen forty-two was not a good year for trans-

Atlantic travel and there was some question whether a trip was feasible under the circumstances. Dulles wrote a letter to Welles noting the invitation and requesting government clearance for the trip. To strengthen his case he observed that as counsel to the Belgian government and the International Nickel Company and trustee of the

Rockfeller Foundation, he would be able to look after matters beyond strictly church affairs. Welles offered the cooperation of the State Department and the trip thus became possible.^

Dulles and Van Kirk traveled to England by mili­ tary plane; the first trans-Atlantic flight for either man. Arriving on July 3, they went their separate ways,

Van Kirk to meet with as many leaders of the British

churches as possible in hopes of laying a foundation

for a continuing liaison between the FCC and the newly emerging British Council of Churches. His travels took him the length and breadth of England. Dulles concen­ trated on renewing contacts with the men he had learned

to know at the Oxford and Geneva Conferences. Thus he met

several times with William Paton, Archbishop Temple, J. H.

Oldham, Arnold Toynbee, and Bishop Bell of Chichester. In 102 addition he had interviews with Anthony Eden, Clement

Atlee, Mr. Bevin, Sir Stafford Cripps and with many of 37 the representatives of the refugee governments in London.

The real purpose of the trip was to discuss post­ war aims with British churchmen, and for that reason a two-day conference was held at Balliol College, Oxford, with most of the Protestant leaders of Britain in at- 38 tendance. In general the British and Americans continued to find Oxford a convenient frame of reference. They reaffirmed the distinctive role of the church as the con­ science and moral arbiter of mankind, and agreed that the postwar world must be shaped by the Christian conception of justice and peace. On the details of the postwar settlement there was some disagreement. Characteristi­ cally the Americans were more visionary about the possi­ bilities of a new world order than the British. As Van

Kirk put it, "perhaps Mr. Dulles and I were more insistent than were our British colleagues that international collab­ oration after the war should look beyond the United Nations 39 toward a more inclusive fellowship of nations." Dulles' rather tactless criticism of British colonialism occasioned some defensive reaction from several churchmen, although most agreed that the time was at hand for the liquidation of the British Empire.

Originally the Americans had hoped to create an

Anglo-American world order commission to coordinate 103 activity and present a united front to the British and

American governments on world order questions. Given the difficulties of wartime communication, it was de­ cided to abandon the idea as impractical. The conferees agreed that for the duration of the war the national churches would focus on creating public opinion within their own nations in support of Christian world order ideals. (Dulles and Van Kirk undertook to publish two

British statements on world order in the United States.

They were entitled The Christian Church and World Order and Social Justice and Economic Reconstruction.)

Throughout 1942 the Commission continued to search for a more definite strategy and role for itself. In

June the Committee of Direction met with eighteen Social

Action secretaries to better coordinate their activities.

In what was in effect a division of labor theCJDP under­ took to:

1 ) provide national publicity for world order activity;

2 ) provide basic study and research material for the churches;

3) provide resource people for lectures and sem­ inars on the local level;

4) serve as a clearing house for all world order concerns. (In order to facilitate this the CJDP was to begin the publication of a monthly bulletin. 104

The Social Action secretaries were responsible for all 40 world order education and activity on the local level.

In September, 1942 the entire Commission met at

Bronxville, New York for two days of discussion. Dulles opened the meeting with an assessment of the Commission's work up to that point. They had begun, he said, with four assignments: 1 ) achieve internal unity and cohesion;

2) establish contacts between the CJDP and government policymakers; 3) create an informed body of public opin­ ion; and 4) make contacts with Christian groups abroad.

Surveying the first two years, he felt they had achieved a rare degree of unity within the Commission. On the third point he found much to be done, although he men­ tioned the Delaware Conference as a highly useful in­ strument in fostering a Christian public opinion in favor of a just and durable peace. With respect to ecumenical cooperation and government liaison he found their efforts had not been rewarded with much success. He observed that a number of important decisions by the Allies were in the offing and called for the CJDP to attempt to bring some influence to bear on those decisions. As an example he cited the matter of Western extra-territorial rights in

China. In an unusual circumlocution he said: "It would be helpful to go to Washington and say: 'We do not know

if this is the time to do this thing regarding China, but 105 the type of thing we are thinking about is the kind of thing the Christian people of America want to have done, and the more you can do in the way of concrete decisions and open action of this kind which will tend to focus our international character in the direction we are going will give you the enthusiastic loyal support of the Ameri­ can people.*" He admitted that such an approach was not a part of the original assignment from the FCC executive committee. But he was convinced, he said, that the CJDP had to do more than merely search for the moral principles of a just peace. It was imperative that the United States government be forced to reveal its plans for the postwar and he believed the CJDP could play a useful role in that process. In thirty-five years of relating to the American government he had never found it so receptive to Christian opinion. Furthermore, noting the speeches of Vice-

President Wallace and Under-Secretary Welles calling for the United States to begin planning for the postwar era, he found reason to believe that many in American policy­ making positions would welcome support from the CJDP. The 41 Commission must "hold up their hands." The Commission agreed, and thereafter its program became far more activ- istic.

In other business the Commission authorized Dulles to explore the possibility of greater collaboration with the Catholic church on world order matters. Several weeks 106 later Dulles was able to meet with Monsignor Michael J.

Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Council and the two agreed to work on a joint world order statement in 42 cooperation with several Jewish groups.

Arnold Toynbee visited the United States in Oc­ tober, 1942 and the leaders of the CJDP met with him at

Princeton University to discuss his views of what the 4 3 churches ought to be saying about the world situation.

Out of that meeting came the idea of a joint British-

American statement on world order. During the following weeks Dulles, Van Dusen, Kenneth Grubb (who happened to be in the United States at the time) and Toynbee drew up a statement which was then sent to William Paton and Arch­ bishop Temple for comment and discussion. The statement was essentially a call for the United States, Britain,

China and the Soviet Union to immediately commit them­ selves to create a world organization with real military and political power to be used for the common good. Not­ ing that the world is "factually" interdependent, it con­ tinued: "The world has become a community and its con­ stituent members no longer have the moral right to act without regard to the harm done to others." Because the statement advocated a strong police force, Dulles only 44 reluctantly lent his signature to the statement.

Dulles1 reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl

Harbor has not been recorded but from his writings during 107 the ensuing months it is apparent that he feared it might foster war passions reminiscent of World War I. A just peace could only be assured, he declared, if the war it­ self was fought with cool dispassion. He was especially concerned about the reaction of the churches, but during the early months of the war his fears of religious chauvinism remained largely unfounded. The memory of the churches' unbridled identification with the Allied cause in World War I was still a conscious restraint. Charles

Morrison of the Christian Century noted with satisfaction that the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists and

Disciples of Christ had all recognized the necessity of the war, but had steadfastly refrained from making the church a party to the war. The Disciples' annual con7 vention illustrated the mood of mid-1942 Protestantism well. A war resolution, drawn up by an Oklahoma judge, was submitted to the convention. It read: "We pledge to the government of the United States our support and allegiance in whatever course it may determine necessary and essential in safeguarding the religion of Jesus Christ and the democratic way of life." The convention refused to ratify the statement, substituting one which "calls on all Christians as citizens, according to the dictates of 45 their conscience, to loyally support the government."

By midsummer, however, some voices began to be 108 heard calling for a more unequivocal declaration of com­ mitment to victory over the enemy. In July the executive board of the United Lutheran Church issued a statement which committed itf without reservation, to the war effort.

The war had been brought on the world by those who denied the sovereignty of God and worshipped only themselves.

Such idolatory the church dare not compromise with. "There fore we call on our people in particular, and all Christ­ ian people in general, to dedicate themselves wholly to the defeat and destruction of this evil. We call upon our people to give our country the fullest measure of devotion and support, as the duty and privilege of the

Christian citizen.

Another harbinger of the shift in the mood of the churches was a highly publicized statement issued over the signatures of ninety-three leading Protestant clergy- 47 men, twenty-five of whom were members of the CJDP.

The "Declaration" was released to the media by Eugene

E. Barnett, general secretary of the YMCA, who said:

"... believing that the American churches have not ex­ pressed their support of the war effort of the United

Nations with sufficient vigor, ninety-three Protestant leaders today joined in a statement calling for the 4 8 defeat of the Axis." Arguing that the war must be seen as a fight against racism and totalitarianism, they in­ sisted that all Christians had a moral obligation to take 109 their place behind government leadership. Later in the year the Catholic hierarchy issued a similar statement 49 declaring the war a "righteous one." Interestingly enough, the Federal Council did not take a position, even though its new President, the Right Reverend Henry St.

George Tucker of the Protestant Episcopal Church, had signed the Protestant "Declaration" of August and wanted the FCC to take such action. Pacifist influence within the FCC remained substantial.

Charles Morrison was bitingly critical of the

"Declaration" on a number of counts, but specifically because it seemed to him to equate an Allied victory with the purposes of God. Could not a defeat of the Allies, 50 he mused, also be construed as an act of God? Like

Morrison, Dulles feared the effect too keen an identifi­ cation between the Allied cause and the will of God might have. But Dulles lacked the theological subtlety of

Morrison and consequently took a different tack. In terms strongly reminiscent of the 1950's, but with quite a different intent, he called on the CJDP to undertake a program to foster a "righteous faith and a sense of mission.To implement such a program he drew up an outline for a symposium in book form entitled A Righteous 52 Faith for a Just and Durable Peace. He wrote the lead article which inveighed against patriotic excesses by 110

Christians. The same theme and virtually the same words were used in an article published in Life in December,

1942. He began by saying: "There are those who assert that during war our thoughts should be of nothing beyond military victory and that the Christian virtues should be laid aside and dependence placed upon the primitive emo­ tions. This demand that Christians thus choose between

Christ and the state is one that can and must be rejected.

To reject it involves no disloyalty to the State ....

Our purpose is that the American people be filled with a righteous faith .... It is lack of such a faith that has made us weak. To recapture such a faith will make us strong.

Dulles believed that the recovery of a righteous faith would serve as an antidote to the rancour of war.

A righteous faith must be based on the way of Christ.

He [Christ] sought to show men how, throughout the ages, they might find the way to surmount evil that would constantly be reappearing in ever changing form. That way, He taught, was to act out of visions that would see clear, minds that would think straight, and hearts that would comprehend the essential unity and equal worthiness of all human beings. He inveighed against hatred and vengefulness, self-deceit and deification of one's particular nation, race or class. He did so not only because such emotions are repugnant to God's will for man, but also because they always make men incompetent to deal with human problems. They create those blind masses and those blind leaders who, He pointed out, end up together in the pit.53

The way of Christ was thus the way of rationality and due Ill process, in which the means remained strictly within bounds of the goals which were sought. Those goals were a world free of the cancer of war and based on a community of law.

But such goals could only be anticipated if the poisonous emotions of mass hatred could be held to a minimum and the cool dispassion of rationality maintained.

Dulles' article was widely hailed as a great suc­ cess. Among those who applauded it were the publishers,

Simon and Schuster, who offered their services in pub­ lishing any materials Dulles or the CJDP might have in 55 preparation. Van Kirk, whose fertile brain was in constant motion, immediately suggested that he and

Dulles do a series of short popular treatments of the bases of a just peace entitled "The A-B-C of Winning the Peace."^ Dulles was interested but the press of events and work in 1943 prevented the project from materializing. 112

NOTES

■^Federal Council of Churches, Biennial Report, 1940, p. 78.. 2 Dulles to Hull, March 12, 1941, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 3 ...... Christianity and Crisis, June 2, 1941, p. 7. 4 Dulles to Kagawa, September 5, 1941, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 5 Federal Council of Churches, Annual Report, 1941, p. 52-3. 6 Speech before the National Board of the YMCA, Detroit, Michigan, January 13, 1941, Box 138, Dulles Papers. 7 Dulles to Lawrence, June 27, 1941, Box 8, Dulles Papers. ^CJDP minutes, June 20, 1941, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 9 Quoted in Divine, Second Chance, p. 44.

^Dulles, Long Range Peace Objectives (CJDP pamphlet, 1941), pT 8-9.

11Ibid., pp. 15-21. 12 Divine, Second Chance, pp. 4 3-44.

^CJDP minutes, September 21, 1941, Box 139, FCC- MSS. 14 Micklem to Dulles, September 24, 1941, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Van Kirk, September 25, 1941, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

■^Dulles continued his criticism of the Charter in an article entitled "Peace Without Platitudes," pub­ lished in the January, 1941 issue of Fortune. 113

^ F C C Biennial Report, 1942, p. 42. 1 ft CJDP minutes, September 21, 1941, Box 139, FCC-MSS.

^ Christian Century, March 25, 1942, p. 325. 20 A Message to Our Fellow Christians (FCC pamph­ let, 1942). 21 Dodds to Dulles, March 9, 1942; Crane to Dulles, March 10, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

22Time, March 16, 1942, p. 46.

2 ^Dodds to Dulles, March 9, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

2^Crane to Dulles, March 16, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

2^Dulles to Crane, March 19, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

26Ibid.

2^Hudson to Dulles, March 27, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 2 8 Dulles had just been reelected as a trustee of the Institute of International Education and as a director of the American Peace Society. Memoranda, Box 139, Dulles Papers. 2^Dulles to Hudson, May 8, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

^ Christianity and Crisis, April 6, 1942, p. 1. 31 A Basis for the Peace to Come (New York, 1942). 32 Memoranda, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 33 CJDP minutes, March 21, 1941 and November 24, 1941, Upright file, FCC-MSS. 34 FCC Biennial Report, 1942, p. 67.

■^William Paton to Dulles, May 27, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 114

^Dulles to Welles, June 2, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers.

"^FCC Bulletin, September, 1942, p. 10. 38 William Paton, Associate Secretary of the Pro­ visional Committee of the World Council of Churches; Bishop Bell of Chichester; Rev. J. Hutchison Cockburn of the Church of Scotland; Rev. J. Pitt Watson, Chm. of the Church and Nation Committee, Church of Scotland; Rev. Eric Fenn, Assist. Director of Religious Broadcast­ ing, BBC; Kenneth Grubb, Controller of the Ministry of Information; Dr. Lindsay, Master of Balliol; A.D.K. Owen, sec. to Sir Stafford Cripps; Dennis Routh, Fellow of All Souls Church, Oxford; Sir John Hope-Simpson, Chm. of the Christian Council of Refugees; Arnold Toynbee; Sir Alfred Zimmern, Royal Institute of International Affairs; Rev. R. D. Whitehorn, Professor of Church His­ tory, Westminster College, Cambridge; Margaret Wrong, Sec. of the International Committee on Christian Literature.

"^FCC Bulletin, September, 1942, p. 10. 40 CJDP minutes, June 5, 1942, Box 207, FCC-MSS.

4^CJDP minutes, September 16-17, 1942, Box 207, FCC-MSS.

Dulles to Ready, October 15, 1942, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 43 Those attending were Frank Aydolotte, Raymond L. Buell, Harold W. Dodds, Clyde Eagleton, Frank Graham, William A. Neilson, Francis P. Sayre, Charles P. Taft, Kenneth S. Latourette, John Mackay, Reinhold Niebuhr, William Scarlett, Henry P. Van Dusen, Luther Weigle, Bishop McConnell, Roswell Barnes, Bulles. (Memoranda, October 9-11, 1942, Box 139, FCC-MSS. 44 British-American Statement on World Order, Oc­ tober, 1942, Box 139, FCC-MSS; Dulles to Van Dusen, October 28, 1942, Box 139, FCC-MSS.

^ Christian Century, August 12, 1942, p. 985.

46Ibid., July 22, 1942, p. 913.

4^Ibid., August 26, 1942, p. 1034. CJDP members were: Atkinson, Aydolotte, Baker, Bates, Beaven, Coffin, Cunningham, Dodds, Dawber, Holt, Horton (Douglas), Mackay, 115

Mays, McConnell, Mott, Niebuhr, Oxnam, Poling, Scarlett, Sherrill, Tobias, Tucker, Van Dusen, Weigle, Woolley.

48Ibid., p. 1022. 49 Time, December 21, 1942, p. 73.

^ Christian Century, August 26, 1942, p. 1022.

^ C J D P minutes, September 16-17, 1942, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 52 A Righteous Faith for a Just and Durable Peace (FCC pamphlet, 1942.) Other contributors were: WiTliam Hocking, Henry Van Dusen, Luther Weigle, Everette Clinchy, John Mackay, John C. Bennett, Albert W. Beaven, Pitirim Sorokim, C. Bromley Oxnam, Francis P. Sayre, Clyde Eagle- ton, Willaim Scarlett, and Harry Emerson Fosdick.

53Ibid., p. 5. 54 Life, December 28, 1942, p. 50. 55 Simon and Schuster to Dulles, January 22, 1943, BOX 197, FCC-MSS.

38Van Kirk to Dulles, February 3, 1943, Box 197, FCC-MSS. CHAPTER IV

THE CRUSADE FOR A WORLD ORGANIZATION

BEGINS— 1943-44

The internationalist crusade to end American iso­ lationism and secure American involvement in an interna­ tional collective security organization began gaining momentum during 1942. In May Vice President Wallace de­ livered his "century of the common man" speech in New

York City, thus throwing his influence on the side of the internationalists. Under-Secretary of State Welles, believing Wallace had been too vague regarding the future, decided to be more specific. In a Memorial Day address at

Arlington National Cemetery Welles reproached the United

States for its isolationism and went on to predict that the men on the battlefields "... will demand that the

United States become the nucleus of a world organization of the future to determine the final terms of a just, an honest and durable peace." It was the most explicit statement yet made by a high administration figure regard­ ing a world organization. Welles' speech, which had not been cleared with the Secretary of State, infuriated Hull,

116 117 who feared Welles had committed the government to a policy it might not be able to follow. Hull was not averse to an international organization? in fact he was a strong internationalist. What he hoped to avoid were the potentially divisive political consequences of a debate on an international organization in the midst of the war.

In order to recapture the initiative he gave a national radio address in July where he stated: "It is plain that some international agency must be created which can— by force, if necessary— keep the peace among nations in the future."1

Thus by late summer, Wallace, Welles and Hull had all endorsed some form of international organization. They had not, however, convinced the President. On the second anniversary of the Atlantic Charter (August 14) he pointedly reiterated his conviction that the "single supreme object­ ive of the United Nations is winning the war." The Ameri­ can people tended to agree with the President. In July,

1942 the Gallup Poll reported that 73% of the people fav­ ored entry into a world organization, up from 50% a year earlier. But when specific questions regarding a postwar organization were posed this high percentage rapidly evaporated. Fortune Magazine found that when a specific set of options were advanced only 34% wanted an active part in a new association of nations. Most, in fact, preferred to defer planning until the war was won. 118

Equally disturbing for the internationalists were the fall midterm elections. Of 115 Congressmen with isola- 2 tionist voting records, 110 won reelection.

The election results were a cause of great concern to Dulles. In a letter to Sumner Welles, he expressed his fear of an isolationist resurgence. Information from various parts of the country, he said, "leads us to feel that we are now in a very critical and formative period, where the attitudes adopted may be decisive for the course our nation will follow after the war. We are impressed by the drift toward a policy of isolationism and reliance on our own strength alone and feel that unless vigorous measures are taken to combat this it will 3 be promoted rather than checked by future events." He was convinced, he told a group of churchmen early in 194 3, that unless the United States committed itself without reservation to the creation of a world organization dur­ ing the war it would never become a reality. Postwar power rivalries between the United States and the Soviet

Union over the disposition of Eastern Europe, and the

United States' monopoly of world power, would destroy any possibility of creating such a body after the war. The

United States would be tempted to repeat its experience 4 after World War I. That must not be allowed to happen.

The CJDP, he announced to Welles, was going to throw its 119 weight behind a crusade for a world organization, and he hoped the Administration would find it possible to give some evidence that it supported the aims of the Commis- 5 s ion.

Up to the end of 1942 the CJDP had been flounder­ ing without a clear sense of purpose or program. Now, however, Dulles determined to place it in the vanquard of an assault on isolationism. Nineteen forty-three became the period of the most intensive activity of the entire life of the Commission, with Dulles avidly throwing him­ self into the venture. In fact, he was so obviously immersed in Commission work that a client was prompted to warn him not to neglect the affairs of the trust fund which he served as counsel.**

At its January meeting the Committee of Direction decided upon three major projects for the year. It would issue a new more specific statement on postwar aims; it would attempt to hold an ecumenical conference on world order; and plans were made for a mammoth campaign, known as the Christian Mission on World Order, to be staged in the fall of 1943.7

Dulles introduced the proposal for a new statement on world order to the FCC executive committee in January g and was authorized to procede with the project. The new Statement of Political Propositions, popularly known as the Six Pillars of Peace, was the most carefully 120 constructed statement ever issued by the CJDP. Three months in the drafting process, the language belonged to

Dulles, but the ideas were a composite of a wide variety of thinking by political, business and church leaders.

Even Under-Secretary Welles was consulted and made sug- g gestions which were incorporated in the document.

Six Pillars was an attempt to state more specifi­ cally and explicitly the implications of the previously published Statement of Guiding Principles. Henry Van

Dusen, who was involved in drafting the paper, explained the nature of the new document:

The CJDP has now taken the second step of indicat­ ing what those principles (Guiding Principles) imply in terms of six Political Propositions. The attempt by Christians to discover the limits within which they may speak with authority in the political and economic realm has been greatly furthered in recent years by the recognition of 'middle axioms.' Middle axioms are propositions midway between broad general goals which are likely to claim ready acceptance but may easily be neglected in practise, and concrete plans which are the province of technical experts.

The CJDP's six Political Propositions are admirable examples of middle axioms. They de­ fine those problems for which international "political framework," "supervision," "organi­ zation," "procedure" must be provided, but they do not attempt to specify the the precise form which such international structures must take . . .

In brief, these Propositions are not so general that they may win lip-service in principle and then be disregarded in practise. They are not so specific that they open churchmen to the charge of dogmatizing beyond the borders of their competence.10 121

The Introduction expressed the sense of urgency which prompted the statement. "Military peril has dramatized for all to see, the need for international cooperation. But as military victory becomes more cer­ tain that need will be less obvious. As we come to grips with the appalling moral/ social and material aftermaths of Axis rule, transitory issues will arise to perplex and divide the United Nations .... Thus, if our nation does not make the right choice soon, it may never be made in our time.Readers were urged to study the Propositions and seek their acceptance by the

United States government.

The Propositions were designed, according to

Dulles, to "force" a decision by the American government 12 in favor of world organization. They sought to estab­ lish the essential bases for a just and durable peace.

In their form they were as follows:

1) The Peace must provide the political framework for a continuous collaboration of the United Nations and in due time of neutral and en­ emy nations.

'The interdependence of the world is strikingly proved by the events that led up to this war. That interdependence calls for permanent political collaboration. Such collaboration should as quickly as possible be universal. But practi­ cally the initial nucleus is the United Nations who have already been forced by events to col­ laborate .

2) The Peace must make provision for bringing within the scope of international agreement those economic and financial acts of national govern­ ments which have widespread international repercussions. 122

Science has made it possible for the world to sustain a far greater population than was formerly the case and to attain for that popu­ lation a higher standard of living. But this involves a large degree of transportation and in­ terchange between one nation and another. Thus all people are subject to grave risks so long as any single government may by unilateral action, disrupt the flow of world trade. This is a form of anarchy that creates widespread insecurity and breeds disorder. It prompts nations to seek self- sufficiency for themselves at the expense of others.

3) The peace must make provision for an organization to adapt the treaty structure of the world to changing underlying conditions.

As the world is now organized, a fixed status is prescribed by treaties and, unless all the parties agree, that status cannot be changed ex­ cept by force or the threat of force. We must, therefore, have an organization to promote such change in the treaty structure of the world as may be needed to keep that structure responsive to future changes in the underlying conditions.

4) The peace must proclaim the goal of auton­ omy for subject peoples, and it must establish in­ ternational organization to assure and to super­ vise the realization of that end.

There must be international agencies, which embrace persons free from self-interest which comes from identification with the particular governing power, and which are charged with the duty to see that pledges of ultimate autonomy are honored, and that, in the meanwhile, there is no exploitation for alien ends.

5) The peace must establish procedures for controlling military establishments everywhere.

It is assumed that those nations with which we are at war will be effectively disarmed. But that alone will not suffice. Military establish­ ments everywhere must be brought under some form of international control.

6) The peace must establish in principle, and seek to achieve in practice, the right of individuals 12 3

everywhere to religious and intellectual liberty.

Peace cannot be preserved merely by docu­ mentary acts that create political bodies and de­ fine their powers and duties. Such bodies can function effectively only as they can count upon a public opinion to understand and support them. It is, therefore, indispensable that there exist the opportunity to bring the people of all the world to a fuller knowledge of the facts and a greater acceptance of common moral standards. Spiritual and intellectual regimentation that prevents this is a basic underlying cause of war. As such it is not a matter of purely domes­ tic concern, and governments and parties must recognize this if the world is to achieve a dur­ able peace.13

The Political Propositions were publicized with a skill and on a scale not usually within the command of church enterprises.^ This was the work of Donald Bolles,

Vice President of the Institute of Public Relations, Inc., a New York advertising agency. Publicizing the Six Pillars was the first project undertaken by the Institute for the CJDP. To ensure the best possible exposure the CJDP held a luncheon for leading business, education, labor, religious and political leaders at the Rockefeller Center

Luncheon Club, where the Six Pillars were first made public. To assure a large attendance, Bolles wrote a letter, signed by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., which said:

"I understand that Mr. John Foster Dulles has invited you to lunch with him on Thursday, March 18. He has also invited me. The basis for a just and durable peace, there to be presented and discussed, which Mr. Dulles has set forth in six brief, ably drawn paragraphs, has impressed 124 me as of such profound significance to the future of civilization that I am setting aside all other plans in order to attend .the luncheon and I greatly hope you will do the same."^ This solemn approach had its effect, for nearly all those invited attended and the glittering array provided just the news-catching setting which Bolles had anticipated. The New York Times and the New York

Herald Tribune both carried two-column front page stories the following day. Copies of the statement were sent to

2000 newspapers throughout the country. It was widely discussed in editorials, syndicated columns and radio programs. In Britain the London Times commended the

Pillars as a significant contribution in the direction of world peace.^

To enhance discussion the CJDP published a ser­ ies of eight special articles on the Six Pillars. One article was published each week between May 20 and July

5, and appeared in ninety-six daily newspapers with a combined circulation of 5,4 00,000. The articles were written by well known personalities in public life. Six- 17 teen religious publications also carried them.

A concerted effort was made to bring the Six

Pillars to the attention of the rank and file church members. Sixty thousand copies were mailed to ministers, denominational leaders, social action secretaries, city 125 and state councils of churches. These recipients were urged to make the Pillars available to the average church member. To assist this process the CJDP staff produced an eighty page discussion outline entitled Six Pillars of

Peace— A Study Guide.' The pamphlet was designed, in Van

Kirk's words, to be "simple, readable, informative and 18 provocative." Later an Instruction Manual for Use

With "Six Pillars of Peace" was published to aid leaders 19 in forming and leading discussion groups.

The British churchmen endorsed the Pillars en­ thusiastically. The fledgling British Council of Churches organized a committee of fourteen church leaders to draw up a British statement incorporating the essential ideas of the Six Pillars. As it turned out the statement, entitled A Christian Basis for Reconstruction, became a fairly good representation of the official position of the British government, for Dulles learned that several high officials of the government had helped to write the 20 statement, although they declined to sign it.

Dulles saw the British statement as a vindication of Christian unity. "Of equal importance is the fact that the British and American statements, taken together, strikingly manifest the power of Christianity to unite national groups in practical programs of common purpose.

The net result is substantial agreement upon the fundamentals 126 21 of a postwar order." Privately, Dulles was less en­ thusiastic about the British statement. He was especially upset by the explicit rejection of the idea of a "single international organization for world government." It, in effect, ratified Roosevelt's notion of a postwar settle- 22 ment under the tutelage of the big four powers. This same criticism was later leveled at the Six Pillars, so perhaps Dulles' strictures need to be taken with a grain of salt. He had apparently hoped the British would be more forthright than he felt was safe for the American churchmen.

Dulles promoted the Six Pillars assiduously. In a series of letters— to Harold Stassen, Lord Halifax,

Senator Connally, FDR, Felix Frankfurter, J. H. Oldham,

Wendell Willkie, and many more— he urged a careful study of the Pillars and if possible, public comment on their behalf. When Anthony Eden came to the United States in the summer Dulles visited him at the British Embassy and 2 3 presented the Pillars to him. Dulles, President Tucker of the FCC, and Roswell Barnes delivered a copy of the

Pillars to FDR at the White House. The President read and commented on them, questioning whether they were not

rather idealistic. The churchmen replied that they had

tried to be realistic. The President then went on to

say that it was a splendid statement and urged the CJDP 127

to see that a copy was sent to every church in the land.

He also urged that greater efforts be made to collaborate with Catholics and Jews. He promised to use the Pillars

in an upcoming speech. The churchmen came away believing

that the President was modifying his position regarding

international organization# but in retrospect they appear

to have been too sanguine. The President's affable per­ sonality and generous nature frequently misled petitioners

into a false optimism about the substantive changes in his m i n d . ^

Dulles sought to get the Republican Party to

accept the Pillars as a basis for their position on the postwar era. In a letter to Henry Taylor# national

chairman of the Republican Party# he proposed that the party use the Pillars as the "best non-partisan statement 2 5 that has been issued," He had apparently sold Dewey on the idea for he [Dewey] urged Harrison Spangler of the

Republican Committee on Policy to see that the Committee

adopt the Pillars as the official statement of the party.

"I should like to see them adopt it without the change of 26 a comma#" he told Spangler. Not all Republicans were

happy with the Pillars # however. In June Dulles appeared

on the NBC discussion program "For This We Fight" with

James T. Shotwell and Senator Robert Taft. Dulles gave an

enthusiastic endorsement of the Six Pillars# but in the

ensuing discussion# when Taft scornfully dismissed any 128 ideas which proposed to eliminate the sovereignty system,

Dulles failed to challenge him, much to the chagrin of

Shotwell and Dulles' colleagues on the CJDP. 27

The generally enthusiastic response which the Six

Pillars received buoyed Dulles' spirits and confirmed his belief that the churches could be a force for good in the world. Responding to a friend who urged him to be­ come more involved in Republican politics, he reflected this hopefulness. "I am as you know working hard, and I think to some effect, as chairman of the church commission and I am, in the international field, getting into a position to have some real influence throughout the country. I would not want to give this up or involve that effort in partisan politics which would discredit 2 8 it and discredit me with my church group."

Not all the reactions to the Six Pillars were laudatory. The Christian Century accused the Commission of ignoring the Delaware Conference Message, and re­ treating from the advanced positions taken by the confer­ ence. In an editorial entitled "Is Delaware Evaporating?"

Morrison questioned whether the Pillars were really based on the Guiding Principles and pointed out several areas of silence in the Pillars which had been explicit in the former statement. There was no reference to moral law,' a strange silence in a document put out by a commission 129 representing the churches." More specifically, there was no "rejection of revenge and retaliation"? no asser­ tion "that colonial government must be an international task"; no explicit reference to any need for "the diminu­ tion or surrender of national sovereignty"; nor any

"specific avowal of any need for basic changes in the national policies of the United States." All in all the editor found the Six Pillars far inferior to the Delaware

Message. Delaware had sought to be "concrete." The

Pillars were "so vague, so generalized, so full of am­ biguous words and phrases, so dependent for meaning on the implications read into them that they could mean anything or nothing.

Another critic of the Pillars was Methodist

Bishop Wilbur E. Hammaker of Colorado. He was convinced that the Pillars represented an accommodation with the national sovereignty system and the abandonment of the principle of universality for the proposed international 30 organization. Dulles engaged in a lengthy correspond­ ence with Bishop Hammaker and conceded that a more spec­ ific reference to a universal international organization might have been desirable. In fact he raised the ques­ tion of rewriting Pillar I with the Committee of Direc­ tion, but it was decided that the consequent confusion would be too great and the idea was abandoned. Instead they reissued the Guiding Principles and reiterated 130 31 the CJDP's opposition to-all power politics.

The second major project undertaken by the

CJDP in 194 3 was the holding of an International Round

Table of Christian Leaders at Princeton in July. One

of the original assignments of the Commission had been

"the convening, as soon as possible, of an assembly of

Christian leaders, lay and clerical to mobilize the

Christians of all lands in support of a peace consonant 32 with Christian principles." The assumption had been that

such a meeting would be held after hostilities had been

ended. Late in 1942 Walter Van Kirk proposed that a

meeting be held during the war as a testimony of Christian

unity even in the midst of war. When the British church­

men were donsulted they rejected the idea because they

believed no truly ecumenical group could be convened.

They pointed out that at best such a meeting would simply be a one-sided conference of churchmen from the United

Nations. Certainly no Axis delegates could be expected

to attend. The fragmentation of the churches would only

be high-lighted by such a meeting. Dulles and Van Kirk

disagreed, although they acknowledged the risks involved.

Shifting ground, they argued that there was a great deal

of postwar planning in progress among national church

bodies, as well as by the Study Department of the 131

Provisional Committee of the World Council of Churches, and that great benefits could be gained from closer con- 33 sultation by all involved.

In February, 1943, the Committee of Direction decided to go ahead with the planning for the conference.

Dulles assigned Henry P. Van Dusen, Elmore McKee, A. L.

Wamshuis, and 0. Frederick Nolde as a planning committee.

Nolde, a man of unbounded energy, became chairman of the committee, and quickly established himself as the driving 34 force in the planning and organizing of the conference.

The by now well defined procedures for such conferences were put into effect. Five major areas of concern were isolated and eleven preliminary study papers dealing with these topics were prepared by competent authorities to serve as a basis for discussion at the conference.

Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, newly appointed to the

CJDP, was chosen as general chairman of the Round Table. 35 Nolde was secretary.

The goals of the Round Table were defined as fol­ lows :

1) to obtain further information on issues wherein the application of Christian principles and of the political propositions derived there­ from, involves peculiar defficulties and complex­ ities;

2) to promote a better understanding of the views held by Christians in different countries;

3) to formulate, insofar as possible, a consensus of views on the problems of order in'the postwar world.36 132

The Round Table met at Princeton for four days,

July 8-11, 194 3. Sixty Christian leaders, representing four continents and twelve nations were in attendance.

Nearly all were from member states of the United Nations, 37 with a few emigres from the Axis states. In order to assure frankness and uninhibited discussion newsmen and visitors were barred. Since the group was small it was possible to meet in general session as a body, and dis­ cussion and dialogue took the place of formal presenta- 38 tions.

Dulles made some opening remarks which provided an insight into his view of things in mid-194 3. He began by observing that in the United States the battle against the isolationists had not been won, but that • the isolationists were on the defensive. "They can be kept there if our efforts are unremitting. We plan that they shall be." Then he went on to note that "Our task will be greatly helped if we can feel that what we are urging upon our nation parallels that which Christians of other lands are prepared to urge upon their nations. It is most important that we be in step with each other."

With considerable exaggeration he pointed to the Six

Pillars as an example of the influence churches could have on foreign policy. "If today the leaders of both political parties are with virtual unanimity expressing 133 themselves in favor of a future international collabora­ tion much as we outlined, that is due in no small part to our timely intervention." The real danger at the moment, as he saw it, was that the Allied peoples were being tempted by "the very devils against which they fought." In many quarters the needs of justice were degenerating into demands for vengeance. A new "Holy

Alliance" based on military force was being created and stood as a formidable obstacle to a just and durable 39 peace.

The Round Table elected a guiding committee to identify the issues and direct the discussions. The discussions were then summarized by an editorial com-. mittee and after ratification by the Round Table delegates, were written up in a comprehensive statement entitled A 40 Christian Message on World Order. The Message was divided into two parts, the first addressed to the world; the second to the churches. In the first section the

Round Table stipulated ten requirements for progress toward world order. The ten points were:

1) That national isolationism, the monopolization of political power by a few nations, and the balance of power which hitherto have failed to maintain the peace, be repudiated as policies which contra­ vene the purpose of establishing world order and the institutions requisite thereto.

2) That temporary collaboration among the United Nations should, as quickly as possible, give way to a universal order and not be consolidated into a closed military alliance to establish a 134

preponderance of power or a concert of power.

3) That drastic reduction in armaments be under­ taken as steps toward the goals envisaged in the Atlantic Charter of the abandonment of the use of force and lifting from the people of the world the crushing burden of armaments.

4) That immediate international collaboration such as is involved in a) conferences dealing with specific problems and in b) the adminis­ tration of relief and reconstruction be guarded against exploitation for purposes of power politics.

5) That if regional organizations arise, they be part of an inclusive world order and shall not threaten the interests of world organization.

6) That a larger measure of discipline and sac­ rifice for the good of the whole world community be practised by each nation as necessary to the good of that nation as part of the community.

7) That individual citizens recognize their re­ sponsibility for their collective decisions as reflected in national policies.

8) That ethical and moral standards recognized as applying to individual conduct be recognized as applying also to group, corporate, and national conduct.

9) That cultural and social collaborations be established, along with political collaboration, as essential for the achievement of world order.

10) That an adequate motivation be developed in the will of the peoples of the world to sup­ port the agencies and arrangements for cooperation, so that the sense of national destiny which has hitherto led nations to seek national aggrandize­ ment, shall hereafter find its expression in works that promote the general welfare of mankind.

With characteristic optimism, the second part of the Message declared that the "Christian church is potentially the chief instrument of world order" for "the desperate needs of the people are for moral and spiritual light, for reiease from fear, for faith and courage, for forgiveness and the grace to forgive. It is the re­ sponsibility of the Church to meet those needs." Among the harbingers of hope was the "new access of power in unity" of the churches., "The emergence of the World

Council of Churches and the increasing vitality of the other ecumenical organizations have occurred at a time when the world has been torn asunder by conflict. Even now the ecumenical character of the Church demonstrates its reality. Across all lines of cleavage the ecumenical fellowship has not only endured but has been maturing. . .

It is a Church made new, and yet the same Church that has spanned the centuries, proclaiming judgment and salvation 41 while civilizations and empires have risen and fallen."

The conference was more important as a symbol of church unity than as a force in promoting a just peace.

But even as a symbol it lacked the universality it osten­ sibly espoused, because, from an ecumenical standpoint, the membership was not very broad. It was most con­ vincing in retrospect, as a reflection of the deep con­ viction of Dulles and the leaders of the FCC that the church could only speak with authority if it spoke in unity. This was the vision of Oxford, and the Round

Table was a tribute to the depth of conviction which that vision had inspired. 136

The concern that the religious community speak with a united voice was expressed in the autumn of 1943 with the publication of an inter-faith Declaration on

World Order, popularly known as Pattern for Peace. The

Pattern was issued over the signatures of 150 prominent

Catholic, Jewish and Protestant leaders. Its purpose was to convince the nation that the American religious community was united in its concern for a new international organization. The initiative for the Pattern came from

Richard M. Fagley of the Church Peace Union. Fagley, with the aid of Father Edward A. Conway, S.J. of Regis

College, drew up the actual statement, which was then ratified by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the

Synagogue Council of America, and the Federal Council' of

Churches. The CJDP was only marginally involved. Dulles signed the statement on behalf of the Commission and later gave a national radio address explaining the state- 42 ment and urging its widespread study.

During 1943 internationalist advocates of a post­ war international organization feverishly pressed their case. When the Seventy-Eighth Congress convened in

January a number of resolutions were introduced propos­ ing the creation of a governmental postwar planning com­ mission. Other resolutions, notably those of Congress­ men John Kee of West Virginia and Fulbright of Arkansas, authorized the House Foreign Relations Committee to con­ duct studies of proposed international organization plans.

Similar proposals were made in the Senate. The State

Department resented these initiatives, for even though

Hull shared the postwar aims of the internationalists, he feared the political and international mischief too many ill-considered plans might create. In other words, these were matters for the State Department to deal with, and at that point neither Hull nor the President were 43 prepared to act.

But the internationalists were not inclined to wait for the Administration to act. Four Senators,

Ball, Hill, Burton and Hatch, submitted a resolution, popularly known as the B2H2 resolution, calling on the

United States to take the lead in forming a permanent international organization immediately. The organiza­ tion would have power to carry on the war, occupy territory liberated from the Axis, administer relief and economic aid, and provide the machinery for negoti­ ating a peace settlement. The resolution also called for the creation of a police force to "suppress . . . any future attempt at military aggression by any nation."

The B2 H2 resolution was clearly a challenge to the Ad­ ministration to come to grips with the matter of a new international organization.

The B2H2 resolution aroused enormous interest in 138 internationalist circles throughout the nation. New groups sprang up to work for its adoption. In July many of these groups were brought into a new United Nations Association led by Clark Eichelberger, Dulles, William Allen White,

Thomas J. Watson, and James T. Shotwell. Its purpose was to promote "the entrance of the United States into a 45 permanent organization for collective security."

Equally important for the internationalist cause was the appearance of Wendell Willkie's One World, which enjoyed a phenomenal popularity. Willkie's evangelical call for a new world order clearly attracted many people.

The book was the progenitor of a new Republican organi­

zation called the Postwar Policy Association. This group, midwestem in origin,.was designed to force the

Republicans to repudiate isolationism, ensure adoption of an internationalist plank in the 1944 Republican plat­

form, and support the B2H2 resolution. Many Republican party leaders believed the Postwar Policy Association was

really a front for a Willkie drive for the Republican

Presidential nomination in 1944, since several of his

lieutenants of 1940 were its chief promoters. As a

result, the Republican high command created its own group, the Republican Postwar Advisory Council, made up of Re­ publican governors, Senators and Congressmen. Signifi­ cantly, Willkie, Ball and Burton were not invited to join

the Council, but the Willkie book and the Postwar Policy 139

Association had forced the Republicans to acknowledge

the importance of postwar issues and in the process served notice to the Democrats that failure to move on' the issue

of postwar organization could become a political lia- bility.1 • 1 -4- 46

The Administration and the Congress were not be­

ing moved. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee under

the chairmanship of Senator Connally, and at the behest of

Hull, was keeping the ^2^2 kill bottled up, primarily for

fear of the isolationist reaction it might cause. Propo­

sition five of the resolution, which called for the crea­

tion of an international police force, was especially

subject to isolationist attack. In an AP poll of the

Senate in April only twenty-four out of ninety-six Sena­

tors evinced support for a resolution providing for an

international police force. To the delight of the inter­ nationalists, the American people sharply disagreed with

the Senate. In a Gallup Poll in flay 74% believed the

United States should support an international police force

to maintain peace after the war.^

Immediately following the summer recess the House

decisively passed a resolution offered by Congressman

Fulbright of Arkansas which did not explicitly call for

an international police force, but put the Congress on

record in support of an international organization. The

Connally Committee was stung to action by what seemed like 140 a challenge to the foreign policy primacy of the Senate.

As a result the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out its own bill known as the Connally Resolu­ tion which undertook: "That the United States, acting through its constitutional processes, join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and maintenance of international authority with power to prevent aggres- 48 sion and to preserve the peace of the world."

Many internationalists found the Connally Reso­ lution much too vague, and a plethora of amendments were offered to strengthen the language of the bill. On be­ half of the CJDP, Dulles sent a strongly-worded letter to Connally urging that the Senate adopt a "clear and comprehensive resolution favoring United States collabora­ tion with other nations in the now demonstrated areas of 49 national inter-dependence." The letter was later sent to all members of Congress. Commission members were urged to write their Senators in a similar vein. Dulles and

Van Kirk did not find the Connally Resolution totally unacceptable, for they offered to testify before the 50 Foreign Relations Committee on behalf of the bill. In fact, Dulles preferred the Connally measure to the ^2^2 resolution, with the Fulbright bill representing his own viewpoint most closely. Dulles protested, as he did con­ sistently throughout, that any plan to create an inter­ national police force was a mistake. He argued that a 141

police force should be used only by a legitimate govern­ ment based on law. On the international level there was neither law nor government based on law. On that basis, he remarked to Senator Ball, an international police

force could only become a mechanism of tyranny in the hands of the most powerful of the national states. Until an

international law-making body could be established any 51 suggestion of a police force was premature. A few months later, in a letter to the United States Federation of Justice, he reiterated his position: ". . . a police

force which is not the servant of a body which can make

and change law generally ends up as a tyrant who provokes

revolt."52

Dulles responded with alacrity to accusations

that the Federal Council was "among the group whose aim

is 'World Government and an International Police Force.'"

He pointed out that the Six Pillars mentioned neither world government nor a police force. What the CJDP en­

visioned as a first step was the creation of functional

agencies on the international level which could ultimately

grow into a more comprehensive world political organiza- 53 tion. He rejected the notion that world government

could be created by fiat as many ardent internationalists

seemed to propose. "... the people must rid themselves

of the false concept that a lasting peace can be achieved 142 through clever formulae devised by clever states- 54 men . . . ." The real solution would only evolve in a kind of organic fashion over a long period of time. On the other hand, he was equally critical of those who seemed unable to advance beyond the old "power politics" of the past. In this category he placed, among others, Walter

Lippmann and FDR.

In July, 194 3, Lippmann published his United States

Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. He proposed that the postwar peace be based on a "nuclear alliance" of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, a position coinciding closely with that of President Roose­ velt. The book dismayed the internationalists. Even

Herbert Hoover found Lippmann frustrating. Writing to

Dulles of his concern over the effect of the book on the drive for an international organization, he concluded:

"Which all brings me to urge that in a kindly and friendly way Lippmann's historic distortion ought to be attended to by you. It was a great pleasure to talk to you again, 55 for sanity is rare." In his reply, Dulles said he was refuting Lippmann all the time. Lippmann, he wrote, 5 6 is wrong, and will be "proven so by history."

During 194 3 Dulles became increasingly impatient with President Roosevelt. In October, in an unguarded moment while speaking to a group of ministers, he harshly criticized the President for his failure to speak out on 143

Administration peace objectives. He accused Roosevelt of being politically timid; of failing to have any 57 "settled convictions"; and of kowtowing to the Russians.

A few weeks later he returned to the same theme in a letter to Van Dusen. "It is perfectly clear to me that the pres­ ent administration has not drawn upon and does not possess the competence needed to deal with the problem of bring­ ing this war to an acceptable end and making a quick and orderly transition to some better postwar order. Roose­ velt is at home when it comes to uttering fine general­ ities, but when it comes down to the concrete, there is complete chaos and confusion, conflict of authority 5 8 and lack of decision."

The same mood of disenchantment was evident at

the general meeting of the CJDP in September. Dulles opened the proceedings with the question: "Has the time come for our Commission to request from the government a more precise formulation of American postwar policy?" He noted that in the nearly two years since the United States entered the war the President had made no public state­ ment regarding postwar aims. He believed that it was time

for the CJDP to express its disapproval of the failure to

act. The consensus of the Commission was that Dulles

should talk to the President about his position on post­ war aims. The Commission enjoined Dulles to emphasize the desire of the CJDP to help and strengthen the President 144 rather than to under-cut him. It was also suggested that the approach be made bi-partisan by having a similar meeting with Republican leaders. Dulles was unable to arrange an interview with Roosevelt, but he did talk to 59 a number of Republican spokesmen.

The confident mood which had characterized the internationalists during the summer was replaced in the fall by one of growing discouragement. It was in that kind of atmosphere that the CJDP made the final plans for its Christian Mission on World Order. The campaign was designed by the Public Relations Institute and was administered by the CJDP in conjunction with six of the major denominational agencies concerned with world order.

The Mission was directed by Walter Van Kirk, but after he became ill, Paul Macy became acting director. A 6 0 staff of seven members coordinated the Mission. Fifteen teams of the ablest clergy and laymen in American Pro­ testantism were sent out to 100 cities throughout the , country during November to hold one day conferences. The aim was. to reach as many leaders of local churches and other organizations as possible. Women's clubs, luncheon clubs, labor and business groups, high schools and colleges were all involved.^ 145

The CJDP sought to accomplish three tasks through the Mission:

1 ) equip leaders to carry on education and action programs; (each conference included at least one methods session, where study materials were introduced);

2 ) "develop a strong body of public opinion alive to the need for keeping America in peace," which translated meant support for an international collective security or­ ganization at the end of the war; .

3) educate the public regarding the principles which Christians believed necessary for a viable world order.^2

The Mission was launched with great fanfare in a colorful ceremony at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine \ in New York City. A message was read from Under-Secretary of State Welles (he was unable to attend because of the

illness of his wife), and Dulles and Senator Ball

addressed the crowd. Senator Ball, v/ith a touch of hyper­ bole, called the Mission the "greatest crusade since

Jesus sent His twelve disciples out to preach the brother- hood of man." Ball criticized the Connally Resolution

for pretending "to make a committment which in reality

it does not make" and urged support for his own kiil*

Dulles' speech was a call for a new creative faith which could carry the nation beyond simple self-interest to a 64 new sense of responsibility for, all men everywhere.

The results of the Mission are hard to evaluate.

It was the most ambitious effort at educating public opinion ever undertaken by the American churches. Much 146 of the success or failure of the Mission rested on the efforts of the local organizing committees. Where there was active leadership, attendance was good and the Mission was usually followed by efforts to continue the program.

Where the committees were weak, the results were some­

times disappointing. The teams which were sent out almost universally got high marks for their efforts. Dulles accompanied a team to Newark, New Jersey, Macon, Georgia, 65 and Birmingham and Mobile, Alabama.

The most important result of the Mission was to

encourage other groups to join the internationalist

crusade. In January, 1944, the Methodist Church began

an ambitious campaign led by G. Bromley Oxnam, presiding

bishop of the Methodist Council of Bishops. He and

several fellow bishops had visited President Roosevelt

early in 1943 to discuss postwar planning. They came

away convinced that the churches ought to play a more

active role in support of an internationalist policy.

Oxnam organized a "Crusade for a New World Order" popularly

known as the "Bishop's Crusade," with the intention of

persuading eight million Methodists to write letters to

the President and Congress in support of an international­

ist posture. The Crusade began on January 10 with mass

meetings in cities throughout the country. On the local

level ministers arranged to visit church members to en­

courage them to write letters. They were told to write 147 in their own way asking that the United States government repudiate isolationism and commit itself to an inter­ national organization. The Bishop's slogan, "The Peace

Hay be Won by a Three-Cent Stamp," was given a vigorous tryout: Washington received one of the largest out­ pourings of mail in history. Unlike many pressure cam­ paigns of this sort, there were very few form letters.

Most were penciled postcards and handwritten letters from men and women v/ho had never before expressed their views to government. Few mentioned international organization as a specific objective, but the majority emphasized the un-Christian character of isolationism and asked that it be repudiated.

During March, when the cjeluge of mail was at its height, the Northern Baptist Convention announced a World

Order Crusade which culminated in another letter-writing campaign, this one with a sharper focus, specifically calling for a universal world organization to maintain 6 7 the peace. Not to be outdone, the Congregational Church began a "personal commitment" drive on behalf of inter­ national organization. On Sunday, May 21, Congregational ministers presented their parishoners with a World Order

Compact and requested everyone to sign it. Modeled on the Mayflower Compact, the document asked people to pledge

"to work for a just and cooperative world order," and to help establish "an international organization for the 148 6 8 better ordering of the inter-dependent life of nations."

As the Christian Mission on World Order was getting

underway in early November, 194 3, several new developments

took place which encouraged the internationalists. On

November 1 the government released the text of the Mos­

cow Declaration, signed by the Big Four foreign ministers

several days earlier. The fourth article of the Declara­

tion recognized the necessity of creating "at the earliest

date a general international organization, based on the

principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving

states . . . for the maintenance of international peace

and security." Beyond that, the four powers agreed to

consult with each other and with other members of the

United Nations "with a view of joint action on behalf of

the community of nations" pending the establishment of 6 9 the new world body. With the publication of the

Moscow Declaration, it was immediately suggested that

article four of the Declaration be added to the pending

Connally Resolution. As a result many of the inter­

nationalists who had earlier opposed the resolution now

came out in favor of it, and it was passed eighty-five 70 to five by the Senate on November 5.

Internationalists generally hailed the Moscow

Declaration as a giant step in the right direction, but

a few dissented, among them Welles, Willkie, and Wallace.

They saw four-power domination of the postwar world 149 71 implicit in the Declaration. The National Catholic

Welfare Council and the Christian Century both expressed suspicions that the Declaration was a facade for a more 72 mundane power politics at the end of the war. The reaction of the men at the CJDP was more favorable. On

November 16 Dulles issued a public statement by the CJDP hailing the Declaration as "a notable step toward realiz­ ing international order as envisaged by our Six Pillars 73 of Peace." In a point by point comparison of the

Declaration and the Six Pillars he was somewhat less en­ thusiastic, finding that the Declaration only approxi­ mated the Six Pillars at two points. The commitment to a general international organization of all 'peace loving' states conformed "substantially" to Pillar I, although he found the language rather ambiguous. The Declaration also contemplated a "general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the postwar period."

Here as in the former case Dulles found the language of the Declaration more vague and less explicit than the

Six Pillars. The Declaration said nothing, except by inference, about the issues raised in the other four

Pillars. Nevertheless, he believed the statement was a step in the right direction. 150

NOTES

^Divine, pp. 65, 6 6 , 6 8 .

2 Ibid., pp. 6 8 , 69, 72, 73. 3 Dulles to Welles, Noveinber 26, 1942, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 4 Discussion at 5th Ave. Presbyterian Church, February 24, 1943, Box 21, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Welles, Noveinber 26, 1942, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

^Warner to Dulles, March 6 , i943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 7 CJDP minutes, January 6 , 1943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 8 FCC executive committee minutes, January 22, 1943, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 9 Welles to Dulles, February 26, 1943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

^^Christianity and Crisis, March 22, 194 3, p. 1.

^ A Just and Durable Peace, Discussion of Politi­ cal Propositions (CJDP pamphlet, 1943), p . .4. ” 12 Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Ses­ sion, (194 3), Appendix, p. 1589. Dulles' remarks were read into the appendix of the Congressional Record at the request of Senator Joseph Ball.

13FCC Bulletin, April, 1943, pp. 11-12.

^ Christian Century, May 26, 1943, p. 631.

^Rockefeller letter, March 9, 194 3, Box 180, Dulles Papers. 16 Clip-sheet of editorial comment and news cover­ age, Box 195, FCC-MSS. 151

17CJDP notes, Box 195, FCC-MSS. 18 Van Kirk to Social Action secretaries, April 20, 1943, Box 195, FCC-MSS. iq FCC Bulletin, October, 1943, p. 9. 20 Correspondence, July, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

3^FCC Bulletin, October, 1943, p. 12.

33Dulles to Van Dusen, August 3, 1943, Box 21, Dulles Papers. 2 ^ Correspondence, March, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

A Jt Memo on conference with FDR, March 26, 1943, Box 21, Dulles Papers. A letter and a copy of the Pillars alongwith., a clipsheet of editorial comment was sent to each member of Congress.

33Dulles to Taylor, August 13, 1943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 26 Dewey to Dulles-^ June 7, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

27 CJDP notes, June 19, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

33Dulles to Ruth Simms, July 2 3, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 29 Christian Century, May 26, 1943, p. 632.

3^Wilbur E. Hammaker, "A Voice or an Echo?" Christian Advocate, July 29, 1943, pp. 14-15.

3^CJDP minutes, September 22-23, 1943, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

33FCC Annual Report, 1941. pp. 93-94.

33Ibid.

*3 A CJDP minutes, February 4, 194 3, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

35CJDP minutes, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 36 A Christian Message on World Order (New York, 1943), p. 6 . 152

37Christianity and Crisis, III (1943), p. 13. 38 Eight social action secretaries had been invited as observers. Publicity was handled by the Institute of Public Relations. 39 Dulles remarks. International Round Table, July 8 , 194 3, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 40 Round Table minutes, July 8-11, 194 3, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 41 A Christian Message on World Order, passim.

^ C J D P memoranda, 194 3, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 43 Divine, pp. 88-92. 44 Ibid., p. 92.

^3 Ibid., p. 98. 46 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenburg (Boston, 1952), p. 55. 47 Divine, p. 110. 4 8 Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 1st Ses­ sion (1943) , p. 8620. 49 Dulles to Connally, October 22, 1943, Box 215, FCC-MSS.

5 0 Ibid.

3^Dulles to Senator Ball, July 14, 1943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. 52 Dulles to the United Spates Federation of Jus­ tice, October 15, 194 3, Box 139, Dulles Papers. 5 3 Correspondence, September, 1943, Box 139, Dulles Papers.

3^Dulles speech to Protestant ministers at the Collegiate Reformed Church, NYC, September 15, 194 3, Box 8 , Dulles Papers.

^Hoover to Dulles, September 30, 1943, Box 139, Dulles Papers. 153

^Dulles to Hoover, August 30, 1943, Box 139, Dulles Papers. 57 David Hinshaw to Donald Bolles, October 15, 1943, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. C O Dulles to Van Dusen, December 23, 1941, Box 8 , Dulles Papers. ^CJDP minutes, September 22-2 3, 194 3, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

^These were Foreign Missions Conference of North America, Home Missions Council of North America. In­ ternational Council of Religious Education, Missions Edu­ cation Mbvement, United Council of Church Women. Post War World, December, 1943, p. 3.

61Post War World, December, 1943, p. 3. 62 FCC Bulletin, September, 1943, p. 8 .

^Time, November 8 , 1943, p. 34. 6 4 Dulles' address was subsequently printed in the Congressional Record, at the behest of Senator Ball, Congressional RecorcT, 78th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, pp. 4649-4650.

65CJDP memoranda, 194 3, Box 197, FCC-MSS. 66 Divine,„ . p. 161..

^ Fellowship, April, 1944, p. 78.

^ Christian Century, March 22, 1944, p. 356.

State Department Bulletin, IX (1943), p. 309. 70 Post War World, November, 1944, p. 2. CHAPTER V

THE SEARCH FOR A CURATIVE AND CREATIVE

WORLD ORDER— 1944-1945

The Moscow Declaration and the passage of the

Connally Resolution marked a terminal point in the work of the CJDP. The drive to "force" the government, in

Dulles1 words, to commit itself to develop a postwar international organization, had been successfully com­ pleted. The President and the Congress were on record favoring the establishment of a general international organization. But this represented only a partial victory. The next step was to translate intentions into action. As Dulles put it:

The Christian forces of this country can be grate­ ful that their government has cooperated with the governments of Great Britain, Russia, and China to make a sound beginning for world order. We can legitimately feel that we have done much to create here a public opinion that has made this possible. We must not, however, be com­ placent or relax our efforts. The Moscow Dec­ laration goes only part of the way. Even then they are still only words. To move from words into functioning institutions infused with the spirit of Christian fellowship remains a political and spiritual task of immense proportions.1

The two major projects of the CJDP during 1944-45 were to press the Administration to create a world organization

154 155 before the war ended, and to deal with the question of what form the new world organization should take.

Many internationalists, including members of the

CJDP, felt that Dulles' analysis of the Moscow Declara- tion had been too laudatory. Apparently Dulles also had some second thoughts for in a new statement issued in early February he was far more critical than before.

In fact, the February statement was criticized for being too critical of the government.^ Entitled "World Organi­ zation— Curative and Creative," the statement expressed concern about potential big-power domination of the postwar world, and an over-reliance on security and the use of force to preserve the status quo. "We do not demand the impossible or the impracticable," said the statement, "but we do insist that international organi­ zation should be designed, not to maintain a faulty world status, but to seek inventively to eradicate the political and economic maladjustments, the spiritual and intellectual deficiencies, the inadequacies of inter­ national law, which basically cause war. We urge our public leaders to take steps to endow the projected world organization with responsibilities that are curative and creative and not merely repressive."^

The "Curative and Creative" statement was issued as an official Federal Council executive committee release and widely disseminated by the Public Relations Institute. 156

To express their concern that the United States take the lead in acting on its commitment to international organi­ zation, a meeting was arranged with President Roosevelt.

Dulles, Bishop Bromley Oxnam, and Bishop St. George

Tucker presented the new statement to the President and urged him to take action. The President then described his own conception of the new world organization. It would have an executive council of the four big powers with several smaller powers serving on a rotating basis.

Its chief function would be to keep the peace. The peace would be kept, Roosevelt explained, by use of economic sanctions. In addition, he envisaged the creation of a large number of special bodies dealing with such matters as health, money, and relief. The President, much to the chagrin of the churchmen, then enquired whether the

Six Pillars had been adopted by the Jewish and Catholic faiths. Dulles described the Inter-faith Statement

(Pattern of Peace) of mid-194 3, explaining that the

Pattern of Peace was built on the Six Pillars. "The

Pattern put steeples on them," he said. Oxnam then went on to describe the Bishop's Crusade, emphasizing the churchmen's hope that the new world organization would be as nearly universal as possible.^

In a letter to Christian Herter several days later Dulles reflected his continuing disenchantment with

Roosevelt and his notions regarding world order. As he .157 saw it, the President had not really moved from his "Anglo-

British Alliance" position of the early war years. Nor did he see any evidence of a genuine commitment to act on behalf of world organization, Moscow Declaration and

Connally Resolution notwithstanding. "I very distinctly gained the impression," he wrote, "that too much personal responsibility is being assumed by a tired man."** Morri­ son of the Christian Century reported that Dulles was

"plunged in gloom because of the dark prospects that there would be a postwar organization with affirmative pothers."

Dulles protested to Morrison that he had never been under any illusion about the difficulties of creating an 7 "affirmative organization."

Despite Dulles' disclaimers, he and his colleagues were very upset by the state of affairs and their response was to issue a public appeal to the President and Congress to take action. The new statement, An Appeal to the Presi dent, the Congress and the People of the United States, was signed by 1251 religious leaders representing the entire spectrum of American Protestantism, from highly patriotic Daniel A. Poling, editor of the Christian Her­ ald, to pacifists like the Quaker Rufus Jones and the

Reverend Harry Emerson Fosdick of Riverside Church in

New York City. Written primarily by Dulles, it was the most pointed statement yet issued by the churchmen. The time had come "when a concrete beginning should be made to 158 realize the Moscow Declaration and the Connally Resolu­ tion, which recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization . . . ." Rejecting the President's idea of a "big-four" peace-keeping force the statement empha­ sized that the new organization "must from the beginning be planned to become universal in membership" and "should have not merely the task of seeking physical security, but responsibility to deal regularly with the conditions which contain the seeds of future war." It concluded by calling on the President, the Congress and the American people "to work vigorously for practical steps to initi- O ate such an organization." The Appeal, coupled as it was, with the outpouring of letters precipitated by the various church campaigns of the spring of 1944, was a potent public pressure tool.

The churchmen's drive for American action on international organization was part of a larger movement working toward the same end. In April Dewey, reading a speech written by Dulles, came out for the immediate 9 creation of a world organization. During the summer

Daryl Zanuck's movie "Wilson" began its phenomenal show­ ing. Portraying Wilson as a hero and Henry Cabot Lodge and his isolationist colleagues as villains, the film was a fantastic distortion of history, but a powerful weapon 159 on behalf of the internationalist crusade. Two books assisted the cause. In June Sumner Welles, now a private citizen, published his The Time for Decision, which became a best-seller almost overnight. The book projected a moderate position on world organization neither supporting the "four policeman" concept of

Roosevelt nor the highly idealistic world government of the radical internationalists. Based on the plans he had developed while in the State Department, Welles' projections were to be essentially reproduced in the

Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. The second book was by Walter

Lippmann. Previously he had opposed any discussion of

specific postwar arrangements during the war, but by

1944 he had changed his mind. "The time has come and- the way is clear to define our war aims," he wrote in the opening sentence of United States War Aims. ^ In terms of international organization Lippmann remained a supporter of Roosevelt's "realistic" power politics. He was still disenchanted with the world government idealists in the

international camp.

By July, 70% of the American people were committed

to the creation of an international organization."^ But

this position was couched in highly pessimistic garb.

Most Americans accepted the inevitability of United States

involvement in world affairs. In that sense isolationism was dead. But Americans were not motivated by any great 160

desire to reform the world. The new internationalism was basically grounded in a desire to find a means to

live at peace. "What the majority want from the new

international policy," a pollster commented, "is to make 12 sure that there are no more world wars." The notion

of the full equality of all nations had little appeal for

the American people. They favored an organization that

was universal in scope but which rested on the military

power of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Brit­

ain and China; a reasonable facsimile of Roosevelt's

"four policeman."

In July the State Department revealed the basic

outlines of a plan for an internationalist organization

which it had submitted to the Allies for study. The plan

called for an executive council, a representative assembly

and a world court. Its universality was emphasized, but

the fact that the "Big Four" would dominate the council

and have an exclusive veto power, was left noticeably

vague. Nor did it describe how the peace-keeping machinery

would work. Many internationalists found the new plan

unacceptable because of its conservative nature, but the

New York Times was probably correct in its assessment

that the plan "represents the consensus of American 13 thought on a method to maintain the peace." Most Ameri­

cans were delighted when Hull announced that a meeting

was to be held by the "Big Four" at Dumbarton Oaks near 161

Washington, beginning on August 21, to hold "informal conversations and exchanges of views on the general sub- 14 ject of an international security organization."

On August 16 the State Department was shocked by a statement put out by Republican Presidential nominee

Thomas Dewey. "I have been deeply disturbed by some of the recent reports concerning the forthcoming confer­ ence," he announced. "These indicate that it is planned to subject the nations of the world great and small, permanently to the Coercive power, of the four nations holding this conference." The statement, drafted by

Arthur Krock and Dulles, went on to warn against a four- power alliance which it termed "immoral"and "the rankest form of imperialism." Pleading for a more democratic form of world order, the statement concluded: "As Ameri­ cans we believe with all our hearts in the equality and rights of small nations and minorities. In the kind of permanent world organization we seek, all nations, great 15 and small, must be assured of their full rights." The response to this statement was shattering; editorial praise was lavish and it was clear that world organiza­ tion was now to be a prime issue in the upcoming campaign.

Few people remembered that just a year earlier Dewey had advocated an Ango-American alliance as the basis for

American postwar policy. By an interesting coincidence,

Dulles' basic convictions and Dewey's political instincts 162 had come into agreement. The result was to be a new initiative in American foreign policy.

Secretary Hull was disturbed by what appeared to him as an obvious political ploy. Rejecting the idea that the United States sought a big power alliance, he invited Dewey to come to Washington to confer about the proposed international organization. Dewey decided to send Dulles instead. The result was a sudden surge of interest in the ideas of Dulles regarding world order.

At a press conference in Albany on August 19 Dulles spelled out his views, basically reiterating his support for an organization as universal as possible. He agreed that the defeated Axis nations would need to be policed by the "Big Four." "That is a specific task which for a considerable time, at least, will be a task of the prin- 16 ciple allied victors and not of a world organization."

In this way the "Big Four" would not need to dominate the world body and it could be set up along more democratic lines.

Dulles and Hull met twice, once on August 2 3 and again the following day. After careful study of the State

Department draft plan Dulles assured Hull that he was reassured about the fate of the small nations, and the two men then issued a joint statement in which it was • agreed that the matter of international organization was a "non-partisan" subject to be kept out of the political 163 campaign. Hull was enormously relieved by the outcome, and it is clear that Dulles shared the same feeling, for while he resented the deviousness of the Administration in revealing its position vis a vis world organization, he remembered only too well the disastrous effect of partisan politics on Wilson's League of Nations. He always considered the role he played in defusing the issue as one of the most, significant events of his life.

Dulles' new prominence as the foreign policy spokesman for Dewey resulted in considerable criticism from churchmen. An executive of the National Baptist

Convention warned Van Kirk that people were telling him: "You will have to vote- for Dev/ey now, because the

Republicans have accepted the Six Pillars of Peace and the Democrats have not." He went on to say that since

Dulles was "a candidate for Secretary of State on the Re­ publican ticket" he ought to sever his connections with 17 the CJDP. Another correspondent warned that as long as Dulles remained chairman people would see the CJDP as an arm .of the Republican party. In that case, he said, 18 the CJDP may as well "fold up its tents." In October the Council on Christian Social Progress of the Northern

Baptist Convention formally asked the CJDP to request

Dulles' resignation, not because of antipathy toward

Dulles, but because they feared the consequences of parti­ san identification with the CJDP. In each of these cases 164

Van Kirk responded that as long as Dulles remained non­ partisan he saw no reason for alarm. "I feel we are indebted to Mr. Dulles," he said, "for seeking to lift the whole matter of foreign policy out of the restricted 19 areas of partisan discussion."

On one occasion the Democrats sought to make political capital out of a statement attributed to Dulles.

According to Robert E. Hannegan, Democratic national chairman, Dulles was soft on Japan. Hannegan accused

Dulles of having written: "The world stands to gain and not to lose from an economically prosperous and stable

Japan .... Care must be taken that this (disarmament) does not cripple peacetime industry .... Japan should be allowed to keep a merchant fleet .... Disarmament 20 should not be made a permanent unilateral agreement."

Hannegan's intent was clear. He hoped to discredit Dulles.

Dulles reacted vigorously. "It is utterly false from beginning to end. I haven't the remotest idea where it came from," he insisted. "A guess is that it may have come out of a church group report, with which I had noth­

ing to do. Certainly I have never said anything like that 21 and I would like to know where it came from." As it turned out, the paragraph came from a statement issued by

Luman Shafer and his CJDP study group on the Japanese peace

settlement, published in June, 1944. Dulles knew about, 165

and had read, the paper, for it had occasioned so much difference of opinion within the Commission that it was

issued as a private paper over the signatures of the 22 committee members. In a telegram to Hannegan, Van

Kirk omitted any mention of the group's connection with

the CJDP, simply noting that it was a statement by a

group of fifteen churchmen, and denying that Dulles had

any connection with the pronouncement. He demanded that 23 Hannegan retract his accusation.

Dulles was attacked from a different angle by

the Independent Fundamental Churches of America. Lauding

Dewey as a champion of free enterprise and constitutional

government, the spokesman of the Independent Fundamental

Churches went on to warn him against Dulles. "We know

of his past interest in pacifism and his present con­

nection with the Federal Council of Churches as chairman

of the CJDP, a reputedly pacifistic organization advocat­

ing disarmament and a world policy which would advantage

Communistic Russia more than any other nation." The spokes­

man urged Dewey to read Carl McIntyre's Twentieth Century

Reformation, which purportedly devoted a chapter to Dulles 24 and his machinations. Dewey forwarded the letter to

Dulles, who sent it on to Van Kirk with the jocular sug­

gestion that he might want to file it in the Commission

archives.

Dulles had anticipated these criticisms. In early February, 1944 he had informed Bishop Tucker, President of the Federal Council, that he would be serving as an advisor to Dewey on an informal basis, though he planned no partisan campaigning or speaking. He offered to

relinquish his position as chairman of the CJDP if Presi­ dent Tucker so desired. Without hesitation Tucker asked 2 5 him to carry on. With his increasing prominence m the

campaign and the rash of criticism, he again tendered his

resignation, this time in a formal letter to the execu­

tive committee of the Federal Council. Again his resig­

nation was turned down. The executive committee expressed

its complete confidence in his leadership and complimented

him on his contribution "toward lifting the main issue 2 6 of foreign policy above partisan debate."

In September, 1944 the CJDP held its annual gen­

eral meeting in New York City. Dulles was unable to

attend because of illness, but the Committee of Direction

met at his home several times to bring him up to date on

developments. Van Kirk reported on plans for a second

National Study Conference to be held in Cleveland in

January, 1945. The decision to hold a conference had been

made earlier in the year. The world situation had altered

appreciably since Delaware in 1942 and it seemed to the

Committee of Direction that a new, broadly based and 167 authoritative statement by the churches was needed. With the convening of the Dumbarton Oaks conference in late

August it also became possible for the conference to deal with the results of those negotiations. Plans were fin­ alized for the conference, with Van Kirk and Luman Shafer in charge of organization and direction. Two study com­ missions were set up under the leadership of Professor

Ernest Hocking of Harvard and Professor Walter Horton of

Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. The commissions pre­ pared papers to be presented to the delegates several 27 weeks prior to the conference.

The Commission also reviewed the work of its two study groups dealing, respectively, with the Far East and Europe. Both groups had issued reports in June, 1944 which had created a great deal of controversey. They were urged to continue their study in preparation for further 28 discussion as the war slowly came to an end. In addition the Commission authorized the writing of two booklets,

A Durable Peace in Europe by William H. Chamberlain, and

A Durable Peace in Eastern Asia by Willis Lamott. Their purpose was to foster study and discussion in the local 29 churches about peace-making issues.

The Commission also authorized the publication of a paper entitled Comments on Current Discussions of Inter­ national Order. Professor Hocking drafted the statement. 168

Its purpose was to reiterate the CJDP's insistence that any new world organization must be universal, and based on the principle of equality for all nations, large and small.n 30

Throughout September the focus of attention was on the slow-moving talks at Dumbarton Oaks. The confer­ ence closed on October 7 and its "Proposals for the

Establishment of a General International Organization" were made public on October 9. It called for the estab­ lishment of a United Nations Organization composed of an assembly of all member nations; an eleven-seat Security

Council with five permanent members; an Economic and

Social Council; and an international court of justice. To assure peace, each of the member nations were asked to provide standby forces to be used to prevent aggression.

A Military Staff Committee, operating under the Security

Council, would be in charge of these forces in an emer­ gency. Two basic issues were deliberately vague. The question of who decided aggression had occurred and who voted to use sanctions was not answered. The politically volatile matter of who would control American troops assigned to the world organization was also conspicuously avoided.^

The publication of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals 169

(hereafter DOP) posed a difficult problem for the church­ men. The proposed organization was clearly a step in the right direction, but it fell far short of the kind of organization the Commission had advocated. Dulles reflected this ambivalence in a congratulatory letter to

Hull. Noting that the Proposals had "many imperfections and inadequacies" he nevertheless admitted that the "main thing is to get started. For this the world owes you 32 much." In a speech to a Presbyterian World Order Move­ ment audience in Brooklyn several weeks later the ambiva­ lence was still present. Though urging the audience to support the Proposals as "a beginning" in the search for a new world order, he criticized the excessive reliance on power. "The arrangement partakes too much of a military 33 alliance," he said.

Dulles' position was beset by pitfalls, for he was writing speeches for Dewey, and Dewey was under fierce attack as an "ersatz" internationalist. He[Dewey] was thus forced to take a strong pro-internationalist stance.. In late September in a speech written by Dulles, he unequivocally endorsed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

Because of the political ramifications Dulles found it virtually impossible to criticize the Proposals before the election. It was only after November 5 that he felt free to speak out critically. 170

Some churchmen were less circumspect. The

National Catholic Welfare Council issued a six-page statement in early November which warned that the Secur­ ity Council "must not be an instrument of imperialistic domination by a few powerful nations" and advocated "a universal institution in which every nation stands on 34 its rights and not its power." The editor of the

Christian Century called for all Protestants to join a campaign to amend the Proposals. Decrying the emphasis on force to preserve the peace, Morrison demanded that the security provisions be removed from the Proposals and replaced by a covenant of peace modelled on the

Kellogg-Briand Pact. "The faith on which to build," he declared, "is the common and inclusive covenant never to 35 resort to war."

The Catholic Association for International Peace labeled the plan a "death sentence" for small nations.

The Catholic Bishops of America issued a statement de­ nouncing the big-power dominance of the Security Council.

They objected to the central role given the Soviet Union, warning that democracy and Marxism could not exist side by 3 6 side within an international organization. Many religi­ ous pacifists were also disenchanted by the emphasis on

force and the lack of guarantees regarding disarmament.

The director of the War Resistors League prophesied that 171 the "... proposed five-power alliance is unlikely to obtain security for small nations or even hold together long enough to set .up a peace guaranteed by international 37 force." Z-Iorrison of the Christian Century agreed, pre­ dicting that a return of power politics would split apart the wartime coalition and lead to an immoral peace unless 38 a more democratic international organization was created.

The CJDP required nearly two months of discussion before it was able to reach a consensus regarding the

Proposals. The argument, as Dulles described it, was between the"realists" and the "perfectionists." The for­ mer insisted that church pronouncements, to be credible, had to deal with the realities of political power and respect the boundaries of political possibility. The latter were unable or unwilling to compromise their prin­ ciples for the sake of what they considered "political expediency." Over a period of several months the Com­ mission slowly moved to a position giving qualified ap­ proval to the Proposals. In a cable to Secretary of State

Stettinius, Dulles said he was "glad to report that the

Commission on a Just and Durable Peace substantially endorsed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, although there 39 was appreciable opposition."

The Statement revealed Dulles' authorship. It. began by recognizing that the transition from inter­ national anarchy to a complete constitutional world order 172

could not be realized at a single step. It was therefore

to be expected that no plan would meet all the require­ ments for lasting peace. The chief defects were catalogued.

The organization proposed has many of the char­ acteristics of a military alliance of a few great powers. Certain provisions seem to envisage a division of the world into regional spheres of in­ terest dominated by one or another of the great powers. Reliance is placed primarily on force un­ related to any explicitly agreed upon principles of justice. Further, the proposed organization should be more adequately endowed with curative functions needed to deal with the causes of war and with creative functions needed to draw the nations together in fellowship.

But the proposals also had certain merits.

With all of these defects, the proposals do, however, have the great merit of providing for a continuing and virtually constant consultation of representatives of the great powers and of selected lesser powers under conditions which will subject what is done to the moral judgment of mankind. The Economic and Social Council, and related agencies, can do much to promote fellow­ ship among the nations and eradicate the causes of war. If the proposals envisage much that partakes of a military alliance at least that military alliance is to be put in a setting which will per­ mit public opinion to influence its evolution toward more adequate general organization.

We believe that the proposed organization with such beneficial modifications as ought to result from further consideration by the pros­ pective members, can be developed into one that will commend itself to the Christian conscience • • • • 40

In December, 1944, Dulles defended the Commission

statement at the biennial meeting of the Federal Council at Pittsburgh. He observed that many churchmen- found

the proposals for the use of force objectionable, but 173

he regarded them as "little more than scenery" necessary

to "secure the indispensable support of the many who,

particularly in wartime, think that peace can be assured

only in the same way that victory is won; that is, by military might." In an elaborate argument worthy of his legal training, he showed that in practise the pro­ visions for the development of military power by the world organization would be virtually unworkable. And

if that was the case, why worry about it?4"*- When the

Statement was presented to the executive committee of the Federal Council for ratification, it was vigorously opposed by Charles Clayton Morrison who argued for a much more critical posture by the churches with regard to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. In his rebuttal, Dulles argued that a distinction must be made between practical possibilities and ideal goals, a distinction he believed 42 Morrison was overlooking. After a few minor changes the Statement was accepted as the official policy position of the FCC.43

Dulles, who had become increasingly conservative about international organization during 1944, had finally embraced the realist position. He came to that partly as a result of political necessity in his role as advisor to Dewey. Equally important was his practical cast of mind which made it far easier for him to accommodate to 174

the political realities than his more idealistically in­ clined church colleagues. In a sense the biennial meet­

ing of the FCC at Pittsburgh marked a turning point in

Dulles' relations with the churchmen. Increasingly in­ volved as a government advisor, he imperceptibly, but

steadily diverged from their perception of what the re­

ligious community ought to be saying about American foreign policy. The fundamental cleavage of the 1950's between

Dulles, the realistic statesman, and his former Protestant colleagues, was beginning. The lines were not yet drawn, but the essential conditions were beginning to form.

The National Study Conference which met at Cleve­

land in January, 1945, became the matrix where many of these

/ cross-currents on world order were hammered out. The Mes­

sage of the conference was a victory for Dulles and those who were convinced that the Christian vision of world order

should be accommodated to the hard realities of power politics. Admitting that the proposed world organization was based on power politics, they urged the churchmen to be realistic. "All politics deal with power," Bishop J.

Bromley Oxnam asserted in his opening address. "The

primary issue is to bring power under control ....

Dumbarton Oaks brings that pov/er under control of solemn 44 agreement." Dulles, who gave the only other address at 175 the conference, argued the same point from a slightly different angle. A perfectionist approach by the Ameri­ can people to world problems would be disastrous, he said.

"We cannot expect our government to seek to cooperate on world problems unless that is what the American people want and unless they want it sufficiently to be tolerant of results which, in themselves, will often be unsatis­ factory .... No administration, of whatever party, would or could do such things as are here suggested if it is going to be denounced whenever the outcome fails 45 to satisfy wholly America's particular ideals."

Many delegates were unwilling to accept that rationale. They argued that the church, because of its peculiar character, could not compromise its ideals. As one of them put it, only by upholding its ideals could the church "generate enough new moral energy to overcome the 46 moral paralysis afflicting our civilization." The debate continued throughout the meetings and was finally resolved by putting the conference on record in support of Dumbarton Oaks, but listing nine changes which the conference hoped could be incorporated in any final plan for a world organization. Time Magazine called the result

."a compromise compatible both with the highest Christian ethics and the ugly facts of human life in a sinful 47 world." Morrison of the Christian Century, who had led the fight against an unequivocal endorsement of the 176 Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, believed that the nine amend­ ments constituted only a conditional approval and hoped they would have the effect of forcing the government to 48 take another look at the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

Whatever the niceties of interpretation by the partici­ pants the real effect was to put the churches on record in support of an actual plan for world organization.

For Dulles and the CJDP that represented a significant milestone in their world order endeavors.

The conference Message was written in three parts, beginning with a declaration of Christian prin­ ciples, followed by a survey of the international situa­ tion, and concluding with a suggested program of action for the churches. In the area of Christian principles the conference formulated a situational approach to the problem of the Christian application of faith to political realities.

Christians must act in situations as they exist and must decide what God's will demands of them there. At all times they must keep the ultimate goals clearly in view but they have equal responsi­ bility to mark out attainable steps toward those goals, and support them. An idealism which does not accept the discipline of the achievable may lose its power for good and ultimately lend aid to forces with whose purpose it can not agree.

If we accept, provisionally, situations which fall short of our ultimate objective, we cannot be morally bound to sustain and perpetuate them. That would be stultifying. It is the possibility of change which is the bridge from the immediate situation to the Christian ideal. That possibility 177

is an imperative for Christians, who must con­ stantly maintain tension with any secular order.

The churches through their leaders have the task of assisting people in situations of this kind. Specifically, in the realm of world order, the churches must declare their understanding of the will of God for life among the peoples of the world .... When a concrete proposal for world organization is presented, Christian leaders must help the people to decide whether it marks a presently obtainable step in the right direc­ tion and, if so, urge them to give it their support.49

In the area of economics the conference actually went beyond Delaware.

The right of private property is not an absolute right but a right qualified by the public interest. Likewise freedom of enterprise does not imply abso­ lute freedom but operation of enterprise con­ sonant with the interest of the public and the wel­ fare of the nation. In the use of property and in the operation of enterprise, therefore, the welfare of the society should be given primary consideration; and it is the duty of the state to prescribe such regulation of industry and of the conditions under which it is carried on as will result in wholesome conditions of employment and fair treatment to those who are engaged in it and to the public at large.

The Church must therefore condemn any failure of our economic system to meet the basic needs which have been indicated. We must ask our people to recognize that in order to supply these needs for all, many changes may be necessary in our economic practices. These changes will probably lie in the direction of a larger measure of social planning and control.

We should not allow our devotion to any single system or method to deny to anyone the basic requirements for the good life. Nor should we allow our preference for our economic or political system to prevent us from collaborating, for the achievement of world order and world peace, with peoples who have a different system.50 178

The conference delegates showed considerable anxiety about the emerging power of the Soviet Union and the signs of East-West tensions. They held that capitalism and communism were not irreconcilable and that- they "can and must" coexist. "Neither is a fixed system, and to some extent in'practise they converge. To the extent that the sacredness of the human person, his liberty and responsibility to God is acknowledged by both systems their cooperation in building a peaceable 51 international order is facilitated."

With respect to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals the Message said: "Accordingly, we recommend that the churches support the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as an important step in the direction of world cooperation but because we do not approve of them in their entirety as they now stand, we urge the following measures for their improvement."

1) A preamble— to state the purposes of justice set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

2) Development of International Law— to bring the actions of the world organization under law.

3) Voting power— to prevent a nation from voting if and when its case is being judged according to predetermined international law.

4) Colonial and Dependent Areas— to establish a Commission to promote the wellbeing of colonies with the goal of their independence in view.

5) Human rights and Fundamental freedoms— to establish a Commission to promote human rights. 179

6 ) Universal membership— to admit all nations willing to accept the obligations of membership.

7) Limitation of armaments— to speed the reduction of armaments.

8 ) Smaller powers— to protect more fully the rights of smaller nations.

9) Amendment— to make it possible to amend the Charter without the consent of all the permanent members.52

The Message incorporated four principles of

conduct needed to bring collaboration out of the realm of

theory and into reality. These had been developed by

Dulles in his opening address. The American government was asked 1 ) to "adopt and proclaim its long-range

goals"; 2 ) not merely "talk about its ideals" but "get

down into the arena and fearlessly and skillfully battle

for them," 3) "battle for its ideals under conditions

such that no particular set-back need be accepted as

definitive," and 4) the American people were asked to

judge the government not merely "by its immediate re­

sults attained," but rather "by its announced long term objectives" and "by whether it worked competently to

achieve them."^

Inferentially the conference raised doubts about

the wisdom of the "unconditional surrender" formula of

the Allies. It called for an explicit statement by the

Allies regarding the status of Germany and Japan following

the end of the war, arguing that such a statement was 180 required not only from moral considerations but to save lives on the battlefield. Nov/here was the conference more emphatic than in its call for an end to imperialism by the white man and the granting of self-determination to all dependent peoples. It called on the churches to stand as champions of dependent peoples everywhere.

The Message concluded with eight specific rec­ ommendations for action by the churches:

1 ) undertake to achieve a far higher degree of unity;

2 ) enlist and train "world minded churchmen" to take their place in the ecumenical movement;

3) teach children the conditions for world peace;

4) use all their facilities to secure American participation in international organization;

5 ) support to the fullest their agencies of relief and reconstruction;

6 ) wage a continuing campaign against race prejudice in all its forms;

7) urged a meeting of the United Nations, at the earliest date, to consider the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals;

8 ) urged the postponement of Congressional action on Peacetime Military Conscription until after the war.

The conference concluded with a moving ecumenical service in Cleveland's Old Stone Church. Fittingly, the final litany closing the service had been written for the

Oxford Conference in 1937. 181 The world is anxious and bewildered and full of pain and fear. We are troubled and yet we do not despair. Our hope is anchored in God. In Christ, as in the union of men with God and of man with man which he creates, life even in the face of all these evils has a meaning. In his name we set our hands, as the servants of God and in him of one another, to the task of proclaiming God's message of redemption, of living as his children and of combatting injustice, cruelty and hate. The church can be of good cheer. It hears its Lord saying, I have overcome the world.54

During the planning stages the Christian Century had been skeptical about the utility of a conference, 55 entitling an editorial "Invitation to a Wake?" By the end of the conference Morrison was convinced that it was the most important conference ever held in the United

States, because it had given the people, from the Presi­ dent on down, a glimpse of the vitality of American

Protestantism. Morrison also commented on the change of mood which took place in the course of the meeting. The delegates arrived tense and anxious, he said. When they

left they were confident and hopeful. The anxiety was the result of fear that churches might lead the nation back into isolationism, or, he noted, fear that the churches might too hastily place their imprimatur on

the still tentative Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. As Morrison

saw it, the churches had vindicated themselves as responsible 56 critics of American foreign policy. Even A. J. Muste was

impressed: "Measured against the bellicose attitude of

church bodies in World War I, the Cleveland Conference 182 registered an amazing advance. Whether it will be enough to stem the incentives to World War III is a more prob- 57 lematical matter."

The conference Message/ while less eloquent than the Delaware Message three years earlier, provided an excellent index to the mind of liberal American Protest­ antism in 1945, now eight years beyond the Oxford Con­ ference of 1937. Most of the American participants at

Oxford were present at Cleveland. The hallmark of Ox­ ford, that the church was an institution responsible for providing society with both ideals and criticism for failure to respect those ideals, was still present.

That the churchmen were still far in advance of their contemporaries in their social and economic conceptions was also apparent, as it had been at Oxford. Finally, in spite of the acrimony over the realist-perfectionist question, the general temper was one of great unity and a common frame of reference. The liberal-ecumenical leadership of American Protestantism continued to be made of a common cloth.

The conference was widely publicized, with over

175 newspapers in thirty states carrying news regarding 58 the proceedings. Many religious journals printed the full text of the Message and presented favorable reports of the conference. Over 200,000 copies of the Message 59 were distributed. The full text was read into the 183

Congressional Record. **° A few weeks after the conference a four-page booklet was produced by Van Kirk entitled

What Did Cleveland Say? Three hundred and twenty thousand copies were distributed.*^

The Cleveland Conference was overshadowed by two other events. On January 10 Senator Arthur Vandenberg gave his historic speech in the Senate calling for "maxi­ mum American cooperation, consistent with legitimate

American self-interest . . . to make the basic idea of

Dumbarton Oaks succeed." 62 This assured Republican sup­ port for the international organization and formally ratified Vandenberg's conversion to international col­ laboration. The second event was the Yalta Conference, which, among other things, set the date— April 21 — and the place— San Francisco— for the United Nations Organi­ zation Conference. Dulles and the CJDP were greatly heartened by both developments.

Yalta revived the fears of many churchmen that the new international organization would be little more than a big-power alliance. The provisions for the use of the veto were a special target of criticism. A group of

Catholic bishops charged that the veto allowed the big- 6 3 powers to commit aggression without fear of reprisal.

The Christian Century agreed, and in early April published 184 a declaration by a group of distinguished Protestant clergymen, many of them members of the CJDP. The exist­

ing proposals, they charged, "were a mere camouflage for the continuation of imperialistic policies and the exer­ cise of arbitrary power by the "Big Three" for the domina- 64 tion of other nations." Dulles disagreed and found an

ally in Reinhold Niebuhr. Admitting the risks of relying

so heavily on the great powers, Niebuhr could see no other alternative. "Nations cannot create a new universal

sovereignty above themselves by a pure fiat of the will," he said, "and then turn around and subject themselves to this sovereignty."^

Dulles argued that Roosevelt, at Yalta, had done what the Cleveland conference had enjoined him to do—

"get down into the arena and fearlessly and skillfully 66 battle" for his policies. The United States had aban­ doned its aloofness in world affairs and was taking the responsibilities and risks which power required. Then in. words ominously portentious of the."brinkmanship" of the

1950's, he went on" "It is the great tragedy of victory that the victors seek a riskless peace. Peace cannot be had on those terms. Peace, like war, requires that peoples 67 go on taking risks."

With the date for convening the United Nations

Organization meeting established, planning for the confer­

ence went on apace. Vandenberg was appointed as an 185

American delegate and immediately asked Stettinius for permission to name Dulles as his advisor. Stettinius, who was unsure of Roosevelt's reaction to such a move, evaded an immediate answer by saying that he was con­ sidering asking Dulles to serve as a consultant to the delegation in his capacity as a churchman. Apprised of this by Vandenberg Dulles decided to avoid possible embarrassment by announcing his intention to attend the . 68 conference as a private citizen. Stettinius prevailed on Roosevelt to appoint Dulles as an advisor to the Ameri- 69 can delegation as a gesture in bi-partisanship. At the behest of Dewey and Vandenberg, Dulles accepted. To accentuate the political character of his position, he resigned as chairman of the CJDP, emphasizing that he was not representing the churches at San Francisco.^

The President of the American Council of Christian Churches,

R. T. Ketchum, did not accept Dulles' explanation. In a bristling letter to President Truman he asked that Dulles be removed from the delegation, arguing that his role as a spokesman for the churches made his presence on the delegation a violation of the American tradition of the 71 separation of church and state. Ketcham was ignored, but his point would seem to have had some substance in fact. Just like his involvement in the Dewey campaign, so this, and in subsequent years, other official assign­ ments, would find Dulles playing a dual role, speaking as 186

an official at one point and a churchman at another.

Frederick Libby of the National Council for the Preven­

tion of War alluded to the problem when he told Dulles

that he usually found himself in agreement when Dulles

spoke as chairman of the CJDP, but in violent disagreement

when he spoke as an official of the government. Dulles

was taken aback by Libby's assertion, responding that he

was totally unaware of such a dichotomy and that he pur- 72 sued the same principles regardless of which hat he wore.

An interesting innovation at the San Francisco

conference gave the churches an unusual opportunity to

influence events. Secretary of State Stettinius, in an

attempt to maximize involvement in the conference, invited

forty-two organizations representing major interest groups

in American life to send consultants to the conference.

The Federal Council of Churches was invited to represent 73 American Protestantism. Two Jewish groups, the National

Catholic Welfare League, the Catholic Association for in­ ternational Peace, and the Church Peace Union were also

in attendance.

At its March 20 meeting the executive committee of the Federal Council committed itself to "create a

spiritual atmosphere at San Francisco." To this end the committee joined the CJDP in calling for prayer on behalf

of the conference. Thirty-four denominations observed

Sunday, April 22, and the opening day, April 25, as days of 187 74 prayer. On the Sunday before the opening of the con­

ference Dulles addressed a mass meeting of 11,000 people

at Oakland, California, held under, the auspices of the

CJDP. Another large meeting took place the same day in

San Francisco. Harold Stassen spoke there in his capacity

as president of the International Council of Religious 75 Education. The Roman Catholics had held a mass meeting S in the city a week earlier. Special United Nations ser­ vices were also held on the first Sunday of the conference 76 throughout the country. The pervasiveness of the churches' presence was nowhere better illustrated than in the attempt by Dulles, at the behest of his CJDP colleagues, to have the Conference opened with prayer. The suggestion was

loaded with dynamite, for the Soviets and many Asians saw

it as an attempt to force Western religious values on the conference. The impass.e was finally broken by simply 77 opening the conference with a moment of silent prayer.

While the consultants had no role to play in the conference itself except as observers, they had continual access to members of the American delegation and even

lobbied with members of other national delegations. A

special liaison staff set up by the State Department pro­ vided consultants with information about the proceedings.

Several times each week the consultants met with the Ameri­ can delegation for closed-door off-the-record discussions. 188

During these meetings the consultants had an opportunity

to present their concerns as a group. As the weeks passed

the consultants came to considerable unanimity on many matters before the conference and were thus able to pre­

sent a united front to the delegates with appreciable

effect.

Walter Van Kirk served as the consultant for the

FCC. Dr. 0. Frederick Nolde and Methodist Bishop James

C. Baker both of the CJDP, served as associates. The con­

sultants sought to present their concerns, specifically

the Cleveland recommendations for modifying the Dumbarton

Oaks Proposals, to the delegates. They also interpreted

the proceedings of the conference to the churches. Van

Kirk, with the aid of Dr. Nolde, prepared bulletins of

information for the religious press, social action sec- 79 retaries, and state and local councils of churches.

Perhaps most effective was Van Kirk's weekly radio pro­ gram, "Religion in the News," which he broadcast from San

Francisco and used as a medium for interpreting the con­

ference to the American people from a Christian point of view.

The FCC consultants decided early in the conference to focus on issues with which the churches were especially

concerned, and to which they could bring some expertise.

One area was human rights. Dumbarton Oaks had referred to 189 the issue obliquely by assigning the Economic and Social

Council responsibility "to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." The Cleveland confer­ ence had called for the creation of a Commission on Human

Rights. Dr. Nolde, who was to spend much time on that issue in later years, drew up four human rights amendments 80 which he proposed to incorporate in the Charter. After gaining virtually unanimous support from the other forty- two consultants, Nolde presented the amendments to Secre­ tary Stettinius. The proposals impressed him and he took them to the American delegation which accepted them with only minor modifications. After acceptance by the other nations at the conference, the proposals were incorporated 81 in the Charter.

The FCC consultants also sought to deal with the problem of colonial peoples and their political status.

Dumbarton Oaks had failed to make any provisions for colonial territories and peoples. As a result the San

Francisco conference had to deal with the problem without the benefit of prior planning. Harold Stassen drafted a

"working paper" for an international trusteeship system 82 and this was used as a basis for discussion. The chief quarrel which the churchmen had with Commander Stassen's proposals concerned his plan to separate the dependent territories into strategic and non-strategic areas with the well-being of the peoples in the first category 190 subordinated to the needs of international security.

Practically this meant continued big-power control over such territories. The FCC consultants protested this provision, pointing out the anomaly of holding a conference to promote collective international order while continuing the old politics of western colonial control. They also called for provisions for "full national independence" for all colonial peoples, rather than the vague "Working Paper" formula of "self-government in forms appropriate to the 83 varying circumstances of each territory." In this case the ideals of the churchmen collided with big-power real­ ities and they were defeated. Stassen did accept and support the Cleveland conference proposal for a trustee- 84 ship council under the aegis of the United Nations.

Van Kirk, Nolde and Baker worked hard as con­ sultants. A typical day, described by Van Kirk, began at

8:00 A.M. with a meeting of all religious consultants, followed by a daylong array of meetings with such diverse people as Lord Halifax, Averill Harriman, Thomas Mazaryk, and a series of delegation members from Asia and South

America, with a final meeting at 8:00 P.M. of all the con­ sultants which lasted for several hours. Sandwiched in between all these meetings was a recording session in which Van Kirk and Nolde discussed the conference on a

West Coast radio network. Van Kirk, in his typically jocular fashion, observed of Nolde: "I want to bear 191 testimony to Nolde's services here. If he doesn't come out of the conference as an assistant Secretary of State 85 . I'll be surprised.” The same might have been said of

Van Kirk.

The energy and single-minded determination of

Van Kirk and Nolde was reinforced by their ready access to the actual conference processes as a result of the presence of Dulles on the American delegation. At least once each day, and frequently more often, the consultants met with him to discuss strategy and planning. Dulles was able to provide them with invaluable inside information.

He knew, for instance, which members of a delegation were the key people to contact on a given issue, and often arranged meetings for the consultants. Equally important was the fact that as advisor to the American delegation he was in a good position to support consultant proposals within the delegation.

Another factor which assisted the churchmen in their efforts was a coincidence of interest between the smaller nations, especially the non-western group, and the churchmen. They agreed wholeheartedly on such matters as human rights, non-discrimination, anti-colonialism, disarmament and kindred matters. By banding together, the small states were frequently able to gain important con­ cessions on those points. That the international 192 aspirations of the churchmen meshed so well with the con­ cerns of the non-western nations, must be seen, in retro­ spect, as a vindication of the churchmen's stated goal of speaking for, and defending the interests of, the poor and the powerless.

The editor of The Lutheran Advocate shared the op­ timism of many churchmen about the influence of the churches at San Francisco.

Often the charge is made that the Church fails to make its influence felt in critical moments of history, and undoubtedly there is much justifica­ tion for the criticism. It can hardly be said, however, that the Church failed to make an impact on the recent San Francisco conference. Indeed most of the important improvements of the United Nations Charter over the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were made as a result of strong criticism of the latter document by the Cleveland conference sponsored by the CJDP . . . ."86

Tough-minded Henry P. Van Dusen, a man with few illusions about anything, concurred: "These representatives [of church organization] have worked consistently and stead­ ily to back the American delegates in giving what Hr.

Dulles has called a "soul" to the Charter . . . the semi­ official representatives of the religious interests of 87 America seem to have done a good sensible job and helped."

President Truman presented the Charter to the Sen ate for ratification on July 2, with the words: "The choice before the Senate is now clear. The choice is not 193 between this Charter and something else. it is between 8 8 this Charter and no charter at all." The internation­ alists had already perceived that fact. In May, while the conference was still in progress, the consultants had begun planning their drive to secure ratification of the

Charter. A coordinating committee of more than one hun­ dred organizations was created to organize the campaign.

The churches were an integral part of the effort.

Dulles and Van Kirk returned to New York City several days before the conference ended in order to assist the organizing effort. In a report to the FCC executive committee Dulles extolled the Charter in unusu­ ally uncritical fashion. The conference, he said, had transformed the big-power alliance framed at Dumbarton

Oaks into a world organization "which will promote jus­ tice and human welfare." He called the Charter "a Magna

Carta for the world" and declared: "I can see no reason­ able ground for Christian people now to hesitate in their support of the San Francisco Charter . . . it is the first duty of our Christian people . . . to assure that the 89 organization will come into being."

In a pamphlet Dulles wrote a few days later, he noted: "It is not a perfect document. It does, however, go far to realize the first phase of making peace just and durable . . . ’." He then itemized how each of the Six

Pillars was enshrined in the Charter. 194

1) It provides for a "political framework for continual collaboration of the nations"; (Pillar I)

2) It provides for an Economic and Social Council; (Pillar II)

3) The General Assembly provides for peaceful change; (pillar III)

4) The Charter sees the dependent peoples as a sacred trust; (Pillar IV)

5) Both the Assembly and Security Council can assist in controlling military establishments; (Pillar V)

6 ) Religious and intellectual freedom is guar­ anteed by the Charter. (Pillar VI)

Dulles concluded that perhaps the most important modifi­ cations of Dumbarton Oaks lay in the Charter's deemphasis 90 on the use of force as a means of maintaining peace.

Walter Van Kirk was less sanguine about the new

United Nations Organization. He forsaw little success for the Security Council. Among necessary improvements he cited the need for more power for the organization, greater attention to the needs of dependent peoples, and easier Charter amendment processes. The greatest threat to the new organization was the national sovereignty system. He saw little evidence that the great powers had actually given up any of their own power for the common good. The great need was for a will to collaborate on behalf of mankind. For this the churches had great responsibilities. "To establish a strong core of 195 world-minded Christians at the center of international 91 life is the inescapable duty of the church."

The editors of Christianity and 'Society, a pub­

lication of the Society of Socialist Christians, reflected

s similar pessimism. They were especially disdainful of

the churchmen's penchant for writing blueprints— Six

Pillars— and using these as standard', by which to judge the Charter. The fact of the matter was, said the editors, that the churchmen were so preoccupied with

their plans that they failed to see that the new inter­ national organization was merely another plan and that 92 no real basis for international peace had been laid.

Most churchmen were less critical than this and the en­

thusiasm of Dulles for what had been wrought at San

Francisco was widely shared by American Christians.

It was to capitalize on this wide-spread enthusi­

asm that the CJDP now bent its efforts. The next hurdle was Senate ratification of the Charter. Dulles had vivid memories of the fight over ratification of the League of

Nations. He sought to mobilize the churches on behalf of a campaign to avoid repetition of that debacle. The Com­ mission met on June 25, the last day of the San Francisco

conference, and drafted a statement entitled The Churches

and the Charter of the United Nations. The next day this was adopted by the FCC executive committee as an official 93 statement. It was sent to denominational leaders with 196 a call from FCC President Oxnam that it be read in all the churches on Sunday, July 2, 1945. It was also sent to all members of the Senate. To popularize the meaning of the Charter, the Commission drew up a pamphlet entitled

What Did San Francisco Gain? and a sub-committee produced a balance sheet entitled The San Francisco Charter: Goals and Achievements. Both pamphlets were widely distributed.

A few days later, Richard Fagley, the new so-secretary of the CJDP, wrote a point by point comparison of the Charter and the Cleveland amendments. This was published through- 94 out the religious press. Under Oxnam's leadership the

Methodists launched a program to organize a "telegram-to-

Senators" campaign in local Methodist congregations. The

Congregational churches held a series of "town meetings" to popularize the Charter. The Presbyterians mobilized their world order forces with a literature and film cam- 95 paign.

During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Charter both Dulles and Bishop Oxnam testified on behalf of ratification. In his testimony

Oxnam stated the case for the churches and at the same time summed up the work of the CJDP.

This summons to support the Charter is the logi­ cal outgrowth of the long study given the question of world law and order by the churches. No question has been studied more carefully and thoroughly in the churches during this generation. This discus­ sion has been carried on in the more than 200,000 Protestant churches in the United States, and 197

literally millions of churchmen have given the subject their careful consideration. Thus the resolutions by the great denominations and by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, represent considered judgment.

I believe a majority so large as to approach near unanimity within the churches desires the earliest possible ratification of the Charter by the Senate and the full participation of our Nation in the organization therein estab­ lished. 96

The Senate ratified the Charter on Saturday,

July 28, by a vote of 89-2. Breckinridge Long reflected the feelings of the internationalists accurately when he wrote: "The faith of Woodrow Wilson has been vindicated.

The record of the United States of 1920 has been expunged. 97 Civilization has a better chance to survive . . . ."

Nine days later the first atomic bomb was dropped on

Hiroshima. 198

NOTES

^Annual Report, 1943, pp. 157-158. 2 Fagley to Bennett, February 3, 1944, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Ibid., February 29, 1944. 4 Biennial Report, 1944, p. 135.

^CJDP minutes, February 15, 1944, Box 21, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Herter, February 18, 1944, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 7 Dulles to Morrison, March 1, 1944, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Post War World, April 15, 1944, p. 1. ^Vital Speeches, X (1944), p. 451.

^■^Walter Lippmann, United States War Aims (Boston, 1944), p. 3.

^ Public Opinion Quarterly, VIII (1944), p. 301. 12 William Lydgate, What Our People Think (New York, 1944), pp. 40-45.

^ N e w York Times, July 17, 1944.

^State Department Bulletin, XI (1944), p. 84. 15 New York Times, August 17, 1944.

16Typescript of Press Conference, August 19-20, 1944, Box 21, Dulles Papers. 17 Stanley Stuber to Van Kirk, August 25, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS. 18 C. E. Brockway, to Van Kirk, September 29, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS. 199

*9Van Kirk to Stuber, August 25, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS. 20 Hannegan press notice, September 19, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS. 21 Dulles to Hannegan, September 22, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS.

22CJDP minutes, September 5-6, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS. 2 3 Van Kirk to Hannegan, September 25, 1944, Box 3 96, FCC-MSS.

O A Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America to Thomas Dewey, October 9, 1944, Box 196, FCC-MSS.

^Memorandum, February, 1944, box 207, FCC-MSS.

26Post War World, October 16, 1944, p. 3.

2^CJDP minutes, September 21, 1944, Box 207, FCC-MSS.

2 8 Ibid.

2 9 Ibid.

30Ibid.

3^Divine, pp. 227-28.

32Dulles to Hull, October 13, 1944, Box 21, Dulles Papers. 33 Dulles speech, November 24, 1944, Box 10, Dulles Papers.

New York Times, November 19, 1944.

33Christian Century, LXI (1944), pp. 1406-7, 1375-6.

38New York Times, February 2, 1945.

3^The New Republic, CXII (1945), p. 543.

38Christian Century, LXII (1945), pp. 39-40, 60. 200 39 Dulles to Stettinius, November 29, 1944, Box 10, Dulles Papers. 4 0 Biennial Report, 1944, pp. 185-186.

41Ibid 42 Dulles to Ernest Hopkins, January 14, 1944, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 43 Biennial Report, p. 22.

44 Changing World, February, 1945, p. 7. 45 Dulles, "Ideals Are Not Enough," International Conciliation, No. 409 (1945), pp. 131-141.

4®William B. Lipphard, "The Christian Church and Global Peace," Missions, XXXVI (1945), p. 151.

47Time, XLV (1945), pp. 22-23. 4 ft Christian Century, LXII (1945), pp. 166-167. 49 "A Message to the Churches," Christian Century, LXII (1945), pp. 174-175.

5 0Ibid., p. 175.

5 1 Ibid., p. 176.

^FCC Annual Report, 1945, p. 143.

^Dulles, "Ideals Are Not Enough," International Conciliation, No. 409 (1945), p. 143.

^ Christian Century, LXII (1945), p. 157.

5 5 Ibid., pp. 39-40.

5 6 Ibid., p. 135.

^fellowship, February, 1945, pp. 31-33.

^Public Relations Materials, 1945, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

59Post War World, April 15, 1945, p. 4.

^Congressional Record, 79 Cong. 1 Sess. (1945), Appendix, pp. 4649-4650. 201

61Post War Worlds April 15, 1945, p. 4. go Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952) , p" 1'35.

^^New York Times, April 15, 1945. 64 Christian Century, LXII (1945), pp. 485-487.

65Nation, CLX (1945), pp. 382-383.

^Dulles speech to Foreign Policy Association, March 17, 1945, Box 10, Dulles Papers.

g O The Papers of Senator Vandenberg, pp. 156-157, 159. :“

^New York Times, April 6 , 1945. 70 His resignation was only a leave of absence. Professor Hocking served temporarily in his absence. 71 Ketchum to Truman, April 17, 1945, Box 195, FCC-MSS. 72 Libby to Dulles, December 20, 1945; Dulles to Libby, December 24, 1945, Box 140, Dulles Papers. 73 Charter of the United Nations Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the U.S. delegation, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945. Department of State, publica­ tion 2349, Conference series 71, pp. 27, 262-266.

^ F C C Bulletin, May, 1945, p. 8 .

^ F C C Annua1 Report, 1945, p. 123. 76 Edward W. Parsons, "Report from San Francisco," Christianity and Crisis, June 11, 1945, p. 2. 77 O. Frederick Nolde, Oral History, Dulles Papers. 78 New York Times, April 26, 1945; San Francisco News, May 16, 1945.

^^FCC Bulletin, May, 1945, p. 8 . 202 80 CJDP notes on San Francisco, 1945, Upright File, FCC-MSS. 81 Charter of the United Nations, State Department Documents, 1945, p . Il4'i 82 Leiand M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents (Bos- ton, 1949), pp. 418-419. ”

9"Van Kirk to Stettinius, May 11, 1945, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

Oil Van Kirk to Stassen, May 23, 1945, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

9*Van Kirk to Barnes, May 16, 1945, Box 60, FCC-MSS. 8 6 The Lutheran Advocate, August, 1945, p. 1. 87 Christianity and Crisis, June 11, 1945, p. 2. 88 Newsweek, July 9, 1945, p. 28. DQ CJDP minutes, June 24-25, 1945, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 9 0 Dulles, The Charter— A Great Document of Human Rights. FCC pamphlet, 1945. 91 Van Kirk to the FCC executive committee, June 18, 1945, Box 18, FCC-MSS.

92 Christianity and Society, (Summer, 1945), p. 5.

®^FCC Annual Report, 1945, pp. 53, 151. 04 Post War World, July, 1945, p. 1.

95CJDP Minutes, June 25, 1945, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 9 6 The Charter of the United Nations Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 79 Cong. 1 Sess., July 9-13, 1945, pp. 450-451. 97 Quoted in Divine, p. 314. CHAPTER VI

THE SEARCH FOR A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE

CONTINUES— 1945-1949

With Senate ratification of the United Nations

Charter the great crusade for a new world organization came to an end. The primary task of the Commission had been completed. But there were still other issues which demanded its attention. The fledgling United Nations required continued support if it was to become a viable force in world order. The peace settlements had yet to be hammered out. The first portents of an East-West rift were becoming increasingly evident. And the war continued its grisly course in the Pacific, ending fin- ally under the shadow of an atomic mushroom cloud.

Clearly the search for a just and durable peace was not yet at an end.

It is a commentary on the ironic nature of his­ tory that even before the new instrument of world order—

the United Nations— could be put into operation, the real

architects of the postwar were revealed to be, not the

internationalists, but scientists working in laboratories

in Chicago, Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos. As E. B. White put it: "The preparations made at San Francisco for a 203 204 security league of sovereign nations to prevent aggres­ sion now seem like the preparations some little girls ' make for a lawn party as a thunderhead gathers just be­ yond the garden gate. The lemonade will be spiked by lightning.The hopes and aspirations of millions of human beings were rudely shaken by the handiwork of a few anonymous men. For many of the internationalists it was as though they had been completely outflanked and now found themselves beginning again at ground zero. But for others the atom bomb had just the opposite effect.

The human spirit is indomitable, perhaps nowhere more so than in the hearts and minds of dedicated inter­ nationalists . For such men— Dulles was a prime example— the bomb simply vindicated the indispensibility of the

United Nations. It provided the clinching argument for a world controlled, not by selfish atomic-powered nation­ states, but by an impartial and truly international world authority.

The dropping of the A-bombs in August, 1945, accentuated the old and unresolved question of how the churches ought to respond to the practise and means of warfareJ The issue, though dormant during the war, had not been entirely laid to rest. Even before the advent of Hiroshima the practice of saturation bombing to force unconditional surrender had troubled the minds of some churchmen. In May, 1945, Dr. Diffendorfer of the Foreign

Missions Conference, and a member of the CJDP, proposed

that a joint statement be issued by the Foreign Missions

Conference and the Federal Council condemning the un-

restricted bombing of Japanese cities. No ac.tion was

taken. A few weeks later the CJDP sent a letter to

President Truman requesting clarification of the meaning of unconditional surrender. In his response the President

insisted that unconditional surrender did not mean the

extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people.^

Just a few days earlier nine members of the editorial board of Christianity and Crisis called on the government 4 to end "unrestricted bombing of Japan." Later in the month they were joined by seventy ministers and educators who called for a halt to saturation bombing and an explicit declaration by the United States government regarding its proposed treatment of the Japanese at the

conclusion of hostilities.^

The attack on Hiroshima came as a profound shock

to many churchmen. The CJDP received numerous messages urging it to speak out against the bombing. A typical one was from W. W. Mendenhall of Cornell University who pointed out the catastrophic effect the bombing might have on missionary work in East Asia unless the American

churches forcefully disavowed any support for such 206 military action.** Many churchmen were deeply disturbed by the White House press release announcing the use of the bomb on Hiroshima. It read in part: "If they [the

Japanese] do not accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been 7 seen on this earth." The implication seemed clear; the weapon would be used again.

Hiroshima caught the Federal Council staff in

New York in a state of becalmed somnolence. Many of the officers were on vacation. Of the staff on international affairs only Richard Fagley, secretary of the CJDP, was on hand. The dropping of the bomb was a climactic experi­ ence in Fagley's life, and plunged him into a period of strenuous activity. Fagley, more than any other church­ man, sensed the significance of this new event in human history. The White House press release convinced him that some action should be taken by the churches, and that it should be done immediately. Fortunately, Samuel

McCrea Cavert, general secretary of the FCC, and Dulles, were also in the city. On the seventh of August Fagley met with them and it was agreed that the FCC should take action on the matter. A tentative statement was drawn • up. But there was one problem. Dulles insisted that the statement be issued over the joint signatures of himself and Bishop Oxnam, President of the FCC. Oxnam, 207 unfortunately, was vacationing in the wilds of northern

Vermont. After a great deal of difficulty he was finally reached by telephone and the statement was read to him for his reaction. In the meantime Dulles made an over­ ture to Cardinal Spellman, inviting him to join in issuing the statement. Spellman blandly replied that he too sought a just and durable peace and hoped it would come soon, He completely ignored the proffered invitation. .

In desperation Dulles contacted Archbishop Conway of

Washington, D.C., who responded favorably, but by that time it was August 9, a second bomb had been dropped and the men at the FCC decided the effort to align the

Catholics would delay issuance of the statement too long.

On the evening of August 9 Dulles and Cavert sent a cable to President Truman protesting the bombings and announc­ ing that Dulles and Bishop Oxnam would issue a statement the following day calling on the President to give the

Japanese an opportunity to surrender before wreaking further destruction. Dulles, Fagley and Cavert, in frequent telephonic discussions with Oxnam in Vermont, spent the night of August 9 hammering out the statement. g It was released to the press the next morning.

Two key paragraphs spelled out the FCC position:

One choice open to us is immediately to wreak upon our enemy mass destruction such as men have never before imagined. That will inevitably obliterate men and women, young and old, innocent and guilty 208

alike because they are part of a nation which has attacked us and whose conduct has stirred our deep wrath. If we, a professedly Christian nation, feel morally free to use atomic energy in that way, men elsewhere will accept that verdict. Atomic weapons will be looked upon as a normal part of the arsenal of war and the stage will be set for the sudden and final destruction of mankind.

Another choice is to consider that the new know­ ledge we possess is, from the beginning, im­ pressed with a trust for the benefit of humanity. President Truman has said, "Atomic power can become a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world peace." The time to prove that is now. We can, in the Japanese war itself, seek to show quickly and dramatically how our new power can be used to stop war— not merely prose­ cute it. That would require at least a tempor­ ary suspension or alteration of our program of air attack on the Japanese homeland to give the Japanese people an adequate opportunity to react to the new situation through leaders who will accept the surrender terms we and our Allies have offered.9

The President responded to the statement with alacrity. "Nobdy is more disturbed over the use of the atomic bomb than I am," he wrote, "but I was greatly dis­ turbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on

Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war.

The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable, but nevertheless true."^ Many who responded to the statement concurred with the President. Others, notably pacifists, found the statement too innocuous, one man calling it a "mealy-mouthed suspension plea.""^ 209

Most, churchmen were relieved that the FCC had acted and that its statement had been a call for a suspension rather than a moralistic denunciation of the bombing.

Dulles was satisfied with the statement. He remarked that "there has been in this war too little moral restraint. I think we can feel better for having called upon our government to exercise it with reference 12 to this extremely dangerous weapon . . . ." With his customary overrating of the effect of his efforts, he noted that no additional bombs had been dropped and that the churches could take some credit for that fact.^^

Several years later he was non-plussed to learn that the reason a suspension took place at that point was be­ cause there were no more bombs to drop. Only two had been fabricated.

Perhaps the most striking element in the Dulles-

Oxnam statement was the absence of any critique of the use of the bomb in the first place, or of its use on the

Japanese civilian population. That this particular as­ pect of the bomb's deployment was not a major factor in

Dulles' mind was illustrated by a letter from Oxnam and

Dulles to Truman on August 22, on the eve of the Japanese surrender. They complimented the President on his "self- restraint in the use of A-power" and his "demonstration of the possibility of A-energy bringing war to an end. 210

If the demonstration is constructively followed up, it 15 may be of incalculable value to posterity." As already noted, many churchmen, especially pacifist members of the CJDP, had found the original Dulles-Oxnam statement

inadequate. They found this letter totally unacceptable.

In response they drew up a statement of their own, with thirty-four signatories, condemning the use of the bomb

in the first place. "Its reckless and irresponsible em­ ployment against an already virtually beaten foe will have

to receive judgment before God and the conscience of man­ kind," they said. "It has our unmitigated condemnation."^

In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some

churchmen turned to the question of the control of atomic energy. Albert Rogers of the Seventh Day Baptist General

Conference urged the CJDP to undertake a campaign in

support of international control of the new weaponry before its use proliferated and such control became im- 17 possible. Many similar proposals were received. In response Fagley drew up a memorandum entitled "What Should

the FCC Say Regarding the A-bomb and World Order?” and 18 circularized it among Commission members and FCC staffers.

Basically Fagley called on the churches to press for in­

ternational control of the A-bomb as the best assurance of avoiding a nuclear holocaust. 211

Opposition to Fagley's proposal came from various sources. A. J. Muste, now a member of the CJDP, argued that the churches should lobby for the abolition of the 19 bomb as the only moral solution. Charles Clayton

Morrison of the Christian Century went even further.

Dealing with the bomb was simply treating symptoms. The disease was war itself. "Let's get at the causes of war rather than undertaking to clip the claws of the beast.

Besides," he warned, "if war comes, the A-bomb will be 20 used, agreement or no agreement." In his typically tough-minded approach to issues Henry Van Dusen argued against international controls because he wanted the

United States to maintain its monopoly of the secret of atomic physics. "... this secret is safer in the hands of this country than in the control of an inter­ national body," he reasoned. "I recognize that the surrender of the secret to the UN would magnify the prestige of the latter. But the secret would then be 21 common property. That is too great a risk to take."

Early in September Dulles left for the London

Foreign Ministers Conference as an advisor to Secretary of State Byrnes. Before leaving he wrote a memo to

Fagley in which he called for the CJDP to stress "that proper international control should be sought so as to assure to the maximum degree possible that atomic energy 212 22 would be used to prevent war, not to prosecute it."

Since Dulles' position coincided with his own, Fagley used the memo to good effect in the subsequent process of drawing up a Commission statement on the matter.

Debate within the Commission over the Fagley memo continued for nearly a month. The vote on the final draft was, as Fagley put it. "forty for and Morrison 23 against." Entitled "Statement on Control of the Atomic

Bomb," it reflected the consensus of the Commission that

the United States should commit the hew discovery to an

international authority. The statement was issued as an

official FCC position paper and widely distributed. It was the first official action by any responsible body

in the United States on the subject of the control of

atomic power.

Dulles was delighted with the statement. He

returned from his first postwar encounter with the Soviets

at the London Foreign Ministers Conference more than ever

convinced that the only option for the United States was

to act quickly to internationalize atomic power. Speak­

ing at the inauguration of Henry P. Van Dusen as Presi­

dent of Union Theological Seminary shortly after his

return, he declared: "The power that we want is the

power of public opinion, not atomic power. Any thought

that we want the latter would wholly destroy our moral 213 influence in the world. Mr. Molotov, speaking last week, said that the 'discovery of atomic energy should not encourage a propensity to exploit the discovery in the play of forces in international policy.' He is quite

O A right." Several weeks later Dulles reiterated these sentiments in an interview with President Truman at the

White House.^

Meanwhile the debate over the control of atomic energy was going on between the civilian proponents of the McMahon Bill (S. 1717) and the War Department spon­ sored May-Johnson Bill (H.R. 4566). In early February,

1946 the McMahon committee invited the FCC to testify on behalf of the bill. An embarrassed Van Kirk had to reply that the FCC had not yet taken a position on the matter 2 6 and that they would have to decline the invitation.

It was not until the special FCC general meeting held in

Columbus, Ohio in early March that the FCC finally formu­ lated a position. On motion from Dulles, the special assembly adopted a resolution to the effect that "Ulti­ mate control of atomic energy should be assigned to civ- 27 ilian, not military agencies." Throughout the spring and summer Fagley and others on the CJDP worked in sup­ port of several groups such as the National Committee for Civilian Control of Atomic Energy and the Emergency

Conference for Civilian Control of Atomic Energy, in 214 their efforts to mobilize public ipinion for the cause.

The CJDP did not take any action on the matter, however.

Questioned about this by A. J. Muste, Dulles admitted that the CJDP had debated the issue at length, but had 28 not been able to devise a plan of action.

The failure of the Commission to act on the ques­ tion of civilian control of atomic energy was symptomatic of the changed conditions which it faced in the postwar era. The most pressing issues were loaded with political and moral ambiguity.. As a result the process of gaining a consensus became more and more difficult. Compounding the problem was a loss of the old sense of purpose which had carried the Commission along during its early years.

Several of the key men on the Committee of Direction were preoccupied with new professional assignments. Dulles was less involved than, usual because of his frequent offi­ cial assignments. As a result Commission activity tended to languish.

The entire Commission met for the first time after the war on November 8-9, 1945. Dulles gave an off-the-record report of the London Foreign Ministers

Conference. At his suggestion the CJDP went on record in support of the United States position with regard to

U.N. trusteeship for dependent peoples. It also endorsed 215

U.N. activity in the field of human rights and fundamental 29 freedoms.

The question of the future of the Commission was discussed. Dulles observed that peace was a long-range project and proposed that the CJDP should continue to deal with specific issues as they arose. Some members argued that a more efficient program could be carried out if the Department of International Justice and

Goodwill and the Commission were merged. A committee was 30 appointed to explore the matter.

Charles Clayton Morrison proposed that the Com­ mission sponsor another "Cleveland" Conference in the spring of 1946. He was particularly concerned that the churches begin to deal with the new problems of the A- bomb and growing East-West tensions.^ The idea didn't generate much enthusiasm,, both Dulles and Van Kirk being chary about large conferences which sought to deal with highly technical and political matters. Dulles was always leery of large conferences because they were dif­ ficult to manage and control. He much preferred to have the church speak through small groups like the CJDP where dangerous or embarrassing positions could be more easily compromised. The Commission voted to plan for a conference, but a few weeks later the FCC executive com­ mittee decided to call a special general FCC meeting 216 instead. Its purpose was to explore the whole gamut of problems, domestic and international, posed by the post­ war situation.

In other business Dulles proposed that the Com­ mission call on the provisional committee of the World

Council of Churches to convene an international consul­ tation of church leaders to be held in the summer of 1946.

He pointed out that one of the original tasks of the Com­ mission had been to convene an international conference of Christian leaders to discuss common world order con­ cerns. The Commission authorized Dulles and Van Kirk to pursue the matter with the provisional committee of the 32 World Council of Churches.

The most substantive work of the November meeting was acceptance of a new Commission statement entitled 33 "Christian Action on Four Fronts for Peace.” It was drafted by Georgia Harkness, Henry P. Van Dusen, and

Bishop Scarlett. Declaring that the immediate future might prove to be "mankind's last chance," the pamphlet called on Christians to take up the responsibility of speaking and acting on behalf of mankind. On the "Inner

Front" the first prerequisite was to cleanse the people from the moral contamination of war" by reasserting the essential Christian qualities of love, trust and brotherhood among men. The "Church Front" demanded a 217 renewed effort to restore the badly disrupted ecumenicity of the Church. Only through unity could the Christian forces of the world promote the goals of a peaceful and just world order.

On the "Peace Treaty Front" the Commission drew up five basic principles upon which to base the peace settlements. The Commission urged that a general peace conference be convened so that world opinion could play a role in the final peace treaties. The "U.N. Front" was primarily an appeal to the United States to maintain its interest in and commitment to the international organization.

The "Four Fronts for Peace" were given maximum exposure by having five syndicated articles, written by distinguished men, published in over 100 newspapers and magazines on a weekly basis from February 10 to March 10,

1946. Dulles wrote the introductory article. The other writers were Senator J. William Fulbright, Governor

Harold Stassen, the Right Reverend Henry St. George 34 Tucker, and Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam.

Dulles attended the first U.N. Assembly in London during January and February, 1946, and then hurried home to share the platform at the special session of the FCC at Columbus, Ohio with President Truman. The President exhorted the churchmen to become the "shock troops" of a moral and spiritual awakening. In his own address, Dulles 218 reviewed the world situation in terras of his experience at the U.N. General Assembly. Neither man expressed much 35 optimism for the future.

During Dulles' absence the Committee of Direction had drafted a statement entitled The Churches and World

Order. This paper was submitted to the special session at Columbus for ratification. Its purpose was to provide concrete objectives which would put the "Four Fronts" program into action.

The special assembly authorized the CJDP to or­ ganize a year-long campaign to "demonstrate anew Christian 37 concern for a just and durable peace." This campaign began at Easter, 1946 and continued through November.

Pastor's conferences, youth retreats, regional and denomi­ national conferences were all part of the program. To assist the educational effort the staff of the CJDP pre­ pared two study pamphlets on The Churches and World Order statement. Walter Van Kirk wrote a small leaflet, The 38 A B C of the U.N. General Assembly, for the same purpose.

During the winter and spring of 1946 planning continued for an international consultation of church leaders. In February the provisional committee of the

World Council of Churches agreed to sponsor the meeting, 39 ■ to be held in England. It requested the CJDP to 219 undertake the planning and organizing for the conference, 40 a task the Commission readily accepted. There was great enthusiasm among the American churchmen for a con­ ference, in contrast to the more measured, even tentative mood of the Europeans and British. The latter were pre­ occupied with the problems of reconstruction, and the war may even have diminished some of their enthusiasm for ecumenical activity. By contrast the American churchmen were optimistic about the prospects for a new ecumenical crusade on behalf of world order.

Dulles and the American churchmen had just com­ pleted many years of what they considered very successful influence on national policy by the churches through the

CJDP. They had great confidence that this could be con­ tinued. In fact one of their proposals to the Provisional

Committee of the WCC was the creation of a church agency on the international level to relate to the U.N. in a fashion similar to the way the CJDP had functioned on 41 the national level. What they sought was nowhere better expressed than by O. Frederick Nolde: "It is imperative that the churches of the world seek in every legitimate way to bring moral pressure to bear on the rulers of the world. If it is appropriate for labor and business to put pressure on the U.N.O., it is necessary for the A O churches to do the same thing." Walter Van Kirk was equally explicit: "... power politics are seeking to 220 expand their influence and the churches must act to counter-balance them. The U.N. may die, but we do not want it to die because the Christian churches are too 43 weak." In the same interview Bishop Bromley Oxnam cited the "power" of the churches in the world.

The experience of the European churchmen had been quite different.from that of the Americans. They had been impressed by the powerlessness of the church as a force in national and international affairs. Their ex­ periences had tended to emphasize the a-political char­ acter of the church. In fact, in some cases an a-political stance had been a condition for survival. Their energies had been focused on maintaining the life of the church, with little opportunity and few resources to deal with the larger social and political issues. For these reasons many European churchmen found the almost exhuberant op­ timism of the Americans about the ability of the churches to influence world affairs highly suspect. They were honestly suspicious of the American attempt to make the 44 ' churches a "power bloc."

The contrast between the mood of the Americans and the Europeans was nowhere more evident than in the discussions regarding the subject matter of the confer­ ence. Dulles argued that the conference should deal with techniques of cooperation among the churches for 221 influencing the international situation. In other words, how could the churches best organize to exert their power on behalf of world peace and justice. He authorized 45 Walter Van Kirk to draw up a program on that basis.

The Americans were taken aback by the negative reaction of' the Europeans to the proposal. The executive secretary of the Provisional Committee of the V7CC, W. A. Visser't

Hooft, accurately reflected European thinking when he proposed that the conference deal with more substantive 46 theological and ecumenical issues related to world order.

He felt that conditions had changed so greatly that it was

important for the church to reexamine its basic principles

in light of the new postwar situation. After several months of debate it was decided to make the primary task of the conference the creation of a new international organization to be known as the Church Commission on

International Affairs (hereafter CCIA). The conference was charged to draw up a Charter, elect officers, and define the work of the new organization. Any additional

business was left to the conference to decide upon when

it met.x. 47

The conference was an American project from begin­

ning to end. Its financing was carried singlehandedly

by the Americans. At Dulles' behest Van Kirk appealed

to the Carnegie Foundation for financial assistance and was quite surprised when the Foundation responded with 4 8 $7500.00. Another $4500.00 was provided by Dulles. He had just received $4500.00 for two articles published in

the Readers Digest on Soviet foreign policy. He turned the entire amount over to the CJDP to help finance the 49 meeting. An additional small sum was provided by social

action organizations in several American denominations.^

Van Kirk and the CJDP staff also prepared a ques- tionnnaire which was sent to leaders of church organi­ zations around the world in an effort to ascertain what had been done by the churches in the area of world order over a period of several decades. The results were

collated and presented to the conference. (The chief

finding of the survey pointed up the enormous amount of world order activity engaged in by the American churches compared to those in other lands.)

The conference convened at Girton College, Cam­ bridge/ August 4-7, 1946. Sixty delegates from sixteen 52 countries were present. Twenty were Americans. Dulles was unanimously elected conference chairman, with W. A.

Visser't Hooft and Walter Van Kirk serving as secretaries.

Marc Boegner, President of the Federation of Protestant

Churches in France, Kenneth S. Grubb, President of the

Church Mission Society (Br.), and Dr. Francis Che Min wei,

President of Huschang University, were elected vice- chairman. Conspicuously absent was the great Japanese 223

Christian leader, Kagawa. Much to the embarrassment and frustration of Dulles, the American occupation author­ ities in Japan adamantly refused to allow Kagawa to attend 54 the conference. The Russian churches were also con­ spicuous by their absence. Querried about this, Dulles replied: "The Russians will not be represented at the 55 conference, but that's not our fault." Whether an over­ ture had been made to the Russian patriarch is uncertain.

The small size of the conference was dictated by necessity— lack of funds— and by design. Dulles' aver­ sion to large conferences has already been noted. Beyond that, the conference was not envisaged as another Oxford.

Its chief purpose was to launch the CCIA and to demon­ strate the unity of the ecumenical movement.

In his opening address Dulles stated his own view of the purpose of the conference succinctly: "We are here to determine how the diffused force of our Christian churches can be funneled into the political life of our 56 world so as to redeem it from failure." The CCIA, he declared, must become a force in helping translate the U.N.

Charter into reality. To accomplish that end he outlined four areas of activity: the CCIA must be inspired by a vigorous faith and must help inspire the churches; it must educate Christians throughout the world regarding the facts of world order; it must be organized and 224 administered so that it could be accessible to the U.N. and make its voice heard; fainally it ought to cooperate with Catholics and Jews in their mutual concerns for world brotherhood and peace.

Turning to world affairs in general, he noted the growing tensions between East and West. He urged that

Christians attempt to mediate the conflict for "no politi­ cal system is incompatible with Christianity." (This point was sharply attacked by the Swiss theologian, Emil

Brunner, who argued that there were political systems which were anti-Christian, and Christians could not be simply neutral, as Dulles implied.) Dulles also criticized the American occupation authorities in Germany, saying he "felt humiliated" by United States policy, especially the conduct of the American troops and their use of "slave 57 labor." He castigated the United States for maintaining 5 8 "far-flung bases which threaten others." He called on the conference to endorse the internationalization of atomic energy, assuring the delegates that the United

States would honor its international commitments in that connection. Calling the U.N. the greatest hope for peace in the world, he urged the conference to search for ways by which to create greater support and respect for the struggling organization. Clearly Dulles' speech was designed to create rapport with the non-Americans, and 225 from the evidence he appears to have generally succeeded.

Most of the conference effort was devoted to launching the new CCIA. Perhaps the most troublesome question had to do with the scope and role of the new agency. Should the Commission be a small select group of churchmen who would seek to influence political leaders or should it be a larger group which would attempt to mobilize public opinion on issues? The Americans sought a strong well-organized group to represent the churches.

The Europeans favored a more cautious approach. The de­ bate went on for several days, with the eventual decision a compromise. The CCIA would be made up of thirty mem­ bers, but its responsibilities would be both educational and lobbyist in character, with its primary focus on 59 the U.N.

The Charter made the Commission responsible to serve the "Churches, Councils and Conferences which are members of the World Council of Churches and the Inter­ national Missionary Council, as a source of stimulus and knowledge in their approach to international problems; as a medium of common counsel and action; and as their organ in formulating the Christian mind on world issues and in bringing that mind effectively to bear upon such issues."■I 6 0

Professor Baron P. M. Van Asbeck of the Nether­ lands was elected chairman of the CCIA. Dulles became 226

vice-chairman. Kenneth Grubb (Br.) was named director in

charge of the CCIA in its ongoing operations and 0.

Frederick Nolde was appointed associate director with

special responsibilities for liaison with the U.N. Two.

offices were set up, one in London under Grubb; the other in New York under Nolde. Rodman Parvin, an Ameri­

can, became treasurer. While the constituent groups of

the CCIA were assessed for financial support, most of

the money came from the Americans.^

Designing the organization and writing its Charter

proved to be easier than making the organization a "force"

in international affairs. The Cold War, the problems of

distance, time and culture, as well as a certain reserve on the part of some of the Europeans, all contributed to

a slow start. While publicly extolling the CCIA, both

Dulles and Van Kirk privately expressed disappointment with the organization during its first years. The activ­

ities of 0. Frederick Nolde, in his work at the U.N. in

connection with such matters as human rights, genocide and

colonial problems represented the most tangible accomp­

lishments of the first number of years.

The CCIA stands as a testimony to the great con­

fidence of the American churchmen, and specifically Dulles, in the efficacy of the churches as agents of influence for

justice and peace in the world. Its creation rested on 227

the assumption, too easily accepted, it appears in ret­

rospect, that the achievements of the CJDP on the national

level could be duplicated on the international scene. The

tough exigencies of the postwar world were to prove too

strong for such a sanguine approach to postwar problems.

The European sense of the powerlessness of the church seems

to have been more appropriate for the bi-polar postwar

world.

In September, 1946 Secretary of State Byrnes de-

•livered a speech before a group of German leaders in

Stuttgart. He accused the Soviet Union of blocking the

reunification of Germany and then in effect, abandoned

the drive for a united Germany by accepting its division

as an accomplished fact. Some historians have pointed

to the Stuttgard speech as the beginning of the "Cold

War.1' East-West hostility had been developing over a

period of several years. At Yalta, and later at Potsdam,

the Russian conception of the postwar world had clashed

with the postwar interests of the United States. At the

meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers during 1945

and 1946 these differences became increasingly apparent

and acrimonious. In March 1946 Churchill delivered his

historic "Iron Curtain" speech, and gave voice to the

growing fears of many Americans when he observed that 228

"Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist inter­ national organizations intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expan- 6 2 sive and proselytizing tendencies."

At about the same time the Russians turned down the cautious and self-serving American plan for interna­ tional control of atomic energy. E)uring the summer they threatened the political integrity of both Turkey and Iran.

The East-West impasse over Germany appeared to some Ameri­ cans as the final evidence that the Soviets were engaged in a dangerous expansionist policy which seriously 63 threatened the stability of the postwar world.

The internationalist churchmen came to that con­ clusion only very reluctantly. They had invested an enormous amount of effort and emotion in the drive to create a just and durable world order. Many of them found it difficult to accept the fact that so soon after the end of the war and the creation of the U.N., the old politics of national power was again the dominating fac­ tor in international affairs. They were especially criti­ cal of United States policy, which was believed to be a precipitating factor in the growing tensions with the

Soviets. Morrison of the Christian Century reflected this sentiment in an editorial entitled "Are the Protest­ ant Churches to Back a 'talk tough' Policy for Making

Peace?" He called for a new effort by the churches to 229 change American policy. The inter-Church Committee of the American-Russian Institute— Dr. Ralph Sockman, Presi­ dent— called for a "great spiritual crusade" to put Ameri- 64 can-Russian relations on a foundation for lasting peace.

By the summer of 1946 Dulles had decided that the churches should speak to the new problem. Writing to his good friend and spiritual counsellor, Roswell Barnes, he described the East-West tensions as the "most serious and most perplexing postwar problem." He said he had not suggested any action to the CJDP on the issue because he had not been clear in his own mind about Soviet intentions.

Now after a year of experience with the Russians he felt more ready to act. He sent along a working paper on the issue for Barnes' critical comments, noting that he had also sent copies to Acting Secretary of State Acheson and Andrei Gromyko.^ This paper was later rewritten and published in two installments in Life Magazine. Entitled

"Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It," it rep­ resents a useful index to Dulles' sense of the situation in mid-1946.

In his explanation of Soviet foreign policy he reverted to his pre-war theory of dynamic and static powers. The Soviets, intent on creating a "Pax Sovietica," were now the dynamic power in the world, and their offen­ sive thrust,gained strength from the fact that it was 230

revolutionary and sought change. The dynamism of the

Soviets was enhanced by the presence of racism, imperial­

ism and economic maladjustment in the West. These con­

ditions sapped the strength of the Western democracies and

gave the lie to their pretentions. Furthermore they were

indications that the-West -suffered from a profound moral

and spiritual malaise. The solution was not the creation

of an impregnable military machine. Rather the salvation

of the West lay in its ability to recover the spiritual

and moral dynamism implicit in its vaunted, but seldom

practised, ideals. Basically the Soviet system was weak

and its successes were rooted in the chaos of war and the

failure of the West to revive its flagging spiritual

qualities.

For the first time Dulles publicly alluded to his

conception of the Cold War in Toynbean terms of challenge

and response. Toynbee's ideas meshed well with Dulles'

evolutionary view of history, and now he used them to

supplement his basic dynamic— status quo frame of refer­

ence. The West was decadent. Dulles was convinced of that.

But he saw the Soviet challenge as a possible stimulant

for rejuvenating the West, reviving "... worthy features

of our historic faith and eliminating the unworthy features which have accumulated largely because the v/estern democ­

racies have not needed to meet a real challenge for many 6 6 centuries." Thus the challenge of the Soviets should be 231 welcomed. "Every civilization faces, and ought to face, periodic challenges. That is nothing to complain about. 6 7 It is the way the world works." The West could recover its vitality and turn back the Soviet challenge by bringing its practise into greater conformity with its ideals. As a start he suggested that the United States renounce imperialism by withdrawing from many far-flung bases which were not necessary for its own security, launch a massive economic aid program for the developing countries, and once-and-for-all renounce the practise of racial dis­ crimination.

At this point Dulles was still convinced the

Soviets could be deterred by a demonstration of goodwill and integrity of purpose. In fact the essence of his position was the assumption that the Soviets would accept the rules of the game— fair play and tolerance. The drive for a "Pax Sovietica" was a challenge, perhaps even a threat, to the West, but at this point Dulles per­ ceived it as neither unprecedented nor particularly alarming.

The articles received widespread comment and were reprinted in Readers Digest. Their reasoned tone and pacific proposals stood in marked contrast to the tough stance of the Truman administration. Morrison of the

Christian Century hailed the articles as a sensible al- 6 8 ternative to the Administrations's bellicosity. Filmed as received without page(s) 232

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. 233 unrestricted arms race will destroy mankind? neither state

socialism nor free enterprise provides a perfect economic

system; and the Russian and American people can learn a

lot from the experience of the other.

In conclusion the statement asserted that the

causes of East-West tension could be largely removed "if

the democratic peoples will make their political institu­

tions so vigorous and life-giving that men everywhere will want them." The opposition of the West to dictatorships

should not be simply "sterile denunciation." Western democracy must be made to work, for such of the attraction of communism "measures disillusionment caused by certain

inadequacies of democracy." Be demonstrating that a

free society can solve its own economic and social prob­

lems it will be seen that democracy rather than dictator­

ship is the "higher phase of social development." A

"definite, consistent, and strongly-backed American program of this order," the statement asserted, would bring a

response from the Soviet leaders since it would "permit

their own people peacefully to develop under their own

institutions and would permit them by fair methods to

propagate their faith in the world." The resulting atmos­

phere would then be such that it would be possible "to

deal in a friendly and fair way with the perplexing post­ war problems. V,

234 Viewed through the chill and fog of two decades of Cold War the statement appears unbelievably naive. But

it has to be understood in terms of the previous experience of its authors. When compared to earlier CJDP pronounce­ ments it is very much in character. Despite the experi­

ences of World War II the churchmen were still basically hopeful regarding the potential decency and rationality of

international politics. The optimism of the 1930's was

still in evidence.

By 1947 the mood had changed appreciably. In

July, 1947, the CJDP published Cross-Roads of American

Foreign Policy, and devoted one section to the problem of Soviet-American relations.Now the tensions were no longer seen as those between two legitimate competing

systems. Rather the issue was that of the free society vs.

the police state. Now Russian communism stood "clearly opposed to Christianity" because it disregarded the

sacredness of personality "which is fundamental to 72 Christianity." More important than the substance of

the statement was its tone. The faith in the rationality of international politics was gone, as was the previous

hopefulness about an ultimate solution. It frankly ack­ nowledged that no immediately available solution was in

sight. The failure of the Moscow Foreign Ministers Con­

ference, the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet 235 investiture of Hungary, and the erosion of stability in

Western Europe had all contributed to the new mood.

The change was apparent in Dulles' own speeches and comments. In a commencement address at Northwestern

University, the new tough mood was apparent. "There is no reason to believe that that effort [Soviet expansion] will stop of its own accord. If it stops, it will be only because something stops it. That something will be either violent resistance or moral resistance so solid 73 that to oppose it would evidently be futile." He was aware of his change of mind, for while criticizing Henry

Wallace for his dovish views on Soviet-American relations, he admitted that just a year earlier he might have agreed with Wallace. At that time, he observed, he still be­ lieved in the good intentions of the Russians. Now he 74 had become more "realistic."

The best evidence of his change of mind was his reversal of his former stand on Universal Military Train­ ing. When he testified before the President's Advisory

Committee on Universal Military Training in June, 1947 he spoke in support of the program. A. J. Muste was out­ raged, because the FCC had consistently opposed Universal

Military Training. He immediately wrote Dulles a letter reminding him that only a year earlier he had publicly opposed the program. Dulles replied,that he had changed 236 his mind because of his experiences with the Russians at the U.N. and at the Foreign Ministers Conferences. The

Soviets, he said, only respect force. The UMT plan was one way of impressing them with the American resolve to 75 halt their aggression, by force if necessary. This new toughness upset some people. Frank Laubach, the gentle and pious literacy specialist with the Foreign Missions

Conference of North America, reprimanded Dulles for his conduct during a heated debate with Molotov at the London

Foreign Ministers meeting. Remarked Laubach: "This sort of thing sounds like the swashbuckling of our Admirals and

Generals and unbecoming the leader of Protestantism. As

I have read your speeches they have been too much on the side of the toughness of a lawyer and not enough like-

Jesus Christ. In your very difficult position as our leader you ought every day to saturate yourself with the 76 Sermon on the Mount."

During 1947 Dulles found himself increasingly estranged from the pacifists who had worked with him for so many years. Memoranda and letters abound complaining of the fact that the "church witness and government policy 77 flow pretty much in the same channel." Even the loyal

Walter Van Kirk found himself frequently at odds with 78 Dulles' positions.

By 1948 Dulles had come full circle. In 1946 his critique of United States and Soviet foreign policy 2 37 was still basically evenhanded and identifiably inter­ nationalist; by 194 8 he was taking a position increasingly uncritical of United States policy. This was nowhere better demonstrated than in his address before the Amsterdam

Conference of the World Council of Churches in 1948.

Dulles and Joseph Hromadka, Dean of the John Hus Faculty of Prague University, were assigned the opening speeches

in Assembly Commission IV dealing with the Church and

International Affairs. Dulles' address, entitled "Christ­

ian Responsibility in Our Divided World," unequivocably condemned the Soviet system as tyrannical and called on

Christians to assist in its eradication.

Typically, Dulles had circulated a copy of his speech among his colleagues for comment before completing the final draft. The churchmen unanimously urged him to tone down the critical character of his remarks vis & vis the Soviet Union. Richard Fagley was especially blunt with his suggestion that Dulles ought to argue for human rights, recovery programs, and fundamental freedoms in terms of their intrinsic value rather than as simply weapons in the 79 fight against communism. Apparently Dulles' intended speech provoked a good bit of discussion within government circles for just before leaving for Amsterdam he received a letter from Eleanor Roosevelt. She was worried, she wrote, by the news that the Amsterdam Assembly was going to be used as a platform for anti-Russian sentiments. "No church 238 meeting should project itself into politics if it can possibly be prevented." In response Dulles said he was

sorry the Soviets were "boycotting" the Amsterdam Assembly.

He assured Mrs. Roosevelt that it would not be anti-Russian beyond perhaps emphasizing the fact that social and politi­ cal institutions that reflect an atheistic and materialis­

tic creed are not acceptable to Christians. Besides, he

noted, the "Communist Hromadka" from Czechoslovakia would

be speaking "in defense" of the Soviet Union and the 80 Assembly would thus not be one-sided. Dulles clearly

saw his speech at Amsterdam as one in which he was "de- 81 fending Western civilization against Soviet Communism."

During 1946 and 1947 the Commission carried on an

active program of education, study and publicity dealing

with the U.N. and the various peace settlements. The

fact that the U.N. General Assembly met in New York for

its fall session (1946) gave the CJDP an opportunity to

promote the U.N. in various ways. The Commission drew up

a statement of welcome to the officers and delegates of

the Assembly which was sent out over the signature of the ft? President of the FCC. On November 10, 1946 the CJDP

held a service of Christian Witness and Intercession at

Riverside Church. All U.N. delegates were invited and 239 representatives of thirty nations attended. Dulles and 8 3 Dr. Fosdick of Riverside Church addressed the meeting.

The Commission also arranged for Van Kirk and 84 Nolde to serve as "observers" at meetings of the U.N.

Dr. Van Kirk prepared the first of a continuing series of reports about the work of the U.N. for the information of

Commission members, pastors, and denominational education 85 and social action secretaries. During the spring of 1947 f the CJDP sponsored a score of regional one-day world order 8 6 conferences promoting support for the U.N. One of Dulles' concerns was to enhance the importance of the U.N. General

Assembly. With the Security Council hamstrung be East-

West tension, he believed greater power by the General

Assembly might be a means of circumventing the Cold War impasse. At the January, 1947 meeting of the CJDP he proposed that the FCC endorse a proposal to give greater authority and responsibility to the Assembly. The CJDP drew up a resolution to that effect and the executive 87 committee of the FCC published it a few weeks later.

It was sent to the President, Congress and all members of 88 the U.N. General Assembly.

The January, 1947 meeting of the CJDP formed two committees to prepare papers on the peace settlements in

Europe and Asia. Dr. Kenneth Scott Latourette chaired the committee on East Asia. The European group was led by Dr. John C. Bennett. The paper on The Churches and 240 the Peace Settlement in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany was prepared before the failure of the Moscow

Foreign Ministers Conference (early spring, 1947) and had a hopefulness regarding a European settlement which the reality of the situation did not warrant. It called for a reordering of Europe which would end nationalistic hos­ tilities and would reconcile "victors and vanquished."

It appealed to the United States and the U.S.S.R. not t j use Europe as a pawn in their big-power rivalries. With respect to Germany, it urged that despite the suffering which Germany had caused, peace would best be served by promoting the "health and sanity" and the spiritual re­ generation of the German people, than by "efforts at 89 repression." The statement was adopted as an official position by the FCC.

The paper by the committee on East Asia did not fare as well. Entitled Problems of Peace in East Asia, it provided an admirable summary of the outstanding prob­ lems facing the area. It was not accorded official status by the executive committee of the FCC, but was published over the signatures of the group which had drawn it up.

The statement fell athwart the growing China debate and

United States-Soviet tensions in Korea. The paper was rather harshly critical of the Chiang Kai-shek regime..

Furthermore it argued that the Communist drive for power in China was basically an indigenous agrarian reform 241 movement receiving no support from the Soviet Union. Fear­

ing repercussions for such heresy the CJDP recommended to the executive committee that it not officially endorse 90 the statement.

One other issue occupied the Commission in 1947 and early 1948. On June 5, 194 7 Secretary of State Marshall in a commencement address at Harvard, announced his sweep­ ing offer to aid the reconstruction of Europe. (Dulles was sure the idea was a result of his influence. "Out of it [a January 1947 speech], and discussions I had with

Secretary Marshall at Moscow, was largely born the so- 91 called "Marshall Plan" as announced at Harvard.") The churchmen responded enthusiastically. The FCC executive committee called the plan "one of history's most momentous 92 affirmations of faith." Many churchmen had been critical of the Truman Doctrine for what they felt was its unneces­ sarily militaristic posture. The Marshall Plan, with its emphasis on economic reconstruction, captivated them, for it seemed like an imaginative alternative to the use of force.

In the fall of 1947, Dulles and Charles P. Taft, brother of the Senator, and newly elected as President of the FCC, testified on behalf of the measure before a Sen- 93 ate committee. In January 1948 the executive committee published a resolution calling for Congress to speedily 242 and fully fund the Plan as it was developed by the Adminis- 94 tration. The campaign on behalf of the European Recovery

Program, as the Marshall Plan was officially titled, came to a climax on March 11. On that day the FCC presented a

"Petition to the Congress of the United States in Support of the European Recovery Program." It was forwarded to each member of Congress with the signatures of 725 leading 95 American churchmen attached. That same evening, the FCC held a meeting at the Washington Cathedral to popularize the issue. The meeting was attended by President Truman and addressed by Bishop Angus Dun of Washington, D.C.,

Secretary of State Marshall, and Dulles. The meeting, in

Dulles' words, was called to put "the American churches on 96 record in support of the European Recovery Program." '

In April Congress passed the Administration bill.

In October, 1947, a committee established to review the status of the CJDP, made its report, subsequently adopted by the FCC executive committee. The recommenda­ tion called ror a reorganization of the Department of

International Justice and Goodwill, and terminated the operation of the CJPD on December 31, 1947. Two committees were created in its place. A Committee of Education and

Action became the public relations arm of the Department.

The second group, the Committee on Policy, v; \s designed to 243

serve as an advisory body to the Department. Its members, about thirty in number, were largely recruited from the

CJDP Committee of Direction. Dulles became chairman of

the new group, serving in that capacity until 1949, when he was named to Senator Wagner's seat in the United States

Senate. The chairmanship was largely honorific and Dulles was only peripherally involved in FCC activity after 1947.

Paul Hutchinson, the new editor of the Christian

Century, noting the expiration of the CJDP, extolled its activity during the war years, but concluded that its demise was probably in order. "Its voice has long lost the ring of Delaware and Cleveland," he said. "Appeals not to lose faith in the U.N. and to keep hoping for the best gave its last days the semblance of a body dying for 97 lack of red corpuscles." Hutchinson was correct, but he

failed to sense that with the passing of the CJDP an unusual era in Protestant world order activity had come to an end. 244

NOTES

^E. B. White, Wild Flag (Boston, 1946), p. 109. 2 FCC executive committee minutes, May 15, 1945, Box 207, FCC-MSS. ^CJDP minutes, June 26, 1945, Box 207, FCC-MSS.

^Christianity and Crisis, June 25, 1945, p. 1.

^Fellowship, July, 1945, p. 1.

^Mendenhall to FCC, August 8 , 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS.

^Press release, August 6 , 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS. q CJDP memoranda, August 19, 1945, Box 7, Dulles Papers. g Statement on the Atomic Bomb, August 9, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS.

^Truman to Cavert, August 11, 1945, Box 7, Dulles Papers. ^Correspondence, August, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS. 12 Press release, August 14, 1945 Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Dulles to Muste, August 21, 1945, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Richard Fagley, Oral History, Dulles Papers. 15 Oxnam-Dulles to Truman, August 22, 1945, Box 7, FCC-MSS.

^ Fellowship, September, 1945, p. 1. Among the signers were Buttrick, J. H. Holmes, Poteat, E. Stanley Jones, Robert Calhoun, Tittle, Bainton, Cogswell, John Paul Jones, Rugus Jones, Muste, Page, Sayre, Villard, Walzer, et al.

^Rogers to Fagley, August 22, 1945, Box 123, FCC- MSS. 245 1 8 Fagley memo, August 23, 1945, Box 123, FCC-MSS. 19 Muste to Fagley, September 4, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS. 20 Morrison to Fagley, September 6 , 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS. 21 Van Dusen to Fagley, September 6 , 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS.

^Dulles to Fagley, September 4, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS.

33Fagley to Cavert, September 19, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS. A i Dulles speech Union Theological Seminary, November 15, 1945, Box 134, FCC-MSS.

^Dulles notes, December 16, 1945, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 2 6 Van Kirk to McMahon Committee, February 14, 1945, Box 135, FCC-MSS.

3^FCC Annual Report, 1946, p. 111.

^Dulles to Muste, June 4, 1946, Box 7, Dulles Papers. 3^CJDP minutes, November 8-9, 1945, Upright File, FCC-MSS.

30Ibid.

31Ibid.

3 2 Ibid. 33 Christian Action on Four Fronts for Peace (N. Y., 1945TT:

3^FCC Bulletin, March, 1946, p. 11.

35Post War World, April, 1946, p. 3.

3^The Churches and World Order (N. Y., 1946).

3^CJDP minutes, March 4, 1946, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 246

38CJDP minutes, June 6 , 1946, Box 207, FCC-MSS.

39Correspondence, February, 1946, Box 45, FCC-MSS.

48FCC Annual Report, 1946, pp. 205-206.

41FCC Bulletin, June 1947, p. 16. "The CCIA may be described as an attempt to develop on a world scale the kind of service which has been rendered by the CJDP on a national level."

A New York Times, August 3, 1946.

43HeraId Tribune, August 5, 1946. 44 CCIA memoranda, Box 34, FCC-MSS.

4^CJDP minutes, December 5, 1945, FCC-MSS.

48Visser't Hooft to Van Kirk, December 27, 1945, Box 45.

A * 7 Report of the British Committee to the American Committee of the WCC, 1946, Box 45, FCC-MSS. 4 8 Van Kirk to the Carnegie Foundation, March .27, 1946; Carnegie Foundation to Van Kirk, April 4, 1946, Box 45, FCC-MSS. 49 Dulles memo, June 27, 1946, Box 140, Dulles Papers. Previously Dulles had received $5000.00 for the same two articles published in Life. Of this amount he gave the CJDP $4100.00.

3UCJDP notes, Box 45, FCC-MSS. 51 CJDP world order survey, April-July, 1946, Box 45, FCC-MSS. 52 Dulles, Rev. G. Ashton Oldham, G. Bromley Oxnam, Dr. JOhn R. Cunningham, Dr. Georgia Harkness, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Dr. 0. Frederick Nolde, Van Kirk, Bishop James Baker, Dr. J. W. Decker, Dr. Ralph S. Diffendorfer, Dr. A. R. Wentz, Dr. John C. Bennett, Dr. Samuel McCrea Cavert, Dr. Walter M. Horton, Dr. Henry Smith Leiper, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, Wesley P. Rennie, and Dr. Tracy Strong.

53Post War World, October 15, 1946, p. 3. 247

54CCIA notes, Box 45, FCC-MSS. 55 World Tribune, August 2, 1946. 5 6 Dulles speech, August 4, 1946, Box 140, Dulles Papers. 57 Lutheran Outlook, September, 1946, p. 288.

(For this statement he got a tough letter from Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, who said such statements "worry” the War Department. Dulles stood his ground, arguing that military necessity should not be allowed to override political and diplomatic con­ siderations, far-flung bases being able to create insecurity because of their threat to another power as well as provid­ ing security to the United States. The military, he insisted, must not be allowed to make the final judgment on such matters. He went on to say that he believed it would be in the United States interest to pull back from some bases then being held, although he did not specify which ones. (Symington to Dulles, September 17, 1946; Dulles to Symington, September 26, 1946, Box 140, Dulles Papers.)

^ Ibid., August, 1946, p. 256. fin FCC Bulletin, September, 1946, p. 11-12. 61 CCIA minutes, August 4-7, 1946, Box 140, Dulles Papers. 62 Winston Churchill, "Alliance of English-Speaking People," Vital Speeches, Vol. XII (1946), p. 331. 6 3 Herbert Feis, Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin. The War They Waged and the Peace~They Sought. (Princeton, 1947), and Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History . of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1817-1367 (New York, 1968). For recent revisions of the above view of the origins of the Cold War see Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War. The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-l945~ (New York, 1968); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, rev. ed., 1962); Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York, 1965). For an admirable summary of the revisionist positions see Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," Perspec­ tives in American History, Vol. IV (1970), ppT 311-347. 248

^ Christian Century, March 13, 1946, pp. 326, 331.

8^Dulles to Barnes, May 8 , 1946, Box 140, Dulles Papers.

88Dulles to Barnes of the New York Herald Tribune, January 31, 1947, Box 140, Dulles Papers.

87Life, June 10, 1946, p. 120.

^^Christian Century, June 12, 1946, p. 175.

88FCC Biennial Report, 1946, p. 62.

7 0 Ibid., p. 240-249. 71 Writers were Dulles, Prof. Hocking, Niebuhr, Harkness and Barnett.

72FCC Bulletin, September, 1947, p. 8 . 73 Northwestern University speech, June 18, 1947, Box 20, Dulles Papers.

7^Dulles to Irving Fisher, June 4, 1947, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

7^Muste to Dulles, June 12, 1947, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

78Laubach to Dulles, November 17, 1946, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

^Correspondence, 1947, Box 155, FCC-MSS.

78Van Kirk to Dulles, June 14, 1947, Box 196, FCC-MSS.

78Fagley to Dulles, March, 1948, Box 10, FCC-MSS. on Eleanor Roosevelt to Dulles, July 29, 1948; Dulles to Eleanor Roosevelt, August 2, 1948, Box 10, FCC-MSS. 81 Dulles to Pettigrew, January 20, 1950, Box 7, Dulles Papers.

82FCC Biennial Report, 1946, p. 232. 249 8 3 FCC press release, November 11, 1946, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 84 FCC Biennial Report, 1946, pp. 55-56. 85 Van Kirk memoranda, Box 215, FCC-MSS.

86FCC Bulletin, June, 1947, p. 20. 87 CJDP minutes, January 1947, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 8 8 FCC Annual Report, 1947, p. 43.

" ibid., pp. 113-118. 90 CJDP minutes, June 20, 1947, Box 207, FCC-MSS. 91 Dulles to Edward Maher, November 22, 1947, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 92 Christian Century, January 28, 1948, p. 99. 93 CJDP memoranda, Box 36, FCC-MSS.

94Ibid.

95Bo x 36, I’CC-MSS. 96 Dulles speech, March 11, 1948, Box 8, Dulles Papers. 97 Christian Century, December 31, 1947, p. 160.' CONCLUSION

The opening session of the First Assembly of the

World Council of Churches took place on Sunday, August

22, 1948, eleven years after the Oxford Conference of 1937.

For many of the 3000 participants packed into the Nieuwe

Kerk in Amsterdam, the colorful ceremony marked the cul­ mination of a decade of arduous ecumenical labor beset by many setbacks and deferred hopes. The decision to create the World Council of Churches had been taken at Oxford, but history's most savage war had intervened. Not until

1948 were the ecumenical forces able to close ranks and give formal substance to the visions of Oxford.

It is significant that Dulles' career as a church­ man began at Oxford and ended, for all intents and pur­ poses, at Amsterdam. In a curious way, his experience paralleled the course of the ecumenical movement itself.

He was won to the church by the enormous energy and optim­

ism exhibited by the ecumenical churchmen at Oxford. His confidence in the churches as "forces" for good in the world had eroded substantially by 1948, just as much of

the optimism of the ecumenical churchmen had by 1948 be­ come more restrained, even fearful. In both instances the

.250 251

forces of tragic history had worked their will.

According to the Oxford prescription, taken

over whole-heartedly by Dulles, the churches served the

indispensable function of providing a common set of

moral values upon which a system of international law

could ultimately be built. It was Dulles' most fer­

vently held belief that until a satisfactory interna­

tional legal system had been created, the ultimate objec­

tive of replacing the chaotic and dangerous nation-state

system would be doomed. The onset of the Cold War, with

its ideologically and historically conditioned tension

between East and West, not only threatened world unity,

based on a common ethos and law, but also changed the

role of the churches in world affairs. Instead of

imperceptibly undermining the anarchic nationalism of

the nation-states, their new responsibility was to

inspire and support the West against the Communist menace.

That thesis was explicitly developed by Dulles in

his speech to the World Council of Churches Assembly at

Amsterdam. After arguing that what Christians seek for

the world are political and social conditions which en­ hance the dignity of man, i. e., a "free society," he went on:

The free society cannot be equated with a Christian- society and it is possible to have free societies whose institutions are not predominantly in­ fluenced by non-Christian religions. But the Christian faith especially emphasizes those 252

qualities of self-control and love of neighbor which are needed for good operation of a free society. So, Christian citizens could feel that to extend free societies was a great long-range effort to which they could worthily dedicate themselves and seek to dedicate their nations .... Those engaged in that effort could feel that they were making the world more nearly one where God's will would be done."l

It was against such a harnessing of the churches on behalf of Western or "free" civilization that Joseph

Hromodka, Dean of the John Hus Faculty of the University of Prague, protested, in his address to the Amsterdam

Assembly. His appeal was for the church, in John Mackay's words, "to be the church" wherever it was, East or West.

Let the church be the leaven, he said, which will "break through the present divisions of the world and speak . . . . 2 with undiminished boldness and truth." A scant half­ decade earlier Dulles would have heartily agreed.

Dulles' perception of the role of the churches in world affairs not only shifted, but as already noted, his optimism about the ability of the churches to in­ fluence events suffered erosion as well. The failure of the Church Commission on International Affairs to gain the influence and prestige he had hoped for, the increasing difficulties which the churchmen experienced in coming to a consensus on international issues, and the general intractability of the problems of the postwar era all reinforced the impression, shared by many of Dulles' 253 contemporaries, that the churches had become weak and 3 ineffective. Thus while Dulles' growing public responsi­ bilities occasioned his withdrawal from church involve­ ments, there is no doubt that a contributing factor was a declining faith in the churches as viable agents in the international arena.*

During much of the decade of Dulles' church leader­ ship he had great confidence in the impact of religious institutions on the course of world affairs. What was the effect of his leadership on the world order activities of American Protestantism during the decade of the 1940's?

Clearly, his contribution was strategic rather than sub­ stantive. It was not the ideas he expressed, but who he was which was important. His position as a leader of the

American foreign policy establishment gave church pro­ nouncements an authority they could not have otherwise enjoyed. They could not as easily be dismissed as the intemperate and idealistic visions of ivory-tower clergy­ men. Of equal importance was his access to the corridors of power. Having lent credence to church statements he then provided the indispensable ingredient of successful influence— contacts and access to decision makers.

Dulles' leadership had an important effect on the posture of the American churches on world order questions.

The fact that that posture was basically in agreement with 254 the official position of the American government was not simply due to Dulles' leadership, for his church colleagues shared his basic outlook. The real implication of his leadership seems to be that his presence tended to circum­ scribe the extent to which the churches could offer alterna­ tives to prevailing American foreign policy. We have ob­ served frequently, how, in the course of his career as a churchman, his political and socio-economic ties affected his positions on world order matters. Thus, while he lent authority to the work of the Commission, he also reduced its ability to be critically prophetic or to assume adver­ sary positions to the government except on the most limited matters. A factor contributing to the basic consensus between the Commission and public policy was the attempt by the Commission to speak for and lobby on behalf of the thirty million members of the Federal Council of Churches.

To be credible when speaking to the government, the Com­ mission had to adopt positions which were broadly shared by most Americans. Thus the Commission was never able to challenge the government on such issues as the use of the

A-bomb, unconditional surrender, or saturation bombing, for it was clear their Protestant constituents did not support them on such matters. More credible, based on opinion polls of the time, was the claim that thirty mil­ lion Protestants supported American involvement in an in­ ternational organization. As a result, the Protestant 255 world-order efforts, massive, coordinated, and highly influential, nevertheless were little more than adjuncts to more broadly based secular movements of the time. The

Commission's ostensible purpose— to bring moral and religi­ ous judgments to bear on international policy— tended to be blurred by the need to remain within the broad consensus of American public opinion.

One of Dulles' significant contributions to Ameri­ can Protestantism in this period was his ability to main­ tain Protestant unity on world order issues. Perhaps the most important quality he brought to that task was his gift as a mediator, a quality not usually ascribed to him.

There is little doubt that it was his leadership which helped to avoid an open break between pacifists and non­ pacifists in the Federal Council world order leadership ranks. There were strains, of course, but his constant depreciation of the use of force in international affairs reassured his pacifist colleages. At the same time he maintained the support of his non-pacifist church colleagues with his reiteration that the exercise of power could never be separated from the use of force.

Dulles' mediating leadership was enhanced by his magisterial manner. He was a man in command of the facts.

He was an expert speaking to and for amateurs. He was a man of influence and power speaking for men and an 256 institution under heavy attack. The onslaughts of secu­ larization had made great inroads on the self-confidence of churchmen in the twentieth century. One can hardly fault them for rallying behind a man who constantly pro­ claimed that the church could and should exercise power, and who put his own influence and prestige at their dis­ posal.

Dulles' colleagues have not been able to agree on the nature of his leadership. Some insist that the Com­ mission served as a rubber stamp for Dulles' own positions.

Others insist his chief role was that of a synthesizer who pulled the disparate positions of the Commission members into a coherent whole.^ On the basis of the record it appears that he did perform the latter role, but it is also apparent that most Commission pronouncements, if not originally conceived or written by Dulles, at least re­ ceived his imprimatur before publication. His was the decisive voice.

Much has been made of the fact that the American churches avoided the chauvinistic excesses which char­ acterized them in World War I.® Certainly some credit for that must go to Dulles and the CJDP, for they con­ sciously sought throughout the war, to combat war passions and hysteria. Dulles continually warned that emotional demands for vengeance would destroy any chance for a viable peace at the war's end. 257

One accusation often leveled at Dulles, both during the 1940's and more recently, is that he used the

Commission as a springboard for his public and political ambitions. There is little doubt that he threw in his lot with the churchmen out of sincere conviction. His perception of the future was never prescient, and neither in 1937 nor in 1940 would anyone with serious political ambitions have chosen the churches as a vehicle to that end. That Dulles' church involvements enhanced his political objectives seems quite clear. That he per­ ceived this as time went on also seems apparent, although he never admitted it, as far as the record is concerned.

On the other hand, one can argue that Dulles would prob­ ably have been Dewey's candidate for Secretary of State had he only devoted himself to his law practise and the

Republican Party. His role as a foreign policy expert did not derive from his church activity. What his church activity provided was a public forum and popular stature which he could not have gained in any other way. Instead of a gilded East Coast foreign policy expert he became a highly respected spokesman for a broad spectrum of American

Protestantism. He certainly derived important benefits from that platform.

Shortly before his death Dulles characterized the

1940's as the most creative period of his life. There 258 seems to be no reason to dispute that judgment. An essen­ tial question, however, is how that period influenced

Dulles' exercise of power in the 1950's. At first glance there appears to be little relation between the inter- nationalistic, idealistic, and even pacifistic Dulles of the 1940's and the belligerent practitioner of "brinkman­ ship" in the 1950's. But there were important continuities.

His emphasis on the dynamic character of international relations, his evolutionary view of human progress, his secularmoralism, his conviction that the moral fiber of the United States had deteriorated in the twentieth century, his opposition to isolationism: all remained an integral part of his world view in the 1950's.

A central element in Dulles' perception of Ameri­ ca' s place in the world was a Wilsonian activism, devoted to assuring that the United States shouldered her world responsibilities. It was only a short and rather direct route from the World War II crusade to end American iso­ lationism and assure her involvement in world affairs to the perception of the United States as the bulwark of the free world against communism. Both demanded an activistic and assertive role by the United States. The ultimate goal of Dulles' internationalism was the creation of a system of international law, but that could only occur after the prior development of a common world ethos. The growth of 259 such a common value system was threatened by the spread of communism. Dulles' exercise of American power was clearly influenced by such a view of the issue.

The apparent discrepancy between the Dulles of the 1940's and the Dulles of the 1950's must be seen, finally, as a result of the demands and responsibilities of power. The internationalist of the 1940's was an observer, a critic speaking for the political opposition; the inter­ nationalist of the 1950's was a steward of American power.

The great internationalist crusade of the churches during the 1940's represented the culmination of the liberal

Protestant social gospel movement which began in the Pro- 7 gressive era. In the area of world order activity, the

1940's represent a watershed in twentieth century Pro­ testant church history. Under Dulles' leadership the Pro­ testant world order posture essentially reinforced pre­ vailing United States foreign policy. The situation changed during the 1950's, when, according to Henry Van

Dusen, the churchmen went to Washington to criticize O Dulles' policies. Increasingly they found themselves dissenting from prevailing government policy. This was dramatically illustrated in 1958 when Dulles addressed the National Study Conference on the Churches and World

Order, where he called on the churchmen to support the government's policy of non-recognition of Red China. The conference, contradicting the Secretary of State, later 260 issued a statement calling for provisional recognition of g the Peking regime. The disagreement was symptomatic of the times. Dulles' generation of world order churchmen had been replaced by new men with a new frame of refer­ ence. Their view of the world had been conditioned by the trauma of World War II, the onset of the Cold War, the advent of nuclear fission, and the overwhelming ex­ pansion of American power. The neo-orthodoxy of Karl

Barth and the dialectical ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr had fundamentally changed their perception of the churches' posture in the world. The result was a new temper which in practise frequently stood in opposition to the dynamics of American Cold War foreign policy. 261

NOTES

John Foster Dulles, "Christian Responsibility in our Divided World," in Man’s Disorder and God's Design (New York, 1949), p. 89.

^Ibid., p. 142. 3 See the Christian Century, March 23, 1949, p. 360. 4 Dulles, "Christian Responsibility in our Divided World," in Man's Disorder and God's Design, p. 111-114.

See Fagley, Bennett, Cavert, Van Dusen, Oral His­ tory, Dulles Papers.

^Ray Abrams, "The American Churches and the Clergy in WWII," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1948, p. 114.

^For a discussion of the revival of the social gospel movement in the 1930's see Paul A. Carter, The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel, 1920-194IT (Ithaca, 1954); also Donald B.Meyer, The Protestant Search for Political Realism (Berkely, I960). g Henry P. Van Dusen, Oral History, Dulles Papers. g John C. Bennett, Oral History, Dulles Papers. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts

The Dulles Papers. Firestone Library. Princeton Univer sity.

National Council of Churches Archives. The Inter-church Center. New York.

Government Documents

Charter of the United Nations Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The Secretary of State, June 26, 1945. Depart­ ment of State Publication 2 349, Conference SEries 71.

Congressional Record, 1941-47.

Department of State Bulletin.

Periodicals and Newspapers

Bulletin of the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace.

Bulletin of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

Changing World.

Christian Century.

Christianity and Crisis

Christianity and Society

Ecumenical Review 262 263

Fellowship.

Free World.

International Conciliation.

Life.

Lutheran Advocate.

Nation.

The New Republic.

Newsweek.

New World.

Post War World.

Public Opinion Quarterly.

New York Times.

Vital Speeches.

Unpublished Material

Frommer, Morris. John Foster Dulles: His Thoughts, Attitudes and Actions Toward Europe, 1919-1935. M.A. thesis. The Ohio State University, 1969.

Simon, Marilyn. John Foster Dulles' Major Concepts of International Relations. M.A. thesis. Ohio State University, 1953.

Burroway, Jessie June. Christian Witness Concerning World Order: The Federal Council of Churches and Postwar Planning, 1941-1947. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1953.

Harrington, Wayne A. Recent Thought on World Peace. Ph.D. dissertation. Georgetown University, 1947.

Vines, K. N. The Role of the Federal Council of Churches rof Christ in America in the Formation of American National Policy. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Minnesota, 1953. 264 Pamphlets

A Christian Basis for Reconstruction. London, 1943.

American Peace Aims. Catholic Association for Interna- tional Peace, 1941.

Chamberlain, William Henry. A Durable Peace in Europe. FCC, 1944.

Commission on a Just and Durable Peace:

A Just and Durable Peace: Memorandum. 1941.

A Just and Durable Peace: Data Material and Discussion Questions. 1941.

Long Range Peace Objectives. 1941.

A Basis for the Peace to Come. 1942.

A Righteous Faith for a Just and Durable Paace. 1942.

Statement of Guiding Principles. 1942.

Guidebook for Action. 194 3.

A Just and Durable Peace: Discussion of Political Propositions. 1943.

Six Pillars of Peace: Editorial Comment . . . 1943

Instruction Manual for Use with Six Pillars of Peace. 1943.

Six Pillars of Peace: A Study Guide. 1943 •

Statements on World Order. 1943.

World Organization— Curative and Creative. 1944.

Christian Action on Four Fronts of Peace. 1945.

From Cleveland to San Francisco. 1945.

What Did The San Franciso Conference Gain? 1945.

What Did The Cleveland Conference Say? 1945. 265

The Churches and World Order. 1946.

Handbook on the Churches and World Order. 1946.

Study Guide on the Churches and World Order. 1946.

Soviet-American Relations. 1946.

Cross Roads of American Foreign Policy. 1947.

Problems of Peace in East Asia. 1947.

Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace:

Your Stake in the Peace. 1943.

Winning the War on the Spiritual Front. 1943.

The United States and Postwar International Coop­ eration! 1944.

Conversations About Christian World Order. Presbyterian Dept, of Education and ACtion. T944.

Dulles, John Foster. Peaceful Change Within the Society of Nations. 1936.

Leadership in Peace. 1949.

The United States and the World of Nations.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 1944.

The Charter— A Great Document of Human Rights" 3.953:

The Church's Opportunities in World Affairs. 1947:

Christian Responsibility for Peace. 1948.

Edwards, Deane. A Litany for Peace. 1946.

Emeny, Brooks. Mainsprings of World Politics. 1943.

Fagley, Richard, ed. Pattern's Progress. 1944. 266 Federal Council of Churches:

TThe 5 -r-J_ Churches and------the International Situation.

The United States and the World of Nations. 1940.

A Message to Christians of All Lands. 1942.

British-American Statement on World Order. 1942.

To Christians of All Lands. 1945.

The Churches and the Charter of the United Na­ tions . 1945.

Statement on Control of the Atomic Bomb. 1945.

Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith. 1946.

Towards Peace in the Far East. 1946.

Present Policies. 1947.

A Christian Message on World Order from the International Roundtable of Christian Leaders. 1942.

Lamott, Willis. A Durable Peace in Eastern Asia.

Lefever, E. W. American Churches and International Affairs. 1953

A Message to the Churches from the National Study Con- ference on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace. Delaware, Ohio. March 3-5, 1942.

A Message to the Churches from the National Study Con- Terence on the Churches and a Just and Durable Peace. Cleveland, Ohio. January 16-19, 1945.

Pattern for Peace— Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant Declaration on World Peace. 1943.

Pope, Liston. Religious Proposals for World Order, An Analysis of Thirty-Four Statements^ 1941.

Van Kirk, Walter. A B C Summary of the Churches and the United Nations: The General Assembly. 1946. 267 Articles

Abrams, Ray E. "The American Churches and Clergy in World War II." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 256 (March, 10487",' Hd~ll9"------Allinsmith, Wesley and Beverly. "Religious Affiliation and Politico-economic Attitudes; A Study of Eight Major U.S. Religious Groups." Public Opinion Quarterly, XII (Fall, 1948), 377-389.

Bainton, Roland. "The Churches Shift On War." Religion in Life, XII (Summer, 1943), 323-335.

Cantril, Hadley. "Opinion Trends in World War II: Some Guides to Interpretation." Public Opinion Quar­ terly, XII (Spring, 1948), 30-44.

Cantril, Hadley, Donald Rugg, and Frederick Williams. "America Faces the War." Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (Fall, 1940), 387-407, 65T-65F:

Cavert, Samuel McCrea. "When is the Church Free?" Chris­ tian Century, LVI (May 26, 1937), 676-677.

"The Christian Churches in the War," Fortune, XXVII (March, 1943), 119-121, 144-156.

"The Churches and the War," Time, XXXVIII (December 22, 1941), 67-68.

Darkin, Arthur. "The Federal Council of Churches and our Foreign Policy," Religion in Life, XXIV (Winter, 1954), 113-126.

Dulles, John Foster. "The Road to Peace," Atlantic Monthly, CLVI (October, 1935), 492-499.

______. "As Seen by a Layman," Religion in Life, (Winter, 1937-8), 9-10.

"The Church's Contribution Toward a Warless World," Religion in Life, VIII (Winter, 1939), 31-40.

"The Treaty of Versailles," Christianity and Crisis, (March 5, 1941), 2-3. 268

"Peace Without Platitudes," Fortune, XV (January 1, 1942), 42-43, 87-90.

______. "Ideals are Not Enough," International Conciliation, No. 409 (1945), 131-1417

"Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It," Life XX (June 3, 1946), 112-126. ----

"Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What To Do About It," Life XX (June 10, 1946), 118-130.

"What Shall We Do With the UN," Chris- tian Century, (September 3, 1947) , 1041-10427

Eagleton, Clyde. "World Government Discussion in the U.S.," London Quarterly of World Affairs, XII (October, 1946), 251-258.

Grubb, Kenneth G. "Christian Approach to International Affairs:. A Criticism," The Ecumenical Review, VIII (July, 1956), 397-4(5157

Hocking, William E. "The Churches and the Current Inter­ national Situation," International Conciliation, No. 409 (1945), 150-1F57

Johnson, F. Ernest. "The Impact of the War on Religion in America," American Journal of Sociology, XLVIII (November, 1942), 353-360.

Lipphard, William A. "The Christian Church and Global Peace," Missions, XXXVI (1945), 151-153.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. "The Myth of World Government," Nation CLXII (March 16, 1946), 312-314.

______. "The Illusion of World Government," Foreign Affairs, XXVII (April, 1949), 379-388.

Palmer, Albert. "Call a World Economic Conference," Christian Century, LV (November 9, 1939), 1368-1369.

Parsons, Edward W. "Report from San Francisco," Chris­ tianity and Crisis (June 11, 1945), 2-4.

Pope, Liston. "Religion and the Cla.ss Struggle," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 231? (March, 1948), 84-91. 269

"Public Opinion on World Organization," FCC Information Service (June 10, 1944), 2.

Van Kirk, Walter. "The Churches and World Peace," Inter­ national Conciliation, No. 304 (November, 1034) ,' 347-377.

"A Just and Durable Peace," Christendom, VI (194T) , 412-425.

"Religion and World Order," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 264 (July, 1949), 106-114.

Books

Abrams, Ray H. Preachers Present Arms. New York: Round­ table Press, 1933.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. "Organized Religion in the United States," ed. by Ray Abrams. Philadelphia: March, 1948.

• "Religion in American Society," ed. by RichardD. Lambert. Philadelphia: November, 1960.

Barnes, Roswell P. A Christian Imperative: Our Contribu- tion to World Order. New York: Friendship Press, 1941.

Bates, M. Searle. Religious Liberty: An Inquiry. New York: Harper, 1945.

Beal, J. R. John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959. New York: Harper, 1959.

Beales, A.C.E. The Catholic Church and International Order. New York: Penguin Books, 1941.

Booth, Alan R. Not Only Peace: Christian Realism and the Conflicts of the 20th Century. New York: Seabury Press, 1967.

Brown, William Adams. A Teacher and His Times. New York; C. Scribners and Sons, 1940. 270

Toward a United Church. New York: CZ Scribners and Sons, 1046.

Carter, Paul A. The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel: Social and Political Liberalism in American Protestant Churches, 1920-19701 Ithaca: Cornell University Press, T93T.

Cauthen, Kenneth. The Impact of American Religious Liber­ alism. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Cavert, Samuel McCrea. The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968. 2 volumes. New York: Association Press, 1968.

Cavert, Samuel, and Henry P. Van Dusen, eds. The Church Through a Half-Century. New York: C. Scribners and Sons, 1936.

Chadwin, Mark Lincoln. The Warhawks: American Internation­ alists Before Pearl Harbor. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1968.

Coffin, Henry Sloan. This Ministry. New York: C. Scrib­ ners and Sons, 1945.

Cohen, Bernard C. The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy-Making. Princeton: World Peace Foundation, 1959.

Cole, Wayne S. America First: The Battle Against Inter­ vention, 1940-41. Madison: University of Wis- consm, 1953.

Corbett, P. E. Post-War Worlds. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.

Culbertson, Ely. Summary of the World Federation Plan: An Outline of a Practical and Detailed Plan for World Settlement. New York: Garden City Pub- lishers, 1943.

Divine, Robert. Second Chance: The Triumph of Interna- tionalismin America During World War II.

Drummond, Roscoe, and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles* Command of American Power. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969. 271

Duff, Edward. The Social Thought of the WCC. New York: Association Press, 1956.

Dulles, John Foster, et al. A Basis for the Peace to Come New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942.

War, Peace and Change. New York: Harper, 1935T

War or Peace. New York: Maxmillan, 1 9 5 Q ^

Eaton, Howard 0., ed. Federation: The Coining Structure of World Government. Norman, Ok1ahoma: Univer­ sity of Oklahoma Press, 1944.

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America. Annual Report. New York, 1939, 1941, 1943, 1945, 1947, 1949.

' . Bien- nial Report. New York, 1940, 1942, 1944, 1946"^ 1943.

Foster, John Watson. Diplomatic Memoirs. Volume II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin^ 1909.

Gaines, David D. The World Council of Churches: A Study of Its Background and History. Peterborough, N.H. r ! R! Smith, 1936.

Gerson, Louis L. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: John Foster Dulles. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1967.

Geyer, Alan. Piety and Politics. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1963.

Gildersleve, Virginia. Many a Good Crusade: Memoirs. New York: Macmillan, 1954.

Goodrich, Leland, and Edvard Hambro. Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents. Bos­ ton! World Peace Federation, 1949.

Goold-Adams, Richard. The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962.

Hambro, C. J. How to Win the Peace. New York: J. B. Lippencott Co., 1942. 272

Holoom, Louise W., ed. War and Peace Aims of the U.N. Boston: World Peace Federation, 1943-48.

Hudson, Darril. The Edumenical Movement in World Affairs. Washington^ D.C.: The National Press, Inc., 1969.

Hull, Cordell. Memoirs. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

Hutchinson, Paul. From Victory to Peace. New York: Willett Clark and Co., 1943.

Hutchison, J. A. We Are Not Divided. New York: Round­ table Press, 1941.

Johnson, F. Ernest de. Religion and the World Order, A Series of Addresses and Discussions. New York: Harper, 1944. ~

Jones, Rufus M. The Church, the Gospel and War. New York: Harper and Row, 1948.

Knox, John. Religion and the Present Crisis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Kramer, Leonard J., ed. Man Amid Change in World Affairs. New York: Friendship Press, 1964.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. The Christian Outlook. New York: Harper, 1948.

______. Emergence of a World Christian Com­ munity. New Haven: Yale University Press, T949.

______, ed. The Gospel, The Church and The World. New York: Harper, 1946.

Lee, Robert. The Social Sources of Church Unity: An Interpretation of the Unitive Movements in Ameri- ican History. New York: Abingdon Press, 196(5.

Leiper, Henry Smith, ed. Christianity Today: A Survey of the State of the Churches. New York: Morehouse- Gorham Co., 1947.

Libby, Frederick J. America's Foreign Policy. Washing­ ton, D.C.: National Council for the Prevention of War, 1944.

Lippmann, Walter. United States Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., m x :----- 273

______. United States War Aims. Boston: Little,Brown and Co., 1944.

Long, Edward Le Roy, Jr., and Robert T. Handy. Theology And Church in Tiroes of Change. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970.

Lukacs, John A. A History of the Cold War. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1962.

Lunger, Harold L., ed. Foundations of Ecumenical Social Thought: The Oxford Conference Report. Phila­ delphia: Fortress Press, 1966.

Lydgate, William. What Our People Think. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1949.

Macfarland, Charles S. . Christian Unity in the Making. New York: Federal Council of Churches, 1948.

Mackie, Robert C. and Charles C. West, eds. The Suffic­ iency of God: Essays on Ecumenical Hope in Honor of W. A. Visser't Hooft. London: LCM Press, 1963.

Man's Disorder and God's Design. New York: Harper, 1949.

Marty, Martin. The New Shape of American Religion. New York: Harpers, 1959.

Meyer, Donald B. The Protestant Search for Political Realism. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1960.

Miller, Robert M. American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1917-19 39. Chapell Hill, N.C.: Uni­ versity of North Carolina, 1958.

Millspaugh, Arthur C. Peace Plans and American Choices: The Pros and Cons of World Order. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1942.

Moellering, R. Luther. Modern War and the American Churches. New York: American Press, 1957.

Nash, Arnold S., ed. Protestant Thought in the Twentieth Century: Whence and Whither. New York: Mac- milIan, 1951.

Nelson, J. Robert, Ed. Christian Unity in North America, St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1958. \

274

Niebuhr, Reinhold. Christianity and Power Politics. New York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1940.

' Christian Realism and Political Prob lems. New York: c! Scribner and sons, 1953.

Nolde, 0. Frederick. Power for Peace. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1946.

'______, ed. Toward World Wide Christianity. New York: Harper, 1946.

The Churches and the Nations. Phila- delphia: Fortress Press, 1970.

Oldham, J. H., ed. Foundations of Ecumenical Thought: The Oxford Conference Report. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966.

Paton, William. The Church and the New Order. New York: Macmillan, 1941.

Paulin, Theodore. Comparative Peace Plans. Philadelphia: Pacifist Research Association, 1943.

Poteat, Edwin McNeill. Four Freedoms and God. New York: Harper, 1943.

Rouse, Ruth, and Stephen Neill, eds. A History of the- Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948! Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967.

Russell, Ruth B. A History of the U.N. Charter. Wash­ ington, D.C.: Brookings, Institution, 1958.

Sayre, Francis B. etal. The Postwar World. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1944.

Schneider, Herbert W. Religion in 20th Century America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.

Shafer, Luman. The Christian Alternative to World Chaos. New York! Roundtable Press, 1940.

Smith, H. Sheldon, Robert T. Handy, and Lefferts A. Loetscher, eds. American Christianity. Volume II. New York: C. Scribner and Sons, 1960.

Spellman, Francis Cardinal. The Road to Victory. New York: C. Scribners and Sons', 1942. 275

Stuntz, Hugh C. The United Nations Challenge to the Church. New York: Harper and Row, 1948.

Temple, William. Christianity and Social Order. New Yox-k: Penguin Books, 1943. The Church Looks Forward. New York: Macmillan, 1944.

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., ed. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, IWST.

Van Dusen, Henry, ed. The Spiritual Legacy of John Foster Dulles. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.

______, ed. Liberal Theology: An Appraisal. New York: C. Scribners and Sons, 1960.

Van Kirk, Walter. Religion and the World of Tomorrow, Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1941.

A Christian Global Strategy. New York: Wi1lett, Clark and Co., 1945.

Wynner, Edith, and Georgia Lloyd, eds. Searchlight on Peace Plans: Choose Your Road to World Gov- ernmentfl New York: Dutton, 1949.

Wyon, Olive, ed. The Universal Church and the World of Nations. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1938.

Yinger, John Milton. Religion and the Struggle for Power. Durham, N. C.; Duke University Press, 1946. ’