Protracted Conflicts in the Eastern

January 2013 06 PROTRACTED CONFLICTS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD: BETWEEN AVERTING WARS AND BUILDING TRUST While working to seal off Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia after the 2008 war, Russia promised to play a constructive role in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Transnistrian conflict. This paper aims to assess how Russia delivered on its renewed peace-making pledge. It also will spell out how Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova have reacted to the new Russian undertaking to revive negotiations within the Minsk Group, the “5+2” format or other formulas with the direct participation of Moscow. The paper will address how other international stakeholders have adapted to the 2008 post-conflict situation and will uncover the developments relevant for the conflict resolution process in the breakaway regions. It will conclude with an analysis on prospective strategies to be employed by all sides and regional players in dealing with the conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood and what could be done in 2013 to push the negotiations forward. Key words: Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, protracted conflicts, Eastern neighborhood. Stanislav Secrieru Echoes of the 2008 war exit strategy, the confusion of the decision-making apparatus produced by several power transitions at Cementing the deadlock in Abkhazia and South the top of the Politburo, soaring human costs and Ossetia rapidly dwindling material resources, is the case The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in point. (Cordovez and Harrison, 1995) Only the shortly after the cease-fire mediated by the European combination of domestic and external factors could Union (EU) was struck, generated dynamics which led set the stage for a drastic policy change by the great Russia and Georgia into what looks like a prolonged powers in a relatively short time frame. The Soviet strategic deadlock. Great powers reluctantly reverse Union’s adaptation towards the growing likelihood decisions taken in the past. Prestige rationales, the of Germany’s reunification speaks volumes about inertia of the decision-making machinery and the how sweeping changes at the international level and possession of substantial resources enough at least imperatives of domestic reforms compelled a great in the short- and mid- run to absorb the high cost power to modify its policy towards a core Cold of what proves to be a mistaken decision, explains War frontline issue. (Grachev, 2008, pp.131-162) the great powers’ lethargy with which specific Looking at the post-conflict situation in Georgia, policies are reappraised and amended. The creeping neither the international context is favorable to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan country’s reintegration, nor is the domestic pressure accompanied by the painful search for an honorable from within Russia or the separatist enclaves to a 1 reconciliation with the Tbilisi authorities. Instead, to impede a worldwide recognition process of the Russia and Georgia are prisoners of a vicious circle separatist republics. The government was active which, as history shows, is not impossible, but will in mobilizing support in capitals and international be hard to untangle. fora for Georgia’s territorial integrity. To this end, Tbilisi sought to gain recognition of the Russian With the end of the military conflict, Russia occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by states was busy cementing its military and economic and international organizations and support for presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia Russia’s troop withdrawal. References regarding amassed a powerful security contingent in each the occupation status of the separatist republics region (approximately 4000-5000 troops) and came from the Lithuanian Seim, the US Senate, deployed tactical ballistic missiles in South Ossetia the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, (Tochka-U) and air defense missile systems in the NATO and OSCE Parliamentary Assemblies. Abkhazia (S-300). It also worked to modernize its air NATO called on Russia to reconsider its decision access infrastructure in South Ossetia (helipad near regarding the recognition of Abkhazia and South Dzhava) and to expand its foothold on Abkhazia’s Ossetia. Georgia avoided engaging the leaders in Black Sea shore (in the port of Ochamchira). As a Sukhumi or Tskhinvali opting to develop policies result, from a military point of view, the separatist over their heads, aimed directly at the population enclaves are safe from a conventional attack, while of the regions (e.g. healthcare, education). Georgia Russia, if needed, is able to split Georgia in two in kept without much enthusiasm “talking for the sake several hours, by cutting the transport infrastructure of the talk” with Russia in the framework of the (main highways and railways) linking the western Geneva process.2 Tbilisi adopted some measures to and the eastern parts of the country, and to rapidly irritate Russia, such as recognizing the “Circassian reach with ground troops the outskirts of Tbilisi. Genocide”, which took place on the site where the In economic terms, Russia has deepened the 2014 Olympic Games will be held and unilaterally detachment of the breakaway regions from Georgia lifted visas for residents from the North Caucasus. and their dependence on Moscow. In 2009, the Despite correcting the decision regarding the visa construction of the gas pipeline from Dzuarikau in free system, extending its provisions to all Russian North Ossetia to Tskhinvali was completed. Russia citizens and hammering the deal on Russia’s significantly increased its direct budgetary support, accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), covering more than 90% of South Ossetia’s budget air communication resumption and the re-opening and slightly below 50% of Abkhazia’s financial of the Kazbegi-Lars checkpoint; Georgia’s positions needs. The Kremlin moved to take over the strategic with regard to the breakaway regions remained infrastructure, such as the Babushera airport and the diametrically opposite. The impasse Russia and railway system in Abkhazia. It also yearned to link Georgia reached by 2012 provides little hope for the non-recognized republics’ development with conflict resolution in the foreseeable future, unless Russian megaprojects or its military presence. The relations between Georgia, the separatist republics involvement of Abkhazia in the preparations for the and Russia will change profoundly. 2014 Sochi Olympic Games and the concentration of South Ossetia’s economy on serving the Russian What about the other protracted conflicts in the military bases epitomize the Kremlin’s approach. Eastern neighborhood? On the diplomatic front, Moscow strived to multiply the number of recognitions of separatist enclaves While working to seal off Abkhazia and South (so far mainly provided by microstates), to portray Ossetia from Georgia, Russia promised to play a Georgia as an aggressive state, and to dissuade arms constructive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh and exporters from delivering any kind of weapons to Transnistrian conflicts. Therefore, this paper aims Georgia. to assess how Russia delivered on its peace-making pledge in the aftermath of the conflict with Georgia. At the same time, Georgia realizing that it cannot It also will spell out how Armenia, Azerbaijan change the new status quo in the short- and mid- and Moldova have reacted to the new Russian run, was eager to make Russia pay the price for the undertaking to revive negotiations within the Minsk new equilibrium on the ground.1 Tbilisi enrolled Group, the “5+2” format or other formulas with the support of the United States (US) and the EU the direct participation of Moscow. The paper will 2 address how the other international stakeholders Nagorno-Karabakh have adapted to the 2008 post-conflict situation and will uncover developments relevant for the conflict Renewed negotiations on the Madrid Principles resolution process in the breakaway regions. It will The armed conflict in the South Caucasus in conclude with an analysis on prospective strategies to 2008 temporarily toned down Baku’s belligerent be employed by all sides and regional players in case rhetoric towards Armenia and reduced the appetite of protracted conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood for militarily recovering Nagorno-Karabakh and what could be done in 2013 to push forward and the surrounding occupied regions.3 Russia’s the negotiations. However, before dwelling into the demonstrated will to use hard power in the region main analytical part, a few observations regarding as well as its capacity to cause damage to the critical protracted conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood are regional infrastructure, which serves Azerbaijan’s necessary in order to acquire a better understanding economic interests, prompted the rebalancing of of the phenomena and its wider ramifications. the traditionally multi-directional foreign policy of Baku. Thus, in 2008-2010 the Russian vector The issue of the protracted conflicts in the received additional weight in Azerbaijan’s strategic Eastern neighborhood is intermingled with several calculations, in particular with regard to the conflict economic and security dossiers which transcend the over Nagorno-Karabakh. local or regional dimension. Protracted conflicts are also integrated in the neighborhood policies of the Azerbaijan was worried about the implications main regional players. Therefore, an analysis of the of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s recognition by Russia for protracted conflict on its

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