January 2013 06 PROTRACTED CONFLICTS IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD: BETWEEN AVERTING WARS AND BUILDING TRUST While working to seal off Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia after the 2008 war, promised to play a constructive role in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Transnistrian conflict. This paper aims to assess how Russia delivered on its renewed peace-making pledge. It also will spell out how , and Moldova have reacted to the new Russian undertaking to revive negotiations within the Minsk Group, the “5+2” format or other formulas with the direct participation of Moscow. The paper will address how other international stakeholders have adapted to the 2008 post-conflict situation and will uncover the developments relevant for the conflict resolution process in the breakaway regions. It will conclude with an analysis on prospective strategies to be employed by all sides and regional players in dealing with the conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood and what could be done in 2013 to push the negotiations forward.

Key words: Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, protracted conflicts, Eastern neighborhood. Stanislav Secrieru

Echoes of the 2008 war exit strategy, the confusion of the decision-making apparatus produced by several power transitions at Cementing the deadlock in Abkhazia and South the top of the Politburo, soaring human costs and Ossetia rapidly dwindling material resources, is the case The recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in point. (Cordovez and Harrison, 1995) Only the shortly after the cease-fire mediated by the European combination of domestic and external factors could Union (EU) was struck, generated dynamics which led set the stage for a drastic policy change by the great Russia and Georgia into what looks like a prolonged powers in a relatively short time frame. The Soviet strategic deadlock. Great powers reluctantly reverse Union’s adaptation towards the growing likelihood decisions taken in the past. Prestige rationales, the of Germany’s reunification speaks volumes about inertia of the decision-making machinery and the how sweeping changes at the international level and possession of substantial resources enough at least imperatives of domestic reforms compelled a great in the short- and mid- run to absorb the high cost power to modify its policy towards a core Cold of what proves to be a mistaken decision, explains War frontline issue. (Grachev, 2008, pp.131-162) the great powers’ lethargy with which specific Looking at the post-conflict situation in Georgia, policies are reappraised and amended. The creeping neither the international context is favorable to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan country’s reintegration, nor is the domestic pressure accompanied by the painful search for an honorable from within Russia or the separatist enclaves to a

1 reconciliation with the Tbilisi authorities. Instead, to impede a worldwide recognition process of the Russia and Georgia are prisoners of a vicious circle separatist republics. The government was active which, as history shows, is not impossible, but will in mobilizing support in capitals and international be hard to untangle. fora for Georgia’s territorial integrity. To this end, Tbilisi sought to gain recognition of the Russian With the end of the military conflict, Russia occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by states was busy cementing its military and economic and international organizations and support for presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia Russia’s troop withdrawal. References regarding amassed a powerful security contingent in each the occupation status of the separatist republics region (approximately 4000-5000 troops) and came from the Lithuanian Seim, the US Senate, deployed tactical ballistic missiles in South Ossetia the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, (Tochka-U) and air defense missile systems in the NATO and OSCE Parliamentary Assemblies. Abkhazia (S-300). It also worked to modernize its air NATO called on Russia to reconsider its decision access infrastructure in South Ossetia (helipad near regarding the recognition of Abkhazia and South Dzhava) and to expand its foothold on Abkhazia’s Ossetia. Georgia avoided engaging the leaders in Black Sea shore (in the port of Ochamchira). As a Sukhumi or Tskhinvali opting to develop policies result, from a military point of view, the separatist over their heads, aimed directly at the population enclaves are safe from a conventional attack, while of the regions (e.g. healthcare, education). Georgia Russia, if needed, is able to split Georgia in two in kept without much enthusiasm “talking for the sake several hours, by cutting the transport infrastructure of the talk” with Russia in the framework of the (main highways and railways) linking the western Geneva process.2 Tbilisi adopted some measures to and the eastern parts of the country, and to rapidly irritate Russia, such as recognizing the “Circassian reach with ground troops the outskirts of Tbilisi. Genocide”, which took place on the site where the In economic terms, Russia has deepened the 2014 Olympic Games will be held and unilaterally detachment of the breakaway regions from Georgia lifted visas for residents from the North Caucasus. and their dependence on Moscow. In 2009, the Despite correcting the decision regarding the visa construction of the gas pipeline from Dzuarikau in free system, extending its provisions to all Russian North Ossetia to Tskhinvali was completed. Russia citizens and hammering the deal on Russia’s significantly increased its direct budgetary support, accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), covering more than 90% of South Ossetia’s budget air communication resumption and the re-opening and slightly below 50% of Abkhazia’s financial of the Kazbegi-Lars checkpoint; Georgia’s positions needs. The Kremlin moved to take over the strategic with regard to the breakaway regions remained infrastructure, such as the Babushera airport and the diametrically opposite. The impasse Russia and railway system in Abkhazia. It also yearned to link Georgia reached by 2012 provides little hope for the non-recognized republics’ development with conflict resolution in the foreseeable future, unless Russian megaprojects or its military presence. The relations between Georgia, the separatist republics involvement of Abkhazia in the preparations for the and Russia will change profoundly. 2014 Sochi Olympic Games and the concentration of South Ossetia’s economy on serving the Russian What about the other protracted conflicts in the military bases epitomize the Kremlin’s approach. Eastern neighborhood? On the diplomatic front, Moscow strived to multiply the number of recognitions of separatist enclaves While working to seal off Abkhazia and South (so far mainly provided by microstates), to portray Ossetia from Georgia, Russia promised to play a Georgia as an aggressive state, and to dissuade arms constructive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh and exporters from delivering any kind of weapons to Transnistrian conflicts. Therefore, this paper aims Georgia. to assess how Russia delivered on its peace-making pledge in the aftermath of the conflict with Georgia. At the same time, Georgia realizing that it cannot It also will spell out how Armenia, Azerbaijan change the new status quo in the short- and mid- and Moldova have reacted to the new Russian run, was eager to make Russia pay the price for the undertaking to revive negotiations within the Minsk new equilibrium on the ground.1 Tbilisi enrolled Group, the “5+2” format or other formulas with the support of the United States (US) and the EU the direct participation of Moscow. The paper will

2 address how the other international stakeholders Nagorno-Karabakh have adapted to the 2008 post-conflict situation and will uncover developments relevant for the conflict Renewed negotiations on the resolution process in the breakaway regions. It will The armed conflict in the South Caucasus in conclude with an analysis on prospective strategies to 2008 temporarily toned down Baku’s belligerent be employed by all sides and regional players in case rhetoric towards Armenia and reduced the appetite of protracted conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood for militarily recovering Nagorno-Karabakh and what could be done in 2013 to push forward and the surrounding occupied regions.3 Russia’s the negotiations. However, before dwelling into the demonstrated will to use hard power in the region main analytical part, a few observations regarding as well as its capacity to cause damage to the critical protracted conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood are regional infrastructure, which serves Azerbaijan’s necessary in order to acquire a better understanding economic interests, prompted the rebalancing of of the phenomena and its wider ramifications. the traditionally multi-directional foreign policy of Baku. Thus, in 2008-2010 the Russian vector The issue of the protracted conflicts in the received additional weight in Azerbaijan’s strategic Eastern neighborhood is intermingled with several calculations, in particular with regard to the conflict economic and security dossiers which transcend the over Nagorno-Karabakh. local or regional dimension. Protracted conflicts are also integrated in the neighborhood policies of the Azerbaijan was worried about the implications main regional players. Therefore, an analysis of the of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s recognition by Russia for protracted conflict on its territory. Instead protracted conflicts helps to understand the multiple of trumpeting loudly its displeasure with the violation interconnections between the political, military, of its neighbor’s territorial integrity, Azerbaijan economic and cultural policies of the various actors worked to accommodate Russian interests. While in the post-Soviet region. At the intra-regional level, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry qualified conflicts hinder inclusive cooperation in the South Georgia’s actions as in line with international norms, Caucasus and explain the geography of new gas Azerbaijan’s leadership refrained from criticizing or oil pipelines and railway projects. Conflicts are Russia directly. (Today.az, 2008) In a dramatic taken in account in Russia’s or the EU’s external reversal of roles, SOCAR agreed in 2009 for the energy policies calculations. At the intra-state first time to export gas to Russia. Later, SOCAR’s level, conflicts are among the factors that impacted symbolic volumes of exported gas slowly expanded negatively on the economic development of states by reaching over 2 bcm (billion cubic meters) in 2012. discouraging or scaring off potential foreign investors, (Azernews, 2012) In 2008 and 2009, branches of by fueling arms races, which deplete societies Moscow State University (MGU) and VTB Bank of development funds, and by weakening states were inaugurated in Baku, further cementing the through artificially accumulated gas debts. Conflicts bilateral human and economic dimension of the also hampered democratization by providing an relationship. Building on Moscow’s declared excuse for authoritarian practices allegedly aimed intentions to prove its honest broker credentials to ensure domestic order and stability necessary to in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan decided to give deal effectively with separatists and their external Russia another chance and to enlist her support to patrons. At the macro-regional level, conflicts are change the status-quo in the conflict area. ’s inter-linked with conventional arms control regimes drive to normalize relations with Armenia and the in Europe, in particular with respect to the Southern United States’ supportive role behind this diplomatic flank ceilings and the principle of the host nation initiative provided an additional boost to Baku’s consent for foreign military presence. Last, but not rapprochement with Moscow. least, protracted conflicts are embedded in rivalries Armenia followed with great concern the military between regional powers, who use them often to conflict unfolding in Georgia. An eventual success undermine each other’s policies and to fend off the of the Georgian army would certainly, in the opinion encroachments of extra-regional powers in what is of Armenian experts, encourage Azerbaijan’s regarded as a “sphere of privileged interests”. hardliners and would increase popular pressure

3 on the president to act.4 Thus, seen from this joint declarations of the French, US and Russian perspective, Georgia’s failure to re-establish control presidents on Nagorno-Karabakh in L’Aquila over South Ossetia was received with some relief in (2009), Muskoka (2010), Deauville (2011) and Los Armenia. It also confirmed that Russia is ready to Cabos (2012). In parallel, Russia intensively courted defend its allies in the region, although there are still Azerbaijan, playing in the hands of Baku’s strategy to doubts in Yerevan at which point of a military clash torpedo the unconditional normalization of relations with Azerbaijan Moscow will decide to intervene between Turkey and Armenia. Ultimately, Russia and by which means.5 The conflict in 2008 severed added a nail in the coffin of the Turkish-Armenian Armenia’s trade transit via Georgia, inflicting heavy rapprochement, asserted greater control over the economic losses, estimated at $670 million. After negotiation process on Nagorno-Karabakh and re- the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement mediated asserted its central role in preserving the military by the EU, Armenia assisted Georgia in repairing equilibrium between Azerbaijan and Armenia. the destroyed railway infrastructure. Fortunately for Armenia, the pipeline which delivers gas Despite renewed expectations, the negotiations from Russia via Georgia had not been damaged. produced few outcomes. The sides committed to Overdependence on terrestrial transit via Georgia seek a solution to the conflict via political means, (around 75%) is one of the factors which explain to encourage confidence-building measures and to Armenia’s reluctance, despite Russia’s pressure, to exchange prisoners of war and return the remains of officers killed in action. Although some progress recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The need for was made, Armenia and Azerbaijan have failed to the diversification of the transit routes also propelled agree on the Madrid Principles tabled in 2007 to Armenia to look for opportunities to re-open the guide a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Major border with Turkey that had been closed in the stumbling issues seem to be: the deadline of the 1990s as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenian force withdrawal from the occupied Thus, in 2008 Armenia responded with pragmatism regions; the guarantee of a terrestrial link between to the Turkish overtures to normalize bilateral Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; the nature of relations. If successful, the process of normalization the interim status of Nagorno-Karabakh; and the with Armenia could augment Turkey’s position in timeframe for the organization of a referendum the South Caucasus, and potentially have an impact to decide its final status. Looking in perspective, on the conflict resolution process in Nagorno- Armenian experts also question the capability Karabakh. of the would-be international peacekeepers in Experiencing an acute image deficit in the Nagorno-Karabakh to enforce peace and assure the international arena as a result of the war with population’s security.6 Parliamentary elections in Georgia and facing Turkey’s reassertion attempts in May 2012 held, according to international monitors, the region, Russia threw its weight behind reviving in a more competitive political environment, have the work of the OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno- reduced Armenia’s leadership space for maneuver Karabakh and mediating high-level talks between regarding talks over the Madrid Principles. Baku and Yerevan. Besides giving a face lift to its Weapons again speak loudly image, Russia sought to assume a leading role among the Minsk Group co-chairs and to prevent fighting After a short period of relative calm during along the Line of Contact, similar to the skirmishes which the “sniper war” however has not stopped, that took place in March 2008. Since August 2008, in 2010 both sides made use of bellicose rhetoric the Russian president hosted 10 meetings between and accused each other of obstructing negotiations. leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result, Verbal mutual attacks spiraled into a series of border the two sides signed the Meiendorf declaration clashes in 2010 along the Contact Line, clashes (2008), the Astrakhan declaration (2010), and the which continued in 2011 and 2012, prompting Sochi declaration (2012); these were the first joint experts to warn of a possible escalation of violence documents adopted by Azerbaijan and Armenia into a full scale war. (International Crisis Group since the 1994 truce that suspended the war. Russia 2011) Several developments fed the deterioration also recruited the high-level support of the co- of the security situation in the region. The process chairs, a fact that was reflected in the G8/G20 of Armenia’s normalization of relations with Turkey

4 came to a standstill. The Turkish leadership, openly negative demographic dynamics in the region. taking the side of Azerbaijan, argued that the (RFE/RL, 2011; Trend.az, 2012) “Parliamentary” normalization of relations with Armenia should (2010) and “presidential” (2012) elections in be contingent upon progress on the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh have not altered the political the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. (Today’s Zaman, power distribution in the separatist enclave, but 2010) The suspension of the normalization process further poisoned the atmosphere between Baku and has pushed Armenia and Azerbaijan to strengthen Yerevan. The outgoing leader of Nagorno-Karabakh their security and military ties with their traditional was re-elected for another term in office. The allies in the region. In 2010, Armenia accepted to “elections” were instrumentalized to demonstrate extend a more robust Russian military presence on the separatist region’s democratic credentials and its territory until 2044, while Azerbaijan concluded to boost its legitimacy at the international level, a strategic partnership and security cooperation pact despite its non-recognized status. In this respect, with Turkey. Deepened military ties with regional Nagorno-Karabakh does not differ from the other allies hardened the positions of both sides. In this non-recognized entities in the post-Soviet region. context, violence along the border became an Azerbaijan blacklisted all foreign citizens who integral part of the negotiation strategies, with both observed the voting process in Nagorno-Karabakh sides relying on it to send signals and to test the will and denounced the “elections” as unhelpful to the of the other to continue talks or engage in military peace negotiations. (Trend.az, 2012) action. Preventing war and maintaining dialogue Despite the heavy impact of the global economic crisis, the arms race has continued with both As the two sides have resumed their militaristic Azerbaijan and Armenia acquiring increasingly rhetoric and clashed along the Contact Line, the sophisticated equipment and weaponry. During Minsk Group, instead of pushing for the Madrid the summer 2012 incursion, Azerbaijan tested a Principles, should engage in shuttle diplomacy to number of drones from its rapidly expanding drone cool off the belligerent drive of the conflict parties. fleet. The top brass in Yerevan assured that it keeps The main objective of the international mediators pace with new military hardware acquisitions, in was preventing skirmishes that could lead to major particular air-defense systems. (Asbarez.com, 2011) military conflict. With this in mind, mediators put As a consequence, Azerbaijan grew increasingly pressure on the two sides to withdraw snipers and irritated by Russia’s arms deliveries to Armenia, implement a mechanism for investigating incidents which neutralized Baku’s effort to sway the on the front line. Although none of the initiatives military balance in its favor and negotiate from a have been implemented, the mediators managed position of strength. Even some arms transfers from to temporarily restrain Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia to Azerbaijan, such as the Mi-35M combat Openly criticizing both sides after a wave of violence transport helicopters or the S-300 missile defense along the Contact Line, the Minsk Group co-chairs systems, could not quell Baku’s anxiety regarding called on the presidents to prepare their respective similar cooperation between Armenia and Russia. societies “for peace, not war”. (OSCE, 2011) Armenia’s enhanced capability to repel an attack solidified the status quo, making any change of However, the August 2012 extradition from the present equilibrium an even more distant Hungary and the pardoning of Ramil Safarov, perspective. convicted for murder on ethnic grounds of an Armenian officer while attending a NATO course The re-settlement of Armenians from Syria in 2004, has led to a rapid deterioration of bilateral fleeing from the civil war in Nagorno-Karabakh ties. Armenia severed is diplomatic ties with an and repetitive promises to re-open the newly- EU member state (Hungary) and took a break refurbished (with assistance of the Diaspora) airport from the negotiations. The glorification of Safarov in Sepanakert in 2011, have further heightened by the Azeri government and the generally weak tensions. Baku threatened to shoot down any aircraft critical reaction of Azerbaijan’s society proved that entering its internationally recognized territory emotions with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh and decried the transfers of Armenians from Syria conflict and ethnic intolerance are still running high, to Nagorno-Karabakh in an effort to reverse the frustrating any attempts to narrow the inter-societal

5 gap which separates the two sides. Violence migrated order to restore the connections that were severed from the border line to the virtual space, opening a during last decade. Moldova’s progress on the road new dimension to the conflict. In the aftermath of to European integration was envisioned to produce a Safarov’s pardoning, governmental and media outlet positive impact on the conflict resolution process in websites in Armenia and Azerbaijan experienced an the long run, by making Moldova more attractive for unprecedented wave of cyber attacks. According the population of Transnistria. In a relatively short to media reports, approximately 40 websites in period, the Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders had Armenia and 20 websites in Azerbaijan became 3 formal or informal meetings (1+1); the work of victims of “cyber wars”. Hackers managed to take the bilateral experts groups dealing with sectoral out for more than one day Azerbaijan’s official issues was revived; passenger rail traffic between presidency webpage. (Abrahamyan, 2012) Chisinau and Odessa, which goes via Tiraspol, was resumed; and a principled agreement to re-establish With peace talks effectively stalled, international telephone communication was reached. mediators worked to nudge the conflict parties to re-launch dialogue. Although by the end of October, In the early stages, the US lent its support to the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan Moldova’s efforts. The US ambassador to Moldova reiterated their commitment to continue negotiations met the separatist’s leader Smirnov in 2010 and towards reaching a peaceful solution, there are no hosted talks between the chief negotiators in signs that would point to an even modest progress in Chisinau. The US also worked actively to diffuse the upcoming talks. The certification of the airport tensions between the two sides over human right in by the Armenian Civil Aviation abuses in Transnistria. As the negotiations process authorities in October 2012 and promises to operate moved from an informal (2010) to a formal phase a first flight between Yerevan and Stepanakert is (2011), the US switched its focus by channeling likely to flare up more disputes between the two most of its support via the OSCE Mission to countries, ultimately poisoning the peace talks. Moldova to ensure the successful implementation of the confidence-building measures.7 Transnistria The EU assumed a bigger role in Transnistria; an Reviving talks evolution facilitated by the breakaway region’s re- orientation of trade towards the European market. In the aftermath of the armed conflict in Georgia in Besides investing in the viability of Moldova’s 2008, the Moldovan president was invited to Sochi, statehood, the EU encouraged more direct talks where he held talks with his Russian counterpart on between Chisinau and Tiraspol and gradually new approaches towards the Transnistrian conflict. increased the financial assistance for confidence- The Russian side pledged to support progress in the building projects. The EU proposed to include the peace talks. In March 2009, the Kremlin sponsored Transnistrian regions into the Moldova-Ukraine a trilateral declaration signed by the Russian inter-regional cooperation under the Euroregion and Moldovan presidents as well as the leader “Nistru” framework. In February 2010, the Union of Transnistria. The process took another turn in suspended the travel ban against the Transnistrian September 2009 when the post-electoral crisis in leadership and raised the issue of the resumption of Chisinau brought to power the Alliance for European the“5+2” talks. To lure Russian support, Germany Integration (AEI). The ruling collation moved to launched the Meseberg Process in 2010, which re-assert Moldova’s stance on the unconditional aimed to enhance EU-Russia cooperation in the evacuation of Russian military stockpiles from security field, in exchange for palpable progress on Colbasna and the troops guarding it. Chisinau the Transnistrian dossier. expressed the need to replace, after almost 20 years of peace in the region, the “peacekeepers” with Throughout 2010 and 2011, Russia’s position civilian monitors under an international mandate. In oscillated between exerting pressure on the parallel, Moldova initiated a diplomatic campaign Transnistrian leadership and, at the same time, to build wide international support to re-launch delaying the decision to re-launch the “5+2” formal negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict negotiations. While Smirnov proved to be a reliable and strived to build direct dialogue with Tiraspol in soldier guarding Russian geopolitical interests

6 in Transnistria for two decades, Moscow grew which was divided in 3 thematic baskets: socio- increasingly uncomfortable in its dealings with him. economic aspects, humanitarian and legal aspects, The Kremlin was scheming to replace him with a and political and security issues. Tiraspol also lifted more compliant leader at the “presidential elections” the customs duty imposed on imports from Moldova scheduled for December 2011. Russia hoped in 2006. It also began the retransmission of the that the alternation of power will internationally “Moldova 1” state-owned channel on its territory improve Transnistria’s murky image. Thus, ahead and sent an observer to attend the EU-Moldova of the “elections”, Russia suspended its financial negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free aid to Transnistria, raised with Tiraspol the issue Trade Area (DCFTA). Shortly after, Chisinau and of the region’s gas debt to Gazprom, and harassed Tiraspol agreed on the resumption of the freight Smirnov’s family through its law-enforcement railway communication and the creation of 2 joint bodies. customs posts in Transnistria to serve it. While planning the power transition in Tiraspol, Ukraine organized in Odessa the first meeting Russia was working after the November 2010 between Prime Minister Filat and the leader of early elections in Moldova to foster the center- Transnistria Shevchuk. Thereafter, the leaders left coalition headed by Communists, which the met 6 times in either formal or informal settings. Kremlin favored. This explains Russia’s reluctance Kyiv’s constructive position was further reflected in 2010, despite the combined efforts of France and in the support for the demilitarization and Germany during the Deauville trilateral summit, internationalization of the present “peacekeeping” to reset negotiations on Transnistria. However, mission in Transnistria and actions towards the Russia was not completely against the re-launch demarcation of the Moldova-Ukraine border on of the “5+2” formal talks (understood by the the Transnistrian segment. To uphold the positive Kremlin as substantial progress) as, according to its momentum, the EU lifted the travel ban against calculations, it would be a fair price for a greater say the Transnistrian leadership and committed €28 in EU security matters if the Meseberg Process were million more to supplement the funds (€12 million) to succeed. allocated for confidence-building measures between Acceleration Moldova and Transnistria for the 2012-2015 period. The Transnistrian conflict passed an important The Russian factor: putting on the breaks watershed after the defeat in December 2011 of As Moldova overcame political deadlock and the Kremlin-backed candidate by the independent talks on a new political and economic treaty with Yevgeni Shevchuk in the “presidential’ race in the EU rapidly advanced, the value of Transnistria the breakaway region. The successful election of as a lever Russia enjoys against Chisinau increased. the president in Moldova in March 2012, which To prevent unfavorable changes of the status averted new early elections and ensured greater quo around the conflict and to derail Moldova’s political stability, provided an additional boost European drive, Moscow acted to curb Tiraspol’s to the negotiation process. The combined effect autonomy and to instrumentalize the conflict in of the two events helped build and sustain in the order to hamper Moldova’s integration with the EU. first half of 2012 the positive dynamics around As a longtime Russian expert confessed, “Russia is Transnistria. The formal talks re-launched in Vilnius not going to wait and see how Moldova with the in November 2011 gathered pace with the help of EU’s help prepares to absorb Transnistria”.10 Ukrainian diplomats.8 Progress was facilitated by Transnistria’s propensity to gain more autonomy The first step in this direction was the appointment through balancing between Russia, Ukraine and of the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the the EU. Tiraspol was eager to draw financial military-industrial complex, Dmitri Rogozin, as assistance from the EU in order to enhance its room special presidential representative for Transnistria for maneuver with Russia and to tackle the difficult and co-chair of the Russian-Moldovan Commission domestic economic situation.9 After 3 rounds of talks, for Economic Cooperation. The nomination of the the sides agreed on the principles and procedures of highest-ranking governmental official since the the negotiations process as well as on the agenda involvement of the deputy head of the presidential

7 administration, Dmitri Kozak in 2003, to deal with The Kremlin strived to ensure that Transnistria Transnistria, signaled the Kremlin’s increased will coordinate its position more closely in the focus and concern regarding developments on the “5+2” talks to prevent agreements which Russia Transnistrian dossier. From his early days in office, did not approve of, such as the one in Vienna in Rogozin acted to intensify communication with the April 2012.11 Russia dispatched a FSB officer to new Transnistrian leader, who was not inspiring become the deputy head of Transnistria’s KGB. much trust in Moscow. He also worked to spoil It also began the modernization of the former the direct dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, military airport in Tiraspol and introduced without which was perceived as marginalizing Russia’s authorization heavy-caliber infantry weapons mediator role. His discourse sought to revive into the “security zone” separating Moldova and Romania’s threat regarding Moldova’s statehood, Transnistria. Explaining the latter as a mistake, the but at the same time, to weaken the Moldovan Russian side nonetheless blamed Moldova for being state by fomenting a split between the executive in non-cooperative with regard Transnistria’s outreach Chisinau and the autonomous region of Gagauzia. initiatives. (Kommersant.md, 2012) (Socor, 2012) He employed bulldozing tactics Soon Transnistria began correcting its policy line, to secure the opening of a Russian consulate in synchronizing it with Russia’s stance. The chief of Tiraspol, needed to boost the institutional capacity the Transnistrian security service resurrected the to distribute Russian passports in the region. “besieged fortress” narrative, accusing Moldova of preparations to host a NATO military base in Russia applied economic “sticks and carrots” Bulboaca. (RIA Novosti, 2012) He was echoed by in Moldova and Transnistria. Until spring 2012, Transnistria’s “foreign minister”, who claimed that Moscow withheld financial aid to Transnistria, in the light of security threats, the “peacekeeping” while normally covering 70% of the separatist’s mission should be bolstered. (Moldova.org, 2012) enclave budget deficit. After several trips to The head of Transnistrian diplomacy also exposed Moscow, Shevchuk managed to secure $30 million a more isolationist economic outlook, denouncing channeled to buttress Transistria’s currency reserves the region’s orientation towards European market as and two tranches (almost $21 million in total) of artificially shaped and hinting that economic agents direct budgetary support. (Unimedia, 2012) In an should return to Transnistria’s traditional markets effort to counterweight the EU’s financial offer, in the east. (TV PMR, 2012) To support this move, Russia promised to provide approximately $95 the head of the “central bank” has not ruled out the million in 2013 for various programs targeting the possibility of using the Russian Ruble in parallel infrastructure, the telecommunication sector, and with the Transnistrian currency. social and economic development. (Noi.md, 2012) In a further effort to de-link Transnistria from In the summer of 2012, Transnistria hindered the process of the border demarcation between Ukraine Moldova, the Kremlin began fostering humanitarian and Moldova, forcing Ukrainian diplomats to hold and economic connections between Transnistria additional talks with Tiraspol to unlock the process.12 and the Russian regions. Mimicking the EU, Russia In the autumn, the “5+2” negotiations and the advertised the idea of a Eurasian region called accomplishments of the working groups registered “Transnsitria”, which would forge cooperation almost no progress, partially due to Transnistria’s between Transnistria and regions from Moldova, increasing demands, an opinion shared by Russian Ukraine, and Russia. (Novosti Pridnestrovia, 2012) diplomats. (Kommersant.md, 2012) Moreover, To derail Moldova’s European integration, Moscow Transnistria reversed its decisions on the customs conveniently switched back the responsibility for duty regarding imported goods from Moldova the gas debt from the old Transnistrian leadership and stopped the retransmission of the Moldovan to the government in Moldova. Besides demanding private news channel ‘Publika TV’ and the state- that Moldova quit the Energy Community with the owned ‘TV Moldova 1’. As Transnistria was EU, the Russian side linked the price for gas in a multiplying its demands and refusing to engage in new contract with Moldova to settle a gas debt of talks covering the 3rd thematic basket (political and $4.1 billion, a major part of it was accumulated by security issues) and Russia became more assertive, Transnistria. (Itar-Tass, 2012) Moldova’s position grew more defensive. Chisinau

8 increasingly suspected Tiraspol of looking for a that despite perceiving Russia as a main security change in the status quo which would pre-empt the threat, it is longing to have normal economic country’s reintegration. Commenting on the change relations with its northern neighbor. Thus, the of fortunes of the Transnistrian conflict, a diplomat prime minister appointed a special envoy for the involved in the mediation recognized that ”without relations with Russia, showing an interest to discus some even minor accomplishment by the end of the directly with Moscow a full range of bilateral issues, year, the positive momentum in the talks is likely to including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In another die out.”13 accommodating move, ‘PIK TV’, the only Georgian public channel broadcasts in Russian, covering the Looking ahead North Caucasus and the European part of Russia As the circumstances around the protracted was taken off air, and at the same time, several conflicts in the Eastern neighborhood do not inspire cable operators in Georgia re-introduced in their TV much optimism, what should we expect in 2013 and packages Russian channels whose retransmission what can be done to make some headway? was suspended after the 2008 armed conflict. The promise of a peaceful power transition in As the “everything but recognition” strategy is Georgia still very much in its gestation stage, it opens new opportunities for the EU’s “non-recognition and The inception in October 2012 of a peaceful engagement” policy towards the breakaway regions transition of power in Georgia, which will continue of Georgia. The EU has to encourage Tbilisi to ease to unfold in 2013 (presidential elections) is good its modalities, adopted in 2010, for the engagement news for the region. In a relatively short time, the of organizations working in the occupied territories, new leadership in Tbilisi has shown the will to which complicated their activities in Abkhazia and amend the previous approach to the protracted South Ossetia. With the modalities significantly conflicts and relations with Russia. While the liberalized, the EU could support more vigorously objectives remain the same, the way the government confidence-building measures in the conflict areas intends to accomplish them is different. and other international organizations could follow it. The EU should seize the moment and re-energize Firstly, there is an obvious change in tone with the Geneva talks, in order to nudge the sides closer regard to the separatist authorities. Instead of labeling towards the adoption of the non-use of force them “puppet regimes” that are not worth engaging declaration, which would include Russia. Also, with, the new Georgian executive announced the EU should make additional efforts to resume its intention to talk directly with Sukhumi and the Abkhazia incident prevention and response Tskhinvali. Secondly, the minister for reintegration mechanism meetings suspended by Sukhumi in called for the amendment of the 2008 Law on March 2012. In more general terms, the EU and the Occupied Territories, several provisions of which US have to remind the new government in Tbilisi have been criticized by the Venice Commission of the importance of its policy towards Adzharia and the EU as impeding the exercise of some and ethnic minorities living in Georgia for the basic rights and cementing the isolation between credibility of its conflict resolution efforts. Given Georgia and the breakaway regions. Modifications the precarious nature of peace in the region and the will probably lift some restrictions on freedom of potentially destabilizing effect of the 2014 Sochi movement and trade activities between Georgia Olympic Games, the EU has to extend the EUMM and its separatist regions. The initiative of the new mandate, which is due to expire in September 2013. reintegration minister to recognize the identification documents issued by the separatist authorities and The task for the Georgian government and the EU to re-open railway traffic between Georgia and to break the vicious circle that hampers the trust- Russia via Abkhazia are in tune with the de-isolation building exercise is not easy. There will not be any approach advocated by new Georgian leadership. miracles overnight. The memories of war are still Thirdly, the new government yearns to normalize fresh. The position of the Abkhazian leadership its relations with Russia within the limits imposed towards Georgia and the EU hardened throughout by the imperatives of the country’s reintegration. 2012. Sukhumi regards Georgia’s attempts to open This policy line fits into the population’s perception up Abkhazia as a trap that seeks to undermine its

9 “statehood”. The Abkhazian leadership decided to and capacity to defend or to re-claim Nagorno- enhance its control over the activities of international Karabakh and the occupied territories around it. In humanitarian organizations by erecting some the case of Armenia’s outgoing president, who is a obstacles in their work. Economically depressed war veteran in Nagorno-Karabakh, the issue cannot South Ossetia with a substantially shrinking be decoupled from his individual war experience. population and a heavy Russian military presence In both countries, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict increasingly resembles a closed military garrison. is an important identity marker, which shapes the Nonetheless, projects to provide potable and national discourse and the self-identification of the irrigation water across the conflict areas in South citizens. Therefore, neither the outgoing presidents Ossetia financed by the EU indicate some space nor the candidates could manifest any intention to for the implementation of confidence-building reach consensus with the rival side, which could be measures. interpreted as a sign of weakness. It is difficult to gauge whether Russia will tolerate The spiraling tensions on the frontline in 2012 to some extent Georgia’s direct outreach towards the exclude even the slightest hint of a deal on the separatist enclaves or whether it will act quietly in Madrid Principles in the run up to the elections. the early stages in order to escalate tensions, which Thus, in 2013 the actors will publically revert to will make re-rapprochement implausible. Beyond more maximalist positions, making dialogue behind a few positive remarks from Moscow, it is equally closed doors, if at all, unproductive. Under these difficult to predict the Russian reaction to Georgia’s circumstances, the Minsk Group objective should be “reset” proposal. The shoot-out between Georgian to keep the dialogue open, which in itself represents forces and North Caucasus rebels on the Russian- a basic confidence-building measure. It will also Georgian border in the summer of 2012 obviously have to manage to keep the tensions around the points to the existence of common security threats possible opening of the airport in Stepanakert from that could facilitate the resumption of the bilateral escalating into a dangerous military-diplomatic dialogue. Supposedly Russia would wait for a full stand-off, which could severe the bilateral dialogue. transition to take place in 2013 in order to engage However, pushing the two sides further to withdraw in any substantial talks with Georgia. Regardless snipers from the frontline will be of little avail, as whether Moscow will reciprocate or not, the post- they serve as an important ‘contactless’ tool of the soviet history of high level Russia-Georgia relations tit-for-tat strategy. should restrain overly enthusiastic expectations Putin’s return to the Kremlin has visibly scaled about quick and substantial improvements in down the Russian president’s interest in becoming bilateral relations once the power transition in more involved in mediating the talks between the Georgia is completed. If Russia will reciprocate conflicting sides. Since formally re-claiming power it will be from a position of strength, perceiving in May 2012, Putin has not hosted a single round of Georgia as the party needing improved relations with talks in the trilateral format, which was extensively the Kremlin in order to recover its lost share of the employed by its predecessor. Having experience Russian market; to fend off pressure on its citizens in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, working in Russia; and, generally to recuperate to Putin is likely to adopt a hands-off approach, some degree a sense of security. increasingly delegating the mediation mission to Containing the negative spillover of the electoral his foreign minister. He mostly will keep a close season in Armenia and Azerbaijan eye on maintaining the military balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Anticipating no concrete The presidential elections in Armenia and breakthroughs in 2013, Putin will thus keep a low Azerbaijan in 2013 will leave an imprint on the profile in the mediation efforts, ensuring however a peace talks. Although the race in Armenia promises functional military equilibrium, which will keep the to be a more competitive exercise, Azerbaijan’s chances of an armed conflict at a minimum ahead president will face similar public constraints as his of the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games. The agreement Armenian counterpart not to compromise on the concluded in September 2012 between Russia and Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The legitimacy of both Armenia on the joint production of small arms with political regimes partially rests on their rhetoric a perspective to deepen cooperation in the defense

10 industry field is indicative of the Kremlin’s approach. “high politics” issues will certainly make progress Russia’s status-quo stance will further deepen the difficult, the focus on “low politics” is worth a try. irritation of Azerbaijan. Baku’s position on the If successful, as experts point out, not only could it re-negotiation of the Gabala radar station lease to be replicated on the frontline, but it would inverse Russia in 2012 confirms this. Azerbaijan asked for the entire logic dominating the process, proving a higher rent ($300 million per annum) and adopted that small achievements at the level of “low politics” an uncompromising attitude. After several rounds of can positively spillover into “high politics” after negotiations, Russia refused to accept the rent hike Armenia and Azerbaijan leave their respective and decided to leave Gabala. electoral battles behind. In spite of the gloomy prospects regarding progress Resurrecting positive momentum in the on “high politics”, namely the Madrid Principles, Transnistria talks 2013 should not be a wasted year. It could be exploited to initiate some “low politics” projects Of the four protracted conflicts in the Eastern that will prepare the ground at the micro-level for a neighborhood, the resolution process is the most sustainable peace between societies, by addressing advanced in Transnistria. Though the sides do not the basic needs of communities. A “people first” discuss the political status of the region yet, they approach, that would aim in the early phases to embarked on the complex trust-building exercise develop and implement a set of military confidence- that aims to reconstruct the links between societies building measures involving militaries and local severed over last two decades. However, by the end authorities along the recognized international of 2012 the early enthusiasm shared by international border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, a border mediators on the possibility of a rapid progress has closed since the early 1990s, should be considered. evaporated. Some diplomats see that “Shevchuk’s These measures would reduce the existing risks stellar moment has passed and Russia is in full control and enhance the security of civilians, drilling holes again.”14 Moreover, Tiraspol’s chief negotiator, in the imaginary walls which separate societies. who has been seen by EU officials as a new and This experience could potentially be transferred promising face of Transnistrian diplomacy, grew to the communities living near the Contact Line. less constructive with each visit he made in Russia. (Huseynov, Poghosyan and Oliphant, 2012, pp.7- The upgraded version of the Transnistrian public 34) A peaceful interaction at the local level could diplomacy sought to get rid of the obstructionist be a powerful example of how intolerance can be image inherited from Smirnov, to be proactive and overcome and prove in practice that the advantages to subtly redirect the responsibility for the eventual generated by cooperation outweigh situations of lack of progress on the Moldovan side.15 As Tiraspol tense isolation between communities. The border reverted to a “fortress under siege” discourse and village of Sadakhlo in Georgia, which until 2007 hardened its position in the talks, it will be difficult was a place where Armenians and Azerbaijanis for Transnistria in the upcoming year to defend and were vigorously trading with each other, serves as extend its public diplomacy gains registered in the a strong reminder that the history between the two first half of 2012. The obstruction of the progress in societies is not only confined to war and hatred. the talks will probably induce a change of attitudes towards Transnistria internationally. As EU officials have committed on many occasions to support the negotiation process in Lately, Transnistria portrayed itself as a champion order to advance on the path of conflict resolution, of unilateral steps made towards Moldova, which the EU special representative for the South have allegedly not been reciprocated. Any attempts Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia could play a to corner Chisinau in this way is futile. Russia’s open role in facilitating an agreement regarding basic pressure to bolster Transnistria’s position will put confidence-building measures between Azerbaijan Moldova in a more defensive mood. In retrospect, and Armenia along the official border line. This the new leadership in Tiraspol has been undoing the could compliment what the EU already does at the effects of the decisions taken by its predecessors level of civil societies to support peace-building in as a reaction to new customs regime on the border the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There should be no between Ukraine and Moldova. Despite claims of illusions about a rapid deal. Although stagnation on an economic blockade and a humanitarian disaster

11 provoked by the new customs regime, around 700 and work together with the US in order to discourage Transnsitrian economic agents were registered as Russia from the militarization of Transnistria and legal persons in Chisinau and penetrated the European instead start withdrawing its arms stockpile from market benefitting from the asymmetric trade the breakaway republic. preferences awarded to Moldova by the EU. Thus, while Transnistria maintains some discriminatory Finally, Moldova’s DCFTA with the EU will measures against Moldova introduced in 2006, its eliminate the unilateral trade preferences in 2013. As economic agents enjoy without restrictions the fruits Transnistria played the role of the passive observer of Moldova’s trade regime with the EU. Moldova’s during the first rounds of negotiations on a DCFTA constructive approach towards the resumption of and showed little interest to be covered by the the economically important for Transnistria freight new trade regime with the EU, its export-oriented railway traffic and proposals to lift the EU travel economy that is substantially dependent on the EU ban of the Transnistrian leadership expose the market is poised to suffer. It is very unlikely that the Eastern markets could compensate the exodus from emptiness of the unilateral steps narrative promoted the European one. Moreover, once the DCFTA is by Tiraspol. in force in Moldova and in some foreseeable future 2013 will be important in many ways for the quality in Ukraine, Transnistria will be sandwiched by the of the negotiations and the general prospects of the EU trade regime, making the Eurasian integration Transnistrian conflict resolution process. Firstly, of Transnistria a far-fetched idea. Thus, in 2013 the the course of the year will show if the positive EU has to double its efforts to convince Tiraspol momentum in talks can be revived and sustained. to take a more active approach in the DCFTA Freedom of travel (railway passenger traffic, negotiations, in exchange for assistance to ensure transportation issues and the opening of the Gura legal harmonization with EU standards. In order Bacului bridge across the Nistru) and cooperation to achieve this, the EU has to focus primarily on in combating crime should be prioritized. Besides the new Transnistrian leader, whose agenda and the efforts of the international observers to keep capacity to deliver on electoral promises to improve the dialogue going, Ukraine’s presidency of the life of his citizens will be undermined by the loss of OSCE could provide an additional boost to the the European market. The EU should also engage negotiations in the “5+2” format and direct talks the business community in order to stimulate the between Chisinau and Tiraspol mediated by Kyiv. Transnistrian leadership’s will to stay connected to Ukraine appointed a special representative of the the European market. At the same time, the EU has OSCE for protracted conflicts who visited Tiraspol to think creatively about a reserve plan in order to in November 2012. Given the improved bilateral minimize the disruptive effects in case Tiraspol will relations with Kyiv, Moldova should use the definitively decline to take part in the DCFTA. Ukrainian channel to patiently continue talking to Conclusion Tiraspol. Secondly, 2013 is the year when Moldova will probably conclude talks on an Association This paper has shown that each protracted conflict Agreement and a DCFTA with the EU. It also can in the Eastern neighborhood is going through set the stage for a visa-free regime with EU in 2014. different phases. These range from small-scale As the negotiation process nears its end, Russia as military clashes along the frontline and attempts a sponsor of an alternative integration design in the to initiate basic confidence-building measures (so- post-Soviet region will be tempted to exercise more called “no peace, no war”) to more sustainable peace pressure to prevent Moldova’s drift towards the and the promotion of complex measures to foster EU. The energy lever, combined with the escalation trust, which could lead to conflict resolution. The of tensions in Transnistria, could be the Kremlin’s escalation of minor incidents into a full scale war answer to these developments. Regardless of in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be ruled out. Thanks Russia’s spoiler tactics, Moldova has to stick to its to presence of the European monitors in Georgia, EU agenda and reiterate its stance on the need to the chances for violence in Abkhazia and South find a peaceful solution to the conflict. At the same Ossetia to resume have been significantly reduced. time, the EU has to continue to diplomatically and The probability of military conflict in Transnistria, financially support Moldova’s European integration despite attempts to ignite the atmosphere, is

12 extremely low. Each conflict poses diverse Organization for Security and Co-operation in challenges, requiring different types of actions from Europe. 2011. Joint Statement on the Nagorno- the international mediators and observers. In some Karabakh Conflict, by the Presidents of the OSCE cases, they must focus on preventing war; in other Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries at the G-8 Summit. cases, they have to maintain a fragile peace or invest Deauville: OSCE, 26 May. http://www.osce.org/ in confidence-building measures aimed at fostering mg/78195 links previously suspended by war and preparing the ground for a sustainable settlement of the conflicts. Moldova.org. 2012. Stanski : Continua Sa Existe Amenintari, Conflictul Armat Poate Izbucni Iar. 6 References November. http://politicom.moldova.org/news/ tanski-continu-s-existe-ameninri-conflictul-armat- Abrahamyan, Gohar. 2012. Cyber War: Armenia Retaliates for Safarov’s Pardon by Hacking Official poate-izbucni-iar-233806-rom.html. Azeri Websites. ArmeniaNOw.com. 3 September. Noi.md. 2012. Rusia Va Aloca Transnistriei peste http://armenianow.com/news/39693/armenia_ 3 miliarde de Ruble Pentru o Serie de Proiecte. hacker_attacks_azeri_websites. 1 November. http://www.noi.md/md/news_ Allmoldova. 2012. Moldova Projecting to Deploy id/15992. NATO Military Base in Bulboaca – Transnistrian KGB Pridnestrovia, N. 2012. Rossya Namerena Vydeliti Chief. 16 October. http://www.allmoldova.com/en/ Pridnestroviu Granty v Razmere 3 milliardov Rublei moldova-news/1249054436.html. na Realizatsiu Prpoektov v Razlichnyh Sferah, 31 Asbarez.com. 2012. Armenia May Acquire More October. http://www.novostipmr.com/ru/news/12- Sophisticated Russian Missiles. 1 September. http:// 10-31/rossiya-namerena-vydelit-pridnestrovyu- asbarez.com/97942/armenia-may-acquire-more- granty-v-razmere-3. sophisticated-russian-missiles/. RFE/RL. 2011. Azerbaijan Threatens to Shoot Azernews. 2012. Azeri Gas Supplies to Russia Rise. Down Karabakh Planes. 16 March. http://www. 19 October. http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/45144. rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_threatens_to_shoot_ html. down_karabakh_flights/2340659.html. Cordovez, Diego and Selig S. Harrison. 1995. Out of Kommersant.md. 2012. Sergei Gubarev : “Poka Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. Net Popolznoveni k Tomu, Shtoby Eti Polovinki New York: Oxford University Press. Stali Odnim Tselym”, 18 October. http://www. kommersant.md/node/10679. Grachev, Andrei. 2008. Gorbachev’s Gamble. Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. Cambridge: Socor, Vladimir. 2012. Putin Suggests Transnistria Polity Press. Self-Determination, Rogozin Displays Transnistria Huseynov, Tabib, Tevan Poghosyan, and Craig Oliphant. Flag. Eurasia Daily Monitor. 6 August. http:// 2012. Putting People First: Reducing Frontline Tensions www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh. Report: ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39731&cHash=9100a600 Safer World. May 2012. http://www.saferworld.org.uk/ acc60c99c1bc8049420805e2. downloads/pubdocs/Putting%20people%20first.pdf. Today.az. 2008. Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry: International Crisis Group. 2011. Armenia and “Georgia’s Actions Comply with International Law”. Azerbaijan: Preventing War. Policy Brief No.60, 8 8 August. http://www.today.az/news/politics/46850. February. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/ html. europe/caucasus/B60%20Armenia%20and%20 Today’s Zaman. 2010. Erdogan: Armenia Talks Azerbaijan%20---%20Preventing%20War. Linked to Karabakh Settlement. 15 April. http:// Itar-Tass. 2012. Skidka na Gaz Dlya Moldavi Vozmozhna www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById. v Sluchaie Uregulirovanya Zadolzhnosti. 12 September. action;jsessionid=60586483D16FC8FB93AD6E74 http://www.itar-tass.com/c13/518435.html. 59011033?newsId=207464.

13 Trend.az. 2012. Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry Considers Holding of Elections in Nagorno- Karabakh as Provocation Attempt. 18 July. http:// en.trend.az/news/karabakh/2047953.html. Trend.az. 2012. Foreign Ministry: Azerbaijan Raises Illegality of Syrian Armenians Settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh Before International Organizations. 6 August. http://en.trend.az/news/ karabakh/2053523.html. TV PMR. 2012. TV Show ‘Public Diplomacy’. 3 November. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AOz NhghZFkg&feature=player_embedded. Unimedia. 2012. Rusia a Alocat Regiunii Transnistrene Jumatate de Miliard de Ruble. 18 July. http://unimedia.info/stiri/rusia-a-alocat-regiunii- transnistrene-jumatate-de-miliard-de-ruble-50053. html. Endnotes

1 Interview with an expert, Tbilisi, 2011.

2 Interview with an official, Tbilisi, 2011.

3 Interview with an expert, Baku 2011.

4 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, 2011.

5 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, 2011.

6 Interview with an expert, Yerevan, 2011.

7 Interview with a US official, 2012.

8 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2012.

9 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2012.

10 Interview with an expert, Moscow, 2012.

11 Interview with a Russian expert, 2012.

12 Interview with an EU official, Chisinau, 2012.

13 Interview with a diplomat, Chisinau, 2012.

14 Interview with a diplomat, Bucharest, 2012.

15 Interview with an EU official, Brussels, 2012.

14 About the Author About the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation Stanislav Secrieru at the time of writing this paper was affiliated expert at the Romanian The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation Centre for European Policies in Bucharest. (BST), a project of the German Marshall Fund of He holds a PhD in Political Science from the the United States promotes regional cooperation National School of Political Sciences and Public and good governance in the Wider Black Sea Administration (Bucharest). He has conducted region; accountable, transparent, and open research at the NATO Defense College (Rome), governments; strong, effective civic sectors; the Institute for European Politics (Berlin) and independent and professional media. To and the New Europe College (Bucharest). respond to the rapid shifts in the region, BST staff He has been involved in research projects at regularly consult with regional experts and aim the European Council on Foreign Relations to sharpen the program’s grantmaking strategy (London), DemosEuropa (Warsaw), Europeum in order to more effectively achieve the Trust’s (Prague), the Heinrich Boll Foundation (Berlin), goals. Taking into account the complexity and the Open Society Foundation (Bucharest) and diversity of the region, BST priorities are the Finnish Institute for International Affairs revised regularly and adjusted to respond to the (Helsinki). He has field research experience region’s changing needs. Adjustments are made in post-soviet space (Armenia, Azerbaijan, in consultation with the BST Advisory Board, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). He the German Marshall Fund’s network of offices recently co-authored the book titled South and internal expertise, and in coordination with Caucasus 20 Years After: Political Regimes, other donors active in the region. Security and Energy. About the Neighbourhood Policy Paper About the CIES series The Center for International and European The Neighbourhood Policy Paper series Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University was is meant to provide the policy, research and established in 2004 as the Center for European professional communities with expert input on Union Studies to study Turkey’s European many of the important issues and challenges Union accession process. Since September facing, in particular, the Eastern neighborhood 2010, CIES has been undergoing a major of the European Union today as they are written transformation by widening its focus in order by relevant experts. The analysis provided to pursue applied, policy-oriented research along with the relevant policy recommendations and to promote debate on the most pressing strives to be independent and not representative geostrategic issues of the region. of any one particular perspective or policy. These Its areas of research and interaction include EU papers will also be translated into Russian so institutions and policies (such as enlargement, that they are accessible to the Russian speaking neighbourhood policies and CFSP/CSDP), world in an attempt to enlarge the scope of the cross-cutting horizontal issues such as regional dialogue an input on Black Sea Region-related cooperation, global governance, and security, issues. The key priority is to maintain the focus inter alia with a geographical focus on the of the policy debate on the Black Sea Region Black Sea Region (including the Caucasus), the and the wider region. Mediterranean, Southeastern Europe, Turkish- Greek relations, and transatlantic relations.

15 Center for International and European Studies (CIES)

Kadir Has University Kadir Has Caddesi Cibali / Istanbul 34083 Turkey

Tel: +90 212 533 65 32, ext. 4608 Fax: +90 212 631 91 50 Email: [email protected] Website: http://cies.khas.edu.tr Director: Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

The Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation

The German Marshall Fund of the United States B-dul Primaverii nr. 50 Corp 6 “Casa Mica” Sector 1 Bucharest, Romania

Tel: +40 21 314 16 28 Fax: +40 21 319 32 74 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.gmfus.org/cs/blacksea Director: Alina Inayeh

ISBN 978-975-8919-78-9