conciliation resources The Karabakh trap Dangers and dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict1 By Thomas de Waal 2 Introduction The unresolved Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorny Karabakh (NK) still looms threateningly over the South Caucasus, but is low down the international agenda. NK is generally termed a “frozen conflict,” but the term is misleading and potentially dangerous; in fact the dispute is in a state of dynamic change that could eventually lead to the resumption of fighting. The facts on the ground are changing while the opposing repeated the message that a victory has been won and it sides, isolated from each other for two decades now, have only remains for Azerbaijan and the world to accept this. a poor grasp of what the other is thinking. As the situation Armenian minister of defence Seiran Ohanian (himself a changes, the danger in particular of a breakdown of the Karabakhi) said on July 29 2008, “Azerbaijan went down self-regulating ceasefire on the Line of Contact (LOC) the military path in resolving the conflict. The Nagorny between the two armies is especially worrying. Karabakh issue has already been resolved by force [in the Armenians’ favour], now we need to bring the issue to a This paper is an analysis of how the facts of the conflict logical resolution by diplomatic means.” are changing, of why the peace process is failing to move forward and the dangers that lie ahead over the next five NK is perceived by Armenians as a purely Armenian to ten years. It is aimed at stimulating a debate about the territory liberated from Azerbaijan. A younger generation long-term strategic options available to the parties involved is growing up in both NK and Armenia, which knows in the conflict with the goal of helping to move forward a NK only in this way and hears that the seven Armenian- peaceful resolution. controlled regions outside NK are “liberated territories” not to be given up. Yet Armenia continues to suffer economic Both sides are caught in a Karabakh trap – pain and international criticism because of the dispute. the situation hurts them in the long run but “Karabakh is the stick that everyone holds above our appears to suit them in the short-term heads,” admits one Armenian official. At the heart of the current deadlock over NK is a central Both sides are thus caught in a “Karabakh trap,” their long- paradox: it is in the long-term interests of everyone to effect term prospects hurt by a situation that is damaging in the a peaceful resolution of the dispute, yet all the key players long run, yet which appears to suit them in the short-term. are more or less comfortable with the status quo, despite Another paradox that bedevils this dispute is that the all its negative aspects. The leaders responsible for taking leaders on both sides have made considerable progress on decisions on a peace process prefer not to make decisions the details of a peace agreement in confidential talks and that could win their countries long-term benefits, calculating yet back home they continue to talk an aggressive language that the risks involved in making compromise are too great. of “no surrender.”3 The aggressive rhetoric and pervasive For one chief reason, the conflict can be said to be “hate-speech” around the NK dispute from many voices “thawing.” This is that the ‘losing’ side is growing more makes for a context of fear and distrust. There is almost confident and more impatient to change the situation in its no self-criticism or attempts to help the other side think of favour. The fact that, on top of the disputed region of NK creative ways out of problems, with each instead preferring itself, seven districts of Azerbaijan are wholly or partially to lecture the other. In this highly rhetorical climate, all occupied by Armenian forces is a source of continuing pain issues are highly instrumentalized. to Azerbaijanis and makes the situation unsustainable in the To an outsider this forms a depressing picture. The situation long run. “I don’t want to hand on this problem to my son, is “no one’s fault” but requires a new frame of reference if that’s why I am for war,” says an educated Azerbaijani in his the region is to avoid the danger either of another wasted thirties and that view is likely to gain more currency. decade with Armenia and Azerbaijan under-achieving their This paradoxically leaves the Azerbaijani authorities with potential or, worse, a renewed outbreak of fighting. less room to manoeuvre as Azerbaijan grows wealthier. The remainder of this paper falls into five parts: The government’s own proclamations about the new 1. The current state of the peace process. status of their country lead to a gap in public expectations 2. The situation on the Line of Contact. between what is thought to be achievable and what is 3. The situation in the region. actually possible, making it harder to negotiate the idea 4. The military capacities of both sides and possible of compromises such as the handover of powers of self- dangerous scenarios in which the conflict “thaws” and government to the NK Armenians. force is used. On the other side, Armenians are caught in a different 5. Some brief conclusions on potential strategic options for trap. Since the ceasefire agreement of May 1994 which the actors involved. cemented their success on the battlefield, Armenians have 2 • Conciliation Resources Current state of peace process 1 The NK peace process is perhaps one of the most closed and confidential negotiating processes in the world. In large part this is because of the continuing authoritarian traditions in these post-Soviet societies, in which leaderships preserve a monopoly on decision-making. Less than a dozen officials in both countries and half a • Armenian withdrawal from six-and-a-half of the dozen international officials are involved in it full time. The occupied territories, with phased withdrawal from small group of regional experts interested in the issue are Kelbajar and special arrangements made for Lachin. kept at arm’s length from the actual negotiations and there • Deployment of up to 10,000 international peacekeepers is little wider debate on the substance of proposals within between NK and the occupied territories, especially in Armenian or Azerbaijani society. The elected authorities of the Kelbajar region. the Karabakh Armenians and Karabakh Azeris (who have • NK provided with an “interim international status” no political role in Azerbaijan) have no formal involvement that gives some of its current elected officials greater in the peace process, even though their homeland is the legitimacy and its citizens international access, but falls subject of negotiations. short of international recognition. • A popular vote (whose details have yet to be The Minsk Group co-chairs have no spokesman or press determined) to be held at an unspecified future date to secretary and internationally the talks get virtually no media determine the future of NK. coverage. The American, French and Russian mediators talk about the merits of a peace process in their visits to The idea is to give both sides something of what they want the region but are constrained by issues of confidentiality. as a first step – the return of the occupied territories to The result is a very slow-moving and opaque process. One Azerbaijani hands, security guarantees for the Karabakh international observer says of it, “this is not a proper peace Armenians and the eventual prospect of a vote on process, merely conflict management.” independence – in the belief that progress and renewed contact can build up the mutual trust required to craft a On the negotiating table currently is a “Document of long-term solution. Basic Principles” of around three pages and 14 or 15 points, which sets out the first phase of a settlement. The The major sticking point for the Armenian side in the document is the culmination of the “Prague Process” which document is the status of Lachin which links Armenia to kicked off with a meeting between the foreign ministers NK by road and is regarded by Armenians as the “lifeline” of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Prague in April 2004. At its linking the two territories. More broadly, the Armenian side heart is the formula that the issue of the status of NK – the is wary of international “security guarantees” that weaken crucial issue which triggered the dispute in February 1988 its own capacity to defend NK. For the Azerbaijani side, and has dominated it ever since -- has to be postponed for the main anxiety, especially after Kosovo’s declaration several years so as to allow progress on other issues. The of independence in February 2008, is the nature of the Minsk Group mediators expressed this formula on March popular vote to be held in the future on the status of NK. 19 2008 by saying that the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan In the words of one Azerbaijani official, “we are worried must be upheld, “while holding that the future status of that the document contains hidden mechanisms for us Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter of negotiations between the losing Karabakh.” parties.” Despite its secret nature, the basic outline of the document is fairly well known. The optimistic view of the Madrid document is that the two sides are close to agreement and merely need “one 1 This paper was written as part of a project entitled “Thinking Strategically about Karabakh” funded by Conciliation Resources as part of the British-government-financed Consortium Initiative on the Nagorny Karabakh peace process.