The Caucasus Globalization

Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 1 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

INSTITUTE O STRATEGIC STUDIES O THE CAUCASUS

THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009

CA&CC Press® SWEDEN 2 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 OUNDEDTHE CAUCASUS AND& GLOBALIZATION PUBLISHED BY INSTITUTE O STRATEGIC STUDIES O THE CAUCASUS Registration number: M-770 Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan Republic

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Editorial Council

Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council (Baku) ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kenan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in Russia (Moscow) SAFAROV Tel: (7 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) KHADURI Tel: (995 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Ayca represents the journal in Turkey (Ankara) ERGUN Tel: (+90 312) 210 59 96 E-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Board

Nazim Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) MUZAFFARLI Tel: (994 – 12) 499 11 74 E-mail: [email protected] (IMANOV) Vladimer Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Georgia) PAPAVA Tel: (995 – 32) 24 35 55 E-mail: [email protected] Akif Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) ABDULLAEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Volume 3 IssueMembers 2-3 2009 of Editorial Board: 3 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Zaza Doctor of History, professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa Professor, Ankara University (Turkey) AYDIN Irina D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and BABICH Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Baku State University (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Executive Secretary EYVAZOV of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of Social and Political Studies (Azerbaijan) Erkin Senior research fellow of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Member GADIRLI of the International Caucasus-Caspian Commission (Azerbaijan) Rauf Ph.D., Leading research associate of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GARAGOZOV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) ARCHIL Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIYEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin Doctor of History, professor, academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians, member of the Presidium of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Econ.), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies (Iran) SANAIE S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla Doctor of History, professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2009 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2009 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2009 4 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

THE REHABILITATION OF Nazim THE POST-CONFLICT TERRITORIES MUZAFFARLI (IMANOV), Eldar ISMAILOV 7

HOW THE KARABAKH CONFLICT FITS Kenan THE NEW GREAT GAME CONTEXT ALLAHVERDIEV 25

CENTRAL ASIA: Rustem NEW GEOPOLITICAL ARCHITECTURE DJANGUZHIN (ZHANGOZHA) 37

HIERARCHICAL GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON AZERBAIJANI VIEWS OF Jason E. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS STRAKES 47

THE PARLIAMENT IN AZERBAIJAN’S POWER Ramil DIVISION SYSTEM ALIEV 60

GEO-ECONOMICS

HYDROCARBON RESOURCES OF THE CASPIAN REGION IN THE GLOBAL ENERGY Ibrahim SUPPLY SYSTEM GULIEV 70 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION PERIOD Rozeta IN THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY ASATIANI 79

STATE POLICY IN THE COORDINATES OF POST-SOVIET MARKET Hadjiaga TRANSFORMATION RUSTAMBEKOV 89

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM George IN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS OF IVANIASHVILI- GEORGIA ORBELIANI 100

TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT OF THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRAL CAUSASIAN Aysel STATES) ALLAHVERDIEVA 116

GEOCULTURE

THE ART OF AZERBAIJANI CARPET WEAVING IN THE CONTEXT OF Roya THE INTERCIVILIZATIONAL DIALOG TAGHIYEVA 133

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION VS. RELIGIOUS RADICALISM Elmir IN ISLAM GULIEV 148

THE EAST AND THE WEST: YESTERDAY, Konul TODAY AND TOMORROW BUNIADZADE 157

SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE CHANGES IN THE ETHNODEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA Anatoli IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD YAMSKOV 166

GEOHISTORY

GEOHISTORICAL PROCESSES IN THE CAUCASIAN-CASPIAN REGION DURING ANTIQUITY (THE 4TH CENTURY B.C.- Parvin 4TH CENTURY A.D.) DARABADI 177 6 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF MIGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN Kerim (19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES) SHUKIUROV 185

AZERBAIJAN’S INDEPENDENCE AND THE GEOINTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN AND Vasif OTTOMAN EMPIRES GAFAROV 193 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Nazim MUZA ARLI (IMANOV)

Editor-in-Chief, The Caucasus & Globalization (Baku, Azerbaijan).

Eldar ISMAILOV

Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE REHABILITATION O THE POST-CON LICT TERRITORIES

Abstract

his article deals with matters of recon- tial competitive advantage and their promo- T structing areas devastated by armed tion with direct government support, and pro- conflicts. It examines a wide range of vision of incentives for active private sector problems associated with post-conflict recon- involvement in rehabilitation works. struction planning: from basic planning as- Theoretical propositions are illustrat- sumptions to the management of risks typ- ed by examples drawn from areas adja- ical of large-scale government programs. In cent to the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of particular, it analyzes the economic aspects Azerbaijan, but many recommendations of restoring life support systems, infrastruc- formulated in this article are of a univer- ture and the economy. Much attention is sal nature and, the authors hope, can be paid to matters of post-conflict economic re- used in reconstructing other post-conflict structuring, identification of areas of poten- areas as well. 8 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I n t r o d u c t i o n

A number of regions in today’s world are engulfed in various kinds of armed conflicts. They lead to human losses, leaving behind them maimed people and broken lives. Armed conflicts also entail destruction of the environment, life support systems, infrastructure, economy and social facilities. Most of this kind of damage can be compensated, although it requires the concentration of vast material, energy, financial and labor resources. Even with active and large-scale support from the world community, the rehabilitation of post- conflict areas and their reintegration into political, economic and cultural life is mainly the responsibility of the state that has internationally recognized sovereignty over these areas. Its duty is not only to fully reconstruct the post-conflict area, but also to provide a level playing field for the activities of all communities involved in the conflict, regardless of whether the conflict was provoked by ethnic, political, religious or other reasons. Such tasks will have to be addressed by two (of the three) Central Caucasian states that have ethnopolitical conflicts in their territory: Azerbaijan and Georgia. At present, it is hard to suppose when exactly they will be able to get down to practical rehabilitation work. But there is no denying that any state should prepare for post-conflict reconstruction in advance, prior to the achievement of a political agreement on resolving the conflict in its territory. It is essentially important to note that forward planning of rehabilitation work is not only the state’s inalienable right, but also its direct responsibility. In this article, the methodology, principles and economic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction planning are considered based on a case study of areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh. A step-by-step settlement, which is now the only subject of negotiation (probably having no alternative), provides that these areas will be liberated in the first place. At the same time, it is quite obvious that from both an urban-planning and a socioeconomic perspective Karabakh has always been a single region, while its division into a highland (Nagorno) and lowland parts is a matter of convention.

Basic Planning Assumptions

Drafting a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction and development plan whose component parts are consistent with each other in both spatial and functional (sectoral) terms is an extremely difficult research task in itself. But it is further complicated if the initial planning parameters, which are usually of a political nature, are not determined (or insufficiently determined). In most cases, the validity of the basic assumptions boils down to how realistic they are, i.e., to their practical feasibility under the most favorable conditions. The actual content of the basic assumptions of a rehabilitation program depends on a number of factors. The most important of these are the specific features of the conflict and the proposed ways of its resolution. It is necessary to obtain basic answers to certain questions, including: will the conflict be resolved by peaceful means or by force of arms? How is the time frame for reaching a final peace settlement to be set? Will the conflict resolution process involve third parties (states, international organizations, peacekeeping forces, etc.)? These circumstances are so important that they themselves can be regarded as separate basic assumptions. Next, the development of a rehabilitation program implies the need for a realistic assessment of the state’s economic capacity. It is a question of determining the amount of resources the state will be able to mobilize and use for post-conflict reconstruction and development. This includes not only the state’s own resources, but also potential international assistance. The program time frame is determined precisely by this financial resource capacity (all other things being equal, the larger this capac- Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ity the shorter is the projected rehabilitation period). This capacity also determines the qualitative level of rehabilitation and reconstruction toward which the program can be geared. The third factor influencing the basic assumptions is the internal political situation in the country. In particular, it is necessary to take into account the level of public confidence in the government: the higher this level the wider are the opportunities for the government to take unpopular measures without fear of potential social discontent. Besides, the implementation of large-scale programs inevitably leads to a sharp increase in the movement of material-commodity, financial and human resources, and the government (especially its security and law enforcement agencies) should be able to control and regulate these flows, ensuring their transparency and preventing such negative phenomena as corruption. An important factor is the presence of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs): the larger their number and the less favorable the conditions of their temporary residence, the higher will be the social pressure on government agencies involved in post- conflict rehabilitation. The basic assumptions should be formulated as briefly and clearly as possible and should be given in the preamble to the program. If the program is developed before the parties reach a political agreement on resolving the conflict, they can be formulated in the form of several simple assumptions. For example, in planning the reconstruction and development of post-conflict areas adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, one can start from the following assumptions: n after the achievement of a political decision on a step-by-step settlement of the conflict, seven areas around the administrative boundaries of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Qubadli, Zangilan, Kalbajar and Lachin) have been liberated in the first place; n the occupation forces have withdrawn from the conflict zone, and illegal armed formations have been disarmed; n the initial measures required to ensure the safety of the population, and also of production and infrastructure facilities have been taken; n a new border security system is being created; n the process of voluntary repatriation of displaced persons to their place of permanent residence is underway; it is assumed that 60-80 thousand will return to the region during the first conventional period, 90-100 thousand each during the second and third periods, 100-110 thousand during the fourth period, and 110-130 thousand during the fifth period (a total of 450- 520 thousand returnees). The assumption on the number of people returning to the post-conflict area is a necessary condition for reconstruction planning, because the subsequent restoration of all life support systems and infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities should be “tied” precisely to this figure. The conventional period can be equated to one or two years or to another time interval depending on the concrete conditions at the start of rehabilitation work. But it should be borne in mind that a shortening or lengthening of the time scheduled for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction is of great importance for the whole process, particularly from the standpoint of financial costs. The assumption on potential inflation, which can be included among the basic assumptions of an economic nature, is of high importance for developing the financial aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. This assumption should be based not so much on current macroeconomic parameters as on inflation forecasts. For example, Azerbaijan’s financial expenditures under a post-conflict reconstruction program for the next five years should be calculated based on an annual inflation rate of 18-20%. Such was the inflation limit projected by the Central Bank for 2009. Since the end of 2008 inflation has somewhat declined as a result of the global financial and economic crisis, which has reduced aggregate demand. 10 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

But there is every reason to suppose that when the crisis is over, inflation in most countries of the world, including Azerbaijan, will almost immediately return to pre-crisis levels. The best alternative of “financial linkages” for such a program would be to make calculations both adjusted and unadjust- ed for inflation. Long-term discount coefficients making it possible to take into account the decline in the value of money over time (time value of money) and usually approved by governments are another basic assumption of an economic nature. In many countries, the use of these coefficients in analyzing and evaluating long-term projects is a mandatory procedure. As regards post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan, it is difficult to take this factor into account because, regrettably, its use in long-term economic planning is still insufficient. Nevertheless, in some cases this factor can be taken into account, particularly where certain costs are calculated based on technical and economic parameters used in current projects developed by international consultants (these include, for example, expenditures on restoring drinking water supply and sewage systems). It is clear that, first, the later the post-conflict rehabilitation begins and, second, the longer it lasts, the stronger will be the influence exerted by the decline in the time value of money and by inflation on its final financial parameters. Some of the basic assumptions are both political and economic. The most important of these is the orientation toward a certain reconstruction standard. In cases where a conflict has been “frozen” for a long time, an orientation toward pre-conflict standards is unacceptable in principle. On the other hand, post-conflict planning will inevitably cease to be realistic if it is oriented toward the highest world standards in the development of life support systems, infrastructure, production and social facilities. The target level of post-conflict rehabilitation should be attainable and should correspond to the country’s financial, material, technical and personnel capacity. In reference to Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the goal can be formulated as their reconstruction at a level slightly above the average indicators achieved in the country’s regions outside the capital by the start of rehabilitation work. The size of this margin should be determined based on the state’s economic capacity. The standards providing the basis for post-conflict planning also depend on the extent of damage. Reliable (as far as possible) information on the actual state of the program area is a key prerequisite for post-conflict planning. The lower the extent of damage the smaller is the amount of resources required for reconstruction, on the one hand, but the harder it will be to reorient the program from previously existing standards to higher ones. Unfortunately, there is no reliable comprehensive information on the state of Azerbaijani territories subject to post-conflict rehabilitation. Limited information received through various channels and the experience of earlier liberated population centers show that all life support systems and the economic and sociocultural infrastructure in the occupied territories outside the administrative boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh have been almost entirely destroyed. That is why post-conflict reconstruction in this case will amount to a virtual recreation of the region’s infrastructure, economic and other systems. This will significantly increase the amount of required resources, although in some cases new construction is economically more efficient than reconstruction, especially from the perspective of minimizing future operational costs. Another “advantage of total destruction” is that it allows greater freedom in planning rehabilitation works without the need to tie them to old systems.

Methodological Principles

Building on international experience. Many states have faced the challenge of reconstructing post-conflict areas whose economy and infrastructure were destroyed as a result of armed conflicts. In Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the 20th century this included Europe, the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R., and also Japan (after the first and second world wars), Lebanon (Beirut), Vietnam and Iran, and at present, the Russian Feder- ation (Chechnya), Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Balkan countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. The use of international experience in the reconstruction and development of devastated areas is an essential condition for post-conflict planning, including in Azerbaijan.1 At the same time, a return to normal life in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas has its difficulties and differs in this respect from many other similar problems in the above-mentioned countries, because it goes far beyond the performance of purely material, technical and financial tasks. It is necessary to reintegrate the currently occupied areas and their population (the Armenian population in the first place) into Azerbaijan’s political, economic and cultural life, and this is just as difficult as addressing the first group of tasks. Reasonable cost minimization. Full-scale post-conflict rehabilitation, as noted above, requires vast resources. In such relatively small states as Azerbaijan, the amount of required funds may well be comparable to the scale of the whole economy. That is why cost minimization is an essential attribute of post-conflict planning. At the same time, resource saving should not be allowed to turn into the cornerstone principle dominating over the objectives of post-conflict rehabilitation. Cost minimization that leads to a decline in the quality of work and thereby poses a threat to public safety is unacceptable in principle. As for Azerbaijan, its current and expected near-future financial capacity is sufficient for an orientation toward relatively high post-conflict rehabilitation objectives (standards). Dual approach: restoration of the old and creation of the new. Post-conflict reconstruction should always combine new construction with restoration of previously existing facilities. The quantitative proportion between these two forms of post-conflict rehabilitation depends on a number of factors. Some of them were already mentioned above: the actual state of infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities in the post-conflict area, the objectives (standards) of reconstruction,2 the state’s resource capacity, and the time interval between the destruction of the area and the start of rehabilitation work. Even when there is an opportunity to restore old facilities, new construction based on advanced technologies is often more effective. This applies not only to information and communication systems (their rehabilitation based on old technologies is evidently unacceptable) but also to traditional elements of infrastructure such as roads. Flexible spatial planning, primarily settlement network planning. It can be regarded as a special case of the application of the previous principle, but is also important in its own right. On the one

1 There are many works on the socioeconomic aspects of post-conflict reconstruction in different countries, for example: H.P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Imprint, Harper Perennial, 2001; P.F. Schaefer, P.C. Schaefer, Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation of Japan after World War II (Case Study), available at [http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ESDP&fileid=898B2CE0-A37F-EC5D-CA30-FC23 8207A1CD&lng=en]; I.D. Turner, Reconstruction in Post-War Germany, Berg Publishers, 1992; Lebanon in Limbo: Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment, ed. by Th. Hanf, N. Salam, Nomos Verlagsgesells- chaft, Baden, Baden-Baden, 2003; Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and Post-War Reconstruction, ed. by S. Khalaf, Ph.S. Khoury, E.J. Brill, Leiden-New York, 1993; R.S. Jennings, The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Ja- pan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq, US Institute of Peace, 2003, available at [http://origin.usip.org/pubs/ peaceworks/pwks49.pdf]. In addition, significant experience in this area has been accumulated by international organizations and IFIs (see, for example: Post-conflict Reconstruction in Japan, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, ed. by N. Rham-Azimi, M. Fuller, H. Nakayama, Geneva, United Nations, 2003; World Bank Group Response to Post Conflict Reconstruction in Kosovo: General Framework For an Emergency Assistance Strategy, available at [http://www. worldbank.org/html/extdr/kosovo/kosovo_st.htm]; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments: Review of the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program and Looking Ahead Toward Sustainable Economic Devel- opment, Working Paper prepared by the European Union and the World Bank, for the May 1999 Donors Conference, World Bank, 1999). 2 Unless otherwise specified, the term “reconstruction” is used in this article to designate both restoration of the old and creation of the new. 12 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION hand, there are serious arguments in favor of restoring the pre-conflict settlement network. First, this approach obviates the need for additional urban and landscape planning, and second, it ensures the legitimate right of each displaced person to return to their own home or at least to their own population center. The private property rights of displaced persons to real estate are among the conservative factors of settlement patterns. On the other hand, the creation of a new settlement structure opens additional opportunities for reintegrating the post-conflict areas into the country’s political and economic structure, although improper implementation may involve an infringement of returnees’ property rights; moreover, the second approach requires a great deal of preliminary work. Evidently, it makes sense to combine these two approaches. The creation of a new settlement pattern should be analyzed in a wider context than actual post- conflict reconstruction. For example, in Azerbaijani territories awaiting liberation such a pattern can be created only based on the unity of the entire Karabakh region. This circumstance should be taken into account in determining the settlements that can become the pivotal elements of the new settlement system and act as an engine in the revival of the region. As earlier research shows,3 in the foreseeable future none of the cities of Nagorno-Karabakh or adjacent areas taken separately can aspire to this role. Hence the proposal to develop the Shusha-Khankendi-Agdam axis as a consolidating center and to turn it into a tripolar agglomeration. Step-by-step approach. Post-conflict reconstruction ranks among large-scale projects whose effective implementation necessitates a division of rehabilitation works into distinct stages. We can assume the following stages typical of most post-conflict areas regardless of the country to which they belong. n The initial (preparatory) stage includes, in the first place, the drafting of a state program for the reconstruction and development of post-conflict areas. At this stage, it is necessary to conduct a set of analytical studies in planning and designing infrastructure, production and sociocultural facilities and to draft recommendations for stimulating local and foreign investors to take part in rehabilitation works, especially in reviving the economy. The government should hold consultations with international financial institutions (IFIs) and other potential donors in order to attract additional resources. In countries where areas subject to reconstruction make up a significant part of the country’s total area, it is possible to set up a special body (ministry or agency) responsible for their rehabilitation and reintegration.4 n The second (“pre-basic”) stage includes a direct (on-site) inspection of post-conflict areas, whereupon the State Program is duly adjusted with subsequent approval by the country’s political leadership. At this stage, initial measures are taken to create a border security sys-

3 This applies, in the first place, to: Tekhniko-ekonomicheskoie obosnovanie programmy vosstanovlenia i rekon- struktsii territori Azerbaidzhana, postradavshikh ot vneshnei agressii, Vol. 1 (Abstract), Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Azerbaijani Territories, Baku, 1998; Ýþðaldan azad olunmuþ drazildrin “Böyük Bdrpa” proqramý, Azdrbaycan Respublikasý Ýþðaldan azad olunmuþ drazildrin bdrpasý vd yeniddnqurulmasý üzrd Dövldt Komissiyasý, Baký, 2005. 4 An analysis of international experience can be of great assistance in determining the mission, tasks and powers of this body. It even makes sense to consider the activities of government bodies set up not by the post-conflict restoration country itself but by other interested states or international organizations. For example, serious lessons can be drawn from an analysis of the work of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction set up by the U.S. Congress in 2004. Administratively, it is subordinate to the departments of state and defense, but presents periodical (quarterly and semi-annual) reports directly to the U.S. Congress, open to the local and foreign public. The latest report at the time of writing this article is dated 30 April, 2009 (see: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction: Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, available at [http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx]). Apart from control over the use of funds allocated for Iraq support and reconstruction, the Office of the Special Inspector General coordinates work in implementing post-conflict reconstruction programs, develops recommendations for their improvement, analyzes the effectiveness of Iraq’s public administration agencies, takes part in drafting and examining laws and regulations, and performs other functions. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

tem, to ensure public safety and to decontaminate priority areas (including staging areas for “pioneer teams”). An important task at this stage is the reinstatement of local civil administration. n The third stage is the basic one and provides for the recreation of life support systems throughout most of the post-conflict area. This includes water and energy supply, telecommunications and postal services, the start of wide-ranging work to restore housing, emergency social security services, transport communications and other infrastructure facilities. n At the fourth (repatriation) stage, displaced persons return to their place of permanent residence. Mass repatriation should be accompanied by the creation of new jobs and of a particularly favorable environment for private enterprise. This is an indispensable condition for the gradual conversion of the post-conflict area into a self-organizing regional entity capable of independent economic development. n Finally, the fifth stage, which can be called a stage of adaptation, is characterized by the final settlement of returnees in their place of permanent residence, with the formation of viable communities and productive forces. The emphasis shifts to tasks associated with the restoration of sociocultural and sports facilities. The process of creating locally elected government bodies (e.g. municipalities) is intensified. This division into stages (like any other) is only conceptual. The inclusion of various kinds of rehabilitation works within a certain stage simply means that they are prioritized. In actual fact, all post-conflict reconstruction activities are “through” activities and are conducted at virtually every stage of the rehabilitation period. Continuous improvement of post-conflict reconstruction programs. All spheres of post-conflict reconstruction are influenced by the time factor. The means of communication are undergoing particularly rapid and radical changes, with a very high rate of technological renewal. Significant changes are taking place in technologies and materials prevailing in civil construction, energy and gas supply, and also in the construction and renovation of transport infrastructure. At the same time, the sequence and nature of rehabilitation works are significantly influenced by the political and economic terms of settlement of each particular conflict. For example, virtually all reconstruction and development works in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas have to be tied in with the repatriation schedule, which is very difficult to compile prior to the adoption of political decisions on the forms and order of the liberation of the occupied territories. That is why after the final approval of the resettlement schedule it will be necessary to make additional adjustments to the program. On the whole, work on the program should continue until the full completion of post-conflict rehabilitation. The expert group working on the program should maintain a constant exchange of views with the general public in its own country, with local and foreign specialists, and also with IFIs and foreign donors. Other principles. Apart from the universal principles listed above, there are specific principles applied in post-conflict rehabilitation with due regard for country specifics, the nature of the conflict and the terms of its settlement, and also the peculiarities of the situation in the post-conflict area. For example, the powers and duties of the central and local authorities should be divided depending on the country’s peculiarities, with additional powers conferred on the local civil administration (within certain limits), especially in the matter of ensuring public safety. An indispensable condition for post-conflict planning is the holding of a set of opinion polls among potential returnees in order to determine their needs and expectations, while surveys among private businesses can play a significant role in determining the sufficient conditions for their involvement in commercial rehabilitation projects. 14 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

At the stage of planning post-conflict measures, cooperation between government and independent experts could be very fruitful, as well as cooperation between local and foreign experts, which makes it possible to analyze the problem from different angles.

Restoration of Life Support Systems and Infrastructure

Repatriation of refugees and displaced persons is among the key components of post-conflict reconstruction, simultaneously serving as a criterion for assessing the effectiveness of the rehabilitation effort. It should be carried out on a voluntary basis: tough administrative measures in this matter are not only undesirable, but also impossible in principle. At the stage of preparatory measures, special surveys (primarily public opinion polls) should help to determine the lower and upper limits of the number of potential returnees. The program should be drawn up based on the upper limit. For example, such studies show that the number of returnees in Azerbaijan will be within the range of 450-520 thousand (85-90% of the total number of IDPs), so that post-conflict rehabilitation should be planned based on the figure of 520 thousand.5 But even with such a high “natural” repatriation potential the authorities should provide for special measures to simplify mass migration. Apart from legal guarantees for the entire range of returnees’ property rights, an exceptional role could be played by direct incentives: material compensation, social security benefits, reimbursement of transportation costs, etc. Reconstruction of housing usually consists of two components: first, the construction of temporary dwellings for the first groups of returnees, and also for “pioneer teams,” in which it would make sense to include some of the returnees themselves, who can take part in the reconstruction work. These dwellings (possibly of a container type) can be located in base centers in the form of small settlements. The second component is the renovation or construction (depending on the extent of damage) of houses for returnees. Housing standards in the post-conflict area can be based on average floor area per urban and rural dweller in the country (as a rule, excluding the capital) immediately before the start of repatriation. A basic solution of the housing problem in post-conflict areas is a function of the state, which should cover a significant part of the expenses involved. Nevertheless, it is advisable to combine various forms of financing: with the participation of government agencies, returnees, private businesses, and international and local donors. Restoration of energy supply is among the components of post-conflict rehabilitation that are “country specific.” Depending on the peculiarities of its energy system, on its existing and projected energy generation sources, each country itself determines the energy supply sources and schemes specific to its post-conflict areas, seeking to reduce production costs and transportation losses. As basic information in post-conflict planning it is necessary to use average energy consumption indicators for households in the country (outside the capital) recalculated in accordance with the upper value of the number of potential returnees. The requirements of other entities can be easily calculated by extrapolating the ratios recorded in other regions of the country. The choice of a basic model for rehabilitating the power supply system (restoration of the pre- conflict system or construction of a new one) depends on the performance characteristics and effi-

5 Azerbaijan’s official statistics provide fairly detailed information on the demographic situation in projected post- conflict reconstruction areas (see: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Population by Economic Regions at the Beginning of the 2008, available at [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/demoqraphic/az/012.shtml#s13]). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ciency of the pre-conflict energy system and the extent of its destruction, on the country’s economic capacity and other factors. In Azerbaijan, these two approaches will have to be combined. The restoration of pre-conflict networks could be relevant to lowland areas: their connection to the country’s integrated power system does not involve great difficulties, while financial expenditures will not exceed allowable limits. In mountain areas it is more advisable to choose the second option, building local power networks (with due regard for settlement patterns) based on damless small and mini hy- dro plants. Drinking water supply is among the priority projects and should precede mass repatriation. In cases where the restoration of pre-conflict water sources and water distribution networks is impossible or takes a long time, it is necessary to create new local water supply systems. It is preferable to use underground sources and springs (if any), which do not require additional expenditures on purifica- tion. During post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan, it will be necessary to restore and drill arte- sian wells, to build water conduits and distribution networks to public standpipes in “pioneer” settlements; to reconstruct and build new water intakes, pumping stations, water storage facilities and water mains; to connect (where necessary and possible) the water facilities of central settlements to water mains; and to restore kariz.6 Serious attention should be paid to restoring sewage systems and treatment of waste (industrial and household) in the cities. The peculiarity of this problem in Azerbaijan is that it will have to be addressed almost from scratch, because there were no modern sewage systems in this region even in Soviet times, while treatment of waste boils down to its “stockpiling” on the ground surface with subsequent burning. A feasibility study for several mini waste treatment plants should be carried out in the post-conflict region. These plants could be commercial, although they could be created with government support. Gas supply in post-conflict areas is not among the top priorities, because delays here do not limit either repatriation or the initial economic recovery of the region. But gas supply in Azerbaijani post- conflict areas will be of great importance from the perspective of economic (and, indirectly, political) reintegration of the highland and lowland parts of Karabakh. Gas supply should also be arranged in Karabakh population centers that are (or will be) mainly inhabited by citizens of Armenian origin. It is quite possible that after the achievement of political decisions on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh the question of Azerbaijani gas exports to Armenia will come on the agenda as well. The gasification of post-conflict areas could technically simplify the solution of this problem. In planning the reconstruction of infrastructure for local civil administration bodies, the assumption is that they should be relocated to the post-conflict areas even before the start of repatriation and large-scale rehabilitation work.7 At the initial stage, they can be housed in any premises fit for this purpose in base centers of reconstruction or, in their absence, in temporary container modules. The construction and equipment of special buildings for them can be included among the tasks of the second conventional period, while their equipment with telecommunications and special transport should be a matter of priority. In most cases (at any rate in Azerbaijan), it is preferable that elected municipal bodies (district, village and settlement), however important for democratic development, should begin operating after the completion of basic post-conflict rehabilitation works. This is explained by the need for the maximum possible concentration of authority, whose diffusion would inadmissibly complicate the rehabilitation process. The general approach to restoring transportation infrastructure depends, n first, on its actual state;

6 Kariz is a traditional source of drinking water in a number of currently occupied population centers, an upstream underground gallery (shaft) for collecting groundwater and bringing it to the surface by gravity flow. 7 In some countries (as in Azerbaijan), the local civil administration authorities of conflict areas are not disbanded and continue to function in places of concentration of displaced persons. 16 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n second, on the degree of obsolescence; n third, on the size of the post-conflict area; n fourth, on the area’s functional purpose (its place in the national and regional division of labor); and n fifth, on the state’s medium and long-term economic priorities. The rehabilitation of roads is usually higher on the agenda than other tasks in the field of transport rehabilitation. The first thing to do is to assess the rationality of previously existing routes. But even where these routes are deemed to be optimal at the current stage, it should be borne in mind that the economic costs of restoring old roads are often comparable to the cost of construction of new ones.8 The conflict specifics have a significant influence on goal setting in this field. For example, a step-by-step solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem implies a situation where road access to some areas of the region, especially to the Kalbajar District, will be complicated because before the occupation road traffic passed through Nagorno-Karabakh territory. That is why in order to ensure direct road traffic to the Kalbajar District it will be necessary to build a tunnel from the north at the Murovdag Pass along the Khanlar-Kalbajar highway.9 Road transportation should be restored in the following order: (i) highways connecting post-conflict areas (their base centers) with the country’s transportation infrastructure; (ii) local roads connecting district base centers with each other; (iii) street networks in cities undergoing reconstruction; and (iv) highways whose reconstruction will come on the agenda after the final settlement of the conflict (in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this includes the rehabilitation of roads between Azerbaijan’s heartland and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory). In contrast to roads, virtually all rail infrastructure facilities are the responsibility of the state, although some of them can be subsequently transferred into the hands of private managers. It is necessary to reconstruct (construct) railway stations, switchyards, sidings, loading terminals, and also track and rolling stock maintenance services. After the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it will be necessary to rehabilitate the Azerbaijani rail section that connected Azerbaijan’s heartland with Nakhchivan. This will make it possible, first, to ease the almost 20-year transport blockade of Nakhchivan and, second, to restore rail communications along the entire Baku-Sadarak route, which will have a positive effect on expanding trade and economic relations of the Central Caucasus with Turkey and Iran. A priority task in the field of air transport is to restore helicopter services, which do not require a costly infrastructure and can be arranged right after the settlement of the conflict. In Azerbaijan, helicopters will be of special importance in reconstructing the Kalbajar District, because before the opening of the Murovdag Tunnel they will be the only mode of transport connecting this district with the rest of the country. The reconstruction of the telecommunications network should be geared to the task of full- scale integration of the population of post-conflict areas into the country’s single information and communication space. This task should be addressed in the following order:

8 The approximate cost of work and its scope can be determined based on the length and quality (surfacing) of roads in the pre-conflict period. In particular, the relevant information on the currently occupied Azerbaijani territories is to be found on the website of the State Traffic Police (see: [http://www.dyp.gov.az/?/az/content/145]). 9 A project for a 3 km tunnel at a cost of about AZN 80 million ($100 million) has already been developed by Azer- baijan specialists (see: Ýþðaldan azad olunmuþ drazildrin Böyük Bdrpa proqramý). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(i) providing “pioneer teams” with mobile communications; (ii) restoring radio relay services; (iii) restoring postal and telegraph services; (iv) restoring reliable telephone services; (v) ensuring reliable television relay services; and (vi) creating local television and radio broadcasting. In Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the rehabilitation of the telecommunications network is significantly simplified by the projected launching of two national satellites. Telephone and fax services, as a rule, should be recreated on a new basis using modern technological equipment. In order to accelerate this process, it would make sense to combine electronic exchanges with the use of the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) system. This system can be created by private companies as well. In Azerbaijan, for example, there are two private CDMA operators evidently prepared to tap into new markets. But in post-conflict areas such a system can also be created by a new, resident operator or by the government itself, with subsequent privatization. The problem of providing the population in post-conflict areas with mobile communications can be solved in a similar way, i.e., on a commercial basis and without additional government spending. The restoration of television and radio broadcasting in post-conflict areas, while being mainly the responsibility of the state, does not take a long time or require large amounts of resources. In some cases, a state regional broadcasting company can be established in one of the post-conflict cities in order to cover, among other things, the course of repatriation and rehabilitation work and provide returnees with the necessary information, say, on available job openings. The postal service should be restored in all population centers. Initially it should perform, along with traditional functions, such functions as providing financial services to the population (utility and other similar payments, money transfers, issue of pensions, grants and other financial assistance). The restoration of postal services usually requires the construction and equipment of new buildings: head post offices in district centers, post offices in settlements and large villages, and agencies providing postal services in relatively small communities or several communities at once. Post-conflict rehabilitation of the social sphere includes the restoration of healthcare, educational, cultural and sports facilities. The healthcare system should combine (i) regional medical treatment and diagnostic centers, (ii) district and specialized hospitals (including maternity homes, children’s hospitals, centers for rehabilitating disabled people, TB and dermatovenerologic dispensaries), (iii) district polyclinics (including children’s), (iv) outpatient clinics and first-aid stations, (v) emergency stations, (vi) sanitary and epidemiological stations, and (vii) pharmacies. Most of the personnel for these medical institutions should be recruited from among the returnees, who should undergo training or further training (in the event of a long break in professional activity) as a precondition for medical practice. The schedule for restoring educational facilities should be matched with the repatriation schedule. This component usually includes the rehabilitation of 18 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(i) preschool institutions, (ii) primary and secondary schools, (iii) vocational training schools, (iv) specialized secondary educational institutions, and (v) children’s post-conflict psychological rehabilitation centers. In contrast to other educational institutions, secondary schools are invariably in demand from the very beginning of repatriation to the post-conflict zone. Moreover, in the first few years they should also function as community centers, performing cultural and educational work and providing information services, and are indispensable as support centers for local self-government. In addition, some school premises should be adapted for simultaneous use as centers of social and psychological rehabilitation, primarily for children.10 According to our preliminary estimates, it is necessary to build a total of 450 general education schools in Azerbaijan’s post-conflict zone. Cultural and sports facilities to be rehabilitated include: (i) district houses of culture (recreation centers), (ii) village clubs, (iii) public (including central district) libraries, (iv) sports complexes, and also (v) museums and (vi) historical monuments. The rehabilitation of most cultural and sports facilities, however important, is among the tasks of the adaptation stage.

Economic Reconstruction

Selection of goals and principles. Post-conflict economic reconstruction always involves a multiple choice in terms of both strategy and tactics. In this case, the selection of long-term economic goals is not so much a question of scientific research as a political question. Nevertheless, it is possible to formulate at least four universal basic principles of post-conflict economic restructuring. n First, the choice of sectoral policy in post-conflict areas is a derivative of the state’s general long-term economic goals. In Azerbaijan, for example, one of these goals is the development of the country’s transit transport potential. This implies the need, on the one hand, to comply with high quality standards in rehabilitating transportation infrastructure, and on the other, to ensure priority development of transport service enterprises. n Second, both the very process of post-conflict economic recovery and the subsequent operation of production facilities should be oriented, in the first place, toward local resources. In all post-conflict reconstruction works, including recruitment of management personnel, priority should be given to returnees, even where this requires additional (reasonably acceptable) expenditures on retraining or further training.

10 Appropriate international organizations can and should be invited to take part in children’s psychological rehabilitation. For example, UNICEF has wide experience of such work in Azerbaijan. The results of its activity have already been validated in 26 districts of the country. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Third, at the stage of intensive reconstruction of life support systems and infrastructure, despite mass involvement of private companies in these works as subcontractors, state- owned companies can dominate. But the philosophy of post-conflict rehabilitation should be based on the idea that the private sector will ultimately become the key sector of the economy. n Fourth, in selecting enterprises to be reconstructed or constructed, the authorities should be guided by the level of their potential competitiveness: Ø top priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in the international market, including the markets of neighboring countries; Ø high priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in the national market; Ø medium priority: enterprises whose products are competitive in local and regional markets. At the same time, some enterprises whose products are designed for the local market can be given higher priority (especially at the first stage of repatriation) if they are associated with local life support systems. Selection of sectors that can exploit the comparative advantages of the post-conflict region is an indispensable condition of effective post-conflict planning. This selection should be made with due regard for the long-term competitive advantages of the country as a whole and is specific to each particular region.11 As for Karabakh, one can identify (as a preliminary recommendation) the following sectors that could potentially constitute the backbone of the economy: Ø In agriculture: grain production (with focus on food grain), horse breeding (breeding of Karabakh racehorses), livestock production (especially sheep breeding), and possibly winegrowing; Ø In industry: carpet weaving (manufacture of Karabakh carpets), leather industry, building materials industry, meat and dairy industry, and possibly winemaking; Ø In the service sector: tourism (especially recreational, health and culinary) and music (the prospect of turning the region into a world center of mugam music is quite realistic). Of great importance for post-conflict economic recovery is government support for the region’s competitive advantage sectors. In the agricultural sector, the main incentive measure is to transfer land parcels to returnees into private ownership free of charge.12 The government should support returnees’ farms, providing them with equipment, agricultural implements, livestock, seeds, fertilizers, fuel and other resources, and also with advisory services. This support could include such forms as government purchase guarantees for their products.13 Some sectors, such as horse breeding or carpet weaving, require specific forms of government support.

11 For detail, see: N. Muzaffarli, Reiting Azerbaidzhana v mezhdunarodnykh sravnitelnykh issledovaniakh, Kavkaz Publishers, Baku, 2006. 12 The possibility of land privatization in proper legal form even before the achievement of a political settlement should be studied separately. This action can have both positive effects (time saving, additional incentives to IDP repatriation, etc.) and negative effects (possible social tensions among IDPs even before repatriation), while such effects as rising public expectations about the resolution of the conflict may turn out to be either positive or negative, depending on how soon a political settlement is reached. 13 In Azerbaijan’s post-conflict areas, the stimulating role of such guarantees would mainly boil down to a psycho- logically comfortable environment for farmers, because the market of agricultural products it is planned to cultivate will be quite large. 20 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ø In the first case this implies direct government enterprise at the early stages of development, and Ø in the second, a lifting of all nontariff restrictions and maximum simplification of export rules.14 Private company motivation. The private sector should be drawn into virtually all types of rehabilitation work, and in such sectors as agriculture, trade and services it should dominate. In sectors where the amount of start-up capital is relatively small and is coupled with quick returns, there is no need for special incentive mechanisms to attract private sector entities. Such mechanisms will be necessary to stimulate more capital-intensive and less profitable types of business. There are several universal (non-sectoral) mechanisms capable of increasing the motivation of private enterprises. n First, provision of financial assistance on a grant basis (government grants only in cases where private enterprises implement particularly important low-margin projects mainly at the initial stages of post-conflict rehabilitation). Apart from ensuring full transparency, it is necessary to set a limit on the size of the grant that can be awarded to one enterprise. n Second, fiscal benefits. In particular, Azerbaijan has gained significant experience in providing tax breaks to private agricultural enterprises, including tax holidays and preferential prices. In the post-conflict zone, such benefits can and should be granted to enterprises in all sectors of the economy. But the government should set the time interval for fiscal benefits in advance and make an announcement to that effect. n Third, soft loans. In Azerbaijan, institutional problems in this area can be regarded as solved: the Enterprise Development Fund and the State Investment Company have already financed hundreds of commercial projects and have gained sufficient experience. An important role in providing soft loans can also be played by national commercial banks, for which purpose it is necessary to open a special credit line at the Central Bank using, along with its own resources, funds received by the state from IFIs and partly from foreign donors. In granting benefits and where tender offers are identical, preference should be given to enterprises owned by returnees and then to enterprises already implementing large investment projects in post-conflict areas, followed by enterprises that had close cooperation and partnership relations with the region in the pre-conflict period. Foreign investors can in principle take part in all types of rehabilitation work, but in practice the political risks related to mini projects will probably prove to be unacceptable. That is why foreign companies can be expected to show the greatest interest in projects directly sponsored or guaranteed by the state, namely, in the reconstruction of certain life support systems (housing stock, water supply and energy systems), transport and production infrastructure, and the creation of new telecommunications systems. During the preparatory period, the government has to develop its own plan of cooperation with foreign investors in the field of post-conflict rehabilitation. The plan should determine the sectors that are potentially most attractive to foreign investors; it should contain a list of projects in which foreign investors will be invited to take part and their technical and cost parameters; rank these projects by the level of their priority for the country from the perspective of the earliest possible and effective performance of reconstruction works; and provide for additional incentives in order to attract foreign investors.

14 Additional incentives for carpet exports to international markets could be provided, in particular, by a system of bonuses for earnings credited to special export accounts of companies in this industry. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Post-Conflict Reconstruction inancing

The main financial burden of post-conflict reconstruction, as noted above, is borne by the state. There are two kinds of public financing of post-conflict rehabilitation. The first kind is indirect financing, which implies the provision of various benefits and preferences, especially fiscal and price benefits, to foreign and local (state and private) companies. Cost estimates here are quite difficult to make without a knowledge of the actual content of the benefits established by law. Direct public investment in post-conflict rehabilitation is more predictable. Nevertheless, projections of public funds required to reconstruct post-conflict areas in Azerbaijan differ widely: from $20 billion to $60 billion. The final figure depends on the basic assumptions and methodology of research, on the formulation of the ultimate goals of post-conflict rehabilitation, on the economic forecasts (including inflation forecasts) used in such calculations, and on a number of other factors. Our investigation, based on the parameters given in this article, shows that total requirements for centralized public investment in post-conflict reconstruction in Azerbaijan (adjusted for inflation) could reach AZN 22.7 billion or $28.4 billion, excluding border and other security costs and decon- tamination (including mine clearing) costs. Moreover, this amount includes expenditures only in the so-called initial period of rehabilitation work. Out of the total amount of the state’s potential financial expenditures, 56.4% will go into the rehabilitation and reconstruction of life support systems, 41.0% into infrastructure, and 2.6% into the creation and development of enterprises with direct public investment. It should be borne in mind that a significant part of investment in life support systems and infrastructure facilities is simultaneously investment in production infrastructure. Any grouping of industries and sectors subject to reconstruction is naturally tentative. For example, matters of repatriation and housing construction Ø can be included in the first group, restoration of energy, water and Ø gas supply in the second group, infrastructure of local civil administration, telecommunications network and Ø social facilities in the third group, and Ø the economy and transport in the fourth group. Expenditures calculated based on these groups and their changes over the years15 are shown in the chart. An increase in required public investment over time is a common feature of most post-conflict rehabilitation spheres. n The first reason is associated with a gradual increase in the number of returnees. n The second is a step-by-step expansion of the scope of rehabilitation work as new areas and population centers are drawn into the orbit of reconstruction. And the third reason is related to inflation. In some cases, inflation is a more important contributor to the increase in rehabilitation expenditures than other factors. An analysis of Azerbaijan’s economic development prospects for the next 10-15 years shows that despite the colossal resource intensity of post-conflict reconstruction the country is quite capable of implementing it. In recent years, the Azerbaijan economy has demonstrated unprecedented growth

15 Each of the conventional periods mentioned above is equated with a year. 22 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Diagram

Direct Public Spending on Various Spheres of Rehabilitation Work by Year (adjusted for inflation, AZN million)

6,500 6,000 Economy and 5,500 transport 5,000 Civil administration, 4,500 telecommunications 4,000 and social facilities 3,500 Energy, water and 3,000 gas supply 2,500 2,000 Repatriation and 1,500 housing 1,000 500 0 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year rates, while the country’s strategic foreign exchange reserves ($18.2 billion as of 1 January, 2009) are already close to 40% of GDP. It is safe to say that as the global financial and economic crisis subsides, the increase in the country’s international reserves will accelerate. There are at least two other factors that will have a beneficial effect on Azerbaijan’s capacity to invest in post-conflict rehabilitation. The first of these is associated with the peculiarities of the world financial crisis, which will be accompanied by an increase in uncommitted funds accumulated by banks. In their desire to revive the economy by financial infusions, most governments and central banks in the world, including Azerbaijan, issue additional credit resources while lowering discount rates or reduce the amount of bank liabilities, including required reserves. These and other similar measures will expand lending opportunities for commercial banks. However, the latter try to limit their lending in view of the crisis-generated increase in credit risk. This is why we can assume that when the global economic recession eases and the world economy enters the phase of post-crisis depression, most of the world’s “surviving” financial institutions will start looking for areas of safe and effective investment of their resources. The second factor is that the mechanisms of effective cooperation between Azerbaijan and international financial institutions have been fully formed in recent years. Azerbaijan has every reason to count on material and organizational support from IFIs, foreign states and donor organizations in post-conflict reconstruction.

Risk Management

Large-scale programs providing for the use of significant financial resources within a short period, especially those geared to overcome the consequences of armed conflicts, are associated Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION with certain risks. Risks threatening post-conflict reconstruction can be either external or inherent in its very nature. Both kinds of risks can be either universal (i.e., characteristic of most similar programs) or specific (i.e., created by the peculiarities of the conflict and the post-conflict situation). External risks include, in the first place, the threat of renewed military action. An analysis of the ways to reduce this threat is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is obvious that in order to reduce this risk it would make sense to declare the post-conflict area a demilitarized zone, to draw a demarcation line that could be controlled by international peacekeeping forces, and to restore the regime of legitimate border controls along the border between the post-conflict area and neighboring states. It is important to arrange effective interaction between all forces whose mission is to ensure internal security in post-conflict areas (in the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, between Azer- baijani, Armenian and international forces). Some specific risks can be due to deficiencies in the political agreements governing the resolution of the conflict. They can arise, in particular, where the status of transport corridors between countries and parts of post-conflict areas is unequal. For example, it is important that the so-called Lachin Corridor connecting Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, on the one hand, and the Megri Corridor connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakh- chivan autonomy, on the other, should have roughly identical status. If a special operating regime is established for the Lachin Corridor (as a condition of security for the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh) while the Megri Corridor remains closed, thereby dooming Nakhchivan to a further transport blockade, proper regional (pan-Caucasian) integration will be impossible. This would not only complicate post-conflict rehabilitation, but would rule out the possibility of restoring interstate transport communications in the region, which would be at variance with the interests, in the first place, of Armenia itself, depriving it of the opportunity to take part in international projects in the field of transcontinental communications. There is also a special group of risks that can be generated by unresolved intercommunal contradictions. It is known, for example, that during the years of hostilities and in the subsequent period the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of both highland and lowland Karabakh have become almost entirely isolated from each other. This circumstance will significantly complicate post-conflict reconstruction, because each new step will have to be balanced from a communal standpoint as well. Neither community should feel that its rights have been infringed in the process of recreating infrastructure networks, routing roads, distributing energy supplies, etc. Many of the region’s inhabitants will regard reconstruction works as a form of direct assistance to the population, and such assistance should be distributed equitably. There is also a risk of sabotage and provocations by extremists and local criminal groups. Such attempts should be ruthlessly suppressed by joint police forces, and this in conditions of full transparency that would rule out the possibility of interpreting such punitive measures as actions directed against one of the communities. The most dangerous universal internal risk is possible corruption in the use of funds, regardless of whether they are allocated by the government or provided by international organizations, and also of who precisely misappropriates the funds (local or foreign participants in post- conflict reconstruction). In order to reduce this risk it is necessary to take all the traditionally applied anti-corruption measures. During post-conflict rehabilitation, the central place among them belongs to: (a) close coordination of the activities of the government, the private sector, civil society and foreign partners, and (b) measures to ensure the maximum possible transparency of financial interactions, especially in holding tenders, most of which should be open. 24 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Unconventional measures should also be used. One of these could be the attraction of foreign companies or organizations to take part in various projects as operators or “co-operators.”16 This form is particularly relevant in cases where the project is wholly or partly financed from foreign sources. In this field, Azerbaijan could draw on its own experience (with certain modifications) gained in managing oil contracts. A typical risk for large-scale government programs is over-bureaucratization of management decision making. It is expressed in interagency barriers, the predominance of sectoral interests, red tape, etc., all of which may not only slow down the reconstruction works, but also reduce their efficiency. It is important to bear in mind that bureaucratization can also be caused by positive aspira- tions, such as the government’s desire to insure itself against ineffective decisions and processes. That is why one of the methods to mitigate this risk is project management jointly with international organizations, because this reduces the possibility of ineffective management and partially relieves the government of the duty to coordinate decisions. Ultimately, it is necessary to achieve an optimal balance between rapid adoption of management decisions and guarantees of their required effectiveness. Special mention should be made of the possible risk of a shortage of managers, highly skilled management personnel capable of acting in extreme situations. In order to cover this shortage, a purposeful effort should be made already at the stage of preliminary measures: by training specialists in the field of strategic spatial planning and nationwide reconstruction management, by organizing short and medium-term courses and training sessions for officials and staff of local civil administration bodies of the occupied areas, and also for technical and engineering personnel. The most effective way to resolve such problems is to set up a special agency as noted above, tentatively, a Ministry for Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. The risk of a shortage of funds appears to be less relevant to Azerbaijan than to many other countries in view of its significant international reserves. Another important point is that many states, interstate associations and IFIs have expressed their readiness to support post-conflict rehabilitation after the achievement of a political agreement. This risk can be reduced by cost minimization and correct planning of rehabilitation works, including their roughly even time distribution. At the same time, it is necessary to continue consultations with IFIs, foreign donor organizations and potential foreign investors on their participation in financing post-conflict reconstruction. The possibilities for local private sector participation in reconstruction works should be explored as well. In particular, the government could conclude a set of agreements with local businessmen in the form of protocols of intent. A fairly serious risk is associated with faster inflation as an inevitable result of the inflow of large additional financial resources into the economy. The measures required to reduce this risk should be determined immediately before the start of rehabilitation, with due regard for the adjusted amount of funds required for reconstruction, the total amount of money in circulation at that time, the rate of inflation, and external economic factors. All the external and internal risks described above are manageable, which should be seen as an argument in favor of an early start on post-conflict rehabilitation.

B y W a y o f C o n c l u s i o n

Post-conflict reconstruction in a relatively short time, for all its complexity and colossal resource intensity, is a perfectly feasible task for modern society. Azerbaijan has the necessary and

16 One could suggest several ways of addressing this problem. First, the government can simply appoint a particular international organization as the operator of a particular project. Second, the government and its foreign partner (partners) can set up a special joint venture that will subsequently be entrusted with managing a particular project (projects). Third, the government can include representatives of its foreign partners in project steering committees. Finally, it is also possible to set up international steering committees for rehabilitating territorial units (such as districts). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sufficient intellectual and economic potential to quickly reconstruct its post-conflict areas, with active support from the international community, after the achievement of a political agreement on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This will make it possible to reintegrate the occupied areas into the legitimate political and economic space, while their economic revival will play a very positive role in improving the well-being of all citizens in the region regardless of their ethnic origin, and also in the overall socioeconomic development of the Central Caucasus.

Kenan ALLAHVERDIEV

Ph.D. (Philos.), associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Political Administration, Academy of State Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

HOW THE KARABAKH CON LICT ITS THE NEW GREAT GAME CONTEXT

Abstract

he author has selected a novel and litical parlance. The forces involved in it are T most promising approach to the Na- seeking effective control over a vast territo- gorno-Karabakh conflict between Azer- ry stretching from the Middle East to the baijan and Armenia, the oldest and hard- Central Eurasian fringes by changing the ge- est-to-resolve of the Caucasian “frozen” con- opolitical balance of forces together with the flicts. He has placed it into the New Great political and geographic borders of the states Game context, a recent coinage of geopo- inside this vast macroregion.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The August 2008 war in Georgia, when everyone could see Russian tanks moving across Geor- gian territory on their TV screens, revived the old fears of the Cold War period and created a wave of interest in all sorts of conceptions and analytical models that systematized in one way or another a new round of geopolitical confrontation involving the global and regional actors. The academic community has not yet reached an agreement on many related issues: Is the unfolding geopolitical confrontation a new one; which forces are involved in it and what strategic plans are they nurturing and what outcomes are they expecting; how will this affect the Greater Caucasus and the so-called frozen conflicts? Below is my humble contribution to the academic community’s all-out effort. 26 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The New Great Game: The 21st Century Scenarios

The Great Game of the 19th century has been and remains one of the pet subjects in the history and theory of geopolitical modeling. The term Rudyard Kipling introduced into circulation in his novel Kim published in 1901 has been used by political1 and historical2 writers to describe the nearly 100-year-long (1813-1907) tug-of-war between the British and Russian empires over domination in Central Asia. According to Peter Hopkirk, a recognized authority on the subject, the Great Game was kept alive by the fact that “for four centuries the Russian Empire has been steadily expanding at the rate of some 55 square miles a day, or around 20,000 square miles a year. At the beginning of the 19th century, more than 2,000 miles separated the British and Russian empires in Asia. By the end of it this had shrunk to a few hundred and in parts of the Pamir region to less than twenty.”3 Each of the two powers pursued its own geopolitical aims: Russia was seeking access to the warm seas of the South, India, and the Indian Ocean while Britain spared no effort to keep Russia away. The Caucasian wars, the Crimean War, and the wars Russia waged against Turkey and Iran were fought with these geopolitical aims in view.4 The geopolitical landslides of the turn of the century and the crescent which ran across Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and which continued radiating tension revived an interest in the Great Game in its modified form, viz. the New Great Game.5 In the absence of direct official or expanded statements, we must rely on foreign6 and Russian7 authors whose works supply an idea about the general outline of the notorious New Great Game. It is wrong, however, to identify the New Great Game with its historical archetype, from which it differs on several key points (see Table 1). While there were no disagreements over the geographic location of the Great Game of the 19th century, opinions differ about the geographic area of the New Great Game of the 21st century. In fact, there several distinctive approaches: n First, the classical approach, according to which the geographical area remained the same, namely, Central Asia, the oil- and gas-rich territory thrown between Russia and China. It is the home of five independent states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) with their particular problems and interests.8 The list of participants has

1 See, for example: Sh. Brysac, K. Meyer, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Asia, Counterpoint, Washington, D.C., 1999; M. Edwards, “The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder,” Central Asian Survey, No. 22 (1), March 2003, pp. 83-103; G. Wheatcroft, “After the Great Game,” available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/books/after-the-great-game.html?pagewanted=2], 11 May, 2003, and others. 2 See: P. Hopkirk, Bolshaia igra protiv Rossii. Aziatskiy sindrom (The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia), RIPOL KLASSIK, Moscow, 2004; V.V. Degoev, Bolshaia igra an Kavkaze: istoria i sovremennost, 2nd edition, Moscow, 2003. 3 P. Hopkirk, op. cit., p. 32. 4 See: A. Dugin, “Kavkazskiy vyzov,” available at [http://www.arctogaia.com/public/vtor11.htm]. 5 See: P. Hopkirk, op. cit., p. 18. 6 See: D.L. Smith, “Central Asia: A New Great Game?” available at [http://www.milnet.com/pentagon/centasia/ cenasap1.htm], 17 June, 1996; M.D. Nazemroaya, “The ‘Great Game’ Enters the Mediterranean: Gas, Oil, War, and Geo- Politics,” available at [http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6862], 14 October, 2007; Dr. Makni, The New Great Game: Oil and Gas Politics in Central Eurasia, Raider Publishing International, 2008, etc. 7 See: A. Dugin, “Bolshaia igra za Kavkaz,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1079420460], 16 March, 2004; M. Leontiev, Bolshaia igra, AST Publishers, Moscow; Aprel-Stb, St. Perersburg, 2008, and others. 8 This approach is detailed in: R. Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 45, Issue 2, January 2003, pp. 187-204, available at [http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~ Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1

Great Game New Great Game

The sides involved

The Russian and British empires Russia, U.S., Euro-Atlantic bloc

Aims

Regional domination Global domination in Central Asia in Central Eurasia

Nature

Offensive—Russia Offensive—U.S., Euro-Atlantic bloc Defensive—Britain Defensive—Russia

Discontinued because of

German threat Chinese threat?

The events that predated discontinuation

a) The world economic crisis of Hypothetically: 1900-1903 a) The global economic crisis of 2008-? b) The imperialist wars of the turn b) Chain of local wars of the 20th century (“struggle against international terrorism”)

The events that postdated the Game

World War I ??!!

changed: the U.S. replaced the British Empire while a new regional player, China, has moved to the fore. n Second, the neo-classical approach that looks at Afghanistan, western China, the Cas- pian, and the Caucasus as part of Central Asia. Lutz Kleveman, for example, argues that America, China, Russia, and Iran are all involved in the New Great Game for the sake of control over the region and its fabulous oil and gas reserves.9 Iran is seen as an independent actor. n Third, the polycentric approach that regards the New Great Game as a multi-board chess game of sorts in Eurasia: Central Asia, the Greater Caucasus, and the Middle East. The recent developments have demonstrated that the “chessboards” (Central Asian, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern) are moving into the international limelight depending on the geopolitical circumstances. Consequently, the number and composition of the sides involved greatly vary. Zbigniew Brzezinski writes about what he calls the Eurasian Balkans, which include content=a780011883~db=all~order=page]; R. Mullerson, Central Asia: A Chessboard and Player in the New Great Game, Columbia University Press, 2007; “Novaya Bolshaia igra: mezhdunarodnaia borba za vliianie v Tsentralnoy Azii,” available at [http://iimp.kz/default.aspx?article_id=781], and others. 9 See: L. Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, Grove Press, New York, 2004. 28 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

the Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uz- bekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan) and, potentially, Turkey and Iran.10 n Fourth, the potamic approach, based on what Halford Mackinder said about the “marine pentagon” (the space between the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, and Red seas and the Persian Gulf).11 There is a commonly shared conviction that control over the Land of Five Seas (with its nearly 70 percent of the world’s explored oil reserves and over 40 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves) is “the key for those seeking territorial and economic control over Eur- asia” (the Heartland, according to the traditional geopolitical theory) and ensures domination over the entire planet.”12 This classification, while including all the key aspects of the theoretical approaches now in circulation in the political sphere, should be regarded as relative to a certain extent, which is explained not so much by the great variety of research paradigms as by the changing tactics employed to achieve the immutable strategic aim. To illustrate the above let me offer you a widely promoted analytical model of the New Middle East supplied by the George W. Bush Administration. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice first used the term in June 2006.13 The idea can be described as liberating the “constructive chaos” forces and changing the state borders across the Greater Middle East—from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Afghanistan and Pa- kistan. In the same year, Lieutenant Colonel of the U.S. Army Ralph Peters presented his ideas about redrawing borders and regime changes across the vast region to the NATO Defense College in the form of a map of the New Middle East. According to the American lieutenant colonel, the borders of the majority of the Middle Eastern states (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) as well as two Cauca- sian states (Azerbaijan and Armenia) should be changed. The classical Great Game zone (the post- Soviet Central Asian republics) will remain unscathed. The very idea of border change is presented as a “humanist” and “moral” attempt to serve the interests of the Middle Eastern nations and their neighbors. Ralph Peters has offered the following comment: “International borders are never completely just. But the degree of injustice they inflict upon those whom frontiers force together or separate makes an enormous difference — often the difference between freedom and oppression, tolerance and atrocity, the rule of law and terrorism, or even peace and war.”14 And further: “Accepting that international statecraft has never developed effective tools—short of war—for readjusting faulty borders, a mental effort to grasp the Middle East’s ‘organic’ frontiers nonetheless helps us understand the extent of the difficulties we face and will continue to face. We are dealing with colossal, man-made deformities that will not stop generating hatred and violence until they are corrected.”15

10 See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard (American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives), Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 125. 11 For more detail, see: V. Maximenko, “Central Asia and the Caucasus: Geopolitical Entity Explained,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3, 2000, available at [http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-09-2000/08.Maksimen.shtml]. 12 M. Andalasav, “Kavkaz v epokhu globalnykh geopoliticheskikh transformatsiy,” available at [http://www. geopolitics.ru/common/publics/114.htm]. 13 Condoleezza Rice: “What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing—the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one” (Special Briefing on the Travel to the Middle East and Europe of Secretary Condoleezza Rice, U.S. State Depart- ment, Washington, D.C., 21 July, 2006, available at [http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/syria/State/69331.pdf]). 14 Quoted from: M.D. Nazemroaya, “Plans for Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a ‘New Middle East’,” available at [www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=NAZ20061116&articleId=3882]. 15 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Ralph Peters’ Map of the New Middle East16

3 3 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1

1 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 3

3 2 1

3 2 2 1 2

3 3 1 1 — Countries gaining territory 2 — Countries losing territory 3 3 — Countries unchanged

So far the new American administration has not commented on the New Great Game project: it neither confirmed nor rejected it yet “new constructive solutions” for the Caucasian and Near and Middle Eastern problems are found among the new officially proclaimed foreign policy priorities. Judging by the U.S.-encouraged ongoing Turkish-Armenian political dialog, the course aimed at defrosting the conflicts in the Caucasus, greater U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, and diplomatic involvement around Iran show that these plans might become a reality. It should be said in all justice that there are those who take the New Great Game for a product of the feverish imagination of certain political scientists: “Although Russia, China, and the United States substantially affect regional security issues, they cannot dictate outcomes the way imperial governments frequently did a century ago. Concerns about a renewed great game are thus exagger- ated.”17 The above, however, leaves little space for optimistic statements about the phantom nature of the New Great Game. It seems that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s measured phrase: “Today Russia is a global player” should remove all doubts.18 All of the above is of special importance: the place of the Caucasian region and its sub-regions will depend on the dominant type of real politics within the New Great Game.

16 R. Peters, “Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look,” Armed Forces Journal (AFJ), June 2006, available at [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899]. 17 R. Weitz, “Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia,” The Washington Quarterly, No. 29 (3), Summer 2006, p. 156 (see also: A. Lieven, “The (Not So) Great Game,” The National Interest, No. 22 (58), Winter 1999/2000, pp. 69-80. 18 [http://www.newsru.com/russia/07jun2008/medved.html], 7 June, 2008. 30 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The New Great Game in the Caucasus: Geopolitical Configuration

Having accepted the fact that the 21st-century New Great Game is unfolding before us, we should identify, with a great degree of accuracy, the Caucasus’ place in it. There are several paradigms to rely upon. n First, passive involvement, which says that the Caucasus has no geopolitical activity of its own and can, therefore, be described as a zone of the global thalassic-telluric confrontation. According to The Financial Times analysts, the Caucasus is an area where the next chapter of the Great Game will be enacted.19 Alexander Dugin of Russia is of a similar opinion: “Any discussion of the Caucasian region in the geopolitical system of coordinates presupposes that the highly complex real balance of regional forces can be reduced to global geopolitical dualism and to the clash between the geopolitical interests of Russia and the United States (or the NATO countries), which always and everywhere remain opposite.”20 Frederick Starr and Svante Cornell of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University suggest “conceptualizing the Caucasus in the framework of a greater Black Sea Region:” “Viewing the entire Caucasus within the prism of a greater Black Sea region makes sense politically as well as economically… In this context, the Caucasus is a discernible geographical entity forming an important eastern pillar in the Black Sea region, and hence a gateway to both Central Asia and Iran for the EU.”21 The author of the following seems to be indulging in an extremely chauvinistic form of the passive involvement paradigm: “Never in history did the Southern Caucasus play an independent geopolitical role. Its choice was limited to outside domination. Under the northern power (Russia) the Transcaucasian countries were invariably much better protected against any threats than when depending on other neighbors.”22 n Second, the active involvement paradigm, according to which the Caucasus possesses geopolitical activity of its own and, together with the Caspian, can be described as an independent entity of world geopolitics.23 In view of the Caucasian-Caspian region’s resource and pipeline potential it can be seen as the central segment on the new Great Game maps.24 Bay Fang from America has written: “Today, there is a new map of Central Asia … known as ‘hub and spokes.’ The hub is the Caspian Sea and the spokes are the multiple pipelines emanating from it, representing potential export routes for the vast oil and gas resources that lie beneath.”25 It should be said that the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Caucasus’ commu-

19 See: I. Gorst, “Foreign Investment: Caucasus is Scene of New Chapter in the Great Game,” The Financial Times, 31 October, 2007. 20 A. Dugin, “Kavkazskiy vyzov.” 21 S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, “The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe,” Silk Road Paper, Washington, D.C., June, 2006, p. 73. 22 “Pokhishchenie Kavkaza,” available at [http://russianews.ru/newspaper/20/15923], 19 June 2008. 23 Substantiation of this can be found in K.S. Hajiev, Geopolitika Kavkaza, Moscow, 2003. 24 See: A. Cohen, “The New ‘Great Game’: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” available at [http:// www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/bg1065.cfm], 25 January, 1996; P. Escobar, “Oil Pipelines are the ‘New Great Game’,” available at [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/24/oil-pipelines-are-the-new_n_178715.html], 24 March, 2009. 25 B. Fang, “The Great Energy Game,” available at [http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060903/ 11game.htm]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

nication potential goes far beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus and should be discussed in the broader Eurasian context.26 n Third, the autonomy paradigm supported by the majority of experts in the Caucasus: its geopolitical importance is evident and autonomous within the New Great Game framework: Ø The Caucasus is a complicated system of relations among several states—Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Russia, and Iran. For this reason the region can be tentatively described as the Greater Indivisible Caucasus (GIC)27; Ø The Caucasus is a subject endowed with a historic mission, therefore “history has now given the countries of the Caucasus a chance to act as a bridge between North and South and as a major transportation and communication link between East and West”28; Ø The Caucasus is a geostratum where geopolitical projects are either synchronized or con- fronted29; etc. In anticipation of great geopolitical shifts in the Caucasus Rashad Rzakuliev put this approach in a nutshell by saying: “Even the most negative of all possible developments will not reduce us to humble bystanders at this geopolitical spectacle.”30 There are three common elements in the paradigms discussed above: Ø The central geographic location of the Caucasus (or the Caspian-Caucasian region) in the Great Land of Five Seas (or the Eurasian Balkans, a much more popular geopolitical formula); Ø An open and fierce confrontation of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian geopolitical strategies: “The Caucasus is developing into a very attractive ‘apple of geopolitical discord’ and a scene of confrontation between the West and Russia. The density of conflict seats and intensity of geopolitical confrontation have already made the Caucasus a zone of the highest risks”31; Ø Multi-variant combinations of interaction among the players in the New Great Game, both old and new.32 The instruments used to achieve the strategic games in the Caucasian states that form part of the New Great Game zone can be divided into three groups: Ø Military interference in the domestic affairs of these states realized either as “humanitarian intervention” or “a struggle against international terrorism;” Ø Secret scenarios realized to bring about regime change (so-called Color Revolutions); Ø The “permanent tension” strategy achieved by “freezing” and “defrosting” ethnopolitical conflicts.

26 See: A. Gut, “Geopoliticheskie realii Yuzhnogo Kavkaza,” available at [http://www.1news.az/analytics/ 20090316114544963.html], 16 March, 2009. 27 See: M. Anadalasav, op. cit. 28 E. Nuriyev, “The Ongoing Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin: Towards War or Peace?” available at [http://cns.miis.edu/cres/nuriyev.htm]. 29 See: V. Maisaia, “Kavkazskaia geostrata—sinkhronizatsia ili konfrontatsia geopoliticheskikh proektov: soprikos- novenie teory Attali i Huntingtona?,” available at [http://cge.evrazia.org/geopolitics_10.shtml]. 30 [http://www.1news.az/interview/20090428100219252.html], 28 April, 2009. 31 M. Andalasav, op. cit. 32 For more detail, see: E. Ismailov, E. Polukhov, “The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Players in Caucasian Politics,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (28), 2004, pp. 46-54. 32 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The above suggests that the New Great Game has reached an active stage in the Caucasus33 in the form of a manageable chaos scenario.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasian Geopolitical Landscape

The frozen conflicts have become points where the basic elements described above are applied and where the geopolitical interests of the global and regional centers of power meet. The question is: Can this statement be applied in its entirety to all the conflicts in the Caucasian region? The answer is negative: in the New Great Game context only the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be described, with good reason, as a geopolitical crossroads. n First, as distinct from the other Caucasian conflicts, this conflict is international: —Historically, it goes back to the Russian Empire’s geopolitical efforts to assert itself in the Caucasus and the Middle East. On the other hand, it is a fragment of sorts of the Great Game of the 19th century when the great powers made the so-called Armenian Question part of the international agenda to divide the weakened Ottoman Empire; —In the regional-political context it is a conflict between two entities of international law (Armenia and Azerbaijan); —In the political and legal context its negotiation format (the U.N. and the OSCE Minsk Group), the number and level of the sides involved, and the attempts to create a special legal case made the conflict international; all attempts to resolve it by means of international law stumble across internally contradictory basic legal principles. n Second, the geopolitical interests of the United States, Russia, the European Union, Turkey, and Iran clash there, which makes the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a special case. n Third, the international actors have transformed the conflict into a tool for putting pressure on Azerbaijan and Armenia to acquire economic, political, and military-strategic preferences and to manipulate their foreign policy courses. n Fourth, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can potentially trigger dramatic changes on the region’s political map: its defrosting in keeping with a negative scenario will produce a domino effect both inside the region and in the neighboring states. No matter how important, the other Caucasian conflicts will produce local effects which have already been shown by the Au- gust 2008 war in Georgia and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. The geopolitical context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is further confirmed by the fact that it has become an “Achilles’ heel” of independent Azerbaijan. In turn, Zbigniew Brzezinski has pointed out: “Azerbaijan’s vulnerability has wider regional implications because the country’s location makes it a geopolitical pivot. It can be described as the vitally important ‘cork’ controlling access to the ‘bottle’ that contains the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.”34

33 In 2005, researchers of the Stratfor Center still asked: The South Caucasus: A New “Great Game” Developing?, available at [http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/65069/south_caucasus_new_great_game_developing], 19 March, 2005. Today, after the events of 2008 and the first half of 2009, this is no longer a question. 34 Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 129. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The fact that Azerbaijan belongs to the Caspian region adds geopolitical importance to the conflict in the New Great Game context by linking it to such components of global geostrategy as “pipelines, tanker routes, petroleum consortiums, and contracts” as “the prizes of the new Great Game.”35 This became even more important when “the Caspian problem escalated beyond its regional confines to acquire global importance. Today we should work toward preventing a global conflict in the Caspian region which will inevitably suck in the littoral as well as all interested states, America and China among them. The stakes are too high since the Caspian is not merely one of the most promising sources of hydrocarbons—it is much more than that. The Caspian region is a large transportation crossroads of the Eurasian continent.”36 From this it follows that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be used as a fuse to blast two neighboring regions—the Caucasus and the Caspian. Their role in world politics does not exclude a global conflict. This means that, the outward complexity of the Caucasian-Caspian landscape notwithstanding, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be regarded as one of the tips of the New Great Game Cauca- sian pyramid (see Fig. 1).

igure 1

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Strategic priority of national security of the Azerbaijan Republic

Geopolitical pillar of The key segment of the Caucasian Region the Caspian Region

Regional Regional Production, export and security economic integration transit of energy resources

Europe’s Geopolitical and Turkey’s Iran’s U.S. interests geo-economic geopolitical and geopolitical and geostrategic of energy interests of economic economic interests security the RF interests interests

Configuration and Results of the New Great Game in Central Eurasia

35 Sh. Brysac & K. Meyer, op. cit., p. xxiii. 36 K. Syroezhkin, “Kak budem delit Kaspii?,” available at [http://www.continent.kz/2000/10/16.html]. 34 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In fact, the pyramid offers a strictly hierarchical cause-and-effect geopolitical chain: n The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as Azerbaijan’s “Achilles’ heel;” n Azerbaijan as the geopolitical axis of the Caucasian-Caspian region; n The current state and dynamics of Azerbaijan’s vulnerabilities and threats will inevitably damage the great and regional powers’ chances to realize their geopolitical interests in the region and affect the New Great Game configuration. This means that the sum total of the above not only indicates the central role of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict among all other conflicts in the Caucasus but also determines its geopolitical dominance in the New Great Game of the 21st century.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and the Current Regional Geopolitical Trends

Normally when looking at the vectors of geopolitical activity in the region experts in Caucasian studies tend to classify them according to the countries involved: American, Russian, Turkic, Iranian, etc. They hold forth about the vital interests of the geopolitical actors in the region and point to possible political strategies. Today much is being said about America’s geostrategy in the Caucasus,37 the Russian-Turkish gambit,38 Iran’s strategy,39 etc. Although academically justified this approach is hardly practicable when it come to short-term, to say nothing of long-term, forecasting. This probably explains why the analyst community is repeatedly caught unawares by the “hot” developments in the Caucasus, be it the August 2008 war in Geor- gia or the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement of 2009. This is caused, on the one hand, by the analysts’ efforts to visualize the vectors of the actors’ geopolitical activity in the absence of reliable information about their plans. While, on the other hand, they tend to analyze the vectors individually and outside the New Great Game context. No matter how kaleidoscopic, everything going on in the Caucasus belongs to the New Great Game algorithm and follows “unwritten rules” of sorts: n To prevent an alliance among the great powers (the American “nightmare,” according to the Halford Mackinder tradition, is a strategic alliance among the continental powers [Russia- Germany; Russia-China, etc.]), or between a great and regional power; n To avoid playing into the hands of actors of “secondary importance;” n To let the rival believe that it has scored a victory by giving it a chance to score a series of tactical victories that will inevitably end in a strategic disaster; n To keep the smaller regional states away from a stable alliance in order to prevent their transformation from an object of geopolitics into its subject;

37 See: C. Hallinan, “The Great Game in the Caucasus: Bad Moves by Uncle Sam,” available at [http://www. counterpunch.org/hallinan10072008.html]; “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests,” 14 January, 2009, available at [http://opencrs.com/document/RL30679/2009-01-14]. 38 See: M. Aydýn, “New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of Instability and Predicament,” available at [http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/sampapers/NewGeopoliticsofCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus]; F.W. Engdahl, “The Geopolitical Great Game: Turkey and Russia Moving Closer,” available at [http://www.globalresearch.ca/ index.php?context=va&aid=12466]. 39 See: K. Sadegh-Zadeh, “Iran’s Strategy in the South Caucasus,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2 (1), Winter 2008. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n To set the region’s parts against one another and draw them into opposing alliances; n To pursue active militarization of the region’s countries which, together with the contested ethnopolitical and state borders, creates a set of tools to be used by the key actors for their own geopolitical purposes; n To haggle behind closed doors while leaving the smaller countries (which have become pawns in the New Great Game) out in the cold. In fact, nothing much has changed since the Munich Deal of 1938 except the forms and geography of exchange; n To be actively involved in the so-called peace process in the form of: —Blocking the rival’s geopolitical strategy; —Weakening/dividing the local states by insisting on all sorts of projects (“a common state,” “peace for territories,” “partnership” programs, etc.), which perpetuates these countries’ dependency, indispensable for geopolitical redrawing of the region’s borders. To clarify the New Great Game’s rules (I have enumerated the most obvious ones which, however, might be interpreted differently), let me remind you that in the last decade we have seen numerous initiatives with high-sounding titles which mentioned “security,” “stability,” and “cooperation,” namely numerous regional security models such as “3 + 3”; “3 + 3 + 2”; and the latest Turkish initiative “The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.” They all failed not because the Caucasian peoples do not want peace and prosperity but because all of them were intended to promote the strategic interests of some of the actors (or their alliances) of the New Great Game in the Caucasus and were successfully blocked by their opponents. Frederick Starr, director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University (the U.S.), has offered an interesting and balanced opinion: “I am inclined to regard Turkey’s Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform as a good yet extremely naïve initiative. Everyone can see that it is seeking greater influence in the region. It wants to divide the Cauca- sus with Russia. On the other hand, if its initiative is realized Europe and America will be pushed out of the region, which is obviously impossible.”40 One wonders whether the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be settled in this fairly crowded geopolitical situation better described as a no-win situation. Until the balance of power is changed or starts changing discussions of all sorts of options—the use of force, compromises, interim, package, stage-by-stage, etc.—will never be crowned with practical results. It should be said that another regional center of power might come to the fore; for obvious reasons, Georgian, Azeri, and Armenian political analysts expect their countries to fill the niche. This was upturned in April 2009 when the United States, Turkey, and Armenia got together to create a road map that would exclude Azerbaijan from regional affairs. This was a moment of truth of sorts: Azerbaijan came forward as an independent regional actor to demonstrate that: n The thesis of its inability to ensure its interests and its security has become outdated; n The Azeri leaders and the public have no illusions about the true intentions of those involved in the New Great Game. They are no longer duped either by the talks about “strategic partnership” coming from the U.S. and Russia, or by the vows of “friendship” coming from Turkey and Iran, or by any other fine diplomatic wording. n Acting in the Real Politics style the country is actively using oil- and gas-pipeline diplomacy to promote its national interests; it selects its own partners and has been successfully preventing all the attempts of the Great Game actors to conspire behind its back. President of the

40 See: F. Starr, “Khrupkaia bezopasnost,” available at [http://www.regionplus.az/ru/articles/view/97], Issue No. 70. 36 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliev acted wisely when he declined the repeated invitations to meet U.S. President Obama and President of Turkey Erdoðan in Ankara (extended by Gül and Hilary Clinton) to pay a short visit to Moscow. It seems that a new—Azeri—geopolitical vector is developing before our very eyes which “is adding an edge to the game in the Southern Caucasus.”41 It is still too early to predict whether this trend will continue, whether it will upset the balance of power in the Caucasus, and how it will affect the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. It is abundantly clear today that the emerging vector has already forced the “old actors” to revise their plans and reduced the usefulness of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an instrument of pressure. Frederick Starr has the following to say on this score: “America has recognized that this instrument applied to compete with Russia proved useless. Russia is still relying on it to preserve its influence in the region, yet in the long-term perspective neither Russia nor any other state will profit from it. Nobody should exploit problems of others to secure their own aims. As for Europe, it has been tied down for a long time, together with Russia and the United States, in meaningless and useless talks on Karabakh.”42 The new “Azeri” vector in the New Great Game has led to the regrouping of forces and has changed the geopolitical configuration in the region. This has been amply shown by: n Stratfor, a private American intelligence center, which says that the threat of re-channeling Azeri fuel resources designed for Europe across Russia instead of Turkey has forced all actors, big and small, to revise their regional interests43; n The panicking and despondent Turkish analytical community, which is indulging in fan- tastic surmises and has even hypothesized that Azerbaijan is inciting Russia against another power44; n The refusal, to the great amazement of the expert community, of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to sign the Nabucco declaration put on the table at the Southern Corridor- New Silk Road Summit held in Prague on 8 May, 2009, thus greatly undermining its realization; n The statement issued by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Af- fairs Matthew Bryza to the effect that Washington would never allow “Russia to dominate in the energy projects of the Southern Caucasus and the adjacent territories,”45 which showed America’s concern and irritation. This changed the way the Karabakh conflict and its place in world politics were presented to the public: “Strange as it may seem, the future of Europe will not be sealed in Paris, Berlin, London, or Brussels but in the Southern Caucasus, a tiny territory crossed by several strategically important oil and gas pipelines, the only power outlets to Europe outside Russia’s control. Meanwhile those who control the energy supplies to Europe control the continent.”46 One feels that Sergey Markedonov of Russia was quite right when he wrote: “Whether or not the Caucasian front will be closed depends on the ability of the main actors of the Great Game in the Cau-

41 M. Chelikpala, “Igra v regione Yuzhnogo Kavkaza stanovitsia vse bolee intriguiushchey,” available at [http:// www.1news.az/politics/20090508025030136.html], 8 May, 2009. 42 F. Starr, op. cit. 43 [http://www.1news.az/analytics/20090508051554145.html]. 44 See: S. Lachiner, “Rossia zamanivaet Azerbaidzhan v lovushku?,” available at [http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/ 248721.html], 25 April, 2009. 45 “SShA ne dopustiat ‘dominorovania’ Rossii v energeticheskikh proektakh v Zakavkazie,” available at [http:// lenta.ru/news/2009/05/11/domination], 11 May, 2009. 46 “Aliev i Sarkisian o chem.-to dogovorilis,” available at [http://www.zerkalo.az./rubric.php?id=41692], 8 May, 2009. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION casus to agree among themselves on the key security issues. Will they be able to stop throwing stones at each another in their glass houses? If not, the Caucasus will change Eurasia rather than vice versa.”47

C o n c l u s i o n

The academic community has accumulated a vast body of scholarly studies on the Caucasian conflicts; some of them are objective, other are biased; there are theoretical and applied studies, etc. Most of them look at the conflicts as either ethnopolitical (while ignoring their geopolitical context) or as produced by the clashing interests of the mighty of the earth. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is no exception. I have already written48 that it is rooted in the zigzags of the 19th-century geopolitical confrontation. Today, nearly two centuries later, the geopolitical pincers of the New Great Game keep the conflict in the confines of the “new world order” seen differently by different actors. This is a vicious circle of even fiercer conflicts, wars, and a struggle for re-division of the world. Prof. Porter of London University, who said that the Great Game would never end and was still going on, was quite right.49 Rudyard Kipling, who put the term into circulation in his novel Kim, was of the same opinion: “When everyone is dead the Great Game is finished. Not before.”

47 S. Markedonov, “Yuzhny Kavkaz: mnogougolnik interesov,” available at [http://www.apn.ru/publications/ article1406.htm], 23 May, 2005. 48 See: K. Allahverdiev, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Context of Retrospective Ethno-Geopolitics,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (55), 2009, pp. 63-74. 49 Quoted from: M. Leontiev, op. cit., p. 14.

Rustem DJANGUZHIN (ZHANGOZHA)

D.Sc. (Political Science), leading research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine).

CENTRAL ASIA: NEW GEOPOLITICAL ARCHITECTURE

Abstract

he author looks at the processes un- synergetic mechanisms that might awaken T derway in Central Asia (a region at the the local societies and their elites with a view stage of political, socioeconomic, and of regional integration as a necessary con- civilizational transformations) to identify the dition for region’s cultural-historical identity. 38 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I n t r o d u c t i o n

The systemic crisis aggravated by the forced transition from one political and socioeconomic system to its opposite creates turbulence that negatively affects the social and political processes in transition countries. The legal framework intended to regulate relations between the state and society as well as between social groups and individuals is beginning to falter. The Central Asian countries have reached the stage where the energy of social chaos can be subdued only by an idea embraced by the region’s majority and conducive to a qualitatively new historical and cultural development stage.

Central Asia: Historical Evolution of its Geopolitical Status

Today, the Central Asian region comprises five independent states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan). In Soviet times, Kazakhstan was mainly treated as part of Southern Siberia and, to a certain extent, of Western Altai; today, however, the country itself and the rest of the world associate it with Central Asia. It is the only country of the CIS southeastern region that underwent a significant population slump between early 1989 (the last Soviet population census) and early 2009: from 16.464 to 15.766 million. Today, however, the situation is much better than it was ten years ago (the population has grown by nearly one million). It should be taken into account, however, that Kazakhstan’s neighbors are demonstrating a spiral-shaped demographic growth.1 Prior to 1992 there were about 10.6 million Russians living in Central Asia; their social status suffered because of the massive outflow of the region’s Russian population driven away by the systemic economic crisis, its undermined domination with no prospect of restoration, and latent civil wars (which cropped up in Tajikistan). On the other hand, unexpected national sovereignty forced the national elites to build complicated multilevel state institutions, balance them out, and tune the administrative and legal systems, etc. The need to switch to a market economy with a qualitatively different infrastructure and social- political system made the task even harder. It is not my intention to provide a more detailed analysis of the above, which inevitably demands a wider data basis. I shall, therefore, limit myself to fairly obvious facts and start with an over- view of the Central Asian countries within my intended subject range. Tashkent and Ashghabad—the capitals of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan—have a centuries- long history behind them while Dushanbe in Tajikistan, Almaty in Kazakhstan,2 and Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan are the products of Soviet times set up to fix the ethnic and quasi-state identity of these national-state entities. Four famous historical cities of Central Asia—Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand—are found in Uzbekistan. One of the magnificent monuments of Central Asian architecture—the Khoja Ahmed Yasavi mausoleum—is in the city of Türkistan (Southern Kazakh- stan). They were the capitals of the nomads and great states of the past as well as centers of Islamic culture.

1 See: M. Salykzhanov, “Za proshedshee 20-letie naselenie Uzbekistana uvelichilos’ pochti na 8 mln., a Kazakh- stana—umenshilos’ pochti na 1 mln,” available at [http://inosmikzcul.canalblog.com/]. 2 Orenburg was the first capital of Kazakhstan; later this function belonged consecutively to Kzyl-Orda and Alma- Ata. Today, the capital of Kazakhstan is Astana. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Recently, attempts have been made, mainly by Western political scientists, to put a new geopolitical term “Greater Central Asia”3 into circulation. So far, it represents hypothetical rather than real geopolitical processes conducive to an integral sector of the Eurasian expanse. The new term, however, poses a question: Can Greater Central Asia be described as a region in its own right or is it an artificial speculative construct? This term is important for my present analysis. It is expedient to correlate the term “Greater Central Asia” with a specific geographical region and to identify the intellectual and practical implications and interpretations stemming from this definition. For a century and a half answers have been sought from the viewpoint of imperial expansion first of the Russian Empire and then of the Soviet Union. In the mid-19th century, Russian (and later Soviet) geographers and economists began calling this part of Eurasia Sredniaia Azia (Middle Asia). For this reason the rest of the world accepted a term fraught with the implication that the sub-region remained under Russia/Soviet control rather than describing its immanent geographical, economic, historical, and cultural features. Even though the term was universally accepted Russia and later the Soviet Union refused to accept the status quo. There was the disturbing conviction that Russia’s presence in Asia would remain crippled as long as Xinjiang and Afghanistan remained outside it. It is for this reason that the Soviet government repeatedly tried to set up a “special region of China” in the 1930s and 1960s by creating puppet regimes; it resorted to civilian and military measures to weaken Beijing’s grip on the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. In the 1960s, the citizens of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, ethnic Uighurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz, were granted Soviet citizenship on a great scale while on the other side of the border the Soviets set up a well-equipped military district (the Central Asian Military District—CAMD), the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground, several large airbases, and military strategic facilities along the border with Xinjiang. The intentions in relation to this part of Central Asia under Chinese jurisdiction were obviously serious. In Afghanistan the Soviet Union pursued similar aims. In 1973, when the Afghan monarchy fell, the Soviets invaded the country, destroyed its economy, and caused 2.5 million casualties among its civilian population; the highway and industrial infrastructure were completely ruined.4 Disintegration of the Soviet Union gave the region the opportunity to transform but the Central Asian geopolitical format remained the same. Indeed, the southern and eastern (formerly Soviet) borders of the now sovereign states remained closed for some time. After a while China opened its western borders on its own conditions. Beijing insisted on certain legal regulations in the newly created Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 1997), which prohibited the citizens of the member states from taking part in separatist propaganda in Xinjiang. China’s WTO membership was another incentive for it to open its eastern (Central Asian) borders. The southwestern Central Asian borders were opened, all of a sudden, thanks to the United States, which deposed the Taliban in Afghanistan. This created a chance, for the first time since the 1930s, to begin unhampered trade and information exchange across the previously sealed-off border and to reach Pakistan, India, and the coastal states of the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan. Even before that the presidents of the newly independent Central Asian states used the new term “Central Asia” (as opposed to Middle Asia of the Soviet times) to describe their region. Askar Akaev, the first president of Kyrgyzstan, who called his country “the Central Asian Switzerland,” was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the new term. One wonders: Central in relation to what? The im- poverished new national-state entities with their still precarious sovereignties preferred to be central rather than marginally middle.

3 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2006. 4 See: Doklad o razvitii cheloveka 2005, Ch. 5. Nasil’stvennyy konflikt, available at [http://www.un.org/russian/ esa/hdr/2005/hdr05_ru_chapter_5.pdf]. 40 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Meanwhile, the Western academic community tagged Central Asia as Central Eurasia. In the context of the revitalized Russian imperial idea, “Eurasia” as a geopolitical term revived the ideas of Russian imperialism and sequestered all West-related elements. How does the term “Greater Central Asia” relate to the labyrinth of definitions and connota- tions? This is another (on a par with the term “Central Eurasia”) attempt to move away from the narrow geographic definition offered by the Soviets. The term “Central Eurasia” proceeds from the fact that throughout two millennia Xinjiang and Afghanistan remained intrinsic parts and inalienable components of the cultural zone to which the five formerly Soviet republics also belong. The term is even wider than that: it can be expanded to cover Khorasan of Iran, the northern part of Pakistan, Mongolia, some of the Russian regions (Tatarstan), and even part of northern India (between Rajas- than and Agra). As distinct from the term “Central Eurasia,” it does not identify the region from the point of view of any external power or national ideology: it concentrates on the region’s geographical, cultural, and economic specifics and their potential key role in the region’s future. The Greater Central Asia super region is divided into three, very distinctive, zones: a steppe belt in the north (an area of horse based nomadic culture stretching from Mongolia to the Great Hungarian Plain and Lake Balaton); a desert to the south of the steppe belt that covers the territory between the Caspian and the Xinjiang’s eastern border (one of the most arid places on Earth); and a vast mountain zone of the Western Himalayas to the south of the desert with the Tien-Shan and Alatau mountain ranges stretching from the south to the north. One of them, the Karakorum mountain range, is the world’s highest if measured from its foot to its summit. These three zones were the homeland of people whose economic lifestyles differed greatly. Nomadic cattle-breeders (with the exception of the Pamir and Tien-Shan Kyrgyz who roamed up and down in the mountains) preferred horizontal forms of social organization. The land-tillers of the oases lived in densely populated cities and were hierarchically organized in full accordance with their complicated irrigation systems. The mountain dwellers, especially the Pamir people and Pashto, developed their local cultures with strong emphasis on the religious, ethno-cultural, and social-political unity that kept them apart from their neighbors’ alien cultures. The diverse geographical, political, cultural, and linguistic landscapes corresponding to the economic and cultural diversity of Greater Central Asia allow us to describe the region as a sum total of incompatible social, economic, cultural, and linguistic features. One thing, however, makes the region an integral geostrategic entity. I have in mind its natural resources and its geopolitical location between the important actors of international policy which border on it on all sides. The authors of The Central Caucasus: Essays on the Geopolitical Economy were quite right when they wrote: “The international experience of regional integration shows that countries with a dynamic production sector, the products of which were competitive on the world markets, were able to make full use of the potential of regional unions.”5 It is highly important to bear in mind (the quoted authors mention this as well) that the local specifics should be correlated according to the impact the strong neighbors (Russia, China, India, Iran, the Middle East, and Europe) have on the regional alliances. The balance and counterbalance of forces should be taken into account by all means: they may either help the region develop into a consistent and competitive partner of the international economic community or plunge it into a zone of turbulence and turn it into a marginal territory. What criteria should be used to identify Central Asia as a central or peripheral region? Such indicators are numerous yet it seems that the indicator associated with political control is the most promising one. The territory was frequently controlled by its neighbors, a circumstance that repeated itself throughout the region’s history. This means that the region’s own resources, irrespective of its geopolitical and economic assets, are not sufficient enough to reproduce the centripetal force.

5 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, op. cit., p. 48. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In this respect, Greater Central Asia is obviously found wanting: in the last two millennia no less than seven empires established their complete or partial control there: Persians, Ancient Greeks, Chi- nese, Mongols, British, and Russians. A closer look reveals another circumstance—success eluded them all. This means that the well-known “chessboard” metaphor fully applies here: the region is an area where the strategic interests of the key actors of world politics will clash.

Integration Ideas Revived

Throughout the centuries hundreds of madrasahs and Islamic colleges in Bukhara and Samar- kand attracted students from faraway countries such as Morocco and Indonesia. Muslim pilgrims are attracted to Bukhara as an important Islamic center that follows close on the heels of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. It should be said that today the borders of Turkestan (Maverannahr, Desht-i Kipchak at different periods) look more external rather than internal. It was back in the 1920s that attempts to set up a Turkestan Federation were cruelly suppressed by the Bolsheviks in the Kremlin,6 however the idea of regional integration remained alive. It was in the air as a romantic dream of the national, mainly humanitarian, intelligentsia. Today the idea of a Turkestan Federation (no matter how attractive) can hardly be realized: the fairly influential political structures inherited from Soviet times and the ruling elites developing autonomously in each of the countries have already affected the nations’ behavioral stereotypes and their national and psychological self-identity. The leaders and the national elites are hardly prepared to share the power they have learned to enjoy. Something has been done to bring about regional integration. Back in 1990, President of Ka- zakhstan Nazarbaev took the first and fairly encouraging steps in the right direction when the leaders of the five Central Asian republics met in Almaty. It was approximately at the same time that the heads of the people’s movements of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan met in the same city (then the capital of Kazakhstan) to resolve the Osh conflict of June 1990 between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Azerbaijan deemed it necessary to attend the second Central Asian summit held in Tashkent in the summer of 1991. The Turkestan Federation (or confederation) issue was not discussed; the sides limited themselves to signing several important interstate economic and cultural agreements. The idea of an interstate alliance of the Central Asian Turkic-speaking nations was discussed at the Almaty conference of the Association of the Turkic Nations in December 1991 and warmly accepted by the region’s national intelligentsias. The reality of the times, however, was obviously unfavorable: first, the subjective factor mentioned above encouraged centrifugal rather than centripetal sentiments among the ruling political elites. Second, there was an objective factor as well: fairly strong neighbors were closely watching regional developments. Russia in the north, China in the east, and the Muslim world in the south were determined to either prevent regional integration (Russia and China) or take part in it while promoting its interests (the Islamic world). The three closest southern neighbors—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan—resolutely moved ahead to the highly promising and capacious, even if poorly structuralized, Central Asian markets. Each of them was fully aware of the brilliant prospects for those who could extend their assistance to the “brothers liberated from the Soviet prison,” thus enabling them to count on a priority position in the development and joint possession of the region’s considerable raw material resources. This explains

6 See: Z.T. Validi, Vospominania. Bor’ba narodov Turkestana i drugikh vostochnykh musul’man-tiurkov za natsional’noe bytie i sokhranenie kul’tury, Kitab, Ufa, 1998. 42 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION their enthusiasm over the large-scale trans-Asian project for a railway and highway system suggested by President Nazarbaev and running along the Great Silk Road of antiquity. China concerned, with good reason, about the region’s possible “bad influence” on the Turkic speakers of Eastern Turkestan and unwilling to miss lucrative economic agreements with “the Central Asian Klondike,” stepped up its involvement in the region. Russia held a very special place at the “supply-and-demand fair:” having realized that the “Slavic alliance” remained a utopia and that it would not be welcome in Europe, it wanted to preserve at least its control over the former colonies. It should be said that there is a certain leeway: Russia is seen as a counterbalance to potentially threatening Chinese or Islamic expansion. Kyrgyzstan and to an even greater extent Tajikistan need Russia on their side in the face of Uzbekistan’s rapidly growing population, which might spread far and wide. Kazakhstan, where Russian speakers comprise nearly a half of its population, has no choice but to pursue a complementary policy. In short, the diverse political and economic interests of all those involved in the Central Asian intrigue will upset the region’s fragile dynamic balance. This means that in the foreseeable future the region might become the “Eurasian Balkans,”7 to borrow a phrase coined by Zbigniew Brze- zinski. There are other options: the region might develop into one of the global markets with large trans-national financial-industrial groups wielding real political power; or it might prefer to rely on its own social-political and cultural-historical resources to set up (or restore) a stable geostrategic regional entity. The former will give the local nations real (but not high) prosperity and stability. In return they will have to abandon, without regret and as promptly as possible, the hope of reviving their national languages and cultural identity as inalienable features of national self-identification. A global market presupposes cultural and linguistic uniformity for the sake of better communication, information exchange, and sustainable coordination. This fully applies to the workforce, engineers, and all the other structures involved in the production, forwarding, and sale of products, as well as to the huge human resources that might be needed. This means that as components of the global markets the Central Asian countries will lose their opportunity for historical and national-cultural development; this is not a hypothesis—this is a mid- term prospect. The other option—a new regional geostrategic entity—suggests a different version of national- state development. It should be said that the national-state sovereignties and the fairly painful death of economic ties and the common information and communication expanse does not mean polarization of the contacts among the new states. This was the collapse of the Bolshevist idea of “the proletariat without homeland or nation” and the Leninist national policy stemming from it, which, in fact, destroyed the multi-level political and socioeconomic pyramid of the “country of triumphant socialism.” At all times the Turkic-speaking Soviet nations have been closely following the developments in the Turkic-speaking world beyond the Soviet borders. The Turkic speakers, who have lived since time immemorial in the Great Steppe Belt (stretching from the Sayano-Altai Upland and Yakutia to the Northern and Central Caucasus, the Crimea, and the Balkans), are aware, even if subconsciously, of their interests when the formerly united state is divided. This creates an interesting parallel with Halford Mackinder’s generally accepted Heartland (also known as Pivot Area) theory and the transnational projects underway today: Partnership for Peace, TRACECA, GUAM, etc. The parallels are mainly superficial since today integration is contemplated in a different historical context.

7 For more detail, see: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, pp. 123-150. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Fabrizio Vielmini of France has written: “It is time to understand Mackinder by turning his conclusions upside down … to highlight the positive element of the potential of land power and the role of railroads (the transport and communication infrastructure in terms of today’s realities.—R.D.) for developing Inner Asian lands. It [this theory] could be then used to build [the] Eurasian cooperation.”8 Not all analysts, however, agree with this. Levent Hekimoglu of Canada is very skeptical about the region’s hydrocarbon reserves and the future of ferrous and non-ferrous ore mining in Kaza- khstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan mainly because of the transportation costs: “Suffer- ing from the curse of inaccessibility, Central Asia resembles more a cul-de-sac in a globalizing world.”9 He seems to be unaware of the fact that a full-scale integration model might transform the region into a self-sufficient geostrategic entity. Any mention of Mackinder’s theory in the new context should be justified by its correspondence to the researcher’s intentions. Nick Megoran of the U.K. has pointed out an important methodological aspect: “…when confronted with the use of Mackinder to analyze Central Asia, we should heed the key insight of critical geopolitics and always ask not only, ‘what does this tell us about Cen- tral Asia?, but, ‘how have citations of Mackinder’s theory been used to construct contemporary geopolitical narratives about Central Asia?’”10

External actors to Encourage Regional Cooperation

To effectively oppose the negative repercussions of globalization and avoid the prospect of becoming the world’s raw material periphery, the Central Asian countries should step up their regional cooperation efforts. In January 2007, speaking in Bangalore (India), WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy said in particular that bilateral agreements with economically strong powers would deprive many of the small weak developing countries of some of their negotiation levers and would undermine their positions, which might be stronger in the multisided context.11 In fact, the Central Asian countries should regard their cooperation and trade and economic integration as tools for protecting their interests. This approach and collective coordination of efforts leading to deeper regional integration largely depend on balanced regional policies, strategic planning, and adequate assessment of the pluses and minuses of globalization and regionalization and of the real and potential threats, challenges, and risks involved. In fact, the question is: Will the Central Asian countries survive as economic and political entities in their own right with the complete set of features associated with a full-fledged entity of cultural-historical evolution? In the context of the world financial crisis, which might move economic power elsewhere, the region should remain economically competitive and politically stable, which calls for no mean skills in forecasting worldwide political and economic changes in the mid-term and long-term perspective in order to pursue its own strategy adjusted to the changing factors. In this context, integration can be

8 F. Vielmini, “The Influence of Mackinder’s Theory on Current U.S. Development in Eurasia: Problems and Per- spectives,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (34), 2005, pp. 64-65. 9 L. Hekimoglu, “Whither ‘Heartland’? Central Asia, Geography and Globalization,” Central Asia and the Cauca- sus, No. 4 (34), 2005, p. 76. 10 N. Megoran, “The Politics of Using Mackinder’s Geopolitics: The Example of Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (40), 2005, p. 102. 11 See: [http://www.exclusive.kz/?uin=1225698294&chapter=1225709768]. 44 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION regarded as an effective shield (or a cushion if the worst comes to the worst) against unfriendly economic, political, and ideological interventions of the world power centers. Regional cooperation is needed to adjust to the inevitable global climate change (that will affect Central Asia along with the rest of the globe)—this is a strategically important factor. In one of its reports the European Union warned about possible conflicts caused by water and food shortages. Analysts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London believe that in the near future a liter of drinking water will cost more than a liter of gasoline.12 This means that the waters coming down from the glaciers of Tien-Shan and Pamirs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will become more expensive than the oil of Kazakhstan or the gas of Turkmenistan. The Syr Darya and Naryn (two borderline rivers) issue should be resolved constructively. During the recent regional summit in Ashghabad, Uzbekistan dropped its claims against Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan relating to these two rivers.13 Earlier in Almaty, Uzbekistan insisted that the Syr Darya should be described in the protocol as a transborder river, something that Kyrgyzstan refused to accept. The transborder status allows the regional countries to join all sorts of international conventions: the countries on the upper reaches should coordinate their hydrotechnical projects with all the other users of the same river; the water is free for all users if the glaciers survive. According to the European Union, in the latter half of the 20th century Tajikistan lost one-third of its glaciers; in the last forty years, Kyr- gyzstan lost about 1000 mountain glaciers.14 The problem should be resolved strictly within the international legal context. Economic cooperation can be regarded as one of the internal factors of intensified regional interaction; it will promote integration seen as the cornerstone of more effective economic development and more efficient economic policies. According to Dosym Satpaev of Kazakhstan, who relies on information supplied by international analysis centers and UNDP data, lower selling costs could increase Kazakhstan’s GDP by 20 percent and Kyrgyzstan’s by 55 percent.15 Closer economic integration of the Central Asian countries will create vaster labor and consumer markets (55 million people) and attract more investments into industry and infrastructure. The situation is much more complicated than it might seem to the superficial observer: there are several internal (obvious and latent) factors. To achieve regional integration the Central Asian countries should go through several stages. n At the first stage, they will have to stand together to combat international terrorism and drug and arms trafficking, which will require cooperation with external military structures. The process is underway: Russia, China, and the United States are all involved through the regional CSTO, SCO, and NATO structures.16 n At the second stage, the Central Asian states should move ahead toward economic cooperation and address the region’s most urgent problems: delimitation of borders inside the region and its borders with the countries outside it; water resources; and the environment. The process is underway with no more or less tangible results. The EurAsEC and SCO are also involved. Transport and communication are another urgent issues. Turkmenistan with its long Caspian coastline is much less dependent on other countries for transportation than its completely landlocked neighbors. In order to move their raw materials and commodities abroad, first of all to Russia, they have to rely on Kazakhstan’s railways and highways. This gives it a chance to control freight flows through tariffs that partners might find unacceptable.

12 See: [http://forumkz.addr.com/article/news_i_03_07_01.htm]. 13 See: [http://www.mfa.kg/mews-of-mfa-kr/prezentovan-proekt-dokumenta-strategiya-es-dlya-ca-prioriteti-dlya- kirgizskoi-respubliki-2_kg.html]. 14 See: [http://www.ferghana.ru/news.php?id=8643&print=1]. 15 See: [http://www.vkurse.kz/main/publications/print:page,1,16384-stranam-centralnojj-azii-pomozhet.html]. 16 Ibid. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

More likely than not transportation tariffs are of a non-economic nature: they depend on the political situation and relations between Kazakhstan and the countries depending on its communication lines. Those experts are probably right who believe that at the initial stage the region could rely on NAFTA’s experience: it will need an umbrella structure with Kazakhstan playing the core role. The Mexican experience within NAFTA suggests that less developed Central Asian countries might also profit from branch association. The agreements binding on the region’s countries will serve as the basis for “soft” integration.17 An analogy between NAFTA and Central Asia is suggested by several common features: the three-level integration model with the most economically developed country being the system-forming core at the first level, countries with close relations with the core at the second level, and countries loosely connected with the core at the third level. Central Asia might borrow the Asian model of regional development known as the Flying Geese Paradigm. Like Japan in Asia, Kazakhstan could become the “lead goose” for its neighbors. This can be realized if, on the one hand, Kazakhstan emerges from the world economic crisis with flying colors and if, on the other, the Central Asian countries accept it as the locomotive of regional integration, which remains to be seen.

Regional Integration: Objective Conditions, Priorities, and Mechanisms

The strategy of Central Asian regional integration and its in-depth development calls for the following imperatives: 1. Closer economic and political cooperation should be accepted as an absolute priority for the Central Asian countries’ foreign policies. 2. Territories and borders should be accepted as immutable. 3. The countries should accept equality, voluntary participation, and mutual confidence as their main principles. 4. The post of presidential aide for integration should be instituted in each of the countries to treat the problem as a trend of state policy. 5. Workgroups for individual integration problems should be set up at corresponding ministries and departments to optimize personnel selection and organization. 6. All signed agreements relating to regional cooperation in all spheres should be unified. Regional integration should rely on integration alliances that could play independent roles in business corporations (state holdings in Kazakhstan) as the driving forces of integration processes and deal with the priority tasks of regional integration. These financial-industrial transnational alliances should have the right of legal initiative to revise the tariff and non-tariff rates of export-import operations and the time of their realization in view of the region’s land-locked nature. A water-energy consortium is developing into a must amid the rapidly deteriorating ecological situation. There are several positive trends that are coming slowly but surely to the fore: 1. Joint Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan-Tajikistan investment funds have been set up.

17 See: [http://www.vkurse.kz/main/publications/16384-stranam-centralnojj-azii-pomozhet.html]. 46 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

2. The Central Asian countries occupied a joint position at the gas-price talks with Gazprom of Russia. 3. There have been attempts (so far unsuccessful) to set up a water-energy consortium. 4. New integration regional initiatives (Union of Central Asian States) have been put forward. It should be said that the Central Asian countries are fairly slow when it comes to integration for non-economic and mainly subjective reasons typical of their domestic policies. By way of comment on the situation, UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis pointed out at the conference devoted to the Central Asia 2005 U.N. Human Development Report that the shared desire of the Central Asian countries to integrate into the world economy was complicated by the different requirements of each country.18 He was convinced that none of the region’s common strategies would bear fruit. Indeed, the raw-material nature of all the region’s countries makes them competitors rather than partners. More than that, integration is slowed down by the different political models, which makes some of them more closed to the world than others. The latent contradictions over borders and even bitterer disagreements over water resources create “tension zones” and destabilize the situation. The local political elites have not yet learned to associate the future of their own countries with the future of the region as a whole; there is “integration separatism” that has created numerous regional associations across the post-Soviet expanse with their own specific aims. One state may belong to several of them, which makes it hard for it to live up to the obligations in each of these structures. According to M. Roberts and P. Wehrheim, experts of the TACIS program, the multilateral trade agreements of the CIS countries abound in overlapping or contradictory provisions that (with the exception of the above-mentioned) are related to the unprotected nature of investments and property as a stumbling block on the road to economic integration, which becomes particularly obvious when there is a change in the political elite, as well as to the declining quality of human capital and the rising numbers of illegal migrants moving inside the region and going beyond it.19 This means that the political and socioeconomic processes in Central Asia, as well as the environmental situation there, have reached the threshold beyond which negative developments triggered by the pending problems may become irreversible.

C o n c l u s i o n

The expert assessments of the political, socioeconomic, and ecological situation in Central Asia, as well as the analysis of the mid- and long-term prospects suggest that there is no alternative to regional integration. To achieve it the region must acquire a civil society and a new generation of politicians ready to shoulder responsibility for the region’s future.

18 See, for example: [http://www.vkurse.kz/main/news/international_news/]; [http://www.ifws.ru/tag/5/]; [http:// www.ng.ru/tag/shos/]; [http://www.ng.ru/tag/shos/; http://www.ckgrt.ru/map/]; [http://www.mchs.gov.kz/news/detail. php?ID=2159]; [http://4cs.ru/experts/about/wp-id_454/]; [http://milpol.ru/data/2009/09_01/Bolshaya_igra_200]; [http:// www.russians.kz/politics/992896-centralnaja]. 19 [http://www.russians.kz/politics/992896-centralnaja]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Jason E. STRAKES

Ph.D. in international studies and political science at the School of Politics and Economics, Claremont Graduate University (Claremont, U.S.).

HIERARCHICAL GLOBAL STRUCTURES AND THEIR IN LUENCE ON AZERBAIJANI VIEWS O INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Abstract

hile much discussion of the inter- The present essay examines the position W national relations of the Caucasus of Azerbaijan within hierarchical global, re- region has relied upon traditional gional and local systemic structures as Western theoretical perspectives of world defined by the economic, political, demo- politics, the foreign and national security graphic and geographic characteristics of policies pursued by the Azerbaijan Repub- their constituent states. This incorporates lic are not closely reflective of their assump- both realist power-based and liberal insti- tions. Much emphasis has been placed in tution-based logics into a single theoretical recent years on anarchic competition for framework. It then presents a model for an- Caspian energy resources by external pow- alyzing their influence upon the perceptions ers. Yet post-Soviet nations such as Azer- of Azerbaijani political elites in defining baijan likely view these interactions from national interests as manifest in their for- the perspective of international hierarchy. eign and security policies.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Republic of Azerbaijan is a country that is often said to occupy a precarious position in the international system. n Surrounded by three former imperial cores and contemporary powers—Turkey, Iran and the Russian Federation—it is commonly viewed as being subject to multiple pressures of competition for strategic influence. n Secondly, it experienced a seven-year civil and international conflict involving the neighboring Republic of Armenia, constituting an internal (1988-1991) and an interstate (1992-1994) phase resulting in approximately 30,000 deaths and 650,000 internally displaced1 —a level of violence matched in the former Soviet space only by the case of Tajikistan. n Thirdly, the war resulted in the continued occupation of one-fifth of the national territory by the forces of Armenia and an unrecognized separatist government that receive both overt

1 See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. “Azerbaijan: IDPs Still Trapped in Poverty and Dependence,” 14 July, 2008, available at [http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/17D873 CC377B6A54802570B8005A73AE?OpenDocument]. 48 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(i.e., security assistance) and illicit (i.e., unauthorized arms transfers) military support from Moscow.2 The National Security Concept promulgated by President Ilham Aliev in May 2007 contains various statements regarding how the present government defines the national identity and interests of Azerbaijan.3 Yet, apart from its central emphasis on Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Kara- bakh, the document is distinguished by the manner in which it prioritizes interrelated domestic and external rather than state-based conventional threats. First, despite public declarations of support for the U.S. Global War on Terror, it does not specifically name the United States as an ally, instead presenting participation in post-9/11 military operations as a necessary aspect of responsible contribution to United Nations and Euro-Atlantic counter-terrorism and peacekeeping activities.4 At the same time, unlike the Republic of Georgia, whose doctrine directly intends membership in NATO and the European Union (EU), Azerbaijan’s partnership with these institutions constitutes cooperation for mutual benefit rather than full integration.5 In line with this definition, regional militarization and armament policies, rather than bilateral tensions with historic imperial powers (and Armenian patrons) such as Iran and Russia6 are identified as collective sources of potential insecurity.7 More significant challenges are posed by the “uncontrolled” territories and conflict zones comprising the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) (known by Karabakh Armenians as Artsakh) and by implication, the Caucasian de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The longstanding priority of the Aliev policy to preserve territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders8 is well represented.9 Yet, rather than the subversion of internal sovereignty by governments and armed forces which are unrecognized in international law and supported by foreign diplomatic and military intervention (as literally exemplified by the Russian counter-offensives in Georgia during August 2008), primary threats are said to emanate from havens for transborder organized crime and illicit trade.10 The serious political instability of the period from 1991 to 1995, characterized by foreign-sponsored antigovernment actions and secessionist movements, also remains a major contingen- cy.11 Finally, the definition of threats is extended to explicitly non-military concerns: extremism, lack of human capital, overdependence on external aid, political pressures on energy infrastructure, desta- bilization of the economy and environmental damage endanger Azerbaijan’s national security as

2 See: Sh. Abbasov, “Arms Scandal Stirs Suspicions of Moscow,” Eurasia Insight, 27 January, 2009; F. Ismail- zade, “Russian Arms to Armenia Could Change Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Orientation,” Central Asia-Caucasus Insti- tute Analyst, 28 January, 2009. 3 See: National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May, 2007, available at [http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Azerbaijan2007.pdf]. 4 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 5 See: E. Mammadyarov, “The Cooperation in the Framework of EAPC/PFP: Perspective of Azerbaijan,” CROSSROADS: The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 218-221; M. Malek, “NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks,” Connections Quarterly Journal, Summer Supplement 2008, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2008, p. 33, available at [https://consortium.pims.org/filestore2/download/4050/Martin%20 Malek_ Summer%20Supplement%202008-3.pdf]. 6 See: F. Ismailzade, “Azerbaijan Under Iranian and Russian Pressure on Relations to U.S.,” Central Asia-Cauca- sus Institute Analyst, 3 November, 2004; E. Süleymanov, Emergence of New Political Identity in the South Caucasus: En- ergy, Security, Strategic Location and Pragmatism, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, The Fletcher School, 2004, pp. 30-40; “Azerbaijan—A Partner for Europe in Energy Security,” in: Europe’s Energy Security: Gazprom’s Dom- inance and Caspian Supply Alternatives, ed. by S.E. Cornell, N. Nilsson, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2008, pp. 47-52. 7 See: National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, pp. 6-7. 8 See: C.S. Brown, “Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani Attitudes towards Kara- bakh and Iranian Azerbaijan,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4, Autumn 2004, pp. 576-596. 9 See: National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, pp. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 15. 10 See: Ibid., pp. 5-6. 11 See: Ibid., p. 5. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION equally as do opposing armies or terrorist groups.12 In sum, these strategic assessments suggest a view of Azerbaijan’s foreign affairs that differs from prevailing Western understandings of international politics. Yet, the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines from 2005 to 2007 has virtually revolutionized policy discourse on international relations in the Caucasus region. This has prioritized the classical narrative of competing Russian, Iranian and Turkish interests, along with continual speculations regarding energy markets and great power (U.S./Russia/EU) access to oil and gas reserves and transshipment routes—the Caucasian counter- part of the Central Asian “New Great Game.” As a result, much public discussion of the foreign and national security policies of post-Soviet Azerbaijan continues to be implicitly or openly influenced by traditional realist/geostrategic assumptions (e.g., Brzezinski’s Grand Chessboard).13 For instance: One leading American foreign policy theorist suggests that the demand for and pursuit of Caspian oil has turned “otherwise weak nations such as Azerbaijan into international ‘players’.”14 Thus, the emphasis is typically on the reactions of Azerbaijani policymakers to external forces, rather than how they perceive the nature of the international environment in which they are situated. Given this condition, the scholarly investigation of Azerbaijan’s foreign and security policies would potentially be advanced by the application of alternative theoretical approaches which interro- gate the conventional wisdom in Western-based Caucasus studies. The present study seeks to introduce an alternate method of analyzing the international relations of Azerbaijan, by taking into account its condition as both a developing and post-socialist state. It will develop a framework for identifying the causal links between the perceptions of Azerbaijani political elites (e.g., the President, Foreign Minister, deputy foreign ministers, and Minister of Defense) regarding the country’s position within the structure of the international system, and the expression of these views in its observable policy outputs.

Anarchy, Hierarchy or Neither? A Conceptual ramework

The research queries pursued in this article seek to both integrate and extend previous approaches in the study of world politics and foreign policy that have seldom been applied to the post- Soviet Caucasian context. Since the late 20th century, much of the discourse in international relations (IR) theory in the United States and Western Europe has viewed the field as a dispute between two major intellectual traditions and thekr subsequent variants. The structural or neorealist perspective posits that as there exists no central mechanism to exert control over the behavior of states, a “self-help” system prevails in which the relative distribution of resources (i.e., economic and military capabilities) and their strategic use by governments—motivated by the “balance of power” and the “security dilemma”—is the primary driver of international interactions.15 Conversely, the

12 See: Ibid., pp. 6-7. 13 See: M.P. Croissant, B. Aras, Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, pp. 125-126. 14 V.M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006, p. 145. 15 See: K.A. Waltz, A Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, 1979; G.H. Snyder, “The Security Dilem- ma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1984; J. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, No. 42 (3), 1988, pp. 485-507; J.J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4, Summer 1990, pp. 5-56. 50 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION liberal institutionalist view asserts that the promotion of commerce between democratic governments as represented by trade, financial transactions and foreign investment, as well as the conclusion of legal agreements by both horizontal and vertical international regulatory and decision-making bodies, rather than strictly alliances and power balancing fosters cooperation and integration among nations.16 Yet, a more contemporary theoretical development that purportedly combines these positions within a single model is the power preponderance or power transitions perspective. In opposition to the anarchic condition assumed in neorealism, the theory of power preponderance suggests that the organizing principle of world politics is a multi-level hierarchy composed of great, lesser and minor powers.17 The relative positions of states within the hierarchy are defined and operationalized by the domestic components of national development. The economic productivity (i.e., gross domestic product), political capacity and population characteristics of the most powerful or “preponderant” states enable them to project their political preferences throughout the international realm, thus minimizing their incentives to engage in conflict. This therefore assumes that the state system is led by a single great power and its coalition of satisfied states unified by acceptance of the status quo and highly integrated by fixed military alliances, trade, communications, currency exchange and technology transfers.18 The U.S., NATO and European Union at the global level, and the Russian Federation, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) (and their subsidiary organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community) presently exemplify this condition in their respective spheres of influence. Subsequent extensions of the core theory present logic and evidence for a “multiple hierarchy model” in which these vertical structural arrangements operate simultaneously at all levels of the international system, which allows for comparisons across world regions (e.g., Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, or the Caucasus).19 At the same time, the lower levels of each respective hierarchy are “conditionally anarchic,” in that they are occupied by a certain number of dissatisfied states that abstain from or reject the conventions promoted by the leading power and its coalition. These actors are still concerned with the dangers posed by “relative gains”, and therefore continue to behave as if the system is anarchic, often pursuing alternative diplomatic or military strategies (e.g., nonalignment, pursuit of nuclear capability, support for insurgencies or terrorism) to oppose the status quo even though they do not possess the resources to directly challenge the preponderant power.20 This “conditional anarchy” dimension is a relatively under-examined facet of the theory, which can be used to interpret foreign policy conflicts that remain below the level of major interstate war. This premise is also logically compatible with propositions in the literature regarding the international relations of small developing or formerly socialist states. The “subaltern realism” perspective posits that contrary to the assumptions of the Western realist tradition, the leaderships of developing nations typically perceive the international system as a hierarchy presided over by great powers, while at the same time the domestic political environment is regarded as a struggle to maintain

16 See: R. Keohane, J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Little, Brown and Company (Inc.), Boston, 1977. 17 See: A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1968; A.F.K. Organski, J. Ku- gler, The War Ledger, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980; R.L. Tammen, et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century, Chatham House Seven Bridges Press, New York, 2000. 18 This is distinct from the “tragedy of the commons” in hegemonic stability theory, as the preponderant state in power transitions does not generate public goods that are consumed by all states in the system, but distributes only private goods among its immediate allies. 19 See: D. Lemke, Regions of War and Peace, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002. 20 See: S. Hussein, J. Kugler, “Conditional Anarchy: The Importance of the Status Quo in World Politics,” Paper presented at annual meeting of the Peace Science Society, October 1990; J. Kugler, S. Werner, “Conditional Anarchy: The Constraining Power of the Status Quo,” Paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Associa- tion, April 1993. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION control of the state against anarchic popular forces.21 A similar condition has been identified as being prevalent in post-communist states, as the Soviet dissolution initially left governments in many former Republics with a weak tradition of national sovereignty and a lack of capable administrative structures, including competent and technically sufficient foreign ministries and diplomatic services.22 Azerbaijan has faced severe local insecurity since independence, experiencing a revolution, an internationalized civil war, ethnic secessions and a series of successful and attempted military coups23 , certain of which are regarded by historians as having been sponsored by external (Russian, Iranian or Turkish) forces.24 Thus, political leaders in these settings are often preoccupied with suppressing internal instability and preserving their position of authority, while also pursuing those external policies that enhance their ability to manage tensions and remain in office. Therefore, the foreign policy and security strategies of these states are designed in order to maintain autonomy and gain leverage against dominant powers within the international hierarchy, as well as through “omnibalancing”, or seeking the external support (i.e., foreign or military aid, alliances or security assistance) of stronger states to defend themselves against domestic pressures and threats.25

Perceptions of Hierarchy in Azerbaijani National Histories

Given the common focus on imperial ambitions toward small states, it is thus curious that prevailing views of the Caucasus region would assume anarchy (power seeking) rather than hierarchy (status seeking) as an explanatory framework. This is because as small states are lacking in opportunities for aggrandizement, they typically rely on asymmetric alliances with larger powers in order to compensate.26 Nevertheless, since independence Azerbaijan has rarely if ever participated in formal alliance systems. It has been suggested that the preoccupation of observers with the role of hegemonic influences in the Caucasus region is a byproduct of the varying reactions of regional and global powers to demands for external support by local leaderships in the post-Soviet period (e.g., Russia to Ter-Petrossian and Kocharian in Armenia, the United States to Shevardnadze and Saakashvili in Georgia, and Turkey to Elçhibey in Azerbaijan).27 Yet, it is arguable that Azerbai- jan’s origins as a modern nation-state are rooted in reaction to imposed hierarchy. The establishment of the twin Russian imperial gubernias of Baku and Elizavetpol during the mid-19th century both established a defined Azerbaijani territory, and aided the founding of a bureaucratic elite unit-

21 See: M. Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World,” in: International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. by St.G. Neuman, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998, pp. 31-49; idem, “Ine- quality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism,” International Studies Review, No. 4 (3), Fall 2002, pp. 27–48. 22 See: M. Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Postcommunist Foreign Policy and International Relations, Hurst&Company, London, 1996, pp. 7-9, 21-30. 23 See: J.D. Fearon, D.A. Laitin, “Azerbaijan: Random Narratives 1.2,” Stanford University, 2006, available at [http://www.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/AzerbaijanRN1.2.pdf]. 24 See: F. Shafee, “Inspired from Abroad: the External Sources of Separatism in Azerbaijan,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, No. 2 (4), Autumn 2008, pp. 200-210, available at [http://cria-online.org/Journal/5/ INSPIRED%20FROM%20ABROAD.pdf]. 25 See: St.R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1991. 26 See: G. Gleason, A. Kerimbekova, S. Kozhirova,“Realism and the Small State: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan,” In- ternational Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 44-45. 27 See: A. Jafalian, Influences in the South Caucasus: Opposition & Convergence in Axes of Cooperation, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, February 2004, p. 7. 52 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ed by a common language and religion.28 This provided a basis for a unified Azeri bourgeoisie to seek to build a polity that could compete with other nations, advocate for the autonomy of the Tran- scaucasus, and pursue independence in relation to the Russian colonial government as well as the neighboring ethnic Armenian community.29 During the Soviet period, the domestic politics of Azerbaijan evolved into a system composed of two primary elements: the hierarchical Baku city-state governed by an assimilated Russian-speaking Azeri nomenklatura that accepted the status quo generated by Moscow, and an anarchic hinter- land of practically independent rayons and village centers loosely based on the former Azerbaijan khanates, where popular identification as Azerbaijanis was weak and subordinate to Iranian Shi‘a Muslim cultural influences, and connections to the capital were limited largely to local administrators and shipments of primary goods.30 It was this peasant population that was prevented from entering the elite residential and economic sectors of Baku into the late 1980s, and formed the dissatisfied popular forces that prevailed with the weakening and collapse of the Soviet system, and in the uprising that removed the post-communist Mutalibov regime from power in 1992.31 With the consolidation of the New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azdrbaycan Partiyasý) government in 1993, President Heydar Aliev combined practical experience with Soviet hierarchy with the production of a nationalist ideology in order to provide the leadership necessary to resist centrifugal processes.32 This was further intended as a defense against neo-colonial policies on the part of the great powers, in their attempt to impose generic concepts of democracy and economic reform on the newly independent Muslim states.33 At the same time, Azerbaijan’s historic position at the confluence of Eu- ropean and Middle Eastern cultural streams has reinforced its maintenance of autonomy versus both Pan-Turkism and Iranian theocratic Shi‘ism.34 Thus, rather than traditional rivalries among the regional powers, perhaps the most significant gauge of Azerbaijani independence and national security is the political and economic orientation of the Russian Federation, which remains the most powerful and influential nation in the Caucasus system.35 Further evidence can be found within the precedents of Azerbaijani national histories of linkages between perceptions of hierarchical global structures and foreign policy behavior related to national security. During the years from 1450 to 1600 AD, the Azeri proto-states established by the Aðqo- yunlu and the Safavid dynasty pursued diplomatic relations with the kingdoms of Western Europe in response to the military and economic threat posed by the growing preponderance of Ottoman Tur- key.36 Similarly, between 1918 and 1920, the leadership of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (Azdrbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyydti) sought unsuccessfully to secure recognition and military support from the United States to defend against the territorial and ideological encroachment of Soviet Rus- sia.37 Finally, reversing the policies of previous post-Soviet leaders, in 1993 Heydar Aliev extended a resolution for the entry of Azerbaijan into the Commonwealth of Independent States in order to

28 See: C. Çaðla, “Foundations of Nation-State in Azerbaijan.” Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies. Obiv, 2003, p. 119; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA & CC Press, Stockholm, 2006, pp. 22-24. 29 See: C. Çaðla, op. cit., pp. 122-123. 30 See: G. Derluguian, “Azeri Orientalists as Mirror of the Post Soviet Revolution,” 21st Century, No. 2, 2007, pp. 46-47. 31 See: Ibid., pp. 50-53. 32 See: A.A. Al-Falah, Heydar Aliev and National Spiritual Values, Gismet, Baku, 2007, p. 26. 33 See: Ibid., pp. 46, 67-69. 34 See: G. Robbins, “Not a Persian Nor a Turk,” Freedom Review, No. 27, 1 March, 1996, available at [http://www. zerbaijan.com/azeri/azerbaijan3.htm] 35 See: Ibidem. 36 See: Y. Mahmudov, Azerbaijan Diplomacy in the Second Half of the XV—Beginning of the XVII Centuries (The Relations of the Aghgoyunlu and Safavi States with the West European Countries), Baku, 2006, available at [http:// www.elibrary.az/docs/azerdiplom.pdf]. 37 See: J. Hassanov, Azerbaijan in the System of International Relations in 1918-1920, Baku, 1993 (in Azeri). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION retain access to the security benefits of the status quo maintained by the Russian Federation, while simultaneously supporting the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the national soil carried out earlier.38 However, while these historical accounts may provide a descriptive view of world and domestic politics from various seats of power in Baku, in order to accumulate evidence of these relationships, one must also identify the national characteristics that constitute system structure.

Hierarchical Structure of the Global and Caucasus Regional System

The analytical approach applied in this study places Azerbaijani foreign relations within the context of the nation’s position in the local, regional and global international hierarchies, presided over by Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. It is therefore necessary to present the empirical basis for these systemic structures. The structural analysis incorporates the framework previously extended by Ismailov and Papava which conceptualizes the Caucasus as consisting of North- ern, Central and Southern subregions.39 It is posited here that this definition essentially conforms to a hierarchical view of world order, as it suggests both a vertical arrangement of states according to their national capabilities, and that the region is divided between two hegemonic coalitions: one oriented toward integration with the U.S. and Western Europe (Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan), and the other toward the classical paradigm of Eurasian geopolitics (Russia, Armenia, and Iran).40 The economic, political, demographic and geographic characteristics of each of these states are summarized in Table 1. All reported figures are current to 2008 where available. Care was taken in assigning the country rankings based on a single indicator or data source (i.e., differences between nominal GDP per capita and GDP at purchasing power parity per capita). Therefore, where necessary these were compared with alternate figures in order to ensure their reliability.

Table 1

Hierarchical Structures in the International and Caucasus Regional System41

Global Level

State Economic Political Demographics Geographic Development Capacity (Population Size (GDP per Size/Total (terrestrial capita PPP) Fertility Rate) area in sq km)

38 See: L. Alieva, Integrative Processes in the South Caucasus and their Security Implications, ed. by J. Dufourcq, C. Coops, NATO Defense College, Occasional Paper Series 13, Academic Research Branch, Rome, March 2006, pp. 23-24. 39 See: E. Ismailov, “New Regionalism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Approach,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006, pp. 7-24; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 3, September 2008, pp. 283-298. 40 See: J. Eyvazov, “Geopolitical Lessons of the Post-Soviet Caucasus: Forward to Globalization or Back to Classi- cal Eurasian Geopolitics?” The Caucasus & Globalization. Vol. 1 (1), 2006, pp. 25-37. 41 Data for each indicator is taken from International Monetary Fund, World Bank and CIA World Factbook 2008. 54 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 (continued)

United States $48,000 Strong 304,059,724/2.1 9,161,923 of America births per woman

European $33,800 Strong 491,018,683/1.51 4,324,782 Union births per woman

Regional Level

Northern Caucasus

State Economic Political Demographics Geographic Development Capacity (Population Size (GDP per Size/Total (terrestrial capita PPP) Fertility Rate) area in sq km)

Russian $15,800 Strong/Moderate 141,377,752/1.4 17,075,200 Federation births per woman

Southern Caucasus

Turkey $12,000 Strong 71,892,808/>2 783,562 births per woman

Islamic $12,800 Strong/Moderate 65,875,224/1.7 165,000,000 Republic of births Iran per woman

Local Level

Central Caucasus

State Economic Political Demographics Geographic Development Capacity (Population Size (GDP per Size/Total (terrestrial capita PPP) Fertility Rate) area in sq km)

Azerbaijan $9,500 Strong 8,410,801/2.05 86,600 births per woman

Georgia $5,000 Moderate/Weak 4,615,807/1.43 69,700 births per woman

Armenia $6,600 Strong/Moderate 2,967,004/1.36 29,800 births per woman

Beginning at the global level, although forecasts suggest that the United States will be surpassed by China as the leader of the international system by mid-century, and despite the recent domestic economic crisis, it presently maintains its status as the “world’s sole remaining super- power.” Also, regardless of rifts fostered by policies such as the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, it Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION maintains the EU and the NATO security community within its coalition of satisfied states. While exhibiting a smaller total population than Europe, America continues to possess a higher rate of replacement through new births. At the same time, the EU, whose member states contribute one quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), is increasingly taking on the character of a sin- gular international entity. In the Northern Caucasus area of the regional level, the Russian Federation remains the world’s most massive state even after the dissolution of the “internal” and “external” Soviet empire in 1989-1991, covering more than one eighth of the Earth’s land area and containing the ninth largest population, despite severe trends of declining fertility during the past two decades.42 Since 2000, national economic indicators have exhibited a steady trend to growth,43 although it presently faces a significant downturn in production and shrinkage of disposable income due to the delayed effects of the global financial crisis.44 The succession to the presidency of Vladimir Putin in March 2000 began a period of concentration of decision-making power in the executive, with direct appointment of federal regional governors and the inauguration of the post-Soviet nationalist party United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) in 2001 that has dominated presidential elections (although it remains to be seen whether the Putin-Medvedev “tandem” regime will ultimately prove stable).45 In the eastern wing of the Southern Caucasus, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s substantial size and population (over 50 percent of the entire inhabitants of the Persian Gulf region) make it a central pivot between the Middle East and Central Asia. The economy has experienced rapid growth in GDP, a rate of nearly 50 percent between 1999 and 2006.46 Iran remains the third largest oil producer in the world and a major prospective competitor in natural gas, with steady increases in production against predictions of decline (nearly doubling between 1986 and 2005) due to high export revenues and increased efficiency in exploration and processing.47 The fusion of theocratic and electoral political system has allowed the Islamic regime to maintain legitimacy and remain in power for three decades despite considerable internal dissent.48 In addition, those provinces that comprise the southwestern frontier of the Caucasus region (Southern Azerbaijan) are both heavily populated (over 13,000,000 people) and contain both major agriculture and industrial processing and manufacturing centers, which constitute over 13 percent of the national GDP.49 Finally, partly as a result of family planning and population control programs, fertility rates have declined sharply in the past two decades, to levels comparable with Western Europe and well below the average for the neighboring Arab countries, as it begins the demographic transition from a classical “underdeveloped” to an industrialized nation.50 To the west, the Republic of Turkey is a longstanding member of the global power coalition in both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and NATO (as well as EU aspirant since 1987), and exceeds Iran in population. The government led by the Justice and

42 See: T. Heleniak, “Russia’s Demographic Decline Continues,” Population Reference Bureau, Washington, D.C., June 2002, available at [http://www.prb.org/Articles/2002/RussiasDemographicDeclineContinues.aspx]. 43 See: Russian Economic Report # 2, January 2001; Russian Economic Report #15, The World Bank, November 2007, available at [http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANFEDERATIONEXTN/ 0,,contentMDK:20888536~menuPK:2445695~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305600,00.html]. 44 See: A. Åslund, A. Kushins, The Russia Balance Sheet, Peterson Institute for International Economics/Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., April 2009, pp. 30-31, 34-38. 45 See: Ibid., pp. 53-54. 46 See: K. Crane, R. Lal, J. Martini, Iran’s Political, Demographic, and Economic Vulnerabilities, The Rand Cor- poration, Washington D.C., 2008, pp. 83-84. 47 See: Ibid., pp. 67-78. 48 See: Ibid., pp. 32-34. 49 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, pp. 71-74. 50 See: K. Crane, R. Lal, J. Martini, op. cit., p. 61. 56 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkýnma Partisi), which entered office in 2002 and was reelected in 2007, has combined a Muslim and secular orientation that has successfully garnered support among both wealthy urban elites and the rural poor.51 Since the introduction of reforms designed to control inflation in 2001, the Turkish national economy has experienced consecutive increases of growth in GDP (a rate of nine percent in 2004), despite high levels of unemployment and a significant current account deficit.52 At the same time, its total fertility rate has declined by over seven percent in recent years, reflecting broader trends in industrialized Europe as its overall population ages and decreases in size.53 In contrast, although Turkey is typically identified as a pivotal regional counterweight in traditional geopolitical analyses, the northeastern provinces (ils) that are actually contiguous with Ajaria Autonomous Republic (Ach’aris Avt’onomiuri Resp’ublik’a) of Georgia, Armenia, and Nakh- chivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan (Ardahan, Kars and Iðdýr), constitute the most sparsely populated, underdeveloped and economically marginal areas of both that country and the Caucasus system as a whole.54 Finally, in the Central Caucasus Azerbaijan is the largest among local states in both the extent of its territory and its population size, density and total fertility rate, all of which are the highest in the subregion.55 While observers identified a lower level of development and industrialization than in Armenia and Georgia in the years after independence56 , Azerbaijan currently possesses the highest level of scientific and technical resources.57 In contrast with the serious political instability that has prevailed in Georgia since the 2003 Rose Revolution (including the disastrous Russian invasion) and recurrent electoral unrest in Armenia, the incumbent Azerbaijani government has consolidated central authority since the mid-1990s and has established relative prosperity and popular support.58 In addition, due to foreign investment and its position in international energy markets, it has experienced rapid economic expansion within the past decade, reporting the world’s highest consecutive rate of growth in GDP from 2005 to 2008.59 Predictive analyses of trends in conflict and development in the Caucasus region assert that due to its natural resource wealth and expanding domestic sectors, Azerbaijan’s power capabilities are expected to increase relative to its immediate neighboring states during the next few decades. This will ostensibly place it in a dominant local position by mid-century, while the resources of Armenia and Georgia are expected to remain at comparable projected levels.60

51 See: A.P. Çelik, L. Naqvi, Turkey: Current and Future Political, Economic, and Security Trends, Canadian De- fence & Foreign Affairs Institute, December 2007, p. 102. 52 See: Ibid., p. 4. 53 See: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook 2008, available at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html]. 54 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, pp. 74-75. 55 See: T. Swietochowski, “Azerbaijan”, in: Encyclopedia of the Developing World, ed. by Th.M. Leonard, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 126. 56 See: W. O’Malley, “Central Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints,” in: Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, ed. by O. Oliker, Th.S. Szayna, Rand Arroyo Center, 2003, pp. 277-278; H. Sadri, “Elements of Azerbaijan Foreign Policy,” Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 2003, p. 181. 57 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, pp. 61-62; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” p. 293. 58 See: H.K. Nazli, “Azerbaijan,” in: Nations in Transit 2008 Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, Freedom House, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. 98-100. 59 See: “Azerbaijan”, in: Asian Development Outlook 2009: Rebalancing Asia’s Growth, Asian Development Bank, March 2009, p. 131, available at [http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2009/AZE.pdf]. 60 See: B. Efird, B. Yeºilada, P. Noordijk, Power Transition Analysis of the Caucasus Region, 2010-2050, Paper prepared for presentation at the 2005 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-5 March, 2005, pp 13; 16; B. Yeºilada, P. Noordijk, B. Efird, Regional Transitions and Stability in the Greater Middle East, Working paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in San Francisco, California, 26-29 March, 2008, pp. 8, 10. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n However, Azerbaijan at the same time possesses several unusual geographic characteristics that affect its status as a leader of the local state system. First, its internal sovereignty is challenged by the presence of the NKR, a virtual enclave state that occupies nearly 20 percent (11,458 sq km) of its total land area.61 It has been suggested that despite the status of the NK dispute as an enduring interstate rivalry, because the site of the conflict is within its national territory, it is Azerbaijan alone that bears the greatest negative impact.62 n Second, Azerbaijan is one of the world’s 12 non-contiguous states, maintaining sovereignty over the exclave Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (Naxçývan Muxtar Respublikasý) that spans 5,500 sq km, falling entirely within the territorial boundaries of Armenia and Iran,63 and is subject to economic blockade by Erevan. n Third, due to historic geopolitical disruptions,64 Azerbaijan possesses a dichotomized or separated national identity commonly referred to as the state of being “two Azerbaijans.”65 This is manifest in two dimensions: First, Azerbaijan proper shares a 400 km contiguous border (600 km including Nakhchivan) with northwest Iran, the former center of the Turkic-Persian (Safavid) beyerbeliks administered from Tabriz, which also spanned what is now Northern Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia.66 Second, the distribution of the local ethnic Azeri community (known historically by the Ottoman Turkish term millet67 ) is divided between the Re- public of (Northern) Azerbaijan and its greater number south of the Araz River (estimated at over 20 million or 25 percent of the national total), concentrated especially in Ardabil, West and East Azerbaijan and Zanjan provinces (ostans).68 The difficult position occupied by Azerbaijan in its local international setting therefore presents challenges to its status as local preponderant power. Although the country has attained a position of dominance relative to Armenia and particularly Georgia due to rapid increases in export-based revenues and foreign investment in the manufacturing and construction sectors, due to the unresolved status of the NK conflict, an interrupted national identity, and encirclement by maturing great and middle powers, Azerbaijan’s leadership has pursued domestic and foreign policies that reflect an intent to mitigate the impact of prevailing structural conditions.

Theoretical Model of Structural Perceptions: Applications to Azerbaijan

The main proposition extended in this study is that the professional diplomatic and foreign policy decision-making elites of small developing and post-socialist countries such as Azerbaijan often

61 See: This area includes southern Goranboy, western and eastern Kalbajar, Khojali, western Tdrtdr, part of Agdam, Fizuli, Lachin, Qubadli, Zangilan, western and eastern Jebrayil, northern and southern Khovajend and Shusha rayons, the 7,634 sq km security belt patrolled by NKR Defense Army and Armenian regular troops, and the self-regulating 175 km “line of contact” (LoC) in which low-intensity fire incidents have continued since 1994. 62 See: W. O’Malley, op. cit., pp. 180, 277. 63 Public International Law & Policy Group, 2006, p. 1. 64 See: E. Souleimanov, O. Ditrych, “Iran and Azerbaijan: A Contested Neighborhood,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, Summer 2007, pp. 101-102. 65 A. Asgharzadeh, “In Search of a Global Soul: Azerbaijan and the Challenge of Multiple Identities,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4, 7-18 December, 2007, p. 7, available at [http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/ 2007/issue4/pdf/2.pdf]. 66 These territories were later separated (an act known by northern Azeri and Iranian Âzarî nationalists as ayriliq) by the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchai (1828), which resolved the Russo-Persian wars of conquest and divided the multiple Azerbaijani khanates between the Qajar and Romanov empires. 67 See: T. Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, London, 2000, pp. xv, 17-19; B. Shaf- fer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity, MIT Press, 2002, pp. 30, 54-55. 68 See: A. Asgharzadeh, op. cit., p. 9. 58 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION perceive the international system as a hierarchical order presided over by global powers rather than as an opportunistic anarchy, which places significant limits on their ability to pursue autonomous national interests.69 This perception in turn impacts and shapes the development or adoption of national security agendas or paradigms from which specific foreign and defense policies are generated. How- ever, this equation is additionally affected by the presence of interrelated domestic and external challenges to the ability of political elites to govern their societies. The variables contained in the flowchart displayed in Figure 1 are defined as follows: The first independent variable (IV1) is the perception of the international environment held by political elites, represented by their evaluation of the status quo generated and promoted by preponderant powers through mechanisms of political, economic and military influence. This is reflected by the quality and condition of their bilateral diplomatic relations with the preponderant state and the degree of direct alignment with (hierarchical), cooperation with (institutional) or rejection of (anarchical) its associated policies or arrangements (IV2). However, these perceptions are at the same time affected by the level of threats that emanate simultaneously from both domestic (IV3a) and international (IV3b) political environments. These can take the form of opposition movements, insurgent or terrorist groups or social unrest within countries, or diplomatic tensions, involvement in interstate disputes, or military challenges to the nation’s territorial integrity at the external level. Finally, the dependent variable (DV) in the model is defined as the summation of the states national interests as expressed in its foreign and national security policies. igure 1

Model of Elite Structural Perceptions and National Interests in Developing and Post-Soviet States

IV 1 IV 3a IV 3b

Domestic (+) External (+) Pressures Perceptions Pressures (Political, of Political (Foreign Ethnic, Elites Intervention) Religious) (Status Quo Evaluation) IV 2 International (+/–) System Structure (Power Distributions) (+/–) Hierarchical

Institutional

Foreign and National Anarchical Security Policies (National Interest)

69 See: M. Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World.” idem, “Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism”; G. Gleason, A. Kerimbekova, S. Kozhirova, op. cit. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

This model rests upon the assumption that as a result of historical experience and geopolitical situation, Azerbaijan’s political leaders view international relations as operating within a series of state systems and subsystems presided over by local (Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey), regional (Russian Federation) and global (United States) powers. Therefore, the perceived position of Azerbaijan within each hierarchy vis à vis the preponderant state(s) will differently affect the political definition of alignments, postures and strategic goals. These orientations in turn condition the development of doctrine regarding the definition of national identity, the preservation of territorial integrity, and the existence of threats to vital national interests. The ultimate outcome of this linkage process is the manifestation of role perceptions in actual policy approaches. At the same time, it is expected that differences in perceptions held by individuals within foreign policy making organizations will contribute to variation in policy approaches across time or issues. Therefore, the strategic orientation of these states are designed in order to derive resources from various global power centers, which provides decision-makers with the ability to select from a range of options for building domestic capabilities. The concept of a “multi-vector” foreign policy, in which states pursue a form of multi-polar balancing in order to preserve their independence while retaining the benefits of alignment with more powerful states, has become common parlance in journalistic and academic discussions of post-Soviet international relations. It might be suggested that multi-vectorism constitutes a form of post-Cold War nonalignment that avoids formal alliance commitments, while deriving benefits from economic and military affiliations or partnerships with both the great powers and their strategic competitors. Within the past decade, it has been uti- lized in order to describe, as well as prescribe the diplomatic agendas and behavior of various countries, most prominently Kazakhstan (to which its origins are attributed), Ukraine, Moldova, Az- erbaijan, Belarus, and by extension, Putin-era Russia. However, it has at the same time rarely been articulated as a theoretical construct, having been applied for varying and inconsistent purposes.70 Recent efforts to provide an analytically useful definition have identified the pursuit of multiple vectors as a pragmatic and non-ideological strategic activity engaged in by rational, self-interested actors.71 The Azerbaijani variant of multi-vectorism, the “balanced foreign policy” (balanslaþdýrýlmýþ xarici siyasýt) doctrine initially introduced by Heydar Aliev, is identified as a cornerstone of the nation’s external orientation.72 More significantly, it provides an observable example of how a strong, centralized leadership pursues an alternate (i.e., non-military) strategy of expressing dissatisfaction with the constraints imposed by hierarchical arrangements. Finally, its logic implies a fundamentally different view from that currently endorsed by Western policy advocates. Rather than “creating major guarantees for Azerbaijan’s independence and sovereignty”73 , the use of energy transit assets such as the BTC/BTE pipelines for full integration into the U.S.-led economic and security architecture via Turkey’s NATO membership would involve surrendering national autonomy and self-reliance. U.S. policymakers have endorsed the integration of Azerbaijan with Turkey since the Mutalibov era, when opposition politicians and liberal reformers had strong incentives to seek an alternative to perceived Armenian influence over Western governments.74 Through its promotion of multiple balancing, the

70 See: G. Kirbassov, A Game Theoretic Approach to Kazakhstan’s Multi-vector Foreign Policy, Paper prepared for the 66th Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, 3-6 April, 2008, Chicago, USA. 71 See: R. Hanks, “Multi-Vector Politics” and Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role as a Geo-strategic Player in Central Asia, Presented at the 49th meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, USA, March 26, 2008. 72 See: National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, pp. 3, 12. 73 S.E. Cornell, F. Ismailzade, “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Azerbaijan,” in: The Baku-Tbi- lisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, ed. by S.F. Starr, S.E. Cornell, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2005, p. 20. 74 See: M. Saroyan, “Azerbaijan Looks ‘West’: New Trends in Foreign Relations with Iran and Turkey,” in: Minor- ities, Mullahs and Modernity: Reshaping Community in the Former Soviet Union, ed. by Edward W. Walker, University of California International and Area Studies Digital Collection, Research Series #95, 1997, p. 239. 60 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION present Azerbaijani leadership has in theory rejected the foreign and security policy formula of local “calls for empire” adopted by other Caucasus states—or, the linkage of national consolidation and survival to the aid and intervention of external powers.75

C o n c l u s i o n

This article has sought to present an alternative conceptual and theoretical model for analyzing Azerbaijan’s foreign and defense policies according to the situation of the republic within the structure of the international system. This is tentatively intended as an alternative to the prevalence of the Western theoretical discourse of realist geopolitics and strategy in contemporary studies of the Cau- casus region. Because qualitative changes in foreign and security policies are likely to occur over time, an extension of this approach would be to develop a means of 1) directly measuring the strength of Azerbaijani foreign policy vectors toward the regional and global powers based on the historical record of diplomatic instruments, and 2) empirically testing the relationship of these indicators with the evolution of the national security concept from the date of independence to the present day.

75 See: A. Jafalian, op. cit., p. 1.

Ramil ALIEV

Post-graduate student at the Institute of Philosophy and Political Legal Studies, Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE PARLIAMENT IN AZERBAIJAN’S POWER DIVISION SYSTEM

Abstract

his article discusses issues typical of branches of power. Based on an analysis T the current stage in state-building in of extensive theoretical data and national Azerbaijan, that is, the place and func- law-making practice, the author gives sev- tions of the Milli Mejlis (national parliament) eral recommendations for further develop- in the context of balancing the different ing parliamentary activity in Azerbaijan. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, like the constitutions of most contemporary states, enforces the fundamental principle of the democratic organization of state power—the division of power. In developing this principle, the country’s Constitution sets forth that these power branches should interact among themselves while at the same time be independent as far as exercising their own powers. Moreover, in a law-based state independence of all its structures, primarily the executive power structures, cannot be absolute but is limited to the regulations of the country’s legislative base.

Representation of Azerbaijan’s Parliament Today

As is known, the theory of state and law envisages two main ways for the people to exercise their power: 1) direct implementation of power functions (direct democracy) and 2) exercising powers by means of representation (representative democracy). Jean Jacques Rousseau, who regarded direct democracy as the political ideal, was the most consistent supporter of the first method of executing power by the people. In so doing, legislative power, according to his theory, should belong directly to the people’s assembly, in which all citizens should participate, and all the other power structures should be entirely subordinate and amenable to it. As- serting the “indivisibility, inalienability, and supremacy”1 of national sovereignty, Jean Jacques Rousseau essentially denied the representative form of rule and upheld the view that deputies cannot be representatives of the people, they are merely plenipotentiaries, commissars, who simply do not have the right to make any final decisions. Correspondingly, a law cannot become such until it is directly approved by the people.2 In support of representative democracy, Charles Montesquieu believed that since it was impossible for the people to directly exercise power in large states and very difficult in small ones, national representation was necessary. It was elected representatives, in his opinion, who were best able to discuss state issues. He believed that a representative assembly should be elected not for making active decisions, a task it was not capable of fulfilling, but to create laws or ensure that those laws they had already created were being observed…3 Representation of the people and law-making are two qualities of legislative power that are integral and functionally insoluble. Several researchers add budget and control functions to this list.4 But the parliament’s key role in the state power structure system is based on the fact that it is the only universal representative structure among all the state power structures that determines both the principles of its formation and its functioning. The parliament as a whole is formed with the participation of all the country’s citizens (incidentally, not all of them, for certain objective reasons, realize this right) based on the universal right of suffrage by secret ballot, which predetermines its designation as a mechanism representing the interests of the entire nation. It is called upon to express the will of the people in ruling the state,

1 J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Penguin Classics, 1968, pp. 70-71. 2 See: Ibid., p. 222. 3 See: Ch. Montesquieu, Izbrannye proizvedeniia, Moscow, 1955, p. 293. 4 See, for example: M.V. Baglai, Konstitutsionnoe pravo Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, 1998, p. 472; Konstitut- sionnoe (gosudarstvennoe) pravo zarubezhnykh stran, Vols. 1-2, ed. by B.A. Strashun, Moscow, 1996, p. 402. 62 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION this is its representative function. As V. Shevtsov notes, legislative power, its formation, and its execution are traditionally associated with the activity of the parliament as a state representative structure. It is precisely the fact that the parliament is a representative structure that makes it a legislative structure.5 As Part II, Art 2 of the Azerbaijan Constitution reads: “The people of Azerbaijan exercise their sovereign right directly by means of universal voting—referendum—and through their representatives.” Execution of legislative power in Azerbaijan is possible only through the Milli Mejlis—the one-house parliament and the republic’s highest representative structure. In correspondence with the current legislation, the Milli Mejlis consists of 125 deputies who are elected on the basis of the majority system and universal, equal, and direct elections by free, personal, and secret ballot. The parliament serves for a 5-year term. Azerbaijan’s election legislation is sufficiently liberal and provides a legal foundation for forming the representative deputy corps. Political parties, blocs of political parties, and citizen initiative groups with the right to vote and permanently residing in the corresponding voting district have the right to nominate candidates as deputies to the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic; citizens also have the right to nominate themselves.

igure 1

Professional Composition of the Third Milli Mejlis

Social workers Journalists 6% 7% Medical workers Economists 5% 7% Teachers Unemployed 5% 9% Creative workers Businessmen 4% 10%

Farmers 2% Servicemen Lawyers 2% 13% Others 2% Scientific workers Bank employees 13% 1%

Engineers 14%

5 See: V.S. Shevtsov, Razdelenie vlastei v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, 2004, p. 191. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to the election results of Milli Mejlis deputies held on 6 October, 2005, the candidates nominated by the Yeni Azerbaijan (New Azerbaijan) Party received 63 mandates (the party had 74 mandates in the previous parliament), those nominated by the Musavat Party acquired 4 mandates, by the Civilian Solidarity Party and Ana Veten 2 mandates each, and by the People’s Front of Azerbai- jan Party, Umid, and another four parties one mandate each. Independent candidates won in 40 voting districts. Fourteen women (currently 11.48%) are deputies in the Milli Mejlis, who, as observations show, actively participate in the law-making process, in creating legal conditions for gender equality, and in protecting women’s individual rights. Experts have different assessments of the representation of the third Azerbaijani parliament. In our view, the representative nature of the Azerbaijani parliament is associated not only with its external, formal characteristics, but also with the contents of its activity, which is mainly manifested in the structure’s designation and competence. However, given the low authority of the political opposition in Azerbaijani society, the fact that one of the structure’s representative characteristics is incomplete should not, in our opinion, be justification for disqualifying the representative nature of the structure as a whole.

Control unctions of the Milli Mejlis

Azerbaijan traveled a long road before it became a republic with a presidential form of rule in which it became possible to exercise, albeit limited, parliamentary control. During almost its entire history, strong executive power has been characteristic of our state. As a result of the reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union which have continued over the last two decades, the balance between the legislative and executive power branches has undergone perceptible changes. The reason for the reforms was primarily withdrawal from the Soviet legal system, which was class-oriented and expressed the interests of specific social groups. Keeping in mind the democratic requirements of the new times, Art 7 of the Constitution enforces the provision on organizing state power in Azerbaijan on the basis of the principle of the division of power by means of its division into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is well-known that the executive branch has always striven to extend its powers and is not interested in being controlled. So there has to be an institution of parliamentary control over the government’s activity which could become an efficient mechanism for preventing uncontrolled and un- punished actions on the part of the government. It should be kept in mind that parliamentary control is an efficient tool only if it can force the government to answer for its actions, on the one hand, and will not prevent this power structure from carrying out its tasks, on the other. In the contemporary legal literature, the authors, while listing and describing in detail the different forms of parliamentary control (questions addressed to the higher state structures and highest-ranking officials, interpellation, raising the question of a vote of no confidence or introducing a resolution on reprehension of the government, issuing a vote of no confidence in the government, reports of the government and ministers on their activity, parliamentary hearings, parliamentary investigations, the activity of parliamentary ombudsmen and other structures under the parliament, impeachment, participation in the formation of executive state power structures, control over the execution of the state budget, ratification and denunciation of international agreements, and so on), fail to give a definition of parliamentary control. But some works do in fact give such a definition. M.M. Utiashev and A.A. Kornilaeva give the following definition of parliamentary control—it is a set of different measures implemented by the highest legislative (representative) state power structure to ensure permanent supervision over and auditing of the system’s 64 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION activity, as well as for removing the violations revealed as the result of such auditing and preventing possible discrepancies.6

Parliamentary Control An Inalienable Attribute of Democracy and Guarantee Against Usurpation of Power and Bureaucratic Tyranny

E.V. Kovriakova defines parliamentary control as a system of regulations that monitor the established procedure for supervising and auditing the activity of the executive power structures, exe- cuted both by the parliamentary majority and opposition and by the auxiliary structures of the highest legislative structure and aimed at assessing this activity with the possible use of sanctions (vote of no confidence, impeachment, and so on).7 Based on the definitions of parliamentary control presented, it can be concluded that its entities are, as a rule, the parliament (or parliamentarians) and the government (in some countries also the president, in the event the parliament initiates the procedure of impeachment or brings the president to criminal account, as, for example, in the U.S. and France). In addition to this, we should mention the activity of auxiliary parliamentary structures in some countries, which carry out so-called indirect parliamentary control. Parliamentary control is aimed at revealing illegal and unauthorized actions on the part of the executive power structures as well as officials. In some cases, the inaction of officials can fall under investigation. The constitutional acts of various countries (Austria, Brazil, Rumania, and Turkey) present a relatively complete list of the different forms of parliamentary control. Art 98 of the Constitution of Turkey, for example, not only presents a detailed list of forms of parliamentary control but also reveals the contents of the deputy or parliamentary inquiry, and general discussion, and regulates the procedures of parliamentary investigation. The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic of 1995 makes two direct mentions of control with respect to the activity of the parliament. These are Art 95.5 “on the basis of representation of the Pres- ident of the Azerbaijan Republic, approval of the state budget of the Azerbaijan Republic, and control over its execution” and Art 144.2, “The legislative and executive powers may transfer additional powers to the municipalities… Execution of such powers is controlled by the legislative and executive powers, respectively.” But in addition to the mentioned articles, several constitutional powers of the Milli Mejlis based on the particular forms of parliamentary control discussed above are directly or indirectly classified among the control powers. They include almost all of the powers envisaged in Art 95 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic. Several of them refer to the implementation of sanctioned control since they are carried out by the parliament’s elaboration of a certain position on a particular issue or by the adoption of a decision based on the obtained information. In addition to the listed constitutional control powers, there are several others enforced in different legal acts. One of them is Art 44, “In-House Charter of the Milli Mejlis.” This article envisages, in compliance with Art 92 of the Constitution, the creation of an Ac- counts Chamber that will be a permanent structure subordinate to the Milli Mejlis for supervising the state budget.

6 See: M.M. Utiashev, A.A. Kornilaeva, “Kontrolnye funktsii regionalnykh parlamentov: sravnitenlnyi analiz,” in: Pravo i politika, No. 1, 2001, p. 30. 7 See: K.V. Kovriakova, Parlamentskiy kontrol: Zarubezhnyi opyt i rossiiskaia praktika, Moscow, 2005, p. 12. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The activity of the ombudsman is also viewed as a form of parliamentary control over the activity of the executive power structures and, primarily, its actkvity relating to the observation of human rights. In his activity, the ombudsman relies on the authority of the delegated collegial legislative structure that appointed him. The provision on granting the ombudsman the right, in compliance with the law, to appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic regarding the violation of human rights and freedoms by means of regulctory acts of the legislative and executive power structures and acts of municipalities and courts is of particular significance. An important element of parliamentary control—the deputy inquiry—is enforced in Art 4 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic “On the Status of a Deputy of the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic.” A deputy inquiry is an appeal by a deputy of the representative structure to a state administration structure or to an official asking for information or an explanation regarding issues relating to the competence of the particular representative institution.8 Decision-making on a vote of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers is an important control function of the parliament in correspondence with Art 95.14 of the Constitution. In execution of this provision, the Constitutional Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Additional Guarantees of the Right to Make Decisions on a Vote of Confidence by the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic was adopted. It was after adoption of this law that the Milli Mejlis obtained the right to appeal to the Cabinet of Ministers for interpellation on issues relating to its powers, whereby “the highest executive power body, the President of the Azerbaijan Repub- lic, shall give a response in the Parliament no later than within a month.” But there are certain limitations on the implementation of this function. For example, the question of a vote of confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers cannot be brought up less than 6 months before a presidential election of the Azerbaijan Republic and may be brought up again only 6 months after the first discussion of this question. Nor are there any legal consequences if the Cabinet of Ministers has already been given a vote of no confidence. Clear delimitation in the law on control powers of the legislative and executive state power structures, as well as a detailed procedure for executing these powers with enforcement of mutual rights and obligations in this process for both sides are important prerequisites for the effective use of control. The existing election system is also very important, which determines the number of parties running for power, and this also means the degree of their influence on the political system. Thus, in order to achieve the most effective model of parliamentary control there should be legislative regulation of the control powers of the representative bodies. In so doing, it should be kept in mind that: a) formal enforcement of control powers in the legislative body far from always means their actual use; b) the effectiveness of the parliament’s control powers largely depends on real responsibility for the non-execution of laws; c) the mechanism of interaction between the legislative (representative) and executive state power bodies, on the one hand, and the public prosecutor and court structures, on the other, in control over law execution must be improved. It is presumed that at the present stage of development such a form of control as parliamentary inquiry should be used more frequently, particularly in the execution of laws. In addition to this, world parliamentary practice shows that the most efficient mechanism for exercising parliamentary control is quasi-judicial parliamentary investigation, which can be followed by retirement of the gov-

8 See: Entsiklopedicheskiy iuridicheskiy slovar, Moscow, 1998, p. 109. 66 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ernment or individual officials if court proceedings can then be instigated against them. Endowing the Milli Mejlis with such a right by means of introducing a corresponding amendment to the Constitu- tion will be a pertinent and timely step aimed at strengthening and expanding the control function of the national parliament.

The Mechanism of Checks and Balances in Azerbaijan’s Reality

The representative nature of the parliament depends not only on the way it is formed or the distinctive features of the election system, but also on the level of interaction in the system of division of power and the system of checks and balances. It is traditionally believed that there should be a balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches that excludes shifting the center of adoption of all power decisions and particularly entire power to one of them.9 The real procedure of the functioning and interaction of the higher state power structures, that is, the state regime, is manifested most graphically in legislative practice. The country’s Constitution determines the legal, juridical model of interrelations between them. In so doing, how realistically the procedure corresponds to the constitutional model largely depends on the methods and ways the main institutions of political (including state) power, which characterize the political regime ruling in the country, function. In order to ensure political stability of the functioning and interaction of the highest state power bodies, the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, along with endowing the national parliament with the listed control powers, also endows the country’s president with such constitutional powers as the right to veto, disbandment of the government, and scheduling a referendum. In this way, the Con- stitution implements a so-called system of checks and balances in interaction with the highest state power structures. In this system, the president’s right to issue decrees, including of a regulatory nature, as well as the right of the Cabinet of Ministers to issue resolutions and instructions on the basis of and in execution of the Constitution, laws, and regulatory decrees of the president, correlate to the functions of the Milli Mejlis regarding the adoption of laws. In turn, the president is endowed with constitutional powers to cancel the resolutions and instructions of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Azerbaijan Repub- lic and Cabinet of Ministers of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, as well as acts of the central and local executive power structures (Art 109 of the Constitution of the AR). As Sh. Aliev notes, with respect to the right to issue decrees, it proceeds from the constitutional status of the president as the head of state and executive administrative acts issued by him are related to the inevitable endowment of the executive power structures with discretion powers (the right of discretion when making decisions in correspondence with the law). The reality of the law is manifested in its execution and the efficiency of state management depends on the successful use of the regulation of the law (general rule) to specific circumstances.10 Under such state regimes to which the Azerbaijan Republic’s belongs, this system is implemented not only for organizing interaction between the branches of power and the president, but also for legislative activity by endowing the president and highest executive and judicial power structures with certain legislative powers. These powers, which are established by the country’s

9 See: M.V. Baglai, V.A. Tumanov, Malaia entsiklopedia konstitutsionnogo prava, BEK Publishers, Moscow, 1998, pp. 392-393. 10 See: Sh. Aliev, Nauchno-prakticheskiy kommentariy k Konstitutsii Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki, Baku, 2000, p. 30. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION constitution, can include the president’s right to place a suspensive veto on laws adopted by the parliament, the removal of which requires a qualified majority of votes; the right of legislative initiative, which belongs to the president, Supreme Court, and prosecutor’s office of the Azerbaijan Republic. An independent judicial power branch was called upon to play a key role in the system of checks and balances, which, in addition to the function of administrating justice, is endowed with the function of judicial control over the activity of all the power branches and structures, the execution of which is necessary for ensuring the practical implementation of the principle of division of power in a democratic law-based state. The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic sets forth that courts and judges are independent and act independently of the legislative and executive power branches. Within the framework of legislative activity, in compliance with Part I, Art 96 of the Consti- tution of the Azerbaijan Republic, in addition to the Milli Mejlis deputies, the President of the Az- erbaijan Republic, the Supreme Court, and Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Azerbaijan Republic, and the Ali Mejlis of the Nakhchyvan Autonomous Republic are endowed with the right of legislative initiative. As can be seen from this list, the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic is not included among the entities with the right of legislative initiative. And although some research- es believe that this right should be granted to the Constitutional Court, justifying this by its activity, direct relation to the Constitution, laws, and regulation-making material,11 in general we think this limitation is very justified. It is the Constitutional Court that has the right to make decisions on cases relating to the compliance of the adopted legislative and other regulatory acts with the Con- stitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, whereby any non-constitutional provisions revealed lose their juridical force by a decision of the Court. This situation places the Constitutional Court in a special position, while giving it the role of arbitrator in legislation issues and the opportunity to come forward with a legislative initiative and initiate the adoption of laws, albeit in a limited way, within the limits of its narrow competence would disrupt the balance and interfere with its ability to be an impartial arbitrator that is not involved in the legislative process and not subject to the influence of political competition. It is not the right of legislative initiative, but the function of judicial control that should be a defining factor in the interrelations not only with the legislative, but also with the executive power branches. The Constitution of the AR also shows this in Part III, Art 130.9, by giving the Constitu- tional Court the right to resolve disputes relating to the delimitation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. In order to execute efficient judicial control over the practical realization of the principle of the division of power, judicial power, the only power branch that is essentially apolitical, should be beyond all the political competition processes, including among the state power bodies. And it should act, in the system of checks and balances, as an independent, politically neutral arbitrator, subordinate in its action exclusively to the Constitution and law, not subject to any influence or, particularly, direct impact from other state institutions or any political or elite groups. In order to ensure the parity and equal participation of the Milli Mejlis and executive power branches in legislative activity on the basis of the democratic principle of the division of power, it seems expedient to create a legal base of this type of state activity in the form of a system of laws on interaction among the highest state power bodies in the legislative process, keeping in mind the system of checks and balances set forth by the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic. This could help to eliminate collisions between them and create legal obstacles to anti-democratic trends in their relations related to the striving of different ruling groups for political domination in legislative activity. This circumstance should also promote an increase in the quality of

11 See: Z.M. Kasumov, Razdelenie vlastei, Baku, 2007, p. 99. 68 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION national legislation with respect to its orientation toward observing and protecting, in particular, human and citizen rights and freedoms, and expression in legislative form of the important interests and objectives of society and state development, and not the private interests of the ruling elite groups. Without this, even in a democratic system of power division, the objectively existing competition between the various branches and structures of state power is a significant factor of political influence on legislative activity. In so doing, we should also keep in mind the fact that the legislator, in turn, when carrying out the functions inherent of him “interferes in power activity at the very moment it appears and during its establishment, as well as throughout its entire functioning.”12 The Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic envisages a sufficiently privileged regime for draft laws submitted to the Milli Mejlis for examination in the legislative initiative procedure. In compliance with Part II, Art 96, such draft laws are submitted for discussion and put to the vote in the established way. In addition, amendments to such draft laws or resolutions are introduced with the consent of the structure executing the right of legislative initiative (Part III, Art 96 of the Con- stitution of the AR). It is presumed that these provisions will restrict the freedom of action of the Milli Mejlis in law-making and place certain limitations on it, which is impermissible. Moreover, as Z. Kasumov points out, the question remains open of whether the Milli Mejlis can overrule the right of legislative initiative of a draft law submitted by the indicated entities or not. Despite the fact that there are no examples of this in the practice of national law-making at present, the researcher concludes that a draft law introduced in this way cannot be overruled.13 It is difficult to agree with this conclusion. n First, Part IV, Art 7 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic guarantees and legally ensures at the highest level the independence of the legislative just like the other branches of state power from each other. “In correlation with the provisions of this Constitution, the legislative, executive, and juridical power branches interact and are independent within the framework of their own powers.” n Second, by expressing its will and adopting the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic by means of universal voting—referendum, the people of Azerbaijan, being the only source of power in the Azerbaijan Republic (Part I, Art 1 of the Constitution of the AR) in instituting state power in the country on the basis of the principle of the division of power in Part III, Art 7 of the Constitution of AR, primarily determine the status of the legislative power branch and only then of the executive and judicial branches.

C o n c l u s i o n

As the current parliamentary practice in Azerbaijan shows, the procedure for forming the Milli Mejlis and organizing its activity is still in the making and looking for an appropriate historical analogy, while certain institutions of the legislative power branch are in need of further improvement. In our opinion, in order for this power branch to undergo advanced development it is necessary to: —give more attention to forming a mechanism of quasi-judicial parliamentary investigation, which could help the national parliament to further strengthen its position in the balance of powers that has developed among the power branches in the Azerbaijan Republic;

12 M.A. Nagornaia, “Rol prava v osushchestvlenii vlastnykh polnomochiy,” in: Vestnik nizhegorodskogo univer- siteta im. N.I. Lobachevskogo, Law Series, No. 2, 2003, p. 80. 13 See: Z.M. Kasumov, op. cit., p. 111. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—make active use of the right granted by the law to deputy inquiry in order to efficiently react to social challenges; —give greater attention to the processing and legislative enforcement of the parliament’s control powers as a whole and of the institution of the government’s responsibility to the parliament in particular. Here it is also appropriate to note that the unsophisticated electoral culture is greatly hinder- ing the intelligent delegation of rights to the voters. The multi-party system that exists in present- day Azerbaijan reflects not so much the diversity of citizens’ social and political interests, as the unsystematic and chaotic nature of political relations. It is no accident that some political parties, including those delegated to the third Milli Mejlis, are not very well organized and represent the interests of small groups. Educational and organizational efforts by the state in this direction would help to increase political pluralism and develop healthy competition among the political parties in the country. 70 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Ibrahim GULIEV

D.Sc. (Geology and Mineralogy), Professor, Academician of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, deputy director of the Institute of Geology, Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of the journal The Azerbaijani Oil Industry (Baku, Azerbaijan).

HYDROCARBON RESOURCES O THE CASPIAN REGION IN THE GLOBAL ENERGY SUPPLY SYSTEM

Abstract

his article looks at the state of the hy- It shows the significant hydrocarbon T drocarbon resource base of the Cas- potential of the region as compared to pian region in the context of the au- the world’s most important oil-bearing ar- thor’s and other expert evaluations. eas.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The end of the 20th-beginning of the 21st centuries have shown that the discovery of one gigantic oil field can affect a state’s destiny and evolution more than all other factors put together. In this respect, during the past 200 years the Caucasus has been and remains today in the epicenter of the world processes. This is primarily due to the discovery and operation of oil fields on the Absheron Peninsula, as well as in the Grozny and Stavropol regions. At the turn of the millennium, the Caspian region found itself in the center of world geopolitics once more. The discovery of gigantic fields, such as Astrakhan, Tengiz, Kashagan, Shakh-Deniz, and Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli, has positioned the Caspian region as the largest raw material base of world class hydrocarbons for the next decade, with all the ensuing consequences. The problems of producing, transporting, refining, and selling oil and gas have shifted from the technological to geopolitical area.

Some Development Trends in the Global Oil and Gas Industry

The time of absolute hegemony of hydrocarbons in the history of civilization is coming to an end. Optimists assure us that there is nothing to worry about for the next 30-40 years, but more informed and so more cautious people reduce this figure to 10-15 years. According to the data of the International Energy Agency, oil production in the world is constantly shrinking at 580 of the 800 large oil fields. In the past decade, the world produced more than double the amount of hydrocarbons than is contained in the newly discovered fields. The discovery of new fields is becoming an increasingly rare phenomenon and they are ever smaller in size. In the last decade, the largest fields were discovered in Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Brazil. The peak of discovery of large fields fell to 1961-1975. But according to several experts, the crisis will come before industrially significant oil reserves end. For the world economy to falter, it is enough to experience a more or less extensive shortage of hydrocarbons, primarily oil, or limited access to it. If the price for oil rises higher than a certain threshold, the consequences could be extremely grievous. Despite the obvious fact that hydrocarbon reserves are finite, there are two views on the prospects for developing oil and gas production in the world. The first is pessimistic and says that the peak of world production has already been reached and more than half of the world oil reserves have already been recovered. M. King Hubbert, a geophysicist who worked for the Shell Company, predicted back in 1956 that U.S. oil production would peak at the beginning of the 1970s and decline there- after. His predictions were scoffed at then but his analysis has since proven to be extremely accurate. It is a well-known fact that when a new field is first discovered there is a rapid growth in oil production volumes during the recovery of the most accessible and, consequently, cheapest oil. As the field undergoes further development, n first it experiences natural depletion and, n second, oil production becomes increasingly expensive. The oil produced at this field loses its competitiveness compared with production at other fields and its volumes gradually begin to decline. The bell curve that depicts oil production dynamics has been called the Hubbert Peak. Colin Campbell, the author of The Coming Oil Crisis, presented data several years ago showing erroneousness of some optimistic predictions made by several international organizations about the time limits for complete development of the world’s proven oil reserves. Campbell accused governments, representatives of the industry, and the scientists of several countries of their obvious lack of desire to recognize the importance of this problem. According to most experts, world oil production could reach its peak in the next decade and then go into decline. According to Kenneth Deffeyes, a professor at Princeton University and author of The View from Hubbert’s Peak, world oil production could reach its peak as early as the middle of this decade. The second viewpoint is optimistic. According to a report by the American Center of Geological Research, world oil production will not reach its peak for another few decades. The latest World Energy Outlook forecast by the International Energy Agency says that the current oil reserves will last the 72 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION world until at least 2020. One of the leaders of the largest oil-producing companies in the world, Exxon-Mobil, is even more optimistic. He believes that there will be no shortage in the world oil market for another 70 years.

Expert Assessments of the Hydrocarbon Potential of the Caspian Region

The appearance of the Caspian region as a new prospective world-class region has aroused immense interest against the background of largely pessimistic predictions about the fate of the oil industry and the desire of transnational monopolies to protect themselves against dependence on the Middle East countries. The intrigue regarding evaluations of the Caspian region’s hydrocarbon potential began at the end of last century when Russian experts, on the one hand, and Western, on the other, presented diametrically opposite assessments that differed by almost an order.1 It is paradoxical that in contrast to the general governing law whereby a region’s resources grow as the state of exploration improves, according to the data of the official Soviet structures, the opposite was seen in the Caspian region. As seismic exploration of the basin in the Southern Caspian increased, there was a steady decrease in the assessments of the size of its potential, which declined by more than 16% during this period.2

Table 1

Official Quantitative Assessments of Proven Hydrocarbon Reserves of the Caspian Sea (1979-1989)3

Total Total length Oil, Condensate, Period of Gas, toe, of seismic million million assessment bcm million profiles, tons tons tons thou. km

01.01.1979 5,650 — 4,450 10,100 10

01.01.1984 3,230 684 5,821 9,735 130

01.01.1989 3,236 590 4,535 8,360 195

According to the assessments made right before the Soviet Union collapsed, the total hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea were divided between Azerbaijan (33%) and Kazakhstan (35%), while Turkmenistan and Russia accounted for 18% and 14% of all the resources, respectively. As for distribution of the proven reserves, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan accounted for approximately 97.5% (87% and 10.5%, respectively) and the Russian Federation for about 2.5%. Not one field containing hydrocarbon in-place reserves was found in the waters contiguous to Kazakhstan.

1 See: A. Konoplianik, Kaspiiskaia neft na Evraziiskom perekrestke, Institute of Geology and Development of Fos- sil Fuels, Moscow, 1998, p. 140. 2 See: I.F. Glumov, Ia.P. Malovitskiy, A.A. Novikov, B.V. Senin, Regionalnaia geologiia i neftegazonosnost Kaspiiskogo moria, Nedra-Biznestsentr, Moscow, 2004. 3 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

Distribution of Hydrocarbon Reserves and Resources in the Areas of the Caspian (1989-1991) (million tons)4

Throughout Category Azerbaijan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Russia the CIS water area

Proven reserves

(A+B+C1+C2) 1988-1991 1,012.2 24.7 — 107.0 880.5

Official assessments of resources

(A+B+C1+D) 1988-1991 8,360.0 1,150.0 2,950.0 1,500.0 2,760.0

More active prospecting at the beginning of 1994 led to a significant increase in the amount of new information. This was promoted by the mass use of new modifications of seismic survey. Specif- ic data about wells appeared, making it possible to shed light on the structure and composition and make adjustments to well and geophysical data. The large amount of new information, difference in methods for assessing resources and reserves, and, frequently, confusion in classifications and termi- nology led to the appearance of great variations in today’s expert assessments of the hydrocarbon potential of the Caspian Sea. As the analysis conducted by experts from the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations and Institute of Geology and Development of Fossil Fuels shows, present-day assessments of recoverable reserves of oil in the Caspian Sea fluctuate within the range of 4-6 billion tons of oil equivalent (toe) and of total hydrocarbon resources within the range of 30-60 billion toe.5 The highest assessments were made in 1997 in a report by the State Department to U.S. Con- gress. With respect to the individual sectors of the Caspian Sea, the data are also quite high. In particular, Kazakhstan’s water area could contain between 9 and 15 billion toe and the Turkmen section, 12.21 billion tons, including 6.74 billion tons of oil and 5.47 tcm of gas.6 One of the latest assessments was made by the author and his Russian colleagues, Professor D.L. Fedorov, former minister of geology and natural resources, and Professor L.E. Levin, a well- known specialist in forecasting oil- and gas-bearing capacities, in the monograph Hydrocarbons Po- tential of the Caspian Region, which came out in Russian and English. Using a new method, the work presents renewed assessments of the initial recoverable resources.7 Let us take a look at the individual sectors of the Caspian Sea keeping in mind our assessments and other expert evaluations available in the literature.

4 Ibidem. 5 See: A. Konoplianik, op. cit. 6 See: Report on the Caspian Sea Region of the EIA Energy Information Administration, 26 October, 1997; 30 De- cember, 1998. 7 See: I.S. Guliev, L.E. Levin, D.L. Fedorov, Uglevodorodnyi potentsial Kaspiiskogo regiona, Nafta-Press, Baku, 2003. 74 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3

Distribution of Potential Hydrocarbon Resources in Paleozoic-Quaternary Deposits among the Oil- and Gas-Bearing Basins and State Sectors, Continent, and Sea (billion tons)8

State Continent Sea TOTAL Sectors

South Caspian Basin

Azerbaijan 9.0 15.0 24.0

Turkmenistan 4.0 7.0 11.0

Iran 2.0 5.0 7.0

Total throughout the basin 15.0 27.0 42.0 Central Caspian Basin

Azerbaijan — 3.0 3.0

Turkmenistan — — —

Russia 6.0 5.0 11.0

Kazakhstan 2.0 4.0 6.0

Total throughout the basin 8.0 12.0 20.0 North Ustiurt Basin

Russia — — —

Kazakhstan 3.0 1.0 4.0

Total throughout the basin 3.0 1.0 4.0 North Caspian Basin

Russia 6.0 — 6.0

Kazakhstan 6.0 12.0 18.0

Total throughout the basin 12.0 12.0 24.0 Total in state sectors

Russia 12.0 5.0 17.0

Kazakhstan 11.0 17.0 28.0

8 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3 (continued)

State Continent Sea TOTAL Sectors

Azerbaijan 9.0 18.0 27.0

Turkmenistan 4.0 7.0 11.0

Iran 2.0 5.0 7.0

TOTAL 38.0 52.0 90.0

Russian Sector

In 1999, a large oil and gas condensate field, Khvalynskoe, was discovered in an area containing geological resources amounting to 250-300 million toe. Two subsequent wells drilled further to the north, on the Shirotnoe elevation, also led to the discovery of an oil and gas condensate field (named after Iu. Korchagin) with preliminary geological reserves of approximately 180 million toe.9 The discoveries made by the first wells in two promising areas and the subsequent discoveries of oil accumulations on the “170 km,” Rakushechnoe, Sarmatskoe, and Tsentralnoe elevations confirmed the sector’s high oil and gas prospects. It was also possible to make an expert evaluation of the forecast hydrocarbon resources of the Russian sector totaling more than 7 billion toe. The evaluations of experts from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ministry of Energy based on these results and other data of thematic and field studies in the northwest water area give slightly lower, but close values of the forecast and prospective geological resources of the sector within the range of 5.4-5.6 billion tons of hydrocarbons.10

Kazakh Sector

In May 2000, drilling of the first exploratory well in Eastern Kashagan was completed. Good quality oil was obtained at a depth of around 5,170 m with a flow rate of 512.8 t/day and gas with a flow rate of 199,000 cubic meters/day. The field’s total geological reserves, according to the assessments of the Kazakhoil National Oil Company, amount to 1.7 billion toe. An exploratory well in the Western Kashagan area produced oil with a flow rate of 463.7 t/day, as well as 215,000 cubic meters/ day of gas, at a depth of 4,250 m.11 This was followed by a series of failures in prospecting in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian (the Tiub-Karagan, Atash, and Kurmangazy structures). And not until recently did representatives of the KazMunaiTeniz Offshore Oil Company unofficially report on a successful result obtained during exploration at the Auezov field under the Zhemchuzhina (Pearl) project. During the first test using an Astra jackup floating drilling rig from Russia’s LUKoil Company, a flow of oil of 300 tons a day was obtained at a depth of 2,340 meters. Auezov, of course, is not Kashagan (which produces up to 1,500-2,000 tons of oil a day), but the obtained result is more than

9 See: I.F. Glumov, Ia.P. Malovitskiy, A.A. Novikov, B.V. Senin, op. cit. 10 Ibidem. 11 Ibidem. 76 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Caspian “Pearl” searchers expected. A decision was made to continue exploration at a depth of 1,850 meters where geologists and drillers hope to obtain much higher indices. Two small structures, Khazar-1, Khazar-2, also seem promising, although their forecast resources are not high. On the whole, Russian experts evaluate the geological resources of the Kazakh sector of the shelf at between 7.5 billion and 8.1 billion toe.12

Turkmen Sector

According to the data of the Turkmenistan Petroleum Industry (Turkmenistan, 2000), between 1996 and 1998 approximately 16,000 km of new seismic cross sections were processed on the Turk- men shelf. This work provided better information about the geological structure of the Turkmen sector, which made it possible to reach more justified conclusions about the region’s potential. Official sources in Turkmenistan gave high assessments of the potential of the Turkmen shelf (12.2 billion toe, see above).13

Iranian Sector

Information on the state of the resource base in the Iranian sector of the Caspian is extremely scanty. According to the assessments of Iranian experts, preliminary seismic surveys of this part of the basin showed that up to 1.6 billion toe of (or approximately 0.4 billion toe of recoverable) resources could be concentrated here. This assessment is essentially the same as one of the Russian experts made earlier regarding the Iranian sector—1.5 billion toe.14

Azerbaijani Sector

The discovered Gunashli, Azeri, and Chirag fields located in the Absheron-Balkhash zone of the Caspian have been a good basis for developing intensive prospecting in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian. Azeri and Western experts estimated the recoverable reserves of the Azeri-Chirag-Gu- nashli mega structure at more than one billion toe.15 The Shakh-Deniz structure was first delineated by Azeri geologists in 1954. Subsequently, the SOKAR Azerbaijani Oil Company drilled two wells of 5,500 m in depth, but stopped drilling for financial and technical reasons. In 1998, the Azerbaijani international operational company began drilling a new well at a water depth of 135 m using a semi-submersible drilling platform, Dede Gorgud. According to the results of drilling and subsequent work, the Shakh-Deniz field contains more than 1,000 bcm of gas and 350 million tons of condensate.16 Along with this and other doubtless achievements, several wells proved commercially unprofitable. During the development by Western oil companies of the resources of the Southern Caspian, prospecting works were carried out in 14 areas and results were obtained in 12 areas, only three of

12 See: I.F. Glumov, Ia.P. Malovitskiy, A.A. Novikov, B.V. Senin, op. cit. 13 Ibidem. 14 Ibidem. 15 See: I.S. Guliev, L.E. Levin, D.L. Fedorov, op. cit. 16 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION which (Garabakh, Ashrafi, and Shakh-Deniz) proved to have reserves of industrial oil and gas. The success of the exploration in terms of the number of productive traps identified thus amounted to 25%. In these areas 19 wells were drilled, 17 of which have been brought up to the level of project facilities and in 6 of which an industrial product has been obtained. Based on this, the success of the exploration in terms of number of productive wells amounts to approximately 35%. The success of the exploration in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea proved much higher than in the Azerbaijani and Kazakh sectors.

Oil Roulette

The relatively low success ratio and high degree of economic risk associated with the extremely high exploration expenses, which sometimes reach 100 million dollars for one offshore area of the Caspian Sea, do not make the region’s prospects, at least in the Southern Caspian, very optimistic. Relative failures always give rise to pessimism, primarily among managers in the energy industry. There are many such examples in the history of oil and gas production. We will remind you that the Leduc field in Canada was not discovered until the Imperial Company had unsuccessfully drilled 133 exploratory wells. The largest world companies drilled approximately 200 wells (“dry” or only with signs of gas) before the first large oil accumulations in the North Sea were discovered. Oil and gas fields are rarely discovered after the first exploratory well is drilled. But a negative result in the first well is only perceived as the final answer for very simple and well-prepared facilities in the areas under exploration. In more complex areas, such as the Southern Caspian, the likelihood of discovering a field with the very first well is estimated at no more than 0.5%. An analysis of the efficiency of exploration in different areas of the Soviet Union over the long run has shown that less than 60% of the fields were discovered after drilling the first well, 75% after one or two, and almost 90% after one to three. There are isolated cases of industrially valuable fields being discovered after drilling the fifth or sixth wells. The distribution of the number of exploratory wells necessary for obtaining a negative conclusion on the oil- and gas-bearing prospects of a facility is approximately symmetrical (after the first well—48%, after one or two—71%, and after one to three—85%). Risks can be reduced when searching for fields by means of deep drilling in two ways: by using the latest technology when preparing the facility for exploratory drilling by means of seismic survey or by carrying out a set of geological-geophysical studies and scientifically justified selection of a facility for exploration based on knowledge of the laws governing the location of hydrocarbon clusters in the area and of regional geological, geophysical, geochemical, and paleogeothermal data. The first way should ensure not only confidence in the availability of a trap (structural form), but also present the possibility of determining the optimal position of the first wells at the facility, as well as provide data on the existence of a collector and cap rock, which is now resolved with the help of additional processing and interpretation of geophysical data. The second way calls for a preliminary evaluation of each facility based on its geological position in the oil- and gas-bearing or prospective basin in the regional respect, and not only in terms of the trap’s individual parameters. Risk-reducing efforts when looking for oil and gas can be extremely effective but do not completely eliminate the risks. Despite the growing difficulties of further prospecting when new regions with difficult geographic conditions (which make drilling more expensive and risks during exploration inevitable) are reached, this work is being resolutely continued with a certain increase in volume. The average spending on prospecting works by the world’s large oil companies amounts to approximately 700 million dollars a year, fluctuating in different companies from 470 to 1,150 million 78 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dollars, which amounts to 12-32% of the spending on the development of previously discovered fields. This spending is stimulated by the fact that, according to geologists’ estimates, there are still 50-150 billion tons of undiscovered recoverable resources of oil and 150-200 tcm of gas in the world.17

Some Geopolitical Aspects

Our analysis confirms the high hydrocarbon potential of the Caspian region as a whole and of the Southern Caspian in particular. For example, in Azerbaijan (on land and offshore) more than one billion 400 million tons of oil and 450 bcm of gas have already been produced,18 and now the gigantic fields of Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli and Shakh-Deniz are being successfully operated. Russia, Kazakh- stan, and Turkmenistan have great prospects. Recently it was announced that prospecting works had begun in the Iranian sector of the Caspian. The analysis of prospecting works conducted makes it possible to claim that as of today there are at least several dozens of promising areas and facilities in the Caspian region, exploration at which will be characterized by low economic and technological risk. In this respect, the Caspian region can currently be regarded as a hydrocarbon base of world significance. Its current relatively small share in the world balance of resources does not determine its significance in the future, since the situation could dramatically change in the next decades. Two main scenarios are possible. If there are no major discoveries of new fields in the Caspian in the next decade, the region will be assigned the role in world energy that the North Sea has played for the past 20 years. In itself this place in world energy guarantees stable development and gradual integration into the world economic community. If discoveries of giant and large fields continue and at least 30% of the region’s potential resources are realized, that is, recoverable reserves amount to more than 20 billion toe, other scenarios will be possible. The countries of the Caspian region will undoubtedly try to pursue their own oil policy, which will naturally arouse opposition among international transnational companies and states. The struggle over the world’s last large oil and gas reserves is the main geopolitical intrigue of the 21st century. There are almost no oil regions left today in the world that are not seized by conflict. In addition to traditional Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus, they include the Sudan, where trans-African pipelines could pass and large oil fields are being developed, Nigeria, the Horn of Africa, Bolivia, Myanmar, and Indonesia. There is also unrest close to the Algerian oil and gas pipelines going to Europe, in the Mozambique Channel (where many islands belong to France), and in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. The countries of Southeast Asia and China have been disputing for several decades now over who the bed of the South China Sea belongs to. The same conflicts are going on between Japan and China and both Koreas. Nor can we forget the disputes that flared up recently over possession of the Arctic shelf. The list can go on. Thousands of pipeline kilometers will be built throughout the world in the next 10-15 years. And all of this is designed to transport oil as quickly as possible from Western to Northern or Eastern Africa, let’s say, or from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf and Europe, the Indian Ocean and even the Pacific Ocean (including via Afghanistan and China). There are also plans regarding transnational control of pipelines, whereby for years ahead, with respect to many countries, including the new gas arteries from the south and southeast of the former Soviet Union to Europe, from the Kurdish and other regions of Iraq, and from the African Mediterranean.

17 See: “Koeffitsient udachi,” Neft Rossii, No. 3, March 1999, available at [http://www.oilru.com/nr/51/82/]. 18 See: “Istoriia nefti i gaza,” Neftegazovaia vertikal, Issue 8, 2006, available at [http://www.ngv.ru/article.aspx? articleID=21658]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION C o n c l u s i o n

In the global economy, energy security means more today than simply protecting fields, refin- eries, and pipelines from terrorist acts. The world is facing the prospect of divvying up energy resources anew, so far it is a cold war among those who have energy resources and those who do not have enough. In this sense, hydrocarbon resources are being used as a “political bargaining chip” and this capital must be used with great care and perspicacity. The countries of the Caspian region, including Azerbaijan, are succeeding in this so far. The positive side of having enormous resources is primarily accelerated integration into the world economic and financial system, technological rearming of the basic industries, and investment of significant funds into science, technology, and education.

Rozeta ASATIANI

D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, Tbilisi Institute of Market Economy and Law (Tbilisi, Georgia).

POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITION PERIOD IN THE GEORGIAN ECONOMY

Abstract

his article analyzes the initial condi- amines the specific features and stages T tions and mechanisms of the post- of economic reforms in Georgia in 1991- communist transition period and ex- 2008.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The breakup of the U.S.S.R. and the related serious changes in the global political and economic space confronted the post-communist countries with the need to address a complex and unusual task unprecedented in world history: the task of transition from the command economy to a market economy. In Georgia, as in other countries of the Central Caucasus,1 the Soviet period is also known as the time of a 70-year socialist experiment. The Soviet Union was a country with dominant state ownership (90%) and a rigid vertical structure of administrative command, with a dictatorial regime and disrupted horizontal relations. The

1 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press, Stock- holm, 2006. 80 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION logical result of this was a closed, “shortage” economy, mainly resource-intensive production of the extensive type with low economic growth rates. Of course, in some areas—education, science, culture, space exploration, nuclear power industry, metallurgy, aviation, etc.—the country achieved significant successes. But they were obviously insufficient to decide the fate of the competition between capitalism and socialism. In 1990, GDP per capita in the Soviet Union ($5.5 thousand) was almost 3.5 times smaller than the figure for the developed countries ($19.80 thousand) and 4.5 times smaller than the U.S. figure ($24 thousand), although it was 2.5 times larger than the same indicator for the developing countries ($2.15 thousand).2 In 1990, GDP growth in the Soviet Union (at 1982 prices) was negative and amounted to 2.2%.3

The 1990s as the Beginning of a New Era in Georgia

The collapse of “barracks socialism” in the East European countries and in the Soviet Union, nearly paralleled by the latter’s disintegration, which resulted in the emergence of independent states seeking to create a new economic system, was one of the most unprecedented phenomena of the 20th century. The well-known American economist John Kenneth Galbraith ranked this event among the three greatest events of the 20th century along with the two world wars.4 It triggered profound transformation processes and raised qualitatively new problems whose solution goes beyond the limits of the classical schemes developed by economic science throughout its entire previous history.5 Hence it is logical that the post-communist countries, including Georgia, entered a new type of transition period without parallel in the history of world civilization. Whereas the transition from wild capitalism to a market economy was based on an economic theory already developed by John Maynard Keynes in the form of a “general theory of employment, interest and money,” the transition from state-monopoly socialism to a market system began spontaneously against the background of a disintegrating economy and without a proper economic theory adapted to the existing situation. When the Western countries began constructing a market economy, they had the necessary initial conditions, whereas in Georgia and other post-communist countries in the 1990s such conditions were virtually absent. The referendum of 31 March, 1991, and the restoration of state independence radically changed Georgia’s course of development not only in the political, but also in the economic and ideological spheres. Georgia joined the process of progressive changes underway in the world economy. From the very beginning it faced a difficult task: to create appropriate conditions for a painless transition from state-monopoly socialism to a market economy. Meanwhile, the old economic system in Georgia began to disintegrate overnight, without any preparation. Matters were complicated by unfavorable initial conditions and low economic potential, and also by internal strife, the division of society into mutually antithetic parts, and a war to preserve the country’s territorial integrity. All of this has naturally had a negative effect on the final results of economic transformation. A significant role in Georgian economic conversion was played by international organizations: the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, and others. Their recommendations

2 See: B. Bolotin, “Mezhdunarodnye sravnenia: 1990-1997,” ME i MO, No. 10, 1998, p. 120. 3 Calculations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (see: “Sovetski ekonomicheski rost: ofitsialnye dannye i al’ternativnye otsenki,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 10, 1995, p. 106). 4 See: J.K. Galbraith, “Economics in the Century Ahead,” in: The Future of Economics, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, p. 17. 5 See: V. Papava, Necroeconomics. The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism, I Universe, New York, 2005, pp. 12-17. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and proposals were basically analogous to the reforms being implemented in the post-socialist countries, especially in Russia, and did not take into account Georgia’s peculiarities, its national interests or the difficult socioeconomic situation in the country. This policy was also to some extent justified, because at the beginning of the reforms Georgia was in the ruble zone and did not have a national currency, which prevented it from implementing reforms based on its own model. The systemic transformation processes launched in Georgia along with political processes spanned across the economic, social, cultural and other spheres. It was clearly stated that the strategy for the transition period was to create a mixed economic system and go over to a market economy. The success of socioeconomic transformation depended in large part on the mechanism for regulating economic processes, a correct assessment of the country’s potential, the level and quality of the institutionalization process started in the country, etc. As it turned out, the government was unprepared to coordinate these systemic reforms, to develop effective control mechanisms or protect the economy from dogmas imposed from outside. On the contrary, in that difficult situation the state quite illogically confined itself, to use Adam Smith’s metaphor, to performing the functions of a “night watchman” and let economic processes take their course. We turned toward pure liberalism when the developed countries had already turned away from it. “Minimal government” in economic policy is now a thing of the past for the civilized world. The state’s economic role in Georgia was absolutely minimized. Add to this the grave legacy of the past. Criminal activities intensified. A specific—consumerist—attitude to the fatherland came to the fore. Many criminals found their way into the upper echelons of power. Against the background of a civil confrontation in the extreme situation of the emergence of a new economic system, the key role was assigned to economic liberalization.

Models of Transition to a Market Economy and Macroeconomic Stabilization

The success or failure of reforms depends to a large extent on the model chosen by the country at the initial stage of economic reform. In this sense, world practice has advanced “shock therapy” and the gradualist model. Shock therapy implies, first and foremost, accelerated transformation through shock treatment and is mainly based on the following principles: lifting of price controls, rapid price and foreign trade liberalization on the basis of free pricing, denationalization of property and creation of private property, minimization of the state’s economic role, etc. It is characterized by excessive radicalism as expressed in a dismantling of the existing economy, in its destruction by different methods. This way of transition to a market economy is not meant to develop the country’s production potential. Its main goal is to liberalize the economy, achieve financial stability, and minimize the budget deficit. The gradualist model focuses on a transformation and renewal of state institutions with a significant retention of the state’s role in the economy, promotion of national production, preservation of state monopolies in key sectors, etc. Based on elements of the old economic system, it implies gradual evolutionary transformation. That is why this gradualist (evolutionary) model is also known as structural-production macro stabilization. It differs radically from other models of macroeconomic stabilization and is designed to develop the country’s production potential and enhance the competitiveness of domestic products. Out of these two models of transition to a market economy, Georgia chose shock therapy. This model, also known as the Big Bang approach, was implemented based on the “Washington Consen- 82 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sus” and proved to be non-optimal for Georgia. It is no accident that shock therapy received a negative assessment from the “Post-Washington Consensus” itself, and the emphasis in post-communist countries was shifted to the new role of the state. In the structure of systemic economic transformation, macroeconomic stabilization plays a decisive role. Without such stabilization, institutional, micro and macro economic transformations, as well as other components of systemic transformation, are distorted. Indeed, institutional transformations (denationalization of property, development of a new legislative framework, creation of a market infrastructure, resource markets, goods and services markets, etc.), and also price liberalization, demonopolization of the economy, antimonopoly regulation, liberalization of foreign economic relations, transition from a closed to an open economy, etc., depend in large part on macroeconomic stabilization. Under macroeconomic instability, market infrastructure institutions take a clearly speculative turn; price liberalization can develop into hyperinflation, and so on. Macroeco- nomic stabilization, for its part, cannot be achieved without institutional, micro and mega economic transformations. World practice knows the following major models of macroeconomic stabilization: orthodox, heterodox and structural-production. Under the orthodox approach, the emphasis is on reducing the state budget through cuts in public spending (on public administration, defense, social protection, government transfers, subsidies, investments, etc.). It is characterized by a tightening of fiscal policy, reduced tax breaks, an increase in taxes, etc. Tight fiscal policy is coupled with a tightening of monetary policy, which is reflected in “dear money” policy. This is expressed in limited issue of currency by the central bank, higher interest rates, rising reserve requirements for banks, etc. In orthodox macroeconomic stabilization there are two ways of selecting economic stabilizers (so-called “anchors”): in the first case, the emphasis is on limiting the amount of national currency in circulation, i.e., on a “monetary anchor” based on monetary methods. This includes a tight fiscal and monetary policy coupled with a floating exchange rate, when anti-inflation measures are confined to reducing aggregate demand and restricting the money supply. In the second case, the emphasis is on stabilizing the exchange rate by establishing a fixed rate or a currency band, i.e., on an “exchange rate anchor.” These measures help to reduce inflation expectations, to anticipate the economic behavior of market actors, etc. The emphasis here is on foreign currency (mainly the dollar) and on maintaining exchange rate stability. Thus, the orthodox macroeconomic stabilization model is an expression, on the one hand, of monetary policy (monetary anchor), and on the other, of a fixed exchange rate (exchange rate anchor). In a weak economy, this creates significant problems such as low investment and business activity, a decline in the scientific and technical potential, a deepening payment crisis, reduced opportunities for expanding production, a drop in the share of domestic products in the national market, a shrinking tax base, falling budget revenues, declining national economic security, etc. The heterodox approach focuses on “freezing” income and prices. It is also known as the “third anchor” of financial stabilization in economic theory and practice. This model, especially in the form of a “shock,” creates a quick anti-inflationary effect but produces negative results as well: value signals are distorted; incentives to develop production disappear; the threat of a goods shortage appears on the horizon, etc. The heterodox model combines the principle of rapid financial stabilization characteristic of shock therapy with the principle of fixed and temporarily frozen prices. Its strategy implies a mechanical combination of the main postulates of neoliberal and neo-Keyne- sian theories.6 The third macroeconomic stabilization model is structural-production stabilization. In contrast to shock therapy, this is a gradualist, evolutionary approach. It is characterized by a more

6 See: J. Stiglitz, “More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus,” available at [http://www.rep.org.br/pdf/73-5.pdf]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION active economic role of the state with the use of well-tried regulatory methods coupled with a progressive structural and investment policy, retention of government control over the key sectors of the economy, modernization of production, protection of local producers, promotion of scientific research, etc. A good example of gradualism is modern China, which has launched a massive modernization of its economic production potential on market principles; by means of an active structural, production and investment policy, it ensures a renewal of production facilities, while its efforts to reduce production costs and improve product quality serve to enhance the competitiveness of domestic products and to increase aggregate supply, which ultimately produces an anti-inflationary effect. At the same time, China is working to increase aggregate demand, which simultaneously provides a basis for addressing social problems. It should be noted that the share of domestic investment in China’s GDP is high, reaching 40%. Structural-production stabilization programs lead to an easing of credit restrictions and provide opportunities for monetary expansion, and this poses a threat of faster inflation. At the same time, inflation can be kept in check by tightening control over monetary expansion, as expressed in control over natural monopoly prices, development of cashless payments, and constant attention to macroeconomic dynamics in general. Moreover, inflation created in this way is short-term. It manifests itself only at the initial stage, gradually abating with a recovery in production. Consequently, financial stabilization achieved in this way differs significantly from liberal monetarist policy. The main thing is that it provides an opportunity to saturate the market with domestic products while ensuring the country’s economic security. Naturally, the implementation of the structural-production model faces a number of obstacles. This includes the need for funds to achieve the said goal, a fairly long waiting period, a high risk of inflation, and strong bureaucratic barriers associated with the implementation of adopted decisions. Our brief survey of macroeconomic stabilization models suggests the following conclusion: Georgia’s macroeconomic policy of transforming (converting) the economy was oriented toward the first, orthodox model. As for the gradualist model, Georgia missed the chance of a gradual, evolutionary transition to a market economy. Consequently, the macroeconomic stabilization model and shock therapy were imposed from outside and provided the basis for Georgian economic policy.

The Stages of Economic Conversion

Judging by the results achieved in systemic transformations, current transformation processes in Georgia (raised to the rank of economic conversion) make it possible to divide the new-type transition period into stages. This period (1991-2008) has its specific features and peculiarities and can be divided into three stages: Stage I (1991-1995), Stage II (1996-2003) and Stage III (from 2004 to date). In order to identify the main trends of the transition period and make an objective assessment of the country’s socioeconomic development, each stage should be analyzed separately. Stage I, as the initial period of economic reforms, had the following features: in the first place, it was associated with the grave consequences of the command system. In particular, Georgia (like some other post-Soviet republics), in contrast to the East European countries and Russia, after gaining political independence was obliged to address two extremely difficult tasks: while implementing shock therapy, it had to create its own public institutions. The lack of public institutions, of a national monetary system and a national currency (Georgia still remained in the ruble zone, and the Russian ruble of the already disintegrated Soviet Union circulated in the country) prevented the application of shock therapy. This is confirmed, among other things, by the fact that the classical shock therapy 84 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION scheme—the Balcerowicz Plan—was implemented in Georgia by slavish imitation, as a reflection of this plan in the Russian “mirror.”7 In this situation, a deficient version of shock therapy, implemented based on liberalization mainly confined to prices, was doomed to failure.8 In the opinion of the well-known American economist and sociologist J.K. Galbraith, reforms begin not with a new government or laws, but with our views on the economic system.9 In all fairness, one must say that the difficulties of the transition period in Georgia were associated not only with the grave consequences of the command system or mental stereotypes ingrained in the public consciousness, but also with an acute shortage of knowledge. Along with goods shortages, there was a clear shortage of people inspired by reformist ideas. Society encountered many problems that were alien to it but were well known in Western countries. The creation of an orderly economic system out of economic chaos required specialized knowledge and professionalism. Another reason for the unfortunate start of economic reforms was a rise in social and ethnic tensions. Various kinds of separatism, internal civil and territorial conflicts with autonomies caused ir- reparable damage to the national economy. No other country started its transition to a market economy in conditions of such devastations as in Georgia. The material damage from the war in the territory of Abkhazia alone exceeds 9 billion lari (GEL), while the damage caused in the Tskhinvali Region is GEL 78 million. The total damage from destruction and fires in Georgia is close to GEL 3 billion, while the damage from military action in Tbilisi is GEL 33 million.10 It should also be noted that the state preserved certain sunset industries and obsolete production facilities that did not meet current requirements, thereby, one might say, conserving the economy. The problem of overcoming excessive monopolization and shortages was also high on the agenda. But the political will for this was lacking, and there was no integrated strategic program taking into account the country’s specific features, which further complicated the development of market relations. Price liberalization in the conditions of an acute shortage of goods operated as an extreme form of administrative command in the economy. It put a heavy burden on society. Here is how U.S. Pro- fessor A. Ivanov assessed this phenomenon: paving the way to a market economy in the conditions of a shortage of goods is suicidal. It is the same as performing heart surgery without anesthesia: the pa- tient will die of pain shock on the operating table.11 True, the price reform in Georgia was launched on 1 February, 1992, but free-market prices for some goods were first introduced in the spring of 1991. Whereas in 1991 the consumer price index was 180%, in 1992 it increased 25-fold, in 1993, 92-fold, and in 1994, 120-fold. Regulated consumer prices soared as well: in 1992, they increased 68-fold compared to 1991, whereas household money income increased only 3.4-fold.12 It is interesting to note that price rises were not accompanied by appropriate market behavior such as an increase in production and, consequently, an increase in supply; on the contrary, this process had the opposite effect. The destructive impact of market instruments without a market caused a slump in production. In effect, production was stifled. Whereas in 1989 output fell by 4.8%, in 1990 it dropped by 12%, followed by 20.6% in 1991, 44.8% in 1992, 25.4% in 1993, and 11.3% in 1994.13 In these conditions, the implementation of a liberal monetary policy (which did not fit into the classical scheme) led to the disintegration of the whole economy. At the same time, there was a worsening of the crime situation with subsequent plunder of the economy.

7 V. Papava, op. cit., p. 125. 8 Ibid., pp. 125-128. 9 See: J.K. Galbraith, Ekonomicheskiye teorii i tseli obshchestva (Economics and the Public Purpose), Transl. from the English, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, p. 270. 10 See: Indicative Plan for Socioeconomic Development in Georgia for 1996-2000, Tbilisi, 1996 (in Georgian). 11 See: Argumenty i fakty, No. 23, 1991. 12 See: Indicative Plan for Socioeconomic Development in Georgia for 1996-2000. 13 R. Asatiani, A Small Country Has No Right to Make Big Mistakes, Siakhle Publishers, Tbilisi, 2005 (in Geor- gian). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In the spring of 1993, the authorities introduced a money substitute: the coupon. This was done without any preparation and was a forced move because the country was left without a currency unit due to an undersupply of ruble notes from Russia. This weak, inconvertible and blocked medium of exchange did not fit into the economy from the very beginning. The depth of the crisis of underproduction in Georgia at that time was self-evident: a drop in output, a sharp worsening of the goods shortages resulting in excess money supply, rapid price rises and high inflation, weak government regulation, uncontrolled monetary circulation, rapidly increasing budget deficit, widespread clandestine usury, rapid growth of unemployment, freewheeling mafia clans, an extremely weak material and technical base, an acute shortage of skilled personnel, emigration of frustrated entrepreneurs, tensions between the center and the regions, degradation of accounting and control, lack of accounting discipline, and emergence of quasi-market structures and relations. All of this culminated and was reflected in the coupon, which depreciated rapidly in this situation. Its unlim- ited issue led to hyperinflation. From the second half of 1993, inflation ran at 60-70% per month, and the consumer price index reached 7,587.9%. This was the peak of consumer price rises. By the end of 1993, galloping inflation processes developed into hyperinflation. In 1993-1994, the country had no approved budget. In the autumn of 1994, the official exchange rate was 2.5 million coupons per dollar, while the actual exchange rate was around 5.4 million coupons. That year inflation stood at 7,380%. The population found itself in unbearable conditions, with average monthly wages of $1.5 and pensions equivalent to 10 cents.14 This was coupled with an increase in the state budget deficit, a reduction in gold reserves, growing domestic demand for imports, a worsening structure of thg external balance, etc. At the same time, the harmful practice of using National Bank loans to cover the budget deficit became habitual. In addition, the Georgian economy was paralyzed by the destructive impact of the war in the Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia. A huge army of refugees appeared in the country and put a heavy burden on the economy. The black market swelled, in effect assuming the responsibility for the biological survival of the population. In early 1994, the authorities adopted an anti-crisis program of macroeconomic stabilization and systemic transformation. Cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was resumed at a qualitatively new level. Their financial support in adopting and implementing stabilization programs was immense. In the second half of 1994, the intense crisis processes at work in the country began to slow down, although in 1995 the decline in production was reduced by only 5%. That year Georgia already had a budget approved by parliament. In late 1994, the National Bank began implementing a tight monetary policy, which made it possible to check hyperinflation and created objective conditions for a currency reform. Annual inflation in that period was just over 50%. In the autumn of 1995, Georgia introduced a national currency, the lari, which was declared the only legal tender. Its exchange rate against the dollar was 1.3 lari per dollar. The decline in production and the five-year economic recession gave way to growth. In 1995, growth was recorded at 0.4%.15 From the end of 1995, significant changes occurred in Georgian economic policy, with a switch from the shock-therapy way of transition to a liberal monetarist model. This ushered in Stage II of economic reforms. Since then, this orthodox line of macroeconomic stabilization has provided the basis for the country’s economic policy. The socioeconomic phenomena and processes that subsequently developed in the Georgian economy fit amazingly well into this model. In particular, as a result of a tight fiscal policy the state budget deficit began to shrink, as expressed in growing taxes, reduced tax breaks, cuts in government social spending, government transfers, subsidies, etc. This tight fiscal policy was followed by a tightening of monetary policy, known as dear (tight) money. As

14 See: Materials of the National Bank of Georgia. 15 Ibidem. 86 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION a policy directed against the inflationary spiral, it implies stringent restrictions on the money supply, which include, apart from reduced issue of currency, a rise in bank reserve requirements. The latter automatically reduces commercial bank reserves and, consequently, the money multiplier. The main purpose of dear money policy is to suppress inflation by cutting the money supply and to stabilize the lari exchange rate. As a result of organizational and economic measures implemented in Georgia, inflation processes were brought under control. A step forward in pulling Georgia out of the economic crisis was the adoption of an Indicative Plan for Social and Economic Development in Georgia for 1996-2000. A number of institutional transformations were put into effect. In 1996-1997, steadily high rates of economic growth and moderate inflation were recorded in Georgia. GDP grew on average by 11%, but due to a number of internal and external factors the GDP growth rate in 1998 was 2.9% lower than in 1997.16 The budget crisis in Georgia in effect started in the first half of 1998. Dear money policy created such significant problems as low investment and business activity, a payment crisis, a shrinking tax base, declining national economic security, etc. All of this was expressed in a sharp drop in state budget revenue. Attention should also be paid to the fact that when the government, after curbing hyperinflation, continued its anti-inflation policy, it placed emphasis on external debt for covering the budget deficit. Georgia’s growing external debt (its share was over 60%) made the national economy dependent on world organizations and on conditions in global financial markets, which served to create an irrational public expenditure structure. Moreover, external debts were supplemented with domestic debt, so that the 2003 state budget was mainly based on debt repayment. This included external debt service and payment of current and old wage and pension arrears. At that time, there were 900 thousand pensioners in Georgia. Payment of 14 lari pensions required GEL 151,200 thousand a year. If we add to this GEL 55 million of assistance to refugees, annual payments under this item required more than GEL 200 million.17 Taking into account public sector wages and external debt service, one can easily imagine the difficult situation in which Georgia found itself after 12 years of reforms. The efforts to curb inflation should have created conditions for growth of investment in the economy, but they only caused a short-term slowdown in inflation, merely “quenching the fire” instead of promoting economic development. That is why it gradually became impossible to keep inflation in check over the long term. It is common knowledge that real stability of the national currency and prices depends on national production and not on the government’s monetary manipulations. Comment here, so to speak, is superfluous: after 12 years of reforms aimed at economic conversion, we produced only one-third of the 1990 figure. Whereas in 1990 Georgia’s national wealth stood at $655 billion, by 2000 it shrank to $388 billion, having lost 59.2%.18 Banks were in effect isolated from investment activity, because high interest rates and low aggregate demand limited private enterprise. Corruption became standard practice, and local production was further undermined by widespread smuggling. The government came to a dead end and could not protect local producers; moreover, it was even unable to create proper laws suitable for the country. Instead of investment in national production, capital fled abroad, because local production was unprofitable and unreliable. Business risk was high, and cashless payments were paralyzed. Instead of that, the hidden economy reached an unprecedented scale (over 60%), and in some areas, as in health care, its share was around 75-85%.19 Georgian economic policy could not keep pace with these de-

16 See: Statistical Yearbook. State Statistics Department of Georgia, Tbilisi, 2003 (in Georgian). 17 See: Materials of the Ministry of Finance of Georgia, Tbilisi, 1996. 18 See: I. Archvadze, What Color Is a Billion?, Mercury, Tbilisi, 2002, p. 21 (in Georgian). 19 See: Statistical Yearbook, p. 57. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION velopments. The country was unable to make proper use of the soft loans and grants that streamed into the country. These and other negative factors prevented the transition to a market economy and progress. Democratic society is based on the rule of law, which has clearly been “in short supply” in Georgia since independence to this very day. It is known that business does not seek to protect such universal values as freedom, rule or law, etc. New institutions are created for their protection, and this is undoubtedly one of the benefits of globalization. Such institutions were created in Georgia as well. As for assistance, a number of global organizations did a great deal in this area, but things did not move forward for lack of political will in the country. That is why the step forward taken by Georgia in the early 1990s was followed by two steps back, with the result that the Soviet monopoly built on the slogan of social justice was replaced with a capitalist monopoly built on clan interests. For this reason, the responsibility of the government authorities fell disastrously, and public interests were subordinated to the interests of a few individuals. We did not take the path that would have led us to the set goal. Although in all fairness it should be noted that in that period there were positive changes as well, with an improvement in some macroeconomic indicators. For example, GDP in 2003 reached 46.8% of the 1990 level instead of 26.3% in 1995 ($866 per capita instead of $614, respectively), etc.20 But this was, so to speak, a drop in the ocean and did not have a significant impact on the country’s economic development. Hence it is no wonder that a new model of revolution appeared in Georgia, drawing the attention of world public opinion. In 2004, Georgia entered Stage III of radical reforms, which continues to date. The “Rose Rev- olution” was assessed as an expression of efforts to protect the people’s constitutional rights and was a kind of response to globalization. Significant assistance in implementing reforms has been provided under the EU technical assistance program, a USAID project called Business Climate Reform in Georgia, the U.N. Develop- ment Program, etc. Special attention has been paid to institutional transformations in all areas of social and economic life, the creation of an administrative and civil service, steps to upgrade and simplify the tax code, improvement of the structure of the judicial system, measures to eliminate the hidden economy and scale down corruption, etc. Improvements in tax administration and cuts in public spending have helped to overcome the permanent state budget deficit that existed until 2003 and have provided an opportunity to balance the budget. From this perspective, certain steps forward have been taken in the past five years: company registration procedures have been simplified; under the new customs code adopted in 2007, the number of tariffs has been reduced from 16 to 3, with changes in tariff rates (which used to range from 1% to 25%). Today they are as follows: 12% for agricultural products, 5% for building materials, and 0% for other goods. The simplification of the customs code has boosted exports. Special attention is paid to attracting foreign investments and bank loans. According to official data, in 2004-2007 the inflow of private foreign capital increased 4.6-fold to $2.3 billion.21 Despite positive changes, Georgia still faces difficult socioeconomic and political problems. First of all, it has proved impossible to balance out social relations and achieve social solidarity in order to avoid armed conflicts, maintain and develop the public sector, etc. Quasi-democracy hinders economic development and the transition to a market economy. In conditions of extremely low demand, social polarization tends to increase. According to the World Bank, Georgia ranks 24th on the list of countries with the highest poverty rate. Today’s pension (despite the trend toward its increase) covers less than a third of the cost of living. A significant part of the population is isolated from business activity, to say nothing of privatization processes

20 Ibidem. 21 See: Economic Trends in Georgia. Quarterly Review, GEPLAC, October 2008, p. 7 (in Georgian). 88 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION rapidly developing in the country without regard for national specifics or social requirements. The protection of private property is inadequate, which poses a serious threat to the development of market relations in Georgia.22 The official statistical service is under government pressure. Unhealthy statistics artificially change the real picture and make it hard to draw correct conclusions. The education system is in a particularly difficult situation in view of mismanaged reforms in this area. In terms of the human development index (first reflected in the U.N. Development Program, with the addition in 1991 of average years of schooling as the basis for a knowledge index), which ranges from 0 to 100 points, 177 countries are divided into three groups. Countries with 80 or more points fall into the high human development category, and those with under 50 points, into the low human development category. Georgia was in the medium category with 72.9 points, but in the 12 ill-fated years it acquired the status of a developing country. True, in terms of the said indicator Georgia has remained in the medium category, but its position has worsened. In the rankings for 2005, it was only in 96th place compared to 81st place in 2002.23 Although average annual growth of real GDP in Georgia in 2003-2007 was around 9% and in 2005-2007 over 10%,24 the 1990 level has not been achieved to date. According to the International Monetary Fund, the business climate has improved, but contracts are still being broken, the judicial system is weak, and the country has been unable to get rid of deep-rooted corruption. Georgia has failed to become an export-oriented country. Since independence until today it has been unable to avoid a negative fiscal balance. Georgia faces the threat of total unemployment. Eco- nomic activity is declining, and employment is naturally declining as well. Experts say that at least 25% of the population could lose their jobs. The main causes of unemployment in Georgia are not of recent origin but are endogenous. A new wave of job losses began after the war of August 2008. The main reason for this was the unsuit- able business environment and, against that background, company refusal to invest in Georgia. The global financial crisis has further worsened the situation. Georgian migrant workers are returning home, and remittances from Georgian citizens living abroad are decreasing. In addition, there are more than 20 thousand refugees from territories occupied by Russia in the August 2008 war (9 villages in the Didi Liakhvi Gorge, 5 villages in the Patara Liakhvi Gorge and 2 villages in the Frone River Valley, and also the Akhalgori District and the Kodori Valley). Thus, the almost 18-year economic reform in Georgia has created more problems than it has solved. The country has once again come to an economic dead end. The construction of a new economic system should have provided the basis for a system built on the principles of rising living standards and social justice. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Instead of a socially oriented market economy, the order of the day in Georgia is sheer biological survival and national salvation. Poor governance and current economic policy have led to the destruction of the economy. Despite the difficult political and socioeconomic situation, Georgia has the potential to resolve its challenging problems. First of all, it is necessary to take advantage of available opportunities and make proper use in the country’s interests of the $4.5 billion grant and loan that Georgia is to receive (through 2010). Support for export-oriented lines of production should become a top priority, while imports of technology and development of leasing should take precedence over imports of consumer durables.25

22 See: V. Papava, “The Essence of Economic Reforms in Post-Revolutionary Georgia: What about the European Choice?,” Georgian International Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2008, pp. 8-9. 23 See: Statistics of the Human Development Report. 2008. 24 See: Economic Trends in Georgia. Quarterly Review, p. 7. 25 See: M. Kakulia, “Postwar Economic Threats in Georgia and the Ways to Neutralize Them,” in: Economic Trends in Georgia. Quarterly Review, p. 10. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

If Georgia is to get on its feet, the first thing to do is to develop an economic policy taking into account the country’s peculiarities. But most important of all, this requires political will both within and outside the country.

C o n c l u s i o n

After the restoration of state independence, Georgia embarked on an extremely complicated transition to market relations. Today, 18 years later, the political and socioeconomic situation in Georgia remains difficult. This is due not only to adverse initial conditions, but also to internal conflicts, wars to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and, most importantly, to inappropriate economic policy. The main purpose of shock therapy was to liberalize the economy instead of developing the country’s production potential, while the orthodox macroeconomic stabilization model was expressed in so-called dear money policy, whose main purpose was to curb inflation by cutting the money supply and to stabilize the lari exchange rate. Since 2004, despite positive changes mainly expressed in measures to simplify tax administration, Georgia continues to face challenging socioeconomic and political problems. Quasi- democracy impedes economic development in conditions of extremely low demand and social stratification. All of this, in my opinion, clearly shows that the transition period in Georgia is not yet over.

Hadjiaga RUSTAMBEKOV

Ph.D. (Econ.), associate professor, Department of International Economic Relations, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

STATE POLICY IN THE COORDINATES O POST-SOVIET MARKET TRANS ORMATION

Abstract

ost-Soviet market transformation has are the primary factor of social develop- P focused attention on the applied as- ment, while economics and politics play pects of concepts dealing with the an instrumental role in their realization. role of the state in the economy. In many The author analyzes these problems with cases, the main theme of discussion is due regard for the impact of globaliza- still the primacy of economics or politics. tion processes on the economy and state But it is the interests of the individual that policy. 90 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I n t r o d u c t i o n

Since ancient times, the state has been the central institution of the social order, that is why it has occupied the minds of practically all great thinkers in history. Despite the significance of various attributes identified by many analysts, priority is given to such a qualitative characteristic of the state as its integrity. This is because a deterministic interaction between all spheres of life is immanent in statehood as such, in different eras and in any form: essentially, it is a blend of politics, economics, culture, religion, traditions and customs. The primary element of this unity is represented in the individual, whose social relationships are always formed in a concrete natural and social environment, for which the state provides a frame of reference at a certain stage of evolution. The definition of the state as an exponent of common interests goes back to Aristotle, who wrote: “…As a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so is a citizen, although the province of one sailor may be different from another’s (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a boatswain, and so on, each having their several appointments), ... yet there are some things in which the same description may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety of the ship is the common business of all of them, for this is the general centre of all their cares: so also with respect to citizens, although they may in a few particulars be very different, yet there is one care common to them all, the safety of the community, for the community of the citizens composes the state.”1 This simile contains a very important truth, because the mechanism of the state, like that of a ship, rests on the organization of motivated human actions. The state sets guidelines (coordinates) for these actions comparable to the course of a ship followed by the political forces at the helm of the state. The state is a vehicle of power, and those who exercise this power usually appeal to the people, the individual, and the citizen. But they themselves do not always live up to their own slogans, which often turn into demagogic ones. This is largely associated with the degree of individual utility that man represents in different eras as an accidental part of certain social entities, be it clans, tribes, com- munes, castes, estates or classes. Their interests (and not those of the individual) provide the basis for social progress and wealth in conditions where the key factors of production are land and capital but not yet labor. It took many centuries of socioeconomic “selection” before civilization could implement in practice, on the tide of scientific, technological and information advances, the thesis that society, the nation and the state gain maximum vitality by promoting the creative labor efforts of the human individual (a thesis perceived as declarative for many centuries). In contrast to land or capital, the labor factor cannot be alienated from the human personality and, consequently, contemporary society can ensure progress only by promoting the economic, political and spiritual interests of the individual. This applies not to the individual in general but to the concrete individual, complete with environment, inherited culture, moral attitudes, behavior patterns and specific perception of the world. This development paradigm is essentially universal, but it has come into sharper focus in the process of post-Soviet transformational changes.

Determination of Policy and the Economy in the Transformation Period

Having gained independence relatively late, after the disintegration of all other colonial empires, the post-Soviet nations were faced with the need to address two important interrelated tasks:

1 Aristotle, Politika (Politics), Moscow, 1911, p. 317. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to restore state sovereignty and engage in systemic economic transformation. After all, the economies of the newly independent states were mere economic fragments of the former Union state (moreover, a state that had used centralized directive management methods). Considering that with such a legacy they also had to enter into existing—and sufficiently contradictory—international global relationships, it is easy to understand the initial economic and political tangle of problems that the newly recreated states had to unravel. This tangle could not be cut like the Gordian knot, while a theory of a post-Soviet return to the market society was simply nonexistent, since there was no historical precedent and such a return was not even expected. Some Western analysts spoke of possible convergence between the two world systems, but hardly anyone ventured to go beyond this and make conjectures about a rapid disintegration of the “socialist camp.” All of this led to a situation where the first practical steps in the economic sphere had to be taken by the post-Soviet states spontaneously, without prior preparation or scientific validation. The extremity of the rapidly developing processes left no room for debate over the primacy of economics or politics and, above all, for their determination, which was important for a systems approach to the inevitable socioeconomic transformations. But practice showed—post factum, often having passed through the sieve of romantic delusions—that market transformation could not take a socially effective form without a targeted state policy. It became increasingly clear that the ongoing transition was not to a laissez faire market like the one that existed in the days of Adam Smith, but to a modern market, which is an organized process and, as the only possible economic development option for the post-Soviet states, requires consistent reforms and the creation of a proper institutional framework, with maximum intensification of the state’s macro regulatory measures along with private initiative. Government policy should be coordinated, proactive and responsive to the economic changes taking place in society, to their nature and in part to the past. In other words, it should be taken into account that society cannot skip over natural development phases but can accelerate the transition and make it less painful socially. In this respect, one should emphasize the state’s efforts to generate new, market-based economic entities while establishing rules and regulations for their interaction so as to ensure optimal conditions for the simultaneous realization of local (individual, collective, sectoral, regional) and national interests. For this purpose, the emerging system should consist of compatible, interrelated and oriented elements with a common regulatory mechanism. The very concept of system implies the transfer of the goals of maintaining a general equilibrium in the functioning of the national economy to all other reproduction levels. During post-Soviet economic transformation, this mechanism is activated by the state, whose task, among others, is to set clearly formulated and realistic development goals and to determine the ways and means of their effective achievement. Finally, the state has the key function of establishing institutions to ensure the general and specific rules of interaction between entities. Reforms first and foremost ensure the performance of tasks associated with changes in property relations, because herein lies the reference point for fundamental changes in: (1) specification of property and property rights; (2) establishment of clear procedures for changes in these rights; (3) establishment of rules for starting and closing a business by economic agents. But all these measures are insufficient without constant coordination of the emergence and development of the market structure as an integrated national reproduction system. This means that the system is established in macroeconomic terms and is given impetus by means of regulatory measures and unregulated forms of interaction between economic agents that are breaking loose from total state control. What distinguishes the market system is that knowing virtually nothing about other people we help them (and they help us) to live in a common economic space. Friedrich Hayek believes that by obeying certain rules of conduct we fit ourselves into a great framework of 92 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION institutions and traditions: economic, legal, moral.2 Hence the conclusion that integration of economic agents of different forms of ownership into the common institutional environment is an essential prerequisite for their successful self-realization. On the other hand, an institutional system has two essential attributes: organic interaction of its parts and a single evolutionary trend of their development. They embrace every individual, every micro or macro-level reproduction and management unit. In the Hegelian dialectic, this is formulated as “the actuality and action of each individual to keep and to take care of his own being, while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre- supposed total in whose complex alone he exists, is on the other a transition into a universal product.”3 Developing this idea, Hegel comes close to characterizing the “pre-supposed total” through the concepts of time, nation (“a mere nation”), culture and the state.4 This dialectic has a direct bearing on post-Soviet transformation processes, because they address the task of creating a political and economic plural whole (total) starting from a monocentric structure. But social monocen- trism is always indifferent to the individual, because its movement is always determined by the masses under the direction of the state as represented by parties and leaders. As for socioeconomic pluralism, it cannot exist without personalized decisions and contacts, whose effect is not only of individual but also of social importance, which is why it is highly important for them to acquire the properties of a protected and generally recognized institution. We can identify the following original coordinates of socioeconomic institutionalization to be followed by state policy during transformation: 1. ensuring coordinated reproduction interaction between all economic units in the country, including the public sector; 2. establishing regular and long-term economic practices that would combine the rules of market transactions with social and cultural rules of interpersonal relations; 3. fostering national economic thinking at all levels of political and economic activity. The process of endowing the economy with these qualities is a long and difficult one, being exposed to conflicting internal and external influences. Contradictions are inherent in the very economic structure of the market, which represents the interests not of one or several but of all economic units and entities. Not all of these are identical to national economic interests but may be diametrically opposed to them. In view of this circumstance, especially in the transition period, it is important to take targeted measures to translate the interests of individual production entities into constructive efforts accompanied by growth of GDP in absolute terms and its equivalent distribution (per capita and among economic actors). But this is one of the tasks of national economic construction whose proper solution requires closer attention to the characteristics of national economic evolution and its current stage in line with the achievements of civilization. This is necessary to ensure the structural and functional unity of the new (in terms of the quality of its macroeconomic space) state, to achieve the effect of system properties of the economy from the perspective of developing a stable and characteristic response to changing internal and external development factors. This applies to the response of a state operating in the context of national economic interests and only because of this: (a) representing concrete, national economic reality in the process of its movement from the past to the future, its emergence and development according to its own algorithm;

2 See: F. Hayek, Pagubnaya samonadeyannost. Oshibki sotsializma (The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism), Moscow, Novosti Publishers, 1992, p. 28. 3 G. Hegel, Entsiklopedia filosofskikh nauk (Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences), Vol. 3, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 340. 4 Ibid., p. 368. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(b) turning the national community and each of its members into an economic actor (agent) with production socialization parameters creating a cumulative effect of multi-agency but unidirectional economic actions. In this process, the state does not monopolize but consolidates the resource, technical and spiritual prerequisites for development, creating equal opportunities for all in achieving economic growth and ensuring public welfare. By performing reform and optimization functions, state policy endows the transforming economy with model properties of genetic evolutionary identification, liberal market mobility, and social orientation encompassing various constituent entities and structural layers of the economic whole. Hence the conclusion that the state is a deterministic economic and political force whose reform potential should be realized in the context of national economic interests so as to create, in Walter Eucken’s words, an efficient and humane economic order that could exist for a sufficiently long time. Such an order, in the author’s opinion, is designed to overcome the scarcity of goods to the maximum extent and enable people to lead an independent responsible life.5 The results of the state’s activities are usually assessed from a socioeconomic standpoint. And this is natural because, for example, if we are dealing with state reforms in economic life, it is necessary to assess the degree of involvement of the bulk of the population in the reform process and the benefits they gain from it. All other lines of reasoning recede into the background, because they do not include the main subject coordinate of state activities: the individual and individual interests associated with national interests. But emphasis here should also be placed on human rights, i.e., the individual’s opportunities to direct state policy toward serving his own interests and to control this process. From this perspective, a significant view is that “the concept of state interests practically coincides with the concept of national interests. Nevertheless, this equality is only possible in a civil society, where human rights are respected.”6 This is a very important point, because only citizens endowed with real economic and political rights can provide engaged support to the state, which it so badly needs in the critical transformation period.

Market Transformation Coordinates in State Policy

In the economy of countries developing on market principles and countries moving toward the implementation of these principles, the functions of the state are far from identical. Under mature market relations, the state performs functions similar to those performed by a football referee, who does not take part in the game but is responsible for ensuring compliance with the rules. But an account has to be taken of the initial conditions for transformation in the post-Soviet countries, where, in football terms, there is still no playing field and no players, i.e., it is impossible to apply the rules of market relations that have long become standard practice in developed parts of the world economy. In these conditions, the state is the most active “player” in the economy or even a playing coach. Depending on the research context, the state is also compared to a “night watchman” or an “emergency firefighter,” but a more suitable comparison for the state in the conditions of post-Soviet transformation is with an engineer renovating his house after a long period of alien use. He has to rebuild (reform) everything, starting from the basement to interior design, so that the “house” acquires a new functional structure and a national face, where everything is arranged for the convenience of the

5 See: W. Eucken, Osnovy natsionalnoi ekonomiki (The Foundations of Economics), Ekonomika Publishers, Mos- cow, 1996, p. 302. 6 I. Aliev, Kaspiiskaia neft’ Azerbaidzhana, Izvestia Publishers, Moscow, 2003, p. 370. 94 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“owner.” One can fully agree with the view that “either you live in your own national home or your home turns into a public thoroughfare. Evidently, people can live in dormitory-type human communities only under compulsion.”7 But a national “home” can be created for economically and politically free citizens with their own interests, whose realization requires common communications, security and rules of behavior. These are provided by the state, which is why it is no wonder that some researchers believe that in the modern world the nation state is a much more fundamental factor than the economy. It is the state that lays down guidelines for economic development, even though it has to take economic factors into account.8 In transforming societies, the main tools used to provide such guidance are institutional and structural reforms, whose purpose is to generate, recreate and develop the major components of a market economy. In this respect, state patronage of emerging national market actors is a key aspect of post-Soviet economic transformation. Another significant question facing state policy is connected with the need to resolve the economic contradictions that were inherited from the past and that can be briefly summarized as follows: spatial distortions in production specialization, a sectoral imbalance and, as a result, incomplete macro reproduction relations. But at the start of market transformation, reform scenarios usually left these key questions in the background, and this led to new contradictions associated, in all probability, with inadequate awareness of the specifics of the ongoing transformation. This includes such major contradictions as the preservation of sectoral monopoly structures coupled with rapid price liberalization; privatization through administrative channels and using anonymous vouchers beyond social control; and an increase in exports of raw or intermediate materials with disregard for matters of economic diversification. At the same time, judgments about how to develop the economy at the transformation stage do not fit into ready-made patterns, although it is possible to identify certain common trends. One of these (unquestionably objective) is the most active role of the state, which is explained by insufficiently developed sociopolitical and not only economic institutions. But the problem is also that transition-period state institutions themselves bear the marks of the old system. This is reflected in a bureaucratization of the state apparatus, which significantly increases the already growing transaction costs. The bureaucrat has more incentives to produce that which he thinks society needs and fewer incentives to produce that which society actually demands. The bureaucrat’s opinion on what society should have is usually called public interests.9 But public interests are usually tailored to private interests, and this is a very common situation, especially in countries with a transforming economy. The benefits of such essentially opportunistic behavior are reaped by the bureaucrat, while its costs are distributed among all members of society. From this perspective, a burning problem is the minimization of access to administrative structures at local and sectoral levels as a condition for economic appropriation. In the transformation period, a great deal depends on subjective circumstances, particularly on the forces or, more precisely, the people at the helm of state. This aspect of the transition period is analyzed quite scantily, although it is sometimes of key importance. The views of the well- known Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto are of interest in this respect. He says in one of his interviews that the starting point of the transformation and the personality of the leader who initiates it are a key factor in the reform process. These two circumstances, in his opinion, are beyond our control and are largely accidental: sometimes people faced with the need to make a historic choice rise to this challenge and lead their countries in the right direction. But sometimes these opportunities are not taken, and then one has to wait for another happy coincidence.10 But what

7 Natsionalnaya ekonomika, ed. by Prof. P.V. Savchenko, Ekonomist Publishers, Moscow, 2005, p. 112. 8 See: J. Ellul, Politicheskaia illiuzia (The Political Illusion), Moscow, 2003, p. 39. 9 See: S. Pejovich, Fundamentals of Economics: A Property Rights Approach, Dallas, 1981, p. 144. 10 [http://www.polit.ru/research/2005/10/20/soto.html]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION means the right direction of development during transformation? What are its coordinates? In answering this question, we should once again return to the interests of the individual and the creation of favorable conditions for their achievement. In this sense, the socially oriented market type of economic organization is particularly effective. Incorporating such advantages as dynamism, scope for constant change, receptivity to innovation and flexible adaptation to customer needs, a market with embedded social goals ensures not only the fastest growth in human history, but also the highest degree of public welfare. But the main thing, however, is that in this process it proceeds from the human factor, human energy, inquisitiveness, ambition and risk. At the same time, use of this factor is only possible when the individual is economically and politically independent and, consequently, seeks to escape from ideological and bureaucratic pressure. In such a system of development coordinates, the state gradually evolves from the status of manager through that of a tutor to that of a partner in the national market mechanism. As a result, the state’s direct involvement in economic processes becomes relatively smaller while its general role in the economy increases. This regularity of the market economy is now in evidence throughout the world, both in transforming countries and at the level of the whole market world, which is going through one of its worst crises since the 1929-1933 Great Depression. At that time, a response to the crisis was the emergence of new trends of economic thought and their implementation in practice, which applies, in the first place, to J.M. Keynes’s theory with its various modifications already after World War II. A theory proclaiming the state and its dirigiste socioeconomic policy to be the driving force of the economy originated precisely in the postwar period. The theorists of dirigisme (the prominent French economist François Perroux is regarded as the founder of this school) saw the main line of government policy in its impact on investments, whose major instruments are the state budget, tax policy, interest rate adjustment and, of course, the solution of social problems. It appears that many propositions of this theory are once again of relevance today, when we are evidently entering an era of new dirigisme (neo-dirigisme) as expressed in monetary policy that has opened the floodgates for a massive outflow of public funds from official reserves (for example, private banks in the United States facing liquidity problems which they themselves cannot resolve have received about $1 trillion, while total EU spending on measures to boost the economy has reached 400 billion euros). Such amounts and forms of government intervention in the market economy are without precedent. Virtually all countries have seen a sharp reduction in discount rates and taxes in order to enhance business activity, but it is symptomatic that measures to revive the economy are not accompanied by a significant increase in the share of state (public) ownership. This suggests that the authorities in developed countries use eclectic methods to fight the crisis, with a paradoxical combination of different methods that can be united in the concept of neo-dirigisme. It may mean the start of a new era in the development of the market system, which is acquiring new state leaders. Whereas Keynesianism replaced not only the theory, but also the practice of liberalism in the market economy of the early 20th century by means of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, neo-dirigisme (true, it has yet to be provided with a proper theoretical justification) is coming to replace the neo- liberalism of the 1980s and 1990s, being manifested in the policy of U.S. President Barack Obama. At the same time, in America and especially in Europe it is considered important to determine the right priorities for further socioeconomic development so as to ensure that government anti-crisis funding has a favorable effect on GDP dynamics while helping to increase employment and boost consumption. In other words, “social medicine” methods are applied to “old” markets suffering from chronic excessive liberalism. But in new market economies these methods should be applied for prophylactic purposes. At the same time, we have to deal here with market economic organisms of different ages. Besides, it is not only a question of the “market” nature of current economic models, but also of their national specifics. That is why we can speak of coordinates for the movement of transforming countries to a nationally specific market economy with elements of state neo-dirigisme. Such an economic development model is observed in Azerbaijan, where the share of the public sector in the country’s economy is steadily 96 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION declining: from 51.6% of total industrial output in 2000 to 48.8% in 2001, 45.2% in 2002, 43.2% in 2003, 41.8% in 2004, 29.3% in 2005, 26.0% in 2006, and 23.2% in 2007. But this trend does not weaken the state presence in the key industrial sectors: 99.8% in oil production and refining, 80.9% in the chemical industry, 90.7% in power generation, 62.9% in metallurgy, 57.4% in the manufacture of machinery and equipment, 51.6% in metalworking, and 49.7% in the textile industry.11 This state of affairs ensures sustainable development of the national economy at the present stage despite the results of the war imposed on Azerbaijan and the global financial crisis. Simultaneously, about 60% of all investments in the Azerbaijan economy are made with public funds, which are mostly used to resolve social problems and for infrastructure purposes. This means, in effect, the state’s function of dirigisme in the economy, mainly performed through the redistribution of revenues from fuel and energy exports. As a result, the Azerbaijan economy shows signs of a progressive transition to faster development of the non-oil sector compared to the oil sector, and one can say that the country has on the whole overcome the barrier of natural resource dependence in its economic development. Without exaggeration, this is the result of state policy among whose coordinates the goals of diversifying and socializing the economy have a dominant position. This is also evident from statistical data on a sharp reduction in unemployment and poverty in recent years. Such large-scale economic and social shifts are only possible due to the strategy of turning the natural resource factor (the country’s oil resources) into the basis for developing the human factor. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev provides weighty arguments in criticizing “the forces that have a poor knowledge of the situation or try to cast doubt on our successes” and “mainly associate our economic development with the oil factor.” This factor, in his opinion, is a “support point” for the national economy today, but highly skilled, professional personnel who love their native country and are attached to it constitute the resource that leads into the future.12 Love of one’s country in the context of economic problems is an interesting aspect of national thinking. The economy, construed not only as a product of the material world of production relations, but also as a phenomenon of national history, culture, mentality and behavior, represents the most sophisticated concept of synergistic research. World experience, too, shows that countries that have achieved the greatest successes in national economic development have always relied on their own traditions. Together with technological achievements and traditions, economic life should or- ganically include, as Werner Sombart noted at the beginning of the 20th century, “patriotism” as recognition of the national community of the state. Identification of oneself with the state as a condition of success,13 one of whose components is the right to influence the policy of this state, is a powerful incentive to optimistic expectations, assessed as a spiritual productive force. The coordinates of political action should be set in accordance with these expectations, and for this purpose it is necessary to act in keeping with the idea that “the state in its spiritual essence is nothing other than the Motherland … or, in other words, a group of people bound together by their common spiritual destiny and integrated into a single whole based on spiritual culture and legal conscience.”14 The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that state policy in the transformation period should be implemented in a three-dimensional coordinate system: the establishment of market principles in the economy, democratic rules in politics and spiritual values in social life. These three axes ultimately converge in the human personality, providing an inexhaustible source not only of economic growth, but also of development free from any, including market fundamentalism, since without rights and national values the latter is nothing but profit seeking. But the constructive market mechanism is not confined to profit, although profit is important as well. In this mechanism, a growing role

11 Data from “Azdrbaycan statistik göstdricildri” for 2000-2008, available at [www. azstat. org]. 12 See: Bakinski rabochi, 25 October, 2008. 13 See: W. Sombart, Pochemu v Soiedinionnykh Shtatakh net sotsializma? (Why Is There No Socialism in the Unit- ed States?), St. Petersburg, 1907, p. 21. 14 I.A. Ilyin, Put’ dukhovnogo obnovlenia, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1993, p. 241. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION is played by people who drive the economy.15 From this perspective, by developing the individual and creating favorable conditions for human life and activity, state policy acquires a kind of perpetual motion machine and immeasurably enhances society’s opportunities to ensure progress.

Macro and Mega Economic Coordinates of State Policy

Today’s marcoeconomy is an open and evolving system involved in intensive interaction with scientific, technological, financial, investment, information and political development factors in both the national and international format. The degree of openness of national economic systems has increased significantly under globalization, which has spanned across the entire world economy and has drawn all countries into its orbit, albeit with different consequences. This is because globalization creates a new, worldwide space for competition not so much between various groups of people or production entities as between entire national economies for the appropriation of the largest possible share of world GDP. The greater a country’s successes in this respect, the more advanced, productive and rational is its economic development model. In one and the same region with generally equal development conditions one can find both rapid economic progress and economic stagnation or even regress. The need to establish the causes of such differences in the results of development comes into focus in the post-Soviet transforming countries, generating a surge of scientific and practical interest in national economic models found in the world economy. Indicatively, the greatest achievements are recorded in countries with a large share of investment in human capital. Market economy models giving priority to human development can also be regarded as the main coordinate of state policy pursuing long-term rather than short-term national revival goals at the transformation stage. But it is clear that a macroeconomic model is not the product of a one-off act. It is formed by targeted efforts with prior resolution of such issues as “what is the general vector of state policy” and “what is the general philosophical and pragmatic basis of state activity.”16 On this basis, conditions are consistently created for the development and reproduction of a specific model of the economy as an integral part of the ethnic and global civilization process. A distinctive feature of such a model is that within it national economic interests can acquire an adapted object and identified subjects (agents) of their implementation. The entry of a national economy into global economic relations precisely with these characteristics is probably the key condition for successful participation in global processes. In view of this, the development of possible lines of economic reform in transition countries should be based on considering the economy as an aggregate of formal (in large part globally unified) and informal (nationally specific) institutions. An important thing to take into account is that it is only in conjunction with ethnocultural institutions that market reforms can provide the national economy with a strategy for ensuring the socioeconomic and creative intellectual self-expression of society. Although the differences between specific national and international/global aspects of development in the modern world tend to blur, these phenomena should not be confused. We are dealing here with two parallel coordinate axes which do not merge together. For example, the policy coordinates of industrial states are underpinned by anthropogenic factors and the advantages of their multinationals in global competition, whereas those of transforming states are mostly based on factors driving the self-organization of resource, production and cultural development components. Efforts to match these coordinates should start from the indisputable fact that “nations as communities of people bound together by lan-

15 See: L. Iacocca, Karyera menedzhera (An Autobiography), Moscow, 1990, p. 194. 16 V.P. Kolesov, “Gosudarstvennoie regulirovanie ekonomiki,” Ekonomist, No. 8, 1996, p. 35. 98 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION guage, culture and mentality and using mutual economic ties, common territory and the nation state as means of survival and development continue to be actors in the international arena and will remain so for a long time to come.”17 Cohesion on national lines is precisely what leads to the emergence of national interests and values, goals and objectives geared toward self-assertion in today’s mega economic space. They should be primary in the policy of a state with a transforming economy, because otherwise this economy, with its inadequate capacity to adapt to the international competitive environment, is doomed to be a donor in the global mega economic space. But apart from cohesion, another condition for the maintenance and steady buildup of the country’s resource potential is the capacity for nationwide purposeful action. When the national potential is used to integrate the country into the international economic environment, preference can be given either to the natural (natural resource) factor or to the human (intellectual) factor. The first choice significantly limits the opportunities for proper participation in the process of international competition, which primarily takes place in finished goods markets. Among other things, it narrows the field of application of the global anthropogenic factor in transition economies, because it is mostly applied in the mineral industry enclave. This poses not only economic threats. The American columnist and author Thomas L. Friedman believes, for example, that the level of democracy is inversely proportional to the level of oil prices. Such is the “first law of petropolitics,” and it is quite possible that this law determines the nature of the current era.18 But the connection of oil and other energy prices with economic and political freedoms can hardly be qualified as a “law.” More likely it is a trend observed in countries where politics comes under ideological (populist socialist, religious, chauvinistic) pressure. It is no accident that in support of his conclusion the author cites the examples of Venezuela, Iran and Russia. In countries where there is no hidden political agenda behind politics and economics (Mexico, Norway, Azerbaijan), the so-called “law of petropolitics” does not work: temporarily rising oil prices do not discriminate against civil society institutions, to say nothing of economic rights and freedoms. At the same time, in the inevitable interaction of transformational and global development coordinates preference should clearly be given not to primary commodities readily marketable throughout the world, but to the human factor and to fostering human abilities (including business skills) during market reform of the production structure. Initially, this may include the creation of separate technologically developed economic clusters with an assured multiplier effect. One should also realize that “natural resource” involvement in the global market, which is characteristic of many developing and transforming countries, means an extensive form of globalization of the national economy. In contrast to this, measures to enhance the human factor and the intellectual potential directly associated with it open fresh prospects for the rise of a transforming economy as a new but intensively developing unit of the world economy capable of enjoying the achievements of modern technology and management. An orientation toward creating conditions for intensive production growth in the process of market transformation and global relations is precisely what enables the national economy to gain absolute, relative and factor advantages and provides alternative opportunities to look for an advantageous niche in the international division of labor. Priority given to the human potential brought into play by the market transformation coupled with access to advanced technology through involvement in global economic relations gives plenty of scope for building a modern but nationally specific economy, for materializing cultural values not in medieval but in industrially advanced production and social dynamics. The point is that human beings play the role of an economic development factor not as abstract individuals but as individuals embedded in the national economic environment and taking part in the global mechanism of international economic relations only through this residential status. Any developed national economy is based on a stable institutional matrix that gives certainty to human relationships achieved through existing rules and norms. According to Douglass C. North, institutions are rules of the game and norms of

17 Yu. Olsevich, “O natsional’nom ekonomicheskom myshlenii,” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 9, 1996. 18 T. Friedman, “The First Law of Petropolitics,” Foreign Policy, 4 May, 2006. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION behavior “that structure repeated human interaction.”19 Formal political and legal institutions, including in the economy, are established by the state, while informal rules are elements of the evolutionary heritage and include moral and ethical norms, popular traditions and value systems governing human behavior. Institutions adapt, direct and stimulate human activity, channeling it into socially acceptable forms and making human behavior understandable and predictable. At the same time, a close connection between formal and informal institutions ensures economic development as national development and opens the way to the use of global scientific and technological achievements in national economic interests. These interests convert informal institutions into a continuation, development and modification of formal rules, thereby providing opportunities for practical utilization of national specifics. From this perspective, one can say that institutions act as an intermediate link, as the basic coordinates of state policy in national economic interests. A special role here is played by informal institutions, which cannot be effective if implanted into the economy from outside. Today’s mega economy, albeit contradictory, is largely integrated and institutionalized. Conse- quently, entry into this economy in effective forms implies the need to take this circumstance into account, because these parameters embody the common attractors of international economic relations. At the same time, the country’s economic whole should develop and function in accordance with its own specific features and should operate in the international arena only as an agent of national economic interests. If one of the parties involved in global interaction has not yet integrated into a single institutionalized whole, this means that the agents representing this underintegrated economy will inevitably serve the interests of the other party. This can be called an effect of macroeconomic integrity, which enhances (or reduces) the country’s opportunities for a concentrated expression of its resource and intellectual potential. In the course of international cooperation, a nation should gain impetus for development, because otherwise the mega economic trend makes no sense. But it is only an integrated economy (in reproduction and institutional terms) that can acquire a globally generated acceleration without losing its own development coordinates. In this context, let us note the following: when a country gains sovereignty, it is faced with the goals of ensuring economic growth and asserting its position in the international arena. The importance of agreeing these goals is particularly evident in the modern world with its increasing economization of politics and politicization of the economy.

C o n c l u s i o n

The modern market toward which the post-Soviet transforming economies are heading is on the whole a state-regulated system. It is only the forms and the degree of this regulation that may differ depending on the development level of the economy, its current and desired structure, the social situation in the country, its history and the people’s mentality. This is particularly noticeable in transforming societies, where the weakness of the institutional framework is usually compensated by the growing activity of the state. Questions about the goals pursued by the state in this process, about their validity and consistency with global reality, and about the direction in which they lead the nations sometimes become predominant. All of this adds urgency to the problems examined in this article, which is an attempt to specify the coordinates of state policy that serve the current and long-term interests of people living in the difficult period of post-Soviet transformation.

19 D. North, Instituty, institutsionnye izmenenia i funktsionirovanie ekonomiki (Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance), Nachala Publishers, Moscow, 1997, p. 33. 100 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION George IVANIASHVILI-ORBELIANI

M. Phil., Founder and Chairman of the International Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, Member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society at Harvard University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE ROLE O NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM IN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS O GEORGIA

Abstract

he study analyzes the methodology of framework to better facilitate the creation T the National Innovation System (NIS), of new knowledge and technological de- which has been successfully used in velopment. The main goal is to capture OECD countries and more recently is be- among the existing methodologies and coming the focus of increased attention best practices the ideas that can enrich from developing nations. It emphasizes the our discussion about the instrumental role importance of NIS as having great poten- of NIS in competitiveness-oriented policies tial as a powerful conceptual framework, in Georgia. The study applies to the cate- which requires increasing financial support gory of benchmarking analysis and envi- for R&D, improving cooperation between ronmental scanning, and suggests practi- universities and the private sector as well cal recommendations for creating NIS in as developing the economic and legal the country.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The first written contribution that used the concept “national system of innovation” is an unpub- lished paper by Christopher Freeman from 1982 that he worked out for the OECD expert group on Science, Technology and Competitiveness.1 The paper, titled Technological Infrastructure and In- ternational Competitiveness, pointed out the importance of an active role for government in promoting a technological infrastructure.2 Freeman was the first who brought the modern version of the full concept “national innovation system” into the literature in his book on innovation in Japan, where the analysis was quite inclusive taking into account the intra- and inter-organizational characteristics of firms, corporate governance, the education system and the role of government.

1 C. Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan, Pinter, London, 1987. 2 The paper was published for the first time more than 20 years later in the journal Industrial and Corporate Change (Freeman, 2004). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

According to OECD, NIS institutions, defined in the narrow context, can be divided into five main categories: n Governments (local, regional, national and international, with different weights by country) that play the key role in setting broad policy directions; n Bridging institutions, such as research councils and research associations, which act as inter- mediaries between governments and the performers of research; n Private enterprises and the research institutes they finance; n Universities and related institutions that provide key knowledge and skills; n Other public and private organizations that play a role in the national innovation system (public laboratories, technology transfer organizations, joint research institutes, patent offices, training organizations and so on). The nation’s innovation infrastructure helps supply inputs to private enterprises. This infrastructure includes: n Scientific and research institutions that serve as a major source of knowledge and include universities and research institutes, laboratories, non-profit think-tanks, R&D consortia, technology transfer centers and technological centers of excellence. n Capital providers and markets that finance innovation and the acquisition of new products and services. Venture capital and government research programs play a particularly important role in supporting technology-based entrepreneurs, start-ups and small business firms. Equity/stock markets provide an important incentive for innovation, reward innovators and determine the value of enterprises. n Education institutions comprising secondary schools, colleges and universities, along with private sector training organizations, should provide the pool of leading-edge scientists, engineers, managers and the technical workforce. The skills, mobility and flexibility of the workforce are an important innovation input to both producers and customers of innovation. n Information infrastructure provides enterprises with the important tools and communication platforms necessary for innovation. Global collaboration and open innovation systems rely on advances in computing, software applications and information networks. n Regional innovation clusters are geographic concentrations of interconnected businersses, suppliers, and associated institutions in a particular field that share a common knowledge base, labor pools, markets or distribution channels.3

Institutional Setup

What possibilities do developing countries have to affect their learning processes in order to develop an adequate NIS? This question arises, as the connection between learning and innovation is obvious and advancing the learning processes and interactions between individuals and groups will lead to implementing innovation system. Therefore, developing countries have to specify their institutions, because these play a dominant role in innovative activities.

3 The term “industry cluster,” also known as a business cluster or competitive cluster, was introduced and the term cluster popularized by Michael Porter in The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990). 102 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Nelson argues that differences between innovation systems of a group of nations are at least partly the result of differences between the economic and political circumstances and priorities of these nations.4 To specify these national distinctions within the scope of an approach of NIS, those factors have to be identified that have an impact on the economic structure of a nation. The industrial development of a country defines the status and quality of technology and the key sectors of the economy. This factor is giving direction to the national economic structure. De- pending on the profession and direction of the technological development, the knowledge base between countries differs and, therefore, different institutional set-ups and learning processes are required. The factor endowment of a country involves all relevant natural, human and infrastructure resources. Depending on the quantity and quality of the nation’s factor endowment a different structure of production is needed. For example, without a sufficient amount of natural resources an economy is reliant on the import of these and has to develop an export-oriented manufacturing economy, if it wants to be internationally competitive. Because of differing economic emphases that result from differing factor endowments, each nation develops its specific system of innovation. The historical endowment is the third factor influencing the economic structure. Depending on historical experiences, like wars, changing political situations or geostrategic location, each country develops its specific social norms and habits of governmental regime. Because of the resulting geographical and political structures, different structures of production are developed. From this follows that the learning process and innovation system are built upon different bases and are individual forms of expression of the national history. These factors lead to innovation success, which is the degree to which value is created for customers through enterprises that transform new knowledge and technologies into profitable products and services for national and global markets. A high rate of innovation in turn contributes to more market creation, economic growth, job creation, wealth and a higher standard of living. This definition updates our perspective on innovation by incorporating more than ideas, R&D, technology development and transfer. The nation must not only generate fresh ideas and intellectual property, but must also apply them and make them commercially successful.

Globalization of Technology and the Role of DI

Multinational corporations (MNCs) predominantly control international trade in the global market. Moreover, a substantial proportion of international trade is either inter-industry or intra-industry trade, which means that a good part, if not all, of the science-based exports originating from the developing economies derives from the operation of multinational corporations operating in these economies. Multinational corporations are considered as leaders in producing innovations of commercial significance, including new technologies, new products and new organizational forms. This makes them a potent vehicle of international technology diffusion. Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison5 show a negative relationship between FDI and total factor productivity of the domestic plants. However,

4 See: National Systems of Innovation: A Comparative Study, ed. by R.R. Nelson, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993. 5 See: B. Aitken, G.H. Hanson, A.E. Harrison, “Spillovers, Foreign Investment and Export Behavior,” Papers 95-06, Columbia-Graduate School of Business, 1994. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Xu6 found a positive relationship between productivity growth and FDI in an aggregative study covering 40 countries. The impact of foreign direct investment on productivity is stronger and more ro- bust for advanced countries than it is for less developed ones. The dismantling of control systems by the developing countries through liberalization policies to attract FDI has not, however, helped much in promoting innovation efforts. The mere presence of FDI does not, of course, significantly change the situation of technological knowledge and the gains to be derived from it until developing countries step up efforts to absorb, adapt, master and improve technology. Indeed, in the absence of innovative capabilities in most of the developing economies, the gains arising from FDI initiatives have remained concentrated in the developed countries. Governments have pursued science and technology policies to improve the innovative perform- ances of agents of production.7 They have also created a network of institutions to promote interactions between agents of production and enhance their competitiveness in the international market. Historically, the state has played a fundamental role in the evolution of the NISs and thus, in the pace and direction of technological progress. Even so, it is worth noting that the competitive edge of the U.S. industries has mainly resulted from the strategic support extended by the federal government. In the words of Ruttan: “Government has played an important role in technology development in almost every U.S. industry that has become competitive on a global scale. The government has supported agricultural technology through research, the automobile industry through design and construction of the highway infrastructure, the development of the computer through military procurement, and the growth of the biotechnology industries through support for basic biological research.”8 Significantly, business-funded R&D expenditure has emerged as the most important and widely accepted indicator of innovation in recent years. Countries vary in terms of experience with respect to private sector expenditure on R&D; but in most countries, business-funded R&D has received substantial government support through incentives and tax concessions.9 The nature of state intervention has, however, undergone a substantial transformation from direct participation to indirect participation via supporting commercially-oriented research through public-private participation and also through the provision of subsidies and tax incentives. The prime minister of Finland was the first highly placed politician using the concept in referring to the need to strengthen the Finnish innovation system already in the very beginning of the nine- ties. Early followers were Canada and South Africa. Some ten years later the president of China in a speech to the Engineering Academy made a similar remark referring to the Chinese innovation system. These examples emphasize the importance of government’s vision and its leadership to carry out innovative reforms. Table 1 below illustrates the extensive range of public policies impacting innovation and the diverse ways these policies can stimulate or inhibit innovation. The public sector is linked to the innovation process in powerful and deep ways. R&D funding from the public sector accounts for a substantial portion of national R&D investment. The choices of government in supporting a field of science (e.g., life science, nanotechnology, advanced computing) are an influence on the direction of innovative activity. However, R&D is only one area of public policy that bears on innovation.

6 See: B. Xu, “Multinational Enterprises, Technology Diffusion and Host Country Productivity Growth,” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 62, No. 2, 2000, pp. 477-493. 7 See: D. Mowery, N. Rosenberg, “The US National Innovation System,” in: National Systems of Innovation: A Comparative Study. 8 V.W. Ruttan, Technology, Growth, and Development: An Induced Innovation Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001. 9 Ibidem. 104 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1

Public Policy Impact on Innovation

Public Examples of Policy Innovation Impact

R&D Funding Impact scientific direction (e.g., life sciences, nanotechnology, advanced computing) and production of scientists and engineers. Supports innovation infrastructure of universities, research centers, federal labs, industry research. Specialized programs like ATP support pre-competitive collaboration. MEP support small manufacturers and SBIR technology-based start-ups. Public R&D goals and administrative procedures can conflict and misalign with private sector goals, expectations and management requirements.

Macro Fiscal and Cost of capital for innovation, and rate of national economic Monetary Policy growth influence investment decisions, available earnings, stock market valuation of innovative enterprises, etc. Currency policy, foreign and domestic, impacts international competitiveness.

Technology Transfer Bayh-Dole Act and federal Tech Transfer Act impact Policy the incentive for industry-university-lab collaboration and rate of knowledge flow to innovators.

Human Resources Federal education and training programs, education, Policy subsidies and research funds to support universities are a determinant of the supply of qualified workers needed for scientific research, development, and commercialization of innovation.

Tax Policy Provides R&D incentive. Rate of depreciation affects transfer of knowledge embedded in new capital. Provides level of incentives for consumers to adopt innovation.

Standards Facilitates platform technologies, such as Internet, computing systems, software. Standards can also function as a barrier to technical change and can restrict markets.

Procurement Government can stimulate market and standards development through large-scale aggregation. Design specifications can restrict introduction of new technologies.

Antitrust Can encourage industry innovation collaboration. Encourages new market entrants. Delays innovation introduction.

Intellectual Property Acts as incentive for innovators. Can restrict entry of competitors. IP protection can be weak globally, reducing return to innovation.

Market Access Choice and access to foreign markets, export conditions and foreign direct investment influence market potential, risk and growth. Export controls can inhibit competitiveness. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 (continued)

Public Examples of Policy Innovation Impact

Economic Regulation Impact innovation investment through pricing control, rates of return, market share restrictions and entry of competitive alternatives.

Social and Can act as stimulus to innovation and also impact Environment performance parameters of innovation. Type of regulation Regulation also impacts industry costs, relationship to suppliers and employment conditions.

Health Care Policy Major driver of business cost of operations. Demographics and growing demand for health care create opportunity for new products, services and productivity-enhancing technology.

Privacy Public concern creates additional demand for protecting information flows and assets.

Homeland Security Creates government market for innovation, and creates additional economic requirements for managing risks and vulnerabilities of most economic sectors, including information industry, financial industry, water, energy, transportation, manufacturing supply chains, etc.

Employment & Current political pressures add to protectionist risks, Manufacturing constraints on global investment, “Buy America” provisions, Initiatives employment transition costs, and higher skill standards.

S o u r c e: Measuring Innovation for National Prosperity, Innovation Framework Report, January 2004.

National Innovation System in Developing Countries

It is often argued that the most essential aspect of a successful catch-up process is the rate at which a follower is able to imitate foreign technology. By means of imitations a country learns to industrialize. Technological imitation involves more than just pursuing the same path of development as more industrialized countries. It rather involves a critical stage in the process of learning to industrialize and therefore should be seen in this context.10 They argue that acquiring foreign technology cheaply and effectively and then adapting it to local conditions is a key element for the technology strategy of developing countries. (Imports of foreign technologies are not substitutes for economic development, but complements.) The rate of imitation is influenced by technological capabilities, policies and institutional arrangements, by the nature of technological systems, market structure for technology and international trading rules.

10 See: C.J. Dahlman, R. Nelson, “Social Absorption Capacity, National Innovation Systems and Economic Devel- opment,” in: Social Capability and Long-Term Economic Growth, ed. by B.H. Koo, D.H. Perkins, MacMillan Press Ltd. 1995, Chapter 5, pp. 82-122. 106 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The term “technological capabilities” covers knowledge and skills needed to acquire, assim- ilate, utilize, adapt, and create technology. The more a following country disposes of technological capabilities and the better it is able to accumulate these, the more successful the intended catch-up process will be.11 This view focuses on the cumulative aspect of technological change, because prior capabilities are important for future rates and directions. Private firms are the main location in accumulating technological capabilities. They are more suitable for the acquisition of foreign technology than public firms, as they are interested in providing training necessary to absorb the available technology in order to maintain their competitiveness. Thus, private firms are crucial for the competitive advantage of a nation. The accumulation of technological capability of a firm is influenced by its relationships with other actors, as they operate in a complex industrial network characterized by competition and cooperation. Consequently, innovation and technological change is not only a technological, but also a social process resulting from informal and formal communication networks. A key aspect of technological development is the creation of institutions and institutional arrangements that facilitate this process. Innovative private firms are not enough in this context. On the one hand, the ability of firms to undertake innovative activities depends on the external market environment and the provided incentives. Therefore, government-industry relations are of great interest to advance the existing conditions for technological progress. Overall national policy toward technology must be implemented in order to facilitate technological change, e.g. by promotion of knowledge- diffusion or by providing support for firms with the creation of technological niches. This follows from the idea of “technological congruence” defined by Abramowitz. It can be argued that for successfully imitating advanced technology, the imitating country should not differ much from the imi- tated one in terms of economic, political and social factors. Therefore, if possible, the government has to provide appropriate surroundings in the range of political and economic incentive systems. On the other hand, careful attention has to be paid to the role of human resource development, as education is central to the process of technological development. The educational needs of countries differ according to their level of development. In industrialized countries normally the main focus lies on reforming the higher education in order to advance technical subjects. Poor countries are focusing on primary education as an important aspect of human development. The catch-up process depends on how countries balance between primary education for all and higher education with emphasis on key subjects. Educational policies have to be designed in such a way, that they are able to facilitate the implementation of merit-based principles and knowledge capitalization. The elements contained in a NIS are those elements necessary for a successful process of catching up. The combination and effectiveness of different institutions, their interactivity and the emphasis of the relevance of knowledge and diffusion are elements constituting a NIS. At the same time, these are identified as important aspects of technological development. Furthermore, the term “social capability,” introduced in the context of the technology-gap approach, is anchored in the concept of NIS, as it defines factors that determine the ability of a country to engage in technological progress. It is argued that factors like culture, factor endowment, institutional arrangements etc. are important for the future rate and direction of economic development. The question about the chance of success for catching up requires a closer examination of the NIS. In addition, it is important to ask, in which way and on what terms this approach can be used, and how national factors affect innovation processes and can influence future outcomes. Dahlman and Nelson12 analyze the relationships among social absorptive capability, NIS and economic performance in developing countries. The most critical element of any successful development strategy is the development of human resources.

11 See: C.J. Dahlman, R. Nelson, op. cit. 12 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In developing countries, micro-innovative strength remains isolated and encapsulated. In addition, many institutions that are important for innovative activities do not exist. It can be noted that, if the concept of NIS is be useable in developing countries, it has to be adapted to the specific characteristics of these countries. To what extent is the argumentation for NIS transferable to the case of transition countries? The term “transition” can be defined as the institutional transformation toward a market economy, like it was and still is observable in Central and Eastern European countries. Institutional transformation toward a market economy that does not bring noticeable economic benefits to the population cannot be pursuited indefinitely within a democratic framework, because these missing economic benefits partly contributed to the collapse of the socialist system. The purpose, then, has to be an effective and rapid transition process. For this reason, the development of a NIS is mandatory, that is reasonably adapted to the specific characteristics and requirements of the country in order to provide a successful catching-up. It can be argued that transition countries are located in the middle of a process of catching up. But, different from developing countries, transition countries have already chosen and pursued their way of development. The question is, if this way to industrialize and catch up is compatible with the specific characteristics of the country. But in both cases the prospects for catching up will depend on their ability to generate industrial and technical and therefore institutional change. However, the different initial positions of these two viewpoints have to be kept in mind. The National Innovation System approach focuses on the outputs of the system and the benefits that accrue to citizens and the society, which means harmonious and aligned interaction of all elements and linkages in the system to ensure effective and sustainable outcomes and impacts. This has important implications for countries: n Every nation has “de facto” system of innovation, which may be more or less effective; n The actions taken by each nation to strengthen its system of innovation should be given the resources available and the current condition of NIS; n Every country will therefore have different and distinctive policy framework that serves its interest.

Measuring Innovation

This Global Innovation Scoreboard (GIS) Report compares the innovation performance of the EU25 to that of the other major R&D performing countries in the world: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa and the US.

Table 2

Global R&D Spending 2002. R&D Expenditures (thousand 2000 US $)

United States26,655,154 36.69% Ukraine 41,536 0.06%

EU2516,595,544 22.85% Luxembourg 33,527 0.05%

Japan14,829,645 20.41% Thailand 32,167 0.04% 108 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2 (continued)

Germany4,777,706 6.58% Slovenia 31,001 0.04%

France3,056,595 4.21% Iceland 26,618 0.04%

United2,802,347 3.86% Croatia 22,647 0.03% Kingdom

China1,540,417 2.12% Egypt, 19,216 0.03% Arab Rep.

Korea, Rep.1,439,710 1.98% Pakistan 17,138 0.02%

Canada1,433,170 1.97% Rumania 15,456 0.02%

Italy1,218,205 1.68% Tunisia 13,056 0.02%

Sweden 1,032,620 1.42% Slovak 12,654 0.02% Republic

Netherlands707,220 0.97% Colombia 8,638 0.01%

Switzerland632,105 0.87% Lithuania 8,628 0.01%

Brazil625,919 0.86% Belarus 7,793 0.01%

Spain609,127 0.84% Kuwait 7,123 0.01%

Australia599,692 0.83% Bulgaria 6,741 0.01%

Israel580,228 0.80% Costa 6,176 0.01% Rica

Belgium517,285 0.71% Peru 5,741 0.01%

Finland428,217 0.59% Uganda 5.67 0.01%

Austria426,419 0.59% Uruguay 4,776 0.01%

Denmark409,286 0.56% Estonia 4,646 0.01%

India386,570 0.53% Panama 4,464 0.01%

Russian356,553 0.49% Nepal 3,830 0.01% Federation

Norway 290,499 0.40% Latvia 3,770 0.01%

Mexico228,914 0.32% Cyprus 2,967 0.00%

Singapore198,692 0.27% Bolivia 2,414 0.00%

Turkey132,131 0.18% Madagascar 2,322 0.00%

Ireland114,103 0.16% Azerbaijan 1,932 0.00%

Hong Kong,102,365 0.14% Georgia 969 0.00% China

Portugal100,925 0.14% Macedonia, 895 0.00% FYR Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2 (continued)

Poland100,102 0.14% Trinidad and 851 0.00% Tobago

Argentina94,134 0.13% Paraguay 746 0.00%

South Africa90,872 0.13% Armenia 599 0.00%

Greece75,783 0.10% Honduras 316 0.00%

Czech Republic71,020 0.10% Kyrgyz 286 0.00% Republic

Malaysia65,253 0.09% Mongolia 282 0.00%

New Zealand62,661 0.09% Seychelles 65 0.00%

Venezuela, RB54,457 0.07% St. Vincent and 52 0.00% the Grenadines

Hungary51,392 0.07% Cape Verde 26 0.00%

Chile42,090 0.06% Serbia and 11 0.00% Montenegro

S o u r c e: 2006 Global Innovation Scoreboard (GIS) Report.

The choice of which countries to include was made based on their global R&D expenditure share in 2002. A non-EIS country’s share had to be at least 0.1% in order to be included. The following countries are included in the 2006 Global Innovation Scoreboard (GIS), with their share of global R&D in parentheses: China (2.12%), Republic of Korea (1.98%), Canada (1.97%), Brazil (0.86%), Australia (0.83%), Israel (0.80%), India (0.53%), Russian Federation (0.49%), Mexico (0.32%), Sin- gapore (0.27%), Hong Kong (0.14%), Argentina (0.13%), South Africa (0.13%) and New Zealand (0.09%). Most innovation policy attention is focused on the capacity to innovate and on input factors such as R&D investment, scientific institutions, human resources and capital. Such inputs frequently serve as proxies for innovativeness and are correlated with intermediate outputs such as patent counts and outcomes such as GDP per capita. Innovation is a non-linear process and the EIS indicators are distributed among five categories that cover different key dimensions of innovation performance:

n Innovation drivers measure the structural conditions required for innovation potential; n Knowledge creation measures the investments in R&D activities; n Innovation & entrepreneurship measure the efforts toward innovation at the firm level; n Application measures the performance expressed in terms of labor and business activities and their value added in innovative sectors, and n Intellectual property measures the achieved results in terms of successful know-how. Innovation inputs include three dimensions: n Innovation drivers (5 indicators), which measure the structural conditions required for innovation potential; 110 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Knowledge creation (4 indicators), which measure the investments in R&D activities, considered as key elements for a successful knowledge-based economy; n Innovation & entrepreneurship (6 indicators), which measure the efforts toward innovation at firm level. Innovation outputs include two dimensions: n Applications (5 indicators), which measure the performance, expressed in terms of labor and business activities, and their value added in innovative sectors; n Intellectual property (5 indicators), which measure the achieved results in terms of successful know-how.

Table 3

European Innovation Scoreboard Indicators

1. INPUT— Innovation drivers

1.1 S&E graduates per 1,000 population aged 20-29 Eurostat13

1.2 Population with tertiary education per 100 population aged Eurostat, 25-64 OECD

1.3 Broadband penetration rate (number of broadband lines per Eurostat NEW 100 population)

1.4 Participation in life-long learning per 100 population aged Eurostat 25-64

1.5 Youth education attainment level Eurostat NEW (% of population aged 20-24 having completed at least upper secondary education)

2. INPUT— Knowledge creation

2.1 Public R&D expenditures Eurostat, (% GDP) OECD

2.2 Business R&D expenditures Eurostat, (% GDP) OECD

2.3 Share of medium-high-tech and high-tech R&D Eurostat, NEW (% of manufacturing R&D expenditures) OECD

2.4 Share of enterprises receiving public funding for Innovation Eurostat NEW (CIS)

2.5 Share of university R&D expenditures financed by business Eurostat, NEW sector OECD

13 The Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) is the statistical arm of the European Commission, producing data for the European Union and promoting harmonization of statistical methods across the member states of the European Union. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3 (continued)

3. INPUT— Innovation & entrepreneurship

3.1 SMEs Innovating in-house Eurostat (% of all SMEs) (CIS)

3.2 Innovative SMEs cooperating with others Eurostat (% of all SMEs) (CIS)

3.3 Innovation expenditures Eurostat (% of total turnover) (CIS)

3.4 Early-stage venture capital (% of GDP) Eurostat

3.5 ICT expenditures Eurostat (% of GDP)

3.6 SMEs using non-technological change Eurostat (% of all SMEs) (CIS)

4. OUTPUT— Application

4.1 Employment in high-tech services (% of total workforce) Eurostat

4.2 Export of high technology products as a share of Eurostat NEW total exports

4.3 Sales of new-to-market products Eurostat (% of total turnover) (CIS)

4.4 Sales of new-to-firm not Sales of new-to-market products Eurostat (% of total turnover) (CIS)

4.5 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing Eurostat (% of total workforce)

5. OUTPUT— Intellectual property

5.1 EPO patents per million population Eurostat

5.2 USPTO patents per million population Eurostat

5.3 Triadic patent families per million population Eurostat, NEW OECD

5.4 New community trademarks per million population OHIM NEW

5.5 New community designs per million population OHIM NEW

S o u r c e: European Innovation Scoreboard 2007. 112 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION EU-Georgia Neighborhood Policy Action Plan

It was March 2003, when the first thoughts about European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) were outlined by the European Commission in the document called Communication on Wider Europe. It demonstrated the high priority that the Union accorded to shaping its future relations with its neighbors. ENP is an outcome of the Lisbon Strategy, which includes a variety of policy measures to enhance research, innovation and business development. These factors are important not only for those countries that have moved very close to the technology frontier, but also for those that are implementing the principles of free market economy. As a country of economic transition, Georgia must create the necessary framework to promote education and research activities and encourage innovation in products and processes. This requires sufficient investment in research and development, high quality scientific research institutions, collaboration in research between universities and industry, protection of intellectual property and innovation stimulation through government procurement. On the basis of Lisbon Strategy analysis we can conclude that that up to 40% of labor productivity growth in Europe is generated by research and development spending and that there are powerful spillover effects into other areas of the economy, depending on the way in which the money is spent. Future economic development of Georgia will critically depend on its ability to create and grow high value, innovative and research-based sectors. The new Strategy Paper published in 2006 elaborated on these thoughts and laid foundation for the new policy. It set out in concrete terms how the Union could work more closely with its neighbors and extend to them some of the benefits of enlargement. Today, the Commission provides an assessment of bilateral relations between the EU and Georgia, reflecting progress under the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and describing the current situation in different areas, including economic and social reforms that will create new opportunities for development and competitiveness. The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the funding instrument of the European Union’s European Neighborhood Policy, which was launched on 14 November, 2006, plays a crucial role in the development of a new innovation policy in Georgia. ENPI priorities reflect the role of innovation systems in a country’s development. Among other priorities, for instance, ENPI aims at facilitating the development of sound research and innovation policies in Georgia, which would help the country achieve and maintain sustainable economic growth. Be- sides, some other ENPI priorities are indirectly relevant to the development of a national innovation system and strategy. Namely, they aim to improve business environment, systematically review the reform strategy, reform the management system of education and science, and improve the quality of statistical data. Apart from these priorities, the chapter on regional cooperation includes a subchapter on the development of Georgia’s potential in the sphere of technological research and innovation to assist the country’s economic and social development. It includes the following themes: n measures to bolster human, material and institutional resources in order to improve technological research and innovation; n integration of scientific and educational institutions, promotion of result-oriented research and innovation projects; Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Georgia’s preparation for the integration with European research framework and EU research and innovation programs, taking into consideration scientific achievements in specific fields.14 One of the important objectives of the European Neighborhood Policy in Georgia is to facilitate the country’s participation in multi-dimensional cooperation and integration processes in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian regions and work out an exclusive, region-specific strategy in this field. The road from the past to the future should lead Georgia through the development and implementation of a strategy to improve the country’s competitiveness. Georgia needs a strong strategic goal—a strategy of change and innovation—to be able to rise to the challenges of global competitiveness. A comprehensive multi-component plan of Georgia’s strategic development should ultimately aim to bring the country’s economic, political and social standards into line with Euro-Atlantic and EU norms. The following steps are vital to solve the problem and accomplish this vision of Georgia’s strategic development: n to develop, integrate and implement knowledge economy and innovation systems aiming to tackle all urgent problems of the country; n to work out long-term cluster strategy and achieve territorial, economic and social integrity in order to ensure the country’s competitiveness in specific fields. The EU has created the model of how to cultivate innovation through quality education connected with research. If Georgia is to develop its capacity for innovation and competitiveness in information-based economy, the country must be prepared to renew its national commitment to innovations and to reinforce the values of life-long learning. Special importance should be paid to ensuring economic growth, competitiveness, establishing stable social protection system, reforming the higher education system and encouraging research and innovation. Georgian universities need to acquire increasing importance as an instrument of economic, social, and cultural development and also as a means of bringing about change in the community in which relationship between education, science and business is receiving increased attention.15 The development of a national system of innovations is the key to successful implementation of each of the above-specified tasks, which are closely linked to the problem of financial and global competitiveness. Innovation is one of the 12 indicators applied by the World Economic Forum in Davos in the last three years to rank competitiveness of 134 countries, including Georgia. It is noteworthy that in the 2008-2009 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) Georgia ranks 90th, down from the 85th place in the previous 2007-2008 GCR. Worse still, if measured by the innovation index alone, the country is ranked only 107th. Another important data provided by the KAM, is the World Bank’s benchmarking tool created in the framework of the Knowledge for Development Program. On the basis on the KAM indexes, we have made a comparative analysis of Georgia’s position relative to its neighbors and EU member states. The results are summarized in the following table: Knowledge Economy Index and such indicators as economic incentives, institutional regime, innovation and information/communication technological development show that Georgia is lagging behind its neighbors. It is important to note that some neighbor countries, namely Armenia, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have already developed and put to use long-term cluster and innovation development strategies based on knowledge economy.

14 See: G. Ivaniashvili, Analyzing EU-Georgia Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan: Modern Benchmarking Approaches to Knowledge Management and Innovations in Georgia, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007. 15 See: Ibidem. 114 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 4

Comparative Analysis of KAM Indexes

Economic Incentive KEI and Innovation Education ICT Institutional Regime Country

1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 recent recent recent recent recent

Germany 8.54 8.758 8.38 8.41 8.93 9.08 8.08 8.74 8.79 8.75

Estonia 8.07 7.76 8.07 8.2 7.42 6.59 8.29 8.07 8.49 8.18

Armenia 5.36 4.61 5.71 2.25 6.06 5.63 6.03 5.98 3.64 4.58

Georgia 4.4 4.5 2.46 1.25 5.27 5.38 6.4 7.17 3.45 4.19

Azerbaijan 3.56 3.46 3.03 0.89 2.65 4.84 5.04 5.75 3.53 2.36 S o u r c e: Knowledge Assessment Methodology, World Bank, 2008

Georgian public sector, higher education institutes and private companies should pay to increased attention to knowledge management and innovation policy to improve the country’s competitiveness. To support the U.N. Millennium Declaration and its implementation, the Georgian government endorsed the so-called Paris Declaration on 2 March, 2005, along with other countries of the world. The Paris Declaration was in fact a follow-up to the Rome and Marrakech forums, laying down a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development, and efficiently tackle poverty and social inequality. Its main purpose is to accelerate the implementation of the millennium development objectives. Partner countries should commit themselves to creating a national development strategy with detailed description of their strategic priorities, which will be linked to the mid-term expenditure framework and reflected in annual budgets—this is the main message of the declaration to partner countries, including Georgia. If Georgia fails to fulfill the multi-parameter and multi-index requirements of the declaration by 2010, it will join the bunch of “no-hopers”—unsuccessful developing countries, which were excluded from the list of recipients of international aid. Thus the study has investigated modern approaches to competitiveness and sustainable economic development in understanding the relationship between government, higher education institutions and business, in order to evaluate Georgia’s capacity and capability to foster the development of National and Regional Innovation Systems. The analysis we have made shows that all actors — public authorities, universities and businesses — must accept their share of the responsibility for raising the levels and efficiency of investment in human capital. Incentives are needed to boost investment in training within individual companies and across sectors in order to support employers in providing suitable access to learning. Among the actions to be undertaken within the framework of this strategy we provide the following recommendations for the Government of Georgia: Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n Set up a public management institution, involving all stakeholders (government, universities, think-tanks, research institutions, business associations etc), to work out recommendations for a national innovation system; n Sharpen understanding of the innovation process, learn and apply best international experience to develop innovative infrastructure and promote innovations in Georgia; n Develop a Research and Innovation policy directly relevant to the sustainable and equitable economic development policy objectives of Georgia; n Prepare governmental program to promote innovation and competitiveness; n Draft, debate and adopt a legislation on innovation policy and competitiveness of Georgia, which should promote the innovation infrastructure and realization of the National innovation system, with clear definitions and unequivocal interpretation, innovation activities, tax- ation and other incentives; n Amend the law on state procurement to encourage purchases of innovative products and services, and reduce corruption; n Further reform efforts through amending the Law on Education to increase the role of universities to encourage research activities; n Equip Georgia with the highly educated, creative and mobile workforce it needs, so that enough young people are graduating with the appropriate skills to obtain jobs in dynamic, high-value and niche sectors; n Reinforce participation of Georgian scientists/students/academics in international and exchange programs; n Improve the attractiveness to researchers through urgently addressing the problem of funding for universities; n Combat the “brain-drain” process, as too many young scientists continue to leave the country; n Encourage life-long and life-wide learning opportunities as well as further the reform efforts in the field of education, science and training to promote sustainable development of human resources and human capital; n Develop special programs of education for public servants (primarily for civic integration); n Reform science management system through appropriate regulatory framework, financing model and governance based on scientific excellence, capacity-building and joint initiatives; n Foster the development of clusters through defining actionable strategies for increasing cluster competitiveness and accelerating growth; n Strengthen administrative structures and procedures to ensure strategic planning of environment issues and coordination between relevant actors; n Establish centers for production excellence to accelerate knowledge sharing and commercialization, including a network of shared facilities and consortia for manufacturing excellence; n Gather Georgia’s top minds on innovation and Catalyze Next Generation Innovators; n Strengthen Georgia’s Manufacturing Capacity and energize the entrepreneurial Economy. It is obvious that good will, or even an initiative demonstrated by government, academia and business sector separately, is not enough to ensure the progress. What is more, if all actors do not use their potential, positive solutions are even less likely to happen. Thorough knowledge about the con- 116 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dition of local economy, which can be obtained through analyzing each of its segments, must become a vital element of the national development policy. In a market economy, the state can support growth by creating conditions that enhance the competitiveness of the economy. This framework may, therefore, be viewed as one of improving Geor- gia’s competitiveness, which should promote the formation of the basis of government’s strategic priorities.

C o n c l u s i o n

Based on the latest knowledge and experience from abroad we are convinced, that the long-term competitiveness of Georgia can only be achieved by the implementation of the essential structural reforms creating conditions for the realization of National and Regional Innovation Systems. Effective fulfillment of proposed concept will require adequate funds, including public and private financing and international donors’ assistance. It is, therefore, important that the resources are invested with the explicit aim of increasing the competitiveness and growth of the entire Georgian economy. Elaborating the innovation policy of the Government of Georgia and the financial instruments for its implementation over the period 2008-2012 will be crucial for the long-term competitiveness of Georgian economy.

Aysel ALLAHVERDIEVA

Ph.D. candidate at the School of Law, University College Dublin (Dublin, Republic of Ireland).

TRA ICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: A TRANSNATIONAL THREAT O THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS O' THE CENTRAL CAUSASIAN STATES)

Abstract

he article discusses one of the most the current stage in world globalization— T dangerous and serious, in the social- trafficking in human beings, especially in humanitarian respect, challenges of women and children, which has become

Support for this publication was provided in part by the FLEX Alumni Grants Program, which is funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State (ECA) and administered by the Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION an international problem in recent years. collapse of the Soviet Union. The main aim The article takes a look at the special fea- of this article is to carry out a compara- tures of the human trafficking problem in tive analysis of the implementation of in- post-Soviet states, primarily in the Central ternational anti-trafficking laws in the na- Caucasian countries, caused by the pow- tional legislation of the Central Caucasian erful migration flows generated by the states.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The term trafficking in humans is circulating with increasing frequency in the mass media, although just two decades ago many countries had no idea what it meant. However, when addressing this phenomenon, media representatives and human rights activists primarily reduce it to trafficking in women for the purpose of sexual exploitation. And although this picture of the trafficking phenomenon is largely justified, the range of victims of this type of slavery extends much broader to include men and children. For example, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons gives the following extensive definition: “‘Trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servi- tude or the removal of organs.”1 According to the data of the International Labor Organization, some 2.45 million people (mainly women and children) in Europe alone are the victims of human trafficking.2 Interpol indicates that every year approximately 120,000 women and children from East European countries become victims of human trafficking in West European states.3 In the context of growing world globalization, the problem of trafficking in human beings is gradually turning into a transnational threat and becoming a topic of current interest in almost every country of the post-Soviet expanse, including the Cen- tral Caucasian states.4 This article aims to examine the most important issues, in particular it looks at:

American Councils for International Education ACTR/ACCELS. The opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily express the views of either ECA or the American Councils for International Education.

1 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supple- menting the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Resolution 55/25 of the U.N. General Assembly of 15 November, 2000, available at [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4720706c0.html]. 2 See: “Trafficking in Women. The Misery behind the Fantasy: From Poverty to Sex Slavery,” A Comprehensive European Strategy, Justice and Home Affairs, The European Commission, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ news/8mars_en.htm], 20 March, 2009. 3 See: “Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: A Europol Perspective,” Europol, February 2008. 4 The author upholds the structurization of the Caucasian region offered by Azerbaijani researcher E. Ismailov, according to which the following political-geographic sub-regions are singled out: the Northern Caucasus (the autonomous state formations of the Russian Federation bordering on the region); the Central Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ar- menia); the Southern Caucasus (the ils of Turkey bordering on Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia [Southwestern Cauca- sus] and northwestern ostânhâ of Iran (Southeastern Caucasus) (see: E. Ismailov, M. Esenov, “Central Eurasia in New Geopolitical and Geo-economic Dimensions,” in: Central Eurasia, Analytical Annual 2005, CA&CC Press, Sweden, 2006, pp. 11-43). 118 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—how big the crime of human trafficking really is in the globalization era and how the determinants of trafficking change in the context of the growing global economic crisis; —what is being done to enforce international anti-trafficking legislation in the Central Cauca- sian states; —the current situation and national mechanisms for combating human trafficking in the Central Caucasian states.

Trafficking in Human Beings A Phenomenon of the Global World

It should first be noted that the problem is of current interest for essentially every country of the world, which are divided into countries of source,5 transit, and destination.6 Given that trafficking in human beings as a global phenomenon is relatively new and has its own peculiarities, it is incumbent upon researchers to give this problem their close attention. In so doing, it is extremely difficult, even practically impossible, to present albeit approximate figures of the victims of trafficking, since the illegal nature of this phenomenon makes these data difficult to assess. Moreover, even that information presented by different international organizations is contradictory. According to the estimates of the U.S. Department of State, approximately 800,000 women, men, and children are moved across international borders every year for the purpose of profitable sexual exploitation.7 According to the U.N. data, over 21,400 victims were identified in 2006 among the 111 countries reporting victim data for that year.8 Approximately 66% of them are women, 12% are men, 13% are girls, and 9% are boys.9 As it can be seen, the figures presented by different international structures significantly differ from each other. It seems to us that such discrepancies cannot only be explained by the different methods used for assessing the victims of trafficking, but also by the hidden nature of this type of crime, which makes any data about it very approximate. Some think that an increase in migration flows is prompting the creation of additional migration barriers in the destination countries.10 This may provide new and fertile ground for cultivating organized criminal activity with respect to moving and keeping illegal migrants in slave-like conditions. The reasons for human trafficking as a global phenomenon should primarily be sought in the socioeconomic conditions of those countries where it is flourishing. Indeed, more often vic-

5 As of today, countries of source or countries that supply victims of human trafficking to the European Union are Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Rumania, Russia, and Nigeria (see: “Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: A Europol Perspective”). 6 As of today, countries of destination in Europe are primarily the countries of the European Union, such as Germa- ny, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain (see: “Trafficking in Human Beings in the European Union: A Europol Perspective”). 7 See: Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. De- partment of State [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/c16467.htm], 23 March, 2009. 8 See: Global Report on Trafficking in Persons. Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, United Nations Of- fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), February 2009, available at [http://www.unodc.org/documents/ Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf]. 9 Ibidem. 10 See: S. Volpicelli, Understanding and Counteracting Trafficking in Persons. The Acts of the Seminar for Women Religious, IOM, Rome, 2004. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tims of human trafficking come from disadvantaged states where, in an effort to overcome poverty, they often make an easy prey for human traffickers. Nevertheless, currently there are many frequently overly simplified and biased approaches in the existing interpretations of such a complex problem: —human trafficking is a relatively new problem; —the problem of trafficking in human beings primarily affects developing countries and countries in transition; —this problem can be resolved by means of political and legal means and responsibility for their enforcement rests on the governments themselves of the source and transit countries of human trafficking; —source countries are mainly taking anti-trafficking action in the scope of their fight against illegal immigration; —this type of crime is being committed by organized crime groups and so is only of an organized crime nature. Human history is very familiar with relations based on the subordination of weaker people to stronger and generated by economic demand. In contrast to the long history of trafficking in human beings, action against this anti-social phenomenon has much more modest time parameters. Contem- porary international law usually singles out the most significant milestones in this action, which essentially did not begin until the 19th century,11 as: —Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others of 2 December, 1949; —Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 7 September, 1956; —Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to it on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 25 May, 2000; —Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November, 2000; —Brussels Declaration of the European Conference on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (18-20 September, 2002); —Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (16 May, 2005), and others; —Council of Europe Framework Decision on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 2002/629/JHA (19 July, 2002); —Directive of the European Council on the Short Term Residence Permit Issued to Victims of Action to Facilitate Illegal Immigration or Trafficking in Human Beings who Cooperate with the Competent Authorities 2004/81/EC (29 April, 2004);

11 Appendix to the Ban on Trafficking in Africans at the International Level to the General Act adopted by the Vi- enna Congress (1815); the London Treaty (1841) entered by England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which puts slave trade on the same level as piracy; the General Act of the Berlin Conference (1885), which envisages the prohibition of slave labor by international law; the General Act of the Brussels Conference (1890), which sets forth the obligation to adopt in national law criminal liability for the forced seizure of hostages; the Saint-Germain Treaty (1919), which regulates the obligation to cooperate in order to completely eradicate slavery and slave trade (see: I.I. Lukashuk, A.N. Nau- mov, Mezhdunarodnoe ugolovnoe pravo, Spark, Moscow, 1999). 120 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—Directive of the European Council on Defining the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, Tran- sit and Residence 2002/90/EC (28 November, 2002); —Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on Trafficking in Women and Girls adopted at its 63rd session on 18 December, 2008. Currently, many states are adopting a whole series of legislative measures aimed at combating human trafficking on the basis of the above-mentioned documents of international law. As of November 2008, 63% of the 155 countries and territories had passed laws against human trafficking addressing the major forms of trafficking.12 Another 16% had passed anti-trafficking laws that cover only certain elements of the definition13 in this Protocol.14 In 2003, only one third of the countries covered by this report had legislation against human trafficking; at the end of 2008, four- fifths did. The number of countries having anti-trafficking legislation more than doubled between 2003 and 2008 in response to the passage of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traffick- ing in Persons. In addition, 54% of the responding countries have established special anti-human trafficking special police units, and more than half have developed national action plans to deal with this issue.15 From the above, it can be seen that quite a number of regulatory acts have been passed against human trafficking in international law. But despite all its diversity, this action basically boils down to two aspects: —an approach based on criminal legal proceedings (including prevention, protection, investigation, and criminal prosecution); —an approach based on combating human trafficking in the source and transit countries by means of increased public awareness. But how productive are such approaches? How can we explain the fact that trafficking in human beings has become so widespread in just the past few decades and why are the numerous international and national anti-trafficking programs often far from being effective? Among the other mythologemes associated with the problem of human trafficking, a few more should be noted. Let us try and figure them out. Mythologeme of “demonization” of international criminal groups engaged in trafficking. It is an opinion of the author that the attempts to reduce the reasons for the globalization of human trafficking to the excessive greed of international crime syndicates or to the corruption of government structures in certain countries to be narrow-minded and even somewhat naïve. They, in themselves, are not independent factors but essentially fulfill the role of conducting channels for actual- izing the shadow aspects of the basic law of the market economy—the balance between supply and demand. In our opinion, the multi-billion revenues obtained from trafficking and the stable dynamics of their growth16 are associated with several objective determinants that make migration waves essentially inevitable: —the different types of population reproduction in the developed and developing countries generate a bilateral need for mass migration;

12 Laws, according to which at least sexual exploitation or forced labor regardless of age or sex of the victims are recognized as criminally punishable. 13 For example, laws which cover only sexual exploitation or ensure the protection of only women and children. 14 See: Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, Executive Summary, p. 4. 15 Ibidem. 16 For more on the shadow aspects of the global economy, including those associated with its criminalization, see: “Kriminalnaia globalizatsiia ekonomiki,” Ekonomicheskaia teoriia prestuplenii i nakazanii, Issue 5, ed. by L.M. Timo- feev, V.A. Latov, RGGU, Moscow, 2002. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

—the large gaps in the levels of income between the population of the developing and developed countries make migration extremely attractive; —the absence of a so-called specific advantage (in material production, the service sector, and so on) in most developing countries frequently makes economic migration the only real way for the active part of their population to meet their material needs. In this way, the needs of people themselves—in some countries to buy and in others to sell (workforce, entertainment, “personal services,” donor organs)—dictate the mass movement of the population. It stands to reason that the global dimensions of migration, when state borders and the limitations set by national governments (migration quotas, legislative regulations, and so on) must be con- tended with and with which these dimensions just do not coincide, inevitably make it difficult to control and encourage the appearance of enormous black markets and criminal schemes for transporting and exploiting people. In other words, illegal international human trafficking is becoming a form of response to market demand. Mythologemes generated by feminist interpretations in the approaches to this problem, according to which human trafficking boils down primarily to forced sexual exploitation of women. Most experts believe that between 80% and 90% of the victims of human trafficking are women. The U.N. Report on Human Trafficking for 2008 prepared by the U.N. Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contains fresh data on contemporary forms of slavery, describes its nature and truly global dimensions, and also indicates that sexual exploitation (79%) and forced labor (18%) are the most widespread forms of trafficking in human beings.17 It is an opinion of the author that the classical approaches to understanding the problem of trafficking largely reflect an inverted form of the cause-and-effect relations that exist here. This is primarily manifested in the fact that in the “source country-transit country-destination country” trafficking chain, it is the source country that is customarily considered the starting point. As paradoxical as it may seem, in so doing the economic component of the human trafficking problem is explained in most cases by categories outside the economy, since the main mechanism of the market economy is ignored—“supply is generated by demand.” It is precisely the growing demand in the host countries associated with the high cost of local services in the sex industry of developed countries18 that is leading to the appearance of competitive monopoly markets. Their existence, in combination with the low salary of migrant women, is created by giant economic scissors which make the sex industry a segment of the workforce market that is extremely profitable for its organizers with all the ensuing negative and criminal consequences. Here are the roots of this type of criminal business, which is in third place in terms of revenue after arms trafficking and the drug business. According to experts, “to date, it has remained unclear whether human trafficking enterprises were driven primarily by networks situated in the source countries or in the destination countries.”19 The launching mechanism of human trafficking should nevertheless be sought in the destination countries, in the existence of the enormous black market of illegal workforce consumption, the toughening up of the migration regime in them, and the creation of a general free trade and movement zone,20 which in turn stimulates the appallingly widespread victimization of

17 UNODC Report on Human Trafficking Exposes Modern Form of Slavery, available at [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html]. 18 An explanation of the high costs in the sex industry caused by the inelastic supply of workforce in this sphere is set forth in: D. Coyle, Sex, Drugs & Economics: An Unconventional Introduction to Economics, Texere, New York, Lon- don, 2002. 19 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, Executive Summary, pp. 7-8. 20 For example, according to the Schengen acquis, border control is not carried out on the domestic borders between countries of the Schengen group. 122 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION women and children. Noteworthy in this respect is conference of the Office for Democratic Institu- tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE held in September 2004 entitled “Ensuring Human Rights Protection in Countries of Destination: Breaking the Cycle of Trafficking” at which attention was focused on the importance of increasing cooperation between source countries of human trafficking victims and countries of destination.21 There is another aspect of the problem associated with the fact that men make up more than 90% of the prison populations of most countries and are particularly over-represented as perpetrators of violent crime. Thus, it might be assumed that human trafficking, where violence and threats are keys to the business, would likewise be overwhelmingly male dominated. However, the data gathered on the gender of offenders in 46 countries suggest that women play a key role as the perpetrators of human trafficking. In Europe, for example, women make up a larger share of those convicted for human trafficking offences than for most other forms of crime.22 The authors of the above-mentioned U.N. Global Report also recognize the need for a defemi- nized interpretation of the trafficking problem. The fact that more women are engaged in slave trade proved a surprise even to them: “Surprisingly, in 30% of the countries which provided information on the gender of traffickers, women make up the largest proportion of traffickers. In some parts of the world, women trafficking women is the norm.”23 At the same time, according to Eva Biode, a special representative of the OSCE on the fight against trafficking, the fact that mainly women are brought to account for trafficking in human beings in no way excludes the fact that men, more influential forces, and big money stand behind them.24 So, although the international law base for combating human trafficking and for identifying and helping its victims has become increasingly stronger in the past twenty years and the range of corresponding studies in this area is constantly expanding, the problem of trafficking is steadily becoming more globalized. With respect to the Central Caucasian Region, the problem areas can mainly be systematized within the framework of two groups of issues: —the implementation and correlation of national legislation of the region’s states to international law; —the current situation and national mechanisms for combating trafficking in human beings.

Implementation of International Law in Action against Trafficking in the Central Caucasian States

As it was noted earlier, the problem of trafficking in human beings is complex in nature. The lack of necessary legal tools is conducive to drawing women into the illegal migration processes and their victimization. This is precisely why the international community believes bringing the national legislative base into harmony with international law standards to be one of its priority tasks in this sphere.

21 See: “Ensuring Human Rights Protection in Countries of Destination: Breaking the Cycle of Trafficking, 23- 24 September, 2004,” available at [http://www.osce.org/item/15919.html]. 22 See: Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, Executive Summary, p. 7. 23 See: UNODC Report on Human Trafficking Exposes Modern Form of Slavery. 24 [http://echo-az.info/obshestvo06.shtml], 18 June, 2008. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It should be noted that recognizing the importance of the trafficking problem, the Central Cau- casian states have also exerted immense efforts over the past decade in this area to introduce international standards into their legislative bases (see Table 1).25

Table 1

Central Caucasian States

Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia International Conventions

Convention on the Rights of the Child 8.09.2000 24.9.2003 — and the Optional Protocol to It on 3.07.2002 30.09.2005 the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 25 May, 2000

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 12.12.2000 15.11.2001 13.12.2000 Punish Trafficking in Persons, 30.10.2003 1.07. 2003 5.09.2006 Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime of 15 November, 2000

Council of Europe Convention on — 16.05.2005 19.10.2005 Action Against Trafficking in Human 14.04.2008 14.03.2007 Beings of 16 May, 2005

However, the signing and ratification of acts of international law provides no guarantee that they will be efficiently enforced. For the purposes of this article it is expedient to take a look at the specific aspects of enforcing international standards based on the example of the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings,26 which entered into force on 1 Febru- ary, 2008 and which is used as the main tool for taking action to combat trafficking. It is expected that the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings may significantly change the situation in protecting and rehabilitating victims in source countries (mainly post-Soviet countries) and destination countries (mainly Member States of the European Union). However, it is important to note that the Convention may not be enforced equally in all the Member States of the Council of Europe since there are significant differences among the 47 countries that are members of the Council of Europe. The Member States of the Council of Europe range from groups of countries with a transition economy to the economically strong and politically stable countries of the European Union. As a result, even if the national legislative frameworks are brought into harmony, the pertinence of the Council of Europe Convention will

25 Compiled by the author on the basis of U.N. and Council of Europe data on the status of the Conventions. 26 Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings (adopted in Warsaw on 16 May, 2005) entered into force on 1 February, 2008 (10 ratifications, including 8 member states). As of March 2009, it had already been signed by 40 and ratified by 20 member states of the Council of Europe (see: “Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings,” Council of Europe Information Document No. 197. Status on 18/3/ 2009, available at [http://www.coe.int/trafficking]. 124 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION greatly vary in practice depending on the traditions of the local cultures, norms of legal conscience, principle of the rule of the law, and degree of economic growth. The first, most obvious, difference among the Central Caucasian countries is that the CE Con- vention is a legally binding document for Armenia and Georgia, but not for Azerbaijan, which as of today has not signed or ratified it. It should be noted that apart from Azerbaijan, another five countries—members of the Council of Europe—Liechtenstein, Monaco, Russia, Turkey, the Czech Re- public, and Estonia as of today have not yet signed the Convention for different reasons; while other 20 countries (Belgium, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and others) have signed it but not ratified it. Experts explain such a large number of states in which the CE Conven- tion has not entered into force by the need for bringing the legislative base of these countries into harmony with the offered standards. After ratification of the Convention its regulations become legally binding. Another legal aspect of the problem lies in the Central Caucasus’ conflict zones—Nagorno- Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia—which in so doing create a legal vacuum in the fight against human trafficking within the Council of Europe’s single space. In addition, the fate of the numerous Azeri citizens in Armenian captivity and subjected to slave labor essentially remains beyond the framework of international law. According to the International Red Cross in Azerbaijan, the families of more than 4,400 people who are missing due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still have no information about the fate of their relatives. These people have the right to know and the authorities are obligated to provide them with the necessary information.27 But the Armenian government refuses to provide information on this issue. In all three Central Caucasian countries the Council of Europe is planning to carry out programs to raise public awareness about the potential threat of human trafficking, as well as render the governments assistance both in protecting local and transit victims of trafficking and in criminally prosecut- ing people engaged in this practice. These lengthy and planned initiatives are intended to ease the ratification and implementation of the three main legal instruments in this area: —the U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; —the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking; —the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol to it on the Sale of Chil- dren, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.

The Current Situation and National Mechanisms for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in the Central Caucasian States

The differences among the region’s countries are also manifested in the nature and scale of the trafficking problem in each of them. Keeping in mind that one of the generally accepted analysis tools in the international research literature is rating data on trafficking published annually by the U.S.

27 [http://www.icrc.org/web/rus/siterus0.nsf/html/azerbaijan-news-130209]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Department of State,28 relying on them the article will try to briefly describe the situation in each of the Central Caucasian countries.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is primarily a source and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and forced labor. Women from Azerbaijan are trafficked to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) for purposes of sexual exploitation. Men are trafficked to Russia for the purpose of forced labor. Men and women are also trafficked to Iran, Paki- stan, and India for purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Children from Azerbaijan are often trafficked to Turkey for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and to Russia for the purpose of forced labor. In addition, Azerbaijan serves as a transit country for victims from Uzbekistan, Kyr- gyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova trafficked to Turkey and the U.A.E. for sexual exploitation.29 Data on the number of human trafficking victims presented by the Azerbaijani state structures and nongovernmental organizations are extremely different. But in contrast to the other two Cen- tral Caucasian states, in Azerbaijan the data of the state structures are twice as high as those of NGOs, which could show the desire of the official departments not to hide the real state of affairs (see Figs. 1 and 2). On the whole, according to the official statistics, the strategy of action against human trafficking carried out in Azerbaijan has shown positive dynamics over the past five years. For example, an order of the country’s president Ilham Aliev in 2004 approved “The Plan of National Measures against Trafficking in Azerbaijan” and appointed a national coordinator for implementing this plan. In 2005, the country’s parliament adopted a Law on the Fight against Trafficking in Persons. In addition, in 2006, a special anti-trafficking unit was created at the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of the Interior. In 2006, 27 cases and 85 victims were identified in the country, and in 2007, 74 cases and 101 victims. In 2008, as many as 342 trafficking-related crimes were exposed in Azerbaijan. This is 119 cases more than in 2007, and 68 of them are qualified under Art 68 of the Criminal Code on trafficking in persons. A total of 315 people have been prosecuted for offenses in this area. The report by the National Coordinator also notes that most of the 48 human trafficking victims placed in shelters in 2008 have been reintegrated into society, 7 were provided with jobs, 3 took professional courses, and 9 received compensation through court decisions for the material damage inflicted on them; 41 victims received benefits during the reintegration process.30 This shows a perceptible improvement in the efforts to expose crimes and an overall increase in the professionalism of officials involved in this activity, but it does not mean that all the problems

28 The compilers of the U.S. State Department report distribute countries in keeping with the following tiers: Tier 1: Countries whose governments fully comply with the Act’s minimum standards. Tier 2: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the Act’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Tier 2 Watch List: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the Act’s minimum standards but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, and: (a) The absolute number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is increasing significantly; or (b) There is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in persons from the previous year; or (c) The determination that a country is making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with minimum standards was based on commitments by the country to take additional future steps over the next year. Tier 3: Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so, available at [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/reports/2009/116114.htm]. 29 See: Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/c16467.htm]. 30 See: Informational juridical portal Legal.Az, available at [http://www.legal.az/content/view/6167/115/]. 126 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

igure 131

Victims of Trafficking in Persons Identified by State Authorities in Azerbaijan, by gender and age (2006-2007)

140 120 1 100 9 80 1 60 100 40 20 76 0 2006 2007

Women Girls Men

S o u r c e: Ministry of the Interior.

igure 232

Victims Sheltered by the NGO Clean World in Azerbaijan, by gender and age (2004-2007)

140 120 100 2 80

60 2 40 48 10 20 6 24 0 2004 2005 2006 2007

Women Men Children

S o u r c e: Clean World and IOM.

31 [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html]. 32 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION have been resolved, which was reflected in the Interim Assessment of the U.S. Department of State for May-November 2008. Azerbaijan, which according to the results of 2006-2007 was ranked as a Tier 2 country, failed to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons last year (see Fig. 3).33 igure 3

Azerbaijan Tier Ranking by Year

2 WL

3 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

The main problems in Azerbaijan in the current situation relating to trafficking are: Ø In February 2008, all human trafficking cases were referred to the anti-trafficking unit. However, the unit has failed to carry out training sessions in trafficking in persons and human rights for its personnel, although one of its main tasks is victim identification. Ø State structures and NGOs are failing to efficiently cooperate in victim identification.

Armenia

Armenia, in contrast to the other two Central Caucasian countries, is primarily a source country for women and girls trafficked to the United Arab Emirates and Turkey for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Armenian men and women are also trafficked to Russia for the purpose of forced labor.34 The U.S. State Department report also states that destination countries now include Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, but no official cases involving these countries as destinations have surfaced. Data on the number of human trafficking victims presented by state structures and NGOs are comparable and artificially low. According to the U.S. Department of State report, in 2007 the government of Armenia investigated only 14 cases of trafficking for labor and sexual exploitation. On the whole, however, according to the U.S. State Department, approximately 2,000 Armenian women are involved in human trafficking. The Armenian government convicted a total of 11 trafficking offenders, with sentences ranging from one to eight years’ imprisonment and fines. At the same time, the State Department points out that it failed to demonstrate evidence of investigation, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences of officials complicit in trafficking.35 The Interim Assessment of the U.S. Department of State for May-

33 “Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment (May-November 2008),” in: Trafficking in Persons Report, 27 Janu- ary, 2009, available at [http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/reports/2009/116114.htm]. 34 See: Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 35 See: Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 128 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

igure 436

Victims of Trafficking in Persons Identified by State Authorities in Armenia, by gender and age (2004-2006)

50 3

30 53 44 20 9 10

0 2004 2005 2006

Women Men

S o u r c e: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

igure 537

Victims of Trafficking in Persons Sheltered by NGOs in Armenia, by gender and age (2003-March 2007)

40 2 6 30 1 20 31 10 20 24 6 1 0 1 2003 2004 2005 2006 up to March 2007

Females Males

S o u r c e: Victims of Trafficking Assisted in Armenia, UNDP.

36 [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html]. 37 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

November 2008 indicates that the Armenian government has achieved modest progress in combating human trafficking in the reporting period but has failed to fulfill its commitments to undertake future actions over the coming year, so remains on Tier 2 Watch List for the fourth consecutive year, i.e. since 2005 (see Fig. 6).38 igure 6

Armenia Tier Ranking by Year

2 WL

3 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

The main problems in Armenia in the current situation regarding combating trafficking are: Ø According to the State Department data, although the government identified more victims of human trafficking than in Georgia and Azerbaijan, these statistics are conflated with figures for smuggling and prostitution crimes; Ø Armenia adopted a National Action Plan and National Mechanism for referring trafficking victims to NGOs and other structures for assistance, but neither of these documents is available to the broad public in English or Russian; Ø Only a small number of convicted Armenian traffickers receive serious sentences. In Arme- nia, traffickers are eligible for release from prison after serving half of their sentences, and early release is routinely granted. Ø Human rights organizations for combating trafficking are limping.

Georgia

This is a source and transit country for women and girls trafficked from Georgia, as well as through Georgia from Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, and other former Soviet countries, to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Western Europe.39 In contrast to Azerbaijan and Armenia, the data on the number of human trafficking victims in Georgia mainly rely on the information provided by the republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The absence of alternative data from NGOs makes it impossible to verify the official statistics. The compilers of the trafficking ranking note significant improvements in this area in Georgia for 2007-2008 and have placed it on Tier 1 (see Fig. 7).40

38 See: “Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment (May-November 2008).” 39 See: Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. Department of State. 40 See: “Trafficking in Persons Interim Assessment (May-November 2008).” 130 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

igure 7

Georgia Tier Ranking by Year

2 WL

3 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

The main anti-trafficking problems in Georgia in the current situation are: Ø The mechanism for referring victims to NGOs, although it is largely efficient, requires improvement of the coordination between these organizations and state structures; Ø There were reports that the government unknowingly jailed trafficking victims on immigration violations. So, although it varies (Georgia is Tier 1, Azerbaijan and Armenia are Tier 2), the current situation regarding trafficking in the three Central Caucasian countries has a low number of exposed victims in common (particularly in Armenia). It is difficult to assess the real dimensions of trafficking in human beings, but according to reliable statistics more victims have been identified in Azerbaijan than in Armenia and Georgia.

Table 241

Years 2004 2005 2006 2007

NGOs NGOs NGOs NGOs State State State State organizations organizations organizations Data of organizations organizations

Azerbaijan — 10 — 6 85 26 101 50

Armenia 9 33 53 21 47 30 — 6

Georgia — — 13 — 21 — — —

The response in these countries to signals about trafficking-related complicity of law enforcement personnel is still low, as is the investigation and prosecution of this complicity. In the court rooms victims are often treated as criminals and the psychological technique of placing the responsi-

41 The summary table was compiled on the basis of data available at [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/ global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION bility on the victims of human trafficking themselves is widespread: “the women were looking for it themselves, they are stupid and naïve, they knew they were going to work as prostitutes, they were looking for easy money and did nothing to escape,” and so on. The victims of trafficking in human beings often encounter misunderstanding and victimization from the people who should be helping them. A separate and rather difficult problem is that of the voluntary return of trafficking victims to their homeland. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are currently facilitating the voluntary return of foreign citizens who have become the victims of human trafficking to their country of source with the help of nongovernmental organizations, the corresponding state structures, and international immigration organizations (IMO). At present, there is no reliable data on the implementation of this process. According to the legislation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, a victim cannot be deported if he or she is underage (for example, Art 16 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Combating Trafficking in Persons). Art 15 of the Law on Trafficking in Persons contains general provisions stat- ing that all victims should be returned and reintegrated into their habitual way of life.42 The law also protects the rights and interests of citizens of Azerbaijan who have become the victims of trafficking in persons and their return to Azerbaijan. But in reality, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, trafficking victims may be deported since the legislation of the two sides involved does not envisage voluntary return to the homeland or cooperation with the state structures of the other country in order to prevent re-victimization. As the documents of the OSCE Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) note, one of the most effective ways to achieve progress in combating trafficking is to create mechanisms for redirecting trafficking victims at the national level, with the following being singled out as the main components: identification of alleged trafficking victims; the main principles of agreements on cooperation; protection and support services; repatriation and social integration.43 The mentioned components are envisaged in all the National Action Plans to Fight Trafficking in Persons adopted in all the Central Caucasian countries.44 But, first, only a general declaration of them is made and, second, they do not contain a specific strategy or implementation tools. So in 2008-2009, efforts have been stepped up to create national mechanisms. After a six-month national experimental investigation, in November 2008 the government of Armenia officially adopted its national referral mechanism for trafficking victims. According to media reports, in the first six months of 2009 the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan approved “Mechanisms of Assistance to Trafficking Victims.” The document stipulates the need for identifying trafficking victims, rendering them legal and medical assistance, and ensuring their integration into society.45 This will also help to resolve one of the most important aspects of the enforcement problem since the legislation of the Central Caucasian states has contained no mandatory provisions to date on rendering support to victims, including financial. “Ac- cess to and providing housing, protection and assistance to victims should be timely and adequately financed. In the context of trafficking in human beings this frequently means proper financing of the functions of international, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations with respect to

42 See: Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Combating Trafficking in Persons, Art 16. Rendering Assistance to Chil- dren who Have Become Victims of Trafficking in Persons; Art 15. Social Rehabilitation of Victims of Trafficking in Per- sons, available at [www.mia.gov.az]. 43 See: “National Referral Mechanisms—Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Trafficked Persons: A Practical Handbook. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),” OSCE/ODIHR 2004, pp. 68-120, available at [www.osce.org/odihr]. 44 See: “National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings in the Republic îf Azerbaijan”; “National Action Plan on Combating TIP of Georgia 2007-2008”; “Action Plan for Prevention of Trafficking in the Republic îf Ar- menia 2007-2009.” 45 See: “Preodolet ‘sindrom nasiliia,’” 14 March, 2009, Zerkalo, 17 June, 2009, available at [http:// www.zerkalo.az./rubric.php?id=40467]. 132 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION providing housing. This will also help to ensure the independent status of these organizations, particularly NGOs.”46 There are two basic models for providing financial assistance to alleged victims of human trafficking. The first model is allotting funds directly to trafficking victims from the state budget. The second, more frequently used, model for rendering financial services is to allot funds to organizations and structures providing services to protect and support the alleged victims of human trafficking. And finally in the countries of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe a combination model of international and national financing of services is found.47 It is an opinion of the author that this latter model would best suit the conditions of the Central Caucasian states since it allows for the consolidated efforts of national governments, civil society institutions, and international organizations.

C o n c l u s i o n

Some of the aspects of the problem of trafficking in human beings discussed in this article not only reveal its transnational nature but also show the need for a comprehensive approach to its solution. The U.N. and Council of Europe Conventions and the OSCE documents set forth specific methods for resolving the problem of trafficking in human beings: eliminating shadow labor markets, fighting poverty and exploitation services, and carrying out a targeted fight against the crime industry engaged in human trafficking. But the growing globalization of this shameful crime of the 21st century clearly shows that the underdeveloped legislative base, insufficient activity of the law-enforcement structures, and ineffective international cooperation are also factors provoking or stimulating trafficking. So when drawing up national strategies for combating trafficking in human beings, the governments of the Central Caucasian states should strengthen cooperation among themselves as well as with the leading countries of the world and authoritative international structures, ensure the adoption of the national legislation on fighting trafficking in human beings in compliance with international standards, and execute rapid ratification of the international instruments against trafficking in human beings.

46 See: Recommendations of the European Conference on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings – Global Challenges of the 21st Century, 18-20 September, 2002, Brussels Declaration on Preventing and Combating Traf- ficking in Human Beings: “Protocols of minimum standards should be drawn up between law enforcement services and IOs and NGOs on the immediate treatment of trafficked victims” (Art 13). 47 “National Referral Mechanisms,” pp. 82-84. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Roya TAGHIYEVA

D.Sc. (Art History), professor, director of the Karimov State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpets and Decorative Applied Arts, chairman of the Azerbaijani National Committee of the International Council of Museums (ICOM) (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE ART O AZERBAIJANI CARPET WEAVING IN THE CONTEXT O THE INTERCIVILIZATIONAL DIALOG

Abstract

he article takes a look at the history jan, the traditional features of Azerbaijani T of the development of Azerbaijani car- carpets, the latter in interaction with world pets in the context of the interciviliza- culture, the place and significance of Azer- tional dialog. It traces the sources of the baijani carpets in world culture, and the pro- development of carpet weaving in Azerbai- tection of the Azerbaijani carpet.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The carpet is beyond doubt an important attribute of human civilization. The traditional carpet, both in terms of its pragmatic and symbolic functions, is the quintessence of the Azerbaijani culture, also being an inherent element of the culture of many other nationalities. For the Azerbaijani people, the art of carpet making is an area of culture that reflects its rich spiritual world, individual and unique characteristics, intellect, world outlook, aesthetics, and life 134 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION philosophy. Since time immemorial, Azerbaijanis have been born, lived, and died on carpets, so it stands to reason that carpets in their innumerable forms have always been an inalienable attribute of their everyday life. Weaving, and carpet weaving in particular, which, being utilitarian in designation, are popular among many nationalities and also embody the aesthetics of harmony, rhythm, and color. But a unique blend of specific geographic, economic, and social conditions was necessary to turn carpet making into a genuine, dominating, and aesthetically valuable art form that comprehensively reflects the essence of the nation’s philosophy and spirit. Azerbaijan, which combines all of these conditions, has been one such area and it was in this unique environment that the nation’s artistic mentality formed. Thanks to this, carpet making became one of the most important aspects of the creative activity of Azerbaijan’s population and stood out among the other types of decorative applied art. The carpet has always been an important attribute of the national lifestyle, reflecting the social, economic, political, and cultural changes in the life of the people and society as a whole. It features in folklore, classical Azerbaijani literature, as well as in the songs of ashug singers. In addition, the carpet has not only become an item of everyday life, but has also developed into the people’s main realm of artistic expression. The carpet retains its value even when the way of life changes and an entirely different everyday and artistic environment takes shape. Despite all the innovations in materials, production techniques, aesthetics, and design, the carpet is an amazing cultural constant. Even the rapid changes in lifestyle in the 21st century have not led to the disappearance of the carpet, which can be found in the most modern interiors. Research of Azerbaijani carpets relies on a broad source base. It includes the data of archeological monuments, beginning with the Eneolithic period and the reports of classical and medieval authors and travelers, as well as of epigraphic monuments, folklore, classical literature, miniature paintings, European artists’ canvases, historical documents, official reports, and the scientific research studies of European, Russian, American, and, of course, Azerbaijani scientists.

Origins of Carpet Weaving in Azerbaijan

The origins of carpet weaving in Azerbaijan can be traced from the Bronze Age. Classical weaving was preceded by the weaving of various household items, such as mats (khesir) from plant fibers. Different types of bulrushes and reeds, flax, nettles, hemp, and many other suitable plants grow in Azerbaijan, providing a rich raw material base for the development of weaving. The abundance of spindles of the Eneolithic period found during archeological digs throughout Azerbaijan show that weaving was a well-developed craft at that time. This is also evidenced by the fabric prints on vessels and remains of primitive looms of the Eneolithic period,1 as well as the remnants of carpet fabrics themselves in later monuments. Weaving underwent further development in the Bronze and Early Iron Age. Many ceramic spindles and samples of so-called ceramic weaving have also been found in the monuments of this time. Convincing evidence has been found of the existence of simple looms in Azerbaijan in the archeological monuments of the Middle Bronze Age. Most likely, local weavers were also successful in assimilating fabric dying in the reviewed period.

1 See: O. Abibullaev, Eneolit i bronza na territorii Nakhichevanskoi ASSR, Baku, 1982, p. 223. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Herodotus speaks of the high level of dying in the classical period.2 Despite the use of plant fiber in weaving during the Early Bronze Age, weaving with wool became the main trend at this time, which was largely promoted by the rapid development of sheep breeding. In many archeological monuments of the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age remnants of fabrics have been found. An analysis of these fabrics showed their wool and flax origin. It was precisely in the Bronze and Early Iron Age that the mobile lifestyle associated with cattle breeding gave rise to the emergence of carpet items— khurjun, chuval, heib, mafrash, and relatively light napless carpets. It was at this time (in the 2nd century B.C.) that classical piled carpet weaving appeared. Ac- cording to researchers, woolen carpets already existed in the Bronze Age in the 2nd century B.C.3 For example, in the town of Maku4 the clay statue of a horse was found with a floral carpet saddlecloth.5 It was probably at this time that carpet weavers borrowed many of the designs that arose in earlier weaving, which later, after disappearing on fabrics and in ceramics, survived to our day on carpet items. For example, the original shape-generating group of carpet motifs is formed by ancient designs that have a multi-century history of development. These designs often have many similarities on ceramic and metal items of the Bronze Age. These shapes also formed the basis of the aesthetic-artistic expression of the Azerbaijani carpet later and can be clearly traced on modern carpets. The geometric design is the most characteristic of Azerbaijani carpets. Azerbaijan is one of those areas where abstract-geometric designs traced from as early as the Bronze Age survived in the same stylistic interpretation in our day and age. The art of neighboring territories does not have the same ancient layer of geometric designs that form the basis of patterns on carpets. The designs found on carpets were also broadly represented in ancient ceramics. Whereby the repetition of not only individual elements, drawings, motifs, and so on is obvious, but also of entire themes and designs. Intricate rituals, particularly the cult of fertility, were an integral part of the religious practice of Zoroastrism, which reflected on the nation’s artistic world outlook. Right up until today, the traditional design has survived with precise division into four parts with a central medallion associated with the symbols of the sun and the four seasons. Monuments of art and historical sources are evidence of the high traditions of carpet weaving on the territory of historical Azerbaijan. Greek historian Xenophon (5th century B.C.)6 pointed out that the Persians learned how to use carpets from the Midians (one of the Azerbaijanis’ distant ancestors). Many facts about carpet weaving in Azerbaijan are referred to by medieval authors. Chinese traveler of the 7th century Huan-Tes-ank calls Azerbaijan a large carpet manufacturing center.7 Albanian historian of the 7th century Moses Kalankatui talks about the manufacture of silk fabric and variegated many-colored carpets in the northern part of Azerbaijan and their use in the everyday life of the nobility.8 Armenian historian Sebeos mentions a multitude of carpets when talking about the booty seized in 628 by Byzantine emperor Hercules in Nakhchivan. Archeological data also reaffirm this. Remains of a loom, carpet weaving tools, remains of wool thread, pieces of felt, decomposed carpets and rugs were found in the catacombs of the 7th century.9 Arab historians of the 10th century report on the large-scale manufacture of “zili” and prayer mats in the Azerbaijani towns of Nakhchivan, Khoi, Bargi, and Bildis, as well as on the production of rugs and madder dyes.10

2 See: V. Latyshev, Izvestiia drevnikh pisatelei v Skifii i Kavkaz, Vol. 1, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 7. 3 See: L. Karimov, Azerbaidzhanskiy kover, Vol. 2, Baku, 1983, p. 10. 4 Located in historical Southern Azerbaijan—contemporary northern Iran. 5 See: Barrasikhaie tarikhi, Tehran, No. 3, 1939. 6 See: Xenophon, Cyropaedia, Vol. 8, Moscow, 1976, p. 216. 7 See: L. Karimov, op. cit., pp. 12, 16. 8 See: M. Kalankatuiskiy, Istoriia Agvan, St. Petersburg, 1861, pp. 158, 161, 181. 9 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, Vol. 1, Baku, 1958, p. 74. 10 See: Khudud al-Alem, Rukopis’ Tumanskogo, Leningrad, 1930, pp. 32b, 33a. 136 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Information about carpets is often found in folklore, dastans (ornate oral history that forms an important part of the Turkic literature of Central Asia), and, in particular, in the famous epos of the 11th century Kitabi Dede Korkut (The Book of Dede Korkut). Many valuable facts about Azerbaijani carpets can be found in classical Azerbaijani literature. For example, Nizami and Hagani (12th century) mention carpets woven from silk using threads of precious metals.11 Medieval European travelers also provide interesting information on the high level of Azerbaijan’s weaving and carpet weaving. In the 13th century, Marco Polo talked about the unique fabrics produced in Tabriz. These fabrics were exported to Europe by Venetian and Genoese merchants. At the same time, Frenchman William of Rubruck visited Derbent, Shemakha, Nakhchivan, and other cities, and noted that many good carpets were produced there which covered the floors and walls of the mosques and palaces of the Azerbaijani rulers.12 But it was not only the lives of the members of the upper classes of medieval society in Azerbai- jan that passed in the company of carpets. For example, Englishmen Bannister and Ducket, who visited Shirvan in the 16th century, related that the homes of the residents had few adornments apart from carpets and copper items. “They sit on the floor, on a rug, their legs drawn up like tailors. There is no one, even the most ordinary person, who does not sit on a rug (good or bad): the entire house or entire room where they sit is covered in carpets.”13 From what they said, it is obvious that all the strata of population in medieval Azerbaijan made wide use of carpets and rugs in everyday life. In the 16th century, English merchants, agents of the English Muscovy Company, came to Azerbaijan, particularly to Shirvan, along the Volga-Caspian route. Englishmen A. Jenkinson, R. Chinny, A. Edwards, T. Bannister, and E. Ducket left valuable information about the Azerbaijani carpets of the mid-16th century.14 The travelers of the 17th-18th centuries also provide us with valuable information about carpets. For example, German Adam Olearius, who traveled from Derbent to Baku and then to Shema- kha, notes that the peasants’ houses are very clean and tidy and the floors are covered with carpets. Scottish doctor Bell also provides similar information, who while serving in Russia in 1715-1718 visited Derbent, Baku, Shemakha, and Tabriz. When describing the everyday life of the residents of Shirvan, he noted that the floors there were covered with carpets and mats. He also said that Tabriz boasted extensive trade in fabrics and carpets.15 In the 19th century, essentially all the travelers, officials, ethnographic specialists, and other researchers who visited Azerbaijan provided us with reports on the large number of splendid carpets in use among all strata of the population. In his fundamental research study A Survey of Persian Art, outstanding American scientist Arthur Pope writes that the conditions in Azerbaijan were conducive to all types of art, including carpet weaving… Carpet weaving in Azerbaijan must have been an ancient art… It is not surprising that civilization in this region arose at an early time, possibly earlier than anywhere else… At the beginning of the 12th century, carpet weaving in Northwest Persia (localized by Azerbaijan) beyond doubt achieved the status of a fine art and it is very possible that it achieved this high status for the first time precisely in this region. This might explain why far more “Great Carpets” came from this region than from the whole of the rest of Persia put together.16 An analysis of the written sources makes it possible to confirm that Azerbaijani carpets were an export item throughout the Middle Ages and on into the subsequent period. They were exported,

11 See: L. Kerimov, Azerbaidzhanskiy kover, Vol. 1, Baku, 1961, pp. 8-9. 12 See: K. Alieva, Bezvorsovye kovry Azerbaidzhana, Baku, 1988, p. 9. 13 Puteshestvenniki ob Azerbaidzhane, ed. by H.E. Shakhmaliev, Vol. 1, Baku, 1961, pp. 34, 83, 157, 180. 14 See: L. Iunusova, Torgovaia ekspansiia Anglii v basseine Kaspiia v pervoi polovine XVIII v., Baku, 1986. 15 See: Puteshestvenniki ob Azerbaidzhane, pp. 260, 391, 401, 402. 16 See: A.U. Pope (ed.), with Phyllis Ackerman, A Survey of Persian Art from Prehistoric Time to the Present, Ox- ford University Press, London, New-York, 1938-1939; Meiji-Shobo, Tokyo, 1965, Vols. VI, III. 110771, 1181a-1184, 1203-4a. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION whereby not only to the neighboring countries of the East, but also to Europe, where they rapidly became part of European everyday life.

The Carpet and Cultural Dialog

There can be no doubt that many other factors, including political, economic, and ethnic, also had an influence on the development of the Azerbaijani carpet. The Caucasian region with its unique natural and climatic characteristics has always attracted numerous tribes and nationalities, who often settled in compact groups there. Over time, they all blended with the indigenous population, introducing their own elements into its art and culture as a whole, including into carpet weaving. Many of these elements, which were processed in the spirit of the local artistic tradition, enriched and developed the artistic characteristics of the Azerbaijani carpet. So in the Azerbaijani carpet, along with such a stable and dominating traditional principle of aesthetic influence as the geometric interpretation of the designs, combination of images of animals and plant ornaments, and a specific color range, elements can also be found that appeared as a result of the interaction with the cultural traditions of Anterior and Central Asia, Iran, India, China, and other countries. This was the natural mutual influence of different cultures of people who had been in long historical and cultural contact and mutually enriching relations with each other. In so doing, the aesthetic value of the Azerbaijani carpet was always in the fact that it preserved the traditions of ancient weaving. The Great Silk Road played an enormous role in the establishment and development of the Azerbaijani carpet. In the 13th century, Azerbaijan maintained close economic trade and cultural ties with China. Chinese motifs and themes appeared in Azerbaijani decorative applied art and architecture which, intertwining with local ideas, presented the world with a series of so-called dragon carpets of the 16th-17th centuries. The dragon is the most popular and most frequently used image in Azer- baijani carpet art. The mythological views of the Azerbaijanis have been associated since ancient times with the image of the dragon, which embodies the power of Evil that is supplemented with the favorable image of the Chinese dragon. The design of these carpets was directly associated with the art tradition of the Far East. Chinese porcelain and textiles, which figured in trans-Asian trade between Azerbaijan and China, were a source of motifs for dragon carpets. Dragon carpets were further developed in the 19th-20th centuries, right up to the present, in unusual compositional developments of Azerbaijan’s local artistic carpet schools.

The Azerbaijani Carpet in Europe

At the end of the 13th-beginning of the 14th century, active trade along the Great Silk Road helped to export an enormous number of carpets to Europe from Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Tur- key. These carpets became part of European everyday life. The depictions on frescoes and paintings by Italian artists of the 14th-15th centuries show the popularity of Azerbaijani carpet art of this period. Today the influence of carpets on the Florence art school and on Byzantine fabric is generally recognized: the color range of the paintings of the early Italian Renaissance was distinguished by its vibrancy and color contrasts, while crimson decorations, circles with relief depictions of lions, drag- 138 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ons, and birds predominated in fabric designs. All of these differences were characteristic of Azerba- ijani carpets. Any art can develop only on a national basis. If the artists of this nation raise and resolve world problems, the local forms of art become the property of mankind as a whole. Without this synthesis there cannot be any art. Active trade with China along the corridors of the Great Silk Road at the end of the 13th-beginning of the 14th century via the Black Sea, Southern Caucasus, then the Caspian Sea and on through Central Asia promoted the export of an enormous number of carpets to Europe from Central Asia, Azerbaijan (the Caucasus, Northwest Persia), and Turkey. Azerbaijani carpets began finding their way to Europe in enormous quantities as early as the 14th century. And this was not an accidental phenomenon. At this time, Azerbaijan’s economy and culture, which was in a state of decline after the destructive Mongol conquest of the 13th century, underwent revival and close trade ties were established with Europe. In the 14th century such trade was under the control of the Viennese and Genoese merchants. It is worth noting that Gustave Colet in his book Oriental Influence on the Paintings of Tuscany expressed the opinion that the Southern Caucasus or even Northern Persia (the historical territory of Azerbaijan) came as a possible source of carpets which used Chinese themes. In medieval Europe these carpets were very popular and widely used in everyday life: they were used to spread on floors, cover tables and gravestones, and hang on walls. Carpets were often hung at public celebrations, at which they played the same role as flags or banners at contemporary celebrations in Europe. These were customs that came with the carpets to Europe during the Renaissance. Carpets hanging over balcony rails at a Venetian celebration were depicted in a painting by artist Carpaccio. At this time, valuable personal carpet collections were formed in Europe. The papacy has owned carpets since the times of Giotto; the import of carpets was designated in inventory lists (since 1295) as Moorish, Turkish, Tatar (Azerbaijani). It is a well-known fact that great artists, in particular, Rembrandt and Rubens, purchased magnificent carpets. Italian, Dutch, and French artists of the era depicted carpets on their frescoes, canvases, and tapestries, thus appreciating and appraising them according to merit. Impressive evidence of the popularity of the images of Azerbaijani carpet art of this period is their depiction with animal themes on the frescoes and paintings of the Italian artists of the 14th- 15th centuries. These are themes of “solitary birds” on the paintings of Giotto, Niccolo di Buonac- corso, Piccio di Simone, and Cola di Petrucelli, the frescoes of Ambrogio in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena; the tree themes with “opposite birds” in the painting by Simone Martini and on the fresco of Niccolo di Pietro Gerini “Calling of Saint Matthew;” and the images of animals in the paintings of the Sasseta school and Taddeo Gaddi. The carpets included in the designs of these canvases became an integral part of the paintings, comprised a single whole with them, and formed the overall style and color scheme of these pieces of art. Today the influence of carpets on Tuscany art and Byzantine fabrics is generally recognized: the color range of the paintings of the early Italian Ren- aissance was distinguished by its vibrancy and color contrasts, while crimson decorations, circles with relief depictions of lions, dragons, and birds predominated in fabric designs, and all of these differences were characteristic of Azerbaijani carpets. The Renaissance artists, who were talented and sensitive to everything beautiful, were charmed and inspired by the beauty of Azerbaijani carpets, and in their depictions they came out before their contemporaries and descendants as examples of great art. After becoming part of European everyday life, Azerbaijani carpets were depicted on the canvases of many European artists in the 15th-16th centuries, too. For example, we see the Karabakh carpet “Mugan” in the paintings of Hans Memling (15th century) “Madonna and Child”17 and “Por-

17 M. Babenchikov, Narodnoe dekorativnoe iskusstvo Zakavkazia, Moscow, 1948, p. 84. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION trait of a Young Man.”18 Azerbaijani Ganja and Gazakh carpets are depicted in a painting “The Ambassadors” by German artist Hans Holbein (16th century), “The Annunciation”19 by Venetian artist Carlo Crivelli (15th century), and “St. Sebastian” by another Italian artist Antonello di Messi- na (15th century). We see Azerbaijani carpets on a fresco in the Cathedral of Santa Maria in Siena by artist Domenico di Bartolo called “The Marriage of the Foundlings,” in a painting by Domenico Moron “The Birth of St. Thomas,” on the tapestry “Lady with a Unicorn” (15th century) from France,20 and in many other paintings by European artists.21 The range of carpets on the canvases of these artists grew, while simple and natural combinations and forms, as well as vibrancy and diversity of color scheme became the aesthetics of the Ren- aissance, which was also characteristic of the carpets with geometric designs of this time. In addition, beginning in the 15th century, imitations of Azerbaijani carpets were noted in Europe, and today they are an integral part of European everyday life, as well as valuable exhibits in museums and private collections of Europe. The Azerbaijani carpet has always been a synthesis of many aesthetic origins, particularly during the tempestuous development of the Eastern culture. Remaining traditional in their spirit and design, carpets featured the most diverse themes of the reality, their creators gleaned motifs from literature, and creatively assimilated the art of miniature painting. The 16th century, which went down in Azerbaijani history as the golden era of its culture, is typical in this respect. The genuine masterpieces of carpet making of that time combined the subtlety and exquisiteness of miniature art and a vibrant and diverse color range with the traditional ornamental-two dimensional solution of motifs and con- ventionality of color. The entire history of the development of carpets shows that artisans were unusually sensitive to the spirit of the times and to universal values. Hunting themes, which appeared as early as the times of ancient rock drawings, traditional carpet designs, such as “Dord fasil” (“Four Seasons”) with its precise division into four parts reflecting cult worship of the seasons of the year, traditional elements of national décor, a conventional color scheme, precise correlation of the central area and border of the carpet, and clearly established depictive techniques presented in horizontal, diagonal, or vertical symmetry are all inevitably found in the carpets of different centuries. The hunting carpets of the 16th century are an example of the extreme sensitivity of carpet- making artisans to the demands of their time. The magnificence of the royal hunt and the splendor of the collective hunt of the feudal nobility were reflected in carpets in the true national spirit both in terms of theme interpretation and ornamental design. The hunt is presented as a manifestation of courage, human audacity, and the eternal harmony and antagonism in nature. Remaining truly national in spirit, content, and form, they reveal the universal philosophy of life, the fight against natural disasters, the governing laws of nature, and the truly human feelings of love, valor, and beauty. The aesthetic ideas about life rooted in the distant past and reborn over the centuries in clearly established forms have invariably undergone development. It was precisely in Tabriz and Ardabil at the beginning of the 16th century that a new curved vegetative ornament was elaborated and brought to perfection in carpet making, which prompted the appearance and development of new designs, such as “Agajli,” “Liachak-turunj,” “Afshan,” “Sheikh Safi,” and “Shah Abbasy.” The classical examples of these carpets, which American scientist Arthur Pope called “Great,” can be found in the collections of the Poldi Piezzoli Museum in Milan, the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, the

18 K. Alieva, op. cit., p. 10. 19 L. Kerimov, Azerbaidzhanskiy kover, Vol. 2, pp. 17, 24. 20 See: R.S. Taghieva, “Gobelen s shirvanskim kovrom,” Bakinskiy rabochiy, 11 January, 1997. 21 See: M. Guliev, “Azerbaidzhanskie kovry na dvukh polotnakh evropeiskikh khudozhnikov XV v.,” Reports of the Azerbaijani S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Vol. 30, No. 7, 1969. 140 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Budapest Museum of Decorative Art, the New York Metropolitan Museum, and the Paris Museum of Decorative Art. The Tabriz 16th century carpet “Sheikh Safi,” which is kept in the collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum in London is considered one of the pinnacles of Azerbaijan’s carpet art of this period. The golden era of the 16th century, when art was called upon to reflect the splendor and might of the royal dynasty, was replaced in the 17th-18th centuries by a period in which the central authorities flagged and court-declamatory art went into decline, which promoted a new revival in age-old folk traditions. As early as the second half of the 18th century, the role of local art schools increased with the formation of separate independent khanate states on the territory of Azerbaijan. Local carpet- making centers quickly began freeing themselves from the professional influence of miniature painting. It was at this time that the oldest archaic layers of archetypes resounded in the people’s minds with renewed strength, which in a certain sense can be seen as the beginning of a return to the original traditions. The folk traditions of carpet making began to be revived in carpets: we again see the two- dimensional design, the geometric interpretation of ornamental motifs, and repeat in the design of the compositional theme, conceived anew, which became characteristic of the carpet art of the 19th-20th centuries. The local khan rulers quickly monopolized the whole of external trade, including carpet trade in the foreign market. In Karabakh, as M.D. Isaev notes, who received information at the beginning of the 20th century from the oldest carpet makers of the territory, the khans tried to set up exemplary carpet manufacturing in their residences. In the early 19th century, carpet drawings and sketches that the local artisans call “khancheshni,” which means khan drawing, were preserved in many places in Azerbaijan. This tradition continued to spread even more throughout the 19th century. For example, there is a carpet at the State Historical Museum in Moscow manufactured in the village of Hila not far from Baku with the inscription and date “1801. Karkhanei Hila.”22 The rapid growth of commercial carpet manufacture in Shirvan, Karabakh, Guba, and Baku was analyzed in detail by Russian researcher M.D. Isaev, who noted that the khans levied tax on the population in the form of piled carpets and palases, keeping in mind the possibility of later selling them beyond the borders of their khanates.23 After conquering the Transcaucasus (at the beginning of the 19th century), Russia also began rapidly assimilating the local carpet market. S.I. Gulishambarov noted an increase in carpet manufacture for export throughout the entire 19th century.24 In addition to Russia, where most of the export naturally went, the main purchasers of Azerbaijani carpets in the 19th century were England, Turkey, Germany, France, the U.S., and several Eastern countries. The export value of the Azerbaijani carpet remained immutable throughout the 20th century until today. The continuously growing interest in Oriental, including Azerbaijani, carpets has given rise to the need for their serious scientific study and systemization. West European scientists take the lead in this matter. The merit of the first foreign researchers lies in the fact that it was they who generated universal interest in Azerbaijani carpets and opened up the amazing world of the carpet, its aesthetics, and its complex philosophy to Europe. Another indisputable merit of foreign researchers of Oriental carpet art is the fact that they were the first to identify the main carpet zones of Azerbaijan (Tabriz, Ardabil, Ganja, Gazakh, Karabakh, Guba, Shirvan, and Baku), and this division formed the basis for the artistic classification of Azerbai- jani carpets. Many Western European carpet weavers selected valuable samples of Azerbaijani carpet art from different collections, beginning from the 14th century right up to the present, and presented

22 Karkhanei is the common name for any crafts workshop. 23 See: M. Isaev, Kovrovoe proizvodstvo Zakavkazia, Tiflis, 1932, pp. 13, 14. 24 See: S. Gulishambarov, Obzor fabrik i zavodov Zakavkazskogo kraia, Tiflis, 1894. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION them for public viewing. Among the works of foreign scientists, including American, we can note the following studies by A. Riegel, R. Neugebauer and A. Orendel, R. Neugebauer and S. Trol, A. Di- ley, W. Bode, A. Pope, F. Kelly and M. Gentles, G. Lewis, and K. Erdmann. The works of contemporary foreign researchers such as J. Chabari, M. Ropers, J. Milhofer, U. Schurmann, M. Behazin, F. Lettenmair, G. Ruedin, K. Larson, J. May, Ch. Ellis, S. Azadi, R. Wright, and others are of immense interest.

Historical Carpet Weaving Centers in Azerbaijan, Types of Carpets, Main Technological Manufacturing Processes

The birth of carpet art is very justifiably associated with the manufacture of non-piled napless carpets that fulfilled numerous utilitarian functions: “palases,” “kilims,” “jejimi,” “shedde,” “verni,” “sumakh,” “zili,” and many other types were used for covering wagons, as awnings, as canopies and curtains, and for covering floors. But it was precisely in the manufacture of these items of basic necessity that the artistic genius of the people and their unique way of thinking began to be fully manifested. Since the early days of weaving, napless Azerbaijani carpets have been distinguished by their compositional richness, exquisite colors, and high manufacturing technique. This made it possible for the author of the monograph Oriental Car- pets published in 1922 in Germany to presume that knotted piled carpets first appeared in the Caucasus, since woven fabrics in general, particularly kilims, were better manufactured here than in other places. Azerbaijani carpets differ greatly in form, purpose, and artistic design. This is confirmed by the existence of different sizes of carpets that have a specific designation. It is enough to name several types of carpets: small “khalcha” and “giaba,” “namazlyk”—prayer mats, “takht-ustu,” “domanak”—bedside rugs, large “khali,” sets consisting of three-five carpets “Dast khali-giaba” intended for spacious rooms, and several others. The «Piriabedil» carpet. The richness of ideas in any type Guba, Azerbaijan, 19th century. of art also gives rise to the richness of State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. forms and hues of expression. When Baku 142 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

talking about the Azerbaijani carpet, mention must be made of the general trends in carpet art and of the local schools of Azerbaijani carpet weaving. The classification of carpets is always relative since no school can avoid the influence of another. Even when the matter concerns the individual work of artisans, there are always general national trends that determine the overall aesthetic principles of items. At present, in terms of style, artistic nature, and manufacturing techniques, seven prominent schools of Azerbaijani carpets can be singled out: Guba, Shirvan, Ganja, Gazakh, Kara- bakh, and Tabriz. Over the many-century development of carpet weaving in Azerbaijan, stable carpet-making centers have formed, the appearance and development of which, as noted, was associated with the existence of a raw material base, sheep breeding. The main ones among them at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries were Shirvan, Guba, Baku, Karabakh, Ganja, Gazakh, Ardabil, Tabriz, Urmia, and Ma- raga. The Guba carpet region is divided into three sub-regions: mountainous, piedmont, and lowland. Manufacture concentrated in the villages of Gonakhkend, Khashi, Jimi, Afurja, Erfi, Sekhiub, Bu- dug, Gyryz, Jek, Khan, and Salmesoiud The “Arjiman” carpet. belongs to the mountainous center. Guba Shirvan. Azerbaijan. End of carpets are known for the high density of 19th century. their weave, exquisite designs, and sub- State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. tle color scheme. The geometricized Baku shapes of their design are mainly based on stylized floral and sometimes animal themes. Medallion designs are very po-pular. The most vibrant designs of Guba carpets are “Giadim minaria,” “Gymyl,” and “Piriabedil,” and the most specific, which are characteristic of this zone in particular, are the “Alpan,” “Guba,” “Gaji-gaib,” and some other designs. Napless carpets (sumakhs and palases) were also manufactured in Guba. The Shirvan carpets are distinguished by their rich artistic workmanship, dense weave, and luster of the wool used, which gave the carpet a velvety look. The most well-known designs of Shirvan carpets are “Gabystan,” “Shemakha,” “Shirvan,” “Gashed,” “Ardjiman,” “Jemjemli,” “Garkhun,” “Gajigabul,” “Gabala,” “Salian,” and others. Shirvan was also famous for its napless carpets—palases and kilims, and in the olden days for its sumakhs. The napless carpets manufactured in the villages of Pashaly and Udulu enjoyed world renown. Shirvan has also long been fa- Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION mous for the manufacture of a wide variety of carpet items—bags (chuvals), sad- dlebags (khurjuns), mafrashes, horse- cloths (chul), and so on. The Baku carpet region was concentrated in the Absheron Peninsula. Carpet making became developed in the villages of Novkhany, Nardaran, Biul- biuli, Fatmai, Pirshagi, Mardakiany, Gala, and beyond Absheron, in the Khyzy carpet center (the villages of Khyzy, Zarat, Gaadi, Novkhany, Kesh, Khil, and others). The carpets manufactured in this carpet-making center in the 19th century brought it world renown and they are still kept in many of the world’s museums today. On the whole, Baku carpets are similar to those of Guba and Shirvan in their technical qualities, but they noticeably differ from them in the artistic respect. Baku carpets are characterized by greater softness of fabric, intensive dyes, unusual artistic taste, and exquisite workmanship. Baku carpets are based on medallion and symmetric designs with geometric motifs and extremely stylized floral elements. The most widespread were the “Baki,” “Surakhany,” “Geradil,” “Fyndygan,” “Khilia-afshan,” “Khilia-buta,” and “Ab- sheron” designs. In the Baku carpet- weaving region, palases, kilims, kheibia, and zili were also manufactured which surpassed similar items of other regions in The «Khilia-buta» carpet. terms of their qualities. Baku. Azerbaijan. Ganja and Gazakh carpets are man- Hegira 1332-1914. ufactured in two centers: in the Ganja State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. center, the main manufacturers are the cit- Baku ies and towns of Ganja, Gadabek, Goran- boy, Shamkir, and Samukh, and in the Gazakh center—Gazakh, Tavuz, and Borchaly. The existence of large cities in this region—Ganja and Gazakh, which use a large number of carpets—stimulated commercial production. Among the Ganja models, carpets with “Ganja,” “Kekhna-Ganja,” “Geda- bek,” “Chirakhly,” “Samukh,” “Chayly,” “Shadly,” and “Fakhraly” designs were distinguished, and the most popular compositions in the Gazakh group were “Shikhly,” “Demirchiliar,” “Oisuzlu,” “Borchaly,” “Gazakh,” “Garachop,” “Garaiazy,” “Salakhly,” “Gachagan,” “Kemerli,” “Gara-koiun- lu,” “Gaymagly,” and “Geycheli.” Some historical carpet weaving hubs in the Gazakh center are currently located in Georgia, where Azerbaijanis compactly live, and in Armenia, where they also lived in many regions (until the end of the 20th century). Napless carpet items were also manufactured in Gazakh: zili, shedde, verni, mafrashes, chuls, kheibias, and so on. The manufacture of namazlyg mats occupied a significant place here. In the 144 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

technological aspect, Ganja and Gazakh carpets compared with Guba and Shir- van carpets were less dense and had higher pile. Karabakh carpets were manufactured in two centers—mountainous and lowland. In the mountainous manufacturing center, the town of Shusha and the villages of Dashbulag, Dovshanly, Gi- rov, Malybeyli, Chanakhcha, Tug, Ta- glar, Gadrut, Muradkhanly, Gasymush- agy, Gubadly, Gogaz, Mishseid, Bagyr- beyli, Khanlyg, and Tutmas dominated in the 19th century. A special feature of the mountainous center was that here commercial manufacture in the villages was less developed than in Shusha. Here such carpets were woven as “Cheliabi,” “Aran,” “Goja,” “Achma-Iumma,” “Sha- balyd-buta,” “Bakhmanly,” and “Mugan.” The carpets of the Talysh-Lenkoran and Nakhchivan manufacturing centers also belong to the Karabakh type of carpets. Here “Talysh” and “Nakhchivan” carpets were the most popular. The Karabakh zone is famous both for its piled and napless carpets, as well as carpet items. The carpets of this group are both large and small. “Dast khali- gebe” carpet sets were particularly popular, which were in great demand both in the internal and external market. Carpets with both a low pile and highly dense weave and less dense carpets with a high The “Geycheli” carpet. pile were manufactured in Karabakh. The Gazakh. Azerbaijan. former were mainly characteristic of End of the 19th century. Shusha and the lowland manufacturing State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. areas, while the latter were characteristic Baku of the mountainous areas. In Karabakh, medallion, thematic and ornamental carpets were manufactured. The most popular designs were “Buynuz,” “Balyg,” “Darianur,” “Bakhchadagiullar,” “Sakhsydagiulliar,” “Khanlyg,” “Khantirme,” “Tasymushagy,” Minakhani,” and “Bulut.” The Tabriz carpet school, which included Tabriz and the Ardabil, Zenjan, Khalkhal, Urmia, Maranu, Garadag, and Maraga carpet-manufacturing regions related to it, is in Iran (in Southern Azerbaijan) and, unfortunately, its items are more often than not presented in scientific publications, catalogues, and exhibitions of many museums as Persian carpets, which introduces confusion into the classification and study of the history of Azerbaijani carpet weaving as a whole. The Tabriz manufacturing center focuses on the following designs of carpets: “Liachek-Tu- runj,” “Buta,” “Balyg,” “Afghan,” Ovchulug,” “Sutunlu,” “Shah-Abbasy,” and “Sheikh Safi.” Most of the designs are composed of floral ornamental motifs, but in the village manufacturing centers Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION purely geometrical designs are customarily used which are close to the North Az- erbaijani manufacturing centers in style and color palette. Tabriz carpets are known for their delicate and intricate floral designs with flexible, gently intertwining shapes and exquisite system of spiral patterns. The pattern in the middle of Tabriz carpets is either dense and fills the entire area or features a medallion design. It was in Tabriz in the 15th-16th centuries that many “Great Carpet” designs were formed that brought the carpets of the region world renown. Researchers have repeatedly noted the influence of the Tabriz carpet school on the establishment of carpet weaving throughout Iran. It was here in the Middle Ages that the manufacture of carpets rose from the handicraft applied arts to the level of supreme art. A special feature of the Zenjan center is the barberry background and “Norshar,” “Tarush,” and “Sultani” designs worked against this background. The towns of Gerov and Miiane along with the nearby villages form the Khalkhal carpet center. A special feature of the carpets of this center is the characteristic golden color and “gera” patterns, and the design “silsilevi-liachek” against a light brown, white, or beige background. Carpets of the Urmia center repeat those of the Tabriz center in terms design and ornaments of the central area; the “tarzi” design is specific for this re- The “Malybeyli” carpet. gion, which is composed of an intricate Karabakh. Azerbaijan. border strip. Hegira 1229-1813. The carpets of the Garadag manu- State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. facturing center are distinguished by a Baku red, blue, and black background with a geometrical or geometricized floral pattern. The town of Germe is the heart of this center along with the neighboring population settlements of Mekhriban, Geravan, Kiulvanag, Kivedne, and Khoja. The “Gellu-giusheli,” “Kheris,” “Garaja,” “Bakhsheyish,” “Achma-Iumma,” and “Sarabi” designs pre- dominate on the carpets of the Garadag center. The Ardabil manufacturing center, in addition to the town of Ardabil itself and nearby villages, includes the Serab, Mir, Nar, Meshkinshakher, and other settlements. Here, on the whole, the “Danaly” and “Arch” designs are used, for which a checked pattern in the center field is characteristic. 146 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Marand manufacturing center includes the towns of Marand, Khoi, Maku, Salmas, Safiian, as well as the sur- rounding areas. The Tabriz school also bore a strong influence on this center. Here mainly “Liachek-Turunj” and thematic carpets such as “Sutunlu” were manufactured. The Maraga manufacturing center includes the towns of Maraga, Tilib, San- gachaly, Binab, Khalasa, and Khash- taruz-charoimag. The designs “Balyg,” “Liachek-Turdunj,” and especially “Gyzyl- gul” composed of floral patterns are mostly spread in this manufacturing center. When distinguishing the technological features of the carpets of South- ern Azerbaijan, it should be noted that in Tabriz and Ardabil, where highly professional production was concentrated, silk carpets were manufactured, while in the Middle Ages carpets with metallic (silver and gold) threads were also made. The local carpets are distinguished by a dense The “Agajly” carpet. weave and low pile. Tabriz. Azerbaijan. End of the 19th century. State Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet. Baku

Protection of the Azerbaijani Carpet

Unfortunately, Azerbaijani carpets are frequently presented at various exhibitions as Iranian, Caucasian, Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and many others. The ethnic map of Azerbaijan is diverse— many nationalities live here who have historically been in close sociocultural contact. It stands to reason that the use and weaving of carpets also became part of their everyday life and culture. Foreign researchers, repeatedly emphasizing the superior qualities of Azerbaijani carpets, have pointed to their contribution to the establishment of carpet weaving of many nationalities and to the interesting samples of Azerbaijani carpet weaving that spread throughout the entire Caucasus. In so doing, they noted that the artistic content of these samples bore no creative momentum, since they were largely not the best copies of the Azerbaijani originals. In his book Carpet Art of the Transcaucasus, M.D. Isaev notes in particular that carpet weaving was especially prominent on the northern shore of Lake Geicha (now Sevan), around which Azerba- ijani villages are dotted.25 Transcaucasian researcher Ia. Zedgenidze writes that the population of

25 See: M.D. Isaev, Kovrovoe proizvodstvo Zakavkazia, Tiflis, 1932, pp. 127-128. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Shusha (Karabakh) is mainly composed of Azerbaijanis and it is they who are mainly engaged in carpet weaving, while the Armenians have to learn carpet weaving from them.26 When studying the group of Shusha carpets, American scientist George O. Bannon noted two rugs woven by Armenians and Kurds, whereby stressing that they are copies of local carpets and not better, being inferior to them both in terms of artistic and technical, as well as color resolution.27 Prominent American scientist Arthur Pope writes in his article entitled “The Myth of the Armenian Dragon Carpet” that there is no significant proof in favor of the Armenian origin of dragon carpets, but there are good reasons to believe that carpets of this type could not have been woven there. We will primarily note that no record or even any local tradition shows that carpet weaving ever existed in Armenia. The Armenians themselves, many of whom were born and raised in different parts of Armenia, admit that they have never heard of Armenian carpets. Moreover, if these dragon carpets really are Armenian, why can we not find any traces of their patterns or, at least, something like them in the various decorative arts that are known as Armenian? There is nothing in Armenia’s architectural design or various paintings that shows any connection to the characteristic patterns of dragon carpets. Arthur Pope goes on to say that a dragon carpet from the George Meyers collection bears the signature of a Muslim weaver of Turkic origin, a race that worked for itself and wove its own carpets. This signature is particularly important, emphasizes the scientist, since it correlates with a very clear tradition that existed in the Caucasus (Guba, Shirvan, Karabakh, and others), at least until recently.28 The Gazakh carpets featuring the “Battle of the Phoenix and the Dragon” theme and the traditional theme of a bird near the tree of life are presented as Anatolian, although Western scientists confidently classify these carpets as the Gazakh school of Azerbaijani carpets. For example, in his book Oriental Rugs, German researcher Fabio Formenton describes carpets of the Gazakh school featuring the “Battle of the Phoenix and Dragon” theme, referring to several other authors, and writes that in terms of stylistic and technical characteristics and the material used both carpets entirely correlate and can be dated to the same time, if not to the same place of origin, and to Gazakh in particular.29 It should be added that the motif of a dragon fighting a phoenix could not be represented in Turkish carpet weaving since both of these are benevolent symbols in the cultic tradition of the Turks. The tradition of the Azerbaijani carpet today declares “Many can repeat the Azerbaijani carpet, but only the Azerbaijanis can develop it.” The successful development of carpet art in Azerbaijan is promoted today by concern about its preservation. In 2004, the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Con- servation and Development of Azerbaijani Carpet Art was adopted.30 At present, the government has adopted a decision to erect a new building for the Museum of Azerbaijani Carpet.

C o n c l u s i o n

In conclusion it should be noted that a certain level of knowledge is needed about countries, nationalities, and cultures for an intercivilizational dialog. All nationalities are interested in such a

26 See: Ia. Zedgenidze, Proizvodstvo kovrov i palasov v gorode Shushe Elisoetpolskoi gubernii, SMOMPK, 1891, Iss.11, p. 3. 27 See: G. O’Bannon, Oriental Rug Review, April/May 1990, pp. 12-16. 28 See: A. Pope, “The Myth of the Armenian Dragon Carpet,” in: Jahrbuch der asiatischen Kunst, Leipzig, 1925, pp. 150, 152. 29 See: F. Formenton, Das Bush der Orientleppiche, Stuttgart, 1974, pp. 26, 27. 30 See: Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Conservation and Development of Azerbaijani Carpet Art of 7 Decem- ber, 2004, No. 799-IIG. 148 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dialog, but it must be directed into the right channel, making efficient use of the cultural potential of the people. Despite all of its uniqueness, the art of Azerbaijani carpet making developed and was enhanced in reciprocity with the cultures of many nationalities. By creating masterpieces of national creativity and crafts, our ancestors gave a signal to us in the 20th-21st centuries about the eternity of existence in the beauty of all-embracing harmony. This is not mystics, it is reality. Many creations of carpet art have plunged into the depths of history or been destroyed, while others have been forgotten, but their legacy will resound forever, continuing the chronicle of folk life in the vibrant images of universal values, harmony of rhythms, and rich variety of many-colored hues.

Elmir GULIEV

Ph.D. (Philos.), director of the Geoculture Department, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan).

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION VS. RELIGIOUS RADICALISM IN ISLAM

Abstract

he author goes back to the roots of Muslim civilization he concludes that the T religious radicalism in the Islamic world Muslim countries stand a chance of joining and charts the ways it can be op- the globalization process on an equal foot- posed. Having analyzed the Western polit- ing with others if they are able to reform ical, economic, and cultural impact on the public consciousness.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Throughout world history human ideas and human activities have been determined mainly by local factors (kinship ties, geographic location, social organization, and religion). In the past the ho- rizons of many were limited to their native town or village. Globalization has done something more than merely change the forms of economic activity, it has changed the nature of human activity and people’s preferences and values. As part of the process, religion became an instrument for all kinds of political forces. In fact, its explosive potential has been exploited since time immemorial by politicians seeking their earthly aims. The first years of the new millennium marked by an upsurge of religious violence cannot be described as an exception. Here I intend to identify the causes of radicalism in contemporary Islam and answer the following questions: How do political and economic changes Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION affect the nature of religious feelings? Why have radical views become the most widespread in the Muslim world? Can the Muslim states, now in the epicenter of international terrorism, cope with it single-handedly? How can the Islamic heritage be used to stem the wave of radicalism? The answers are extremely important not only for the Muslim civilization: the course and results of the antiterrorist struggle will shape the political future of the world and the nature of its civilizational development.

Religion and Religiosity in the Globalizing World

Late in 2008 sociologists from Maryland University published the results of their highly interesting project which showed that 51 percent of the population in 20 countries was dead set against conversion to a different faith; while a third resolutely objected to the right to profess any religion. The following European and Muslim countries demonstrated the highest share in both groups: the PNA, 78 percent; Indonesia, 72 percent; Egypt, 67 percent; France, 64 percent; Azerbaijan, 63 percent; Russia, 62 percent; Poland and Jordan, 60 percent each; Britain, 57 percent; Turkey, 55 percent; Italy, 53 percent; India, 52 percent. Nigeria with 20 percent, Kenya with 25 percent, and South Korea with 20 percent demonstrated the highest degree of indifference. A great number of people object to the right to profess any religion in their homelands: 67 percent in Egypt; 54 percent in Ukraine; 51 percent in Jordan, and 50 percent in South Korea. There are similar sentiments in other countries as well: Russia (38 percent), Germany (36 percent), the U.K. (33 percent), Italy (30 percent), and France (26 percent). A fairly high share of the respondents objected to the equal status of all religions: 46 percent in Poland; 45 percent in Egypt; 44 percent in Russia; 40 percent in Ukraine, 36 percent in the PNA; and 31 percent in Azerbaijan.1 An analysis of the results reveals the fact that in our steadily contracting world, in which the boundaries between cultures are growing increasingly transparent, religion remains an important individual ethnopsychological feature. Exhausted by callous rationalism and pragmatism and wrung dry by a never-ending stream of information and the pursuit of technological novelties, human beings are turning to irrational forms of cognition in the hope of bringing order and clarity to their lives. Religions have outlived the modernist ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries to become actively involved in the current recarving of post-modernist thinking that rejects all generalizations. In the culturological context, however, the traditional religious world perception comes across another “brainchild” of Western civilization, namely, the global culture. This notorious term has been moved to the center of philosophic discussions while a large part of the academic community looks at it as a political mythologeme created by the financial and political elite to justify its claims to shape world civilization. In his paper “Global Culture(s): Salvation, Menace, or Myth?” delivered at the New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globaliza- tion conference (Taiwan, 6-7 October, 2001) American Sociologist Prof. Immanuel Wallerstein con- vincingly demonstrated that it was wrong to regard “global cultures” and “world culture” as syno- nyms for the simple reason that at all times they have remained unknown to the absolute majority of the planet’s population and were hardly of any value even for the highly educated minority well acquainted with their postulates.2 We, in turn, interpret global culture as a sum total of the achievements of the Anglo-Saxon civilization: the vehicle of globalization, the scientific, technological, and eco-

1 Interfax Agency, 12 December, 2008, available at [http://www.interfax-religion.ru/dialog/?act=news&div= 27857]. 2 [http://www.politstudies.ru/universum/dossier/01/wall02.htm]. 150 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nomic superiority of which ensures the advance of the global culture across practically the entire world. P. Berger, A. Giddens, Z. Bauman, J. Tomlinson, I. Wallerstein, M. Featherstone, A. Appa- durai, A. Zinoviev, and others made the specifics of the budding global culture one of their subjects.3 According to Peter Berger, director of the Institute for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University, the only thing that brings together the manifestations of the global culture at the elite and mass level is extreme individuality that liberates man from all his obligations to tradition and society.4 It is the feeling of individual freedom that makes the global culture highly attractive; this thesis is effectively exploited to promote the American way of life in the Third World countries.5 The ideologues of liberalism, the cornerstone of the global culture, have so far failed to in- vent new methods to identify “the individualized personality from among the world of faceless units” (to quote A. Zinoviev), yet liberation from obligations to society makes the road to material success much easier. This is globalization’s serious challenge to the local cultures and religious traditions. The global culture, however, should not be counterpoised to religion as such. Evangelical Prot- estantism, the Pentecostal Church born in the United States late in the 19th century in particular, is an important instrument of cultural globalization. Peter Berger has pointed out that this movement “reveals purely Anglo-Saxon features” while its ideology inculcates in its followers a feeling of belong- ing to a certain global community with the center in the United States.6 This means that the relations between the global culture and religion are multidimensional and multilevel. In fact, the global culture per se can be regarded as a quasi-religious phenomenon: it divides the globalizing society into estates of sorts: the elite (political and financial), with access to all the boons created by globalization, which follows certain rules of conduct and shares certain ideas; the “middle class,” composed of pros- pering businessmen and intellectuals who, driven by the hope of joining the elite, follow its dress code, rules of conduct, and modes of entertainment; and the lower stratum, the “pariahs” with little or no chance of acquiring the status of actor in the global economic expanse. At the same time, the members of each of the groups are not unanimous in their attitude toward global culture. There are sincere cosmopolitans among the elite and the pariahs ready to exchange traditions for the “American dream;” there are also those who remain loyal to their ethnoconfessional identity while demonstrating their superficial adherence to the global culture. This means that traditional world perception remains all-important in the globalizing world. By liberating man from the fetters of a certain milieu, globalization opens up a wide range of possible life strategies and, by the same token, poses the very difficult problem of “internal self-identification and building one’s own axiological hierarchy.”7 Tradition, religious tradition in particular, as a

3 See: P. Berger, “Four Faces of Global Culture,” National Interest, Vol. 49, 1997; M. Featherstone, Undoing Cul- ture: Globalization, Postmodernism and Identity, Sage, London, 1995; A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991; J. Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1999; I. Waller- stein, “Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System,” in: Global Culture: Nationalism, Globali- zation and Modernity, ed. by M. Featherstone, Sage, London, 1990; A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimen- sions of Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London, 1996; Z. Bauman, Globalizatsiia: posledstviia dlia cheloveka i obshchestva, Ves Mir, Moscow, 2004; A.A. Zinoviev, Globalnyi cheloveinik, Algoritm, Eksmo Publishers, Moscow, 2006. 4 See: P. Berger, “Kulturnaia dinamika globalizatsii,” in: Mnogolikaia globalizatsiia, ed. by P. Berger, S. Hunting- ton, Russian translation, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2004, p. 16. 5 The extent to which the dominance of personal over public interests is hailed in the United States is best illustrated by John Kennedy’s widely quoted phrase: “Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country” (see: J.F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” 20 January, 1961, available at [http://tucnak.fsv.cuni.cz/~calda/Docu- ments/Modern/jfk.html]). 6 See: P. Berger, op. cit. 7 V. Kuvaldin, “Globalizatsiia—svetloe budushchee chelovechestva?” available at [http://scenario.ng.ru/interview/ 2000-10-11/5_future.html]. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION source of axiological attitudes, is gaining importance when the utilitarian interpretation of morals and law is sending materialist culture into an even greater crisis. In his The Crisis of Our Age: the Social and Cultural Outlook (1941), American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin wrote with good reason that violence and crime, mental disorders, and economic poverty spread far and wide during crises.8 In turn, A. Panarin has pointed out that the present conflict of values was caused “by a general misbalance of consciousness torn apart between the experience of what is and the experience of what is desired. To remain sane consciousness had to dethrone both in order to confirm the position of total relativism.”9 This makes the preserved ethnocultural and religious identity an axiological-philosophical im- perative; attempts to revive society by bringing it back to religion and traditional values are much more frequent. Today, when the church carries much less weight in society than the media and when the corrupt bureaucracy is unable to ensure public prosperity, a large part of society is turning back to religion. The media and the political system are obviously unable to shoulder much of what religion is expected to accomplish: its compensatory, regulatory, and other functions. This forces politicians to demonstrate, on a gradually increasing number of occasions, that they are interested in religion and seek the advice of the clergy. Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote in her The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God and World Affairs that for some time now religious convictions have been becoming all too obvious in the White House and U.S. Congress.10 American sociologists Manuel A. Vásques and Marie Friedmann Marquardt offer the following comment: “With this return to religious sources of legitimation, it seems as if religion has turned the tables on modernity, showing the latter’s failure to fulfill its own utopian illusions.”11 This means that the global culture does not exert an unambiguous influence on religion. An analysis of the globalization rating printed annually by the Foreign Policy journal shows that the degree to which the state is involved in global exchange says nothing about the level of the nation’s religiosity.12 What is more, some of the Muslim and Buddhist movements are using, with spectac- ular results, Western (Protestant) technologies to set up their own religious networks. Nurchular, a pro-Turkic movement, which has been described as an extremist organization and banned in the Russian Federation since 25 May, 2008 by a decision of the Supreme Court, is one such example.13 The Roman Catholic Church and the League of the Islamic World are, in fact, global institutions that cannot be identified with any local initiative or be viewed as the sum-total of a multitude of regional branches. So-called new religions are spreading in the globalizing societies together with the traditional religions. In his Sociology, Neil Smelser described the new religions as a protest against the bureaucratic nature of organized religion because their ideologues concentrate not so much on doctrine and faith as on their personal subjective experience and mystical approach to the realization of the final aim of life.14 There is a different opinion: new religions are seen as an attempt to adapt to contemporary society. According to Colin Campbell, the new religions are much more tolerant of science and axiological diversity; they much more lenient toward personal religious ideas; they seek direct religious experience and help people find their bearings in the chaos of the contemporary world.15

8 See: P. Sorokin, Krizis nashego vremeni, available at [http://www.krotov.info/lib_sec/18_s/or/okin_04.htm]. 9 A.S. Panarin, Narod bez elity, Algoritm, Eksmo Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 59. 10 See: M. Albright, Religiia i mirovaia politika, Russian translation, Alpina Business Books, Moscow, 2007, p. 27. 11 M.A. Vásquez, M.F. Marquardt, Globalizing the Sacred: Religion across the Americas, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2003, p. 16. 12 See: V. Yelenskiy, “Globalizatsiia, voobrazhaemye soobshchestva i Pravoslavie,” available at [http:// www.archipelag.ru/geoculture/religions/secular/orthodoxy]. 13 See: Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 May, 2008. 14 See: N. Smelser, Sotsiologiia, Feniks, Moscow, 1998, p. 486 (Russian translation). 15 Ibid., p. 489. 152 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Not infrequently the new religiosity phenomenon is manifested in the greater interest in occult practices and folk believes. Prof. Lillian Voyé of Belgium believes that these beliefs develop autonomously and are much closer to magic that to religion. Today, however, religion is using them to influence secular society.16 In the 20th century, many philosophers predicted the revival of mysticism yet their assessments differed: according to Oswald Spengler, the revived interest in magic and theos- ophy meant that Western civilization was drifting toward its extra-historic state.17 Nikolai Berdiaev, in turn, believed that mysticism and occultism triumphed because society needed “religious gnosis” and that this should be interpreted as a transition to spirituality.18 In any case, the fact that early forms of religious consciousness have been revived means that in the globalizing society religiosity is assuming a new quality.

Religion as an Instrument of Geopolitical Influence

It is wrong to look at the sociocultural changes underway in the world today outside their political context. Globalization has moved the next redivision of the world closer but its outlines cannot yet be discerned. So far it has become clear that social conflicts (which might develop into wars or revolutions) are rocking states which the leading powers regard as globalization objects. The changes realized in this way in these countries, very much in conformity with the current political “fashions,” are mostly destructive. The weakening national states and the mounting cosmopolitan- ism of the elite groups supply the background for religious and ethnic identification which, granted “favorable” conditions, might develop into radical and extremist movements. Very much in line with the dual standards practice these movements are differently assessed: some of the radicals are hailed as human rights activists while others are listed as religious fundamentalists and ter- rorists. Not infrequently the “globalizers” exploit the religious factor to secure their geopolitical aims, the Muslim world currently at the stage of high passionarity being one such region. The theoreticians of global chaos describe Islam as a system unable to coexist with other civilizations and religions. Samuel Huntington, the author of the civilization clash theory, describes the Islamic world as a belligerent civilization inclined toward the use of force in conflict settlement and living within “bloody borders:” “Wherever one looks along the perimeter of Islam, Muslims have problems living peacea- bly with their neighbors.”19 Premier of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu has written that revived Islam is determined to push the West away and destroy it. The hatred of the United States obvious in the Arabic and Muslim world is caused not so much by the West’s aggressive policy in the Middle East and its support of the Jewish state. He is convinced that this is a delusion because enmity of the West, which goes back into the past, still remains the moving force behind the militant Arabic-Islamic political culture.20 Bernard Lewis has discerned the roots of “this hatred” that “goes beyond hostility” in the Koranic conception of the “enemies of Allah:” “But Islam, like other religions, has also known periods when it inspired in

16 See: L. Voyé, “Secularization in a Context of Advanced Modernity,” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60 (3), 1999, p. 279. 17 See: O. Spengler, Zakat Evropy, Vol. 2, Russian translation, Aitir-Press, Moscow, 2004, p. 325. 18 See: N.A. Berdiaev, “Novoe srednevekovie,” available at [http://www.philosophy.ru/library/berd/midl.html]. 19 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, p. 256. 20 See: B. Netanyahu, Voina s terrorizmom: Kak demokratii mogut nanesti porazhenie seti mezhdunarodnogo ter- rorizma, Alpina Publisher, Moscow, 2002, p. 122. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION some of its followers a mood of hatred and violence. It is our misfortune that part, though by no means all or even most, of the Muslim world is now going through such a period, and that much, though again not all, of that hatred is directed against us.”21 The West moulds its opinions about Islam and its followers accordingly. The United States and its allies shape their policies in the Islamic world under the impact of the above and similar statements. Western interference in the domestic affairs of the Muslim states did little to reduce the tension. Irritated by the gap between the Western and Muslim civilizations the globalization apol- ogists talk about the limits of global expansion of a “fundamental and meaningful nature.”22 One cannot but wonder whether the West should bridge the gap to save its dominating position. The answer is not an easy one: to preserve the present level of social and economic prosperity the industrialized powers need resources; the problem can be resolved by maintaining a state of manageable chaos in that part of the world best described as a “raw material appendage.” The Islamic world, which occupies an important geostrategic area, is rich in natural resources, and demonstrates population growth, has a special role to play. On the one hand, Islam is the only philosophical system that, having expanded its sphere of influence, challenged the West as the global hegemon. On the other, its conflict potential is high, or at least enough to stir up “manageable conflicts” in any part of the world. What made the Islamic factor a suitable candidate for the role of a global destabilizing factor? How does Islam’s regulatory base affect the spread of radicalism? Is there a chance for the Muslim civilization to move along a different road in the globalizing world? Alexander Ignatenko believes that Islamic radicalism is an endogenous element connected with the “Salafi” interpretation of the holy texts, which perpetuates the logic of the past. He has written that the Salafi heritage contains a radical idea which when “implanted in the public consciousness might acquire certain practical, organizational forms even where there are no social, economic, or political ideas for radicalism or extremism.”23 The examples supplied are of a debatable nature: he ties together the Salafi doctrine and taqfir (accusation of apostasy) and jihad. It seems that the author has erro- neously identified Salafism with Kharijism (one of the earliest religious-political trends in Islam). His description of Salafis is fairly vague: “The Salafis insist that in everything the Muslims do, believe in or accept as rules they should follow what existed and what was done during the period of early Is- lam.” Meanwhile, hardly any of the Sunni, Shi’a, or Sufi trends idealize early Islam or are oriented toward the practices of the Prophet Muhammad. In Islam nearly all the religious-legal and ideological schools appeal to the Islamic original sources, therefore each of them can be described as fundamen- talist. Ignatenko’s attempt to discern the sources of religious radicalism (which claims exclusiveness and ignores the temporal and spatial context) in the special way the holy texts were interpreted de- serves attention. Vitaliy Naumkin, another Russian expert in Islam, describes “European colonialism of the New Time, the continued expansion of the West, its obvious desire to dominate, impose its values and its direct armed interference”24 as one of the causes of Islamic radicalization. He is convinced that radicalism can be described as a response to the deep-cutting crisis into which the Islamic world was plunged by the failed nationalist and socialist ideologies. The situation is further exacerbated by the obvious Western cultural expansion interpreted by the Islamic ideologists as a desire to push Islam to

21 B. Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3, September 1990, available at [http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199009/muslim-rage]. 22 A.G. Kosichenko, “Vliianie globalizatsii na kulturu i tsennosti cheloveka,” available at [http://www.kisi.kz/parts/ global.html]. 23 A.A. Ignatenko, “Endogenny radikalizm v islame,” available at [http://i-r-p.ru/page/stream-library/index- 2488.html]. 24 V.V. Naumkin, “Fekhtovanie tsivilizatsyi,” Rossiia v Globalnoi Politike, No. 5, 2007, available at [http:// www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/28/8550.html]. 154 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the margins of social life. One can hardly be surprised, writes R. Landa in this connection, that some Muslims are determined to use force to defend their national and social interests normally presented in a religious wrapping; from the religious point of view the struggle against the “bad Muslims in power” who violate the Koranic rules and serve the “infidels” is even more justified.25 Aziz Niiazi, director of the Institute of Central Asia Development Problems, associates religious radicalism with failed modernization: the Islamic protest movements, he argues, are of a social- ecological nature that relies on the population strata that “suffered more than others from the destructive results of accelerated industrialization.” These movements regard the Islamization of public relations as an alternative to the existing order supported by the secular elite with no ideological under- pinnings.26 The socioeconomic prerequisites of religious radicalism are gathering weight as the Muslim countries become more involved in a close global exchange. While in a closed society living according to religious traditions poverty is not a defect but a social norm, in a globalized society poor people are keenly aware of their deficiency. In an effort to bring the situation into harmony with their world perception they turn to Islamic tradition as a source of social justice and join all sorts of radical movements with no social and economic platforms which survive by exploiting anti-Western rhetoric. Radical groups thrive and grow because people are illiterate and know next to nothing about religion. According to the World Bank, in 1990 in Algeria (when the Islamists were riding the wave of popularity) 42.6 percent of the adult population was illiterate.27 The share of illiterate women was even higher—54.5 percent.28 In these conditions, secular governments tend to make the same mistake: instead of promoting religious education and upgrading the level of religious culture they infringe on the rights of the Islamists in an attempt to curb their activities, which merely attracts more supporters to their ranks. The weak position of intellectual Islam is another no less important factor in the spread of Islamic radical and religious-political movements. In Tunisia, for example, the Hizb al-Nahdah (Resurrection Party) has been preserving its following against the background of the much less popular ulemas. Significantly, its leader Rashid Gannouchi, who has been living as a political émigré in the U.K. since 1991, does not belong to the ulemas. In fact, Abdelfattah Mourou, one of the movement’s founders, can be described as an educated theologian. The nation looks at the state- supported ulemas as part of the totalitarian system that interferes with the socioeconomic reforms.29 People mistrust the traditional religious leaders mainly because they are unwilling or not prepared to defend the Islamic social ideals and come forward with adequate assessments of the political and social developments. Moderate Islamic leaders not associated with the government could have played this role but they are deprived of organizational resources, money, and state support. This leaves the radical and religious-political leaders free to mold ideas about Islam in the minds of the Muslims.30 This means that for several reasons the Islamic world is defenseless in the face of the global threats, with religion being the conductor of these threats. Muslim politicians and public figures are fully aware of the fact that the future of the Muslim civilization is being decided today but in most Muslim states the ruling elite has nothing to offer the nation except modernization “from above.” This

25 See: R.G. Landa, “Politicheskiy islam: predvaritelnye itogi,” available at [http://www.i-r-p.ru/page/stream-library/index-2118.html]. 26 See: A. Niiazi, “Konflikty v Tsentralnoi Azii i na Kavkaze: novyi vzgliad,” available at [http://cis.ng.ru/words/ 2001-03-28/1_asia.html]. 27 See: C. Kaul, V. Tomaselli-Moschovitis, Statistical Handbook on Poverty in the Developing World, Oryx Press, Phoenix, 1999, p. 206. 28 Ibid., p. 209. 29 See: C. Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic Society in Practice, University Press of Florida, 1994, p. 158. 30 See: A. Malashenko, “Islam: poslednee preduprezhdenie Zapadu,” Pro et Contra, No. 3, 2004, p. 91. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION is hardly the best option in the globalizing world: its inevitable repercussions in the form of exacerbated social contradictions will stir up more social protests. Successful modernization in the Islamic world demands that the values of different social groups become much closer and that the Western experience of state, economic, educational, etc. development be drawn upon taking full account of the ethical and legal norms of Islam. The Muslim nations should be shown how the world is changing and should adjust their religious consciousness accordingly. Success calls for complex measures, religious education being one of them.

Islamic Religious Education and Reform of Social Consciousness

Islam’s vast ideological potential should be tapped to prevent religious radicalism, help the faithful to better adjust to the social context, and organize a dialogue among civilizations. Religious education, which involves detailed explanation of the basic religious and legal provisions of Islam, its moral and ethical values, and their role in contemporary society is an important instrument to be used to tap the religion’s potential to the full. F. Kozyrev has justly noted, however, that neither religiosity per se nor religious education can produce religious tolerance. In other words, religious education is a double-edged sword: it can prevent religious enmity and can fan it.31 This means that the process (its contents and organizational forms) should be supervised by the state and civil society. Today, religious education can no longer pursue purely religious aims—it should have socially important aims in view as well. In this it will serve society, fortify its spiritual and moral convictions, strengthen its political organization, develop a market economy on the principles of mutual trust, and extend social and cultural contacts. Religious education is an important tool for inculcating religious tolerance and respect for other ideologies. On the whole, religious education in the Muslim countries should pursue the following aims: 1. Explain the fundamental philosophical and ethical-legal norms of Islam, the role of religion in society today, and its potential contribution to settling global problems. This is an important component of religious education that helps oppose religious violence and radical and extremist ideologies. Our experience has taught us that, being unaware of the basics of religion, many of the radically-minded Muslims cannot distinguish between the Shari‘a aims and methods. There is a commonly accepted opinion that a Muslim state living according to the Shari‘a is the main aim of Islam. In fact the state and the laws should be regarded as merely the means used to achieve a much more important aim—fulfilling one’s obligations to the Almighty, oneself, and society. In my monograph Koran i globalizatsiia: v poiskakh gumanisticheskikh idealov (The Koran and Globalization: In Search of Humanistic Ideals) (Baku, 2005) I have demonstrated that Islam regards social and related problems as stemming from the violated natural harmony of public being. This means that religious education should help restore it by channeling the creative energy of the faithful to overcome the civilizational crisis and addressing global problems. 2. Preserve and strengthen the moral-ethical norms of Islam that are expected to direct and develop scholarly and public thought. This has become especially important in the conditions of mythologized consciousness, development of virtual dependence, and informational over- loads. Islam’s ethical system cements the brotherhood of men, it is higher than ethnic or ra-

31 See: F.N. Kozyrev, “Vospitanie veroterpimosti kak pedagogicheskaia zadacha,” in: Obrazovanie i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo (materialy kruglogo stola 15 noiabria 2002 g.). Seriia “Nepreryvnoe gumanitarnoe obrazovanie (nauchnye issledovaniia),” Issue 1, Sankt-Peterburgskoe filosofskoe obshchestvo, St. Petersburg, 2002, p. 75. 156 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

cial distinctions and it helps strengthen national unity. Religious values serve as the basis for the harmonious development of the individual; they support the family as a traditional institution; they confirm justice, individual and collective responsibility, and respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms. Stronger traditional spirituality is an effective remedy against all the ailments of contemporary materialist society.32 3. Inculcate tolerance toward other religions and different Islamic trends as well as respect for people irrespective of their race, ethnic or other affiliation. This element of religious education presupposes knowledge of other religious and religious-philosophical teachings. This has become especially important today when globalization has made isolation impossible, when the idea of a “territory” is no longer three-dimensional, and when labor migration has reached even the poorest countries. It has been noted that tolerance of other religions and cultures does not undermine one’s own cultural and religious tradition. 4. Uproot the regressive tradition which has nothing to do with the Muslim societies’ historical needs; promotes mythologized consciousness and mystical practices; and revives those fragments of collective memory that interfere with the progressive development of any nation or the Muslim umma as a whole. These traditions, some of them having nothing to do with the holy texts or defying rational explanations, are rejected by the progressive-minded part of society. More likely than not it is these traditions that cause disagreements among the Mus- lims and draw a barrage of populist criticism from the religious radicals. 5. Religious consciousness should be reformed so that civil culture and the individual partici- pating in it can be reformed in turn and the religious meaning of labor, wealth, and secular science actualized. This movement is intimately connected with the previous task since reform requires a critical assessment of our own tradition. The efforts to restore “medieval” religious thinking will fail because under globalization public consciousness is changing at a pace that deprives restoration of its meaning. We should admit that reformation is impossible until the Muslim world acquires the adequate conditions for its intellectual resources.

C o n c l u s i o n

The above suggests that integration of the Muslim countries into the global process exacerbates their social contradictions, which encourages religious radicalism. This is a systemic phenomenon caused by numerous religious, political, economic, social, cultural, and other factors. Religious radicalism, which tends to develop into extremism and terror, undermines the domestic stability of the Muslim countries and regions, interferes with their social and economic progress, and causes the suffering of thousands upon thousands of people. The international community is duly concerned with international terrorism yet it is the Islamic world that bears the main burden of its consequences. The United States and its allies accuse the governments of the Muslim countries of being unable to oppose terrorism; they use this as a pretext for their wider military presence in the strategically important region. The war on Iraq and the military operation of the Jewish army in Gaza demonstrated to the world what America’s and its allies’ struggle against “international terrorism” was all about. The results are better described as humanitarian catastrophes. In other words, international terrorism is spearheaded against the Muslim civilization rather than the West. Fully aware of the threat, those Muslim countries that claim the role of equal partners in the global processes (Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan) are waging an active struggle

32 See: A.A. Abusulayman, Crisis in the Muslim Mind, IIIT, Herndon, 1997, p. 153. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION against international terrorism. The results largely depend on the causes of Muslim radicalization and the remedies. I am convinced that victory should be sought in the ideological sphere with well-organized state- and public-controlled religious education being the main weapon. State and public control should not be interpreted as interference in the religious communities’ internal affairs: people should be isolated from destructive ideas clothed in religious garb, otherwise radical movements and external forces will be free to go on with their brainwashing.

Konul BUNIADZADE

D.Sc. (Philos.), senior research associate, Institute of Philosophy and Political Legal Studies, Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE EAST AND THE WEST: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

Abstract

he East-West division, the ways their gation. She also analyzes the causes of the T philosophies developed and the results moral and spiritual crisis mankind is living of their impact on the relations between through to put forward solutions based on civilizations are a few of the subjects the the achievements as well as the problems author has selected for an in-depth investi- both civilizations are coping with.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In recent history academics have been turning with increasing frequency to ancient history in search of arguments to support the division between the East and the West. To put this differently: while yesterday the problem of a divided world did not exist, today it has moved to the fore and can be discerned as the primary cause of practically all the global challenges. It is worth noting in this case that the East in the East/West antinomy is mainly the Islamic East, while the Far East, an object of Western influence in the form of conquests and many years of colonialist policy, has largely preserved its independent thinking, original culture, and national specifics. India, China, and Japan are pertinent examples of this. The Japanese have no fears of possible Europeanization of the younger generation (something imposed elsewhere by the demands of the times and conditions of life today): they are completely confident in the spiritual richness of their religion and its indissoluble bond with the nation’s values. They know that this contact 158 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION with spirituality and the awareness of the sanctity of their national culture and traditions will inevitably return the young people to their sources, their religion, and their shrines.1 The East is frequently associated in people’s minds with the Far East and the Islamic East, however this phenomenon de- serves special discussion. It should be said that the West and the Islamic East have traveled along similar roads, remaining in close contact and inevitably influencing each other. To a certain extent they can be described as two sides in a single imaginary expanse, which means that they can be discussed as two sides of the same phenomenon starting with the time Islam came into being. Prof. Khalilov has rightly written that “were the idea of civilization closely connected with religious values we could have spoken of civilizations that corresponded to their religions.”2 It is not my task here to analyze the civilizations related to the above concepts; I intend to trace how philosophy and ways of thinking as a whole have developed and influenced the relations between the civilizations and their results.

Yesterday

The Middle Ages were an important milestone in the philosophical development of the East and the West. As distinct from other regions, which remained loyal to ancient traditions (China and India are two pertinent examples), the East and the West were greatly influenced by Christianity and Is- lam—new religions sent to them from above. They deeply affected the way of thinking, morality, and mode of life, generated new ideas of the world as a whole, and created conditions in which a new philosophical trend could develop. Significantly, many of the philosophical systems and theoretical ideas of the Middle Ages (some of them not more than mere embryos) inspired all sorts of conceptions and ideas later advanced and systematized by other thinkers. Christianity and Islam are separated by about seven centuries yet philosophical thought in the West and the East moved forward along parallel lines and according to certain regularities. An analysis of the ideas about the world shaped by these two religions and their impact on philosophical thinking as well as the roads traveled by philosophical trends in the process of their development reveals (with few exceptions) practically identical stages in their progress: 1. The initial period of Christianity and Islam and their perception of world philosophy: an analysis of their self-preservation and preservation of their dogmas. 2. The systematization and mutual influence of Christian and Islamic philosophies. 3. The separation of religion from philosophy: science and technology become the moving force behind philosophical thought in the West; religion regains its lost domination in society in the East. Let us take a look at each of these periods. The long time span that separates the two religions makes it hard to put the initial period into a specific time framework. The monotheist religions exerted a great influence on the philosophical thought of people with a rich cultural heritage and provided an impetus for a new trend in their development. I have in mind, first and foremost, the new treasure trove of knowledge—the Holy Book, which acquainted people with divine revelations and promoted esoteric knowledge. Second, the Prophet became the role model for society and its members. The phenomenon of man acquired new dimensions: man is Allah’s most

1 See: Natsionalnaia religiia iapontsev. Shinto, Kraft +, Moscow, 2008, pp. 43-44. 2 S. Khalilov, The East and the West. Toward the Humane Ideal (Philosophical Sketches), Azerbaijan University, Baku, 2004, p. 142 (in Azeri). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION inferior and sinful creation; man is the Divine Word; man represents Allah on Earth; man is the vehicle of Divine promise and, finally, man is the Creator. n Developing in different historical time spans, the West and the East covered practically identical routes during the first period. In both regions the new religion, after negotiating the initial stages of self-preservation, reached the highest ranks in the social hierarchy. On the other hand, the mechanism of inheritance was obviously at play through which the old world perception acquired new hues and the old dogmas were enriched with rationalism. Finally, the new religion, being deeply rooted in the past, professing different ideas, and having numerous specific distinctions, remained immutable. In this period, irrational consciousness, which influenced both ways of thinking, began developing as one of the trends of independent thinking. The first period tilled fairly fertile soil for systematized philosophic thought to present it in a more or less complete form (the second period). Valuable scientific works appeared in the West and in the East; a new generation of great philosophers and thinkers created their own philosophical schools and trends. n During the second period the West acquired scholastic philosophy (the 9th-16th centuries). It was a time when patristic philosophy was systematized and the sciences and knowledge created by most philosophers were used in the interests of religion. It was during this period that Western philosophers plunged into the deepest layers of Islamic thought and through it familiarized themselves with Ancient Greek philosophy. This triggered a new trend in West- ern philosophical thought. It should be said that in the 11th-3th centuries Eastern philosophy passed through a very complex period which enriched it with new knowledge. Some describe this period as the Renaissance of the Islamic East. At that time philosophical thought was powered by “knowledge of others:” Ancient Greek and Islamic philosophy in the West and Ancient Greek philosophy in the East. It should be said that philosophical thought in the East was systematized within a very short period thanks to its close association with Ancient Greek philosophy. It even reached heights from which it could determine the trends Western philosophy, several centuries older than itself, should follow. n The history of philosophy describes the third period as the Renaissance of Western philosophy, which is normally dated to the end of the Middle Ages. For several reasons, however, I have dated it to the period under review. Indeed, traditional periodization is limited to the West which means that Eastern philosophy should be pushed aside. Applied to Eastern philosophy this approach excludes Western philosophy and its history from the textbooks on the history of philosophy. On the other hand, it was during this period that the first prerequisites of the future East/West polarization appeared together with their different approaches to philosophical thought, science, and activities designed to reorganize society. Finally, anyone wishing to acquire a complete picture of medieval philosophical thought should study the third period. It is for this reason that I deemed it expedient to reject some of the classifying conventions in order to include this period in my analysis. I have written above that the third period covers the age of renaissance of philosophy in the West (the 16th-17th centuries) and in the Islamic East (the 14th-17th centuries). It should be said that the third period has several very distinctive features: in the West and in the East religion is alienated from philosophy; in both regions religion is being “reformed,” which has created a situation where philosophy in the West and religious thought in the East have developed into independent entities. Bertrand Russell in his Wisdom of the West wrote about this period in the history of Western thought during which, with the invention of the printing press, new ideas began spreading far and wide. It was this invention that finally undermined the old power: the Bible written in the 160 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION common language and printed in many copies became widely accessible, which means that the Church could no longer control the minds of its followers.3 The second specific feature is associated with the science-religion interconnection and looks even more important since it is a continuation or rather an addition to the first period. While in the West science sought to replace religion, in the East religion tried to replace science, which, in the final analysis, created contradictions. In the East philosophical thought grew out of religious soil while in the West it developed on scientific soil. In other words, Western man cognized science but lost the idea of its association with spirituality; while Eastern man cognized faith but lost its call to science. It should be said that attempts to replace science with religion or to explain it from a religious position are still going on in the Islamic East: the efforts to find references in the Koran to discoveries made in the West in order to substantiate Islam’s positive and progressive features have never ended. The West and the East tried to extend their territories and increase their material riches. The West was driven by its small territory and scarce natural riches; scientific achievement armed the West with weapons and navies with the help of which it conquered and colonized distant countries and expropriated their riches. In this way the West multiplied its material wealth, its power, and its influence the world over. At the same time, this wealth had to be spent rationally on new weapons, a new way of life, corresponding policies, etc. This is confirmed by Bertrand Russell, who described trade and wars as the two main forces that have pushed technologies forward throughout human history.4 The West was rapidly gaining might and influence—this was recognized by all. The new conditions created new thinking: Western man is always right; his claims to domination are always justified, while Eastern man is doomed by his faith to meekness and obedience.

Today

A look into the past will show us that the East was far ahead of the West in many spheres of human endeavor while the West knew how to use its achievements and raise them to a higher level of perfection. This went on as long as the East remained the producer of ideas and a “brain center.” The East stayed within the crippling limits of its religious dogmas obviously unwilling to escape. Toshi- hiko Izutsu wrote in his time: “Oriental philosophy, in turn, does not seem to be able to maintain its spiritual values in the face of the pressing problems … as it did in the past. It will find itself utterly powerless in the presence of contemporary problems. For technology is no longer a Western phenomenon. It is rapidly extending its sway over the whole globe.”5 After liberating itself from the suffocat- ing conditions of religious domination, the West in the Renaissance referred to religion and the long past Middle Ages to reject all discoveries, ideas, and plans (no matter how progressive) that reached it from the East. It is not surprising that the history of philosophy deliberately limited the history of the East to the pinching limits of the Middle Ages. The West was inundated by scientific advances, technological progress, numerous discoveries, and information diversity, which caused concern in the philosophical community: indeed, the scientific and technical progress of the late 19th century pushed aside philosophy and man. Bertrand Rus- sell was convinced that the gap between artistic and scholarly occupations was another novelty of intellectual life of the 19th century. The scientific way of life, Bertrand Russell pointed out, with its laboratories and experiments, seemed to suppress the spirit of freedom and quest indispensable for

3 See: B. Russell, Mudrost Zapada, Moscow, 1998, p. 264 (Russian translation). 4 Ibid., p. 447. 5 T. Izutsu, The Concept and Reality of Existence, Islamic Book Trust, 2007, p. 52. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION artists.6 It turned out that the above was nothing but a prelude to later events. In the 20th century, the achievements of philosophy, psychology, national thinking, sociopolitical thought, and technology (splendidly represented by Freud, Nietzsche, Adam Smith, Darwin, Marx, Engels, August Comte, Charles Pierce, and others) produced two devastating wars and the atomic bomb, the ultimate threat to mankind’s continued existence. What was going on in the East while the West remained preoccupied with everything positive and negative taking place in its realm? Was it to remain engrossed in miniature painting, lyrical poet- ry, Koranic interpretations, new religious-mystical sects, and new prophetic hadith? No, Islam called on the faithful to study, to enlighten themselves, and to duly serve religion and the people. The Mus- lims, however, preferred to look at the world through the prism of dogmas and prescriptions. Jamal- al-din Afghani offered the following comment: “I find it strange that our scholars divide sciences into Muslim and European and for this reason dissuade people from studying useful sciences. They fail to understand that science cannot belong to one nation: it belongs to those who master it.”7 The past of any Eastern nation abounds in crucial events. There is a more or less widespread opinion that Azerbaijan reached its highest point at the turn of the 20th century. This is true and this is logical. Here I am not talking about individual thinkers or even nationalities—I am talking of ideas, the importance of which cannot be squeezed into the frames of the East, of theories that should serve mankind rather than one nation. I have in mind activities that should reaffirm the place and role of the East in the system of values common to mankind. What does the East have for countering Western thinking today? Here is a very apt contribution from Giuseppe Mazzini: “We have the past, we have a great and glorious past, but we do not have a good history to illuminate all of this with the light of philosophy.”8 Late in the 19th century, Jamal-al-din Afghani asked the same question: “Wise science tells us about the causes and ties that exist between us. Isn’t it amazing that our scientists read Sabri and Shamsul-barie and are proud to call themselves founts of wisdom? Yet they never ask themselves what we are? What is electricity, steamships, a railway?”9 Jamal-al-din Afghani spent many years traveling in the West and Muslim countries in an effort to find an explanation for why the Islamic East had fallen far behind Europe in terms of social developments and sciences. He repeatedly raised these questions in the press and offered his suggestions at conferences. Being fully aware of the deeply buried causes he stressed: “If a Muslim intellectual and scholar embraced the democratic European traditions in their entirety he would be able to educate people and introduce them to all the contemporary progressive democratic ideas by relying on the Koranic teaching.”10 In other words, he wanted to set up an entity with the spirit of the East and the reason of the West. Muhammad Iqbal, another Islamic philosopher, was also distressed about the unenviable fate of the Muslim countries. Educated in Europe, he played one of the key roles in building Pakistan as an independent Muslim state; his Western education and national thinking forced him to look outside the limits of the East; he was deeply concerned with the fate of mankind and tried to find a way out of the impasse. Having concluded that “the West is developing lopsidedly and is, therefore, deprived of morality and spirituality, while the East is steeped in piety and superstitions,” he realized that “both the East and the West should once more discover the world of the spirit for themselves.”11 His Euro- pean education made Muhammad Iqbal equally well versed in the problems of the East and the West; probably for this reason he is much more popular in Europe. In his The Reconstruction of Religious

6 See: B. Russell, op. cit., p. 447. 7 J. Afghani, Selected Works, Baku, 1998, p. 32 (in Azeri). 8 G. Mazzini, Estetika i kritika. Izbrannye statii, Iskusstvo, Moscow, 1976, p. 199. 9 J. Afghani, op. cit., p. 31. 10 Ibidem. 11 H. Abdulkerim, “Muhammad Iqbal,” in: History of Islamic Thought, in 4 vols, ed. by M.M. Sharif, Istanbul, 1991, p. 405 (in Turkish). 162 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Thought in Islam, he did not go along with Muhammad ‘Abduh, an Egyptian thinker who insisted on reform of morality; he also rejected the idea of Europeanization of science and public life and of emulating the West and following in its footsteps, an idea favored by Afghani. In other words, he insisted on the revival of the Eastern spirit and ideas, something which both the East and the West needed. Today, the West can be described as a complete construction in which “people are the means for building this impeccable structure; they are the conscious means. In the East people, as distinct from bricks, remind us ideal monuments of art with an independent and original structure, which means that it is very hard to build anything from them… There are no bricks in the East, there are pebbles, boulders, and unique monuments which individual activity has turned into works of art.”12 Society can be described as a “construction” with a structure of its own guided by immutable rules and traditions. This relates to the idea of a world adjusted to the rules. This is the fate of both highly developed and developing members of society. In other words, the fate of a brick in the wall of a completed building is similar to the fate of a brick in an unfinished building or a mossy brick in a ruined structure. Western philosophers have warned about the danger of spiritual impoverishment. Bertrand Russell wrote that the pressure of the organized nature of contemporary life has given rise to irrational thinking in philosophy as a riot against the threat to human freedom which, as was generally believed, emanated from science.13 Because of this the West goes on producing, from time to time, philosophical trends and schools yet the East remains the main source of ideas. The West borrows from the East what it needs and distorts it with its own faults and shortcomings. On the other hand, instead of going deep into the idea and borrowing it in its totality, the West appropriates it and passes it for its own. If this proves impossible the idea is discarded. Today, the West is awakening to the Sufi ideas; UNESCO declared 2007 the Year of Mowlana Jalaluddin Rumi. There are scores of research centers in Europe and dozens of publications looking into the creative works of Ibn Arabi. Why this interest? What attracts people to Sufism, a key Islamic conception, amid the steadily mounting negative attitudes toward Islam? The answer is: liberalism, loftiness, love of man, and fairness, that is, principles traditionally ascribed to Christianity. Mowlana and Ibn Arabi are accepted not as Muslim thinkers but as the vehicles of the well-known Christian principles. For some reason, however, the fact that Sufism forms the core of Islam and all the abovementioned principles and ideas are parts of the same teaching is carefully ignored. The history of philosophy points to the following regularity: irrespective of conditions, time and space, irrational thought moves to the background from time to time in the face of rational thinking in order to survive. It is this type of thinking that has made a full-fledged human association between the West and the East possible. There is another side of the same coin: no matter how enthusiastic the West is about Sufism (Islamic mysticism of our days), it is equally implacable in relation to Islam. Today the material is hailed to an unprecedented extent both in the West and the East; it determines the relationships between people. In view of its priority in science, technologies, politics, and economics, the West is obviously the winning side. At the same time, the East is craving “Eu- ropeanization” as the shortest road to stability and clarity; the West is seeking new knowledge. Its completed building does not need new bricks which have skipped adequate processing and, therefore, do not fit the brickwork. Meanwhile, each and everyone can find a place amid the randomly scattered stones of the East. This explains why Eastern man is rejected in the West and is keenly aware of his second-rate status there. While Western man is at home in the East. Today the “small individual monuments” of the East have become the “rock quarries” for Western construction projects. This is best illustrated by the emigration of talented young people to the West or, rather, by the fact that they are lured there.

12 S. Khalilov, op. cit., p. 170. 13 See: B. Russell, op. cit., p. 448. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Tomorrow

Is there a way out? According to Prof. Khalilov, “the East is at a loss. If it can find itself, the road to salvation will be opened to it.”14 Today much is being done to recapture the old grandeur and might of the East at numerous conferences, in TV programs and in monographs, but the results are negligi- ble. Indeed, against the background of the mind-boggling achievements of Western science, the East proves unable to offer an alternative science, and there is no need to do this. The East proves unable to offer a social structure alternative to the normal and self-regulating society of the West, even though such an alternative is needed. Today, when Western philosophical thought is in a decline, both the West and the East need a new system of thinking. The situation is even worse than that: mankind, not merely Eastern and Western philosophy, has found itself at a dead end. Any casual observer of the situation in the world will agree with Taha Jabir al-Alwani of Malaysia, who has written: “When humanity becomes so presumptuous, it becomes so overbearing and tyrannical that it destroys the environment by polluting the land, sea, and air. When the natural order is disrupted, Earth is inundated with diseases of excess and perversion. Entire continents are enveloped by hunger, destitution, pestilence, and destruction, and the majority of people are forced to live in misery: ‘Those who turn from remembering Me shall live lives of misery’ (the Koran, 20:124).”15 This is true: mankind is living through a crisis of spirituality and consciousness hence the urgency for resurrection. I dwell on the sources of this issue because the Islamic East and the West are two sides of the same coin. This important factor should be viewed as the core of the problem and its solution. Numerous monographs, societies and alliances, research centers, etc. prove that the number of those concerned about the future of the West and the East is great indeed, however the number of those who are moving in the right direction is small. This is best confirmed by Jamal-al-din Afghani, who said: “If a nation has no philosophy, then even if its members are scientists, the sciences of this country cannot develop in the right direction and the people will find it hard to profit from them.”16 In other words, researchers should approach problems as philosophers. Toshihiko Izutsu wrote: “It is my conviction that the time has come when we must begin making efforts to revive the creative energy contained in this kind of philosophy (Oriental philosophy.— K.B.) in such a way that its spirit might be resuscitated in the form of a new philosophical world view powerful enough and alive enough to cope with the new problems peculiar to the new historical epoch into which we have just entered. Such, it would seem, is the intellectual task imposed on us. And in the course of carrying out this task, we Orientals shall and must learn precious lessons from the way contemporary Western existentialism is struggling to solve the problems of human existence in the very midst of the dehumanizing and dehumanized structure of modern society. I believe that only through this kind of intellectual collaboration will the much hoped-for philosophical convergence of East and West be actualized.”17 What is the gist of the above? The author looks at the East and the West not as isolated entities; he believes that we should look for a way out of the impasse in which mankind as a whole has found itself. To realize this we should identify the problems both regions are facing today. Salakhaddin Khalilov regrets that “the Western and Eastern people cannot achieve a shared position; the history of philosophy common to all mankind is presented not as an entity by as two alternative points of view.”18

14 S. Khalilov, op. cit., p. 174. 15 Al-Alwani, Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought, London, Washington, 2005, p. 32. 16 J. Afghani, op. cit., p. 29. 17 T. Izutsu, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 18 S. Khalilov, National Philosophical Thought in the Islamic World and the Problems of Its Teaching, Adiloglu, Baku, 2008, p. 4 (in Azeri). 164 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The above suggests that to find a way out of the crisis we should take into account the problems both regions are facing and correctly apply all the boons and achievements of both the East and the West. In order to move science and technology forward and improve his moral existence man has always looked for and found different roads leading to his aims. This quest is still going on; man will find new ways of dealing with these problems. An analysis of the history of philosophy and of the present decline of thought reveals that our knowledge is based on three main books: the Holy Book, Nature, and Man. Muhammad Iqbal, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sheikh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, and others refer to two sources—the Holy Book and Nature. Azeri philosopher Salakhaddin Khalilov relies, besides them, on the intellectual world, the world of man. Today, the fact that the East is trailing behind the West is frequently described as Islam’s responsibility. Jalal-al-din Afghani had the following to say on this score: “If any Muslim states that his religion contradicts all these sciences this would mean that he is an enemy of his religion. Religious manners are important evidence of man’s good breeding; a philosophical perception of the world follows suit.”19 In fact, an in-depth analysis of the issues and a careful comparison of its various aspects reveal that the spiritual crisis in Western and Eastern cultures is caused by a one-sided approach to this problem. We cannot ignore the fact that in natural scientific studies and the practical implementation of their findings the West has by far outstripped the East. We should bear in mind, however, that all the shortcomings that overshadow the achievements stem from inadequate knowledge or even oblivion of the precepts of the Holy Book. Al-Alwani referred to divine revelation and nature when he wrote: “In conclusion, the two read- ings must be combined, for if they are not allowed to complement one another, the result will be an unbalanced understanding of reality. This is why the Islamization of Knowledge is such an epistemo- logical and civilizational necessity, not only for Muslims but for humanity in general, and why it may be considered a solution to the global crisis of contemporary thought.”20 Muhammad Iqbal agreed with this: “With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam. …Surely, it is high time to look to the essentials of Islam.”21 Prof. Khalilov agrees with his predecessors; he calls on the East to use its advantages: “The moral and philosophical doctrines applied and taught in the East have not become priorities; they have not penetrated public life as if being created for abstract individuals. It is ignored that it is Islam that stands apart from all other world religions in its viability, its direct relevance to reality, scientific quest and practical content. It looks as if we have failed to grasp all the advantages of our religion.”22 This does not set one religion against the other; the religious principles registered in the Bible and the Koran should be merged into unified religious principles to be used for the benefit of the people. It is correct understanding of the first book that makes for correct understanding of the second (Nature) and adequate conditions for its expression possible. Al-Alwani wrote in this connection: “The Islamization of Knowledge is primarily a methodological issue designed to identify and articu- late the relationship between revelation and the real-existential.”23

19 J. Afghani, op. cit., p. 33. 20 Al-Alwani, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 21 M. Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal Academy, Lahore, 1989, Chapter “Knowledge and Religious Experience,” available at [www.allamaiqbal. com]. 22 S. Khalilov, “Filosofskie etiudy,” Zhurnal filosofskikh i obshchestvenno-politicheskikh nauk, No. 3-4, 2006, p. 119. 23 Al-Alwani, op. cit., p. 35. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 165 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Man is the third book that completes the first two; he is not only a book but also the link that connects the other two. There are also traditional sciences as well as sciences that have not yet been discovered which study and will study man as an object. The problem is that all the minutest details of man’s material and spiritual life should be investigated. In this case the situation is different: man is a microcosm that reflects the meaning of existence. On the other hand, he himself is one of the main Books leading to the cognition of Absolute Truth; he is the third important component that makes the other two complete. In other words, man should be regarded in unity with the other two books, in their context and as an indispensable component for “reading” the other two books. According to Salakhaddin Khalilov, “the three books should be studied in their synthesized form, in interrelation with each other. Only in these conditions can the idea stemming from the meaning of being be perceived in its entire and perfect form.”24 This means that by plunging deeper into study of the material world (wisdom contained in divine revelation and nature), man acquires the opportunity to study the book of the mind—the spiritual world. In other words, the three books are mutually complementing elements of a single truth, its “gates,” because in an effort to cognize only “one part (one of the books.—K.B.), man moves further away from the whole (this is best illustrated by the current state of affairs in the East and West.—K.B.). The truth is in entity, integrity.”25 Man is no longer forced to remain either in the physical or in the spiritual world. This helps him achieve maturity as an individual and member of society. The philosophers mentioned above relied on Islam. However, it was not Islam proper that was discussed, rather the sides’ philosophical positions: the Koran urges man to read all three books, to correctly understand them, and to apply this understanding in real life. This is the Islam’s real power.

C o n c l u s i o n

My analysis relied mainly on Eastern philosophers and thinkers; I intend to explain this and sum up the above. At all times the East remained a source of ideas and creative activities. In view of the well- known fact that history tends to repeat itself, we turn mainly to Eastern thinkers. It should be said that the West has created numerous philosophical schools and trends far removed from man’s interests and morality. This makes it hard (but not impossible) to identify the ideas called on to serve the interests of mankind. In fact, what do we know about the idea of “Europeanization” concealed in the dark- est corners of a Western philosopher’s lofty ideas? Emaciated ideology, decadent morality, the ever- burning craving for everything that can be used to one’s advantage, and the desire to prove one’s case and superiority. In his time, Abu-Turhan said that “all religions stemmed from the East.” It is no accident that medieval Eastern philosophy remained for many centuries and remains today a source of ideas for the West and the spirit that inspired the physical body. This body is physically well-developed and is quite able to support itself but it has no spirit, and this is its huge shortcoming. On the other hand, this spirit is embodied in the East, which was chopped off as a head that could no longer produce ideas. I have dedicated my analytical effort to the following: united, the East and the West will achieve salvation. This is neither Europeanization nor globalization—this is the unity of two substances.

24 S. Khalilov, “Filosofskie etiudy,” p. 121. 25 Ibid., p. 125. 166 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Anatoli YAMSKOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), chief researcher at the Center of Interdisciplinary Studies of the Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russia).

SPECIAL EATURES O THE CHANGES IN THE ETHNODEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD

Abstract

his article conducts an analysis of the censuses, scientific publications on the T dynamics of the ethnodemographic ethnodemography and ethnogeography of composition of the Abkhazian popu- contemporary Abkhazia, and the author’s lation in the post-Soviet period based on field studies during expeditions in 2003- the data of the 1989 and 2003 population 2006.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which reached its official conclusion on 26 December, 1991, the polyethnic population of Abkhazia1 underwent truly dramatic changes—it, according to the estimates available, has shrunk by more than half and the ethnic composition and dispersal of this republic’s residents have significantly changed. This work is devoted to defining the scope of these changes. In so doing, the emphasis is placed on an attempt to evaluate the reliability of the assessment of the ethnic composition and dispersal of the population of Abkhazia as of 2003 and on identification of the nature and reasons for the possible inaccuracies.2 Before going on, I would like to briefly remind you of the tragic events the Abkhazian people have endured during the past 20 years and the factors that have had the greatest influence on the dynamics of the size and migration of the republic’s population.

1 For more on the ethnic composition of the population of all the Soviet republics, see, for example: A.N. Yamsk- ov, “The ‘New Minorities’ in Post-Soviet States: Linguistic Orientations and Political Conflict,” Cultural Survival Quar- terly, No. 2-3, Vol. 18, 1994, pp. 58-61. 2 Field studies in the form of collective expeditions lasting around one month each were carried out together with the D.I. Gulia Abkhazian Institute of Humanitarian Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Abkhazia (Sukhum). N. Dubova and A. Yamskov’s trip in 2003 was financed from the budget of the RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthro- pology, the expedition of researchers from the RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology and the Abkhazian Institute of Humanitarian Studies in 2004 was financed under project No. 04-01-1833e of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (RHSF) called “Rural Abkhazia Today: Sociocultural and Medical-Demographic Problems” headed by N.A. Dubo- va, and the expeditions in 2005 and 2006 under RHSF project No. 05-01-01069a called “Medical-Anthropological and Demographic Consequences of the Sociocultural Changes at the End of the 1980s-Beginning of the 2000s in Rural Ab- khazia” headed by A.N. Yamskov. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 167 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Reasons for the Radical Transformation in the Size and Ethnic Composition of the Abkhazian Population in the 1990s

The worsening ideological crisis and aggravated political struggle in the upper echelons of the Soviet political leadership from the second half to the end of the 1980s created a growing power vacuum in the Union Center. This resulted in an abrupt rise in the real significance and relative independence of the power structures of the Union republics. But many of them, particularly the Bal- tic and South Caucasian republics, also experienced a tempestuous redistribution of power within the party and Soviet leadership, whose members were oriented toward different political and ideological trends in the Union Center. In so doing, many local leaders also began to rely on the mass sociopolitical movements that appeared at the same time, which were either ethnic in nature or rapidly became so.3 The Georgian S.S.R. was no exception in this respect. At the end of the 1980s, the Abkhaz A.S.S.R, which belonged to the latter, began to show the first signs of political contradictions and tension in the polyethnic party and Soviet leadership and elite strata of the intelligentsia during per- estroika, which ultimately escalated into the Abkhazian-Georgian ethnic conflict and disassociation of the autonomy’s population. The first major blood in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict spilled on 15-16 July, 1989, when 11 Georgians, 5 Abkhazians, and one Greek were killed and many more injured4 in clashes near the city of Ochamchira. Escalation of the conflict between the Abkhazians and the local Georgians, which was only temporarily frozen after the above-mentioned tragic event following the entry of troops from the Soviet federal center, continued to embrace the entire population of the autonomous republic.5 On 14 August, 1992, the government of independent Georgia sent its troops to Abkhazia. A full-scale war began that ended on 30 September, 1993 with Abkhazia’s total victory. Only the upper part of the Kodori Gorge, or Abkhazian Svaneti, where the Svans have lived since the end of the 19th century, remained beyond the republic’s control. The Svans are a sub-ethnic group that consider themselves Georgians and have close linguistic and cultural affinity. After the war, in which the Svans actively participated on the Georgian side, the local Svan leaders only de jure recognized themselves as part of Georgia, whereas de facto they retained their independence from both Sukhum and Tbilisi. It was not until 25 July, 2006, after armed clashes between the army and police units sent from Georgia and supporters of the local Svan leader, that Tbilisi established its direct rule in the Kodori Gorge. During the Abkhazian-Georgian war of 1992-1993, the Abkhazian side alone lost at least 2,000 people,6 mainly ethnic Abkhazians (servicemen and civilians). According to other sources, approximately 2,700 Abkhazian servicemen perished in this war, a figure which reached 12,000 when volun-

3 For more detail, see: A. N. Yamskov, “Trevozhnoe budushchee ‘respublik svobodnykh,’” Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, No. 4, 1991, pp. 89-100. 4 See: V. Pachulia, T. Achugba, “Abkhaziia na rubezhe XX-XXI vekov,” in: Abkhazy, ed. by Yu.D. Anchabadze, Yu.G. Argun, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2007, pp. 97-98. 5 For more on the author’s views of the main reasons for the ethnic conflicts in this region, see: A.N. Yamskov, “Ethnic Conflict in the Transcaucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Theory and Society, No. 5, Vol. 20, 1991, pp. 631-660. 6 See: T. Achugba, A. Khashba, “Etnodemograficheskaia kharakteristika i geografiia rasseleniia,” in: Abkhazy, p. 54. 168 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION teers from other regions of the former Soviet Union were added.7 Abkhazians formed the backbone of the Abkhazian armed formations, but a large number of local Armenians and many Russians, as well as volunteers from among the mountain peoples of the Northern Caucasus, Cossacks, and Russians from the southern regions of Russia, also participated in the war against Georgia. According to the data of experts from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the total losses during this war amounted to approximately 12,000,8 while according to the data of the Abkhazian and Georgian authorities, 1,510 servicemen and “several hundred civilians” from the Abkhazian side (mainly Ab- khazians) and 3,365 servicemen and “approximately 7,000 civilians” from the Georgian side were killed,9 that is, mainly Georgians. In the Gal district and the territories contiguous to it, armed campaigns were periodically launched right up until 2008 by local and small Georgian diversion units that penetrated from Geor- gia, which resulted in quite a large Abkhazian death toll. Finally, on 9-12 August, 2008, during the war between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia, Abkhazian army units seized the Kodori Gorge, essentially without losses, ousting the Svans (earlier their numbers, along with the Georgian military, were estimated at approximately 3,000 people).10 On 26 September, 2008, the Russian Federation recognized the state sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Abkhazia and began establishing diplomatic relations and drawing up agreements on defense cooperation with it. The aggravation of the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict in the 1980s-1990s and the postwar economic collapse along with the increasingly flagrant criminalization led to the mass exodus of a large number of Abkhazians to Russia (members of all ethnic groups, including Georgians) or to Georgia (only Georgians). The economic blockade imposed by the Russian Federation on Abkha- zia between the middle and end of the 1990s also played a negative role, which essentially im- peded its revival from the postwar socioeconomic chaos for decades and gave rise to mass unemployment. It was not until the first years of the 21st century that this blockade began to outlive its usefulness and gradually became a formality, but Russia did not officially lift it until 6 March, 2008. Ab- khazia’s economy failed to revive until 2003-2004 when trade turnover between Russian and Ab- khazian enterprises was established and mass Russian tourism increased during the summer season creating, in turn, demand for agricultural products and giving a boost to the repair and construction of housing and roads, development of the coastal towns and settlements, improvement of transportation, and so on. At that time, Russia permitted the residents of Abkhazia to acquire Russian citizenship and by mid-2005 the absolute majority (more than 80%) of its permanent residents had taken advantage of this.11 All of these twists and turns could not help but have a very serious effect on the absolute size of the population, its relative share in the total population, and the dispersal of the main nationalities of Abkhazia—Abkhazians, Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Ukrainians, and Greeks.

7 See: “Tsenoiu zhizni otstoiav Otchiznu,” Respublika Abkhaziia, No. 90, 12-13 August, 2006, pp. 1-2. 8 See: V.I. Mukomel, “Vooruzhennye mezhnatsionalnye i regionalnye konflikty: liudskie poteri, ekonomicheskii ushcherb i sotsialnye posledstviia,” in: Identichnost i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh, ed. by M. Olkott, V. Tis- hkov, A. Malashenko, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, 1997, p. 301. 9 Ibid., p. 302. 10 See: A. Vashchenko, “Gruziia gotovitsia k pryzhku,” Ekho Abkhazii, No. 33, 16 August, 2005, p. 2. 11 For example, Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh estimated the number of the republic’s residents with a Rus- sian passport at 80%-82% of the entire adult population, and another 7-8,000 people were in the process of applying for Russian citizenship in the summer of 2005 (see: “Interview of Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh with Interfax,” Fo- rum, 22 August, 2005, p. 3). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 169 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Changes in the Size of the Main Nationalities of Abkhazia in the 1990s

When assessing the reliability of the statistics obtained during the population census, one should understand that it cannot be absolute in principle. The doubts voiced below about the reliability of the results obtained from the population census conducted in Abkhazia in 2003 should in no way be perceived as criticism of the authorities or of the experts who carried out this census. In addition to the data of the 2003 population census of Abkhazia, which will be discussed below, there are also expert evaluations that present a significantly different ethnodemographic picture.12 According to A. Ankvab, who held the post of prime minister in 2004, there were a total of approximately 225,000 people living in Abkhazia, including approximately 65,000 Abkhazians and about 60,000 Georgians in the Gal district alone, while the postwar economic collapse and unemployment forced about another 40,000 Abkhazians to leave the republic for Russia.13 However Russian statistics determined the number of Abkhazians in the Russian Federation at the time the population census was conducted as follows: 1989—7,239 people14 and 2002—11,366.15 So from the official viewpoint the number of Abkhazians in Russia in the 1990s increased by approximately 4,000 people, although in reality this figure is probably much higher (possibly even several-fold), since many of the new arrivals remained illegal migrants for quite a long time. All the same it is difficult to believe that the real increase could amount to almost 40,000 people, as should follow from A. Ankvab’s statement. Evidently he slightly underestimated the number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia, while the scope of their exodus to Russia is clearly overestimated, since the opposition actively accused the authorities at that time of the ongoing extremely difficult socioeconomic situation provoked by the mass exodus of the republic’s residents to Russia in search of work. Moreover, a statement by Alexei Vashchenko, who is well-known for his support of Abkha- zia and South Ossetia and is an assistant of Viktor Alksnis, who was a deputy of the Russian Fed- eration State Duma at that time, appeared in the Abkhazian press in the summer of 2005. According to him, the comments supplied by the Duma contain enough justified data to believe that approximately 64,000 Abkhazians, approximately 20,000 Russians, and 75,000 Georgians live in Abkha- zia (including three thousand in Abkhazian Svaneti), while the number of Abkhazians in the Rus- sian Federation amounts to around 30,000 people.16 Evidently in this case too, the Russian experts chose not to take a very critical view of the estimates made by the Abkhazian oppositionists in the heat of the acute political struggle of 2004 and, following suit, artificially lowered the number of Abkhazians. Finally, a well-known Russian expert on the Caucasus said that at the very end of the 1990s, Vladislav Ardzinba, president of Abkhazia, determined the size of the Georgian population in the Gal district at 60,000 people, while Eduard Shevardnadze, president of Georgia, put the number at

12 They were presented and analyzed by the author of this article in a joint publication (see: N.A. Dubova, A.N. Yamskov, “Sotsialno-demograficheskie osobennosti abkhazskikh populiatsii v dolgozhitelskikh seleniiakh,” in: Sovremennaia selskaia Abkhaziia: sotsialno-etnograficheskie i antropologicheskie issledovaniia, ed. by N.A. Dubova, V.I. Kozlov, A.N. Yamskov, IEA RAN, Moscow, 2006, pp. 40-41. 13 See: V. Shariia, “Aleksandr Ankvab vystupaet na avanstsenu. Zametki s IV S’ezda OPD ‘Aitaira’ (Vozrozhde- nie),” Ekho Abkhazii, 10 August, 2004, p. 7. 14 See: “Etnoiazykovaia situatsiia u narodov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (po dannym perepisi naseleniia 1989)” (table), in: Narody Rossii: Entsiklopediia, ed.-in-chief V.A. Tishkov, Bolshaia Rossiiskaia Entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1994, p. 441. 15 See: Vserossiiskaia perepis naseleniia 2002 goda, Vol. 4. “Natsionalnyi sostav i vladenie yazykami, grazhdan- stvo,” Part 1. “Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia,” available at [www.perepis2002.ru/ct/html/TOM_04_01.htm]. 16 See: A. Vashchenko, op. cit., p. 2. 170 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

55,000 people. Evidently the matter concerned the territory within the old borders of this region, for after creation of the Tkuarchal district in postwar Abkhazia and transfer of some of the villages to the Ochamchira district, just 37% of the Gal district’s prewar area remained.17 The data of the official 2003 Population Census provide a very different picture (see Table 1 below). But there is every reason to believe that in this case too, again for political reasons, the assessment of the number of Abkhazians in the republic is, on the contrary, overestimated and the number of Georgians clearly underestimated. At the same time, objective circumstances, which make their census or current record difficult, play a very significant role, as will be shown below, in the overestimation of the number of Abkhazians. Table 1

Changes in the Ethnic Composition and Size of the Abkhazian Population in 1989-2003

198918 200319

Ethnic group Number of Share of Number of Share of people the population people the population

Entire population 525,061 100% 214,016 100%

Including: Abkhazians 93,267 17.8% 94,597 44.1%

Georgians 239,872 45.7% 44,04120 20.6%

Armenians 76,541 14.6% 44,869 21.0%

Russians 74,914 14.3% 23,420 11.0%

Ukrainians 11,655 2.2% 1,797 0.8%

Greeks 14,664 2.8% 1,486 0.7%

In this case, the size of the Georgian population in 2003 seems dubious, since if these data are taken as the truth, there are only about 40,000 Georgians living in the Gal district and the areas of the Ochamchira and Tkuarchal districts contiguous to it. Although all the estimates made above are much

17 S. Markedonov, “Nepriznannuiu Abkhaziiu priznaiut,” Chegemskaia pravda, No. 30, 9 August, 2005, p. 6. 18 See: “Raspredelenie naseleniia Abkhazskoi ASSR po naibolee mnogochislennym natsionalnostiam i yazyku,” in: Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia SSSR po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 g., Finansy i Statistika, Moscow, 1991, pp. 116-117. 19 See: “Natsionalnyi sostav nalichnogo naseleniia po dannym ucheta naseleniia 2003 goda,” in: Abkhaziia v tsifrakh, State Statistics Board of the Republic of Abkhazia, Sukhum, 2005, p. 15. 20 These statistics included 40,443 “Georgians” and 3,598 “Mingrels,” but the author joined these figures in the table. In reality, most of the Georgian population of Abkhazia are Mingrelians and the entire Gal district, for example, is currently populated by them, but only a small number deems it necessary to call themselves Mingrelians in particular, rather than Georgians. Like the Svans, the Mingrelians are a sub-ethnic group of Georgians who have a close linguistic and cultural affinity with them, but in so doing their language is not understood by the Georgians themselves. In 1926, when a population census was carried out with special emphasis on ethnic and linguistic affiliation, and among the primarily peasant population of Abkhazia the ideas of Georgian unity were not as popular as they are today, the number of Mingrelians in Abkhazia was four-fold higher than the number of those who called themselves Georgian at that time, while all of them, along with their kindred Svans, were calculated at 67,500 people, or 31.8% of the republic’s population (see: T. Achugba, A. Khashba, op. cit., p. 53). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 171 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION higher—55-60,000 people and more, right up to 65-70,000. On the other hand, the data on the Geor- gian population of Sukhum and the Gagra, Gudauta, Sukhum, and Gulripsh districts can be considered quite precise, and they totaled approximately 4,700 people in 2003.21 So, taking account of the expert estimates presented above, it can be presumed that approximately 65,000 Georgians of the almost 240,000 actually remain in Abkhazia, most of whom live in the Gal district, accounting for almost 99% of the population there, as well as in the villages that belonged to this region during Soviet times of the contiguous parts of the Ochamchira and Tkuarchal districts. Evidently underestimating the number of Georgians living in Abkhazia is prompted by political considerations. Many of its residents have secretly obtained Georgian citizenship and until the fall of 2008 were frequently traveling there for commercial reasons. Quite large groups of Georgians, mainly women and elderly people, continue to live in the cities of Sukhum and Gagra too. There are also a number of Georgians living in Abkhazian families in most Abkhazian villages as the result of the formerly widespread practice of mixed marriages during the Soviet period. The data of the Abkhazian population census are just as debatable with respect to the number of Abkhazians living in the republic in 2003. Against the background of the noticeable losses in population during the war years,22 acute drop in fertility,23 and exodus of some Abkhazians to Russia, the data indicating that supposedly there has been a slight increase in the size of the republic’s Abkhazian population do not hold much water. So its real size can only be assessed very pro- visionally for that year at approximately 70-75,000, considering that another approximately 15- 20,000 Abkhazians now live in Russia, about 8-12,000 of whom came from Abkhazia during the period under review.

Changes in the Dispersal of the Main Nationalities of Abkhazia in the 1990s-Beginning of the 2000s

Dispersal of the population in Abkhazia has undergone significant changes, since the more than two-fold drop in its size was accompanied by an even greater decrease in the total number of urban residents (see Table 2), whereby at the expense of Georgians, Russians, Ukrainians, Greeks, and the representatives of some other ethnic groups alone. In Tkuarchal alone, an industrial center situated in the mountains, there was a significant, almost two-fold, drop in the number of its Abkhazian residents as well. Serious changes also occurred in the rural population—due to the departure of Georgians, many villages beyond the territory of the former Gal district were ultimately abandoned. The littoral belt to

21 Here and hereafter data for 2003 are taken from “Natsionalnyi sostav nalichnogo naseleniia po dannym ucheta naseleniia 2003 goda,” pp. 14-15. 22 For example, in the Abkhazian villages of Jgerda and Chlou of the Ochamchira district and Duripsh of the Gudauta district, my colleague N.A. Dubova determined the losses of able-bodied men during the 1992-1993 war and during the subsequent hostilities at approximately 10%-15% of this age group (for more detail, see: N.A. Dubova, A.N. Yamskov, op. cit., p. 45). 23 As a well-known demographer figuratively said about the Abkhazians, “falling far behind developed countries in our level of socioeconomic development ... we were quick to borrow the peculiarities of population reproduction from them,” that is, low fertility and, in the case of some villages, depopulation (see: R.P. Shamba, “Osobennosti dinamiki i polovozrastnoi struktury selskogo naseleniia Gudautskogo raiona,” in: Kavkaz: istoriia, kultura, traditsii, iazyk, according to the documents from an international scientific conference dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the D.I. Gulia Abkha- zian Institute of Humanitarian Studies, Abkhazian Academy of Sciences, 28-31 May, 2001, ed. by V.Sh. Avidzba, AbIGI, Sukhum, 2003, p. 354). 172 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2

Dynamics of the Size of the Population of Abkhazian Cities in 1991-2003

City Size of the population Size of the population in 199124 in 200325

Sukhum 120,000 43,700

Gagra 26,900 10,700

Tkuarchal 22,000 4,800

Ochamchira 20,600 4,700

Gal 15,700 7,200

Gudauta 15,300 7,700 the south of Sukhum, particularly the area stretching from the mouth of the Kodori River to Ocham- chira, which before the war was an essentially entirely built-up area along the railroad and highway and in which some villages bordered directly on each other, is now essentially deserted. So the dispersal of Abkhazians has significantly changed for many reasons, such as mass resettlement in the cities of Sukhum, Gagra, and partially Gudauta; resettlement in some of the coastal town-type settlements and villages of the Gagra, Gudauta, and Gulripsh districts; and departure of the population from the most remote, peripheral parts of the mountain villages.26 Urbanization of the Abkhazians, which progressed at an accelerated rate in the mid-1990s, led to an increase in their numbers in 1989-2003 in Sukhum by 65% and in Gagra and the coastal town-type settlements, in which 2/3 of this region’s population reside, by 44%. On the other hand, as a result of this process, the number of Abkhazians has noticeably decreased in the mainly rural population of the Gudauta (by 10%) and, particularly, of the Ochamchira (by 32%) districts. The noted resettlement in the coastal villages and town-type settlements has also led to an increase in the Abkhazian population in the Gulripsh district by a total of 277%,27 since only isolated Abkhazian families or members of polyethnic families used to live there. Abkhazian experts also note that “along with moving to the cities, the outflow of residents from mountain and piedmont Abkhazian villages to coastal villages and settlements has also become more active (for example, from the village of Arasadzykh to the villages of Uarcha and Dranda and the town-type settlement of Agudzera), where there used to be very few Abkhazians.”28 According to the 2003 population census, it can be presumed that a little more than half of Abkhazians now live in cities,29 while in 1970 the level of their urbanization amounted to only 11.4%30 and increased quite slowly right up until 1989. Several indirect signs indicate the way the

24 According to the data of corresponding reference articles, see: Bolshoi entsiklopedicheskii slovar, 2nd ed., re- vised and supplemented, ed.-in-chief A.M. Prokhorov, Bolshaia Rossiiskaia Entsiklopediia, Moscow, 1997, pp. 241, 246, 318, 864, 1167, 1206. 25 The data in this table rounded off by the author are taken from: “Chislennost nalichnogo naseleniia po g. Su- khum i raionam po dannym ucheta naseleniia 2003 goda,” in: Abkhaziia v tsifrakh…, p. 14. 26 See, section prepared by the author in the following work: N.A. Dubova, A.N. Yamskov, op. cit., p. 47. 27 The author’s calculations from data presented in the following work: T. Achugba, A. Khashba, op. cit., p. 54. 28 Ibid., p. 55. 29 The author’s conclusion based on a comparison of the data from the tables (see: “Chislennost nalichnogo naseleniia…,” p. 14; “Natsionalnyi sostav nalichnogo naseleniia…,” p. 15). 30 See: T. Achugba, A. Khashba, op. cit., p. 53. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 173 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION urbanization of the Abkhazians has increased: the percentage of those living in Sukhum, Abkhazia’s absolutely dominating city center,31 amounted to 10% in 1970, to 13% in 1979, to 16% in 1989, and to 26% in 2003.32 In the same way, the share of Abkhazians living in the Gagra district, which is ur- banized by Abkhazian standards, increased in 1989-2003 from 7% to 11%, while other Abkhazian city-dwellers are residents of Gudauta, Tkuarchal, and the coastal town-type settlements of the Gudauta and Gulripsh districts. Another, but also indirect, argument in favor of the conclusion that there are more urban than rural residents among the Abkhazians is provided by the data of the 2003 population census that city- dwellers constitute 44.9% of the population of Abkhazia.33 For according to this same source, the Georgian population of Abkhazia constitutes about 20% of the republic’s residents, however 89% of them live in the Gal, Tkuarchal, and Ochamchira districts, the level of urbanization of which amounts to 24%, 32%, and 19%, respectively, and just the town of Gal is populated by Georgians. So the clear majority of Abkhazia’s Georgian population are rural residents at present and it is this what defines the prevailing superiority of the rural population over the urban in the republic. But we should not forget that all of these estimates for 2003 are provisional due to the very likely overestimation of the number of Abkhazians and underestimation of the number of Georgians in the data of the population census, as mentioned above. So in the middle and second half of the 1990s, urbanization of the Abkhazians was truly explosive. However, even after becoming urban residents, they remained very closely tied to their native villages.34 There were many reasons for the accelerated urbanization. It was partially prompted by the possibility of seizing the houses and apartments abandoned in the cities by the Georgians and city- dwellers of other non-titular ethnic groups who fled during and immediately after the Abkhazian- Georgian war, as well as by the desire of young and middle-aged Abkhazians to settle in the centers of socioeconomic life, where there was a chance of finding a job or at least making some kind of a living in the very economically difficult period from the middle to the end of the 1990s. Even the disappearance in the aftermath of the 1992-1993 war of the strict restrictions on registration in cities and acute competition with Georgians and the members of the other main ethnic groups of the population of Soviet Abkhazia for the right to urban registration that prevailed in the late Soviet period also became a kind of stimulus for postwar urbanization. In addition, many of the Abkhazians who moved to such cities and coastal town-type settlements as Gagra, Pitsunda, Novyi Afon (New Athos), Tsan- dripsh (former Gantiadi), Sukhum, Gudauta, and so on after the war also very justifiably hoped that sooner or later mass Russian tourism would be revived in the republic and then city houses and apartments would again become an important source of income during the resort season, which did in fact happen less than ten years after their resettlement. But this accelerated and partially somewhat artificial urbanization of the 1990s gave rise to another phenomenon that was probably unique for contemporary Abkhazia. Evidently, in this respect, we can even talk about a certain special “semi-urbanization” of the Abkhazians, whereby the bound- ary between city and village residents is extremely vague and provisional since many people who mainly live in the city invest a large or very large part of their income in farming on the landed plots of close relatives and receive a corresponding part of their income there. In Jgerda of the Ochamchira district and Khuap of the Gudauta district, such people constitute 12% and 9%, respectively, of the

31 For more on the unique position of Sukhum in the system of Abkhazian cities, see: L. Bartsyts, Natsionalnaia geografiia Abkhazii. Sovremennoe sostoianie, problemy i perspektivy ee razvitiia, Sukhum, 2004, p. 103. 32 The author’s calculations based on data presented in the following work: T. Achugba, A. Khashba, op. cit., p. 54. 33 “Chislennost nalichnogo naseleniia…” (table), p. 13. 34 For more about this, see: D.A. Kandelaki, A. Sh. Khashba, “Transformatsiia polovozrastnoi struktury selskikh abkhazov v postsovetskii period,” in: Sovremennaia selskaia Abkhaziia: sotsialno-etnograficheskie i antropologicheskie issledovaniia, pp. 78-79. 174 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION entire official size of the able-bodied population of these villages,35 without, of course, being included in their number. It should be emphasized that this does not simply concern the relatives of rural residents who periodically visit their villages from the cities and help with the farm work. In Jgerda or Khuap, as in any other Abkhazian village, the latter are much greater in number since essentially all urban Abkhazians are very closely tied to their native villages and the relatives who still live there. But in this case the people mentioned above who are engaged in farm work on a permanent basis and in so doing acquire a significant or most of their personal income from it live with their village relatives for most of the year, although they are officially counted as city-dwellers registered in Sukhum, Gudauta, or Ochamchira. On the other hand, as in other regions of ongoing urbanization, the majority of Abkhazia’s rural residents essentially spend most of their time in the city where they have their main job and main or significant source of income, while they engage in farm work at their landed plots primarily to produce food for their family. Such people, who constitute 8% of the able-bodied population in Jgerda and 7% in Khuap, actually work and live most of the time in the city and do not maintain their land plots as a source of income. In so doing, however, they are registered in their villages. As a result, during population censuses such people, both in the first (officially city-dwellers who live for the most part in villages with their relatives and work on their land plots) and in the second case (officially villagers who work and mainly live in the city), may be counted twice—in terms of their place of official registration and in terms of their actual place of residence, that is, they are counted both as urban and rural residents. This is precisely what gives rise to the artificially high number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia. It is possible that something similar could also occur with the residents of some Armenian settlements, but to a much lesser extent. On the other hand, this phenomenon has in no way affected the Russians and Georgians of Abkhazia—since the war of 1992-1993 almost none of the first remain among the rural population, and rural Georgians can no longer compete with the Abkhazians when it comes to taking possession of the abandoned housing or vying for jobs in the conditions of acute unemployment in the cities and coastal settlements. Finally, in very recent years, thanks to the development of Russian tourism and the high season- al demand for work hands in Abkhazia’s coastal resort zone (from Gagra to Sukhum), most people, particularly from remote mountain villages, become temporary labor migrants. For example, approximately 10% of the able-bodied population from the above-mentioned village of Khuap regularly travels to the coast to earn a living. The same goes for approximately 8% of the population of Kalda- khuara. These people live and work far from home during the entire resort season (at least three months, that is, from July to September, and sometimes longer, from mid-June to the beginning of October) in the coastal cities and villages, only seldom visiting their relatives. Many of them ultimately settle in the cities for good. There was quite a massive outflow of residents from the Abkhazian villages to the cities after the 1992-1993 war, which is also confirmed by the data in Table 3. When analyzing the data of Table 3, it should be kept in mind that they naturally do not include data about those Georgian (mainly Mingrelian) farms from which people fled during the war. But some Georgians, mainly elderly, remained in these (and many other) villages and so their farms, like the small number of farms of Turks (in Jgerda), individual farms of Armenians or Russians (in Duripsh and Kaldakhuara), were also included in the corresponding column of Table 3. Of course, this column also includes a rather noticeable number of ethnically mixed farms (primarily Abkhazian- Georgian, as well as Abkhazian-Turkish, Abkhazian-Armenian, Abkhazian-Russian, and others). But not only has an accelerated outflow of the Abkhazian population to the cities been noticed in recent years. Concentration of the residents of certain villages in their central or other parts that

35 For more detail, see: A.N. Yamskov, “Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie i sotsialno-demograficheskie osobennosti selskikh abkhazov,” in: Etnicheskaia ekologiia: narody i ikh kultury, ed. by N.A. Dubova, L.T. Solovieva, IEA RAN, Moscow, 2008, p. 151. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 175 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 3

Number and Share of Abkhazian Farms Abandoned in the Villages after the 1992-1993 War

Official number of farms Percentage in the villages Number of of abandoned Village Year (including those Abkhazian Abkhazian abandoned by farms abandoned farms their Abkhazian after 1993 in the villages owners)

Chlou 2003 498 10 2%

Jgerda 2003 259 11 4%

Duripsh 2003 572 38 7%

Khuap 2006 147 20 14%

Kaldakhuara 2006 251 936 4% better equipped with roads and transportation services has also been going on at the same time. On the whole, it is typical for Abkhazians to be very scattered over a vast territory that is now considered officially to be one settlement. Some of the houses or groups of houses of relatives are separated by mountain streams and rivers, ravines overgrown by trees, sections of fields, orchards, or plantations. Sometimes a traditional Abkhazian village with a population of several hundred people can stretch for tens of kilometers. Such is Jgerda, for example, which extends over low foothills and a piedmont valley, connected with the coastal Sukhum-Ochamchira highway by an asphalt road 15-20 km. Unfortunately, we cannot give a detailed description of the changes in dispersal of other ethnic groups of the Abkhazian population at present for two reasons. n First, there are no corresponding published data, and n second, we only studied rural Abkhazians during our expeditions. So only a few very general conclusions can be drawn. As for the Georgians, as mentioned above, their numbers have dramatically decreased in the largest cities (Sukhum and Gagra), while only isolated people remain mostly in rural regions in the north and the center of the republic among the ethnically mixed families or rare families of elderly people. However, the south of Abkhazia is an exception—the Gal district and the areas that belong to the Ochamchira and Tkuarchal districts where a predominantly Georgian (usually Mingrelian) population currently lives in essentially mono-ethnic villages and the city of Gal. The Armenian and Russian population was forced to entirely leave most of the littoral belt in the environs of Sukhum and particularly to the south of it due to the intense destruction of these settlements during the war, but it has largely remained in the Gagra district and in Gudauta and its environs. Under Abkhazian conditions, Ukrainians essentially do not distinguish themselves from Russians, and their dispersal has changed in the same way. Most Russians and many Armenians have left Su-

36 This is the minimum estimate, since a total of 16 households were abandoned in Kaldakhuara. It was impossible to establish the precise percentage of Abkhazian farms among them. But in 9 of them the head of the household had a genuinely Abkhazian name. Incidentally, since many Abkhazian names now sound the same as those of Mingrelians, the total number of Abkhazian farms abandoned in Kaldakhuara is most likely much higher than 9. 176 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION khum for Russia, but some rural Armenians resettled in this city after the war. Like the Abkhazians, the Armenians left many remote mountain villages, moving closer to the Russian border to the villages of the Gagra district or to Sukhum and its suburban villages. For example, most residents of the village of Atara Armianskaia from the Ochamchira district also moved to the Gagra district near the Russian border along the Psou river. The Greek population has almost entirely left Abkhazia, including the rural regions to the north of Sukhum and the city of Sukhum itself, while only members of ethnically mixed families have remained in the republic, in the village of Kaldakhuara, for example.

C o n c l u s i o n

There is every reason to believe that a full-fledged population census will be conducted in Ab- khazia in 2010. The future census will no doubt provide much more precise data about the ethnic composition and dispersal of this country’s population. But even if political considerations do not influence the specialists carrying out the census and processing its information, they will continue to encounter an extremely difficult scientific and practical problem—how to correctly determine the size of the urban and rural population of Abkhazia under conditions when many Abkhazians essentially live in the village and city at the same time. Evidently in the future too it will not be possible to completely avoid a certain amount of overestimation of the number of Abkhazians in Abkhazia for this objective reason caused by the incomplete urbanization of the Abkhazian part of the republic’s population. The question of the ethnodemographic structure of the republic’s population and of the absolute and relative size of the main ethnic groups has become extremely politicized in contemporary Abk- hazia. Until recently Abkhazians predominated in the power structures, but truly volatile questions prevail in Abkhazia today—how long will the Abkhazians be able to hold onto complete political power in conditions of democratic elections and the absence of a direct military threat, when and to what extent will representatives of other ethnic groups (and which ones) be able to share this power with them, and what might this development of events hold in store for the republic? Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 177 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Parvin DARABADI

D.Sc. (Hist.), professor, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

GEOHISTORICAL PROCESSES IN THE CAUCASIAN-CASPIAN REGION DURING ANTIQUITY (THE 4TH CENTURY B.C.- 4TH CENTURY A.D.)

Abstract

he author concentrates on the contacts states of the Central Eurasian mega-region T between Greece and Rome, two major that formed the content of the geohistorical civilizational centers of antiquity, and the processes in the Caucasian-Caspian region.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Caucasus and the Caspian, part of the vaster area where human civilization emerged and developed, are found at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. This easily explains the highly important role they have been playing for the last three millennia in the political, economic, and cultural development of all the peoples and countries that formed the Central Eurasian mega-region. From the geostrategic point of view it can be described as an open door to the Near and Middle East and Central Asia and further on to India. The Caucasus, the Black, Azov, and Caspian coasts of which helped to turn it into a military-strategic springboard leading to the Near and Middle East, the Eastern Mediter- ranean, and the Persian Gulf, can be described as the geopolitical key to this door. Its advantageous 178 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION geographic location made the Caucasus a huge bridge between Eastern Europe and Hither Asia crossed by caravan routes that tied together Central Asia, the Black Sea coast and the Mediterranean, the Eurasian steppes and the Near East.

The Caucasus and the Caspian in Antiquity

In antiquity, the narrow littoral strip on the western Caspian coast where the Caucasian mountains abutted the sea was known as the Caspian Route. This was the best road between Southeastern Europe and Hither Asia, which for many centuries connected the lands of the North Caucasian nomads with the regions of ancient agriculture of the Southern Caucasus. Belligerent steppe nomads found this opening leading to the rich land-tilling areas of the south as early as the Bronze Age. It was interaction between the northern nomads and the settled land-tilling population of the east that played an important role in the history of the Caucasus and Hither Asia. It can be described as one of the major elements of the economic system of antiquity. The Caspian Route became the main artery of the vigorous ethno-genetic processes that contributed to the ethnic development of the peoples and ethnic groups now living in the Caucasian states. Mirza Kazem bek, a prominent Orientalist of the 19th century, wrote: “No other area of antiquity remained open to the inflows and outflows of different peoples to the same extent as Northern Media (territory of Azerbaijan.—P.D.). Since time immemorial the Caucasian bridge was a theater of political developments; peoples of all races and all varieties invaded it from all directions: from the south and southeast pressing to the north and northwest and from the north in an effort to reach the south and southeast. For this reason the passes between the Caspian and the Black Sea knew no peace. The present linguistic blends of the Caucasian mountains and the historical names ‘the Caucasian, Cas- pian, or Albanian Gates,’ etc. confirm the above. The peoples’ ebbs and flows first hit Northern Media at the foot of the Caucasus and flooded it.”1 Throughout the centuries this road was used by ancient Iranian tribes who moved from the East- ern European steppes to the Iranian Plateau (no later than the 9th century B.C.); later it was used by the Scythians, Massageteans, Sarmatians, Alanians, Huns, Savirs, Khazareans, and many other Eur- asian nomads to reach the Southern Caucasus and Hither Asia. It is no accident that Derbent, an im- pregnable stronghold with impressive fortifications, appeared at the narrowest and therefore strategically most important point along the Caspian Route when the Scythians moved onto Hither Asia in the late 8th-early 7th centuries B.C. Herodotus (5th century B.C.), Strabo (1st century B.C.-1st century A.D.), Pliny the Elder (1st century), Ptolemy (1st-2nd centuries), Cassius Dio (2nd century), and other Greek and Roman historians and geographers mentioned the Caspian (Albanian) Gates in their works. The same processes were going on in the west, on the Caucasian Black Sea coast, where the Cimmerians and Scythians of the Northern Caucasus migrated southward in the 8th-7th centuries B.C. along the Meotida-Colchis Route, negotiated the Main Caucasian Range through the Darial Gorge, and invaded Assyria, Urartu and Media. On the whole, since time immemorial, or since Homer’s time to be more exact, the Caucasus, the Black Sea coast and the Caspian attracted the attention of the intellectual and military-political elite

1 Quoted from: A.S. Sumbatzade, Azerbaijantsy—etnogenez i formirovanie naroda, Elm Publishers, Baku, 1990, p. 16. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 179 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of antiquity. The Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions of the time of Adadnerari III (810-783 B.C.) described the Caspian as the “Great Sea of Sunrise.”2 It seems that the Greek myth of the Argonauts who crossed the sea to mysterious Colchis to get the Golden Fleece came as a result of the rumors about the riches of the Caucasus. Homer believed that in the west the land stretched to the Atlantic while in the east it ended at the “Sun pond,” the Caspian.3 He described the Caspian as a “Sun pond, the bay of a deep and smoothly flowing worldwide river called the Ocean.”4 As early as in the 5th century B.C. Herodotus possessed much more exact information about the Caspian Sea and its size: “This is a closed water body that has no outlets to any other sea.”5 Both the Father of History and later authors of classical antiquity invariably pointed to the extremely patchy ethnic composition of the “Country of Mountains.” “There are many different tribes living in the Caucasus,” wrote Herodotus. Geographer Strabo (1st century B.C.-1st century A.D.), historian Cor- nelius Tacitus (55-117), and others confirmed this.6 The natural riches of the area which served as a place for all sorts of contacts between Eastern Europe and Hither Asia attracted ancient Mediterranean states: Alexander the Great, Pompey, Caesar, Nero, and other potentates of the ancient West looked at the Caucasus and the Caspian with a great deal of interest. As early as in the 6th century B.C. ancient Greeks reached the Northern Black Sea coast to set up their colonies there: Phanagoria, Hermonassa, Kepy, and others appeared on both sides of the Cim- merian Bosporus (nowadays called the Strait of Kerch). About 480 B.C. they united to form the Bosporan Kingdom with the capital in Panticapaeum. In the 4th century B.C. the Northern Caucasus mainly populated by the Sindo-Meotian tribes became a major grain exporter to Athens. The resultant fairly close economic and political contacts between the Bosporus and autochthonous tribes created cultural interaction. The Meotians borrowed some of the material and spiritual achievements of the world of classical antiquity, while the Bosporans learned military tactics from the local tribes and borrowed some types of armaments and military equipment much better suited to the local conditions than the Greek ones. During that period Ichkeria and Daghestan essentially remained outside the Greek influence coming from the Northern Black Sea coast.7 By the mid-1st millennium B.C. the northern and eastern Caspian regions were already populated by nomadic cattle-breeders whom Herodotus and other authors of antiquity called Scythi- ans; the cuneiform texts of the Achaemenid period referred to them as Saks. In the 3rd-2nd centuries B.C. they were replaced with tribal unions of the Usuns who lived in Zhetysu (Semirechye), tribes that belonged to the Kantsjü state and lived in Karatau and along the middle reaches of the Syr Darya, as well as the Alanian tribes that roamed between the western shores of the Aral Sea and the Caspian northern coast. They maintained economic, political, and cultural ties with China, Transoxiana/Ma Wara’un-Nahr, and the Volga area. One of the branches of the Great Silk Road ran across the land of the Usuns.8 In the mid-1st millennium B.C. Margiana and Parthia were two most economically developed states on the territory now occupied by Turkmenia. Hyrcania was situated on the southeastern Caspian coast; Massageteans and Dakhs roamed the steppe to the north of it. In the 7th-6th centuries B.C. Margiana was part of Bactria while Parthia and Hyrcania belonged to the Median state. Later, in the 6th-5th centuries B.C. they belonged to the Achaemenid Empire; still

2 I.M. Diakonov, “Assyriysko-vavilonskie istochniki po istorii Urartu,” Vetsnik drevney itorii, No. 2, 1951, p. 32. 3 M.A. Mirzoev, Imena na kartakh Kaspia, Nedra, St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 5. 4 I.S. Zonn, Kaspiiskaia entsiklopedia, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia Publishers, Moscow, 2004, p. 225. 5 K.G. Aliev, Antichnye istochniki po istorii Azerbaijana, Elm Publishers, Baku, 1986, p. 14. 6 Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza s drevneyshikh vremen do kontsa XVIII v., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 21. 7 See: Ibid., pp. 78-79. 8 See: Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia (BSE), Vol. 11, Moscow, 1973, p. 149. 180 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION later, after the conquests of Alexander the Great first Parthia and later, in the 3rd century, the Sas- sanian Empire dominated over these territories. Meanwhile, the thalassic Hellenic West, having withstood, thanks to its naval force, the pro- tracted Greco-Persian wars (495-449 B.C.) and the fierce pressure of the telluric continental East represented by the Achaemenid Empire, launched, after a little more than100 years, its counter-offensive towards the East that went on for several centuries.

Hellenism in the Caucasus

In the latter half of the 1st millennium B.C. the thalassic West (represented by the world of antiquity) expanded to the telluric East mainly along two main routes: the northern (Black Sea-Cauca- sian) and the southern (Asia Minor-Caspian). The Caucasus, in turn, acted as a fairly reliable natural barrier on the road of Hellenistic (mainly cultural and economic in the north and Greco-Roman military-political in the south) expansion. The famous march into Asia (the 330s-320s B.C.) of Alexander the Great, the first geostrategist in world history, transformed the Caucasian-Caspian region into one of the military-political factors of the confrontation between the macro-civilizations of the West and the East. It began in the mid-1st millennium B.C. when thalassic Greece appeared in the Mediterranean while Persia became the leading telluric power of the Middle East. Alexander the Great was convinced that the Caspian was a defective sea: it was not a sea at all but a quagmire of stagnant water, and he presumed it was connected with the Azov Sea and the Don.9 After defeating the Achaemenid Empire, conquering the tribes of Cadussi, Tapur, and Amard and occupying, in the summer of 330 B.C. Zadracarta, the capital of Hyrcania, Alexander the Great completed the encirclement of the Caspian. After returning to the West from India Alexander planned to conquer the Mediterranean up to the Atlantic; he contemplated a march along the southern coasts of Asia and subjugation of the Scythians and areas around the Caspian. After the Indian march he intended to explore the rivers, littoral areas, and the World Ocean. In India he was captivated by the idea of peripheral naval routes passing along the very edge of the earth. Even before he concentrated on the Arabian expedition in 323 B.C., he issued an order that spoke volumes about his plans to conquer the world: he ordered Heraclides to build a navy in Hyrcania to be used for studying the Caspian and discovering new naval trade routes. Being convinced of the Earth’s symmetry, he regarded the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea as the southeastern gulfs of the ocean, and so the Caspian Sea was its northeastern equivalent. This meant that the Caspian, very much like the Persian Gulf, might have an ocean outlet and could let continue the march northward. It was necessary to find out whether the Caspian was an enclosed sea, something which most geographers and Alexander the Great suspected all the time. If this were true, all other investigations would be futile: for this reason, Heraclides was not instructed to conquer or to develop but merely to study the Caspian Sea. An ocean outlet would have boosted Alexander the Great’s interest.10 However, he died when the Arabian expedition was ready to begin but never lived to see it through. The collapse of the huge Achaemenid Empire under the powerful blows of Alexander the Great’s armies and the setting up of a world power opened the era of Hellenization of the East in the

9 See: F. Schachermeyr, Aleksandr Makedonskiy (Alexander der Grosse), Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 186 (Russian translation). 10 See: Ibid., p. 333. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 181 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION history of East-West relations. It was Alexander the Great who, for the first time in world history, tried to realize the impressive geopolitical idea of unifying the Europeans and Asians (represented by the Greeks and Persians)—the idea of mutual understanding and mutual penetration of peoples. The episode of the celebrated weddings at Susa is ample evidence of this.11 His cause of Hellenization of the East was, to a certain extent, continued by his generals who headed the Seleucid Empire and Egypt of Ptolemy. It was the marches of Alexander the Great that contributed to the emergence of new Hellenistic states in which Greek culture and economic and military-political organization were intertwined, in the quaintest of ways, with the traditional Oriental way of life. This blend created states with a new political order in which Greece’s developed production relations were combined with the military-administrative system of the East. Hellenism delivered the first blows at ethnic and religious insularity; it created new forms of statehood, laid the foundations for a new culture, new art, new beliefs, and revived economic life, trade, etc.12 On the whole, Alexander’s conquest of vast areas in the East and the emergence of Hellenistic states created the most favorable conditions for drawing closer two different cultures—Eastern and Western. This epoch, which lasted until the 1st century B.C., was filled with various economic, political, ideological, and cultural achievements. It was at that time that the Seleucids tried to use the Southern Caucasus to establish trade contacts with the East. This called for more detailed knowledge of the Caspian coast, which forced Seleucus I to order Partocles to travel, between 285 and 282 B.C., along the Caspian coast and acquire a more or less clear idea about its western and eastern parts.13 The expedition looked for outlets to other seas and addressed more practical tasks as well: subjugation of the coastal South Caspian tribes.14 Just like Alexander the Great before him, Seleucus I was looking for trade possibilities; in the 3rd century B.C. the Seleucids even kept a naval squadron in the Caspian.15 In fact, Seleucus’ plans were even more ambitious: a channel to connect the Caspian and Black seas to facilitate trade.16 How- ever, soon after the discovery of the naval trade route from Europe to India these plans were abandoned; from that time on the Caspian and the Kura were used for internal trade in Albania of antiquity.17 Later, in the 1st century A.D., Pliny the Elder wrote that this route could be used for international trade: “The Indian goods carried across the Caspian to the Kura can be moved in five days by land to the Fazis (the Rioni.—P.D.) that runs into the Black Sea.”18 The need to portage vessels from one water body to another (in the absence of a channel between the Caspian and the Black and Azov seas) did nothing to encourage trade along this route. On the other hand, under Vespasian (A.D. 69-79) navigator Hippalux, who discovered the monsoons, the already used sea route from Egypt to India via the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean was made much safer.19 Meanwhile, by the late 2nd century B.C. the Seleucid Empire, the outpost of Hellenism in the East, had disappeared. It was replaced with Parthia, which served as a link of sorts between the

11 See: R. Frye, Nasledie Irana (The Heritage of Persia), Oriental Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1972, pp. 180- 181 (Russian translation). 12 See: B.G. Gafurov, D.I. Tsibukidis, Aleksandr Makedonskiy i Vostok, Moscow, 1980, p. 391. 13 See: R. Hennig, Nevedomye zemli (Terrae Incognitae), in 4 vols, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1962, pp. 244-246 (Russian translation). 14 See: L.A. El’nitskiy, Znania drevnikh o Severnykh stranakh, Moscow, 1961, pp. 126-128. 15 See: E. Bikerman, Gosudarstvo Sekevkidov (Institutions des Séleucides), Moscow, 1985, p. 94 (Russian translation). 16 See: Ibid., p. 40. 17 See: K.G. Aliev, Antichnaia Kavkazskaia Albania, Azerneshr Publishers, Baku, 1992, p. 121. 18 K.V. Trever, Ocherki po istorii i kul’ture Kavkazskoy Albanii (IV v. do n.e.—VII v. n. e.), Moscow, Leningrad, 1959, pp. 43-44. 19 K.G. Aliev, op. cit., p. 120. 182 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION eastern and western parts of the ecumene. Western Hellenism was gradually retreating under the pressure of Oriental Iran-ism. Deprived of their privileges, the Greeks were no longer separated from the locals by their social and political status. This ushered in a new, Parthian, stage in the history of Hellenism—a synthesis especially evident in ideology and culture.20 This blend created a new art that can be described as Hellenic-Oriental. Having acquired its very distinctive nature by the 1st century B.C., it destroyed the artistic styles of both Classical Greece and the Ancient Orient. Parthian art, in particular, combined elements of Greek, Achaemenid, and recent Central Asian nomadic traditions.21 The powerful drive toward restoring Iranian culture undermined Hellenism in Parthia: everything Hellenic was rejected outright. It was a time when the Iranian-Oriental world prevailed over the predominantly Hellenic one; the East “digested” Hellenism.22 In the 1st century B.C. Parthia became the center of attraction for all anti-Hellenic elements of the East Mediterranean states.23 By the mid-2nd century B.C., the Roman Republic developed into the strongest Mediterra- nean power. Having destroyed Carthage, it moved, early in the 1st century B.C., to Asia Minor. Its expansionist policy in the East developed in leaps and bounds until Parthia reached the Euphrates. Rome was threatened—a military clash was inevitable. This launched the great Ro- man-Parthian confrontation that can be described as a total war between Europe and Asia. The- odor Mommsen wrote in his History of Rome that the kings and peoples of Asia had closed ranks in the face of the powerful and arrogant West. This war, wrote the German historian, could be described as a national struggle between the East and the West for the simple reason that this was precisely what it was.24

Rome and the Caucasus

In the 1st century B.C. the Caucasus or, to be more precise, Albania, which bordered on the Caspian in the west, became one of the targets of the Roman eastward expansion. It filled a vast territory that stretched from the Smaller Caucasus and the lower reaches of the Kura and Arax to the northeastern offshoots of the Main Caucasian Range, its advantageous geographic location being its main attraction. In the south its land routes led to the major ancient Oriental trade roads that crossed the vast Parthian Kingdom from the west to the east—from Antioch and Seleucia on the Tigris to Margiana. They led to the west, the Rome-dominated countries, and to the east, to India and China, and met at the ancient Median city of Ektabany. The Romans, who were likewise seeking stronger positions on the western, Albanian, Caspian coast, were driving for control over one of the branches of the Great Silk Road (2nd century B.C.-16th century A.D.); having accomplished this, they expected to come into contact with the Central Asian regions, bypassing the Parthians who ruled there. The Romans also planned to use Albania on the western Caspian coast to deliver a blow at Parthia, its main rival in the East, from the north and move deeper into Asia. On the whole, the military expeditions of Roman generals Lucullus, Pompey, Mark Anthony, and others pursued both military-strategic and geoeconomic aims. They were resolved to find a way

20 See: Istoria Irana, Moscow, 1977, p. 88. 21 See: R. Frye, op. cit., p. 240. 22 See: Ibid., p. 244. 23 See: A.G. Bokshanin, Parfia i Rim, Part II, Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1966, p. 250. 24 See: Th. Mommsen, Istoria Rima, Vol. III, Moscow, 1941, pp. 61-62. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 183 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to establish trade contacts with India and China across Central Asia beyond the lands dominated by Parthia that controlled the trade between the West and the East. Gneus Pompey (106-48 B.C.) came close to the desired aim: having secured a union with Parthia, he routed Mithridates VI of Pontus and invaded the Southern Caucasus. He planned to march on Iberia and, having fortified its rear, cross Albania to reach the western Caspian coast. His plans were thwarted by the local tribes. Ancient authors (Gaius Valery Flakk, Strabo, Priscian, etc.) described their determined resistance to the Romans. Rufus Festus Avienus (4th century A.D.) had the following to say: “There, close to the Caspian waters, roamed belligerent Scythians; this is also the home of fierce Albans. There, in the stony fields live blood-thirsty Cadusses, swift Mards, Hyrcans, and Apirs.”25 The Albans’ stubborn resistance and internal strife in Rome forced Pompey to abandon his earlier designs. The Romans, however, did not shelve their plans of reaching the Caspian via Al- bania. Meanwhile the Roman-Parthian rivalry in the East led to another war. Julius Caesar, who was planning a war with Parthia, intended, after defeating it, to cross Hyrcania along the Caspian Coast and the Caucasus, go along the Black Sea, and invade Scythia and Germany to come back to Italy via Gallia. This would have closed the circle of the Roman domains and expanded the Empire to the Ocean.26 In the 30s B.C. Mark Anthony, a member of the Second Triumvirate, invaded Parthia and was defeated. It should be said that during the era of Roman conquests, the absolutely correct idea of the Cas- pian as an inland water body, generally accepted at the time of Herodotus, was rejected. The Caspian was believed to be part of the ocean or its bay. At that time several names were used: the Caspian, Hyrcanian, Scythian, or Albanian sea. These hydronyms were applied to parts of the Caspian Sea according to the names of the tribes that lived along the Caspian coast. In the Middle Ages the Caspian Sea was known under different hydronyms, the most popular being the Khazar, Tabaristan, Abeskun, Jurdjan, Baku, etc. seas. Later the hydronym of Caspian, derived from the tribal name of the Caspians living along the southwestern littoral zone, prevailed. In the new millennium Rome did not abandon its attempts to reach the Caspian western coast and become entrenched there. In the mid-1st century A.D., Emperor Nero (54-68) planned a large march on the Caspian in an effort to revive the plans of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar to establish trade routes to the East across the western Caspian. It was under the same emperor that India was connected by a direct route with Aden. The trip took 40 days and was fairly hazardous. Indian and Chinese goods reached Europe via the Central Asian regions of the Parthian Kingdom, across the Caspian and the Caucasus; part of the route lay along the River Oxus (Amu Darya), across the Cas- pian, the rivers Kura and Fazis (Rioni), and reached the Black Sea. At certain periods the Caspian Sea was an important part of the Great Silk Road.27 Meanwhile, in the mid-1st century A.D. the belligerent tribes of Alans and Sarmatians who occupied the vast steppes between the Azov Sea and the northwestern coast of the Caspian became very active. In the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D., they frequently passed the Darial Gorge (the Alanian Gates) and Derbent Pass (the Albanian Gates) to attack the Southern Caucasus, Atropatene, and Parthia. They even reached Cappadocia in Asia Minor. Tacitus specifically pointed out that “there was hardly an army able to stand opposed to their mounted hordes.”28 The Alans established contacts and entered into alliances with some North Caucasian mountain tribes and frequently changed sides when fighting in the Southern Caucasus.

25 Quoted from: A.S. Sumbatzade, op. cit., p. 44. 26 See: K.G. Aliev, Antichnye istochniki po istorii Azerbaijana, p. 65. 27 See: N.A. Aliev, Voenno-morskaia istoria Azerbaijana, Elm Publishers, Baku, 2002, pp. 20-21. 28 Cornelius Tacitus, Sochinenia, Vol. 2, Leningrad, 1969, p. 42. 184 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

On the whole, the fact that the North Caspian nomads and their well-armed and well-organized units became more active in the Caucasus and systematically penetrated the south added a new aspect to the Roman-Parthian rivalry in the vast Central Eurasian geopolitical expanse. It is no accident that in 68 Nero planned a military expedition to reach the Caspian and to complete the encirclement from the north and the south at the “Caspian Gates” (the Derbent Pass) to close the road for the North Cau- casian nomads to Hither Asia controlled by Rome.29 This was made easier by the fact that Parthia was considerably weakened by internal strife and the need to defend its eastern borders. Nero, in turn, built up a formidable force by drawing on numerous legions from several Roman provinces (Spain, Germany, Britain, and Illyria). One of them, staffed with the best Roman warriors, was called the phalanx of Alexander the Great; there was also a legion of marines, the first in Roman history. The revolt in Gallia interfered with Nero’s plans. Later, from time to time the Romans appeared on the western Caspian coast: for instance, the troops of Domician (84-96) reached their cherished destination yet never managed to become entrenched there. Theodor Mommsen was right when he wrote that the Caucasus again had betrayed its historic importance: very much like the Persians and the Greeks before them the Romans found their limits there. At that time the Parthian pressure on Caspia porta or Caspia claustra (Tacitus) prevailed over the Roman; yet it was Rome that opened the Caspian Sea for the West. Meanwhile, the new powerful Sassanian Empire in Persia that emerged in the first decades of the 3rd century A.D. opened a new stage in the struggle with Rome and Byzantium which ended in the 5th century when Persia established its hegemony over the Caucasian-Caspian region, which survived until the Arabic invasion of the 7th century.

C o n c l u s i o n

Geohistorical experience has shown that the attempts of the very different civilizational West- ern and Eastern societies to cooperate during antiquity ended with mutual alienation that went on for the next two thousand years. In the new, third millennium the problem of cooperation between the largest civilizational communities, divided mainly by territorial and religious characteristics (let me remind you of the “clashes of civilizations” theory formulated by Samuel Huntington), is still topical; the same can be said about its far-reaching geopolitical and geo-economic repercussions for the whole of mankind.

29 See: E.A. Pakhomov, “Rimskaia nadpis’ I v. n.e. i legion XII Fulminata,” Izvestia Akademii nauk Azerbaijanskoy SSR, No. 1, 1949, p. 84. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 185 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Kerim SHUKIUROV

D.Sc. (Hist.), associate professor, History of Azerbaijan Chair for the Humanities Departments, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS O MIGRATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND IRAN (19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES)

Abstract

he author offers his analysis of the po- of the Central Caucasus and reveals the hid- T litical and legal side of population migra- den mechanisms and purely political reasons tion in the context of Russia’s purpose- behind the resettlement of Armenians in the ful efforts to change the ethnic composition Central Caucasus and Azerbaijan.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The Russian-Iranian relations of the 19th-early 20th century and their political, economic, and other aspects have been fairly well studied,1 however population migration between the two states so far remains outside the scope of scholarly attention. The encyclopedic dictionary of demographics interprets the term “migration” as the movement of people (migrants) across borders for the purpose of permanent (or long-term) settlement. There is external (emigration and immigration) and internal migration. The former involves crossing state borders (it is also known as international population migration); internal migration is part of the population movement between settlements.2 Migration policy can be described as the sum total of all the methods and measures employed to channel migratory movement in the right direction.3 Migration may be generated by objective factors (economic, social, political, natural calamities, etc.) or by armed clashes between large powers. Migration between Russia and Iran became a problem during the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804- 1813 and 1826-1829 waged over the Azeri lands. Before that the population migrated between the southern and northern Azeri khanates; this was internal migration. The Gulistan (1813) and Turkman- chai (1828) treaties4 divided the Azeri lands between Russia and Iran, which transformed population movement from internal into external migration. At first this was a very specific movement, which

1 See: N.A. Kuznetsova, Iran v pervoy polovine XIX veka, Moscow, 1983; Russko-iranskaia torgovlia. 30-50-e gody XIX veka. Sb. Dok., Moscow, 1984. 2 See: Demograficheskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’, ed. by D.I. Valentey, Moscow, 1985, p. 251. 3 Ibid., p. 250. 4 See: K. Shukiurov, “The Caucasus in the System of International Relations: the Turkmanchai Treaty was Signed 180 Years Ago,” The Caucasus and Globalization, Issue 4, Vol. 2, 2008. 186 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION differed from anything observed in the neighboring states and which forced the sides to readjust the political and legal aspects throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. Russia-Iran migration was related to all the political, economic and cultural aspects of life in the Caucasus, Northern Azerbaijan in particular, which means that an in-depth investigation of migration will present some issues of Azerbaijan’s past in a new light: the settlement of Armenians in Azerba- ijan, the relations between Southern (Iranian) and Northern (Russian) Azerbaijan, the shaping of the Azeri nation, etc.

Migration Issues in the Turkmanchai Treaty

Migration issues were first discussed in the Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828. Russia’s migration policy formed part of its general efforts to weaken Iran and fortify its own position in the region. As a multisided phenomenon, migration was dealt with in several articles, Arts XIV and XV in particular: “Art XIV. None of the high contracting parties will ever demand extradition of the defectors and deserters who became subjects of the other side before the last war or during it. To prevent harmful effects potentially created by deliberate contacts between some of the defectors and their former compatriots the Persian Government pledges to ban those who are personally indicated by the Russian Government or will be enumerated later from its possessions between the Arax and the line formed by the Chara River, Lake Urmia, the Jakatu and Kizil Ozan rivers up to the place it falls into the Caspian. His Imperial Majesty, Emperor of All Russia, in turn, promises to prevent Persian defectors from settling or living in the Karabakh and Nakhchyvan khanates, or in the Erivan Khanate on the right bank of the Arax. It goes without saying that this condition remains and will remain in force only as applied to people with public ranks or having other distinctions such as: Khans, Begis and spiritual leaders, or Mollas who by the strength of their personal example, per- suasion, or secret contacts might exert harmful influence on their former compatriots whom they ruled or whom they continue ruling. As for the common people of both States, the high contracting parties have agreed that their subjects who moved or will move from one State to another can settle and live everywhere the Government, under which they will live, allows them; Art XV. His Majes- ty the Shah moved by the noble and salutary intention to restore calm in his Power and relieve his subjects from everything that might increase the misfortunes already created by the war, which the present treaty has luckily ended, extends his complete and whole-hearted forgiveness to all the people and Officials of the Region called Azerbaijan. None of them, irrespective of their status, should be persecuted or insulted because of their opinions, deeds or conduct during the war or during the temporary occupation of this Region by the Russian troops. More than that: the Officials and common people will be granted a period of one year starting from this day to freely move together with their families from the Persian to the Russian Regions, to move or sell their movable property without any hindrances from the Government or the local Officials without paying dues or taxes on the property sold or moved. In relation of real estate there has been established a five-year period during which such property can be sold and disposed of in any other way. However, this period of grace does not extend to those who during the one-year period mentioned above will commit a crime punishable by law.”5 Alexander Griboyedov who played an important role in drafting and signing the treaty wrote: “It is nowhere said that we should allow our subjects to move with their families and property (to Iran.—K.Sh.) since all articles speak of the conquest of Azerbaijan.”6

5 Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom politicheskie i torgovye. Collected and published by T. Yuzefovich, St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 220-222. 6 Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoy Arkheograficheskoy Komissiey, Vol. VII, Tiflis, 1878, p. 645 (hereinafter Akty). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 187 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

There were three main migration trends: (1) Armenian resettlement; (2) political emigrants; (3) general migration issues. Armenian resettlement (Art XV) was resolved immediately after the Treaty had been signed. V. Parsamian wrote on this score: “In the spring of 1828 massive resettlement of Persian Armeni- ans began. For several months over 40 thousand Armenians from the areas around Tabriz, Maku, Maraga, Salmas, Urmia, and Hoy moved to the Yerevan and Nakhchyvan provinces.”7 Armenian resettlement was funded by the Iranian contribution, which accounts for the fairly speedy fulfillment of Art XV.8 Politically motivated migrations from the Central Caucasus to Iran and back took place during the two Russo-Iranian wars. Judging by Part 1 of Art XIV both sides wanted to neutralize political migrants. In fact, political migrants from the Central Caucasus, and from Northern Azerbaijan in particular, did fight on the Iranian side against the Russian Empire (at the early stages of the 1826-1828 war former rulers or descendants of those who had ruled the liquidated North Azeri khanates came back from Iran to lead the Muslims uprisings of 1826) but no organized political opposition emerged either in Iran against Russia or in Russia against Iran. Gradually, general migration issues came to the fore, which explains why Part 2 of Art XIV caused friction in the relations between the two countries; in the 1830s and early 1840s it became much harder to regulate population movements between them. The issue reached its highest point under Baron Rozen, who was Caucasian viceroy in 1831 through 1837, and E. Golovin, who came after him and remained viceroy until 1842. It was under these two officials that migration-related initiatives and instructions first appeared. In December 1832, Baron Rozen informed the vice- chancellor (that is, deputy foreign minister) about the problems created by Art XIV of the Treaty of Turkmanchai. As a result, “in 1833 our (Russia’s.—K.Sh.) mission in Teheran was instructed to reach an agreement with the Persian government about the rules that would allow the subjects of both countries to cross border only with the permission of local authorities.”9 The death of Fatali Shah in 1834, which caused political complications in Iran, discontinued the talks.10 “On the instructions Golovin issued on 5 March, 1841 all information about the rules observed in the Tran- scaucasian area by the officials of the quarantine control and gubernia bureaucrats when dealing with the Persians moving into inner gubernias (the bulk of the migrants came from Southern Az- erbaijan.—K.Sh.) who arrive at the borderline without passports and those who have papers issued either by Persian authorities or our consulates was submitted… on 31 September of the same year. These papers testify … that Persians who arrived at the Russian border with written permission issued by the Persian government, or without documents or with documents issued by our consulates were allowed to cross into Russia.”11 “After discovering that there are Persian subjects living in Russia with only one document issued by their government on plain paper without signatures or stamps and without passports issued by our consulate in Persia on the strength of Art 317 of the 14 Code of Passports and Fugitives (issued in 1832), General Skalon instructed that these foreigners be detained and sent back.”12

7 V.A. Parsamian, “A.S. Griboyedov i pereselenie armian,” in: Is istorii vekovoy druzhby, Yerevan, 1983, p. 140. 8 The total size of the contribution set forth in Art VI of the Treaty of Turkmanchai amounted to “ten kururs of toman raidje, or twenty million silver rubles” (Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom…, p. 218). 9 The State Historical Archives of Georgia (SHAG), Record group 11 (Diplomatic Chancellery of the Viceroy of the Caucasus), Inventory 1, File 151, sheet 32; ibid., File 1416, sheet 6. 10 Ibid., File 1416, sheet 6. 11 Ibid., Record group 2 (Chancellery of the Governor of the Transcaucasian Area), Inventory 1, File 1164, sheet 3. 12 Ibid., sheet 4. 188 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Later, on 15 June, 1842, Golovin initiated a decision that said in part: “In future, until the government issues permanent rules related to the legal passports to be demanded from Persian subjects arriving in Russia, the local authorities should treat leniently those who fail to present legal documents at our borders. In future, only obvious vagrants should be deported; it is no longer required, however, that the presented documents be verified by our missions.”13 This did not change, to any noticeable degree, the political and legal aspects of population movement between the two countries. The rescript Nicholas I (1825-1855) issued on 12 November, 1842 to newly appointed Gover- nor of the Caucasus Neydhardt says: “There is another, no less important question closely connected with stronger peace on the Persian border. Art XIV of the Treaty of Turkmanchai allowed Russian and Persian subjects to freely move between the two states. Today the article is interpreted too widely and the freedom given to the people on both sides of the border is abused. To discontinue the resultant difficulties the Teheran court started negotiations to arrive at conditions that would clarify Art XIV of the Treaty.”14 On 3 July, 1844 the prolonged negotiations about Art XIV of the Treaty of Turkmanchai produced a convention on the movement of subjects of both countries. It said in part: “In order to cut short frequent violations and abuses caused by people living in the border regions of Russia and Per- sia when crossing the border, the plenipotentiaries of the contracting sides, with the permission and on the instructions of their governments, signed the following articles: n Art I. The subjects of both Powers cannot in future cross the border between them without passports and formal permission from their governments; n Art II. Any subject of either of the two states who crosses into the other without a passport will be detained and transferred to the nearest border officials or to the minister, chargé d’affaires, or consul of his state with all his clothing, weapons, and other belongings; n Art III. All requests by subjects of either state to their governments for permission to migrate should be submitted without outside interference; n Art IV. If officials of either government, in view of the friendship that unites them, require passports from each other, they should be issued, without legal obstacles, for several families.”15 This convention, however, also failed to clarify the situation; it triggered even wider mutual claims.16

The Greater Role of Economic Migration from Iran to Russia and Its Control

After the Russo-Iranian war of 1826-1828, when the political situation in the Central Caucasus stabilized, some of the Iranian population moved to Central Caucasus either temporarily or perma-

13 The State Historical Archives of Georgia (SHAG), Record group 2 (Chancellery of the Governor of the Tran- scaucasian Area), Inventory 1, File 1164, sheet 4. 14 Akty, Vol. IX, Part 2, Tiflis, 1884, p. 594. 15 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoy imperii. Sobr. vt. Vol. XIX, Otd. 1, 1844, No. 18247, p. 589. 16 The State Historical Archive of the Azerbaijan Republic (SHAAR), Record group 6 (Department of State Property of the Main Administration of the Viceroy of the Caucasus), Inventory 1, File 19; Record group 32 (The Cas- pian Chamber of State Property), Inventory 1, File 240 and others; SHAG, Record group 11, Inventory 1, File 2975, sheet 99. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 189 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nently in search of employment.17 Economic migration was part of the population movement between Russia and Iran. N. Belova had the following to say on this score: “Czarist officials described the economic migrants as ‘Persians,’ ‘Persian laborers,’ etc. in their documents. The czarist officials and Iranian authorities preferred to ignore the real nationality of the workers who came to Russia from Iran. As a rule, the economic migrants from Iran were Azeris.”18 By the mid-19th century the Central Caucasus had developed enough to need more workforce, which explains why it was suggested that the conditions of the 1844 convention be toned down; Rus- sia was even prepared to negotiate its liquidation.19 The convention could not be liquidated, however special rules were instituted in the Caucasian Vicegerency (the first vicegerency in the Caucasus existed between 1844 and 1881) to facilitate an inflow of Iranian population to the Central Caucasus. A circular letter of 11 December, 1868 pointed out in particular: “It has been clarified in relation to the people living in Persia’s borderline provinces, Astara, Ardabil, Ujarud, Gerger, Marand, Maku, and Hoy, that they can freely cross the border with their national passports, requiring no visas from the Russian consuls when they come to Russian border towns or villages on business or in search of employment.”20 A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov (1882- 1890), Director of Civilian Affairs in the Caucasus (between 1881 and 1905 the all-Russia administrative system functioned in the Caucasus), confirmed the circular letter by his edict of 6 June, 1887. On 14 December, 1887 a new edict was issued to clarify the situation21; a circular letter of 30 May, 1888 identified the territories adjacent to Iran that refuted the document of 11 December, 1868. It said: “On the strength of the circular letter of 14 December, 1887 No. 10935, those who cross into Russia from Iran and Turkey with passports bearing no visas from our consulates should be allowed to stay only in the border areas and for no longer than half a year… On our side of the Persian border these are the following areas: Lenkoran, Jevat, Jebrail, Zangezur, Nakhchyvan, Sharuro-Daralagez, Erivan, and Surmali districts.”22 This situation survived until the early 20th century when resolute measures were taken. In his circular letter of 28 June, 1903 No. 761, the Director of Civilian Affairs in the Caucasus wrote: “Ac- cording to the information that my department possesses today there is a considerable number of Persian subjects living in the Caucasian Area who either came here at different times without national passports or who lost them on arrival or who carry Persian passports without visas of our consulates in Persia. I believe it necessary to settle the status of all who live illegally within the area under my administration by extending to them a non-recurrent and extraordinary measure in the form of certain privileges in relation to the order and time of obtaining legal residence permits. I deem it necessary to issue the following decision to all Messrs. Governors and regional heads: “1. All Persian subjects without legal national passports endorsed by our consuls in Persia should be given six months starting on the day this edict is issued to obtain the abovementioned documents with obligatory visas of our consulate in Persia. “2. The children and grandchildren of those Persian subjects who have been living in the Cau- casian Area for a long time and have come of age but carry no residence permits indispensa-

17 See: Obozrenie Rossiyskikh vladeniy za Kavkazom, St. Peterburg, Part III, 1836, p. 289. 18 N.K. Belova, “Ob otkhodnichestve iz Severo-zapadnogo Irana v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka,” Voprosy istorii, No. 10, 1956, p. 114. 19 SHAG, Record group 5 (Chancellery of the Head of the Main Administration of the Director of Civilian Affairs in the Caucasus), Inventory 1, File 1448, p. 1; File 1901, sheet 1. 20 Ibid., File 5023, sheet 1. 21 Ibid., Record group 12 (Chancellery of the Head of the Main Administration of the Director of Civilian Affairs in the Caucasus), Inventory 1, File 628, sheet 1. 22 Ibid., Record group 15 (Foreign Ministry official for transborder communication under the Viceroy in the Cauca- sus), Inventory 1, File 191, sheet 23. 190 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

ble for foreigners living in the Empire (Arts 292-301 of the Passport Code) should receive such permits if it is established that they were born in the Caucasian Area and have been living permanently in it. Otherwise they should be asked to present, on the strength of the Passport Code, within six months national passports with visas from the Russian consulates in Persia.”23 During the 1905-1907 revolution, the czarist authorities deported the greater part of the Persian subjects from the Caucasus, especially from Baku.24 This did not stem the process, which continued unabated. How did Iran treat the outflow of its population? Its government was concerned by the great number of migrants leaving for Russia. This explains why the 1844 convention was not annulled.25 It was not until the 1890s that the Iranians made feeble efforts to limit it.26 In 1904, the Iranian government arrived at an official stand on the economic migration issue. An official document stated that Muzafar Addin Shah (1896-1907) allowed his subjects migrate to Europe in search of employment; they paid 2 tumans for a passport valid for six months; a monthly work permit for Russia and nearby countries cost 2 krans; those who failed to pay the tax faced a fine of 7 tumans.27

Passports for Migrants: Rules and Reality

It was only after 1844 that migrants were required to present their passports, which means that the process of obtaining a passport at home and registering it in Russia became very important. Ma- terials of the Kavkaz newspaper28 and archival documents show that in Iran the process was more or less spontaneous and was seen as a source of state income and personal enrichment of state officials. The passport reform did nothing to regulate the process.29 Upon their arrival in Russia new- comers had to present their passports to the gubernia administration in one of the cities. After checking the personal information of the passport bearer, the administration marked his passport as invalid and exchanged it for a residence permit.30 To remove the difficulties created by this process Envoy Plenipotentiary of Iran in St. Petersburg Mirza Abdulla Khan suggested that the gubernia administrations replace national passports of Persian subjects with residence permits.31 On 5 Jan- uary, 1880 the Law Department of the State Council accepted this suggestion. One of the archival documents says: “Transferred from the Caucasian Committee of His Imperial Majesty, the Viceroy of the Caucasus (at that time Grand Prince Mikhail Nikolaevich (1862-1881) filled this post.—K.Sh.) on the changed order of issuing passport documents to Persian subjects living in the Caucasus. The Law Department believes: the corresponding articles of the Code of Laws should be changed and rules that: Persian subjects who arrive in the Caucasus and Transcaucasian Area are allowed to receive passports for residence and travel in the Empire in exchange of their national documents; they will be allowed to renew these passports both in the chancelleries of the

23 SHAG, Record group 15, Inventory 1, File 191, sheet 17. 24 See: N.K. Belova, op. cit., p. 120. 25 SHAG, Record group 5, Inventory 1, File 1901, sheet 10. 26 See: Kavkazskoe sel’skoe khoziaistvo, No. 143, 1896, p. 2459. 27 Z.Z. Abdullaev, Promyshlennost’ i zarozhdenie rabochego klassa Irana, Baku, 1963, pp. 192-193. 28 See: Kavkaz, 8 May, 1882. 29 SHAG, Record group 11, Inventory 1, File 2264, sheets 3-19, 20. 30 Ibid., Record group 5, Inventory 1, File 5396, sheet 10. 31 Ibid., sheets 6-8. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 191 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION governors and in the uezd police departments at their place of permanent or temporary residence.”32 On the whole, the passport system retained serious flaws that permitted numerous abuses,33 the entire burden of which was borne by economic migrants. Azeri poet M.A. Mojuz (1873-1934) wrote in his “Mechta” (Dream) poem: “Allah, if you have no cash, open people the road to Russia or soften the heart of the consul so that he issue passports to them.”34 The majority crossed the border without passports to avoid the numerous problems this process entailed. A document dated 1855 says: “…the number of Persian subjects who arrive in Russia without written documents has increased considerably. Not detained at the border, they do not remain in the border areas but move further on.”35 Another document dated 1877 speaks of the considerable growth in the number of Persian subjects without documents living in Russia.36 The Baku governor presented the following document dated 10 November, 1901 to the Caucasian Director of Civilian Affairs: “The Imperial Russian Mission in Teheran informed me that there are laborers, Persian subjects, who cross the border into Russia and asked me to take measures,”37 etc.

The Shahsevan Question “Resolved”

The nomadic tribes who roamed between Russia and Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries were another specific feature of the population movement of the time. The Shahsevan nomads stood apart because of their numbers, social status, and place in Russo-Iranian relations of the 19th century. So far many of the important features of this numerous tribe (its genesis, ethnic consolidation, social and economic development , etc.) have not been adequately studied despite the vast body of relevant information found in written sources, archival materials, and academic writings especially related to the 19th century.38 When the Afshars and Qajars, who played an important role in Iran’s political life, lost their privileged positions, the Shahsevans came to the fore on the country’s socioeconomic and political stage. Having consolidated in the early 19th century, they developed into a mighty economic and political force.39 They acquired even more power after the Treaty of Turkmanchai. An edict issued to Minister Plenipotentiary A.S. Griboyedov on 1 May, 1828 pointed out that the nomads presented dangers for Russia’s borders and indicated what should be done to avert them.40 Later, under the 1831

32 Ibid., sheet 23. 33 Ibid., Record group 11, Inventory 1, File 3170, p. 36; Record group 12, Inventory 1, File 924, sheets 2-3. 34 M. Mojuz, Works, Baku, 1982, p. 66 (in Azeri). 35 SHAG, Record group 11, Inventory 1, File 2975, sheets 72, 73. 36 Ibid., Record group 5, Inventory 1, File 4847, sheet 1. 37 Ibid., Record group 12, Inventory 2, File 437, sheet 3. 38 SHAG Record group 7 (Administration of Property, Forests, Agricultural Affairs and Industry at the Main Ad- ministration of the Viceroy of the Caucasus), Inventory 1, File 42; G. Markov, “Shahsevany na Mugane,” in: Zapiski Kavkazskogo otdela Imperatorskogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, Book XIV, Issue 1, Tiflis, 1890, pp. 1-2; I. Ogranovich, “Svedenia o Shahsevanakh,” in: Kavkazskiy kalendar’ na 1871g., Tiflis, 1870, pp. 68-84; F.B. Rostop- chin, “Zametki o Shahsevenakh,” Sovetskaia etnografia, Issue 3-4, 1933, pp. 88-118; I.A. Ibragimov, Iranskiy Azerbai- jan v posledney chetverti XIX veka i ego mesto v russko-iranskikh otnosheniakh (candidate thesis), Moscow, 1968, pp. 46-72. 39 See: V.V. Trubetskoy, “Rol’ osedlo-kochevykh plemen Irana v period novogo vremeni,” in: Ocherki novoy istorii Irana, Moscow, 1978, p. 179. 40 See: Akty, Vol. VII, pp. 622-624. 192 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION convention signed in Iran, the Shahsevans received permission to winter in Mugan.41 From this time on they spent the winters in Mugan. To limit their settlement to Mugan the borders of the Shemakha kishlags were specified.42 The czarist authorities, however, dissatisfied with these measures, banned border crossings for the Shahsevans. In 1884, they were stopped by the force of arms from crossing the border into Mu- gan.43 The year remained in popular memory as “top gaytaran il” or “the year of those who were turned back by guns.” V. Markov wrote on this score: “From 1885 until today the Shahsevans remained calm and never tried to cross the border without permission.”44 These measures deprived the Shahsevans of their best kishlags. By the same token, however, czarist Russia (despite the Shah- sevans’ repeated attempts to return to Mugan) mainly resolved the question responsible for a lot of tension between the two countries. Russian Caucasian studies insist that this measure was applied at the request of the shah.45 There is no doubt, however, that this was done to include the Mugan lands in the landed fund from which Russian settlers received landed plots. They were moved there to create a much more reliable defense system on the border in full accordance with the new stage in the czarist settlement policy that took shape in the 1880s.46

C o n c l u s i o n

Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries the migration issue loomed prominently in Russo- Iranian relations when Russia relied on the Treaty of Turkmanchai (Arts XIV and XV) to impose its conditions. The basic principles registered in the Treaty were replaced, after negotiations, with new ones favorable for Russia (the 1844 Convention). Russia exploited the migration policy to resolve its own outstanding sociopolitical and economic problems: first, by moving Armenians to the Central Caucasus, it changed its ethnodemographic structure (in Northern Azerbaijan in particular); second, Iran never developed into a center of Northern Azeri political opposition; third, the Russian economy profited from cheap labor from Iran, etc. After the coup of October 1917 the Russian Empire fell apart; a new situation emerged bringing new political and legal migration rules with it.

41 Ibid., Vol. XI, Tiflis, 1888, p. 587. 42 SHAAR, Record group 7, Inventory 1, File 142, sheet 1. 43 See: I. Ogranovich, Provintsii Ardebilskaia i Serabskaia, Tiflis, 1876, pp. 202-203; L.F. Tigranov, Iz istorii obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy v Persii, St. Petersburg, 1909, pp. 11-115. 44 V. Markov, op. cit., p. 57. 45 See: L.K. Artamonov, Severnyy Azerbaijan. Voenno-geograficheskiy ocherk, Part 2, Tiflis, 1890, p. 193. 46 See: P. Petrovich (M. Avdeev), Mugan i Salianskaia step, Baku, 1927, p. 15; D.I. Ismail-zade, Russkoe krestian- stvo v Zakavkazie. 30-e gody XIX-nachalo XX v., Moscow, 1982, pp. 58-64. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 193 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Vasif GA AROV

Lecturer, Chair of New and Recent History of Azerbaijan, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan). AZERBAIJAN’S INDEPENDENCE AND THE GEOINTERESTS O THE RUSSIAN AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES

Abstract

he author has taken as his subject the determination” proclaimed by Russia in or- T problem of Azerbaijan’s independence der to achieve independence for Azerbai- in the light of relations between Rus- jan and also helped to set up loyal regimes sia and the Ottoman Empire at the con- in the Caucasus. The author looks at the cluding stages of World War I. In fact, Az- causes and results of the struggle between erbaijan found itself in the center of all the Russia and the Ottoman Turks over oil-rich problems that developed between these Baku, which became exacerbated when the two countries. The Ottoman Empire tried Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan was to capitalize on the “right of nations to self- formed.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

After joining World War I, when the war with Russia reached its height, the Ottoman state embraced Turkism as the centerpiece of its official policy. Enver Pasha looked at the war against Russia as the only effective way to liberate the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire from the pressure of czarism and set up a new state, the Great Turan. The czarist government, in turn, which promised the Armenians autonomy in Eastern Anatolia, made an effort to isolate its Muslim Turks from the Ottoman state. In a world that seemed captivated by nationalist ideas, the widening national-liberation movement of the Azeris looked especially threatening to the rulers of Russia. They had no choice but to try and keep the Azeris away from the Ottoman Turks. By fanning contradictions between the Sunni and the Shi’a and insisting on Russifi- cation, czarism consistently pushed the Ottoman Turks out of the Transcaucasus and erased all memory of their ethnic affiliation from the people’s minds.1 The Russian authorities never trusted the Azeris and other Muslims, who from the very beginning of World War I were placed under strict control crowned with the state of emergency introduced in Azerbaijan in the summer of 1916. On the whole, throughout the war, Russia treated Azerbaijan as a source of raw materials, an important economic base, and a military-strategic foothold to be used to attack the Ottoman Empire.

1 See: G.I. Omer, The Soviet Foreign Policy and the Karabakh Issue in the Light of Regional and Global Security, Istanbul, Alpha Publishers, 2004, p. 300 (in Turkish). 194 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Despite the Turkish military leaders’ exertions, the campaign of 1914-1917 on the Caucasian front was a failure; it was thanks to the Bolshevist coup of October 1917, the Decree on Peace which followed and bared the Russian front, and the deep-cutting crisis of the Russian statehood that the idea of Turan was revived among the ruling Ottoman circles. These and other aspects of the Ottoman state’s active foreign policy in relation to Azerbaijan and the Caucasus as a whole form the subject of the present article.

Independence of Azerbaijan at the Brest-Litovsk Talks

The truce signed on 2 (15) December 1917 in Brest-Litovsk and three days later, on 5 (18) December, in Erzincan ended the military confrontation between Russia and the Ottoman state in World War I. On 9 (22) December, 1917, Soviet Russia and the Central Powers opened a peace conference in Brest-Litovsk that continued on and off until 3 March, 1918. The Ottoman Empire expected the following from the Brest-Litovsk peace talks: 1. Return of the vilayets in Eastern Anatolia still occupied by Russia; 2. Return of the Kars, Ardahan, and Batum sanjaks transferred to Russia as part of the contribution imposed on the Ottoman state for its defeat in the 1877-1878 war; 3. Independence of the Muslim peoples of the Central Caucasus who were expected to set up an Islamic state there under Ottoman protectorate. At that time, the Ottoman government was resolved to achieve independence for the Central Caucasus to deprive Russia of its domination in the region. It did not reject the buffer state idea even if its ruling circles had different ideas about it than the Transcaucasian Commissariat, in which Arme- nians and Georgians had the final say. They wanted an Islamic State of the Caucasian Muslims. Since part of Eastern Anatolia was occupied by Russians, the Ottoman Turks had no access to the Caucasus, which meant that they could not affect the developments there. Forced to accept reality, the Ottoman Turks deemed it expedient to recognize the Transcaucasian Commissariat as an independent state.2 On 16 January, 1918, they officially invited the Transcaucasian Commissariat to attend the Brest- Litovsk conference3; the invitation was declined. Nevertheless, the Ottoman government attached great importance to the Brest-Litovsk talks, which explains why Premier Talat Pasha personally attended the peace conference. When Soviet Russia issued its Decree on Turkish Armenia, its strategic plans and designs in Eastern Anatolia became absolutely clear. The Turks were stirred into action.4 On 16 January, 1918, Talat Pasha met Foreign Minister of Germany Richard von Kuhlmann in Brest-Litovsk to discuss how the Russian troops could be removed from Eastern Anatolia. The Ger- man minister said that there was no chance of a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks and that in the near future the situation would change (meaning that the cease-fire regime would end). He promised that through several consecutive indirect military operations the Ottoman lands would be liberated and the political problem settled in the most satisfactory way.5 Satisfied, the Turkish premier telegraphed the

2 Archives of Military History and Strategic Studies of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Turkey (AMHSSD- MRT), A. ½, K. 1366-340, D. 406, F. 1-48; A. 4/3671, K. 2906, D. 438-154, F. 7-6 (in Turkish). 3 AMHSSDMRT, A. 4/3671, K. 2906, D. 438-154, F. 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-8; Dokumenty i materially po vneshney politike Zakavkazia i Gruzii, Tiflis, 1919, p. 52. 4 See: K. Selami, The Turkish-Soviet Relations, Ulke kitablary, Istanbul, 1998, pp. 241-242 (in Turkish). 5 See: A.N. Kurat, Turkey and Russia, Ankara, Ministry of Culture, 1990, p. 368; E.A. Turkgeldi, “Reminiscences of the Brest-Litovsk Conference” BTTD, III/13 (March 1986), pp. 49-50 (both in Turkish). Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 195 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION gist of the talks to Enver Pasha and asked him to contact the German General Staff to start preparations for an offensive of the Ottoman troops.6 Talat Pasha wrote in his telegram: “Having concluded peace with Ukraine, the Germans are planning an offensive on Petrograd to force the Bolsheviks to sign a peace treaty. They have already started preparations. The Ottoman delegation is convinced that this, on the whole, suits our interests. The Bolshevik propaganda is intended to conceal the fact that they want to restore Russia of the past. With this aim in view they are pressing against independence of Finland and Ukraine, thus completely baring their true intentions. If Ukraine becomes independent, the Crimean government will follow suit, which will make it possible to set up an Islamic state.”7 On 10 February, 1918, the talks in Brest-Litovsk were discontinued once more; Lev Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation, went back to Petrograd. This played into the hands of Ottoman Turkey. Until that day its delegation had not dared to put on the table its maximum demands on the Soviets. On the one hand, it was fairly hard to convince the Germans to back the Turkish demands; while on the other, it feared that excessive demands might wreck the talks, for which the Ottoman delegation did not want to be blamed. The demarche of the Soviets left the Ottoman delegation free to move ahead with its maximum demands. Back in Istanbul, Talat Pasha and Nasimi Bek raised the question in the Cabinet, which decided to supplement the new German ultimatum with the Turkish demands: 1. Return the Kars, Ardahan, and Batum sanjaks to Turkey, which had been forced to transfer them to Russia as a contribution for the defeat in the 1877-1878 war; 2. Withdraw the Russian troops and the Red Army units from the territories populated by Turks and move Turkic troops in to ensure law and order there; 3. Give the Muslims living in the Caucasian territories adjacent to the 1878 borders the right of self-determination.8 On 24 February, 1918, Enver Pasha informed Zeki Pasha, who remained in Brest, and the Ger- man Chief Command through him of the Cabinet’s decision. General Ludendorff, in turn, asked Gen- eral Hoffmann, who represented the German Chief Command in Brest-Litovsk, to back the Ottoman demands.9 German Foreign Minister Kuhlmann, on the other hand, regarded the demands as excessive and unacceptable; he believed that they might endanger the talks or even provoke clashes between Russia and the Ottoman state. It was not his intention, however, to openly object to the demands. As a result, the Ottoman state demanded the following as part of the German ultimatum: 1. Immediate withdrawal of the Russian troops from the occupied parts of Eastern Anatolia; 2. Withdrawal of the Russian troops from the sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum (which Tur- key was forced to abandon as a contribution for the defeat in the war of 1877-1878); occupation of the lands by Ottoman troops until order was completely restored; 3. Denunciation of all treaties concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Russia (especially those of an economic nature).10 German Ambassador to Turkey Bernstorff concluded: “The Turkish government is out to make up for its territorial losses on other fronts (Palestine, Syria, and Iraq) at the expense of the Caucasus.

6 See: A.N. Kurat., op. cit., p. 368. 7 Ibid., pp. 368-369. 8 See: K. Selami, op. cit., p. 343. 9 Ibidem. 10 See: A.N. Kurat, op. cit., pp. 381-382; K. Selami, op. cit., p. 344. 196 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha insist that the Turks and Germans can establish economic cooperation in Asia (in Turkestan and Iran) through the Batum-Baku railway.”11 It seems that Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha had planned on Turkey advancing into the Caucasus as far as Baku even before the Brest-Lito- vsk Treaty was signed. To realize these plans and prevent Russia’s possible pressure some time in the future, all the Caucasian Muslims had to be united into a single Islamic state under the Ottoman protectorate. On 27 February (at the final stage of the Brest-Litovsk Conference, 27 February-3 March, 1918), when the Germans had already agreed to include the demands related to Kars, Ardahan, and Batum in their final ultimatum, Ottoman representative in Brest Ibrahim Hakki Pasha formulated new demands on Soviet Russia: “Proceeding from the ‘right of nations to self-determination’ formulated by Soviet Russia, an independent ‘Caucasian Islamic State’ should be set up in the Caucasus; the national Muslim governments in Kazan, Orenburg, Turkestan, and Bukhara should be also recognized.”12 The Ottoman delegation believed that the Islamic state should serve as a buffer between Russia and the Ottoman Empire; it was expected to include Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The Soviet delegation resolutely refused. The Germans, likewise, refused to accept the project which had nothing to do with their national interests.13 The project was buried but the Soviets promised the Caucasian Muslims broad rights. It should be said that the Turkish delegation did not limit itself to the above demands: Ottoman Turkey wanted domination over all the Turks and Muslims on Russian territory. It was demanded that the Turks of Russia receive the broadest possible political and cultural rights, while the Ottoman Empire would control their observation. This was the first time the rights of the Turks and Muslims of Russia were discussed at the international level, albeit with no positive results—the Germans refused to support the Ottoman delegation. The Austro-Hungarian delegation, likewise, regarded them as threatening the cause of peace and refused to go along with the Turks. Time was short—the conference was moving to its end too fast for the Ottoman delegation to enlist at least some supporters. The Soviet delegation exploited the German and Austro-Hungarian positions to decline the Ottoman demands.14 Under the peace treaty Russia was obliged to return the vilayets of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum; satisfied, the Turkish official circles refused to press further so as not to damage the frail peace. The question of the Caucasian Muslims’ independence remained suspended: it was rejected both by Russia and the Ottoman allies. On the other hand, in view of the earlier failed stages of the Brest-Litovsk talks, the Entente promised to side with Soviet Russia if it continued the war against Germany. The Bolshevik leadership was split over the issue: some thought that the Brest- Litovsk Treaty was short of high treason, while many of the top figures wanted the war to continue. This explains why the Ottoman leaders deemed it wise to leave the Caucasian Muslim issue alone. On 3 March, 1918, Soviet Russia, on the one side, and Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the other, signed a peace treaty of 14 articles and additional protocols in Brest-Litovsk. Soviet Russia signed peace treaties with each of their allies.15 The Ottoman state fulfilled two of its three demands:

11 K. Selami, op. cit., p. 382. 12 G. Jaschke, “Der Turanismus der jungturken. Zur Osmanischen Aussenpolitik im Weltkriege,” in: Die West des Islams, Bd. 23, H.1/2, Leipzig, 1941. S. 24. 13 See: A. Arslan, “Akhyska and Akhalkalaki during World War I and National-Liberation Movements (1914- 1921),” in: Caucasian Studies, IV, Istanbul, 1997, p. 99 (in Turkish). 14 See: A.N. Kurat, op. cit., pp. 383-384. 15 AMHSSDMRT, A. 4/3671, K. 2928, D. 496-28, F. 1-151; A. 5/10677, K. 4324, D. 200, F. 28; The Ottoman Ar- chive of the Republic of Turkey (further OART), ShchR. NMSh. IShO, D. 55, E. 2; ShchR. ShchMSh. IShO, D. 107, E. 10; Mirnye peregovory v Brest-Litovske, Vol. 1, NKID, Moscow, 1920, p. 223. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 197 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Russian troops were moved out of Eastern Anatolia and the Elviye-i Selâse lands were returned to Turkey.

The irst Results of Russian-Ottoman Opposition in Azerbaijan

Under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Ottoman government restored the prewar 1877-1878 border; and under the Batum Peace Treaty of 4 June, 1918, it returned to the 1829 borders. This not merely satisfied the ruling circles’ pride but also provoked an intensive advance of Turkish troops further into the region. The events in the Caucasus and especially the developments in Azerbaijan served as an even stronger inducement. The rich oilfields of Baku were luring the Ottoman Turks further to the east. On 15 October, 1918, Commander of the Eastern Armies Group Khalil Pasha telegraphed Enver Pasha from liberated Baku: “Today, the oil and oil fuel accumulated in the Baku reservoirs are worth hundreds of millions of lire. Sent to us by the will of Allah, this source can resolve all our problems. We lost thousands in the battle for Baku—the larger part of the Baku treasure is ours by right. This is our victory prize, which we and Azerbaijan should use.”16 On top of this, by marching on the Caucasus at the very end of the war, Enver Pasha planned to recoup the territorial losses on the southern fronts with territorial gains in the Caucasus. The Azeri- populated areas would have helped the Ottoman state to restore its influence in the Caucasus, which had been greatly undermined by the war.17 The Soviet government in Moscow was closely following the Caucasian developments and the progress of the Ottoman troops. As soon as Moscow learned that Gumri had been captured on 15 May, Ambassador Galib Kemal Bek received note No. 1877 dated 28 May, 1918 and signed by Georgi Chicherin, which said: “In future, no territories will be transferred to the Ottoman Empire” and “Having learned that the Turkish troops captured Alexandropol (Gumri) and are moving toward Baku, the Soviet government resolutely objects to this grave violation of the strict conditions of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk and demands that the troops be halted.”18 In this way, by voicing its concern, the Soviet government initiated, late in May 1918, the Baku Question. At that time, the Soviet government did not have enough military power in the Caucasus and had to limit itself to diplomatic means. In June 1918, Ottoman troops started moving toward Ganja; on 5 June, the Fifth Division under Mursal Pasha entered the city.19 Soviet Russia was watching this progress with great concern. On 24 May, in a telegram to Chairman of the Baku Council of People’s Commissars Stepan Shaumian, Lenin wrote: “The international position of Baku is a hard one, therefore I believe you should try to form a bloc with Jordania.”20 On 6 June, in conformity with this letter of instruction, Shaumian approached Noi Jordania in the name of the Baku Soviet with a suggestion that they support the Soviet government, which was allegedly defending the Transcaucasus against the Otto-

16 Sh.S. Aidemir, Enver Pasha: from Macedonia to Central Asia (1914-1922), Remzi Publishers, Istanbul, 1985, pp. 425-426 (in Turkish). 17 See: N. Udjeer, The Azeri and Daghestani Marches of the Ottoman Army during World War I, Ministry of De- fense, Ankara, 1996, p. 44 (in Turkish). 18 A.N. Kurat, op. cit., pp. 529-530. 19 See: J. Hasanov, Azerbaijan in the System of International Relations, Azerneshr Publishers, Baku, 1993, p. 94 (in Azeri). 20 V.I. Lenin ob Azerbaidzhane, Azgiz Publishers, Baku, 1970, p. 120. 198 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION man invasion. The letter said, in part, that if the Georgian government did not allow the Ottoman troops to cross its territory into Azerbaijan, the R.S.F.S.R. would reward Georgia with an autonomous status when the people’s commissars came to power in the Transcaucasus.21 Germany, in turn, also put pressure on Georgia. As a result, on 10 June, the Ottoman troops moving through Borchaly to Azerbaijan found themselves face to face with German-Georgian troops. Germany and the Ottoman state, staunch allies throughout World War I, found themselves on opposite sides in the Transcaucasus. The Germans and Georgians were defeated in a short military operation; many of them were taken prisoner. Establishment of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and entry of the Ottoman armed forces into its territory caused a lot of concern in Soviet Russia, which intended to establish its power in the Transcaucasus and gain control over Baku. The leaders of the Baku commune, who remained loyal to Russia, continued fighting the national government of Azerbaijan in the hope that Moscow would rescue them. On 6 June, 1928, Naval Commissar of the Commune G. Korganov ordered a military march on Ganja. He intended to rout the city, the cradle of Azeri independence, before the Ottoman troops could reach it.22 The Caucasian Islamic Army and the troops of the Baku Commune clashed at Goychai in what turned into a four-day-long battle (it lasted from 27 June to 1 July); it sealed the fate of Azerbaijan. The Bolshevist and Armenian march on Ganja was disrupted; the Caucasian Islamic Army pressed onward to Baku.23 On 20 July, it captured one of the key points, the city of Shemakha; by the end of the month it reached Baku’s outskirts. Soviet Russia, which interfered through German brokerage, slowed down the Caucasian Islam- ic Army’s progress. In June 1918, being fully aware that the Commune would be unable to halt the Ottoman Turks, Moscow entered into talks with Germany in an effort to retain its control over Baku by diplomatic means. Germany, in turn, concerned about the developments on the Western front and the course of the war as a whole, was displaying an ever growing interest in Baku. In June 1918, having talked to delegates at the Istanbul Conference, Germany became firmly resolved to capture Baku and its oil with the help of Russia. Germany no longer expected its Ottoman ally or the government of Azerbaijan to grant it access to Baku’s oil, therefore it seized the opportunity that presented itself. On the one hand, it announced that it had nothing to do with the Azeri events; on the other hand, Germany promised to do everything it could to halt the Ottoman offensive in return for the Soviet promises to sell it Azeri oil. Late in June, the sides reached a preliminary agreement24 under which Germany pledged to keep the Ottoman Turks away from the Baku oil, while Russia promised to share it with Germany. The talks that began in Berlin in June 1918 were concluded with a treaty (which supplemented the Brest-Litovsk Treaty) signed on 27 August. Under Art 13, Russia pledged to accept Germa- ny’s recognition of Georgia’s independence. Art 14, which related directly to Azerbaijan, said: “Germany will not support any third country if military operations occur in the Caucasus outside Georgia or the districts mentioned in Art 4.3 of the peace treaty. It will use its influence to keep the armed forces of the third power in the Caucasus within the following boundaries: the Kura from its mouth to the village of Petropavlovskoe, along the administrative border of the Shemakha district to the village of Agrioba, and further on along a straight line up to the point where the borders of the Baku, Shemakha, and Guba districts meet; and from here along the northern border of the Baku district up to the sea.

21 See: J. Hasanov, op. cit., p. 95. 22 Ibid., p. 106. 23 See: P.G. Darabadi, Voennye problemy politicheskoy istorii Azerbaijana v nachale XX veka, Baku, 1991, p. 114. 24 See: J. Hasanov, op. cit., pp. 108-109. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 199 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“Russia will do its best to promote the production of oil and oil products in the Baku region and will give Germany a quarter of the produced amount, but no less than the amount of tons, yet to be established, every month.”25 The part related to the Caucasus mainly dealt with Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. By entering into a conspiracy with Soviet Russia Germany went against the interests of Austria-Hungary and essentially betrayed its other ally, the Ottoman Empire, the unmentioned “third power.” By that time it, together with Azeri troops, had already crossed the demarcation line.26 On 29 August, two days after the Russian-German treaty had been signed, German Ambassador to Turkey Bernsdorff informed the Ottoman leaders of this. Istanbul was very much agitated. The Great Majlis of the Unity and Progress Party and the parliament discussed the treaty of 27 August. Premier Talat Pasha asked the German government not to ratify the agreement. On 3 September, 1918, the Ottoman government decided to dispatch Talat Pasha to Berlin to defuse the tension. The treaty pushed the relations between the two countries to the brink of a crisis, but it turned out that the parties to it could not fulfill their obligations; on top of this, the treaty contained several contradictions. Russia promised Germany a quarter of the produced oil; meanwhile, on 31 July, 1918, Baku liberated itself from Soviet Russia’s control, which meant that Russia had no access to the oil and so could not share it with Germany.27 Under the same treaty, Germany pledged to push the British out of Baku and help Russia to establish Soviet power there. On 2 September, 1918, head of the Ger- man military mission in Georgia Kress von Kressenstein reported from Tbilisi that the insistent Rus- sian demands “to capture Baku without Ottoman help” could not be fulfilled in the current situation. In the very first days of September 1918, German officials concluded (on the strength of information received) that Soviet Russia could not influence the developments in Baku. From that time on Germa- ny no longer relied on Russia and pinned its hopes once more on its Ottoman ally. The German General Staff insistently imposed its help on the Turks. General Hindenburg informed the Ottoman leaders that he had dispatched two brigades to the Transcaucasus to oust the British from Baku. On 13 September, General Ludendorff ordered von Kressenstein to plan an offensive on Baku and report when ready.28 The German Chief Command planned an offensive on Baku in the latter half of Sep- tember-early October to capture the city and establish German control over the Caspian. Nuru Pasha, in command of the liberation of Baku since 10 September, ordered an all-out attack to begin on 13 September. In the small hours of 14 September (at 4 a.m.), the assault began. On 15 September, 1918, Baku was liberated and the Azeri government could return to its capital. The Ottoman state triumphed in the cruel and uncompromising struggle for Baku’s oil waged by Russia, Germany, Britain, and itself.

The Azeri Issue at the Berlin Talks

Germany and Britain, which had considerable potential in the struggle for Baku, took into account the current situation and accepted the Ottoman victory. Soviet Russia, however, refused to rec-

25 Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, Vol. 1, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1957, pp. 443-444; T. Siunbiul, The Azeri File, Ankara, 1990, pp. 91-92 (in Turkish); T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan in 1905-1920—the Shaping of Nation- al Identity in a Muslim Community, Baglam, Istanbul, 1988, pp. 182-183 (Turkish translation). 26 Sovetsko-germanskie otnoshenia ot peregovorov v Brest-Litovske do podpisania Rapall’skogo dogovora, Part 1, 1917-1918, Political Literature Publishing House, Moscow, 1968, p. 644. 27 See: W. Baumgart, Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918. Von Brest-Litovsk bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges, Wien, München, 1966, pp. 202—203; W. Bihl, Die Kaukasus Politik der Mittelmächte. Die Zeit der versuchten kaukasischen Staatlichkeit (1917—1918), Teil II, Böhlau Verlag, Wien, Köln, Weimar, 1992, p. 108. 28 See: W. Baumgart, op. cit., p. 204; Istoria diplomatii, ed. by Acad. V.L. Potemkin, Moscow, Leningrad, 1945, p. 364. 200 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION oncile itself with the loss of Baku, the oil of which it badly needed for its economy. When he learned that Turkey had captured Baku, Russia’s Ambassador to Berlin Adolph Joffe immediately protested against the violation of the treaty of 27 August in a note to the German government.29 Talat Pasha, in turn, arrived in Berlin to settle the Baku and, on the whole, Azeri Question, which had caused a lot of tension between the two countries. Both questions were related to the Ottoman-Russian-German talks in Berlin. German-Ottoman relations were burdened by numerous accumulated and recent problems, the most outstanding of them being active Ottoman military actions in the Southern Caucasus despite German protests and the Ottoman state’s reluctance to retreat on the Baku question. This explains why, on 27 August, Germany entered into a secret additional agreement. The Gumuldur issue proved to be another stumbling block: at the beginning of World War I the Ottoman state had had to transfer it to Bulgaria, now it wanted the region back. The contradictions looked too complicated to be resolved promptly.30 On 5 September, Talat Pasha attended the Vienna Conference of the Central Pow- ers; the next day, back in Berlin, he started talks with German officials. In Berlin, Turkey concentrated on two issues of prime importance: 1. Resolution of its contradictions with Germany related to Azerbaijan and the Caucasus in general and settling the situation there; 2. Return of the Gumuldur area. Despite the importance of this issue, the Ottoman state was prepared to back off in exchange for German support of its Caucasian and Turkestan policies. German Foreign Minister Kuhlmann pointed out that in exchange for the territorial concessions to Bulgaria the Ottoman state had already acquired Kars, Ardahan, and Batum with German support.31 On 10 September, Talat Pasha submitted a memorandum to the German Foreign Ministry related to his country’s Caucasian policies to preserve the advantages already gained in the region and to force Russia to recognize the independence of the Caucasian republic by giving Germany economic concessions. Soviet Russia was irritated by the fact that the Turks had captured Baku. Soviet Ambas- sador to Berlin A. Joffe announced that the treaty of 27 August was null and void. The same was said about the articles of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty related to the Ottoman Empire.32 After analyzing the situation, Germany concluded that continued close relations with the Ottoman state were the only option. The active negotiations between Talat Pasha and the German diplomats ended on 23 September, 1918 with a secret Ottoman-German Protocol of 7 articles.33 The document, which was mainly related to Azerbaijan, was signed by Talat Pasha and von Hintze; its articles, however, also dealt with the Southern and Northern Caucasus, Turkestan, and Iran.34 By signing the Ottoman-German Protocol Turkey pledged to share some of its privileges obtained under the Batum treaty with Germany. In exchange, the Germans recognized Baku as an inalienable part of Azerbaijan; they limited their recognition of the independence of the Caucasian republics to Georgia. Germany promised, however, to force Russia to recognize Azerbaijan and Armenia as two independent states; it was unwilling to accept them as such without Russia’s consent. Afraid that the Ottoman Empire would tighten its grip on the Southern Caucasus to become the only master of

29 See: W. Bihl, op. cit., p. 122. 30 See: Yu.H. Bayur, History of the Turkish Revolution, Vol. III, Part 4, TTK, Ankara, 1983, p. 227 (in Turkish). 31 See: W. Zürrer, Kaukasien 1918-1921. Der Kampf der Grobmächte um die Landbrücke zwischen Schwarzem und Kaspischem Meer, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf, 1978, p. 119. 32 See: W. Baumgart, op. cit., p. 122. 33 OART. HR.SYS. D. 2303, G. 14 (in Turkish). 34 Ibidem. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 201 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Baku, Berlin wanted Turkey to remove its troops from the region. The Ottoman leaders promised to pull out, however Talat Pasha remained convinced that the Caucasian Islamic Army or Ottoman troops camouflaged as the Azerbaijan Army would stay behind. This had proven possible after the Batum Treaty and would be possible after the protocol. The Ottoman Empire and Germany agreed to use the natural riches of the Caucasus together. In fact, Berlin’s desire to use Baku oil was easily explained by its wartime needs as well as the Ottoman state’s willingness to allow Germany to make use of the oil industry and the oil communication lines until the end of war. Turkey pledged to convince the Azeri leaders to accept this. The Ottoman-German Protocol contradicted the German-Russian treaty of 27 August, which meant that Germany, officially or otherwise, waived it. When the Ottoman troops entered Baku, the Soviet government informed Germany that it intended to sever relations with the Ottoman state. On 21 September, Izvestia carried the corresponding note drawn up a day earlier which described the liberation of Baku by the Ottoman troops as an ag- gression against “one of the most important cities of the Russian Republic” with the help of “Tatar bands.”35 Concerned about Soviet Russia’s obviously negative attitude toward the liberation of Baku confirmed by Chicherin’s note, Talat Pasha and Ahmad Nasimi Bek decided to meet the Russian ambassador in Berlin to discuss the Baku Question. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Rus- sia entrusted Adolph Joffe with negotiations to “ensure that the Ottoman side transfers Baku to the Soviet authorities.” To ensure success, the Russian ambassador asked the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to hold back on submitting the note. With Georgi Chicherin’s permission it was decided to hand over the note on 3 October. Talat Pasha learned about the note and its content from German officials and French radio. The talks began on 21 September. Talat Pasha was convinced that the Baku Question should be resolved peacefully. The Russian diplomat accused the Ottoman state of violating the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The sides dug in their heels, so the long deliberations proved useless. It was decided, however, to go on with the talks.36 The next day the talks were resumed; Adolph Joffe repeated his accusations and cited numerous proofs. He insisted that “it was under Turkey’s pressure that the Caucasian Muslims decided to separate from Russia and set up an independent state.” The Russian ambassador deliberately distinguished between the Caucasian Shi‘a and Turkish Sunni Muslims to point out that the Shi’a, who were mainly peasants, did not want to suffer under the yoke of the Ottoman Sunni beks. Talat Pasha, fully aware of Russia’s traditional policies of fanning religious strife, countered the absurd arguments with, “Here I am: I am a Turk and I am a Shi’a.”37 After prolonged negotiations Talat Pasha said: “I am prepared to confirm in writing that Ot- toman Turkey will in no way interfere in Caucasian affairs.” He went on to say: “Turkey does not intend to capture Russian territories and the Turkish troops will be pulled out of the Caucasus.”38 The ease with which Talat Pasha promised this is explained by the fact that Turkey had reached an agreement with Germany on the Caucasian Question in the form of the Ottoman-German Protocol. Germany pledged to help Azerbaijan achieve independence from Soviet Russia. When talking to Adolph Joffe, Talat Pasha spared no effort to force Soviet Russia to recognize Azerbaijan as an independent state. The Russian diplomat, in turn, was very firm: even if Azerbaijan became in-

35 Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, Vol. 1, pp. 490-492. 36 See: A.N. Kurat, op. cit., p. 525. 37 State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic, Record group 894, Inventory 10, File 150, pp. 1-2; Diplomaticheskie besedy A.A. Topchibasheva v Stambule (zapisi chrezvychaynogo i polnomochnogo ministra Azerbaijanskoy Respubliki). 1918-1919 gg., Ergyun Publishers, Baku, 1994, p. 9. 38 A.N. Kurat., op. cit., pp. 554, 555. 202 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dependent, Baku, as an object of special economic importance, would never be transferred to the Azeris.39 The Russian ambassador refused to be satisfied with the promise of Turkey’s withdrawal from the Caucasus. He insisted that the army of Azerbaijan, complete with its military equipment, leave Baku. Talat Pasha, who had earlier said that “the Ottoman Empire intended to live in peace with Russia and resolve the Baku Question through talks,” had to accept this.40 Ambassador Joffe hastened to inform Moscow, but Georgi Chicherin was not satisfied; he telegraphed that the Soviet government found these statements inadequate. The ambassador was instructed to insist on the “transfer of Baku to the Soviet authorities,”41 otherwise the Ottoman troops would stay behind as the “Army of Azerbaijan.” On 24 September, Talat Pasha and Ahmad Nasim Bek met Adolph Joffe once more. The ambassador demanded that the Ottoman troops be immediately removed from Baku, which should be transferred to the Soviet authorities, and that the Turks repay the damage inflicted during the siege of Baku. The Russian ambassador behaved as a victor, imposing his conditions on the defeated side. Talat Pasha was very open: his country had no intention of transferring any territories to Russia since it had no desire to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Caucasian peoples. Indeed, the demand to “transfer Baku to the Soviet authorities” defied logic, which allowed Talat Pasha to brush aside all the Soviet claims with a clear conscience. The Russian diplomat insisted. Talat Pasha replied by saying that if Russia recognized Akhyska and Akhalkalaki as Ottoman possessions he would be prepared to move the Ottoman troops beyond the line stipulated by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; no further concessions were promised. The same day, Talat Pasha, driven by the negative information about the situation on the fronts and inside the country, had to leave for Istanbul. It was decided that Ambassador Rifat Pasha would replace him at the negotiation table. On 3 October, Rifat Pasha informed Joffe that the Ottoman troops had been pulled out of the Southern Caucasus.42 It should be said that complications on the Bulgarian Front forced the Ottoman government to pull its forces from other fronts, the Southern Caucasus included, to defend Thrace. At the same time, however, Turkish units were moving from Baku to Daghestan. On 3 October, the Russian ambassador handed over the note to the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin in which Russia demanded that Turkey remove its troops beyond the line stipulated by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and transfer the territories thus vacated to Russia. It was suggested that a special international commission be set up to appraise the damage inflicted by the Ottoman state, which had violated the Brest Treaty; both sides asked Germany to become an intermediary.43 Keenly aware of the coming denouement of the war and of the problems that awaited the Otto- man Empire, Soviet Russia seized the diplomatic initiative in an effort to recapture Akhyska, Akhal- kalaki, Gumri, and other territories Turkey had acquired under the Batum Treaty. By that time Istanbul was ready with its instructions, according to which Rifat Pasha and Adolph Joffe had to sign the following protocol: 1. The regular Ottoman units and irregular troops, together with instructors and officials, will be withdrawn from the Caucasus immediately. The territories enumerated in Art 4.3 of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (Kars, Ardahan and Batum) will be excluded from the pulling-out.

39 See: Yu.H. Bayur, op. cit., p. 246. 40 A.N. Kurat., op. cit., p. 555; S. Yerosimos, The Turkish-Soviet Relations. From the October Coup to the Nation- al-Liberation Movement, Istanbul, 1979, pp. 31-32 (in Turkish). 41 A.N. Kurat., op. cit., p. 555. 42 OART. HR.SYS. D. 2303, G. 14. 43 See: Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, Vol. 1, pp. 509-510. Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 203 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Withdrawal of the troops and equipment should be complete within four weeks from the moment the protocol was signed. 2. Russia’s idea of a commission to assess the damage done by the Ottoman troops in the Cau- casus and settlement of the resultant problems should be postponed until a more suitable time. 3. The Russian and Imperial Ottoman governments will ask the German government to guarantee the fulfillment of the above obligations and ensure security of the Turkish troops against the British on the Caspian coast.44 Rifat Pasha presented the draft to Joffe who, on 5 October, dispatched it to Georgi Chicherin. The Russian People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs did not like the draft at all. He insisted that the Turkish troops leave Baku and the whole Southern Caucasus to the Soviet authorities. Talat Pasha, in turn, wanted to transfer Baku and the rest to the national government of Azerbaijan, therefore the protocol did not mention the possibility of Soviet Russia gaining control of Baku. The Soviet ambassador in Berlin was instructed not to sign the protocol. The Soviet government came forward with new demands: the Turkish troops should be removed beyond the line stipulated by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty while Russia should regain Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. These demands were declined and the protocol remained unsigned. The Soviet government became even more determined than ever to rup- ture diplomatic relations with the Ottoman state. At the first stage of the talks the Turkish side agreed to huge concessions and reached an agreement with Germany on the Azeri and Caucasian questions registered by the Ottoman-German Proto- col of 23 September, 1918. The Russian-Ottoman talks failed. The Ottoman government agreed to pull out of the Central Caucasus in exchange for Russia’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s independence. The Soviet government, which continued regarding the region as a sphere of its exclusive interests, had no intention of allowing anyone close to the Baku oil. Its position can hardly be described as constructive, which resulted in ruptured diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Em- pire. On top of this, by that time it had become abundantly clear that the German-Ottoman bloc had lost the war.

C o n c l u s i o n

In the wake of the coup of October 1917, Azerbaijan became a bone of contention between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. The “right of nations to self-determination” declared by Soviet Russia was nothing but a step toward a socialist centralized state, or unitary statehood. The Ottoman government tried to capitalize on the right of nations to self-determination to insist on independence for the Caucasian Muslims and set up an Islamic state under its patronage. Having secured the return of East- ern Anatolia and Kars, Ardahan, and Batum under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (two issues out of the three raised at the peace talks) and unwilling to undermine the cause of peace, the Imperial Ottoman Government did not insist on independence for the Caucasian Muslims. It, in fact, was not in a position to do this. In the summer of 1918, the Ottoman state won the struggle with Soviet Russia over Baku and Azerbaijan as a whole. Germany, Turkey’s ally in World War I, entered into separate talks with Rus- sia and, on 27 August, signed an agreement (which remained on paper). Meanwhile the contradictions among Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia over the Baku Question reached its peak in Sep-

44 See: A.N. Kurat, op. cit., pp. 559-560. 204 Volume 3 Issue 2-3 2009 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tember when it was pushed to the center of the trilateral talks in Berlin. Great economic sacrifices allowed the Ottoman leaders to reach an agreement with Germany in the form of the Ottoman-Ger- man Protocol of 23 September, 1918. They failed, however, to find a common language with Russia, therefore the draft Russian-Turkish protocol was never signed. Their disagreement over the Azeri Question led to disrupted diplomatic relations. After the Armistice of Moudros, Soviet Russia de- nounced the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and moved forward to restore the state within its 1914 borders. This ushered in a new era in Caucasian history.