Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: Last B53 Nuclear Bomb to be Dismantled Today

1. Ashton Says Nuclear Talks with Iran could Resume Soon 2. 'Iran's Plan, Basis of Nuclear Talks' 3. Era of Nuclear Bombs Over, Says Ahmadinejad 4. UN Report May Worsen Fears over Iran Nuclear Plans 5. AP Exclusive: Note Shows Big Power Split over Iran 6. 'South Remains Defenseless against North’s Missile Threats' 7. US Envoy: Progress in NKorea Talks but No Deal 8. No Other Country Is as Threatened as India is by N-Weapons: Mani Shankar Aiyar 9. India Rebuffed Libyan Leader's Request for Nuke Help in 1978 10. New Nuke-Carrying Borey Class Submarine Tested 11. Bulava Missile Test Launch Scheduled for Late October 12. NATO Official Rejects Russia's Joint Missile Defense Proposal 13. NATO Still Hopes to Link Russia to Missile Shield 14. Bye-Bye to Lance Nuclear Weapon 15. Possible Study of Anthrax Vaccine’s Effectiveness in Children Stirs Debate 16. Last B53 Nuclear Bomb to be Dismantled Today 17. Cyber Attacks against U.S. Energy Dept. Disclosed 18. New Cyberweapon ‘Duqu’ Threatens Vital Infrastructure 19. Talks Will Resume, But … 20. Is this the Beginning of the End for Britain as a Nuclear Power? 21. Obama's Missing Defense Won't Replace Missile Defense 22. What Kim Jong-Il Learned from Qaddafi's Fall: Never Disarm 23. How Many Nukes Does China Have?

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved. Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

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Tehran Times – Iran Ashton Says Nuclear Talks with Iran could Resume Soon Political Desk Sunday, October 23, 2011 TEHRAN - In a letter to Iran on Friday, Catherine Ashton, the European Union's foreign policy chief, announced that the 5+1 group is willing to resume talks with Iran within weeks if Tehran is prepared to "engage seriously in meaningful discussions". The letter came after Saeed Jalili, Iran's Supreme National Security Council secretary and chief nuclear negotiator, wrote a letter last month to Ashton announcing Iran’s readiness to resume talks. Ashton has been leading efforts on behalf of the 5+1 group (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany) to negotiate with Tehran over its atomic activities. Iran has said it is willing to resume discussions, but insists that other countries recognize its right to enrich uranium. If Iran is ready to discuss concrete confidence-building measures without pre-conditions, "we would be willing to agree on a next meeting within the coming weeks at a mutually convenient venue," Ashton said. "I welcome your suggestion to resume talks, in order to take fundamental steps for sustainable co-operation," she said in the letter, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters. The main bone of contention between Iran and the West is Tehran’s nuclear enrichment activities. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran is legally authorized to produce nuclear fuel for civilian purposes. Ashton said the goal "remains a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature" of Iran's nuclear program. "In order to start such a process, our initial objective is to engage in a confidence-building exercise aimed at facilitating a constructive dialogue on the basis of reciprocity and a step-by-step approach," the letter added. http://tehrantimes.com/index.php/politics/3812-ashton-says-nuclear-talks-with-iran-could-resume-soon (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Press TV – Iran 'Iran's Plan, Basis of Nuclear Talks' Sunday, October 23, 2011 Following an announcement by the EU foreign policy chief regarding the willingness of P5+1 nations to resume talks with Iran, a senior Iranian lawmaker insists that Tehran's basis for the talks would remain its proposed package. The proposed package has always been Iran's basis for the talks, just as the West and P5+1 governments presented [their own] suggested package during talks, and Iran intends to continue the negotiations within the framework of this package, said Chairman of the Majlis (parliament) National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Alaeddin Boroujerdi said on Sunday. In a letter to Tehran on Friday, Catherine Ashton said if Iran is ready to discuss concrete confidence-building measures without preconditions, the P5+1 - Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States plus Germany - “would be willing to agree on a next meeting within the coming weeks at a mutually convenient venue." Ashton added that the goal of the talks "remains a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature" of Iran's nuclear program.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Boroujerdi emphasized that the Islamic Republic has never refused a request for negotiations within the framework of the proposed package. Iran and the P5+1 held two rounds of multifaceted talks in Geneva in December 2010 and in the Turkish city of Istanbul last January. Tehran says it is prepared to continue the talks but has no intention of compromising on its nuclear rights. http://presstv.com/detail/206127.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Nation – Pakistan Era of Nuclear Bombs Over, Says Ahmadinejad Monday, October 24, 2011 Stating that the "era of nuclear bombs is over", Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has attacked the countries stockpiling atomic weapons as "politically and mentally retarded." "We have already expressed our views about nuclear bombs... Those who are seeking to build nuclear bombs or those who stockpile, they are politically and mentally retarded," Ahmadinejad said in an interview to the news agency. Asserting that Iran's controversial nuclear programme was just for peaceful purposes, he said, "they are stupid because the era of nuclear bombs is over." Ahmadinejad said the overall budget of Iran's atomic energy agency is USD 250 million, and the whole budget is aimed at "peaceful activities." "Iranians are clever enough to see that with this limited amount of money, USD 250 million, we are not able to be at war with the other side," he said. US-led Western nations are locked in a stand-off with Iran over its nuclear programme, which they allege is aimed at building a nuclear weapon. However, Tehran rejects this claim and insists it's only for peaceful purposes. The Iranian president also warned that any US military action against his country will be "sheer stupidity". "I ask a question, 'What are the American bases doing in our region?' Even the current year, they made military contract amounting to USD 90 billion with the countries of the region." "If the United States is not going to provoke tension in our region, and if they do not make artificial threats, they would not be able to sell their arms," he said. Suggesting the US leaders to review their policies, he said, "They have more than 1,000 billions of dollars for military budget. If they spend this money for the American economy, is it necessary for the people to go to Wall Street? Would there remain any difference or hostility? Whenever they resist hostility anywhere in the world, that could be attributed to the United States or to one of its allies." "The United States has become weaker and weaker. And now, they are hated in the region. They are hated in the whole world. Anywhere in the world, if you go, you see that the US government is hated." "They should review their policies. They should stop accusing other countries. They should see where the problem is. Maybe the problem is really in the United States itself. This is a friendly recommendation," he said. He also said that Iran will encourage its close ally Syria to reach an understanding with anti-regime protesters.

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Jerusalem Post – Israel UN Report May Worsen Fears over Iran Nuclear Plans IAEA to publish report pointing to military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program, but will stop short of clear-cut conclusions, diplomats say. By Reuters October 24, 2011 VIENNA (Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog is expected to publish intelligence soon pointing to military dimensions to Iran's nuclear activities but stopping short of saying explicitly that Tehran is trying to build atom bombs, Western diplomats say. Russian and Chinese reluctance may frustrate any Western bid to seize on next month's report by the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to press for expanded United Nations sanctions on Iran, a major oil producer. Moscow and Beijing signaled concern last week that the timing of the IAEA document could damage any chances for diplomacy to resolve the nuclear row. In contrast, Western envoys believe the report -- which they portray as incriminating for Iran -- will pile further pressure on the country to curb its sensitive nuclear work and address international concerns about its aims. "We are in favor of a strong report," one Western official said. "The IAEA has a lot of information that would allow the agency to come to clear findings on the issue of possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program. The different views indicate divisions among the six major powers involved in the search for a diplomatic solution to the long-running dispute over Iran's nuclear program -- the United States, Germany, France, Britain, China and Russia. Western powers believe Iran is secretly trying to develop nuclear weapons, but Tehran denies this, saying it is enriching uranium only to power reactors for electricity generation. Western diplomats say Russia and China may be unwilling to back any move at a mid-November meeting of the IAEA's 35-nation governing board to refer Iran once again to the U.N. Security Council, based on the agency's report. "The follow-up to the next (IAEA) report is going to be critical, but it doesn't necessarily need to involve a new U.N. Security Council resolution," said analyst Peter Crail of the Washington-based Arms Control Association. "If the details in the report do point to work on developing a nuclear warhead, the board members should adopt a resolution that at the very least condemns such activities and calls for Iran to cooperate with the IAEA investigation." Russia, which has commercial and other links with Iran, has proposed a step-by-step effort to defuse the nuclear standoff, but Western diplomats have given the plan a cool response. European Union leaders warned Iran Sunday it would face tougher sanctions if it failed to respond to concerns about its nuclear activities. Two days earlier EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton -- who handles contacts with Iran for the six powers -- told Tehran that talks could resume soon if it was ready to "engage seriously in meaningful discussions."

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Report unlikely to give decisive, 'Syria-style' conclusions IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said last month he would soon set out in greater detail the reasons for his growing concern that Iran may be working to develop nuclear weapons. Western diplomats believe he will publish significant amounts of information on this in his next quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program, due in early November. They say it is likely to include intelligence about work which can have both military and civilian uses, and work which would make little sense for activities not related to weapons development. It may also give names, locations and dates. "Iranian experts have conducted experiments with neutron sources and highly explosive detonators that would only make sense for military applications," former IAEA deputy director general Olli Heinonen told Der Spiegel magazine. For several years the IAEA has been investigating Western intelligence reports indicating that Iran has joined together efforts to process uranium, test high explosives and revamp a ballistic missile cone to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The IAEA has said in previous reports that the data it has obtained about such issues is extensive and comprehensive, and also "broadly consistent and credible." The IAEA has "received countless pieces of information on Iran's nuclear activities from governments and other sources," one Western envoy in the Austrian capital said. Iran has routinely dismissed the accusations as baseless and forged, insisting its nuclear program is aimed at producing electricity so that it can sell gas and oil abroad. But its history of concealing sensitive nuclear activity and its refusal to suspend work that can also yield atomic bombs have drawn four rounds of U.N. sanctions, as well as separate sanctions imposed by the United States and the European Union. The United States has called on Amano to make his "best assessment" of whether there have been military dimensions to Iran's nuclear work and whether that may still be the case. But several diplomats said he is unlikely to come to a conclusion regarding Iran as clear-cut as the one about Syria in a report in May, when he said a facility bombed by Israel in 2007 was "very likely" to have been a secret nuclear reactor. Iran's nuclear activities are spread out geographically and any military work would take place in secrecy beyond the reach of U.N. inspectors. "To come to a Syria-type conclusion ... is going to be difficult," said one nuclear expert who declined to be named. http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=242975 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Miami Herald Monday, October 24, 2011 AP Exclusive: Note Shows Big Power Split over Iran By GEORGE JAHN, Associated Press VIENNA -- Russia and China are urging the chief U.N nuclear inspector to scrap or delay U.S.-backed plans to reveal intelligence on Iran's alleged nuclear arms experiments, in a bluntly worded confidential document obtained Monday by The Associated Press.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The diplomatic note to International Atomic Energy Agency chief Yukiya Amano points to an East-West rift among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council over how to deal with concerns about Iran's nuclear activities. The United States, Britain and France want Amano to share what his agency knows or suspects about Iran's alleged weapons experiments with the IAEA's 35-nation board at its meeting next month. But Russia's and China's opposition likely will delay Western hopes of having the board report Tehran to the Security Council for the second time for its nuclear defiance, a referral that could open Iran to more sanctions. In the note, Moscow and Beijing warn Amano against "groundless haste" and urge him to "act cautiously," adding that "such kind of report will only drive the Iranians into a corner making them less cooperative." An international official familiar with the matter said Amano plans to go ahead nonetheless, arguing that it is his duty to inform the decision-making board of evidence pointing to such experiments. Russia, China, the United States, Britain, France and Germany are formally unified in trying to persuade Iran to meet concerns over its nuclear program. But a diplomat briefed on the matter said he was told that the Russians and Chinese went to Amano without consulting the other nations. The diplomat suggested that the fractures within the group may hinder any new attempt to engage Iran in talks over its nuclear program. He, like others who consented to talk about privileged issues, asked for anonymity. A cell phone message left with Iran's chief IAEA representative was not immediately returned. Asked about the Chinese-Russian note, chief U.S. delegate Glyn Davies said Washington supports "IAEA's efforts to address questions about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program." "The burden remains on Iran to answer the IAEA's questions, which it has thus far refused to do," he said in an e- mail. Iran is under four sets of U.N. Security Council sanctions for not mothballing a program that can make both nuclear fuel or fissile warhead material. It has rapidly expanded such activities since they were discovered in 2002, and concerns have grown as the country has refused to let the IAEA probe growing intelligence-based allegations that it is working on a nuclear warhead and other aspects of a weapons program. Tehran insists, however, it is only interested in nuclear power, not weapons. It says the intelligence is fabricated by the United States and its allies. In its efforts to blunt pressure, Iran has found economic and strategic allies in both China and Russia. Since the IAEA asked for Security Council involvement five years ago, these two nations have supported U.N. and other sanctions only reluctantly and on condition they be watered down. In contrast, Washington, London and Paris continue to seek tougher U.N. sanctions, and their determination to ramp up pressure on Tehran has only increased in the wake of an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington revealed earlier this month. Both Moscow and Beijing have reacted with caution to those allegations and continue to oppose toughening pressure on Iran over its nuclear activities. That is a stance that contrasts with the Western view - and which was clearly enunciated in their diplomatic note to Amano. In an allusion to Washington, London and Paris, they warned that "certain members of the IAEA Board of Governors will most probably use (such) a separate report ... as a pretext" to again report Iran to the Security Council. "This is a straight way forward to a new UNSC resolution on sanctions against Iran," said the note. The two nations, it said, "are definitely seriously concerned about such a development."

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

For months, the U.S. and its allies had been contemplating pushing for renewed IAEA referral of Iran to the Security Council using a strongly worded Amano report as a springboard - a strategy that a second diplomat said now seemed unlikely considering strong Russian and Chinese disapproval. The diplomat, who is from an IAEA member nation, said that the West now may try to garner support for an IAEA resolution that gives Iran until March to cooperate with U.N. agency attempts to probe the arms allegations. Missing that deadline on the part of Tehran could trigger renewed referral to the Security Council, he said. The diplomat said the evidence making a case for fears about secret nuclear weapons experiments will be backed up by documentation reflecting "cross-checks" of intelligence provided by various nations. He and the other diplomat both said that Iran will be given a copy of the summary and asked to respond before it is presented to the IAEA board. In his previous report to the board in September, Amano said his agency is "increasingly concerned" about a stream of intelligence suggesting that Iran continues to work secretly on developing a nuclear payload for a missile and other components of a nuclear weapons program. The restricted report obtained by the AP said "many member states" are providing evidence for that assessment, describing the information it is receiving as credible, "extensive and comprehensive." Tehran denies secretly experimenting with a nuclear weapons program and has blocked a four-year attempt by the IAEA to follow up on intelligence that it secretly designed blueprints linked to a nuclear payload on a missile, experimented with exploding a nuclear charge, and conducted work on other components of a weapons program. In a 2007 estimate, the U.S. intelligence community said that while Iran had worked on a weapons program such activities appeared to have ceased in 2003. But diplomats say a later intelligence summary avoided such specifics, and recent IAEA reports on the topic have expressed growing unease that such activities may be continuing - although in a less concerted fashion. http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/10/24/v-fullstory/2469583/ap-exclusive-note-shows-big-power.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Korea Times – South Korea October 24, 2011 'South Remains Defenseless against North’s Missile Threats' By Lee Tae-hoon Despite its continuous efforts to beef up air defense capabilities, officials acknowledge that South Korea remains highly vulnerable to growing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. Seoul will be unable to properly counter North Korea’s ballistic missiles capable of carrying chemical or even nuclear warheads for the next 10 years, Noh Dae-lae, the head of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), admitted in a National Assembly audit late September. In 2007, the South Korean military purchased 48 secondhand Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) systems from Germany, rather than new PAC-3 units largely due to budget constraints, but their ability to intercept North Korean missiles is limited. “Earlier versions of patriot systems were designed to counter air-breathing targets, things with engines in them, such as jets and helicopters, fixed wing aircraft,”said Morri Leland, director of International Business Development at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “But threats have evolved and now there is a need to counter theater-ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air- breathing missiles.”

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The PAC-2 interceptor is designed to maneuver close to the incoming target and detonate its explosive fragmentation warhead, but it is optimized primarily for engagements against aircraft with limited capability to deter missiles. “Don’t be fooled, don’t be misled. Old missiles cannot counter cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and theater missiles,”he said. With regard to the growing call to improve air defense capability here, Leland said his company stands ready to assist South Korea in the upgrade of the existing Patriot equipment to PAC-3 capability. “Lockheed Martin is willing to provide a Launcher Modification Kit (LMK) that is required to upgrade a PAC-2 Launcher to a PAC-3 Launcher,” Leland said. “Upgrading Korea’s Patriot equipment will be the fastest, most affordable, and lowest risk way to ensure defense against today’s most sophisticated threats.” An industry source said refurbishing Korea’s existing PAC-2 systems to the PAC-3 (Configuration 3) would cost approximately $350 million, or about one third of $1 billion that Korea paid to procure the used ones. The PAC-3 missile is widely viewed as the world’s most advanced, capable and powerful theater air defense missile. It is designed for hit-to-kill performance utilizing an accurate millimeter wave seeker combined with an agile airframe. “Prior to the introduction of hit-to-kill technologies, the tradition for air defense was to try to get close enough to the target to knock it off course with blast fragmentation affects,” he said. “However, this did not destroy the target.” The official argued the hit-to-kill missile provides the best defense against hostile ballistic and cruise missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), adding that the PAC-3 is also highly effective against fixed and rotary winged aircraft. He also pointed out that PAC-3 missiles can significantly increase the Patriot system’s firepower, given that 16 PAC-3s load on a Patriot launcher, compared with four Patriot PAC-2 missiles on a legacy system. “Korea has legacy Patriot equipment which is currently incapable of firing the PAC-3 interceptor,” Leland said. “This leaves the Korean Peninsula vulnerable to many current and developing threats from nearby adversaries.” The PAC-3 system is currently fielded by the U.S. Army as well U.S. allies including Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan. Lockheed Martin successfully conducted the first hit-to-kill intercept in 1984 and PAC-3 has achieved more than 22 successful test flights since 1994. However, he noted that what is often neglected in reporting is that there is not one solution to all threats and Korea should consider introducing THAAD, which is designed to complement the PAC-3 against longer-range threats. PAC-3’s greatest strength lies in its ability to intercept missiles with shorter ranges and operate in the low endo- atmosphere, whereas THAAD is capable of flying faster and higher in the mid-to-high endo-atmosphere where the atmosphere is thinner or in the exo-atmosphere (outside the atmosphere). “PAC-3 is designed to operate in the low endo-atmosphere and use the atmosphere for maneuvering and changing direction very quickly,” he said. “The former is capable of enduring high stresses and heating in the lower part of the atmosphere, whereas THAADs can fly higher and farther away, and thus more suitable for longer-range ballistic missiles.”

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Leland said that he believes Korea should take a “layered approach” in introducing anti-missile technologies, given that the country is facing a growing need to intercept North Korean missiles with WMDs as far away as possible. The South Korean military plans to begin production of indigenous Cheolmae-2 missiles, but like PAC-2, they are primarily designed to defend against aircraft, rather than tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles armed with WMDs. Seoul has recently announced its ambitious plan to develop its own version of the Patriot missile system to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles, but experts say it would take at least five to 10 years to accomplish it. Kim Young-san, head of DAPA’s guided missile department, says that the military has yet to secure a budget for upgrading PAC-2 or buying PAC-3 or THAAD, but will seek to balance the import of foreign technology and indigenous development. “We plan to develop and secure our own missile defense technology, but at the same time are acutely aware that we will likely need help from foreign countries in securing core technologies or filling a possible security gap.” In this regard, Leland suggested that Korea closely work together with Lockheed Martin to meet its own goals without having to make the huge capital investment that the U.S. government and his company have already made. “Hit-to-kill technology is extremely sophisticated,” he said. “If Korea chooses to take the same type of investment that is their choice, but it should be noted that it is a technology that we have proven to exist. It’s proven in combat and it is there now.” http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/205_97240.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Seattle Times Tuesday, October 25, 2011 US Envoy: Progress in NKorea Talks but No Deal Talks between the United States and North Korea regarding Pyongyang's nuclear program ended Tuesday with what the top U.S. envoy called a narrowing of differences, but fell short of reaching a deal to resume formal negotiations. By JOHN HEILPRIN, Associated Press GENEVA — Talks between the United States and North Korea regarding Pyongyang's nuclear program ended Tuesday with what the top U.S. envoy called a narrowing of differences, but fell short of reaching a deal to resume formal negotiations. The U.S. special envoy to North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, told reporters just after the two-day talks wrapped up that there had been progress without agreeing to a formal resumption of negotiations, either bilaterally on in the so-called six-party format that also includes China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Nevertheless, he called it a useful meeting whose tone was "positive and generally constructive." "There's a long history to this relationship and we have many differences, not all of which can be overcome quickly. I am confident that with continued effort on both sides, we can reach a reasonable basis of departure for formal negotiations for a return to the six-party process," Bosworth said outside the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. "We narrowed differences in terms of what has to be done before we can both agree to a resumption of the formal negotiations," he said.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Bosworth said the two sides will remain in touch through what is called the "New York channel" - North Korea's mission to the United Nations in New York - since the two nations have no formal relations. U.S. diplomats want North Korea to adhere to a 2005 agreement it reneged on requiring verifiable denuclearization in exchange for better relations with its Asian neighbors. China, North Korea's closest ally, has urged Pyongyang to improve its strained ties with the United States and South Korea. "We came to the conclusion that we will need more time and more discussion to reach agreement," Bosworth said. "So we will go back to capitals and consult further." Beijing wants to revive the stalled six-nation disarmament negotiations. North Korea walked out on the talks in 2009 - and exploded a second nuclear-test device - but now wants to re-engage. Last year, Pyongyang also was blamed for two military attacks on South Korea that heightened tensions on the peninsula. Bosworth talked about a narrowing of differences during the two-day meeting, but provided no specifics. The first day was held at the U.S. mission. On the second day Tuesday, the two sides met for a "working lunch" of a little more than an hour at the North Korean mission, on the opposite side of Lake Geneva, then talked for one hour more before breaking up. The North Korean delegation was headed by First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. Bosworth was accompanied by Glyn Davies, the U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is taking over the negotiating in future talks. After the first day of talks Monday, Bosworth also said the two sides were narrowing their differences. The start of Tuesday's closely watched talks was delayed without explanation. Bosworth said the discussions also "touched on all issues" - such as urgently needed food aid for the North, families long separated on the Korean peninsula and the remains of troops missing in action. The U.N.'s top relief official, Valerie Amos, said Monday after visiting North Korea that it was "not appropriate" for the nuclear talks in Switzerland to extend to humanitarian assistance to the chronically hungry Asian country because that aid "must be kept separate from a political agenda." The U.N. is urging countries to provide $218 million in emergency aid to North Korea. http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016602691_apeukoreasnuclear.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Economic Times – India October 25, 2011 Press Trust of India (PTI) No Other Country Is as Threatened as India is by N-Weapons: Mani Shankar Aiyar NEW YORK: Voicing concern over growing nuclear stockpile in South Asia, Congress MP Mani Shankar Aiyar today said that no other country is as threatened as India is by atomic weapons and prospect of these arsenal falling into the hands of terrorists. Making a strong case for eliminating nuclear weapons, Aiyar, who is also Chairman of the Prime Minister's Informal group on advancing the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a nuclear-weapons-free and nonviolent world order, said: "non-proliferation is no substitute for elimination." "No country is more threatened than India is by the growing nuclear arsenals in our neighbourhood and the prospect of terrorists accessing nuclear materials or even weapons. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is, therefore,

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 difficult to envisage," he said at a nuclear disarmament conference here organised by Global Security Institute and East West Institute. Elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to ensure that they are not used for "mass genocide" by terrorists and "mass suicide" by states, he said, adding that "there is no third way." "So long as nuclear weapons are in existence, they can be used - or stolen," he added. Pointing out that while unilateral nuclear disarmament will not be easy, he said India "could rid itself of these weapons" within the framework of an international convention for the universal elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. "India must continue to pursue its vision of a non-nuclear world since a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-World would be good for the planet, good for the region and good for India's national security." http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/no-other-country-is-as-threatened-as-india-is-by-n- weapons-mani-shankar-aiyar/articleshow/10486171.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Times of India - India India Rebuffed Libyan Leader's Request for Nuke Help in 1978 By Srinivas Laxman, Tamil News Network (TNN) October 22, 2011 MUMBAI: Slain Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi had unsuccessfully sought India's help to develop nuclear weapons in the late 1970s and New Delhi had even sent a three-member team to Tripoli to negotiate a deal, a former nuclear scientist has revealed. "Gaddafi had sent his deputy, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, to New Delhi in 1978 to negotiate the deal to obtain plutonium reprocessing technology and a research reactor similar to Cirus at Barc in Mumbai," the scientist, who had played a key role in the first nuclear test in 1974, said. He said Jalil proposed an India-Libya collaboration for the purpose and held discussions in this regard with then defence minister George Fernandes. "Fernandes conveyed the request to the PM Morarji Desai, who turned it down immediately." He said Desai's response angered Jalil who threatened "to walk out." He said New Delhi did not want to completely disappoint Libya. "It sent three scientists - P K Iyengar, V Meckoni and K T Thomas - to Tripoli to explore the possibility of negotiating an India-Libyan nuclear deal in the months ahead. Then Indian ambassador to Libya Homi J H Taleyarkhan was enthusiastic about this plan and hoped it would materialize." The Libyans insisted that they wanted reprocessing know-how during the talks. "We advised them that they should improve their manpower position before getting this technology. The Libyans were very upset and said they will seek Canada's help if India does not offer them this technology. But nothing happened." He said Pokhran- 1's success had convinced Gaddafi that India had developed the technology for making nukes. Libya had signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it seven years later. It concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1980. The erstwhile Soviet Union supplied it a 10MW research reactor located in Tajoura a year later. Gaddafi had also unsuccessfully attempted to obtain nuclear weapons from China in 1970. Years later, Pakistan PM Zulfikhar Ali Bhutto invited Libya to participate in his country's nuclear weapons programme in 1974. But Bhutto was executed by the time Libyan scientists joined the project. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/India-rebuffed-Libyan-leaders-request-for-nuke-help-in- 1978/articleshow/10447756.cms

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Russia Today (RT) – Russia New Nuke-Carrying Borey Class Submarine Tested 24 October 2011 Sea trials of the new Rusian Borey class submarine, the Aleksandr Nevsky, has started in the White Sea. The boat is the first series-produced vessel of its kind and is to become part of Russia’s nuclear deterrence. The submarine was laid down in March 2004 and first launched in December 2010 reports Itar-Tass. The company trial of the Nevsky is done under the command of Captain 1st rank Vasily Tankovid. His crew come from the Pacific Fleet and have passed special training course to man the modern submarine. The first vessel of this class, the Yury Dolgoruky, is currently involved in fire tests of the nuclear ballistic missile Bulava and its upgraded version the Liner. Producer of the submarines, Sevmash shipyards, are building another boat of the series, the Vladimir Monomakh, at the moment. The Navy wants a total of eight Borey class submarines deployed by 2020. They will be the backbone of Russian naval nuclear deterrence for at least several decades to come. Each vessel costs about $750 million, according to the producer. The submarines are 170 meters long, 13.5 meters wide, have a displacement of 24,000 tonnes, can submerge up to 450 meters and travel at speeds of up to 29 knots. They can carry between 12 and 20 MIRVed nuclear missiles, depending on the vessel. They are also armed with six 533-caliber torpedo tubes, which fire Vyuga cruise missiles. The vessels are manned by 107 officers and sailors. They are equipped with a rescue capsule, which can bring call crew members back to the surface in an emergency. http://rt.com/news/borey-class-submarine-trial-557/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

ITAR-TASS – Russia Bulava Missile Test Launch Scheduled for Late October 24 October 2011 MOSCOW, October 24 (Itar-Tass) — Russia plans to carry out a third test launch of the Bulava intercontinental ballistic missile from the Yuri Dolgoruky strategic nuclear submarine at the end of October, an official from the state commission for flight testing told Itar-Tass on Monday. “The Bulava missile will be launched from the Yuri Dolgoruky newest nuclear submarine in the White Sea within the framework of the state flight tests of the missile complex,” the official said. http://www.itar-tass.com/c32/254933.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Xinhua News – China NATO Official Rejects Russia's Joint Missile Defense Proposal October 25, 2011 Xiong Tong A NATO official said Tuesday a joint anti-missile system proposed by Russia was impossible but Moscow should connect its missile defense system to that of the Western alliance.

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NATO rejected the Russian proposal because it could not entrust its security to third countries, said James Appathurai, the NATO secretary general's special representative to the Caucasus and Central Asia, in an interview with Interfax news agency. Moscow has long opposed the deployment of NATO missile defense facilities near its borders, saying they would be a security threat to the country and upset the strategic balance of force in Europe. Russia has also long sought a legal guarantee from Washington and NATO that the NATO missile defense system was not targeting Russia. But Appathurai said, if Russia connected its missile defense system to NATO's, it would get an "ultimate 100 percent guarantee." He said the U.S.-led NATO system could not pose any threat to Russian strategic missiles for obvious technical reasons. "We make it clear that it (the anti-missile defense system) has no technical capabilities to interrupt Russia's capability to counter a nuclear strike," Appathurai said. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-10/25/c_131212032.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Atlanta Journal-Constitution October 25, 2011 NATO Still Hopes to Link Russia to Missile Shield By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV, Associated Press MOSCOW — NATO still hopes to engage Russia in its prospective missile defense system, but won't yield to Moscow's push for the shield to be run jointly, an alliance envoy said Tuesday. James Appathurai, deputy assistant NATO Secretary General, said the alliance would like to reach a missile defense deal with Moscow by NATO's summit in Chicago next May, but added that he wouldn't "gamble on expectations." "We are always, of course, optimistic at NATO," Appathurai said at a news conference. "But we are also determined to keep the hand outstretched. I can't predict, of course, when we would arrive at agreement." Russia says the U.S.-led missile defense plan could threaten its nuclear forces, undermining their deterrence potential. It has agreed to consider NATO's proposal last fall to cooperate on the missile shield, but the talks have been deadlocked over how the system should be operated. Russia has insisted that the system should be run jointly, which NATO has rejected. Appathurai insisted that the alliance's 28 members share a treaty obligation to provide security for each other and can't outsource that. "We can't do that with any other partner no matter how trusted," he said, adding that NATO is offering Russia an "unprecedented level of transparency and cooperation." Appathurai argued that the alliance has proposed to engage Russia by sharing data and coordinating a response. He also mentioned a U.S. proposal for Moscow to have a close look at the shield's technical capabilities and see that it won't threaten its security. The NATO proposals have failed to impress the Kremlin, which has continued to push for legal guarantees that the future system wouldn't threaten Russia. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has warned that the failure to reach agreement on missile defense may prompt Russia to deploy new offensive weapons, triggering an arms race.

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Relations between NATO and Russia have been a roller coaster over the past decade, reaching a high point after the September 2001 terrorist attacks and then plummeting to post-Cold War low after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war when the alliance froze relations with Moscow. Despite the missile defense dispute, Appathurai argued that current relations between NATO and Russia are "broader and deeper than they have ever been," pointing to Russia providing a vital overland supply link for NATO forces in Afghanistan. "We have a clear shared interest in ensuring that Afghanistan finds its feet, maintains stability and doesn't export drugs, terrorism or extremism," he said. The two sides have cooperated successfully on counter-terrorism, anti-drug and counter-piracy missions, and "have potential for more in all of these areas," Appathurai said. "We shouldn't let missile defense become the single prism through which we see our relationship," he added. "It's not the only part and shouldn't define the rest of it." Appathurai and other NATO officials and military officers opened a four-day seminar Tuesday to brief their Russian counterparts on the alliance's missions and plans. "It's best to understand each other's perspective, to exchange ideas and to identify best practice," said British Maj. Gen. Simon Porter. "The future is about working together and understanding each other." Russian Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev, the head of the General Staff of the Russian armed forces' academy, said meetings like this week's seminar will help narrow differences. http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/nato-still-hopes-to-1209321.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Knoxville News Sentinel Blog Atomic City Underground By Frank Munger Bye-Bye to Lance Nuclear Weapon October 22, 2011 As noted in earlier post, Y-12 completed its dismantlement work on the W70 (Lance) weapon system during Fiscal Year 2011, and the National Nuclear Security Administration later emphasized the importance of the milestone of eliminating the materials from the U.S. nuclear stockpile. "The W70 was a tactical nuclear weapons system deployed on the Lance missile as a mobile artillery tactical missile system. This weapon was retired in the early 1990s as the last nuclear missile deployed by the U.S. Army," the NNSA said. In a statement, NNSA Deputy Administrator Don Cook said, "Completing the dismantlement of all components for the W70 is a clear example of our firm commitment in supporting President Obama's goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in the U.S. national security strategy. I am proud of the work done at Y-12 and throughout the national security enterprise in continuing to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our mission." The NNSA emphasized that Y-12 was able to complete its work on the W70 dismantlement because of the use of infrared debonding technology, which is now being offered for commercial licensing. http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2011/10/bye-bye-to-lance-nuclear-weapo.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

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Washington Post Possible Study of Anthrax Vaccine’s Effectiveness in Children Stirs Debate By Rob Stein October 24, 2011 The Obama administration is wrestling with the thorny question of whether scientists should inject healthy children with the anthrax vaccine to see whether the shots would safely protect them against a bioterrorism attack. The other option is to wait until an attack happens and then try to gather data from children whose parents agree to inoculate them in the face of an actual threat. A key working group of federal advisers in September endorsed testing, sparking objections from those who consider that step unethical, unnecessary and dangerous. The National Biodefense Science Board (NBSB), which advises the federal government, is to meet Friday to vote on its working group’s recommendation. “At the end of the day, do we want to wait for an attack and give it to millions and millions of children and collect data at that time?” said Daniel B. Fagbuyiof Children’s National Medical Center in Washington, who chaired the group. “Or do we want to say: ‘How do we best protect our children?’ We can take care of Grandma and Grandpa, Uncle and Auntie. But right now, we have nothing for the children.” The vaccine has been tested extensively in adults and has been administered to more than 2.6 million people in the military. But the shots have never been tested on or given to children, leaving it uncertain how well the vaccine works in younger people and at what dose, and whether it is safe. Unlike with measles, mumps and other diseases, the chance that children will be exposed to anthrax is theoretical, making the risk-benefit calculus of testing a vaccine on them much more questionable. “It’s hard to believe that it’s something that makes a great deal of sense,” said Joel Frader, a pediatrician and bioethicist at Northwestern University’s Feinberg School of Medicine. “It would be difficult to justify testing it on kids simply on the hypothetical possibility that there might be an attack.” Anthrax is a life-threatening infection caused by a toxin-producing bacteria long considered a bioterrorist’s likely choice because it is relatively easy to produce and distribute over a large area. A week after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, letters containing anthrax spores arrived at several media offices and two Senate offices, killing five people and sickening 17 others. The FBI eventually concluded that the letters were mailed by Bruce Ivins, a disgruntled scientist at Fort Detrick in Maryland who committed suicide in 2008, although some experts question the FBI’s findings. As part of broad effort to better protect Americans against bioterrorism, the Pentagon began a controversial military anthrax immunization program in 1998 that was challenged in court over questions about the vaccine’s safety and reliability. Currently, the Pentagon requires the shots for personnel assigned to bioterrorism defense activities and some other special units, as well as those deployed 15 or more days in the Middle East and some nearby countries, and in South Korea. The federal government has spent $1.1 billion to stockpile the vaccine to protect Americans in the event of an attack. Antibiotics would help protect those immediately exposed. The vaccine would defend against lingering spores, which is how the pathogen lurks in a dormant state. The vaccine is made from a piece of a strain of anthrax that doesn’t cause the illness. In April, Nicole Lurie, the assistant secretary in charge of bioterrorism at the Department of Health and Human Services, asked the 13-member biodefense board to evaluate whether the vaccine should be tested in children. A

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 federal simulation of an anthrax attack on San Francisco, called Dark Zephyr, raised quesions about how to handle children. “If there were an anthrax release and we needed to administer anthrax vaccine, we have no experience with kids. It’s never been in the arm of a kid,” Lurie said. “I started asking myself, ‘Is this the right way to respond in an emergency?’ ” Those concerns were heightened by the public wariness that had been shown toward the H1N1 influenza pandemic vaccine. “There is a lot of skepticism on the part of the public about vaccines in general,” Lurie said. “If you had a situation where a vaccine has never been given to a child, it’s pretty hard to think what you could say to people about its safety and efficacy.” But testing drugs and vaccines in children is problematic. Parents generally are allowed to let their children participate in studies only if they would face minimal risk or would be likely to benefit directly or indirectly in some way. “With this, you’re putting children at risk for no clear scientific or medical benefit,” said Meryl Nass, a doctor in Bangor, Maine, who is one of the most outspoken critics of testing the vaccine in children. Nass and others maintain that there are serious questions about the vaccine’s effectiveness in adults as well as concerns about sometimes serious complications among those vaccinated in the military. A variety of complications have been reported, including nervous system and autoimmune disorders, Nass said. “Really, the core question is ‘Why? Why test?’,” said Bruce Lesley, president of First Focus, a Washington-based advocacy group for children. “We don’t want to be subjecting kids to risks needlessly.” Some question the value of a study, saying that testing in animals indicates it will be difficult to determine what level of immune system response will be protective. “What exactly are we going to learn?” said Vicky L. Debold, an associate professor of health administration and policy at George Mason University. “We’ll know what antibody levels these infants produce, but do we know those antibodies are going to protect against death due to anthrax exposure?” After sifting through the scientific, social and ethical conundrums raised by this question, the eight-member working group concluded that it would be ethically justifiable to conduct a study, which would provide crucial information, such as whether the vaccine is safe and how many doses would be needed. “A lot of things have happened that we didn’t think could happen. I think the threat is real, and we should be prepared,” said Fagbuyi, an assistant professor of pediatrics and emergency medicine at the George Washington University School of Medicine. Fagbuyi and others dispute concerns about the vaccine’s safety, noting that the Food and Drug Administration, the National Academy of Sciences and many other independent authorities have concluded that it is as safe as other commonly used vaccines, producing serious complications very rarely. “Our role is to protect children,” said John S. Bradleyof the University of California at San Diego, who advised the working group on behalf of the American Academy of Pediatrics. “If the military is telling us there is a credible threat, the best way to protect children is to have the data.” If the board endorses the recommendation, Lurie will meet with counterparts at the FDA, the National Institutes of Health and other agencies to work out the details, including how many children would be studied, at what ages and doses, and how costs would be covered. “Because it’s such a heated issue, I’ve tried hard to keep an arm’s length until the board makes a recommendation to me,” Lurie said. “To be honest, the safest and easiest thing to do would be to not make a decision and kick the

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530 can down the road. But it seemed to me it that would be socially irresponsible. I would hate for a lot of children to die because we didn’t have enough information for the public to feel comfortable getting vaccine.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/possible-study-of-anthrax-vaccines-effectiveness-in- children-stirs-debate/2011/10/13/gIQAFWLdDM_story.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Fort Worth Star-Telegram Last B53 Nuclear Bomb to be Dismantled Today Monday, October 24, 2011 By Anna M. Tinsley The nearly 50-year history of the country's single most powerful nuclear weapon is coming to an end. Workers at the nation's only nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly facility will spend less than an hour today doing the final work to dismantle the last B53 -- the United States' most destructive weapon -- which weighs about 10,000 pounds and is roughly the size of a minivan. This weapon was deployed at the height of the Cold War and was targeted at Russia. "This was a big part of our Cold War strategic plan," said Steve Erhart, the top federal official at the Pantex weapons plant, about 17 miles northeast of Amarillo. "Its dismantlement is a key point in history," he said. "It takes ... a lot of destructive power off of the earth." Officials from the Energy Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration will be among those gathering at Pantex today to mark the end of the B53. They will watch as workers, who have already done the bulk of the work to take apart the weapon, take the final steps to dismantle it. Pantex officials said in a statement that this "ensures that the Cold War system will never again be part of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile." B53s, described as "high yield strategic thermonuclear bombs," were first introduced around 1962. They were designed to be dropped from a B-52 bomber as a "bunker buster," sending shock waves similar to an earthquake through the ground to collapse deep underground shelters near Moscow where high-ranking officials might be. The bomb could burrow underground and destroy everything in its path -- and then some. Ultimately, the bomb, which contained about 300 pounds of high explosive around a uranium core, had a yield of 9 megatons, making it about 600 times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, Japan, during World War II, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Because of the bomb's size and age, officials said dismantling the weapon "did present some challenges," Erhart said. "We had to engineer solutions to safely handle a bomb that size." Some early versions of the weapon were retired in the 1960s, and the U.S. began to disassemble some in the 1980s. The remaining B53s were retired from the country's active arsenal in 1997. President Barack Obama has called on the U.S. to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, saying in 2009 that "to put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same." Last year, the National Nuclear Security Administration gave Pantex the authority to begin dismantling the B53 weapons system. For years workers have studied the best way to dismantle the fewer than 50 B53s, especially trying to anticipate the "unknowns with how this weapon system has aged," said John Woolery, general manager of Pantex. "Before touching it, we had to spend about three years ... identifying a safe process to disassemble it."

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Once the work is finished, Pantex workers "can be quickly retrained to work on any other [weapon] we have a need for," Woolery said. "It's a matter of where the priorities are." http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/10/24/3470120/last-b53-nuclear-bomb-to-be-dismantled.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Reuters India.com Cyber Attacks against U.S. Energy Dept. Disclosed By Roberta Rampton Monday, October 24, 2011 WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Department of Energy has been hit by recent successful cyber attacks and needs to do more to protect its computer systems, the department's internal watchdog said in a report on Monday. The report by the department's inspector general did not disclose who launched the cyber attacks or the consequences at four affected locations. The Department of Energy (DOE) has dozens of agencies, regional offices and laboratories. Among other tasks, it manages the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile through its National Nuclear Security Administration. The audit found a growing number of weaknesses in the department's computer systems. The report said investigators found 60 percent more weaknesses in the DOE's computer systems than during a similar audit in 2010, making this the second year in a row that the number of problems has jumped. The DOE fixed only 11 of 35 weaknesses identified in the prior audit, the report said. "Continued vigilance is necessary due to the recent department incidents and increased cyber attacks by both domestic and international sources," the report said, noting that the department's computer systems are "routinely threatened with sophisticated cyber attacks." The report, which covered the 2011 fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, did not state when the attacks occurred, other than describing them as "recent successful attacks." It also did not state explicitly that the National Nuclear Security Administration had been a target of the attacks, but the agency defended itself. The National Nuclear Security Administration criticized the report for failing to recognize the effectiveness of its "layered" approach to cybersecurity, calling some of the problems identified in the report "isolated issues." "We are concerned that a casual reader of this report might not fully understand that the findings, while important, do not represent demonstrated risks," Kenneth Powers, the agency's associate administrator for management and budget, said in a letter to the DOE Inspector General. The report said the department has begun to fix many of the problems identified in the audit. Cybersecurity has become a major issue across the U.S. government, with attacks against all agencies' systems up almost 40 percent last year, the report said. The audit, conducted between February and October, found examples of poor management of computer access codes and passwords and failure to use up-to-date security measures on some computers and systems to protect against viruses and hackers. A department spokesman was not immediately available for comment on Monday. Editing by Will Dunham

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Washington Times New Cyberweapon ‘Duqu’ Threatens Vital Infrastructure By Shaun Waterman, the Washington Times Monday, October 24, 2011 Computer security researchers are warning that a new version of the sophisticated cyberweapon that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear program could be the precursor to a new wave of cyberattacks. The new weapon, dubbed Duqu, appears to use portions of the original source code from the Stuxnet worm that attacked computers at the Iranian nuclear plant at Natanz in 2009 and 2010. It is designed to steal information to enable future attacks against the special computerized systems that control power stations, chemical plants, oil refineries and water treatment facilities, according to computer security firm Symantec and the Department of Homeland Security. “We thought the people behind Stuxnet would disappear. We caught them red-handed,” Symantec researcher Liam O Murchu told The Washington Times, “Instead, they’re back.” “The attackers are looking for information such as design documents that could potentially be used in a future attack on an industrial control facility,” DHS warns in a bulletin issued last week. Industrial control systems are considered among the most dangerous potential targets for computer hackers because they can be manipulated to damage or even destroy the plants they control, causing explosions at power stations, polluting drinking water supplies or releasing oil or deadly chemicals into the environment . “This threat is highly targeted toward a limited number of organizations,” the DHS bulletin says. “Although the method of propagation has yet to be determined, the targeted nature of the threat would make social engineering a likely method of attack.” Social-engineering attacks generally involve email attachments that are cleverly designed to look as though they come from a colleague or other trusted associate. When opened, they install malicious software on the victim’s computer. Stuxnet, the first example of a cyberweapon aimed at industrial control systems, was designed to destroy the centrifuges Iran used to enrich uranium by manipulating the computer software that ran them to make them spin out of control. It has never been revealed who was behind Stuxnet, but the sophistication of the weapon led most observers to conclude it was a nation state. The targeting of Iran’s nuclear program and some clues apparently left by the authors led some to speculate that the intelligence agencies of Israel or the United States might have been responsible. Mr. O Murchu, whose team spent months last year studying Stuxnet, said about 50 percent of Duqu used source code from the earlier cyberweapon. The program got its name because it creates computer files with the prefix, DQ. “Only the creators [of Stuxnet] have access to the source code,” he said, adding that the attackers had been working on Duqu for “probably the last year.” The first definite evidence of the weapon being used was discovered last month, but attacks could have started as early as December, the Symantec report says.

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Peter Szor, the senior director of research at McAfee Inc., the computer security arm of Intel Corp., said it theoretically would be possible to create Duqu by reverse-engineering Stuxnet itself. But that would be “very, very time consuming and resource intensive.” “Who would do that?” he asked, when it would be cheaper and easier to write a new piece of software from scratch. Other experts cautioned that, without access to the source code itself, it was impossible to be certain that Duqu was developed by the same authors. “Just from looking at the [infections], you can’t tell for sure whether it used the same source code,” said Ralph Langner, another security specialist who studied Stuxnet. Rick Howard, director of intelligence for iDefense, went further, saying he doubted the same people were behind the two weapons. Stuxnet was “very highly targeted … planned and executed with military precision,” said Mr. Howard, a former computer security specialist for the Army. “It doesn’t make sense to me” that a team with that level of skills and resources “would use the same techniques and codes twice,” he said. Nonetheless, the Hungarian lab that first discovered Duqu reiterated its conviction over the weekend that the two cyberweapons were “nearly identical.” Mr. Szor said McAfee had preliminary data from its customer base of about half a dozen potential infections, including a factory, possibly a car plant, in Iran, and computer systems in Britain and the United States. Mr. O Murchu said that Symantec had identified “about 10” Duqu infections in Europe, and that the software was not designed to propagate like conventional malicious software does. “It’s not a worm or a virus,” he said. “It doesn’t replicate itself.” He said researchers do not know it got into the systems it infected. But “several” of the affected organizations were “companies involved with the manufacture of industrial control systems,” he said. The Duqu attackers apparently were gathering information about industrial control systems, Mr. O Murchu said. He noted that one of the reasons Stuxnet was so dangerous was that the people who designed it had very detailed information about the centrifuge control system they were attacking. “Why is the team behind Stuxnet now looking at other [industrial control system] data?” he asked, “When you draw that dotted line, it gives you pause for thought.” A DHS spokesman said the department would continue to work with cybersecurity researchers to get more information about Duqu and distribute it to the private-sector companies that own and operate critical U.S. industrial control systems. Mr. Szor said early signs indicate that “more than one machine is infected” at some of the victim organizations, underlining the determined and targeted nature of the attack. He said McAfee had identified three or four slightly different versions of Duqu. “It’s almost like every piece is custom made for just that one attack,” he said.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Mr. O Murchu said the attackers had been more careful to try to hide the traces of their weapon this time around. Data that Duqu sent to its home base, a computer server in India that was disabled this week, was both encrypted and hidden along with photographs. “They’ve gone to a lot more effort to to hide the traffic,” he said. Duqu also was designed to erase itself from infected computers automatically after 36 days, he said, although that could be modified by the attackers. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/24/new-cyberweapon-threatens-vital-infastructure/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Korea Times OPINION October 23, 2011 Talks Will Resume, But … By Andrei Lankov Last month representatives of North and South Korea met in Beijing to discuss the resumption of nuclear talks. Currently, it is not clear what the immediate impact of this meeting will have, but few people in the know would doubt that the resumption of nuclear talks is in the offing. But what are these talks about? For the roughly two decades (and these talks in one form or another have dragged on for nearly two decades by now) that talks were conducted, deals made and money paid, ostensibly, to achieve a goal which was described as ``complete, verifiable and irreversible” denuclearization of North Korea. This is a worthy aim, to be sure, but there is one small problem with it: It is unachievable. Under no circumstances will the North Korean government surrender its nuclear program. Actually this has been the case from the beginning, but only now, after decades of efforts, expectations and failures has this simple truth finally been realised by the majority of decision makers in Washington and Seoul. The North Korean nuclear program fulfils three major aims. First, it provides the regime with a powerful deterrent. Second, nuclear weapons play a major role in North Korean diplomacy. Third, nukes are used for propaganda purposes as well, since the existence of nuclear weapons boosts nationalist feelings and is good for the domestic prestige of the regime. As time has passed, the relative importance of these three aims has changed, but all of them have been present from the outset. First of all, the North Korean government believes that nuclear weapons constitute the ultimate deterrent, making a foreign invasion very unlikely. North Korean diplomats used to say that Saddam Hussein would probably still be living in his palace had he had nuclear weapons. Of late, the approach has been further vindicated ― at least in the eyes of the leadership in the North ― by events in Libya. In 2003, Colonel Gadhafi did what the North has been asked to do for years ― he surrendered his nukes in exchange for better relations with the West. However he did not get much from the surrender. On the contrary, Western countries intervened in the Libyan Civil War and helped to overthrow the credulous dictator. One cannot imagine a starker confirmation of North Korean leaders’ ingrained fears. They believe ― probably correctly ― that countries of the West would never have meddled in the affairs of a nuclear Libya, so the anti-Gadhafi rebels would have been slaughtered in no time. Neither Kim Jong-il nor his people will repeat Gadhafi’s grave mistake.

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Second, a nuclear program is a major factor which allows the North to punch well above its weight in the international community. Objectively, North Korea is a fourth-rate dictatorship whose economy is roughly the size of Ghana’s and whose social system is a joke. It can squeeze unconditional and relatively generous aid from foreign powers only because it knows how to appear dangerous. This diplomacy ― as a matter of fact, successful ― is made possible by the existence of the nuclear program. It is often argued that North Korea would be rewarded for its denuclearization by a generous aid package, so it would therefore make economic sense to ``sell the nukes.” The leadership in Pyongyang is sceptical of such promises. They know that without nukes they would immediately lose control over the conditions under which aid is provided, and they need aid to be provided strictly according to their conditions. Among other things, these conditions include lax control over distribution, which allows aid to be first delivered to groups whose support is vital for regime stability (like the police and the military). Huge foreign investment is not attractive to Pyongyang, either. North Korea does not need foreign money that it cannot completely control; rather it needs aid and donation. That being the case, what can be realized by the resumption of negotiations? The ROK-U.S. side obviously believes that negotiations will drive tensions down. This seems to be a correct assumption, but with an important proviso; the North is not going to talk merely for the sake of it. They see negotiations as a means to get a large scale resumption of aid from the United States and South Korea. If they do not get aid and concessions fast enough, they are likely to resume their favoured tactics ― building up tensions through a chain of provocations. Apart from aid, the North Korean side would like to discuss arms control ― that is, a deal under which Pyongyang would stop further production of nuclear devices but will keep what it has got. But this option is unlikely to be considered by Washington and Seoul any time soon. So it is good news that talks might start soon. However, neither side is willing to make sufficient concessions, so one should not expect too much from this coming diplomatic offensive. Professor Andrei Lankov was born in St. Petersburg, Russia, and now teaches at Kookmin University in Seoul. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/10/304_97151.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

London Sunday Express – U.K. OPINION Is this the Beginning of the End for Britain as a Nuclear Power? Sunday October 23, 2011 By Marco Giannangeli PHILIP Hammond’s appointment as defence secretary has once again thrown open the debate over the future of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent. Outwardly the argument is whether Mr Hammond, pushed by budgetary concerns and appeasing the Lib Dems, will reduce our submarine-based Trident system, or replace it with something different. The real question for those who appreciate that Britain can never be without a robust nuclear deterrent is much more delicate: will a US-centric Trident system be replaced by a joint Anglo-French policy to shore up European defence? Mr Hammond, successor to Dr Liam Fox, is viewed with trepidation by senior military and defence experts, who rate him a “budget man”, not a “deep defence thinker”.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Guy Anderson, chief analyst with IHS Jane’s Defense & Security Intelligence & Analysis, said: “Dr Fox argued hard to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent and expended much political capital on the issue. While Dr Fox hinted he would have been willing to resign over it, Hammond is unlikely to share his strong feelings.” The MoD has assuaged concerns with a statement in which the Defence Secretary said: “I have always supported Britain retaining its nuclear deterrent as the ultimate insurance against the most extreme threats and wholeheartedly believe in maintaining a continuous, submarine-based deterrent.” Speaking to the Sunday Express last night Mr Anderson said: “This may well be his position but it is not clear how far he would push if funding started to bite. His record is causing concern among military figures.” Indeed, Mr Hammond has abstained from every vote concerning the renewal of Trident, though party sources were last night suggesting this was due to “family commitments”. Specifically at stake is not the US Lockheed Martin missile system, expected to continue in service until at least 2042, but the four Faslane-based Vanguard submarines. One of these constantly patrols the oceans in radio silence for up to three months, its 16 Trident missiles sharing up to 48 warheads – the ultimate safeguard of Britain’s security. The Vanguards will have to be replaced within 20 years. Since a replacement takes 20 years to design and implement, a stand has to be taken soon and politics has already played a role. While preliminary work is underway on a submarine replacement programme, estimated to cost £20billion at 2006 values, any decision to go ahead has been postponed until 2016. Ostensibly this was done to push back the £3billion initial development costs until 2020. It had more to do with the belief that the Conservatives will have their own, non-coalition mandate by then and be able to tackle the thorny issue without Lib Dem pressure. Mr Hammond has three main options. First, he could advocate scrapping or emasculating the nuclear deterrent, as advocated by Nick Harvey MP, Armed Forces Minister and a Lib Dem. The argument is that as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya show, the world has moved on from the Cold War days where Mutually Assured Destruction was the only game in town. A Cabinet Office level study is examining alternatives and is due to report at the end of next year. Those to the right of the party say that an alternative, cheaper land- based system might work but there are drawbacks. One expert explained: “The problem with having a land-based system, even a mobile one, is that it can be tracked by any nation with the technology to do so. However, most nations do not have the sophistication to do this.” The number of submarines could be slashed to two, with constant patrols scrapped. This would save considerable money, with the downside that Britain would not be in a position to “de-escalate” a ballooning conflict. Secondly, we could just replace the Vanguards on a like-for-like basis. This would require considerable design help from the US but would safeguard about 11,000 jobs. The third option is trickier. There have been overtures from France about a new age of mutual nuclear assistance. France has only recently rejoined Nato but it has been operating a highly effective submarine, air and land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system. This could work by sharing a “continuous at-sea deterrence”, taking turns keeping an Anglo-French underwater vigil. SHARING a nuclear deterrent may send senior military chiefs into a lather but in some lights it makes sense. In 2009, President Nicolas Sarkozy declared: “There can be no situation in which the vital interests of either of our two nations could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.”

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Certainly, the very thought of Britain giving up a totally independent nuclear deterrent and pitching in with France, sends shivers down the spine of military kingpins. As former First Sea Lord Admiral Lord West told the Sunday Express: “I would much rather see closer ties with the US since our interests are more often than not more aligned.” Atlanticists should consider two things: nuclear issues are separate from any other aspect of defence and the US has already made clear it would not oppose any move that would strengthen Europe and relieve America’s financial burden. President Obama’s position on nuclear arms has already caused ripples of worry here and in France – he seeks a world in which no nation holds nuclear weapons. Etienne de Durand, from the French Institute of International Relations, said: “France is increasingly worried that the US is slowly in withdrawal, as was shown in Libya, and that this might also influence the UK’s ultimate resolve to maintain its nuclear deterrent. “France does not want to be the only nuclear power in Europe.” http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/279082/Is-this-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-Britain-as-a-nuclear-power- (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Examiner OPINION/Columnist Obama's Missing Defense Won't Replace Missile Defense By James Carafano, Examiner Columnist October 23, 2011 Presidential candidate Barack Obama argued in 2008 for "proven and cost effective" missile defense. President Obama promised "phased and adaptive" missile defense. But other than pairing adjectives, Obama has done little to build a working missile defense. His first move was backward: gutting much of the Bush missile defense plan. That included canning land-based interceptors in Poland that would have shielded our troops and allies in Europe from the growing threat of Iranian nuclear missiles. He also cut back on the number of planned ground-based interceptors in Alaska, designed to protect from a North Korean attack. In return for those cutbacks, we're getting the phased-and-adaptive approach ... which turns out to be little more than power point slides and sleight-of-hand substitutions calculated more to avoid antagonizing the Russians than to protect U.S. interests. But Congress is starting to wake up to the fact that the small-ball missile defense alternatives promoted by the White House aren't sufficient to meet our rapidly escalating security challenges. Last month, the Senate Appropriations Committee cut funding for a version of the Aegis cruiser sea-based missile defense. Called the Navy Standard Missile Block II-B, it was supposed to able to shut down Iranian missiles aimed at the United States. One problem, which even the administration admits, is that the Block II-B could not be operational until at least 2020. The intelligence community believes Iran will have nuclear-tipped missiles long before that.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Worse, a recent Defense Science Board report questions the science behind the missile. Specifically, the board doubts that a sea-based missile can be made fast enough to catch an intercontinental ballistic missile in the ascent phase. Given these facts, the committee voted to ax funding for the program. As more and more shortcomings in Obama's missile-defense-on-the-cheap programs are exposed, the budget knives may come out more and more. For example, over the next five years the administration has proposed spending $20 billion on missile defense for Europe and less than $5 billion for missile defense of the homeland. Sooner or later some enterprising math major will ask why we're spending four times as much to protect European travel destinations. Once that conversation starts, further cuts to Obama's program seem likely. "Phased and adaptive" is failing and appalling. Meanwhile, balances are shifting. While we're reducing our nuclear arsenal, Russia isn't. It now has more nuclear weapons than the United States. China is beefing up its weapons, and the North Korean and Iranian programs keep marching on. The White House seems perfectly content to let our nuclear force atrophy. And Congress' response to an ever- bigger missile threat is to cut missile defense. How odd. The entire missile defense budget amounts to single digits of the Pentagon's overall budget. It is also the last line of defense against catastrophic nuclear attack. That math suggests missile defense is hardly the place for budget cutting. "Phased and adaptive" is unraveling. The nation is increasingly more exposed. Now is not the time to cut missile defense. Nor should Congress rely on the White House to chart a responsible course forward. Funds cut from the Navy Standard Missile Block II-B should be reinvested in other, more mature versions of the Navy Standard Missile. The goal should be to enhance those models so that cruisers stationed off the eastern United States could take out intercontinental ballistic missiles in the late midcourse stage of their flights. Washington should also revive the idea of staging ground-based interceptors in Europe. (The technology used in this approach is more proven -- and much cheaper -- than Obama's alternative.) Increased investments in the U.S. ground-based interceptors also ought to be in the mix. Examiner Columnist James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation. http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/10/obamas-missing-defense-wont-replace-missile- defense (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Atlantic OPINION/Analysis What Kim Jong-Il Learned from Qaddafi's Fall: Never Disarm As the U.S. tries to restart multiparty talks with North Korea, it may find that the rogue state suddenly sees greater value in keeping its nuclear arsenal By Mira Rapp-Hooper & Kenneth N. Waltz October 24, 2011

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The world watched in awe this Thursday as photos of Mummar Qaddafi's bludgeoned corpse marked the end of the Libyan dictator's 42-year rule. Libyans filled the streets in jubilation and leaders worldwide issued impassioned statements as the brutal regime came to an end. But 6,000 miles away in Pyongyang, North Korea, one leader was probably not celebrating. This gruesome end to Qaddafi's rule has likely confirmed what Kim Jong Il must have long been aware -- a dictator who wants to hold on to power should also hold onto his nuclear weapons. Libya once had the materials needed to make nuclear bombs: centrifuges, weapons designs, and fissile material. Finding their manufacture exceedingly difficult, the country gave up its program in 2003, under strong pressure from the U.S. and its allies. Enticed with an end to heavy sanctions it had endured since the 1980s, improved relations with the West, and a guarantee of security, Qaddafi ended his nuclear quest. Just 8 years later, his position was as far from secure as one could imagine. The North Korean dictator has taken a very different nuclear path. No doubt understanding that his regime and his own survival are under constant threat, Kim has been quite unwilling to disarm. The last two decades have provided him with numerous cautionary tales of dictatorships defeated -- the Iraqi army was trounced in 1991, NATO triumphed over Milosevic in 1999, and the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003. And just this March, as NATO operations in Libya began, a North Korean spokesperson announced the lesson that Kim's regime had learned: "It has been shown to the corners of the earth that Libya's giving up its nuclear arms. ... was used as an invasion tactic to disarm the country by sugarcoating it with words like 'the guaranteeing of security' and the 'bettering of relations.' Having one's own strength," the official continued, "was the only way to keep the peace." Today and on Tuesday, representatives from the United States will meet with North Korean officials in Geneva. Envoys will discuss the resumption of the paralyzed six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear program. In 2005, that multilateral dialogue produced a joint statement in which North Korea committed to gradual disarmament. In exchange, the state would receive much-needed foreign aid, security guarantees, and diplomatic relations with Washington. But this familiar disarmament package can hardly look promising to Kim after Qaddafi's violent demise. The cycles of stalled negotiations that have repeated since 1994 suggest that Kim may never have been truly interested in nuclear disarmament. But the lessons of Qaddafi's ouster will surely make him less inclined to this course than he was already. North Korea has long demanded a security guarantee from the United States; given the volatile and aggressive nature of the regime, the U.S. has understandably been hesitant to give one. But now more than ever, it is hard to see what sort of assurance could convince Kim to disarm. The Dear Leader has probably learned through careful observation that the only true security guarantee for a fragile autocracy, one that must fear internal dissent as well as outside aggressors, may be a nuclear arsenal. Conventional weapons, which North Korea has in spades, have time and again shown themselves to be unreliable deterrents when state survival is in question. Nuclear weapons have never failed to deter other states -- no matter how powerful those states may be. The strong have been able to deter the strong -- the United States and Soviet Union did so for decades -- but, alas, the weak can also deter the strong. This surely played a large role in why the U.S. was so eager to disarm Qaddhafi in 2003; it is also why we'd like to see the same from North Korea. But, now that Kim has watched the demise of one of his fellow dictators, we are not likely to. Mira Rapp-Hooper, a PhD candidate in political science at Columbia University, specializes in nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. Kenneth N. Waltz, an adjunct professor at Columbia and a professor at the University of California Berkeley, has published widely on nuclear proliferation. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/what-kim-jong-il-learned-from-qaddafis-fall-never- disarm/247192/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Wall Street Journal

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

OPINION/ Global View October 25, 2011 How Many Nukes Does China Have? Plumbing the secret Underground Great Wall. By Bret Stephens Pg. 17 Shortly after the end of the Cold War, an American defense official named Phillip Karber traveled to Russia as an advance man for a visit by former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. "We were meeting with Russian generals," Mr. Karber recalls, "and we met a three-star who told us they had 40,000 warheads, not the 20,000 we thought they had." It was a stunning disclosure. At a time when legions of CIA analysts, Pentagon war-gamers and arms- control specialists devoted entire careers to estimating the size of the Soviet arsenal, the U.S. had missed the real figure by a factor of two. Mr. Karber, who has worked for administrations and senior congressional leaders of both parties and now heads the Asian Arms Control Project at Georgetown University, tells the story as a preface to describing his most recent work. In 2008, he was commissioned by the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency—which deals with everything from arms-control verification to nuclear detection and forensics—to look into a mysterious Chinese project known as the "Underground Great Wall." The investigation would lead Mr. Karber to question long-held assumptions about the size—and the purpose—of China's ultra-secret nuclear arsenal. The agency's interest in the subject had been piqued following the devastating May 12 earthquake that year in Sichuan province: Along with ordinary rescue teams, Beijing had deployed thousands of radiation specialists belonging to the Second Artillery Corps, the branch of the People's Liberation Army responsible for the country's strategic missile forces, including most of its nuclear weapons. The involvement of the Second Artillery wasn't entirely surprising, since Sichuan is home to key nuclear installations, including the Chinese version of Los Alamos. More interesting were reports of hillsides collapsing to expose huge quantities of shattered concrete. Speculation arose that a significant portion of China's nuclear arsenal, held in underground tunnels and depots, may have been lost in the quake.Mr. Karber set about trying to learn more with the aid of a team of students using satellite imagery, Chinese-language sources and other materials—all of them publicly available if rarely noticed in the West. History also helped. Tunneling has been a part of Chinese military culture for nearly 2,000 years. It was a particular obsession of Mao Zedong, who dug a vast underground city in Beijing and in the late 1960s ordered the building of the so-called Third-Line Defense in central China to withstand a feared Russian nuclear attack. The gargantuan project included an underground nuclear reactor, warhead storage facilities and bunkers for China's first generation of ballistic nuclear missiles. China's tunnel-digging mania did not end with Mao's death. If anything, it intensified. In December 2009, as part of the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic, the PLA announced to great fanfare that the Second Artillery Corps has built a cumulative total of 3,000 miles of tunnels—half of them during the last 15 years. "If you started in New Hampshire," notes Mr. Karber by way of reference, "and went to Chicago, then Dallas, then Tijuana, that would be about 3,000 miles." Why would the Second Artillery be intent on so much tunneling? There are, after all, other ways of securing a nuclear arsenal. And even with a labor force as vast and as cheap as China's, the cost of these tunnels—well-built, well-lit, paved, high-ceilinged and averaging six miles in length—is immense.

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

The extent of the tunneling was also hard to square with the supposedly small size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, which is commonly believed to be in the range of 240-400 warheads. "So they've built 10 miles of tunnel for every warhead?" Mr. Karber recalls asking himself. "That doesn't make sense; it's kind of overkill." That thought prompted Mr. Karber to take a closer look at Western estimates of China's arsenal. In the late 1960s, the U.S. military projected that China would be able to field 435 warheads by 1973. A straight-line extrapolation based on that assumption would suggest that China would have somewhere in the order of 3,000 warheads today. In 1984 the Defense Intelligence Agency estimated that China would have 818 warheads by 1994 and more than 1,000 today. More recent reports in the Chinese media put the figure somewhere between 2,350 and 3,500, with an average annual warhead production of 200 over the last decade. By contrast, estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council suggest that China's arsenal peaked by about 1980 and has been more-or-less flat ever since. How accurate are any of these figures? Without on-site inspections, it's impossible to say for sure: As a report by the Council on Foreign Relations noted a decade ago, "China stands out as the least transparent by far of all the nuclear-weapon states." Yet despite the opacity, the consensus view among China watchers is to go with the low estimates. Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists insists the Chinese are "not in the business of trying to reach [nuclear] parity with the U.S. or Russia. They're not hiding hundreds and hundreds of missiles in these tunnels." The tunnels, he adds, are China's "typical game of hiding what they have and protecting their relatively limited missile force." Mr. Karber isn't persuaded. "One kilometer of tunneling is approximately equal to the cost of four or five nuclear weapons and certainly several delivery systems," he notes. Why would China devote such vast resources to building a protective network of tunnels, while devoting comparatively few to the weapons the tunnels are meant to protect? Then too, there is the question of whether Beijing's declared nuclear policies are believable. Beijing insists that it has a "no first use" policy. Yet in 2005, PLA Maj. Gen. Zhu Chengdu told The Wall Street Journal that China would launch nuclear attacks on "hundreds of, or two hundreds" of American cities if the U.S. came to Taiwan's aid in the event of a war with the mainland. Beijing also claims to adhere to a policy of maintaining a small nuclear force, described by one Chinese general as a "minimum means of reprisal." Here too Mr. Karber has his doubts. China is in the midst of a major nuclear modernization effort that includes building a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles reportedly capable of delivering multiple warheads. It fields an estimated force of nearly 1,300 tactical and theater missile systems that can be tipped with either a nuclear or a conventional warhead—the ambiguity itself giving China immense strategic leverage in the event of war. Mr. Karber also suspects China may have up to five missiles for every one of its mobile launcher vehicles. If so, those "reloads" would go far to explain the discrepancy between China's observed number of mobile launchers— one of the reasons for thinking China has a relatively small number of missiles—and Mr. Karber's suspicions about the true size of its arsenal. What purpose would a large and presumably invulnerable Chinese arsenal serve? For decades, nuclear experts have understood that the key to "winning" a nuclear exchange is to have an effective second-strike capability, which in turn requires both a sizable and survivable force. The Second Artillery itself suggested some ideas when it announced the completion of the Underground Great Wall in 2009, claiming it gave China the ability to "withstand nuclear strikes"; that "Taiwan independence can despair"; and that China no longer had cause to be "afraid of a decisive battle with the United States."

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530

Mr. Kristensen writes this off as standard regime propaganda, noting that "the Chinese are known for putting out incorrect information as a form of information warfare." Yet it's unclear why the U.S. arms-control community seems happy to accept Beijing's claims about its nuclear doctrine at face value while dismissing the giant network of tunnels as the equivalent of a Chinese Potemkin village. Mr. Karber has some thoughts on that score. The low estimate of China's arsenal, he believes, originally derived from an estimate of delivery vehicles—meaning missiles, mobile launchers, airplanes and submarines—that could be observed. After that, he suspects, "lack of new evidence and inertia seem to have kept the numbers flat." He also fears an institutional bias in favor of the low numbers. Within the U.S. government, "the Pentagon and the intelligence community have been criticized over the years for 'worst case projections,' so now everyone avoids them like the plague." Outside of government, "arms-control experts have tried hard to downplay the PLA strategic effort in order to head off 'unnecessary' U.S. reaction." China, after all, is supposed to be the role model for the kind of arsenal a "responsible" nuclear power should have, and a China with an arsenal much larger than commonly believed would be the ultimate inconvenient truth for those pushing for steeper nuclear cuts. Mr. Karber is a careful, deliberate man, who favors negotiated arms-control with China. In speaking to me, he repeatedly insists that his research is far from definitive and cannot substitute for a real intelligence-gathering effort. He also admits that it's possible—if only just—that the Chinese have led with the tunnels in order to stock them later with weapons, launchers and missiles. Yet for all of the uncertainties, there is little doubt about the tunnels themselves, which the Pentagon acknowledged for the first time this year in its annual report on the Chinese military. And nobody who cares about the nuclear balance can look away from the mountain of evidence Mr. Karber has compiled, much less fail to consider what it might imply. That goes especially for the Obama administration, which has moved forward with an ambitious agenda of deep nuclear cuts with Russia as if China's arsenal barely existed. That assumption needs urgent reconsideration. The alternative is for China, steeped in a 2,500 year military tradition of concealment, deception and surprise, to announce—at a time and in a manner of its choosing—its supremacy in a field that we have foolishly abandoned to our dreams. Joel Winton, a recent graduate of Cambridge and an intern at the Journal, assisted with the research for this column. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204346104576639502894496030.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Issue No. 951, 25 October 2011 United States Air Force Counterproliferation Research & Education | Maxwell AFB, Montgomery AL Phone: 334.953.7538 | Fax: 334.953.7530