Beyond Trident: a Civil Society Perspective on WMD Proliferation

Beyond Trident: A Civil Society Perspective on WMD Proliferation

Ian Davis, Ph.D. Co-Executive Director British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

ESRC RESEARCH SEMINAR SERIES NEW APPROACHES TO WMD PROLIFERATION SPRU – SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY RESEARCH

9 JANUARY 2007, University of Sussex

1 The British American Security Information Council

Independent, non-profit research and advocacy organization founded in 1987 Offices, staff, advisors, patrons and governing board membership on both sides of the Atlantic A transatlantic bridge for policy makers and opinion shapers Mission: To facilitate the exchange of information and analysis on transatlantic security and arms control issues as a means of creating a more stable and secure world. It is our belief that a law-guided approach based on negotiated treaty regimes and cooperative security should be at the heart of the transatlantic security agenda

2 The British American Security Information Council

Washington, DC 110 Maryland Ave, NE, Suite 205 Washington, DC 20002 Tel: +1 202 546 8055, Fax: +1 202 546 8056

London The Grayston Centre 28 Charles Square London N1 6HT Tel: +44 (0)20 7324 4680, Fax: +44 (0)20 7324 4681 Web site: www.basicint.org

3 BASIC & Nuclear Weapons

Drawing international attention to the desirability and possibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world Pushing for transparency in arms control Linking NPT commitments to US, UK and NATO nuclear policy Emphasizing the need for nuclear states to lead nuclear arms control processes, not problem states Working with others to bring pressure to bear on nuclear weapon states Pushing for a commitment from the nuclear weapon states for elimination while pursuing practical steps

4 Current BASIC Nuclear Weapons Priorities

UK Trident replacement Iran’s nuclear program Nuclear terrorism/ CTR program US/ NATO nuclear policy/ missile defence Future of NPT Proliferation Security Initiative

5 Context

The Cold War Orthodoxy: Nuclear deterrence kept the peace in Europe

The Missed Opportunities: Arms control Gains and Losses in the 1990s

The New Orthodoxy: The nexus between failed states, WMD proliferation and international terrorism

6 US & UK Nuclear Weapon Accidents

US DoD admits 32 accidents between 1950-1980 US GAO Report: 563 nuclear weapon incidents reported by the US navy between 1965-83

See www.cdi.org/Issues/NukeAccidents/accidents.htm

UK MoD (reluctantly) admits 20 accidents between 1960- 1991

7 Post-Cold War Developments in Nuclear Arms Control

POSITIVE: NEGATIVE: START I & Start II Challenges to NPT: India and IAEA Additional Protocols Pakistan; Iraq, Iran and North Indefinite extension of NPT Korea; P5 upgrading stockpiles 1995 Little progress on NPT ’13 ICJ Ruling 1996 disarmament steps’ CTBT 1996 ? Stagnation at the CD SORT 2002 ?? No progress at 2005 NPT Review Conference & World CTR Program/ PSI Summit Illicit trafficking networks in nuclear know how US-India nuclear cooperation ?

8 Fundamental Changes in the United States

Bush Administration 2001 Terrorist attacks September 11, 2001 Constructing a new strategic build-up Primary threat ‘rogue states’ and terrorists with WMD Only strengthen multilateral frameworks if do not constrain unilateral ability to act Impact on non-proliferation architecture: Dominance of US-centred world view Less reliance on international law and non-proliferation treaties, and growing emphasis on counter-proliferation and pre-emption by ‘coalitions of the willing’ e.g. Iraq, PSI, Nato ‘response force’ 9 P5 Nuclear Stocktake 2003

US USSR/ UK France China Warheads Russia 2003 7,650 8,200 200 350 400 stockpile (3,000 R) (10,000 R)

Peak 32,500 45,000 410 540 450 number 1967 1986 1969 1993 1993 Total built 70,000 55,000 1,200 1,260 750 1945-92 1949-03 1952-01 1960-03 1964-03 Nuclear 1,030 715 45 210 45 tests (1992) (1990) (1991) (1996) (1996) 10 “Death, destroyer of worlds”

“Little Boy” 12-15 kilotons (Hiroshima);“”Fat Man” 22 kilotons (Nagasaki) British Trident: max 48 warheads per submarine (x4); each warhead has a 100 kiloton yield 100 kiloton warhead on built up area =100,000+ fatalities 30,000 warheads today = 1 million Little Boys, or 5,000 megatons of destructive energy Carl Sagan & others: a war involving 100 megatons could trigger a nuclear winter

11 Growing stockpiles of nuclear materials

SQs of nuclear IAEA Inspectors in material under IAEA the Department of safeguards: Safeguards:

1982: 18,578 1982:358 2002:123,320 2002:542

12 Some nuclear proliferation is acceptable

US research into ‘new’ nuclear weapons - although “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters” R&D curtailed by Congress, the Replacement Reliable Warhead (RRW) program continues Reduced readiness time for US nuclear test sites Israel deploys nuclear arms in submarines

UK Trident Replacement - upgrades by other NWS

US-India nuclear cooperation

“Free nations don't develop weapons of mass destruction”, G.W. Bush, Wisconsin, Oct 3, 2003

13 Beyond Trident

Joint initiative: Acronym Institute, BASIC, ORG & WMD Awareness Program To promote debate on Britain’s future security and especially Trident replacement Outputs: leaflet (Jan 2006); DVD/film ‘Anthropology 101’ (July 2006); Research Report (November 2006)

14 BASIC Green Paper (Dec 06)

Assesses three options: - Delay - Upgrade - Disarm (incl. virtual nuclear option) Four reasons for believing a decision is premature: 1. longer life expectancy; 2. dropping CASD; 3. reduced lead times; and 4. point of no-return

15 Government White Paper (Dec 06)

40-page Defence White Paper on 'The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent' (4 December) Key themes: government's view of why a deterrent remains relevant after the cold war, why a decision in principle has to be taken now, and what decisions will be taken in future. Reduction in number of "operationally available warheads" from fewer than 200 to fewer than 160, with a corresponding 20% cut in size of the overall stockpile. Detailed work on the concept of a new submarine to begin shortly with a contract for the detailed design to be placed by 2012-14. Costs: "Our initial estimate is that the procurement costs will be in the range of £15-20bn (at 2006/07 prices) for a four-boat solution, some £11-14bn for the submarines; £2-3bn for the possible future refurbishment or replacement of the warhead; and £2-3bn for infrastructure over the life of the submarines." At least three big decisions are postponed: whether the fleet should be four or three submarines; whether to refurbish or replace the warheads; and whether to develop a successor to the D5 missile. Bottom line: The White Paper commits Britain to a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines, was presented as a fait accompli to the cabinet and looks as though it will easily command a parliamentary majority, with Conservative support, when it is put to a vote in March 2007.

16 What next?

Seek to influence vote in parliament in March 2007 Seek cross-party consensus for an amendment to delay decision Further BASIC briefings: The timing question Costs of replacement 21st Century British deterrence The ultimate insurance policy? Is non-replacement irreversible? Possible benefits to non-replacement Can we leave France as the only nuclear-weapon state in Europe? Safety concerns to deployment