Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials the Political and Technical Dimensions

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials the Political and Technical Dimensions TRANSPARENCY IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS THE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DIMENSIONS EDITED BY NICHOLAS ZARIMPAS At a time when arms control is being deconstructed by some and a blueprint for its reconstitution is being sought by others, the enhancement of transparency in nuclear warheads and materials as a means to achieve deeper and irreversible nuclear reductions deserves urgent atten- tion. The contributions in this volume map out the progress made and identify and discuss the reasons why countries pos- sessing nuclear weapons are impeding transparency. The main focus is on the technical means and procedures that have been used, are under development or have been proposed for building, strengthening and institutionalizing transparency. The authors analyse the arrangements for the establishment of stockpile declarations, the verification of nuclear warhead status and dismantlement, the storage and disposal of fissile materials, as well as the monitoring of production facilities. This volume brings together a unique and wide body of information and in-depth analysis by an informed group of arms control experts and is expected to stimulate international debate on the subject of nuclear transparency. Dr Nicholas Zarimpas (Greece) was Leader of the SIPRI Project on Military Technology and International Security in 1999–2002. He previously worked for the European Commission and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, where he specialized in the nuclear fuel cycle and the manage- ment of plutonium. During the past 10 years he has acted as scientific secretary to several international technological and policy committees. Other contributors to this volume Dr Gunnar Arbman (Sweden) Dr Oleg Bukharin (United States) Professor Steve Fetter (United States) Dr Richard L. Garwin (United States) Mr Camille Grand (France) Professor David Hafemeister (United States) Dr Li Bin (China) Dr Alexander Pikayev (Russia) Dr Annette Schaper (Germany) Dr Thomas E. Shea (United States) Professor William Walker (United Kingdom) Recent and forthcoming SIPRI books from Oxford University Press SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Executive Policing: Enforcing The Law In Peace Operations SIPRI Research Report no. 16 Edited by Renata Dwan paperback and hardback The Regulation of Arms and Dual-Use Exports: Germany, Sweden and the UK Ian Davis The Security of the Caspian Sea Region Edited by Gennady Chufrin A Future Arms Control Agenda: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 118, 1999 Edited by Ian Anthony and Adam Daniel Rotfeld The Evolution of Biological Disarmament SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 19 Nicholas A. Sims paperback Military Expenditure of African States: A Survey Wuyi Omitoogun SIPRI Research Report no. 17 paperback and hardback Managing Technology Transfers in a Proliferation Environment: Implementing Article X of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 20 Jean Pascal Zanders and Dorothy B. Preslar Paperback ISBN 0-19-925242-4 1 9 780199 252428 Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials The Political and Technical Dimensions Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Catherine Kelleher, Vice-Chairman (United States) Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia) Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands) Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt) Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom) Professor Dr Helga Haftendorn (Germany) Professor Ronald G. Sutherland (Canada) The Director Director Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 Email: [email protected] Internet URL: http://www.sipri.org Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials The Political and Technical Dimensions Edited by Nicholas Zarimpas OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2003 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © SIPRI 2003 First published 2003 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to SIPRI, Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-925242-4 Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Contents Preface x Acknowledgements xi Acronyms and abbreviations xii 1. Introduction 1 Nicholas Zarimpas I. Towards nuclear disarmament? 1 II. Nuclear warheads and fissile materials 5 III. Transparency: definitions and characteristics 7 IV. Is transparency in nuclear warheads and materials needed? 8 V. Scope and objectives 11 VI. The structure of this volume 11 Part I. The political dimension 2. Reflections on transparency and international security 15 William Walker I. Introduction 15 II. Internal and external transparency 15 III. Competition and secrecy, cooperation and transparency 16 IV. Transparency as an instrument of non-proliferation 18 V. The post-cold war intensification of transparency measures 19 VI. The deterioration of arms control 23 VII. Conclusions 29 3. Nuclear weapon states and the transparency dilemma 32 Camille Grand I. Introduction 32 II. The context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 33 III. Transparency, democracy and strategic/administrative culture 36 IV. Nuclear transparency and security 37 V. A typology of the transparency efforts of the NWS 39 VI. Conclusions 48 Appendix 3A. China and nuclear transparency 50 Li Bin I. Introduction 50 II. Chinese attitudes towards nuclear transparency 51 III. Reasons for transparency 53 IV. Concerns over transparency 55 vi TRANSPARENCY IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND MATERIALS V. Changing factors in the shaping of China’s transparency policy 55 VI. Conclusions 57 4. Transparency and security in Russian–US nuclear relations 58 Alexander Pikayev I. A historical overview 58 II. Post-cold war developments 60 III. Three scenarios for developing nuclear transparency 72 IV. Security concerns and prospects for transparency in warheads 75 V. Conclusions 78 5. US nuclear security cooperation with Russia and transparency 80 David Hafemeister I. Introduction 80 II. Early efforts to control warheads and fissile materials 80 III. Major post-cold war initiatives 85 IV. The 1990s: initiatives to limit warheads and fissile materials 93 V. Conclusions 108 Figure 5.1. Diagram of the Russian nuclear weapon cycle and 86 Russian–US monitoring requirements Figure 5.2. A model of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility under 102 construction at Ozersk, Russia Figure 5.3. A crane at the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility 103 lowering fissile material into a ‘nest’ 6. Nuclear transparency from the perspective of non-nuclear weapon 112 states Gunnar Arbman I. Introduction 112 II. Transparency related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty 114 III. Transparency measures relevant to the NNWS 115 IV. Central transparency issues to be addressed by the NNWS 122 V. Options for the NNWS to exert influence towards greater 123 transparency VI. Can the Revolution in Military Affairs help to promote 124 nuclear transparency? VII. Conclusions 125 Part II. The technical dimension 7. Stockpile declarations 129 Steve Fetter I. Introduction 129 II. Progress towards stockpile declarations 131 III. Definitions 132 IV. Declarations: a phased approach 136 V. Verification 145 C ONTENTS vii VI. Conclusions 149 Table 7.1. Levels of information that could be included in declarations 138 of nuclear warhead and fissile material inventories Table 7.2. The number of warheads and military stocks of plutonium 139 and HEU, 2000 Table 7.3. The US warhead inventory, by type, 2000 140 Table 7.4. The US military plutonium inventory, by grade and form, 142 2000 8. Technologies and procedures for verifying warhead status and 151 dismantlement Richard L. Garwin I. Introduction 151 II. Outside the regime: covert warheads
Recommended publications
  • EURASIA Russian Heavy Artillery
    EURASIA Russian Heavy Artillery: Leaving Depots and Returning to Service OE Watch Commentary: The Soviet Union developed large caliber artillery, such as the 2S4 ‘Tyulpan’ 240mm mortar and the 2S7 ‘Pion’ 203mm howitzer, to suppress lines of communication, destroy enemy headquarters, tactical nuclear weapons, logistic areas, and other important targets and to destroy urban areas and field fortifications. After the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation placed most of these large caliber artillery systems into long-term storage depots for several reasons. The first is that they were intended to deliver nuclear, as well as conventional, munitions (the end of the Cold War meant that a long-range tactical nuclear weapon delivery was no longer needed). Another reason is that better tube (2S19M Msta-SM) and missile (MLRS/SRBM/GLCM) systems, such as new 300mm MLRS platforms, the Iskander missile system, and the 2S19M Msta-SM 152mm howitzer, allow Russia to fulfill many of the same tasks as large caliber artillery to varying degrees. The 2S4 ‘Tyulpan’ self-propelled mortar is equipped with a 240mm 2B8 mortar mounted on a modified Object 123 tracked chassis (similar to the 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzer) with a V-59 V-12, 520 horsepower diesel engine, capable of 60 km/h road speed. The Tyulpan has a crew of four, but five additional crewman are carried in the support vehicle that typically accompanies it. The system is capable of firing conventional, chemical, and nuclear munitions at a rate of one round per minute, although Russia reportedly now only has conventional munitions in service.
    [Show full text]
  • Heater Element Specifications Bulletin Number 592
    Technical Data Heater Element Specifications Bulletin Number 592 Topic Page Description 2 Heater Element Selection Procedure 2 Index to Heater Element Selection Tables 5 Heater Element Selection Tables 6 Additional Resources These documents contain additional information concerning related products from Rockwell Automation. Resource Description Industrial Automation Wiring and Grounding Guidelines, publication 1770-4.1 Provides general guidelines for installing a Rockwell Automation industrial system. Product Certifications website, http://www.ab.com Provides declarations of conformity, certificates, and other certification details. You can view or download publications at http://www.rockwellautomation.com/literature/. To order paper copies of technical documentation, contact your local Allen-Bradley distributor or Rockwell Automation sales representative. For Application on Bulletin 100/500/609/1200 Line Starters Heater Element Specifications Eutectic Alloy Overload Relay Heater Elements Type J — CLASS 10 Type P — CLASS 20 (Bul. 600 ONLY) Type W — CLASS 20 Type WL — CLASS 30 Note: Heater Element Type W/WL does not currently meet the material Type W Heater Elements restrictions related to EU ROHS Description The following is for motors rated for Continuous Duty: For motors with marked service factor of not less than 1.15, or Overload Relay Class Designation motors with a marked temperature rise not over +40 °C United States Industry Standards (NEMA ICS 2 Part 4) designate an (+104 °F), apply application rules 1 through 3. Apply application overload relay by a class number indicating the maximum time in rules 2 and 3 when the temperature difference does not exceed seconds at which it will trip when carrying a current equal to 600 +10 °C (+18 °F).
    [Show full text]
  • "Official Gazette of RM", No. 28/04 and 37/07), the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, at Its Meeting Held on ______2007, Enacted This
    In accordance with Article 6 paragraph 3 of the FT Law ("Official Gazette of RM", No. 28/04 and 37/07), the Government of the Republic of Montenegro, at its meeting held on ____________ 2007, enacted this DECISION ON CONTROL LIST FOR EXPORT, IMPORT AND TRANSIT OF GOODS Article 1 The goods that are being exported, imported and goods in transit procedure, shall be classified into the forms of export, import and transit, specifically: free export, import and transit and export, import and transit based on a license. The goods referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article were identified in the Control List for Export, Import and Transit of Goods that has been printed together with this Decision and constitutes an integral part hereof (Exhibit 1). Article 2 In the Control List, the goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license, were designated by the abbreviation: “D”, and automatic license were designated by abbreviation “AD”. The goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license designated by the abbreviation “D” and specific number, license is issued by following state authorities: - D1: the goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license issued by the state authority competent for protection of human health - D2: the goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license issued by the state authority competent for animal and plant health protection, if goods are imported, exported or in transit for veterinary or phyto-sanitary purposes - D3: the goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license issued by the state authority competent for environment protection - D4: the goods for which export, import and transit is based on a license issued by the state authority competent for culture.
    [Show full text]
  • 2017 HPC Annual Report Team Would Like to Acknowledge the Invaluable Assistance Provided by John Noe
    sandia national laboratories 2017 HIGH PERformance computing The 2017 High Performance Computing Annual Report is dedicated to John Noe and Dino Pavlakos. Building a foundational framework Editor in high performance computing Yasmin Dennig Contributing Writers Megan Davidson Sandia National Laboratories has a long history of significant contributions to the high performance computing Mattie Hensley community and industry. Our innovative computer architectures allowed the United States to become the first to break the teraflop barrier—propelling us to the international spotlight. Our advanced simulation and modeling capabilities have been integral in high consequence US operations such as Operation Burnt Frost. Strong partnerships with industry leaders, such as Cray, Inc. and Goodyear, have enabled them to leverage our high performance computing capabilities to gain a tremendous competitive edge in the marketplace. Contributing Editor Laura Sowko As part of our continuing commitment to provide modern computing infrastructure and systems in support of Sandia’s missions, we made a major investment in expanding Building 725 to serve as the new home of high performance computer (HPC) systems at Sandia. Work is expected to be completed in 2018 and will result in a modern facility of approximately 15,000 square feet of computer center space. The facility will be ready to house the newest National Nuclear Security Administration/Advanced Simulation and Computing (NNSA/ASC) prototype Design platform being acquired by Sandia, with delivery in late 2019 or early 2020. This new system will enable continuing Stacey Long advances by Sandia science and engineering staff in the areas of operating system R&D, operation cost effectiveness (power and innovative cooling technologies), user environment, and application code performance.
    [Show full text]
  • RCF Fellows Kai He.Ai
    Decision Making During Crises: Prospect Theory and China’s Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior after the Cold War Kai He Utah State University May 2012 EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No. 33 Knowledge-Net for a Better World The East Asia Institute(EAI) is a nonprofit and independent research organization in Korea, founded in May 2002. The EAI strives to transform East Asia into a society of nations based on liberal democracy, market economy, open society, and peace. The EAI takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. is a registered trademark. Copyright © 2012 by EAI This electronic publication of EAI intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of EAI documents to a non-EAI website is prohibited. EAI documents are protected under copyright law. The East Asia Institute 909 Sampoong B/D, 310-68 Euljiro 4-ga Jung-gu, Seoul 100-786 Republic of Korea Tel. 82 2 2277 1683 Fax 82 2 2277 1684 EAI Fellows Program Working Paper No. 33 Decision Making During Crises: Prospect Theory and China’s Foreign Policy Crisis Behavior after the Cold War* Kai He Utah State University May 2012 Abstract Through examining four notable foreign policy crises with the United States since the end of the Cold War: the 1993 Yinhe ship inspection incident, the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 embassy bombing incident, and the 2001 EP-3 midair collision, I introduce a prospect theory- based model to systematically explain China’s foreign policy crisis behavior after the cold war.
    [Show full text]
  • K-12 Individual No. Name Team Gr Rate Pts Tbrk1 Tbrk2 Tbrk3 Tbrk4
    K-12 Individual No. Name Team Gr Rate Pts TBrk1 TBrk2 TBrk3 TBrk4 Rnd1 Rnd2 Rnd3 Rnd4 Rnd5 Rnd6 1 Chakraborty, Dipro 11 2299 5.5 21 24 43 20.5 W27 W12 W5 W32 W8 D3 State Champion, AZ Denker Representative 2 Yim, Tony Sung BASISS 8 2135 5 20.5 23.5 38.5 17.5 W24 W10 D3 D16 W11 W9 3 Aletheia-Zomlefer, Soren CHANPR 11 1961 5 20 23 35.5 18.5 W25 W26 D2 W40 W15 D1 4 Desmarais, Nicholas Eduard NOTRED 10 1917 5 18 20 33 18 W39 W23 W18 L15 W10 W8 5 Wong, Kinsleigh Phillip CFHS 10 1992 4.5 20 20 24.5 15 -X- W17 L1 W26 D7 W15 6 Todd, Bryce BASISC 10 1923 4.5 17 19 26.5 14.5 W38 D18 L9 W23 W21 W16 7 Chaliki, Kalyan DSMTHS 9 1726 4.5 17 18.5 26 15 W46 L16 W28 W22 D5 W17 8 Li, Bohan UHS 9 2048 4 22 25 29 18 W30 W11 W45 W9 L1 L4 9 Mittal, Rohan CFHS 9 1916 4 19.5 20.5 23 17 W47 W22 W6 L8 W20 L2 10 Pennock, Joshua CFHS 10 1682 4 19 22 24 14 W31 L2 W25 W21 L4 W29 11 Aradhyula, Sumhith CFHS 9 1631 4 18 20 22 14 W41 L8 W38 W13 L2 W19 12 Johnston, Nicolas Godfrey CFHS 9 1803 4 18 19.5 21 13 W43 L1 W29 L17 W24 W20 13 Martis, Tyler BRHS 12 1787 4 17 18 21 13 W42 L15 W24 L11 W18 W22 14 Plumb, Justin Rodney GCLACA 10 1700 4 16 17 20 13 W51 L32 W19 L20 W28 W27 15 Martinez, Isaac GLPREP 10 2159 3.5 21.5 24.5 27.5 16 W28 W13 D16 W4 L3 L5 16 Chen, Derek H CFHS 10 1965 3.5 21 23.5 26 15.5 W35 W7 D15 D2 D17 L6 17 Woodson, Tyler GILBHS 1640 3.5 19 19 17.5 14 W50 L5 W30 W12 D16 L7 18 Cancio, Aiya CFHS 9 1469 3.5 18.5 20 17.5 12.5 W36 D6 L4 W46 L13 W25 AZ Girls' Invitational Representative 19 Folden, Kurt CHANPR 10 1207 3 14 18 12 10 L32 W50 L14 W31 W23 L11 20 Thornton,
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Features of the Financial Literacy the Population of the Sverdlovsk Region
    E3S Web of Conferences 295, 01013 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202129501013 WFSDI 2021 Regional Features of the Financial Literacy the Population of the Sverdlovsk Region Elena Razumovskaia1,2,*, Denis Razumovskiy1,3, Elena Ovsyannikova1 1Ural State Economics University, 620144 Yekaterinburg, Russia 2Ural Federal University, 620002 Yekaterinburg, Russia 3Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration under the President of the Russian Federation (UIU RANEPA), 620144 Yekaterinburg, Russia Abstract. The presented research is devoted to analysis of the principles and optimality criteria for the structure of household financial resources, formed on the basis of surveys of a sample of 5,842 respondents from the Sverdlovsk region based on the author’s methodology for assessing the level of financial literacy and the structure of citizens expenses. The initial hypothesis about the influence of the level of financial literacy of the population on the structure of household spending has been verified. Examples of author questionnaires are presented, developed taking into account the methodological support of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the NAFR Analytical Centre. The conclusion is substantiated that more financially literate people are inclined to plan income and expenses and are able to evaluate the structure of their expenses from the position of optimality. The study is supplemented by an analysis of an array of statistical information on indicators of the financial situation of the population of the cities of the Sverdlovsk region. The purpose of the study is to verify the relationship between the level of financial literacy of the population of the Sverdlovsk region and the structure of household spending based on a subjective assessment of optimality by respondents.
    [Show full text]
  • F15-Picador.Pdf
    PICADOR SEPTEMBER 2015 PAPERBACK ORIGINAL A Clue to the Exit A Novel Edward St. Aubyn A beautifully modulated novel that shows Edward St. Aubyn at his sparkling best Charlie Fairburn, successful screenwriter, ex­husband and absent father, has been given six months to live. He resolves to stake half his fortune on a couple of turns of the roulette wheel and, to his agent's disgust, to write a novel—about death. In the casino he meets his muse. Charlie grows as addicted to writing fiction as she is to gambling. FICTION / LITERARY Picador | 9/1/2015 9781250046031 | $16.00 / $18.50 Can. His novel is set on a train and involves a group of characters (familiar to readers Trade Paperback | 208 pages | Carton Qty: of St. Aubyn's earlier work) who are locked in a debate about the nature of 5.5 in W | 8.3 in H consciousness. As this train gets stuck at Didcot, and Charlie gets more Other Available Formats: passionately entangled with the dangerous Angelique, A Clue to the Exit comes Ebook ISBN: 9781250046048 to its startling climax. Exquisitely crafted, witty, and thoughtful, Edward St. Aubyn's dazzling novel probes the very heart of being. MARKETING National Review Coverage Digital Marketing PRAISE Online Advertising and Social Media Campaign Praise for Edward St. Aubyn Targeted Outreach to Literary and Reading Group Sites Backlist Promotion "Perhaps the most brilliant English novelist of his generation."—Alan Hollinghurst "One of the great comic writers of our time."—The New York Review of Books ALSO AVAILABLE Lost for Words: A Novel "Gorgeous, golden prose…St.
    [Show full text]
  • Article Thermonuclear Bomb 5 7 12
    1 Inexpensive Mini Thermonuclear Reactor By Alexander Bolonkin [email protected] New York, April 2012 2 Article Thermonuclear Reactor 1 26 13 Inexpensive Mini Thermonuclear Reactor By Alexander Bolonkin C&R Co., [email protected] Abstract This proposed design for a mini thermonuclear reactor uses a method based upon a series of important innovations. A cumulative explosion presses a capsule with nuclear fuel up to 100 thousands of atmospheres, the explosive electric generator heats the capsule/pellet up to 100 million degrees and a special capsule and a special cover which keeps these pressure and temperature in capsule up to 0.001 sec. which is sufficient for Lawson criteria for ignition of thermonuclear fuel. Major advantages of these reactors/bombs is its very low cost, dimension, weight and easy production, which does not require a complex industry. The mini thermonuclear bomb can be delivered as a shell by conventional gun (from 155 mm), small civil aircraft, boat or even by an individual. The same method may be used for thermonuclear engine for electric energy plants, ships, aircrafts, tracks and rockets. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Key words: Thermonuclear mini bomb, thermonuclear reactor, nuclear energy, nuclear engine, nuclear space propulsion. Introduction It is common knowledge that thermonuclear bombs are extremely powerful but very expensive and difficult to produce as it requires a conventional nuclear bomb for ignition. In stark contrast, the Mini Thermonuclear Bomb is very inexpensive. Moreover, in contrast to conventional dangerous radioactive or neutron bombs which generates enormous power, the Mini Thermonuclear Bomb does not have gamma or neutron radiation which, in effect, makes it a ―clean‖ bomb having only the flash and shock wave of a conventional explosive but much more powerful (from 1 ton of TNT and more, for example 100 tons).
    [Show full text]
  • Yekaterinburg
    Russia 2019 Crime & Safety Report: Yekaterinburg This is an annual report produced in conjunction with the Regional Security Office at the U.S. Consulate in Yekaterinburg, Russia. The current U.S. Department of State Travel Advisory at the date of this report’s publication assesses Russia at Level 2, indicating travelers should exercise increased caution due to terrorism, harassment, and the arbitrary enforcement of local laws. Do not travel to the north Caucasus, including Chechnya and Mt. Elbrus, due to civil unrest and terrorism, and Crimea due to foreign occupation and abuses by occupying authorities. Overall Crime and Safety Situation The U.S. Consulate in Yekaterinburg does not assume responsibility for the professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms appearing in this report. The American Citizens’ Services unit (ACS) cannot recommend a particular individual or location, and assumes no responsibility for the quality of service provided. Please review OSAC’s Russia-specific page for original OSAC reporting, consular messages, and contact information, some of which may be available only to private-sector representatives with an OSAC password. Crime Threats There is minimal risk from crime in Yekaterinburg. With an estimated population of 1.5 million people, the city experiences moderate levels of crime compared to other major Russian metropolitan areas. The police are able to deter many serious crimes, but petty crimes still occur with some frequency and remain a common problem. Pickpockets are active, although to a lesser degree than in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Pickpocketing occurs mainly on public transportation, at shopping areas, and at tourist sites.
    [Show full text]
  • United States House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations
    United States House Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia This article is about the 1952-1954 investigation into non-profits. For the 80s and 90s report on the People's Republic of China's covert operations within the United States, see Cox Report. The Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations was an investigative committee of the United States House of Representatives between 1952 and 1954.[1] The committee was originally created by House Resolution 561 during the 82nd Congress. The committee investigated the use of funds by tax-exempt organizations (non-profit organizations) to see if they were being used to support communism.[2][3] The committee was alternatively known as the Cox Committee and the Reece Committee after its two chairmen, Edward E. Cox and B. Carroll Reece. Contents • 1 History • 2 Members • 3 Dodd report • 4 Final report • 5 Criticisms • 6 References History In April 1952, the Select Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations and Comparable Organizations (or just the Cox Committee Investigation), led by Edward E. Cox, of the House of Representatives began an investigation of the "educational and philanthropic foundations and other comparable organizations which are exempt from federal taxes to determine whether they were using their resources for the purposes for which they were established, and especially to determine which such foundations and organizations are using their resources for un-American activities and subversive activities or for purposes not in the interest or tradition of the United States." In the fall of 1952 all foundations with assets of $10 million or more received a questionnaire covering virtually every aspect of their operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons
    VERSION: Charles P. Blair, “Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons,” in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, eds., Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009), pp. 193-238. c h a p t e r 8 Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons Charles P. Blair CONTENTS Introduction 193 Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) 195 Fissile Materials 198 Weapons-Grade Uranium and Plutonium 199 Likely IND Construction 203 External Procurement of Intact Nuclear Weapons 204 State Acquisition of an Intact Nuclear Weapon 204 Nuclear Black Market 212 Incidents of Jihadist Interest in Nuclear Weapons and Weapons-Grade Nuclear Materials 213 Al-Qa‘ida 213 Russia’s Chechen-Led Jihadists 214 Nuclear-Related Threats and Attacks in India and Pakistan 215 Overall Likelihood of Jihadists Obtaining Nuclear Capability 215 Notes 216 Appendix: Toward a Nuclear Weapon: Principles of Nuclear Energy 232 Discovery of Radioactive Materials 232 Divisibility of the Atom 232 Atomic Nucleus 233 Discovery of Neutrons: A Pathway to the Nucleus 233 Fission 234 Chain Reactions 235 Notes 236 INTRODUCTION On December 1, 2001, CIA Director George Tenet made a hastily planned, clandestine trip to Pakistan. Tenet arrived in Islamabad deeply shaken by the news that less than three months earlier—just weeks before the attacks of September 11, 2001—al-Qa‘ida and Taliban leaders had met with two former Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists in a joint quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Captured documents the scientists abandoned as 193 AU6964.indb 193 12/16/08 5:44:39 PM 194 Charles P. Blair they fled Kabul from advancing anti-Taliban forces were evidence, in the minds of top U.S.
    [Show full text]