<<

Trident Replacement: the practical implications

Presentation to British Pugwash AGM

8 April 2008

J ohn Ainslie Coordinator, Scottish CND

Trident Replacement

Submarine Missile

Warhead Targeting “Successor”

New submarine Timeline 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Concept Design Initial Design Detail Design Outputs Initial Gate Build

Main Gate Nuclear-Powered 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28

Astut Successor MUFC e

Reactor for “Successor”

Rolls Royal Royce Navy PWR2   New Design

New Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant (NGNPP)

“avoid pumped flow systems” Steve Ludham RR

“a modern & much simpler plant” Rear Admiral Matthews

USS Narwhal (1969 – 1999) When built - quietest submarine Continuous Patrols

One armed submarine on patrol at all times Alert – “measured in days” non-verifiable

“our planned future programme should take us up to 750 [patrols]” Rear Admiral Matthews

Patrols 1968-2007 300 2008-2060 ? 450 Total 750

Infrastructure - Devonport

Refit Dockyard

Infrastructure - Derby

Fuel Rod Fabrication

Infrastructure - Faslane

Submarine Base and Shiplift

Infrastructure - Coulport

Explosives Handling J etty Infrastructure - Dounreay

Submarine Reactor Prototype & overhaul of coolant pumps

The Scottish Question “the Parliament … calls on the UK Government not to go ahead at this time with the proposal in the White Paper, The Future of the ’s Nuclear Deterrent” 14 June 2007

71 for 16 against 39 abstained 2 did not vote

If not where ?

1963 Polaris option - Falmouth Trident Replacement

Submarine Missile

Warhead Targeting Missile System

Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS)

New US missile to replace Trident D5

In service by 2029

Initial concept studies started in 2007

Considered by Strategic Advisory Group November 2007

Missile options

24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 48 50 52 54 56 58 60

British “successor” submarine in-service 2024 – 2060

Trident D5 in service with US Navy until 2042

ULMS & SSBN(X) in service with US Navy from 2029

Underwater Launched Missile System

“any successor to the D5 system should be compatible with, or be capable or being made compatible with, the launch system for the D5 missile” Bush to Blair Dec 2006

“concepts for future submarines may have missile tubes larger than 87 inches in diameter”

ULMS Test Bed Request for Information 7 Nov 2007

Future RV system ?

Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV)

Developed for nuclear Trident (E2 RV)

Revived for Conventional Trident

Option for ULMS ?

Operational independence ?

“without United States cooperation … Polaris would become ineffective after only a few months”

Sir Charles Ellworthy, CDS, March 1971

Trident Replacement

Submarine Missile

Warhead Targeting Nuclear Warhead

The special nuclear relationship

1958 Mutual Defence Agreement

Solly Zuckerman – no interest beyond Polaris

Polaris upgrade – to revive relationship

Peter J ones – “whether the UK had done it themselves”

The first UK thermonuclear bomb

Red Snow warhead Not based on Grapple design Anglicised version of

US Mk 28 warhead The Polaris family

Polaris WE 177

Primary Primary Secondary US or UK UK design US design US design Origin Cleo test W 58 W 59

Polaris J ennie Reggie

WE 177B Katie Simon

WE 177A Katie A

Chevaline Harriet Reggie

WE 177C Katie A Reggie

source: www.nuclear-weapons.info Origin of the UK Trident design

UK design Anglicised US design “The warhead was designed “The warheads were in the UK” anglicised by the AWE” Bob Ainsworth Mar 08 National Archives 1978 – 1980 opened door to details 4 tests of UK lightweight of US designs; warhead; 50 kiloton yield 6 further tests 1980-87 Primary uses British Secondary probably derived High Explosive from US design (as with Polaris family)

US components in UK Trident warhead … it was decided on cost-effectiveness grounds to procure certain non-nuclear warhead components from the United States. (Bob Ainsworth)

Arming, Fusing & Firing System

Neutron Generator

Gas Transfer System ?

Future of the US nuclear stockplie

Life Extension

Reliable Replacement Warhead

US Life Extension Programmes (LEP)

B61-7/11 LEP underway

W80 LEP cancelled

W76 Major LEP

US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)

More reliable ?

Safer

More secure

Increased weight and size

US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)

Livermore design chosen

No funding FY 2008

Advanced Certification

Funding request FY 2009

US Reviews

Report date

Congress Commission 2008

Policy Review 2009

Posture Review 2010

Options for British warheads

Life Extension or

High Surety Warhead

Life Extension underway since 2000

Britain will probably follow US lead

New UK High Surety Warhead

Features – IHE, FRP, No Be

Design Options

Design Previous tests Modified UK Trident None Modified UK TD-127 ?? Anglicised US WR1 US

Warhead components

Reentry Vehicle (RV) case

Life Extension Mk 4 RV Replace some fittings

New Warhead Larger Mk 5 RV New production

Plutonium

Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus

New Warhead New Pit Fire Resistant

Pit Tube

Life Extension Replace pit tube

Tamper

Life Extension Beryllium No replacement

New Warhead Substitute for Beryllium

High Explosives

Life Extension US – replace after 30 yrs UK - EDC 37 High Explosive - replace after 16 ? years

New Warhead Insensitive High Explosives Safer, Larger & Heavier

Detonation System

Life Extension Replace detonators

New Warhead Optical initiated firing system

Secondary HEU

Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus

New Warhead New HEU secondary

Interstage

Life Extension Remanufacture Fogbank

New Warhead Substitute for Fogbank Substitute for Beryllium

Radiation Case

Life Extension No replacement

New Warhead New simpler design

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System

AWE vacancy

Warhead Electrical Engineer

Support the approval programme for the introduction of the system into UK Trident

AWE website

Support the approval programme for the introduction of the Mk4A AF&F system into UK Trident

Beechgrove Recruiting

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System

MK4A AF&F

key part of US -1 warhead upgrade / LEP

advanced fuzing options increased targeting flexibility and effectiveness increase the warfighting effectiveness of the D5 system

introduced in UK Trident system by 2017

Arming, Fuzing & Firing System

Life Extension upgrade to Mk4A

New Warhead New design

Neutron Generator

Life Extension MC4380 introduced 2003

New Warhead New design

Gas Transfer System

Life Extension Acorn (UK 2005) Acorn II (LEP)

New Warhead New design

Warhead Timeline

08 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56

W76-0 W76-1

and Reliable Replacement Warhead

Initial lifespan New AF&F Refurbished Warhead or High Surety Warhead

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston

Orion Laser

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Hydrus Hydrodynamic Facility

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston High Explosives Fabrication Facility

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Uranium Production Facility

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston

Refurbish A90

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston

Refurbish A45

Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston

New Supercomputers

Modernisation of AWE Burghfield New Warhead Assembly & Dissassembly Facility

Current Gravel Gerties

AWE budget 2005 - 2011 £ million 1000 900 800 700 600 Development 500 400 300 200 Running costs 100 0

05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11

Tritium supply

2006 2054

Tritium decays with half-life of 12 years

No current source of UK tritium

New facility ? – linked to civil nuclear

Lower yield warhead the continued availability of a lower yield from our warhead Future of UK Nuclear Deterrent December 2006

UK Trident warhead – yield fixed at time of manufacture.

Future US & UK submarine warheads – possible variable yield.

Trident Replacement

Submarine Missile

Warhead Targeting Targeting system

Transfer of US targeting data

UKLO STRATCOM Omaha

OPLAN SACEUR 8044 Mons Belgium information STRATCOM Omaha NOTC MoD London

SWS IPT sanitised Bath / Corsham

Corsham

Corsham

Corsham

Site 3 Cold War bunker for PM and Queen

Corsham

DCSA HQ UK Defence Communications Hub

Corsham

Corsham Computer Centre

Trident targeting Targeting system

Magnetic Tape Cartridge

Target Fire Control Planning (Submarine) (Corsham) Target Change Message

Targeting system upgrades

SLBM Retargeting System (SRS)

operational in 2003

quickly, accurately & reliably retarget missiles to targets

timely & reliable processing of an increased number of targets

support adaptive planning

US and UK systems Targeting system upgrades

SLBM Planning & Operational Flexibility (SPOF)

follow on to SRS

funded 2010 - 2012

improve flexibility & responsiveness

enhance accuracy and effectiveness

application in UK ? Fire Control hardware upgrades

US UK In service

Mod 4 Mod 5 2003

Mod 6 Mod 7 2010

Targeting software for UK Trident

// Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; kmax_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk

Targeting software for UK Trident

// Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; kmax_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk

Targeting software for UK Trident

// Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; kmax_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk

Targeting software for UK Trident

// Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; kmax_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk

Assigned to NATO ?

NATO attack less likely

independent attack less likely

bilateral attack most likely

Closing Points

Dependence on US support

Early stage of long-term plan

Need greater transparency

Endangered species