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Trident Replacement: the Practical Implications

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Trident Replacement: the practical implications Presentation to British Pugwash AGM 8 April 2008 J ohn Ainslie Coordinator, Scottish CND Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Warhead Targeting “Successor” Submarine New submarine Timeline 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Concept Design Initial Design Detail Design Outputs Initial Gate Build Main Gate Nuclear-Powered Submarines 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 Astut Successor MUFC e Reactor for “Successor” Rolls Royal Royce Navy PWR2 New Design New Generation Nuclear Propulsion Plant (NGNPP) “avoid pumped flow systems” Steve Ludham RR “a modern & much simpler plant” Rear Admiral Matthews USS Narwhal (1969 – 1999) When built - quietest submarine Continuous Patrols One armed submarine on patrol at all times Alert – “measured in days” non-verifiable “our planned future programme should take us up to 750 [patrols]” Rear Admiral Matthews Patrols 1968-2007 300 2008-2060 ? 450 Total 750 Infrastructure - Devonport Refit Dockyard Infrastructure - Derby Fuel Rod Fabrication Infrastructure - Faslane Submarine Base and Shiplift Infrastructure - Coulport Explosives Handling J etty Infrastructure - Dounreay Submarine Reactor Prototype & overhaul of coolant pumps The Scottish Question “the Parliament … calls on the UK Government not to go ahead at this time with the proposal in the White Paper, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” 14 June 2007 71 for 16 against 39 abstained 2 did not vote If not Scotland where ? 1963 Polaris option - Falmouth Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Warhead Targeting Missile System Underwater Launched Missile System (ULMS) New US missile to replace Trident D5 In service by 2029 Initial concept studies started in 2007 Considered by Strategic Advisory Group November 2007 Missile options 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 British “successor” submarine in-service 2024 – 2060 Trident D5 in service with US Navy until 2042 ULMS & SSBN(X) in service with US Navy from 2029 Underwater Launched Missile System “any successor to the D5 system should be compatible with, or be capable or being made compatible with, the launch system for the D5 missile” Bush to Blair Dec 2006 “concepts for future submarines may have missile tubes larger than 87 inches in diameter” ULMS Test Bed Request for Information 7 Nov 2007 Future RV system ? Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) Developed for nuclear Trident (E2 RV) Revived for Conventional Trident Option for ULMS ? Operational independence ? “without United States cooperation … Polaris would become ineffective after only a few months” Sir Charles Ellworthy, CDS, March 1971 Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Warhead Targeting Nuclear Warhead The special nuclear relationship 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement Solly Zuckerman – no interest beyond Polaris Polaris upgrade – to revive relationship Peter J ones – “whether the UK had done it themselves” The first UK thermonuclear bomb Red Snow warhead Not based on Grapple design Anglicised version of US Mk 28 warhead The Polaris family Polaris Chevaline WE 177 Primary Primary Secondary US or UK UK design US design US design Origin Cleo test W 58 W 59 Polaris J ennie Reggie WE 177B Katie Simon WE 177A Katie A Chevaline Harriet Reggie WE 177C Katie A Reggie source: www.nuclear-weapons.info Origin of the UK Trident design UK design Anglicised US design “The warhead was designed “The warheads were in the UK” anglicised by the AWE” Bob Ainsworth Mar 08 National Archives 1978 – 1980 opened door to details 4 tests of UK lightweight of US designs; warhead; 50 kiloton yield 6 further tests 1980-87 Primary uses British Secondary probably derived High Explosive from US design (as with Polaris family) US components in UK Trident warhead … it was decided on cost-effectiveness grounds to procure certain non-nuclear warhead components from the United States. (Bob Ainsworth) Arming, Fusing & Firing System Neutron Generator Gas Transfer System ? Future of the US nuclear stockplie Life Extension Reliable Replacement Warhead US Life Extension Programmes (LEP) B61-7/11 LEP underway W80 LEP cancelled W76 Major LEP US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) More reliable ? Safer More secure Increased weight and size US Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Livermore design chosen No funding FY 2008 Advanced Certification Funding request FY 2009 US Nuclear Weapon Reviews Report date Congress Commission 2008 Policy Review 2009 Posture Review 2010 Options for British warheads Life Extension or High Surety Warhead Life Extension underway since 2000 Britain will probably follow US lead New UK High Surety Warhead Features – IHE, FRP, No Be Design Options Design Previous tests Modified UK Trident None Modified UK TD-127 ?? Anglicised US WR1 US W89 Warhead components Reentry Vehicle (RV) case Life Extension Mk 4 RV Replace some fittings New Warhead Larger Mk 5 RV New production Plutonium pit Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus New Warhead New Pit Fire Resistant Pit Tube Life Extension Replace pit tube Tamper Life Extension Beryllium No replacement New Warhead Substitute for Beryllium High Explosives Life Extension US – replace after 30 yrs UK - EDC 37 High Explosive - replace after 16 ? years New Warhead Insensitive High Explosives Safer, Larger & Heavier Detonation System Life Extension Replace detonators New Warhead Optical initiated firing system Secondary HEU Life Extension No replacement Lifespan 60 years plus New Warhead New HEU secondary Interstage Life Extension Remanufacture Fogbank New Warhead Substitute for Fogbank Substitute for Beryllium Radiation Case Life Extension No replacement New Warhead New simpler design Arming, Fuzing & Firing System Arming, Fuzing & Firing System AWE vacancy Warhead Electrical Engineer Support the approval programme for the introduction of the system into UK Trident AWE website Support the approval programme for the introduction of the Mk4A AF&F system into UK Trident Beechgrove Recruiting Arming, Fuzing & Firing System MK4A AF&F key part of US W76-1 warhead upgrade / LEP advanced fuzing options increased targeting flexibility and effectiveness increase the warfighting effectiveness of the D5 system introduced in UK Trident system by 2017 Arming, Fuzing & Firing System Life Extension upgrade to Mk4A New Warhead New design Neutron Generator Life Extension MC4380 introduced 2003 New Warhead New design Gas Transfer System Life Extension Acorn (UK 2005) Acorn II (LEP) New Warhead New design Warhead Timeline 08 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 W76-0 W76-1 and Reliable Replacement Warhead Initial lifespan New AF&F Refurbished Warhead or High Surety Warhead Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Orion Laser Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Hydrus Hydrodynamic Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston High Explosives Fabrication Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Uranium Production Facility Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Refurbish A90 Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston Refurbish A45 Modernisation of AWE Aldermaston New Supercomputers Modernisation of AWE Burghfield New Warhead Assembly & Dissassembly Facility Current Gravel Gerties AWE budget 2005 - 2011 £ million 1000 900 800 700 600 Development 500 400 300 200 Running costs 100 0 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 09/10 10/11 Tritium supply 2006 2054 Tritium decays with half-life of 12 years No current source of UK tritium New facility ? – linked to civil nuclear Lower yield warhead the continued availability of a lower yield from our warhead Future of UK Nuclear Deterrent December 2006 UK Trident warhead – yield fixed at time of manufacture. Future US & UK submarine warheads – possible variable yield. Trident Replacement Submarine Missile Warhead Targeting Targeting system Transfer of US targeting data UKLO STRATCOM Omaha OPLAN SACEUR 8044 Mons Belgium information STRATCOM Omaha NOTC MoD London SWS IPT sanitised Bath / Corsham Corsham Corsham Corsham Site 3 Cold War bunker for PM and Queen Corsham DCSA HQ UK Defence Communications Hub Corsham Corsham Computer Centre Trident targeting Targeting system Magnetic Tape Cartridge Target Fire Control Planning (Submarine) (Corsham) Target Change Message Targeting system upgrades SLBM Retargeting System (SRS) operational in 2003 quickly, accurately & reliably retarget missiles to targets timely & reliable processing of an increased number of targets support adaptive planning US and UK systems Targeting system upgrades SLBM Planning & Operational Flexibility (SPOF) follow on to SRS funded 2010 - 2012 improve flexibility & responsiveness enhance accuracy and effectiveness application in UK ? Fire Control hardware upgrades US UK In service Mod 4 Mod 5 2003 Mod 6 Mod 7 2010 Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) Software for US [ F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); target planning & F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k); F4=sys[sys_indx].relia[k]; fire control Fsum=F1*F4*(F0+F2+F3); If(Fsum<min_pk) MIN_PK=Fsum; If(Fsum>max_pk) { max_pk=Fsum; indx=k; { If ((max_pk-mi_pk)<+0.0001) Indx=indx_cep; ; opt_index[targ_indx][sys_indx; return(max_pk Targeting software for UK Trident // Assess system response time suitability F1=beta1]*Obj_Time(targ_indx,sys_indx); //Assess Yield Suitabilty F2=beta[2]*Obj_Yield(yld) //Assess Probability of Kill Suitability for (int k=0; k<fz_opts; k++) [ US Eyes Only F0=beta0]*Obj_Pk(targ_indx, cep[k], yld); F3=beta3}*Obj_HOB(targ_indx,sys_indx,k);
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  • A History of the United Kingdom's WE 177 Nuclear Weapons Programme

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    MARCH 2019 A History of the United Kingdom’s WE 177 Nuclear Weapons Programme From Conception to Entry into Service 1959– 1980 Dr John R. Walker © The British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 2018 All images licenced for reuse under Creative Commons 2.0 and Wikimedia Commons or with the approriate permission and sourcing. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility The British American Security of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of BASIC. Information Council (BASIC) 17 Oval Way All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be London SE11 5RR reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or Charity Registration No. 1001081 any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. T: +44 (0) 20 3752 5662 www.basicint.org Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. The Author BASIC Dr John R Walker is the Head of the Arms Control The British American Security Information Council and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU) at the (BASIC) is an independent think tank and registered Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, and charity based in Central London, promoting has worked in ACDRU since March 1985. He innovative ideas and international dialogue on currently focuses on the Chemical Weapons nuclear disarmament, arms control, and Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin nonproliferation. Since 1987, we’ve been at the Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Comprehensive forefront of global efforts to build trust and Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the UN Secretary- cooperation on some of the world’s most General’s Mechanism, and arms control verification progressive global peace and security initiatives, more generally.