DOCSLIB.ORG

Tickling the Sleeping Dragon's Tail: Should We Resume Nuclear Testing?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tickling the Sleeping Dragon's Tail: Should We Resume Nuclear Testing? TICKLING THE SLEEPING DRAGON’S TAIL Should We Resume Nuclear Testing? National Security Report Michael Frankel | James Scouras | George Ullrich TICKLING THE SLEEPING DRAGON’S TAIL Should We Resume Nuclear Testing? Michael Frankel James Scouras George Ullrich Copyright © 2021 The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory LLC. All Rights Reserved. “Tickling the sleeping dragon’s tail” is a metaphor for risking severe consequences by taking an unnecessary provocative action. Its origin can be traced to the last year of the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in 1946. When investigating the critical mass of plutonium, LANL scientists usually brought two halves of a beryllium reflecting shell surrounding a fissile core closer together, observing the increase in reaction rate via a scintillation counter. They manually forced the two half-shells closer together by gripping them through a thumbhole at the top, while as a safety precaution, keeping the shells from completely closing by inserting shims. However, the habit of Louis Slotin was to remove the shims and keep the shells separated by manually inserting a screwdriver. Enrico Fermi is reported to have warned Slotin and others that they would be “dead within a year” if they continued this procedure. One day the screwdriver slipped, allowing the two half-shells to completely close, and the increased reflectivity drove the core toward criticality. Slotin immediately flipped the top half-shell loose with a flick of the screwdriver, but by then he had endured a lethal burst of fast neutrons. He was dead nine days later. Richard Feynman characterized the activities of the critical mass group as “tickling the tail of a sleeping dragon.” NSAD-R-20-098 TICKLING THE SLEEPING DRAGON’S TAIL iii Contents Figures .........................................................................................................................................................................................v Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................................vii Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 Nuclear Testing Overview ................................................................................................................................ 3 US Nuclear Testing ...........................................................................................................................................................3 A History of Nuclear Test Surprises ......................................................................................................................... 11 Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship and the Certification Process......................................................... 15 Testing Moratoria and Treaties ................................................................................................................................. 17 The Arguments: To Test or Not to Test? .......................................................................................................18 Major Arguments in Favor of Resumption of Testing ...................................................................................... 19 Major Arguments against Resumption of Testing ............................................................................................. 22 Our Bottom Line: To Test or Not to Test? .....................................................................................................27 What Might Change Our Decision? ..............................................................................................................31 Test Readiness ..................................................................................................................................................37 Recommendations ..........................................................................................................................................39 A Final Thought ................................................................................................................................................40 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................................................... 43 Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................................... 49 About the Authors ............................................................................................................................................................... 49 Figures TICKLING THE SLEEPING DRAGON’S TAIL v Figures Figure 1. Worldwide Nuclear Testing ..............................................................................................................................4 Figure 2. US Nuclear Tests 1945–1992 ............................................................................................................................5 Figure 3. Subsidence Craters at the Nevada Test Site with the Sedan Ejecta Crater in the Foreground...6 Figure 4. A Typical Target Chamber for a Horizontal Line-of-Sight Test .............................................................7 Figure 5. Seismic Cavity Decoupling Strength as a Function of Frequency .....................................................8 Figure 6. Sedan Crater at Nevada Test Site Excavated by a Plowshare Test ......................................................9 Figure 7. Castle Bravo Event ............................................................................................................................................ 12 Figure 8. Mk 12 Reentry Vehicle Damage ................................................................................................................... 13 Figure 9. Calculated Electromagnetic Pulse Footprint from a Detonation over the United States ....... 14 Figure 10. Exposure of US Troops during an Atmospheric Test in the 1950s ................................................ 15 Figure 11. Target Chamber of the National Ignition Facility at LLNL with 192 Laser Beams Converging on a Target in the Containment Sphere ....................................................................................... 16 Figure 12. The IMS for Verifying Compliance with the CTBT ............................................................................... 32 Figure 13. 1970 Baneberry Event Venting through Undetected Rock Fissure .............................................. 38 Image credits: Figure 1. Worldwide Nuclear Testing. Data mostly from Arms Control Association, with modifications, “The Nuclear Testing Tally,” fact sheet, last reviewed July 2020,https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ nucleartesttally. Figure 3. Subsidence Craters at the Nevada Test Site with the Sedan Ejecta Crater in the Foreground. From NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) Nevada Field Office,Nevada Test Site Guide, DOE/ NV-715 Rev 1 (Las Vegas: NNSA, March 2005), 58, https://www.nnss.gov/docs/docs_LibraryPublications/ DOENV_715_Rev1.pdf. Figure 4. A Typical Target Chamber for a Horizontal Line-of-Sight Test. From Harold Drollinger, Robert C. Jones, and Thomas F. Bullard, A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, vol. 5, DOE/NV/26383–109 (Las Vegas: NNSA, February 2009), https://doi.org/10.2172/1010604. vi THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY APPLIED PHYSICS LABORATORY Figure 5. Seismic Cavity Decoupling Strength as a Function of Frequency. Reproduced from John R. Murphy and Brian W. Barker, A Comparative Analysis of the Seismic Characteristics of Cavity Decoupled Nuclear and Chemical Explosions, PL-TR-95-2177/SSS-TR-95-14980 (Hanscom Air Force Base, MA: US Air Force Phillips Laboratory, 1995), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA304812.pdf. Figure 6. Sedan Crater at Nevada Test Site Excavated by a Plowshare Test. From NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) Nevada Field Office,Nevada Test Site Guide, DOE/NV-715 Rev 1 (Las Vegas: NNSA, March 2005), https://www.nnss.gov/docs/docs_LibraryPublications/DOENV_715_Rev1.pdf. Figure 7. Castle Bravo Event. From Thomas Kunkle and Byron Ristvet,Castle Bravo: Fifty Years of Legend and Lore, A Guide to Off-Site Radiation Exposures, DTRIAC SR-12-001 (Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, January 2013), https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/ SR-12-001-CASTLE-BRAVO.pdf. Figure 8. Mk 21A Reentry Vehicle Damage after X-Ray Exposure in an Underground Nuclear Test. From Byron Ristvet, “A Brief History of US Nuclear Weapons Testing During the Cold War: 1947–1992,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency briefing, September 11, 2013. Figure 9. Calculated Electromagnetic Pulse Footprint from a Detonation over the United States. Originally from the Department of Defense. Appears in Michael J. Frankel, James Scouras, and George W. Ullrich, The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapon Use, National Security Report NSAD-R-15-020 (Laurel, MD: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2015). Figure 10. Exposure of US Troops during an Atmospheric Test in the 1950s. Federal Government of the United States, public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:Exercise_Desert_Rock_I_(Buster-Jangle_Dog)_002.jpg.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA)
    The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) August 5, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46476 SUMMARY R46476 The Energy Employees Occupational Illness August 5, 2020 Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) Scott D. Szymendera During the Cold War, thousands of Americans worked in the development and testing of the Analyst in Disability Policy nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile. Some of these workers were exposed to radiation, beryllium, silica, and other toxic substances that may have contributed to various medical conditions, including different types of cancer. Enacted in 2000, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA, Title XXXVI of P.L. 106-398) provides cash and medical benefits to former nuclear weapons arsenal workers with covered medical conditions and to their survivors. Part B of EEOICPA provides a fixed amount of compensation and medical coverage to Department of Energy (DOE) employees and contractors, atomic weapons employees, and uranium workers with specified medical conditions, including cancer. Workers with certain radiogenic cancers can access EEOICPA Part B through one of two pathways: dose reconstruction and the Special Exposure Cohort (SEC). Under dose reconstruction, the worker’s individual work history and radiation exposure is evaluated to determine the probability that the worker’s cancer was caused by his or her exposure to ionizing radiation. Under the SEC, workers from the same worksite can petition to be included in the SEC based on the site’s work and exposure history. All members of the SEC with covered cancers are eligible for Part B benefits. Approximately 70% of EEOICPA Part B cancer cases are awarded benefits via the SEC rather than dose reconstruction.
    [Show full text]
  • The United States Nuclear Weapon Program
    /.i. - y _-. --_- -. : _ - . i - DOE/ES4005 (Draft) I _ __ _ _ _____-. 67521 - __ __-. -- -- .-- THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR - %”WEAPQN PROGRA,hik ..I .La;*I* . , ASUMMARYHISTORY \ ;4 h : . ,‘f . March 1983 \ .;_ U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary, Management and Administration Office of The Executive Secretariat History Division -. DOE/ES4005 (Draft) THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPON PROG.RAM: ASUMMARYHISTORY .' . c *. By: . Roger M. Anders Archivist With: Jack M. Hall Alice L. Buck Prentice C. Dean March 1983 ‘ .I \ . U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary, Management and Administration Office of The Executive Secretariat History Division Washington, D. C. 20585 ‘Thelkpaemlt of Energy OqanizationAct of 1977 b-mughttcgether for the first tim in one departxrmtrmst of the Federal GovenmTle?t’s - Programs-With these programs cam a score of organizational ‘ . ? entities,eachwithi+ccxmhistoryandtraditions,frmadozendepart- . .‘I w ’ mnts and independentagencies. The EIistoryDivision,- prepareda . seriesof paqhlets on The Institutional Originsof the De-t of v Eachpamphletexplainsthehistory,goals,and achievemzntsof a predecessoragency or a major prqrm of the -to=-TY* This parquet, which replacesF&ger M. Anders'previous booklet on "The Office of MilitaxxApplication," traces the histoe of the UrL+& Statesnuclearweapx prcgramfrmits inceptionduring World War II to the present. Nuclear weqons form the core of America's m&z defenses. Anders'history describes the truly fo&idable effortscf 5e Atanic Energy Cmmission, the F;nergy Rfzsearch and Develqmlt z4dmCstratian,andtheDep&m- to create adiverse a* sophistica~arsenzl ofnucleaz ~accctqli&mentsofL~se agenciesandtheirplants andlabc J zrsatedan "atanic shie2 WMchp- Psrrericatoday. r kger M. Anders is a trained historianworking in the Eistzq Divisbn.
    [Show full text]
  • (CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1241
    USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal CUWS Outreach Journal 1241 10 November 2016 Feature Item: “AN EVOLVING NARRATIVE: A Report on the Role and Value of U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1989-Today.” Authored by Rebecca Hersman, Clark Murdock, and Shanelle Van; A report of the CSIS International Security Program; Published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS); October 2016; 76 pages. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Evolving-US-Nuclear-Narrative.pdf This study aims to create a dialogue with the nation’s nuclear personnel about the rationales for the U.S. nuclear arsenal that already exist—some of which have been stated at the highest levels of leadership—to ask what the nuclear forces actually hear, what works and what does not, and what motivates them on a daily basis. Over the last few years, many observers, including key Department of Defense (DoD) officials, have commented on the need for DoD to better communicate a more compelling rationale for why the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains essential to the post–Cold War strategy of the United States and to the security of the American people. Those airmen and sailors who comprise the nuclear workforce, and who are asked to dedicate their lives in service of their mission, deserve a persuasive explanation as to why their unwavering stewardship of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will matter as long as these weapons exist in the world. In the assessment of some, including this study’s authors, a coherent narrative about the fundamental role of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Views and Issues America's Atomic Veterans
    THE VIEWS AND ISSUES OF AMERICA’S ATOMIC VETERANS N-001 TRINITY SITE - NEW MEXICO THE FIRST ATOMIC BOMB TEST JULY 16, 1945 ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED OVER HIROSHIMA, JAPAN AUGUST 6, 1945 ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED OVER NAGASAKI, JAPAN AUGUST 9, 1945 N-002 TRINITY TEST - 07-16-45 - 19 KILOTONS N-003 HIROSHIMA 2 MILES FROM THE CENTER OF BLAST 08-07-45 N-004 HIROSHIMA 1.5 MILES FROM THE CENTER OF BLAST 08-07-45 N-005 “ FAT MAN “ DETONATION OVER CITY OF NAGASAKI PHOTO TAKEN BY A JAPANESE RAIL LINE SURVEYOR N-006 NAGASAKI 2.5 MILES FROM CENTER OF BLAST 08-10-45 N-007 NAGASAKI 1.5 MILES FROM CENTER OF BLAST 08-10-45 N-008 BIKINI ATOLL ( MARSHALL ISLANDS ) “ CROSSROADS “ 2 WEAPONS EFFECTS TESTS INVOLVING 42,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL N-009 38 MILES TEST ABLE TEST BAKER THERE WERE 23 ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTED ON BIKINI ATOLL N-010 CROSSROADS “ ABLE “ PHOTO FROM ISLAND CAMERA N-011 CROSSROADS “ BAKER “ PHOTO FROM AIRCRAFT N-012 CROSSROADS “ BAKER “ PHOTO FROM ISLAND CAMERA N-013 BIKINI ATOLL “ SANDSTONE “ 3 TESTS 10,000 + MILITARY PERSONNEL N-014 SANDSTONE “ X-RAY “ - 04-14-48 - BIKINI ATOLL TOWER SHOT 37 KILOTONS N-015 B-29 “ OVEREXPOSED “ AIR CREW BEING CHECKED FOR RADIATION AFTER RETURNING FROM ATOMIC CLOUD SAMPLING MISSION OVER BIKINI ATOLL N-016 NEVADA TEST SITE “ RANGER “ & “ BUSTER- JANGLE “ ( 11 TESTS ) 7,000 + MILITARY PESONNEL - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ENEWETAK ATOLL “ GREENHOUSE “ ( 5 TESTS ) 7,500 + MILITARY PERSONNEL N-017 CAMP DESERT ROCK MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSEMBLED FOR ATOMIC WEAPONS TEST BRIEFINGS N-018 GROUND OBSERVATION TROOPS ON WAY TO THEIR
    [Show full text]
  • Radiation Poisoning , Also Called Radiation Sickness Or a Creeping Dose , Is a Form of Damage to Organ Tissue Due to Excessive Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
    Radiation poisoning , also called radiation sickness or a creeping dose , is a form of damage to organ tissue due to excessive exposure to ionizing radiation . The term is generally used to refer to acute problems caused by a large dosage of radiation in a short period, though this also has occurred with long term exposure. The clinical name for radiation sickness is acute radiation syndrome ( ARS ) as described by the CDC .[1][2][3] A chronic radiation syndrome does exist but is very uncommon; this has been observed among workers in early radium source production sites and in the early days of the Soviet nuclear program. A short exposure can result in acute radiation syndrome; chronic radiation syndrome requires a prolonged high level of exposure. Radiation exposure can also increase the probability of contracting some other diseases, mainly cancer , tumours , and genetic damage . These are referred to as the stochastic effects of radiation, and are not included in the term radiation sickness. The use of radionuclides in science and industry is strictly regulated in most countries (in the U.S. by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ). In the event of an accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, either evacuation or sheltering in place are the recommended measures. Radiation sickness is generally associated with acute (a single large) exposure. [4][5] Nausea and vomiting are usually the main symptoms. [5] The amount of time between exposure to radiation and the onset of the initial symptoms may be an indicator of how much radiation was absorbed. [5] Symptoms appear sooner with higher doses of exposure.
    [Show full text]
  • Atomic Veterans' View Regarding VBDR
    The Atomic Veterans' View Regarding VBDR, Dose Reconstruction and the V. A. Claim Compensation Programs By: R. J. Ritter – C.E.M. Director - National Commander National Association of Atomic Veterans, Inc. February 16, 2007 1. Slide N001 On behalf of America’s atomic veteran community, I am pleased to offer their views, issues, comments and suggestions to the Veteran’s Advisory Board on Dose Re-construction, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, and those interested parties who are with us today. When first asked to prepare this presentation, I found it impossible to adequately convey, those views, concerns and opinions in 30 short minutes. It is well to note that America’s atomic veterans have been attempting, for the last 50+ years, to tell the stories of their experiences to those who have little or no interest in these events. With this in mind, I have selected a series of slides from a ( 90 minute ) public awareness program developed by NAAV, Inc., that will address their core issues within the allotted 30 minute period. This approach will adequately convey the depth, magnitude and importance of those radiation exposure events that were a critical part of their life experiences, and bring to the forefront the root cause for our presence here today. Slide N002 The year 1945 marked the dawn of the age of nuclear weapons, as the Manhattan Project proof tested the world’s first atomic bomb, and the decision by United States to used these atomic weapons to shorten the war in the Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • Radioactivity 60 (2002) 165-187 RADIOACTIVITY
    JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL Journal of ELSEVIER Environmental Radioactivity 60 (2002) 165-187 RADIOACTIVITY An assessment of the reported leakage of anthropogenic radionuclides from the underground nuclear test sites at Amchitka Island, Alaska, USA to the surface environment Douglas Dashera3*,Wayne ans son^, Stan Reada, Scott FalleS, Dennis Farmerc, Wes ~furd~,John Kelleye, Robert patrickf " Aluska Department of Etz~~ironmentalConservation, 610 Liniversitj Avenue, Fairbanks, AK 99709, USA ~at~sonEnvironmentul Research Sercice, Inc.,I902 Yew Street Rd., Bellingham, WA 98226, USA ' U.S. Encironmental Protection Agency Radiation and Indoor Encironments National Laboratory, P.O. Box 98517, La.r P'egrrs, NV 89193, USA d~osAlatnos Nationnl Laboratorj, Clzemical Science and Technology, MS J514, Lo.s Alamos, NM 87545, USA 'Institute of Marine Science, Lini~lersityof' Alasku Fairbanks, Fuirbanks, AK 99775, USA ~1eutinn:~ribil~flslantr' Association, 201 East 3rd Arenue, Ancltoraye, AK 99501, USA Received 14 February 2000; accepted 26 May ZOO0 Abstract Three underground nuclear tests representing approximately 15-16% of the total effective energy released during the United States underground nuclear testing program from 1951 to 1992 were conducted at Amchitka Island, Alaska. In 1996, Greenpeace reported that leakage of radionuclides, 24'~mand 239t'40 Pu, from these underground tests to the terrestrial and freshwater environments had been detected. In response to this report, a federal, state, tribal and non-governmental team conducted a terrestrial and freshwater radiological sampling program in 1997. Additional radiological sampling was conducted in 1998. An assessment of the reported leakage to the freshwater environment was evaluated by assessing 'H values in surface waters and 240~~/239~~ratios in various sample media.
    [Show full text]
  • Bob Farquhar
    1 2 Created by Bob Farquhar For and dedicated to my grandchildren, their children, and all humanity. This is Copyright material 3 Table of Contents Preface 4 Conclusions 6 Gadget 8 Making Bombs Tick 15 ‘Little Boy’ 25 ‘Fat Man’ 40 Effectiveness 49 Death By Radiation 52 Crossroads 55 Atomic Bomb Targets 66 Acheson–Lilienthal Report & Baruch Plan 68 The Tests 71 Guinea Pigs 92 Atomic Animals 96 Downwinders 100 The H-Bomb 109 Nukes in Space 119 Going Underground 124 Leaks and Vents 132 Turning Swords Into Plowshares 135 Nuclear Detonations by Other Countries 147 Cessation of Testing 159 Building Bombs 161 Delivering Bombs 178 Strategic Bombers 181 Nuclear Capable Tactical Aircraft 188 Missiles and MIRV’s 193 Naval Delivery 211 Stand-Off & Cruise Missiles 219 U.S. Nuclear Arsenal 229 Enduring Stockpile 246 Nuclear Treaties 251 Duck and Cover 255 Let’s Nuke Des Moines! 265 Conclusion 270 Lest We Forget 274 The Beginning or The End? 280 Update: 7/1/12 Copyright © 2012 rbf 4 Preface 5 Hey there, I’m Ralph. That’s my dog Spot over there. Welcome to the not-so-wonderful world of nuclear weaponry. This book is a journey from 1945 when the first atomic bomb was detonated in the New Mexico desert to where we are today. It’s an interesting and sometimes bizarre journey. It can also be horribly frightening. Today, there are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the civilized world several times over. Over 23,000. “Enough to make the rubble bounce,” Winston Churchill said. The United States alone has over 10,000 warheads in what’s called the ‘enduring stockpile.’ In my time, we took care of things Mano-a-Mano.
    [Show full text]
  • AGO-Camera Atomica-REV-FINAL-REV.Indd
    Camera Atomica Camera Atomica edited by John O’Brian Contents 6 Foreword Matthew Teitelbaum 8 Acknowledgements John O’Brian 11 Introduction: Through a Radioactive Lens John O’Brian 30 Test and Protest 75 Nuclear Flowers of Hell John O’Brian 107 Posing by the Cloud: US Nuclear Test Site Photography in Process Julia Bryan-Wilson 124 Hiroshima and Nagasaki 151 Hidden and Forgotten Hibakusha: Nuclear Legacy Hiromitsu Toyosaki 165 Atomic Photographs Below the Surface Blake Fitzpatrick 180 Uranium and Radiation 217 Through the Lens, Darkly Iain Boal and Gene Ray 234 Visible and Invisible 269 The Wrong Sun Douglas Coupland 277 Radical Contact Prints Susan Schuppli 292 Atomic Timeline 294 List of Illustrations 304 Colophon This is the corrected version of an essay that originally appeared in Camera Atomica (ed. John O’Brian, Art Gallery of Ontario and Black Dog Publishing, 2015). Quotations should be derived from this version of the text, and not the earlier print version. Posing by the Cloud: US Nuclear Test Site Photography in Process Julia Bryan-Wilson 8 Camera Atomica Fig. 1. United States Department of Energy News Nob, Nevada Test Site, established April 22, 1952, 1952 Julia Bryan-Wilson Posing by the Cloud 9 A cluster of cameras perched on their tripods stare out from a rocky outcropping. [Fig. 1] Boxes of equipment huddle at their feet as men ready the equipment for use. What event have they gathered to capture? What sight are they eagerly facing? This is News Nob, a strategic spot positioned seven miles from the Nevada Test Site that was established in 1952 as a designated area for journalists to photograph the nearby atomic detonations.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Weapons Technology 101 for Policy Wonks Bruce T
    NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY FOR POLICY WONKS NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS BRUCE T. GOODWIN BRUCE T. GOODWIN BRUCE T. Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory August 2021 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS BRUCE T. GOODWIN Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory August 2021 NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY 101 FOR POLICY WONKS | 1 This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-11-3 LCCN-2021907474 LLNL-MI-823628 TID-61681 2 | BRUCE T. GOODWIN Table of Contents About the Author. 2 Introduction . .3 The Revolution in Physics That Led to the Bomb . 4 The Nuclear Arms Race Begins. 6 Fission and Fusion are "Natural" Processes . 7 The Basics of the Operation of Nuclear Explosives. 8 The Atom . .9 Isotopes . .9 Half-life . 10 Fission . 10 Chain Reaction . 11 Critical Mass . 11 Fusion . 14 Types of Nuclear Weapons . 16 Finally, How Nuclear Weapons Work . 19 Fission Explosives . 19 Fusion Explosives . 22 Staged Thermonuclear Explosives: the H-bomb . 23 The Modern, Miniature Hydrogen Bomb . 25 Intrinsically Safe Nuclear Weapons . 32 Underground Testing . 35 The End of Nuclear Testing and the Advent of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship . 39 Stockpile Stewardship Today . 41 Appendix 1: The Nuclear Weapons Complex .
    [Show full text]
  • Foundation Document Manhattan Project National Historical Park Tennessee, New Mexico, Washington January 2017 Foundation Document
    NATIONAL PARK SERVICE • U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Foundation Document Manhattan Project National Historical Park Tennessee, New Mexico, Washington January 2017 Foundation Document MANHATTAN PROJECT NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK Hanford Washington ! Los Alamos Oak Ridge New Mexico Tennessee ! ! North 0 700 Kilometers 0 700 Miles More detailed maps of each park location are provided in Appendix E. Manhattan Project National Historical Park Contents Mission of the National Park Service 1 Mission of the Department of Energy 2 Introduction 3 Part 1: Core Components 4 Brief Description of the Park. 4 Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 5 Los Alamos, New Mexico . 6 Hanford, Washington. 7 Park Management . 8 Visitor Access. 8 Brief History of the Manhattan Project . 8 Introduction . 8 Neutrons, Fission, and Chain Reactions . 8 The Atomic Bomb and the Manhattan Project . 9 Bomb Design . 11 The Trinity Test . 11 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan . 12 From the Second World War to the Cold War. 13 Legacy . 14 Park Purpose . 15 Park Signifcance . 16 Fundamental Resources and Values . 18 Related Resources . 22 Interpretive Themes . 26 Part 2: Dynamic Components 27 Special Mandates and Administrative Commitments . 27 Special Mandates . 27 Administrative Commitments . 27 Assessment of Planning and Data Needs . 28 Analysis of Fundamental Resources and Values . 28 Identifcation of Key Issues and Associated Planning and Data Needs . 28 Planning and Data Needs . 31 Part 3: Contributors 36 Appendixes 38 Appendix A: Enabling Legislation for Manhattan Project National Historical Park. 38 Appendix B: Inventory of Administrative Commitments . 43 Appendix C: Fundamental Resources and Values Analysis Tables. 48 Appendix D: Traditionally Associated Tribes . 87 Appendix E: Department of Energy Sites within Manhattan Project National Historical Park .
    [Show full text]
  • The Weird Nukes of Yesteryear
    The Cold War produced some oddball weapons. Here are three of them. The “Davy Crockett,” shown here mounted on a tripod at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, was the smallest nuclear warhead ever developed by the US. The Weird Nukes DOD photo end of a series of thermonuclear bombs initiated in 1950. This followed the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb of Yesteryear in 1949, several years before Western By Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris intelligence agencies expected such an event. y the time the Cold War reached some concern about whether they could It was the era of “bigger is better.” its height in the late 1960s, the be carried in aircraft, due to size. The The zenith of “big bombs” would be American nuclear arsenal had “Little Boy” dropped on Hiroshima seen on Oct. 30, 1961, when the Soviet grown to more than 31,000 tipped the scales at 9,700 pounds, and Union detonated (at Novaya Zemlya in Bweapons. The Army, Navy, Air Force, the “Fat Man” dropped on Nagasaki the Arctic) a thermonuclear bomb that and even the Marine Corps worked weighed 10,300 pounds. The immediate produced an explosion equivalent to to acquire weapons for the “nuclear follow-on bombs were about the same 58 megatons—the largest man-made battlefield,” whether in the air, on the size or smaller. explosion ever achieved. Soviet Premier ground, on water, or underwater. However, the development of ther- Nikita Khrushchev would later write Three of the more unusual—and in monuclear or hydrogen bombs led to in his memoirs: “It was colossal, just the end impractical—of these weapons much larger weapons, with the largest incredible! Our experts later explained were the enormous Mk 17 hydrogen US nuclear weapon being the Mk 17 to me that if you took into account the bomb, the Navy’s drone anti-submarine hydrogen bomb.
    [Show full text]