The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations
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Acknowledgement The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) wishes to acknowledge the advice and assistance received in the preparation of this document from: Dr Geoff Ballard Chief Executive, Safety and Reliability Directorate Dr Donald Broadbent Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford Dr Roger Clarke Director of the National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) Mr H J Dunster CB Former Deputy Director General of HSE and former Director of NRPB Professor Bev Littlewood Director of the Centre for Software Reliability, City University, London Dr David Slater Chief Inspector, HM lnspectorate of Pollution and Mr Brian Street Non executive Chairman of Air Products plc. The document was produced by a working group under the chairmanship of Mr J D Rimington CB, Director General of HSE and including, besides the above, Dr S A Harbison, Head of Nuclear Safety Division and Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, HSE, and other HSE officials. The tolerability of risk from nuclear power stations Contents Introduction 7 Risk and the tolerability of risk 2 The regulation of industrial risk 4 Broad principles of risk assessment 12 The harm from radiation 15 The risks in the normal operation of nuclear installations 20 The risk of nuclear accidents 21 Discussion of tolerable risk 29 Conclusion 33 Appendices 1 The specification of risk 35 2 Comparisons of risk 37 3 The application of cost benefit analysis to nuclear safety assessment 48 4 Consideration of societal risk for certain non-nuclear hazards 54 References 59 Further reading 60 London: HMSO O Crown copyright I988 Revised 1992 Applications for reproduction should be made to OPSI (formerly HMSO) (ii) INTRODUCTION received in November 1988, stating their intention to review the document and possibly to republish it in some updated form, taking account of comment. 1 This document originates in a recommendation by Sir Frank Layfield, in his 5 Subsequently, the document received a close report of the Sizewell B Public lnquiry (1986) that public examination at the lnquiry by Mr Michael the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) should Barnes QC into the application to build a new 'formulate and publish guidelines on the tolerable nuclear power station at Hinkley Point 2. As a result levels of individual and social risk to workers and the lnquiry Report made a number of observations the public from nuclear power stations.' He said as to the standards to be applied to a station to be 'the opinion of the public should underlie the built at Hinkley. By and large, the report accepted evaluation of risk; there is at present insufficient the document as a clear and accurate exposition public information to allow understanding of the of the risks, and of the standards applied by HSE basis for the regulation of nuclear safety.' He through its Nuclear Installations lnspectorate (NII). recommended 'that as a first step, HSE should publish a document on the basis of which public, 6 Sir Frank Layfield had also recommended in expert and Parliamentary opinion could be 1986 that a review should be carried out of the expressed.' Safety Assessment Principle (SAPs) applied by the NII in reviewing designs or modifications of 2 This attitude to industrial risk, and in nuclear power stations. This has since been done. particular the use of the word 'tolerable' was new. Obviously, the detailed principles applied in Until that time, discussion of the extent of the risks, the revised SAPs need both to reflect and follow to people or to the environment from industrial on from the account of the standards described in undertakings tended to be regarded as a matter for the Tolerability document, which themselves experts. Many experts believed, and some still describe the overall safety aims pursued by HSE. believe, that the quantification of risks is too So the Health and Safety Commission have uncertain and too difficult a matter for people decided that the two documents should be generally to grasp. Others openly said, and some republished in a single series, taking account both still do, that most ordinary people only wish to of public comment and of the conclusions of the believe that there is no risk at all from such two major inquiries. undertakings, are probably not interested in finding out what exactly the risks are, and that to carry on 7 This does not mean that the SAPs can never a public discussion on the subject simply provokes be adapted to new circumstances. On the objections to things that people are not in reality contrary, it will be necessary to develop the bothered about. detailed approach so far adopted by NII in relation to any new designs proposed for nuclear power 3 But in fact many people are bothered about stations in the UK having regard to the approach nuclear power and other industrial risks and have adopted in other countries, so far as seems become more so during the years since Sir Frank sensible and safe. It seems right however, at a Layfield wrote his report'. The Health and Safety time when no such proposals are in immediate Commission and Executive believe that the public prospect, to bring up to date the thinking that has ought to have available to them an accurate applied so far, and to republish, in the Tolerability account of important industrial risks and how they document, the overall approach and standards are controlled. In response therefore to Sir Frank which the Health and Safety Commission and HSE Layfield's recommendation, HSE produced the first intend should apply, whatever changes may in version of this document (the Tolerability future be made in the approach described in the document) in February 1988, comparing the extent SAPs. of the nuclear risks with other risks and stating what measures and standards are applied to their 8 In the meantime the approach and reduction. philosophy described in the original Tolerability document is increasingly applied to the regulation 4 The Commission invited public comment on of other major industrial risks in the UK, and has the document, and published all the comments attracted world-wide attention. That does not mean that precisely the same limits are applied to all 'Risk' is the chance and the consequences taken risks as to the nuclear risk. As the document together. In common speech we quite often use explains, hazards and risks differ from industry to the word 'risk' as referring more to the industry and some are arguably more readily consequence than to the probability. So, for acceptable, and the associated risks more example, if we see a steeplechaser going for a tolerable, than others. But the need to be clear high fence we may say 'that's risky' meaning not what the risks are, how they compare with other so much that there is a high probability of it being risks and hazards and within what limits they struck, but that it will have nasty consequences if should be regulated, is invariable. this does happen. And indeed, there are three components to be considered in estimating any 9 So this document, like its predecessor, is a risk - the probability (eg, whether there is a 'high straightforward account written for the general risk' or not), the event to which probability public. It begins by discussing how people attaches, and the severity of the consequences. normally approach risk. It shows how industrial All of these components are implicit in any risks, and in particular nuclear risks, are regulated discussion of risk but need to be made quite in the UK. It explains the nature of the risk from explicit when considering societal risk (see radiation and how risk is calculated when deciding paragraph 61 and beyond). to licence nuclear installations. It is written in a spirit that final judgements about whether a given 13 Whenever we do something that involves risk is tolerable are not matters for experts alone, taking a risk - even stepping off a pavement when but for the people who have to bear the risks, and there is traffic - we usually do so because we who are therefore entitled to be given the best believe we can see some benefit that outweighs it. possible technical advice about them. We are likely to take the consequence for granted, to estimate the risk, however instinctively, and then see if we can reduce or avoid it. These simple principles apply also to the much more wide- RlSK AND TOLERABILITY OF RISK ranging risks this publication discusses. 10 'Tolerability' does not mean 'acceptability'. It 14 Besides the risks each of us willingly takes to refers to a willingness to live with a risk so as to secure benefits we want, we face a degree of risk secure certain benefits and in the confidence that it from naturally occurring hazards. There is, for is being properly controlled. To tolerate a risk example, a chance of one in ten million* each year means that we do not regard it as negligible or that any one of us will be killed by lightning. something we might ignore, but rather as Because lightning generally kills only one person something we need to keep under review and at a time, and the risk to each of us is very low, we reduce still further if and as we can. For a risk to treat it as negligible; ie apart from taking certain be 'acceptable' on the other hand means that for simple precautions the possibility of dying in this purposes of life or work, we are prepared to take it way does not influence our behaviour. pretty well as it is. 15 We all know three other important things Risk: some basic considerations about risk.