/.i. - y _-. --_- -. : _ - . i - DOE/ES4005 (Draft) I ______-. 67521 - __ __-. -- -- .--

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR - %”WEAPQN PROGRA,hik ..I .La;*I* . , ASUMMARYHISTORY \ ;4 h :

.

,‘f .

March 1983

\ .;_ U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary, Management and Administration Office of The Executive Secretariat History Division -. DOE/ES4005 (Draft)

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPON PROG.RAM: ASUMMARYHISTORY .' . c

*.

By: . Roger M. Anders Archivist

With: Jack M. Hall Alice L. Buck Prentice C. Dean

March 1983

‘ .I

\ . . . U.S. Department of Energy Assistant Secretary, Management and Administration Office of The Executive Secretariat History Division Washington, D. C. 20585 ‘Thelkpaemlt of Energy OqanizationAct of 1977 b-mughttcgether

for the first tim in one departxrmtrmst of the Federal GovenmTle?t’s

- Programs-With these programs cam a score of organizational ‘ . ? entities,eachwithi+ccxmhistoryandtraditions,frmadozendepart-

. .‘I w ’ mnts and independentagencies. The EIistoryDivision,- prepareda . . seriesof paqhlets on The Institutional Originsof the De-t of

v Eachpamphletexplainsthehistory,goals,and achievemzntsof

a predecessoragency or a major prqrm of the -to=-TY*

This parquet, which replacesF&ger M. Anders'previous booklet on

"The Office of MilitaxxApplication," traces the histoe of the UrL+&

Statesnuclearweapx prcgramfrmits inceptionduring World War II to

the present. Nuclear weqons form the core of America's m&z defenses. Anders'history describes the truly fo&idable effortscf 5e

Atanic Energy Cmmission, the F;nergy Rfzsearch and Develqmlt z4dmCstratian,andtheDep&m- to create adiverse a*

sophistica~arsenzl ofnucleaz ~accctqli&mentsofL~se

agenciesandtheirplants andlabc J zrsatedan "atanic shie2

WMchp- Psrrericatoday. r

kger M. Anders is a trained historianworking in the Eistzq

Divisbn. Although whenever pssible he has checked his work K%C-;:

appropriateoffices within the De-t, the author, and the CCef Historian ultitely detemined the conicentand conclusionsof L!7e

study* The paqhlet is the product of teamork within the Hiszz~~ Division,and the authorjoins IE in thankingAJice Buck,prentice Dean,

J&e Raines, and Travis Hulsey for their unflaggingskill, cheer- fulness,andhardwork

It is our hope that this paxqhletwill prove useful both to

De~talparsonnel and the public. _- ______._ ...... -. ..-- _--_- - _ -- I

c

,

.,’ l-l r-l In P W =t 2 2 ;;f A z Ki % x G m s; G 2 ts

. . . 9 * ...... * ...... * ...... l ...... 0 ...... l ...... * . . .* ...... a ...... e ...... 9 ...... $ ...... IG ...... 9 . . g ...... B . . . . . 2 ...... ‘3 . . . . . +J . . . f . 2 ...... l . . . . q . i . d, ...... m ...... +; . . . 2 . . . . k . . . . a . -i i . i . . IQ ...... * . 8 . IT . . . . I? ?ii . . I . Ti . ‘cd . ri I illh . . I3 ; . e: . . ‘il . . % . . . . 2 . ii . . . $ . iI . . 5!i B . . g . . B . . . . . 9 . 3 3 CH . d B ih PC8 . 1 PC 1 . . . d I . iI t: . . . I I I I . . e-i 3 4 . . . 6 j 8 . . . l-l B . ii . . # ci 6 ‘ii! 2 4 2 . . . II ii . .!z ul c tr, 5 I . . 9 . y . ‘it 8 . , 1 .!T d a cc! B B . . 2 iI Y . a d , , Ii ‘3 El8 % B a k B 8 4 fi IQ 3 B -2 1 ii! 8 IFi4 1- i3p P t 1i! Ii1 1 The origins of the UniM.States' nuclearweaponpxqramcanbe

tracedto the discuveryof fissionin 1939. After scientistsdiscover&

(_ that an atan ofuraniuxnaxldbe split,they also realizedthatfission. . could release huge +munts of energy. If a fission bmb could be

devel~,weapxsoftrm=ndous explosivepower couldbeprcduced. The

weapms potential of fission was as apparent to American nuclear

physicistsas to their counm in Nazi Germany.' Because Geman

scientists disuvered fission,Hitler semzd to have a si~Lficant

headstart on the road to a weapn which could terrorize Eursp an2

perhaps even the United States. Amzrican scientistsorganized them

selves into research teams* anurgateffort todevelop an atcLc bmb

beforeGemany. Hitler'sattackonPol.andandthe fall of France _cUele2

their efforks. whentheunitedStatesen~~thewarinDec~.1941,

researchers dkecked by scientist-administratorsVann~BushandJ~~s

B. t35nant.

L un&r @JpJ& Tpc1;o -the Manhattsn Ehgineer District _-

Grovesbuilttheplants and laboratoriesrequired toprcduceabak.At Oak Ridge,Tennessee, Grmes' engineerserected a huge gaseousdif,lsicn plant to prckce enricheduranic. At Eanford,Washiqton they t=,lt t!!ee reactorsto prcEuce the recentlydiscmered fissionableelmex plutonim. Finally at Los Alms Groves created a weapm lakrz~r~

under the directionof' J. F&x-t 0_3_=ztnheirrertc design atmic '-5. ..c.-c w~bzr and his colleagueswere c~rkin th$ a ,,cjun"km5 -_-.:' P uraniumwuld work but feared that an implosionbc& using plutorhm might fizzle. Therefore,they conducted the world's first nuclear weapon test at Alamgordo, New Maxicc in July 1945. The Tr5nitv shot wss a dramtic successand the ixplosionbmb, called"Fat Man" teas used on Nagasakion August 9, 1945,-three days after the “gun” lxrn?S, czlkd

"Little Boy" was used on Hiroshima. The atmic bcxbs leveled both 2 citiesand ended the war in the Pacific.

America now debat& hm tc manage the awesane power of attic energy* The debate'centered on congressionalefforts to create an .agencyto direct nuclear research and developmnt. One of the m* controversialLkueswaswhethertoentrustthe atcm to a civilianor to amilitary wency. Decidbigtoentrusttheatcmto civilians,Congress passed tie Atmic EnergyAct which President Truman signedon August 1,

1946. The Act established a five mnbar axmissiok and assignedto the

CZczmissicnall atmic eneqy facilitiesandprogram. The AtunicDle-qy

Act admmished the Carmissionto manage the atm "subjectat all~3ztas to the paramunt abjective of assuring the camm defense and security."3The congressionalmandatemeant thatdevelopingandtesting nuclearweapcns would be the firstpriority of the Atark Eneqy Cuks-

Sian. To assure that the Cmmission factored military needs tit3 weaFonP=F=%the Act created a military liaison cmrnitteetc+LCi. repcrtedbothtcthe Cmmission and the Secretxy of Defewe. m provide Congressionalchecks and balances over the atic energy F-V q, the Act also created a Joint CongressionalCczmittee on Attic

E==9Y* Before the Cmmission assumedcontrol of the atom, the Navy mr.cY: to Imcx what the attic bmb would do t=,a mdern fleet. 73.eKxI!-~c-L~

3 Eqineer District acaxdingly axranged the Crossroads test at Bikini

atoll. TwObc& weredetonatedneara ,,fleet"consisting of captured

Germn and Japanese warships, a variety of other surfacevessels, and

sukxnarines.For apublicccnditionedtoequatetheatomicbm-bswith

the devastationof entire cities,the Mqaratively few ships sunk or

damaged were a let-down. Afterwards,m congressmenquestionedthe i I 'need to hold the Crossroadstest atalL A coordinatedplan for

developingatcmic weapons and investigatingtheir effectswould have to

waituntilthenewCcmi.ssioncmld organize.

The New Camnissionand the Cold War

The Atmic Eneqy Ccxmissionofficially assured its duties on

January 1, 1947. The Cmnission delegatedresponsibility for nucleaz

weapon developmentto the division of military application. The

divisim establishedprogram for the research,~develop-ent, and prsr

duction of &clear weapons,andinterpretedmilitaqrequiremntsfor

thepr&uctionofatanicbmbs totheCarmission.5 _ Intemationalevents soonlenturgencytothew=ponp~a=

TensionsbeM2en the United States and the soviet Union had spkt t5e

Grand Allianceof World War II and had begun the Cold War. The Cm-

IluJnist guerillas under MqoTse-TqthenbroughtQzinaintotheSm-iet

oxbit. Simul~ly CanTnmist guerrillas threatened to enguE Greece

andperhaps thewhole eastern Nediterranean. ACXXpin Februazry1948

installedaC4mnunist ~ovwmwinczechoslovakia,and a few ~0:C,;:s

later the Sovietsshut off the land routesto Berlin. PresidentT5.s~ equatedStalinwithHit&randdetexknedtostandup to the Camz-st threats"

3 W-g PresidentTruman that the United States'stzly of atomic

weayns was not adqua- to met the security reqizments, the

ccsnrnissionwent to work/ In the next few years the Ccmission con-

vexed an obsolete oak Ridge plant to the prcduc?&m of weaponspar&; c. solv3d operating problems pla&ing Hanford reactors; put plutonium p1~03~don on an efficientbasis; and decidedto build 6~ rmre reactors r: at HanfoA. The Ccmnissionalso steppedup the p?cductionof enriched

uxmtium frm the Oak Ridge gaseous diffusionplants and mved weapm

ordnancewrk frmI;osAlams to the Sandia laboratoryin Albuquerqe,

New &co, allming Los Alams to concmtrate on weapon research.

Finally,the Mssion establisheda provinggrounds at EnewetakAtoll

in the Pacific,sche&Aing its first test series,tied Sandstone,for

the @ring of 1948. 'I% Sandstoneseries was a technicalsuccess 2nd

enabled the (+rmissiontz double the smll stoc@ile of b&x.' 3 response to the Soviet ,*xt, the Cmmission had taken weapn ?rc-

duction‘outofthe laboratory&>d had put it on an assezrbly-linebasis.

After the Berlin crisis tit bmission decided to add a t!-k-5

gaseousdif-iuion plant to the Oak Ridge axrplex. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff, hmever, determined in May 1949 that the riefenseEq!aLm.t

needed far mxe b&x than Ccmission ,-la&s could then pmduce. c15Lo

Joint Chiefs's requixdts mant that tz Gmnission would have zz

build a fourthgaseous diffc?sion plant at Oak Ridge and redesignone cf

the new reactorsat Hanford. The news that F?ussiahad set off an a*~Lc

explosionon Pqust 29 'shockedthe nation and L3xched off a d3‘"a:e within'the govezmmt over whether to develop a hy3ogen bc&. X-x

both tie &mission and the NationalSecurity Council bd conside_% 2~3 issue, president Trumn ordered the &mission to proceed Lzt!-.the

develaprwt of a hydrogenbcrrb on January31, -1950.*

The President'S order put the &mnission in a diffic_Lt-position.

T0pmducethelarge gmntities of tritimthatthe hyd.rcgenIxxrbwould requiz, the CMrnissionwould have to reduce plutorim productionat

Hanford and switch reactorsto tritium produ&on. if PlUtonium PrO- , . of weqc?S.~-!Che Comnission ’ ductimdropped,somu&dtheproduction * . decided in May 1950, therefore,to build b4c reactorsat a w site

The Korean War

On June 25, 1950,North Xorez fcrcesattacked South Korea. Within

days the tited States had cm-:sted air, naval, and ground forces tc

the Korean War. Once again"*_.=x&ion was at war and the Joint Chiefs

ofstaffhadto sendwhat fed zserves oftrainedinfantryunits.+4rwrica

possessed into action. ?eT.zxJseof fears that the Korean war easily

muldescalate into a general war, the Ccmission felt men greater

urgencyfor the nucl;-srwn program.

PresidentTrxan soon decided to reinforceoverstretched American

bmops with ata& mscle. With the "very safetyof the nation . . .

in the bahrxe,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the Cmmissicn to

transferrmnuclear weapon cmponents to militarybases in the United

Kingdan in early July. Caly nuclearcores would then have to be rLsfi&

acrosc the Atlantic shouldthe Cmmmists attackinEurope. Becausez!!

process of aming the b&xi 'znd loading them onto airplaneswas so

pxderous , the‘nuve constitu+A a significantincrease in Amzicz calbat readhess. Concurrentlythe Cmmission agreed to transfer nonnucl~ vents to "an advancebase in the Pacific."10

TheKor~~~mralsostimlatedadramticexpansion of the plmts

which produceduranium and plutonium for nuclear~ns. On August 8,

1950, PresidentTruman ordered'the &mission and the Depa?mentOf

Defense to stug?y requirrts "to increasethe output of fiss&nable

material in the innediate future.” The ctzanissionand the De-t

fox&a jointworkinggroupwhichremmendedthattheCmnissimbuild a new gaseous diffkion plant cacplex (later erected at Paducah,

Kentucky) and add three mre reactors to the Savannah River plant.

Totalcapital~ditieforthe expansioncame to $1.4 billion - the

cost of all the facilitieserected by the ManhattanEngineer District

duringWorld War II. PresidentTruman approvedthe plan on Cctober 9, .

1950?

After initbl reverses,American soldiers m the North Korean

advance, then mmterattacked, and IargelydestroyedtheNorthKorw~ army- As PresidentTruman orderedthe 1950 expansionprogram, American soldierslaunched their victoriouspursuit into North Korea. Within a

mnth, hmever, Cmmmist China sent her armies into the war, we--

running sme -can mits and inflictinga bloody defeat on others. Outnmbezd by the Chine&e and surpxisedby thei- sudden assault,the

, krericansretreated fran North Korea. The Korean police action had

kcaEanund~laredwar. Grimly, the Presidmt declared a natiorzi

ezrtergencyon Dece&er 16, 1950.

The national ex-ergencyjustified testing nuclear weq0n.s within th.2

a3n*&ental Ukted States. Weapn developznt had nm becm~ so so$his-

ticated that it becam possible to plan tests to resolvespecific design

r prcklemi. Shiltaneouslythe Korean War hadnBdetheEhewetakproving

groundsrathervulunerableinadditiontobeingvery expensivein tems

ofmilitaqresources. Twodaysaffhedeched the national aEr-

gency, PresidentTruman approved the Camission's reccmrwdation to

b. estklish a continentalproving ground at the Las vqasbarbingand ” gunnery range inNevada. One of the chief advantagesof the Las Vqas , . site was that using it posed fewer radiolcqiml hazards to Amrimns

thananyoftheothersites considered.DuetotheKoreanemergencythe

Camissicn began plarhingits first continentaltest serieson a

20, 1950, and conducted the first test explosiona littleover a mnth

later. The test series,&ed operationFknger, eventually consisted of six test shots,a.ll of them of relativelysmall yields,and pmvided

i3igQrtant data fo? fissionweapons and for the thexmnucleax program

tests scheduled for the Pacificin April.12

Quicke.?.?qthePaceofTesting

- i I thehydrog~b&p&qramwasfl-ing. calculEkio3s

byI;osAhmx mathemticianStanislaw Ulamdemnstratedthata proposed

designforthehydrogenbahwuldnotignite a fusionreaction. A few

we&la~Ulamsuggestedanewapproachand byAprilEiward Tellerhad

gzspedthekeytostarthgthefusion reaction. A successful

L experbst in the spring test series cmfkmed that Teller was on the 13 ri*ttrack. l ,/ The sping test series, called Gree&ouse,was conductedin the

Pzcificin Fpril and May 1951, The series was designed to test desig principlesfor fissionweapons, and because of Teller's recent ide2,

wuld 5e an3xrqmt~t miiestone in the develwt of th~~nuclezr -* Greenhome, whiti produced the largest atmiic explosionto

that date, providedccnvincingprcof of the soundnessof Teller’s design

for the hydrogenbcmb. So e+ensive and catplexwere the logisticsfor

the Pacifictest seriesthat Greenhouse consmad the effortsof approxi- mately 6,000 militaxyand civiJianpersonnel, and .2,580scientists md 14 techniciansfrmtheCamission. c Cmmission scientistsguickly analyzedthe Greenhousedata. To

coordinate the finaldrive forthehydrog~barbtheCami.ssioncalle-da

conferenceat PrincetonUniversity in June 1951. Mee+hg for &o days

the Csmissioners and key scientistsdiscussed every aspect of t!!

thermnuclear program All agreed - "successwas at last possible."

T!bescientists could tik on the last leg of the jouxney with a

feelingof confidence. Yet the hydrogm bomb had caused bitter tivi-

sions among scientistsover both the ethicsof buildingthe fusim *b

and the resourceswhich the thexmnuclear pro&m would czcmnandf_-=rr,

other priorities. Neversatisfiedwith the resourcesallocated to ',ie

hydmgenba&prograxn,EdwardTellerfimlly resignedfrunIos Alaccs ic

Septe&er 1951. He redned close to the program, hmever, 25 a

Thetechniti- at Ranger and Greenhouseraised gueticx

about the rate ofthepmductionof enricheduraniumandplutoniuzn,Tne

rapid stridesin developingfissionweapom resultedin greaterd~a.ks

for both types of fissionablem&erials. As the Camission considezz ,i the issue, SenatorBrien M&%hon, Cbaiman of the Joir+tCmrnittrw cz

Atmic Ene?qy,asked the Ccmission "to estimte the cost of (a) izcz~~c-

ing by50 percent, (b) doubling,and (c) increasingby 150

existing and presently plamed capacity for prcducing matexial and atqnic Ix&s." So cmplex were the 'issues 8 -n's request that the Camission put togethera m ko hrepare,

another expansionstudy. Cost estimatesfor the programranged fran $2 billion to $7 billion. Afftersuhnittinga~rttoSenatorMdQhon,

the Cairnissionreferred the expansionprogramto the Natimal SemriQ

*. Co‘mciP . While the Camission debated whether to build new pmductim

. facilities,it conducted a second contin~tal.test _series,called

Buster-Jangle. Already continental tests had -beME cmplex. In

test weapon effectsfor the Dt of Defenseand the Federal Civil

Defense Administration.TheDepartmkof Defense sent a 5,000 mn regimzntalcm&at team and 3,450 observerstotheprovinggroundsto

train the soldiersfor atmic warfare. The Ccmnissionwas responstiie

for the radiolcgicalsafety of the soldiersas well as for the Whni-

cianswhostudiedthe effedtsof the blasts. Sohastilyhadsarrreofthe

military experimzntsbeendevisedthatthe Ccmnissicmtstest mriiger

advised the Cmnission that it should assure ca@ete control of all 17 future test series. Despite his admnitim, however, the militaxy

retahed control of its vixmts and mtu.aUy asmu& reqcmi- bility for th& radiologicalsafety 'n~asurestaken to protect the soldierswhotrainedfor~atanicwarfare. l . Fissionweapn advancesfueled the expansiondesatewithinboth the

Joint Cmnittee and the Ccmission. Meeting on January 16, 1952, the . . .’ %ational Security Council approved a second major expansionof the

Carmission's p,-ocictionfacilities. The program,sc.kCdd for cwle-

tion in 1957, cost an estimated $4.9 billion and added an additicrzl gaseousdiffusion plant to the 0ak Ridge carplexand two new plants '-3

0 the Paducahaqlex. Baddition,atj&d gaseous diffusionm~@ex has

erectedatPor&muth, Ohio. 33 increaseplutonium productionWo new 10 largereactorswereadded to the Hanfordccx~@ex.~~

Edward Teller,wamhile, continuedto press for a secondwea_m

re,sex& laboratory. Failing to convincethe &mission, he took his

, campEigntotheJoint~t~onAtamic~ergyandthe~~tof Defense. By late March 1952,he had won so many allies.thatthe Ccmnis-

sion concludedit would have to build &other Qeapon researchl&m-a- . tory. The Comnissionpicked Livermre, Californiaas the site and by Septerhrthelaboratoq~asare.ality. 19

As the Ccmission activatedits secmd weapcm laboratorythe pace

of tfzting accelerated. The proximityof the Nevada Test Site to Los

Alarms allwed laboratoryscientists to cmnute easily beWee test

seriesand laboratory planning. By April 1, 1952, the &mission bega a third con~~ental series of weapon tests, called 3mbler-Snae. Again the :rieldswere relativelysmz3.l. Again the Cmmission wnductx?

military effects tests and units of soldiersmaneuvered across the

desert after severalshots. At TUmbler-Snapper,hmwer,the ccm;rissim

shared radiologicalsafety responsibilityfor the soldierswith the

Army. For the first tim the Cmrrissioninvited a limited rxmbex cf

newsmento witnessand fhn the April 22, 1952 shot in or&r to give t!?e &nsrican people first-hand.knmledge of an atmic explosion. Te

&mission had finallyCcmpleM pemment facilitiesat the test site and had established an tinsive off-site radiation rrunitsring .20 ne%mrk. I

The mnitoring network, which could track fallout

nation,had been estzblishedby the Cmmission's divisionof

medicine. 'RE divisionprovided the &mission with advice frm tical experts onthehazards andeffects ofradiationaswell astithanalyses

of the data capturedby the radiationmonitoring network. Toprovide

the scientificfoundation for data gleanedfrm the n-onitoringnetirk,

the ditision supemisedseveralresearchprogramswfiichinvestigated

. 'radiationeffects. The divis2on gave the Comnissionatice on the

effects of fallout for a-spheric and later for undergmmd test

1 . series.

In Novenber 1952,,the Oxmission successfullytested a therm-

nucleexdevice in the PacificIvy series,called Mike. Thevzimntal

device prodxed a blast of 10.4 megato,ns,mre than 500 f;zs lzger

than the Trinty shot. Mike was so powerfulthat the eqlosion which

blew the island of Elugelabfrcmn the 'faceof the earth could be sm 21 hundredsof miles away. The world had enteredthe thezmnuclearage, but theCmrnissionhad yet to createa deliverablethemmnuclear.weapcr,.

Pxducing Nuclear wEqms

The Comission's testingprogram was only one part of the nuclear

=ponpv. The Cm-mission also es+Alished syst%mt.icweqm researchand dwelmt, and built plants to pr&uce enricheduraCz.,

plutmium, and‘nonnuclearweapon qxnts. Oh E!ch 21, 1953, the

Camission and the De-t of Defense sighed an agreementw?Lch delineatedtheir roles in building nuclear weapcns. The Cartn.+sicz would dwelop and produceweapons zo militaryspecifications established

by the Defense Da-t. Since 1953 nuclear weapoL?s 22 developedand producedjoir+a; under this agreement.

The &mission carpleted the fissionablematerials

plants ahead of schedule. The fizst two SavannahRiver reactcrs*L> produc?z.ionin 1953 and the other three started up a yez later. ?_. m_ > early 1954 the Paducahgaseous diffusion plants were producingenriched

urtimandby~ thePortmouthplantswereinoperation. The

izm largeE&mfordreactorswentintooperationin1955. Thereafter, the &mission consistentlyexceeded goals for the productionof fissionable

. mthals.23

As the Ccmxissionpro&c& more enricheduraniumard plutoniumit

built additional plants to assesbleweapons. TheCmtGsim erected . plants formanufacturingweaponparts in Pocky Flats, Colorado (1952).,

Kansas City, Missouri (1952),Burlington, Iowa (1952),Yiamisburg, Ohio

(1955),and Pinellas,Florida (1957),and also opened a weapon assenbly

plantinAmrill0, Texas in 1952. Weapon engineeringfo* the Livemore

Laboratorywasconcentrated inaLivemcrebranch of Sandialaboratories 24 in 1958.

Theprodu&ionandassexblyplantspra%ced alargeweapon stock-

. pile. By 1953 assembledweapons were being turned over to the mi1itca-y

and by 1956 mst of the stockpilewas in ,the physical, if n@: the

fomal, cmtrolof the Defense Depar&mt. The Cmmission, hcwever,

continuedtoexerciseits sta~toryresponsibilitytomintain safe,but reliableweapons. Uthestoc)pile grew, the number of nuclearweapc~s being transportedand stored around the corn+++ increased. To prepare for the remte possibilitythat a transit or storage accidentmight

detonatethe conventionalexplosive in a weapon, the Ccmission incor-

pmated safety considerationsinto weapon design,drew up policiesfor

safely transprtixg and storingweapons, and establish& specialtexs 25 trainedandequip@tohandlea~ accident. ‘T-e&g and .Fallout

AftertheMike shot of Novmber 1952, the major ptilm facingthe

&mission and its scientistswas the develvt of a deliverable

thearonuclear weapon. The Upshot-Knothole_seri& of the springof 1953

,. included an open shot for reporters and civil defense officials,

5 ditaq effectsshots, and troopmnuvers (the Armywas ncr*rcarpletely t ; . responsiblefor the radiologicalsafety of its soldiers),._The drive for

a deliverablethexmnuclear -, hmever, daninatedthe series. To accczin&ateLos ?Aams' need for crucialexperiments and precisedata, the test groq decided topermit cmparatively larger explosionsthan

were usually fired at Nevada. The group decided to fire shots fran

300-foottmers. The test group,which anticipate falloutbeyond the

test site, was confident that its radiologicalsafety procedzres 26 wouldprotectlocal camunities.

The Cmmission had learned that fallout &run one of the Rzngfx

shotshad~doyTnin measurableamuntsinaradioactivesnmsto=;nin

Wchester, New York in 1951. SincethentheCamissionhadworkedhzd

toimprwef~outpredictianbyinstallinganexpandedradiaticn~-

toring,neWork around the test site. The system seem&Lto work weI1

enough for the

inhabi*& areas to sipau or negligiblea&unts. But fallout f,m c,ise

I 1 seventhshot,calledSimn, driftedacross local higImays and forcedz!!

ccmnissionto set up roadblocks andtowashdmncars oontminat&tr.iti

the fallout. The ninth shot, ~zrry, sent a fallout c&oud over IcxL hiq'imaysand tmard St. George,U"Lah. The Cmmission had to wash z's

again and had to ask St. George residentsto take cover until tie -'-*Ab-r"__

had passed. The incidentscaused local cmcern and resul^t&in ts~ ~16

13 Congressionalmqukiesa to the Cmnission. Butmstpeoplefeuedthat the atcmicexplosiars had causedthe'severe tornadoes, and o&&r IXIUSCL weather pla@g @z countrythat springof 1953.27 The Cmmission, however, was worried abut the Upshot-Knothole

fallout. Troy, New York had suffereda long-distancerainout and the ccmnissionershad'receivedrepxts l~tfallouthadcausedtheunusually

large nwber of deathsin1953 ammg sheepherds grazing,amundthe test

site. The fallout issue czme to a head wha Los Alams scientists wanted to add an ad&ional shot to pr&lce vi*& data for the 1554 thGL.KkZIlLlCl~ test series. Although the Presidentand the Cmnission wPm& the shot, one of the Ccmissioneks was so coilcernedabut fallout that he requesteda full-scalereview of Yhe highly bter- relatedpublic relations and safeq prcblems"the Camission had cze&L=Z in NevadL2*

The ccgrmissioninmdiately launchedan investigationcf the she? deaths and a full-scale review'of Nevada testing. Cczmission scientis?zs,"fully aware that the futureof ~tinentaltestingrrig~C, hang on the results,"concluded that falloutdid not cause the she+ deaths. They remained silent on whether it might have been ,a cm- tributingfact& and in-public'&&unmts the Ccmission "gloss& over the fact that scientific opinion an the qxiestionwas ,mZ me I.29 Tk &view cmnittee decided that continentaltes*>s should continuebut subgesteaseveral m&hods to reduce fallout E-~-an test shots. The Conmission adop+Sd mst of the suggestims .2-L intqratec!them into planningfor the next coiA&mA2l series. While the Cmnission was planningthe 1954 series SovietUnion

annm the explosionof a hydrogenbomb. Actually Pll!ssianshad probably detonateda large fissionweapon which buxned sma themv-

nuclear fuel. For securityreasonstheCamissimccul.dnotexplain

thatthesaviets hardly had a deliverablethemmuclear upon. 3o To mst &rericansthe Carmissionhad to work even harder so as not to lose

’ the grim race with the SovietUnion.

The 1954 spring Pacific tests series, called Castle, provided

perhaps the grea&Sst technbl successes of any tests other than Trtity orMike. SixthemYnuclearshotswerefiredandmst of these surpassed

the Ccxmission'smstoptimistic pr&ctions. Not only did the MS-

sionhave adeliverable thenmnuclearweaponbut it also couldproducea

whole "family"of themonucleax weapons inaspectmm of yields frm

smlltacticaltolargestrategic~. NmtheCamissiacould,use

awholenewphilosophy inbuildingthe stockpile. Ratherthanbuild

bmbswithabalanmd distributionof yields, the Cmnission concen-

trated on making specific types of wapons and working optimm 31 charae~istics into them.

Castle, hodever, unapddly demnstrated that multi-mzgatin

th-lear weaponsalsocouldprcducesignificant axrmmtsof My

fallout. The first shot,of the series,a fifteenmagatin'blast caXed

Bravo, produced a mssive fallout cloud which rose mre than Wanty

milesintothestratosphereandtriggeredthunderstoms andrain squalls . .’ throughoutthe Pacifictest area* Falloutf_rcm the cloudwas scat&aed

over mre than seven thousand square miles of_. ocean, the navdl task : . v

15 forces supportingthetest; 236 Elarshallesenatives living on several near-by atolls, 31 Americanweather servicepersonnel stationed on the atolls,and the Japanesefishing vessel, the Luc@ Dragon. The fate of the LuckvDragon receivedprunin~tattentionin the Japanesepress and brought the dangers of fallout'tothe attentionof the world.32 The

BraTashatensured thatfalloutmuldbecme aconcernof all Americans, notjustthosewho livednear the Nemda Test Site. ,:- -

Bravo link& the falloutissue to the test ban issue. m April 2,

1954, shocked by Bravo fallout,hrimMinister Nehruof Indiacalled for a test rrmatorium. His plea led the Eisenhmer ML&ration briefly to considerhalting nuclear weapon tests, but the Ministration which wanted topreserve%rrarica~stechzicalleadoverthe Pussianscould find 33 nowaytoenforce su& ate&ban.

Increasing, public cmcexn about the Bravo fallcutput presumeupon the &mission to release ((thefacts" about fallout. Wishingto inform the Amrican people about fallout,the Carmissionreleased "A Reportby the United StatesAtmic EnergyCmnissim on the Effectsof High Yield

NuclearExplosions" on F&maxy 15, 1955. In it the Camission not only explainedBravo falloutbut also discussedfallout fran N-da tests.

The &mission characterizediodine 131 and'strmtium 90 as the m

Imst hazardous cmponen~ of falloutbut assurredAmaricans thattestig posed Little hazard to health.34 The report, neve,*less, fueled rather than calmed the falloutcontroversy. Perhaps because its publi- c&ion coincidedwith the beginningof the spring'1955 test series,it helped to touch off anewwaveof concern&outcontinentaltes+~g. The 1955 Nevada series has dubbed Teapot and again consistedcf weapon develmt, mili&%ryeffects, and “open” shots. The Ccamissicn plannedto fire fourteenshots to test new- designsand to find

ways to m&.lCe fallout fmn all w. Under the new criteriafor

testingonthecontient, nine of the shotshad yieldsof less than ten kilotonsand were fired fran toknsrs400 to 500 feethigh. Over eight

personnel c thousandmilitary participatedin the series althoughtroop manewerswereheldatonly Wo shots. The-retained soleresponsi- c . bility for the radiologicalsafety of the txoops for:Teapotand al.1

The had put other continental series. Catmission far mre resources

into off-siti monitoring but assign& sole responsibilityfcr the

mhitoring to the Public Hdth Sezvice which had estzblished fixed

stations in small ccmmnitiesaround the test site. The hiblic Health

Service,henceforth, conducted mst off-sitemonitoring and transformed theperceptionof falloutradiation frcmaproblemin industriaLszfety 35 tothatof ageneralhzzardtothepublic as awhole.

As testing accelerated,more people became concezxedaImut the

healthhazards of fa2lout. Consequentlyfallout&m w anatiozalissue

with scie&sts and laymen concernedaboutboththe soh~ticand gmetic effectsof falloutradiation. In responseto the Camission's weqon

effectssta&Wrent the Federation of Am&can ~iedists prolpd th% a At the United Nations" catmission assess the hazards of testing.

Cmnissim's request the Nationalkademy of Sciencesalso launcheda radiationstudy. simltaneouslyin 1955 the Joint Car&t&e on Atmic En~andtheSenate~serviceS Cmrnittee heldhearingsonproblens 36 L-elatedto the hazardsof fallout.

The Cmmission reed by authorizingConmissioner L%y to

releasescientific data about fallout. On June 3, 1955,Libby ti?xsti

the aLumi of the Universityof Chicagomdassmdthemthar ftiozt did not "constituteany real hazard to the imediate health" of

Arrericans.In January 1956 he revealedthat the &mnissim had beam

studyingthe hazards of falloutworl&ide under the nama of Psject

SunShine. ProjectSunshine scientists labeled strontium90 as the ,mst hazardousradioisotope in fallout and created a worldwidenetiork to

mmitoritspresence inhmans , fads, and sd.ls. G&y, who becamethe

CamTlission'sspokesman on fallcut,subsequently released,mre scientiic dataonfalloutthrougha seriesofhighlytechnical qeeches. 37 .

TWardhticlearTest Ban Negotiations

As fears of fallout rose sodid fears of theultimate consequences

of the nuclear arms race. PresidentEisenhm~.~~, fully mare that a nuclearwar could result in "civilizationdestroyed" and "the ax-&i-

lation of the ixreplacsableheritage of mankind handed dwn tc us

generation'frmgeneration" ms fixnlyccmitted to haltingthe nucLeaz

ams race. 2o inject life into deadlockeddi sammentnegotiatim~ he took the unprecedenteds&p of appointingHarold Stassento a cabinet

level post for &eloping diszmammpolicy. At the Gmeva confezexe in 1955, the President offered to exchange blueprints of mili-AZ

facilitieswith the Russians;manwhile, he prcdded Harold Stzssez zc

devise a axprehensive disammmtplan. To the Ccmissionrs &za~ , Sta-ssen seemed all too wCLling.to separate the test ban issue from

cmprehensive disammant negotiations. The Ccmnissionargued that a properlysupexvised ban on weapon tests shbuldbe an integralpart of a

cqrehensive disarmment agreemzntwiththe Puasians.38 The wCz_

p*rogrmwas so fiml y l*ed to axinscontrol issues that the Ccmissi~r. muld have to mnage the program with one eye on arms mz---_,I negotiatiors.

1Q The 1956 Presidentialelection carrpaign gave increasediqetus to'

the push for atestban when candidateMlai Stevensonsuggested that * . theUnit&Statesunilaterally stoptestingas a firststepin -5

a test ban agret with the Swiet union. Although StW-

* ultimately lost the eleztion, he made test ban a partisan issue. As . . Stevensonand Eise.~.~mersparred on the testbanissue, the Catmission l’ r conducteda sevateen shot Pacific test series called FMwing, which

further advanced the Ccmnission'sdesigns of nuclear weapons which pxduced lniniml faliouL Within a few months of the election,and

during the intemalEisenhmerA&nini.strationspaxringwerpositions to

take at the 1957 London disaxmItWlt conference,stassen virhlauy

separatedtest ban negotiationsfran the Americandi samment package

and set the stage for separateagreement on the test ban issue. In 1957

Abert Schweitzer added hisvoice to the opponentsof testing,the Pope endorsedSchweitzertsstand,andILnusPaulingobtainedthe sighatures

of 2,000 scientistson a petitionopposing testing. That spring the

Joint Cannittee onAtcmic Energy cautiouslyexplored the health effects ofradiatiminhearingsheldwertbem Of 1957.3g

As $he Eis~~~s'-rationIlr;nred~~test'bannegotiatiors

the Cczmissionste~upthepace oftestkj,conductLxgthetnenty-

four shot Plurrs3bosseries at Nevada in 1957. The tests, which wlorec’,

2iI defense and anti-submarinewarheads ccmsistedof relativelysrrall

explosions. The Cannissionalso explored a nwel method to prevent -., faoutbytestingadevicedeepw. Consequently,theF&Y&~

shot proved that nuclear weapn tests could be perfomred entirely

-0UI-d. Again, the Federal Civil.DefenseAdministration and +be

Deparkmk of Defensecondu&ed civil and militaxyeffects tests as pax% 40 of the series. 19 Stassenfsfailure in London proved tobeonlya.teqoraqhaltin

themarchtotestbannqotiations. QI parch 31, 1958, only days tiff

theyhadcacpletedtheixmst extensiveseries to that date, the Smiet

tin announceda unilateraltestban and appealed to other nuclear

, pcxers tohalttheirtests. tiesidentEisenhmerandChaimanUkita

Khrushti agreed shortlythere&ter to sponsoratedmical card-m to determinewhether a system to detect nuclearwea~"tests could be aeated. The technicalconferencewas held in Geneva fr0anJul.y2 until

Ausust 21, 1958, and concluded that such a system was techrzically feLible. PresidentEisenhmm accepted the conclusionsof the con-

ferenceand announcedon August 22 that the Uni&A Stateswould suspend 41 testingfor a year once test ban negotiationsbegan. With a test ban at hand the &mission tested at an even store

qent pace. .PhaseI of the Hardtack series, held at the Pacific

provinggrounds frcm April th.kugh-gust 1958,consisted of thirty-five

shots;mst of them relativelys&l. Rocketscarried tmmagaton range experimantshigh into the a-sphere fran launchingsites on Johmon

Island. Phase II of Hardtack,held at Nevada, consistedof nine-

sh~,fourofthemmdergmmd and tenwith the devicess&ended 1900

feet above the ground byballoons. mst of these shotswere sml.1 z-id

falloutwas xCnimal.42'The Eiardtackseries concludedon ktober 30,

1958. On Nwxrber ltest ban negotiationsopened in Geneva. *For a time, the era of confrontationbetweenthe United Statesand the Sa;,et

Unionwas givingway to an era of negotiations. MutilDefense andNAT0 When the EisenhowerAdministration &raced test ban negotiatiors,

it also sought closer ties with Uarica's allies. The Administration

obtainedan amen-t to the Atic Ehergy Act on July 2, 1958,which allowed the United States totransfer to its allies nonnuclear carp3nentsofatomic~~s~certaininfoaMtianabovtthe~~~~. , The next day the United States and the United Kingdm~signed a broad

agrmt which permitted the exchange of detailed atmic weap

.infomation,nonnuclearwea~nccqonents, andcertainwea~nmterials.

Within a year mre restrictedmutual defenseagreemants ere concluded with Canada,France, West Gemany, Greece,theNetherlands, andTUrkey. The Ccnmissionhenceforth had to decidewhat infomation or parts co&d

be given each nation and to mnitor joixtly with the Dt of 43 Defensethe informationand oxqonentsgoingoverseas.

The Genevatestbantalks,~dh~~y~de~~p~ess than

most East-Westnegotiations during the 1950's,stmbled over verifica-

tion prirrarilybecause of the difficulty of detecting undmti nuclear explosions. The negotiationsstimulated attention with&z t!*

Camission to the pro&ems of detect&g nuclear weapon tests. Lr. _ . the Cmmission established , cooperationtiththeDepxmutofDefense,

the Vela program to explore the detectionof tests perfomed uzzdar- -. , ground and in ouLL;erspace, and the mnitoring of tests by satelll*z.

During the Geneva negotiationsboth the United States and the ZCb%t Union refrainedfran testing,resulting in an unpolicedtest rmratcr:~z. frcm late 1958 until September1961. On Septmber 1, 1961, the Soviet

Union mdd~ybroke the moratoriumwith an extensiveseries of tests and the axnferenm collapsed soonafter.

When the SovietsbrokethemratoriurnPresident JohnF. Kennedy had been studying the issue of testresmption. After a personalappeal to

ChakmnKhrushchev failed,President I&x&y orderedthe resurrptianof

Americantests and the Cmnissim respondedwith the Nougat series in

Nevada. !!!henext year the Cmmission continuedNougat at Nevada and launch& the Dmkic'series in the Pacific. Most Nevada tests were undergruund,except for three amspheric shots and a crateringexperi- Kent. Ag& the DefenseDepaxr!ment conducted training exercises, which involvedLw IMnuevers,in conjunctionwith the one aWospheric shot.

The Pacific series, which began on April 25, 1962 consisted. almost entirely of a-spheric shots. Includedin the serieswas an underkate shot and five high altitudeshots. By the end of the year the Comis- 45 sim had announced61 shots at Nevada and 36 shotsin the PacSic.

Nevada tests had included Wo shots fran a new Carmission

OriginatingattheLivermre laboratoryin programcalled Plawshare. ,. - . _.

1957 the objective of Plmshare was_ to use nuclear explosivesfor peaceful pu&s suchas large-s&e ex=vationprojects,pmerprCr duction, isotope prodxtion, and the recoveryof oil fran shale, t-taz _ - sands, or depletedwells. The program consistedof both laboratory sties and field experiments. By late 1961 the Cmmissim had detona- the &me explosionto explorethe pcssibi.liQof recsvexing usefulheatenergy andvaluableisotopesf&n a nuclearexplosion. The

ProjectSedan aqcim-lt at Nevada in July 1962 studiedthe usemess

22 of nuclearexplosions for large excavationprojects such as harborsor

canals. The 1OO'kilotonSedan shot dug out a crater320 feet deep and

with an averagediarreter of 1280 feet and displacedalmst 7.5 miXian 46 cubicyards,or 12miUiontons ofearth.

, The Cold War Heats Up t The cmmission conductedthe 1961 and 1962 tests as the inter-

.national situationbecame more tense. Heatingupthe Cold War, the SovietUnion began a seriesof cor&ontatims over Berlin in 1961. Put

the worst crisis came in Cctober 1962, when PresidentKennedy demnded

that the Soviet Union withdraw missiles it had deployed in Cuba. AlthcughChaimanKrushchevrmoved themissiles,theworld seemE close

to the brink of nuclearwar before the crisisended.

The Cuban missilecrisis profoxmdly affected test ban negoti:zims

which had resumd in Geneva. Doubtlesslythe crisis mde t..._:the ri o?. titedstatesandthe Soviet Union mre wiSJing to uqranis~

October 11, 1963, the m powers formallyentered into a treatySzxkg _’ nuclear testing in the atisphere,underwater, and in outer space.

Tlxreafterall.&nericannucleartestingwascmcktedun~.. .

‘Threerrcmths later inhis first State of the Union ad&s, Presi-

titLyndonB.Johnson announcedthattheUnit&Stateswouldr&ce izs

productionof enricheduraniumby 25 percent and shutdown four p-"c- ductionreactors. The United States,the President declared,wwuld.?ot

stodqile ams beyond its needs. Indeed, so efficientlyhad z-2

production mrqlexes operatedthat the Cmnission had put only c- T.Z~ reactorintc productionsince the mid-1950's. Calledthe New Prsl-'.c:

R&actorar?d added to the Hanfordcarplex, the unit was symbolicz, <-.e

23 abundanceof fissionablematerials in that it was designedto produce 48 eitherplutonium or electric power.

~LimitedTestBan~~andthep~~ancut-backsi~eda

, new era for the nucleazweap program. The overridingCold Warmissian of &QE Atomic Energy Cmrnission,producing a nucleara&&al to protect

the free world, had been successfullyachieved and the fact politically

recognized. The Cmmission had created warheads for stra*qic and

tactical missiles, a variety of nuclear b&x, nuclear shells for

til1e.q pieces, atomic demlition devices resemblinggigantic land mines,. antiwine weapons, and tor@os. So efficientwere its

factoriesthat by the early 1960's the nuclear arsenalnmbered in the

*tensof thousandsof weapons. "of this huge total,Secretary of C&e-se

~BcNamara...re~~that 7000 were located in WeSE

Airope.“49The Comnissi0n'sachievemant ranked as one of the rmS=

dramaticand awescm feats in the historyof the nation. Although2!!

nuclearweapn programconsumed the largestprtion of the Cmmissioz's

budget,it could no longerclaim the urgencyor werritig kqx-knce cf

the'195O'S. The carrmissionconLimed to carry out an extensiveweapE tes*t+

p-m, nmplanningandconducting testsby fiscalyearrather CX.Y.by pericdic series. In the 1960'stest series consistedof weapx desqz

and verificationshots, Plowshazeexperimqts, and Vela prcgra.~skzs. Because the shots were all fired undergmund no further mili*r-_ c:

civil effectstests were coxkted. The Qamission, however,KE~~-_L-& Although atmspheric test&g' stopped in 1963, reassessmentsof dosesreceivedfrana~spherictes~g~dnat. Thatyearaseriesof

l. hearings before the Joint Cm&tee on Atmic Bmm-gy explored the

“. hazardsof iodine 131. As a result of the hearingsthe Camissicm and ,

*the PublicHealthService~lIOrbidityand~~~studiesof, . off-siteNevada ammmities. The data cdbcted indicated that there ~e~t~rele~deathsthtn~dnormallybeexpected,but resultswere not conclusive. Data fran‘theMarshall Islanders ex_oosed to the Bravo falloutindicatedra~ti~-rela~thyroidprablems~e a

di&nctpossibility,especially among childrenezq?osed to fallout. In

1965 +& Public Health Seece began a major thyroidstudy an-mg school childreninsele&edcounties inutah,Arimna,and Nevada. Although

thyroid abnomalities were found in -ninety-fivestudents, fX-* &al 51 resultsagain seemedinconclusive.

The Caanissioninitiated a searchfor test sites to supplemarkthe

Nevada Test Site in 1966. Camission engineerssooh located sites in centralNevadaandonAmhi?zka Islandsuitable fortestswhichcouldnot

beheldnearLasvegas. The Carmissionfired a nohnuclearVela de-

tion shot oh Amhitka im1967 and conductedan intenrediateyield test - . in cmtral NeMda a year later. The Ccmnissionultimately fired Wo

nuclear shots,Milrm and Ca_nnMn on Amhitka, but by 1969 the use of

~nr=~~tkahad~~~~~~~~sc~~ernedthat~esho~wwld krevably damage local ecology or set off seismicdisturbances. To preservethe Amhitka environmentthe Cmmission establisheda nmber cf mizorm?l~pmgrams. Along with severalstate groqs, the Ccmnissis.:

‘A, ,” I ?5 sea otter population. In a dramtic gestureto demmstrate his faith

thatthe~shotwouldnottouchoffseriousseismicdist~ances,

Cami,ssionChaimanJamasR. Schlesingertookhiswifeandtw daughters -.* to the island'forthe Noverrber6,' 1971 test shot.'*

As the &mission tested, the United States and the Soviet Uzion , found mre camon ground for ams controla~ts. A series of treaties banned nuclear'weapons testing, storage, or deploymentin

Antarcti.ca (Anmtic’Treaw, 1959)) outer space (OuterSpace Treaty,

1967),I&in America (Treaty of Tlateloco,19671, snd on the ocean floor

(Sea-Bed Treaty, 1971). In 1969 the ism supeqmers bqan a seriesof

strategicarms limitation(SALT) talks a&red at halting the devmt

of anti-ballisticmissile systems. By 1972 the talks had produced

a~~~wi.lichwouldhelptokeeE,~~learwar,fnms~gandreduce

Soviet missileproduction. The SALT agreemantsled PresidentNixon to

proclaimthat the era of cor&ontation between Amsrica and the Soviet 53 Urlbnhadbeensuccesshuymnsforrnedintoanera ofnegotiations.

The Curmissionnot only continuedto perfect nuclear weapons but

also investigatednewwaystoproduceweaponsand fissionablematerials.

In the concept of laser fusion, Camission scientistsexplored the

abili~ofhigh-energyla&erstoinduce thelnmuclearreactiohsinsr~

deuteri~tritiumpellets. Becausela.serfusionhad$.itaxyaswellas per implicationsthe Cmmission counted it as a weapon program.

Cmmission scientistsalso exmined the ptential use of lasers to

separate isotopes of uranium. By 1974 laser isotope separatim had 54 beccmalargeprcgrzm, _~ mmrdtheDepammtofEbemy

The energy crisis,manwhile, ovezzk the Atcmic mergy Cumis-

sion. PresidentGerald R. Ford signedthe Ehergy ReorganizationAct of

1974 on cctober 11, abolishingthe Attic Ene.qy &mission and trans-

l ferringits nuclearweapcn prcg&n to the newly foIlEdEn- Research _ andDevelopmantAdministrationERDA). EecausetheEnergyResearchand l . . Develmt I&ministration'sprb-axy purpose was to developnew source.5

of energy Congressquestionedwhether nuclearweapon prcgram shculdbe

assignedto the agency. Afterayearofstudy,ERDAandtheDepartnant

of kfense remmended that ERDA shouldretain Program* Cne expelling reason forl&ving the weapcnprcgramin the civilian agency was that the weapon laboratoriesalso had iqcrtant 55 researchcapabilities.

The cmtinuingams controlnegotiationshadfarrmre impact

waapcnprcgrarnthanmergy reorganization.TheUnitedStates signedthe

ThresholdTestBanTreatywhichprahibited~~testswithyiel~

exceeding150 kilotonsand specifiedthatnuclearweapcn,tests must be

confined to specific,test sites. The United States agreed to use

national technical mans to verify cmpliance with the treaty and

he.nceforthcmduc@dweapontestingprqrmsin catpliancewithit. The

United States also signeda cmpanion to the ThresholdTest BanTreaty,

theTreaqJon undergroundNuclear Explosionsfor PeacefulFUposes‘m The treaty cm peaceful explosions defined ce-'tzi? 1. May 20, 1976.

activitieswhich did not ccnstitutepeaceful nuclear-explosionsand applied to all nuclear explosionscon&x&d outside specified weaen

testing grcunds. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Weaty also l&rite2 56 all undergroundtest shotsto 150 kilotons. In.1977 PresidentJimy Carter,foIlming his campzignpremise to

give energy reorganizationa high priority,proposed the establishmnt

of a single cabinet level Deparkent of Ebrgy to be created frm severalexisting energy agencies. He obtained legislationcreating the

deparbent and activatedit & October 1, 1977. The entire nuclear

~~np~wastransf~tothenewdepartmentandplaced~~an . . 57 assistantsecretaxy for defense programs. In contrastto 1975 only

one Congressmanraised the question0f whether it was appropriateto assignthewqmnpmgraxnto a civilianenergy agency.

The WeapmFYcgBmofthe ~tofBx.rgy . The departmantlaunched a canprehensiveweapm program,includbg

theprcductionofTrident/Poseidonwarheads,the developrrerltofwarheads

for Minut0mn and Cruise missiles, and plans for

firedprojectiles. !thedeparbantcmtinuedtostudy

nuclearweapms. m Mvesber 1977 the wt announcedthe ample-

tion at LawrenceLivexmre I&oratory of a major facilitydesign& m

cmduct laser-drivenfusion research. The de-t foresaw gre2t progressusing carbon dicxide lasers of even greaterpmer and kte?- sity, and erecteda laser fusion laboratoryatIm Alams as well as 2

ParticleEeam Fusion Fa/ciliw at Sandia I&oratories. To supp2--t2%~

Carter Administration'ssearch for a axprehensivetest ban trea* 5%

deet also pursued a vigorous program of seismic researk 222 I placed an advancedseismic detection station at McMinrrville,TEYXSS~Z.

The depzrmt cmducted a nuclear weapon accident exercise at Z.%Z

Nevada Test Site and initiateda programto improveand arrestdete-:=- 58 rationin the aging nuclearweapon productionplants. One of the major problems theDeparbantfa&wasdetemining

whether fallcut radiation frm abrcsphericweapon tests had caused

cancer or 1-a amng fomer soldiers'or local off-siteresidents.

The b%rshallese and Japanese victims who received large doses of

, _. radiation frm the Bravo fallout had been cqqsated for their injuries. Buthadthevery lowdoses frmfalloutradiationalso caused I . injury to others? Fomer military personnelwho had-participatedin

e maneuversat the test site argued that soldierswere exposedto

mre radiationthanpreviouslybelievedandthatthe ~surehadcaused

illnessanddeath fromcancer. Reportsof the soldiertshealthprcblems

and new studies amng the Marshallese,which derrmstratedthe smaller

the radiationdose the longer the peziod before thyroidtumrs became

&dent, caused intense public anxiety and by the fall of 1977 had

swm@ the DeparImantsof mergy andDefensewith&ls fromcancer 59 patientsand their relatives.

In NDE&& 1978, in reqcnse to the cutpcuringof public ccnce.m President carter-ordered the De-t of Health, Education, and Welfareto establisha prcgrmof researchon the effectsof radiaticm

scpo-• In addition,Congress dizecbd the Deparbnt of Health, Education,and'Welfare to establisha canprehensiveprogram of research

on the effectsoflm-l&elradiation and to reviewall fedffalpvs

in this field. Coqeracg with the De-t of Health, Education, and Welfarethe Daparbent of Energy opened its files on the effectsof -. . radiationand abmspheric testing programsto federal-researchersad

Congressional investigators. In Fe!xuaq 1979 in reqwnse to a reqesk frcxnGovernor ScottMatheson of

to decla&fy and release all informtion on the effects of fallout.

Establishingthe OffsiteRadiation -sure ReviewProject, thedew- mentcollected all relevantrecords and data relatingto . a-spheric testing and fallout,deposited &em in a Coordinationand Infomation Center inLasVegas,Nevada,and,usedthedata toreassess radiztion ? doses tothelccalresidents. Ayearlaterthedeparkrmtestablisheda DoseAssessrwt~~~Graurptoprovidea~i~andgeneraldir~an

to the OffsiteRadi&on -sure ReviewProject. 60

Dr. Joseph Lyon, an epidemiologistwh

the years 1959 to 1967. Lyon believed that his data establisheda .

possible link be-en testing and childhocd leukemia. Althmgh

scientistsquestioned his m&hcdology, the gave_7ment intensifiedits

investigationsof the healtheffectsof fallout. News of Lyons' S&Y%,

and of the allegedinjuries to fomer soldiers,hmever, had sparkeda

wave of claim against the gmemmen t requestingdamages for illness

causedby falloutradiation. By mid1982 the wtfaced over 53

radiation litigation cases with alleged damages totaling aver $2 I b-on?

Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States in

Nwemser 1980. Although the new president prartisedto redxe ttle

federal govm t's role in energy regulation and mnagerrmt, he resolvedto strengthennuclear research and develmt, includingthe

wqonpmgram: Withinayearthewt wasworkingto inmaase

the pr&tuc?Aonand testingof nuclearwwns and to qgzade detorie ratingproduction f&lities. 62

The President'sactions were indicativeof the vital role nuciear

weapms h+ve played in protectingthe Nation and the free world for a nearly forty years. Originatingin the crash effort to produce an

atanic bah, the nuclear weapon prcgram provided the keystone for

American'sdefenses during the ColdWar. As tensionbetweenthe United StatesandtheSovietUniongxaduallyrelaxed, theprakctionofnuclear

weaponsbecam a less urgent,but neverthelessvital task for America.

The energycrisis of the.197O'sseemed to cbscurethe ixportanceof 'Lhe

weapm program. As the energy crisis faded, PresidentReagan put the.

weaponprogramatthetopoftheDepartmzntof &ergy’s priorities.

3i 1. Richzd G. Hewlettand 0w.E. Anderson,Jr. The New World,

1939-1946Volum I of A Historyof the United StatesAtanic Fswcry

&mission (UniversityPark; 1962),pp. 10-11; (hereafterci*& as

Hewlettand Anderson,New World.)

. -

2. Foradetailedstudy ofthewartimproject, seeHewlettand Anderson,New World.

3. Hewlettand Anderson,New World,pp. 428-455and 482-530. Joint

Cmxnitteeon Atcxnic Energy, Atmic Enerq LegislationThroqh 94th

Conqzss, 1st Session (Washington,1976), p. 353.

4. Hewlettand Anderson;New World,E. 580-581.

5. AliceBuck, "A History of the Atic Energy Camission," InstitutionalOriginsoftheDep3rtmnt0fEnerqy I EnergyHistoq

Series,DOE/ES-OOO~, August, 1982, p. 1, (hereaftercited as Em&,

"AtauicEnergy Ccxtnission," Institutional Origins); RogerM.

Anders,“The Office'ofMilitary Applications ,' Institutional Originsof the De-t of Ebercy,Energy History Series, Volccre

I, No. 1, Nov&xr, 1978,pp. 2-3, (hereaftercited as Anders, "Officeof MilitaryApplications," Institutional Origins);

PrenticeC. Dean, *T&gy ELsto,qChronology frun World Wax II ti the Present,"Institutional Origins of the Deqrbentofmw~,

Direction: The First Year (Washington,1972), p. 105. Hewlettand

Duncandiscuss the transfersin Atic Shieldon'pp. 521-22 and

524-25. The quote aboutthe Pacificbase is fran Atmic SMeld, p. 524.

11. AZ 1140,pp. 19-23. Thequoteis franHewlettandDuncan, Atanic . Shield,p. 525.

12. Gordon-, Ea&xnd Statementfor Ranger,January 9, 1951; GordonDean,Memranduin for the Chaimm,~Mi.litaryLiaison

Cmnittee, December20, 1950,AEC 38'8;and JanrtsMcCoxnack to t?x

Ccmission, Decembr 22, 1950,AEC 388/l;Richard G. Hewlett,

"hbclearWeapcn Testingand StudiesRelated to HealthEffects: An

HistoriczlSumxy," ConsiderationofThreeProqsals bConduct ResearchonPossibleHealthEffectsofRadiationFrcmNuclebr

W~nTestinginArizo~,Nwada,andUtahandNucl~Weapan

T~~gandS~~esRelatedtoHealthEffects: AnFistorical

Surmry‘ ReqzndingtoRemmmdationsbythePanelof~ on

the &&ive of PHS Docmmts (Washington,19801, pp. 4243, (~ter'citedas Hewlett,"NuclearWeapcnTesting," Panel of

E%perts); HewlettaM Duncan,Atanic Shield,p. 535.

_.

13. Hewlettand Duncan,Atanic Shield,m. 535-37and 541. ’

14. Hewlettand Duncan,Atic Shield,pp. 541-42;Hans A. Bethe,

"Cmmnts an the Historyof the H-Emb," I;osAlams S&exe, EC,

1982,p.. 48; Joint AMI-lZ0DPress ReleaseNo. ,377,June 13, 1951. .

15. Hewlettand Duncan,Atanic Shield,pp. 542345; EdwardTeller with

Allan Brown;The Legacyof Hixoshixa(New York, 1962),pp. 53-55,

(hereaftercited as Teller,Legacy of Hiroshima);He F. York,

The Advisors: Oppenhehr,Tell&, and the Se (San

p. 8 Francisco,1976), 81, (hereaftercited as York, The Advisors). .

. 16. pI#31140, pp. 28-39. Mdlahonis quotedon p. 31.

17. Hewlettand buncan,Atmic Shield,pp. 563-64;Gordon Dean,

M!zmrandum for the (himan, MilitaryLiaison Camnittee, AM3 446/S,

August 14, 1951.

18. AEC 1140,pp. 44-46;Hewlett and Duncan,Atmic Shield,pp. 576-78.

19.. Hwlett and Duncan, Atmic Shield,pp. 569-571,and 581-584;

Teller, , pp. 58-62;York, The Advisors,pp. 129-131.

20. Hewlett'"NuclearWeapmTesting," PanelofEqerts,pp. 48,and

59; U. S; Atmic m Cam&ion, Major Activitiesin the Ataxic

mergy programs: Jqmaq-June, 1952 (Washington,1952) pp. 13 e . . ,444s.

-_ , 21. Hewlettand Duncan,Atmic Shield,pp. 592-593;Hewlett, "Nuclex

WeaponTesting," Panel of Experts,pp. 50-51;Gordon Dean to GeneralEisenhwer, November7, 1952.

35 22. Anders,"Office of MilitaryApplications," Institution=1 Oriqins,

p. 6.

.

23. AEC 1140,R. 46-48. ~ . :_ __

.-

24. Anders,"Office of MiLitay A@ications," InstitutionalOrigins,

pp. 4-5. I _

25. Anders,"Office of MilitaryApplication," Institutional Origins,

pg. 5-6.

26. Hewlett,%ucleax Weqaa Testing," Panel of Wperts, pp. 51-52.

27. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapcn Tes*Ang," Panel of Escperts,pg. 52-54.

28. The quote is fran Eugene Zuckertto the Carmissionersand Gaerzl

Manager,June 9, 1953; Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapm Testing,” Panel of

Bqerts, pp. 4748 and 54-57,Ninutes, Cmnission Meetbg 862,

13, 1953.

29. Thequoes&t the sheep studies franHewlett,"Nuclear

Weapon Testing,"PanelofExperts, PP- 56-57. The erovzlof reportof the Cam&tee reviewingtheuse oftheNevadaTest Site

is found h Minutes,Cannission Meeting 1012, June 30, 1954.

30. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapm Testing,"Panel of Experts,p. 69; York,

The Advisors,pp. 89-92 and S7-iO0. 31. York, The Mvisors, pp. 85-87;Minutes, General Mvisoxy Cmmittee

uieeCng41,'July 12-15, 1954.

32. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapon Testing," Panel of EqerIzs,pp. 60-62;U. S.AtmicE&rgyCumission, ARe~rtby theUnitedStatesAtcznic

Enerq Camission on the Effectsof High YieldNuclear E%plosiors c (Washington,1955), p. 15, (hereaftercitedasAX,,Reporton _ Effects). For adescriptionofthe LucIq'Dragon';‘fate,see: RalphE. Lap;?,The Voyageof the Lucky Dragon (NewYork, 1958),

(hereaftercited as Lapp, Voyageof the Lucky Dragon).

33. Iqp, Vqage of the Lucky Dragon,p. 132; Earl VOSS, Nuclear

ah: The Test-BanTrap (Chicago,1963), pp. 44-47, (hereafter

cited as Voss, Test-BanTrap).

34. AX, Reporton Effects,pp. 13-18.

35. Hewlett,~*NuclearWeaponTes*~," PanelofF,pp. 59 and 62-66. .-.

36. Buck, %tanic Energy(Bmissim," InstitutionalOrigins, p. 4. Lewis L. StraussMen and Decisi&s (NewYork, 1962),p. 415.

37. AEC Press Release,Remarks Preparedby Dr. Wi.lliardF. L&by for

Deliveryat the Alumni Reunion,The Universityof Chicago,Chicago,

Illinois,June 3, 1955;Buck, "AtanicEnergy Cannission,"

37 InstitutionalOrigins, p. 4; Hewlett,"NuclearWeaponTesting,"

Panel of EkpertsrP* 49.

38.

civilizatim in his farms &arwFor-Peace speech. See: Public Papersof the Presidentsof the UnitedStates: DwightD. Eisenhmer, 1953 (Washington,1960), p. 817; Voss, Test-BanTra?, pp. 59-66,69, 93-94,and 101. . .

39. HaroldK. Jacobsonand Eric Stein,Diplomats, Scientists, znd

Politicians: TheUnited States andtheNuclear Test Ban

Negotiations(Ann Arbor, 1966),pp. 16-18,21 and 24, (hereafter

citedasJaabsonand Stein,Diplmats, Scientists,and

Politicians);Hewlett, "Nuclear Weapon Testi+g,"Panel of w,

pp. 66-67;Voss, Test-BanTrap, pp. 84-91,93-105, and 114-120.

40. Lmis StrausstoPresidentEisenhmer, Decmber 21, 1956;U. S.

AtanicEh@qy Camis&n,~Major Activitiesin Atmic Energy

Prqrams, July-, 1957 (W&ixqton, 1958),pp. 274-75.

41. Jacobsonand Steiq,biplamtsm,'~Scientists, and Politicians,pg. h5-52, 67-80,and 89-90. .__~_':---."-.-

42. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapon Testing,"Panel of Experts,pp. 68-69;U.

s. Depa?L?km!stof Erlergy "Z+nnounc~ Uriited States Nuclear Tests,

July 1945 Though Decerdxr 1979,"NVO-209, pp. 10-13, (hereaf'~ cited as DOE, "mouncedNuclearTests"); Dean, “~History

chonology,” InstitutionalOrigins, pp. 24-25.

43. Anders,"Office of MilitaryApplication," Institutional Origins, p.

c 7; Jacobsonand Stein,Diplmats, Scientists,arcI Politicians,pp. . 36-37. .

44; The Vela programsare brieflydesched in JacobsonandStein,

Diplcmts, Scien&ts, and Politicians,p. 178.

45. Hezrlett,~Nuclear Weapn Testing,"Panel of m, pp. 73-74;

UnitedStates Atanic Rwqy Carmission,Annual Report, 1962

(Washingtm,1963), pp. 233-234,(hereafter the annualreports are citedasAEC,AnnualRepoti).

46. AEC, AnnualPepoti, 1961, pp. 210-211;AEC, A&al Reqx-t,1962,

pp. 241 and 14749; Z.&&m, "Officeof MilitaryApplication," _. Institutional origins, pp. 9-10.

_

47. 'JaccbsmandSteindiscuss the impactof thecrisismnegotiations

in Diplmats, Scientists,and Politicians,pp. 423-424.

48. PublicPqers of the Presidentsof the UnitedStites: LondonB. -. , Johnson,1963-1964, Book I (Washington,1965), p. 117; AEC, knr,u;+l mwrt, 1963,PP. 46-47. 49. HerbertYorkdescribesthemanydifferentuses fornuclearwmpms

in The Advisors,pp. 136-37. The quote is frcm p. 137.

50. AX, Annual Report,1963, pp. 64-72,207-233; ABZ, AnnualReqm, 1964,p. 66-72 and 157-64;‘AEc,Annual Report;1965, pp. 99-108

and 191-209;DOE, "AnnouncedNuclear Tests," pp. 17-35. . , .-

51.. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapon Testing," Panel of Escperts,pp. 77-81.

52. Annual Repxt, 1966,p. 126; AEC, AnnualRe~rt, 1967,p. 63;

AnnualReport, 1968, p. 64; AEC, AnnualReport, 1969, p. 75;

mual report,1970, pp. 136-38;ADZ, AnnualRepwt, 1971,pp.

3 and 95-98.

53. Ola Dahlmn and Hans Israelson,Mxitoring Udergrourd hbclear

Exposions(New York, 19771,pp. 13-17, (m cited as Dahhm

and Israelson,Monitoring underground Nuclear ~losions);

Keesing'sResezrchReport, Disaxrmmt: Negotiatims a&Treaties 1946-1971(New York, 1972),pp. 358-368;.Jam% R. Schlesinger,

"Nationalhcurity in 'An Era of Negotiations,’ *’ Speech before t??

cmnmnwealthclub ofcaxfomia, sanFrancisco,caxforn&,

Septmbr 22, 1972.

54. Anders,"Office of Mil&bxy Application,"Institutional Origins,

p. 10. 55. Alice L. Buck, "A Historyof the EnergyResearch and Develmt

ziiisnistration, #’ InstitutionalOriginsof the Departr;wtofEnercw,

Energy History Series,DWES-0001, March, 1982, pp. 1-2 and 10; U. s.mqyReseizchand DeveloFhnoJlfAdministration,Fbndingand

, Managmt Alternatives for~ERDAMilitmyA@ication and

RestrictedData mctions: ExecutiveSurrmzy (Washington,1976), t p. 16.

. .

56. DahlmanXld Israelson,Monitoring Underground Nuclear Explosions,

pp. 17-19.

57. Jack M. Hall, "The UnitedStates Departrrentof Emqy: AFistOL_Y,' InstitutionalOriginsof theDeparbrmtofEnergy,Energy History

Series,Ix1E/ES-0004, Now&r, 1982,pp. 4-5, (hereafterci- as

Hall, Vepar?mxzntof Rergy,” Instil2&bnal Origins); Dean,

“Ena-gy History chmolqy,” InstitutionalOrigins, p. 63.

58. U. S. Departrrentof Energy,Annual Report to Congress,1978

@Qshinqton,1978) pp. 145-48, (hereaftercited as DOE, Annual

Rem*); Em, annual ~eprt, 1980,pp. 8-2, 8-4, and 8-10.

,

59. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapon Testing,"Panel of mrts, pp. 89-92; BufordL. Allen to Leon Silverstrcm,January 24, 1977. . ’

60. Jimlycarrterto JosephCalifano, Novmber 27, 1978;Hewlett,

%uclear Weapm Testing,’ Panel of Experts_,pp. 92-96;COE, .-__.2-A--** ’

F&p,rt,1982, p. 110; "Off-Site2adiation Egpsure Ftevi2wPrcjerr

11 Documnt Collection,"Briefing Chaztazrpiledby PrenticeDean,

HistoryDivision, Jaxmaq 1983;Joseph L. Lyon, et al., Yl7ildhccd

LeukeSbsAssociatedwithFalloutfran Nuclear Testing," The New

E-qhnd Journalof Medicine,February 22, 1979, p. 401. *.. ._ -. .__ . . ._ _ - ._ . . _.. ..:

61. Hewlett,"Nuclear Weapm Testing,"Panel of Experts,pp. 88-89 and

94-95; A categoricalAnalysis of Cases on File as of August 12, 1982,Prepared by the Officeof GeneralCounsel. .

62. Roll, "Depxfxnt of Energy,” InsstutionalOrigins,pp. 7-8; DOE Annual ~~rxrt.1982. pp. 107 and 110.

.

, APPENDIX I Chronology

January1939 German scientistsHahn and Strassinann published results of their 1938 SperirrentswithwkkhtheydiscuvereCi the fissionprocess. . septmber 1, 1939 NaziGemmyinvabdPoland; WorldWar II began. , De&er 7 & 15, 1941 Uni~Statesen~edwaxwithJapan and Gernrany,respectively. . . August 13, 1942 , ManhattanEngineerDistrictestdished toprcducenuclezrweapons.

Decmhx 2, 1942 PhysicistsunderdirectionofEnrico Femi at the Universityof Chicaqo's MetddrgiwlLaboratory createdthe firstcontrolled, self-sustgining nuclearchainreaction.

IQLrch15, 1943 Weapon laboratoryestablishe&at '2s Alamx,Nev&xico. NC%'called Tar AlarmsNational Laboratory. Juiy 16, 1945 Firstatmicbamb,Trinitv, eetcx-k atAlamgordo,NewMexicobythe Manhat& Engheer Distri&

&gust 6, 1945 Firstatanicbmb "LittleBoy"dzz onHkoshim, Japan.

August 9, 1945 Secondatmic bmk "Fat Man" &EC..+& overNagasaki,Japan.

August 14, 1945 The governKen tof IIqerialJapm acceptedthe PotsdamDeclaratim ~72 surb&.

Januxy 26, 1946 The United Nations General Assek~y 2 Lmdon establishedthe UnitedNaticz AtanicEmzqy (Zamission.

June 14, 1946 Bernard Ban&, U. S.-delegate*a ',cle U.N. AtcmicEnergy &mission ?rssed a plant0 outlaw the manufactureci atmic barbs,dismantle those aL-ek-:- existing,and shareatmic enez_.*

T- 1 ;.- -- at secretswith other nations. &_- w-.-C Union rejectedthe planandit f~l&. June-July 1946 !LbeManhat&mEngineerDistrict cmductedC@rationCmssmads, detonatigtwoshotsintheBikini AtDXLintheMarshallIslands.

August 1, 1946 . AtanicEnergy&t signedby President TnmnpctablishedtheAta&Ru-gy Camissim and transferred the Army’s * ManhattanEngineerD&rictatmic programsand facilitiesto the five member carmission. , .- January 1, 1947 Atmic Energy&mission, offici&ly z_r~ticn under Chaiman David E. .

March 12, 1947 PresidentTruman proposed U. S. aid to GreeceandTurkey, (the- Do&rine).

June 5, 1947 Planforeconanic aid-Europe proposedby SecretaryofStateGzcrqe HarshaLl,later called the "m&&l Plan."

April-Nay 1948 The Camission conducbzd0peration Sandstone,'firingthreeshots or: En-et& intheMarshal1 Islands.

F’dmcy 1948 Accxmr&t~inCzechosluvakia'~~ cxmtrolofthe gcv~t.

June 23, 1948 BerlinBlcckadedeclaredbythe Smiet 7 Union; lifted'inMay 1949.

August 29, 1949 SovietUnion detonatedits firs: a&&c device. President'Ilrur;ianannoun&it a-l sep- 23. . Sepwrber 30, 1949 Cunmnist Maa Tse4hg establihed z!! , PeoplesRepublic of China.

Januaq 31, 1950 PresidentTruman announced prqzafz x developthe thermnuclearbcxrb.

February2, 1950 Klaus F'uchs,British atmic scie?'lr,cL, confessedto Britishinvestigators *at he betrayedsecrets of the atmic jcr;j projectto Lb SovietUnion.

June 25, 1950 Noti Koreantroops invade2 Sox'L Korea, s~tar!Lngthe KoreanWar.

. . July 11, 1950 CordonE.Deanbecamchaimanofthe Atanic~Cccrnission.

July 17, 1950 Julius RDsenberg was arrested by the FEEand~~tithconspiracyto camitespionage. HiswifeEthelwas arrestedin August. On June 19, 1953 _^_ theywereexecuted. , I october9, 1950 - _. PresidentTnman aycwed an expansion of Ccmissim facilitieswhich pr&uced uraniumand plutoniumfor nuclear weapolls* Novankr 26, 1950 Chinesetrocps enter&the fightingin Korea.

Decexber16, 1950 PresidentTruman declaredaNational mrgmcydueti the fightingin Korea.

December18, 1950 PresidentTruman apprcvedtheCcmi.s- __. _ sion'sreccmbendationtcestablisha continen~plminggroImd.

January-February1951 OperationPancer,the first continental nuclearteZGZies condxtedatthe NevadaProvingGround,nwcalled NevadaTest Site, 60 miles noti of Las Vegas,Newda. Five shotswere fked.

Aprii+ay 1951 TheCamission ccnductedOperation GreenhcuseatEnewetak,detonatingfcur _ tests. _^

oztcber-Nov~ 1951 ~ _ The Ccmnissionconducted.Operatim .-_ __ Buster-JangleattheNevadaTest Site, whichconsisttedofseventests. _ ..w Januazy11, 1952 : _ _” United NationsDisammen t Cmkssia established. C - Security Councii aupmved . Januzy 16, 1952 TheNaticnal secmd rrajorexpansion of the Camission~snuclearpruduction facilities.

ApriiJune 1952 The Cmmissicn conductedOperatic3 Tunbler-Snapper at the NevadaTest Site, detonatingeight nuclear testi.

June 1952 Universityof CaIifornia'sLivezmze Laboratory,nmLmrenceLivemcre NationalLaboratory,establish&by tie &mission.

: - “I- _ ’ NW- 1, 1952 The firstthermnucleardevice, cede rmied 'Mike,"de-ted by the Ccmission at mewetak, during OperationIvy. Thedeviceqk&d with a yield at 10.4 nqatons.

March-June1953 The Ccmission conduct& operation Upshot-KnotholeattheNevadaTest Site, detonatingeleven mplosims includingshots "simn" and "Hmy."

July 2, 1953 LfksL.StmusSbecamenewchairnranof the AtmicEnergy Camissim. August 20, 1953 The SovietUnion detonateda large fissionweapon which burned sanz izhezmnuclearfuel Therhitedstates calledthe shot Joe 4.

November28, 1953 U.N. Disaxnamnt Cmmission creat& suhmnittee of Five: mehers were UnitedStates, Soviet Union, Canada, FYance,and Great Britain. Decek& 8, 1953 PresidentEisenhmer delivered"Atms _ for Peace"qeekh beforethe United Nations.

January21, 1954 U.S.S.Nautilus, the firstnuclear pxeredsubmzine,launchedbythe Navy* February 1954 InaMemrandumofUnderstandingsigned bythecarmissim, thepublicHealth Semiceaccqtedrespnsibili*for mnitoring off-siteradiation. . . March-May 1954 The ccmnissim conducted Operation Castle attheMarshallIslands,which , consistedof sixtests. "BElvo,"the firstshotofcastle, explodedwith a force of fiEteen -atins, the largestannounced u. s. nucleartest,

June 29, 1954 TheCcmissionannouncedthatitdenied Dr. J. RobertQpenhehzr accesstc restricteddata. August 30, 1954 PresidentEisenhwersignedtheAtQnic EnergyAct of 1954,a major revisionof the 1946 Act, which gave addedeqhqsis to develo;mer,tof peacetim uses of atmicenergy,and encouragedprivate andpublicgmupstobuild,mn,and operatepowerreactors.

.-.. ,_,_. :. _ -

4 Feb~mary+lay1955 The - , Ccmnission&mducm Operation !kapotattheNevadaTest&e, dema~gfourteentesw

February15, 1955 "AReportbytheUnitedStitesAtanic EnergyCmnission on the Effectsof High Yield NuclearExplosions" was released.

April 15, 1955. Joint CcmnitteeonAtcmicEnergyheld hearingsonhezlthandsafetyprablems associatedwitha~spheric nuclear testing. my 14, 1955 TheCcxnnissionand theDepar&nsntof DefenseconductedOperati&Wigwam,an underwaternuclear test 500 miles sodwest of San Diego,Crdihka. .

July 21, 1955 PresidentEisenhckJerproposedan Vpen Skies". policyofmtual aeri; 3.nqction during a smmitconference heldinGene~,switzerlandbeweenthe. Unit&States, GreatBritain,France, andthesarietunian: _.. August 8-20, 1955 TheUnited StatesparCcipaM in the firstInternationalConferenceonthe PeacefulUsesofAtcmicEn~,in 'Genwa,Switzerland. Mayduly 1956 ThecQrmissionwnductedOperation %dwingattheMarshallIslands, firing seventemnucleaxtestshots, incl&g the firstakdropof au. S. thexmnuclearweapon.

July 26, 1956 Egypt rE!tionalized the Suez canal which provokedthe 'Suez Crisis"and an attackon Egypt by Israel,Great Britain,and France,October 29- Novmber6.

Novmber 4, 1956 SovietUnion crushedderfmstratioLnsh-l Hungary.

47 .a- F&ruzy 1957 First Plmshare syrtpsiumheld at Livezmre I&oratory.

March 18, 1957-Septe&iz6, 1957 U.N. DisamlanEnt Subcamittee ("Of Five")held last seriesof negotiations inmndoIL

May 27, 1957June 7, 1957 Joint Cmnittee onAtunic~ergyheld hearingson radioactivefallout and its effectsonmn.

May 1957+arc?a1958 TheCmnission conductedOpratic~ Plun&& at the NevadaTe& Site, firingthirty-threetests including && iIp&&&lI the firstdetonation cmtained eund. Shot "S&q" wasalsodetonated.

April-August1958 The &mission conductedthe thi.xx- five shot OperationHz&tack I in the MarshallIslands#

July 1, 1958~August21, 1958 The ‘talference of Expehs tc St+ the Possibilityof DetectingViolatimr of a PossibleAgra t on the Su.sxzlcn_ of NuclearTests" held.

July 14, 1958 John A. M&one becarrrechaixrm 7 G,I ci=_- AtomicEnergy &mission.

August 22, 1958 PresidentEisenhcmr a&unced n-oratoriummweapntesting toLbqti CctQber31.

August-Sep- 1958 The Carmissionconducted Opera&A kyus in the South Atlantic,de+~zi'%-q threehigh-altitude nuclear tests.

Se$exber l-13, 1958. The United States participated.in t!! secondUnited Nations Interna*ti~L I Conferenceon the PeacefulUses cf AtunicEneryy inGeneva, SwitzezLmd.

Septenber 1958 - LibbyXuckcroftagreementsigned, allowedcloser cooperation for izxzL defensebetweenUnitedStatesz,ruZ Grs'; Britain.

Sepdber- 1958 Tke Cmrnission coducted Opexat;cr, Raxdtack II at the Nevada Test S:&Le, WhichconslstedOf tlk-ty-six tesc,s. .

mveher 1, 1958~septeihr 1961 Unit& States,,Great Britain, znd SovietUnionabidebymratoriuxnon aizmsphericnucle.arweapntestingas negotiatims continuedforatiefinitive agreemnt.

May 5-8, 1959 __-. JointCannitteeonAtanicEZmqyheld. hezingsonradiationand falloutfran . _. nuclear tests.

Nweinkr 24, 1959 AMesK>randu;nofCuoperationbetwee?tbe e . UnitedStatesandsovietUnimsigned by Chaiman Mccone and ProfessorVasily l%elyanw,HeadoftheUSSRMain AdministrationforUtilizationof . AtmicEneqy.

March 1, 1961 Glenn T. SeaborgMI& by President Kermedytobech&mn oftheAtmic Energy&mission.

August 13, 1961 EastGemEngm7~t began constructionof BerlinWall, which closedall land routesbe&EenEastand West Berlin.

SW- 1, 1961 SovietUnhn broke nucleartest mratorimn, andon October23 and 30 ftiedshotspstimatedatthktyand fiftymegatons.

Septebz 5, 1961 PresidentKennedyorderedresmptionof . _ ._. undergroundnucleartesting. ‘September1961June 1962.:_ .: TheCamissiancmductedOperation NoJo a&&*Lvadii Test site,firbg .

De&x&, 1961 ~ AspartofNouqatsbot "Gnane"the firstPeaceful Nucle&r Ekplosion (as , part of EYojectPlmshare) was - _._ detonatedinasaltcavityinCarlsbad, . _ New&xi.m. April 24, 1962 PresidentKennedy &thorized resurrption of atmspheric nuclearweapn te&nq.

April-Nwexber1962 The Ccmnissioncon&xi& Operation lhninicI in the chrisbras ~sl'zrd and JohnstonIsland areas of the Pactiic. This was the last U. S. a-The_ic test series.

49 July 1962June 1963 The Ccmnissionconducted operation StoraxattheNevadaTest Site; aX testswereunderground. Opera&m DaninicII, cmducted at the Nevada Test SiteduringJuly1962was the last above groundtest seriesheld in the Unitedstates.

I July 6, 1962 Project Plmshare's shot "Sedan"was detonatedattheNevadaTest Site.

4: October1962 Cubanmissilecrisis.

June 3-6, 1963 JointCamitteeonA&icEnergyheld hearingson falloutandradiation.

August 5, 1963 The LimitedNuclear Test Ban Treaw signedby theUnitedStites,Great Britain,znd SovietUnion, banned nucleartests in the oceans, atmsphere, andouter space. The Treatytook effectin Nove&ar 1963.

January8, 1964 PresidentJohnsan announceda 25 percent reductim in +& productionof enricheduraniumandshutdmnof four . productionreactors.

December10, 1967 Project"Gasbuggy," aPeacefulNuclear &@osive, was detonatsdin New Mexico as part of ProjectPlawshxe. It was the first jointgov- t industzq naturalgasstimlation~imant. ProjectRulison, Septmber 10, 1969 and ProjectRio BlancoMay 17, 1973 were alsogassGmlationfqeriImlts.

October2, 1969 TheCamissiondetonatedshot"~.rm" at Amhitka, Alaska.

March 5, 1970 , Ratificationofthe Trealq for the Nonproliferationof NuclearWeapons Sy theUnitedStates, theUnitedKingdm, andtheSOvietUnionand45other nations.

&lgust 17, 1971 Jams R. Schlesingerbecarne~a..of the AtanicEnergy &mission.

Novexrber6, 1971 The carmissiondetonated shot * * II ,ICannAn atAmhitka,Alaska.

__ May 22, 1972 PresidentNixon, in the firstvisit of aU.S.Presidenttob%ccw, participatedinasumitmztingand SignedthesAtT I agreement.

'F&mazy 6, 1973 Ata&EnergyCamissionerDi.qLeeRay de.signatedchakmnbyPresidentNixon.

. July 1974 ThreshcldTestBanTr~ty signedbythe UnitedStatesand* SmietUnicn.

PresidentFordsignedtheE%rgy ReorganizationAct,akclishingthe AtanicEhergy Camissimand transfemingitsnuclearweap0nprqram totheEnergyResearchandDevelopm& Administration.

January19, 1975 EnergyResearchandDevelopmnt MministrationactivatedandFQkrt C. Seamans,Jr., namd Administratcr.

May 28, 1976 Trea~onundergroundNuclear Explosionsfor PeacefulPurposes signed by theUnited States and SovietUnion.

August4, 1977 PresidentCarter signedtheDepz.rZrmt ofzrl~Actabolishiugthem=gy Researchand Developer& AdministraC'm andFederalEhergyAdmin~sthation,zrc? transfemedtheir~~cti.clnstithee Depxhmtofmxgy. The-t beganoperatianonOctober1.

Augzt 5, 1977 JarmasR.Schksing~naninated as f;-s, SecretaryofRmqy.

Nwember 27, 1978 PresidentJimny Carterorderedthe DepartmtofHeal.th,Education,and Welfareto establisha prcgrm for researchon the healtheffects of lcn- levelradiatimexposure tocmm.rLxes inNevada,UtahandArkzona.

Fe?mE!ry22, 1979 JosephLyons published"Childhd Lukemix AssociatedwithFalloutfm NuclearTesting," in The NW Cwl~:< Journalof Medicine.-

Fgril 19, 1979 House Camittee on Interstatemd ForeignCmmzrce held hearingoz c,k.e healtheffects of lm-level radk:cr. atSaltIzkeCity,Utah.

c August 24, 1579 CharlesW. Duncan,Jr., naxred second SecretaryofE&rgybyPresident carter,

May 16, 1980 Dose AssessmentAdvisoryGroup established. _ ._ Januax~~23, 1981 JmB.EdWXdSnarrred thirdSecretary I 0fEhergybyPresident Reagan.

July 23, 1981 CuxdinationandInfomationCenter opledinLasvegas,Nev&a. .. - September13, 1982 lreneAllenv.United Statestrial began in Salt Lake City,Utah.

Nweriber5, 1982 EmaldPaulHodelnamdfourth Secretary of Energy by President Reagan.

, APPENDIX II

Nuclear Detonations and . Early Stockpile Data

United States Nuclear Detonations

1945- 1974 Event or Series Name Description Dates Trinity ...... First test of an atomic ... July 16,1946 bomb Hiroshima ...... Arst use in combat ...... August 6,1945 Nagasaki ...... Second use in combat ... August $1945 Crossroads...... June - Juty 1946 Sandstone ...... April.May1948 ” Ranger ...... January - Febmary.1951. Greenhouse ...... April - May 1961 Buster-Jangle...... October - November 1951 Tumbler-Snapper ...... April-June 1952 Ivy ...... October - November 1952 Mike, experimental ...... October 31,1952 thermonuclear device Upshot-Knothole ...... March -June 1963 Castle ...... February - May 1954 Bravo, experimental. .... February 28,1954 thermonuclear device Teapot ...... February - May 1955 Wtgwam ...... May 14,1955 Redwing ...... May - July 1956 Plumbbob ...... May - October 1957 Hardtack ...... April - August 1958 Argus...... August - September 1958 Hardtack ...... September - October 1958

NO TESTS CONDUCTED FROM OCTOBER 30,1958 to SEPTEMBER 1961

Nougat ...... ’ September Ml -June 1962 -.- . <. , -‘.: Dominic I ...... d...... April 1962 - June 1962 Storax ...... Sedan, excavation ...... July 6,1962 experiment Dominic II ...... Four above ground tests. July 1962

LIMITED TEST BAND TREATY, AUG. 5,1963, PROHIBITED NUCLEAR DETONATIONS IN ATMQSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

. Nib& ...... *...... August 1963 - June 1964 I Whetstone ...... Juty 1964-June 1965 _. Flintlock ...... July 1965 -June 1966 Latchkey ...... July 1966 - June 1967 Crosstie...... July 1967 -June 1968 Bowline ...... Juty 1968 - June 1969 Mandrel ...... July 1969 - June 1970 Emery ...... October 1970. June 1971 Grommet ...... July 1971 - May 1972 Toggle ...... July 1972 -June 1973 Amor ...... October 1973 -June 1974 Bedrock ...... July 1974 - Anvil ...... July 1975.September 1976 Fulcrum...... October 1976-September 1977 Cresset...... Octobei 1977-September 1978 Quicksilver...... October 1978.September 1979 Tinder Box...... October 1979-September 1980 Guardian...... October 198CMeptember 1981 Preatorian...... October 198%September 1982

Total Detonations by Year

1945...... 3 1964...... 29 1946...... 2 1965...... 28 1947...... :... 0 1966...... 40 1948...... 3 1967...... 28 1949...... 0 1968...... 33 . 1950...... 0 1969...... 29 , 1951...... 16 1970...... 30 1952...... lO 1971...... 12 1953...... ll 1972...... 8 . 1954...... 6 1973...... 9 1955...... 18 1974...... 7 1956...... 18 1975...... 16 1957...... 32 1976...... 15 1958...... n 19n...... I2 1959...... o 1978...... 12 1960...... 0 1979...... 14 1961...... 10 1980...... 14 1962...... 96 1981...... 16 1963...... : ... 43 TQTAL 697

Early Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Data

. .--. ._ ._ .- . Fiscal Year . ;. - 1945 1346 1947 7948 .

Number of nonnuclear : J components . 1. Gun-type 0 0’ 2’ 2 Imp&ion-type. . :. -I- ’ 2” 9 29’ 53‘

Number of nuclear components

3. Gun-type 0 0 4. implosion-type : 13 50

*Numbers declassified in 1976 APPENDIX Ill .

NEVADA PROVING . . . GROUNDS

TEST AREA 10 0

TEST AREA 2 TEST AREA 9

t TEST AREA 4 . I \ TEST AREA 7

c 3 f TEST AREA 1 TEST AREA 3 +

PASS 1 \ --’

FRENCfitiAN FLAT

. - -. -- - _ ___ ._ ____

CAMP MERCURY

MILES

W Failout Pattern from March .I, 1954 Bravo -Detonatibn Superimposed on Eastern- United States

The figures represent estimated lifetime Iradiation doses.

Miles

RICHMOND.

. ;- G APPENDIX i/ Laboratories and Production Facilities

Atomic Energy Commission

AEC faciliry Location Conrmror-operator Multiprogram Laboratories Argonne National Laboratory ...... Chicago, Ill...... Univ. of Chicago and Argonne Universities Assn. t Brookhaven National Laboratory ...... Upton, N.Y...... Associated Universities, Inc. - Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory...... Berkeley, Ca...... University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratory...... Livermore, Ca...... University of California . Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory...... Los Alamos, N. Mex.. University of California Oak Ridge National Laboratory ...... Oak Ridge, Tenn.. . . . Nuclear Div., Union Carbide Corp.., - Pacific Northwest Laboratory...... Richland, Wash. . . . . Pacific Northwest Div. Battelle Memorial Inst.

Engineering Development Be ; Atomic Power Laboratory...... Pittsburgh, Pa...... Westinghouse Electric Corp. Ha, trd Engineering Development Lab...... Richland, Wash, . . . . Westinghouse Hanford Co. Knc,,s Atomic Power Laboratory ...... Schenectady, N.Y. . . General Electric Co. Liquid Metal Engineering Center ...... Santa Susana, Ca.. . . Atomics International Div. Rockwell lnt’l Corp. Idaho National Engineering Lab...... Idaho Falls, Id...... Aerojet Nuclear Co. Naval Reactors Facility, INEL ...... Idaho Falls, Id...... Westinghouse Electric Corp. Sandia Laboratories ...... Albuquerque, N. Mex. Sandia Corp. (Western Et Livermore, Ca. . . Electric-BellSystem) Savannah River Laboratory ...... Aiken, S.C...... El. du Pont de Nemours B Co . Shippingport Atomic Power Station ...... Shippingpon, Pa. . . . Duquesne Light Co.

Specialized Physical Research Laboratories Ames Laboratory ...... Ames, Iowa ...... Iowa State U. of Sci. &Tech. Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory ...... Batavia, Ill...... Universities Research Assn. Notre Dame Radiation Lab...... South Bend, Ind.. . . . Univ. of Notre Dame Princeton Plasma Physics Lab...... Princeton, N.J...... Princeton University ’ Stanford Linear Accelerator Center ...... Palo Alto, Ca...... Stanford University

Specialized Biomedical Research Laboratories Comparative Animal Research Laboratory ...... Oak Ridge, Tenn.. . . . University of Tennessee Franklin McLean Memorial Research Ins%, (formerly Argonne Cancer Res. Hosp.)...... Chicago, Ill...... University of Chicago Inhalation Toxicology Res. Inst...... Albuquerque, N. Mex. Lovelace Foundation of Medical Education and Research Laboratory of Nuclear Medicine Et / Radiobiology ...... Los Angeles, Ca. . . . . Univ. of Calif. at L.A. (UCLA) . Laboratory of Radiobiology...... San Francisco, Ca. . . Univ. of Calif. Medical Center MSU/AEC Plant Research Lab...... E. Lansing, Mich.. . . . Michigan State University ORAU Research Facilities ...... Oak Ridge, Tenn.. . . . Oak Ridge Associated - , Universities Pueno Rico Nuclear Center...... Mayaguer and Rio Piedras, P.R...... Unive&y of Puerto Rico Radiobiology Laborato.ry ...... Davis, Calif...... University of Caiif. (Davis) Radiobiology Laboratory ...... Satt Lake City, Utah . University of Utah Savannah River Ecology Lab...... Aiken, S.C...... University of Georgia U. of Rochester Med. Lab...... Rochester, N.Y...... University of Rochester .~ L _

Production, Development, and Fabrication Centers BurfingtorrAEC Plant ...... Burtington, Iowa . . . . Mason 8 HangerSilas Mason Co., Inc. Feed Materials Plant ...... Ashtabula, Ohio.. . . . Reactive Metals, Inc. Feed Materials Plant ...... Femald, Ohio...... National Lead Co. Feed Materials Plant ...... Paducah, Ky...... Nuclear Div., Union Carbide Corp. Hanford Works...... , . . . . . , ...... Richland, Wash. . . . . Attantic-Richfield Hanford Co. and United Nuclear, Inc. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant ...... INEL, Idaho ...... Allied Chemical Corp. ; _. KansasCiiPlant...... Kansas Cii, MO.. . . . Bendix Corp. Mound Laboratory ...... Miamisburg, Ohio . . . Monsanto Research Corp. I NevadaTestSite...... Mercury, Nev...... Reynolds Electrical 6 Engineer- ing Co.; EG&G, Inc.; and Hoimes Er Narver Inc. I Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant ...... Oak Ridge, Tenn.. . . . Nuclear Div., Union Carbide : . Corp. Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant...... Paducah, Ky...... Nuclear Div., Union Carbide Corp. Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant...... Portmouth, Ohio . . . . Goodyear Atomic Corp. . Pantex Plant ...... Amarillo, Texas . . . . . Mason b Hanger-Silas Mason Co. Inc. Pinellas Plant ...... Cleaiwater, Fla...... General Electric Co. Rocky Flats Plant ...... Golden, Colo...... Atom& International Div. Rockwell International Corp. Savannah River Plant ...... Aiken, S.C...... El. du Pontde Nemours 6 Co. Y-12 Plant ...... Oak Ridge, Tenn.. . . . Nuclear Div., Union Carbide Corp.

1974 Annual Repon to Congress

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. _ Department of Energy Research and Development and Production Facilities

Pacific Northwestlab.

HEADQUARTERS

SAN FRANCISCO

!bhntitic lab. *t.A \

I \ '.Y

I.EGEND: @ OperatiImsMfics q Fad Office Ir, AIW OIfCS

0 Energy Technology ft Mining Tschnobgy Canters

v Pfoductiocl Facility w pa._ Anril 19Rl APPENDIX VII

FinancialStatistics ,

U.S. Government Investment in the Atomic Energy Program _ ._.,._

(From June WOThrough January 18, WE] ._ i

_. . _ _ - _.-_ (in millifs

L - Appropriation Expenditures: . National Defense Research Council ...... $ .5 Dffice of Scientific Research and Development ...... 14.6 War Department (including Manhattan 5ngineer District)...... 2218.3 2233.4

Atomic Energy CommMon: F-1 years prior to 1966...... 34643.8 Fiscal year 1966 ...... 2,402.g fiscal year 1967 ...... 2263.7 Fiscal year 1968 ...... 2466.6 F-1 year 1969 ...... 2450.4 Rscal year 1970 ...... 2455.0 Fiscal year 1971 ...... 2274.7 Fiscal year 1972 ...... 2392.1 F-1 year 1973 ...... 2393.1 FIxal year 1974 ...... 2,307.5 F-1 Year 1975 (through January 18) . ..- ...... 1,5126

Total AEC ...... 573624

Total Appropriation Expenditures...... 59,795.8

Unexpended Balance of Funds in U.S. Treasuy __. _, ______. - January 18,1975 ...... C...... ~ 3A39.9

_” Total Funds Appropri8ted ...... *...... 63235.7

Collections paid to U.S. Treasury ...... *...... a...... 58.0 Property and services transfehed to oQherFederal agencies without reimbursement, net of such transfers received . .l from other Federal agencies ...... *... Cost of operations from June 1940 through January 18,1975...... 46.E

I’ AEC Equity at January 18,1975 8s shown on Balance Sheet ...... ‘...... $16,15X5

. . APPENDIX Vlf! PERSONNEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION-

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy CHAIRMEN DATES OF SERVICE Brien McMahon 1946- Burke 8. Hickenlooper 1947-1948 Brien McMahon 1949 - 1%2 (d. 7/28/52I Carl T. Durham (Acting) . 1962. W. Steriing Cole 1953-E% Clinton P. Anderson 19640 1966 Carl T. Durham 1956 - 1968 . Clinton P. Anderson - 1959. Chet Holifield 19600 1961 . - 1962.1964 , - John 0. Pastore Chet Holifieid 1965.1966 John 0. Pastore 1967-1966 Chet Holifield 1969.1970 John 0. Pastore 1970 - 1972 Meivin Price ‘1973-

Military Liaison Committee CHAIRMEN DATES OF SERVICE Lt Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, USAF 1346-1946 Donald F. Carpenter 1946. William Webster 1946.1949 Robert F. LeBaron 1949-1954 - Herbert B. Loper l-054- 1960 Geraid W. Johnson 1961-1962 W.J. Howard 1963.1965 Carl Walske 1966.1972 Donald R. Cotter 1973 -

General Advisory Committee CHAIRMEN DATES OF SERVlCE J. Roben Oppenheimer 1946-1552 lsidor I. Rabi 1%2- 1956 Warren C. Johnson ’ 19% 1969 Kenneth S. Piper 1960-1961 Manson Benedict 1962-1963 LR. Hafstad 1964-1967 Norman F. Ramsey 1968. Howard G. Vesper 1969.1972 Lombard Squires 19730 AEC Commissioners

From To ,

Sumner T. Pike Oct. 31, 1% Dec. 15, 1951 David E. Liiienthal, Chairman Nov. 1, 1% Feb. 15, 1950 Roben F. Bather Nov. 1, 1% May 10, 1% William W. Waymack Nov. 5, 1% Dec. 21, 1% Lewis 1. Strauss Nov. 12. 1% Apr. 15, 1950 Chairman July 2, 1953 June 30, 1958 I Gordon Dean Mdy 24, 1% June 30, 1953 Chairman July 11, 1958 June 30, 1953

I Henry DeWolf Smyth May 30,1% Sept. 30, 1954 Thomas E. Murray- May 9, 1950 June 30, 1957 Thomas Keith Glennan Oct. 2, 1950 Nov. 1, 1952 Eugene M. Zuckert , Feb. 25, 1952 June 30, 1954 Joseph Campbell July 27, 1953 Nov. 30, 1954 Willard F. Libby . Oct. 5, 1954 June 30, 1959 ‘John Von Neumann Mar. 15, 1955 Feb. 8, 1957 Harold S: Vance Oct. 31, 1955 Aug. 31, 1959 John S. Graham Sept. 12, 1957 June 30, 1962 John Forrest Floberg Oct. 1, 1957 June 23, 1960 John A. McCone, Chairman July 14, 1958 Jan. 20, 1961 John H. Williams Aug. 13, 1959 June 30, 1960 Roben E. Wilson Mar. 22, 1960 Jan. 31, 1964 Loren K. Olson June 23, 1960 June 30, 1962 Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman Mar. 1, 1961 Aug. 16, 1971 Leland J. HawoRh Apr. 17, 1961 June 30, 1963 John G. Palfrey Aug. 31, 1962 June 30, 1966 James T. Ramey Aug. 31, 1962 ‘June 30, 1973 Gerald F. Tape July 15, 1963 Apr. 30, 1969 Mary I. Bunting June 29, 1964 June 30, 1965 Wilfred E. Johnson Aug. 1, 1966 June 36, 1972 Samuel M. Nabrit .. . Aug. 1, lS66 Aug. 1, 1967 Francesco Costagiiola Oct. 1, lS68 June 30, 1969 Theos J. Thompson June 12, lS69 Nov. 25, 1970 Clarence E. Larson Sept. 2, IS69 June 30, 1974 James R. Schlesinger, Chairman Aug. 17, 1971 Jan. 26, 1973 William 0. Doub Aug. 17, 1971 Aug. 17, 1974 Dixy Lee Ray Aug. 8, 1972 Chairman ’ Feb. 6, 1973 Jan. 18, 1975 William E. Kriegsman June 12, 1973 Jan. 18, 1975 , William A. Anders Aug. 6, 1973 Jan. 18, 1975

General Managers

Carroll L. Wilson * Dec. 31, 1% Aug. 15, 1950 Marion Boyer Nov. 1, 1950 Oct. 31, 1953 Kenneth D. Nichols Nov. 1, 1953 Apr. 30, 1955 Kenneth F. Fields May 1, 1955 June 30, 1958 Paul F. Foster July 1, 1958 Nov. 30, 1958 A. R. Luedecke Dec. 1, 1958 July 31, 1964 R. E. Hollingsworth Aug. 11, 1964 Dec. 31, 1973 John A. Erlewine Feb. 15, 1974 Dec. 31,‘1974 DiRECTORS OFTHE DIVISION OF MILITARY APPLICATION

Brig. General James McCormack, Jr., USAF February 1, 19470 August 19, 1951

Brig. General Kenneth E. Fields, USA August 20, iSSl- April 30, 1955 I Maj. General Alfred D. Starbird, USA July 1, 19550 . January 25, 1961

Maj. General Austin W. Betts, USA January.26, 1961- February 14, 1964

Brig. General Delmar L. Crowson, USAF February 17, 19640 June 30, 1967

Maj. General Edward 8. Gil'ler, USAF* + July 1, 19670 June 30, 1972

Maj. General Frank A. Canan, USA* July 1, 7972- November 23, 1973

Maj. General Ernest Graves, USA* December 15, 1973- September 21, 1975

Maj. General Joseph K. Bratton, USA September 22, 1975 August 17, 1979

Maj. General William W. Hoover, USAF September 13, 197S-

*Also held the title of Assistant General Manager forMilitary Application while serving as division 'director. , *Also held the title of Assistant General Manager for National Security while serving as division director.

I . I

38 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

GENERAL MANAGER DEPUTY GENEFIAL MANAGER

OPERATIONS OFFICES GENERAL COUNSEL

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON r CONTROLLER L I 1 I I INSPECTION 171 I 1 I ASST. TO THE GEN. MGA. , J FOR EOUAL EMPL. OPPOA.

Af+3STANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR ENERGY AND OEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH ______~~~_~~~_~~~~~~_~_~~~~. ______‘-L_,___,i-_-______,___------

REACTOR DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY MILITARY APPLICATION BIOLOGY AN0 MEDICINE’ APPLIED TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS PHYSICAL RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR RESEARCH SPACE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS NAVAL REACTORS SCHENECTADY NAVAL REACTORS OFFICE NUCLEAR EDUCATION AND TRAINING *I PITTSBURGH NAVAL REACTORS OFFICE

.

I I 1

ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAdER FOR ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER FOR PAOOUCTION b MANAGEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY NUCLEAR MATLS. . ______-______-______------. ______-_-_-__---. ______~ PRODUCTION AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS GRAND JUNCTION OFFICE CONSTRUCTION OPERATIONAL SAFETY > CONTRACTS WASTE MANAGEMENT AN0 TRANSPORTATION PERSONNEL E HEADOUARTERS SERVICES MGMT. INFO. AND TELECOMM. SYSTEMS 5 CLASSIFICATION x LABOR RELAIIOFIS i7 . I December 1971 b\‘.