Pdf, Accessed 10 August 2013

Home , Bryan Cartledge, Chevaline, Curtis Keeble, Denis Thatcher, Donald Soper, Frank Panton

Notes

Introduction

1 . Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 2 . He eventually defeated Michael Foot in the leadership run-off. Foot would succeed Callaghan as leader in 1980, defeating Denis Healey. 3 . James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 385–408. 4 . David McKie, ‘Lord Callaghan Labour prime minister who, uniquely, held all four of the great offices of state, but whose consensus politics were washed away in the late 1970s’, The Guardian , 28 March 2005. 5 . ‘Why grass roots protests are now a “Must”’, The Guardian , 4 March 2010. 6 . Callaghan, Time and Chance , p. 400. 7 . Ibid. p. 448. 8 . Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 388–464. 9 . Ibid. pp. 381, 393, 422–424, 429–435 and Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 413–447, 478, 498, 515. 10 . For a comprehensive synopsis see Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s (London: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 11 . Andy McSmith, ‘Margaret Thatcher obituary: the most divisive political leader of modern times’, The Independent , 8 April 2013. 12 . Quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), pp. 408, 397–436. 13 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Coles.pdf, accessed 10 August 2013. 14 . John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recollections of an Errant Politician (London: Politico’s, 2002), p. 202. 15 . Ibid., p. 217. 16 . Ibid., pp. 210, 222. Dennis Kavanagh, ‘Lord Pym: Leading “wet” in Thatcher’s first cabinet who became Foreign Secretary during the Falklands War’, The Independent , 8 March 2008. 17 . Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), p. 41. 18 . Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 52. 19 . Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 4, 27. 20 . Ibid., p. 27. 21 . David Alan Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, International Security, Vol. 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71. This line of analysis can also be found in John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

247 248 Notes

22 . These ministers included the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 23 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , pp. 9, 27–28, 32–33, 135–139, 229–230. 24 . Now Lockheed Martin. As with the UK effort, a large number of both government and private contractors each played a part. 25 . Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961–1963 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), p. 335. 26 . G.M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear Relationship 1962–1982 (Aldershot: Gower, 1983). 27 . During the course of both the British Nuclear History Study Group and earlier meetings, the ad hoc nature of the archival preservation process was brought to light, with many documents destroyed or still waiting for security vetting. 28 . Lorna Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford: The History of Nuclear History in Britain’, Minerva , Vol. 38, No. 2 (2000), pp. 211–212. 29 . Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London: Hart-Davies, 1953). 30 . It may also be the case that participants have a vested interest in shaping the historical record in a particular way in order to justify the role they played at the time. 31 . Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010). 32 . It also draws intellectual reasoning from international perspectives on national nuclear weapons programmes and from the vast literature on British domestic politics, Strategic Studies, Intelligence Studies and Cold War history. 33 . Private interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, January 2012.

1 The British Labour Government and the Development of Chevaline, 1976–1979

1 . Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 392–393. For a more personal recollection see James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 449–450. 2 . http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/Oct/1974-oct-labour- manifesto.shtml, 18 July 2011. 3 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 148–159, 159–171, 202–223, 230, 273–275, 277, 280–282. 4 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Top Secret Artificer UK Eyes: A Report on the Progress and Status of the Chevaline Project: The Main Report, 1 April 1976. 5 . Ibid. 6 . Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected ... the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment’s contribution to the Chevaline Payload’, Proceedings from a conference on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme , held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. Henceforward, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 7 . This is well described in the memoirs of the Prime Minister and Chancellor at the time. See James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1988), pp. 413–567 and Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 455–456. A Notes 249

non-partisan account can be found in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 376–396. 8 . TNA, DEFE 13/752, Annex A to COS 45/72, 25 April 1972. 9 . This issue is covered in detail in Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 146–50. 10 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 11 June 1976. A separate minute in the same file also queried whether the renewal of nuclear understandings between the US and UK (which were renewed whenever a new President or Prime Minister came into office) whether Callaghan needed to sign the ‘secret understanding with the President of the United States about U.S. nuclear units in this country. The same also applies on Diego Garcia.’ TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.T. Armstrong to Sir John Hunt , 11 March 1976. 11 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 11 June 1976. 12 . Perspectives on the Soviet ABM programme in this period can be found in Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin: The Cold War and Beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 91–94 and Pavel Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), pp. 418–433 and http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_ modest_Expectations_sovie.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 13 . Pavel Podvig, ‘History and the current status of the Russian early warning system’, Science and Global Security , Vol. 10 (2002). The current status of these radars can be found at http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/06/daryal-u_radar_in_ mishelevka_d.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 14 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 7 July 1976. 15 . http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_Expectations_sovie.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 16 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, John Hunt to Mr. P.R.H. Wright Polaris Improvements , 21 June 1976. 17 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, Patrick Wright to J.F. Mayne Polaris Improvements , 6 July 1976. 18 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, Meeting of Ministers: The Nuclear Deterrent Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 29 July 1976 at 4.15 pm, 2 August 1976. 19 . More on these financial mechanisms can be found in http://www.cnduk.org/ information/briefings/trident-briefings/item/101-cnd-special-report-the-next- chevaline-scandal, accessed 1 May 2014. 20 . Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 142, 167. 21 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Polaris Improvements , 6 August 1976. 22 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, M. Gainsborough to CPE (Mr Hall) Polaris/Chevaline Costs, 14 October 1976. 23 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, P.J. Hudson DUS(FB) Nuclear Weapons Research , 3 November 1976. 24 . ‘Sir Frank Cooper’, The Daily Telegraph , 30 January 2002. 25 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Frank Cooper to DUS(FB) Nuclear Weapons Research , 8 November 1976. 26 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, B.G. Cartledge to Martin Vile Nuclear Weapons Policy, 20 July 1977. 27 . Ministry of Defence: Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System , Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1981–82, HC 269 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982), pp. v, 3. 250 Notes

28 . These cost rises may have been leaked to the press leading to a speculative article appearing in The Daily Mail in May 1977. The Daily Mail , 16 May 1977. 29 . Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 54. 30 . Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 31 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Chevaline Cost Plan , 25 April 1977. 32 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, RM to Prime Minister Polaris Improvement Programme – Nuclear Testing , 8 July 1976. 33 . The role and function of the Penetration Aid Carrier is described in detail in Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2012), pp. 139, 150, and The Sword and the Shield , pp. 47, 62, 157, 165, 170. 34 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES, 28 October 2004. 35 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, F.H. Panton ACSA(N) to DCA(PN) Nuclear Test, 19 February 1976. 36 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to PS/S of S Chevaline Nuclear Warhead Tests , 27 February 1976. 37 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, Annex A to MO 22/8 Dated 30th May 1977 UK Nuclear Weapons Programme , 30 May 1977. 38 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 21 July 1977. 39 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, F.K. Jones to N. Wicks Chevaline , 26 July 1977. 40 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, John Hunt to Prime Minister Chevaline , 26 July 1977. 41 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, David Owen to Prime Minister Chevaline , 26 July 1977. 42 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, J.C. to Secretary of State for Defence Chevaline , 3 August 1977. 43 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.T. Jackling to R.J. Meadway, 26 August 1977. 44 . Particularly as the first Polaris flight trial in September 1977 had not gone entirely to plan. Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 45 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Ministry of Defence Chevaline Steering Committee CSC/P(77)4 19 April 1977 Cost Plan (Paper by CPE) , 19 April 1977. 46 . Mike Rance from material largely supplied by Roy Dommett, ‘RAE’s Role in & Contribution to Chevaline’, and S.C. Metcalf and R.L. Dommett ‘An Introduction to Chevaline’, both Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 47 . Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 48 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, July 1978 , 7 July 1978. 49 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Secretary/CNS to PS/S of S Chevaline , 11 August 1978. 50 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Secretary/First Sea Lord to PS/S of S Chevaline, 25 September 1978. The ‘PAC itself was the responsibility of Hunting Engineering. But it carried rocket motors, penetration aids, re-entry bodies, electronic components and wiring designed elsewhere’. Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 51 . Ibid. 52 . Rance, ‘RAE’s Role in & Contribution to Chevaline’, and Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 53 . Woomera ‘had the great advantage that it was over land, and the flight hardware and data packages could be recovered ... The vehicles launched from Woomera in Phase ii) were Jabiru, Skylark and Falstaff, Jabiru (a WRE test rocket) and Skylark (provisioned by Bristol Aerojet from the UK), were important to the development Notes 251

of elements of the payload concepts ... Falstaff was a RAE-RPE development which gave a payload bay of similar dimensions to Polaris, and thus allowed full scale trials of the PAC and payload release.’ Metcalf and Dommett, ‘An Introduction to Chevaline’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 54 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 55 . Ibid. 56 . Ibid. 57 . See also interviews conducted with Roy Dommett. British Library Website, http:// sounds.bl.uk/Oral-history/Science/021M-C1379X0014XX-0001V0, accessed 18 February 2014. 58 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 59 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, July 1978 , 7 July 1978. 60 . Ibid. 61 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 62 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, From COMMCEN FCO London to MODUK Owen for CWR, 18 November 1978. 63 . Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons , pp. 86–100. This would have been a test of a primary device used as the first stage to detonate a thermonuclear secondary. 64 . TNA, DEFE 19/181 (TNA), Note for the Record Avis 202 Discussion with Harry L Reynolds Associate Director for Nuclear Explosives LLL, 17 July 1978. 65 . It was hoped Cresset (Fondutta) would lead to a lighter warhead increasing the range of Chevaline by about 64 (nautical) miles. TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, July 1978 , 7 July 1978. 66 . TNA, DEFE 19/181 (TNA), V.H.B. Macklen to PUS , 15 August 1978. Callaghan gave his approval of this test (now due to take place later in December) on 2 October 1978. TNA, DEFE 19/181, V.H.B. Macklen to Drake Seager, 2 October 1978. 67 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister British Nuclear Test Programme , 3 November 1978. 68 . TNA, DEFE 19/181, V.H.B. Macklen to Secretary of State, 23 November 1978. 69 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, V.H.B. Macklen to Secretary of State British Nuclear Test – 20 November 1978 , 23 November 1978. 70 . Nessel was the American codename for the test, the British codename was Dicel. TNA, DEFE 19/181, AWRE Aldermaston Classification Notice No. 40 Classification Guide for Dicel/Nessel, 14 March 1979. 71 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) British Nuclear Test Programme, 23 October 1978. 72 . TNA, DEFE 19/181, V.H.B. Macklen to PS/S of S , 23 October 1978. 73 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister British Nuclear Test Programme , 3 November 1978. This warhead was not compatible for the Mk. 3 re-entry vehicle used in Poseidon, but it was a step towards a British equivalent of the warhead for the Mk. 4 re-entry vehicle for both the C-4 and D-5 versions of Trident. With the development work on the Chevaline warhead now completed, work had begun to focus on the next most likely requirement (the US Trident missile). The lead-in time for a UK warhead was likely to be long, and needs had to be anticipated if designs were to be available when required. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 74 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to Secretary of State British Nuclear Test – 20 November 1978 , 23 November 1978. 252 Notes

75 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister British Nuclear Test Programme , 3 November 1978. 76 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, David Owen to the Prime Minister British Nuclear Test Programme, 31 October 1978. 77 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, David Owen to Prime Minister PM/78/125 British Nuclear Test Programme , Undated, 16 November 1978. 78 . TNA, DEFE 19/181, David Owen to Prime Minister , 16 November 1978. 79 . Macklen found Owen’s minute ‘not very helpful’ from the MoD’s point of view. TNA, DEFE 19/181, V.H.B. Macklen to Secretary of State, 22 November 1978. 80 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, G.G.H. Walden to B.G. Cartledge British Nuclear Test Programme, 28 November 1978. 81 . TNA, DEFE19/181, Bryan Cartledge to R.L.L. Facer, 1 December 1978. 82 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, SCDS(B)1 to PSO/CDS British Nuclear Test Programme, 30 November 1978. 83 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Bryan Cartledge to Roger Facer UK Nuclear Test Programme, 1 December 1978. 84 . David Owen, Time to Declare , (London: Penguin 1992), pp. 380–381. 85 . Ibid. 86 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ commons/1979/jan/16/united-kingdom-underground-nuclear-test, accessed 9 February 2014. 87 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, J.F. Howe PS/PUS Chevaline Costs , 22 June 1978. 88 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989–02–15/Debate-12.html#Debate-12_ spnew28, accessed 13 September 2002. 89 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report , 7 July 1978. 90 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, January 1979 Report to Secretary of State , January 1979. 91 . Ibid. 92 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 18 January 1979. 93 . Metcalf and Dommett, ‘An Introduction to Chevaline’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 94 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, January 1979 Report to Secretary of State , January 1979. 95 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 18 January 1979. 96 . A fifth launch (P5) would take place again from Cape Canaveral on 4 April 1979, less than a month before the General Election. TNA, DEFE 25/335, J.D. Gutteredge to B.G. Cartledge, 2 April 1979. 97 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, January 1979 Report to the Secretary of State, January 1979. 98 . As Kate Pyne describes ‘Part of AWRE’s difficulties with Chevaline at this time stemmed from Sir Edwin Pochin’s investigation into the discovery of plutonium dust in the lungs of laundry workers at Aldermaston. Several buildings had to be closed, two of which were vital for the production of components needed in Chevaline warheads. By March 1979, it became apparent that warheads for the first Boatload could not be produced in time because of remedial activity in these buildings resulting from recommendations in Sir Edwin Pochin’s Report. By mid-April 1980, resources in the area at Aldermaston where both these buildings were located became overloaded. The crucial plutonium facility could not be re-opened before January 1981 and even then, some of the remedial work Notes 253

was still in progress.’ Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. See also TNA, DEFE 13/1365, Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE): Pochin Report on investigation into radiological safety at AWRE, Aldermaston, due to high levels of plutonium found in staff, 1 January–31 December 1978. 99 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chevaline Progress Report, January 1979 Report to the Secretary of State, January 1979. 100 . See for example the memoirs of Mrs Thatcher and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe: Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 92–121, 339–378 and Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2004), pp. 121–129. 101 . TNA DEFE 25/335, D.W.H. to Prime Minister Chevaline , 26 January 1979. 102 . Healey, The Time of My Life , p. 456. 103 . Ibid. 104 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, David Owen to Prime Minister Chevaline , 1 February 1979. Owen’s views are further detailed in Chapter 2. 105 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 9 February 1979. 106 . Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 385–386. 107 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Bryan Cartledge to Roger Facer Chevaline , 6 February 1979. 108 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 9 February 1979. 109 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 110 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Bryan Cartledge to Roger Facer, 6 February 1979. 111 . Healey, The Time of my Life , p. 313. 112 . Private correspondence with Sir Michael Quinlan, 23 October 2002. 113 . The protocol to the ABM Treaty signed in July 1974 limited the Soviet Union to protecting Moscow with an upper ceiling of 64 interceptor missiles and also removed the option of defending two sites simultaneously. 114 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Meeting British National Criteria for Strategic Deterrence, 10 November 1975, TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Frank Cooper to Secretary of State, 25 June 1976. 115 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, M.C. to Secretary of State , 31 March 1976. See Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 146–150 for details of these controversial deliberations. See also ‘The Bomb, the Chancellor and Britain’s Nuclear Secrets’, BBC Radio 4, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00zdj01, accessed 9 April 2014. 116 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, David Owen to Prime Minister Chevaline , 1 February 1979. 117 . Ibid. The MoD rebutted this charge noting ‘the British deterrent is not intended to mirror the major and varied strategic nuclear forces of the United States or the thinking which goes with them. Indeed, it is the very concentration of our capability that drives us to seek the utmost from it’. TNA, DEFE 25/335, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline , 9 February 1979. 118 . Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (London: Indigo, 1997), pp. 124–125. 119 . TNA, DEFE 5/192/45, The Rationale for the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force , 25 April 1972. 120 . Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 114. 254 Notes

2 The Callaghan Government and Polaris Replacement 1976–1979: The Duff-Mason Report

1 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Record of a Meeting in the Defence Secretary’s Office held on Thursday 27th May at 2.30pm, 1 June 1976. 2 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, FM to Prime Minister Chevaline, 19 September 1977. 3 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, E.A.J. Fergusson to Bryan Cartledge Chevaline, 23 September 1977. 4 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, R.L.L. Facer to B.G. Cartledge Chevaline, 29 September 1977. 5 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, Clive Rose to Mr Cartledge c Sir John Hunt Chevaline 30 September 1977. 6 . Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), p. 448. 7 . Interview with Sir Paul Lever, available from www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/ collections/BDOHP/Lever.pdf, accessed 12 August 2013. 8 . Ibid. 9 . W.J.A. Wilberforce to Mr Moberly PS/PUS Private Secretary, 22 September 1977. Reproduced in David Owen, Nuclear Papers (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp. 75–76. 10 . This was based on the sea room they could operate in and complicated once the SSBNs moved into deep water. 11 . W.J.A. Wilberforce to Mr Moberly PS/PUS Private Secretary, 22 September 1977. Reproduced in Owen, Nuclear Papers , pp. 75–96. Many of these issues regarding cruise were subsequently examined in detail by the Nuclear Matters Working Party detailed below. TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78)11 Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Cruise Missile Options for a UK Strategic Deterrent Note by the Secretary, 21 June 1978. 12 . Summary Record of a Meeting on Military Nuclear Issues in the Secretary of State’s Office at 10:15 a.m. on Monday 17 October 1977. Reproduced in Owen, Nuclear Papers , pp. 97–103. 13 . Ibid. In doing so he rejected the number of 17 additional SSNs put forward by Ian Smart in his recent Chatham House study. Ian Smart, ‘British foreign policy to 1985: The future of the British nuclear deterrent: technical, economic and strategic issues’, Royal Institute of International Affairs , 1977. 14 . This was a highly secret committee that even lacked a Gen number normally assigned to Labour government sub-committees. 15 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, John Hunt to Prime Minister Military Nuclear Issues, 25 October 1977. 16 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, Conclusions of a Ministerial Meeting held at No. 10 Downing Street on Friday 28 October 1977 at 0945, 28 October 1977. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid. 19 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Nuclear Matters Note of a meeting held in Sir John Hunt’s Room, Cabinet Office, on Wednesday, 2 November 1977 at 5:30 pm, 2 November 1977. 20 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 60, 63, 147, 153. 21 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Nuclear Matters Note of a meeting held in Sir John Hunt’s Room, Cabinet Office, on Wednesday, 2 November 1977 at 5:30 pm, 2 November 1977. Notes 255

22 . Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old Labour: The Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974–1979 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 180. 23 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Matters, 28 November 1977. 24 . Ibid. 25 . Ibid. 26 . Ibid. 27 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Defence Policy, 29 November 1977. 28 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Note of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 1 December 1977 at 10:00 a.m., 6 December 1977. 29 . Ibid. 30 . Ibid. 31 . Ibid. 32 . Ibid. 33 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Terms of Reference for a Study of Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent, undated 1978. 34 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, John Hunt to Mr. Cartledge Top Secret and Personal, 9 December 1977. 35 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Studies, 13 December 1977. 36 . Ibid. 37 . Ibid. 38 . Ibid. 39 . Ibid. 40 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Criteria for Deterrence Note of a Meeting held in Sir Anthony Duff’s room, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on Wednesday 4 January 1978 at 11:00 a.m., 5 January 1978. 41 . TNA, PREM 16/1564, K.R.S. to Sir John Hunt United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent, 30 January 1978. 42 . Ibid. 43 . Ibid. 44 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Criteria for Deterrence Note of a meeting held in Sir Anthony Duff’s Room, Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Thursday 23 February 1978 at 3:00 p.m., 23 February 1978. 45 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Working Party on Nuclear Matters, 24 February 1978. 46 . Ibid. 47 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Criteria for Deterrence Note of a meeting held in Sir Anthony Duff’s room Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 15 March 1978 at 9:30 a.m., 15 March 1978. 48 . Ibid. On the Multilateral/Atlantic Nuclear Force proposals see Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 16, 19–24, 26, 34–35, 54, 60–70, 76–77, 85, 120–121, 167, 170–171, 197, 231, 239, 247, 259, 270. 49 . The importance of Britain maintaining its strategic deterrent for those who, like President Giscard of France, wanted to avoid ‘exclusive reliance on the US’ was subsequently communicated by Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor, to the Prime Minister in Bonn on 19 October 1978. TNA, PREM 16/1977, 256 Notes

Extract from a Record of the conversation between PM and Schmidt in Federal Chancellery Bonn 19 October 1978 at 0935. Top copy filed on Germany (Sept 78) ‘Bonn Visit – Policy’, 19 October 1978. 50 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Criteria for Deterrence Note of a meeting held in Sir Anthony Duff’s room, Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 22 March 1978 at 11:00 a.m., 22 March 1978. 51 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 3rd Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Note of a meeting held in room 3110 MoD Main Building on Wednesday 29 March at 2:00 p.m., 29 March 1978. 52 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 4th Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Minutes of a Meeting held in the Polaris Management Centre, on Monday 3 April at 10:00 a.m., 3 April 1978. 53 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 5th Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Note of a Meeting held at the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), Aldermaston on Monday 10 April at 10:30 a.m., 10 April 1978. 54 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78)7 Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Presentation on RAF Theatre Nuclear Forces Note by the Secretary, 21 April 1978. 55 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters, 3 May 1978. 56 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78)9 Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Launch Platform and Delivery Vehicle Combinations for An Independent UK Nuclear Strategic Deterrent, 15 May 1978. 57 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78)8 Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Presentation to the Working Party Note by the Secretary, 15 May 1978. 58 . This was mistaken with the M-4 carrying six MIRV warheads with the first sea launch in March 1982 with operational deployment beginning in 1985. For more information see Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997–1998 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 187. 59 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 8th Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 6134, MoD Main Building on Monday 26 June at 3:00 p.m., 28 June 1978. 60 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Criteria for Deterrence, 13 July 1979. 61 . This also bore on decisions regarding Labour’s 1974 Manifesto commitment. TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Criteria for Deterrence, 13 July 1979. 62 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, BGC to Prime Minister The UK Deterrent, 20 July 1978. 63 . Ibid. 64 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, BGC to Prime Minister The UK Deterrent, 4 August 1978. 65 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, 13 August 1979. 66 . Owen, Time to Declare , p. 381, and Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (London: Indigo, 1997), p. 124. 67 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, David Owen to Prime Minister Nuclear Weapons Policy, 31 July 1978. Callaghan’s comments were dated 18 August 1978 owing to the summer recess of Parliament. 68 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, David Owen to Prime Minister Nuclear Weapons Policy, 31 July 1978. Notes 257

69 . Ibid. 70 . Ibid. 71 . Ibid. 72 . Ibid. 73 . Ibid. 74 . Ibid. A similar series of judgements were arrived at in December. G.G.H. Walden to B.G. Cartledge, 12 December 1978. Reproduced in Owen, Nuclear Papers , pp. 151–157. 75 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, David Owen to Prime Minister Nuclear Weapons Policy, 31 July 1978. 76 . Ibid. 77 . Ibid. 78 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, N. Sanders British Nuclear Deterrent, 10 August 1978. 79 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 12th Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 6134, MoD Main Building on 8 November at 10:00 a.m., 8 November 1978. 80 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, D of DP(C) to AD(N), 13 November 1978. 81 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, AD(N) to Director C, 14 November 1978. 82 . TNA, DEFE 68/405, NMWP(78) 13th Meeting Ministry of Defence Working Party on Nuclear Matters Minutes of a Meeting held in Room 6134, MoD Main Building on Friday 17 November at 10:30 a.m., 17 November 1978. 83 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Studies on the Future of the British Deterrent, 3 November 1978. Callaghan’s decision to move forward into ministerial discussions was made around 21 November. TNA, PREM 16/1977, BGC to M.J. Vile, Esq., Cabinet Office Studies on the Future of the U.K. Deterrent, 21 November 1978. 84 . France was added soon after. TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 7 December 1978. Callaghan’s request was hand- written on Hunt’s note. 85 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Part I: The Politico-Military Requirement Summary of Report, December 1978. 86 . Ibid. 87 . Ibid. 88 . See for example the fine tribute paid by Sir Richard Mottram in his obituary in The Guardian , 2 March 2009. Quinlan’s views of the ‘seamless robe of deterrence’ and TNF modernisation can also be found in Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (Abingdon: Routledge/ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 167–259. 89 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Part I: The Politico-Military Requirement Summary of Report, December 1978. 90 . See for example, Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945– 2010 (London: Penguin, 2010), pp. 78–80. 91 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Part I: The Politico-Military Requirement Summary of Report, December 1978. 92 . Ibid. 93 . Ibid. 94 . Ibid. 258 Notes

95 . Ibid. 96 . Ibid. 97 . Ibid. 98 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, The Politico-Strategic Background Annex, December 1978. 99 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, The Study of Factors Related to Further Consideration of the Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Summary of Part III on System Options and their Implications, undated 1979. 100 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, David Owen to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 11 December 1978. 101 . Ibid. 102 . Ibid. 103 . Ibid. 104 . He questioned ‘Am I right? And where do we stand’. TNA, PREM 16/1977, M.J. Vile to B.G. Cartledge, 12 December 1978. 105 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 12 December 1978. 106 . TNA, PREM 16/1977, John Hunt to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 15 December 1979. 107 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, Duff Mason Report on factors relating to the further consideration of the future of the UK nuclear deterrent Part III System Options, December 1978. This report is also available in TNA, DEFE 19/275. 108 . Ibid. 109 . Ibid. 110 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Duff-Mason Part III System Options, December 1978. 111 . There was an additional reason which has been redacted. 112 . These criteria remain classified in some files under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act (1958) but are widely mentioned in many others. TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, 13 August 1979. 113 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Duff-Mason Part III System Options, December 1978. TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, 13 August 1979. 114 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Annex C: Other Criteria: An Assured Second Strike Capability, December 1978. 115 . Ibid. 116 . An early copy of this paper had been provided to Callaghan the week before. TNA, PREM 16/1977, G.G.H. Walden to B.G. Cartledge, 12 December 1978. 117 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, David Owen to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 19 December 1978. 118 . Ibid. 119 . Ibid. 120 . Ibid. 121 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 20 December 1978. 122 . Ibid. 123 . Ibid. 124 . Ibid. 125 . Ibid. 126 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, FM to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 20 December 1978. 127 . Ibid. Notes 259

128 . Ibid. 129 . Ibid. 130 . David Owen, Time to Declare , (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 381. 131 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Note of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 21 December 1978 at 9:45 a.m., 22 December 1978. 132 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , p. 133. 133 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Note of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 21 December 1978 at 9:45 a.m., 22 December 1978. 134 . Ibid. 135 . Ibid. 136 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Prime Minister The U.K. Deterrent: Ministerial Meeting on 2 January, 21 December 1978. 137 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Note of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday 2 January 1979 at 11:00 a.m., 3 January 1979. 138 . Ibid. 139 . Ibid. 140 . Ibid. 141 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Carter: 3:30 p.m., 5 January, at Guadeloupe, 5 January 1979. K.O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 620. 142 . James Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 554–557. Callaghan’s record of the discussions is an accurate representation of the declassified record of the time. 143 . Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 301 and 501. 144 . Ibid, p. 555. 145 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Carter: 3:30 p.m., 5 January, at Guadeloupe, 5 January 1979. 146 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , pp. 118, 128–129, 135, 140, 160, 164, 229, 254, 273. 147 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Carter: 3.30 p.m., 5 January, at Guadeloupe, 5 January 1979. 148 . Ibid. 149 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Matters Next Steps, 7 January 1979. 150 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Mr. Cartledge Future of British Nuclear Deterrent, 15 January 1979. 151 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, LR to The Prime Minister Personal Chancellor of the Exchequer Nuclear Defence Policy, 17 January 1979. 152 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Defence Policy, 18 January 1979. 153 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Notes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Friday 19 January 1979 at 10:00 a.m., 23 January 1979. 154 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Mr. Cartledge, 12 February 1979. 155 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, BGC to Prime Minister Polaris Replacement, 23 March 1979. 156 . Ibid. 157 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, BGC to Prime Minister Your letter to President Carter about Trident, 26 March 1979. 260 Notes

158 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, Jim Callaghan The Prime Minister Secret for the President’s Eyes Only, 27 March 1979. 159 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, B.G. Cartledge to His Excellency Mr. Peter Jay, 27 March 1979. 160 . Hennessy, Muddling Through , pp. 126–127, and private correspondence with Lord Owen, March 2006. 161 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, John Hunt to Mr. Cartledge Nuclear Matters, 27 March 1979. 162 . Ibid. 163 . TNA, PREM 16/1978, B.G. Cartledge to Sir John Hunt, 6 April 1979. 164 . James Callaghan, Time and Chance , p. 553. 165 . For personal recollections of the Duff-Mason Report see also the edited transcript of the ‘Cabinets and the Bomb’ Workshop, held at the British Academy, 27 March 2007. Available from http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectiv es/0703cabinetsandbomb-1.html, accessed 10 May 2008. 166 . Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 60. 167 . For an insider’s view see Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the Bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 323–329. 168 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State Briefing New Ministers, 2 May 1979. 169 . Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs (London: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 385. 170 . Hennessy, Muddling Through , p. 125. 171 . Ibid. 172 . Quoted in Hennessy, Muddling Through , p. 124. 173 . Ibid., pp. 123–127. 174 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, Duff-Mason Report on factors relating to the further consideration of the future of the UK nuclear deterrent Part III System Options Annex F: International Aspects of System Choice, December 1978.

3 Britain, the US and NATO LRTNF Modernisation, 1976–1979

1 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 192–202. 2 . TNA, FCO 41/1651, P. Lever to Mr Tickell, 7 February 1975. 3 . Much has been written on the ‘neutron bomb’, see for example Donald Snow, ‘Strategic Implications of Enhanced Radiation Weapons: A Preliminary Analysis’, Air University Review , July–August 1979. 4 . TNA, FCO 41/1651, P. Lever to Mr Tickell, 7 February 1975. 5 . TNA, FCO 41/1651, Dr I. J. Shaw to Head of DIS(CS), 18 March 1975. 6 . The ‘Euromissiles crisis’/‘dual track’ decision is compressively covered as a multilateral study in Leopoldo Nuti, Bernd Rother, Frédéric Bozo and Marie- Pierre Rey (eds), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (the Wilson Center/Stanford University Press, forthcoming). 7 . On the security dilemma see Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 8 . TNA, FCO 66/613, Small yield tactical nuclear weapons (‘mini-nukes’), 11 January–13 June 1974; and TNA, FCO 41/1434, NATO Nuclear Planning Group study on implications of technological development, January–December 1974; and TNA, FCO 41/1653, NATO Nuclear Planning Group: new technology study, January–December 1975. Notes 261

9 . Desmond Ball, ‘The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983’, in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (eds), Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 73 and William Burr, ‘The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 39. 10 . http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c760614a.htm, accessed 8 May 2014. 11 . TNA, DEFE 31/160, NATO Nuclear Planning Group Final Communique, 15 June 1976. 12 . Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , p. 200. 13 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, To Immediate UKDEL NATO Brussels Telegram No. 138 of 11 May 1976. Nuclear Planning Group: US Paper on Improving the Effectiveness of NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Forces, 11 May 1976. 14 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, John Killick to A. P. Hockaday, 14 May 1976. 15 . Alan Campbell, ‘Sir John Killick: High-flying envoy at the heart of Britain’s cold-war diplomacy’, The Guardian , 16 February 2004. 16 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, John Killick to A. P. Hockaday, 14 May 1976. 17 . Ibid. 18 . Ibid. 19 . Ibid. 20 . It was also Killick’s view that Haig was ‘rather an authoritarian character, and chafes at the bit’. TNA, FCO 46/1374, John Killick to A. P. Hockaday, 20 July 1976. 21 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, D. J. Sleigh Head of DS12 to PS/S of S NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Forces, 27 May 1976. 22 . Commentary on the Nunn Amendment can be found in Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 187–195, 199, 223–224, 230. 23 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, R. T. Jackling DS12 to DUS(P) Visit of Dr Cotter, 21 May 1976. 24 . TNA, FCO 46/1374, Report on Seminar on the Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons Held at the National Defence College, Latimer, 7 May 1976 , 23 July 1976. 25 . TNA, DEFE 31/160, UK Record of NPG Ministerial Meeting: 14 June , 16 July 1976. 26 . Ibid. 27 . On the speech, see Kristina Spohr-Readman, ‘Conflict and Co-operation in intra-Alliance Nuclear Politics: Western Europe, America and the Genesis of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 1977–1979’, Journal of Cold War Studies , Vol. 13, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 40–41. 28 . Helmut Schmidt, ‘The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture’, Survival , Vol. 20, Issue 1 (January-February 1978), pp. 2–10. 29 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 25 November 2007. The ‘Mulley letter’ is referred to in Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 230–231. 30 . Fred Mulley to The Hon Dr Harold Brown, 4 August 1977. The declassified letter was provided to the author by Sir Michael Quinlan. It does not have a TNA heading. 31 . Ibid. 32 . Ibid. 33 . Ibid. 34 . Ibid. 35 . Ibid. 36 . Ibid. 262 Notes

37 . Spohr-Readman, ‘Conflict and Co-operation’, p. 47. See also David Jablonsky, ‘NATO’s Long-Term Defense Planning: Will It Work?’, Parameters, Journal of the US Army War College , Vol. XI, No. 2 (1981), pp. 75–82. 38 . This is not to say there wasn’t also considerable discord also. 39 . Spohr-Readman, ‘Conflict and Co-operation’, p. 47. 40 . NATO documents page, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b791212a. htm, Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The ‘Double- Track’ Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces) of 12 December 1979, accessed 1 November 2009. 41 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 25 November 2007. 42 . Ibid. See also Kristina Spohr-Readman, ‘Germany and the politics of the neutron bomb, 1975–1979’, Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 21, No. 2 (June 2010), pp. 259–285. 43 . The role of the task forces is covered in David M. Walsh, The Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976–85 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 114–116, 127–128. 44 . Christoph Bluth, ‘British-German Defence Relations, 1950–80: A Survey’, in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, British German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance , (London: Jane’s for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988), pp. 28–29 and Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy , p. 230. It has been suggested to the author that Task Force 10 was reluctantly added on. Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 45 . TNA, DEFE 11/793, Attachment to COS(Misc) 557/154C, 11 November 1977. 46 . Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 47 . TNA, DEFE 11/793, Attachment to COS(Misc) 557/154C, 11 November 1977. 48 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, Annex A to DP 27/77(Final) , 21 November 1977. 49 . Ibid. 50 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, Annex A to DP 27/77(Revised Final) , 9 January 1978. 51 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, NC Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State Cruise Missiles , 20 March 1978. 52 . Ibid. 53 . Ibid. 54 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, R.L.L. Facer PS/Secretary of State to PSO/CDS , 4 April 1978. 55 . David Owen to Prime Minister, 31 July 1978, reproduced in David Owen, Nuclear Papers (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009), pp. 117–148. 56 . Ibid. 57 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, J.D. Sutton AVN ACAS(Pol) Cruise Missiles – An AFD View, 7 November 1978. 58 . Ibid. 59 . Ibid. 60 . Ibid. 61 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, D. J. Fewtrell Head of DS9 to AUS(AS) , 14 November 1978. 62 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent Part 1: The Politico-Military Requirement , undated November 1978. 63 . See for example Richard Mottram's obituary in The Guardian , 2 March 2009. 64 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent Part 1: The Politico-Military Requirement , undated November 1978. Notes 263

65 . More information on PD 59 can be found at Bill Burr, ‘Jimmy Carter’s Controversial Nuclear Targeting Directive PD-59 Declassified’ http://www2.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb390/, accessed 7 April 2014. 66 . http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-beb27d-interview-with-harold-brown- 1987–1, accessed 28 March 2014. An explanation of this change in posture can be found in Walter Slocombe, ‘The Countervailing Strategy’, International Security , Vol. 5, No. 4. (Spring 1981), pp. 18–27. 67 . K. O. Morgan, Callaghan: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 618. 68 . Ibid. 69 . James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 301 and 501. 70 . Ibid. p. 543 and p. 549. 71 . Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 482–483. 72 . Morgan, Callaghan: A Life , p. 619 and Callaghan, Time and Chance , p. 555. 73 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Annex A to DP10/79 (Final) A Study of a Possible New UK Contribution to a NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force , 19 June 1979. 74 . Ibid. 75 . Zbigniew Brzezinski to The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defence Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-38, 22 June 1978. http://www. jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/prmemorandums/prm38.pdf, accessed 28 March 2014. 76 . Richard A. Ericson, Acting Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs and George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs to the Secretary of State, SCC Meeting on PRM-38, 23 August 1978. Available from http://www2.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb301/doc02.pdf, accessed 28 March 2014. 77 . State Department cable 258185 to U.S. Embassy London, TNF Bilateral with UK, 11 October 1978. Available from http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ ebb301/doc03.pdf, accessed 28 March 2014. 78 . State Department cable 292218 to U.S. Mission NATO, Statement for November 20 NAC on TNF Issues, 17 November 1978. Available from http://www2.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb301/doc05.pdf, accessed 28 March 2014. 79 . William Burr, ‘Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO’s Dual-Track Decision: The Road to the Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War’, http://www2.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb301/index.htm#doc2, accessed 28 March 2014. 80 . U.S. Mission to NATO cable 10805 to State Department, November 20 NAC on Arms Control Issues, 24 November 1978. Available from http://www2.gwu. edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb301/doc06b.pdf, accessed 28 March 2014. 81 . David Owen to Prime Minister, 31 July 1978, reproduced in Owen, Nuclear Papers , p. 132. 82 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 83 . Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 313. 84 . Morgan, Callaghan: A Life , p. 622. 85 . TNA, DEFE 19/186, J. D. Bryars ADS (Defence Staff) Election Briefs: SALT and CTB , 2 May 1979. 86 . Ibid. 87 . Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 548–552 and http://openvault.wgbh.org/ catalog/wpna-2077fa-interview-with-james-callaghan-1987, accessed 28 March 2014. 88 . http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-986edb-interview-with-helmut- schmidt-1987, accessed 28 March 2014. 264 Notes

4 ‘Gone Bananas’ – The Conservative Government and Chevaline, 1979–1983

1 . ‘Sir Michael Quinlan’, The Telegraph , 1 March 2009. 2 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, August 2008. 3 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State Briefing for Ministers, 2 May 1979. 4 . Ibid. 5 . Ibid. 6 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS/Secretary of State Chevaline Trials and Publicity, 13 June 1979. 7 . Ibid. 8 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Report to the Secretary of State Chevaline Progress Report, 15 June 1979. 9 . TNA, DEFE 25/335 V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to CDP Effects of IPCS Dispute on Nuclear Programme and Particularly Chevaline , 5 July 1979. 10 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS/Secretary of State Chevaline Trials and Publicity, 13 June 1979. 11 . Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected ... the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment’s contribution to the Chevaline Payload’, Proceedings from a Conference on the History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme , held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. Henceforward, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 12 . Ibid. 13 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to Secretary of State (thro’ PUS), 27 June 1979. 14 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, R.C. Mottram to Secretary of State British Nuclear Test Programme, 4 July 1979. A colourful digest of Mottram’s career in the civil service can be found at http://www.civilserviceworld.com/i-would-have-been-a- perfectly-credible-cabinet-secretary/, accessed 10 March 2014. 15 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Bryan Cartledge to Roger Facer British Nuclear Test Programme, 13 July 1979. 16 . TNA, PREM 19/14, R.L.L. Facer to B.G. Cartledge Nuclear Warhead Test Programme, 24 May 1979. 17 . See below. TNA, DEFE 24/2122, R.C. Mottram PS/PUS to PS/CSA Nuclear Matters, 29 June 1979. 18 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, ACNS(P) to Secretary of State Chevaline Warhead Production – Effect on Maintenance of the Deterrent , 25 July 1979. 19 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Lillian to Prime Minister, 1 September 1979. TNA, PREM 19/14, B.M. Norbury to Clive Whitmore, 19 October 1979. P6 was the last of the development Improved Front Ends. Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 20 . TNA, PREM 19/159, F.P. to Prime Minister Chevaline , 18 March 1980. 21 . Ibid. 22 . TNA, PREM 19/159, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitemore Chevaline Flight Trials , 14 February 1980, and Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 23 . Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 24 . Ibid. Notes 265

25 . TNA, PREM 19/417, B M Norbury to Clive Whitmore Chevaline Flight Trials, 14 October 1980. 26 . TNA, PREM 19/417, C.A. Whitmore to Brian Norbury Chevaline Flight Trials , 25 February 1981. 27 . TNA, DEFE 25/435, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitmore Chevaline Flight Trials , 30 January 1981. 28 . Ibid. 29 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 30 . Stan Orman, ‘Evolving the Management of Chevaline, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 31 . TNA, PREM 19/695, J.N. to Prime Minister Chevaline , 2 March 1982. TNA, PREM 19/694, D.B. Omand to Clive Whitmore Chevaline Flight Trials – Publicity , 4 January 1982. 32 . TNA, PREM 19/695, J.N. to Prime Minister Chevaline , 17 June 1982. 33 . Hew Strachan, ‘Britain’s Deterrent’, Political Quarterly , Vol. 51, 1980, p. 425. 34 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ commons/1980/jan/24/nuclear-weapons, accessed 9 March 2014. 35 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989–02–15/Debate-12.html#Debate-12_ spnew28, accessed 13 September 2002. 36 . Private correspondence with Lord Pym, 16 May 2003. 37 . Frank Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 1981–2’, Prospero , No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 91–108. 38 . Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline’, pp. 91–108. 39 . Quoted in Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline’, pp. 92–93. 40 . Ibid. 41 . The Times , 9 December 1981. 42 . Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline’, p. 92. 43 . Key passages were removed by the Ministry of Defence from the public report for security reasons such as that relating to the yield of the Chevaline warheads. 44 . Quoted in Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline’, p. 100. 45 . Ibid., p. 101. 46 . Ibid. 47 . TNA, PREM 19/694, F.H. East to Sir Robert Armstrong Chevaline , 17 February 1982. 48 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Chevaline , 19 February 1982. 49 . The Times , 23 March 1982. 50 . Ibid. 51 . The Times , 31 January 1982. 52 . Ibid. 53 . Panton ‘The Unveiling of Chevaline’, pp. 91–108. 54 . Ministry of Defence: Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System , Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1981–82, HC 269 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982), pp. v, 9. This view of poor management by the MoD has also been disputed by a number of senior officials involved with Chevaline in private conversations with the author. 55 . Ibid., pp. v, 15, 20. 266 Notes

56 . TNA, CAB 196/123, A.D.S. Goodall to Mr Hatfield General Election: Brief by OD Secretariat, 8 June 1983. TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983. 57 . TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983 58 . TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983. £600 million was for development and the remainder was production costs. TNA, CAB 196/123, Michael [Quinlan] to Dennis, 3 June 1983. 59 . TNA, CAB 196/123, Michael [Quinlan] to Dennis, 3 June 1983. 60 . S.C. Metcalf and R.L. Dommett ‘An Introduction to Chevaline’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 61 . Ibid. 62 . http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/uk/slbm/chevaline.html, accessed 9 March 2014. 63 . TNA, DEFE 69/719, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to US of S(RN) Polaris Successor, 6 April 1981. 64 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Appendix 1, 17 November 1981. 65 . TNA, DEFE 25/435, Sir David Cardwell to the Honourable Dr R. DeLauer, 4 August 1981. 66 . TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983. 67 . TNA, CAB 196/123, Michael [Quinlan] to Dennis, 3 June 1983. 68 . TNA, DEFE 5/192/45, The Rationale for the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Force , 25 April 1972. 69 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Frank Cooper to Secretary of State, 25 June 1976. Frank Cooper was Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the MoD between 1976 and 1982. 70 . Pavel Podvig, ‘The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s – A Research Note’, International Security , Vol. 33, 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 136–137. 71 . John Simpson, Keynote Address, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 72 . Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 51–53, 132, 134–135, 137–140, 150, 229, 230, 256, 257, 275, 279 and Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 9–10, 139–144, 148–159, 159–171, 201, 220, 202–223, 230, 273–275, 277, 280–282. 73 . This task was given to Mathew Jones of the London School of Economics and Political Science. 74 . This was the figure given in 1980 when the project was announced. It equates to £4,200 million in 2004 prices. For more information see Philip Pugh, ‘Chevaline: Costs and the Wider Context’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004.

5 Mrs Thatcher and the Trident C-4 Decision

1 . Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 386–400. Notes 267

2 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, CNS to Secretary of State, 15 June 1979. 3 . Richard Ullman, ‘The Covert French Connection’, Foreign Policy , No. 75 (Summer 1989), pp. 3–33, Kristan Stoddart, ‘Nuclear Weapons in Britain’s Policy Towards France, 1960–1974’, Diplomacy and Statecraft , Vol. 18, No. 4 (December, 2007), pp. 719–744 and Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 141–151. 4 . Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 19 and 93–123. 5 . http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26901.htm, accessed 8 May 2014. 6 . Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (Abingdon: Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 221–255. 7 . Ian Smart, ‘British Foreign Policy to 1985: The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent: Technical, Economic and Strategic Issues’, Royal Institute of International Affairs , 1977. 8 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, P.J. Goulden to Mr Gilmore Mr Moberly Future of the British Deterrent, 23 April 1979. 9 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, A.P.H. [Arthur Hockaday] to Secretary of State , 11 July 1979. 10 . Peter Hill-Norton, ‘After Polaris’, The Economist , 15 September 1979. 11 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS of Secretary of State Briefing New Ministers, 2 May 1979. 12 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Choice of a System to Replace Polaris, July 1980. 13 . In October 2005 a request to the Cabinet Office to declassify it was turned down on grounds of national security. In 2010 it was released following lengthy discussions between Lord Owen and the Cabinet Office. David Owen, Nuclear Papers (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009). 14 . These suggested amendments were in the role of the strategic deterrent in a NATO rather than national context and further advancements in the area of cruise missile penetrability. TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.M. Legge DS12 to DUS(P) Future of the British Deterrent , 25 April 1979. 15 . TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister The Future of the Deterrent, 4 May 1979. 16 . Ibid. 17 . TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Matters, 14 May 1979. 18 . Ibid. 19 . Ibid. 20 . TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister Future of the British Deterrent, 18 May 1979. 21 . TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister Talk with Dr. Brzezinski , 21 May 1979. 22 . On the style of Cabinet government see Peter Hennessy’s majestic, Whitehall (London: Fontana, 1990), pp. 307–318, Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), pp. 400–401, 410, 427–428. See also Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 62. 23 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to CSA Nuclear Matters , 10 May 1979. 268 Notes

24 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State Successor to Polaris, 11 May 1979. TNA, DEFE, 24/2122, VCNS for CNS to DUS(P) Nuclear Matters , 11 May 1979. 25 . Hennessy, The Prime Minister , p. 405. 26 . Clive Whitmore recounted that Carrington ‘had a genuine respect for Mrs Thatcher, but he was also driven mad by what he saw as her stubbornness and lack of realism’. Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013), pp. 429, 453. Carrington firmly denies the language used in the exchange which Moore refers to took place. Private correspondence with Lord Carrington, 27–28 August 2013. 27 . Andrew Roth, ‘Obituary Francis Pym’, The Guardian , 7 March 2008. 28 . Quoted in Hennessy, The Prime Minister , p. 402. 29 . Hennessy, Whitehall , p. 663. 30 . TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 1st Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, 24 May 1979. 31 . Ibid. 32 . Ibid. 33 . It was also noted that there might be West German objections to Anglo-French collaboration as it might undermine US commitments to Europe and a brief requested on the issue of collaboration. Ibid. The second meeting of MISC 7 dealt with the future supply of HEU through ‘Project Destiny’ and whether the US would supply it or whether the UK would need to develop Capenhurst for this purpose. This had potential non-proliferation concerns and ‘could weaken the posture we were at present adopting towards Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations’. TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 2nd Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, 10 July 1979. 34 . TNA, PREM 19/14, CAB/WH 021/30 For White House Communications Staff from 10 Downing Street, 30 May 1979. 35 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Jimmy Carter to Prime Minister Thatcher, 8 June 1979. 36 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, Clive Rose to Ron Mason, 13 June 1979. 37 . Ibid. 38 . Ibid. The A-4 option is discussed below. 39 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, Clive Rose to Ron Mason, 13 June 1979. 40 . TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 3 rd Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, 19 September 1979 and Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 244–245. 41 . John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom (Basingstoke: Second Edition, Macmillan, 1986), pp. 173, 174 and 196. Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One , pp. 366–372, 448–449. 42 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 43 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, PS/CSA to Sir Anthony Duff and Sir Clive Rose Successor to Polaris, 1 June 1979. These options are detailed below. 44 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 20), Jimmy Carter to Prime Minister Thatcher, June 1979. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/ displaydocument.asp?docid=110475, accessed 3 November 2012. 45 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 20), Zbigniew Brzezinski Memorandum for The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense, 8 June 1979. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument. asp?docid=110475, accessed 3 November 2012. Notes 269

46 . Ibid. 47 . Ibid. 48 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 20), Zbigniew Brzezinski to Sir John Hunt, June 1979. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/ displaydocument.asp?docid=110475, accessed 3 November 2012. 49 . These criteria have been redacted in the declassified Duff-Mason Report. 50 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. The revised Part III of Duff-Mason was distributed to Sir John Hunt, the Cabinet Secretary; Douglas Wass, the Permanent Secretary in the Treasury; Michael Palliser, PUS at the FCO; Terence Lewin, the CDS; and Sir Frank Cooper, the PUS in the MoD, in October 1979. TNA, DEFE 68/406, CSA 483/79 Ron [Mason] to Sir John Hunt The Strategic Deterrent , 12 October 1979. 51 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 52 . Ibid. 53 . Surface ships were very visible, and vulnerable, to attack, and fixed or mobile systems on the sea bed could breach the 1971 Sea Bed Treaty. 54 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 55 . The Sound Surveillance System was a system of hydrophones which tracked (mainly) Soviet submarines during the Cold War. 56 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 57 . Ibid. 58 . Ibid. 59 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 20), Zbigniew Brzezinski Memorandum for The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense, 8 June 1979. Available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=110475, accessed 3 November 2012. For more information on the Mildenhall Agreement see Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , pp. 141–149. 60 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 61 . For more information on these issues see Kristan Stoddart, ‘The Wilson Government and British Responses to ABMs, 1964–1970’, Journal of Contemporary British History , Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 1–33 and Kristan Stoddart, ‘Maintaining the Moscow Criterion: British Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 1974– 1979’, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 31, No. 6 (December 2008), pp. 287–314. 62 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 63 . Ibid. 64 . TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983. 65 . Ranges redacted in the original reference but stated later in Duff-Mason. 66 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 67 . Ibid. 68 . Ibid. 69 . Ibid. 270 Notes

70 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, Frank Cooper to Sir John Hunt Nuclear Matters , 9 July 1979. 71 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, August 2008. 72 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.M. Legge Head of DS 17 to PS/Secretary of State The Secretary of State’s Visit to Washington: 15–18 July , 11 July 1979. 73 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, R.L.L. Facer to Bryan Cartledge MO25/2/1/2, 20 July 1979. 74 . TNA, PREM 19/14, R.L. Wade-Gery to B.G. Cartledge Successor to Polaris, 24 August 1979. 75 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wade-Gery.pdf, accessed 3 November 2012. 76 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 77 . Thatcher, The Downing Street Years , pp. 244–245. 78 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Force – Interim Report Cabinet Office, 14 September 1979. TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister MISC 7: Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Force , 18 September 1979. 79 . TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 3rd Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, 19 September 1979. 80 . Ibid. 81 . Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), pp. 41–42. 82 . TNA, CAB 130/1109, MISC 7(79) 3rd Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, 19 September 1979. 83 . TNA, PREM 19/14, G.G.H. Walden to M.O.D.B. Alexander, 28 September 1979. 84 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Jimmy Carter to The Right Honourable Margaret R. Thatcher, 15 October 1979. 85 . TNA, PREM 19/14, John Hunt to Prime Minister Nuclear Defence Matters , 19 October 1979. 86 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Margaret Thatcher to The President of the United States, 22 October 1979. 87 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent , 29 October 1979. 88 . TNA, PREM 19/14, F.P. to Prime Minister The Successor to Polaris , 1 November 1979. 89 . TNA, PREM 19/14, G.H. to Prime Minister The Strategic Deterrent , 14 November 1979. 90 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Carrington to Prime Minister The Successor to Polaris , 29 November 1979. 91 . Toby Harnden, ‘Obituary: Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, The Independent , 25 January 1999. 92 . TNA, DEFE 23/220, J.B. Duxbury Air Commodore Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 93 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Confidential Annex to COS 22nd Meeting, held on Tuesday 21st August 1979 at 10:45 a.m. , 21 August 1979. 94 . Ibid. 95 . Although it had been made available for the new government. TNA, DEFE 25/335, Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting Tuesday 21 August 1979 at 10:45 , 21 August 1979. 96 . Although it has been suggested by one senior official at the technical working level that the Duff-Mason criteria for deterrence had existed since 1960. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. Notes 271

97 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 98 . Ibid. 99 . Ibid. 100 . Ibid.. 101 . Ibid. 102 . Ibid. 103 . Ibid. 104 . Ibid. 105 . Ibid. 106 . Ibid. 107 . Ibid. 108 . Ibid. 109 . Ibid. 110 . Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 111 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 112 . Ibid. 113 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, M.E. Quinlan to VCNS Coulport and Successor Systems , 11 July 1979. 114 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, R.C. Mottram PS/PUS to Sec/VCNS Coulport and Successor Systems , 13 July 1979. 115 . Sir Frank Cooper, The Telegraph , 30 January 2002. Cooper, a former Spitfire pilot during World War II was also described by his close colleague, Michael Quinlan, as ‘tough as old boots’. Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, August 2008. 116 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, R.C. Mottram PS/PUS to Sec/VCNS Coulport and Successor Systems , 13 July 1979. 117 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, VCNS to DUS(P) Coulport and Successor Systems , 16 July 1979. 118 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 119 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 120 . Ibid. 121 . Particularly as they were constrained to 100 launchers in the defence of Moscow and they were unlikely to break out or withdraw from the ABM Treaty of 1972. 122 . Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 123 . Private interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, January 2012. 124 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 125 . Ibid. 126 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 43–82. 127 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 128 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–1981, Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 26 November 1980 , 27 November 1980. John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recollections of an Errant Politician (London: Politico’s, 2002), p. 219. 129 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to PS/CSA Successor Systems: Questions for the US, 11 June 1979. 130 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to PS/CSA Successor Systems , 8 August 1979. 131 . This view was placed in the following, and somewhat damning, context, ‘At present the UK’s leverage within the Alliance is mainly at the high-quality end of the military scale; its economic position is weak, some of its post- 272 Notes

Imperial problems are embarrassing, its major European allies could argue that its geographical position is no more crucial than their own, and it contributes forces which, though of high quality, are not numerically large’. TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 132 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 133 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.N.H. Blelioch to DUS(P) , 6 August 1979. 134 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Sir Robert Armstrong Polaris Replacement: Dr Aaron’s Call , 30 November 1979. 135 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Jimmy Carter to The Right Honorable Margaret R. Thatcher, 15 October 1979, TNA, PREM 19/159, Message from the Prime Minister to President Carter, 22 October 1979. TNA, 19/14, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister, 2 November 1979. TNA, 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Replacement of Polaris, 4 December 1979. This meant the Home Secretary and Chancellor could not be told that agreement with Carter had been reached and that MISC 7 ‘need not in fact speculate on American willingness to help ... but you cannot disclose the reasons for this’. TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 136 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 245 and TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 137 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 138 . Ibid. 139 . Ibid. 140 . Ibid. 141 . Ibid. 142 . http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104149, accessed 29 July 2013. 143 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 144 . Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorised Biography Volume One , pp. 353, 455–481. 145 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 146 . Ibid. 147 . Ibid. 148 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Sir Robert Armstrong Polaris Replacement: Dr Aaron’s Call , 30 November 1979. 149 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Future of the Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7), 4 December 1979. 150 . Ibid. 151 . Ibid. 152 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Replacement of Polaris, 4 December 1979. 153 . Ibid. 154 . TNA, DEFE 23/222, Frank Cooper to C.A. Whitmore Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington, 14 December 1979. 155 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Modernisation of NATO’s Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces and the Replacement of Polaris , 12 December 1979. Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986), p. 155. Notes 273

156 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, COMMGEN FCO London to MODUK, 9 September 1980. 157 . The Times , 14 December 1979. TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Visit to Washington – 17 December 1979 Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent , 13 December 1979. 158 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 246 159 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Note of a Meeting in the Oval Office, The White House, Washington DC, on Monday 17th December 1979, 19 December 1979. 160 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Sir Robert Armstrong Polaris Replacement , 11 February 1980. 161 . TNA, PREM 19/159, FP to Prime Minister Polaris Successor , 29 February 1980. 162 . Ibid. 163 . Ibid. 164 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Draft letter from C.A. Whitmore to B.M. Norbury, Esq., PS to Secretary of State for Defence Polaris Successor , 3 March 1980, TNA, PREM 19/159 Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Polaris Successor , 3 March 1980. 165 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Polaris Successor , 3 March 1980. 166 . By Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. for his attempted pacification of South Vietnam under Lyndon Johnson. Frank L. Jones, ‘’Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy’, Parameters , Journal of the US Army War College (Autumn 2005), pp. 103–118. 167 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Sir Robert Armstrong Polaris Replacement , 27 March 1980. 168 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Polaris Replacement , 28 March 1980. 169 . Ibid. 170 . Ibid. 171 . Ibid. 172 . Ibid. 173 . http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/10008828/ Margaret-Thatcher-a-woman-at-No-10-with-a-style-all-her-own.html, accessed 5 August 2013. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One , pp. 571–573. 174 . Hennessy, Whitehall , pp. 257–258. 175 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert [Armstrong] Note for the Record Meeting of Ministers: 14 April 1980 , 15 April 1980. 176 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Mr Alexander Polaris Replacement: Komer Negotiations , 17 April 1980. 177 . Ibid. 178 . Ibid. 179 . Ibid. 180 . Ibid. 181 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Robert Armstrong to Mr. Alexander House of Commons Defence Committee: Enquiry into Successor Systems , 12 May 1980. 182 . Ibid. 183 . The record of this meeting – MISC 7(80) 1st Meeting – remains classified. 184 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Prime Minister MISC 7: Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: The Present Position, 30 May 1980. 185 . Ibid. 186 . Ibid. 274 Notes

187 . Ibid. 188 . Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010), passim xiii–xxv. 189 . The Times , 22 April 1980. 190 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–1981 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 3 December 1980. See also parliamentary debates in the House of Lords, Hansard, Vol. 403, No. 62, 18 December 1979. Peter Hennessy, The Secret State 2002, pp. 120–193. 191 . TNA, DEFE 24/2116, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to Head of DS 17 Successor Options , 4 February 1980. 192 . Hansard HC Deb 28 April 1980 Vol. 983 cc995–1113 available from Hansard website, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/apr/28/defence- estimates-1980#S5CV0983P0_19800428_HOC_257, accessed 26 January 2013. 193 . House of Commons, Defence Committee Session 1980–81 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy , 26 November 1980 and House of Commons, Defence Committee Session 1980–1981 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence , 3 December 1980. 194 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 246. 195 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 23), Memorandum Urgent National Security Council Jim Thompson to Zbigniew Brzezinski UK and French Nuclear Programs – MBB Item (TS), 29 May 1980. Available from Margaret Thatcher. org website, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument. asp?docid=110476, accessed 4 November 2012. 196 . Ibid. 197 . Ibid. 198 . Jimmy Carter Presidential Library Website, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary. gov/documents/pddirectives/pres_directive.phtml, accessed 4 November 2012. 199 . TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Prime Minister MISC 7: Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: The Present Position, 30 May 1980. 200 . The US had expressed their wish to expand the British Sovereign base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean for their own purposes. Ibid. 201 . Ibid. 202 . America had also agreed to supply the SNM the UK had requested which were needed for the UK warhead programmes. TNA, CAB 130/1129, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Limited Circulation Annex A MISC 7(80) 1st Meeting Minutes Monday 2 June 1980 at 10:00 a.m., 3 June 1980. 203 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Top Secret Annex to Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the United States Secretary of Defense at 10 Downing Street on Monday 2 June 1980, 2 June 1980. 204 . Emissaries would have informed Britain and America’s key allies, but West Germany’s Chancellor Schmidt was to be told before his visit to Moscow on 30 June. TNA, PREM 19/159, R.L. Wade-Gery to Mr Alexander Polaris Replacement, 5 June 1980. 205 . TNA, CAB 130/1129, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Future of the United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: The Present Position Note by the Secretaries, 29 May 1980. 206 . Ibid. 207 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister, 21 July 1980. Notes 275

208 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 246. TNA, PREM 19/417, Harold [Brown] to The Honourable Francis Pym, 14 July 1980. 209 . Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brassey’s, 1986), p. 18. This was confirmed to the author by Sir Michael Quinlan. 210 . TNA, PREM 19/417, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitmore Polaris Successor, 23 June 1980. 211 . Mrs Thatcher penned in the margin ‘Do I have to make a statement?’. TNA, PREM 19/417, B. Ingham to Prime Minister Polaris Successor – Announcement , 2 July 1980. 212 . TNA, PREM 19/417, C.A. Whitmore to B.M. Norbury Polaris Successor, 7 July 1980. 213 . Hansard HC Deb 28 April 1980 Vol. 983 cc995–1113 available from Hansard website, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/apr/28/defence- estimates-1980#S5CV0983P0_19800428_HOC_257, accessed 26 January 2013. 214 . TNA, PREM 19/417, F.P. to Prime Minister Polaris Successor: Memorandum , 10 June 1980. This was in line with an earlier commitment in the House of Commons. 215 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Margaret Thatcher to Secretary of State for Defence Polaris Successor, 11 June 1980. 216 . TNA, PREM 19/417, C to Prime Minister Polaris Successor: Memorandum , 12 June 1980. 217 . Ibid. 218 . TNA, PREM 19/417, R.L. Wade-Gery to Prime Minister Polaris Successor: Memorandum , undated June 1980. 219 . TNA, PREM 19/417, G.H. to Prime Minister Polaris Successor Memorandum, 16 June 1980. 220 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Clive Whitman to B.M. Norbury Polaris Successor: Memorandum , 17 June 1980. 221 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Clive Whitman to David Wright An glo-American Negotiations on Polaris Replacement , 17 June 1980. 222 . TNA, PREM 19/417, B.M. Norbury to John Wiggins Polaris Successor: Memorandum , 19 June 1980. 223 . TNA, PREM 19/417, R.L. Wade-Gery to Prime Minister Anglo-American Negotiations on Polaris Replacement (MISC 7(80)2), 13 June 1980. 224 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Robert Armstrong to Mr. Whitmore, 24 June 1980. Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 246. Margaret Thatcher wrote her letter on 10 July 1980 with President Carter replying on 14 July 1980. TNA, PREM 19/417, Margaret Thatcher to President Carter, 10 July 1980 and TNA, PREM 19/417, Jimmy Carter to The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, 14 July 1980. 225 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Carter – June 1980 Brief by the Cabinet Office, 20 June 1980. Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 245. 226 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Prime Minister’s Meeting with President Carter – June 1980 Brief by the Cabinet Office, 20 June 1980. 227 . Hennessy, Cabinet , p. 155. TNA, CAB 126/68/6, Cabinet Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 17 July 1980 at 10:30 a.m., 17 July 1980. 228 . This slightly earlier than planned public announcement was forced on the government as Richard Burt, a journalist who went on to work at a senior level for the US State Department (including on nuclear issues), was about to break 276 Notes

the story in America for the New York Times . Hennessy, Cabinet , p. 155. TNA, PREM 19/417, D.J. Wright to J.F. Halliday British Strategic Nuclear Force , 15 July 1980. As the government brought forward the decision, Burt’s story was usurped and did not appear. 229 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Cabinet: Parliamentary Affairs , 16 July 1980. 230 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , p. 216. 231 . Transcript of the ‘Cabinets and the Bomb’ Workshop held at the British Academy in 2007, http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectives/0703cabinetsandbo mb-2.cfm, accessed 14 August 2013. 232 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , p. 217. 233 . Private interview with Sir John Nott, 3 May 2006. 234 . Callaghan also suggested this could be done by Select Committee comprised of Privy Councillors who are constitutionally bound to keep strict secrecy. TNA, PREM 19/417, M. Maclean to B. Norbury, 21 July 1980. On the Privy Council and its peculiarities see Hennessy, Whitehall , pp. 349–351. 235 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–81 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 3 December 1980. See also parliamentary debates in the House of Lords, Hansard, Vol. 403, No. 62, 18 December 1979. 236 . Hansard website, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/jul/15/ strategic-nuclear-deterrent, accessed 4 November 2012. 237 . Len Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb: The First Eighty Years’, International Affairs , Vol. 84, No. 2 (July 2006), pp. 685–700 and Len Scott, ‘Selling or Selling Out Nuclear Disarmament? Labour, the Bomb, and the 1987 General Election’, International History Review , Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 115–137. 238 . The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, Defence Open Government Document 80/23, Ministry of Defence , July 1980. 239 . Ibid. 240 . Ibid. 241 . Ibid. 242 . Ibid. 243 . David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 260–261. 244 . Carter Library (Brzezinski Donated Files, Box 34), Memorandum Recommendation National Security Council Jim Thompson Robert Blackwill to Zbigniew Brzezinski BBV Lunch Item US/UK Strategic Cooperation (TS), 13 February 1980. Available from Margaret Thatcher.org Website, http://www. margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=110478, accessed 4 November 2012. 245 . Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War Second edition, (London: Verso, 1986). 246 . CMND 7979, The British Strategic Nuclear Force Texts of Letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the United States Secretary of Defense, July 1980. 247 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Jimmy Carter to The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, 14 July 1980. The latter was a separate letter which also reaffirmed the outline agreement. 248 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, COMMGEN FCO London to MODUK, 27 August 1980. Notes 277

249 . CMND 7979, The British Strategic Nuclear Force Texts of Letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the United States Secretary of Defense, July 1980. 250 . Ibid. 251 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, Clement J. Zablocki to Sir Nicholas Henderson, 7 August 1980. 252 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, UKMILREP Brussels to MODUK, 15 July 1980. 253 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, J.P. Fawkes AD DI(RG) to APS/S of S, 12 August 1980. 254 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Francis Pym to The Rt Hon Norman St John Stevas, 22 December 1980. 255 . Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One , p. 702. 256 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , pp. 216–217. Nott later offered a more colourful account saying ‘When I was approached by Margaret Thatcher to become Defence Secretary we had a very jovial meeting with Denis Thatcher and whisky and everything else, and she said “Are you sound on the nuclear question John?”, and I said “Well, I believe I am’”. Transcript of the ‘Cabinets and the Bomb’ Workshop held at the British Academy in 2007, http://www. britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectives/0703cabinetsandbomb-2.cfm, accessed 14 August 2013. 257 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , p. 202. 258 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Extract from Record PM + S/S Defence, 10 February 1981. See also Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography , Volume One, p. 573. 259 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Extract from Record PM + S/S Defence, 10 February 1981. 260 . Ibid. 261 . Michael Stothard, ‘Thatcher’s ministers opposed Trident’, Financial Times , 30 December 2011. 262 . Alan Travis, ‘Thatcher battled cabinet ‘wets’ over Howe austerity plans National Archives releases papers detailing row over 1981–1982 spending round that ended with purge of opponents in reshuffle’, The Guardian , 30 December 2011. 263 . Nott’s speech and the full debate that followed can be found here http:// www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1981–03–03a.137.0#g219.2, accessed 8 August 2013. 264 . Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (London: Indigo, 1997), pp. 126–127. 265 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, AUS(DS) to AUS (D Staff) 256/80 Fitting Trident into the Programme, 30 July 1980. By this time Carver was a retired Chief of Defence Staff. For his later views of deterrence see http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/ wpna-60f99c-interview-with-michael-carver-1987, accessed 5 May 2014. 266 . Alan Travis, ‘Thatcher went behind cabinet’s back with Trident purchase’, The Guardian , 30 December 2011. 267 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989–02–15/Debate-12.html#Debate-12_ spnew28, accessed 13 September 2002. 268 . Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 106–125. 269 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State ANNEX A , 3 October 1980. 270 . Hennessy, Muddling Through , p. 127. 278 Notes

271 . Sir Michael Quinlan, ‘The British Experience’ in Henry Sokolski (ed.), Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, 2004), pp. 271. 272 . Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent , p. 114. 273 . Quoted in Hennessy, Muddling Through , pp. 122–123. 274 . Private interview with Lord Carrington, January 2012. This was a view he placed on record at the time http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/30/thatcher- cabinet-opposed-trident-purchase, accessed 6 August 2013. 275 . TNA, CAB 128/70/8, CC(81) 8th Conclusions Cabinet Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday 24 February 1981 at 11:00 a.m., 24 February 1981. 276 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , pp. 216.

6 Follow-on Negotiations for Trident C-4

1 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Wg Cdr T.C. Flanagan SCDS(B)1 to PSO/CDS, 11 September 1980. 2 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, AAP to Minister of State Trident: Amendment to Polaris Sales Agreement, 19 September 1980. On the classified annexes to the PSA see Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), pp. 32–33. 3 . TNA, DEFE, 24/2125, Dr R.G. Ridley Director DSc6 Loose Minute DUS(N) Trident: Amendment to Polaris Sales Agreement , 4 August 1980. 4 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, M.E. Quinlan to AUS(OR) Head of DS17 Trident , 4 August 1980. 5 . See below. 6 . TNA, DEFE, 24/2125, D.C. Fakely ACSA(N) Trident , 26 August 1980. 7 . TNA, FO 93/8/460, Sir Nicholas Henderson to Department of State Washington, 30 September 1980. 8 . Ibid. 9 . Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 10 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Frank Cooper to Secretary of State , 15 July 1980. 11 . Ibid. 12 . Ibid. 13 . Ibid. 14 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, B.M. Norbury PS/S OF S to PS/PUS , 17 July 1980. 15 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, CSA to CNS , 24 July 1980. 16 . These were the chairmen of the ORC(N) and the DEPC(N). 17 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, CNS to Secretary of State, 23 September 1980. 18 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, B.M. Norbury PS/S OF S to Sec CNS , 7 November 1980. On the early management of Trident see also Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brassey’s 1986), pp. 77–78. 19 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, CSA to Secretary of State Manpower for the Defence Nuclear Programme, 8 August 1980. 20 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, David Cardwell to VCAS , 23 September 1980. 21 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, VCAS to CDP , 6 October 1980. 22 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, David Cardwell to VCAS , 23 October 1980. 23 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, VCAS to CDP , 12 November 1980. 24 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, AAP to Minister of State, 15 August 1980. Notes 279

25 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Choice of a System to Replace Polaris, July 1980. 26 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 27 . It might be that the total of 27 missiles, taken by AWRE as meeting the ‘Moscow Criterion’ (when 16 missiles armed with Chevaline had been accepted as capable of exhausting the Moscow ABM defences), was down to the differences in penetration aids between the two systems. Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 28 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, V.M. Howard Commodore Director C/DPS to PSO/CDS, 19 November 1980. 29 . Meanwhile the British nuclear weapons establishments were looking to increase the accuracy of the C-4 from a Circular Error Probability (CEP) of 1,500ft to 1,100ft. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 30 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Commodore V.M. Howard Director C/DPS to PSO/CDS, 19 November 1980. 31 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, DS 11/7 Trident: Next Steps, 21 August 1980. 32 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Choice of a System to Replace Polaris, July 1980. 33 . This cost was to be spread over fifteen years. TNA, DEFE 25/325, Britain’s Strategic Nuclear Forces: The Choice of a System to Replace Polaris , July 1980. 34 . Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 35 . TNA, DEFE 24/2116, R.M. CSA to ACSA(N) Successor System Options , 21 February 1980. 36 . Ibid. 37 . Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 38 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, S. Webb DS17 to PS/CSA Trident Programme , 30 July 1980. 39 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, Frank Cooper to CSA , 28 July 1980. 40 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, AUS(DS) to AUS (D Staff) 256/80 Fitting Trident into the Programme, 30 July 1980. 41 . Lord Carver, among many other senior military posts, had been the Chief of Defence Staff between 1973–1976 and later became an outspoken critic of Trident and of prevailing nuclear strategy. 42 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. The fault lay not with the reactor itself but a problem in the reactor’s cooling system. Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 43 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 44 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, The Study of Factors Related to Further Consideration of the Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Summary of Part III on System Options and their Implications , undated 1979. 45 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 46 . Ibid. 47 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to DUS(P) ‘Successor’ Lead Times, 3 August 1979. 48 . TNA, DEFE 68/406, Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent Part III – System Options , August 1979. 49 . Ibid. 50 . Ibid. 51 . Ibid. 52 . Which the US estimated would take seven years. 280 Notes

53 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to DUS(P) ‘Successor’ Lead Times, 3 August 1979. 54 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.M. Legge Head of DS 17 to DFA(P) Successor Systems, 1 August 1979. 55 . TNA, DEFE 24/2116, Head of DS 17 to DUS(P) Successor System Options, 28 February 1980. 56 . Sub-strategic strikes were not to be aimed directly at cities (counter-value) but against military targets (counter-force), but as military targets tended to be in or near cities any differences were far from clear cut and would have led to a similar level of civilian deaths. 57 . Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. TNA, DEFE 24/2116, Head of DS 17 to DUS(P) Successor System Options , 28 February 1980. 58 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting Tuesday 10 June 1980 at 1445 Item 1 The Case for Five SSBNs Speaking Note, 9 June 1980. 59 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting Tuesday 10 June 1980 at 1445 Item 1 The Case for Five SSBNs Speaking Note, 10 June 1980. 60 . Ibid. 61 . At this time there was also some discussion of a 12-tube option being produced. TNA, DEFE 25/325, Wg Cdr T.C. Flanagan SCDS(B)T to PSO/CDS, 9 June 1980. 62 . Nothing is known about this committee at the time of writing. 63 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State Successor System, Undated, June 1980. 64 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Dictated by the Chief of the Defence Staff and signed in his absence by N.A.D. GRANT Capt RN Acting PSO/CDS to Secretary of State Successor Systems, 13 June 1980. 65 . Defence Open Government Document 80/23, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, July 1980). 66 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Attachment 1 to COS(Misc) 205/901A Successor System: The Case for Five Ballistic Missile Firing Submarines (SSBN) Introduction , 10 June 1980. 67 . Ibid. 68 . TNA, DEFE 24/2124, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to Head of PPAG Polaris Successor: Case for a Fifth Boat , 20 June 1980. 69 . The Minister of State for Industry, Adam Butler, described this as watching the blood drip from British shipbuilders. TNA, DEFE 25/325, Record of a Meeting held in the Minister of State’s Office at 11am on 3rd July 1980 , 3 July 1980. TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to Head of DS17 Successor System to Polaris , 5 June 1979. 70 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, Record of a Meeting held in the Minister of State’s Office at 11am on 3rd July 1980 , 3 July 1980. 71 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, US of S (RN)/KS/2/1/2 to PS(DUS)(N) Trident: Initial Expenditure, 22 August 1980. 72 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, DS 11/7 Trident: Next Steps, 21 August 1980. 73 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–81, Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 26 November 1980 , 27 November 1980, 973. 74 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, Visit by CSA and DCDP(N) to Washington – 10/11 July 1980 Note for the Record, 15 July 1980. 75 . Berhanykun Andemicael and John Mathiason, Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005). Notes 281

76 . NAST 1231 – the Naval Air Staff Target guided missile would have been a compo- nent of the British TNF modernisation programme but was never developed. TNA, DEFE 25/235, R.M. to CDS The Nuclear Warhead Programme, 13 July 1979, and private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 77 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, SCDS(B)1 to PSO/CDS Stocks of Fissile Material , 26 June 1979. 78 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, VCAS to CDS Trident – Submarines and Missile Programmes , 15 July 1981. 79 . TNA, DEFE 24/2122, J.F. Howe DFA(P) to PS/CSA Successor Systems , 8 August 1979. 80 . As with the tests conducted during 1978 these had a tactical as well as a strategic application. TNA, DEFE 25/335, V.H.B. Macklen DCA (PN) to Secretary of State (thro’ PUS) British Nuclear Test Programme , 27 June 1979. 81 . TNA, DEFE 19/181, D.C. Fakely to Head of DS 2 , 1 August 1979. 82 . Ibid. 83 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Frank Cooper to Sir John Hunt Nuclear Weapons Programme, 5 July 1979. 84 . TNA, PREM 19/417, I.H.G. to Prime Minister British Underground Nuclear Test Programme, 9 September 1980. 85 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister British Nuclear Tests , 9 September 1980. 86 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Clive Whitmore to Brian Norbury British Nuclear Test Programme, 23 September 1980. 87 . TNA, PREM 19/417, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitmore British Nuclear Test Programme, 20 November 1980. This was subsequently delayed due to adverse weather. TNA, PREM 19/417, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitmore British Nuclear Test Programme , 10 December 1980. 88 . TNA, PREM 19/417, J.D.S. Dawson to M.O.D.B. Alexander British Nuclear Test Programme, 17 December 1980. 89 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Clive Whitmore to Brian Norbury British Nuclear Test Programme, 10 June 1981. 90 . TNA, PREM 19/417, C to Secretary of State for Defence British Nuclear Test Programme, 15 June 1981. 91 . TNA, DEFE 24/2125, S. Webb DS 17 to DFA(P) BAe Proposal for a Strategic Cruise Missile, 6 July 1980. 92 . TNA, DEFE 24/2124, Head of DS 17to APS/S of S Letter from Mr Jefferson of BAe , 19 June 1980. 93 . Ibid. 94 . TNA, DEFE 24/2124, D.A. Crampin Finance Manager (Polaris) to DS17 (Mr Webb) BAe Proposal for a Strategic SLCM, 2 July 1980. 95 . House of Commons, Defence Committee Session 1980–81 Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy , 26 November 1980, pp. 931–932. 96 . Graham Spinardi, From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 142.

7 Mrs Thatcher, MISC 7 and the Trident II D-5 Decision

1 . See for example Paul Kengor, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism (New York: Regan Books, 2006) and John Patrick Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, and the Making of History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). 282 Notes

Presidential National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 12 of 1 October 1981 authorising this modernisation can be found at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/ archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/NSDD12.pdf, accessed 14 July 2013. 2 . TNA, DEFE 69/719, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to US of S(RN) Polaris Successor, 6 April 1981. 3 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, RM CSA to Secretary of State , 9 July 1981. 4 . Ibid. 5 . Ibid. 6 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent , 13 August 1979. 7 . Ibid. 8 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, RM CSA to Secretary of State , 9 July 1981. 9 . Ibid. 10 . TNA, PREM 19/417, JN to Prime Minister Trident , 15 July 1981. 11 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, VCGS CGS draft to CDS CNS CAS SECCOS , 15 July 1981. 12 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, M.E. Quinlan (DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State Trident, 15 July 1981. 13 . TNA, PREM 19/417, JN to Prime Minister Trident , 15 July 1981. 14 . Ibid. 15 . Ibid. 16 . Ibid. 17 . Jonathan E. Medalia, ‘The MX Basing Debate: The Reagan Plan and Alternatives’, Congressional Research Service, 2 November 1981. Available from www.dtic.mil/ cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478140, accessed 7 August 2013. 18 . TNA, PREM 19/417, JN to Prime Minister Trident , 15 July 1981. Nevertheless there were concerns within the COS that with a falling pound/dollar exchange rate and short-term problems with the delays to Chevaline and the need to re-motor the UK’s Polaris missiles. TNA, AIR 8/2846, Costs of the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, 17 July 1981. 19 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Robert Armstrong to Mr Wade-Gery, 24 July 1981. 20 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, Brief for Chief of the Air Staff Nuclear Matters, 27 July 1981. 21 . Ibid. 22 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, D.C. Fakley ACSA(N) to Head of DS17 UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 12 August 1981. 23 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, B.M. Norbury PS/S of S to DUS(P) Visit by US Secretary of Defense , 6 August 1981. 24 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, J.F. Howe DFA(SS) to Head of DS17 Visit by the US Secretary of Defense, 21 August 1981, 13 August 1981. In a separate briefing paper it was also noted there had been discussions with the US on a joint building programme for SSBNs. TNA, DEFE 24/2126, J.F. Howe DFA(SS) to Head of DS17 UK/US Defence Review Working Group , 13 August 1981. 25 . This modernisation programme was outlined in correspondence by President Reagan in October 1981. It included at least 100 MX missiles, accelerated development and deployment of D-5, development of a new stealth bomber (what became the B-2 ‘Spirit’), improvements in air defences and ABMs (developments that would lead to the 1983 SDI initiative) and improvements to command, control and communications. TNA, PREM 19/417, Ronald Reagan Secret via Cabinet Office Channels WH05575, 1 October 1981. This was fully supported by Mrs Thatcher, TNA, PREM 19/417, Margaret [Thatcher] to Ron[ald] Reagan, 19 October 1981. 26 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, JN to Prime Minister UK Strategic Nuclear Decision , 21 August 1981. Notes 283

27 . Ibid. 28 . TNA, PREM 19/417, JN to Prime Minister US Strategic Nuclear Decision , 21 August 1981. 29 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Caspar Weinberger to Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher, 24 August 1981. 30 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, J.A. Gilbert AVM ACDS(Pol) to A/CDS UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 26 August 1981. 31 . Ibid. 32 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, John Peters AUS(AS) to DASB , 4 September 1981. 33 . Ibid. 34 . Ibid. 35 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, A/CGS to ACDS(Pol) UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 4 September 1981. 36 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, VCNS as Acting CNS to SECOS UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 4 September 1981. 37 . John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recollections of an Errant Politician (London: Politico’s, 2002), p. 214. 38 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, AUS(NS) to Head of DS17 UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 3 September 1981. 39 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, MO 18/1/1 D.B. Omand PS/S of S to AUS(D Staff) MISC 7 , 10 September 1981. 40 . TNA, PREM 19/417, G.H. to Prime Minister Trident, 1 September 1981. 41 . TNA, PREM 19/417, D.B. Omand to C.A. Whitmore Prime Minister’s Visit to Scotland – Trident Depot, 2 September 1981. 42 . For more information on this period see Richard Aldous, Reagan & Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (London: Hutchinson, 2012), pp. 49–55. 43 . This is not what Nott had intended. Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , p. 206. 44 . Ibid, pp. 238–241. 45 . Ibid, pp. 240–241. 46 . T NA, PR EM 19/417, J N to Prime Minister UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 14 September 1981. 47 . TNA, PREM 19/417, G.H. to Prime Minister UK Strategic Nuclear Force, 17 September 1981. TNA, DEFE 24/2126, A.M.D. Milne-Home Captain, Royal Navy Assistant Director of Naval Plans (Polaris) to ACDS(P) Trident In-Service Date – Implications of Delay, 4 September 1981. TNA, DEFE 24/2126, A.J. Gragg Head of DS4 to DFA(SS) SSN Numbers , 14 September 1981. 48 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, J.A.C.G. Ayre COS 1201/901A Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 23 September 1981. 49 . TNA, DEFE 24/2126, J.A. Gilbert AVM ACDS(Pol) Trident Follow-On Studies , 3 August 1981. 50 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, A.W. Dennis MISC 7 UK Strategic Nuclear Force – Chiefs of Staff Advice Annex A to DPS (C)/C19 Dated 2 Oct 81 Note by the Directors of Defence Policy UK Strategic Nuclear Force – Chiefs of Staff Advice , 2 October 1981. 51 . Ibid. 52 . Ibid. 53 . Ibid. 54 . Ibid. 55 . Ibid. 56 . Ibid. 57 . Ibid. 284 Notes

58 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, Appendix to Annex to DPS(C)/C19 Dated 2 Oct 81 UK Strategic Nuclear Force – Draft Chiefs of Staff Advice to the Secretary of State on UK Strategic Nuclear Force Issues , 2 October 1981. 59 . This criteria can be found in Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–1964 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010) pp. 43, 60, 101, 165, 248, 265, and 286 and Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2012), pp. 9–10, 12–13, 38, 42–47, 50, 53, 124, 135, 140, 143, 149, 159–164, 229, 235 and 254–256. 60 . For an explanation of Galosh and its importance to British strategic targeting and Polaris see Kristan Stoddart, ‘The Wilson Government and British Responses to ABMs, 1964–1970’, Journal of Contemporary British History , Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 1–33 and Kristan Stoddart, ‘Maintaining the Moscow Criterion: British Strategic Nuclear Targeting, 1974–1979’, Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 31, No. 6 (December 2008), pp. 287–314. 61 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.A. Miller Group Captain DASB to PS/CAS ND Presentation to COS on Strategic Nuclear Matters – Wednesday 7 October 1981 , 2 October 1981. 62 . Ibid. 63 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.A. Miller Group Captain DASB to PS/CAS UK Strategic Nuclear Force – Chiefs of Staff Advice , 6 October 1981. A further critique along the same lines can also be seen in TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.A. Miller Group Captain DASB to PS/CAS MISC 7 Chiefs of Staff Submission , 6 October 1981. 64 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State The Future of the UK Nuclear Deterrent, undated October 1981. 65 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, Assistant Director of Naval Plans to DUS(P) Trident – Implications of Delay , 12 October 1981. 66 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, D.E. Young Head of DS1 to DUS(P) MISC 7, 13 October 1981. 67 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, D.B. Omand PS/S of S to DUS(Navy) Submarine Launched Nuclear Cruise Missiles , 13 October 1981. 68 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, M. Gainsborough DFA (SS) UK Strategic Deterrent: Cruise Missile Supplement, 14 October 1981. 69 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, D.C.G. Brook Air Cdre PSO/CDS to Secretary of State The Future of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent , 16 October 1981. 70 . Ibid. 71 . See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. 72 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, D.C.G. Brook Air Cdre PSO/CDS to Secretary of State The Future of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent , 16 October 1981. 73 . Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/2/72 f85, MT letter to Reagan (modernisation programme for US strategic forces) 19 October 1981, available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/121699, accessed 23 February 2013. 74 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, CSA to Secretary of State UK Strategic Deterrent – Paper for MISC 7 , 3 November 1981. 75 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 17 November 1981. An early draft of Nott’s presentation mentioned ‘Apart from the strong opposition we shall face in Parliament, it could give rise to public accusations of a change to a “warfighting” or “first-strike” strategy’. TNA, DEFE 24/2126, J.M. Legge UK Strategic Nuclear Force , 2 September 1981. 76 . Plans were also in place for the supply of the special nuclear materials needed for the UK’s weapons programme (Plutonium, Tritium and HEU) including the Notes 285

supply of HEU for nuclear propulsion codenamed Project Destiny. TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 17 November 1981. In September Mrs Thatcher had written to Reagan following the cancellation of Project Destiny requesting ‘significant quantities of highly enriched uranium, weapons grade plutonium and tritium from the US Department of Energy, at various rates from about 1985 for some ten years, in order to implement our future nuclear deterrent proposals’ as well as a ‘relatively modest quantity of low enriched uranium’. This required amendments as necessary to the MDA for these purposes and agreement from the US Department of Energy and Department of Defense. MT letter to Ronald Reagan (modernisation of UK nuclear deterrent capability) 10 September 1981, Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/2/69 f39, available from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/121686, accessed 23 February 2012. 77 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Annex C, 17 November 1981. 78 . Ibid. 79 . Ibid. 80 . Ibid. Still, the possibility of running the Resolution class until the late 1990s and converting them to C-4 was examined but was highly problematic. TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Appendix 5 , 17 November 1981. 81 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Annex C, 17 November 1981. 82 . Ibid. 83 . Ibid. 84 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Appendix 4 , 17 November 1981. 85 . TNA, CAB 130/1160, MISC 7(81)1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence Annex C, 17 November 1981. 86 . Ibid. 87 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, M. Gainsborough DFA(SS) to PS/SofS Trident: Processing D5 Missiles in the US , 20 November 1981. 88 . Ibid. 89 . Ibid. 90 . Ibid. 91 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7(81) 1, 23 November 1981. 92 . Ibid. 93 . Ibid. 94 . Ibid. 95 . TNA, CAB 130/1222, Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(81) 1st Meeting, Tuesday 24 November 1981. The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent, 24 November 1981. 96 . A contingency of 20% had already included in the cost estimate. Ibid. 97 . Ibid. 286 Notes

98 . Ibid. 99 . Ibid. 100 . Ibid. 101 . Ibid. 102 . Ibid. 103 . Ibid. 104 . Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 247. 105 . Ibid. 106 . TNA, PREM 19/694, R.L.L. Facer to Home Secretary MISC 7 – 24 November 1981 The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7(81)1), 20 November 1981. 107 . Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow , p. 213. 108 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, L.S. Bryson Controller of the Navy to Minister of State (DP) Trident: Interim Funding, 2 December 1981. 109 . Ibid. 110 . Ibid. 111 . Ibid. 112 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.M. Hastie-Smith DUS(P) to Minister of State(DP) Trident: Interim Funding , 3 December 1981. 113 . Ibid. 114 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, C.V. Balmer PS/Minister (DP) to Sec/ C of N Trident: Interim Funding , 3 December 1981. 115 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, B.T. Brown Secretary/Chief of Naval Staff to PS/CSA Chiefs of Staff Meeting on Nuclear Matters , 7 December 1981. 116 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–81, Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 26 November 1980 , 27 November 1980, 973. 117 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.A. Miller Gp Capt DASB Brief for Chief of the Air Staff, 11 December 1981. 118 . This was unrealistic because this assumed a full four-boat force of 16 missiles armed with 14 MIRV warheads per missile totalling 896 warheads but one boat was very likely to be in refit and it could be difficult or impossible to bring it to operational readiness in an emergency. 119 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent MISC 7(81)1, 11 January 1982. 120 . Ibid. 121 . Ibid. 122 . Ibid. 123 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 1st Meeting, Tuesday, 12 January 1982, 18 January 1982. 124 . Ibid. 125 . Ibid. 126 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , pp. 18–27. 127 . An interesting examination of Labour’s nuclear weapons policies during the 1980s can be found in Len Scott, ‘Selling or Selling Out Nuclear Disarmament? Labour, the Bomb, and the 1987 General Election’, International History Review , Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 2012), pp. 115–137. 128 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 1st Meeting, Tuesday, 12 January 1982, 18 January 1982. 129 . Ibid. 130 . It was retained at the time as a Most Confidential Record of which only Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, may have had a copy. Notes 287

131 . TNA, PREM 19/694, MISC 7(81) 1st Meeting, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Tuesday 24 November 1981 at 10:25 a.m., 24 November 1981. 132 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 1st Meeting, Tuesday, 12 January 1982, 18 January 1982. 133 . Ibid. 134 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Trident , 19 January 1982. 135 . TNA, CAB 128/75, Confidential Annex to Minutes of Full Cabinet – CC(82) 2nd Conclusions 21 January 1982, 25 January 1982. 136 . Ibid. TNA, CAB 128/75, Cabinet Most Confidential Record to CC(82) 2nd Conclusions Thursday 21 January 1982, 21 January 1982. 137 . Transcript of the ‘Cabinets and the Bomb’ Workshop held at the British Academy in 2007, http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectives/0703cabinetsandbo mb-2.cfm, accessed 14 August 2013. 138 . TNA, PREM 19/694, CAB/WTE 001/21 Immediate 211550Z Jan 82 From: Cabinet Office London To The White House, 21 January 1982. 139 . TNA, PREM 19/694, ZCZCWAG016 FM The White House To Cabinet Office, London, 26 January 1982. 140 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, 1 February 1982. 141 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wade-Gery.pdf, accessed 16 July 2013. 142 . Ibid. 143 . TNA, PREM 19/694, R.L. Wade-Gery to Mr. Coles Trident , 12 February 1982. 144 . Ibid. 145 . Ibid. 146 . TNA, PREM 19/694, Prime Minister Trident A.F.C., 12 February 1982. 147 . TNA, PREM 19/694, J.O. Kerr to R.L. Wade-Gery Trident, 16 February 1982. 148 . TNA, PREM 19/694, R.L. Wade-Gery to Mr Coles Trident: Procedure, 22 February 1982. 149 . TNA, PREM 19/694, A.J.C. Prime Minister Trident , 22 February 1982. 150 . TNA, PREM 19/694, OO F C O Deskby 250800Z, 25 February 1982. TNA, CAB 130/1182, Trident Anglo-American Negotiations on D5 (Note by the Cabinet Office), 2 March 1982. 151 . TNA, PREM 19/694, R.L. Wade-Gery to Mr Coles Trident, 26 February 1982. 152 . TNA, PREM 19/695, J.O. Kerr to A.J. Coles, 1 March 1982. 153 . TNA, PREM 19/695, John Nott to Sir Robert Armstrong, 25 February 1982. 154 . TNA, PREM 19/695, Sir Robert Armstrong Trident Announcement Date, 3 March 1982. 155 . TNA, PREM 19/695, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister The United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent (MISC 7(82) 1), 3 March 1982. 156 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, MISC 7(82) 1 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent Memorandum for the Secretary of State for Defence, 2 March 1982. 157 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Draft Letter A To: The President, The White House, Washington DC From: The Prime Minister, 2 March 1982. TNA, CAB 130/1182, Draft Letter B To: The Rt Hon Margret Thatcher MP From: The President, 2 March 1982. 158 . TNA, CAB 128/75, Cabinet Most Conf ident ia l Record to CC(82) 8t h Conclusions, 4 March 1982. 288 Notes

159 . Ibid. 160 . Ibid. Moore, in his official biography of the Prime Minister is incorrect in stating a briefing for ministers on D-5 did not take place although he is right to point out it was not undertaken by Michael Quinlan who was working in the Treasury at that time. Moore is also incorrect to suggest ‘Mrs Thatcher did not know ... at the time the US administration wanted to help as much as possible’. Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013), pp. 571–573. Peter Hennessy’s book The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 410 does list Quinlan, along with Lewin, as leading the briefs. 161 . In his defence Howe, the Chancellor, as a member of MISC 7 would have heard the briefing before. Nott, Here Today Gone Tomorrow , p. 217. 162 . TNA, CAB 128/75, Cabinet Most Conf ident ia l Record to CC(82) 8t h Conclusions, 4 March 1982. 163 . Ibid. 164 . Ibid. 165 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Limited Circulation Annex MISC 7(82) 2nd Meeting Minutes Thursday 4 March 1982 at 10:00 a.m., 15 March 1982. 166 . Ibid. 167 . With corresponding publicity material alongside separate material made available for local Conservative Party organisations. 168 . TNA, CAB 128/73, CC(82) 10th Conclusions Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 11 March 1982 at 10:00 a.m., 11 March 1982. 169 . HC Deb 11 March 1982 vol 19 cc975–86, available from http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/mar/11/trident-missile-programme, accessed 24 February 2013. 170 . Ibid. 171 . Ibid. 172 . Ministry of Defence, Defence Open Government Document 82/1, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, March 1982). The following month Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. It is worth noting that UK nuclear weapons were offloaded prior to the task force reaching the Falklands and no SSBNs were deployed to the area. CBRN Ministry of Defence, ‘Operation CORPORATE The Carriage of Nuclear Weapons by the Task Group assembled for the Falklands Campaign’. Available from http://www.rna-10-area.net/files/corporate-nuclear. pdf, accessed 8 July 2014. 173 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, MISC 7(82) 4 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: Annex A Effect of Missile Processing on the Independence of the UK Deterrent , 19 July 1982. 174 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, MISC 7(82) 4 Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: Missile Processing Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Defence, 19 July 1982. 175 . Ibid. 176 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, MISC 7(82)3rd Meeting Cabinet Nuclear Defence Policy Minutes of a Meeting Held at 10 Downing Street on Wednesday 28 July 1982 at 10.30am, 29 July 1982. 177 . Ibid. 178 . TNA, PREM 19/695, John Nott to Prime Minister United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: Missile Processing, 7 September 1982 Notes 289

179 . TNA, PREM 19/695, John Coles to Richard Mottram United Kingdom Strategic Deterrent: Missile Processing, 9 September 1982. 180 . TNA, FO 93/8/466, Sir Oliver Wright to George Shultz, 19 October 1982. 181 . For a fuller discussion of the submarine basing options see Colin McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? (London: Brassey’s, 1986), pp. 20–22. 182 . Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s 1992), p. 392. 183 . TNA, PREM 19/417, Caspar Weinberger to Her Excellency Margaret Thatcher, 24 August 1981.The formal offer from the President came on 1 October. Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 247. 184 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 247. 185 . Private interview with Sir John Nott, 3 May 2006. 186 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 247. 187 . Private interview with Sir John Nott, 3 May 2006. 188 . McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? , p. 24. 189 . Ibid. 190 . Although the latter had retired, he remained a powerful politico-military figure. 191 . Private interview with Sir Bryan Cartledge, January 2012. 192 . Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986), p. 155. 193 . TNA, AIR 8/2846, R.A. Miller Group Captain DASB to PS/CAS ND Presentation to COS on Strategic Nuclear Matters – Wednesday 7 October 1981 , 2 October 1981. 194 . Ibid. 195 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 247. 196 . Private interview with Sir John Nott, 3 May 2006. 197 . Ibid. 198 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 248. 199 . Hansard , HC Debates 975–976, 11 March 1982. Private interview with Sir John Nott, 3 May 2006. 200 . McInnes, Trident: The Only Option? , pp. 26, 69. 201 . Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs , p. 392. 202 . Ibid. 203 . David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 276–277. 204 . Ibid. 205 . Martin Westlake, Kinnock The Biography (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001), pp. 437–444.

8 Creating the ‘Seamless Robe of Deterrence’: Great Britain’s Role in NATO’s INF Debate

1 . Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 239. 2 . The US position is explored in Henry H. Gaffney, ‘Euromissiles as the Ultimate Evolution of Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies , Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 2014), pp. 180–199. 3 . This scenario, illustrated by NATO’s Wintex-Cimex exercise in 1981, was dram- atized by BBC Radio 4 in ‘Winter Exercise’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/ b03lkmpy, accessed 10 April 2014. 290 Notes

4 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , pp. 241–244. 5 . TNA, DEFE 68/240, M.E. Quinlan (DUS)(P) CM Basing , 23 May 1979. 6 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, M.E. Quinlan DUS (P) to PUS Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces, 6 July 1979. 7 . Her earliest briefing was on 6 June. TNA, PREM 19/972, B.G. Cartledge to Paul Lever Intelligence Briefing: C.T.B. and Chemical Warfare, 7 June 1979. 8 . TNA, PREM 19/972, Robert Armstrong to Mr. Whitmore, 16 January 1980. 9 . TNA, PREM 19/416, B.M. Norbury to C.A. Whitmore, 30 June 1981. 10 . TNA, PREM 19/15, John Hunt to Mr. Cartledge , 11 May 1979. 11 . Ibid. 12 . TNA, PREM 19/15, General Haig’s Farewell Call on the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street on 13 June 1979 at 10:00, 13 June 1979. 13 . Ibid. 14 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 240. 15 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Annex A to DP10/79 (Final) A Study of a Possible New UK Contribution to a NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force , 19 June 1979. 16 . Ibid. 17 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, NC Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State UK Contribution to a NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force (LRTNF) , 28 June 1979. 18 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, F.P. to Prime Minister NATO Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces, 5 July 1979. 19 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces , 5 July 1979. 20 . Quinlan’s views of the ‘seamless robe of deterrence’ and TNF modernisation can be found in Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (Abingdon: Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 167–259. 21 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces , 5 July 1979. 22 . Ibid. 23 . See for example Thomas R. Rochon and David S. Meyer, Coalitions & Political Movements: The Lessons of the Nuclear Freeze (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), Robert Kleidman, Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993), and Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Volume 3 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003). 24 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, NC Chief of the Defence Staff to Secretary of State UK Contribution to a NATO Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force (LRTNF) , 28 June 1979. 25 . Ibid. 26 . Ibid. 27 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces , 5 July 1979. 28 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, J.A. Robinson to Sir Michael Palliser TNF Modernisation, 2 July 1979. 29 . TNA, DEFE 25/335, C (Carrington) to Prime Minister Theatre Nuclear Arms Control , 6 July 1979. 30 . TNA, F.P. to Prime Minister NATO Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces , 5 July 1979. 31 . This was an extra flight of 16 missiles to offset a slightly reduced West German contribution. TNA, PREM 19/15, F.P. to Prime Minister, 20 September 1979. 32 . TNA, PREM 19/15, F.P. to Prime Minister Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces , 17 September 1979. Notes 291

33 . TNA, PREM 19/15, John Hunt to Prime Minister MISC 7: Long-range Theatre Nuclear Forces 18 September 1979. 34 . TNA, PREM 19/14, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS/S of S , 22 October 1979. 35 . TNA, PREM 19/15, Michael Alexander to G.G.H. Walden Soviet Ambassador’s Call , 15 October 1979. 36 . Ibid. 37 . TNA, PREM 19/14, Draft Message from the Prime Minister to President Carter, 19 October 1979. 38 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , pp. 241–244. Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/1/4 (Personal Message T132/79T), 1 November 1979. 39 . T NA, PR EM 19/15, Extract from the record of discussion between PM + Chancellor Schmidt , 31 October 1979. 40 . TNA, PREM 19/15, V. Dolgov to Mr. M. Alexander, 29 November 1979. 41 . TNA, PREM 19/15, Record of a Discussion between the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Joseph Luns at No. 10 Downing Street on 7 November at 1210 hours, 7 November 1979. TNA, PREM 19/15, Margaret Thatcher to President Carter, 9 November 1979. 42 . NATO Documents Webpage, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_ texts_27040.htm, accessed 1 November 2009. 43 . Ibid. 44 . TNA, FCO 28/4064, Curtis Keeble to C.L.G. Mallaby, 15 February 1980. 45 . TNA, FCO 28/4064, R.A. Fulton to C.C.R. Battiscombe Activities of Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, 16 June 1980. 46 . The KGB ( Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti ) was the prime intelligence agency of the USSR whilst the GRU ( Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye ) was under the direction of the Soviet General Staff. 47 . http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/stasi-documents-provide-operational-details-on-operation-ryan-the-soviet-plan-to-predict-and-preempt-a- western-nuclear-strike-show-uneasiness-over-degree-of-clear-headedness-about- the-entire-ryan/, accessed 26 March 2014. 48 . Ibid. 49 . See for example Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Harper Collins, 1992), Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations 1975–1985 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (eds), More Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Global Operations 1975–1985 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1992) and Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 709, 722–723 and 841. Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face: The Memoirs of a Spymaster (London: Trafalgar Square, 1997). 50 . TNA, FCO, 28/4064, R.A. Fulton to C.C.R. Battiscombe Activities of Soviet Embassy in East Berlin, 16 June 1980. 51 . TNA, FCO, 28/4064, D.B.C. Logan to D.C.A. M Madden The SS20 Deployment Programme, 27 June 1980. NATO too withdrew its older systems following the Montebello decision of October 1983. 52 . TNA, FCO, 28/4064, A. International Affairs (a) Tass in Russian for abroad 2025 gmt, 19 June 1980. The pamphlet ‘Protect and Survive’ can be found at http://www.atomica.co.uk/main.htm, accessed 26 March 2014. The BBC was also tasked with an emergency broadcast which began with the most ominous words ‘This is the Wartime Broadcasting Service. This country has been attacked 292 Notes

with nuclear weapons. Communications have been severely disrupted, and the number of casualties and the extent of the damage are not yet known. We shall bring you further information as soon as possible. Meanwhile, stay tuned to this wavelength, stay calm and stay in your own homes’. The full transcript can be found at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/03_10_08nuclearattack. pdf, accessed 26 March 2014. 53 . TNA, FCO, 28/4064, Special Consultative Group Meeting: 15–16 June US Strategy for Preliminary Exchanges, undated 1980. 54 . This can be contrasted with the Italian position which is outlined in Leopoldo Nuti, ‘Italy’s Nuclear Choices’, UNISCI Discussion Papers , No. 25 (January 2011), pp. 167–182. 55 . TNA, FCO 46/2769, J.M. Stewart (AUS) Defence Staff to PS/S of S SDE 81 – Control over GLCMs , 19 March 1981. 56 . TNA, FCO 46/2769, P.H. Moberly to PS/PUS, 2 April 1981. 57 . TNA, FCO 46/2769, R.J. Harding (Head of DS8) MOU on GLCM Basing in the UK, 14 April 1981. 58 . TNA, FCO 46/2769, J.M. Legge (Head of DS17) to APS/S of S, 8 April 1981. 59 . TNA, FCO 46/2769, Michael [Quinlan] to P.R. Sommer, 10 March 1981. 60 . TNA, PREM 19/979, John Nott to Prime Minister Nuclear Issues, 20 October 1982. 61 . Ibid. 62 . Ibid. 63 . TNA, PREM 19/979, F.P. to Prime Minister, 25 October 1982. 64 . Ibid. 65 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, 12 November 1982. 66 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, 12 November 1982. 67 . TNA, PREM 19/979, F.P. to Prime Minister Nuclear Issues, 3 November 1982. 68 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, 12 November 1982. 69 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Confidential FN UKDEL NATO 301800Z to Immediate FCO, 30 November 1982. 70 . http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c821130a.htm, accessed 24 March 2014. 71 . Ibid. 72 . TNA, PREM 19/979, R. Mottram Drafted by Mr Nott and signed in his absence to Prime Minister Basing of Cruise Missiles and Arms Control , 15 December 1982. 73 . TNA, PREM 19/979, John Coles to Richard Mottram INF Deployment , 15 December 1982. 74 . TNA, PREM 19/979, A.D.S. Goodall to Mr Facer Nuclear Forces: Prime Minister’s Briefing , 21 December 1982. 75 . TNA, PREM 19/979, F.P. to Prime Minister Alliance and Nuclear Matters , 13 January 1983. 76 . TNA, PREM 19/979, GRS 1085 Confidential DESKBY 211400Z, 21 January 1983. 77 . TNA, PREM 19/979, F.P. to Prime Minister INF Negotiations , 25 January 1983. 78 . Private interview with Lord Heseltine, January 2012. 79 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Ministry of Defence Prime Minister Control Arrangements for UK Based Cruise Missiles, 25 January 1983. 80 . TNA, PREM 19/979, F.P. to The Prime Minister Control Arrangements for UK-Based Cruise Missiles, 26 January 1983. Notes 293

81 . On these agreements see John Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets’, Diplomatic History , Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 33–61. Both are detailed in the Conclusion. 82 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister MISC 7: Basing of United States Cruise Missiles, 26 January 1983. 83 . Ibid. 84 . Ibid. 85 . TNA, CAB 130/1224, MISC 7(83) 1st Meeting (Basing of United States Cruise Missiles), 27 January 1983. 86 . Ibid. 87 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Meeting at Chequers on 30 January: Arms Control Issues , 28 January 1983. 88 . For more information see John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapter 9. 89 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Ron to Margaret Thatcher VZCZCWAG061 FM The White House to Cabinet Office, London, 16 February 1983. 90 . TNA, PREM 19/979, From Cabinet Office London to Immediate White House, 18 February 1983. 91 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Record of a Meeting between the Defence Secretary and Mr Weinberger in Vilamoura, Portugal at 1900 HRS on Monday 21st March 83 , 24 March 1983. 92 . Anne Hessing Cahn, ‘Team B: The trillion-dollar experiment’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 24–27. See also Pavel Podvig, ‘The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s – A Research Note’, International Security , Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 118–138. 93 . TNA, CAB 130/1224, MISC 7(83) 2nd Meeting (Basing of United States Cruise Missiles), 8 March 1983. 94 . Ibid. 95 . TNA, CAB 130/1224, MISC 7(83) 3rd Meeting (Basing of United States Cruise Missiles, Policing of Demonstrations at Military Bases), 28 March 1983. 96 . Ibid. 97 . Paul Brown, Shyama Perera and Martin Wainwright, ‘Protest by CND stretches 14 miles’, The Guardian , 2 April 1983. 98 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Prime Minister’s Personal Message Serial No. T34/83, 23 March 1983. 99 . TNA, PREM 19/979, CAB/WH001/24 From Cabinet Office London to Immediate White House, 24 March 1983. 100 . TNA, PREM 19/979, GR 750 FM Washington to Immediate FCO, 30 March 1983. Reagan made this speech on 30 March. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/ speeches/1983/33083a.htm, accessed 10 May 2014. 101 . Document provided to the author through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, henceforward FOIA, but lacking a file number. Michael Heseltine to The Rt Hon John Biffen MP, 11 April 1983. 102 . Ibid. 103 . Ibid. 104 . TNA, CAB 128/76/14, Conclusions Former Reference: CC(83) 14th Conclusions Cabinet Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 28 April 1983. 294 Notes

105 . For evidence of possible Soviet infiltration. Stella Rimington, Open Secret: The Autobiography of the Former Director-General of MI5 (London: Arrow; New edition, 2002), pp. 161–163, 176. See also Michael Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: My Autobiography (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2000), pp. 249–251. 106 . David Fairhall, Common Ground: The Story of Greenham (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 50–52, 91. 107 . Ibid. p. 51. 108 . Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb , p. 277–278, 281. 109 . This was described by Heseltine in a 1987 interview. http://openvault.wgbh.org/ catalog/wpna-8b36be-interview-with-michael-heseltine-1987, accessed 5 May 2014. 110 . Len Scott ‘Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited’ in Michael Herman and Gwilym Hughes (eds.), Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 5–23. 111 . FOIA, Cruise Missile Counter Force Capabilities, 19 May 1983. 112 . SDI is discussed in the Conclusion. 113 . The ‘evil empire’ speech has been seen as one of the defining moments of the Cold War. A full transcript of the speech can be found at https://www.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks_Annual_Convention_National_Association_ Evangelicals_030883.pdf, accessed 5 May 2014. 114 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, 12 November 1982. Thatcher, Downing Street Years , pp. 268–269. See also Robin Day, ... But with Respect: Memorable Interviews with Statesmen and Parliamentarians (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp. 221–224. The declassified text (with some redaction) of the Murphy-Dean Agreement can be found on the National Security Archive website, ‘Consultation is Presidential Business’ webpage, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/usukconsult-8. pdf, accessed 21 October 2008. A (UK) commentary on the significance of the Murphy-Dean Understanding can be found in Baylis, ‘Exchanging Nuclear Secrets’, p. 58. See also Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2000), pp. 328–330. 115 . Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Subject: INF Nuclear Control Issue (U), 4 April 1983. Provided to the author by Bill Burr following his declassification request. 116 . Thatcher, Downing Street Years , pp. 171 and 259. Reagan’s views are covered in Daryl G. Kimball, ‘LOOKING BACK: The Nuclear Arms Control Legacy of Ronald Reagan’, Arms Control Today (July/August 2004); Ronald E. Powaski, Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (London: Random House, 2006). 117 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. 118 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 25 November 2007. 119 . Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 56. 120 . Len Scott, ‘Selling or Selling Out Nuclear Disarmament? Labour, the Bomb and the 1987 General Election’, International History Review , Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 115–137. 121 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 25 November 2007. 122 . TNA, FO 973/413, NATO ‘Double Track’ Decision: The Present Stage, April 1985. Notes 295

123 . Private interview with Lord Powell, January 2012. 124 . Private interview with Sir Bryan Cartledge, January 2012.

Conclusion

1 . David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 276–277. 2 . Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role? Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 132, 134–135, 137–140, 150, 230, 256, 275, 279. 3 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield, Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1970–1976 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 9–10, 139–144, 148–159, 159–171, 201, 220, 222–223, 230, 273–275, 277, 280–282. 4 . Mike Rance from material largely supplied by Roy Dommett, ‘RAE’s Role in & Contribution to Chevaline’, Proceedings from a Conference on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme , held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. Henceforward, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 5 . Ibid. 6 . Peter Hennessy, Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Postwar Britain (London: Indigo, 1997), pp. 120–129. 7 . Frank Panton, ‘Politics and Strategic Background. 1964–1982’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 8 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 11 June 1976. Polaris could be launched from the Mediterranean, but this was not a favoured option. Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 63, 146–150, 152–153. 9 . The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, Defence Open Government Document 80/23, Ministry of Defence , July 1980. 10 . Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 114. 11 . Mike Rance from material largely supplied by Roy Dommett, ‘RAE’s Role in & Contribution to Chevaline’; the range of industrial firms involved in Chevaline is described in Mike Rance, ‘The Contribution of Industry to Chevaline Based on material provided by Roy Dommett and staff past and present in Hunting Engineering (Insys), RPE/PERME and Sperry Gyroscope’. The role of British Aerospace, David Reade, ‘The Role of British Aerospace in the Chevaline Project’. All from the Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 12 . House of Commons Defence Committee Session 1980–81, Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 26 November 1980 , 27 November 1980, 990. See also Stan Orman, ‘Evolving the Management of Chevaline’, Conference at RAES , October 2004. 13 . Kate Pyne, ‘More Complex than Expected’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 14 . When Polaris-Chevaline was nearing the end of its service life in the mid-1990s there was ‘some overlap with Trident’. C. Metcalf and R.L. Dommett ‘An Introduction to Chevaline’, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 15 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wade-Gery.pdf, accessed 3 November 2012. 16 . Tanya Ogilvie-White, On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan (Abingdon: Routledge/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 167–259. 296 Notes

17 . See for example http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=1981–03– 03a.137.0#g219.2, accessed 8 August 2013. 18 . This line of reasoning can be found in John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture and Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 19 . Both the memoirs of Mrs. Thatcher and of the Secretary of State for Defence, Francis Pym, indicate that the Trident decision was a relatively uncomplicated choice. 20 . Hansard, House of Commons Debates, http://www.parliament.the-stationery- office.co.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989–02–15/Debate-12.html#Debate-12_ spnew28, accessed 13 September 2002. 21 . Transcript of the ‘Cabinets and the Bomb’ Workshop held at the British Academy in 2007, http://www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/review/perspectives/0703cabinetsandbo mb-2.cfm, accessed 14 August 2013. 22 . Fred Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, Second edition 1986). 23 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Wade-Gery.pdf, accessed 3 November 2012. 24 . CMND 7979, The British Strategic Nuclear Force Texts of Letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the United States Secretary of Defense, July 1980. 25 . Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume One: Not For Turning (London: Allen Lane, 2013), p. 573. 26 . TNA, PREM 19/159, Text of a message from Robert Armstrong to David Aaron dated 24th May, 3 June 1980. 27 . Confidential correspondence, 6 April 2006. 28 . Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent , p. 114. 29 . TNA, CAB 196/123, R.L.L. Facer to Mr Goodall Briefs for a Labour/Alliance Administration , 6 June 1983. 30 . TNA, CAB 196/123, Michael [Quinlan] to Dennis, 3 June 1983. 31 . TNA, CAB 196/123, D.J. Fewtrell Head of DS17 to AUS(D Staff) Briefing for New Minister: Brief 4a: Present British Nuclear Forces and their Future , 27 May 1983. 32 . House of Commons, Fourth Report from the Defence Committee Session 1982–83 , 12 May 1983. 33 . Defence Open Government Document 80/23, July 1980. 34 . TNA, DEFE 25/325, M.E. Quinlan DUS(P) to PS to Secretary of State ANNEX A , 3 October 1980. 35 . Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent , pp. 106–125. 36 . TNA, CAB 196/123, Michael [Quinlan] to Dennis, 3 June 1983. 37 . Helmut Schmidt, ‘The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture’, Survival , Vol. 20, No. 1 (January – February 1978), pp. 2–10. 38 . Jan Hoffenaar and Christopher Findlay (eds.), An Oral History Roundtable: Military Planning for European Theatre Conflict During the Cold War Stockholm, 24–25 April 2006. Available from http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf, accessed 6 April 2014. 39 . Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1983), pp. 291–308. 40 . Christoph Bluth, ‘British-German Defence Relations, 1950–80: A Survey’, in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, British German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Notes 297

Alliance , (London: Jane’s for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988), pp. 28–29 and Christoph Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 230. 41 . Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War . 42 . TNA, PREM 19/979, R. Mottram Drafted by Mr Nott and signed in his absence to Prime Minister Basing of Cruise Missiles and Arms Control , 15 December 1982. 43 . TNA, PREM 19/979, Michael Heseltine to Prime Minister The Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) Programme, 21 July 1983. 44 . TNA, CAB 130/1182, Most Confidential Record to MISC 7(82) 4th Meeting, 12 November 1982. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 268–269. See also Robin Day, ... But with Respect: Memorable Interviews with Statesmen and Parliamentarians (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), pp. 221–224. 45 . Private interview with Sir Michael Quinlan, 3 August 2006. See also Bluth, ‘British-German Defence Co-operation’, pp. 28–29, in Karl Kaiser and John Roper, British German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the Alliance . 46 . Bill Jackson and Dwin Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 390–391. 47 . Len Scott, ‘Selling or Selling Out Nuclear Disarmament? Labour, the Bomb and the 1987 General Election’, International History Review , Vol. 34, No. 1 (March 2012), pp. 115–137. 48 . Len Scott ‘Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited’ in Michael Herman and Gwilym Hughes (eds.), Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did It Make? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 7. 49 . http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-69f07a-interview-with-donald-soper- 1986, accessed 6 April 2014. 50 . http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-2077fa-interview-with-james-callaghan-1987, accessed 27 March 2014. 51 . This line of thought is pursued in Baylis and Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience . 52 . Private interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, January 2012. The rational choice/ rational actor model can be found in John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Reckless States and Realism’, International Relations , Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 241–256. 53 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire , pp. 58, 73, 115, 127, 183–188, 199, Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 87–93, 114, 122–123, 135–136, 182–185, 188, 199, 211–214, 225, 227. 54 . Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis second edition (Old Tappan NJ: Addison-Wesley, 1999). 55 . Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010). 56 . TNA, CAB 196/124–1, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Nuclear Release Procedures and Related Matters , Strictly for the Personal Information and Use of the Prime Minister Warning: This paper is to be seen only by CLARET indoctri- nated personnel , June 1983. 57 . Ibid. 58 . Ibid. 59 . On the Athens Guidelines see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 13, 44, 47, 134, 168. 60 . Ibid. p. 64. 298 Notes

61 . TNA, CAB 196/124–1, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Nuclear Release Procedures and Related Matters , Strictly for the Personal Information and Use of the Prime Minister Warning: This paper is to be seen only by CLARET indoctri- nated personnel , June 1983. 62 . This was intended to offer over 200 guidelines for responses to an attack on the UK, including after a nuclear attack. Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 88–91, 183. 63 . Ministers were not told in peacetime of their selection. Ibid. 64 . Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst , pp. 310–359. 65 . TNA, CAB 196/124–1, Robert Armstrong to Prime Minister Nuclear Release Procedures and Related Matters , Strictly for the Personal Information and Use of the Prime Minister Warning: This paper is to be seen only by CLARET indoctri- nated personnel , June 1983. 66 . On the Soviet side see David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race (London: Icon Books, 2011) and Pavel Podvig, ‘The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s – A Research Note’, International Security , Vol. 33, Is. 1 (Summer 2008), p. 136. On the US command and control system see Daniel F. Ford, The Button: The Pentagon’s Strategic Command and Control System (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985). 67 . Pavel Podvig, ‘Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet Response to the SDI Program’, available from http://russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_ help_End_the_col.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. See also Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin: The Cold War and Beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 107–150. 68 . Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 233–246, 322–338. See also Thatcher, Downing Street Years , p. 463–485. 69 . http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-the-united-states-of- america-and-the-union-of-soviet-socialist-republics-on-the-elimination-of- their-intermediate-range-and-shorter-range-missiles/, accessed 7 April 2014. 70 . Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), p. 56. 71 . Ibid., pp. 56–57. 72 . John Nott, Here Today Gone Tomorrow: Memoirs of an Errant Politician (London: Politico’s, 2002), pp. 218–219. 73 . Private interview with Lord Powell, January 2012. 74 . Private interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, January 2012. 75 . On Paul Nitze’s role in US foreign and defence policy see Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), pp. 14–15; David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York: Harper & Row, 1990); as well as Nitze’s autobiography, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision – A Memoir (with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden) (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989). 76 . Paul Nitze’s account of the ‘walk in the woods’ and the subsequent series of arms control negotiations that led to the 1987 INF Treaty can be found at http://www. achievement.org/autodoc/page/nit0int-1 and http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog ?f%5Bmedia_s%5D%5B%5D=Transcript&f%5BrI_collection_ancestors_s%5D% 5B%5D=info%3Afedora%2Forg.wgbh.mla%3Awpna&page=23, both accessed 7 April 2014. Notes 299

77 . John Prados, How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), pp. 83–85. See also http://www.armscontrol.org/ act/2011_10/Reykjavik_When_Abolition_Was_Within_Reach, accessed 7 April 2014. 78 . John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). The after effects of Reykjavik on the British are covered in Baylis and Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience , Chapter 9. See also David Reynolds, Summits: Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp. 317–369. 79 . Simon Lunn, ‘The Anglo-American Relationship: The Alliance Context’, in Michael Clarke and Rod Hague (eds.), European Defence Co-operation: America, Britain and NATO (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p. 75 80 . Podvig, ‘Window of Vulnerability that Wasn’t’, p. 136. 81 . MoD Web Page, http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/177.html, accessed 29 November 2005. 82 . Andreas Parsch, Directory of US Military Rockets and Missiles UGM-133 Page, http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-133.html, 29 November 2005. 83 . CMND. 6994, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (London: HMSO, 2006). 84 . CM 7948, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (October 2010). See also Malcolm Chalmers, ‘Towards the UK’s Nuclear Century’, RUSI Journal , Vol. 158, No. 6 (December 2013), p. 18 85 . For more information see Baylis and Stoddart, The British Nuclear Experience , Chapter 10 and Conclusion. Bibliography

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Aaron, David, US official, 119, 124–125, Atomic Weapons Research 136, 138, 140, 210 Establishment, Aldermaston Able Archer, NATO exercise, 243 (AWRE now AWE) ABM Treaty, 27, 31, 35, 157, 159, 175, Chevaline development, 13, 22–23, 98 253, 271 Chevaline warhead, 18, 24–25, 31, Afghanistan, 91, 136, 139, 147, 213, 228, functions and responsibilities, 29, 97, 237, 243 157, 166 Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), Trident warhead programme, 158, 51, 71, 88, 118–120, 125, 179, 209 169, 177, 187, 209, 228, 230–231, Aitken, Air Chief Marshal John, 74, 204 234, 251, 279 Aldermaston, see Atomic Weapons Australia, 21, 96 Research Establishment Allison, Graham, 239 B-2, US stealth bomber, 282 Andropov, Yuri, Soviet Premier, 219 Backfire, Soviet bomber, 76, 84–87, Anglo-French nuclear co-operation, 39, 91–92, 203, 208, 210, 213, 59, 62, 75, 117–122, 124, 126, 134, 235–236 268 Barbados, 2, 70 Ankara, NATO NPG Meeting, 140 Barrow-in-Furness, 52, 178 Anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), 12, 15–16, Bartholomew, Reginald, US official, 119 18–19, 23, 27–32, 35, 38, 47–49, Baylis, John, 247, 293, 294, 296–297, 62, 94–96, 99–100, 105–106, 299 110, 120, 122, 129–130, 157–161, BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 169–171, 175–177, 181–182, 185, 291–292 188, 201, 227–229, 249, 253 Belgium, 136, 140, 208, 211, 236 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 36, 44, Belize, 193, 200 48, 51, 61–62, 120–121, 122–123, Benjamin Franklin (640) class 127, 133, 160, 162–163, 182 submarine, 160, 163 Anvil (Banon), UK Nuclear Test, 19 Biffen, John, UK Conservative Armstrong, Sir Robert, UK Cabinet politician, 149 Secretary, 103, 132–138, 140, 151, Blue Streak, MRBM, 122, 165, 232 171, 184, 187–189, 191–192, 194, bolt from the blue, 10, 44, 64, 109, 157, 214, 218, 241–242, 286 242 Asia, 59 Bondi, Hermann, UK nuclear scientist, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) 30, 103 (ACAS(Pol)), 45 Braithwaite, Rodric, UK diplomat, 5, 9, Assistant Chief Scientific Advisor 130, 239, 244 (Nuclear) ACSA(N), 164 Bramall, Dwin, 127, 161, 170, 200 Athens Guidelines, 241, 297 Brezhnev, Leonid, Soviet Premier, 93, Atlantic Ocean, 228 210–212 Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADMs), British Aerospace (BAe Systems), 154, 77 165–166 Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence British Broadcasting Corporation, see BBC purposes, see UK/US Mutual Defence Brown, Harold, US Defense Secretary, Agreement 70, 83, 89, 124–125, 141, 148, 235

311 312 Index

Brussels, 17, 80 sending of officials to the US, 70, 116, Brussels NPG Meetings, 79, 82, 132, 216 125 Bryson, Adm Lyndsey, 186–187 secrecy, 70, 116, 145, 276 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, US National secret understandings, 249 Security Adviser, 93, 116, 122, successor system debate, 10, 15, 125, 135, 235 33–34, 36, 39–41, 46, 68–72, 75, Buccaneer, Royal Navy strike aircraft, 116, 125, 143, 152, 257–259, 276 57, 84, 244 views of Restricted Group Members, 1, Burghfield, 18, 23, 98, 156, 166, 222, 229 3, 5, 8–9, 34 Burr, William, 91, 263, 294 winter of discontent, 2, 71, Burt, Richard, 275–276 Cameron, David, UK Prime Minister, 246 Cabinet, 3–5, 12, 16, 19, 30–31, 37–38, Cameron, Neil, 26, 74, 86, 127, 207–209 41–42, 70, 116, 132, 134–135, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 143, 148, 151, 161, 165, 183–184, (CND), 10, 19, 113, 147, 149, 153, 191–196, 200, 204, 217, 230–232, 201, 204, 210, 214, 222–223, 227, 243–244, 267 237–238 Cabinet by sub-committee: Cape Canaveral, 21–22, 95, 98–99, 252 MISC 7, 5–6, 116–117, 124, 126, Capenhurst, 268 132–134, 139, 141–142, 144, Cardiff (Royal Ordnance Factory), 18, 156 150–15, 158, 172–173, 175, Caribbean, 2, 193 178–191, 194–195, 198–200, 210, Carrington, Peter, 5, 115, 117, 126, 135, 214–218, 220–221, 231–233, 238, 137, 139, 142, 148–149, 153, 165, 268, 272 187, 200, 205, 210, 215, 268, 278 Restricted Group, 3, 5–6, 17, 19–21, Carter, Jimmy, US President, 2, 10, 40, 26, 31–32, 37–38, 40–41, 46–47, 66, 68–71, 73–75, 85, 90–91, 93, 54, 65–66, 68, 70–71, 73, 75, 115, 117–119, 125–126, 132–137, 115–116, 238 140 –144, 147, 150 –151, 167–168, Cahn, Anne Hessing, 219 172, 200, 211, 229–230, 232, 234, Callaghan, James 243, 272 Chevaline, 17, 20–21, 27, 29–30, 32, Cartledge, Brian, UK official, 47, 71, 226–227 200, 224 deterrence criteria, 14, 16, 18, 21, Carver, Michael, 32, 150, 159, 200, 277, 46–47, 52–54, 60, 65–67, 71 279 domestic politics, 12, 41, 239 Cat House, Soviet ABM radar, 15 Duff-Mason, 46–47, 52–54, 60, 65–68, Central Front, 78 74 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 219, Guadeloupe Summit, 2, 69–70, 74–75, 223 90, 200, 259 Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), 6, 26, 32, Labour Party politics, 70, 145, 150, 38, 86, 114, 162, 178 200, 247 see also Carver, Michael, Cameron, LRTNF debates, 90–93, 234–236 Neil, Hill-Norton, Peter, Lewin, negotiations with Jimmy Carter, 66, Terence 68–73, 75 Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), 155, 171, 178 nuclear testing, 25, 251 Chief Polaris Executive (CPE), 45, 53, relationship with Helmut Schmidt, 155–156 69, 90 Chiefs of Staff (COS), 6, 30–31, 87, 90, replacement file, 73, 115, 150 126–127, 146, 152, 169–171, 173, Restricted Group discussions, 6, 37, 178, 189, 205, 207, 209, 282 46–47, 52–54, 60, 65–66, 68, 70, Chief Strategic Systems Executive 73, 75, 116, 257 (CSSE), 155 Index 313

China, 35, 42–43, 59, 63, 67, 129 warhead and nuclear testing, 18–19, CINCHAN (Commander-in-Chief 24–27, 29, 31, 45, 120, 228–229, Channel), 244 251–252, 265 Chekhov, Soviet radar, 15 China, 35, 42–43, 45, 59, 63, 67, 129 chemical weapons/warfare, 195 Churchill–Eisenhower Agreement, 241 Chevaline, 1, 9–11, 45, 48, 51, 73–74, Circular Error Probability (CEP), 36, 115, 118, 124, 129, 151, 159, 175–176, 279 165–166, 171, 174, 183–184, 190, cities, see damage criteria 195–196, 226, 265, 295 Clyde (river), 29, 121, 130, 175 characteristics, 12–14, 94–96, Clydeside, 201 105–107, 122, 130 Cold War, 101, 109, 147, 223–225, 228, Chevaline imperative, 32, 62, 233–234, 237, 243–246, 248–249, 109, 111–113, 146, 151–152, 269, 294 158–159, 173, 184, 187, 201, Coles, John, UK official, 4 229, 231, 233 command and control, 6, 44, 53, 57, 65, costs and funding, 13, 15, 17–18, 20, 81, 88, 120, 175, 195, 218–220, 28, 30, 47, 96, 100–102, 105, 110, 223, 237, 242, 298 131, 266, 282 Commonwealth, 26, 59 deployment, 20, 29, 96–99, 109, 113, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 229, 295 20, 24–26, 42, 45, 61, 86, 97, Falstaff rocket tests, 22–23, 96, 251 117–118, 140, 154, 163–164, 228 flight trials, 21–23, 94, 96–99, 106, Conference on Disarmament, 223 250–252 Congress, 68, 71, 74, 79, 133–137, 140, front-end, 19, 29, 148, 182, 192–193 Hydrazine Actuation System, 22, 29, Conservative Party, 180–181, 193, 216, 106 288 Jabiru rocket tests, 21, 250 Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrence (CASD), Moscow Criterion and rationale, 15, 36–37, 44, 62, 65–67, 121, 190, 13–16, 20, 23–24, 29–30, 32, 34, 195, 233 36, 43, 47, 74–75, 93, 109–110, conventional (non-nuclear) forces, 128, 146, 227–228, 279 42, 48–49, 51, 55, 69, 76–81, Multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), 83–84, 86, 88, 113–114, 125, 132, 106–107, 122 136 –138, 140, 143, 145, 149–150, PAC report, 102–105, 187 159, 162, 168, 170, 172–173, penetration aids, 23, 105, 177–179, 185, 189–190, 192, 194, Penetration Aid Carrier, 12, 18, 20, 197, 199–201, 203, 206–209, 230, 22, 98–99, 227, 250–251 232, 235–236, 245 progress reports, 13, 17, 20, 23–24, 28, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 47, 96, 98 245 public announcement, 95–96, 98, Cooper, Duff, 8 100–102, 111–112, 139, 144, 150, Cossiga, Francesco, Italian Prime 226, Minister, 143 range, 50, 95, 105, 123, 228 Coulport, 53, 96, 98–99, 130–131, 135–136, re-motoring problem, 106–108, 168, 161, 171, 174, 182, 198, 201 173–174, 177, 282 Counter-force targeting, see nuclear Skylark rocket tests, 13, 21–23, 96, targets and targeting and NATO 250 Counter-value targeting, see nuclear threat of cancellation, 20–21, 26–27, targets and targeting and NATO 30–31, 38, 110 Craig, Air Marshall, David, 157, 164 twin Chamber Propulsion Unit, 106, Cresset (Fondutta), UK nuclear test, 24, 227 251 314 Index crisis management, 239, 297 Dog House, Soviet ABM radar, 15 Christopher, Warren, US politician, 155 Dommett, Roy, UK nuclear scientist, Crosland, Antony, 3, 15, 20 251, 295, 308 cruise missiles, 20–21, 27, 35–40, 42, Downing Street, 4, 116, 141 44–48, 49, 53, 61, 63, 65, 67–68, dual-capable, 88, 240 70–71, 74, 84, 86–88, 92, 114, dual key custody of US nuclear 118, 120, 122, 127, 130–131, 154, weapons, 213–221 165–166, 177, 201, 204, 207, 209, see also nuclear sharing 214, 216–217, 221, 232, 236, 267 dual track decision, 1–2, 4, 10–11, 78, see also Ground Launched Cruise 82–83, 85, 119, 132, 139–140, 147, Missile (GLCM), Sea-Launched 177, 179, 188, 202–213, 216, 221, Cruise Missile (SLCM) and 224–226, 234, 236 Air-Launched Cruise Missile dual track deployment, 237–238, 260 (ALCM) see also Ground Launched Cruise Cuban missile crisis, 239, 243 Missiles (GLCMs) custody of nuclear weapons, 183 Duff, Anthony, UK civil servant, 38, Czechoslovakia, 88 43–45, 54, 70, 73, 118 Duff-Mason Report, 9–10, 34, 38, damage criteria for strategic deterrence, 42–48, 52, 97, 111, 114–115, 139, 46, 62, 67, 119–122, 130, 150, 160 152, 164, 229, 244, 246, 260, see also nuclear targets 269–270 Daryal, Soviet radar, 16, 109 basing options, 44, 46, 52, 60–75, deadhand, 242, 298 117–131, 150, 158–160, 166, see also command and control 169, 173, 175–176, 179, 182, decoys, see Penetration Aids 230, 233 Defence Open Government Document deterrence criteria, 46–48, 52–60, 80/23 (DOGD 80/23), 144, 146, 63–67, 71, 73–75, 87–88, 116, 119, 151, 162, 230, 234 122, 127–131, 157–158, 166, 169, Defence Policy Staff (DPS), 127–131, 159, 173, 175–176, 182, 230, 233 161, 170, 205–206 first strike, 64, 109–110 Defence Review, 17, 27, 102, 113, 163, first use, 43 172, 174, 200, Nuclear Matters Working Party Defence Secretariat, UK MoD, 38 (NMWP), 43–45, 53, 155, 177 Defence Secretariat 17 (DS17), UK MoD, second centre of decision, 53, 55, 58, 161, 165 91, 152, 234 Defence Secretariat 19 (DS17), UK MoD, second strike, 177 see also Defence 222–223 Policy Staff, Duff, Anthony, Defense Department, US, 7, 119, Mason, Ronald, Quinlan, 124–125, 141, 171, 191, 285 Michael Denmark, 88 D’Estaing, Valery Giscard, French early warning radars, 16 President, 2 East Germany, 88, 210, 212–213 Deputy Undersecretary (Navy), 155, 178 East of Suez, 67 Détente, 91, 136, 143, 211, 219, 224 East–West, 76, 85, 91, 205, 228, 236, 243 Dicel Post, see Quicksilver Nessel ECM (electronic counter-measures), 36, 84 Diego Garcia, 140–142, 249, 274 EEC (European Economic Community), Director General Intelligence (DGI), 42, 4, 140 204 ERW (Enhanced Radiation Warhead/ disarmament, 12, 59, 101, 142, 145, 195, Weapons), 76, 235, 260 197, 201, 204, 214–215, 223 see also neutron bomb Index 315

European theatre, 77–78, 82, 84, Ground Launched Cruise Missiles 205–206, 235 (GLCMs), 4, 36, 69, 82, 88, 126, Euro-strategic balance, 77, 204, 211 188, 204, 209–211, 213–221, 223–224, 226, 234, 236–238, 241, F-111, US strike aircraft, 85, 203, 205, 244 208, 218, 236 Gorbachev, Mikhail, Soviet Premier, Fakely, Denis, UK nuclear scientist, 102, 224, 237, 243–244 158, 164 Gordievsky, Oleg, 213 Falklands, 4, 113, 117, 215, 288 Greenham Common, 147, 217–218, Fallex, NATO exercise, 82 221–222, 236–237, 241 Falstaff, 21–23, 96, 250–251 see also Ground Launched Cruise Farnborough, see RAE Missiles (GLCMs) Faslane, 53, 96, 121, 130–131 Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Foreign FBS (Forward Based Systems), 92 Minister, 211 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), see Gryphon, see GLCMs West Germany Guadeloupe, 2, 27, 54, 60, 65, 68–75, 90 Fielding, Colin, UK nuclear scientist, 163, 187, 229 Haig, Alexander, SACEUR, 80–81, 205, 261 fissile material, 62, 75, 98, 164 Hastie-Smith, Richard, UK official, 187, see also UK/US barter arrangements, 192, 231 plutonium, uranium (U-235) Healey, Denis, Labour Chancellor of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Exchequer, 3, 5, 15, 20, 27, 29–30, (FCO), 34–38, 42–43, 74, 80–81, 32, 37, 46–47, 70–71, 73–74, 202, 114, 127, 140, 142, 171, 183, 191, 241, 247 212–213, 238–239 Heath, Edward, former UK Conservative France, 2, 7, 35, 42, 50, 55–56, 58–61, Prime Minister, 4–5, 46, 116–117, 63, 67–69, 75, 90–91, 113–114, 131, 226 116, 118, 121–122, 128, 134, 149, Henderson, Nicholas, UK diplomat, 125, 153, 177, 185–190, 194–195, 206, 142, 148, 155 213, 217, 225, 233, 255, 257 Hennessy, Peter, 8, 116, 139, 240, 242, see also Anglo-French nuclear 249, 260, 267, 276, 288 cooperation Heseltine, Michael, 217–218, 222–223, Frankfurt, 93 237, 294 Freedom of Information Act (UK), 293 Heuser, Beatrice, 297 highly enriched uranium (HEU), 97, G-7, 170 124, 268, 284–285 Galosh (Soviet ABM system), 15, 19, 23, Hill-Norton, Adm Peter, 114 29, 35, 49, 94–95, 177, 284 HMS Vanguard, 108, 245–246 General Election (June 1983), 105, 195, HMS Vengeance, 245 202, 223, 233–234 HMS Victorious, 245 General Election (May 1979), 40–41, 73, HMS Vigilant, 245 94, 105 Hockaday, Arthur, UK official, 5 General Election (October 1964), 190 Holbrook, see Dicel Post General Election (October 1974), 12 House of Commons, see parliament General Strike Plan/Programme, 244 House of Lords, see parliament Geneva, 16, 197, 215–217, 223, 244 House of Representatives, see Congress Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, West German Hungary, 88 Foreign Minister, 212 Hunter-Killer submarine, see SSN Germany, 66–67 Hunting, Engineering company, 250, 295 see also East and West Germany Hydrazine Actuation System, 22, 29 316 Index

Independent UK deterrence, 7, 10, Killick, John, UK official, 80–81, 261 27, 31–32, 40, 48, 54–55, 58, Kinnock, Neil, UK politician, 202 62–64, 86, 94, 109, 112–114, Kissinger, Henry, US National Security 122, 128–129, 133, 146, 152–153, Adviser and Secretary of State, 3 180–183, 186, 188–190, 194, Komer, Robert, US diplomat, 136–138, 197–198, 206, 214, 216–217, 226, Kvitszinsky, Yuri, Soviet official, 244 228, 232, 237, 245 see also Duff-Mason Report Labour Party, 2, 9, 12, 19, 27, 37, 40–41, India, 26 68, 101, 145, 190, 201–202, 214, Indian Ocean, 140, 274 224, 226–228, 238, 246 Ingham, Bernard, UK official, 141, 174 Laird Cammell , 163 intelligence, 6–7, 13–14, 16, 20, 23, Lance, US surface-to-surface missile, 28–32, 34, 42–43, 45–46, 48, 218, 240, 244 50–51, 55, 63–65, 70, 74–75, 80, Lawrence Livermore National 94, 96, 110, 130, 173, 175, 179, Laboratory, 7, 24 195, 204–205, 212–213, 219, 232, Lawson, Nigel, 117 237, 239, 243, 248, 291 Leach, Adm Henry, 171 see also Director General Intelligence Leber, Georg, West German Defence (DGI); Joint Intelligence Minister, 84 Committee (JIC); KGB; Satellite Leningrad, 35, 49 Intelligence Lewin, Adm Terence, 127, 162, 178–179, Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile 269, 288 (ICBM), 84, 114, 171, 206, 242, 245 Lib/Lab Pact, 12 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty Lockheed, US aerospace company, 7, (INF), 215, 224–225, 243–244 106, 108–109, 131, 192, 248 Intermediate-range ballistic missile/s Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (IRBM), 1, 9, 203, 206, 209, 235 (LRTNF), see North Atlantic Irish Sea, 50, 121 Treaty Organisation Italy, 143, 208, 215, 220, 292 Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP), 85, 88, 92 Jabiru, see Chevaline Los Alamos, US nuclear-weapons Jackson, Henry ‘Scoop’, US Senator, 68 laboratory, 7 Jaguar, UK ground attack aircraft, 84, 244 Luns, Joseph, NATO Secretary General, Japan, 58 212, 291 Joint Chiefs of Staff, US, 138 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), M-4, French SLBM, 46, 53, 62, 67, 130, 13–14, 20, 32, 34, 38, 41, 43, 70, 142, 256 152 Macklen, Victor, UK nuclear scientist, Jones, Mathew, 266 25–26, 42, 97, 103, 164, 252 Jones, Nate, 212 Macmillan, Harold, former Jones, Peter, AWRE/AWE Chief Conservative Prime Minister, 7, Engineer, 18, 102 65, 137, 151, 232 Joint Working Group (JOWOG), 7, 155 Malone, Peter, 32, 152, 229 Mason, Roy, UK Defence Secretary, 2, KAL 007 (South Korean airliner), 243 14, 17, 19, 31, 34, 82–83 Kennedy, John F., former US President, McDonald, Ian, UK MoD official, 141 151 McFarlane, Robert ‘Bud’, US official, 192 KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy McInnes, Colin, 200, 275, 278, 289 bezopasnosti), 212–213, 291 MDA, see Mutual Defence Agreement Kiev, 35, 49 Mearsheimer, John, 297 Index 317

Mediterranean Sea, 14–15, 31, 295 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA), 7, Medium Range Ballistic Missile 61, 95, 112–113, 119, 122, 131, (MRBM), 204, 206, 209 135, 152, 155, 188, 230, 232, 285 Metcalf, Steve, UK nuclear scientist, 107, MX Peacekeeper ICBM, 171, 216, 282 251 Middle East, 59, 80 Nassau Agreement, 141, 144, 194, 233 MI5, 223 see also Supreme National Interest Mildenhall Agreement, 122, 269 Clause Milliband, Ed, 246 NAST 1231, 164, 281 Minsk, 49 National Retaliatory War Plan (NRWP), Moberly, Patrick, UK official, 124–125, 13, 94, 152, 233, 244 231 National Security Council (NSC), 89, Molesworth, RAF/USAF airbase, 236 119, 125, 136 Montebello, NATO summit, 291 neutron bomb/radiation, 10, 76–77, 85, Moore, Charles, 137, 148, 268, 288 90, 92–93, 204, 206–207, 224, Moore, Richard, 284 235, 260 Morality, 50, 57, 83, 149, 229–230, 232 Nevada, US nuclear test site, 24, 97, 234 MORI, 218 Newbury, 222 Moscow, 205, 212–213, 215, 223, 237, Nike Hercules, US SAM, 79 239, 243, 253, 271, 274 Nitze, Paul, US official, 222, 244 Moscow Criterion, 94–95, 98, 109, Nixon, Richard (US President), 81 111–114, 116, 122, 128–191, 131, non-nuclear weapons state, 43, 55, 58 146, 152, 157, 160, 166, 169, 175, non-proliferation, 1, 55, 59, 190, 229, 177, 188, 198, 200, 227–228, 230, 268 279 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 59, 142, see also nuclear targeting 154, 183 Moscow Olympics boycott, 213 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Mottram, Richard, UK official, 41, 97, (NATO), 7, 9, 35–36, 41, 43, 130, 257 57–58, 60, 63, 66, 75, 80, 95, Mulley, Fred, UK Defence Secretary, 100, 109, 113–114, 119, 121, 2–3, 18, 20–21, 25–30, 34, 37, 128–129, 131–132, 137, 139–141, 46, 66, 70, 73, 75, 82–84, 235, 143–145, 147–148, 153, 175, 241, 261 178–179, 183, 189–190, 193, 198, multilateralism, 7, 12, 76, 145, 216 201, 232–233, 241, 243–245, 267, multilateral force, 44, 255 289, 291 multiple independently targetable estimates of Warsaw Pact strength, 9, re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), 10, 78–79, 81, 85, 89, 203, 212, 235, 30–31, 35, 41, 46, 50, 53, 62, 67, 245 70, 72, 97, 100, 106, 114, 122–127, Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces 130–131, 134, 138, 144, 152, (LRTNF), 1, 9–10, 19, 55, 57–59, 154, 157, 159, 166, 170, 176–177, 76–93, 126, 128–129, 131–132, 182–183, 203–227, 230, 245, 256, 139–140, 144, 147, 160, 179, 185, 286 203–226 multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs), 35, MC 14/3, NATO strategy of Flexible 46, 122–124, 126 Response, 10, 45, 48–49, 54, 56, Murphy-Dean Agreement (1958), 44, 79, 83–85, 91–92, 127, 170, 188, 218–221, 237–238, 241, 294 204–205, 224–225, 235–236, 238, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 245 (MBFR), 42, 76, 79, 211, 236 MC 48/MC 14/2, NATO strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 89 Massive Retaliation, 78–79, 170 318 Index

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nunn Amendment, 82, 261 (NATO) – continued North Atlantic Council, 80, 91 Odom, William, US General, 235 studies of follow-on use, 78, 81, Ohio, US SSBN, 52–53, 160, 163, 169, 235 see also Athens Guidelines, 176–178, 181, 183–184, 199, 245 Atomic Demolition Munitions see also Trident (ADMs), Central front, Dual track operational requirements (OR), 6, 233 decision, Dual track deployment, Operational Requirements Committee Enhanced Radiation Weapons, (ORC), 156 Escalation Control, Euro-strategic Ordnance Board, 130 balance, European Theatre, Ottawa declaration, 114 Neutron bomb, Nuclear Planning Ottawa NPG meeting, 83, 171 Group (NPG), Polaris/Trident Owen, David, 3, 8–9, 18, 20, 26–28, commitment to NATO, SACEUR, 30, 32, 34, 36–38, 46–49, 51–52, SS-20, Warsaw Pact, WINTEX 59–60, 64–66, 68, 70–71, 73–74, Northwood, 241 87, 101, 150, 252, 267 Nott, John, 4–5, 99, 102, 113, 139, 143, 148–150, 163, 168, 170–175, Pakistan, 268 178–181, 183–184, 186, 191, Palliser, Michael, UK FCO official, 38 193–194, 196–201, 214–217, 223, Panton, Frank, UK nuclear scientist, 231, 237, 243, 277, 283–284 103, 227 nuclear fission, 18, 24, 77 parliament, UK, 2–3, 12, 17, 19, 27–28, nuclear football, 242 31, 40, 54, 100–101, 104–105, see also command and control 110 –111, 139, 141, 143–144, nuclear fusion, 77, 164 148–151, 153, 189, 196, 201–202, nuclear howitzer, 244 213–214, 216, 218, 220–222, 227, Nuclear Matters Working Party 230, 233, 237, 256, 276, 284 (NMWP), see Duff-Mason Report PD-59, 89–90 Nuclear Operations Plan (NOP), 81, 208 Pearle, Richard, US official, 90 Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 79, Pebble, 242 81–84, 86, 90, 145, 205–206, 216 penetration aids (for missiles), 12–13, nuclear propulsion and reactors, 36, 48, 22–23, 98, 100, 105–106, 124, 52, 61, 65, 75, 98, 121, 123–124, 154–155, 158–159, 166, 226–227, 159–161, 168, 178, 181–182, 184, 230, 250, 279 195–196, 279, 285 see also ABMs; Chevaline; decoys; see also SSN Super Antelope nuclear release procedures, 80, 115–117, Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC), 12, 18, 133, 218, 239–242 22, 98–99, 106, 227, 250–251 see also Command and control; Crisis Pentagon, 171, 191 management; Northwood; Perry, William, US official, 119 nuclear sharing, 203, 206 Pershing, US surface-to-surface missile, nuclear targets and targeting, 10, 37, 92, 211 109, 127, 146, 152, 175, 234 Pershing II, US surface-to-surface see also damage criteria, Moscow missile, 16, 82, 92, 179–180, 185, Criterion 188, 204, 206, 209, 211, 214, nuclear testing, British, 27, 163–166 216–217, 223–224, 236–238 see also individual test series – Plessey, 234 Anvil (Banon), Cresset (Fondutta), Pochin Report, 252–253 Dicel Post, Quicksilver (Nessel), Podvig, Pavel, 15, 109, 245 Quicksilver (Quargel) Poland, 88 Index 319

Polaris, US/UK submarine-launched Quicksilver (Nessel), 25–26, 251 ballistic missile, 1–2, 7, 10–12, Quicksilver (Quargel), 25, 29 14, 16–19, 21–22, 25–29, 32, 34, Quinlan, Michael, UK MoD official, 36–37, 43, 51, 54–55, 57, 72–73, 5, 8, 38, 41, 56, 82–85, 89–92, 87–88, 91, 93–101, 103, 105, 94–95, 105–106, 124–125, 139, 112–114, 118, 120–123, 125–127, 141–142, 146, 152, 161–162, 204, 129, 131–135, 138, 144, 146–147, 230–231, 236, 257, 262, 271, 275, 150–153, 155, 158–163, 165, 169, 288, 290 177, 183, 187–190, 192, 195–200, 205, 207–209, 226–228, 230–234, RAF Germany, 244 236, 240–242, 245 RAF Strike Command, 240–241 A-4, 53, 64, 70–71, 118–119, 123, 126, Reagan, Ronald, US President, 10 130–131, 150–151, 160, 268 ‘Evil Empire’ speech, 223, 243 commitment to NATO, 1, 95, 119, 144, morality of nuclear weapons, 232 203, 207–208, 244 negotiations for Trident D-5, 10, life extension, 30–31, 45, 48, 50, 52–53, 90, 149, 166, 170–172, 178–179, 65–67, 106–109, 180, 182–185 184–185, 191–192, 196, 199–200, re-motoring, 60, 62, 69, 97, 108–109, 223, 231 131, 168, 171, 173–174, 177, 184, nuclear arms control and ‘Zero 199, 282 option’, 214, 219, 222, 237 see also Chevaline, Trident nuclear sharing arrangements with Polaris Sales Agreement, 7, 61, 95, the UK, 217–219 112–113, 118–119, 122, 131, relationship with Margaret Thatcher, 134–136, 147, 151–152, 154–155, 168, 179, 243, 283 160, 165, 194, 196, 182, 199, 230, Strategic Defence Initiative, 242 234, 278 strategic modernisation programme, see also command and control; 218–219, 282 Chevaline; Nassau Agreement; Trident views of the Soviet Union, 223, 237, 243 Politburo, 212, 237, 242 Reykjavik, 243–244, 299 Poseidon, US submarine-launched ROF (Royal Ordnance Factories), 7, 98, 156 ballistic missile, 7, 25–26, 30, 46, Rogers, Bill, 145 50, 52, 81–82, 84, 103, 109, 123, Rose, Clive, 30, 38, 41, 43, 70–72, 74, 130–131, 160, 163, 205, 241, 251 115–118, 127 Powell, Charles, UK official, 201, 224, 243 Rosenberg, David A., 6 Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), 235 Rosyth, 53, 130–131 primary, thermonuclear, 18, 251 Royal Aeronautical Society, 21, 110, 226 proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1, 26, Royal Aircraft Establishment 50, 55, 59, 189–190, 229, 233, Farnborough (RAE), 13, 21, 156, 245, 268 158, 166, 177, 227, 229, 251 Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs), Royal Air Force (RAF), 19, 43, 45, 120, 235 157, 172, 177, 187, 2 0 0, 2 07–2 0 8, Public Expenditure Survey Committee, 215, 220, 237, 240–241, 244, 256 13, 15 see also individual aircraft and Pym, Francis, 5, 97–101, 115, 117, 124–127, weapons 133, 136 –139, 141–145, 148–149, Royal Navy, 13, 31, 51–52, 62, 64, 99, 151, 156, 161–162, 164, 187, 200, 103, 110, 113–114, 121, 130, 154, 207, 210, 215–218, 243, 296 161, 171, 178, 186, 196, 200, 226, Pyne, Kate, 13, 18, 22–24, 250, 253, 264 244–245 see also individual ships, aircraft and Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), 79, 81–82, 120 weapons 320 Index

Rumsfeld, Donald, US official, 82–83 Special Branch, 223 Russia, see Soviet Union Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), 97, RYaN (Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie), 135, 147, 163, 274 212–213, 237, 243 Sprint, US ABM, 28 Sprintski, Soviet ABM, 28, 96 SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Spohr-Readman, Kristina, 261 Europe), 35, 58, 83–84, 86, 95, SS-4, Soviet land based missile, 213 161, 205–206, 208, 220–221, 244 SS-5, Soviet land based missile, 213 see also commitment of UK nuclear SS-20, Soviet land based missile, 1, 9, 75, forces to, 77, 82, 84–87, 91–93, 203–205, Nuclear Operations Plan 208, 210–211, 213, 223–225, SAM (surface-to-air missiles), 120 235–236, 238, 243–245 Sandia, US nuclear laboratory, 7 SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile Satellite Intelligence (SATINT), 96, 109, submarine), 10, 36–37, 48, 50–53, 195, 211, 227 62, 65, 67, 84, 95, 97–98, 105, 109, Schlesinger, James, US Defense 114, 118, 120–122, 160–161, 163, Secretary, 79, 81 168–169, 171, 175–176, 178, 181, Schmidt, Helmut, West German 183–184, 193–194, 198, 205, 208, Chancellor, 2, 68–69, 82–83, 218, 220, 228, 230, 233–234, 241, 90–93, 143, 204–205, 235, 237, 274 245–246, 254, 282, 288 Scotland, 50, 171, 182, 191, 197, 201 SSN (nuclear hunter-killer submarine), Scott, David, 45, 53 36, 48, 50–52, 62–67, 121, 161, Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), 178, 182, 254 51–52, 62–63, 68, 71, 118–121, St John Stevas, Norman, UK politician, 160, 165–166, 178–180, 182, 185 148 second centre of decision, 1, 43–45, 49, Stalin, 129 55, 58, 64, 76, 91, 114, 138, 152, Stasi, 212–213 206, 208, 234 State Department, US, 119, 122, see also Duff-Mason Report 124–125, 154, 191, 213, 220, 275 second strike, 175 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 241 see also Duff-Mason Report Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT Second World War see World War II, I/II), 20, 30, 35–36, 40, 42–43, secrecy, 6–7, 12, 26–27, 31–32, 70–71, 45, 59, 61, 68, 70, 76, 79, 83, 86, 73, 101–104, 113, 125, 132, 139, 90–93, 116–119, 125, 132–136, 143, 147, 151, 153, 192, 195, 227, 140, 147, 161, 183, 208, 210–213, 240–241, 249, 254, 276 215, 219, 236, 244 Senate, see Congress Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Shaw, Ian, UK MoD official, 78 223–224, 242–243, 294 Schultz, George, US politician, 217 Strathclyde, 171 Silken, John, 197 Staveley, William, 173 Sino-Soviet split, 66 Stingray torpedo, 184 SIOP (Single Integrated Operational Su-24 ‘Fencer’, Soviet fighter-bomber, 208 Plan), US, 79, 82 sub-harpoon missile, 48, 51 see also nuclear targeting Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile/s Slocombe, Walter, 119, 141, 263 (SLBMs), 25, 36–37, 40, 80–82, Soper, Donald, 238 84, 97, 114, 121–123, 178, 185, SOSUS, 121 206, 226 Soviet Union, see USSR, Submarine Launched Cruise Missile, SSPO (Strategic Systems Projects Office), 51–52, 62–63, 68, 71, 118–121, US Navy, 154–155, 157, 163, 173 160, 165–166, 178–180, 182 Index 321 sub-strategic targeting, 83, 87–88, 161, negotiations for Trident D-5, 168–202, 203, 206, 224, 238, 280 231–232, 288 Super Antelope (UK Polaris personality and leadership style, modification), 226 3–6, 174, 192, 200–201, 218–219, superpowers, 11, 16, 20, 37, 45, 56, 63, 224, 231–233, 239, 242–243, 78–79, 84, 113, 127–128, 147, 210, 277 217, 225, 235–236, 243–244 relationship with Jimmy Carter, 118, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 134 (SACLANT), 86, 172, 244 relationship with Ronald Reagan, supreme national interest clause, 147, 168, 191, 199, 218–219, 222, 194, 232 242, 282 relationship with senior ministers, tactical nuclear weapons, 43, 48, 78–79, 3–5, 116, 141, 147–148, 174, 186, 82–83, 93, 114, 204, 208–209, 215 216, 235–236, 240, 281 relationship with the civil service, 6, see also Central Front; NATO; 136–137, 174, 184–186 European theatre, Euro-strategic secrecy, 115, 141–145, 151, 241–242, balance and individual weapons 244, 268, 277 Tebbit, Kevin, UK MoD official, 230 special relationship, 179, 214, TERrain COntour Matching (TERCOM), 218–219–223, 242–243, 282 36, 86, 88, 120, 127, 166 Thatcherism, 3–5 see also Ground Launched Cruise Thatcherite, 149 Missiles (GLCMs) Trident C-4 and D-5 announcements, Thames Valley Police, 221 143–145, 149–150, 194–197, 199, Thatcher, Margaret, British Prime 244, 275 Minister, views of nuclear deterrence, 112, 179, Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, 204, 207, 210, 223–224, 231–232, 117, 134 242–243, 277 arms control, 118, 219, 222–224, views of the Soviet Union, 1, 139, 179, 236–237 205, 211, 213, 237, 242 Cabinet deliberations, 141, 143, views of the US, 210, 217–219, 151–152, 165, 184, 191–195, 200, 221–223, 242 244 Wade–Gery negotiations, 124–125, Callaghan’s Polaris replacement file, 136–138, 191–192 115, 150 Wets, 149 Chevaline, 9, 32, 73, 93, 95–96, Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF), 45, 59, 98–99, 104, 112, 151, 228 80–82, 84, 91–92, 113, 116, 119, Duff-Mason Report, 61, 116–144, 150 125, 132, 143, 157, 164, 185, 203, dual track deployment, 1, 144, 147, 208, 210–211, 213, 223, 228, 236, 203–205, 207, 210, 213, 215–224, 257, 281, 290 237 see also North Atlantic Treaty intelligence assessments and Organisation (NATO) Long-Range briefings, 130, 204–205, 237 Theatre Nuclear Forces MISC 7/Restricted Group The Netherlands, 136, 216, 236 deliberations, 97, 115–117, Thor MRBM, 204, 218, 221, 206 138–139, 141–144, 151, 183, Tigerfish torpedo, 177 187–188, 191, 199, 221, 232–233 Tomahawk cruise missile, see SLCM negotiations for Trident C-4, 10, 36, Tornado, multirole aircraft, 51, 85, 88, 94, 111, 115, 124–125, 132–150, 190, 206–209, 236 165, 230, 296 Trafalgar Class submarine, 168, 199 322 Index treasury, 5, 18, 27, 38, 42–43, 45, 74, 59, 63, 66–67, 69, 71–72, 74–77, 102, 133, 137, 149, 169, 174, 79, 82–83, 86–87, 89–90, 92, 95, 186–187, 192–193, 199, 227, 269, 100, 106, 110, 112–113, 115–116, 288 118–121, 129, 133, 135, 138, 140, Trenchard, Thomas, 186–187 143–144, 146 –155, 158, 164, 168, Trend, Burke, former UK Cabinet 182, 194–196, 199, 201, 203, 208, Secretary, 67 212, 216, 221, 223, 228, 232, 234, Trident, US SLBM, 238, 240, 245, 253 C-4, 10, 46, 50, 52–53, 62, 67–68, see also individual US persons; 70–72, 74, 75, 107, 109, 112, departments, armed services; 116–119, 122–127, 129–134, 136, ships; aircraft and weapons 138, 147, 150, 153, 157–163, United States Navy (USN), 52, 65–66, 166–176, 178, 180–182, 185–188, 163, 201 191–193, 196, 199, 201, 226, 229 Ural mountains, 32, 175, 177, 228 costs, 62, 107, 117, 123, 138–144, US–French nuclear weapons 158, 160–161, 171, 173, 178, cooperation, 119, 122 182, 186, 191–193, 229–231, US–Soviet relations, 38, 66, 210 243, 279, 285 USSR, 4, 8, 10–11, 14, 23, 28, 30–31, flat-top variant, 158 35, 37, 42, 44–46, 48–49, 54–60, number of warheads, 130–131, 63–64, 67, 69, 74, 77, 79, 81–84, 157–159, 161 87–90, 92, 94, 100–101, 104, number of submarines and UK 109–110, 118, 120–121, 128–129, SSBN build options, 50, 52–53, 135, 145, 147, 157, 159, 175, 177, 62, 126–127, 133–134, 158, 160, 182, 188, 195, 203–209, 211–213, 166, 169–176, 178, 180–182, 230 216, 219, 222–224, 227–228, 230, warhead, 123, 134, 140, 147, 158, 236–237, 242–244, 253, 291 175, 182, 251 D-5, 10, 46, 52–53, 62, 108–109, Van Agt, Dries (Dutch Prime Minister), 123–124, 130–131, 158–160, 166, 211 168–202, 226, 231–232, 243, 245, Vance, Cyrus, 117, 126 282, 288 Vanguard class submarine, 108, 245–246 costs, 162, 170–181, 186, 190–197, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, 157, 164 199, 200–201, 231 Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, 173 number and type of warheads, 175, Vickers, 52, 178, 234 182, 245, 251 Vietnam War, 204, 273 number of submarines and UK SSBN Vladivostok Accords, 31, 35, 175 build options, 160, 170–178, Vulcan, medium bomber aircraft, 51, 179–184, 186–191, 195–197, 199, 57, 84–85, 88, 126, 203, 205–206, 245 208–209 Kings Bay decision, 171, 179, 182, 189, 197–199, 231 W-58, US warhead, 18 Tritium, 284 Wade-Gery, Robert, UK official, see also Special Nuclear Materials 124–125, 132, 136, 138, 140, 142, Truman–Churchill understanding 171, 192–193, 229, 231 (1952), 218, 220, 223, 237, 240 Walden, Brian, 217 Tuzo, Harry, 80 Waldergrave, William, 4 Walney Channel, 52 United Nations, 197 war-fighting, 77–78, 83 United States, 1–2, 6–7, 14, 30, 32–33, war-termination, 146, 224, 238 36–37, 39–40, 42–43, 52–56, 58, war-winning, 56, 127 Index 323

Warsaw Pact, 10, 43, 56, 76, 78–79, Whitehall, 9, 45, 73, 89, 97, 103–104, 81, 84–85, 87, 89, 128, 203–204, 114, 130, 137, 155, 168, 241, 243 206, 209, 212, 224, 230, 235, Whitelaw, Willie, 5, 115–116, 142, 221 238, 245 Whitmore, Clive, UK official, 4, 38, 117, Washington, 9, 18, 30, 70–72, 80–81, 268 93, 116–117, 124–127, 136, 138, Wigley, Dafydd, 222 141, 155, 191–193, 216, 220, 232 Wilson, Harold, former Labour Prime Wass, Douglas, UK official, 38, 192, 269 Minister, 2–3, 9, 12, 32, 67, 70, Watergate, 81 103, 116, 151, 226 WE-177, 157, 164, 172, 187, 204, 209, WINTEX, NATO exercise, 82, 289 244 Woomera, 21–23, 250 Westcott, 23, 227 World War III, 78, 236–237 West Germany, 2, 16, 45, 55, 57–58, 76, Wright–Eagleburger Agreement (1983), 82, 85, 88, 90–91, 114, 116, 201, 241 204–206, 208, 212–213, 215–216, 222–224, 235, 237–238, 241, 244, 274 Younger, George, 191 Weinberger, Caspar, 171–172, 182, 199, 201 Zuckerman, Sir Solly, former MoD/ Westminster, 9 Government chief scientist, 47