Ground crewmen bring a British RAF Command Vulcan V-bomber to a high state of readiness. In case of nuclear war of the British V-force would likely spearhead any retaliatory attack. Vuleans, the world's largest delta. wing bombers, carry either conventional or nuclear internally and one standoff weapon externally.

Although there are some misgivings about the future, today's British RAF Bomber Command is decidedly a viable force for the 1960s. Here is a report on the powerful capabilities of the 's nuclear aerospace force . . . SAC'S KISSING COUSINS

HE officer commanding, seated in the War Room of his operational control center, reached for the T red phone and spoke an order into it which ener- gized his widely dispersed command. The order was a single word—Scramble! A small but superbly trained band of men sprang into action. With machine precision, they raced By Richard Clayton Peet through prescribed checkout procedures, preparing their planes for flight. Jet engines began their roar. Seconds later, hundreds of aircraft were on the roll. In less than two minutes, a giant nuclear retaliatory armada was airborne. Most Americans would immediately conclude that the situation described was taking place in our own . We have become accustomed

28 AIR FORCE Magazine • January 1964 Sir , Bomber Commander CinC, credits Valiant, first V-bomber, today is used primarily as a tanker. technical innovation and high crew proficiency with Here a Valiant refuels one of the Vulcans that made the first keeping Bomber Command a viable force in the 1960s. nonstop flight of 11,500 miles from UK to Australia in 1961.

to thinking in terms of SAC alone in the retaliatory gram to develop its own strategic medium bombers. role. We overlook the fact that, in the event of actual The result was the V-bomber force of Valiants, Victors, nuclear hostilities, the first manned strike on Soviet and Vulcans which became operational in the mid- defenses will likely be spearheaded by someone else. 1950s. Preceding SAC and its B-52s, and perhaps even blast- First of the series was the Entering ing a path for it, will be the V-bomber force of the squadron service in 1955, it was a Valiant that carried BAF—SAC's kissing cousin—Bomber Command. Britain's first air-dropped A- and H-bombs. Because Kissing cousin is an apt term for the relationship be- of its lower performance it was phased out of the strike n these two elite organizations. There is a corn- role some time ago, although it continues to render n, almost religious, bond between them. They train yeoman service as an aerial tanker and also serves as together, compete together, target together, and, if a tactical bomber for NATO. need together be, are prepared to die togeer in the perform- Next came the Vulcan, the world's first large bomber ance of their joint mission. Both firmly believe, how- of deltawing configuration. Manufactured by , ever, that so long as a credible deterrent and the will the Vulcan B.1 entered squadron service in 1957 with to utilize it in defense of freedom are maintained by the B.2 following along in 1960. the West, the danger of nuclear conflagration is re- Third of the V-bombers was the Vic- mote. In this sense, peace is truly their shared pro- tor. It became operational in 1959 with its B.2 model fession. entering service in 1962. It was the biggest and heavi- Bomber Command was assigned its deterrent role est, as well as the last, of the series. Victor features a in 1957. A Defense White Paper issued that year an- readily identifiable crescent or cusp-shaped wing. tounced, "Britain must possess an appreciable element The average radius of action of the V-bombers is of nuclear deterrent power of her own." beyond 1,500 nautical miles without in-flight refuel- Up until then, she had none. Though her scientists ing. This brings them within range of seventy percent bad made significant early contributions to atomic of the important targets in the USSR, including most theory (it was an Englishman who first split the atom) cities with more than 100,000 population. and had cooperated closely with scientists of this Currently, the Mark I series of Victors and Vulcans I . country in the development of the original atomic is being replaced by more advanced models. New , Britain did not embark on her own nuclear- from the ground up and equipped with more powerful weapons program until 1949. Progress thereafter was engines, the Mark 2 versions boost over-all perform- lit, however. On October 3, 1952, the British con- ance significantly. They are more maneuverable and ted their first atomic tests in the Monte Bello can fly higher ( as high as a U-2) and faster than our ds, off Australia, and on October 11, 1956, the own B-52s. air-dropped Britain's first operational atomic Originally designed to carry free-falling bombs, the b over Maralinga, Southern Australia. And, a few V-force is in the process of transition to the Blue Steel ths later, on May 15, 1957, Britain successfully standoff air-to-surface . With a nuclear warhead d her first H-bomb over Christmas Island in the in the megaton range, Blue Steel enables launching • C. aircraft to attack targets without having to penetrate ut bombs alone do not make a deterrent. Effective the close defenses surrounding them. Inertially guided, ery systems are also required. Knowing this, the Blue Steel's liquid-fueled propels it at 'sh government embarked upon a concurrent pro- (Continued on following page)

RCE Magazine • January 1964 29

Avro Vuleans. In time of international crisis, Bomber Biggest and heaviest of the V-bombers is Victor, charac- Command's entire V-force would be dispersed to the more terized by crescent-shaped wing. Like Vulcan, it carries than fifty operational-readiness bases throughout the UK. either nuclear or conventional bombs or Blue Steel missile. SAC's KISSING COUSINS

more than twice the speed of sound. Range has not As with SAC, a portion of the V-force is always on been released but is said to be in the neighborhood Quick Reaction Alert. It can be scrambled in a matter of 150 miles. of minutes. Additionally, the flexibility of the readiness Is today's Bomber Command a viable force in the plan enables the AO CinC to quickly bring his whole 1960s? command, or any part of it, to full alert condition. An "Decidedly," asserts its new boss, Air Officer Com- immediate-link system enables him to communicate manding in Chief, Sir John Grandy. The directly with crews on the ground or in the air. In Air Marshal's confidence appears to be solidly based. times of rising international tension, the entire V-force Through technical innovation and advance and a tre- can be scattered to bases throughout the United King- mendously high state of crew proficiency, both ground dom. More than fifty of these bases are in a state of and air, Bomber Command has kept its V-force of 180 operational readiness. Such dispersal would pose se- of the world's most modern aircraft at least one step vere targeting problems for a nuclear aggressor. ahead of its competition. That is all it needs to be to No more than four bombers would be assigned to perform its mission. any one base. The sites themselves are designed with From its ipception, Bomber Command built with survivability in mind. Aircraft are stationed on Oper- viability in mind. "If the deterrent influence of the ational Readiness Platforms directly adjacent to run- bomber force is to be effective," declared the Defense ways which eliminates taxiing delays. Aircrews are White Paper of 1958, "it must not be thought capable housed in caravans ( trailers ) nearby. In times of crisis, of being knocked out on the ground." Acutely aware crews are stationed at cockpit readiness. All four jet of its vulnerability, British planners concentrated on engines on V-bombers can be started simultaneously. the problem of keeping the V-force alive in the event Ground, servicing equipment automatically falls away of hostilities. as aircraft begin to roll. These features, plus tremen- Their thinking proceeded on certain assumptions. dous aircrew proficiency, enable Bomber Command to The chief of these was that, in the event of nuclear react with remarkable agility. Its average four-element attack, the United Kingdom would not be the only scramble time in 1963 was one minute, thirty seconds. target. The US would also be assaulted. Interdepend- The V-bomber retaliatory force, which incidentally ence in this sense was taken for granted. can deliver conventional as well as nuclear weapons, Accordingly, joint procedures have been worked out was assigned to SACEUR ( Supreme Allied Com- to ensure that the retaliatory forces of both nations mander, Europe) in May 1963. Although national con- survive even a surprise nuclear assault. Although it is trol in peacetime is still maintained by Britain, the V- deemed highly unlikely that one could be launched force in the event of war will follow SACEUR's nuclear, without prior warning from political or intelligence strike plan. After seeing his new command on exercise sources, such a possibility has been taken into account. in Britain not long ago, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer called An elaborate electronic warning network has been his visit "a very impressive experience." constructed around the periphery of the USSR. Bomber Command's ability to reach the targets as- BMEWS, the DEW Line, and other early-warning de- signed it is equally impressive. To get there, it has a vices assure both nations tactical warning of atomic number of extremely difficult penetration problems to attack. A minimum of four to eight minutes notice, surmount—an elaborate early-warning net, an abun- perhaps as much as fifteen, will be provided Britain by dance of day fighters and all-weather interceptors the system. For Bomber Command, that will be enough. armed with air-to-air , ground-to-air antiair-

30 AIR FORCE Magazine • January 1964 The principal arma- ment of V-force is the Blue Steel standoff, air- to-surface missile, which is guided inertially, has megaton-range warhead.

The TSR-2 is scheduled for rollout early this year. Its highly sophisticated elec- ironic systems will enable it to hug the ground at high speed and in total darkness.

Artist's conception of TSR-2 in flight shows sleek lines of the new jet, which will be able to fly at either Mach 2 at 60,000 feet on, at close to Mach 1 at ground level.

CONTINUED

craft missiles in profusion, plus the system of tactical platform made it a near perfect weapon for the RAF. controls which coordinates the lot. In typical fashion, It could even be launched from points over Britain it- it has set about finding counters for each. It has come self. There was a possibility that Skybolt would be up with a mixed bag of Electronic Countermeasures wedded to a military version of the VC-10 long-range (ECM) calculated to confuse, upset, jam, or neutralize jet transport. Six missiles were to be carried by each the defensive forces unleashed against it. Every V- aircraft. A fleet of thirty VC-10s were to be procured. bomber is equipped with ECM devices. So powerful The plan was for one-third of them to be airborne at is some of the equipment that the RAF has never been all times. This would have brought Bomber Command permitted to turn them all on at one time in any exer- close to its ideal of an invulnerable deterrent. cise over for fear of causing a total communi- For these reasons, the RAF could not have been cations blackout. keener on Slcybolt. Its cancellation was a severe blow. Other devices relied upon to assist target penetra- Skybolt was only one of a series of disappointing tion include evasive routing of strike aircraft, the Blue decisions in recent years which tend to cloud the fu- Steel standoff weapon, the disruptive effect that would ture of the British deterrent. The Statement of Defense be wrought on Russian defenses by US ICBMs, and, in 1957 was the kickoff. It dashed RAF hopes to de- st but certainly not least, retaliation from the deck up. velop a supersonic bomber by substituting in its stead Both SAC and Bomber Command have turned to the missile. In 1960, Blue Streak, too, was e multilevel pattern as Russian defenses against the canceled (partly, it is speculated, because of the

- gh-level attack have improved. By coming in with a Slcybolt deal, executed that year, with the United rtion of their force at extremely low altitudes, they States). The final blow in the series occurred at Nassau. pc to underfly Soviet early-warning . But hot- But Britain is not out of the deterrent business— dding Vulcans, Victors, and B-52s--which were de- not by a long shot. Scheduled to roll out early this year gned to fly at 50,000 feet and higher—at 500 feet and is a new aircraft, the TSR-2. wer is not without its problems. Fatigue increases Designed to penetrate at ground level so as to skim arkedly. Extensive structural beefing-up of all three under enemy radar, the TSR-2 is powered by two craft has been required. Bristol Siddeley Olympus with each develop- Air Marshal Grandy says, "Penetration by aircraft ing 33,000 pounds of thrust. These are the same en- of Bomber Command of areas covered by the most gines that will be used in the Anglo-French Concorde odem and sophisticated air-defense systems could SST. Possessing a short-field capability, TSR-2 will be t be successfully prevented." able to fly at more than twice the speed of sound at of how long will this ability last? altitude ( 60,000 feet) and at close to Mach 1 on the e immediate outlook is good. A new, longer- deck. A sophisticated electronics system will enable it e, low-level version of Blue Steel is in the works. to hug the ground at high speeds in total darkness. hould push viability beyond the mid-1960s. And Armament will consist of a short-range nuclear guided was the time the Skybolt was due to take its missile carried internally. ace in the lineup. Announced ferry range is several thousand miles Slated to be carried by the Vulcan ( one slung under without in-flight refueling. Range at low level has not each wing), Skybolt would have constituted a been released. It is a safe bet, however, that despite addition to the British deterrent. Its 1,000-mile range the fact that fuel consumption is reputed to be less from a highly mobile, nearly undetectable launching (Continued on following page)

AIR FORCE Magazine • January 1964 31 SAC's KISSING COUSINS CONTINUED than in comparable engines, the range penalty for low- "Polaris became operational in 1960. It will be ex- level operations will be severe. The radius of opera- traordinary if, in this age of rapid fire technology, it is tions on such missions is not expected to exceed 1,000 able to survive a decade without an effective counter . nautical miles. "All through history, for each new weapons devel- The TSR-2 gives promise of being a highly versatile opment, a successful counter has been found. I cannot weapon system. While its initials indicate its mission bring myself to believe that the development of Polaris is Tactical Strike/Reconnaissance, it is capable of signaled the end of history." another role. This was described by the Secretary of Some Polaris detractors even question its viability State for Air, Sir Hugh Fraser, in a recent speech: today. Patrick Gordon Walker, the Labor Party's "With its long range it can be employed, if need be, shadow , has described it as "a small, to attack strategic targets. Thus, the TSR-2 will not second-strike weapon." It is relatively inaccurate, he only help to close the so-called gap before the arrival claims, and "wholly inadequate" as the backbone of in service of Polaris , but, when the sub- Britain's deterrent force. marines are on station, it will be a most useful supple- Other critics point out that, since the seas are free ment for them in the deterrent role." and open to everyone, nothing could stop an aggress° Current plans call for the procurement of a mini- from dispatching a fleet of killer subs to lie in wait at mum of fifty aircraft. harbor entrances where Polaris submarines are serv - The emergence of the TSR-2 as a strategic-delivery iced. When they put to sea, they could be followed system has been followed with great interest in NATO While nuclear subs would be required for the job, the circles. A "growing belief" is reported to exist that awkward Polaris subs' shape assures that killers would TSR-2s could form the nucleus of a far better MLF have little trouble keeping up with them. than the vaunted but vulnerable Polaris surface fleet. Even in peacetime, one or two vessels could be di Beyond TSR-2, prospects for Bomber Command posed of in this fashion. Who could question the look grim. At present, no successor aircraft are planned. disappearance? Who knows how the Thresher w British thinking on manned systems in recent years lost? And you can't start a nuclear war on suspicio has closely paralleled our own. A fascination with alone. Yet the loss of just two submarines in this way missiles as an end-all in weaponry has prevailed. But they point out, would constitute the loss of half just as over here, this outlook is slowly changing. British deterrent. There is a growing awareness that we may have These arguments and others like them have open jumped the gun in eliminating man from the strategic- up Pandora's box. Opponents have seized upon the weapons picture. Increasingly, the view expressed by to call into question the whole future of British deter Air Marshal Grandy that "there will always be a future rence. Some urge that the nuclear arsenal be scrapp for manned aircraft" is gaining acceptance. His reason- immediately. Others, while more reasonable in the ing that only manned systems provide the "degree of criticism, profess to see no future at all for the UK flexibility, discretion, choice of target and accuracy" the deterrent game. needed in today's strategic arsenal has begun to make Unfortunately, the controversy has been inject sense to even the most enamored of missile men. into politics. A Parliamentary election must be hel And so, after a hiatus of several years, new manned sometime this year. As the campaign warms up, it a systems are being seriously discussed again on both pears that one of the most important issues, perha sides of the Atlantic Pervading these conversations in the major issue, will be the future of the deterren Britain, however, is the realization that unless some- Championing the antiposition is the opposition Lab thing radical occurs, Bomber Command's deterrent Party. It has always had a vocal minority which fa days are numbered. While its viability is vouchsafed vored unilateral disarmament and banning the bomb through the 1960s, thereafter the major deterrent role But responsible elements in the Party take a more cau shifts to the . Needless to say, the Admi- tious view. They hold that an independent deterren ralty looks forward to its impending prominence with while desirable, has become too expensive for a coun pleasure. It has never liked being out of the deterrent try of the UK's limited resources. They point out tha picture. Deprived of its senior strategic status a decade at present, seven percent of the gross national produ ago by Bomber Command, it was delighted with the is allocated for defense purposes. Of this amoun which put it back in the picture roughly ten percent is spent on the V-force. But th again. When Polaris becomes operational, the Royal exploding cost of technology will require larger an Navy will be top dog once more. larger outlays in the future, if credibility is to be main The RAF's attitude toward playing a back-seat role tamed. In Labor's view, the UK simply cannot affor is exemplary. One high-ranking officer summed it up it. And so the Party looks forward to easing Britai in this way: "No one minds such a change, so long as out of the deterrent business. there are sound military reasons for it." The Conservatives generally favor the retention o But outside Whitehall, not everyone is happy with a deterrent capability. Despite the high esteem an the Polaris decision. Some analysts feel that the sub- genuine affection felt for the United States, they shud marine-delivery system, even with the advanced Po- der at the idea of entrusting their destiny totally to u laris A-3, is overrated—not for today, but for the 1970s They are convinced that if Britain is to continue t when the first of the British fleet is scheduled to enter play a major role in world affairs, strategic-nude service. One critic summed up his reservations thus: (Continued on page 75) AIR FORCE Magazine • January 19 32 SAC's KISSING COUSINS CONTINUED forces must be maintained. They see them as the the American guarantee of European security may ticket to the conference table. Perhaps the most elo- possibly lose, at least in Russian eyes, its force and quent defense of the Party's position was made by the effectiveness at some time in the future. Until effec- aging but ageless tive political union can be achieved either in European "Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly or Atlantic terms—and British defense planners be- of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of prov- lieve the latter, at least, to be some way off, national idence and at great cost and sacrifice we have been nuclear capabilities are regarded as valuable." able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we One final point. Underlying the mistrust of Amer- abandon our nuclear deterrent there will be no such ica's intentions is the belief, widely shared, that the second chance. To abandon it now would be to aban- US wants Britain out of the nuclear business altogeth- don it forever." er. This has led to a suspicion in some quarters that One of the most appealing arguments of the antis is we deliberately set about creating the current deter- that unilateral disarmament by Britain will tend to in- rent crisis. Rightly or wrongly, we are blamed for fur- hibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Proponents scoff nishing the antis with the only "intellectual" support at such claims One prominent pro voiced his reserva- they have. It is thought that not until Secretary Mc- tions in this way: "The fact that we pull our nuclear Namara's Ann Arbor speech formally adopting the teeth will not make a whit of difference to France, doctrine of counterforce did they have a strategic leg India, Red China, Israel, or any other nation seeking to stand on. The counterforce doctrine gave them one. to grow its own. Nuclear nationalism," he asserted, "is Although it may not be appreciated in this country, a virus that cannot be stopped by example alone. Fur- Britain is one big city as the H-bomb flies. Accord- thermore," he added, "think of how humiliating it ingly, counterforce has little application or appeal. would be if, after our grandiose gesture, we ended up Air Marshal Sir 's caustic comment per- a simple pawn in a three-way nuclear chess game be- haps best sums up British reaction to it. "Thermo- tween the US, Russia, and France." nuclear incineration," he wrote, "is a rose that smells As the British election draws nearer, the debate no more sweet under the other name of counterforce grows more heated. But heat does not necessarily gen- retaliation." erate light. Oftentimes, the proliferation of comment The Ann Arbor speech tended to undermine British serves more to confuse and confound than it does to faith in the whole concept of deterrence. The shock explain. Yet the controversy has brought out several of Skybolt's cancellation did not improve matters. Nor points of great interest over here. They relate to as- did our espousal of MLF. It is believed that from these pects of the problem not generally appreciated or acorns, the deterrent issue grew. taken into account by us. They should be studied. Advocates of an independent deterrent ask whether The first concerns the size of the British deterrent any nation, committed as we are to nuclear weapons, as suggested by Air Marshal Sir in a can legitimately aspire to inhibit the UK from possess- lecture last March: ing or maintaining them in its own national interest? "The size of a deterrent force must be related to the Besides resentment, there is a strong feeling that such value to an enemy of the prize being protected. For policies are dangerously shortsighted. A British de- example, suppose, I repeat, suppose Russian leaders terrent compounds the problems of both offense and were prepared to sacrifice half their country in ex- defense for the . In addition, it relieves change for the removal of the USA from the competi- this country of the sole moral responsibility for the tive scene. Then, for the American deterrent to be possible use of nuclear weapons. viable, it would have to be demonstrably capable of The trouble with any debate on deterrence is that it destroying far more than half Russia in retaliation. inevitably leads to an Alice in Wonderland of sup- But Russia would not be prepared to accept anything positions and hypotheses. One can never see with like the same damage in exchange for the removal of total clarity; nor does one ever emerge into a state of the United Kingdom. Therefore, a much smaller retali- absolute certainty. atory force can give us as much or greater security than Yet, the quest for credibility must continue. It is a e USA achieve with their vast nuclear capability." never-ending pursuit. Another factor worth heeding over here is the grow- Whether or to what extent Britain will remain in ing mistrust of the United States which is being mani- the deterrent game is not yet clear. But what is cer- fested by both major parties. With Labor, this takes tain is that the game will go on—with or without the form of a reluctance to rely on us as a supplier of her.—En weapons. Skybolt is cited to show that the only deter- rent worth having is one that is of the home-gown variety. The author, Richard C. Peet, recently returned from Eng- A simmering mistrust of American intentions also land, where he interviewed Air Marshal Sir John Grandy and other members of Bomber Command, the RAF, and permeates Conservative thinking. It furnishes the the British Defense establishment. A lawyer by training, theme for a quite different hypothesis, however. It Mr. Peet has held professional positions on both Capitol was summarized by the Defense Correspondent of the Hill and in the Executive Branch of government. He has London Times recently: devoted considerable time to study and writing on defense "The official view, which bears a remarkable simi- matters. A graduate of Tulane University, he is a former ty in essence to that of General de Gaulle, is that Reserve officer in the Air Force.

R FORCE Magazine • January 1964 75