Notes Introduction 1 . Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 2 . He eventually defeated Michael Foot in the leadership run-off. Foot would succeed Callaghan as leader in 1980, defeating Denis Healey. 3 . James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 385–408. 4 . David McKie, ‘Lord Callaghan Labour prime minister who, uniquely, held all four of the great offices of state, but whose consensus politics were washed away in the late 1970s’, The Guardian , 28 March 2005. 5 . ‘Why grass roots protests are now a “Must”’, The Guardian , 4 March 2010. 6 . Callaghan, Time and Chance , p. 400. 7 . Ibid. p. 448. 8 . Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 388–464. 9 . Ibid. pp. 381, 393, 422–424, 429–435 and Callaghan, Time and Chance , pp. 413–447, 478, 498, 515. 10 . For a comprehensive synopsis see Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s (London: Simon and Schuster, 2009). 11 . Andy McSmith, ‘Margaret Thatcher obituary: the most divisive political leader of modern times’, The Independent , 8 April 2013. 12 . Quoted in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2000), pp. 408, 397–436. 13 . www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/BDOHP/Coles.pdf, accessed 10 August 2013. 14 . John Nott, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recollections of an Errant Politician (London: Politico’s, 2002), p. 202. 15 . Ibid., p. 217. 16 . Ibid., pp. 210, 222. Dennis Kavanagh, ‘Lord Pym: Leading “wet” in Thatcher’s first cabinet who became Foreign Secretary during the Falklands War’, The Independent , 8 March 2008. 17 . Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984), p. 41. 18 . Rodric Braithwaite, Across the Moscow River: The World Turned Upside Down (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 52. 19 . Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 4, 27. 20 . Ibid., p. 27. 21 . David Alan Rosenberg, ‘The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945–1960’, International Security, Vol. 7 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–71. This line of analysis can also be found in John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945–1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 247 248 Notes 22 . These ministers included the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Home Secretary, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 23 . Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role , pp. 9, 27–28, 32–33, 135–139, 229–230. 24 . Now Lockheed Martin. As with the UK effort, a large number of both govern- ment and private contractors each played a part. 25 . Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day 1961–1963 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1973), p. 335. 26 . G.M. Dillon, Dependence and Deterrence: Success and Civility in the Anglo-American Special Nuclear Relationship 1962–1982 (Aldershot: Gower, 1983). 27 . During the course of both the British Nuclear History Study Group and earlier meetings, the ad hoc nature of the archival preservation process was brought to light, with many documents destroyed or still waiting for security vetting. 28 . Lorna Arnold, ‘A Letter from Oxford: The History of Nuclear History in Britain’, Minerva , Vol. 38, No. 2 (2000), pp. 211–212. 29 . Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget (London: Hart-Davies, 1953). 30 . It may also be the case that participants have a vested interest in shaping the historical record in a particular way in order to justify the role they played at the time. 31 . Peter Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945–2010 (London: Penguin, 2010). 32 . It also draws intellectual reasoning from international perspectives on national nuclear weapons programmes and from the vast literature on British domestic politics, Strategic Studies, Intelligence Studies and Cold War history. 33 . Private interview with Sir Rodric Braithwaite, January 2012. 1 The British Labour Government and the Development of Chevaline, 1976–1979 1 . Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 392–393. For a more personal recollection see James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Fontana, 1988), pp. 449–450. 2 . http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/Oct/1974-oct-labour- manifesto.shtml, 18 July 2011. 3 . Kristan Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield: Britain, America, NATO and Nuclear Weapons 1970–1976 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 148–159, 159–171, 202–223, 230, 273–275, 277, 280–282. 4 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, Top Secret Artificer UK Eyes: A Report on the Progress and Status of the Chevaline Project: The Main Report, 1 April 1976. 5 . Ibid. 6 . Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected ... the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment’s contribution to the Chevaline Payload’, Proceedings from a confer- ence on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent: The Chevaline Programme , held at the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, 28 October 2004. Henceforward, Conference at RAES , 28 October 2004. 7 . This is well described in the memoirs of the Prime Minister and Chancellor at the time. See James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1988), pp. 413–567 and Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990), pp. 455–456. A Notes 249 non-partisan account can be found in Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Office and Its Holders Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2000), pp. 376–396. 8 . TNA, DEFE 13/752, Annex A to COS 45/72, 25 April 1972. 9 . This issue is covered in detail in Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 146–50. 10 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 11 June 1976. A separate minute in the same file also queried whether the renewal of nuclear understandings between the US and UK (which were renewed whenever a new President or Prime Minister came into office) whether Callaghan needed to sign the ‘secret understanding with the President of the United States about U.S. nuclear units in this country. The same also applies on Diego Garcia.’ TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.T. Armstrong to Sir John Hunt , 11 March 1976. 11 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 11 June 1976. 12 . Perspectives on the Soviet ABM programme in this period can be found in Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield from Stalin to Yeltsin: The Cold War and Beyond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 91–94 and Pavel Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001), pp. 418–433 and http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_ modest_Expectations_sovie.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 13 . Pavel Podvig, ‘History and the current status of the Russian early warning system’, Science and Global Security , Vol. 10 (2002). The current status of these radars can be found at http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/06/daryal-u_radar_in_ mishelevka_d.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 14 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, R.M. to Prime Minister Polaris Improvements , 7 July 1976. 15 . http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/very_modest_Expectations_sovie.shtml, accessed 9 April 2014. 16 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, John Hunt to Mr. P.R.H. Wright Polaris Improvements , 21 June 1976. 17 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, Patrick Wright to J.F. Mayne Polaris Improvements , 6 July 1976. 18 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, Meeting of Ministers: The Nuclear Deterrent Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street on Thursday 29 July 1976 at 4.15 pm, 2 August 1976. 19 . More on these financial mechanisms can be found in http://www.cnduk.org/ information/briefings/trident-briefings/item/101-cnd-special-report-the-next- chevaline-scandal, accessed 1 May 2014. 20 . Stoddart, The Sword and the Shield , pp. 142, 167. 21 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Polaris Improvements , 6 August 1976. 22 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, M. Gainsborough to CPE (Mr Hall) Polaris/Chevaline Costs, 14 October 1976. 23 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, P.J. Hudson DUS(FB) Nuclear Weapons Research , 3 November 1976. 24 . ‘Sir Frank Cooper’, The Daily Telegraph , 30 January 2002. 25 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Frank Cooper to DUS(FB) Nuclear Weapons Research , 8 November 1976. 26 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, B.G. Cartledge to Martin Vile Nuclear Weapons Policy, 20 July 1977. 27 . Ministry of Defence: Chevaline Improvement to the Polaris Missile System , Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1981–82, HC 269 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982), pp. v, 3. 250 Notes 28 . These cost rises may have been leaked to the press leading to a speculative article appearing in The Daily Mail in May 1977. The Daily Mail , 16 May 1977. 29 . Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 54. 30 . Confidential correspondence, October 2002. 31 . TNA, DEFE 24/895, Chevaline Cost Plan , 25 April 1977. 32 . TNA, PREM 16/1181, RM to Prime Minister Polaris Improvement Programme – Nuclear Testing , 8 July 1976. 33 . The role and function of the Penetration Aid Carrier is described in detail in Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–1970 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2012), pp. 139, 150, and The Sword and the Shield , pp. 47, 62, 157, 165, 170. 34 . Pyne, ‘More complex than expected’, Conference at RAES, 28 October 2004. 35 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, F.H. Panton ACSA(N) to DCA(PN) Nuclear Test, 19 February 1976. 36 . TNA, DEFE 13/1039, V.H.B. Macklen DCA(PN) to PS/S of S Chevaline Nuclear Warhead Tests , 27 February 1976.