Iow Imtx Dpa Ndv Eab Eon Rbs Mzv Bdf Mzv Imdw

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Iow Imtx Dpa Ndv Eab Eon Rbs Mzv Bdf Mzv Imdw

(MDWAY6.MDW) 08157 CHICAGO MIDWAY INTL (MDW) MIDWAY SIX DEPARTURE SL-81 (FAA) CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ATIS TAKEOFF MINIMUMS: BADGER 132.75 PETTY 116.4 BAE B Rwys 4L/R, 13C/L, A N42 49.64' CLNC DEL E Chan 111 W87 38.04' 121.85 22L/R, 31C/R, STANDARD. L-28 GND CON Rwys 13R, 31L, NA, ATC. N43^ 07.01' - W88^17.06' 121.65 L-28, H-5 GIPPER MIDWAY TOWER SIMMN DUPAGE 115.4 GIJ G 118.7 226.3 N41 58.84' JI MIDWAY DEP CON W88 52.71' 108.4 DPA APD Chan 101 118.4 388.0 L-28 Chan 21 N41^ 46.12' - W86^ 19.11' N41^ 53.42' - W88^ 21.01' POLO L-28, H-5-10 L-28 LEWKE 111.2 PLL M VZ N41^ 45.72' Chan 49 W87^ 03.80' R-096 N41^ 57.94' 1500 L-28 W89^ 31.45' 315^ 100 L-28 2400 LOCALIZER 109.9 I-MXT IM TX LOCALIZER 109.9 Chan 36 IOWA CITY I-MDW DMI 116.2 IOW I W WO Chan 36 Chan 109 NOTE: Radar required. 135^ N41^ 31.14' NOTE: Chart not to scale. W91^ 36.80' 224^ EC-3, 03 JUL 2008 to 31 L-28, H-5 1400 1300 4 D M E EARND N41^ 25.52' W87^ 34.33' DENNT MOLINE L-28, H-5 N41^ 25.15' 114.4 MZV ZM V CMSKY W87^ 43.48' Chan 91 BACEN N41^ 19.26' N41^ 24.78' L-28, H-5 ACITO N41^ 24.40' W90^ 38.28' W87^ 52.63' N41^23.92' W88^ 01.78' L-27, H-5 L-28, H-5 W88^11.0' L-28, H-5 PEOTONE L-28, H-5 113.2 EON NEO Chan 79 N41^ 16.18' - W87^ 47.46' NEWTT L-28 N41 03.54' BRADFORD W88 04.60' DANVILLE 114.7 BDF B ROBERTS L-27 111.0 DNV D FD N EC-3, 03 JUL 2008 to 31 Chan 94 V 116.8 RBS R Chan 47 B GUIDO N41^ 09.58' S Chan 115 N40^ 17.42' N40 17.63' W89^ 35.27' N40^ 34.90' - W88^ 09.86' W87^ 51.81' W87 33.43' L-27, H-5 L-27, H-5 H-5 L-27, H-5 T DEPARTURE ROUTE DESCRIPTION TAKE-OFF RWYS 4L/R: Northbound departures assigned headings 360^ (CW) thru 080^, Climbing right turn to 2400 heading 100^ before proceeding on course, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 13C: Climb heading 135^ to 1400 before turning, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 13L: Climb heading 135^ to 1400 before turning, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 22L: Climb heading 224^ to 1300 before turning, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 22R: Climb heading 224^ to 1300 before turning, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 31C: Climb heading 315^ to 1500 before turning, thence. TAKE-OFF RWY 31R: Climb heading 315^ to 1500 before turning, thence. DME EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT: Complete initially assigned turn within 4 DME of Midway. Maintain 3000 feet or assigned lower altitude, thence. NON-DME EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT: Complete initially assigned turn south of DPA R-096. Maintain 3000 feet or assigned lower altitude, thence. expect radar vectors to first enroute fix. Expect clearance to requested altitude/flight level 10 (ten) minutes after departure. CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MIDWAY SIX DEPARTURE CHICAGO MIDWAY INTL (MDW) (MDWAY6.MDW) 08157.

Copy Link

Recommended publications

Continuity / Change: Rethinking Options for Trident Replacement
CONTINUITY / CHANGE: RETHINKING OPTIONS FOR TRIDENT REPLACEMENT DR. NICK RITCHIE Dr. Nick Ritchie Department of Peace Studies BRADFORD DISARMAMENT RESEARCH CENTRE University of Bradford April 2009 DEPARTMENT OF PEACE STUDIES : UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD : JUNE 2010 About this report This report is part of a series of publications under the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre’s programme on Nuclear-Armed Britain: A Critical Examination of Trident Modernisation, Implications and Accountability. To find out more please visit www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/trident.html. Briefing 1: Trident: The Deal Isn’t Done – Serious Questions Remain Unanswered, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing1.html Briefing 2: Trident: What is it For? – Challenging the Relevance of British Nuclear Weapons, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing2.html. Briefing 3: Trident and British Identity: Letting go of British Nuclear Weapons, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing3.html. Briefing 4: A Regime on the Edge? How Replacing Trident Undermines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing4.html. Briefing 5: Stepping Down the Nuclear Ladder: Options for Trident on a Path to Zero, at www.brad.ac.uk/acad/bdrc/nuclear/trident/briefing5.html. About the author Dr. Nick Ritchie is a Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. He is lead researcher on the Nuclear-Armed Britain programme. He previously worked for six years as a researcher at the Oxford Research Group on global security issues, in particular nuclear proliferation, arms control and disarmament.
[Show full text]
The Benefits of Moving to an All-W87 ICBM Force the NNSA Is Proposing
The Benefits of Moving to an All-W87 ICBM Force The NNSA is proposing to replace the W78 ICBM warhead with a new W87-1 warhead using a “W87- like” pit. A better alternative Replacing the 200 deployed W78s with the some of the 340 W87s in storage would bring several benefits: 1. Enhanced safety—much sooner: A major feature of the W87-1 is that it would use insensitive high explosives (IHE). As NNSA states in its report W78 Replacement Program (W87-1): Cost Estimates and Insensitive High Explosives: “Replacing the conventional high explosives (CHE) in the current W78 warhead with IHE is the single most significant weapon system change that improves the warhead’s safety and security.” But the W87 also uses IHE and could be deployed now, not in several decades. 2. Less demanding pit production schedule: The W87-1 would use new plutonium pits, which requires the NNSA to start up and then quickly ramp up its pit production from the current zero (and none since 2013) to 80 per year by 2030. As the NNSA states, this will be “challenging.” The alternative would obviate or significantly delay the need to produce 80 pits by 2030. 3. More realistic schedule overall: The NNSA faces significant schedule challenges in producing the W87-1, as it states in the FY19 Stockpile Stewardship & Management Plan: “Production is predicated on all newly manufactured components and a nuclear material manufacturing modernization strategy that relies on large, multi-year investments in component and material capabilities.” 4. Reduced NNSA workload: The NNSA and the weapons complex are already struggling to manage five simultaneous major work programs on weapons in the stockpile while also building the UPF and trying to establish a pit production capacity.
[Show full text]
The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program
Order Code RL33748 Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program Updated December 3, 2007 Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program Summary Current U.S. nuclear warheads were deployed during the Cold War. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains them with a Life Extension Program (LEP). NNSA questions if LEP can maintain them indefinitely on grounds that an accretion of minor changes introduced in replacement components will inevitably reduce confidence in warhead safety and reliability over the long term. Congress mandated the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program in 2004 “to improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing weapons and their components.” Since then, Congress has specified more goals for the program, such as increasing safety, reducing the need for nuclear testing, designing for ease of manufacture, and reducing cost. RRW has become the principal program for designing new warheads to replace current ones. The program’s first step was a design competition. The winning design was selected in March 2007. If the program continues, NNSA would advance the design of the first RRW, assess its technical feasibility, and estimate cost and schedule in FY2008; start engineering development by FY2010; and produce the first deployable RRW between FY2012 and FY2016. Congressional actions on the FY2008 national defense authorization bills (H.R. 1585, S. 1547) and energy and water appropriations bills (H.R. 2641, S. 1751) have called this schedule into question. For details, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments, which provides background and tracks legislation and developments.
[Show full text]
Nuclear Weapons
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees November 2018 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has Taken Steps to Prepare to Restart a Program to Replace the W78 Warhead Capability GAO-19-84 November 2018 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has Taken Steps to Prepare to Restart a Program to Replace the W78 Warhead Capability Highlights of GAO-19-84, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The Department of Defense and NNSA The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have sought for nearly a decade to has taken steps to prepare to restart a life extension program (LEP) to replace replace the capabilities of the aging the capabilities of the Air Force’s W78 nuclear warhead—a program which was W78 nuclear warhead used by the U.S. previously suspended. According to NNSA officials, these steps are typically Air Force. NNSA undertakes LEPs to needed to conduct any LEP. Therefore, they can be undertaken despite the refurbish or replace the capabilities of current uncertainty about whether the final program will develop the warhead for nuclear weapons components. In fiscal the Air Force only or for both the Air Force and the Navy. Specifically, NNSA has year 2014, NNSA was directed to taken the steps described below: suspend a program that was evaluating a capability that could • Program management. NNSA has begun to establish the program replace the W78 and also be used by management functions needed to execute a W78 replacement program, as the U.S. Navy. NNSA’s most recent required by NNSA’s program execution instruction.
[Show full text]
Gao-20-703, Nuclear Weapons
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters September 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Should Further Develop Cost, Schedule, and Risk Information for the W87-1 Warhead Program GAO-20-703 September 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Should Further Develop Cost, Schedule, and Risk Information for the W87-1 Warhead Program Highlights of GAO-20-703, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not consider cost and NNSA restarted a program in fiscal estimates in early major design decisions for the W87-1 warhead because it was year 2019 to replace the capabilities of not required to do so, but NNSA has since changed its guidance to require that the aging W78 nuclear warhead with cost be considered, according to a May 2019 NNSA review of program the W87-1. NNSA made key design documentation. The design decisions that remain for features that would achieve decisions for this weapon from 2010 either minimum or enhanced requirements for the W87-1 could affect cost, until the program was paused in 2014. according to NNSA officials (see table). We found, however, that NNSA did not NNSA estimated in December 2018 yet have study plans for assessing the costs and benefits of the remaining that the W87-1 would cost $8.6 billion decisions consistent with best practices as detailed in NNSA’s analysis of to $14.8 billion, which could make it the alternatives business procedure. NNSA does not require and only recommends most expensive warhead modernization program to date.
[Show full text]
Temperature Immersion Thermistor and Rtd Sensors St-W* Series
TEMPERATURE IMMERSION THERMISTOR AND RTD SENSORS ST-W* SERIES DESCRIPTION The PreCon Model ST-W* Immersion Thermistor and RTD Sensor provides precision remote temperature sensing for building automation systems and mechanical equipment room instrumentation. The active sensing element is a highly stable precision thermistor material or platinum RTD. TCC-12 The sensing element is sealed with a temperature conductive compound in a 4-7/8" (12.4 cm) stainless steel tube and brass fitting. A brass thermowell is the standard well provided with each sensor. A Greenfield connector is factory installed for NEW!flexible connection. The sensor probe assembly is removable from the thermowell for replacement without draining the system. FEATURES • Lifetime warranty • ±0.36°F (±0.2°C) thermistor accuracy ST-W24 • ±1°F (0.53°C) RTD accuracy WEL-B • Wide selection of thermistor and RTD curves • Brass thermowell for quick temperature response • Adaptable with many options • Easy to mount and remove from thermowell • Waterproof stainless steel probe APPLICATION OPTIONS The Model ST-W* is a waterproof sensor featuring a 304 • 304 stainless steel well, maximum temperature 900°F stainless steel probe and brass fitting. The fitting has a 1/2" (482°C),maximum pressure 3000 psig (20,685 kPa) NPT female threads to accept the standard Greenfield fitting. • Handy-box enclosure It has 1/8" NPT male threads for installing into a furnished • Custom lengths (wells available) TEMPERATURE WEL-B thermowell. The thermowells are designed with close • 1/2" LB conduit fitting tolerances, eliminating the need for thermal grease under • Liquid-tight fitting normal conditions. Each well is designed so that the sensor • Weather resistant box assembly can be easily removed after installation.
[Show full text]
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF of TRI-VALLEY Cares -0 Case No
Case4:14-cv-01885-JSW Document26 Filed08/20/14 Page1 of 5 1 SCOTT YUNDT (CSB #242595) TRI-VALLEY CARES 2 2582 Old First Street 3 Livermore, California 94550 Telephone: (925) 443-7148 4 Facsimile: (925) 443-0177 Email: [email protected] 5 6 Attorney for Amicus Curiae TRI-VALLEY COMMUNITIES 7 AGAINST A RADIOACTIVE ENVIRONMENT (CAREs) 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 12 13 ) Case No. 4:14-cv-01885-JSW THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ) 14 ) ISLANDS, a non-nuclear-weapon State party ) MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 15 to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of ) AMICUS CURIAE OF TRI-VALLEY Nuclear Weapons, ) CAREs IN SUPPORT OF VENUE IN THE 16 ) NORTHERN DISTRICT COURT OF Plaintiffs, ) CALIFORNIA 17 ) v. ) 18 ) Hearing Date: September 12, 2014 ) Time: 9:00 A.M. 19 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Courtroom: Oakland Courthouse, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, THE ) 20 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ) Courtroom 5 – 2nd Floor, OF AMERICA; THE DEPARTMENT OF ) 1301 Clay Street 21 DEFENSE; SECRETARY CHARLES ) Oakland, CA 94612 ) 22 HAGEL, THE SECRETARY OF ) DEFENSE; THE DEPARTMENT OF ) 23 ENERGY; SECRETARY ERNEST MONIZ, ) THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY; AND 24 THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY 25 ADMINISTRATION, 26 Defendants. 27 28 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF TRI-VALLEY CAREs -0 Case No. 4:14-CV-01885-JSW Case4:14-cv-01885-JSW Document26 Filed08/20/14 Page2 of 5 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive 3 Environment (CAREs) hereby moves this Court for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in the 4 above-captioned case in support the Plaintiff’s choice of venue in the Northern District Court of 5 California and to oppose dismissal based on that choice of venue.
[Show full text]
Keyword Index
Neuropsychopharmacology (2014) 39, S692–S709 & 2014 American College of Neuropsychopharmacology. All rights reserved 0893-133X/14 www.neuropsychopharmacology.org Keyword Index 10q24.32 . ............... ................T156 Adolescent Depression . .M198 22q11....................................T37 adolescent development . M100, W223, M133 4-Chlorokynurenine . ....................... W226 adolescent stress . .........................M21 5-HT2A receptor . ....................... W196 ADRA1A . ........................T262 5-HT2C . ................................M130 adrenergic receptor . ....................... W205 5-HT3 receptors........................... W246 adult....................................W82 5-HT7 . ................................ M93 Adversity. ........................M199 5C-CPT . ................................W62 aerobic . ........................M163 5HT5A receptor antagonist....................W191 affective disorders . ........................W80 [11C]carfentanil............................M143 affective neuroscience . M167 affective priming . ........................M112 A African American . ........................T197 aggression . ........... M78, M211, T154, W74 aging..........W31, M181, M223, T54, W30, W31, W227, ABCB gene . ............................ W75 M141, M156, M232, W5, W104 ABCB1 . ................................T254 Agomelatine . ........................W210 Abuse Liability ........................... W160 Agonist . ....................... M266 Abuse Potential ............................W165 agoraphobia
[Show full text]
Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I 3 Stockpile
3 Stockpile Chapter Three USNuclear Stockpile This section describes the 24 types of warheads cur- enriched uranium (oralloy) as its nuclear fissile material rently in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. As of 1983, the total and is considered volatile and unsafe. As a result, its number of warheads was an estimated 26,000. They are nuclear materials and fuzes are kept separately from the made in a wide variety of configurations with over 50 artillery projectile. The W33 can be used in two differ- different modifications and yields. The smallest war- ent yield configurations and requires the assembly and head is the man-portable nuclear land mine, known as insertion of distinct "pits" (nuclear materials cores) with the "Special Atomic Demolition Munition" (SADM). the amount of materials determining a "low" or '4high'' The SADM weighs only 58.5 pounds and has an explo- yield. sive yield (W54) equivalent to as little as 10 tons of TNT, In contrast, the newest of the nuclear warheads is the The largest yield is found in the 165 ton TITAN I1 mis- W80,5 a thermonuclear warhead built for the long-range sile, which carries a four ton nuclear warhead (W53) Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and first deployed equal in explosive capability to 9 million tons of TNT, in late 1981. The W80 warhead has a yield equivalent to The nuclear weapons stockpile officially includes 200 kilotons of TNT (more than 20 times greater than the only those nuclear missile reentry vehicles, bombs, artil- W33), weighs about the same as the W33, utilizes the lery projectiles, and atomic demolition munitions that same material (oralloy), and, through improvements in are in "active service."l Active service means those electronics such as fuzing and miniaturization, repre- which are in the custody of the Department of Defense sents close to the limits of technology in building a high and considered "war reserve weapons." Excluded are yield, safe, small warhead.
[Show full text]
Corso Sectional Series
Corso Sectional Series DESIGN YOUR OWN SERIES Contemporary style with modular flexibility, this Corso sectional provides both extreme comfort and the opportunity to change your configuration on demand. Shown in the 42-inch depth but add further dimension with the optional 38-inch opportunity. SHOWN: (5) U2A1-SBC Corso Armless Chairs (1) U2E1-SBC Cosro Sectional Chair Seat height: 16 Finish: Modern Elm BUILD YOUR CORSO SECTIONAL IN 6 EASY STEPS STEP 1: Select your Upholstery STEP 4: Select your Seat Style STEP 2: Select your Depth S - Single Bench Cushion U2 Depth: 42" M - Multi, Three Seat Cushion U8 Depth: 38" STEP 5: Select your Back Style STEP 3: Select your Frame B - Box (loose) O1 - Ottoman K - Knife (loose) SL - Left Arm Sofa W=93" STEP 6: Select your Base Style SR - Right Arm Sofa W=93 W - Wood Foot DL - Left Arm Davenport Corner Sofa W=107" C - Concealed foot DR - Right Arm Davenport Corner Sofa W=107" LL - Left Arm Loveseat W=65" LR - Right Arm Loveseat W=65" NOTE: Additional 13" x 23" Kidney Pillows are E1 - Sectional Chair W=42" eliminated on the #U8 (38" depth) frame styles. A1 - Armless Chair W=28" SHOWN: U8SL-MBW Corso Left Arm Sofa U801-SXW Corso Ottoman U8SR-MBW Corso Right Arm Sofa Arm height: 25 / Seat height: 16 Finish: Modern Elm Corso Sectional Elements 1/4" = 1' Scale U2 U8 Depth Depth = 42" = 38 " U2A1 Corso Armless Chair U2E1 Corso Corner U2SL Corso Left Arm Sofa Overall: W28 D42 H35 Inside: W28 D24 H21 Overall: W42 D42 H35 W93 D42 H35 Inside: W24 D24 H21 Inside: W84 D24 H21 U8A1 Corso Armless Chair Overall: W28
[Show full text]
High School Championship -- Standings
2017 TCA South Texas State Scholastic Championships: High School Championship -- Standings # Place Name ID Rtng Post Team Rd 1 Rd 2 Rd 3 Rd 4 Rd 5 Rd 6 Rd 7 Tot TBrk[M] TBrk[M] TBrk[S] TBrk[R] TBrk[C] 1 1 Priya Niki Trakru 13806686 2013 2033 STSTMAW63 W53 W18 W25 W12 W2 W6 7.0 30.5 24.5 34.5 34 28 2 2-5 Camille Y Kao 14297024 1969 1968 W85 W82 W32 W20 W11 L1 W15 6.0 29 22 32 25.5 26 3 Polo Stein 14275794 1709 1726 SBSBHSW69 W58 D10 W14 W27 D6 W16 6.0 28 22.5 31.5 27.25 24.5 4 Genta Kaieda 14354622 1888 1877 SHSHS W52 W41 L39 W43 W25 W22 W17 6.0 26.5 21.5 30.5 26.5 23 5 Fabian Olivares 13958918 1614 1656 SBSBHSW78 W16 W54 L39 W41 W11 W13 6.0 26.5 21.5 30 26.5 24 6 6-9 Jonathan Huerta 14086076 1748 1757 BRHHECHSW87 W111 W49 W26 W39 D3 L1 5.5 28.5 21.5 30.5 21 26 7 Satya G Holla 14354691 1698 1704 STSATSW72 W91 W33 L11 W26 W20 D8 5.5 27.5 22 30.5 23.25 23.5 8 Ritik Verma 13745958 1927 1903 CCVETERAW126 L44 W73 W30 W10 W36 D7 5.5 27 21.5 28.5 22.25 21.5 9 Jesus Guillen Jr 13762512 1791 1766 BRHHECHSW73 W108 L26 W111 D31 W40 W29 5.5 23.5 19 25.5 19.25 21.5 10 10-24 Nicholas Galindo 14494914 1390 1530 BRPORTERW99 W67 D3 W29 L8 W31 D12 5.0 29 23 32 21 22 11 Glen Ernest Rocha 16122046 1459 1543 HREARLYW65 W56 W84 W7 L2 L5 W44 5.0 29 23 32 20 23 12 Jorge Hernandez 14281624 1611 1617 SHSHS W51 W68 W44 W40 L1 D19 D10 5.0 29 22 32.5 20.5 23.5 13 Michael D Thomas 14793323 1783 1750 SBVMA W75 L43 W87 W42 W32 W28 L5 5.0 26.5 20.5 29.5 19.5 21 14 Jose Castillo Jr 14085711 1493 1504 BRHHECHSD103 W64 W35 L3 D30 W43 W40 5.0 26.5 20.5 29 19.5 19 15 Luis Ferna
[Show full text]
The United States' Nuclear Inventory
The United States’ Nuclear Inventory The nuclear age began on July 16, 1945, when the United States tested the first atomic bomb. Less than a month later, the United States would become the only nation to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At its peak, the United States had more than 31,000 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. Through various arms control agreements and unilateral reductions, the United States has a total inventory of around 5,550 nuclear warheads. These weapons are deployed on air, sea, and land platforms in what is referred to as “The Triad.” Since the end of the Cold War, each U.S. President has directed their administration to create a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlining the role of U.S. nuclear weapons. President Trump’s NPR states that America’s nuclear forces are “directed toward deterring aggression and preserving peace.” While some of the content in the 2018 NPR is similar to past reviews — including the policy of ambiguity over when the United States would use nuclear weapons — there is a renewed emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, and a call for “supplemental capabilities” in the form of new low-yield weapons. How Many? The United States’ total nuclear inventory is 5,550, with around 3,800 active warheads in the stockpile and another 1,750 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. Under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States is allowed 1,550 nuclear warheads on 800 strategic launchers, only 700 of which can be deployed.
[Show full text]