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Heater Element Specifications Bulletin Number 592
Technical Data Heater Element Specifications Bulletin Number 592 Topic Page Description 2 Heater Element Selection Procedure 2 Index to Heater Element Selection Tables 5 Heater Element Selection Tables 6 Additional Resources These documents contain additional information concerning related products from Rockwell Automation. Resource Description Industrial Automation Wiring and Grounding Guidelines, publication 1770-4.1 Provides general guidelines for installing a Rockwell Automation industrial system. Product Certifications website, http://www.ab.com Provides declarations of conformity, certificates, and other certification details. You can view or download publications at http://www.rockwellautomation.com/literature/. To order paper copies of technical documentation, contact your local Allen-Bradley distributor or Rockwell Automation sales representative. For Application on Bulletin 100/500/609/1200 Line Starters Heater Element Specifications Eutectic Alloy Overload Relay Heater Elements Type J — CLASS 10 Type P — CLASS 20 (Bul. 600 ONLY) Type W — CLASS 20 Type WL — CLASS 30 Note: Heater Element Type W/WL does not currently meet the material Type W Heater Elements restrictions related to EU ROHS Description The following is for motors rated for Continuous Duty: For motors with marked service factor of not less than 1.15, or Overload Relay Class Designation motors with a marked temperature rise not over +40 °C United States Industry Standards (NEMA ICS 2 Part 4) designate an (+104 °F), apply application rules 1 through 3. Apply application overload relay by a class number indicating the maximum time in rules 2 and 3 when the temperature difference does not exceed seconds at which it will trip when carrying a current equal to 600 +10 °C (+18 °F). -
Fock–Goncharov Coordinates for Semisimple Lie Groups
FOCK–GONCHAROV COORDINATES FOR SEMISIMPLE LIE GROUPS S. GILLES Abstract. Fock and Goncharov [FG06b] introduced cluster ensembles, providing a framework for coordi- nates on varieties of surface representations into Lie groups, as well as a complete construction for groups of type An. Later, Zickert [Zic19], Le [Le16b], [Le16a], and Ip [Ip18] described, using differing methods, how to apply this framework for other Lie group types. Zickert also showed that this framework applies to triangulated 3-manifolds. We present a complete, general construction, based on work of Fomin and Zelevinsky. In particular, we complete the picture for the remaining cases: Lie groups of types F4, E6, E7, and E8. Contents Acknowledgements 2 1. Introduction 2 1.1. Classical Teichmüller space 2 1.2. Cluster ensemble structures 4 1.3. Higher Teichmüller spaces 5 1.4. Results 7 1.5. Historical context 7 2. Ingredients 8 2.1. Root spaces and Weyl groups 8 2.2. Unipotent subgroups 9 2.3. Coxeter elements 9 2.4. Generalized minors 9 2.5. Factorization coordinates 11 2.6. Quivers 11 2.7. Cluster ensembles 12 3. Key identities 13 3.1. Actions of a dubs 13 3.2. Actions of σG 13 3.3. Grid exchange relations 14 4. Coordinates on generically-decorated representations 15 4.1. Configurations and gluings 16 arXiv:2104.04941v1 [math.GT] 11 Apr 2021 4.2. Triangular quivers and Fock–Goncharov coordinate structures 17 4.3. From coordinates to representations 21 4.4. Regarding 3-manifolds 23 5. Main Result: Fock–Goncharov coordinate structures for non-An 23 5.1. -
The Maintenance of a Capable, Credible
he maintenance of a capable, size of the deployed strategic arsenal B61 nuclear gravity bomb, carried by credible nuclear deterrent shrinks and the US reviews its nuclear the B-52 and B-2 bomber fleets. seems to have consensus gov- requirements. In the near future, officials want to Ternmental support. Defense and Energy Department lead- consolidate the number of warheads to Despite heavy investment in the nu- ers want to streamline and standardize the curb costs and accommodate an evolving clear mission over the last few years, Air maintenance of the nation’s warheads—a concept of nuclear deterrence, which Force and senior defense officials say process that has long been unpredictable may be far different from the policies much work lies ahead for the nation’s and irregular, according to a senior USAF and assumptions that dominated the Cold stockpile of nuclear warheads. official working in the Air Staff’s nuclear War. The task is to bring the nuclear Not long ago, ambitious plans were deterrence shop. weapons complex—the nation’s nuclear on the books for a new nuclear earth- warheads and the laboratories and facili- penetrating weapon and the first new- Consolidation ties charged with their care, testing, and build warhead since the Cold War. Then, “We are in a period of transition,” said maintenance—into the 21st century. Administrations changed and the budget Billy W. Mullins, the associate assistant As a result, over the coming decade- crunch hit. chief of staff for strategic deterrence plus, the National Nuclear Security In the aftermath of the New START and nuclear integration on the Air Staff. -
The Benefits of Moving to an All-W87 ICBM Force the NNSA Is Proposing
The Benefits of Moving to an All-W87 ICBM Force The NNSA is proposing to replace the W78 ICBM warhead with a new W87-1 warhead using a “W87- like” pit. A better alternative Replacing the 200 deployed W78s with the some of the 340 W87s in storage would bring several benefits: 1. Enhanced safety—much sooner: A major feature of the W87-1 is that it would use insensitive high explosives (IHE). As NNSA states in its report W78 Replacement Program (W87-1): Cost Estimates and Insensitive High Explosives: “Replacing the conventional high explosives (CHE) in the current W78 warhead with IHE is the single most significant weapon system change that improves the warhead’s safety and security.” But the W87 also uses IHE and could be deployed now, not in several decades. 2. Less demanding pit production schedule: The W87-1 would use new plutonium pits, which requires the NNSA to start up and then quickly ramp up its pit production from the current zero (and none since 2013) to 80 per year by 2030. As the NNSA states, this will be “challenging.” The alternative would obviate or significantly delay the need to produce 80 pits by 2030. 3. More realistic schedule overall: The NNSA faces significant schedule challenges in producing the W87-1, as it states in the FY19 Stockpile Stewardship & Management Plan: “Production is predicated on all newly manufactured components and a nuclear material manufacturing modernization strategy that relies on large, multi-year investments in component and material capabilities.” 4. Reduced NNSA workload: The NNSA and the weapons complex are already struggling to manage five simultaneous major work programs on weapons in the stockpile while also building the UPF and trying to establish a pit production capacity. -
Influencer Poll: Likelihood to Recommend & Support
Wave 56 Influencer Poll Update January 2018 Public Release Influencer Poll: Likelihood to Recommend & Support 1 Likelihood to Recommend and Support Military Service Likelihood to Recommend and Support Military Service 80% 71% 70% 71% 70% 66% 66% 66% 67% 63% 63% 63% 64% 61% 63% 60% 50% 46% 47% 47% 45% 44% 42% 43% 42% 39% 38% 40% 35% 32% 33% 34% 34% 30% 20% 10% Likely to Recommend: % Likely/Very Likely Likely to Support: % Agree/Strongly Agree Yearly Quarterly 0% Jan–Mar 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Likely to Recommend Military Service Likely to Support Decision to Join § Influencers’ likelihood to support the decision to join the Military increased significantly from 67% in 2015 to 70% in 2016. § However, Influencers’ likelihood to support the decision to join the Military remained stable in January–March 2017. = Significantly change from previous poll Source: Military Ad Tracking Study (Influencer Market) Wave 56 2 Questions: q1a–c: “Suppose [relation] came to you for advice about various post-high school options. How likely is it that you would recommend joining a Military Service such as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard?” q2ff: “If [relation] told me they were planning to join the Military, I would support their decision.” Likelihood to Recommend Military Service By Influencer Type Likelihood to Recommend Military Service 80% 70% 63% 59% 59% 60% 58% 60% 57% 56% 57% 55% 54% 53% 48% 55% 50% 54% 47% 52% 51% 44% 51% 47% 42% 42% 42% 49% 41% 43% 42% 45% 45% 46% 40% 42% 37% 41% 39% 41% 38% 38% 38% 37% 37% 39% 34% 35% 34% 30% 33% 33% 32% 33% 32% 31% 32% 31% 31% 31% 32% 20% 25% 25% 24% 31% 29% 10% % Likely/Very Likely Yearly Quarterly 0% Jan–Mar 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Fathers Mothers Grandparents Other Influencers § Influencers’ likelihood to recommend military service remained stable in January–March 2017 for all influencer groups. -
The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program
Order Code RL33748 Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program Updated December 3, 2007 Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Nuclear Warheads: The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program and the Life Extension Program Summary Current U.S. nuclear warheads were deployed during the Cold War. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) maintains them with a Life Extension Program (LEP). NNSA questions if LEP can maintain them indefinitely on grounds that an accretion of minor changes introduced in replacement components will inevitably reduce confidence in warhead safety and reliability over the long term. Congress mandated the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program in 2004 “to improve the reliability, longevity, and certifiability of existing weapons and their components.” Since then, Congress has specified more goals for the program, such as increasing safety, reducing the need for nuclear testing, designing for ease of manufacture, and reducing cost. RRW has become the principal program for designing new warheads to replace current ones. The program’s first step was a design competition. The winning design was selected in March 2007. If the program continues, NNSA would advance the design of the first RRW, assess its technical feasibility, and estimate cost and schedule in FY2008; start engineering development by FY2010; and produce the first deployable RRW between FY2012 and FY2016. Congressional actions on the FY2008 national defense authorization bills (H.R. 1585, S. 1547) and energy and water appropriations bills (H.R. 2641, S. 1751) have called this schedule into question. For details, see CRS Report RL32929, The Reliable Replacement Warhead Program: Background and Current Developments, which provides background and tracks legislation and developments. -
Nuclear Weapons
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees November 2018 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has Taken Steps to Prepare to Restart a Program to Replace the W78 Warhead Capability GAO-19-84 November 2018 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has Taken Steps to Prepare to Restart a Program to Replace the W78 Warhead Capability Highlights of GAO-19-84, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The Department of Defense and NNSA The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have sought for nearly a decade to has taken steps to prepare to restart a life extension program (LEP) to replace replace the capabilities of the aging the capabilities of the Air Force’s W78 nuclear warhead—a program which was W78 nuclear warhead used by the U.S. previously suspended. According to NNSA officials, these steps are typically Air Force. NNSA undertakes LEPs to needed to conduct any LEP. Therefore, they can be undertaken despite the refurbish or replace the capabilities of current uncertainty about whether the final program will develop the warhead for nuclear weapons components. In fiscal the Air Force only or for both the Air Force and the Navy. Specifically, NNSA has year 2014, NNSA was directed to taken the steps described below: suspend a program that was evaluating a capability that could • Program management. NNSA has begun to establish the program replace the W78 and also be used by management functions needed to execute a W78 replacement program, as the U.S. Navy. NNSA’s most recent required by NNSA’s program execution instruction. -
NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program’S Schedule Constraints
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees July 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program's Schedule Constraints GAO-20-409 July 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program’s Schedule Constraints Highlights of GAO-20-409, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found To maintain and modernize the U.S. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized nuclear arsenal, NNSA and DOD agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), has identified a range of risks conduct LEPs. In 2014, they began facing the W80-4 nuclear warhead life extension program (LEP)—including risks an LEP to produce a warhead, the related to developing new technologies and manufacturing processes as well as W80-4, to be carried on the LRSO reestablishing dormant production capabilities. NNSA is managing these risks missile. In February 2019, NNSA using a variety of processes and tools, such as a classified risk database. adopted an FPU delivery date of However, NNSA has introduced potential risk to the program by adopting a date fiscal year 2025 for the W80-4 LEP, (September 2025) for the delivery of the program’s first production unit (FPU) at an estimated cost of about $11.2 that is more than 1 year earlier than the date projected by the program’s own billion over the life of the program. schedule risk analysis process (see figure). NNSA and Department of Defense The explanatory statement (DOD) officials said that they adopted the September 2025 date partly because accompanying the 2018 appropriation the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 specifies that NNSA included a provision for GAO to must deliver the first warhead unit by the end of fiscal year 2025, as well as to review the W80-4 LEP. -
Gao-20-703, Nuclear Weapons
United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters September 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Should Further Develop Cost, Schedule, and Risk Information for the W87-1 Warhead Program GAO-20-703 September 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Should Further Develop Cost, Schedule, and Risk Information for the W87-1 Warhead Program Highlights of GAO-20-703, a report to congressional requesters Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) did not consider cost and NNSA restarted a program in fiscal estimates in early major design decisions for the W87-1 warhead because it was year 2019 to replace the capabilities of not required to do so, but NNSA has since changed its guidance to require that the aging W78 nuclear warhead with cost be considered, according to a May 2019 NNSA review of program the W87-1. NNSA made key design documentation. The design decisions that remain for features that would achieve decisions for this weapon from 2010 either minimum or enhanced requirements for the W87-1 could affect cost, until the program was paused in 2014. according to NNSA officials (see table). We found, however, that NNSA did not NNSA estimated in December 2018 yet have study plans for assessing the costs and benefits of the remaining that the W87-1 would cost $8.6 billion decisions consistent with best practices as detailed in NNSA’s analysis of to $14.8 billion, which could make it the alternatives business procedure. NNSA does not require and only recommends most expensive warhead modernization program to date. -
Iow Imtx Dpa Ndv Eab Eon Rbs Mzv Bdf Mzv Imdw
(MDWAY6.MDW) 08157 CHICAGO MIDWAY INTL (MDW) MIDWAY SIX DEPARTURE SL-81 (FAA) CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ATIS TAKEOFF MINIMUMS: BADGER 132.75 PETTY 116.4 BAE B Rwys 4L/R, 13C/L, A N42 49.64' CLNC DEL E Chan 111 W87 38.04' 121.85 22L/R, 31C/R, STANDARD. L-28 GND CON Rwys 13R, 31L, NA, ATC. N43^ 07.01' - W88^17.06' 121.65 L-28, H-5 GIPPER MIDWAY TOWER SIMMN DUPAGE 115.4 GIJ G 118.7 226.3 N41 58.84' JI MIDWAY DEP CON W88 52.71' 108.4 DPA APD Chan 101 118.4 388.0 L-28 Chan 21 N41^ 46.12' - W86^ 19.11' N41^ 53.42' - W88^ 21.01' POLO L-28, H-5-10 L-28 LEWKE 111.2 PLL M VZ N41^ 45.72' Chan 49 W87^ 03.80' R-096 N41^ 57.94' 1500 L-28 W89^ 31.45' 315^ 100 L-28 2400 LOCALIZER 109.9 I-MXT IM TX LOCALIZER 109.9 Chan 36 IOWA CITY I-MDW DMI 116.2 IOW I W WO Chan 36 Chan 109 NOTE: Radar required. 135^ N41^ 31.14' NOTE: Chart not to scale. W91^ 36.80' 224^ EC-3, 03 JUL 2008 to 31 L-28, H-5 1400 1300 4 D M E EARND N41^ 25.52' W87^ 34.33' DENNT MOLINE L-28, H-5 N41^ 25.15' 114.4 MZV ZM V CMSKY W87^ 43.48' Chan 91 BACEN N41^ 19.26' N41^ 24.78' L-28, H-5 ACITO N41^ 24.40' W90^ 38.28' W87^ 52.63' N41^23.92' W88^ 01.78' L-27, H-5 L-28, H-5 W88^11.0' L-28, H-5 PEOTONE L-28, H-5 113.2 EON NEO Chan 79 N41^ 16.18' - W87^ 47.46' NEWTT L-28 N41 03.54' BRADFORD W88 04.60' DANVILLE 114.7 BDF B ROBERTS L-27 111.0 DNV D FD N EC-3, 03 JUL 2008 to 31 Chan 94 V 116.8 RBS R Chan 47 B GUIDO N41^ 09.58' S Chan 115 N40^ 17.42' N40 17.63' W89^ 35.27' N40^ 34.90' - W88^ 09.86' W87^ 51.81' W87 33.43' L-27, H-5 L-27, H-5 H-5 L-27, H-5 T DEPARTURE ROUTE DESCRIPTION TAKE-OFF RWYS 4L/R: Northbound departures assigned headings 360^ (CW) thru 080^, Climbing right turn to 2400 heading 100^ before proceeding on course, thence. -
NEMA Motor Control
Bulletin Eutectic Alloy Overload Relays Heater Elements Selection For Application on Bulletin 100/500/609/1200 Line Starters Eutectic Alloy Overload Relay Heater Elements Heater Element Selection Type J — CLASS 10 Table of Contents 0 Type P — CLASS 20 (Bul. 600 ONLY) Type W — CLASS 20 Overload Relay Type WL — CLASS 30 Class Designation...... this page Heater Element Selection ....................... this page 1 Type W Heater Elements Ambient Temperature Correction..................... this page Time — Current Characteristics............ 1-169 2 Index to Heater Element Selection Tables ............................. 1-170 3 Description The following is for motors rated for Continuous Duty: For motors with marked service factor of not less than 1.15, or Overload Relay Class Designation motors with a marked temperature rise not over +40 °C United States Industry Standards (NEMA ICS 2 Part 4) designate an (+104 °F), apply application rules 1 through 3. Apply application 4 overload relay by a class number indicating the maximum time in rules 2 and 3 when the temperature difference does not exceed seconds at which it will trip when carrying a current equal to 600 +10 °C (+18 °F). When the temperature difference is greater, see percent of its current rating. below. A Class 10 overload relay will trip in 10 seconds or less at a current 1. The Same Temperature at the Controller and the Motor — equal to 600 percent of its rating. Select the “Heater Type Number” with the listed “Full Load 5 Amperes” nearest the full load value shown on the motor A Class 20 overload relay will trip in 20 seconds or less at a current nameplate. -
Wou Women's Basketball
WOU WOMEN’S BASKETBALL - YEAR-BY-YEAR RESULTS 1976-77 (10-10) L62-67 Oregon H L47-67 Portland State A W62-41 Southern Oregon H L54-69 Washington H W68-65 Alaska Fairbanks H W59-52 Eastern Washington A W72-54 Central Washington A W65-59 Oregon State H L58-69 Seattle Pacific H L64-81 Washington A L46-78 Oregon A L45-53 Portland State H W61-45 Oregon State A W61-52 Southern Oregon A L61-66 Alaska Anchorage H L55-64 Alaska Anchorage N W77-59 Alaska Fairbanks N W58-55 Alaska Anchorage N W61-60 Oregon N1 L60-69 Washington N H 3-5; A 4-3; N 3-2 1977-78 (7-11) L45-79 Washington A L54-64 Western Washington A W63-46 Linfield H L51-74 Washington State H L52-66 Boise State H L58-73 Oregon H L57-62ot Oregon State A W77-53 Southern Oregon H W77-53 Portland State H L56-72 Alaska Anchorage H W46-42 Washington H L55-75 Western Washington H W79-48 Southern Oregon A W83-65 Lewis & Clark H L57-68 Portland State H L40-90 Oregon A L61-64 Montana State H W58-49 Montana H H 6-7; A 1-4; N 0-0 1978-79 (19-7) L75-76 Oregon State H W75-48 Eastern Oregon H W76-61 Alaska Anchorage H W68-39 Gonzaga (Wash.) A W62-53 Pacific Lutheran (Wash.) A L66-68 Alaska Fairbanks H L38-62 Alaska Fairbanks H W68-54 Seattle Pacific H W62-48 Lewis & Clark A W80-41 Linfield H W89-20 Oregon Tech H W77-65 Southern Oregon H L52-63 Portland State A L63-64 Southern Oregon N W72-32 George Fox N W72-30 Oregon Tech A W68-62 Southern Oregon A W77-52 Linfield A L74-75 Portland State H W78-68 Alaska Anchorage H H 7-4; A 6-1; N 1-1 1979-80 (25-4) AIAW Region 9 Champion W75-37 Northwest Nazarene (Idaho)