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The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation

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The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation what wrongs our armsmay do The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation AUGUST 2003 Martin Butcher, Director of Security Programs PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY what wrongs our armsmay do The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation © Physicians for Social Responsibility and Martin Butcher AUGUST 2003 Martin Butcher, Director of Security Programs PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................... 6 Glossary......................................................................................................................................................... 7 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................... 11 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 17 Chapter One: NBC Weapons Threats to the United States and its Allies ............................................ 23 The Ballistic Missile Threat .......................................................................................................... 25 NBC Weapons and Bunkers ........................................................................................................ 27 21st Century Proliferation: State Actors ..................................................................................... 29 21st Century Proliferation: Non-State Actors ............................................................................. 29 Table 1: State Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs.............................. 30 Does U.S. Policy Make the Threat Worse? ................................................................................. 31 Chapter Two: The Development of Counterproliferation Policy ........................................................... 33 Counterproliferation Since World War II .................................................................................... 33 A Long History of Proposed Nuclear Use in Counterproliferation ...................................... 34 The Establishment of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative .......................................... 35 Unilateralism and Preemption: Counterproliferation in the New National Security Strategy of the United States ........................................................................ 36 The Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy ..................................................... 36 The Essence of the Bush Doctrine ......................................................................................... 37 The Implications of Bush’s National Security Strategy for U.S. and Global Security .............. 39 The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction .......................................... 40 Preventing WMD Use ............................................................................................................. 41 Chapter Three: Adapting Nuclear Use Doctrine to the Needs of Counterproliferation ..................... 43 The Roots of the Bush Administration Nuclear Use Doctrine .................................................. 46 The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review............................................................................................... 48 Shifting NATO Policy and Doctrine ............................................................................................ 51 NATO and Counterproliferation ............................................................................................ 51 Changes in NATO Nuclear Policies and Operational Practice ............................................ 52 France and the U.K. – Doctrinal Opacity on Nuclear Counterproliferation ............................ 56 French Policy ............................................................................................................................ 56 British Policy ............................................................................................................................. 57 Counterproliferation and the European Union – A Moderate Alternative .............................. 58 Chapter Four: Military Options for Countering NBC Weapons ............................................................. 61 Defensive Options: Counterproliferation and Missile Defenses .............................................. 62 Offensive Options: Counterforce Capabilities Against an Adversary’s NBC Infrastructure... 62 Improved Capability Against Hardened Targets................................................................... 63 The Agent Defeat Weapon Program ..................................................................................... 63 A Role for Nuclear Weapons .................................................................................................. 64 Nuclear Weapons Options for Counterproliferation Missions ................................................. 66 Table 2: Phases 6.x Life Extensions Process ........................................................................ 67 Project PLYWD ......................................................................................................................... 68 The B61-mod 11....................................................................................................................... 69 A New Generation of Nuclear Weapons? ............................................................................. 70 Other Advanced Concepts ..................................................................................................... 72 Available Nuclear Weapons.................................................................................................... 72 Chapter Five: The Environmental and Health Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use .................... 75 The Health Effects of Nuclear Explosion ............................................................................... 77 Chapter Six: Conventional Weapons Options for Counterproliferation Missions ............................... 79 Thermobaric Weapons ................................................................................................................ 81 Chapter Seven: Legal and Military Constraints on Military Operations ................................................ 83 Counterproliferation and International Law: Can Preemptive or Preventive Strikes Be Justified Legally? ................................................................................. 83 Jus Ad Bellum .......................................................................................................................... 84 Jus In Bello ............................................................................................................................... 87 Can Counterproliferation Preemptive or Preventive Strikes Be Justified Militarily? .............. 88 Limited Military Utility of Nuclear Weapons .......................................................................... 90 Chapter Eight: Counterproliferation and the Non-Proliferation Regime .............................................. 93 An End to Negative Security Assurances? ................................................................................. 93 A Norm of Non-Possession? .......................................................................................................97 Jeopardizing the CTBT? ............................................................................................................ 100 Enhanced Test Readiness...................................................................................................... 100 Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................. 103 Preventing Nuclear Use ............................................................................................................. 104 Building a New Paradigm .......................................................................................................... 104 Ensure Compatibility of Counterproliferation Policy with Non-Proliferation Goals ........ 104 Renounce the First Use of Nuclear Weapons ..................................................................... 105 Renounce the Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Chemical or Biological Weapons ....... 105 Abandon the Development of New Nuclear Capabilities and Weapons ........................ 105 Promoting a Global Coalition for the Elimination of NBC Weapons .................................... 105 Ratify and Implement the CTBT ........................................................................................... 105 Strengthen and Expand Cooperative Threat Reduction and Non-Proliferation Programs .......................................................................................... 106 Negotiate Deep Cuts in Strategic Weapons and the Elimination of Tactical Nuclear Weapons .............................................................. 106 Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Role of the IAEA ........................................................... 106 Enhance Global Controls on Fissile Materials ..................................................................... 106 Pursue Non-Proliferation Responses to Biological and Chemical Weapons Terrorism ......................................................................................
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