Federation of American Scientists Special Report No 3 May 2012 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons By HANS M. KRISTENSEN 1 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons By HANS M. KRISTENSEN Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org 2 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Acknowledgments e following people provided valuable input and edits: Katie Colten, Mary-Kate Cunningham, Robert Nurick, Stephen Pifer, Nathan Pollard, and other reviewers who wish to remain anonymous. is report was made possible by generous support from the Ploughshares Fund. Analysis of satellite imagery was done with support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Image: personnel of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano Air Base in Italy load a B61 nuclear bomb trainer onto a F-16 fighter-bomber (Image: U.S. Air Force). 3 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 About FAS Founded in 1945 by many of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is devoted to the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labor are applied to the benefit of humankind. e founding mission was to prevent nuclear war. While nuclear security remains a major objective of FAS today, the organization has expanded its critical work to issues at the intersection of science and security. FAS publications are produced to increase the understanding of policymakers, the public, and the press about urgent issues in science and security policy. Individual authors who may be FAS staff or acknowledged experts from outside the institution write these reports. us, these reports do not represent an FAS institutional position on policy issues. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in this and other FAS Special Reports are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. For more information about FAS or publications and reports, please call 1-202-546-3300, email [email protected], or visit the website at www.FAS.org. Copyright © 2012 by the Federation of American Scientists. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. ISBN 978-1-938187-01-8 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org 4 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Table of Contents Acknowledgments ....................................................................................... 3 About FAS ................................................................................................... 4 Abbreviations .............................................................................................. 6 Foreword ..................................................................................................... 7 Introduction ................................................................................................ 8 U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons ......................................................... 11 Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons ................................................... 45 Profile: Kaliningrad Region ......................................................................... 70 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................ 79 About the Author .......................................................................................... 85 5 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Abbreviations ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile ACDA: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AS: Air-to-Surface ASMP: Air-Sol Moyenne Portee (Air-to-Ground Cruise Missile) ASMPA: Air-Sol Moyenne Portee Amélioré (Improved Air-to-Ground Cruise Missile) ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare CGN: Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser CONUS: Continental United States CRS: Congressional Research Service CV: Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier CVN: Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier DDG: Guided-Missile Destroyer DDPR: Deterrence and Defense Posture Review DIA: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency DOD: U.S. Department of Defense FOI: Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut (Swedish Defence Research Institute) GAO: Government Accountability Office GUMO: Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony (12th Main directorate) HLG: High-Level Group ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile JCS: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff km: kilometer MUNSS: Munitions Support Squadron NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPG: Nuclear Planning Group NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty NPR: Nuclear Posture Review NRDC: Natural Resources Defense Council RAF: Royal Air Force SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile SLBM: Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile SLCM: Sea-Launched Cruise Missile SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine SSGN: Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Submarine SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile SSN: Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine STRATCOM: U.S. Strategic Command Su: Sukhoi Tu: Tupolev Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org 6 Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Foreword Vision and leadership: those are the overarching themes of this insightful FAS Special Report by Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. As he underscores in this report, about twenty years ago at the end of the Cold War, U.S. President George H. W. Bush, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin seized the opportunity to re- duce nuclear dangers in a series of unilateral, but mutually reinforcing, steps by taking thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons off-alert and slating them for dismantle- ment. Mr. Kristensen argues that the time is ripe for new leadership in both the United States and Russia to take the next steps in phasing out U.S. non-strategic weapons de- ployed in Europe and in having Russia complete its commitments under the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, especially the requirement to eliminate its ground- launched nuclear weapons. is report also wisely points out that “non-strategic nuclear weapons are neither the problem nor the solution” to NATO European countries’ security concerns. ese weapons are anachronistic vestiges of Cold War thinking. e United States keeps non- strategic nuclear weapons in Europe because a few eastern European NATO allies are nervous about Russia, and as a card to play to get Russia to reduce its larger inventory of such weapons. Russia, for its part, maintains a large inventory of mainly outdated non-strategic weapons partly to compensate for what it sees as NATO's superiority in conventional weapons. Both justifications are poorly suited for the security concerns facing Europe today. Rather, Mr. Kristensen calls for the United States to declare vic- tory in its long-past mission of keeping these weapons in Europe and instead reaffirm that long-range strategic nuclear weapons can provide any nuclear deterrence missions. He advises that reductions and eventual elimination of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe proceed unilaterally but with a nudge to Russia to make recipro- cal steps and take part in formal negotiations to reduce its non-strategic nuclear weap- ons. Both NATO and Russia can and should realign their defense planning such that they recognize that they need not pose military threats to each other. is would fur- ther reduce the perceived need for non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. FAS is proud to publish this thoughtful report that provides practical recommen- dations for resolving the vexing issues of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. Charles D. Ferguson President Federation of American Scientists May 2012 7 Federation of American Scientists www.FAS.org Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons May 2012 Introduction Two decades after U.S. and Russian unilateral nuclear initiatives withdrew most non- strategic nuclear weapons from around the world to storage at home and scrapped most of the weapons, non-strategic nuclear weapons again have risen to the top of the nuclear arms control agenda. NATO is completing a review of its military posture, including the role and number of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the United States and Russia are considering how to include non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future arms control agreement. Russia, the United States, and NATO do not disclose how many non-strategic1 nu- clear weapons they have or where they are deployed. As a result, uncertainty and rumors fuel a debate full of half-truths, exaggerations and worst-case assumptions. This report estimates that Russia and the United States combined possess around 2,760 non-strategic nuclear weapons in their military stockpiles. Another 2,000-3,000 weapons have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. Since 1991, the United States has destroyed about 90 percent of its non-strategic nuclear weapons and devalued them in its military posture. Recently, however, the Obama administration has reaffirmed the importance of retaining some non-strategic nuclear weapons to extend a nuclear deterrent to allies. And the U.S. Congress has made further reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons conditioned on reducing the “disparity” in Russian non-strategic nuclear forces. Russia says it has destroyed 75 percent of its Cold War stockpile of non-strategic nu- clear weapons, but is insisting that at least some of the remaining weapons are needed to counter NATO’s conventional superiority and to defend its border with China. Follow- ing a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on April 19, 2012, Russian Foreign Minis-