Issue No. 1281 15 September 2017 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 //

Feature Item

“Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement”. Written by Kenneth Katzman, Paul Kerr and Valerie Heitshusen, published by the Congressional Research Service; September 7, 2017 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44942.pdf Trump Administration statements indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This report does not analyze the advantages and disadvantages of any specific option, or examine in detail the implications of any particular course of action. Those issues are examined in: CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Amid North Korea Tension, Mattis Heads to US Nuclear Weapons Bases • Trump Review Leans Toward Proposing Mini-Nuke • The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea • Federal Auditors Say US Nuclear Dump Running Out of Room US COUNTER-WMD • America's Defenses At Sea Are Getting a Big Upgrade • Radiation Security Tested On Maersk Ship • Applied DNA Enlists With Army’s Bio-Warfare Defenders • Did Homeland Security Ignore a Breakthrough Tool to Block Bioterrorism? A Trial Will Decide US ARMS CONTROL • Arms Control Experts Urge Trump to Honor Iran Nuclear Deal • Trump Moves Closer to Decertification of Iran Nuclear Deal • Nuclear Arms Control and Reductions in Jeopardy • Proliferation in The Age Of Uncertainty ASIA/PACIFIC • How North Korea’s Improved So Quickly • North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Satellite Imagery Shows Post-Test Effects and New Activity in Alternate Tunnel Portal Areas • S Korea Defiant in Face of New Sanctions, Vows to Pursue Nuclear Deterrence • Holes Forming in US Nuclear Umbrella, Some in Japan Argue EUROPE/RUSSIA • Russia's Use and Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium Pose Significant Nuclear Risks • Ban Treaty Contradicts Russia's National Interests • Russia Advocating Conciliatory Approach to North Korea • How Russia Quietly Undercuts Sanctions Intended to Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Program MIDDLE EAST • Just Bombed a Chemical Weapons Factory That Syria Shouldn’t Have Had • High Court Rejects Petition for More Oversight of Israel’s Nuclear Agency • Russia Will Never Let Iran Obtain Nuclear Weapons • US Moves Run Counter to Spirit, Letter of Nuclear Deal: Iran's IAEA Envoy INDIA/PAKISTAN • 'India Is Uranium-Rich Country': Nuclear Chief Dr Sekhar Basu • For China, ’64 N-Test Was Meant As A ‘Head-on Blow’ to India • India’s Mounting Nuclear Trade Aspirations • Exclusive: Pakistan Builds New Tunneled Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility in Baluchistan COMMENTARY • Talk About ‘Little Nukes’ Is Cover For Lacking A Foreign Policy Strategy • Editorial: Revamp of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Slow Going But Vital • To Neutralize the North Korean Threat, America Must First Understand the North Korean Regime • Save the INF Treaty—But Not By Repeating History

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US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DefenseOne (Washington, DC) Amid North Korea Tension, Mattis Heads to US Nuclear Weapons Bases By Marcus Weisgerber September 12, 2017 The U.S. defense secretary will inspect American ICBMs, then visit the military command that would lead a nuclear war. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis will visit two key American nuclear weapons bases this week as military forces in the Pacific remain on high alert following North Korea’s apparent hydrogen bomb test earlier this month. Days after Pyongyang released images of Kim Jong-Un inspecting what North Korea says is its first hydrogen bomb, the Trump administration’s Pentagon chief will highlight America’s much larger nuclear arsenal. Mattis on Wednesday will visit Minot Air Force Base, in North Dakota, which controls intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, scattered across the state, and is home to B-52 bombers, which can launch nuclear cruise missiles. On Thursday, the secretary is scheduled to visit U.S. Strategic Command, in Omaha, Nebraska, the military headquarters that would run a nuclear war. “His visit to two nuclear-focused locations comes at an opportune time given the ongoing Nuclear Posture and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews,” Pentagon officials said in a statement late Tuesday. The trip comes just weeks after North Korea fired an ICBM over Japan and said it tested a hydrogen bomb. South Korean officials now believe Pyongyang is planning to test-launch an ICBM. President Donald Trump ordered a review of U.S. nuclear forces soon after taking office in January. The Pentagon has said it hopes to finish the review by year’s end. Among the items reportedly under consideration are smaller nuclear bombs. The U.S. currently has 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, which date back to the 1970s. The U.S. Air Force took a step toward replacing them last month, hiring Boeing and Northrop Grumman to start developing technology and building parts for a new missile. Also last month, the Air Force awarded $900-million deals to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to start developing highly controversial nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Former Defense Secretary William Perry is among the vocal opponents of the new weapon who say it will destabilize foreign relations. The Pentagon is also in the midst of buying new nuclear-armed stealth bombers and submarines. The price tag for all of these upgrades and overhauls could be as much as $1.5 trillion over the next three decades, according to the Arms Control Association. Last month, Mattis visited a Navy Ohio-class nuclear submarine base in Washington state. After the stop at Minot, he will have visited all three “legs” of the U.S. . The U.S. military has worked to sharpen procedures and training in its nuclear forces after a series of embarrassing incidents in the mid-1990s. In 2007, a B-52 mistakenly flew live nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Six months later, it was revealed that the military — in 2006 — mistakenly shipped ICBM fuses to Taiwan, instead of helicopter batteries.

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And just in the last five years, commanders have had to deal with cheating scandals involving nuclear-related service members in the Air Force and Navy, and a scandal involving illicit drug use by military personnel who guard nuclear weapons. http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/09/amid-north-korea-tension-mattis-heads-us-nuclear- weapons-bases/140943/?oref=d-river Return to top

Politico (Washington, DC) Trump Review Leans Toward Proposing Mini-Nuke By Bryan Bender September 9, 2017 It would be a major reversal from the Obama administration, which sought to limit reliance on nuclear arms. The Trump administration is considering proposing smaller, more tactical nuclear weapons that would cause less damage than traditional thermonuclear bombs — a move that would give military commanders more options but could also make the use of atomic arms more likely. A high-level panel created by President Donald Trump to evaluate the nuclear arsenal is reviewing various options for adding a more modern "low-yield" bomb, according to sources involved in the review, to further deter Russia, North Korea or other potential nuclear adversaries. Approval of such weapons — whether designed to be delivered by missile, aircraft or special forces — would mark a major reversal from the Obama administration, which sought to limit reliance on nuclear arms and prohibited any new weapons or military capabilities. And critics say it would only make the actual use of atomic arms more likely. "This capability is very warranted," said one government official familiar with the deliberations who was not authorized to speak publicly about the yearlong Nuclear Posture Review, which Trump established by executive order his first week in office. "The [nuclear review] has to credibly ask the military what they need to deter enemies," added another official who supports such a proposal, particularly to confront Russia, which has raised the prominence of tactical nuclear weapons in its battle plans in recent years, including as a first-strike weapon. "Are [current weapons] going to be useful in all the scenarios we see?" The idea of introducing a smaller-scale warhead to serve a more limited purpose than an all-out nuclear Armageddon is not new — and the U.S. government still retains some -era weapons that fit the category, including several that that can be "dialed down" to a smaller blast. Yet new support for adding a more modern version is likely to set off a fierce debate in Congress, which would ultimately have to fund it, and raises questions about whether it would require a resumption of explosive nuclear tests after a 25-year moratorium and how other nuclear powers might respond. The Senate is expected to debate the issue of new nuclear options next week when it takes up the National Defense Authorization Act. The push is also almost sure to reignite concerns on the part of some lawmakers who say they already don’t trust Trump with the nuclear codes and believe he has dangerously elevated their prominence in U.S. national security by publicly dismissing arms control treaties and talking opening about unleashing "fire and fury" on North Korea.

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"If the U.S. moves now to develop a new nuclear weapon, it will send exactly the wrong signal at a time when international efforts to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons are under severe challenge," said Steven Andreasen, a State Department official in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush who served as the director of arms control on the National Security Council in the Clinton administration. "If the world's greatest conventional and nuclear military power decides it cannot defend itself without new nuclear weapons, we will undermine our ability to prevent other nations from developing or enhancing their own nuclear capabilities and we will further deepen the divisions between the U.S. and other responsible countries." The details of what is being considered are classified, and a National Security Council spokeswoman said "it is too early to discuss" the panel's deliberations, which are expected to wrap up by the end of the year. But the review — which is led by the Pentagon and supported by the Department of Energy, which maintains the nation's nuclear warheads — is undertaking a broad reassessment of the nation's nuclear requirements — including its triad of land-based, sea-based and air-launched weapons. The reassessment, the first of its kind since the one completed for President Barack Obama in 2010, is intended "to ensure that the United States' nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies," Trump directed. The United States has long experience with lower-yield nuclear devices, or those on the lower range of kilotons. For example, the bombs the United States dropped on Japan in World War II were in the 15- to 20-kiloton range, while most modern nuclear weapons, like the warhead that is mounted on submarine-launched missiles, are reportedly as large as 475 kilotons. The device tested by North Korea earlier this week was reportedly 140 kilotons. So-called mini-nukes were a prominent element of the American arsenal during the early decades of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union's conventional military capabilities far outstripped those of the United States and military commanders relied on battlefield nuclear weapons to make up for the vulnerability. In the early 1950s, the Pentagon developed a nuclear rocket known as the "Honest John" that was deployed to Europe as a means of deterring a massive Russian invasion. The Pentagon later introduced the so-called Davy Crockett, a bazooka with a nuclear munition in the range of 10 to 20 tons. "We even had atomic demolition munitions," said Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's top weapons tester in the 1990s, who also managed nuclear weapons programs at the Department of Energy. "They were made small enough so that U.S. Army soldiers could carry them in a backpack. It was a very heavy backpack. You wouldn’t want to carry them very far." More recently, during the administration of George W. Bush, the Pentagon sought to modify one of its current warheads — the B61 — so it could be tailored to strike smaller targets such as underground bunkers, like the type used by North Korea and Iran to conceal illicit weapons programs. The so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator was intended to rely on a modified version of the B61, a nuclear bomb dropped from aircraft. But that effort was nixed by Congress. The nuclear review now reviving the issue is taking some of its cues from a relatively obscure Pentagon study that was published in December, at the tail end of the Obama administration, the officials with knowledge of the process said. That report by the Defense Science Board, a Pentagon advisory panel, set off what one Pentagon official called a "dust-up" when it urged the military to consider "a more flexible nuclear enterprise

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // that could produce, if needed, a rapid, tailored nuclear options for limited use should existing non- nuclear or nuclear options prove insufficient." But the finding "emerged from a serious rethinking about how future regional conflicts involving the United States and its allies could play out," John Harvey, who served as adviser to the secretary of Defense for nuclear, chemical and biological programs between 2009 and 2013, recounted at a Capitol Hill event in June. "There is increasing concern that, in a conventional conflict, an adversary could employ very limited nuclear use as part of a strategy to maximize gains or minimize losses," he explained. Some call this an "'escalate to win' strategy." Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at an appearance before a defense industry group last month, described the rationale this way: "If the only options we have now are to go with high-yield weapons that create a level of indiscriminate killing that the president can't accept, we haven't provided him with an option." But critics question the logic of responding to Russian moves in kind. "[Vladimir] Putin's doctrine and some of his statements and those of his military officers are reckless," said Andrew Weber, who served as assistant secretary of Defense responsible for nuclear policy in the Obama administration. "Does that mean we should ape and mimic his reckless doctrine?" "The premise that our deterrent is not credible because we don't have enough smaller options — or smaller nuclear weapons — is false," he added in an interview. "We do have them." For example, he cited the B61, which recently underwent a refurbishment and can be as powerful as less than a kiloton up to 340 kilotons, and the , which is fitted to an air-launched cruise missile that can deliver a nuclear blast as low as five kilotons or as high as 80, according to public data. A new, more modern version of a low-yield nuke, he added, would "increase reliance on nuclear weapons. It is an old Cold War idea." Joe Cirincione, president of Ploughshares Fund, a foundation that advocates reducing nuclear arms, also took issue with the argument for more nuclear options. "They decry the Russian argument," he said of the proponents, "but it is is exactly the policy they are now favoring: advocating for use of a nuclear weapon early in a conflict." "It is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which we would need a military option in between our formidable conventional capabilities and our current low-yield nuclear weapons capabilities," added Alexandra Bell, a former State Department arms control official. "Lawmakers should be very wary of any attempt to reduce the threshold for nuclear use. There is no such thing as a minor nuclear war." Others also express alarm that depending on what type of device the review might recommend, it might require the United States to restart nuclear tests to ensure its viability. The United States hasn't detonated a nuclear weapon since 1992. "If we actually started testing nuclear weapons, all hell would break loose," said Coyle, who is now on the board of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, a Washington think tank. "In today’s environment, if the U.S. were to test low-yield nuclear weapons, others might start testing. Russia, Iran, China, Pakistan, India. It would certainly give North Korea reason to test as often as they wanted.”

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In Cirincione's view, the idea is fueled by economic, not security reasons. "This is nuclear pork disguised as ," he said. "This is a jobs program for a few government labs and a few contractors. This is an insane proposal. It would lower the threshold for nuclear use. It would make nuclear war more likely. It comes from the illusion that you could use a nuclear weapon and end a conflict on favorable terms. Once you cross the nuclear threshold, you are inviting a nuclear response." But others involved in the deliberations contend that if the administration seeks funding for a new tactical nuke, it might get a far more receptive audience in Congress. Already Republicans are pushing to build a new cruise missile that some say would violate the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia — a direct response to Moscow's violations of the arms control pact. The Senate is expected to debate the issue next week when it takes up the defense policy bill, which includes a controversial provision similar to one already passed by the House. http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/09/trump-reviews-mini-nuke-242513 Return to top

Scout Warrior (Minnetonka, MN) The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea By Kyle Mizokami September 10, 2017 American tactical nuclear weapons were stationed on the Korean Peninsula for much of the Cold War, on call and ready to repel a North Korean attack. Nuclear bombs, American tactical nuclear weapons were stationed on the Korean Peninsula for much of the Cold War, on call and ready to repel a North Korean attack. Nuclear bombs, artillery shells and missile warheads were withdrawn from Korea in 1991. Now, as reports surface—and are later denied—of South Korean requests to return tactical nuclear weapons to U.S. bases in Korea, it’s a good time to reflect on the history of the weapons and why they were sent to the country in the first place. The U.S. history of nuclear weapons and Korea dates back to the Korean War, when President Harry S. Truman debated using nuclear weapons to stanch the China’s Thanksgiving counteroffensive. The following spring, nine nuclear bombs were transferred to Okinawa, along with nuclear-capable B- 29 bombers, in case the decision was made to use them. Truman went so far as to predelegate authority to use the bombs to Gen. Matthew Ridgway, commander of U.S. forces in Korea, but Ridgway declined to use them. Nuclear weapons were first based on the Korean peninsula in 1958, as a result of the U.S. Army’s reorganization of combat divisions into the so-called “Pentomic” structure thought to be ideal for battlefield . U.S. Army forces in Korea received M442 nuclear shells for 203mm (8- inch) howitzers. Armed with a twelve-kiloton nuclear warhead, the M442 had a range of eleven miles. Army forces in Korea also received the Honest John artillery rocket, widely considered the first American , with had a range of 5.3 to 15.7 miles. Honest John was equipped with a W7 warhead with a yield of ten kilotons or a warhead with a sixty-kiloton yield. Under army control, the M442 and the Honest John would be used against advancing waves of North Korean troops, wiping out entire brigade-sized formations of the Korean People’s Army with

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // the heat and blast of a nuclear explosion and contaminating the area with deadly radioactive fallout. Another weapon deployed in 1958, the atomic demolition mine could be placed along likely North Korean advance routes. Highly mobile at just sixty pounds, the mine could be deployed just before an attack and had a yield of twenty kilotons. In 1958, the U.S. Air Force deployed fifteen Matador cruise missiles in South Korea. Matador missiles flew at subsonic speeds, had a 620 mile range and carried a forty-kiloton nuclear warhead. The missiles, under the control of the 310th Tactical Missile Squadron at Osan Air Base, were only briefly in service before being withdrawn in 1961. Matador missiles would have almost certainly have been launched at Pyongyang and other strategic North Korean locations. The U.S. Army deployed surface-to-air missiles to South Korea in 1961. Nike Hercules had an effective range of seventy-five miles and included the W7 warhead with a yield of two or twenty kilotons and later the W31 with a yield of two, twenty or forty kilotons. Rumor has it one mission of Nike Hercules batteries in South Korea was to use them as surface-to-surface missiles, laying down a carpet of radioactivity along the DMZ. Although the rumor has yet to be corroborated, Nike Hercules did have a surface-to-surface capability and was the basis for South Korea’s first generation surface-to-surface missile, NHK-1, or Hyunmoo-1. In 1961 the air force replaced the Matador cruise missile with the Mace, and by 1962, the U.S. Army in Korea added the Sergeant surface to surface missile, a missile with a 200 kiloton nuclear warhead and a range of seventy-five miles. The M28/29 Davy Crockett tactical nuclear recoilless rifle, with a ten to twenty ton nuclear yield, was in service in Korea from 1962 to 1968. In 1964, the Army deployed the M454 155mm with the warhead. The W48 warhead was sub-kiloton in yield, providing an explosive equivalent to just 70 to 100 tons of TNT. The U.S. Air Force maintained an arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs in Korea. B43 and B57 bombs were likely stored on the peninsula, and B61 bombs were stationed in South Korea when all nuclear weapons were ordered removed in 1991. Air Force F-4D Phantom II fighters were the delivery vehicles and nuclear bombs were stored at Osan Air Base, Kunsan Air Base, and Kwangju Air Bases. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed to South Korea were kept a high state of readiness, not only as a hedge against a no-notice invasion by North Korea but also as part of the Single Integrated Operating Plan, or SIOP, that would govern an all-out nuclear war. As part of the SIOP, the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Force Base kept four Phantom fighters loaded with nuclear weapons ready at all times. At the height of the Cold War deployment, U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea numbered approximately 950 weapons of all types. By the 1970s the Army and Air Force had phased out all nuclear rockets, surface to surface missiles, and cruise missiles from South Korea, leaving artillery shells and gravity bombs the only tactical nuclear weapons remaining in-country. The United States pulled all tactical nuclear weapons out of South Korea in 1991. If United States and South Korea agreed to return tactical nuclear weapons to the Korea, what weapons are available? With the dismantling of the last tactical nuclear artillery shell in 2003, the only remaining tactical nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal are an estimated 500 B-61 gravity bombs. U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter bombers based at Osan or Kunsan Air Bases are the logical deployment systems for the B-61. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea lasted decades before being ended in 1991. North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems arguably makes such weapons vulnerable to attack. While B-61 bombs in South Korea would make them more responsive to U.S. forces in an emergency, they would be less secure, vulnerable to North Korean missiles. They might also force North Korea into developing a doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare,

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // making them more likely to be used in a general war scenario. The era of tactical nuclear weapons based in South Korea is likely over. http://scout.com/military/warrior/Article/The-History-of-US-Nuclear-Weapons-in-South-Korea- 107229766 Return to top

ABC News (New York, NY) Federal Auditors Say US Nuclear Dump Running Out of Room By Susan Montoya Bryan September 7, 2017 The only underground nuclear waste repository in the United States doesn't have enough space for radioactive tools, clothing and other debris left over from decades of bomb-making and research, much less tons of weapons-grade plutonium that the nation has agreed to eliminate as part of a pact with Russia, federal auditors said. In addition, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that the U.S. Energy Department has no plans for securing regulatory approvals and expanding the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico before it reaches capacity in less than a decade. "DOE modeling that is needed to begin the regulatory approval process is not expected to be ready until 2024," the auditors said in their report released Tuesday. Energy Department officials contend there's enough time to design and build addition storage before existing operations are significantly affected. A Senate committee requested the review from auditors amid concerns about ballooning costs and delays in the U.S. effort to dispose of 34 metric tons of its plutonium. Citing the delays and other reasons, Russia last fall suspended its commitment to get rid of its own excess plutonium. The U.S. has not made a final decision about how to proceed. However, the Energy Department agrees with auditors about the need to expand disposal space at the repository and devise guidance for defense sites and federal laboratories to better estimate how much radioactive waste must be shipped to New Mexico as the U.S. cleans up Cold War-era contamination. Don Hancock, director of the nuclear waste safety program at the Southwest Research and Information Center in Albuquerque, said he was pleased the auditors acknowledged the space limitations and hoped the report would spur a public discussion about how to handle the surplus plutonium and waste from bomb-making and nuclear research. "The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, it was never supposed to be the one and only," Hancock said. "So it's past time to start the discussion of what other disposal sites we're going to have." The New Mexico repository was carved out of an ancient salt formation about a half-mile below the desert, with the idea that shifting salt would eventually entomb the radioactive tools, clothing, gloves and other debris. The facility resumed operations earlier this year following a shutdown that followed a 2014 radiation release caused by inappropriate packaging of waste by workers at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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The release contaminated part of the underground disposal area and caused other problems that further limited space. Federal auditors say another two disposal vaults would have to be carved out to accommodate the waste already in the government's inventory. More space would be needed for the weapons-grade plutonium. The initial plan called for conversion of the excess plutonium into a mixed oxide fuel that would render it useless for making weapons and could be used in nuclear reactors. However, the estimated cost of building a conversion facility at the Energy Department's Savannah River site in South Carolina has grown from $1.4 billion in 2004 to more than $17 billion. About $5 billion already has been spent on the facility. Estimates also show it would take until 2048 to complete the facility. Faced with the skyrocketing cost, the government began considering whether it would be cheaper to dilute the plutonium and entomb it at the plant in New Mexico. No final decisions have been made. Federal auditors say without developing a long-term plan, the Energy Department may be forced to slow or suspend waste shipments from sites across the U.S. and compromise cleanup deadlines negotiated with state regulators. http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/watchdog-agency-us-nuclear-dump-running-room- 49684101 Return to top

US COUNTER-WMD

The National Interest (Washington, DC) America's Missile Defenses at Sea Are Getting a Big Upgrade By Dave Majumdar September 10, 2017 The United States Navy has successfully tested its potent new Raytheon AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) against simultaneous air and ballistic missile threats. The powerful Gallium Nitride [3]-based active electronically scanned array radar will replace the Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1D phased array radar on future Block III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers as the core of the Aegis combat system. According to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), the AMDR performed exactly as expected during the September 7 test event, which was designated Vigilant Talon. During the test, at 13:38 local time— or 19:38 Eastern Daylight Time—the Navy simultaneously launched a short-range ballistic missile target and multiple air-to-surface cruise missile targets off the west coast of Hawaii to put the new radar though its paces. The AN/SPY-6(V) searched for, detected and maintained track on all targets throughout their trajectories, according to NAVSEA. It was the third ballistic missile defense test for the new radar.

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"This radar was specifically designed to handle ballistic missiles and cruise missiles simultaneously, and it's doing just that," Capt. Seiko Okano, NAVSEA’s major program manager for Above Water Sensors, Program Executive Office (PEO) Integrated Warfare Systems (IWS), said in a statement. [4] "AMDR is successfully demonstrating performance in a series of increasingly difficult test events and is on track to deliver advanced capability to the Navy's first Flight III Destroyer." According to NAVSEA, the Navy’s test successfully met its “primary objectives” against a “complex short range ballistic missile” and “multiple air-to-surface cruise missile” targets simultaneously based on preliminary data. NAVSEA will have to take a more detailed look at the data to fully evaluate the SPY-6 radar’s performance based upon telemetry and other data obtained during the test. With its Gallium Nitride technology, the SPY-6 is roughly 30 times more powerful than the current 12-foot SPY-1 array with an antenna that is just two feet larger at 14 feet. The new radar also has much greater dynamic range compared to the SPY-1—particularly in areas with lots of interference from other emitters, jammers and clutter. The SPY-6 also has digital beam-forming capability, which enables rapid horizon-to-horizon surveillance of air targets while simultaneously devoting much more energy toward ballistic missile defense. Huntington Ingalls Industries will start building the first Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer— the future USS Jack H. Lucas—in fiscal year 2019. The new destroyers will form the core the of the Navy’s surface fleet until the service eventually develops a future surface combatant that will eventually replace both the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke hull form. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-missile-defenses-sea-are-getting-big-upgrade- 22247 Return to top

Port Technology (London, UK) Radiation Security Tested on Maersk Ship Author Not Attributed September 11, 2017 US government security teams have executed a container-climbing trial designed to safely place radiation detection equipment on and around stacked cargo containers aboard the vessel Maersk Detroit. Members of US agency National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), specifically the Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team (NRAT), conducted advanced maritime training aboard the vessel while it was on a voyage last month. During the tests the 6,300 TEU containership was fully loaded with commercial cargo as it sailed from Savannah, Georgia, to Houston NRAT is a deployable team of experts that provides critical scientific and technical advice to domestic and international partners in response to a nuclear or radiological threat. NRAT team members then recorded data from specialized radiation detection equipment designed to detect weak or shielded radiation sources. Aboard the Maersk Detroit, NRAT team members conduct radiation mapping measurements on the weather deck.

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The NRAT unit that participated in this exercise was composed of scientists, engineers and technicians from Joint Base Andrews near Washington, DC and Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas, US. Over the last 20 years, NRAT has developed and refined specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures to better locate and identify radioactive material on container ships. Lonnie Swindell, program manager for NNSA’s Office of Nuclear Incident Response, said: “Combining those tactics, techniques, and procedures with specialized tools and detection instrumentation, NRAT has become the most capable entity in the world for handling this type of operation. “At the same time, the team was able to address the challenges and complexities of radiological detection on a large vessel while at sea.” https://www.porttechnology.org/news/us_tests_radiation_security_aboard_maersk_ship Return to top

Innovateli (New York, NY) Applied DNA Enlists with Army’s Bio-Warfare Defenders By Gregory Zeller September 12, 2017 Applied DNA Sciences is in the Army now. Already under U.S. Department of Defense contract on a number of different projects, the Stony Brook-based biotech has entered into a new Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center. Best known as a developer and distributor of in-house botanical-DNA-based security and authentication protocols, Applied DNA is lending its expertise in a slightly different capacity this time: Its science teams will study the potential commercialization of somebody else’s technology, specifically the ECBC’s innovative “DNA microarray.” Functioning primarily as the nation’s principal R&D resource for non-medical chemical and biological defense, the ECBC has developed an in-field DNA-based tracking system that could soon emerge as an impenetrable safeguard for both military and commercial supply chains – precisely the direction Applied DNA wants to evolve its own authentication technologies, according to President and CEO James Hayward. “Rapid, hand-held DNA detection has long been a goal of ours and is essential to the long-term growth of our technology platform,” Hayward said Tuesday. The company is therefore “honored” to enlist with the Army and to study the ECBC tech “as a complement to our DNA authentication products,” the CEO added, noting the DNA microarray breaks new ground by being “capable of rapid detection anywhere, anytime, for global supply chains.” The Cooperative Research and Development Agreement is part of the Defense Logistics Agency Rapid Innovation Fund award secured by Applied DNA in June. Under the terms of the CRADA, Applied DNA researchers will work with ECBC experts to cooperatively study the feasibility of applying ECBC’s microarray technology to “varied supply chains.”

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The handheld microarray allows for detection of DNA tags “within a few minutes,” according to Applied DNA. The project will demonstrate the system using Applied DNA’s proprietary DNA taggants, which will be introduced to standard inks and varnishes and various surfaces – no “amplification” or other prep work required, according to the company, “greatly simplifying in-field DNA detection.” The project is a golden opportunity for the Stony Brook biotech. The Edgewood Chemical Biological Center – which facilitates hundreds of top engineers, technicians and other science specialists at sites in Maryland, Arkansas, Illinois and Utah – offers what Applied DNA called “an unrivaled chemical-biological research-and-development infrastructure.” The ECBC’s unique focus – protecting warfighters, first responders and citizens from chemical and biological warfare agents – creates “a unique role in technology development that cannot be duplicated by private industry or research universities,” Applied DNA added. Not a bad partner for a biotech with a unique authentication platform and universal aspirations, according to Hayward, who noted Applied DNA’s “continued efforts to commercialize technologies made available under our ongoing DoD contracts.” “This mutually beneficial cooperative research-and-development project parallels our ongoing partnership with several Department of Defense agencies,” the CEO said. “We believe the ECBC’s technology is extremely promising and are excited to work alongside it on this next-generation data capture.” http://www.innovateli.com/applied-dna-enlists-armys-bio-warfare-defenders/ Return to top

Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles, CA) Did Homeland Security Ignore a Breakthrough Tool to Block Bioterrorism? A Trial Will Decide By David Willman September 8, 2017 Four years ago, a top Department of Homeland Security scientist reported a potential breakthrough in the government’s race to detect deadly pathogens spread by bioterrorists or nature — germs that could cause calamitous infections. A Silicon Valley company called NVS Technologies appeared on track to build a portable device that would swiftly and accurately analyze air samples from sensors deployed nationwide, and determine whether they contained anthrax spores or other lethal germs. "NVS has done a tremendous job in fulfilling our requirements,’’ Segaran Pillai, Homeland Security’s chief medical and science advisor, wrote in a seven-page internal report dated June 13, 2013. He recommended continued funding for NVS "to ensure a successful outcome for the Nation.’’ But the promising project was abruptly halted in February 2014 — six months before NVS engineers were due to deliver prototypes. A new acting division director at Homeland Security terminated the NVS contract for "convenience,” a legal term that gives the government broad leeway in oversight of its contracts.

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More than three years later, Homeland Security has yet to find a reliable way to quickly detect biowarfare agents and the cause of unusual disease outbreaks, a key vulnerability in the defenses hastily erected after the terrorist attacks of 2001. The contract dispute with NVS now is headed to court. A three-day trial is scheduled to start on Sept. 12 in Washington before an administrative law judge of the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. A decision may not be issued for weeks. A company typically faces a heavy legal burden to prove a federal contract termination was made in bad faith. But the case highlights a far larger problem: how the government’s costly campaign to block the threat of bioterrorism has yet to produce a dependable solution. And although the path to innovation is lined with unmet promises, the NVS case remains a puzzle. A review by the Los Angeles Times of government documents and sworn testimony, and interviews with senior scientists and present and former government officials, show the proposed NVS technology — a 10-pound, touch-screen device costing about $15,000 apiece — had won uncommon praise from scientific experts at federal agencies in line to use it. “I couldn’t believe that they would terminate this contract, considering how far along the technology was,’’ said Stephen A. Morse, a microbiologist who monitored the NVS project for the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The CDC, Morse said in an interview, hoped to use the NVS device to detect bioterrorism and "causative agents’’ of respiratory tract infections. "I think it had tremendous potential,” he said. Shutting down the project "betrayed the nation,’’ said the NVS chief executive, Hans Fuernkranz, a molecular biologist who has developed widely used tools for analyzing genetic materials. “I’m absolutely flabbergasted at what happened.’’ A lawyer for NVS Technologies, James S. DelSordo, argued in a pretrial brief that the government owes NVS $286 million for lost sales and related costs. The company, he wrote, was victimized by government "mismanagement and a campaign to harm its business which culminated in the inappropriate termination of the contract.’’ A government lawyer, Christopher M. Kovach, countered that "there exists no evidence’’ that Homeland Security "possessed an intent to injure’’ NVS. The official who terminated the contract "decided to prioritize” other research and development efforts, Kovach wrote. Homeland Security also lodged a counterclaim, seeking $606,771 that it says it overpaid NVS. The case stems back to the widespread fear that erupted after several anthrax-laced letters sent through the U.S. mail killed five Americans shortly after the 2001 terrorist attacks. In response, President George W. Bush authorized ambitious efforts to prevent biological attacks that could cause mass casualties. The CDC began to stockpile therapeutics for rapid deployment against likely bioagents. And in his 2003 State of the Union address, Bush announced deployment of "the nation’s first early-warning network of sensors to detect biological attack.’’ All told, the various federal efforts have cost about $21 billion so far — but with mixed results. By early 2010, for instance, it was clear to government scientists that the nationwide system for swiftly and reliably detecting a bioterrorism attack — called BioWatch — was not working as promised.

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BioWatch, which had cost nearly $1 billion to install and operate by then, took up to 36 hours to gather and analyze potential pathogens. Worse, its sensors had falsely warned of dozens of germ attacks in major cities — including at the Democratic National Convention in Denver in 2008. So Homeland Security looked for ways to improve BioWatch. In April 2010, it awarded a contract, initially worth up to $18.3 million, to NVS Technologies, based in Menlo Park, Calif. The NVS device was designed for public health labs that used the BioWatch data, as well as for hospitals and doctors’ offices. Instead of 36 hours, the device was supposed to identify a germ in less than an hour. According to the company, material from a BioWatch air filter or a patient’s throat swab would be injected into a sample port in the NVS device. It then would purify the sample and analyze its genetic material for dozens of potential pathogens. Pillai and his colleagues at Homeland Security, who were overseeing the NVS contract, teamed with scientists from other agencies seeking biodetection technology — including the Secret Service, the Food and Drug Administration and the CDC. In June 2013, the director of Pillai’s division expanded the contract to $23.4 million. Prototypes were supposed to be ready the following summer for advanced testing at three government laboratories. Sally A. Hojvat, the FDA division director who could ultimately decide whether to grant regulatory clearance for the NVS device, was enthusiastic. "We strongly believe the government must take the initiative to make this happen if we plan to have a highly robust diagnostics and surveillance program to capture a potential biological attack early and also to support the clinical intervention/mitigation and save lives,’’ she wrote in a Dec. 4, 2013, e-mail to Pillai. But Donald Woodbury, who had been put in charge of Pillai’s division in September 2013, was unpersuaded. Woodbury had spent much of his career at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which developed stealth technology and other sophisticated tools for the Pentagon. He voiced doubt about the NVS technology and canceled the contract. The termination drew scrutiny from House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and from Homeland Security’s inspector general. In meetings with them, Woodbury defended his decision, saying the government could find suitable commercial technology. In a February 2015 report, Inspector General John Roth rejected Woodbury’s arguments. "We did not identify evidence to substantiate any of the concerns,” he wrote. A month later, an assistant inspector general, Mark Bell, requested in a two-page memo that colleagues conduct a deeper investigation. Woodbury’s actions were “questionable because numerous” federal experts believed the NVS device “was meeting its milestones to provide a very promising piece of equipment,” he wrote. Woodbury defended his actions as proper. He said in a pretrial affidavit that he had opposed the "public health’’ aspect of the NVS project and that it "did not represent the best use’’ of taxpayer money. Woodbury conceded in separate deposition testimony that Pillai, a microbiologist, "had the greatest expertise,’’ but said they disagreed about the merits of the technology. The contract was awarded before he took charge and “all I could do was fix it,’’ he said.

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Woodbury retired from Homeland Security at the end of 2016. “I think that I acted appropriately as a steward of government resources,” he told The Times this week regarding the NVS project. Without the federal contract, NVS abandoned work on the technology and laid off all 35 of its employees in 2014, Fuernkranz said in an interview. He now works as a consultant to venture capital firms. And BioWatch, the nation’s dubious sentry for bioterrorism, remains unchanged — slow and unreliable at a cost of about $80 million a year. http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-germ-suit-20170910-story.html Return to top

US ARMS CONTROL

The New York Times (New York, NY) Arms Control Experts Urge Trump to Honor Iran Nuclear Deal By Rick Gladstone September 13, 2017 Alarmed that President Trump may soon take steps that could unravel the international nuclear agreement with Iran, more than 80 disarmament experts urged him on Wednesday to reconsider and said the accord was working. In a joint statement, the experts said the 2015 agreement, negotiated by the Obama administration and the governments of Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia, was a “net plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.” Because of the monitoring powers contained in the agreement, they said, Iran’s capability to produce nuclear weapons has been sharply reduced. They also said the agreement made it “very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly.” Mr. Trump has repeatedly assailed the agreement — a signature achievement of his predecessor — describing it as “a terrible deal” and a giveaway to Iran. He also has said that he believes Iran is violating the accord, an assertion that has been contradicted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear monitor that polices Iran’s compliance. The accord, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, severely limited Iran’s nuclear activities in return for ending or easing many sanctions that were hurting the Iranian economy. Under an American law, Mr. Trump must recertify every 90 days that Iran is complying with the nuclear accord, or the American sanctions that were lifted could be reinstated. The next 90-day deadline is in mid-October. When he reluctantly signed the last recertification in July, Mr. Trump said, “If it was up to me, I would have had them noncompliant 180 days ago.” The possibility that Mr. Trump may find a reason to declare Iran noncompliant, regardless of the merits, alarmed the nonproliferation experts.

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They warned in their statement that “unilateral action by the United States, especially on the basis of unsupported contentions of Iranian cheating, would isolate the United States.” Last week, Mr. Trump’s ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki R. Haley, suggested in a Washington speech that the president would be justified in decertifying Iran even if it was technically honoring the accord. Iranian officials have said that any resumption of the nuclear-related sanctions by the United States would violate the deal. Whether that would lead to its unraveling is unclear, but President Hassan Rouhani of Iran has suggested the country could quickly restore the nuclear-fuel enrichment capabilities that had been limited by the agreement. The signers of the statement urging Mr. Trump to respect the agreement are experts in nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy from around the world. They included Nobuyasu Abe, commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission; Hans Blix, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Thomas E. Shea, a former safeguards official at the International Atomic Energy Agency; and Thomas M. Countryman, a former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation. The statement was organized by the Arms Control Association, a disarmament advocacy group based in Washington. The Trump administration’s concerns with Iran have come as the United Nations Security Council, prodded by the United States, has ratcheted up pressure on North Korea to stop its nuclear and missile testing and resume disarmament talks. Kelsey Davenport, the director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, expressed worry that if the administration abandoned the Iran agreement, any possibility of inducing North Korea to negotiate would be lost. “Given that we are already struggling to contain the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis, it would be extremely unwise for the president to initiate steps that could unravel the highly successful 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which would create a second major nonproliferation crisis,” she said. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-trump.html Return to top

The Strategist (Canberra, Australia) Trump Moves Closer to Decertification of Iran Nuclear Deal By Mohammed Ayoob September 12, 2017 It looks increasingly likely that President Trump will not certify to the US Congress that Iran has met its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action when it comes time to do so in October. That, as US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley noted in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute, would not necessarily invalidate the nuclear deal, but would leave it up to Congress to decide whether the US remains a party to the accord. The requirement to certify Iranian compliance is not a part of the JCPOA, but was created by the US Congress in the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act. It’s a requirement of US law, not of the JCPOA itself.

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If Trump decides not to certify, the onus would be on Congress to choose whether to continue to comply with the JCPOA or withdraw from the nuclear agreement. Congress would have 60 days to make that determination. If Congress decides that Iran isn’t in compliance with the JCPOA or that it’s not in the US’s security interest to continue implementing the deal, it could re-impose sanctions on Iran that were removed after the nuclear agreement was reached in 2015. Ambassador Haley, in her speech to the AEI, deliberately broadened the subject of compliance to include other concerns, such as Iranian missile activity, its support for groups that the United States considers to be terrorists, and its policies of ‘destabilising’ the Middle East. She argued that the president and Congress are likely to decide the issue of Iran’s compliance and the re-imposition of sanctions on the basis of such broader considerations, in addition to the precise issue of Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA, which was directed specifically at restraining Iran’s nuclear-weapons- related program in return for removal of sanctions. Given Haley’s closeness to the president and in light of speculations in Washington that she may soon replace Rex Tillerson as secretary of state, it appears that her remarks were meant to preview the decision that Trump is likely to make next month. His impending decision to decertify, in combination with Congress’s strong and widely signaled inclination to re-impose sanctions on Iran, means that there’s a very good chance that the US would withdraw from the nuclear deal. Such a decision would not only mean a return to the worst days of American–Iranian antagonism, it could open the way for Iran to withdraw from the JCPOA as well. If Tehran decides to do so, it could return quickly to enriching uranium up to weapons-grade level, and it could resume work at the Arak heavy-water plant in order to move down the plutonium route to the acquisition of nuclear capability. According to CIA estimates, in 2013 before the signing of the interim agreement Iran was only eight to 12 weeks from reaching the breakout point. Anticipating that course of events, a group of leading practitioners and scholars of American foreign policy issued a statement on 8 August strongly exhorting Trump not to renege on the nuclear deal. They argued forcefully that: The international agreement with Iran continues to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. No American national security objective would be served by withdrawing from it as long as Iran is meeting the agreement’s requirements. To the contrary … such a unilateral act would have grave long term political and security consequences for the United States … Doing so would bring the United States—rather than Iran—into noncompliance with the agreement. The statement’s authors, all veterans of the foreign-policy arena, then went on to advise the president that he should continue to certify Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA as long as the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to determine that Iran is keeping its part of the bargain. However, such sensible advice seems to be falling on deaf ears in Washington. The move towards decertification is picking up greater momentum, despite the IAEA’s clear statement in its latest quarterly report that Iran was in full compliance with the agreement, with its stockpile of low-enriched uranium less than a third of the maximum allowed under the JCPOA. Decertification accompanied by the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran by the US could have very dangerous consequences. At the least, it would mean a major rift between the US and its leading European allies if Iran continues to stick to its side of the bargain. That would increase the distrust between the Trump administration and major European governments that is already evident in their mutual relationship. At worst, it could mean a major war involving the US in the Middle East if Iran withdraws from the JCPOA and resumes enrichment activities. In such an event, the US, either alone or in company with Israel, might launch attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran in retaliation could target American facilities in the Gulf, as well as launch attacks on American allies such as Saudi Arabia. It might also target US forces in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan with the help of its surrogates in those countries. Such a conflagration would be a

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // recipe for disaster—not only for the Middle East, but for the whole world—and it would be unlikely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in the long run. By renouncing the JCPOA, so meticulously put together after excruciating bilateral and multilateral negotiations by the Obama administration as described masterfully by Trita Parsi in his book Losing an enemy: Obama, Iran, and the triumph of diplomacy, the Trump administration will be snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/trump-moves-closer-decertification-iran-nuclear-deal/ Return to top

LobeLog Foreign Policy (Washington, DC) Nuclear Arms Control and Reductions in Jeopardy By Peter Jenkins September 8, 2017 Discussions last month in Astana, during a five day meeting on “Nuclear Dangers” hosted by the Kazakh government, gave rise to some sobering findings. A recent vote in the UN General Assembly had lifted the spirits of many of the participants in this conference. On July 7, 122 States – over 60% of the UN membership – voted for the adoption of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, to complement existing treaties that ban the possession and use of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Discussions in Astana brought home to these participants the reality that none of the nine states that currently possess, collectively, a total of some 15,000 nuclear weapons (US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) has shown the slightest interest in incurring an obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals by becoming a party to the new treaty. At best the new treaty has created a non-binding international norm that Non-Nuclear Weapon States can deploy to browbeat nuclear-armed States into moving faster in a direction to which five of them claim to be committed, towards the world “free of nuclear weapons” for which President Barack Obama called in Prague in April 2009. Equally disappointing for many participants was a stock-taking of the nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia. Those two countries have a record of nuclear arms control and reduction dating back to 1963. Their most recent bilateral agreement, New Start, achieved in 2010, commits them to reducing deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1550 by 2018. Implementation of that agreement has been proceeding to plan, but whether the Trump administration will agree to extend the agreement beyond 2021, when it is due to expire, has become uncertain. Participants also heard that a decades-old US/Russia dialogue on nuclear matters is in abeyance and that the NATO/Russia Council has not met since 2013. Sam Nunn, a former Democrat Senator for Georgia and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, criticized NATO’s decision to suspend the Council to show disapproval of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It is precisely in times of crisis that the Council ought to be meeting, he argued. Yet another strand of the US/Russian nuclear relationship is also in trouble. Washington believes that Moscow has deployed a ground-launched cruise missile in contravention of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement, one of the products of a golden age of US/Russian arms reductions. Russia denies the charge and points to US deployments of Ballistic Missile Defense

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // launchers in Romania and Poland as breaches of that agreement. In the US Congress pressure is growing for US repudiation of the INF treaty. This could well lead to a revival of the threat to Western Europe from Russian non-strategic nuclear-tipped missiles. Meanwhile, in the context of a $1.3 trillion modernization of its nuclear arsenal, the United States is developing a Long-Range Stand-Off cruise missile to deliver nuclear warheads to distant targets. These missiles, incorporating Stealth technology, will be launched from a new generation of Stealth bombers. Moscow will perceive these weapons as increasing Washington’s ability to carry out a highly destructive first strike on Russian targets, and Moscow will want to respond by improving its own first (and second) strike capabilities, both nuclear and non-nuclear. An existing strategic balance between the United States and Russia will be put at risk. This risk could have been somewhat mitigated if President Obama had pledged that the United States would never be the first party to a dispute to resort to nuclear weapons (“”). Conference participants heard that Obama wanted a No First Use pledge to be part of his legacy. US allies in NATO and the Far East, who want the United States to be able to threaten first use in their defense, joined forces with domestic opponents to talk him out of it. Compounding apprehensions about the future, a 20 year-old Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty still has not entered into force. There is no majority in the US Senate for its ratification. China, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and India say they are waiting upon US ratification to embark on or complete their own ratification procedures. A global moratorium on nuclear testing has held since 1998, however – the special case of North Korea apart. That special case was high on the conference agenda. Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian and American experts addressed it. None held out hope that diplomacy, intrinsically desirable, would induce the North Korean leadership to wind back their nuclear weapon program, or even freeze it. All expected North Korea to react to a US strike on nuclear and missile facilities by annihilating Seoul. Other aspects of the nuclear proliferation agenda offered a brighter prospect. Participants heard that Iran is respecting its 2015 nuclear commitments; four international summits on Nuclear Security, between 2010 and 2016, have reduced the risk of terrorists acquiring weapon-grade material or actual warheads; nuclear-weapon-free zones cover Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific. One other agenda item merits a mention. Participants discussed the implications for “nuclear deterrence”, and “strategic stability” based on nuclear deterrence, of emerging non-nuclear military and cyber technologies. They agreed that this topic requires detailed study. There appears to be potential for advanced conventional and cyber weapons to threaten a perceived virtue of nuclear weapon systems, their invulnerability, but also to replace nuclear weapons as a source of strategic deterrence and stability. https://lobelog.com/nuclear-arms-control-and-reductions-in-jeopardy/ Return to top

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Arms Control Wonk (Washington, DC) Proliferation in The Age of Uncertainty By Michael Krepon September 10, 2017 Almost every important indicator of geopolitical power is in flux, except for economic indicators. U.S.-Russia relations are unmoored. The direction of U.S.-China relations is uncertain. America’s relations with allies are sliding downhill. The global nuclear order is only one mushroom cloud away from near complete unraveling. Even Sino-Indian relations – the two Asian masters of kicking the can down the road – have some notable, unfamiliar aspects as they head toward the possibility of more intense incidents in peripheral areas and at sea. U.S. politics are also in flux, as is incontrovertibly clear with the election of Donald Trump. Even before his inescapable presence, America’s geopolitical standing was badly weakened. U.S. power projection capabilities remain very strong – even after being grotesquely misapplied in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ramifications of the odd juxtaposition of U.S. domestic political incoherence and enduring military strength have yet to play out. The aggressive use of force and diminishment of diplomacy — two hallmarks of the post 9/11 U.S. mindset — could result in even greater tragedy. Factors contributing to regional stability in southern Asia are also in flux. New Delhi has buddied up to Washington, and vice versa, while China has placed steep economic bets on Pakistan – but not too steep. If Pakistan cannot meet its interest payments, China gains equity stakes. At the same time, Pakistan has gone from being a major non-NATO ally of the United States to being denied foreign military financing credits by the U.S. Congress. This progression was long delayed but inevitable as long as Rawalpindi placed a higher priority on desired outcomes in Kabul than in Washington. The global nuclear order is wobbly. The nuclear safety net, thickly woven out of treaties to reduce nuclear dangers and proliferation prevention, as well as decreased U.S. and Russian force levels, is unraveling. The great, but largely unheralded achievements of the Cold War and the chaotic period immediately following it have either been forgotten or taken for granted. The non-governing wing of the Republican Party is busy cutting additional strands of this safety net, rather than repairing them. This process of unraveling isn’t happening from the bottom up, as most strategic analysts assumed back when so much creativity and diplomatic effort went into the creation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and its attendant reinforcements. Instead, the problem of proliferation is now primarily a top-down and middle-up problem rather than the “Nth country” problem, as proliferation mavens have long presumed. At present, there are no new seekers of nuclear weapons – at least not yet. The primary challenges to the nonproliferation “regime” are now vertical instead of horizontal. This can change: headaches can grow on both the vertical and horizontal axis, depending on whether the North Korean problem is botched or the Iran nuclear deal is screwed up. These decisions lie primarily in the hands of Donald Trump, the most cost-effective investment the Kremlin has ever made to diminish America’s stature and influence. The North Korean and Iranian challenges are familiar. The Obama administration negotiated a verifiable ten-year hiatus on the Iranian challenge, a surprising result for those assuming that states hell bent on obtaining the Bomb do not take extended time outs. This pause is deemed insufficient by the tough minded, whose leverage on Tehran would diminish in direct proportion to their success in unraveling the deal while making it look like Tehran’s fault. It would be pure folly for

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Trump to nullify this deal when other nuclear-armed relationships are so unsteady, but this remains quite possible. The North Korean challenge has been a slow-motion crisis punctuated by useful, but temporary diplomatic interventions. It has now picked up surprising speed and appears inescapably immediate. I use the term “appears” advisedly because the immediacy of this challenge presumes that a long game buttressed by diplomacy and containment will fail with respect to North Korea, even when it has succeeded in preventing mushroom clouds in dealings with the Soviet Union and China. The vertical proliferation problem has several dimensions. At the top tier, the United States and the Russian Federation are not increasing force structure; instead they are recapitalizing it, with new bells and whistles that their nuclear enclaves cannot resist. There is also significant dynamism evident in states that already have three-digit-sized arsenals. Arsenals of this size allow them to move from counter value to counterforce targeting. China, India and Pakistan are on the cusp of this transition as they build out their Triads. Beijing and New Delhi might still mostly resist this impulse, even though MIRVs are clearly within their grasp. Pakistan, where such decisions rest in military hands, has already defined counterforce requirements for its shortest- and longest-range missiles. The challenges posed by uncertainties in U.S. relations with Russia and China is compounded by their military competition in space. Beijing is new to this competition; Washington and Moscow are not. And then there is cyber warfare, a relatively new phenomenon for which there are no tacit, let alone formal rules of competition. This is where we are. How we extricate ourselves from this mess won’t be by calling for “arms control,” “nonproliferation,” “deterrence stability,” “arms race stability” or abolition. Nor will we extricate ourselves from this mess by force of arms or “tougher” sanctions. “Strengthened” deterrence doesn’t reduce nuclear dangers; it locks them in place. The way to reduce the nuclear dangers we now face is the same way as in the past – by sensible diplomatic engagement backed up by the usual instruments of power that are demonstrable but not employed. http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1203818/proliferation-in-the-age-of-uncertainty/ Return to top

ASIA-PACIFIC

The Economist (London, UK) How North Korea’s Missiles Improved So Quickly Author Not Attributed September 7, 2017 They may be able to carry a nuclear bomb to America within a year Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, has made no secret of his goal of developing a nuclear-tipped missile with enough range to destroy cities in America. What has confounded many experts is the speed at which his engineers are getting there. Only last year the consensus was that they would not succeed before 2020; now the target seems achievable within a year.

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If North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, on September 3rd, was of a two-stage nuclear device small enough to fit on a Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), as it claims, that marks a big advance over the previous nuclear test a year ago. The regime claimed that test, too, was of a two-stage device (also known as a thermonuclear or hydrogen bomb), in which an initial nuclear explosion is used to amplify a second one. But estimates of its yield (explosive power) varied between 10 and 30 kilotons, which even at the higher end is too little for a hydrogen bomb. David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a think-tank, believes that the North had instead tested a “boosted fission” device, in which lithium, deuterium and tritium are placed at the centre of a single-stage bomb, to increase its yield with a bit of fusion. The most recent test was calculated by NORSAR, a Norwegian seismic agency, to have had a yield of about 120 kilotons, or about eight times that of the fifth test (see chart). That would be quite low for a two-stage thermonuclear device of the kind North Korea would like the outside world to believe it has developed, but not too powerful for it to have been a boosted fission device. The day before the test, Mr Kim was pictured posing in front of a peanut-shaped container (almost certainly a plausible mock-up), with each end of the shell supposedly holding one of the device’s two stages. The official statement suggested that the test was of a device that could be adjusted to produce explosions that range between tens of kilotons and hundreds. That is a tricky feat to master, but a convenient way of explaining the relatively low yield for a genuine thermonuclear device. Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies sees no reason to doubt North Korea’s claims. He argues that, based on the experience of other countries, six tests is more than enough to develop a thermonuclear device. Mr Albright remains more sceptical that the North has mastered two-stage technology. That matters, he says, because single-stage devices have a limited yield (even boosted-fission ones), whereas the power of a two-stage warhead is immense. With the latter, even with a relatively inaccurate guidance system, an entire city could be destroyed by a single missile. Either way, says Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the North Koreans will have learned a lot from the latest test and will probably have a true thermonuclear capability sooner rather than later. If the story of North Korea’s path to a hydrogen warhead has been one of predictable, albeit accelerating, progress, the same cannot be said of the rapid advance it has made in long-range missiles over the past two years. Its intermediate-range (up to 4,000km) Musudan missile, which is also known as the Hwasong-10, had failed in six out of seven tests, the most recent in October last year. Yet since May, North Korea has twice successfully tested both the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the Hwasong-14. Michael Elleman of the IISS says that no other country has advanced from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. In a report published last month, he argues that the reason for the startling breakthrough was that North Korea had quite suddenly got hold of much better, more reliable rocket engines. Mr Elleman believes that the Hwasong-12 and -14 are powered by versions of a high-performance Soviet missile engine known as the RD-250 which the North has acquired by stealth. Mr Elleman says that North Korea could not have developed and manufactured such large rocket motors, which generate 40 tonnes of thrust, from scratch. The only outfits with a history of producing this type of engine are Energomash in Russia and KB Yuzhnoye in Ukraine. The latter has fallen on hard times, particularly since 2014, when Russian-backed separatists seized nearby parts of eastern Ukraine. Even before that, in 2011, North Korea had been caught trying to procure missile parts from KB Yuzhnoye. Mr Elleman reckons that, amid the chaos in the

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // surrounding area, the North Koreans may now have succeeded, with the help of disgruntled employees or corruptible guards, in acquiring a “few dozen” RD-250 engines and transporting them home by train (they are only about two metres high and a metre wide). Mr Lewis, among others, questions Mr Elleman’s theory and suggests that the North Koreans could have sought help from Iran, or that their own indigenous skills are being underestimated. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, however, agrees with Mr Elleman both about the type of engine and its probable source. Whoever is right, what is not in doubt is the sudden leap forward this year of North Korea’s missile programme. The one piece of the jigsaw still needed to produce a credible nuclear-armed ICBM is a re-entry vehicle that will protect the warhead during its descent through the earth’s atmosphere. The re- entry vehicle attached to the second Hwasong-14 that was tested appeared to burn up in the terminal phase of its flight. But even if North Korea does not yet have one that can withstand the speed at which an ICBM travels, neither Mr Fitzpatrick nor Mr Elleman thinks building one will be an insuperable obstacle to engineers who have come this far this fast. North Korea’s nuclear- weapons programme is not quite there yet, but it is getting very close. https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21728644-they-may-be-able-carry-nuclear-bomb- america-within-year-how-north-koreas-missiles-improved Return to top

38 North (Washington, DC) North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Satellite Imagery Shows Post-Test Effects and New Activity in Alternate Tunnel Portal Areas By Frank Pabian, Joseph Bermudez and Jack Liu September 12, 2017 New commercial satellite imagery confirms earlier 38 North analysis identifying numerous landslides throughout the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site on the slopes of Mt. Mantap (and beyond) resulting from North Korea’s sixth nuclear test. These disturbances are more numerous and widespread than seen after any of the North’s previous five tests, and include additional slippage in pre-existing landslide scars and a possible subsidence crater. However, it is unclear from the imagery whether this subsidence is due to what has been reported as “a cave-in that was externally observable,” associated with the 4.6 magnitude event that occurred eight minutes after the test. There also appears to be increased water drainage in the North Portal Area, likely stimulated by the large underground nuclear test. Such underground water flow stimulation (brought about by expansion of existing cracks and fissures) could also be expected to promote the transport of radionuclides to the surface, and is not inconsistent with a more recent report that some radionuclides (traces of Xenon-133) were detected in the environment following the test (by South Korea). Imagery from September 8 also shows a large tractor/trailer cargo truck in the South Portal Area for the first time, and mining carts and other equipment are present outside the West Portal. Such activity, coming shortly after the largest underground nuclear test conducted at Punggye-ri to date (via the North Portal), suggests that onsite work could now be changing focus to further prepare those other portals for future underground nuclear testing. Revised Magnitude Estimates Raise the Equivalent Yield to Approximately One Quarter of a Megaton

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At the time of 38 North’s first report on the sixth nuclear test, the preliminary seismic magnitude estimates varied from 5.8, as published by both the CTBTO and NORSAR, to 6.3 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). More recently, both the CTBTO and NORSAR have officially revised their estimates upward to 6.1. This revision is significant because, rather than providing an equivalent yield of about 120 kilotons derived from the lower magnitude estimates, the application of standard formula with appropriate constants shows that the yield can now be estimated to have been roughly 250 kilotons (one quarter megaton). This large explosive yield is also quite close to what 38 North had previously determined to be the maximum estimated containable yield for the Punggye- ri test site. The CTBTO also published a very useful graphic illustrating the relative strength of this most recent and sixth underground nuclear test vis-à-vis the DPRK’s previous five acknowledged tests to date (Figure 1). Post-Test Commercial Satellite Imagery Multiple satellite images of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site following the nuclear test form a mosaic of new information on post-test effects and activities around the site. Mt. Mantap and Its Environs To date, we have only two seismically derived relative geo-location estimates for a more precise location of the September 3 test and both of them place the event under Mt. Mantap as shown in Figure 2A. The first, by the seismic analytical team at NORSAR, shows a roughly 700 meter wide error ellipse, while the second estimate by the Lianxing Wen’s Geogroup is a bit further to the west of the peak with a claimed error circle diameter of 200 meters. Both are consistent with our expectations that the North Koreans would seek to utilize the maximum available overburden (~800 meters) at the site using the same North Portal as was used in the previous four tests. An apparent rectangular subsidence “crater” appears in the stratified volcanics at the basalt escarpment lip on the western corner of Mt. Mantap (Figures 2B and 2C). This “crater” is likely what has been reported as a possible “collapse chimney crater,” but could also just be induced slippage prompted by the massive tremor. We may know more once synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery becomes available to potentially plot the epicenter of all of the surface disturbances. The North Portal A comparison of pre- and post-test imagery of the North Portal (Figure 3) shows some changes. Most importantly, imagery of September 4 showed a significant increase in the water drainage flow emanating from the tunnel used in the conduct of this test, suggesting that the tremors had likely stimulated that increased flow. On September 7 (Figure 4), what appeared to be two white vehicles were parked near the North Portal. (Note: The appearance of such vehicles is not a common occurrence and their presence could be indicative of a post-test inspection effort.) Recent rains converted much of the area from dry earth to mud, but no evidence of landslides was visible in the immediate vicinity of the North Portal. Other small, unidentified, objects were also noted in the parking apron located on the south side of the engineering operations building. More recent imagery from September 8 (Figure 5) shows that the white vehicles are no longer present. The West Portal 38 North reported new equipment being present outside of the West Portal on imagery from August 27, which was the first significant activity in that area since late March. The most recent imagery from September 8 shows some mining carts on the rail line that extends from the West Portal to the spoil pile. This may be a prelude to new tunnel excavation activity (Figure 5). The South Portal

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For the first time in over a year, activity was noted within the South Portal Area. A large tractor/trailer cargo truck was located in the area between the primary and secondary tunnel portals (Figure 6). The purpose of the vehicle is as yet unknown. The Main Administrative Support Area Pre- and post-test imagery of the main administrative support area (Figure 7) shows little change and no obvious vehicle tracking. The spatial resolution and the perspective of the post-test imagery were insufficient to determine whether or not the monument/pavilion observation point had been removed. The greenhouse remains uncovered. Imagery from September 8 (Figure 8) shows a few minor changes, including the possible removal of the propaganda placards, although additional imagery from a more southerly perspective would be necessary to confirm. The Command Center A comparison of pre- and post-test imagery of the Command Center (Figure 9) shows that a long white truck had been moved next to a vehicle parking shed located inside the courtyard of the Command Center in imagery from September 4. New vehicle tracking was also present in the courtyard area. However, that white truck was no longer present in imagery from September 7 (Figure 10). It is possible that this vehicle was involved in the transfer of test support equipment associated with the most recent test, although we cannot confirm this based on imagery alone. Other New Reporting There was also one report of concern that Mt. Mantap might actually collapse as a result of the nuclear testing beneath it. Such reports of the mountain’s demise are highly exaggerated, although there is little doubt that there would have been significant “cracking” (possibly extending to the surface) as well as significant “irreversible strain” resulting from this event. Such cracking facilitates radioactive gas seepage in other environments. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the North Portal will ever be used for another nuclear test. There are still two unused additional tunnel complexes (served by the South and West Portals) that are also deemed potentially capable of further nuclear testing, albeit for tests having lower yields than that of the sixth test. Conclusions Some of North Korea’s key claims, such as having conducted a large underground nuclear test (with a device capable of yielding “hundreds of kilotons”) have apparently now been corroborated, and evidently including the claim of having detonated a “hydrogen” bomb: “The United States has tentatively concluded that North Korea detonated an H-bomb over the weekend, as the regime has claimed, a senior U.S. administration official said Thursday.” However, the claim that no radioactivity was released may not be true. Detection of radioactive xenon-133 has been since reported in South Korea, although the official statement by the South Korean Nuclear Safety Agency was that, “The agency is currently tracking down the inflow of the material to conclude whether it is a result of the nuclear test.” Additional information on the type and extent of the radionuclide dispersal will likely be addressed by the CTBTO in the near future. We also see no reason to alter our previous assessment that regardless of whether this most recent test was an operational warhead for an ICBM or simply a device, the yield of the test clearly shows North Korean progress in increasing the yields of their nuclear weapons. The significance of this is that it has the potential to dramatically increase the threat posed by its Strategic Force (responsible for ballistic missiles) as individual nuclear warheads potentially now have 10-times (or more) greater destructive power. This would allow fewer missiles to be employed to ensure destruction of

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // a given target, and increase the target areas threatened by North Korean ICBMs by allowing a larger number of targets to be engaged with the current missile inventory. If the claim that the device just tested has a variable yield is true (from tens to hundreds of kilotons), then this may also imply the North Koreans intend to adopt an expanded policy of using nuclear weapons, including tactical use, in addition to deterring threats to existence of the state. By doing so, they would join countries such as the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, etc. that have policies regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons, clearly further destabilizing the Korean peninsula situation. http://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/ Return to top

PressTV (Tehran, Iran) S Korea Defiant in Face of New Sanctions, Vows to Pursue Nuclear Deterrence Author Not Attributed September 13, 2017 South Korea has confirmed that the traces of radioactive xenon gas it recently detected were from a North Korean nuclear test earlier in the month. The South Korean Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSCC) explained on Wednesday that its land-based detector in the country’s northeast had discovered traces of xenon-133 isotope on nine occasions, while its mobile device near the country’s east coast had detected traces of the isotope four times. “It was difficult to find out how powerful the nuclear test was with the amount of xenon detected, but we can say the xenon was from North Korea,” said executive commissioner Choi Jongbae in a press conference in the capital, Seoul. He said, however, that the commission was unable to confirm what kind of nuclear test the North had conducted. North Korea said on September 3 that it had conducted a successful hydrogen bomb test and that the bomb was small enough to fit on a missile. The NSCC said the xenon detected had no impact on South Korea’s environment and population. Xenon is a naturally occurring, colorless gas used in manufacturing some lights. But the detected xenon-133 is a radioactive isotope that does not emerge naturally and has been linked to nuclear tests by Pyongyang in the past. The North Korean test, which was the country’s sixth, prompted the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to escalate sanctions against Pyongyang by imposing new bans on the country’s textile exports and a limit on its fuel supplies. South Korea fires ‘Taurus’ Meanwhile, Seoul announced on Wednesday that it had conducted its first live-fire drill for an advanced air-launched cruise missile in a bid to strengthen the country’s pre-emptive strike capability against North Korea. The Taurus missile launched from an F-15 jetfighter traveled through obstacles at low altitudes before striking a target off the South's western coast, the Defense Ministry said.

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The missile, manufactured by Germany's Taurus Systems, is reported to have a maximum range of 500 kilometers and its stealth characteristics allow it to avoid radar detection. Pyongyang remains defiant Meanwhile, in a statement seen by Press TV, the North Korean Embassy in Tehran strongly condemned the latest UN Security Council sanctions resolutions against Pyongyang. “Resolution 2371 and 2375 against the DPRK (North Korea), which the US fabricated by employing all sorts of despicable and violence means and methods, are aimed at depriving the DPRK of its legal right for self-defense and completely suffocating its state and people through a full-scale economic blockade,” read part of the statement. The statement added that North Korea’s nuclear program was “a fair and legitimate measure for self-defense to protect its sovereignty” from “the high-handed and arbitrary acts of the US, which has made it its business to pursue the policy of extreme hostility and pose a nuclear threat” to Pyongyang. The statement hit out at the US for “driving the situation of the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a nuclear war and manipulating the UNSC” to adopt the sanctions resolutions, which revealed Washington’s “evil intention to obliterate” North Korea. It added that the resolutions would, on the contrary, make North Korea more determined to go on with its nuclear program. “The adoption of illegal and evil ‘resolutions on sanctions’ serves as the occasion for the DPRK to verify that the road it chose was absolutely right and to harden its resolve to follow this road at a faster pace without the slightest diversion until this fight to the finish is over,” it stressed. The statement also stressed that the North’s “nuclear deterrence” power was not up for negotiations, warning that Pyongyang would “not hesitate to use any form of ultimate means” should the US persist in its “reckless attempts to stifle” the country. The UN Security Council on Monday adopted a new sanctions resolution on North Korea. The US-drafted resolution was passed unanimously, just a month after the UNSC decided to ban exports of coal, lead, and seafood in response to Pyongyang’s launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The North Korean ministry described the newer resolution as “heinous provocation aimed at depriving the DPRK of its legitimate right for self-defense and completely suffocating its state and people through full-scale economic blockade.” Trump calls sanctions small step, vows much tougher moves US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday that the new sanctions on the North were a small step. “I don’t know if it has any impact, but certainly it was nice to get a 15-to-nothing vote, but those sanctions are nothing compared to what ultimately will have to happen,” Trump said in vague but threatening remarks. Moreover, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin warned officials in China, which is Pyongyang’s key ally and trading partner, that if it did not follow through on the new sanctions, Washington would “put additional sanctions on them and prevent them from accessing the US and international dollar system.”

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Asked if Trump was considering other moves, including cutting off Chinese banks from the US financial system, White House spokeswoman Sarah Sanders said, “All options are on the table. The president has also said that he wants every country involved to step up and do more.” The US’s initial draft of the sanctions resolution had to be watered down to win the backing of China and Russia, which are both UNSC veto-wielding powers. It stopped short of imposing a full embargo on oil exports to North Korea, most of which come from China. ‘Magnitude of North Korea test much higher than formal estimates’ Meanwhile, a US monitoring group also said on Wednesday that North Korea’s latest nuclear test had had a yield of 250 kilotons, which is much higher than earlier, official estimates. The authoritative US website 38 North, which is linked to the Johns Hopkins University, said that it was lifting its estimate for the yield of the blast to “roughly 250 kilotons.” The figure is more than 16 times the size of the 15-kiloton US bomb that destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima in 1945. Other official estimates of the yield vary from South Korea’s 50 kilotons to Japan’s 160. http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/09/13/534987/South-Korea-radioactive-xenon-gas-North- Korea-nuclear-test Return to top

Nikkei Asian Review (Tokyo, Japan) Holes Forming in US Nuclear Umbrella, Some in Japan Argue Author Not Attributed September 9, 2017 Ex-defense minister floats possibility of hosting American nukes Debate is growing in Japan over whether the American commitment to defend allies with nuclear force will hold as Washington's own defense interests loom larger, and whether stationing nuclear weapons here could shore up this key deterrence strategy. The cure To former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the time has come to discuss letting the U.S. military bring nuclear weapons within the country's borders. "Is it right to say that Japan will not host them but will take shelter under the American umbrella?" the veteran lawmaker in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party asked in a television appearance Wednesday. The proposal speaks to concern that the nuclear umbrella might not work as advertised. With North Korea having developed an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the U.S. and working on a miniaturized warhead to go with it, Washington could think twice about responding in kind to a nuclear attack on Japan for fear of retaliation, the thinking goes. Ishiba and peers worry that if Pyongyang realizes this, the American pledge to defend Japan with nuclear force could lose credibility and thus its power as a deterrent. Enabling the U.S. military to bring a portion of its nuclear capabilities to Japan -- by letting nuclear- missile-equipped submarines call on bases here, for example -- could make Pyongyang more reluctant to move against Japan. And unlike during the Cold War, when the U.S. deployed many

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // tactical nuclear weapons in , the arms could be kept in Japan only temporarily, blunting public opposition. Worse than the disease? But adopting such a plan would prove tougher it sounds. Japan's three "non-nuclear principles" bar bringing nuclear weapons within its borders, in addition to proscribing their manufacture and possession. Altering this bedrock credo would risk a severe public backlash, not to mention objections from such neighbors as China and Russia. Nor is the move particularly well-supported within the LDP. Japan's thinking is "the same as ever" as far as the principles are concerned, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera told reporters Friday. Whether taking in nuclear weapons would boost deterrence is itself questionable. Nuclear-armed American submarines frequently patrol the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, according to an official in Japan's Ministry of Defense, and could launch a nuclear attack on North Korea at any time. In fact, "if it's understood that there are nuclear weapons here, Japan could end up becoming more of a target," warned an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here. Besides, the American extended-deterrence scheme, including the nuclear umbrella, is "unwavering," Onodera said. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Holes-forming-in-US-nuclear-umbrella- some-in-Japan-argue?page=1 Return to top

EUROPE/RUSSIA

Phys.org (Isle of Man, UK) Russia's Use and Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium Pose Significant Nuclear Risks Author Not Attributed September 13, 2017 Russia currently holds the world's largest stockpile of highly enriched uranium, a nuclear weapon- usable material, posing significant nuclear security risks, according to a recent report issued by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), a group based at Princeton University and made up of nuclear experts from 16 countries. The report, "The Use of Highly Enriched Uranium as Fuel in Russia," provides unprecedented details of the military and civilian use of highly enriched uranium in Russia—the only country to produce highly enriched uranium as an export. Russia's stockpile of highly enriched uranium is estimated to be about 680 tons, and as of 2017, Russia is estimated to use about 8.5 tons of highly enriched uranium annually, a large fraction of which is weapon-grade material. Likewise, Russia currently operates more highly enriched uranium facilities than the rest of the world combined, creating substantial nuclear security risks. "There has been a great deal of progress in reducing the number of locations where highly enriched uranium can be found outside of Russia. As a result, Russia has become an increasingly important part of the remaining problem," said Frank N. von Hippel, founding co-chair of IPFM and senior

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // research physicist and professor of public and international affairs, emeritus, at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson of Public and International Affairs. The report was edited by Pavel Podvig, a researcher at Princeton's Program on Science and Global Security, with contributions by six other leading Russian experts. In addition to its stockpiles, Russia also has a large number of highly enriched uranium facilities— 58 nuclear reactors and assemblies—meaning that substantial amounts of highly enriched uranium are moving through the fuel cycle. Highly enriched uranium poses special concerns, the researchers wrote, as it can be used relatively easily in simple nuclear explosive devices by states with limited nuclear weapon expertise or even by non-state actors. Over the past several decades—and especially since 9/11—there have been high-level international initiatives to address these risks, especially for highly enriched uranium for civilian uses, like reactors used for nuclear research. "Reducing the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors is a complex but solvable technical task, and promising new fuels are under development in the United States, Europe, and Russia," said Alexander Glaser, co-director of the Program on Science and Global Security, co-chair of the IPFM and associate professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering and international affairs at Princeton. While Russia has been active in returning its highly enriched uranium from research facilities abroad and has closed down some domestic highly enriched uranium facilities, it has not made highly enriched uranium minimization a priority, according to the report. On the contrary, Russia is working on a number of new projects that involve the use of highly enriched uranium and, in 2012, resumed production of highly enriched uranium for export. "Russia's participation is essential for the success of the global effort to reduce the risks associated with highly enriched uranium use," said Podvig. "Russia has the ability to make a strong contribution to the international highly enriched uranium minimization effort. This would require launching a new round of international cooperation that would involve Russia's technical community in developing a new strategy for reducing the use of highly enriched uranium." Securing Russia's commitment to this goal requires development of a comprehensive global highly enriched uranium minimization strategy, according to the report. Given the variety of applications for highly enriched uranium worldwide, such a strategy should include a consistent approach to the use of highly enriched uranium to fuel high-performance civilian reactors, defense-related research facilities, and naval reactors. The report concludes that, eventually, this effort also must address the material security risks associated with highly enriched uranium stocks for weapons. Additional information can be found in two already published reports. Von Hippel authored an earlier IPFM report, "Banning the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium," and Glaser was a contributor to the 2016 U.S. National Academies report, "Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors." https://phys.org/news/2017-09-russia-stockpiles-highly-enriched-uranium.html Return to top

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Sputnik (Moscow, Russia) Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Contradicts Russia's National Interests Author Not Attributed September 12, 2017 Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov says that the proposal to destroy global nuclear arsenals is irresponsible since nuclear weapons are objectively one of the guarantors of international security. Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov said on Tuesday that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was passed in the United Nations this year, is contrary to Russia’s national interests. "It [TPNW] contradicts Russia's national interests and our vision of how to move toward nuclear disarmament. We have always confirmed that we share the goal of creating a nuclear-free world, joined a number of politically binding declarations on this matter, but we have repeatedly emphasized that this is a long-term goal, the way to which should be phased, and that the work in this direction should be pursued in terms of strengthening strategic stability and taking into account the national security interests of all countries, including, of course, Russia," Ulyanov said in an interview with the Kommersant newspaper. It is rather irresponsible to call for complete destruction of global nuclear arsenals in the current political environment characterized by unpredictability, violence and conflicts, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, Mikhail Ulyanov, said. Diplomatic Solution: Russia, China Unite for Peace on Korean Peninsula "The reduction of nuclear arsenals does not happen in a vacuum, but in a modern world that is very far from being perfect. It is becoming more turbulent, conflict-ridden and unpredictable," Ulyanov said in an interview with Russia's Kommersant newspaper. "Therefore, we call for a more sober and realistic approach to the task of nuclear disarmament… Under current conditions, it is not serious, even irresponsible to raise the issue of total destruction of nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapons are objectively one of the guarantors of international security. Someone may not like it, but this is the current reality," the Russian diplomat stressed. On the issue of North Korea Mikhail Ulyanov said in an interview that Pyongyang primarily bets on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles due to lack of reliable international guarantees for its national security. "We unequivocally condemn the line of conduct chosen by Pyongyang, but we must realize that in the absence of truly reliable international legal guarantees for its national security, North Korea relies on nuclear missile weapons, treating them primarily as a deterrent tool," Ulyanov told the Kommersant newspaper. Many Western countries do not seem to understand this or do not want to understand it, he added. However, Russia continues to regard North Korea as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as Pyongyang violated withdrawal procedures, according to the Russian diplomat "We continue to consider it [North Korea] as a party to the NPT as Pyongyang announced its withdrawal having violated the procedures envisaged by the treaty," Ulyanov told the Kommersant newspaper.

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On September 3, North Korea said it had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb that could be mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile. A week before that, Pyongyang launched a missile, which flew over Japan's territory. Pyongyang's ongoing nuclear and missile tests have been a source of concern for the states in the region and their allies, as well as for the international community on the whole. https://phys.org/news/2017-09-russia-stockpiles-highly-enriched-uranium.html Return to top

Voice of America (Washington, DC) Russia Advocating Conciliatory Approach to North Korea By Brian Padden September 7, 2017 Russia is increasingly advocating an arms control strategy to accept North Korea as a nuclear state, disagreeing with the United States and its allies, and even to a degree with China, which all support applying sanctions to force Pyongyang into denuclearization talks. While meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in Vladivostok, Russian President Vladimir Putin Thursday again urged for dialogue to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, and said whipping up military hysteria around the North Korean crisis was counterproductive and could trigger a global catastrophe. He also said it is not possible to resolve the North Korean crisis with sanctions and pressure alone. A different approach Echoing the sentiments of the Russian leader, Alexander Nikitin, the head of an academic institution run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, told an international defense forum in Seoul Thursday that the time has come to stop seeking the “immediate denuclearization of the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and instead pursue "realistic and verifiable” arms controls talks. “Sanctions, the limitation of food supplies, a limitation of fuel is not a method to bring North Korea to the negotiation table,” said Nikitin, who is director of the Center for Euro- Atlantic Security at Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The Russian academic suggested treating North Korea like India and Pakistan, two countries that were given sanctions waivers by the U.S. in 2001, even though they openly tested nuclear weapons and refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the NPT, only the United States, Russia, the , France, and China are permitted to possess nuclear weapons. Sanctions support North Korea has now conducted six nuclear tests in the last decade, more than 20 ballistic missile tests this year alone, and is rapidly moving toward its goal of developing a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of targeting the U.S. mainland. The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has stressed that all options, including military action, are being considered to eliminate what it calls this unacceptable existential nuclear threat from North Korea.

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In contrast to the Russian representative's conciliatory views on North Korea, other officials at the Seoul Defense Dialogue forum voiced support for imposing more coercive measures against Pyongyang. 'Time to tighten the screws' Lim Sung-nam, the vice minister of Foreign Affairs for South Korea, said the continued belligerent and threatening behavior of the Kim Jong Un government has convinced the progressive leadership in Seoul to back away from its earlier position advocating for talks and outreach. “Now is not the right time for dialogue, rather it is time to tighten the screws on North Korea with a view to forcing the regime to change its strategic calculation,” he said. Jia Qingguo, a professor of international studies at Peking University in China, categorized North Korea's relentless missile and nuclear tests as “suicidal.” He voiced support for stronger sanctions and proposed the United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan engage in five-party talks as North Korea refuses to negotiate. It is time, he said, to discuss all possible contingencies, including what to do if the Kim regime collapses. Sanctions combined with dialogue Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi Thursday said the U.N. Security Council should make a further response on North Korea, but that sanctions must be combined with dialogue. The United States asked the U.N. to impose an oil embargo after North Korea's latest and biggest nuclear test. European Union Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini also expressed support Thursday of adopting tougher economic measures to restrain the rapidly growing North Korean nuclear threat. https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-advocating-conciliatory-approach-to-north- korea/4018723.html Return to top

The Washington Post (Washington, DC) How Russia Quietly Undercuts Sanctions Intended to Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Program By Joby Warrick September 11, 2017Russian smugglers are scurrying to the aid of North Korea with shipments of petroleum and other vital supplies that could help that country weather harsh new economic sanctions, U.S. officials say in an assessment that casts further doubt on whether financial measures alone can force dictator Kim Jong Un to abandon his nuclear weapons program. The spike in Russian exports is occurring as China — by far North Korea’s biggest trading partner — is beginning to dramatically ratchet up the economic pressure on its troublesome neighbor in the face of provocative behavior such as last week’s test of a powerful nuclear bomb. Official documents and interviews point to a rise in tanker traffic this spring between North Korean ports and Vladivostok, the far-eastern Russian city near the small land border shared by the two countries. With international trade with North Korea increasingly constrained by U.N. sanctions, Russian entrepreneurs are seizing opportunities to make a quick profit, setting up a maze of front companies to conceal •transactions and launder payments, according to U.S. law enforcement officials who monitor sanction-busting activity.

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Such trade could provide a lifeline to North Korea at a time when the United States is seeking to deepen Kim’s economic and political isolation in response to recent nuclear and missiles tests. Trump administration officials were hoping that new trade restrictions by China — including a temporary ban on gasoline and diesel exports imposed this spring by a state-owned Chinese petroleum company — could finally drive Kim to negotiate an agreement to halt work on nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems. The U.N. Security Council late Monday approved a package of new economic sanctions that included a cap on oil imports to North Korea, effectively slashing its fuel supply by 30 percent, diplomats said. A U.S. proposal for a total oil embargo was dropped in exchange for Russian and Chinese support for the measure. “As the Chinese cut off oil and gas, we’re seeing them turn to Russia,” said a senior official with detailed knowledge of smuggling operations. The official, one of several current and former U.S. officials interviewed about the trend, insisted on anonymity in describing analyses based on intelligence and confidential informants. “Whenever they are cut off from their primary supplier, they just try to get it from somewhere else,” the official said. The increase in trade with Russia was a primary reason for a series of legal measures announced last month by Justice and Treasury officials targeting Russian nationals accused of helping North Korea evade sanctions. Court documents filed in support of the measures describe a web of alleged front companies established by Russian citizens for the specific purpose of concealing business arrangements with Pyongyang. While Russian companies have engaged in such illicit trade with North Korea in the past, U.S. officials and experts on North Korea observed a sharp rise beginning last spring, coinciding with new U.N. sanctions and the ban on fuel shipments in May by the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. The smuggled goods mostly are diesel and other fuels, which are vital to North Korea’s economy and can’t be produced indigenously. In the past, U.S. agencies also have tracked shipments of Russian industrial equipment and ores as well as luxury goods. Traffic between Vladivostok and the port of Rajin in North Korea has become so heavy that local officials this year launched a dedicated ferry line between the two cities. The service was temporarily suspended last week because of a financial dispute. China, with its large shared border and traditionally close ties with Pyongyang, remains North Korea’s most important trading partner, accounting for more than 90 percent of the country’s foreign commerce. Thus, Beijing’s cooperation is key to any sanctions regime that seeks to force Kim to alter his behavior, current and former U.S. officials say. Still, Russia, with its massive petroleum reserves and proven willingness to partner with un•savory regimes, could provide just enough of a boost to keep North Korea’s economy moving, allowing it to again resist international pressure to give up its strategic weapons, the officials said. “Russia is now a player in this realm,” said Anthony Ruggiero, a former Treasury Department official who is now a senior fellow with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington think tank. “The Chinese may be fed up with North Korea and willing to do more to increase the pressure. But it’s not clear that the Russians are willing to go along with that.” The reports of Russian oil smuggling come as Moscow continues to criticize international efforts to impose more trade restrictions on North Korea. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a joint news conference Wednesday with South Korean leader Moon Jae-in, pointedly refused to support new restrictions on fuel supplies for the North.

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“We should not act out of emotions and push North Korea to a dead end,” Putin said, according to South Korean media accounts of the news conference. Rare insight into exactly how Russian firms conduct business with Kim’s isolated regime can be gleaned from the court papers filed last month to support new sanctions against Russian nationals accused of supplying diesel and other fuels to North Korea. The papers describe in detail how one company, Velmur, was set up by Russian operatives in Singapore to allegedly help North Korea purchase millions of dollars’ worth of fuel while keeping details of the transactions opaque. Velmur was registered in Singapore in 2014 as a real estate management company. Yet its chief function appears to be “facilitating the laundering of funds for North Korea financial facilitators and sanctioned entities,” according to a Justice Department complaint filed on Aug. 22. The company has no known headquarters, office space or even a Web address, but rather “bears the hallmarks of a front company,” the complaint states. According to the documents, Velmur worked with other Russian partners to obtain contracts this year to purchase nearly $7 million worth of diesel fuel from a Russian supplier known as IPC between February and May. In each case, North Korean operatives wired the payments to Velmur in hard currency — U.S. dollars — and Velmur in turn used the money to pay IPC for diesel tanker shipments departing the port of Vladivostok, the documents show. “The investigation has concluded that North Korea was the destination” of the diesel transshipments, the Justice Department records state. “As such, it appears that Velmur, while registered as a real estate management company, is in fact a North Korean financial facilitator.” Officials for Velmur could not be reached for comment. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, reacting to the U.S. court filing last month, dismissed the sanctions policy as futile, while declining to address specific allegations about sanctions-busting by Russian individuals. “Washington, in theory, should have learned that, for us, the language of sanctions is unacceptable; the solution of real problems is only hindered by such actions,” Ryabkov said. “So far, however, it does not seem that they have come to an understanding of such obvious truths.” U.S. officials acknowledged that it may be impossible to physically stop Russian tankers from delivering fuel shipments to North Korean ports, as long as the Putin government grants tacit approval. But the United States enjoys some leverage because of the smugglers’ preference for conducting business in dollars. When Justice Department officials announced sanctions on Russian businesses last month, they also sought the forfeiture of millions of dollars in U.S. currency allegedly involved in the transactions, a step intended as a warning to others considering trading with North Korea. Black-market traders tend to shun North Korea’s currency, the won, which has been devalued to the point that some Pyongyang department stores insist on payment in dollars, euros or Chinese renminbi. “There are vulnerabilities here, because the people North Korea is doing business with want dollars. It was dollars that the North Koreans were attempting to send to Russia,” said Ruggiero, the former Treasury official. “The Russians are not about to start taking North Korean won.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-russia-quietly-undercuts- sanctions-intended-to-stop-north-koreas-nuclear-program/2017/09/11/f963867e-93e4-11e7- 8754-d478688d23b4_story.html?utm_term=.01225b36f8c2 Return to top

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MIDDLE EAST

Vox (New York, NY) Israel Just Bombed a Chemical Weapons Factory That Syria Shouldn’t Have Had By Alex Ward September 8, 2017 This could also raise tensions with Iran and Hezbollah. While the international media was transfixed by the crisis in North Korea this week, Israel did something provocative and potentially dangerous: It bombed a suspected Syrian chemical weapons factory. It’s a move that escalates Jerusalem’s quiet involvement in the Syrian civil war and that may heighten tensions with Iran. Around 2:42 am local time on Thursday, Israeli jets attacked a Syrian military installation near the city of Masyaf that allegedly produces chemical weapons and advanced missiles. The Syrian Army said two soldiers died, while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the UK-based monitoring organization that supports anti-government forces in the civil war, claims there were at least seven casualties. In a statement, the Syrian military said there could be “serious repercussions of such acts of aggression on the security and stability of the region.” The Israeli government didn’t comment on the operation. But it looks like it hit Syria to prevent Iranian ally Hezbollah — a Lebanese militant group that considers Israel an enemy — from acquiring precision-guided missiles to use against Israel. And the strikes came just one day after the United Nations blamed Syrian forces for a chemical weapons attack in April. After that attack, President Donald Trump ordered 59 Tomahawk missiles on a Syrian military base but didn’t completely destroy it. Israel’s strikes, however, appear to have hit much harder. And it’s a very big deal that Syria still had a chemical weapons facility, given that it had earlier promised to give up all of those weapons. But even though the facility was in Syrian territory, the real target of the strike was Iran. That’s because Tehran has spent the past five years fighting to keep Assad in power while taking advantage of the civil war’s chaos to gain more control in the region, in part by providing Hezbollah with advanced weapons. Israel, however, is willing to use military force to stop it from achieving those goals — and that could lead to problems down the road. “This is something Israel cannot accept” There’s little doubt that Israel is trying to send a message to Iran and Hezbollah. “Iran is busy turning Syria into a base of military entrenchment,” Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, said at a news conference last week. “It wants to use Syria and Lebanon as war fronts against its declared goal to eradicate Israel.” “This is something Israel cannot accept,” he continued. That line of argument has been used by other senior members of the Israeli government. “Everything will be done to prevent the existence of a Shiite corridor from Tehran to Damascus,” Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said during a radio interview on Thursday.

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Israel has launched around 100 strikes inside Syria over the past five years, according to Amir Eshel, a former chief of the . Usual targets include convoys of Syrian military or Hezbollah members. But Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser, told reporters in a conference call that Thursday’s airstrikes went further than other attacks because it targeted the chemical weapons center. Israel is particularly worried about Hezbollah because they fought each other before. In 2006, they battled in a month-long war where the militant group fired more than 4,000 rockets into Israel, and Israeli forces fired around 7,000 bombs and missiles into Lebanon. About 160 Israelis troops and civilians died, according to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and about 1,100 Lebanese — most of them civilians — perished, per the Human Rights Watch, a US-headquartered advocacy organization. It also reports about 4,400 Lebanese were injured, and around 1 million people were displaced. Today, Israel believes Hezbollah has around 150,000 rockets at its disposal. But those weapons aren’t as advanced as the precision weapons made at the facility Israel struck. If Hezbollah acquired them, then it could more effectively damage Israel in a future war. It’s worth noting the timing of the strikes. On Wednesday, a UN commission said Syria was responsible for killing around 80 people with chemical weapons in the town of Khan Sheikhoun. Assad denies his government had anything to do with the attack. In 2013, Syria promised to give up his chemical weapons as part of a diplomatic deal with Russia and the United States to avert a planned American strike that would have been in response to Assad gassing almost 1,000 of his own citizens to death near Damascus. “The factory that was targeted in Masyaf produces the chemical weapons and barrel bombs that have killed thousands of Syrian civilians,” Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli intelligence, tweeted on September 7. Hezbollah and Assad-backed forces have yet to strike back after Israeli attacks in Syria. As the New York Times notes, that’s likely because they prefer to focus on winning the civil war rather than on another fight with Israel. But that could change. “Now it’s important to keep the escalation in check and to prepare for a Syrian-Iranian-Hezbollah response and even opposition from Russia,” Yadlin tweeted. So far, at least, Syria and Hezbollah haven’t hit back. https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16273512/israel-syria-chemical-weapons-iran- hezbollah-factory Return to top

The Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel) High Court Rejects Petition for More Oversight of Israel’s Nuclear Agency By Yonah Jeremy Bob September 13, 2017 The court said the Knesset and not the judicial branch should decide the issue. The High Court of Justice rejected a petition on Tuesday for increased oversight and basic regulation of Israel’s nuclear program.

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While saying the issue “is a worthy issue for public debate,” and taking the historic step of holding hearings on the issue, the court said the Knesset and not the judicial branch should decide the issue. This mantra was also mentioned repeatedly by the three justices at the September 6 hearing on the petition of the Israeli Disarmament Movement and 100 other citizens, asking the court to order the Knesset to pass legislation that would enhance oversight. In a legal brief, the state had asked the High Court to dismiss the petition without even an oral hearing, arguing that the High Court can strike laws as unconstitutional, but cannot order the Knesset to pass laws. It had added that there is already oversight over the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, through the state comptroller and others, even if it is not anchored in law and made public. The court, in rejecting the state’s legal brief last week, for the first time ever entertained the idea and held hearings about whether it had oversight powers over Israel’s nuclear program. It was also the first hearing run by Justice since her designation on Tuesday as the next Supreme Court president – to go into effect in late October. However, with the negative comments of the justices, who also included and Noam Sohlberg, leaving the outcome of a rejection fairly certain, Israeli Disarmament Movement leader Sharon Dolev pushed back at the time. “Nuclear ambiguity [about whether Israel has or does not have nuclear weapons] made it impossible for us to get real oversight over two of the most dangerous facilities in Israel, an ambiguity that killed the responsible discourse around these facilities,” she said. “In the end, I am sure that there will be regulation and oversight over the Israel Atomic Energy Commission,” Dolev said. “The question is, if as with most cases, it will have to happen after a catastrophe. I hope not, because oversight can reduce the chances of a... catastrophe. “The judges think that it is up to the parliament. It is hard to trust that our parliament... will be able to do it... with the level of nuclear discourse in Israel, but it is up to us to keep pushing. It is too dangerous not to do anything.” Prof. Avner Cohen of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, a longtime critic of Israel’s nuclear program and one of the petitioners, flew in from California to attend the hearing. He also requested to make a statement at the hearing, which the High Court sometimes allows for prominent attendees, but Hayut rejected Cohen’s request. Petitioners had said that the solution to the lack of transparency is to enshrine the Israel Atomic Energy Commission’s operations in primary legislation that would regulate its roles, authority, form of organization and management, and require monitoring of its activities and facilities. Noting that the IAEC was created in 1952, the petitioners had contended that its roles and methods of monitoring its activities have never been enshrined in law, a status quo that cannot continue. The petition recalled that the entirety of the agency’s functions are governed by a secret administrative order, issued by then-prime minister David Ben-Gurion, and by a later series of secret government decisions. Trying to build its case, petitioners’ lawyer Eitay Mack pointed out that the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), though secretive and at the heart of the nation’s security, has been regulated by a broad Knesset law at least since the passage of the General Security Services Law in 2002.

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But the justices rejected this comparison, saying that the Shin Bet performs interrogations with obvious deep invasions of privacy and risk to fundamental human rights of dignity. In contrast, they said that the petitioners concerns were far vaguer and less immediate, and left time for them to lobby the Knesset to pass legislation. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/High-Court-rejects-petition-for-more-oversight-of-Israels- nuclear-agency-504935 Return to top

Pravada (Moscow, Russia) Russia Will Never Let Iran Obtain Nuclear Weapons Author Not Attributed September 13, 2017 Russia values Israel's independence on its Western allies in the process of building bilateral agreements, Russian Ambassador to Tel-Aviv Alexander Shein said in an interview with Walla. As is known, Israel does not take part in the sanctions pressure that the West has been putting on Russia. Accordingly, Russian counter-sanctions do not affect Israel either. At the same time, Israel has to manoeuvre smartly not to complicate relations with third countries. "We very much appreciate that Israel, being an ally of the United States has not joined Western sanctions against Russia and pursues its own independent policy towards Russia, taking a neutral stance on events that take place in the field of Russian-Ukrainian relations and so on," said Shein, adding that Russia treats Israel outside the context of its relations with the United States of America. The ambassador said that Russia and Israel cooperate as partners, although there are certain discrepancies in the relations between the two countries. "Our only goal is to find common ground, points of mutual understanding and interaction." Our ideas about what is happening in the world and the region may not coincide in many aspects, but for the most part we find mutual understanding and we can cooperate in many ways, and this is what we do. Of course, this is a partnership," Shein said. According to the diplomat, Moscow looks up to "equal" relations with all countries of the Middle East, without singling out any of them, unlike in the Soviet times, when some countries would be prioritised. In the interview, Shein touched upon one of Israel's key issues - the Iranian nuclear program. The official assured that Russia will never let the Islamic Republic possess nuclear weapons. "As far as Iran is concerned, we are participants of a comprehensive agreement signed between the Group of Six and Iran, which allows the IAEA to closely control Iran with regard to peaceful nuclear issues to prevent the development of the nuclear bomb. We will never let Iran obtain nuclear weapons," Shein said. http://www.pravdareport.com/news/world/asia/01-09-2017/138567- russia_iran_nuclear_weapons-0/ Return to top

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PressTV (Tehran, Iran) US Moves Run Counter to Spirit, Letter of Nuclear Deal: Iran's IAEA Envoy Author Not Attributed September 13, 2017 Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says the US administration’s recent moves with regard to the Iranian nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), run counter to the deal. Reza Najafi made the remarks while speaking to a quarterly meeting of the IAEA’s 35-member Board of Governors in Vienna on Wednesday. After more than 20 months, the implementation of the JCPOA by the other side, especially the US, is not acceptable yet, Najafi said, adding that the US administration has adopted an unconstructive approach against the spirit and letter of the agreement to undermine its successful implementation. The Iranian envoy said a recent visit by a US official to Vienna was aimed at undermining the credibility of the UN nuclear body and an instance of Washington’s sinister intention and insincere behavior. Najafi warned that exerting pressure on the IAEA would adversely affect the professional and impartial nature of the agency's duty to carry out the job entrusted to it by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which was adopted on July 20, 2015 to endorse the nuclear deal, and would consequently weaken the independence and credibility of it. Like any other agreements, the JCPOA is based on acting in accordance with mutual commitment, in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, he added. The US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, travelled to Vienna last month to speak with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano about Iran’s nuclear agreement. The US is putting pressure on the IAEA to inspect Iranian military sites, a demand rejected by Tehran which says the information with regard to the Islamic Republic’s military sites are classified and access to such locations, specially by the US, is out of the question. Iran says the US demands for access to its military sites are aimed at politicizing the JCPOA and that issues pertaining to Tehran’s defense capabilities are non-negotiable. On Monday, Amano said Iran was abiding by the rules set out in the nuclear accord it signed with the P5+1 group of countries in 2015. “The nuclear-related commitments undertaken by Iran under the (deal) are being implemented,” Amano said in the text of a speech to the Board of Governors. "The verification regime in Iran is the most robust regime which currently exists. We have increased the inspection days in Iran, we have increased inspector numbers ... and the number of images has increased," he said, adding, "From a verification point of view, it is a clear and significant gain." Elsewhere in his remarks, Amano noted that the IAEA did not distinguish between civilian or military sites in its inspections and would ask for access when necessary. http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/09/13/535033/Iran-US-IAEA-Reza-Najafi-Amano Return to top

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INDIA/PAKISTAN

NDTV (New Delhi, India) 'India Is Uranium-Rich Country': Nuclear Chief Dr Sekhar Basu By Pallava Bagla September 11, 2017 In an exclusive interview to NDTV, Dr Basu said that the development has helped improve uranium fuel supply to nuclear reactors in the country. For a very long time one has only heard that India is country that is not blessed with indigenous uranium and that unless we import uranium there will be no energy independence. However, India's atomic chief Dr Sekhar Basu asserts that thanks to new explorations India can now call itself a uranium-endowed country. NDTV visited the uranium processing plant to get this rare insight. In an exclusive interview to NDTV, Dr Basu said that the development has helped improve uranium fuel supply to nuclear reactors in the country. "When I joined the atomic energy programme we were told India has just about 60,000 tons of mineable uranium. But today the quantity has grown by 4 to 5 times. Government is fully supporting us to make India uranium self-sufficient," Dr Basu said during a visit by NDTV to Jaduguda uranium mine, the oldest site in the country. For a very long time these Indian-made nuclear reactors ran on very low efficiency. The reason being cited was that the uranium fuel was in short supply. In fact, the raison d'être of the Indo-US nuclear deal was to get access to imported uranium. The locally mined uranium is supplied to generate electricity and also to power nuclear weapons capability. India currently has 22 operating nuclear power plants which have an installed capacity of 6780 MW. Of these the two nuclear plants at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu are run on uranium imported from Russia. http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-is-uranium-rich-country-nuclear-chief-dr-sekhar-basu- 1748499 Return to top

The Hindu (New Delhi, India) For China, ’64 N-Test Was Meant as a ‘Head-On Blow’ to India By Amit Baruah September 9, 2017 K. R. Narayanan, as China Division head, warned that the test, coming after 1962 war, would further weaken India’s position on border claims Beijing believed that it had delivered a “head-on blow” and sent shock waves through India after its first-ever nuclear test conducted on October 16, 1964 — two years after the border war fought by the two countries. A cable sent from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to Beijing at the end of October 1964 said the “success” of its nuclear test had led Prime Minister Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to get various countries to “censure” China, but they refused to go along with him.

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India, the cable said, was engaged in an internal debate on how to respond to China’s nuclear test. “The current issue for India is not whether it should produce nuclear weapons but whether it can do so,” the communication said, concluding that Delhi would actively strive to do this to enhance its international status. The cable is available at the Wilson Centre’s Digital Archive. Countering U.S. presence The Chinese also believed that the United States was engaged in exerting its influence on a weak India after the 1962 war. “But now the United States wants to control India and manage its relationship with Pakistan at the same time, thus it is unwilling to help India manufacture atomic bombs.” The Embassy also believed that China’s newly acquired nuclear status would also enhance the chances of regaining its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council from Taiwan, clearly linking the two. “As we [China] now had a bigger chance of regaining our place in the United Nations, India is hoping to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council with Soviet support,” the cable added. In the Indian assessment, the Chinese nuclear explosion would “alter the political balance in Asia and disturb profoundly the status quo in the world”. As Director of the China Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, K.R. Narayanan, who went on to become President of India, linked the Chinese nuclear test with India’s options relating to the border dispute. “But even in the immediate future India cannot ignore the bomb…as one of the factors affecting the power balance between China and India and the rest of Asia. Peking’s bomb is not a tactical weapon, but a strategic instrument,” Mr. Narayanan’s secret memo, circulated after internal discussions in the Ministry, said. “If the recovery of Aksai Chin and the settlement of the border question through resort to arms was inconceivable hitherto it would be more so in the future,” Mr. Narayanan believed, adding that India would also have fewer military and diplomatic options after the Chinese nuclear test. Arguing that China had now secured the breakthrough to “big power” status, the memo felt the real question for India was a long-term one —how India and China would be in 25-50 years if they followed different policies with regard to the use of nuclear energy. Mr. Narayanan felt the Chinese had attacked in 1962 because they wanted to damage India’s influence in the Asian-African world and “expedite the process of polarisation” in India’s domestic politics. “The ideological bitterness which the Chinese evinced against Jawaharlal Nehru sprang from a realisation that it was his policies of non-alignment and socialism which stood as a border against the Communist dream of a violent revolution in India.” Build the bomb In Mr. Narayanan’s view, diplomacy could only embroider on the fact of power but not act as a substitute for it. “Therefore, whatever policy we may choose to follow, it seems that without a nuclear bomb of our own, India cannot answer the challenge posed by China.” He argued that India acquiring the bomb might make Chinese leaders sit up and reconcile with Delhi just like the U.S. and other nuclear powers were coming to grips with the reality of China. According to the memo, China’s ultimate aim was to drive the U.S. out of Asia and “establish herself” as a nuclear power equal to the U.S. and the USSR. A second nuclear test conducted by the Chinese

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Daily Times (Lahore, Pakistan) India’s Mounting Nuclear Trade Aspirations By Beenish Altaf September 12, 2017 India’s membership of exports’ control cartels will give it a distinct advantage in global commerce The mounting political and strategic relationships among the countries have given birth to a new pattern of rising interactions with global forces. While analyzing India’s growing quest for multilateral export control regimes, it can be said that India has a unique history of its relationship withexport control cartels. The country that provided an idea for the formation of one of the cartels is now passing through a new phase, expecting a legal membership in it. It is certain that the membership of such regimes will give India a distinct advantage in participating in the management of global commerce in advanced technology. The four multilateral exports control regimes namely, the NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement have emerged as the oldest multilateral bodies for exports control and are considered some of the few leading forums of the global exports control systems especially in contemporary geo-politics. Despite the fact that these are informal groups with a small number of member countries, they derive their importance from the nature of their membership. Members of these regimes are mostly major suppliers of high or sensitive technology that is mostly of dual use in nature. Focusing on recent years, India is undoubtedly trying to integrate itself fast within these regimes by playing politics around. However, it is quite obvious that it would face roadblocks in its integration in the existing system. A somewhat deeper analysis indicates that the old non-proliferation order and actors are slowly reconciling to India’s integration with the global exports control system. India’s membership of the four multilateral exports control regimes may further question the credibility and efficacy of the global system including the non-proliferation regime. India has claimed that it has a spotless non-proliferation record and that it should be included in nuclear mainstream countries by also making it part of the NSG. However, it seems India’s non- proliferation record is not as clean as it would have us believe. It has been said a lot in post-nuclear suppliers groups’ debates that India’s first nuclear test was actually a device derived from Canadian and US exports, designated purely for peaceful purposes. That test spurred the United States and several other countries to create the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to more severely restrict global nuclear trade. Since India’s nuclear program is largely plutonium based, its uranium reserves are apparentlyshown to be low for civil nuclear usage, and are actually low for military usage. The trend of nuclear deals with India, set-in largely by the US, though for its own interest, has and will further overwhelm India with uranium reserves.

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India’s civil nuclear programme will not only benefit out of it but will also keep extensive amounts of uranium for its growing nuclear weapons program. This assistance to India has made it a big aspirant to become a South Asian nuclear giant. It also expects to be recognized as a world’s de jure nuclear power. India, right after getting the MTCR membership, immediately decided to work on enhancing its Brahmos missile ranges. Analytically, it could be assessed that if India is doing this within days of getting the MTCR membership, what willit do if its dream comes true of getting NSG membership. It would, for sure, lead the way for enhancing its uranium reserves for military usage. Analytically, China stonewalled India’s entry into NSG as it hasinfluencebeingan active member of the group but it could not stall India’s membership to the MTCR since China is not a member itself. Nevertheless, India is undoubtedly spending more and more on developing its tremendous firepower and strike capabilities. This is alarming for the world in general and the region in particular. It could have a destabilizing impact on South Asia, owing to the fact that India is neither party to the NPT nor has it accepted full scope safeguards ever on its nuclear trade. So there should not be any chance of including India into the hub of civil nuclear trade, more specifically the multilateral export control regimes. If done so, the purpose of all the regimes to aid non- proliferation efforts would be wiped out. http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/12-Sep-17/indias-mounting-nuclear-trade-aspirations Return to top

ThePrint (New Delhi, India) Exclusive: Pakistan Builds New Tunneled Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility in Baluchistan By Vinayak Bhat September 5, 2017 The new facility in Baluchistan can store 30-60 Shaheen-III missiles, will bring India and even Israel into target range. In continued efforts to safeguard its nuclear first-strike capability, Pakistan is building an underground facility in the restive Baluchistan region that is likely to be used to deploy its Shaheen series of nuclear-tipped missiles, bringing the entire Indian mainland, and even Israel, into its target range. Information accessed by ThePrint shows that the new facility is coming up in an earthquake prone zone deep in the mountains of Baluchistan. Pakistan’s FWO or Frontier Works Organisation, akin to India’s BRO or Border Roads Organisation, has built at least three sites. Two of these at Khuzdar and Kori have been detailed earlier and subsequently confirmed by geospatial information analyst Frank Pabian of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. The third facility revealed now is in Kenji in the foothills of the Barugh mountains and is still under construction. It is expected to take another two years to be completed at the present pace of construction and no missiles are possibly deployed there yet. The facility can store 30-60 Shaheen- III missiles which have a range of 2,750 km and can pose a serious threat to most major Indian cities. The facility is at a distance of about 965 km from New Delhi, 1,100 km from Mumbai and 3,200 km from Port Blair.

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Located painstakingly through open source Google Earth satellite imagery dated 2004 through 2016, this nuclear weapons tunneled storage facility is in Qambar district, 80 km east of Khuzdar and the same distance west of Larkana. The exact location is 27 41 41N 67 26 01E and construction began in the first half of 2003. The facility has three main tunnels with double layered perimeter fence, support area with possible administrative office. The site may have mechanical transport (MT) garages, residential buildings and a religious place in future. The main area consists of three main tunnels with approximate 10 m wide entrances. The tunnels have been carved out of the mountains for more than 14 years, indicating large areas that must be prepared inside the mountain interconnecting each other. The height of entrance cutouts are approximately 15-25 m and width 20-25 m. The tunnels’ entrances would most likely be strengthened by cement concrete and compressed earth just like other tunneled facilities observed in Pakistan. There is a new road being constructed from the northern portal towards the west of the complex. This possibly will lead to yet another tunnel entrance in future. The southern portal has a smaller opening of 5m width located very close to it. This probably is an emergency exit in case of any unforeseen eventuality. One of the entrances has construction material dumped near it in the latest imagery. These materials look like iron bars used in heavy construction projects especially for intertwining in reinforced concrete. Similar construction material was observed near the northern entrance earlier which now has been removed, suggesting its use in internal construction. This suggests that construction of the northern portal has possibly been completed and construction of the central portal is in full swing. Latest imagery also shows that the administrative and support complex presently consists of a possible administrative office and a likely high-bay garage. The complex also has a 9 m x 9 m building tucked into the mountain side, probably being used an explosive store. There are two small buildings which possibly may be makeshift mosques. Towards the south of this complex there is a cement mixing plant and two more barracks probably used as residential accommodation for the construction staff and a motor transport garage. The excavated earth from these four tunnels is being very systematically disposed at various places including the stream flowing nearby. The traces are being carefully camouflaged, by fast growing trees and shrubs, to avoid detection. However, nothing can be hidden from satellite imagery. The rough calculations of internal sizes are still possible from detected disposal dumps. The approximate internal area would be 150,000 Cu m. For a layman it would be a tunnel of 10 m x 10 m size for a distance of 1.5 km. The road within the inner fence is being lined with fast growing trees on both sides for camouflaging future vehicular movements. This entire area is prone to high seismic activities which probably have not been factored into while selecting the sites. The recent seismic activity observed by the United States Geographic Survey (USGS) when plotted vividly displays the imminent dangers to these facilities as indicated in image below. A two layered perimeter security has been provided to this facility. Both outer layers are probably barbed wire fences. No watch towers are seen yet along the fences. Obviously these fences are still under construction.

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The third layer of security and access control is being provided by a gas field, about 9.5 km from the site, being manned by FWO. The three portal entrances are vastly separated from each other by more than 400 m-1000 m to avoid bombing in one dive. The facility has not yet been provided with any air defence cover. It has a single entry and exit road. Access control facilities are observed only at the support area and tunnel entrances. This tunneled facility makes targeting of mobile launcher units difficult if not impossible. The construction of tunnel entrances in different directions would preclude a single sortie air attack. https://theprint.in/2017/09/05/pakistan-builds-new-tunneled-nuclear-weapons-storage-facility- baluchistan/ Return to top

COMMENTARY

The Federalist (Alexandria, VA) Talk About ‘Little Nukes’ Is Cover For Lacking A Foreign Policy Strategy By Tom Nichols September 11, 2017 This is a bad idea whose time has already come and gone, and the nuclear warriors’ ideas are just as bad now as they were 15 or 20 years ago. Every American president since Ronald Reagan has left office with fewer nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal and reduced the centrality of nuclear arms in American defense planning. But advocates of nuclear warfighting might have new reason to be optimistic that policy will swing back their way under President Trump. According to a report in Politico, the Trump administration is considering returning to an idea defeated years ago in Congress, the construction of “mini-nukes” that could take out buried or heavily shielded facilities without doing a lot of damage to surrounding areas or populations. Here we go again. This is a bad idea whose time has already come and gone, but with Trump in office, some of the nuclear warriors who have been waiting to put a stamp on U.S. strategy have quietly returned to the bureaucracy, and their ideas are just as bad now as they were 15 or 20 years ago. The Pointless Nuclear Posture Review The nuclear door is opening in the coming year because it’s time for another round of the pointless exercise known as the “Nuclear Posture Review” (or NPR), a full examination of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security. It’s not that doing such reviews is inherently a bad idea, but if the last three—done in 1994, 2002, and 2010—are any indication, the result will be affirming the nuclear conventional wisdom along with whatever bumper sticker is important to the administration at the time. In 1994, it was “hedging.” That is, the NPR conducted under Bill Clinton determined that we were doing everything we were supposed to do, but could do it a bit smaller, while hedging against any current or future threats. What was supposed to be a no-assumptions, top-to-bottom review ended up as a ringing endorsement of the nuclear status quo, a kind of Mini-Me of our Cold War strategy.

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In 2002, the Bush 43 administration classified important parts of the NPR but let it slip anyway that the new wrinkle was to draw up plans for nuclear use against a group of smaller states—Iran, North Korea, Syria, and some other miscreants—while vowing to plunge tons of money into a “responsive infrastructure,” another way of saying that future threats would be dealt with by flooding Virginia’s 703 area code with consulting contracts. The 2002 NPR was a flop, even among the people who were supposed to understand it. After a series of mishaps (including a B-52 crew accidentally flying nuclear weapons across the United States without knowing it), a blue-ribbon panel in 2008 led by former defense secretary James Schlesinger concluded that even the Air Force wasn’t clear about what nuclear weapons were supposed to do or why we had them. In the end, the Bush 43 NPR—which was mostly an artifact of 9/11—pretty much disappeared without trace, as it should have. The 2010 NPR was much like its 1994 counterpart, in which all options were kept open while reaffirming Barack Obama’s commitment to a nuclear-free world. It kept the basic structure of our nuclear deterrent while wishcasting for a world in which we didn’t need nuclear weapons. From a “purely strategic point of view,” as political scientist Stephen Walt noted at the time, the 2010 NPR and its carefully hedged promises were “largely meaningless.” This time, Trump has issued an order that begins: “To pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of the United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces,” then calls for a United States nuclear deterrent that is “modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st- century threats and reassure our allies.” As opposed, apparently, to our current antique, fragile, rigid, delicate, unready deterrent. It’s Not Just a Waste of Money, But Dangerous What all this government-speak really means is: spend a lot of money on building a new generation of smaller nuclear weapons, and pay a lot of contractors to explain to everyone how to use them. This would all be bad enough, except that creating a more varied fleet of smaller and more usable nuclear weapons is itself a dangerous idea. During the Cold War, the United States maintained a strange menagerie of nuclear forces, based on the assumption that we were outnumbered and outgunned by the Soviets and the Chinese, and might need to escalate to nuclear weapons because we’d be losing on the battlefield. What’s more, we wanted Moscow to know that we’d have no choice, and thus the Soviet leaders would be deterred from starting a war of aggression that would run a massive risk of going nuclear, and eventually destroying both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This was a risky strategy borne of existential necessity. The current drive to create smaller nuclear weapons then concoct a menu of options for using them, however, is a needless foray into discretionary first use, in the name of giving the president “flexibility” when in reality it would just add to the temptation to use weapons that should be ruled out immediately for any reason less than the survival of the United States. This renewed obsession with using nuclear arms springs from two sources. One is purely a function of the military-industrial complex: there are a lot of companies and institutions that have been itching to see nukes become relevant again, and thus reopen a flow of contracts and funding that dried up after the Soviet collapse. Nuclear Weapons Are Not Magical The second issue, however, is more reasonable and pressing. U.S. strategists are understandably frustrated at the inability to translate America’s gigantic military power into a reliable deterrent against the shenanigans of Vladimir Putin in Europe, the risk-taking lunacy of the weird dumpling

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // running North Korea, or the shrewd game of catch-me-if-you-can played for the last few decades by the Iranians. Military planners want to be able to offer the president a reliable way to squash an incipient threat, particularly from a nuclear program, quickly and completely. Nothing, the reasoning goes, can do the job like a nuclear weapon. This belief in the magical properties of nuclear arms, however, is just so much wishful thinking. A small nuclear weapon is not going to deter Putin from seizing a chunk of the Baltics, no more than it will stop Kim Jong Un from destroying Seoul or Tokyo before we dispatch him to his maker. And the Iranians know—as do we—that no American president is going to throw a nuclear weapon, no matter how small, into the tinderbox of the Middle East. These realities highlight the bigger problem with nuclear strategy that has plagued American thinking since the Cold War: too many strategic debates, when stymied, default to nuclear force as a crutch, a kind of dummy variable that balances difficult equations without making hard or costly choices. Is it expensive to keep a large force in Europe or Korea? No worries, we’ll cover the gap with nukes. Not enough air power to destroy an Iranian program if it rears its head? Nukes. This is not strategy; it is a placeholder for strategy. If America is serious about deterring smaller powers and defending our allies in Europe and Asia, we need to increase the size of our conventional forces rather than tinkering with new kinds of nuclear forces. This would be expensive and take time, but it would be a far more reliable path than trying to buy a shortcut to deterrence with tiny nukes and Strangelove-like ideas about using them. Whether all this gets past Defense Secretary James Mattis or survives into the new NPR remains to be seen. Unfortunately, the advocates for nuclear use finally have the one piece of the puzzle they needed: an administration led by a president who does not seem to understand nuclear weapons, and who is willing to let tough talk about the world’s most dangerous weapon take the place of a responsible strategy. http://thefederalist.com/2017/09/11/talk-little-nukes-cover-lacking-foreign-policy-strategy/ Return to top

Omaha World-Herald Editorial: Revamp of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Slow Going But Vital Author Not Attributed September 12, 2017 Reaching consensus in Congress on how to fund the programs in coming years will be a challenge, given the competing demands on the federal budget. Gen. John Hyten, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, sums it up well in describing the status of our nation’s nuclear weapons triad of air, sea and land power. “If you look at every element of the nuclear enterprise, it has to be modernized,” Hyten says. “All our stuff is old. It’s still ready, safe, secure, reliable. But it’s old.” The venerable B-52 bomber, for example, has been flying since the Eisenhower era and will remain a key part of our airborne arsenal for years to come before it can be replaced. There is a measure of progress, however. Last month the Pentagon awarded the third major recent contract for modernization of the nuclear triad. That contract is for a replacement for the aging Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system.

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The other contracts, both announced last year: the B-21, the successor aircraft to the B-52, and the Columbia-class submarine, to replace the Ohio-class subs. These are needed steps by the Pentagon. It’s vital that our systems be updated to maintain an effective deterrent in the face of ongoing defense modernization by countries such as Russia and China, the increasing sophistication of air defense technology and the Russian government’s cheating on a 1987 treaty limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces. U.S. Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, underscored the importance of nuclear modernization during a recent World- Herald interview. She also noted the challenges ahead. Weapons development on projects this complex is a slow- going enterprise. Deliveries of the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine, for example, aren’t scheduled until the early 2030s. Reaching consensus in Congress on how to fund the programs in coming years will be a challenge, given the competing demands on the federal budget. The General Accounting Office has estimated the cost at about $400 billion over the next 10 years, with further spending required in succeeding years. These costs are separate from another security need — strengthening our anti-missile defenses in the wake of North Korea’s long-term missile threat. Another complication on the modernization issue is the ongoing debate over whether the Pentagon should develop a new nuclear-tipped cruise missile, an issue on which Secretary of Defense James Mattis so far has taken no position. It’s appropriate that the Trump administration has begun a detailed review of U.S. nuclear weapons needs and strategy, with a timeline of 12 to 18 months for completion. That effort can provide important guidance on this challenging issue. http://www.omaha.com/opinion/editorial-revamp-of-u-s-nuclear-arsenal-slow-going- but/article_4d78d44c-2671-581d-b059-1d8c65d125f6.html Return to top

National Review (Washington, DC) To Neutralize the North Korean Threat, America Must First Understand the North Korean Regime By Nicholas Erberstadt September 11, 2017 A new approach is clearly needed, but what could it entail? Our seemingly unending inability to fathom Pyongyang’s true objectives, and our attendant proclivity for being taken by surprise over and over again by North Korean actions, is not just a matter of succumbing to Pyongyang’s strategic deceptions, assiduous as those efforts may be. The trouble, rather, is that even our top foreign-policy experts and our most sophisticated diplomatists are creatures of our own cultural heritage and intellectual environment. We Americans are, so to speak, children of the Enlightenment, steeped in the precepts of our highly globalized era. Which is to say: We have absolutely no common point of reference with the

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // worldview, or moral compass, or first premises of the closed-society decision makers who control the North Korean state. Americans’ first instincts are to misunderstand practically everything the North Korean state is really about. The DPRK is a project pulled by tides and shaped by sensibilities all but forgotten to the contemporary West. North Korea is a hereditary Asian dynasty (currently on its third Kim) — but one maintained by Marxist-Leninist police-state powers unimaginable to earlier epochs of Asian despots and supported by a recently invented and quasi-religious ideology. And exactly what is that ideology? Along with its notorious variant of emperor worship, “Juche thought” also extols an essentially messianic — and unapologetically racialist — vision of history: one in which the long-abused Korean people finally assume their rightful place in the universe by standing up against the foreign races that have long oppressed them, at last reuniting the entire Korean peninsula under an independent socialist state (i.e., the DPRK). Although highly redacted in broadcasts aimed at foreign ears, this call for reunification of the mijnok (race), and for retribution against the enemy races or powers (starting with America and Japan), constantly reverberates within North Korea, sounded by the regime’s highest authorities. This is where its nuclear weapons program fits into North Korea’s designs. In Pyongyang’s thinking, the indispensable instrument for achieving the DPRK’s grand historical ambitions must be a supremely powerful military: more specifically, one possessed of a nuclear arsenal that can imperil and break the foreign enemies who protect and prop up what Pyongyang regards as the vile puppet state in the South, so that the DPRK may consummate its unconditional unification and give birth to its envisioned earthly Korean-race utopia. In earlier decades, Pyongyang might have seen multiple paths to this Elysium, but with the collapse of the Soviet empire, the long-term decline of the DPRK’s industrial infrastructure, and the gradually accumulating evidence that South Korea was not going to succumb on its own to the revolutionary upheaval Pyongyang so dearly wished of it, the nuclear option increasingly looks to be the one and only trail by which to reach the Promised Kingdom. Like all other states, the North Korean regime relies at times upon diplomacy to pursue its official aims — thus, for example, the abiding call for a “peace treaty” with the U.S. to bring a formal end to the Korean War (since 1953 only an armistice, or cease-fire, has been in place). Yet strangely, few foreign-policy specialists seem to understand why Pyongyang is so fixated on this particular document. If the U.S. agreed to a peace treaty, Pyongyang insists, it would then also have to agree to a withdrawal of its forces from South Korea and to a dissolution of its military alliance with Seoul — for the danger of “external armed attack” upon which the Seoul–Washington Mutual-Defense Treaty is predicated would by definition no longer exist. If all this could come to pass, North Korea would win a huge victory without firing a shot. But with apologies to Clausewitz, diplomacy is merely war by other means for Pyongyang. And for the dynasty the onetime anti-Japanese guerrilla fighter Kim Il Sung established, policy and war are inseparable — this is why the DPRK is the most highly militarized society on the planet. This is also why the answer to the unification question that so preoccupies North Korean leadership appears to entail meticulous and incessant preparations, already underway for decades, to fight and win a limited nuclear war against the United States. To almost any Western reader, the notion that North Korea might actually be planning to stare down the USA in some future nuclear face-off will sound preposterous, if not outright insane. And indeed it does — to us. Yet remember, as we already know from press reports, North Korea has been diligently working on everything that would actually be required for such a confrontation: miniaturization of nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and even cyberwarfare (per

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // the Sony hacking episode). Note further that while North Korean leadership may be highly tolerant of casualties (on the part of others, that is), it most assuredly is not suicidal itself. Quite the contrary: Its acute interest in self-preservation is demonstrated prima facie by the fact of its very survival, over 25 years after the demise of the USSR and Eastern European socialism. It would be unwise of us to presume that only one of the two forces arrayed along the DMZ is capable of thinking about what it would take to deter the other in a time of crisis on the peninsula. At this juncture, as so often in the past, serious people around the world are calling to “bring North Korea back to the table” to try to settle the DPRK nuclear issue. However, seeing the DPRK for what it is, rather than what we would like it to be, should oblige us to recognize two highly unpleasant truths. First, the real existing North Korean leadership (as opposed to the imaginary version some Westerners would like to negotiate with) will never willingly give up their nuclear option. Never. Acquiescing in de-nuclearization would be tantamount to abandoning the sacred mission of Korean unification: which is to say, disavowing the DPRK’s raison d’etre. Thus submitting to foreign demands to de-nuclearize could well mean more than humiliation and disgrace for North Korean leadership: It could mean de-legitimization and de-stabilization for the regime as well. Second, international entreaties — summitry, conferencing, bargaining, and all the rest — can never succeed in convincing the DPRK to relinquish its nuclear program. Sovereign governments simply do not trade away their vital national interests. Now, this is not to say that Western nonproliferation parlays with the DPRK have no results to show at all. We know they can result in blandishments (as per North Korea’s custom of requiring “money for meetings”) and in resource transfers (as with the Clinton Administration’s Agreed Framework shipments of heavy fuel oil). They can provide external diplomatic cover for the DPRK nuclear program, as was in effect afforded under the intermittent 2003–07 six-party talks in Beijing. They can even lure North Korea’s interlocutors into unexpected unilateral concessions, as witnessed in the final years of the George W. Bush administration, when Washington unfroze illicit North Korean overseas funds and removed Pyongyang from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in misbegotten hope of a “breakthrough.” The one thing “engagement” can never produce, however, is North Korean de-nuclearization. Note, too, that in every realm of international transaction, from commercial contracts to security accords, the record shows that, even when Western bargainers think they have made a deal with North Korea, the DPRK side never has any compunction about violating the understanding if that should serve purposes of state. This may outrage us, but it should not surprise us. For under North Korea’s moral code, if there should be any advantage to gain from cheating against foreigners, then not cheating would be patently unpatriotic, a disloyal blow against the Motherland. Yes, things would be so much easier for us if North Korea would simply agree to the deal we want them to accept. But if we put the wishful thinking to one side, a clear-eyed view of the North Korea problematik must be resigned to the grim reality that diplomacy can only have a very limited and highly specific role in addressing our gathering North Korean problem. Diplomacy must have some role because it is barbaric not to talk with one’s opponent — because communication can help both sides avoid needless and potentially disastrous miscalculations. But the notion of a “grand bargain” with Pyongyang — in which all mutual concerns are simultaneously settled, as the “Perry Process” conjectured back in the 1990s and others have subsequently prophesied — is nothing but a dream. It is time to set aside the illusion of “engaging” North Korea to effect nonproliferation and to embrace instead a paradigm that has a chance of actually working. Call this “threat reduction”:

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Through a coherent long-term strategy, working with allies and others but also acting unilaterally, the United States can blunt, then mitigate, and eventually help eliminate the killing force of the North Korean state. In broad outline, North Korean threat reduction requires progressive development of more effective defenses against the DPRK’s means of destruction while simultaneously weakening Pyongyang’s capabilities for supporting both conventional and strategic offense. A more effective defense against the North Korean threat would consist mainly, though not entirely, of military measures. Restoring recently sacrificed U.S. capabilities would be essential. Likewise more and better missile defense: THAAD systems (and more) for South Korea and Japan, and moving forward on missile defense in earnest for the USA. It would be incumbent on South Korea to reduce its own population’s exposure to North Korean death from the skies through military modernization and civil defense. The DPRK would be served notice that 60 years of zero- consequence rules of engagement for allied forces in the face of North Korean “provocations” on the peninsula had just come to an end. But diplomacy would count here as well: most importantly, alliance strengthening throughout Asia in general and repairing the currently frayed ROK–Japan relationship in particular. Today’s ongoing bickering between Seoul and Tokyo reeks of interwar politics at its worst; leaders who want to live in a postwar order need to rise above such petty grievances. As for weakening the DPRK’s military economy, the foundation for all its offensive capabilities, reinvigorating current counterproliferation efforts such as PSI and MCTR is a good place to start — but only a start. Given the “military first” disposition of the North Korean economy, restricting its overall potential is necessary as well. South Korea’s subsidized trade with the North, for example, should come to an end. And put Pyongyang back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list — it never should have been taken off. Sanctions with a genuine bite should be implemented — the dysfunctional DPRK economy is uniquely susceptible to these, and amazing as this may sound, the current sanctions strictures on North Korea have long been weaker than, say, those enforced until recently on Iran. (We can enforce such sanctions unilaterally, by the way.) And not least important: revive efforts like the Illicit Activities Initiative, the brief, but tremendously successful Dubya-era task force for tracking and freezing North Korea’s dirty money abroad. Then there is the China question. Received wisdom in some quarters notwithstanding, it is by no means impossible for America and her allies to pressure the DPRK if China does not cooperate (see previous paragraph). That said: China has been allowed to play a double game with North Korea for far too long, and it is time for Beijing to pay a penalty for all its support for the most odious regime on the planet today. We can begin by exacting it in diplomatic venues all around the world, starting with the U.N. NGOs can train a spotlight on Beijing’s complicity in the North Korean regime’s crimes. And international humanitarian action should shame China into opening a safe transit route to the free world for North Korean refugees attempting to escape their oppressors. If North Korean subjects enjoyed greater human rights, the DPRK killing machine could not possibly operate as effectively as it does today. Activists will always worry about the instrumentalization of human-rights concerns for other policy ends — and rightly so. Today and for the foreseeable future, however, there is no contradiction between the objectives of human-rights promotion and nonproliferation in the DPRK. North Korea’s human-rights situation is vastly worse than that in apartheid South Africa — why hasn’t the international community (and South Korean civil society) found its voice on this real-time, ongoing tragedy? The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights has already prepared a comprehensive commission of Inquiry on the situation in the DPRK. Let governments of conscience seek international criminal accountability for North Korea’s leadership.

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Many in the West talk of “isolating” North Korea as if this were an objective in its own right. But a serious DPRK threat-reduction strategy would not do so. The North Korean regime depends on isolation from the outside world to maintain its grip and conduct untrammeled pursuit of its international objectives. The regime is deadly afraid of what it terms “ideological and cultural poisoning”: what we could call foreign media, international information, cultural exchanges, and the like. We should be saying, “Bring on the ‘poisoning!’” The more external contact with that enslaved population, the better. We should even consider technical training abroad for North Koreans in accounting, law, economics, and the like — because some day, in a better future, that nation will need a cadre of Western-style technocrats for rejoining our world. This brings us to the last agenda item: preparing for a successful reunification in a post-DPRK peninsula. The Kim regime is the North Korean nuclear threat; that threat will not end until the DPRK disappears. We cannot tell when, or how, this will occur. But it is not too soon to commence the wide-ranging and painstaking international planning and preparations that will facilitate divided Korea’s long-awaited reunion as a single peninsula, free and whole. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/451230/north-korean-nuclear-threat-understanding- regime-key-neutralizing-it Return to top

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Chicago, IL) Save The INF Treaty—But Not by Repeating History By Thomas Graham and Bernadette Stadtler September 13, 2017 In 1983, the United States began deploying ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The deployment caused the Soviets to walk out of ongoing arms control negotiations. But it also led to the negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the elimination of an entire class of missiles from the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thirty-odd years later, as the United States contends with a Russian violation of the INF treaty, some experts and policy makers have urged Washington to develop its own treaty-violating missile and to help allies—who are not bound by the treaty—acquire the new missile. Indeed, Congress is currently considering legislation calling for the United States to develop a program of record for a missile that, if tested, would violate the treaty. But even if the United States retraced all the steps it took during the initial INF Treaty negotiations—including the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe—it could not recreate the underlying conditions that allowed the negotiations to succeed in the first place. Only a clear understanding of today’s underlying conditions can shape an effective response to Moscow’s treaty violation. How it happened. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union deployed in Europe an accurate, road-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. The missile, known as the SS-20, sparked concern within NATO. The SS-20 system appeared to be a nuclear war–fighting weapon, as opposed to a weapon of deterrence, and was regarded as a huge threat to the alliance. In 1979, NATO responded with a “double-track” strategy, which entailed engaging the Soviet Union in negotiations on theater nuclear forces while simultaneously preparing to deploy US intermediate-range missiles in Europe if negotiations failed. Though the US missiles that were eventually deployed are often perceived solely as a response to the deployment of the SS-20, they

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // were also intended to reassure NATO allies concerned that arms control treaties, including a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), would weaken US extended deterrence. The US-Soviet negotiations that ultimately resulted in the INF Treaty began in 1980, but neither side seemed to take the talks particularly seriously. Rather, NATO’s European members were the driving force behind the negotiations. Though they never had a seat at the bargaining table, European NATO members knew they faced an uphill battle in persuading their citizens to accept US missiles if diplomacy failed—and therefore they wished to see it succeed. The United States had less skin in the game and might have let the negotiations languish without NATO pressure. On the Soviet side, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was not willing to accept limitations on his nation’s very large force of intermediate-range missiles. And the Soviets were optimistic that public opposition to US missiles in Europe might prevent their deployment. In 1981, Ronald Reagan inherited the INF negotiations and announced an ambitious new vision for the talks: the “zero option,” under which the United States would deploy no intermediate-range missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union eliminated its own intermediate-range missiles. Brezhnev rejected this proposal as one-sided because it would require the Soviet Union to dismantle existing weapons while the United States would only have to forgo deploying new ones. In 1983, with no progress achieved on the diplomatic track, the United States began deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. In response, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations—which only resumed in early 1985. Shortly after the negotiations restarted, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. In contrast to his predecessors, who attempted to achieve foreign policy objectives by increasing Soviet military might, Gorbachev believed that security could be based on political measures, including arms control. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet military’s influence over foreign policy weakened, and the Politburo even re-evaluated the SS-20 and concluded that it was militarily irrelevant. Under Gorbachev, the INF negotiations gained pace. In 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik to discuss arms control. The leaders made remarkable progress—almost finalizing an agreement that would have, in principle, eliminated all nuclear weapons. Though they were unable to achieve this lofty goal, they built momentum for the INF talks, which concluded with the signing of the treaty in December 1987. What’s different now. The INF Treaty was the product of a specific moment in history, and its successful negotiation depended on a number of conditions that do not pertain today. First, NATO countries played an important role in influencing US actions during the negotiations. Members of the alliance, West Germany in particular, pushed the United States to deploy missiles in Europe to solidify US extended deterrence and counter the Soviet threat. European leaders pushed for deployment even though they faced enormous pressure from politicians at home who opposed the introduction of missiles into Europe, as well as from the public, which was deeply antinuclear. Today, NATO countries seem ambivalent about Russia’s INF violation. The United States, in order to protect sources and methods, has thus far been unable to share with its NATO allies in-depth information about the violation. Some allies have been reluctant to confront Russia until they see more evidence. Even if they possessed all the information, members of the alliance would be reluctant to accept new nuclear weapons systems on their territory. Five NATO states—, the , Germany, Norway, and Luxembourg—have previously called for the United States to remove from Europe its approximately 150 to 200 tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers have speculated that NATO’s newest members might accept US missiles on their territory, but since NATO decisions are made by consensus, the whole alliance would have to support the decision to deploy missiles.

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// USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 //

Furthermore, negotiations toward the INF Treaty succeeded in part because of the personal characteristics of Soviet and US leaders at the time. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev favored an improved relationship with the West and believed that arms control negotiations could contribute to Soviet security. Gorbachev and Reagan also seemed to hold nuclear weapons in a different regard than did other Cold Warriors. Reagan famously pronounced that “[A] nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Gorbachev called for the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” Although some dismiss these stances as political posturing, the attempts by Reagan and Gorbachev to rid the world of nuclear weapons at Reykjavik demonstrated their commitment to disarmament. US and Russian leaders today are substantially different from Reagan and Gorbachev. President Donald Trump has professed to want better relations with Russia, but he has also been the subject of intensive investigation into potential collusion with Russia during his presidential campaign. His independence in dealing with Russia has been further stymied by anti-Russia sentiment in Congress, which recently passed sanctions against Moscow. While President Vladimir Putin appears to have a positive personal relationship with Trump, he thrives on competition with the United States and may count on it for political survival. Furthermore, neither Trump nor Putin has expressed any particular affinity for arms control. What to do. Conditions have changed since the INF Treaty was negotiated, but saving the treaty and preventing a new SS-20–like threat to Europe are not impossible. The United States, in order to bring Russia back into compliance, will have to adopt strategies that are specifically tailored to the conditions that exist today—conditions that include possible NATO reluctance to host new nuclear- capable weapons systems and Putin’s aggressive approach to foreign affairs. One possible approach involves capitalizing on Russia’s refusal to admit that it is in violation of the treaty, despite its having been presented with evidence of the infraction—and Moscow’s preference, if the treaty is indeed to fail, that blame land on the United States. Unfortunately, that is precisely where blame would land if Washington were to develop an intermediate-range missile system that, if tested and deployed, would violate the treaty. If, on the other hand, the United States shared with its allies indisputable evidence of Russia’s violation, pressure on Moscow to come back into compliance would mount. In addition to publicizing Russia’s violation, the United States should also offer Russia a way to save face and return to compliance without having to admit a violation. If the time ever comes for the United States to remind Russia just how much it hated the deployment of US missiles in Europe, it could do so without violating the INF Treaty. Steven Pifer, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has suggested that the United States could deploy additional conventional air- and sea-launched cruise missiles to Europe. These systems exhibit several advantages: They would not violate the INF Treaty, which only covers ground-based systems; they are already in the US arsenal; and they would be easy to remove if Russia returned to compliance. The original negotiations toward the INF Treaty offer valuable lessons about handling Russia’s violation of the agreement—but simply matching Russia’s violation with a new violation is not a viable solution. Negotiations succeed and fail for a number of complex reasons, including who is in power, who is at the table, and how the international community views (and whether it supports) the negotiations. To save the INF Treaty, the United States must develop strategies that both acknowledge—and take advantage of—circumstances that exist today. http://thebulletin.org/save-inf-treaty%E2%80%94-not-repeating-history11109 Return to top

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ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

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