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(CUWS) Outreach Journal # 1281 Issue No. 1281 15 September 2017 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // Feature Item “Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement”. Written by Kenneth Katzman, Paul Kerr and Valerie Heitshusen, published by the Congressional Research Service; September 7, 2017 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44942.pdf Trump Administration statements indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This report does not analyze the advantages and disadvantages of any specific option, or examine in detail the implications of any particular course of action. Those issues are examined in: CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 2 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // TABLE OF CONTENTS US NUCLEAR WEAPONS • Amid North Korea Tension, Mattis Heads to US Nuclear Weapons Bases • Trump Review Leans Toward Proposing Mini-Nuke • The History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in South Korea • Federal Auditors Say US Nuclear Dump Running Out of Room US COUNTER-WMD • America's Missile Defenses At Sea Are Getting a Big Upgrade • Radiation Security Tested On Maersk Ship • Applied DNA Enlists With Army’s Bio-Warfare Defenders • Did Homeland Security Ignore a Breakthrough Tool to Block Bioterrorism? A Trial Will Decide US ARMS CONTROL • Arms Control Experts Urge Trump to Honor Iran Nuclear Deal • Trump Moves Closer to Decertification of Iran Nuclear Deal • Nuclear Arms Control and Reductions in Jeopardy • Proliferation in The Age Of Uncertainty ASIA/PACIFIC • How North Korea’s Missiles Improved So Quickly • North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site: Satellite Imagery Shows Post-Test Effects and New Activity in Alternate Tunnel Portal Areas • S Korea Defiant in Face of New Sanctions, Vows to Pursue Nuclear Deterrence • Holes Forming in US Nuclear Umbrella, Some in Japan Argue EUROPE/RUSSIA • Russia's Use and Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium Pose Significant Nuclear Risks • Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty Contradicts Russia's National Interests • Russia Advocating Conciliatory Approach to North Korea • How Russia Quietly Undercuts Sanctions Intended to Stop North Korea’s Nuclear Program MIDDLE EAST • Israel Just Bombed a Chemical Weapons Factory That Syria Shouldn’t Have Had • High Court Rejects Petition for More Oversight of Israel’s Nuclear Agency • Russia Will Never Let Iran Obtain Nuclear Weapons • US Moves Run Counter to Spirit, Letter of Nuclear Deal: Iran's IAEA Envoy INDIA/PAKISTAN • 'India Is Uranium-Rich Country': Nuclear Chief Dr Sekhar Basu • For China, ’64 N-Test Was Meant As A ‘Head-on Blow’ to India • India’s Mounting Nuclear Trade Aspirations • Exclusive: Pakistan Builds New Tunneled Nuclear Weapons Storage Facility in Baluchistan COMMENTARY • Talk About ‘Little Nukes’ Is Cover For Lacking A Foreign Policy Strategy • Editorial: Revamp of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Slow Going But Vital • To Neutralize the North Korean Threat, America Must First Understand the North Korean Regime • Save the INF Treaty—But Not By Repeating History twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 3 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // US NUCLEAR WEAPONS DefenseOne (Washington, DC) Amid North Korea Tension, Mattis Heads to US Nuclear Weapons Bases By Marcus Weisgerber September 12, 2017 The U.S. defense secretary will inspect American ICBMs, then visit the military command that would lead a nuclear war. U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis will visit two key American nuclear weapons bases this week as military forces in the Pacific remain on high alert following North Korea’s apparent hydrogen bomb test earlier this month. Days after Pyongyang released images of Kim Jong-Un inspecting what North Korea says is its first hydrogen bomb, the Trump administration’s Pentagon chief will highlight America’s much larger nuclear arsenal. Mattis on Wednesday will visit Minot Air Force Base, in North Dakota, which controls intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, scattered across the state, and is home to B-52 bombers, which can launch nuclear cruise missiles. On Thursday, the secretary is scheduled to visit U.S. Strategic Command, in Omaha, Nebraska, the military headquarters that would run a nuclear war. “His visit to two nuclear-focused locations comes at an opportune time given the ongoing Nuclear Posture and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews,” Pentagon officials said in a statement late Tuesday. The trip comes just weeks after North Korea fired an ICBM over Japan and said it tested a hydrogen bomb. South Korean officials now believe Pyongyang is planning to test-launch an ICBM. President Donald Trump ordered a review of U.S. nuclear forces soon after taking office in January. The Pentagon has said it hopes to finish the review by year’s end. Among the items reportedly under consideration are smaller nuclear bombs. The U.S. currently has 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, which date back to the 1970s. The U.S. Air Force took a step toward replacing them last month, hiring Boeing and Northrop Grumman to start developing technology and building parts for a new missile. Also last month, the Air Force awarded $900-million deals to Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to start developing highly controversial nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Former Defense Secretary William Perry is among the vocal opponents of the new weapon who say it will destabilize foreign relations. The Pentagon is also in the midst of buying new nuclear-armed stealth bombers and submarines. The price tag for all of these upgrades and overhauls could be as much as $1.5 trillion over the next three decades, according to the Arms Control Association. Last month, Mattis visited a Navy Ohio-class nuclear submarine base in Washington state. After the stop at Minot, he will have visited all three “legs” of the U.S. nuclear triad. The U.S. military has worked to sharpen procedures and training in its nuclear forces after a series of embarrassing incidents in the mid-1990s. In 2007, a B-52 mistakenly flew live nuclear weapons from Minot to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. Six months later, it was revealed that the military — in 2006 — mistakenly shipped ICBM fuses to Taiwan, instead of helicopter batteries. twitter.com/USAF_CUWS | cuws.au.af.mil // 4 // USAFCUWS Outreach Journal Issue 1281 // And just in the last five years, commanders have had to deal with cheating scandals involving nuclear-related service members in the Air Force and Navy, and a scandal involving illicit drug use by military personnel who guard nuclear weapons. http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2017/09/amid-north-korea-tension-mattis-heads-us-nuclear- weapons-bases/140943/?oref=d-river Return to top Politico (Washington, DC) Trump Review Leans Toward Proposing Mini-Nuke By Bryan Bender September 9, 2017 It would be a major reversal from the Obama administration, which sought to limit reliance on nuclear arms. The Trump administration is considering proposing smaller, more tactical nuclear weapons that would cause less damage than traditional thermonuclear bombs — a move that would give military commanders more options but could also make the use of atomic arms more likely. A high-level panel created by President Donald Trump to evaluate the nuclear arsenal is reviewing various options for adding a more modern "low-yield" bomb, according to sources involved in the review, to further deter Russia, North Korea or other potential nuclear adversaries. Approval of such weapons — whether designed to be delivered by missile, aircraft or special forces — would mark a major reversal from the Obama administration, which sought to limit reliance on nuclear arms and prohibited any new weapons or military capabilities. And critics say it would only make the actual use of atomic arms more likely. "This capability is very warranted," said one government official familiar with the deliberations who was not authorized to speak publicly about the yearlong Nuclear Posture Review, which Trump established by executive order his first week in office. "The [nuclear review] has to credibly ask the military what they need to deter enemies," added another official who supports such a proposal, particularly to confront Russia, which has raised the prominence of tactical nuclear weapons in its battle plans in recent years, including as a first-strike weapon. "Are [current weapons] going to be useful in all the scenarios we see?" The idea of introducing a smaller-scale warhead to serve a more limited purpose than an all-out nuclear Armageddon is not new — and the U.S. government still retains some Cold War-era weapons that fit the category, including several that that can be "dialed down" to a smaller blast. Yet new support for adding a more modern version is likely to set off a fierce debate in Congress, which would ultimately have to fund it, and raises questions about whether it would require a resumption of explosive nuclear tests after a 25-year moratorium and how other nuclear powers might respond. The Senate is expected to debate the issue of new nuclear options next week when it takes up the National Defense Authorization Act. The push is also almost sure to reignite concerns on the part of some lawmakers who say they already don’t trust Trump with the nuclear codes and believe he has dangerously elevated their prominence in U.S.
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