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Tactical Nuclear Weapons The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR—an intergovernmental organization within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non- proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local entrenched tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, Government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and Governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from Governments and donors foundations. The Institute’s web site can be found at URL: http://www.unidir.org Cover page: designed by Diego Oyarzún-Reyes (UNCTAD) UNIDIR/2002/11 Tactical Nuclear Weapons Time for Control Taina Susiluoto Editor UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat. UNIDIR/2002/11 Copyright © United Nations, 2002 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No. GV.E.02.0.7 ISBN 92-9045-143-2 CONTENTS Page Preface by Patricia Lewis . v Statement by Former President Mikhail Gorbachev . ix Workshop Report. xiii Part I – The 1991 Declaration and the Evolving Security Framework 1 Chapter 1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Unilateral Arms Control Policy Rose Gottemoeller . 3 Chapter 2 An Update on Efforts to Reduce Tactical Nuclear Weapons William C. Potter . 7 Chapter 3 Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism Pavel Podvig. 15 Chapter 4 Fuel for the Fire: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism Alistair Millar . 19 Chapter 5 Security of Nuclear Materials and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Frank von Hippel . 25 iii iv Page Part II – Strengthening the 1991 Declarations 35 Chapter 6 Tactical Nuclear Arms Control? Alexander A. Pikayev . 37 Chapter 7 A Realistic Strategy for Controlling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Jack Spencer. 47 Chapter 8 The Challenged Regime on Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debate on Legal Aspects Taina Susiluoto. 53 Chapter 9 Tactical Nuclear Weapons Regime: Is It Legally Binding? Sergey Radchenko . 75 Chapter 10 Strengthening the 1991 Declarations: Verification and Transparency Components Nikolai Sokov . 93 Chapter 11 The September 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and the Elimination, Storing and Security Aspects of TNWs Joshua Handler. 107 Part III – Nuclear Weapons Development and Testing 133 Chapter 12 New Nuclear Weapons Development and Testing Rebecca Johnson . 135 Chapter 13 Nuclear Testing and New Strategic Frameworks: The Need for a Strategic Nuclear Framework Responsive to Terrorist Threats Charles Meade . 143 Recent UNIDIR Publications 147 PREFACE To mark the tenth anniversary of the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev unilateral declarations on tactical nuclear weapons, UNIDIR and its collaborating partners held a meeting in September 2001 at the United Nations in New York. The meeting took place days after the terrible attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on the 11th September. At the UNIDIR meeting and many times since that fateful day, the issue of terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, fissile materials has been raised. The continuing lack of control over tactical nuclear weapons means that there is a clear and present danger that tactical nuclear weapons may have been, or may be in the future, stolen or sold to those with an intent to use them for the purposes of terrorism. Tactical nuclear weapons are a particularly dangerous category of nuclear weapons. They are portable, often integrated into conventional force structures and, in some cases, less well guarded than their strategic counterparts. Despite the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, there has never been any formal agreement on the removal and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Despite periodic updates on progress, data were never agreed, only proportions of numbers to be eliminated or stored were declared. Still today a great deal of uncertainty exists over the implementation of the 1991 unilateral declarations. Perhaps more worrying, there seems to be a renewed interest in this category of nuclear weapons. Post September 11, in addition to the concerns over the terrorist use of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials, there have been discussions and debates, in public and in private, on the potential use by States of small, low yield nuclear weapons to attack underground hideouts of terrorist leaders or terrorists’ weapons manufacturing facilities. In addition the use of nuclear weapons as a response to chemical and biological weapons attacks is also being debated. None of these debates has led to official policy changes, but with the increasing concerns over the long-term adherence to the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that new small, short-range and “useable” nuclear weapons could be on the horizon. v vi In response to these developments, and with the support of the United Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, UNIDIR continued a study began in 1999 on the situation regarding tactical nuclear weapons. UNIDIR hosted a first workshop in Geneva in March 2000 at which papers analysing such issues as the current situation, numbers and definitions, and regional approaches were presented. In September 2001 the second workshop in New York, looked at issues of transparency, verification, control, legislation, terrorism, potential development of TNWs and the link to concerns over nuclear testing. There is sustained and increasing interest over these aspects of tactical nuclear weapons. It is indeed time to control this class of weapons. Perhaps it may already be too late to prevent these weapons getting into the hands of those with the intent to use them or the materials contained therein, so as to cause injury and mayhem to targeted civilian populations. But we must start from here and at least bring under control those weapons that are covered by the 1991 Initiatives. Ten years is late enough. Let’s hope that it is not too late. This volume is a collection of the papers that were presented at the New York seminar. Not all the papers presented in New York have been published in this volume and some of the papers have been updated to take account of political developments. A collection of some of these papers was circulated in draft form at the 2002 Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. UNIDIR’s collaborating partners for this meeting were the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Green Cross International and Global Green USA. Many thanks go to them for their support and practical contributions throughout the planning and execution of this project. Sincere gratitude goes to the generosity of our financial sponsors for the meeting and the publication the Governments of Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and New Zealand. I should particularly like to thank the authors of the papers: President Mikhail Gorbachev, the former President of the USSR, William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Rose Gottemoeller of the Carnegie vii Endowment for International Peace, Pavel Podvig of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Alistair Miller of the Fourth Freedom Forum, Frank von Hippel and Josh Handler of Princeton University, Alexander Pikayev of the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow, Jack Spencer of the Heritage Foundation, Taina Susiluoto of UNIDIR, Sergey Radchenko of UNIDIR and the London School of Economics, Rebecca Johnson of the Acronym Institute, Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch of the Government of Mexico and Charles Mead of RAND. Thanks also to Terence Taylor of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and Robert Nelson of Princeton University for the presentations they made at the conference, despite great difficulties. Most of all, it must be said that the meeting and the publication would never have taken place without the unfailing efforts of Taina Susiluoto and her team at UNIDIR. Taina worked with Nicolas Florquin on loan from the Monterey Institute and the Department for Disarmament Affairs and Sergey Radchenko from the London School of Economics in the planning of the meeting and collection of the papers. Isabelle Roger and Jackie Seck provided administrative support; the publication was edited by Steve Tulliu and brought to press by Anita Blétry. I am very grateful for all the hard work and support that went into this work. Now, however, the hard work must not go to waste and urgent political and practical action needs to be taken to control tactical nuclear weapons. Patricia Lewis Director UNIDIR Geneva STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV1 Dear friends, I am sorry I could not join you today for this important gathering to discuss the 10th anniversary
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