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University Microfilms International A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 N Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 8618782

Hall, Richard Cooper

THE CRISIS IN BULGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1911-1913

The Ohio Stale University Ph.D. 1986

University Microfilms

International300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

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University Microfilms International THE CRISIS IN BULGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1911-1913

DISSERTATION

Presented In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

By

Richard Cooper Hall, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University

1986

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Carole Rogel

Alan Beyerchen

Williamson Murray Advisor Department of History Copyright by Richard Cooper Hall 1986 To My Parents

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I express sincere appreciation to Dr. Carole Rogel for

her guidance and assistance throughout the course of this

project. Thanks go also to the other members of my

advisory committee,. Drs Alan Beyerchen and Williamson

Murray, for their suggestions and comments. Gratitude is

expressed to Drs Andrei Pantev, Ivan Ilchev and Georgi

Gounev of the University of Sofia; Dr. Radoslav Popov of

the Institute of Balkan Studies, Sofia; and Georgi Markov of the Institute of History, Sofia, for their suggestions.

To my wife, Audrey, I offer sincere thanks for your patience and encouragement.

iii VITA

4 January 1950...... Born - Lima, Ohio

1972...... B.A., Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennesse

1974...... M.A., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1974-78...... U. S. Army

1978-Present...... Ohio State University

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Eastern European History

Minor Fields: Modern European History; Modern European Diplomatic and Military History; Geography

iv TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA...... iv

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES...... vi

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER PAGE

I. THE TURCO-BULGARIAN RAPPROCHEMENT 10

II. GESHOV'S ALLIANCES...... 42

III. FINAL PREPARATIONS...... 82

IV. THE WAR FOR THE NATIONAL ASPIRATION... 121

V. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS...... 158

VI. THE FALL OF ADRIANOPLE...... 198

VII. GESHOV'S PEACE...... 234

VIII. TOWARD THE CATASTROPHE...... 276

CONCLUSION...... 296

MAPS...... 303

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 305

v NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND DATES

The "Suggestions for the Transliteration of the

Bulgarian Alphabet," proposed by J. F. Clarke and C. E.

Black in C. E. Black, The Establishment of Constitutional

Government in Bulgaria (Princeton, 1943) 321-323 have been

utilized for the transliteration of the Bulgarian

language, with three exceptions. No attempt has been made

to differentiate between W and M . And the two former

letters of the Bulgarian language *t5 and have been transliterated according to usage in T. Atanasova et. al. ,

Bulgarsko-angliiski rechnik (Sofia, 1983).

All dates have been given according to both the

Gregorian (New Style) and Julian (Old Style) calendars with the Gregorian date first. At the time of he events discussed in this work a thirteen day difference existed between the two calendars. The dates of Bulgarian newspaper references are given only according to the

Julian calender.

vi INTRODUCTION

During the tenth century and again in the thirteenth a Bulgarian Empire dominated the Balkan Peninsula. During these times Bulgaria was among the premier states in

Europe in terms of political, economic and cultural authority. Tsars Simeon and Kaloman threatened

Constantinople and ruled territories stretching from the

Black to the Adriatic Seas. But during the fourteenth century Eulgarian political power fragmented and the

Bulgarians were the first of the Balkan peoples to fall completely under the control of the invading Ottoman

Turks. By the end of the fourteenth century the last vestiges of Bulgarian independence had vanished. For four centuries the Bulgarians remained under Turkish domination.

Initially this was not entirely negative, but the failures of a decaying Ottoman administration together with what the Bulgarians regarded as their national awakening beginning about 1762 with Father Paisi's History of the Slavo-Bulgarians resulted in a century-long evolution toward identifying the Bulgarian ethos and creating a Bulgarian national state. Throughout the first

1 2

half of the nineteenth century, aided by an economic

upturn, a Bulgarian national consciousness spread

throughout the Ottoman lands south of the Danube

River and east of the Vardar River. The first major success of this movement was the acknowledgement of the

Ottoman authorities in 1870 of an autonomous church, an exarchate determined by national identity-the Bulgarian.

The exarchate's extensive territory encompassed the region south of the Danube stretching from the Black Sea to Lake

Ohrid. Bulgarian nationalists thereafter projected the future borders of the Bulgarian state to coincide with those of the exarchate.

After this success the Bulgarians turned to armed revolutionary struggle to attain a national state. While even during the time of the most enlightened Ottoman rule

Bulgaria had never been entirely quiet after 1829 outbreaks of violence directed against the Turkish authorities were more frequent. These outbreaks culminated in 1876 with a major revolt against Turkish rule. The Turks overcame the poorly armed revolutionaries without difficulty and exacted a terrible retribution on the Bulgarian population.

News of the 'Bulgarian massacres,' initially reported by the American correspondent J. A. MacGahan and the

American diplomat E. Schuyler, outraged public opinion throughout Europe, and especially in Russia. Failing to 3 achieve satisfaction from the Constantinople government the Russians successfully intervened militarily against the Turks in 1877 and in March 1878 forced the defeated

Turks to sign the Treaty of San Stefano.

This treaty established a large Bulgarian state under the nominal suzerainty of the Turkish sultan. The borders of this state were roughly equal to the borders of the exarchate and were highly satisfactory to the majority of

Bulgarian patriots. By the Treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria became the first state in eastern Europe to have attained the national frontiers to which it aspired. But the euphoria of San Stefano lasted only four months.

Unfortunately the San Stefano treaty was only preliminary, subject to the review of the other Great

Powers. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary especially perceived in San Stefano Bulgaria a Russian base from which it might dominate the Balkans. Their opposition to

San Stefano Bulgaria resulted in the convocation of the concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

There, under the tutelage of Bismarck, San Stefano

Bulgaria was divided into three parts. The northern third became the autonomous principality of Bulgaria. The southern third became the autonomous Turkish province of

Eastern Rumelia. And the western third, Macedonia, remained under direct Turkish authority. So the

Bulgarians after having attained their national 4

aspirations at San Stefano, saw them shattered several

months later at Berlin.

Thereafter every Bulgarian government sought to

reverse the Berlin settlement and unify the Bulgarian

lands on the San Stefano basis. In 18B5 Eastern Rumelia

was joined to the Bulgarian principality. Russian

diplomatic opposition and Serbian military opposition to

this unification were overcome by strenuous effort. But

Macedonia remained an irredentist area. However,

Bulgarian claims there were increasingly contested by

Greek and Serbian pretensions. These conflicting

aspirations hindered a united Balkan effort against the

Turks and perpetuated Turkish rule in Europe.

After the unification with Eastern Rumelia the Sofia governments tried various stratagems to achieve the national goal. Stambolov in 1890 attempted a Turcophile policy, Stoilov in 1897 sought detente with Serbia, Danev in 1902 sought an alliance with Russia. All of these diplomatic initiatives were intended to enhance the ability of Bulgaria to achieve the national aspiration.

These policies were not bound to any strong preconceptions. Various governments were described as

Russophile or Turcophile but these terms were not mutually exclusive. All of these governments realized that if they did not proceed towards the national aspiration Macedonian extremists could seize the initiative and attempt to unify 5

Macedonia with Bulgaria on a basis uncontrolled by the

Sofia government. Bulgaria, however lacked the strength to solve this problem unilaterally. Support would be necessary from the Great Powers. The importance of the

Great Powers regarding Balkan questions had been amply demonstrated to the Bulgarians by the Congress of Berlin.

But the conflicts over Macedonia rendered any Balkan cooperation impossible.

The Macedonian revolt of 1903 demonstrated the urgency of the Macedonian problem and the strength of the

Macedonian bands. Even though the bands were overcome by the Turks they were not decisively defeated. After 1903 the Macedonian issue became more acute for all Balkan governments. In 1904 the Petrov government attempted to reach an arrangement with Serbia and also sought a detente with Turkey. The Malinov government in 1908 cooperated with Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by declaring independence. This independence was intended to enhance Bulgaria's international position and facilitate

Bulgarian demands regarding Macedonia. The Young Turk movement and the worsening condition of European Turkey by

1911 had made the San Stefano question critical for

Bulgaria. The foreign policies of the various Bulgarian governments demonstrated a flexible approach toward the

San Stefano aspirations. Bulgaria would continue to 6

explore all means and alliances to attain this national

objective.

Many fine works are available for a study of

Bulgarian foreign policy during the period of the struggle

for national unification. Richard J. Crampton's Bulgaria

1Q7B-1918 (New York, 1983) is the standard work in a

western language on this period. Also very useful are L.

S. Stavrianos' The Balkans since 1453 (New York, 1958);

Barbara Jelavichs' two volume History of the Balkans

(Cambridge, 1983) and Charles and Barbara Jelavich's The

Establishment of the Balkan National States 1804-1920

(Seattle, 1977). In Bulgarian N. Stanev's Nai-nova

istoriya na Bulqariya. 1878-1912 (Sofia, 1925), T.

Girginov's two volume Istoricheskl razvol na suvremenna

Bulqariya. Ot vuzrazhdanieto do Balkanskata voina 1912 g_.

(Sofia, 1934) and the new multivolume Istoriya na

Bfllqariya (Sofia, 1979- ) are standards. For the diplomatic history of the Balkan Wars E. C. Helmreich's

The Diplomacy of Balkan Wars 1912-13 (Cambridge, 1938) is the best overall work on the interactions of the Great

Powers during this period. Andrew Rossos' Russia and the

Balkans 1908-1914 (Toronto, 1980) closely examines Russian and Balkan diplomatic activities during the Balkan Wars.

Edward C. Thadden's Russia and the Balkan Alliance 1911-12

(University Park, 1970) studies the Russian role in the development of the Balkan Alliance. Excellent observations

on the political and military events of the Balkan Wars

are made in George Young's (Diplomatist) Nationalism and

War in the Near East.

Bulgarian perspectives of these events is found in works such as A. Girginov's Narodnata kastastrofa.

Voinite 1912-1913 g.. (Sofia, 1926), P. Todorov's two volume Poqromite na Bulqariya (Sofia, 1930) N. Kolarov's

Orchek vurhu diplomaticheskata lstoriya na Balkanskite voinl (Sofia, 1938), and Tushe Vlahov's Otnosheniyata mezhdu Btflqariya i^ tsentralnlte sili po vreme na voinite

1912-1918 (Sofia, 1957). V. A. Zhebokritskii's Boloariva naknaune balkankikh voin 1912-1913 (Kiev, 1960) and

Bolqariya v period balkanskikh voin 1912-1913 g. (Kiev,

1961) are excellent studies of this time.

Indispensible to any study of Bulgarian diplomatic history during the Balkan Wars are the Doklad na parlamentarnata izpitatelna komisiya (Sofia, 1918) and the

Prilozhenie kum tom purvi ot doklada na parlamentarnata izpitatelna komisiya (Sofia, 1918). The Doklad publishes much Bulgarian diplomatic correspondence from this period and the Prilozhenie contains interesting testimony about the events of the Balkan Wars by the major participants in these events. The Prilozhenie must be used with caution, since this testimony was given by members of the former

Geshov-Danev government in answer to charges of misconduct 8 made by the then governing politicians of the Radoslavov cabinet who had opposed many of the polices of the Geshov government when it was in power. Nashata Duma (Sofia,

1925) is the response of Geshov and several of his cabinet members to renewed charges of misconduct raised by the

Stamboliski government.

The military aspect of Bulgaria's participation in the First Balkan Wars is amply covered in the Bulgarian ministry of War's seven volume Voinata mezhdu Bulqariya i.

Turtsiva 1912-1913 (Sofia, 1937). A. Ganchev's

Balkanskata voina. 1912-1913 a. (Sofia, 1939), and

Mezhdusuyuznicheskata voina 1913 qodina (Sofia, 1940) provide another good account of the military operations of the Bulgarian armies. The best source in a western language for information on the Bulgarian military operations during the Balkan Wars is Oberstleutnant

Friedrich Immanuel's Per Balkankrleg 1912 (Berlin, 1913-

14). Reginald Rankin's Inner History of the Balkan War

(London, 1914) is also useful.

Many participants in the events of 1911-13 in

Bulgaria have left valuable memoirs. Ivan E. Geshov's

Balkan League (London, 1915) and Prestupnoto bezumle

(Sofia, 1914) give the former minister president's view of this period. Memoirs by diplomats serving the Bulgarian cause at this time include A. Toshev's Balkansklte voini

(Sofia, 1928), M. Madzharov's Diplomaticheska podqotovka na nashite voini (Plovdiv and Sofia, n. d.), S. S.

Bobchev's Stranitsi iz moyata diplomaticheska misiya v

Petroqrad 1912-1913 (Sofia, 1940) and G. I. h'aiinkov's

Romuniya i_ nelnata politika epremo Bulqariya (prez 1912 i_

1913 a. ) (Sofia, 1917). Ivan I. Fichev's Balkanskata voina. 1912-1913 (Sofia, 1940) is a good military memoir from the former Bulgarian Chief of Staff.

The motives and actions of Tsar Ferdinand throughout his reign and especially during the period of the Balkan

Wars are very obscure. Two standard biographies exist,

Hans Madol's Ferdinand von Bulqarien. der Traum von Byzanz

(Berlin, 1931) and Stephen Constant's Foxy Ferdinand Tsar of Bulgaria (New York, 1980). But neither of these works clarifies Ferdinand's role in the events of the Balkan

Wars. CHAPTER I

THE TURCO-BULGARIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

On 22/9 March 1911 the Malinov cabinet resigned.

This was not unexpected. Since the beginning of the year

Tsar Ferdinand had demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the government by his open quarrel with the minister of war, General Nikolaev.* This dissatisfaction resulted from the Malinov government's foreign policy inertia.

After the successful declaration of independence in 190Q the Malinov cabinet had achieved no significant foreign policy results. Nothing concrete had come from negotiations with Greece and Serbia.* As A. V. Nekludov, who became Russian minister in Sofia in the spring of 1911 noted, the Malinov cabinet was simply "worn out. "J The

San Stefano imperative in Bulgarian foreign policy dictated that a government make perceptible progress toward a solution of the problem of the Bulgarians living in the Ottoman Empire.

The new government, which took office on 29/16 March

1911, was a coalition composed of the National Party and the Progressive Liberal Party. Some time before, these two parties had agreed that if either had the opportunity 11 to form a government, they would collaborate in a coalition.4 Both parties were Russophile.9 Ivan E.

Geshov, the National Party leader, became both minister president and foreign minister in the new cabinet. He had received much of his education in England and counted John

Stuart Mill as a major influence on his thought.9 Geshov was considered by some to be the richest man in Bulgaria.7

This wealth protected him from Ferdinand's blandishments and gave him independence from court circles. He had a long career of public service and had served in the

Stoilov cabinet from 1894-97.* Geshov's personality was not dynamic. One political opponent compared him to a rabbit,"timid and fearful."9 Geshov himself confessed, "I think slowly, I am not a fast speaker, I am even willing to suffer by allowing others to act first."1* Ferdinand did not like Geshov.11 But the reticent and cultured former finance minister made a good impression on others.

An Austrian journalist described him as "very conservative. But slow as he is to decide upon a question, all the more quickly does he carry his decision into effect; and this he always does with a kind of Roman self-possession."1* And Nekludov rather liked the "self- possessed old man."‘1 Geshov was regarded as an advocate of a policy of peace and especially concord with the

Turks.14 Geshov gave promise of a safe and steady foreign policy. 12

The leader of the other half of the governing coalition was a different sort of individual. Stoyan

Danev was a lawyer who had been educated in Prague,

Heidelberg and Paris.19 He had served previously as foreign minister (1901-02) and minister president. <1902-

03). He was an extreme Russophile.1‘ Soon after the coalition took power in 1911 Danev stated that, "Russia must have a strong active policy. This is necessary for us Balkan Slavs, who exist only thanks to the powerful existence of Russia.",T Yet Nekludov found him to be

"stubborn" and recognized in him "the typical characteristics of the sworn Russophile, the political man who, whilst not being hostile to us, considers that the

Russian representatives are forced to support him in all he does, to hate his enemies, even personal ones, and to see eye to eye with him on all matters affecting his country."1* Danev held no portfolio in the coalition government, but continued to serve as the President of the

Subranie (National Assembly), a post he had assumed in the autumn of 1910. The cabinet ministers were equally divided between the two parties of the coalition.

Ferdinand's reasons for accepting the Geshov-Danev coalition are complex. While he undoubtedly considered that Bulgaria might have to resort to armed conflict with

Turkey to realize the national aspirations in Macedonia and Thrace, his acceptance of a coalition led by the 13

peaceful Geshov indicates that a policy of war with Turkey

had not already been determined. 1 * A desire for a broad

base of support f'or the proposed constitutional changes

was a motivation for Ferdinand accepting the coalition. ••

And the Russophile government gave some assurance against

the growing ties between Turkey and the Triple Alliance.■*

But a coalition led by the moderate and peaceful Geshov

and the stubborn and ultrarussophile Danev gave Bulgaria several options. A rapprochement might be pursued under this arrangement with either Turkey or with the Christian

Balkan states. Bulgaria had not abandoned its politique d*oscillation but in fact sharpened and focused it.“# A broader basis for the realization of the national aspirations offered a greater chance of success and stability for Bulgaria and for Ferdinand. Despite his dislike for Geshov Ferdinand knew the new minister president would undertake no dangerous adventures or engage in outrageous poses. The Geshov-Danev cabinet proceeded cautiously in foreign affairs. As expected the national aspirations received primary consideration.

Geshov later wrote, "My first task as the leader of

Bulgarian policy was to deal with the unfortunate problem of Macedonia and Thrace which had been tormenting Bulgaria ever since the Treaty of Berlin.He broke with the anti-Turkish policy of his immediate predecessor A.

Malinov and adopted the old Stambolovist policy of seeking 14

Improved relatione with Turkey in return for concessions

in Macedonia and Thrace.•4 Geshov immediately made overtures to Constantinople. In an interview with a

Turkish journalist Geshov said, "Our policy is and always will be peaceful. We have always been advocates of friendly relations with Turkey. We desire and will follow a policy of peace. However this does not depend entirely on us. Turkey for its part needs to assist us in reaching our goal."®s Soon afterward in a speech in Russe Geshov stated:

Our policy is sincere, and we are anxious that it should not prove to be only the ephemeral policy of our cabinet, but should become the permanent policy of Bulgaria. We hope that the neighboring empire will facilitate our task by responding to our invitation to eliminate the causes which are at the bottom of our misunderstandings, and the motives which incite public opinion in our country. In a parliamentary democracy, no government can march against public opinion. It will be a misfortune if our pacific policy fails because of the pressure of public opinion for whose excitement we are in no way responsible.®6

Here Geshov indicated his belief in the strength of public opinion as a force in demanding the attainment of the national aspirations. The government endeavored to explain its Turcophile policy. Mir, the organ of the Nationalist

Party, asserted that "the best interests of the Bulgarian people" were served by closer relations with Turkey.®7

The Progressive Liberal paper Bulqariya echoed the same sentiment: 15

Relations between Bulgaria and Turkey today go beyond the sphere of narrow Turco-Bulgarian Interests. The Balkan political balance lies In the peaceful purposes of the neighboring states. The keys to peace are in Sofia and Constantinople. . . The Turkish government, whose desire for peace is beyond any doubt, we believe, will demonstrate no less zeal than the Sofia government to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.••

Through these pronouncements with the emphasis on peace

and the status quo the Geshov government clearly sought a detente with the Ottoman Empire.

Geshov made his foreign policy objectives more explicit in a speech at Vratsa on 4 June/22 May 1911. He

averred that Bulgaria:

above all wants good neighborly relations with those nearby states, to which every year large amounts of our goods and numbers of our workers go. Bulgaria wants to refrain from placing our population under future burdens, to avoid adventures, which could cost Bulgaria dearly and make thousands of Bulgarian families miserable both inside and outside the kingdom. Finally if we cannot help our brothers outside our borders, then at least we do not want to create reasons for new burdens and suffering, and new pain and misery for them.**

With this speech Geshov announced the public rationale for a Turcophile policy. The national aspirations brought the foreign policy of every Bulgarian government under close public scrutiny, and required that each government make serious efforts to explain its policy. The emphasis of the speech on material and physical well being demonstrated Geshov's desire to pursue a policy of peaceful pragmatism toward Turkey. 16

Geshov's Turcophile policy was not limited to words.

The Bulgarian government took several concrete actions to demonstrate the sincerity of its intentions. Early in

April 1911 Crown Prince Boris and his brother Prince Cyril visited Constantinople. More importantly the government took steps to discourage raids into Turkish territory by the Macedonian bands. The Minister of the Interior A.

Lyutskanov went on a tour of the border areas to demonstrate the government's determination to prevent the

Macedonians from creating any new incidents with Turkey.s*

And the Albanian revolt which erupted in May 1911 received no sympathy from the Bulgarian government.1 *

The Geshov government's policy of peaceful pragmatism was welcome to the Great Powers. The Germans commended

Bulgarian policy for contributing to the tranquility of the Turkish frontier and Macedonia.11 Russia and France also viewed this policy favorably.J a The acceptance of the status quo in the Balkans by Bulgaria eased the chances for a Great Power confrontation resulting from a

Balkan quarrel.

A major test of Geshov's Turcophile policy occurred in May 1911. On 14/1 May a Bulgarian officer, Captain N.

Georgiev, was shot and killed by Turkish soldiers while he was on a tour of Bulgarian outposts on the Turkish frontier. Bulgarian public opinion became outraged and the opposition parties called for strong measures against 17

Turkey.34 The Bulgarian military also grew restive.’*

But the government maintained its policy and sought to soothe the agitated population. Bulqariva affirmed that,.

"the Bulgarian government will do its duty and maintain the honor of the state, without leaving the course of its peaceful policy."36 Geshov warned that the anti-Turkish feeling within Bulgaria would have serious consequences for Bulgarians living in the Ottoman Empire. In a speech in Sofia on 7 June/25 May he stated, "We have nothing in common with our so-called nationalists, who inflict mischief on Bulgaria and on Bulgarians outside our borders, as well as on our foreign policy."37 Geshov attempted to use the Georgiev incident as leverage in seeking an accord with Turkey. On 7 June/25 May he instructed the Bulgarian minister in Constantinople to demand satisfaction for Captain Georgiev's death and to attempt to resolve questions concerning an amnesty for

Bulgarian political prisoners in Turkey, an end to atrocities against the Bulgarian population in Macedonia and several other matters involving the Bulgarian Church in the Ottoman Empire.3• The resolution of these questions was the precondition for the establishment of a real detente between Bulgaria and Turkey.3* Those responsible for the death of Captain Georgiev were eventually brought to trial.4* But the Turks demonstrated no interest in the issues raised by Geshov. 18

Another incident occurred on 27/15 May when a Turkish

officer was killed on the Bulgarian frontier.* * The

Bulgarians admitted responsibility and called for a mixed

Bulgarian-Turkish commission to investigate this

incident.4• After the death of the Turkish officer

Bulgarian public opinion appeared to consider that just retribution had been exacted and anti-Turkish agitation abated. All through the crisis the Bulgarian government steadily maintained a peaceful and reasonable demeanor.

Its pro-Turkish course continued.

The strongest evidence for the sincerity of the

Geshov government's desire to reach an agreement with the

Turks was its rejection of anti-Turkish alliance offers.

Immediately after the new Bulgarian government assumed power it began to receive friendly overtures from the other Christian Balkan states. The first to act was

Greece. At the end of March 1911 Captain Francis, a Greek military attache, approached the Bulgarian Chief of Staff

General Fichev. The Greek officer mentioned the ongoing reorganization of the Turkish army and suggested that the

Balkan states should administer a coup de grace to solve the Balkan question before the reorganization proceeded any further.41 Captain Francis assured General Fichev that a Greco-Bulgarian collaboration was possible. This contact had no concrete result. In April a Bulgarian officer did attend the spring Greek army maneuvers.4 4 But 19 the Bulgarian military did not have a high opinion of their Greek counterparts.4 s Nothing further developed.

Shortly thereafter an even more serious proposal arrived in Sofia from Athens. For some time E. Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, had entertained the idea of an alliance with Bulgaria.** With the assistance of James D.

Bourchier, a British journalist sympathetic to the problems of the Balkan states, he formulated an alliance proposal. Venizelos approached the Bulgarian Minister

President Malinov through the Greek Minister in Sofia with the proposal, but without success.* 7 With the Geshov government Venizelos employed a much more circumspect method out of a desire to preserve secrecy. The draft of the proposal for a Greco-Bulgarian entente to protect the privileges of Christians in the Ottoman Empire and an eventual Greco-Bulgarian defensive alliance, together with letters from Bourchier to Ferdinand and Geshov were carried by an associate of Bourchier from Athens to

Vienna, where they were delivered to the British journalist H. W. Steed.** Steed then conveyed the proposals and letters to the Bulgarian legation in

Vienna.*• The Bulgarian minister in Vienna, Ivan

Salabashev, reported on 11 April/29 March that he had

"very important letters" for Geshov.3* The material arrived soon thereafter in Sofia, where Geshov personally 20 deciphered it.s1 No other members of the cabinet were informed.

However, after all the precautions taken to advance the proposals to Sofia Geshov made no direct response. He informed his friend Bourchier that the Bulgarian government did not oppose "an exchange of views" with

Greece.’* But no such exchange occurred. Geshov later said that the friendly reception of a group of Bulgarian students in Athens in the spring of 1911, "created an atmosphere highly propitious to an exchange of ideas, paving the way for an understanding, if not an alliance between the two countries.’a But this was spoken from hindsight. No direct contacts transpired. An atmosphere of cordiality without overt friendliness prevailed in

Greco-Bulgarian relations.

The Greeks also approached Danev in April with a proposal for an alliance. This proposal was in the form of a memorandum prepared by a Greek committee appointed to study the idea of a Greco-Bulgarian alliance. 34 Danev, however, considered this proposal to be "premature.No further action resulted from this Greek memorandum.

The Greeks tried again to reach an agreement with

Bulgaria in June. The Greek Minister in Sofia, D. Panas, approached Geshov with the suggestion that Greece and

Bulgaria undertake joint steps along with the Great Powers to protest the extreme nationalism of the Young Turks.’* 21

Geshov informed Nekludov of this Greek idea and said that while he valued the recently improved relations with

Greece, such a step as Panas proposed would lead to trouble in Bulgarian-Turkish relations. Geshov's reluctance to act with Greece met with approval in St.

Petersburg.37 The Russians feared Greece soon might become embroiled with Turkey in a conflict over Crete.

Clearly Turkey was more important to Bulgarian policy than

Greece.

The Bulgarian government made no significant response to the Greek overtures because it sincerely sought a detente with Turkey. Geshov's vague reply to Bourchier was a courtesy to an old friend, and indicated that

Bulgaria wished to have a friendly relationship with

Greece only in the general context of a policy of the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans. The Geshov government considered that for the present at least a detente with Turkey offered greater advantage to Bulgaria than one with the Balkan states.

At almost the same time as the Greeks the Serbs approached the new government in Sofia. They, like the

Greeks, viewed the change of government there as an incentive to attempt to reach an agreement. On 16/3 April

Milan Milovanovich, the Serbian prime minister, met with

Andrei Toshev, the Bulgarian minister in Beograd and suggested a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance against Turkey.3* Milovanovich indicated that Serbia's major goals were in the direction of the Adriatic and would not conflict with

Bulgarian aspirations in Macedonia. But in order to secure its position Serbia would require a portion of

Macedonia north of a line from the Bregalnitsa River to

Babuna mountain to the town of Dibra to the Adriatic.

This included the important towns of Veles and Skopie.

Milovanovich indicated a willingness to negotiate however. 39 A division of Macedonia had always been a problem for previous Bulgarian governments and precluded any similar agreement with Serbia.

The Serbian proposal caught Geshov by surprise and placed him in a difficult position.69 He wished to improve relations with Serbia but not at the expense of his Turcophile policy. Nor did he want to undertake the difficult problem of a division of Macedonia. To further complicate the issue the Serbian offer was not unwelcome to Danev, who recently had told the Russian charge in

Sofia that he did not entirely share Geshov's point of view and personally favored a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance to block Austrian aspirations to gain an Aegean outlet at

Salonika.6 * Geshov reacted with characteristic ceution to the Serbian overture. On 27/14 April he told the Serbian

Minister in Sofia, Dr. Miloevich, that he wanted to see good relations between Bulgaria and Serbia restored.69 23

Encouraged by this tentative response the Serbs renewed their efforts. On 29/16 April Milovanovich met with Toshev. Two days later Nikola Pashich, a former

Serbian prime minister and an important political figure called on Toshev and advocated a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance with a division of Macedonia along a line from the

Bregatnitsa River to Veles to Durazzo on the Adriatic.

Pashich also "slyly" suggested that Serbia preferred a

Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople to a Russian occupation of that great city.*J Pashich had wanted a larger portion of Macedonia than had Milovanovich.

Geshov now become wary of the Serbian proposal. In a letter of 2 May/19 April he asked Toshev's opinion on a maximum concession in Macedonia and indicated that a meeting between himself and Milovanovich would be premature.64 Toshev replied that a division of Macedonia was impossible for political and moral reasons.63 Soon thereafter Geshov acted to discourage the Serbian initiative. He disclosed the hitherto now secret Serbian proposal to the Russians and indicated that the Serbs had told Toshev that they wished to move in Macedonia immediately.6 6 The Serbs claimed in their defense that the talks were only theoretical.67 But Geshov insisted that Toshev's version of the talks was correct and considered the matter closed.6• Undoubtedly Geshov exaggerated the immediacy of the Serbian intentions.66 In 24 doing so he avoided antagonizing his coalition partner and dealing with the thorny issue of a division of Macedonia.

Furthermore he remained consistent with his program of seeking an entente with, not against Turkey. Geshov knew that Russia wanted no disruption of the status quo in the

Balkans, and by misrepresenting the Serbian purposes he insured that St. Petersburg would strongly discourage the

Serbs. His scheme succeeded. When N. Hartwig, the ambitious Russian minister in Beograd, offered to go to

Sofia to meet with his old acquaintance Danev in order to facilitate the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations his suggestion was rejected by the Russian foreign ministry.7* St.

Petersburg wanted a Serbo-Bulgarian detente without any mischief in the Balkans.

The smallest Balkan country also approached the new government in Sofia with an alliance offer. In June 1911

King Nikola of Montenegro sent a letter to Ferdinand through a Dutch journalist, Baron de Gruyff, in which the lord of the Black Mountain suggested joint action against

Turkey.7‘ Ferdinand received de Gruyff for a long interview and gave him a letter for Nikola. The Bulgarian government however did not treat the Montenegrin offer seriously.7* Given Nikola's well known penchant for trouble with the Turks, any encouragement given him by

Bulgaria could only threaten the Bulgaro-Turkish detente desired by the Geshov government. The rejection of the 25

proffered anti-Turkish proposals from Greece, Serbia and

Montenegro demonstrated that the policy of the Geshov government was sincerely Turcophile.

During the summer of 1911 a domestic matter with strong foreign policy implications dominated the attention of the Geshov government. A Grand National Subranie met to discuss and approve alterations to the Bulgarian constitution arising from Bulgaria's change in legal status from a principality subject to the suzerainty of the Turkish sultan to an completely independent kingdom in

1908.7 * Of particular importance was Article 17, which regulated the position of the Head of State (Tsar) to the

Subranie. The old article 17 stated:

The Prince represents the Principality in all its relations with foreign states. In his name, and with the approval of the Subranie, special convention may be made with the neighboring states regarding matters dependent on the administration of the Principality, and for which the reciprocal action of the government in question is required.74

Under the old article 17 the Prince had sole responsibility to conduct foreign policy. But his actions were subject to the approval of the Subranie.

The Malinov government had prepared a modification of article 17 which somewhat diluted the authority of the

Subranie and this in a slightly different version was accepted by the Subranie.79 But the Geshov government's proposal was much stronger. It not only diluted the powers of the Subranie but also specifically delimited the 26 powers of the government against both the Head of State and the Subranie. It read:

The Tsar is the representative of the state in all its relations with other states. In his name the government negotiates all agreements which are approved by the Tsar. These agreements are reported by the ministers to the Subranie, as soon as the interests and security of the land permit. However peace talks, commercial talks as well as all talks which necessitate state expense or contain changes in the existing statute, or the current public or civil law of Bulgaria becomes final only after acceptance by the Subranie. In some cases the secret clauses of a treaty cannot invalidate the open clauses.76

Three major changes are apparent in the Geshov article. The first change is that Bulgaria's foreign relations are no longer restricted to the rather vague concept of neighboring states. Under the new article

Bulgaria could seek agreements anywhere. This change reflected Bulgaria's status as a sovereign state since the

1908 declaration of independence.

The right of the government to conclude secret treaties, the second major change, is implicit in the new article. The government needed only to report foreign treaties to the Subranie "as soon as the interests and security of the state permit." In fact, since the government would decide when the interest and security of the state permitted, it would have carte blanche to conclude secret treaties whenever this was considered appropriate. The new article 17 made little difference in 27 this regard. Secret treaties had been concluded in 1902 and in 1904 under the old article 17.

The third major change involved the government itself. The government received specific mention as the primary instrument of foreign policy and as the intermediary between the Tsar and the Subranie. This gave the government much responsibility and permitted the Tsar to assume a less prominent role in foreign affairs. He still retained great potential to manipulate events, but the new article 17 left the government in an enhanced position.

Understandably the Geshov cabinet worked hard to secure the passage of these constitutional changes in the

Grand National Subranie convoked for the purpose of approving any alterations to the constitution. The government made a strong effort to explain the effect the proposed changes would have on foreign policy. The government emphasized that the power of the Tsar would not increase and that the ability to conclude secret treaties would have a positive impact on Bulgarian foreign policy.

Mir stated, "Article 17 is not a question of the right of the crown, but of the right of Bulgaria to conduct its own foreign policy as an independent state. More clearly the question is whether Bulgaria will conduct its foreign policy to conclude Becret agreements with foreign powers or not."77 In his speech to the Grand National Subranie 28

Geshov averred that article 17 "does not represent any

kind of expansion of the crown, it represents the

expansion of the law of Bulgaria in the sense that like other states Bulgaria will be able, on its basis, to conclude secret agreements."7“ In the same speech GeBhov made a strong allusion to the problem of national unity.

"I think, it is sufficient that you remember the example of Piedmont."7* He implied that with the new powers bestowed upon the government by the revised article 17, the government could realize the goal of Bulgarian national unity. Furthermore he implied that secret treaties would be a vehicle for the realization of that goal. When an opponent of the revised article 17 charged that it would be used to take Macedonia, the Progressive-

Liberal newspaper Bulqariya coyly responded, "If such a great work can be done with the test of the constitution, we can be thankful to Mr. Dzhidrov for his discovery.•

In fact secret treaties did prove to be an important step toward the realization of the national goal. But at this point the government only wished to take advantage of the popularity of achieving that goal in order to secure the passage in the Grand National Subranie of the constitutional revisions. Geshov's mention of Piedmont was quite apt. He wanted to unite Bulgaria with a conservative cautious policy. He did not want the radical elements in the Macedonian bands to preempt the 29

unification of Bulgaria. Unfortunately Geshov was no

Cavour.

In the elections in June 1911 for delegates to the

Grand National Subranie the pro-government candidates won a strong majority.*‘ Nevertheless when the assembly met, many of the delegates were reluctant to approve the government sponsored changes to the constitution. The minister of justice in the Geshov cabinet, the Progressive

Liberal Petur Abrashev, wrote in his journal, "Article 17 of the constitution so frightened and intimidated

Bulgarian political thought, that even those who were elected on a platform of carrying out this text acted as if they feared to legalize it. It was necessary to encourage the majority almost every day in order to make clear what was completely clear.In the end the only real opposition to the proposed revisions came from the socialists and the peasant Agrarians.•’ The revisions passed the Grand National Subranie with a decisive majority. Significantly Russia favored the changes since they would facilitate a Russo-Bulgarian agreement.*4

The adoption of the constitutional changes, and especially article 17, was the first major accomplishment for the Geshov government. The Government was pleased.*3

Now the government rather than the Tsar would negotiate secret treaties.•* The changes gave the Geshov-Danev coalition the strongest position any Bulgarian government 30

had yet enjoyed to conduct a strong and distinctive

foreign policy. The government had gained authority at the expense of both the Subranie and the tsar. "It may be considered that the Royal prerogative has been somewhat diminished by the new modification," wrote the British

Minister in Sofia to London.•7 The French minister in

Sofia reported that Ferdinand was unhappy with this loss of authority.•• However the Tsar undoubtedly recognized the advantages of a loss of direct responsibility. And he still possessed the power to manipulate.

After its success in attaining the desired constitutional changes the Geshov government maintained its Turcophile course. Talks continued between Geshov and the Turkish minister in Sofia which at that time tended to encourage Geshov.■9 Probably the discussions centered around the same questions Geshov had transmitted to

Constantinople in June.

Toward the end of July the government considered a new effort to obtain an accord with Turkey. The Bulgarian minister in Constantinople as well as the Bulgarian counsels in Salonika and Bitola were ordered to Sofia to discuss this question with the government.99 But while some members of the government still favored a bid to the

Turks for an agreement, the minister in Constantinople M.

Sarafov strongly disagreed and no initiative resulted from these talks. An indirect approach to the Turks through 31 the Bulgarian counsel in Salonika, Antanas Shopov, proved unsuccessful.•* But apparently as late as August Geshov still harbored hopes for an accord with the Turks when H.

W. Steed "greatly surprised" him by advising him not to hurry to reach an agreement with Constantinople.**

Obviously Turkey had no interest in an accord with

Bulgaria.

During August a shift in Bulgarian policy became evident. The government began to modify its Turcophile stance and adopt a more balanced attitude. This shift was signaled by Geshov in a speech on 19/6 August. He stated,

"...we have decided to carry out a peaceful policy, a policy of sincere good neighborly relations with all

Balkan states. We do this, because the present government is deeply convinced that our policy is imperative for the

Bulgarian people and that only through it can we demonstrate our ardent desire to reach the accord so necessary for the people of the Balkan peninsula."**

About this time Geshov began to speak of fears of Austrian designs on Macedonia and talked of a Bulgarian-Serbian-

Greek-Turkish entente to oppose this.*4 This represented a reversal of his policy of the previous spring when he had rejected the advances of the Greeks and Serbs for alliances. Such anti-Austrian talk was not unwelcome to

Russia, who at that time hoped to consolidate Greece, 32

Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey into an anti-Austrian bulwark in the Balkans.99

Relations with Russia also began to warm toward the end of the summer of 1911. Crown Prince Boris visited his imperial godparents Nicholas and Alexandria in Russia and the Russian fleet made a good will visit to the Bulgarian port of Varna.96 General Fichev, who had been considered as something of a Russophobe, was invited to the Russian army maneuvers and was received in an audience by the

Russian tsar.97 Relations between Bulgaria and Russia were so good that rumors of ongoing negotiations for a

Russo-Bulgarian military accord surfaced in Sofia.99

Undoubtedly the Geshov government realized that any Balkan entente was feasible only under the aegis of Russia. And the government naturally inclined to Russia anyway.

Bulgaria began to broaden its foreign policy in

August 1911 because of the obvious disinterest of the

Ottoman Empire in an accord with Bulgaria. But the question of the Bulgarian population in Turkey, which formed the impetus to act for the Bulgarian government, remained constant. At the time of the shift in policy

Geshov had concluded that the condition of the Bulgarian population in Turkey was worsening, and even that the

Bulgarian population there was beginning to decline.99

The ethnic basis for the Bulgarian claim to Macedonia was eroding. If this trend continued Bulgaria risked failure 33

in the achievement of its national aspiration in

Macedonia. This realization introduced a note of urgency into Bulgarian policy. Geshov warned Nekludov that the hardships the Bulgarian population endured in Turkey every day caused great difficulties for the Bulgarian government's peaceful policy.1•• And Ferdinand expressed concern for the stability of his throne to Nekuldov because of the unrest due to their plight.1•* But

Ferdinand also assured the Russian ambassador that only a massacre of Bulgarians in Turkey, a Turkish war with a

Great Power or a bloody internal dispute would induce

Bulgaria to abandon its policy of neutrality. These statements of the minister president and the tsar were attempts to force Russia to pressure the Turks to make concessions to Bulgaria. The Bulgarian statesmen knew that at the end of the summer of 1911 the Turks were on the verge of a war with Italy. Also neither Geshov nor

Ferdinand wanted events in Turkey to get out of control and to force Bulgaria to act. Both were especially concerned that the Macedonian bands might gain the advantage in such a situation.1•• Then both the government and the Tsar might become superfluous.

Looking back to this period of Bulgarian policy

Geshov wrote:

No Bulgarian statesman, responsible for the future of the Bulgarian nation could remain indifferent to such a condition of things, or ignore the open threats of the Turks to 34

aggravate the measures aiming at the annihilation of the Bulgarians in Macedonia. My manifest duty was to examine hov Bulgarin could best be enabled to stop these excesses. Among the various methods that suggested themselves, the most important consisted in an understanding, not with Turkey who had rejected our advances, but with our neighbors.1•1

The Geshov government's Turcophile policy had failed to

alleviate the problem of Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire.

The national imperative demanded that the government

attempt a new solution or resign. Before he left for his autumn vacation at Vichy, where he took the waters because of a heart condition, Geshov indicated that on his return he would discuss a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance with the

Serbian Minister in Sofia.1*4 The Bulgarian government had accepted the concept of a Balkan alliance in order to attain the national imperative. 35

FOOTNOTES

1. General Ivan Fichev, Balkanskata volna 1912-1913 (Sofia, 1940), 10-11.

2. Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan rivalries and Russian foreign policy 190B-1914 (Toronto, 1981), 31.

3. A. Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences (New York, 1920), 17.

4. Archive of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; Diary of Petur Abrashev, fond 51 opus I a.e. 17, hereafter referred to as BAN 51-1-17-1.

5. Elena Statelova, "Rusko-btSlgarski politicheski otnosheniya (1908-1912 g.)" Istoricheskl preqled. XXVIII (1973) 14.

6. Ivan Geshov, Spomeni lz qodini na borba i_ pobedi (Sofia, 1916), 37.

7. Sigmund Muenz, Balkan Herrscher und Staatsmaenner (Vienna, 1912), 184. Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars 1912- 1913 (New York, 1980), 335.

8. On the life of Geshov see Iliya S. Bobchev, Zhivot. deinost i. vuzqledi na Ivan Evstratiev Geshov (Sofia, 1933) and Bulgarska akademiya na naukite, Ivan Evstratiev Geshov: vuzqledi i^ deinost (Sofia, 1926).

9. Dobri Ganchev, Spomeni za knyazheskoto vreme (Sofia, 1973) 72.

10. Geshov, Spomeni. 34.

11. BAN 51-1-17-4; Trotsky, 335; Muenz, 184-85.

12. Lieutenant Hermengild Wagner, With the Victorious Bulgarians (London, 1913), 20.

13. Nekludoff, 20.

14. James D. Bourchier, The London Times. 5 June 1913. M, "The Balkan League. The History of its Formation," Fortnightly Review. XCIII (1913) 433.

15. There is no biography of this outspoken and controversial Bulgarian statesman. For a brief summery of his life see Entsiklopediya Biflqariya (Sofia, 1981). 36

16. George Logio, Bulgaria. Past and Present (Manchester, 1936) 356.

17. A. L. Popov, "Diplomatcheskaya podotovka balkanskoy voin 1912 g. " Krasnyl arkhlv VII (1925) 13.

18. Nekludoff, 25.

19. See Tushe Vlahov, "Vunshnata politika na Ferdinand i Balkanskiya Buyuz," Istorlcheski pregled VI (1950) 444 and R. J. Crampton, The Hoilow Detente (London, 1979) 45, for an opposing view.

20. Andrej Pantev et al, "The Foreign Policy of the Opposition Parties in Bulgaria. 1900-1914," Bulgarian Historical Review. Ill (1975) 49; Elena Statelova, "Za btflgaro-srubskite otnosheniya v period 1909-1911," Istorlcheski pregled XXV (1969) 35.

21. Statelova, "Bulgaro-srubskite otnosheniya," 35.

22. Crampton feels that the Geshov-Danev cabinet had committed itself to Russia. Crampton, 43. At this time the Russians favored a Bulgarian turn to either Turkey or to the Christian Balkan states.

23. Ivan E. Geshov, The Balkan League (London, 1915) 1.

24. Rossos, 31; Popov, 13, William Langer, "Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League 1908-1912," Political Science Quarterly XLIII (1928) 336.

25. Mir no. 3237, 27 March 11.

26. Mir no. 3245. 3 April 1911; Geshov, Balkan League, n. 1; Fichev, 22.

27. Mir no. 3234, 23 March 1911.

28. Bulgariya no. 49, 24 March 1911.

29. Mir no. 3289, 24 May 1911.

30. Documents diplomatigues francais 1871-1914 (Paris, 1929-59), hereafter referred to as DDF 2nd ser. XIII 289.

31. Rumyana Bozhilova and Bobi Bobev, "Bulgariya i albanskiyat vupros v nachaloto na XX vek," Istoricheski pregled XXXVIII (1982) 30. Some previous Bulgarian governments had supported the Albanian cause. Ibid. 29. Ferdinand personally favored meddling in Albanian affairs. See Elena Statelova, "Sur la question des relations 37 bulgaro-turques au cours de la periode 1909-1911," Etudes hiBtorlgues V (1970) 436.

32. Central State Historical Archive, hereafter referred to as TsDIA, fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1017, 1.

33. Ernst Christian Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars. (New York, 1969) 31; Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912. (University Park Pennsylvania, 1965) 20-25; DDF 2nd ser. XIII 232.

34. Die Internationalen Beziehunqen lm Zeitalter des Imperlalismus: Dokumente aus den Archiven der Zarlschen und der Provisorischen Reqierunqen (Berlin, 1942) hereafter referred to as RD 3rd ser. I i 32 n. 2, 64 n. 2, 77 n. 2. Nekludov thought this incident might mean the end of the Bulgarian attempt to reach an agreement with Turkey.

35. BAN 51-1-17-20.

36. Biflqar iya no. 65, 5 May 1911.

37. Mir no. 3292, 1 June 1911.

38. Fichev, 28; Statelova, "La question des relations bulgaro-turques," 454.

39. Statelova, "La question des relations bulgaro- turques, " 455.

40. Stenoqrafski dnevnitsl na XV oblknoveno narodno subranie (Sofia, 1911) hereafter referred to as XV ONS 1st RS, speech of I. E. Geshov, 17 December 1911, 1512. Hereafter all dnevnitsi of the obiknoveno narodno subranie will be referred to as ONS.

41. RD 3rd ser. I i 77; Fichev, 29.

42. RD 3rd ser. I i 64 n. 2.

43. Fichev, 23.

44. DDF 3rd ser. IV 360.

45. M. Petkova and M. Genovska, "Material! za Balkanskata voina (1912-1913)," Izvestia na durzhavnite arkivi VI (1962) 252.

46. Lady Grogan, The Life of J. D. Bourchier (London, n. d. >, 135. 38

47. Prilozhenle kum tom purvl ot doklada na parlamenternata izpitatelna komisiya (Sofia, 1918) hereafter refereed to as Prilozhenle I (Malinov) 288. Malinov did not communicate the details of his foreign policy to his successor, Geshov. He claimed he attempted to meet with Geshov on several occasions for this purpose, but did not succeed in doing so. Ibid. 293.

48. James D. Bourchier, in The London Times. 5 June 1913; Grogan, 135. H. W. Steed claimed that early in 1911 Geshov commissioned Bourchier to discuss a Greco-Bulgarian alliance with Venizelos. This seems unlikely in view of Geshov's Turcophile policy at that time. See H. W. Steed, Through Thirty Years (New York, 1924) I 360.

49. Steed, ibid.

50. Ivan Salabashev, Spomeni (Sofia, 1943) 284.

51. Bourchier, Times 5 June 1913. See also Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 117-118.

52. Geshov, Balkan League. 37.

53. Ibid. See also Edouard Driault et Michel Lheritier, Histoire Diplomatigue de la Grece de 1821 a nos jours (Paris, 1926), V 62. The Greeks were encouraged also and spoke of a visit by King George to Sofia.

54. Otto Bickel, Russland und die Entstehung des Balkanbund 1912 (Koenigsburg and Berlin, 1933) 124; Rossos, 48; DDF 3rd ser. II 172, IV 360.

55. Ibid.

56. RD 3rd ser. I i 116.

57. Ibid. n. 2.

58. Andrei Toshev, Balkanskite voini (Sofia, 1929) I 298- 99; Statelova, "Bulgaro-srSbskite otnosheniya," 36. Milovanovich suggested that the negotiations could take place in Beograd or that he would meet personally with Geshov in a third country, possibly at the Turin Exposition.

59. Statelova, "Bulgaro-srllbskite otnosheniya," 36; Toshev I 298-99; British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. hereafter refereed to as BD (London, 1926- 38) IX i 470; RD 3rd ser. I i 6. The British Minister in Beograd, Sir Ralph Paget, ascribed the initiative to Geshov. 39

60. RD 3rd ser. I i 6 n. 3.

61. Benno von Slebert (ed. > Graf Benckendorffs Diplomatlecher Schriftwecheel (Berlin and Leipzig, 1928) II 389.

62. Toshev, I 300; Statelova, "Bulgaro-srubskite otnosheniya," 36.

63. Toshev, I 307-08; Statelova, ibid.

64. Toshev, I 308; Statelova, ibid. 37.

65. Toshev, I 309.

66. RD 3rd ser I i 6 n. 3; Statelova, "Bulgaro-srubskite otnosheniya," 37.

67. RD 3rd ser, I i 31, 50.

68. Ibid.

69. Rossos, 31-32. See also Dimitije Djordjevich, Milovan Milovanovich (Beograd, 1962), 164.

70. von Siebert, II 405; RD 3rd ser. I i 65.

71. Mary Edith Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle (Mew York, 1920) 222-223; John D. Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle. Montenegro and Austria-Hungary 1908-1914 (West Lafayette, Indiana, 1983) 106; Helmreich, 84.

72. RD 3rd ser. I i 298.

73. Vasil Radoslawoff, Bulgarien und die Weltkrise (Berlin, 1923) 45-46; Todor Girginov, Istoricheski razvoi na suvremena Bulgariya ot vuzrazhdaneto do Balkanskata voina 1912 godina (Sofia, 1934) I 287.

74. Bulgarlya no. 91, 14 July 1911; Cyril E. Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (Princeton, 1943), 292. See also S. Balamezov, La Constitution de Tirnovo (Sofia, 1925) 36-37.

75. Bulgariya. ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Mir no. 3305, 15 June 1911. 40

78. Dnevnitsi (stenoqrafski ) na petato veliko narodno subranle v qr. Veliko Turnovo (Sofia, 1911) Speech of Ivan E. Geshov, 17 June 1911, 230.

79. Ibid.

80. Bulqariya no, 86, 1 July 1911.

81. Helmreich, 31.

82. BAH 51-1-17-6.

83. John D. Bell, Peasants in Power. Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1899-1923. (Princeton, 1977) 97-98; Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria. Origins and Development 1883-1936. (New York, 1959) 43; V. A. Zhebokritskii, Bolgariya nakanune balkansklkh voin (Kiev, 1960), 133.

84. Nekludoff, 28.

85. BD IX i 509, 515. See also Zhebokritskii, 135. The government's internal position was strengthened by this success.

86. See Stojcho Grancharov, "The Bulgarian Bourgeois Democracy, " Bulgarian Historical Review X (1982) 509.

87. BD IX i 509.

88. DDF 2nd ser. XIV 70.

89. Prilozhenle I (Geshov) 110; Geshov, Balkan League, 6.

90. Statelova, "la Question des relations Bulgaro- Turques," 456.

91. Ibid.

92. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 110; Geshov, Balkan League. 5.

93. Ivan E. Geshov, Aleksandur Lyudskanov, Politicheskite programani: rechi proizneseni na 6 avgust v Pleven i. 7 avgust y^ Shuman (Sofia, 1911) 9.

94. BD IX i 515, 517. Earlier in the summer Ferdinand's semi-annual visit to Austria-Hungary had raised fears of an Austro-Bulgarian entente. See BD IX i 505, 510; DDF 2nd ser. XIII 289.

95. Thaden, 38-57. 41

96. Helmreich, 31.

97. Fichev, 42-43.

98. According to well placed sources the Russian military attache in Sofia, Colonel Romanovsky, was negotiating with either the Chief of Staff General Fichev or the Minister of War General Nikiforov. BD IX i 518; Oesterreich- Unqarns Aussenpolitik von bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Krieqsauebruch 1914 (Vienna, 1930) hereafter referred to as Q-UA III 2583, 2640 n. C. Fichev does not mention any such contact in his memoirs. These reports were later discounted by the British. BD IX i 334.

99. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 704, 9; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 111; Geshov, Balkan League. 8-9.

100. RD 3rd ser. I i 298.

101. Ibid.

102. Geshov, Balkan League. 19; Crampton, 43. Here again Geshov indicates that he sought a unification of the Bulgarian lands along the lines of Cavour's conservative program for Italy.

103. Geshov, Ibid. 9-10; Rossos, 32-33.

104. BD IX i 517. CHAPTER II

GESHOV'S ALLIANCES

While Geshov was out of the country the Italians declared war on Turkey on 29/16 September 1911 and invaded

Turkish North Africa. Any such event which threatened the status quo in the Balkans received close attention from great and small powers alike. Naturally Bulgaria was among the most concerned onlookers. An opportunity to participate in the dismemberment of European Turkey and realize the Bulgarian national aspirations could materialize during this war. Also the possibility of a preemptory Turkish attack on Bulgaria seriously concerned the Sofia government.

At the time of the outbreak of the war the acting minister president and foreign minister was Teodor

Teodorov. Teodorov was the minister of finance in the

Geshov cabinet and a leading figure in the Nationalist

Party.‘ He reacted excitedly to the news of the Italian declaration of war. Upon being informed by the Italian minister in Sofia that Italy was at war with Turkey,

Teodorov exclaimed, "We shall follow you when the occasion arises."* Geshov's policy of peaceful pragmatism toward

42 43

Turkey was finished. Both Teodorov and Minister of War

General Nikiforov were deeply worried that the centuries

old enemy Turkey might launch a surprise attack on

Bulgaria. The war also jeopardized the Christian

population of European Turkey, which did not enjoy the

confidence of the government in Constantinople. Several

ministerial councils met under Teodorov's leadership to

determine the necessary measures to protect Bulgaria.*

The promise and the danger of the war forced the Sofia

government to act quickly.

The government immediately assumed a pose of calm.

Teodorov stated that the Tripoli question lay outside

Bulgarian interests but warned that any change in the

status quo in the Balkans might force Bulgaria to respond.* The semi official paper Mir asserted:

Undoubtedly the Bulgarian government does not want to breach the peace of the Balkan Peninsula. But it will follow developments with special attention and will not permit Bulgarian interests to be harmed. As in the past Turkey now has the opportunity to guarantee not only the neutrality of her neighbors, but also their friendship. However Turkey must eradicate the suspicion and distrust she expresses even in the most peaceful negotiations.8

Behind this tranquil facade, however, Teodorov was determined to act decisively to benefit from the Tripoli crisis or at least to avoid negative consequences for

Bulgaria. He suggested to D. Panas, the Greek minister in

Sofia, that the war might facilitate a solution to the problem of Crete. Teodorov also assured Panas that 44

Bulgaria would react if Turkey attempted to crush Greece.6

The Bulgarians also approached the Italians. The government instructed General Fichev, the chief of staff, to explore the possibility of an Italo-Bulgarian agreement directed against Turkey.7 Fichev talked with the Italian military attache in Sofia but the Italians eventually declined to enter into any arrangement with Bulgaria, claiming that their obligations to the Triple Alliance prevented them from acting in the Balkans.

But Teodorov's major effort was to accelerate the

Bulgarian inclination toward Serbia which had begun the previous month. The Bulgarians realized that any real progress in a rapprochement with Serbia depended on a concession in Macedonia. Animated by the events in North

Africa, Teodorov explained to Nekludov:

We have come to the conclusion, that if we wish to guard our complete political and economic independence from the encroachments of Central Europe, and if we truly desire to improve the lot of our kin in Turkey we must as far as possible make our national and economic policy one with that of Serbia. We represent two nationalities very closely related by blood, language and even by our former historic destinies. What prevents us from living in perfect harmony together? Simply and solely, at this moment, disagreement on the subject of our spheres of action in Macedonia. We would therefore suggest to the Serbians to go thoroughly into this question with us in order to arrive at a good and solid understanding.•

Undoubtedly Geshov, before his departure, had determined that at some point in the negotiations with Serbia such a step would be necessary. Teodorov merely hastened the 45 process. Teodorov calculatingly presented the Bulgarian rapprochement with Serbia in an anti-Austrian context.

This vas to insure Russian support. He also assured

Nekludov that any Serbo-Bulgarian understanding would endeavor to preserve the status quo in the Balkans.* This again was to gain Russian support.

At the same time Teodorov disingenuously alluded to the real intention of the rapprochement with Serbia. He

"somewhat naively" told Nekludov, "We are thus doing, what you have wanted us to do for a long time. We shall conclude a totally frank agreement with Serbia, we shall even give them Skopie, but you must promise us protection against Romania."*• The Bulgarian government feared that if it did act against Turkey the Romanians might assist the Turks. Russian support was the most obvious and effective counter to this threat. Teodorov evidently anticipated action against Turkey and thus belied his assurances for the preservation of the status quo in the

Balkans. Nevertheless the rapprochement with Serbia received the blessing of the Russian foreign ministry. 1 1

The Bulgarians approached the Serbs along two fronts. In

Sofia on 30/17 September Danev gave the Serbian Minister

Miloevich assurances that if Austria-Hungary initiated any action against Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia would unite against such a threat.*• The same day Teodorov told the

Serbian minister that Bulgaria was prepared to enter into negotiations with Serbia. 1 * Two days later, on 2

October/19 September, Teodorov met with Miloevich and indicated that the Bulgarian Ministerial Council unanimously favored an agreement with Serbia and that

Ferdinand also would consent to such an agreement.1A In addition Teodorov demonstrated a willingness to discuss a partition of Macedonia and told Miloevich, "We do not need to fight over what is debatable, but we must consider what is definitely due us and what we are prepared to give up to each other voluntarily. We shall cede to you Skopie, you to us Salonika, Bitola and I think also Veles. 5

Teodorov's frank proposal demonstrated the sincerity of the Bulgarian intentions. This was the first time a

Bulgarian official had discussed a partition of the San

Stefano legacy. Undoubtedly the extent of the Bulgarian concessions had been determined in August before Geshov left for Vichy. The concern of the acting government hastened the statement of definite proposals for negotiations and somewhat weakened Sofia's bargaining position.

While Danev and Teodorov talked with Miloevich in

Sofia a Bulgarian emissary was dispatched to Beograd to pursue the rapprochement. This was Dimitur Rizov, a

Macedonian who at that time was the Bulgarian representative in Rome and who had served in the past as

Bulgarian minister in both Cetinje and Beograd. While in 47

Sofia on vacation Rizov had met with Geshov and on 14/1

September had urged Geshov to consider a Serbo-Bulgarian

alliance. Geshov concurred. * * Before leaving Sofia

Geshov told Rizov to talk to Teodorov, who subsequently

endorsed the proposed alliance enthusiastically and sent

Rizov to Beograd. Geshov told Rizov to arrange a meeting

for him with Milovanovich, and Rizov received additional

instructions from Teodorov before departing.* 7

In Beograd Rizov met with Milovanovich and Pashich.

The standard Bulgarian principal of Macedonian autonomy

received perfunctory attention, but the main point of the

discussions was a territorial settlement for the disposal

of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The

Serbs wanted Kossovo and the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and

agreed to Bulgarian designs on Adrianople.1• In Macedonia

the Serbs wanted a line along the Bregalinitsa River to a

border east of the Vardar River, and west along a line

from Lake Ohrid including the towns for Ohrid, Struga and

Prilep.1• Later in the discussions, according to Rizov,

the Serbs conceded Struga. These Serbian claims in

Macedonia were roughly analogous to those proposed by

Milovanovich the previous spring. As in the past

Milovanovich was conciliatory and Pashich stubborn.■'

Rizov stated that Bulgaria conceded Skopie but insisted on

Veles, and proposed the Pchina River as a partition line.

Furthermore Bulgaria wanted a border on Lake Ohrid.81 In 48

the end Rizov claimed he had no instructions to conclude

an agreement with Serbia but did arrange the meeting

between Milovanovich and Geshov for the time when the

latter passed through Serbia on his return from France.

After his meeting with the Serbs Rizov spoke with Hartwig, the Russian Minister in Beograd. He urged Hartwig to persuade the Serbs to be more conciliatory and the Russian promised to help.8*. Rizov then telegraphed his account of his meetings to Geshov and arranged to meet him in

Vienna.

Geshov meanwhile had abbreviated his vacation after learning of the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish War and had departed from Vichy to return to Sofia. On his way back he sojourned in Paris and Vienna in order to gain insight into the war from both Great Power alliance systems.

Haste did not appear to be a primary concern as he met with the French Foreign Minister de Selves on 4 October/21

September and with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister

Aehrenthal on 7 October/24 September,. 11 Geshov asked de

Selves and Aehrenthal if the war would be localized and short, and if the Ottoman Empire was in any danger of internal disarray as a result of the war. These questions were the reason for Geshov's delay. A prolonged conflict was likely to encompass the Balkans eventually and civil disturbances in Turkey could force Bulgarian intervention to protect the Bulgarians residing there. Both foreign 49 ministers indicated that they felt the war would be short and local, and while de Selves admitted the danger of internal unrest in Turkey, Aehrenthal did not.** These answers undoubtedly relieved Geshov since Bulgaria would not be forced to intervene in the war immediately. He would have the time to pursue negotiations with Serbia.

Geshov assured Aehrenthal that Bulgaria was peacefully inclined.88 While in Vienna Geshov had two other meetings. The first was with the Russian minister in

Vienna, N. Giers. Geshov informed Giers of his conversations with de Selves and Aehrenthal and expressed his concerns over Austrian, Romanian and Turkish opposition to a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. He sought

Russian guarantees against such opposition. “ Giers assured him that Russia supported the alliance. Geshov's other meetings were with Rizov, who had arrived in Vienna fresh from his conversations in Beograd and had maps marked to indicate the conflicting Serbian and Bulgarian claims in Macedonia, and D. Stanchov, the Bulgarian minister in Paris then returning to his post after a vacation in Varna.87 The Bulgarian Minister in Vienna, I.

Salabashev, also claimed to be present.88 At these meetings Geshov learned the details of Rizov's conversations in Beograd. From Rizov he also learned about the existence of the 1904 agreement with Serbia.8*

The Bulgarian then wrote a memorandum to serve as the 50 basis for Geshov's upcoming talks with Milovanovich. This memo, based on Rizov's recollections of the 1904 treaty mutatis mutandis, envisioned an autonomous Macedonia. But if this was impossible the Bulgarians were prepared to partition Macedonia at the line of the Pchina River and were willing to concede the sandjaks of Uskub (Skopie) and

Prizren as the maximum Bulgarian concessions.J• This was approximately what Teodorov and Rizov had proposed in their conversations with Serbian representatives. The memo also contained as casus foederis: any attack on

Bulgaria or Serbia; any attack by any other Balkan state by Turkey; any attempt by Austria-Hungary to occupy

Albania or Macedonia; internal troubles in Turkey; or

"when the interests or Bulgaria and Serbia demand that the question be settled."a* This last point demonstrates the domestic concerns of the government. If Bulgarian public opinion became strongly aroused against the Turks Geshov wanted to insure that the Bulgarian government would remain in control of the process of the liberation of

Macedonia. Russian participation in the proposed alliance was a conditio sine qua non for the Bulgarians. This memorandum was the basis for the future negotiations for the alliance with Serbia, and for the treaty which subsequently resulted from these negotiations.

Then on a train between Vienna and Oderburg Geshov presented his plans to Ferdinand. The Bulgarian tsar, who 51 had been visiting his Hungarian estates, approved the plans and urged caution in dealing with Serbia.*•

Ferdinand remained apart from the formulation of the plan and its execution. He probably consented to the idea of a definite Serbian alliance only under some pressure from the Geshov government.** After his meeting with Ferdinand

Geshov, traveling incognito so as to avoid Austrian suspicions, arrived in Beograd on the evening of 11

October/29 September 1911.*4 There, as had been arranged previously, Milovanovich joined the train in a special coach, and the two Balkan statesmen discussed the alliance

Milovanovich had wanted for some time, and Geshov had considered since August. Geshov later wrote that "the fons et oriqo of our alliance was the meeting with

Milovanovich."*3 In this meeting Milovanovich, who had apparently overcome any rancor he might have felt over the manner in which he had been rejected the previous spring, dominated the conversation. His proposals for a causus foederis were very similar to those formulated in Vienna by the Bulgarians.** He felt that Serbia and Bulgaria should wait until the end of the Italo-Turkish War to act against Turkey, and then only with Russian support. The cautious Geshov must have received these proposals with a sense of relief. But while formally agreeing to the principle of Macedonian autonomy, Milovanovich suggested that the best means to accomplish a partition of Macedonia 52 would be to leave the exact line to the discretion of the

Russian emperor.

Let us drav no line at present, he added. By adopting that course you will spare yourselves the criticism of having consented to a preliminary repartition of Macedonia. Later on, when your compatriots have secured the lion's part, no one will think of protesting that a small part of Macedonia has been awarded to Serbia by the Russian emperor, under whose patronage and high sense of justice this great work will have been accomplished.37

Milovanovich's adroit proposal allowed Geshov to withdraw from the previous Bulgarian position of a definite division of Macedonia and enabled him to rely on Russia to solve the problem of the partition of Macedonia. Geshov claimed he accepted Russian arbitration, "because above all, the most modern principle for determining international disputes is arbitration."1* But by accepting this concept the Bulgarian government could escape the onus of responsibility for the partition of

Macedonia and leave it to the grandson of the revered Tsar

Liberator of Bulgaria. After a favorable interview lasting about three hours Milovanovich had his coach detached from the train at Lipovo and Geshov continued on to Sofia.3"

Any satisfaction Geshov might have felt from this meeting however soon vanished. Upon his arrival in Sofia on the morning of 12 October/29 September he discovered the government and the Bulgarian public in a state of near panic because of the mobilization of Turkish troops in 53

Thrace.*• The cool facade of the government had collapsed completely, and the government was obsessed with the fear of Turkish aggression against Bulgaria.4 * Turkish assurances that the military measures taken in Thrace were no danger to Bulgaria failed to calm the frightened

Bulgarians.4* The opposition parties howled for war against Turkey.4 J Bulgaria was very close to military action against the Ottoman Empire. Not without a certain braggadocio, Teodorov informed the Russian charge in Sofia that Bulgaria would not initiate action against Turkey.

But if attacked, Bulgaria, with the help of Serbia, Greece and Montenegro could destroy Turkey if Russia would restrain Romania.4 4 Also the Bulgarians approached

Russian sources to seek urgently needed supplies of coats and boots’ for the Bulgarian army.4 3 The government decided to mobilize a border division but to await

Geshov's return before any conclusive military action.46

At first when Geshov did return to Sofia has position appeared shaky. The cabinet and the military were determined to fight.47 Geshov himself admitted that he feared a Turkish attack.43 Nevertheless he took immediate steps to calm the situation. He somewhat dampened the enthusiasm of his colleagues for war by reminding them of its cost.43 He also asked for a Great Power guarantee against a Turkish attack.33 He stressed to one Great

Power minister in Sofia that the guarantee was imperative, 54

"In any event I must have it, otherwise I cannot take responsibility either before my own convictions or before the country. Moreover I shall be forced to act by public opinion."3* Bulgaria was on the brink of war.

But by 14/1 October, two days after his return,

Geshov was the master of the situation.*' On 17/4 October he accepted the assurances of the Turks that their troops would be sent away from the Bulgarian frontier, and that the army corps in Thrace would not be strengthened. s>

Nevertheless he continued to insist on the Great Power guarantee.3* He felt that since he had requested it he would see it through and that this guarantee would stifle any latent bellicosity of the Bulgarian military. After

Geshov had been back in Sofia for a week the war clouds had dissipated.33 Only then did Ferdinand return to

Bulgaria.34 Geshov's position had prevailed against the opposition of his government colleagues, the military and public opinion.

This relaxation of tension was due to two factors.

One was the assurance of Russia that Turkey would not attack Bulgaria.3 7 The Bulgarians could not believe that

Russia, which had sacrificed so much in 1877-78 to liberate Bulgaria from Turkey, would permit Bulgaria to suffer a Turkish attack. The other factor was the assurance of the Turks themselves.3• Although the Turks had given such assurances to Teodorov previously, only the 55

determination of Geshov and the support of Russia lent

credence to them.s• By 15/2 October the Ministerial

Council accepted a formula proposed by M. Paleologue, the

French Minister in Sofia, and withdrew its order for

mobilization.** Paleologue had convinced the Bulgarian government that any mobilization on its part could be considered an act of aggression by Turkey and that war would be inevitable. By the time the Powers succeeded in making a demarche in Constantinople it was no longer necessary.

After the war mania had subsided, the government in

Sofia concluded that it had overreacted to events. The realization that its actions could have brought war upon

Bulgaria sobered the government.*' Not without a sense of relief Mir reported on 21/8 October, "Our frontier with

Turkey is peaceful and quiet, and the Turks are concerned only with the Tripoli question. And since from the beginning our government has stated that this question concerns only Tripoli, all danger in the Balkans is precluded."** Through the remainder of the year the opposition parties continued to call for a war with

Turkey.*J But the crisis was over. For the present

Bulgaria would not fight Turkey.

This crisis demonstrated the strong anti-Turkish sentiment in Bulgaria. Most of the ministers in the government were prepared to fight the Turks, not only out 56 of a desire to resolve the San Stefano question but also out of a fundamental sense of national self preservation.

Geshov's determination to avoid war at that time was bolstered by his talks with Milovanovich. These talks indicated that in the future Bulgaria could depend on the assistance of Serbia against Turkey. Geshov prevailed over his bellicose colleagues with the help of Russian and

Turkish assurances. He emerged from this crisis in the strongest position he had thus far enjoyed as the leader of the Bulgarian government.

After the crisis had abated Geshov ostensibly resumed his Turcophile policy. Negotiations with the Turks recommenced. During Geshov's absence Assim Bey, the

Turkish foreign minister, had proposed a basis for negotiations to settle the differences with Bulgaria.

This had been Geshov's aim ever since he had assumed office the previous spring. These Turkish proposals called for the easing of tensions between Turkey and

Bulgaria, nonintervention in internal affairs questions, settlement of internal questions so as not to give offense to the other party and mutual guarantee of frontiers for a fixed term.44 The Bulgarian government had some cause for encouragement since the Turkish foreign minister had previously been the minister in Sofia and had agreed to assume the post of foreign minister only recently on the condition that the could pursue a pro-Bulgarian policy.45 57

Geshov responded to the Turkish offer with a proposal

which included, among other points, the conclusion of a definite Turco-Bulgarian commercial treaty, general amnesty for all convicted Bulgarians in the Ottoman

Empire, a return to the Ottoman Empire of all Bulgarian refugees who had fled during the disturbances of 1902-03 and the construction of a Kumanovo-Kyusdendil railway.*4

Nevertheless Geshov remained skeptical of the Turkish offer and reports from the Bulgarian minister in

Constantinople further diminished his interest in it.*7

In any event the Bulgarian counter proposals received no response from the Turks.** But relations with the Turks remained good during the autumn of 1911.** This episode demonstrates that Geshov even in the fall of 1911 was willing to explore the possibility of obtaining meaningful concessions from Turkey, especially when the Italian war might have made the Turks more amenable to the Bulgarian demands. Geshov continued to think in pragmatic terms.

The major focus of Bulgarian policy now was of course

Serbia. After his return from abroad Geshov received approval from the Ministerial Council and the sanction of

Ferdinand to determine the details of the alliance with

Serbia.7• In addition to Geshov himself, only his

Nationalist Party colleague Teodorov, his coalition partner Danev and the Minister of War General Nikiforov were privy to the information on the course of the 50 negotiations.71 Geshov, as he had in Vienna, sought to insure Russian support for the alliance vith Serbia.7* He told Nekludov that he would not undertake the project without Russian support.

After the Turkish crisis had fizzled Ferdinand showed

Geshov the text of the 1904 treaty with Serbia and also the text of the 1902 agreement with Russia, neither of which was known to Geshov previously.73 Ferdinand showed

Geshov these texts in confidence, but the minister president was concerned about the validity of these treaties and consulted Teodorov, who as a lawyer could provide some insights.7* The resulting assurance seems to have satisfied Geshov's concerns about Russian support for the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance and about Russian support to counter Romanian intervention on the side of Turkey.

Geshov then ceased to badger Nekludov on the question of

Russian support.75 Final Russian agreement for the proposed Serbo-Bulgarian alliance came at the end of

November, with the stipulation that the alliance must be defensive and for the maintenance of the status quo.7 *

Geshov assured of Russian backing, could proceed with contacts with the Serbs.

After a lull of several weeks following Geshov's return to Sofia Serbo-Bulgarian contacts resumed. The

Serbian minister in Sofia, M. Spaljkovich, in a positive temper submitted an eleven point proposal for an alliance 59

to the Sofia government at the beginning of November/end of October 1911.77 Geshov, however, immediately rejected the Serbian offer. He specifically objected to article three, which reserved for Serbia the right to declare war without the agreement of Bulgaria, and article four, which not only failed to mention the sacred Bulgarian principle of Macedonian autonomy, but also proposed that the entire vilayets of Monstir and Salonica come under the arbitration of the Russian Tsar.7* This proposal varied greatly from the territorial outline of the discussion between Milovanovich and Geshov in the railroad coach.

Furthermore the Bulgarians, who possessed a larger army and greater resources then did the Serbs, had no intention of allowing their smaller potential ally to determine the moment for the outbreak of the war. While Geshov wanted the alliance he would not accept it on unfavorable terms.

Shortly thereafter Spalajkovich submitted a modification of the Serbian proposal which satisfied the

Bulgarian demand that the allies begin any war at the same time, but still failed to please the Bulgarians on the difficult Macedonian question.7* In the revised Serbian proposal all Macedonia was divided into three parts; one part indisputably reserved for Serbia, another part reserved indisputably for Bulgaria and the remaining part left to the arbitration of the Russian tsar. Geshov again rejected the Serbian proposal.•• Nevertheless this 60

proposal would eventually form the basis of the Serbo-

Bulgarian alliance.•* The determination of the extent of

the three zones of partitioned Macedonia remained the

sole, but extremely knotty, point of contention.

Frustrated in his contacts with Spalajkovich, Geshov decided to approach Milovanovich directly. The Bulgarians considered Milovanovich to be the most amenable Serbian leader.•• In November 1911 Milovanovich was in Paris with the Serbian King Peter Karageorgevich. There the

Bulgarian diplomats Rizov and Stanchov, with French help, met him.*1 The Bulgarians reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of Macedonian autonomy and stated that the concession of Skopie could be made only "after events have established that Macedonian autonomy is either impossible or cannot last long."*4 While Stanchov insisted, Rizov cajoled in order to convince Milovanovich that the maximum

Bulgarian concession in Macedonia was the Sandjak of

Skopie and that the arbitration of the Russian Tsar in the case of the failure of Macedonian autonomy should be binding. Milovanovich, while demonstrating some understanding of the Bulgarian position, only promised to do his best to convince his colleagues in Beograd of the seriousness of the Bulgarian intentions. The Paris approach was thus largely unproductive. No immediate proposals were forthcoming from Beograd.*8 61

During the month of December the attention of the

Bulgarian government was diverted from the alliance negotiations to a new outbreak of trouble in Macedonia. A bomb explosion perpetrated by a member of a Macedonian revolutionary band as a provocation to the Turks in the town of Shtip had its intended effect and scores of

Bulgarians were massacred by vengeful Turks.*6 Bulgarian public opinion flared against the Turkey and calls for war l resounded throughout the country.*7 Geshov acted quickly and demanded that the Turks take measure^to prevent similar incidents. He himself promised to close the

Bulgarian borders to the Macedonian bands.•• He also attempted to soothe the angry Bulgarian population. Mir charged, "That the assassinations in Macedonia have as their chief purpose to embitter Bulgaria and discredit the peaceful policy of the Bulgarian government is best seen from the fact that the assassins select Bulgarian centers in which to create disorder and if possible, even massacres," and further stated, "Bulgaria has no interest in exposing our co-nationals to destruction and compromising ourselves before the civilized world as the violators of the peace.Geshov did not want to allow the Shtip massacre to disrupt his negotiations with Serbia or to force Bulgaria into a premature war with Turkey.

Due in large part to Geshov's prompt and statesmanlike 62

actions much of the furor over Shtip had abated by the

middle/beginning of December.**

While the government as able to contain the outrage

resulting from the Shtip massacre and the repercussions never reached the same proportions as those resulting from the outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war soon after the Shtip crisis, a discernable rift began to appear among the makers of Bulgarian policy. Geshov and Teodorov apparently wanted further concessions to^Serbia while x \ Danev and the military did not.•‘ Ferdinand appeared to favor Danev at this time.** In mid December/late November

Ferdinand had not definitely agreed to the Serbian alliance.91 But by 20/7 December he indicated to Geshov his assent.94 The division within the government and the uncertain position of Ferdinand caused Geshov to consider resignation.*■ Undoubtedly the emotions engendered by the events at Shtip tended to increase the perceived urgency of the need for the Serbian alliance, and correspondingly increased the tensions between the factions disagreeing on the means to achieve the alliance. Ferdinand's vacillation was typical of his approach to almost every important issue. It reflected his desire to avoid overt responsibility for any political action.

This internal problem was overcome by the appearance of new proposals from Beograd on 28/15 December. While the Serbs accepted the principle of Macedonian autonomy 63

and conceded two small towns to the Bulgarian zone, they

considerably enlarged the extent of the contested zone.**

Geshov refused to accept these proposals because of the

size of the contested zone.* 7 Now he found himself in

agreement with the Bulgarian military. Both Geshov and

General Nikiforov focused on the town of Struga at the

northern end of Lake Ohrid which was included in the

contested zone by the Serbs and was considered

strategically important by the Bulgarian military."*

Geshov, moreover, thought that the Serbs had already

conceded Struga.**

At this point the Bulgarians requested Russian

intervention to reach an agreement with Serbia.‘* * The

Bulgarians wanted Russian support to pressure the Serbs

into accepting a border favorable to Bulgaria in

/ Macedonia. Both Nekludov and Colonel Romanovskii, the

Russian military attache in Sofia, worked to facilitate an

agreement with Serbia.1•‘ Romanovskii proposed a line in

eastern Macedonia which would have divided Struga between

Bulgaria and Serbia.‘ This was considered by the

Bulgarians as their final offer. The military and

Ferdinand considered themselves bound to accept the

Romanovskii line.1•* Probably their sense of loyalty

arose more from disingenuousness rather than any feeling

of loyalty toward Russia. 64

The Serbs however refused to accept the Romanovskii

border. By February the negotiations were again at a

standstill. At one point the frustrated Spalajkovich

burst into Danev's office and tearfully begged him to

intervene with Geshov to renew the negotiations.1•*

Finally, a change of government in Beograd, which returned the more conciliatory Milovanovich to power together with a Russian assurance that Struga, while nominally within the contested zone, would fall to Bulgaria in any arbitration, brought about a successful end to the negotiations. 1 •* On 13 March/29 February 1912 Geshov and

Ferdinand signed the treaty of alliance in Sofia. In order to maintain secrecy the seal of the foreign minister, rather than the seal of state, which would have involved the participation of more people, was employed to validate the treaty.1,6 The Bulgarian demands had prevailed, albeit in a somewhat underhanded manner. And the Bulgarian demands were the work of Geshov. He had to pressure Danev and Ferdinand to accept the treaty. 1 *7

Geshov thus bore the major responsibility for the creation and the sanction of the treaty.

Geshov later admitted that the Bulgarian government had rushed to conclude the treaty with Serbia.1 " His concern for haste had several bases. He feared that other combinations of countries directed against Bulgarian interests might arise if Bulgaria did not act quickly.‘ 65

The Turks could ally with Romania or receive definite

commitments from the Triple Alliance. Or possibly the

Serbs could have sought alliances elsewhere.

Another cause for haste was concern that the

Macedonian bands might create another incident like that

in Shtip which could force the Bulgarian government to act against Turkey prematurely, and could even take the process of the liberation of Macedonia out of the control of the Sofia government. During the winter of 1912 Geshov attempted to reach an agreement with Milovanovich to restrict the operation of Bulgarian and Serbian supported bands in Macedonia.* 1• Geshov also was concerned that the

Turks might favor the Serbian bands in order to create enmity between Serbia and Bulgaria. 1 1 * Moreover, Geshov wanted to insure that when Bulgaria did obtain Macedonia the Sofia government would have complete control there. * * *

And the government wished to control the timing of any military action against the Turks.

Finally Geshov wanted to conclude the treaty before the Italians occupied Albania or Macedonia.11J A protracted war with Turkey could force the frustrated

Italians to enter the Balkans in order to conclude the war decisively. To forestall this possibility Geshov attempted to reach an understanding with Italy. In the autumn of 1911 and again in March 1912 the Bulgarians approached Italy and offered an alliance. * * * Failing this 66 the Bulgarians offered to fight in tandem with Italy against Turkey. The Italians however did not want to become entangled in Balkan affairs and distrusted

Bulgarian links with Austria-Hungary.11s All of these factors pressured Geshov to hurry to reach an agreement with the Serbs. But given the overall favorable nature of the treaty, Geshov would have been unlikely to secure any more advantageous terms even with additional time.

The treaty itself consisted of an open and a secret part. 1 ' 4 The open portion of the treaty contained a formal alliance with a provision for a military convention.117 The secret portion contained an agreement for Serbia and Bulgaria to consult, "in the event of internal troubles arising in Turkey which might endanger the state or the national interests of the contracting parties, or of either of them; or in the event of internal or external difficulties of Turkey raising the question of the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula."11* The other major article of the secret annex divided Macedonia into a

Serbian zone, a Bulgarian zone and a contested zone to be arbitrated by the Russian Tsar.11 * Overall the treaty was solid and favorable to Bulgaria. At the price of the de facto abandonment of the principle of Macedonian autonomy and with it the unrealistic ideal of the incorporation of all Macedonia in to the Bulgarian state, Bulgaria had 67 obtained an alliance with its moat aerioua rival in the

Balkans.

Furthermore the alliance was devised with the knowledge and approval of Bulgaria's protector, Russia, in whom Bulgaria had great confidence, especially after

Geshov had learned of the 1902 convention. 1 “ As he later wrote, "We accepted Russia as the arbitration judge, because Russia liberated Bulgaria, because she established our San Stefano ideal and because with the convention of

1902 she guaranteed our territorial integrity."1*1 This statement neatly expresses the Russophile basis of the

Geshov government. In the view of the Bulgarian government, Russia had given Bulgaria complete freedom to undertake a war with Turkey, which Bulgaria might not win but could not lose.1““ To strengthen this connection both

Ferdinand and Danev hinted soon after the conclusion of the Serbian alliance that Bulgaria was ready to renew negotiations for a military convention with Russia.1**

The Bulgarians hoped that such a convention would insure

Russian support against any Romanian threat.

With the conclusion of the Serbian alliance the

Bulgarian government turned its attention to the question of an alliance with Greece. Back in September 1911 Geshov had indicated to Bourchier an interest in negotiations with the Greeks.1*4 While the Bulgarians did not regard the Greek army highly, they considered the Greek navy an 68

important asset, because in a war with Turkey it could

disrupt the movement of Turkish troops from Asia to

Europe.1,9 Also the participation of Greeks in a Balkan

alliance was intended to offset any Russian disapproval of

a war with Turkey and to influence favorably European

public opinion with the formation of a united Balkan front and not merely a pan-Slav league directed against

Turkey.1 The Bulgarians welcomed and depended upon

Russian sponsorship. Hrowever, the recollections of 1878, when Bulgaria lost its national unity in part because of the Great Power perception that Bulgaria was merely a pawn in Russia's pan-Slav designs to dominate eastern Europe and the Straits, remained alive in the formulation of

Bulgarian policy.

Soon after Geshov's hint a proposal from Athens reached Sofia on 16/3 October 1911 for a mutual defense pact.1•7 The Bulgarian government, and especially

Ferdinand, who remained nervous about the Turks and did not trust the Serbs, received this proposal positively.*“•

Geshov responded favorably. But when he informed Nekludov and asked for the Russian opinion on the Greek offer

Nekludov and his superiors in St. Petersburg indicated concern that a Greco-Bulgarian agreement threatened the status quo and the peace of the Balkans.189 Since Russian leverage was so important to the ongoing negotiations with 69

Serbia, on which Sofia placed a higher priority, the

proceedings with the Greeks were suspended.

Only after the talks with Serbia were almost

concluded did Geshov again raise the issue of a Greco-

Bulgarian alliance. At the celebration of the coming of

age of Crown Prince Boris on 2 February/20 January 1912

Geshov told Bourchier, "We consider that the proposals which have been made to us through your agency furnish a suitable basis for an arrangement, and we should be glad if the Greek government would now transmit them to us through its minister M. Panas.11 The negotiations began soon thereafter in Sofia, but almost immediately encountered the same problem which had plagued those with

Serbia, the division of Macedonia. This time the major point of contention was the large port city of Salonica.

The Greeks considered Salonica as a conditio sine qua non for any negotiations.‘1 * The Bulgarians were just as adamant, regarding Salonica as the necessary outlet for western Macedonia. 1 J • For much of the spring of 1912 the negotiations foundered on this point. Toward the middle of April Danev sought British assistance to persuade the

Greeks to come to terms.1J J A new proposal submitted by

Panas on 27/14 April lacking the obligatory reference to

Macedonian autonomy was met with a Bulgarian counter proposal containing the reference. 1 14 This in turn was rejected by the Greeks. After several further meetings in 70

Sofia the Greeks at last agreed to accept the Bulgarian

formula for Macedonian autonomy. On 29/16 May 1912 the

treaty was signed in Sofia.

The treaty was a defensive alliance, and contained an appended declaration which excused Bulgaria from any obligations arising from complications involving a change in the status of Crete.115 This provision was intended to allay Russian fears. Really the alliance was more offensive than defensive in nature. 1 * * Its intent was to prepare for war against the Turks.

No provision was made in the treaty for a partition of territory in Macedonia. Geshov claimed that he lacked the time to do bo.1,7 In fact the Bulgarians considered themselves to be militarily superior to the Greeks. Also they were physically closer to their goals in Macedonia than the Greeks. Geshov himself later admitted that the

Bulgarians hoped to reach Salonica before the Greeks. 111

The Bulgarians thought that Greece, lacking a strong army and a Great Power patron, could not contest Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. Thus no arrangement was necessary.

The conclusion of the alliance with Greece left

Bulgaria in a strong political position. Bulgaria had determined the course of the negotiations with Serbia and

Greece by awaiting Serbian and Greek proposals and by conducting the negotiations in Sofia. Bulgaria, at the center of the Balkans and at the center of two separate 71 alliances, had assumed a dominant position in the Balkan

Peninsula. Geshov alsG was in a strong position. He had remained firm against the excessive demands of his potential allies while enforcing a more conciliatory scheme of alliance against the opposition of his coalition partner and the Bulgarian military. Geshov had realized the old dream of a Balkan confederation and had made

Bulgaria the dominant factor in it. His next goal would be to utilize this confederation to achieve the Bulgarian national ideal. 72

FOOTNOTES

1. Some considered him to be the real leader of the Nationalist Party. See Elena Statelova, "L'ldee d'un Rapprochement balkanique et la Presse bourgeoise en Bulgarie (1909-1912)," Etudes balkanique. II (1970) 77.

2. Wagner, 7.

3. BAN 51-1-17-10.

4. Die qrosse Politik der europaeischen Kabinette 1B71- 1914 (Berlin, 1922-27) hereafter referred to as GP XXXIII 12033, 12034; RD 3rd ser. I ii 487, 512; O-UA III 2677.

5. Mir no. 3362, 22 September 1911.

6. M, "The Balkan League. A History of its Formation," Fortnightly Review XCIII (1913), 434-435. Teodorov repeated this conversation to the Turkish Minister in Sofia, Assim Bey, Before Assim Bey left to become the new Turkish foreign minister.

7. Fichev, 41-42.

8. Nekludoff, 38. Nekludov was surprised by this change in the Bulgarian attitude. See also Die Auswaertiqe Politik Serbiens 1903-1914 (Berlin, 1928, 1929, 1931) hereafter referred to as SD I 148, 149; RD 3rd ser. I ii 512. Because of this change of policy Teodorov later claimed to be the originator of the Balkan League. See 17th ONS, 1st IS, Speech of Teodor Teodorov, 5 May 1914, 668.

9. RD 3rd ser. I ii 512.

10. Ibid. 487, 598. To Nekludov's relief Geshov did not raise the issue of protection against Romania after he returned from France. See Ibid. 716. Probably by that time Geshov had learned of the 1902 agreement with Russia and assumed that it covered such a contingency. See above, 58.

11. RD 3rd ser. I ii 526.

12. SD I 150. This was due to concerns that Austria- Hungary might aide its Triple Alliance ally Italy against Turkey. 73

13. Ibid. 149.

14. Ibid. 152; RD 3rd ser. I ii 512; Toshev, I 312. Ferdinand's agreement to the alliance was always shaky.

15. SD I 152.

16. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 111, (Rizov) 370; Geshov, Balkan League. 10. According to Rizov the minister president was a bit skeptical of an alliance with Serbia.

17. Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 370. Geshov, Balkan League. 13. Rizov had signed the 1904 agreement with Serbia and had discussed the possibility of an alliance with the Serbs in 1909 and 1910. See Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 387; Geshov, Balkan League. 10. Rizov was a messenger, utilized for his connections in Beograd. He was not a policy maker.

18. Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 371.

19. Ibid: RD 3rd ser. I ii 563.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 111; Geshov, Balkan League 11; RD I ii 561.

24. Geshov, Balkan League 11-12; RD 3rd ser. I ii 561.

25. O-UA III 2750.

26. RD 3rd ser. I ii 561.

27. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 119, (Rizov) 371-72; Geshov, Balkan League 13. Stanchov was a confidant of Ferdinand's. See D. Mishev, "Ideologiya na dogovora," Svobodno mnenie II 4 (1914) 53. For an excellent map of the conflicting claims in Macedonia see Dimitrije Djorjevich, "Pashich i Milovanovich u pregovorima za balkanski savez 1912 godine," Istoriski chasopis IX-X (1959) 485.

28. Salabashev, 318. Lieutenant Wagner places Salabashev and Ivan S. Geshov, the Bulgarian minister in Berlin and cousin of the Bulgarian minister president, at the meeting. See Wagner, 8. Both Salabashev and Wagner agree on the general outline of events at the meeting, with 74

Rizov and Stanchov favoring an immediate war with Turkey; Salabashev and, in Wagner, Ivan S. Geshov opposing such a war and Ivan E. Geshov expressing no opinion. Wagner, as a correspondent for the Viennese paper Reichspost, probably obtained his information from Salabashev or someone close to him.

29. Ivan E. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie i_ anketata po neqo. Facti i^ documenti. (Sofia, 1914) 9, Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 119. On this treaty see Helmreich, 3-7.

30. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 112; Geshov, Balkan League 14.

31. Ibid.

32. Geshov, Balkan League 14; Helmreich, 4B n. 36. Thus when he met Milovanovich Geshov could affirm that Ferdinand approved the plan for the alliance. See RD 3rd ser. I ii 625, 716.

33. See BD IX i 525.

34. The previous day an unknown Bulgarian using the name Geshov had passed through Beograd. See RD 3rd ser. I ii 625.

35. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 704, 17. On this meeting see Geshov, Balkan League 15-17; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 117-118; RD 3rd ser. I ii 625, 716; BD IX i 525, IX ii 574.

36. See Rossos, 38.

37. Geshov, Balkan League 17. The idea of Russian arbitration come from the 1904 treaty, which contained a provision stating that any dispute arising between Serbia and Bulgaria would be settled by the Russian Tsar. See Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 371.

38. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 12.

39. Milovanovich felt that during this conversation Geshov had been somewhat tentative. See Toshev, I 317.

40. The Turks had mobilized three divisions in Thrace during the first week of October/third week of September. See RD 3rd ser. I ii 569.

41. BAN 51-1-17-10. See also Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 113; RD 3rd ser. I ii 569.

42. Fichev 38-39; RD 3rd ser. I ii 512. 75

43. Elena Statelova, Politika. partil. pechat na bulgarskata burzhoalya 1909-1912 (Sofia, 1973) 121-125; Geshov, Balkan League 18.

44. RD 3rd ser. I ii 587.

45. Ibid. The Bulgarian Quartermaster General Dikov stated that these items were needed so desperately that if Russia could not supply them then Bulgaria would turn to Austria-Hungary.

46. O-UA III 2750; BD IX i 521.

47. O-UA III 2751,2766; GP XXXIII 12037; RD 3rd ser. I ii 614; BD IX i 521, 523.

48. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 113. But at the same time he was "shocked" at the bellicosity of his colleagues.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid. Geshov, Balkan League 18; RD 3rd ser. I ii 614; O-UA III 2750. Teodorov had requested such a step previously.

51. O-UA III 2750. Geshov later wrote that the war-like temper of his colleagues was a "revelation" which "irrevocably resolved" him to ally with Serbia and Greece. Balkan League 18. His prior actions, however, indicate that he had decided to ally with the Serbs at least as early as August 1911.

52. RD 3rd ser. I ii 614.

53. Ibid. 658.

54. Ibid. n. 2.

55. Ibid. 702; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 10. See also William C. Askew, Europe and Italy's Acgulsition of Libya 1911-1912 (Durham, North Carolina, 1942) 73-74.

56. RD 3rd ser. I ii 702.

57. Ibid. 633; BAN 51-1-17-10.

58. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1017, 4; RD 3rd ser. I ii 614 n. 2, 638, 657, 658; O-UA III 2770, 2778, 2779.

59. See Fichev, 38; RD 3rd ser. I ii 512; BD IX i 521. 76

60. TsDIA 568 opus 1 a. e. 721, 11. The formula read, "The Royal Government, having henceforth all guarantees that the Turks will not attack Bulgaria, renounces all measures of mobilization it has taken."

61. BAH 51-1-17-10. Abrashev afterward called the entire affair "a tempest in a teapot."

62. Mir no. 3375, 8 October 1911.

63. Statelova, Politika. partli. pechat 131.

64. Geshov, Balkan League 6 n. 1; Toshev, I 325. A slightly different version of these proposals is found in RD 3rd ser. I ii 755, which in addition to those mentioned by Geshov contained a Turkish proposal for a linkage of the Bulgarian railway system to the Turkish system between the Macedonian town of Kumanovo and the Bulgarian town of Kyustendil. On this point see also Langer, "Origins of the Balkan League," 342 n. 2. Langer demonstrates that Geshov's assertion that he did not transmit the Turkish proposals to the Bulgarian cabinet is not true. See Popov, IX 58. Evidently Geshov regarded the Turkish proposals more seriously then he later wished to admit.

65. RD 3rd ser. I ii 638.

66. Toshev, I 325. This railway line would link the Bulgarian railway system with the Macedonian system.

67. Popov, IX 58.

68. Toshev, I 325.

69. See DDF 3rd ser. I 118; RD 3rd ser. I ii 755.

70. Geshov, Balkan League 17, 19; RD 3rd ser. I ii 716, 813.

71. Geshov, Balkan League 19; Stoyan Danev, "Moyata misiya v Krim prez 1912 god. " Rodina III 2 (1940) 122. Danev affirmed that Geshov was in "constant contact" with him on the conduct of both foreign and domestic policy.

72. RD 3rd ser. I ii 757.

73. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 9; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 119, (Teodorov) 166-67. Interestingly enough Danev, who had negotiated the 1902 treaty, had not mentioned its existence to his coalition partner Geshov. This suggests that communication between them was somewhat unilateral. 77

74. Ibid.

75. RD 3rd ser. I ii 757. Teodorov and Stanchov, however, continued to press Nekludov on the matter of Russian support against Romania.

76. Ibid. 813.

77. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1004, 19-20; RD 3rd ser. I ii 801. Ferdinand had insisted the that negotiations take place in Sofia because he feared Austrian spies in Beograd. Nekludoff, 52.

78. Geshov, Balkan League 19-20. This meant that the division of all Macedonia would be subject to Russian arbitration. No Bulgarian statesman could have accepted a proposal which could have denied all Macedonia to Bulgaria.

79. Ibid. 21-23; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 114-116; RD 3rd ser. I ii 829.

80. Ibid.

81. See Rossos, 42.

82. Djordjevich, 477.

83. Geshov, Balkan League 23; Simeon Damjanov, "La France et la Bulgare a 1'epoque des Guerres balkaniques 1912- 1913" Etudes balkanigues II (1971) 32; Nadejda Muir, Dimitri Stancioff Patriot and Cosmopolitan (London, 1957) 142.

84. Geshov, Balkan League 26.

85. Apparently Milovanovich, after his return to Beograd, disagreed with Pashich on the extent of concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia. This disagreement interrupted the negotiation process. Dordjevich, 479.

86. Doklad na parlamentarnata izpitatelna komissiya (Sofia, 1918) hereafter referred to as DPIK I 11-20 nos 3, 6, 11; Trotsky, 231.

87. Toshev, I 323-24; Zhebokritskii, 187-89.

88. DPIK I ii no. 1; XV ONS 1st RS, speech of Geshov, 26 November 1911, 633.

89. Mir no. 3417, 27 November 1911. 78

90. Eventually 53 persons were punished by the Turkish authorities for participation in the Shtip massacre. DPIK I 23 no. 16.

91. Nekludov, 52.

92. Popov, IX 59.

93. Ibid. 52.

94. Ibid. 62.

95. O-UA III 3280. Nekludov feared that Geshov would resign because of Ferdinand's preference for Danev. Popov, IX 59. Throughout the remainder of his tenure as minister president Geshov would consider resignation with increasing frequency as a means to end his political burdens.

96. Geshov.Balkan League 33; Popov IX 65.

97. Ibid.

98. Popov, IX 68, 69.

99. Ibid.

100. Geshov, Balkan League 33; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 13.

101. Popov, IX 68, 69, 70, 74. The Russian minister in Beograd, Hartwig, advocated the Serbian position. See Ibid. 71, 75.

102. Ibid. 71, 74, 75.

103. Ibid. 71.

104. BAN 51-I-17_16. Here Spalajkovich apparently considered Danev more conciliatory than he did Geshov. This perception was mistaken.

105. See Rossos, 42-44.

106. BAN 51-1-17-16.

107. BD IX i 558, 559, 566.

108. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 131.

109. Ibid.

110. Toshev, I 346-47. See also DDF 3rd ser. II 297. 79

111. Toshev, I 335.

112. See Geshov, Balkan League 19.

113. DDF 3rd ser. I 614; Mezhedunarodnye otnosheniya v epokhu Imperializnia. Dokumenty lz arkhivov tsarskoqo i_ vremennoqo pravltelstv 1Q7Q-1917 (Moscow, 1938-40) hereafter refered to as MO 2nd ser. 19 11 716.

114. Toshev, I 335; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 25; Stoyan Danev, "Balkanskiyat suyuz" Rodina II 2 (1940) 57. See also Alessandro De Bosdari, Delle guerre balcaniche della grande querra e dl alcunl fatt1 precedentl ad esse. (Milan, 1928) 49.

115. Armando Pitassio, Francesco Guida, "La Politica estera italiana e gli slavi del sud nei rapporti delle legazioni di Belgrado e di Sofia nei period 1904-1908 e 1911-1913" offprint from Universita delgi Studi de Perugia. Annali della Facolta dl Scienze Polltiche a_. a_. 1978-79. 15, 90-91. Materiali di Storia, 3, "Aspetti e problemi della politica italiana verso gli slavi del sud nei periodo precedente la I guerra mondiale. "

116. For the text of the treaty see B. D. Kesiyakov, Prinos kum diplomaticheskata istorlya na Btflqarlya 1878- 1925 (Sofia, 1925-26 I 36-48; DPIK I 159-173; Geshov, Balkan League 112-117; BD IX ii appendix II; Balkanicus (Stojan Protich) The Aspirations of Bulgaria (London, 1915) 96-109; Diplomatist, Nationalism and War in the Near East (Oxford, 1915) 387-89.

117. Ibid.

118. Geshov, Balkan League 114.

119. One historian points out , "Properly speaking there was no disputed zone, for the line drawn in the Serbo- Bulgarian treaty was to stand as the future boundary between the two states except for a small strip near Struga, which Sazonov had promised to Bulgaria." Philip E. Mosely, "Russian Policy in 1911-1912" Journal of Modern History XII March 1940 76.

120. Geshov, Balkan League 36.

121. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 12-13.

122. Gunnar Hering, "Die Serbisch-Bulgarischen Beziehungen am vorabend und waehrend der Balkankrieg," Balkan Studies III 2 (1962) 316. 80

123. MO 2nd ser. 19 ii 625, 626, 772. Geshov considered the 1902 convention still valid and did not make any such hint.

124. Grogan, 136. Teodorov also had hinted of a desire of an accommodation with Athens. See above 43.

125. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 15, (Geshov) 122; Danev, "Balkanekiyat suyuz," 53.

126. Stoyan Danev, Ocherk na diplomatlcheskata istorlya na balkanskite durzhavi (Sofia, 1922) 102.

127. Geshov, Balkan League 38; RD 3rd ser. I ii 667. Rumors of such proposals already had surfaced. See RD 3rd ser. I ii 505.

128. Geshov, Balkan League 38; RD 3rd ser. I ii 717, 769.

129. RD 3rd ser. I ii 768 n. 1, 799. Nek.1 udov wrote that such an arrangement "is not handy."

130. Bourchier, Times 6 June 1913.

131. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 122.

132. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 15, 17. See also Nashata duma. Vurzrazeniya na bivshite ministri I_. E. Geshov. Dr. S. Danev. T. Teodorov. M. I_. Madzharov. I_. Peev i_ P. Abrashev sreshtu obvinenlyata na sud ot 1923 godlna (Sofia, 1925) (Teodorov) 61, for the extent of the Bulgarian claims in southern Macedonia.

133. BD IX i 568.

134. Geshov, Balkan League 38-39; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 117-18.

135. For the text of the treaty see Kesiyakov 148-151; Geshov, Balkan League 127-130; BD IX ii 1015-18; Balkanicus, 110-115; Diplomatist, 396-400.

136. See Helmreich, 76-77; Diplomatist, 184. Diplomatist noted that the treaty contained the obligation to fight together on any treaty violations of the rights of Greeks of Bulgarians by the Turks, or of the violation of the 'law of nations' by the Turks. "The whole existence of the (Ottoman) Empire in Europe being at this time a systematic violation of treaty rights and any joint representation being in the then temper of the Young Turks tantamount to a challenge, the elaborately 'defensive' drafting could not conceal the offensive object of the ai arrangement. "

137. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 118; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 132-133. See also von Siebert II 637. Ferdinand and the military urged a quick settlement of the treaty. The reasons for haste mentioned in the context of Serbia also apply to Greece. See above 64-66.

138. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 122. CHAPTER III

FINAL PREPERATIONS

In the spring of 1912 after the signing of the

alliance with Serbia and with the conclusion of the alliance with Greece imminent, Stoyan Danev embarked upon a diplomatic mission to Russia. Ostensibly Danev was to convey an invitation from Ferdinand to Nicholas II to attend the consecration of the Alexander Nevsky in Sofia.1

This imposing cathedral had been constructed to commemorate the Russian sacrifices in the Russo-Turkish

War of 1877-78. In that war Russia had liberated Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke. The Sofia government felt that no international suspicions could arise from such a mission.

But the real reason for Danev's journey was to seek formal Russian approval for the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance and to determine the Russian attitude toward a definite solution to the San Stefano question.* Danev himself apparently originated the idea of a mission to Russia back in December 1911.J The Geshov government prudently wanted to secure as much support as possible from St. Petersburg before attempting to achieve the national aspiration.

82 83

Danev's trip received positive attention as indicative of Bulgaria's enhanced international status due to the constitutional reforms of the previous summer and of Bulgaria's close relationship with Russia. Bulqariya boasted:

Today the independent de jure and de facto Bulgarian kingdom can take advantage of its freedom in international relations without any constraints. In international relations a major role is consigned to protocol and displays of interaction among states are expressed in official acts of reciprocal courtesy which are also demonstrations of mutual respect and observances of mutual interests. With the recent complications in the international situation on the peninsula, where the interests of the Great Powers conflict, the dispatch of Dr. Danev to Lavadia is in itself an expression of the hearty relations which exist between Bulgaria and Russia and no other hidden goals or meanings need be sought in it.4

The mission was presented as a foreign policy success by the government.

Upon his arrival in Livadia, the Russian tsar's vacation home in the Crimea, Danev immediately met with the Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov. Danev did not conceal from Sazonov that Bulgaria intended to act against

Turkey.s But Sazonov warned against a war with the Turks and stated, "every challenge you give the Turks we consider madness.He told Danev not to expect help from

Russia against Turkey. This was not an auspicious beginning for Danev's journey.

Danev discussed several other topics with the Russian foreign minister.7 The Bulgarian government was concerned 84

that any action it initiated against Turkey would incur a

negative response from Romania, and wished to insure that

the 1902 convention still covered such a contingency.

Sazonov, however, told Danev that the treaty was no longer

in force because it had been denounced by the Bulgarian

government in 1903.• At best Russia could only help

Bulgaria by diplomatic means.• Danev did not seem

particularly surprised or discouraged by Sazonov's

denial.*• He still depended on the pro-Bulgarian

sentiments in Russia which had liberated Bulgaria thirty

years before from the Turks.

Another topic raised by Danev concerned the arbitration agreement in the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty and

Bulgaria's future frontiers. Sazonov foresaw no obstacle to the Russian arbitration of the treaty, and did not object to the eventual attainment of the San Stefano borders by Bulgaria. But when Danev pressed him on the inclusion of Salonika and Adrianople, two towns not within the borders of San Stefano Bulgaria, Sazonov demurred. He agreed that the Bulgarians might have Salonika but wanted to consult the Russian general staff on the question of

Adrianople.* * This was a more heartening response for

Danev. His position indicated that he was considering something more than San Stefano Bulgaria. Salonika and

Adrianople could make up for the loss of Skopie and northern Macedonia to Serbia. 85

Danev discussed several other matters with Sazonov.

He informed the Russian foreign minister about the

Bulgarian negotiations vith Greece and indicated that

Bulgaria was interested in an arrangement with Montenegro.

On his own initiative he suggested that the Bulgarian

Crown Prince Boris might marry one of the Russian tsar's daughters. 1• This idea was discretely discouraged by

Sazonov. Danev also met with Nicholas II who accepted the role as arbitrator of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty but expressed the hope that his services would not be required.1J The Bulgarian leader tried to persuade

Nicholas to join Bulgaria in the war against the Turks.1 *

But the Russian tsar declined this invitation.

Danev then continued on to St. Petersburg where he hoped to clarify the question of Adrianople with the

Russian general staff. Due to the illness of Chief of

Staff General Zhilinsky, however, nothing was accomplished in this matter.* a Danev did discuss a possible Bulgaro-

Russian military convention with the Russian Minister of

War General Sukhomlinov.* 4 Informal negotiations to this end had been in progress for some time between the

Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg General Paprikov and the Russian Ministry of War.‘7 But these talks had no definitive conclusion. ‘ • A pact with Bulgaria offered

Russia very little advantage in the Balkans at this time.

After these talks Danev departed. Danev's mission to Russia had mixed results. He

personally felt that despite Sazonov's restraint Russia

was prepared to accept the Bulgarian position on the

necessity of conclusively resolving the San Stefano

question.1• And while Sazonov had advised against a war

with Turkey and denied the validity of the 1902

convention, he at least had mentioned diplomatic support

against Romania. Furthermore Sazonov had confirmed the

San Stefano frontiers plus Salonika for Bulgaria. This

somewhat muddled Russian position did little to discourage

the impulsive Danev, who was under the spell of the

attainment of the Bulgarian national aspirations.

After leaving St. Petersburg Danev traveled on to

Vienna. There he met Geshov, Teodorov and Rizov. Danev's

report on his Russian mission was positive. He apparently

failed to tell Geshov that Sazonov considered the 1902

convention invalid.•• Perhaps Danev feared such a

disclosure might dissuade the cautious Geshov from any

further action toward a forceful settlement of the San

Stefano question.

In Vienna Geshov and his governmental colleagues proceeded to deal with several domestic and foreign aspects of the pending conflict with Turkey. They decided to appoint General M. Savov deputy commander in chief of the Bulgarian army.•1 Savov was a controversial figure who had been tainted with corruption as a result of his 87

service as minister of war in the Stambulovist Petrov government in 1904.•• BecauseV)f Savov's ties to

Ferdinand and the opposition this could have been a conciliatory gesture. But Geshov insisted that Savov was selected for his military abilities.•* The selection was not confirmed by the government until September.*4 This indicates that the government in the late spring of 1912 strongly considered a military solution to the San Stefano question.

Another domestic issue discussed in Vienna was the formation of a coalition government during any war with

Turkey. While Geshov and Teodorov claimed to favor the idea Danev was less enthusiastic.*9 Immediately before the outbreak of the war Ferdinand also favored this plan.*6 The broad coalition government never was implemented, however, at least in part because of squabbling among the various opposition parties.*7 But by the fall of 1912 the diplomatic successes of the government in preparation for the war precluded any power sharing by the Geshov-Danev coalition. This narrow coalition had no desire to apportion its glory with the opposition.

In foreign policy matters the government of Bulgaria, sitting in the Austro-Hungarian capital, decided to seek arrangements with two additional powers before confronting the Turks. Due to the concerns of the Bulgarian Chief of Staff General Fichev that the Balkan allies lacked the strength to defeat Turkey by themselves the government decided to approach Italy again." Bulgaria sought an alliance with Italy, and failing this, an agreement for separate but parallel military action against the Turks.

Rizov had no success when he returned to Rome.** Fichev even placed an information service directed by the

Bulgarian military attache in Constantinople at Italian service.3* Nevertheless the Bulgarians never succeeded in involving Italy in their plans for a reckoning with

Turkey.

Also in Vienna the Geshov government decided to approach Montenegro. This had not been done previously, because Bulgaria had no conflicting interest with

Montenegro and because, on one observer noted,

"relationships between Sofia and Cetinje were close and the well known feelings of King Nichola were considered sufficient guarantee that no difficulties need be apprehended on the part of Montenegro."31 Rizov, who had close contacts with the Montenegrins, arranged a meeting with several members of the Montenegrin government who were in Vienna at that time. These meetings, attended by

Danev, Teodorov, Rizov and the Montenegrins General

Martinovich and Foreign Minister Gregovich took place in the Hofburg. No firm agreement was reached.3* However the basis for a future agreement was formed. The Bulgarians 89 knew that they could have a satisfactory arrangement with

Montenegro at a time preferable to themselves.

The inclusion of Montenegro in Bulgaria's Balkan plans had several advantages. With its doughty warriors and centuries old tradition of fighting the Turks

Montenegro brought a certain unanimity to the anti-Turkish

Balkan coalition. Montenegro also enjoyed close personal contacts with the Russian royal house through the marriages of two of King Nikola's daughters to Romanov grand dukes. And Montenegro, given the undisguised pan-

Serb aspirations of its king, might prove in some future case a useful counterweight to Serbia.

Bulgarian contacts with Montenegro continued throughout the summer of 1912. At one point Danev promised Montenegro all the land she could conquer.11 On

18/5 July King Nichola offered to open hostilities against

Turkey.14 But the Bulgarian government was not ready to accept this offer. Geshov was not prepared to accelerate the advent of the war by encouraging the impetuous Nichola and made no effort to deal seriously with the Montenegrins during the mid summer of 1912.

After the conclusion of the Vienna meetings Geshov and Danev returned to Sofia. Their government was well on its way to the realization of its plans for a confrontation with the Ottoman Empire. With the conclusion of the Serbian and Greek alliances, the formal 90

acknowledgement to Russia for its plans and the initiation of Montenegrin contacts, Bulgarian foreign policy entered a period of delicacy and tact. The fine details of the process of the achievement of the national goal had to receive thorough attention before the onset of the crusade. Geshov did not want to act before every facet of the preparations was complete. His letter of 23/10 July to M. Madzharov, the Bulgarian minister in London, reflected the careful stance of Bulgarian policy at this time. Geshov wrote:

...you must keep in mind the great change which has occurred among us in recent months. We are both encouraged and discouraged by everything that happens in our southern neighbor, and all our friends and both coalition party circles insist that we do not miss this opportunity. Of course ample deliberations and confirmations where necessary will be needed, as well as sympathy from everywhere. We hope that you will make every effort where you are so that we can gain sympathy there. For now it goes without saying that we must appear more peaceable than ever and must try to insure that the (Italo- Turkish) war does not end soon. And in order that it does not end soon we must shout, as loud as we can, that we want peace.13

Geshov wanted to act against Turkey in the autumn, after the September elections for the Duma had occurred in

Russia.34 These elections might return a government more favorable to the Bulgarian cause than the one in which

Sazonov served. Also the longer the Italo-Turkish war continued, the more exhausted Turkey would become and better chances would become for an arrangement with 91

Italy.*7 The Italo-Turkish war provided an excellent

screen for Bulgaria's preparations.

Geshov's policy of.purported peace received a severe

jolt on 1 August/18 July when a bomb explosion on market

day in the Macedonian town of Kochana resulted in the

massacre of over 100 Bulgarians.** Outrage resounded

throughout Bulgaria.*9 Even the normally restrained semi­

official newspaper Mir threatened:

If the maintenance of the status quo means the toleration of anarchy in the Turkish Empire until the complete obliteration of the Christian population, every Balkan state, which has co­ nationals there is obligated to protest. And if these protests are not heeded, they themselves must take care that the anarchy is stopped.*•

Geshov and the Bulgarian government were in a difficult position and even feared a possible revolt by the military.4 *

Geshov himself admitted that he was unpleasantly surprised by the Kochana incident, because Bulgarians had suffered and because of the difficult consequences for his plans.4• He responded to this massacre with a relatively mild protest to Constantinople.4* But he worried that the

Mir editorial might have been excessive and could "open the eyes of the Turks and reveal to them the true intentions of Bulgaria."44 Geshov attempted to allay the suspicions of the Turks, reassure his angry countrymen and continue his preparations for the confrontation with

Turkey. 92

A proposal by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister

Count Berchtold gave Geshov additional cause for concern.

This proposal, addressed on 14/1 August to the other Great

Powers, suggested that the Balkan states receive Great

Power encouragement to allow the Turkish government time

to implement its newly stated policy of

decentralization.*3 Initially Geshov feared that this

proposal might spur the other Balkan states into premature

action, primarily because of concerns about the

establishment of an autonomous Albania, and he claimed

that Berchtold's proposal demonstrated partisanship for

Turkey.*4 But the proposal gave the Bulgarian government

time to realize its wider objectives. Geshov indicated to

Toshev in a letter of 1 September/19 August that the idea of reform in Turkey, especially within the context of the

implementation of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, was very useful in gaining the support of European public opinion for the Bulgarian cause, in mitigating the treaty of an autonomous Albania and in allaying the suspicions of

Romania.* 7 The advocacy of article 23, which called for the establishment of autonomous provinces in European

Turkey, held another attractive possibility for Geshov.

An autonomous Macedonia might be created without a war.

Geshov firmly insisted that article 23 serve as the basis for a decentralized regime in Turkey and unsuccessfully sought Russian support for his position.*4 93

Gradually the Sofia government became more conciliatory.

On 20/7 September Geshov told H. Panafieu, the French minister in Sofia, that the Bulgarian government expected that Berchtold's proposal would have some effect.4* While a settlement on Geshov's terms was unlikely, it was not completely unthinkable. And in countering Berchtold's plan Geshov gained valuable time.

At the same time Geshov sought to undermine

Berchtold's proposal by stressing the unreliability of the

Turks. He wrote to Madzharov on 29/16 August:

And I think that both you and we here must continue to emphasize that this power (Austria- Hungary) which five years ago opposed judicial reform in Macedonia, now recognizes the need for decentralization. Since there is danger that the English might be hypnotized by the idea that the peaceful Kiamil Pasha is in fact the chief of the present ministry in Turkey, you will act, when and where possible, in order to divest them of the idea that Kiamil will able to accomplish anything. I already wrote you how we were deluded by the hope that the Young Turks would be able to accomplish anything, how bitterly disappointed we were and how we must explain to the English the major problem--the impossibility to see the reorganization of Turkey by a Turkish party or personality, in order to stress that the English not repeat the crime of Beaconsfield of 1878.9•

Geshov's energetic opposition to the Berchtold proposal indicates his genuine concern that the reform of Turkey would be left to the Turks with the sanction of the great powers. Under this condition the plight of the Christian population in European Turkey would continue to deteriorate, and the Balkan states would lose their 94 opportunity to confront the Turks, since the Turks presumably would enjoy Great Power support. Also under this condition Geshov could not remain in office.

To further pressure the Great Powers Geshov hinted that the position of both the king and the government was in danger if the powers did not take meaningful steps to hasten the reform of Turkey.51 While the Bulgarian populace undoubtedly was aroused against Turkey, especially after the Kochana incident, the Bulgarian tsar and government had every intention of confronting Turkey and to assuage public opinion. This was merely an attempt to gain time.

The time gained by this maneuvering enabled Geshov to turn to several other important diplomatic and domestic matters relating to the pending conflict with Turkey. One of the most important of these matters concerned

Bulgaria's relations with its northern neighbor. The

Romanian attitude toward Bulgaria's realization of the San

Stefano ideal had concerned the Sofia government for some time. The Bulgarians especially were worried that Romania might come to an arrangement with the Ottoman Empire.SB

Bucharest had made no attempt to conceal their requirement for compensation if any change in the status quo of the

Balkan peninsula occurred.81 The Romanians hinted that they would be willing to make a deal with Bulgaria.84 In

March 1912 immediately after the signing of the Serbo- 95

Bulgarian accord, the Bulgarian minister in Bucharest, G.

Kalinkov, met with the Romanian Foreign Minister T.

Majorescu. Kalinkov reported that Majorescu told him:

in case of any kind of conflagration in the Balkans, as long as Bulgaria maintained the status quo. Romania also would uphold it. But if Bulgaria should move toward the complete or partial realization of the San Stefano aspiration, Romania with every means will want the correction of our artificial Dobrudzha frontier more or less according to the Bulgarian gains from the Turkish inheritance.9*

This was a definite indication to the Bulgarian government that Romania was an important factor in the considerations for attaining the national goal.

The Geshov government, however, took no immediate steps to deal with Bucharest. Its energies were directed toward the negotiations with Greece, Danev's trip to

Russia and the general question of the confrontation itself. Finally in July Majorescu asked the young

Bulgarian charge in Bucharest, Ikonomov, what Bulgaria would do in case of a cataclysm in Turkey. Ikonomov reported this to Geshov, who perceived in Majorescu's question a Romanian desire for negotiations.39 Geshov proceeded cautiously. On 14/1 August he instructed

Ikonomov to asked Majorescu to define cataclysm.37 Geshov was in a delicate position. An arrangement with Romania was desirable for Bulgaria. But he did not wish to inform

Romania, and thus Romania's ally Austria-Hungary, that 96

Bulgaria was planning a reckoning with Turkey. Nor was he anxious to discuss any surrender of Bulgarian territory.

Majorescu replied evasively to Geshov's question. He said, "the events have not yet occurred which necessitate a discussion of the fatal question."3* But he intimated that an agreement might be attained within two or three weeks after such an event. Geshov was not satisfied with this response. On 24/11 August he instructed Ikonomov to seek some sort of formal statement from Majorescu that

Romania would not hinder a Bulgarian move against Turkey and empowered the young Bulgarian diplomat to assure the

Romanians in his own name that Bulgaria had no pretensions to the Romanian portion of the Dobrudzha. Again Majorescu failed to respond with the desired promise of disinterest.3* Undoubtedly Ikonomov's assurances for the

Romanian Dobrudzha did not impress the Romanians who did not consider that they held territory by the leave of their southern neighbor.

After this exchange Geshov briefly lost interest in an accord with Romania. The discussions themselves became controversial. Majorescu stated that he did not consider Ikonomov's soundings as serious. Rather they were only the efforts of a junior diplomat trying to appear important.*• Geshov insisted that Ikonomov had handled his instructions well.6 * At the time, however,

Geshov feared that Ikonomov's conversations with Majorescu 97 might have leaked and instructed Kalinkov to assure the

Romanians that Ikonomov had spoken only theoretically and to downplay the importance of Ikonomov's remarks.6*

Ikonomov in fact had carried out his instructions well given the delicate situation. Any failure in the Romano-

Bulgarian talks in August 1912 should be ascribed to

Majorescu's fickleness rather than Ikonomov's inexperience.6 * Danev did not consider the talks a failure and was encouraged by the lack of a definite

Romanian response.64 But the Bulgarian government had indications that the Romanians wanted a significant territorial concession in return for neutrality.68

Nevertheless Geshov made no further attempt to contact

Bucharest before the outbreak of the war.

However, after his return to Bucharest Kalinkov stayed close to Majorescu. Throughout the month of

September he assured the Romanians that Bulgaria would not fight Turkey, and would maintain the status quo in the

Balkans.66 The Bulgarian minister was especially convincing because he was not privy to information on

Bulgaria's plans for a confrontation with Turkey and believed that Bulgaria would not go to war.67 The

Romanians themselves did not reckon on a war in the

Balkans.6* Only after the Bulgarian mobilization did

Majorescu inform Kalinkov that Romania would not mobilize or participate in the war but afterwards would present a 98

'bill.'*• This lack of any definite negative response from Romania and confidence in Russian support encouraged the Bulgarians to proceed with their plans.

Further domestic preparations were necessary.

Bulgaria had to prepare politically and militarily for the confrontation. By 9 August/27 July Geshov and the

Ministerial Council had decided that Bulgaria would fight

Turkey.7* On 26/13 August at Tsarska Bistritsa, the

Tsar's retreat near Sofia, on Geshov and Danev's initiative they plus Minister of War General Nikiforov met with Ferdinand. 7 * There Ferdinand typically wavered on the question of war, expressing concern that the army was not prepared materially. Nevertheless Geshov regarded this meeting as positive and continued his preparations.7*

Ferdinand himself attempted to remain in a safe and comfortable position in relation to the war question.

While he kept informed on diplomatic and domestic events he maintained a certain distance from the preparations for the conflict, to insulate himself from any unpleasant outcome. As Abrashev astutely noted immediately before the outbreak of the war:

The Tsar has the right to laugh. He maintained peace amidst the bellicosity of Bulgarian politics and high military chiefs for twenty- five years, only to draw the sword during the most peaceful government, when Bulgaria has not only allies, but a great readiness for war. If we succeed, the Tsar will become Ferdinand the Great, but if we fail he will rightly say, 'This is why I was peaceloving for twenty-five years. 99

One time I was carried away by the general call for war and I injured Bulgaria.'7*

Ferdinand wanted to survive with his position intact

whatever the result of the pending conflict.

Even before the Tsarska Bistritsa meeting the Geshov

government had decided to accept the offer of King Nichola

to initiate the war and began further negotiations with

Montenegro.7 * The Bulgarian minister in Cetinje, A.

Kolushev, was called to Sofia, where the terms for an

agreement with Montenegro were settled.7 5 Kolushev

remained in Sofia briefly and after returning on 28/15

August quickly concluded an oral accord with Montenegro.

This agreement provided for an offensive war against

Turkey.7* Montenegro promised to initiate the war by 14/1

September and to field forty thousand troops. Bulgaria in

return promised to enter the war no later than thirty days

after Montenegro's start and to pay a subsidy to

Montenegro.7 7 Geshov defended this subsidy by demonstrating that larger allies historically often had subsidized smaller ones and indicated that the Bulgarian government hoped to recover the money paid to Montenegro in a war indemnity from Turkey, or possibly from

Montenegro itself.7• With the addition of Montenegro the

Bulgarian system of Balkan alliances was complete.

Bulgaria had not exercised such a predominance in the

Balkan peninsula since the time of Tsar Ivan Asen II in the thirteenth century. 100

Nevertheless the final arrangements for the war were far from complete. The exact timing of the mobilization and the declaration of war required a decision. N.

Pashich, who had become the Serbian minister president after Milovanovich's premature death in July, maintained reservations regarding the timing of the declaration of war because of concerns of a possible Austrian move against Serbia. The Bulgarian government sought to allay these fears by sending Danev to meet secretly with Pashich on a train between Lapovo and Nish on 21/8 September.

Danev told the Serbian leader that he was optimistic that

Austria would not intervene in any Balkan conflict and that Germany would not assist Austria.71 Danev's optimism was based on earlier Austrian assurances to Bulgaria that the Dual Monarchy would not oppose any Bulgarian advances in the Balkans. •• Danev apparently convinced Pashich and both sides proceed towards mobilization.•1 The Bulgarian position prevailed. As Helmreich notes, "the hub of the whole was Sofia, and as the hub turns, so turns the wheel.

Sofia pressed for a war with Turkey.

After Geshov was certain of the Serbian mobilization he proceeded to other matters. On 24/11 September the

Bulgarian Chief of Staff General Fichev reported to the

Ministerial Council that the chances for a Bulgarian victory in a war with Turkey were favorable.* 1 After this meeting Geshov decided that Bulgaria would mobilize.64 101

Two days later the Ministerial Council sanctioned the mobilization, but decided to defer the official decision until the following day, because the thirteenth was considered an unlucky day.*5 A report on 26/13 September that Sazonov, while visiting his British allies, had told the Bulgarian minister in London that in the event of a war Bulgaria would be alone impressed the Ministerial

Council but failed to alter their resolve to fight.•*

This warning was only one of many from Sazonov that

Bulgaria could expect no Russian support in war with

Turkey.*7 But these warnings had little effect on

Bulgarian policy.

By September 1912 the Russophile Bulgarian government felt confident enough to act against the advice of St.

Petersburg. Most Bulgarians could not believe that Russia would allow them to fail in their crusade for their national aspiration, and felt that the accomplishment of the San Stefano borders served Russian interests as well as Bulgarian. •• On 3 September/21 August Geshov wrote

Toshev that now no power could quench the flame in the

Balkans:

Who will be the fireman, Russia, or Austria or the gendarme of the Balkans, Romania? In that case let not the Russians delude themselves. Everything which, on the advice of Russia, we have completed with such hard work over the past six months will collapse in a moment. And it will be the start of a new era, an era of seeking other friends, an era so terrible that I prefer not to think about it. However I will not be entrusted to think about it...*9 102

The Sofia government was confident that Russia would not

actively oppose Its efforts to attain the San Stefano borders. Despite Sazonov's denials of support, Geshov counted on this support to protect the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance from Austrian and Romanian intervention.

Behind this facade of confidence the government was still very skittish. On 27/14 September General Fichev seemingly reversed himself and warned that even with allied help Bulgaria could hope to fight for only two to three weeks. After that without some Great Power support

Bulgaria risked disaster.*• This greatly disconcerted the

Ministerial Council and Geshov considered resignation.•1

Fichev's warning bolstered the government's attempt to reach an agreement with Italy. But this foundered on

Serbian opposition.9• The Serbs feared that Rome would hinder their plans for expansion in Albania. The government did not resign. But this incident illustrates that the government had no clear idea about the condition of the Bulgarian military and had in fact not troubled to inquire until plans for war were well along. This poor contact between the government and the military would have adverse consequences for Bulgarian aspirations.

Further questions of military preparedness remained.

Some military preparations had begun early in the year.

Generals Nikiforov and Fichev had been aware of the diplomatic activity behind the format ion of the Balkan alliances almost form the start. Already Geshov and

Nikiforov had signed a military convention with Serbia on

29/16 April 1912.** Supplemental agreements were signed on 2 July/19 June and 28/15 September.9* The convention provided for mutual assistance against a Romanian or

Turkish attack on Bulgaria and against an Austrian attack on Serbia. The convention stressed the Vardar valley in

Macedonia as the major theater of war.” The supplemental agreements shifted the Bulgarian forces to the Maritsa valley in Thrace and away from the professed Bulgarian goal in Macedonia.96 The Bulgarian general staff felt that the Maritsa theater offered the best opportunity to defeat the enemy forces.97 Also any Turkish attack on

Bulgaria would likely originate in the Maritsa valley, so a major Bulgarian troop concentration there was necessary.

Such was the confidence of the Sofia government in Russian support for the terms of Serbo-Bulgarian treaty that the possible Serbian occupation of Macedonia was not a major point of concern. Later events would demonstrate that the decision to concentrate Bulgarian troops in the Maritsa valley was militarily correct but politically questionable.

On 29/16 September an important meeting of the

Ministerial Council took place, attended also by the senior military commanders in the Bulgarian army. Geshov 104 opened the meeting with a stirring speech. One army commander recalled:

The old Nationalist, with a sincere and slightly trembling voice, expounded his goals to the meeting. Gradually his voice became louder and soon the walls of the Ministerial Council resounded with the echo of his youthful timbre; walls which probably never before had heard such fiery and ardent patriotism. He sketched the political situation for us, explained that we were in an offensive and defensive alliance with the fraternal Serbs and Montenegrins and that a little later Greece had been accepted into the alliance; that Romania would remain neutral, that our liberators would maintain friendly and benevolent neutrality toward the allies and that undoubtedly the other European countries will remain neutral also.9*

Geshov then asked the generals about the chances for success in the pending war. The generals responded that

Bulgaria could expect success, although General Fichev still had some reservations concerning the material preparation of the army and insisted that the other Balkan states should proceed immediately with their mobilizations. 99 These reservations startled Geshov, and two further sessions were necessary that same day before the generals were persuaded to lessen their material demands.1,1 Finally a one o'clock the next morning the

Ministerial Council sanctioned an immediate mobilization of the Bulgarian army. This meeting was intended to emphasize to the army commanders that the government intended to direct the national crusade. But it also demonstrated that communication between the government and the army was inadequate. A meeting between the government 105 and the military commanders regarding the pending war should have occurred months, not weeks before the before the intended start of the war.

Members of the government afterwards insisted that even at this extreme point they did not seek war. Danev stated that had the great powers intervened to force

'serious reforms' in Macedonia war could have been averted.1•* Teodorov understated the Bulgarian case when he wrote that the mobilization was, "an inevitable act of self defense against the provocative mobilization of the

Turkish army on the Bulgarian frontier around Adrianople, which was ordered by the Turkish government on 24/11

September with the sole purpose of an attack on

Bulgaria. 111 " And Geshov later averred:

we unquestionably did not want to declare war on Turkey. If an agreement with Turkey could have given us what we wanted, we would not have declared war on them. But they did not give us what we wanted, and answered us with a declaration of war. We were prepared for war, no doubt, because as soon as one man is mobilized, keep in mind, war can result. We did not think that the mobilization of the four allied states would impress Turkey and force her to give us what we wanted.1,1

Since the crisis of the previous autumn the entire course of Bulgarian policy had aimed at a conflict with Turkey.

By September 1912 the diplomatic and military basis for the conflict was established. In the unlikely event that the Turks would agree to Bulgarian demands for the implementation of article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin war 106

could have been avoided. In this sense the statements of

the ministers are correct. But since the autumn of 1911

the Geshov government was determined to confront the

Turks, and since August 1912 to fight them, as the only

means to realize the national aspiration.

The mobilization was announced on 30/17 September to

great public enthusiasm. Geshov had urged the Serbs and

Greeks to mobilize coincidentally with Bulgaria.1 * * He

encouraged Serbia to adopt an overt stance, "It is

necessary to appear open, so that the mobilization is

because of this action (i. e. because of the Turkish mobilization of 24/11 September) and not because of hitherto unannounced maneuvers.3 This reflected the growing Bulgarian confidence regarding the coming events.

This open response to the Turkish mobilization was also intended to impress other European countries. The small

Balkan states were merely reacting defensively to the provocative actions initiated by Turkey.

Only on the day after the mobilization proclamation did the Chief of Staff General Fichev contact the

Macedonian organization and arrange for the distribution of arms and money for the organization of partisan bands in the upcoming fight.'As recently as August during the excitement over the Kochana massacre the government had acted against the bands to prevent further precipitate action by the Macedonians. ‘ •7 Despite its lingering 107 distrust of the Macedonians the Ministerial Council had decided on 26/13 September to arm them because of a sense of patriotic enthusiasm.1•• But the government also realized that all fighters were needed. And the

Macedonians could occupy parts of their homeland while the

Bulgarian army was fighting the Turks in Thrace.

Unlike the Serbs the Greeks made difficulties about the mobilization. Athens wanted to delay in order to negotiate further with Bulgaria to obtain a definite partition agreement for Macedonia.1•' The Greek Foreign

Minister L. Coromilas even suggested the postponement of hostilities until spring.*'• Also the Greeks were reluctant to endanger their sea supply routes by precipitate military action. * 1 1 At this point Geshov attempted to compromise. He was anxious to bring the entire Bulgarian alliance system to bear on the Turks. He emphasized to Athens that reform, not conquest was the object of the allied actions.11• This was not convincing.

But Geshov also offered to withdraw Bulgarian reservations on the question of Crete.*‘* This concession cost

Bulgaria nothing and satisfied the Greeks. They then agreed to join Bulgaria and Serbia in a state of mobilization.* 1 ♦

Soon afterwards, on 7 October/22 September Geshov,

General Fichev and two Greek representatives signed a military convention in Sofia. 1 1 a By this convention 108

Bulgaria promised to:

assume with an important part of her army offensive operations against Turkish forces concentrated in the vilayets of Kossovo, Monastir and Salonika. If Serbia should take part in the war, in accordance with her agreement with Bulgaria, the latter will be allowed to use her forces in Thrace; but in that case she guarantees to Greece that a Serbian army of at least 120, 000 men will act on the offensive against the Turkish forces concentrated in the said vilayets.*‘*

With this convention the Bulgarian government demonstrated its intention to fight the Turks in Thrace. Also the

Bulgarians indicated their senior position in the alliance with Greece. The Bulgarians clearly dominated the anti-

Turkish coalition.

With the mobilization of the allies the preparations for war were almost complete. The Sofia government continued to insist on the implementation of article

23.* * 7 Geshov felt that this would prevent the Turks from becoming alarmed and concluding peace with Italy. The note delivered to the Turks on 12 October/30 September called for the implementation of article 23 with,

"administrative autonomy of the provinces, Belgian and

Swiss governors, elective local assemblies gendarmerie, educational liberty and local militia," acting under the control of the ambassadors of the Great Powers in

Constantinople and the ambassadors of the Balkan states. ‘ ‘ • Geshov later claimed that the acceptance of this note by Bulgaria's allies meant that they consented 109

to the old Bulgarian principle of Macedonian autonomy.1 1 *

The secret clause of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of March

1912 however had rendered the idea of Macedonian autonomy-

obsolete.1*• The Sofia government would not consider this

idea seriously in October 1912 after the outbreak of the

war.

The final attempts by the Great Powers to force

reform in Turkey and avert war came to naught. Neither

the Turks nor the Balkan allies had any interest in

Berchtold's proposal, or in Sazonov's later

counterproposal, which would have given the European

provinces of Turkey some autonomy.1•1 The Bulgarians now

were intent upon war. After the careful preparations of

the previous year the realization of the national aspiration was near. Mir stated:

The question for Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro today is this: whether to embark on a sharp war, which within two months of huge sacrifices, which they are prepared to make, will end the intolerable situation in the Balkans; or to continue to be checked in their development by a chronic war, which no one can deny prevails at the present time in the European provinces of Turkey. Only the egotism and rivalries of the Great Powers impede the elimination of this chronic war. Peace is in the hands of the Great Powers. If they do not agree to end this chronic war we shall bring about peace through a general war.***

But the time for Great Power intervention had passed. The failure of he Turks to accept the allied note resulted in the withdrawal of the Balkan ambassadors from 110

Constantinople on 17/4 October and an allied declaration of war the next day.1•* The crusade had begun.

The period from the conclusion of the alliance with

Greece in the spring of 1912 to the declaration of war in

October 1912 was the acme of Geshov's position of power in

Bulgaria and in the Balkans. He maintained a firm control over the events leading up to the outbreak of the war.

Not even the unpleasant surprise of the Kochana massacre seriously impeded his plans for a confrontation, although it may have confirmed his growing suspicions that Bulgaria would have to fight. Furthermore Geshov secured allied agreement to begin the war on Bulgarian terms. Bulgaria was the unchallenged leader of the Balkans.

Geshov was pleased with his accomplishments. He spoke of the Balkan alliances as the "pride" of

Bulgaria.1•4 Other Bulgarians recognized his achievements. Abrashev in his diary wrote immediately before the decision to mobilize,

I must admit that Mr. Geshov, the minister president of Bulgaria, has conducted affairs with tact, enviable diligence and skill. Not only is Geshov a very honest man, but he also has a strongly developed sense of right and justice even though he is not a jurist. In the present fateful moment he has demonstrated a healthy patriotism and a stalwart defense of the interests of the motherland, just as he did when he on several occasions lay in Turkish prisons.‘8 9

And on 6 October/23 September, the day after the war began, the opposition leader D. Tonchev stated in the Ill

National Subranie:

As long as Mr. Minisiter President assures us, that the government has taken every measure to safeguard the national interests after the conclusion of events, and we must believe this, I think the responsibility for the results of these events will fall not only on the Bulgarian government, it will fall on the entire Bulgarian people.* 8 6

The war would alter this situation. Never again would

Geshov enjoy such prestige and such control over the destiny of his country. 112

FOOTNOTES

1. Stoyan Danev, "Moyata misiya v Krim prez 1912 god." Rodina III 2 (1940) 123; MO 2nd ser. 19 ii 790.

2. Prllozhenle I (Danev) 18-19; Geshov, Balkan League 43.

3. BAN 51-1-17-20; Popov, IX 64.

4. B ulqariya no. 87, 24 April 1912.

5. Geshov, Balkan League 45.

6. Danev, "Krim," 125.

7. See MO 2nd ser. 19 11 878.

8. Ibid. 126; Prllozhenle I (Danev) 18-19.

9. Helmreich, 112 n. 37.

10. E. C. Helmreich and C. E. Black, "The Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention of 1902," Journal of Modern History IX (1937) 481. On the question of the validity of the convention see also Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878- 1918 (New York, 1983) 277.

11. Danev, "Krim, " 127; Prllozhenle I (Danev) 10; Siebert II 618.

12. Danev, "Krim," 128.

13. Ibid. 129-30; Danev, "Balkanskiyat suyuz," 60. Nicholas II wrote to Ferdinand and expressed his regrets that he could not attend the consecration ceremony of the new cathedral because of the upcoming Romanov jubilee. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 778, 2-3.

14. BD IX ii 434.

in Danev, "Krim," 133.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid. 131; Prilozhenie I (Panrikov) 300. While the Bulgarians apparently wanted a new military arrangement Russia was less enthusiastic. See RD 3rd ser. 1 ii 699.

18. Geshov, Balkan League 47. Geshov thought that the Russians were in no temper to conclude a military agreement with Bulgaria especially given Danev's bellicose 113

disposition.

19. Danev, "Krim," 131.

20. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 120. Geshov thought that the convention was in force when the Balkan War began and only after December 1912 started to have doubts. See below 1Q0.

21. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 135-36, (Rizov) 373; Fichev 81-82. Geshov claimed that his was Rizov's idea. See also Mariya Veleva, "Pravetelstvenata kriza prez Mai-Juli 1913 g." Godisnlk na Sofiysklya universltat LIV (1965) Kniga III 88.

22. See Crampton, Bulgaria, 298; Trotsky, 262-63.

23. BAN 51-1-17-62; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 28.

24. Because of intra-service rivalries General Nikiforov, the minister of war, preferred Ferdinand act as commander in chief. Ferdinand was commander in chief by the constitution. The compromise finally adopted was Ferdinand as commander in chief and Savov as deputy commander in chief. Of course Savov actually ran the army. BAN 51-1-17-48; Minsterstvo na Voinata. Shtab na Armiyata-Voinno Istoricheska Komisiya, Voinata mezhdu Btflgariya i Turtsiya 1912-1913 god. (Sofia, 1937) hereafter referred to as Voinata. I 294-95.

25. Prllozhenle I (Rizov) 373.

26. BAN 51-1-17-46.

27. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 28. In September 1912 Danev disingenuously indicated that he did not want a wide coalition government because Geshov would not participate in it. BAN 51-1-17-38.

28. Prllozhenle I (Danev) 24, (Rizov) 372.

29. Ibid.

30. De Bosdari, 65-66.

31. M, "Balkan League," 46. Nicholas was a known Bulgarophile.

32. On these meetings see Treadway, 106-07; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 118, (Danev) 16; Geshov, Balkan League 41, Danev, "Balkanskiyat suyuz," 55.

33. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 86-87 n. 24. 114

34. DPIK I 197 no. 1, 197-98 no. 3.

35. M. I. Madzharov, Diplomaticheska podqotovka na nashite voyni. Spomenl. chastnl pisml. shlfrovanl telegram! i_ poverltelnl dokladl (Sofia, 1932) 42-43.

36. SD I 180. An excellent English paraphrase of this interesting document is found in Helmreich, Balkan Wars 103-104.

37. Ibid. I 182.

38. DPIK I 35 no. 1, 35-36 no. 2, 37-40 no. 8, 40-41 no. 9; BD IX i 607.

39. DDF 3rd ser. Ill 255; BD IX i 615; Geshov, Balkan League 49-50; Zhebokritskii, 198-200; Aleksandr Velev, "Politicheskie partii v Bolgarii i balkanski voini (1912- 1913) Etudes historlgues IV (Sofia, 1968) 443-45; Antanas Shopov, Kak ni se nalozhi Balkanskata voina (Sofia, 1915) 21-33.

40. Mir no. 3614, 26 July 12.

41. MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 610, 618. Geshov noted the example of the Greek army revolt in 1909.

42. SD I 180.

43. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 710, 2-3; BD IX i 607.

44. SD I 180.

45. OU-A IV 3687; Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold. Grandseiqneur und Staatsmann (Graz, 1963) I 289-91; F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Saraievo. the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866-1914 (London, 1972) 344-45.

46. O-UA IV 3649, 3712.

47. Toshev, I 362. Some Bulgarians by this time were growing impatient with Geshov's preparations. Rizov pointed out that Bulgaria lacked the moral basis to insist on article 23 because Bulgaria itself had transgressed the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 and again in 1908. DPIK I 107-09 no. 17.

48. DPIK I 101-02 no. 9, 102 no. 10.

49. DDF 3rd ser. Ill 444. 115

50. Madzharov, 52. At the same time in a dispatch to Paris Geshov termed Kiamil Pasha "a man without a past and without a future." DPIK I 225 no. 2. Geshov's emphasis on Kiamil Pasha's untrustworthiness suggests that Geshov had placed high hopes on his talks with the Turks the previous autumn and was still disappointed by their failure.

51. O-UA IV 3757; BD IX i 677, 702, 718.

52. For example see TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 1- 2, 7; DPIK I 205 no. 1; DDF 3rd ser. I 123, II 99; G. Kalinkov, Romuniya i^ neynata politika spremo Biflqariya (Prez 1912 i 1913 g.. > (Sofia, 1917) 76-77.

53. O-UA III 2546; Kalinkov 78.

54. See Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 312, 334; Fichev, 37.

55. Kalinkov, 95. See also Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 312, 334; BD IX i 724. At that time the Romanians undoubtedly knew of the Bulgaro-Serbian alliance. On 15 April 1912 the German Foreign Minister Alfred von Kinderlen Waechter wrote to King Carol of Romania, "We have just now received a very characteristic oral report from an absolutely secure source. A secret agreement has been concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia under the direct auspices of Russia." Ernst Jaeckh, Kinderlen-Waechter der Staatsmann und Mensch (Stuttgart, 1925) II 186-87.

56. Geshov, Balkan League 47-48. Kalinkov at that time was on leave in Bulgaria. Geshov says that this occurred in June. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 129; TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a.e. 1254, 5-7; DPIK I 205-06 no. 2. See also Eleanor Pace "Roumania and the Balkan Wars, " unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1944, 52.

57. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 8-9; Kalinkov 96.

58. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 10-13; DPIK I 207- 10 no. 5; Kalinkov 97.

59. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 14-16; DPIK 210-11 no. 5; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 129.

60. DPIK I 211-14 no. 7; Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 315; Kalinkov 100-01; Minstere des Affaires etrangeres, Documents diplomatiques. Les evenemenets de la peninsule balkanique. L 'action de la Roumanie septembre 1912-aout 1913 (Bucharest, 1913) hereafter referred to as Rom Doc, 52. 116

61. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 130.

62. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a.e. 1254, 20; Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 339; DPIK 211 no. 6.

63. See for example N. Schbeko, Souvenirs (Paris, 1936) 146.

64. Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 313.

65. MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 541, 620.

66. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a.e. 1254, 22-25; DPIK I 211- 214 no. 7; Kalinkov 99.

67. Kalinkov, 99. Appointed to his post by the Malinov government, Kalinkov was considered somewhat suspect by the Nationalists. See Mir no. 3177, 15 January 1911.

68. O-UA IV 3660, 3773, 3893.

69. Kalinkov 106; Rom Doc 1.

70. BAN 51-1-17-23-24. Even before this on 4 July/ 21 June as Justice Minister Abrashev left on a vacation Geshov told him, "Tell me your address. The way things are going we perhaps soon shall have war." Ibid. 23.

71. Ibid. 27; Geshov, Balkan League 50; M, "Balkan League" 439.

72. Danev pinpointed this meeting as when the decision to fight the Turks was taken. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 27.

73. BAN 51-1-17-68.

74. On the Montenegrin offer see DPIK I 197 no. 1, 197-98 no. 3. Kolushev was called first to Munich on 14/1 August and from there when Geshov was unable to go to Munich to Sofia on 20/7 August. See Ibid. 198 no. 5, 199 nos. 7,8.

75. Ibid. 194 no. 8. Geshov originally intended to meet Kolushev in Munich to avoid any suspicions. But due to the urgency of war preparations the meetings were held in Sofia. Geshov, Balkan League 42; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 118.

76. On the agreement see Voinata I 62; Rossos, 58-9; Kesiyakov I 45n; Nikola Kolarov, Qcherk vurhu diplomaticheskata istoriya na Balkanskite voini (Sofia, 1938) 22-23. 117

77. The amount of the subsidy varies according to the source consulted. Kesiyakov and Danev stated 750,000 leva per month. Kesiyakov, I 45n; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 16. Toshev stated that the subsidy amounted to 35,000 leva per day, or I lev per day per Montenegrin soldier. Toshev, I 361. Tarnowski reported that the subsidy was 30,000 leva per day. O-UA IV 3909. The official history of the war gave the flat sum of 2,250,000 leva as the amount of the subsidy. Voinata I 62.

78. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 119.

79. DPIK I 155 no. 10; Danev, "Balkanskiyat suyuz," 61; MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 761. See also Count Carlo Sforza, Fifty Years of War and Diplomacy in the Balkans. Pashich and the Union of the Yugoslavs (New York, 1940), 84-5.

80. See O-UA IV 3678, 3734; BAN 51-1-17-36; Helmreich, Balkan Wars, 113.

81. BAN 51-1-17-33-4; Toshev, I 381. At the same time Ferdinand was having second thoughts about the war and refused to receive Danev after his return from the meeting with Pashich. BAN 51-1-17-37.

82. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 89.

83. Fichev, 73-4. Fichev states the he in turn asked the ministers about the political preparations. Danev told him in an "emphatic" tone that was the business of the government.

84. BAN 51-1-17-37.

85. Ibid. 39.

86. Ibid. See also Madzharov, 57-61.

87. See for example O-UA IV 3809, GP XXXIII 12149. Sazonov at one point said with exasperation to General Paprikov, "I tell you for the twenty fifth time that you cannot count on us. "

88. See for example MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 873.

89. Toshev, I 363. Prophetic words.

90. BAN 51-1-17-40.

91. Ibid* 41.

92. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1191, 28. 118

93. This convention was considered to be part of the alliance agreement, For the convention see Geshov, Balkan League. 117-22; Volnata I 48-51.

94. For these subsequent agreements see Geshov, Balkan League 122-27; Voinata I 51-56; Fichev, 57-61, 67-68.

95. Article 4 of the convention stated, "Should Bulgaria and Serbia declare war in accordance with a previous agreement, both parties undertake, in the absence of any special disposition to the contrary, to detach from their armies mobilized in accordance with article I of the present agreement, at least 100,000 men each and sent them to the Vardar theater of war."

96. Article 3 of the agreement of 28/15 September stated, "the entire Bulgarian army will act in the valley of the Maritsa, leaving at first one division on the line Kyusdendil-Dubnitsa, the later being protected by a small garrison."

97. Fichev, 68-69.

98. Radko Dimitriev, Treta armiya v Balkanskata voina 1912 godina (Sofia, 1922) 20. Montenegro adhered to the alliance after Greece.

99. BAN 51-1-17-42-43; Stefan S. Bobchev, Stranitsi iz moyata diplomaticheska misiya v_ Petrograd 1912-1913 (Sofia, 1940) 7.

100. BAN 51-1-17-42-43.

101. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 79.

102. Nashata duma (Teodorov) 26, 30.

103. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 127.

104. DPIK I 135 no. 11.

105. Ibid. 155 no. 13.

106. PetiTr Durvingov, Istoriya na Makedono-Odrinskoto opulchenie (Sofia, 1919-25) I 1-3. See also Petar Stojanov, Makedoni1a vo vremoto na balkanskite i_ prvata svetska voina 1912-18 (Skoplje, 1969) 69. The Macedonian bands themselves had been preparing for the pending conflict since June. Stojanov, 114.

107. MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 541. 119

108. BAN 51-1-17-39-40.

109. DPIK I 186 no. 14; Petur Todorov, Pogrom!te na Bulqariya (Sofia, 1930) I 103.

110. BAN 51-1-17-35.

111. Voinata I 293.

112. DPIK I 186 no. 13.

113. Ibid. 187 no. 16. The Greco-Bulgarian treaty contained no provision for joint action if Greece annexed Crete. See chapter 3 above.

114. Ibid. 187 no. 19.

115. For the convention see Geshov, Balkan League 130-33; Voinata I 59-61.

116. Ibid.

117. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1191, 181.

118. Geshov, Balkan League 55-57. Abrashev regarding this note wrote, "I imagined what kind of face the Sultan will make, when he reads the note of his former slaves, with their demand for reform in the provinces of his empire to be accomplished under their control, at the expense of mobilizing their armed to force him to bow. I do not doubt that his answer will be a declaration of war." BAN 51-1-17-56.

119. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 31.

120. For another view see Dimitur G. Gotsev, Ideyata za avtonomiya kato taktika v^ proqramite na natsionalnoosvoboditelnoto dvlzhenie v^ Makedonlya i_ Odrinsko 1893-1941 (Sofia, 1983) 30-31.

121. See DPIK I 231 no. 8; Geshov, Balkan League 52-53. Sazonov did not envision the participation of the Balkan states in the administration of the autonomous provinces when he made his proposal on 17/4 September.

122. Mir no. 3661, 21 September 1912. Rarely has the concept of a war for peace sounded as ironic as here in the Balkan context.

123. Montenegro had already begun to fight on 9 October/26 September. 120

124. Nashata duma (Geshov) 250.

125. BAN 51-1-17-38.

126. 15th ONS, IS, speech of D. Tonchev, 23 September 1912, 12. Tonchev later was a member of the Radoslavov government which brought legal proceedings agaisnt Geshov for his management of the events leading up to the war and during the war itself. CHAPTER IV

THE WAR FOR THE NATIONAL ASPIRATION

The war began with tremendous popular support. The

Geshov government's prestige was at its zenith. One

Bulgarian historian noted that at the beginning of the war, "rarely has a government received greater credit and greater support from every side and stratum as did the

Geshov government."1 Only a few muted voices opposed the war.* The crusade to attain the national aspiration had started. Ferdinand emphasized this in his proclamation to the Bulgarian people announcing the war:

I am ordering the valiant Bulgarian army to enter Turkish territory. Side by side with us the armies of the associated Balkan states Serbia, Greece and Montenegro will fight against the common enemy for the common goal. And in this struggle of the cross against the crescent, of freedom against tyranny, we shall have the support of all those who love justice and progress. Strengthened by these sympathies, let the Bulgarian soldier remember the heroic deeds of his grandfathers and the valor or our teachers, the Russian liberators. Let us sweep along from victory to victory.J

Ferdinand's reference to the Russian liberators was deliberate. It was intended to demonstrate to the traditionally Russophile Bulgarian people that Bulgaria enjoyed Russian support for the war, and to imply that the

Bulgarian cause was consistent with Russian purposes.

121 122

Neither of these implications was strictly true. The

Russian Foreign Minister S. Sazonov repeatedly had

attempted to dissuade Bulgaria from a war with Turkey ever

since he had learned the details of the Serbo-Bulgarian

treaty at Livadia in May 1912.4 Although the Bulgarian

government anxiously sought Russian advice on various

aspects of the war preparations Sazonov's counsel against

the war was studiously ignored.

Geshov hoped to circumvent the Russian foreign office with a direct appeal to the Russian people. In an interview with a correspondent of the St. Petersburg paper

Novoye Vreme he challenged Sazonov with the statement:

This agreement [the Balkan alliance] is a great historical event because never before have all the peoples and states of the Balkans had such unity. I would like to know if there is any Russian diplomat who would assume the responsibility to isolate Bulgaria and to disrupt our agreement. Do not forget that the sufferings of the Bulgarian Christians are the consequence of the great sin committed at the Congress of Berlin when Europe refused to regulate the Bulgarian question. We hope that Russia will not condone a similar sin and will accomplish the great legacy of the Tsar Liberator for the acquisition of human rights by the Balkan Christian population.8

The Bulgarian diplomat sent to St. Petersburg to replace

General Paprikov, Stefan Bobchev, was instructed to work around Sazonov.4 The Bulgarian government wanted to insure the pan-Slav support of Russia for the war against the Turks. These pan-Slav sympathies of the Russian 123 people had been instrumental in the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turks in 1Q78.

At the same time Geshov slyly emphasized his importance for Russian policy. At the beginning of the war he told Nekludov:

I can only wish my colleagues and myself good luck in our decision to stay at the rudder and bear the heavy responsibility for the coming events. If we would withdraw, the government would pass into the hands of those who have allowed themselves to be tempted by Austrian promises and flattery and who would destroy the great fact of the reconciliation with Serbia and who in the final analysis declared war on the Turks supported not by the Balkan alliance but by agitation from Vienna and Budapest.7

Geshov implied that if he was not at the head of the government Russophobe elements could control the course of the war in a manner inimical to Russian policy. Geshov represented his government as the chief hope for a

Russophile policy during the war. The later attempts of the army high command and Ferdinand to manipulate

Bulgarian policy and to ignore the Sofia government supports Geshov's contention.

Despite Sazonov's warnings against the war the official Russian position was one of benevolent neutrality. Even before the war began Colonel

Romanovskii, the Russian military attache in Sofia, offered the Bulgarians a substantial gift of military supplies including shoes, overcoats and rifles.* During the war itself Russian volunteers enthusiastically 124 participated as soldiers and in the medical services in

support of the Bulgarian cause.* This popular Russian

support counteracted the admonitions of the Russian

foreign office against the war.

Even the Russian foreign office provided Bulgaria

with important diplomatic aid. One week before the war

Sazonov warned the Bulgarian government to refrain from

military activity in the Black Sea, so that the Turks

would not close the Straits.1• The minuscule Bulgarian

navy posed little threat to the Turks. The Turkish navy,

however, possessed the capacity to damage considerably the

Bulgarian Black Sea ports of Varna and Burgas. Geshov

quickly agreed to Sazonov's request and asked him to

restrain Turkey also from military activity in the Black

Sea.* * The Bulgarian populace felt that Russia would

protect the Black Sea coast from a Turkish attack.1■ The army shared this confidence.1 * When in the first days of the war the Turks did bombard Varna and Burgas Sazonov reacted promptly with a note to Constantinople demanding an end to further activity of this sort.1 * The Turks complied. This action helped the Bulgarians since they lacked sufficient naval forces and coastal fortifications to defend their Black Sea 1ittoral adequately.

Furthermore St. Petersburg apparently employed diplomatic means to restrain Romania.15 Thus Russia aided the 125

Bulgarian war effort with both material and diplomatic assistance.

The Geshov government initially contemplated further

Russian help for the Bulgarian war effort. On 17/4

October, the day before the declaration of war Ferdinand left Sofia for army headquarters in Stara Zagora.

Accompanying him was Stoyan Danev, who had been dispatched by the Ministerial Council to represent the government at headquarters. * 4 After his careful preparations for the conflict Geshov wanted to insure that the war would be conducted with this same close attention. He also wanted to keep the conduct of the war under the careful scrutiny of the government. But Danev had a more specific purpose at headquarters. Geshov considered that even if military measures against the Turks failed the Great Powers would want to end the conflict and would grant autonomy to

Macedonia.‘7 Danev went to headquarters to signal the government in Sofia when defeat threatened the Bulgarian forces so that Geshov could then immediately demand Great

Power and especially Russian intervention. Several times during the first week of the war at headquarters Danev raised the question of Russian intervention.1• Also in

St. Petersburg Bobchev worked to arrange for this intervention. * * This explains why the military was informed about the war at a curiously late date. The 126

cautious Geshov wanted to insure a Bulgarian political

success no matter what the military outcome.

Danev's presence at headquarters irritated Ferdinand

and the army high command. The tsar complained to Danev,

"Why do you wont to intervene now? You forced me to

declare war and now you want to interfere. This is

shameful. We shall fight whether we win or not."*•

Neither Ferdinand nor the actual commander of the

Bulgarian forces General Savov desired intervention.**

Ferdinand, away from the government in Sofia, bestirred himself to regain some of the authority he had abandoned over the past year and a half. Once the war began neither the tsar nor the army wanted interference from the government.

Almost immediately Ferdinand and the high command distanced themselves from the government and began a separate course.** The most telling indication of this gulf was the absence of communication between Sofia and headquarters. Despite Danev's presence at headquarters the army sent only sporadic reports about the war to

Sofia. These infrequent reports was the only information the government had about the war.“* Also the army usurped the government's authority to call up reserves and on its own authority disarmed the Turkish population living in

Bulgaria.84 The minister of war in Sofia General

Nikiforov was ignored.8 3 Unfortunately in this situation 127

Geshov appeared unwilling to assert the government's authority.** He had no personal military experience and probably considered himself ill-prepared to interfere in the military conduct of the war. Furthermore he was preoccupied with routine governmental affairs as well as the diplomatic management of the war. Obviously he should have exerted himself further to demand information and accountability in military affairs.

The government was not alone in its ignorance of the conduct of the war. Information available in Sofia from the front was limited. Most newspapers except for the semi-official papers Mir and Bulqariya suspended publication at the outbreak of the war due to a shortage of men and materials.*7 Coincidentally the high command instituted a policy of strict censorship to enforce its control over the military situation. War correspondents were subject to numerous detailed restrictions.•• The attitude of the high command was summarized by General

Fichev when after a major battle he told a correspondent,

"Why should we report it? We did not want to advertise, we wanted to fight."*9 This censorship was probably unconstitutional. 7 • Furthermore it seriously impeded the government's desire to instill in European public opinion a positive impression of the Bulgarian war effort.

Nevertheless the government made no effort to counter this action of the high command. The censorship weakened 128 governmental control over the military and left the populace prey to rumors and fantasies concerning the military situation. This made a realistic appraisal of the army and the war very difficult.

The stunning Bulgarian victories over the Turks eliminated the need for Great Power intercession and precluded an immediate conflict between the government and the high command over the conduct of the war. On 22-23/9-

10 October around Lozengrad-Kirk Kilasse the Bulgarian army inflicted a major defeat on the Turkish forces. 3 *

One week later the Bulgarians gained another important victory at Lule Burgas.*• After these victories both

Ferdinand and Danev, despite their earlier disagreements, urged that the idea of autonomy receive no further consideration as a war goal.3* Geshov agreed. He later wrote, "After Lule Burgas no Bulgarian doubted that San

Stefano Bulgaria had to be created."3*' Geshov instructed his diplomatic representatives to:

emphasize that after the huge losses incurred, the impossibility of a return to Turkey of the liberated and compromised population and that the single most expedient way to accomplish the final pacification of the peninsula would be the liquidation [of European Turkey] and its division among the allies.33

Immediate territorial aggrandizement replaced the original

Bulgarian policy of autonomy and eventual union. Geshov wanted to insure that the Great Powers would not return a liberated Bulgarian population to Turkey as had happened 129 in 1878 after the Congress of Berlin. He also wanted to insure that the Great Powers would place no obstacles in the way of the Serbo-Bulgarian division of Macedonia.

Ironically if, as the government had projected, Bulgarian arms failed during the first weeks of the war an autonomous Macedonia might have resulted from Great Power intervention. This autonomous Macedonia then eventually might have united with Bulgaria as did Eastern Rumelia in

1885. This apparently was Geshov's initial plan with the

Great Powers sanctioning an autonomous Macedonia after receiving the Bulgarian request for intervention.

For a short time further the Sofia government continued to adhere to the idea of Great Power intervention as a means to end the war. Even with the big victories Bulgarian resources were limited . The war could not last long without incurring huge debts and loses of men and material. When Danev returned to Sofia from headquarters on 4 November/22 October he urged the

Ministerial Council to consider intervention.3* Danev also claimed that the tsar and General Savov then favored intervention because of concerns over the completeness of the Bulgarian victory at Lule Burgas.37 Furthermore

Sazonov from St. Petersburg indicated that Bulgaria should be satisfied with the San Stefano borders.3* The

Ministerial Council that same day agreed to seek Great 130

Power intervention to end the war. ” The war might have ended for Bulgaria soon after 4 November/22 October.

But a change in Russian policy prevented this. The same evening of his return to Sofia Danev spoke with

Nekludov, who told him that Russia now was willing to concede the major Thracian city of Adrianople to

Bulgaria.** Until then Adrianople was considered to be in the Russian sphere of influence around the Straits. When

Danev had raised the issue of Adrianople at Livadia the previous spring he had been rebuffed.* * The next day with the prospect of this prize the Ministerial Council ceased the consideration of Great Power intervention.** Further confirmation of Russian acquiesence of a Bulgarian acquisition of Adrianople arrived in Sofia on 6

November/24 October. * a This Russian action was extremely popular in Bulgaria. Nekludov noted, "It is as if we have freed Bulgaria a second time."** About the same time the

Sofia government began to comprehend the extent of the

Lule Burgas victory.*3 Amidst the euphoria of the victories over the Turks and the Russian agreement to a

Great Bulgaria extending beyond the San Stefano boundaries intervention in the war by the Great Powers was unthinkable by the Bulgarians. Only Geshov retained doubts about continuing the war.** Bulgaria would force the defeated Turks to accept dictated terms. 131

After the Bulgarian victories all doubts about

Russian support evaporated. The concession of Adrianople demonstrated this. Furthermore the Russian people seemed genuinely excited by the Bulgarian successes. S. Bobchev, the Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg later wrote:

When news of the Bulgarian victories became known, Russian society assumed a proud front, as if they themselves had triumphed. The press adopted a lively tone, and the feeling toward Bulgaria and her allies increased. In the salons, even in high society there was no other topic of conversation, let alone among the Russian intellectual circles and the wide masses, who now also expressed their deep and sincere fraternal feelings. In every home I happened to visit, I discovered that the map of the Balkan Peninsula was on the table, and paper Bulgarian flags followed every step forward. Everywhere the Bulgarian ambassador was greeted with enthusiasm. 4 7

Even Tsar Nicholas expressed his approval for the

Bulgarian cause.4* Geshov's policy to circumvent the disapproval of the Russian foreign office by appeals to

Russian popular opinion appeared to be confirmed by the popular response to the Bulgarian victories.

But after the victories the Geshov government started to demonstrate a desire to transcend Russian patronage.

An important indication of Bulgaria's new attitude was

Danev's diplomatic mission to Austria-Hungary. Soon after the first major Bulgarian victory Danev, or someone associated with him, conceived of the idea of a diplomatic journey to the Dual Monarchy.4* The Nationalist members of the ruling coalition were reluctant to approve the 132 mission because of potential clashes with Russian and

Serbian interests.5* But Danev claimed to have Russian sanction for the mission.51 So on 4 November/22 October the Ministerial Council approved the mission.5 • This was the same evening the Ministerial Council learned of

Russian agreement for San Stefano Bulgaria.

The reasons for Danev's mission were vague. He stated that Austria-Hungary was the Great Power most directly concerned with events in the Balkans and therefore deserved consideration, and that Austria-

Hungary, as a member of the Triple Alliance, had influence in Turkey.53 He also thought that the Dual Monarchy could help with the problem of Romania.54 But he failed to formulate specific objectives.

Consequently when Danev did meet with the Austro-

Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold in Budapest on

9 November/27 October the resulting conversation had no definite result. Danev admitted that his mission was unofficial and that he lacked the authority to negotiate.35 He mainly sought Austrian support for

Bulgarian claims to Turkish territory. He emphasized

Bulgarian aspirations to Salonika and averred that

Bulgaria did not want to enter Constantinople.36 Danev upheld Serbian claims to an Adriatic port, at least in part because of concern for Bulgarian interests in the disputed zone in Macedonia.37 And he reiterated 133

Bulgaria's refusal to grant Romania territorial

compensation, although he hinted that Bulgaria might

reconsider this point if Austria pressed Turkey to make

peace on Bulgarian terms.8• Despite the cordial nature of

the talks Danev outlined no new policy nor did he receive

any indication of Austrian support for the questions he

had raised.

Later Danev enjoyed brief audiences with the Emperor

Franz Joseph and on 11 November/30 October with the heir

to the Habsburg throne, Francis Ferdinand. The meeting

with Francis Ferdinand resulted in a diplomatic imbroglio

afterwards when Danev stated that Francis Ferdinand did

not consider the Serbian acquisition of an Albanian port a

casus belli for Austria-Hungary.3* This was probably

wishful thinking on the part of the Bulgarian diplomat.

The Austrians quickly responded that Danev must have

misunderstood the Habsburg heir.‘* This flap further

muddled the outcome of Danev's meetings in Budapest.

Danev claimed that his mission to Budapest convinced

Austria-Hungary to acknowledge Bulgarian pretensions to

Salonika and prevented a Romanian attack on Bulgaria.61

Both of these assertions were extravagant. The Austrians

never fully supported Bulgarian claims to Salonika. And while Vienna opposed a Romanian attack on Bulgaria,

Danev's mission had little bearing on this opposition.4*

His mission was premature. He should have waited until 134

the position of Bulgaria was clarified by a complete

military victory over Turkey or at least until an

armistice had been signed. He succeeded only in creating

the impression that a rift existed among the Balkan allies

and that Bulgaria questioned the value of Russian

patronage.* 1 Any positive results were tarnished by the

Francis Ferdinand incident. And St. Petersburg could not

help but suspect the Bulgarian motives for the mission.

At best the mission had no benefit at all and only

indicated that Bulgaria, despite Geshov's Russophile

government, would attempt to vacillate between Russia and

Austria-Hungary.14 This was an favorable portent for

Geshov's Russophile government.

The Bulgarian victories also exacerbated relations

with the Greek allies. Not surprisingly the problem in

Greco-Bulgarian.relations concerned the division of the

spoils of the Ottoman Empire. Geshov had missed the

opportunity the previous summer to reach a territorial

agreement with Greece favorable to Bulgaria. During the

war even though they encountered little resistance the

Greek army had performed better than the Bulgarians had

anticipated. Because the Greeks were in possession of

much of the disputed territory after the fighting began

they were in a much stronger negotiating position. But

even before the Greek successes contact between Sofia and

Athens continued in an attempt to reach a territorial 135

settlement. Less than one week after the outbreak of the

war the Greeks raised the issue of annexation of occupied

territory.*9 A specific Greek proposal reached Sofia on

31/18 October.** The Greeks wanted Salonika, Kavala,

Bitola and Seres in the east and a common frontier with

Serbia at Lake Ohrid in the west.*7 This proposal

produced a strongly negative reaction in Sofia. "The

Greeks are intoxicated by their success," sniffed one

minister.*•

Geshov quickly rejected the Greek proposal. He

wrote, "Let Venizelos compare the size of our army and the

amount of our sacrifices with those of the Greeks, and he

will understand the outlandishness of the project and our

categoric refusal to accept it even as.the basis for

discussion. "** In a note to Athens a short time later

Geshov further refined this concept of proportionality as

the basis for the territorial settlement between Greece

and Bulgaria. Comparisons of the populations of the

conquered territories, the comparative losses of men and

material as well as the respective sizes of the Bulgarian

and Greek armies would define this concept of

proportionality.7* Crete and the Aegean islands would be

included on the Greek side of the ledger. This concept of

proportionality favored Bulgaria because of the great

military effort in Thrace and the large number of casualties suffered there. It was intended to insure that 136

Bulgaria would receive the San Stefano border in the south

and possibly also Salonika and the island of Thasos.71

Proportionality would form the basis of Bulgarian policy

toward Greece until the next spring. The implicit

arrogance of the Bulgarian position did little to achieve

a satisfactory settlement with Greece.

A more specific dispute with Greece focused on the

city of Salonika. The largest city in Macedonia and the major port for the entire Vardar valley, Salonika was an

important prize. The Greek army first entered the city on

8 November/26 October and obtained its surrender.7* Two days later a small Bulgarian force hurrying from the north also entered the city, over the protests of the Greeks.7 a

Although the Greeks had arrived first Geshov firmly pressed the Bulgarian claim. He told the Bulgarian minister in Athens, D. Mishev, "Entry into a city is not a title to rule that city."74 An uneasy condominium was established with units of both armies stationed in the city.

Neither side was satisfied with this arrangement.

Danev spoke of the need to employ force if the Greeks would not surrender their claim to Salonika.78 This city was a constant obstacle to settlement between Bulgaria and

Greece. The dispute over Salonika insured a rapprochement between Greece and Serbia, which would oppose Bulgaria. 7 ‘

Salonika was important for Bulgaria because of its size 137

and location and because its acquisition would compensate

for the loss of northern Macedonia and Skopie to Serbia.

For this reason Geshov and Danev tenaciously pressed

Bulgarian claims to the city.

The growing estrangement with Greece caused Bulgaria to rely more firmly on Serbia. The written agreement guaranteed by Russia made the Serbs in the Bulgarian view a dependable ally. Geshov regarded Pashich as pro-

Bulgarian in the dispute with Greece.77 Because of a desire to avoid further Greek occupation of Bulgarian desideratum in southern Macedonia Geshov asked the Serbs to advance into Bitola before the Greeks could occupy it.7* In return the Sofia government strongly supported the Serbian demand for an Adriatic port. Geshov averred that, "We stand together with Serbia, just as they stand with us in Bucharest and Athens."7* Geshov assured

Pashich that Bulgaria would support Serbia militarily on the Adriatic question.•• Although Danev's mission to

Budapest introduced an element of uncertainty into Serbo-

Bulgarian relations Geshov clearly intimated to Beograd that Serbia continued to enjoy Bulgarian support.* *

During the war Bulgaria continued to regard Serbia as a dependable ally.

Relations with Romania, however, worsened as the

Bulgarian army was smashing the Turks. Ironically had the

Bulgarian army failed relations with Romania would have 138 remained normal since the Bucharest government repeatedly had declared that only a breach of the status quo would result in a Romanian demand for compensation.•* Of course the Bulgarians had hoped for a change in the status quo even in defeat. But as soon as the extent of the

Bulgarian victories became clear and a change in the status quo became obvious Romania raised claims for compensation from Bulgaria. On 4 November/21 October

Geshov received a letter from the Romanian statesman Take

Ionescu which suggested territory north of a line from

Tutrakan to Balchik in northeastern Bulgaria would compensate the Romanians well.*3 This caused great indignation in the Bulgarian Ministerial Council.*4

Geshov immediately sought Russian support against the

Romanian claims. He told Sazonov that Bulgaria could not cede territory to Romania but would guarantee Romanian

Dobrudzha.,s Geshov stressed that he relied on Russian support. The Sofia government submitted a detailed memorandum to Sazonov which explained the Dobrudzha guarantee and offered an accord with Romania on cultural and economic questions as well as the cession to Romania of two small pieces of Bulgarian territory in the northeast.*4 At the same time Geshov attempted to pressure Russia by threatening to raise latent Bulgarian claims to the Romanian portion of Dobrudzha.*7 Publicly

Geshov stressed a correct attitude toward Romania. He 139

told an Auetrian correspondent, "Romania is the only state

Con the Bulgarian frontiers] we have never fought. It would be an outrageous crime if now in the twentieth century we would fight with her. And I can assure you that the odium of such a crime will not fall on us.

With the Bulgarian army totally engaged in fighting the

Turks, Geshov wanted no armed conflict with Romania.

The Sofia government took one other action designed to placate Russia. This visit had been contemplated earlier in connection with Danev's mission to Austria-

Hungary, but never acted upon.** On 14/1 November with the apparent approval of Nekludov the Ministerial Council decided to send Danev to Bucharest.9* The Bulgarian minister in Bucharest, Kalinkov, opposed this visit because he feared it might excite Romanian hope for compensation. 9 1 Sazonov, however, urged the Bulgarians to talk with Bucharest and intimated that the Romanians might be satisfied with a small concession of territory and the demilitarization of Silistra, a strategic Bulgarian town on the Danube.9* Therefore on 22/9 November Geshov informed Kalinkov that Danev would come to Bucharest.93

This Bulgarian policy was intended to placate Russia without acceding to the Romanian demands. Geshov depended on Russia to protect Bulgaria's virtually undefended northern border against a Romanian attack. Sazonov's advice therefore could not be ignored completely. But 140

Geshov did not want to relinquish any territory. By offering an agreement without significant territorial concessions the Bulgarians sought to gain.time until the war with Turkey was concluded and Bulgaria would be in a more favorable position to deal with the Romanian pretensions.

Even before the decision to Bend Danev to Bucharest had been made however, events on the Thracian battlefield were developing which would have a profound impact on

Bulgarian policy. After its victory at Lule Burgas the

Bulgarian army had continued to advance slowly in the direction of Constantinople, hampered more by its logistical and physical exhaustion than by Turkish resistance. Only the outdated fortifications at Chataldja remained to impede the march of the Bulgarian army to the

Bosphorus. The Sofia government's position on an entry into Constantinople was equivocal. Geshov asserted that he did not want Bulgarian troops to enter the ancient imperial city.94 Danev claimed to oppose an entrance. 93

The majority of the Ministerial Council also opposed taking Constantinople.94 But Geshov and the Ministerial

Council greatly desired a definitive peace with Turkey.97

An occupation of Constantinople probably would assure such a peace.99 Danev himself thought that military necessity might force Bulgaria to take the city.99 He even had formulated an ill-considered scheme to occupy 141

Constantinople and present it at a later date to Russia as a gift.••• Furthermore Ferdinand had made no secret of his desire to stage a lavish entrance into the Turkish capital. * • * As the Bulgarian troops neared the Chataldja fortifications the question of Constantinople loomed large in Bulgarian policy, without a definite resolution apparent.

The equivocation of the Bulgarian government was exacerbated by the position of St. Petersburg. As early as 1909 Russia had indicated that Constantinople and its environs were a forbidden zone for Bulgarian aspirations.1•' The Russians sent another reminder to this effect to Sofia immediately before the outbreak of the war.'•1 But this forbidden zone shrank with the triumphal advance of the Bulgarian army. When Sazonov conceded the San Stefano borders he warned the Bulgarians,

"in no case go to Constantinople because you will complicate many matters."1"4 Two days later, however, he informed Sofia that Bulgaria could have Adrianople.1 *3

And by 13 November/31 October Sazonov reluctantly had agreed to a temporary Bulgarian occupation of

Constantinople.1•6 To make matters worse when Bulgarian troops did reach Chataldja a Russian politician urged them to erect the cross on Hagia Sophia.1*7 At the same time

Bobchev reported from St. Petersburg that, "public feeling for the Bulgarians is at its zenith. The Russians 142

Impatiently await the victory at Chataldja and the entry

into Constantinople."1•• Under these circumstances of

apparent Russian ambiguity, the temptation to take the fabled city was understandable.

Furthermore the Great Powers appeared to condone the

Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople. The French minister in Sofia wrote , "It will be almost impossible for the Bulgarian government, in spite of contrary counsel from Russia, to avoid having its army enter

Constantinople.Nor did the Germans and Austrians oppose a Bulgarian occupation of the city.‘1• The Geshov government had the option to enter the city if its troops succeeded in breaching the Chataldja fortifications.

This option involved many uncertainties and dangers however. Foremost among these was the alienation of

Bulgaria's Russian patron. The fickle Sazonov could easily reverse his reluctant acquiesence to a Bulgarian entry into Constantinople and might leave Bulgaria to extract itself from the problems which would inevitably ensue from this occupation, as well as from the problems with Greece and Romania. With Bulgarian troops arriving at Chataldja a request from the Turkish Grand Vizier for an armistice offered Geshov a way out of this dilemma.

The Turks initially had approached the Great Powers on 4

November/23 October and had tried again on 5 November/24

October and on B November/27 October before finally 143

addressing the Balkan allies through the Russian minister

in Constantinople. 1 * ' On 12 November/30 October Ferdinand

at Bulgarian army headquarters received the formal Turkish

request for an armistice.‘*• At this point Geshov and the

Ministerial Council were not inclined to enter the

city.111

Ferdinand had other ideas. When he transmitted the

Turkish note to Sofia two days later he forbad the

government to inform the allies:

Disagreeably surprised and deeply grieved by the action of the Grand Vizier, I, as a Bulgarian, as the supreme commander of these victorious and fearless armies which are now under the walls of Constantinople, and in the name of the honor of our country, am obligated to forbid you to communicate this demand of the Grand Vizier to our allies until I have obtained the opinions of my assistants, of the commanders of the three armies and of the five men who are responsible for the issue of the war.11 *

Ferdinand wanted to consider the military feasibility of an attack on Constantinople.

The Tsar's order disoriented the government. Geshov had received the Turkish request gladly and had hoped that it would lead to immediate negotiations.* * 3 The day before receiving the Tsar's order forbidding transmission of the armistice request to the allies the Ministerial

Council had prepared a telegram informing the allies of the request and another containing conditions for the armistice.*‘‘ These conditions included a demand that the

Turks retire from Chataldja. When Ferdinand's order 144 arrived the Ministerial Council understood that the Tsar intended to take Constantinople and among themselves objected that this was a political, and not a military question, and therefore was the government's prerogative.117 But the government did not act to assert its authority. Geshov was strangely inactive and claimed to have too much work to personally confront the tsar on this matter.1 1 • Had he seriously opposed the attack he should have acted at this point. He should have insisted that the peace process begin immediately. This way he might have thwarted further military activity. By his failure to act Geshov attempted to avoid responsibility.

This failure insured that the minister president would lose authority no matter what the outcome of the attack.

On 15/2 November, the day after his initial order,

Ferdinand authorized contacts with the allies regarding the armistice request.*‘• Meanwhile he ordered the army to prepare an attack on the Chataldja fortifications.1••

Initially the army high command was skeptical of an assault on the Turkish positions.1 * 1 Cholera had erupted in the army and some units were not yet in a position for the attack.**“ After a tour of the front however General

Savov concluded that an attack was feasible. ‘* 1 Despite its opposition to the attack the government made no attempt to contact the high command.184 Geshov later stated that he lacked the constitutional authority to stop the attack unilaterally and concluded that the army would

not have obeyed his order to halt anyway.188 But he also

conceded that the army acted in the expectation that the

attack would create more favorable conditions for

peace.186 Had the Bulgarians taken Constantinople undoubtedly they would have been in a strong position to dictate peace. On the other hand Geshov at the time had strong indications that Russia had decided to oppose the attack.187 Since the beginning of the war Geshov had distanced himself from military affairs. The

Parliamentary Investigative Commission, conducting an investigation into the Bulgarian disaster of 1913, noted,

"the high command was not viewed by the government as its organ, but as an autonomous institution with complete freedom to make technical decisions."188 Even at the time of the attack had Geshov acted energetically especially given the initial uncertainty in the high command, the attack might have been avoided.188 The conflicting conditions rendered the government inert. At least Geshov should have indicated officially his opposition to the attack if he really did oppose it.

But Geshov took no action at all. In this way he hoped to benefit from a victory but avoid the consequences of a defeat or a Russian rebuff. His intentional failure to either order the ariny to attack or to forbid it, in this critical situation forfeited the government's control 146

over the course of the war and allowed Ferdinand and the

high command to determine both the military and diplomatic

direction of the war. In seeking to avoid responsibility

Geshov lost responsibility.

The attack at Chataldja began on 17/4 November.

Despite heavy losses the Bulgarians failed to maintain a

sustained presence in the Turkish positions. The next day

the Bulgarians ended the attack and settled into defensive

positions in front of the Turkish lines.133 For the

moment the war was over.

While Bulgarian soldiers were fighting and dying at

Chataldja the government in Sofia concerned itself with

armistice terms. On 17/4 November the Ministerial Council determined a Turco-Bulgarian frontier in Thrace between

Saras Bay and the mouth of the Maritsa River.* 3 * This was sent to Ferdinand for approval the same day, during the height of the battle.‘33 The next day Ferdinand, now aware of the failure of the attack, approved the government's conditions for an armistice and urged the acceptance of a Turkish proposal for a meeting between representatives of the Turkish and Bulgarian armies.133

This was a complete reversal of Ferdinand's position. The costly failure of the attack had unnerved the Tsar.134

This change in Ferdinand in turn disconcerted Geshov.133

Despite the lack of information from the front in Sofia he must have realized that something was wrong. This was the 147

first indication that the attack had failed and that the

position of the army was perilous.

Two days later, on 19/6 November, Ferdinand suggested

that "in order to spare the honor of Turkey" conditions

for the armistice might undergo an amelioration, with both sides withdrawing from Chataldja leaving a neutral xone between the armies,1,4 The next day Ferdinand admitted to

Geshov that the army could not fight the for the next ten to fifteen days and urged that peace negotiations begin immediately.1a7 Meanwhile Danev had returned to army headquarters. There he failed to comprehend the true situation in the sick, exhausted and depleted army and advocated forcing Chataldja if the Turks did not accept the armistice conditions.11' Even then the government had not understood the magnitude of the army's defeat at

Chataldja and the implications of this defeat for

Bulgarian policy.

Finally on 25/11 November negotiations began at

Chataldja between Bulgarian and Turkish representatives.

By this time the true situation had become clear to the government in Sofia. The army had been defeated. The

Ministerial Council grumbled against the Tsar but took no action to assert its authority. 1 1 ’ The Chataldja defeat as well as sickness exhaustion had rendered the Bulgarian army unable to continue. The favorable moment for a decisive peace had passed. 148

The impressive early successes of Bulgarian arms

surprised the government and undermined its ability to

maintain its hitherto unchallenged control of the

political situation. Geshov displayed a marked

disinclination to interfere with the activity of the high

command, especially as the victories exceeded the

expectations of the government. This was a fatal error

because the government, increasingly isolated by military

censorship, lost its ability to direct policy. At

Chataldja, with Bulgarian troops poised to eject the Turks

from Europe, Ferdinand interceded to add an additional

complication to Bulgarian policy. Because of its own

wavering over the question of Constantinople the

government in Sofia failed to comment on this question and

never completely regained the authority to direct policy.

At the same time the government was losing control of the domestic situation the foreign political situation was falling apart. Relations with the Greek ally had developed into an open dispute. Romania sought Bulgarian territory and posed a major threat to the Bulgarian rear.

And most ominous of all Bulgaria had disconcerted its

Russian patron with the Budapest mission and the Chataldja attack. The circumstance that Russia's own indecisive policy had contributed to the Bulgarian actions made little difference. After the fighting was over at

Chataldja Ferdinand and the high command were quick to 149 thrust responsibility for policy back at the government.

The government would conduct the armistice negotiations.

Six years later a similar scenario would be enacted between Spa and Berlin after the defeat of the German army. 150

FOOTNOTES

1. Aleksandur Griginov, Narodnata katastrofa. Volnlte 1912-1913 g.. (Sofia, 1926) 40.

2. Velev, 445-47; Bell, 104-05; Rothechild, 59.

3. Aleksandur Ganchev, Voinite prez tretoto Bulqarsko tearstvo (Sofia, n. d. ) II 87.

4. See above, 83-85.

5. Interview reprinted in Mir no. 3671, 2 October 1912. Alexander II ia remembered in Ruaaia aa the tear who liberated the serfs, and in Bulgaria as the tsar who liberated Bulgaria from the Turks. Geshov's mention of human rights has a contemporary ring.

6. Bobchev, Stranitsi 14.

7. RD 3rd ser. IV i 6.

8. BAN 51-1-17-66. The Bulgarians had requested substantial amounts of overcoats and boots from the Russians in March 1912 around the same time the Serbo- Bulgarian convention was signed. See MO 2nd ser. 19 ii 599, 674.

9. See for example Boris P. Kuyumdziev, Diplomaticheska i materialna podkrepa ot Rusiya na Btflqariya po vreme na Balkanskata voina (Sofia, 1968).

10. DPIK I 231-32 no. 19; RD 3rd ser. IV i 2. Nekuldov had raised this issue earlier in September. See MO 2nd ser. 20 ii 627, 719, 828.

11. DPIK I 232 no. 20.

12. Trotsky, 261.

13. DPIK I 235 no. 30.

14. Ibid. 235 no. 31. 236 no. 33; Bobchev. Stranitsi 21.

15. Helmriech, Balkan Wars 112 n. 39.

16. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 23.

17. Ibid. (Geshov) 142-43; Toshev, 114. 151

18. DPIK I 234 no. 29; BAN 51-1-17-77; Prilozhenie I (Savov) 252-53, II (Savov) 288; Fichev, 125.

19. DPIK I 237 no. 36; Bobchev, Stranitsi 22-23.

20. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 253. At the same time Ferdinand called Danev "a dangerous peace lover." Fichev, 125.

21. BAN 51-1-17-76.

22. See Veleva, 89.

23. DPIK 237 no. 39

24. BAN 51-1-17-80.

25. Ibid. 83.

26. Ibid. 80.

27. Trotsky, 169-70.

28. Ibid. 171-73; Rene Paux, De Sofia a. Tchataldla (Paris, 1913) 74-81; Ivan Shipchanov, Vestiteli na voina slava (Sofia, 1983) 24-34.

29. M. P. Noel-Buxton, With the Bulgarian Staff (New York, 1913) 5.

30. Shipchanov, 31; Trotsky, 172.

31. For the military details see Voinata II 306-340; Oberstleutnant Friedrich Immanual, Per Balkankrieg (Berlin, 1913,14) II and III 21-30; Kiril Kosev, Podvigut (Sofia, 1983) 47-67.

32. Voinata III 167-527; Immanuel, II and III 30-42.

33. BAN 51-1-17-88.

34. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 103. See also Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 142-43.

35. DPIK I 238-39 no. 42.

36. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 29.

37. BAN 51-1-17-94.

38. DPIK I 662 no. 16. 152

39. BAN 51-1-17-94.

40. Ibid. 95.

41. See above, 83-86. -

42. BAN 51-1-17-97.

43. DPIK I 240-41 no. 49; 663 no. 21.

44. RD 3rd ser. IV i 204 n. 1 pg 214.

45. BAN 51-1-17-98.

46. See O-UA IV 4182.

47. Bobchev, Stranitsi 102.

48. Georoe Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories (Boston, 1923) 123.

49. Stoyan Danev, "Aktsiyata mi v Peshta," Rodina I 3 (1940) 65. Teodorov claimed that the then Minister of Commerce and Agriculture Dimitur Hristov, a member of Danev'e Progressive Liberal Party, originated this idea. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 198.

50. BAN 51-1-17-88-90; Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 198.

51. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 29, 38. See also TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 727, 24.

52. BAN 51-1-17-94; DPIK 240 no. 47. The Bulgarian minister to Austria-Hungary, Salabashev, was not informed of the mission. Salabashev, 409.

53. Danev, "Aktsiyata mi, " 66-7.

54. RD 3rd ser. IV i 207.

55. Danev, "Aktsiyata mi, " 68.

56. Ibid. O-UA IV 4362, 4378.

57. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 81.

58. O-UA IV 4368.

59. DPIK 241 no. 51; BD IX ii 240; Danev, "Aktsiyata mi," 48; Toshev, II 58.

60. O-UA IV 4460. See also Hantsch, I 346-47. 153

61. Danev, "Aktsiyata mi," 79.

62. See Bridge, 353-57; Helmreich, Balkan Wars 269-70.

63. GP XXXIII 12357; O-UA IV 4328; Hantsch, I 344; Trotsky, 220.

64. Edward Ritter von Steinitz, "Berchtolds Politik waehrend des ersten Balkankrieges, Ber1iner Monatshefte IX (1931) 238.

65. DPIK I 560 no. 2.

66. Ibid. 560 no. 3.

67. Ibid. 560-61 no. 4, 561 no. 5.

68. BAN 51-1-17-97. The obvious irony was missed.

69. DPIK I 562 no. 7.

70. Ibid. 564 no. 10; Geshov, Balkan League 67-68.

71. BAN 51-1-17-98.

72. D. J. Cassavetti, Hellas and the Balkan Wars (London, 1914) 104-07.

73. The commander of the Bulgarian force telegraphed Ferdinand, "From today Salonika is under the scepter of Your Majesty." Fichev, 231.

74. DPIK I 565 no. 12.

75. Toshev, II 58.

76. Georgi Markov, "Bulgariya i neinite suyunitsi prez Balkanskata voina (1912-1913)" 1storicheski Pregled I (1983) 33.

77. BAN 51-1-17-98.

78. Toshev, II 47; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 41. Danev later stated, "We had faith in the Serbs and thought that an occupation of Bitola by the Greeks was a danger."

79. DPIK I 392 no. 2, 392-93 no. 3; BD IX ii 187.

80. SD I 210. See also Rossos, 97. 154

81. On the effect of Danev'e mission see RD 3rd ser. IV i 208 n. 2 pg 218.

82. RD 3rd ser. IV ii 8.

83. BAN 51-1-17-92; Kalinkov, 116; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 62.

84. BAN 51-1-17-92, 94; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 62. Geshov wrote, "Needless to say, after our glorious victories, the others tin the government! did not want to hear of any cession of land. "

85. DPIK I 663 no. 18. When he confirmed the San Stefano borders Sazonov had urged the Bulgarians to seek an arrangement with Romania.

86. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 727, 19. See also RD 3rd ser IV ii 233. Nekludov reported a slightly different version of this Bulgarian proposal. See RD 3rd ser. IV ii 191.

87. RD 3rd ser. IV i 233 n. 2 pg. 239.

88. Mir no. 3697, 29 October 1912.

89. BAN 51-1-17-98.

90. DPIK I 666 no. 28.

91. DPIK I 669 no. 33; Kalinkov, 125; Rossos, 140-41.

92. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 755, 2.

93. Kalinkov, 125-26.

94. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 36; DDF 3rd ser. IV 495; BD IX ii 109; Salabashev, 406.

95. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 201 n. 35. See also RD 3rd ser. IV i 253.

96. BAN 51-1-17-107; O-UA IV 4506; Bobchev, Stranitsi 156.

97. BAN 51-1-17-97; O-UA IV 4314.

98. See Todorov, I 173; Griginov, Narodnata katastrofa 49-50.

99. O-UA IV 4378; BD IX ii 192. 155

100. Toshev, II 48. Some Bulgarians contemplated Russian military support for taking Constantinople. Trotsky, 156.

101. See Hans Roger Madol, Ferdinand von Bulqarien. Per Truawi von Byzanz (Berlin, 1931) 140-48; Stephen Constant, Foxy Ferdinand Tsar of Bulgaria (New York, 259-63; Nekludov, 116-20; RD 3rd ser. IV ii 253. Geshov feared that Ferdinand wanted to better King George of Greece's entrance into Salonika with an entrance into Constantinople.

102. Nekludov, 122.

103. Fichev, 86.

104. DPIK 662 no. 16. See also BD IX ii 119

105. DPIK I 240-41 no. 49; 663 no. 21. See above pg.

106. DDF 3rd ser. IV 384, 411; BD IX ii 195.

107. RD 3rd ser. IV i 86 n. 1 pg. 92.

108. DPIK I 242 no. 54.

109. DDF 3rd ser. IV 429.

110. O-UA IV 4282; GP XXXIII 12297, 12320.

111. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 199-200; Ganchev, II 176.

112. DPIK 261-62 no. 3; RD 3rd ser. IV i 231.

113. BAN 51-1-17-108.

114. Ganchev, II 177; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 32-33. See also BAN 51-1-17-108; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 143.

115. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 143.

116. BAN 51-1-17-108.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid. 109.

119. DPIK I 262 no.5, 263 no. 7; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 33.

120. Ganchev, II 144.

121. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 273; Fichev, 200. 156

122. DPIK I 241 no. 52.

123. Fichev, 200-01; Radko Dimitriev, 317-1Q. When Savov pressed Radko Dimitriev for a decision the Third Army commander responded, "One thousand years after Krum and Simeon came to Constantinople history still cannot forgive them for failing to attack and take it. Doubtless they would not forgive us. But you see the situation. You decide."

124. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 273-74. Savov knew that the Turks had requested an armistice.

125. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 36. In both of these assertions Geshov is probably correct.

126. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 143. See also Ibid. (Savov) 275. Savov claimed that he acted at Chataldja as, "the instrument of the government." Prilozhenie kum tom drugi ot doklada na parlamentarnata izpitatelna komisiya (Sofia, 1918) hereafter referred to as Prilozhenie II (Savov) 58.

127. Toshev, II 47; BD IX ii 192.

128. DPIK I 1180. See also Veleva, 86.

129. Todorov, I 205.

130. Both Fichev and Savov attributed the failure of the attack to the lack of modern tactical knowledge in the Bulgarian officer corps. Fichev, 221; Prilozhenie I (Savov) 274. Other observers blamed cholera (Lt. Colonel Reginald Rankin, The Inner History of the Balkan Wars (New York, 1914 313) and the effective firepower from Turkish naval vessels operating in the Sea of Marmara. Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, With the Turks in Thrace (New York, 1913) 271-72.

131. BAN 51-1-17-112; Stoyan Danev, "Primirieto v Chataldja na 20 Noemvri 1912 g. , " Rodina III 1 (1939) 94. This border was similar to one mentioned by Danev at Budapest. See O-UA IV 4363.

132. DPIK I 264 no. 11; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 33.

133. DPIK I 226 nos 13, 14. See also DDF 3rd ser. IV 493.

134. Fichev, 204.

135. BAN 51-1-17-114. 157

136. DPIK I 266-67 no. 15.

137. DPIK I 268 no. 20; Danev, "Chataldja," 95-96. Ferdinand wrote, "The main thing is that the peace negotiations start no matter how."

138. DPIK I 670 no. 37, 671 no. 39. Danev said regarding the defeat at Chataldja, "By itself this failure does not matter." Here he was right.

139. BAN 51-1-17-177. CHAPTER V

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

On the eve of the armistice negotiations at Chataldja the mood in Sofia was buoyant. Bulgaria was about to conclude its brief and glorious war. Insulated from the real conditions at the front by the strict military censorship, the capital basked in the apparent victory.

Two days before the talks began the semi-official paper

Mir boasted:

We accepted negotiations only so that we would not be accused of incorrect conduct toward the Great Powers and so that we would not involve any of them in the war. But if we, against our will, find that we must enter Constantinople, let no one doubt, that the conditions of the present situation will be greatly altered and we shall not be content with our current demands. We are not greedy, but we shall not be denied just compensation after we have made new sacrifices.'

The Bulgarian army, however, was in no condition to attempt another attack. Significant Turkish forces faced the Bulgarians at Chataldja and at Gallipoli. In the

Bulgarian rear, astride the major supply and communication lines between Bulgaria and the Chataldja front, the

Turkish garrison at Adrianople was surrounded but remained intact. And the Bulgarian army was plagued by cholera,

158 159

benumbed by exhaustion and starved by a dearth of adequate

supplies.

The army commanders, unlike the population of Sofia, understood the difficulties of the Bulgarian position.

Both Savov and Fichev were very discouraged and wanted peace at any price.• Also Radko Dimitriev, whose Third

Army had suffered heavy casualties in the Chataldja attack, urged a rapid conclusion of peace with the Turks.J

And Ferdinand was dispirited.4 Danev, who along with

Savov and Fichev comprised the Bulgarian delegation at the

Chataldja armistice talks, understood that his country was in a difficult position. s With the demoralization of the high command Bulgarian hopes at the armistice talks depended upon Danev.6

When the armistice negotiations began on 25/12

November the Bulgarians represented Serbia and Montenegro as well as their own country. Greece, however, sent a separate delegation. Prior to the armistice talks the

Greeks had attempted to force the Macedonian boundary issue and had proposed an 'ethnic' frontier.7 But Geshov, reiterating his policy of proportionality, refused to deal with Athens, "because it is impossible to foresee, what our frontier in the east will be, which islands the Greeks will take, what our final losses will be and so forth" and asserted with some justification that, "without our sacrifices the Greeks would not have been able to have 160

Crete and the islands."• And on 3 December/20 November

the Ministerial Council declined to respond to the Greek

proposal.* Despite the difficulties of the Bulgarian army

Geshov refused to consider any amelioration of his policy

towards Greece. Proportionality remained the basis of

this policy. Faced with Bulgarian intransigence, the

Greeks preferred to manage their own affairs.

The armistice negotiations were concluded after only

five sessions. Initially the Bulgarians hoped to obtain

the surrender of the Adrianople garrison and a mutual

withdrawal from the Chataldja positions.*• These

expectations were not consistent with the Bulgarian

military situation. The Turks refused to consider either

condition. Danev quickly adopted a less stringent program

which allowed the Turks to remain in Adrianople and left

both armies in place.‘' Before the next meeting with the

Turks, Ferdinand, who had recovered his strength but not

his senses, urged an assault on Adrianople. The high

command refused to consider any activity.1 * The army was

in no condition to fight. Danev then proposed to the

Turks that the armies remain in place and that the

Bulgarian forces gain access to the rail line which passed

under the guns of the Adrianople fortresses.‘3 This

proposal received a positive Turkish response. Agreement

to these conditions ensured that the sick, tired and hungry troops at Chataldja could receive supplies by rail 161

directly from Bulgaria.14 Essentially the negotiations

were over.

But Greece caused some difficulties. The Athens

government attempted to link the armistice to a settlement

of the future Greco-Bulgarian frontier. ‘ 3 The Greeks did

not share the Bulgarians' desperation to end the war and

even proposed forcing the Dardanelles and Chataldja and

dictating the peace in Constantinople.* * The exhausted

Bulgarians could not consider this proposal serious iy • ‘ 7

Geshov indicated a willingness to submit the Greco-

Bulgarian boundary question to the Entente powers for

arbitration. 1 • But nothing further materialized in this

direction. At the same time the Bulgarian delegation at

Chataldja met separately with the Turks for friendly discussions and gestured toward a separate arrangement.* *

This was intended to pressure Athens.

The armistice was signed on 3 December/20 November one week after the negotiations began. Greece did not sign and Greek forces continued to beseige the fortress of

Janina. But Serbia and Montenegro did endorse the armistice. Overall the terms were favorable for Bulgaria.

In addition to the use of the Sofia-Chataldja rail line the Bulgarians secured access to the Black Sea for their supply ships. Thus they could supply their troops at

Chataldja by sea from the ports of Burgas and Varna.8*

Also the besieged fortress of Adrianople could not be 162

resupplied. The Bulgarians hoped it would surrender

soon.* 1 The formal peace talks would convene in London on

13 December/30 November. Geshov had wanted the talks to

meet in Sofia.*• But Greek and Turkish opposition caused

him to agree to London. The Bulgarians reasoned that

since the Turkish Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha was an

Anglophile the British might exercise a useful influence

on him.* * The Russophile Geshov government identified its

interests with those of the Entente powers.

The Chataldja armistice negotiations were the acme of

Danev's diplomatic endeavors. His bluffing and boasting

were well suited to dealing with the Turks. His shrewd

efforts ensured that the weak and ailing Bulgarian army

would continue to hold its favorable strategic position at

Chataldja and around Adrianople, and actually improved the

Bulgarian logistical and communication situation. At the

same time he persuaded the Turks that the Bulgarians were

still prepared to act. This way he secured better terms

for Bulgaria than the government or the high command had

expected.

After signing the armistice Danev hurried to Sofia.

He remained there only one day to receive instructions for the pending Bucharest and London meetings. Geshov did not want to go to London himself because, he claimed, the other Balkan leaders were not going.** This was a mistake. At London he might have met with Venizelos, who 163

did attend the conference.•s Also at London Geshov could

have asserted a decisive control over Bulgarian policy.

His familiarity with London and with the English language

and his predilection for the Entente powers would have

been definite assets for the Bulgarian cause at the peace

talks. Instead he left the critical position to Danev.*6

Geshov lacked the taste for diplomatic wrangling.*7 He

also lacked the confidence to advocate the Bulgarian cause

in London.

Danev arrived in Sofia on 7 December/24 November and departed the next day for Bucharest. The Sofia government had arranged this visit in middle/early November to accommodate Russia.** Since then St. Petersburg had given further indications that the visit was desirable.** But the armistice had forced a postponement of the visit. The

Geshov government refused to consider any territorial concessions to Romania, but was willing to meet cultural and economic demands for those Romanians living in the newly occupied territories.3• The government completely ignored Ferdinand's professed willingness to cede the important town of Silistra to Romania.3 * Danev went to

Bucharest without the authority to negotiate, and was instructed only to "understand" the Romanian position.3*

This was small basis for reducing tensions with Romania and demonstrates that the Bulgarians were acting only under duress. 164

In Bucharest Danev met with the Romanian leaders

Majorescu and Ionescu as well as other politicians and

King Carol. He stated the Bulgarian position on

concessions to Romania and suggested that Romano-Bulgarian

talks begin in London concurrently with the peace talks.12

The initial impression of his visit was favorable.14 And

he himself entertained a positive perspective.13 Danev

indicated to the Romanians that a settlement of the

dispute was possible.16 But the Bucharest government

chose to believe that Danev had agreed to the idea of a

border rectification.17 Danev strongly denied this.16

The point remained moot. Other than the agreement to talk

further in London, the Bucharest meeting was without

important result.19 But this did not concern the Sofia government. As long as talks continued with Bucharest

Russia would be satisfied and Bulgaria would remain in control of all its territory.

After spending only one day in Bucharest Danev embarked on an exhaustive grand tour of Great Power capitals, stopping in Vienna, Berlin and Paris before finally arriving in London. In Vienna he reiterated

Bulgarian support for Serbia in the question of a Serbian outlet on the Adriatic and in both Vienna and Berlin emphasized the importance of Salonika for Bulgaria.4 6 He also reported his impressions of the Bucharest talks.

Danev received a positive impression of his Berlin 165

sojourn.4 * The German Foreign Minster A. Kinderlin-

Waechter's Bulgarophile tendencies were apparent in this

meeting.41 In Paris Danev discussed similar matters and

stressed that Bulgaria had no understandings with any

Triple Alliance power.41 This was intended to assure the

French that Bulgaria had made no agreements with Austria

as in 1908, when Bulgaria declared independence

concurrently with Austria's annexation of Bosnia-

Hercegovina. Danev felt that his visits to the Great

Power capitals were successful and that real sympathy for

Bulgaria existed in Berlin and Paris.44 He hoped that

this sympathy would further Bulgarian aims in London.

Danev finally arrived in London on 14/1 December.

Almost immediately difficulties with Sofia over the issue

of the future Turco-Bulgarian frontier. Danev balked at

new instructions to claim the town of Rodosto on the Sea

of Marmara, and warned Sofia that if Bulgaria possessed

such inordinate pretensions the army must prepare to

continue the war.43 The government considered Rodosto as

a bargaining chip for strengthening the Bulgarian claim to

Adrianople.44 But some ministers, as well as Ferdinand

and military circles, wanted to acquire Rodosto as an outlet on the Sea of Marmara.4 7 This claim to Rodosto, whether from speculative or acquisitive motives, was a mistake. When Danev did present the demand for Rodosto to the Turks as part of the overall allied peace plan the 166

Great Powers were unfavorably impressed.*• The Bulgarians

appeared greedy and grasping.

Despite the flap over Rodosto the Bulgarian

delegation wanted a rapid and moderate peace settlement.

The army needed time to recuperate.** The main Bulgarian

objectives were the resolution of the Thracian frontier

and the possession of Adrianople.3• Shortly before the

opening of the conference Geshov assured the National

Subranie, "The government, which appreciates your

confidence, will do everything possible to conclude a

peace and a lasting settlement with all of its

neighbors."3‘ Unfortunately these two objectives were

mutually exclusive.

Bulgarian interests however soon were lost in the

Great Power bickering over Albanian frontiers.3* At first

delay caused no great alarm as it allowed the army time to

rest. But after a week Savov informed the government in

Sofia that the Turks were using the delay to reinforce

their army.3 * At this point the government considered

terminating its participation in the London conference.3*

And from London Danev urged that the negotiations cease.33

He thought that the Great Powers would intervene to

prevent the collapse of the conference and would pressure

the Turks to accept the allied demands. The government agreed with Danev. After receiving assurances from Savov that the army would be ready in four or five days Geshov 167 communicated this information to Danev and told him, "in this case we have no reason to fear the eventual rupture of the negotiations, but we must notify the Turks, the

Great Powers and especially Russia that after a new war we shall not be satisfied with the Adrianople line anymore."3* But the army was still in no condition to continue the war. The Bulgarian threat was a bluff.37

Geshov and his government, however, did not seem to have realized that the actual condition of the army precluded any real support for this threat. Danev had a more realistic appraisal of the situation.

Despite Savov's assurances to the contrary the army remained in a difficult position and the high command knew it. This situation compelled the high command to take desperate action. On 14/1 December the Bulgarian military attache in St. Petersburg, "in the name of his government" requested heavy artillery and ammunition and also two battleships and two cruisers or torpedo boats.3* This request clearly indicated that the Bulgarians intended a renewed attempt upon the Chataldja lines. Naturally the

Russians refused this ambitious request.3* The Sofia government disclaimed any connection with the action of the attache.** But this incident demonstrated that the

Bulgarian high command still maintained pretensions towards interfering in policy, and did nothing to allay 160

Russian suspicions about Bulgarian designs on

Constantinople.

Soon afterwards the Sofia government was seriously embarrassed by another attempt by the military to interfere in policy. Back on 26/13 November, the first day of the armistice negotiations at Chataldja, Danev, instigated by the high command, had suggested to Sofia that Konstantin Kalchev go to Constantinople to negotiate.4 * Kalchev, a Bulgarian banker, was a personal friend of the Turkish Foreign Minister Kiamil Pasha.

Geshov rejected this idea.48 However, he agreed that

Teodorov could come to military headquarters to discuss the matter further.4 * Teodorov likewise refused to sanction the mission.4* At the same time the high command proposed to send one Tenyu Nachev on an unofficial mission to bribe the Turkish commander of Adrianople to surrender.49 The Ministerial Council did not oppose this proposal. They considered it to be a purely military affair.44 The Nachev mission was concerned only with the surrender of a military objective. He contacted only the garrison commander. But Nachev was unsuccessful.47 The government then considered the matter of unofficial contacts with the Turks closed.

Despite Geshov's prohibition, however, the high command decided to send Kalchev to Constantinople. He received unrestricted authority from the high command to 169

persuade the Turks to surrender.6• In the Turkish capital

he met several times with Kiamil Pasha.6* But on 25/12

December Geshov learned from the British minister in

Sofia, H. Bax-Ironside, of Kalchev'e presence in

Constantinople.7* This placed the Bulgarian government in

a difficult position, because Kalchev's appearance in

Constantinople appeared to be an move to circumvent the

London peace process, and an attempt at separation from

the allies.7 *

Upon learning that Kalchev was in Constantinople

Geshov immediately disavowed the mission.7* Genuinely

angry, he submitted his resignation and considered the

resignation of the entire cabinet.7* While Geshov

undoubtedly desired the surrender of Adrianople the action

by the high command undermined the credibility of the

government. Geshov responded to this provocation in the

manner he should have adopted when Ferdinand decided to

attack Chataldja the previous month. Geshov's resignation

could have demonstrated the authority of the government.

Kalchev's mission was an effort by the high command

to hasten the end of the war. They considered this as a military mission since it concerned the surrender of

Adrianople.7 * But it was also an attempt to regain some of the initiative lost after the failure of the Chataldja attack.73 And the Kalchev mission was one of desperation.

The high command still regarded the situation of the army 170 as critical and did not think that the London peace proceedings would alleviate this situation fast enough.

The army acted not for Bulgaria but for the Bulgarian army.

Geshov withdrew his resignation when he received assurances that Kalchev's mission had encompassed intelligence gathering purposes.76 This was a face saving device for Geshov, and suggests that he had learned that some members of his government may have had prior awareness of the Kalchev mission. Geshov himself was unlikely to have sanctioned this affair since his position depended on the maintenance of international agreement and on Great Power approval for the new frontiers of Bulgaria.

But others in his government with close ties to the military such as the Agriculture and State Property

Minister D. Hristov may have known of Kalchev's mission.77

While Geshov survived this incident he failed to derive any advantage from it. He should have held out longer to gain some concession to his authority from the military and Ferdinand. The Kalchev affair further eroded Geshov's authority.

The army continued to meet with the Turks. On 7

January/25 December on Turkish initiative Savov met with them at Chataldja.7* The Turks indicated a desire for a separate peace with Bulgaria but refused to concede

Adrianople. This time the Sofia government was informed 171

of all activities involved in this affair.79 Savov's care

to apprise Sofia of the talks with the Turks suggests that

the high command temporarily was content to accept the

responsibility of the government for policy. The government perceived these Chataldja meetings as a Turkish attempt to separate Bulgaria from the allies without paying the price of Adrianople.•• Without Adrianople a separate peace was unthinkable and nothing further developed from these meetings.

Meanwhile Danev had advised caution on the London negotiations since "Savov does not seem inclined to attack

Adrianople and for now any military activity can have no other object."•* Although far from the front Danev made a realistic assessment of the military's strength and its objectives. The military itself never made the same assessment. This failure was a major obstacle to the

Bulgarian peace efforts. Because of this the government in Sofia never obtained a clear picture of the actual condition of the army. This in part was due to the deliberate policy of the army to withhold information from the government. At one point immediately before the start of the London peace process the Chief of Staff General

Fichev informed the Ministerial Council that the condition of the army was secret and not available to the government." But the high command itself never developed a realistic comprehension of the actual condition of the 172 army. Faced with conflicting reports on the readiness of the army to renew the war Geshov decided to continue the

London negotiations.•J Diplomacy was the only way out of

Bulgaria's dilemma.

During a lull in the London negotiations Danev met with Venizelos on three different occasions. Venizelos renewed Greek efforts to establish a Greco-Bulgarian frontier. He offered a concrete proposal for a border starting on the left bank of the Struga River and proceeding to the Vardar River and on to the south shore of Lake Prespa and then to Korcha, with Salonika falling to Greece.*4 This proposal met with the usual Bulgarian obstinacy. Danev claimed he lacked the authority to negotiate and insisted that Salonika must be Bulgarian and that the Bulgarian principle of proportionality be upheld.*9 Venizelos was just as recalcitrant as Danev.

After the talks with the Greek delegate Danev advised

Geshov that the Greeks might have to be forced out of

Salonika.** Geshov later claimed that he had moderated his view on Salonika by this time and was prepared to submit the question of Salonika to arbitration or even to relinquish the city to Greece.*7 Nevertheless the Sofia government took no steps during this time to resolve the dispute with Greece.

Bulgaria's relations with its Serbian ally became more complicated during December 1912. In London Bulgaria 173

continued to support Serbian claims to northern Albania.••

In return the Serbs backed Bulgarian demands for

Adrianople and hinted at support for Bulgarian pretensions

to Salonika.** Geshov pointedly ignored an Austrian offer

of support for all Bulgarian territorial claims if

Bulgaria withdrew support for the Serbian claims in

Albania and if Bulgaria reached an arrangement with

Romania.•• He correctly feared that if the Serbs were

thwarted in Albania they might seek compensation in the

territory promised to Bulgaria by the treaty of February

1912.* * Already disturbing reports from Macedonia were reaching Sofia indicating that Serbian forces were consolidating their control in those areas which belonged to Bulgaria by treaty.** As early as 27/14 November 1912

Toshev had expressed doubt that the Serbian troops in

Macedonia would ever withdraw.*J These concerns about

Serbia placed additional pressure on Bulgarian diplomacy since the army could not take over from the Serbs in

Macedonia until the peace treaty had been signed.

But Bulgaria's major foreign policy problem continued to be Romania. In Bucharest Danev had agreed to further negotiations in London with Romanian representatives.*4

The Sofia government's adamant position, however, left him little room to maneuver. On 24/11 December Geshov explained this position to the Bulgarian minister in

Bucharest: 174

Romania has no right to compensation and rectification. Her great desire is unjust and immoral. In the end Russia will protect us in our true cause against Romania, especially because we have enjoyed a convention with Russia since 1902. Besides this the Ministerial Council has decided that any concession of cities or significant inhabited places is out of the question.*9

Geshov instructed Danev along the same lines.*4 Under

these circumstances Danev initially avoided his Romanian

counterparts.

However, Danev could not elude the Romanians forever.

He requested further instructions from Sofia but received

only the same vague answers as before.*7 The most helpful

suggestion sent from Sofia was the ludicrous idea that

Romania take Mt. Athos in place of a rectification of the

Bulgarian frontier.** At the same time Danev learned from

Kalinkov that if the Romanians did not obtain anything

from the negotiations in London they would terminate these

negotiations and with the probable support of the Triple

Alliance seek redress by other means.** Then Danev

personally assumed the initiative. He formulated a four

point plan to serve as the basis for negotiations with

Romania. These points included: 1) a guarantee of the

Romanian Dobrudzha, 2) the dismantlement of the

fortifications of Silistra, 3) a border rectification

including the cession of several small salients into

Romania with three or four villages if necessary, 4) church and cultural rights for the Kurtzo-Vlach population 175

in Macedonia.• Danev transmitted these proposals

directly to St. Petersburg for approval.1•1 This

indicates that like Geshov Danev relied on Russia to settle the dispute with Romania. Also this action

indicates Danev's impatience with his government. He avoided the obstacle of Sofia by dealing directly with St.

Petersburg. Danev was frustrated by dealing with Sofia from London. The Bulgarian government learned of Danev's proposals from Bobchev.1'■ The government had little choice but to accept his fait accompli. 1 *2 This is what

Danev intended. Because the government had abdicated the responsibility for negotiating with Romania Danev had to act.

When on 2 January 1913/21 December 1912 Danev finally presented his proposals they were promptly rejected by his

Romanian counterparts N. Misu and T. Ionescu as insufficient.1•4 Misu countered with a demand for a slice of Bulgarian territory northeast of a line from Silistra to the Black Sea.1•’ The Romanians had anticipated a more conciliatory attitude from Bulgaria. Earlier on 25/12

December Bucharest had proposed an arrangement whereby economic considerations as well as the mobilization of the

Romanian army in support of Bulgaria were offered in return for a cession of Bulgarian territory.' This

Romanian offer presented Sofia with a viable means to escape the deadlock with the Turks. The combined weight 176 of the Bulgarian and Romanian forces could compel the

Turks to accept terms favorable to Bulgarian aspirations.

And Russian desires for a Bulgarian accommodation with

Romania would be satisfied. The cession of territory in return for service had precedent in recent European history. Fifty years before Cavour had surrendered Nice and Upper Savoy to Napoleon III in return for French help in driving the Austrians out of Italy. Geshov himself had given up claim to territory he considered to be Bulgarian in Macedonia in order to reach an agreement with Serbia.

But Geshov refused to consider the Romanian offer.

He doubted Romanian sincerity in working for the goal of a greater Bulgaria, and he felt that the cession of southern

Dobrudzha ran counter to his policy of the creation of a

San Stefano Bulgaria.*•7 Nor did he wish to contemplate the cession of Silistra. On 30/17 December he remarked that any minister who surrendered Silistra should be stoned.Danev himself had to overcome strong personal misgivings to develop his four point plan and continue to negotiate with the Romanians. He had been insulted by a groundless Romanian assertion that in Bucharest he had assumed some obligation which he now refused to honor.

For a short time he declined to continue the negotiations and asked to be recalled to Sofia.*•* This request was promptly and firmly denied. * 1 • No one else in Sofia 177

wanted to assume the thankless task of negotiating with

Romania.

Despite the problems confronting Bulgaria Geshov met

the new year with a message of hope and accomplishment.

In writing about Bulgaria's war aims he stated, "This

marvel, in which until recently no one believed, for which

thirty five years ago blood was shed eagerly, will be

realized. This ideal, the creation of a Bulgaria as great

as that of San Stefano, will be accomplished. "* * * But

already a serious crisis had developed in the southeast.

On 10 January 1913/28 December 1912 Savov informed Geshov

that Turkish strength was growing and that a successful

enemy attack could ensue in ten to fifteen days. Savov

insisted that the war commence immediately. 1 ‘ • The same day in a communication to the Ministerial Council

Ferdinand warned of Serbian and Greek treachery and

berated the ministers for their alleged fear of Romania.

He boasted, "Let her [Romania] occupy our frontiers, if

Europe allows her to do so. This temporary setback will

not hinder our thoughts and purposes in the least. The only salvation is the renewal of military activity against

Turkey...After that we shall think of Romania and of the pretensions of the Greeks and Serbs."111 While Ferdinand adopted a brave facade he clearly was concerned about the exposed position of the Bulgarian troops at Chataldja. i7a

Savov already had made representations for a renewal of the war on 31/18 December 1912 and 9 January/27

December 1912. 1 1 4 But after Ferdinand's letter Geshov regarded these appeals more seriously. Another element of concern arose on 10 January/28 December when Nekludov told the Ministerial Council that Russian assistance in the case of a Romanian attack appeared doubtful.118 And two days later Danev renewed his suggestion that the London talks cease. * * 6 Under these circumstances the government requested a meeting with the tsar and the high command to determine if war could be waged against both Turkey and

Romania. 1 1 7 Geshov and his colleagues needed clear information on the condition of the army. This council would determine whether the anti-Romanian tendency of the government or the anti-Turkish tendency of the army would prevail in Bulgarian policy.

The crown council met at Karaagach near Adrianople on

15/2 January. Present were the entire Ministerial Council except Teodorov, the Tsar, Savov, Fichev, and the commanders of the four Bulgarian armies; Generals

Kutinchev, Ivanov, Radko Dimitriev, and Kovachev respectively. While the generals wanted to renew the war they failed to agree on the condition of the army and on the army's objectives if the war was renewed. Fichev and

Radko Dimitriev opposed an attack on Adrianople and Savov and Ivanov resisted the idea of an attack on Chataldja.‘‘■ 179

Fichev did not think the army would be ready to take the offensive until spring.11• However, all the generals agreed in a signed protocol that Bulgaria could not fight

Turkey and Romania simultaneously and that, "because of the severe consequences of a Romanian occupation of part of Bulgaria a border rectification should be considered. "1 *• Ferdinand also urged concessions to

Romania and blustered, "Well, alright, if we give them land then we shall have an excuse to fight in three years and take back all Dobrudzha."»“* Geshov and the other ministers said little during the council. Nevertheless

Geshov did reveal the terms of the agreement with Serbia in some detail.108 The attitudes of the high command and the tsar reflected a realistic assessment of the situation. By making a small concession to Romania

Bulgaria could deal decisively with Turkey and then turn to the growing disputes with Serbia and Greece. A hostile

Romania poised at Bulgaria's back made the accomplishment of any policy difficult. The crown council revealed the military leadership to be divided and uncertain. But the anti-Romanian tendency of the government by necessity bowed to the anti-Turkish tendency of the high command.

After the council Geshov informed Danev that Bulgaria was prepared to denounce the armi ice if the allies agreed.181 The army was rea dy t o ight Turkey despite the lack of consensus on a military objective. But the 180 attitude of the generals toward Romania surprised the government. According to Geshov only then did the ministers realize the necessity of negotiating with

Romania.*8 * Nevertheless the only additional concessions

Geshov condoned were a small piece of the Black Sea coast;

Medzhie Tabia, an elevated site commanding Silistra; and two small salients in the Dobrudzha.183 The government, still convinced of the justice of its position against the

Romanian claims, refused to make meaningful concessions.

Soon after the disappointing result of the crown council Geshov received a disturbing report from Teodorov, who had left for St. Petersburg in December. Teodorov had traveled to Russia on a diplomatic mission to seek the support Geshov believed was due Bulgaria under the provisions of the 1902 convention. The Bulgarian finance minister ostensibly was to solicit Russian advice on the question of concessions to Romania.*86 Also he was instructed to press Bulgarian claims to Salonika and urge

Russian pressure on Turkey to conclude peace.*87 Over the objections of the Ministerial Council Ferdinand unwisely constrained Teodorov to court Russian approval for the inclusion of the Sea of Marmara port of Rodosto in

Bulgaria.* 8 8 But the evocation of the 1902 convention was the major purpose of the mission.

In St. Petersburg Teodorov discussed Salonika and

Rodosto with the Russian foreign minister. While Sazonov 181

was encouraging on the Salonika issue he disfavored the

Rodosto claim.1*' Teodorov should have dealt with the

Rodosto issue more discreetly and separated the Bulgarian

government from this claim. In his discussions with

Sazonov he also invoked the 1902 convention and requested

aid against Romania.111 Sazonov responded that the

convention was "non existent" and added that in 1910

Ferdinand, the then Minister President Malinov and General

Paprikov had repudiated it. 1 3 1 At this time Teodorov also

learned from Sazonov that Romania wanted Medzhia Tabia and

four or five kilometers of Black Sea coast. But the

Ministerial Council would agree only to Danev's four points.* 3■

The report of Sazonov's disavowal of the convention arrived in Sofia on 18/5 January and gave the Geshov government the second major jolt of the year.111 Geshov refused to accept this dismissal of the convention and informed St. Petersburg that he considered it still valid.134 And he warned Sazonov that difficulties over the convention would encourage the Russophobe opposition parties in Bulgaria, "With the utmost conviction we ask in the name of solidarity and of our interests not to give this weapon to the enemies of an alliance with Russia."133

Sazonov retreated before Geshov's insistence on the convention. Already even before Geshov's emotional response Sazonov had conceded to Bobchev that the 182 convention had not been "denounced" in 1910 but was only

"incomplete."*14 Finally on 28/15 January Geshov learned that Sazonov now hid behind the statement that, "at the present time I consider that the convention cannot have any practical importance, since affairs [with Romania] proceed in a conciliatory manner."137 This statement was a compromise. While Sazonov apparently withdrew his objections to the validity of the convention he implied that it would not apply in the current dispute with

Romania. Despite this on 29/16 January Sazonov warned the

Romanians of Russian intervention if they invaded

Bulgaria.'34 This Russian warning did not mean, however, that Sazonov supported the idea of Bulgarian territorial integrity.*3• Geshov still hoped that with or without the convention Russia would come to Bulgaria's aid. Thus

Sazonov's attempt to avoid an obligation to preserve

Bulgarian territorial integrity against Romanian pretensions had little practical significance for Geshov's policy except to increase doubts and anxieties on the possibilities of Russian help.

Geshov received his third major shock of the new year soon after the bad news from St. Petersburg arrived in

Sofia. The Young Turk coup in Constantinople on 23/10

January overthrew the Kiamil Pasha government and presented the Balkan allies with a good excuse to renew the war. The same day Danev once again urged that the 183 negotiations in London stop. 1 *• Geshov agreed.14 1

Although he still hoped for peace he could not resist

Danev's arguments.14• But the day after the Young Turk coup Savov gave a less sanguine assessment of the condition of the army than the one he had delivered at

Karaagach nine days before.141 The army, Savov said, could resume activity if so ordered but still was not in good condition. Then on 26/13 January Fichev dramatically called on Geshov in Sofia. On learning that Geshov had not informed Danev that at Karaagach the generals had stated that no offense could be contemplated until spring,

Fichev became alarmed. The chief of staff later recorded,

"I immediately begged Minister President Geshov not to break off the peace negotiations, because we would make useless sacrifices without any practical results."144

Geshov himself was in no hurry to end the negotiations.14 5

He immediate ly tel egraphed Danev that the negotiations must continue.144 This produced a justifiably surprised and angry reaction from Danev.141 He could not negotiate without current information on the condition of the army.

Unfortunately Sofia did not have this information. Danev later claimed that if he had known that the army was incapable of action he would have concluded peace with the

Kiamil Pasha government.144 This assertion has some validity given Geshov's own strong desire for peace. 184

Geshov's failure to keep Danev informed warranted

Danev's censure. But Geshov himself had reason to be

angry with the army. He had no basis on which to evaluate

the condition of the army.14* Without a clear picture of the current state of the military forces the Geshov government was seriously hampered in its determination of policy. The separation of the government and the military was almost total. Even worse the army leadership was in disarray.

Finally Geshov capitulated to Danev's and Ferdinand's demands to renew the war.131 On 28/15 January he told

Danev to break off the negotiations.181 The next day the talks in London ended.13* Before the armistice was denounced, however, a problem arose. Savov informed the

Ministerial Council that if the army was attacked by a superior force it might have to withdrawal.13* After initial concern the Ministerial Council decided that this was a military question and proceeded with plans to denounce the armistice.134 On 30/17 January the armistice was denounced. The war would begin in four days.

The Young Turk coup affected the Bulgarian negotiations with Romania. Bucharest immediately became more exacting and demanded a Silistra-Balchik line in the

Dobrudzha, including both of those cities.133 But further negotiations could not continue in London since the conference there dispersed due to the renewal of the war. 185

So on 27/14 January Danev and his Romanian counterpart

Misu agreed to a protocol which stated the views of the two sides.136 The protocol was signed two days later.197

In it Danev restated his four part plan. The Romanians increased their demands to claim a slice of northeastern

Bulgarian territory from Tutrakan to Balchik.139 Both sides agreed to continue the talks. This adjournment of the negotiations with Romania was favorable to Bulgaria because nothing important had been conceded. Bulgarian territory remained intact.

By the end of the negotiations with Romania, however,

Bulgarian policy toward Romania had been weakened overall.

Great doubts existed about Russian support. And the results of the Karaagach meeting had undermined the

Bulgarian resolve to resist. The garrison in Silistra had orders not to oppose a Romanian attack.139 Furthermore several ministers in the government now supported concessions to Romania.141 The end of the London talks with Romania insured only that the Romano-Bulgarian conflict would move to another arena.

The London conference was a failure for Bulgarian policy. One Bulgarian historian evaluated it thus:

Bulgaria left London with a poor perspective. The war with Turkey would continue and the sacrifices of material, morale and blood would be given mainly by the Bulgarian side. The pretensions of Romania would enter into a critical and decisive phase. The allies would attempt to impose a revision of the territorial conventions to their advantage. Furthermore as 186

the war between Bulgaria and Turkey continued on the Thracian front, Bulgaria became increasingly isolated from her allies, who demonstrated an intention to conspire against her.161

Also the Geshov-Danev coalition had suffered a strain over the Sofia government's failure to keep Danev informed. '*•

And the military, while interfering with the government's policy, demonstrated that it still had not recovered from the failure at Chataldja and that its leadership was still uncertain about the extent of the damage resulting from this failure. The Geshov government was unable to utilize the armistice to recover the dominate position in the

Balkan alliance and in the determination of Bulgarian policy. Bulgaria entered the second phase of the war in scarcely better political or military condition then when the first phase of the fighting ended. 187

FOOTNOTES

!• Mir no. 3709, 10 November 1912.

2. BAN 51-1-17-135; Danev, "Chataldja," 96.

3. M. I. Madzharov, "Radko Dimitriev za mezhdu- suyuznicheskata voina," Bulqarska misul XV (1940) 488.

4. Danev, "Chataldja," 98; Fichev, 223. According to Danev Ferdinand begged him to, "save my beautiful army."

5. DPIK I 271 no. 27.

6. Danev claimed to have had complete freedom of action to negotiate with the Turks. Danev, "Chataldja," 99. Nevertheless he sought instructions from Sofia. See for example DPIK I 274-75 no. 33.

7. DPIK I 567 no. 15, 270 no. 24; DDF 3rd ser. IV 566. Initially the Bulgarians had assumed that they also would represent the Greeks at the armistice talks. See Prllozhenle I (Danev) 34. a. DPIK I 568 no. 17.

9. Prilozhenle I (Teodorov) 337.

10. Danev, "Chataldja" 96.

11. BAN 51-1-17-124; DPIK I 274-75 no. 33. At this point the Sofia government still considered the prospect of a unilateral withdrawal to a Chorlu-Sarai line.

12. Fichev, 224-25; Dnevnik no. 4210, 19 May 1914, letter of Ferdinand to Savov dated 16 November 1912.

13. DPIK I 277 no. 38; Danev, "Chataldja" 105; Rankin, 321-25.

14. The Bulgarians used this advantage well. Within three weeks they were sending ten trains a day through Adrianople to their troops. BD IX ii 435.

15. DPIK I 574 no. 27; RD 3rd ser. IV i 404; BD IX ii 314.

16. BAN 51-1-17-127; DPIK I 576-77 no. 32; Danev, "Chataldja" 100. 188

17. BAN 51-1-17-127. The war might have ended differently had the Greeks made this proposal in early November.

18. DPIK I 576 nos 30, 31; BD IX ii 319.

19. DPIK I 278 no. 39, 280 no. 45; GP XXXIII 12459, 12576; Danev, "Chataldja" 104. Savov told a Turkish delegate, "Don't worry about the Greeks. If they don't give in to us we shall retreat to the north and let you send 50,000 men against them." Apparently the Bulgarian high command still considered a withdrawal from Chataldja possible.

20. For the text of the armistice see DPIK I 283-84 no. 54; DDF 3rd ser. IV 619; RD 3rd ser. IV i 428; BD IX ii 332; Danev, "Chataldja," 105; Kolarov, Ocherk 58.

21. RD 3rd ser. IV i 380; O-UA V 4747; 17th ONS 1st IS, speech of S. Danev, 5 May 1914, 643-44.

22. DPIK 276 no. 37.

23. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 35.

24. BAN 51-1-17-137; DPIK I 580 no. 40; BD IX ii 362.

25. See Madzharov, Podqotovka 95. Geshov did express an interest in meeting Venizelos. DPIK I 580 no. 37. Venizelos himself was "annoyed" at Geshov's absence. Ibid. 580 no. 39.

26. The members of Geshov's Nationalist Party were displeased by his decision to remain in Sofia. But Danev's Progressive Liberals were satisfied. Abrashev noted , "Even Danev's enemies cannot deny that in the present critical days all hope rests with him." BAN 51-1- 17-136.

27. See Geshov, Spomeni 31. He wrote, "In my youth as well as in my old age I lacked the speculative spirit which is a distinct feature and necessary condition for a successful merchant." In this respect Danev was a much better negotiator.

28. See above, 139.

29. RD ser. IV i 327, also n. 2 pg 324.

30. BAN 51-1-17-134; DPIK I 666 no. 28. These 'Romanians' were called Vlachs or Aromani and served as a focus of Bucharest's interests in the Balkans. See also 189

O-UA IV 4568; Rom Doc 12; Kolarov, 88.

31. BAN 51-1-17-118; DPIK 671 no. 39.

32. Stoyan Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya prez 1912- 1913 god.," Rodina I 4 (1939) 20; Prllozhenie I (Danev) 44.

33. Rom Doc 13; O-UA V 4828, 4878.

34. DPIK I 677 no. 53; O-UA V 4846.

35. O-UA V 4891. See also GP XXX IV 12533.

36. Rom Doc 13.

37. DPIK I 681 no. 58; Kalinkov, 131. See also Rossos, 141-42.

38. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 278 n. 85.

39. Shebeko, 145.

40. O-UA V 4891; GP XXXIV 12533, 12539; Joseph M. Baernreither, Fragments of a^ Political Diary (London, 1930) 143, Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 21. Salabashev later told Geshov that in Vienna Danev had boasted that he himself would determine policy in London, without reference to the Sofia government, and that he had no instructions. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 704, 31. Salabashev later recorded this incident in his memoirs. Salabashev, 417. While in an extravagant mood Danev might have made such a claim he regularly referred issues to Sofia while he was in London. See Prllozhenie I (Danev) 55.

41. Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 21.

42. See E. C. Helmreich, "The Conflict between Germany and Austria over Balkan Policy 1913-1914," in Essays in the History of Modern Europe (New York, 1936) 132-33. Kinderlin-Waechter's death soon after his meeting with Danev was a blow for the Bulgarian cause in Europe.

43. Raymond Poincare, Au service de la France. Neuf annees de souvenirs. II, Les Balkans en feu 1912 (Paris, 1926) 388.

44. DPIK I 285-86 no. 58.

45. Ibid.; Prilo^henie I (Danev) 42, 47. 190

46. DPIK I 288 no. 64. See also Madzharov, Podqotovka 100, 103; Georgl Markov, "The Bulgarian Delegation at the London Peace Conference (December 1912-May 1913)," Bulgarian Historical Review XII 3 (1984) 32-34.

47. BAN 51-1-17-138, 145, 148; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 141; Madzharov, Podqotovka 116-18.

48. DPIK I 286-87 no. 61, 287 no. 62. See also Stoyan Stoyanov, "Bulgariya na Londonskata mirna konferentsiya (1912-1913)," Izvestiva. supplement to Voennoistoricheskl sbornik vol. 37 (Sofia, 1984) 83.

49. BAN 51-1-17-148, 49; Diplomatist, 212-13.

50. Stoyanov, 82. Of course the Bulgarians considered the Macedonian frontier question settled already.

51. 15th ONS 2nd RS. Speech of I. E. Geshov, 10 December 1912, 55.

52. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 249-80; Rossos, 107-121.

53. BAN 51-1-17-150; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 44; Markov, "London Conference," 34.

54. BAN 51-1-17-152.

55. DPIK I 287-88 no. 63.

56. Ibid. 288 no. 64. Geshov implied here that Bulgaria would demand further territory in Eastern Thrace, possibly Rodosto, if the war was resumed.

57. George Logio, Bulgaria. Past and Present (Manchester, 1936) 380.

58. V. Semenikov, "Epizod iz istorii balkanskoi voiny," Krasnyi arkhiv XXXVII (1927) 186.

59. Ibid.

60. Bobchev, Stranitsi 156-57. However Abrashev implied on 12 December/30 November that the government knew of this request, and had in fact received encouragement from Colonel Romanovskii. See BAN 51-1-17-141.

61. DPIK I 272 no. 29.

62. Ibid. 2 7 2 no. 31; Nashata duma (Geshov) 2 5 0 .

63. DPIK I 273 no. 32. 191

64. Girginov, Katastrofa 58.

65. BAN 51-1-17-122; DPIK I 674 no. 44. Nachev was held in low esteem and was referred to as "chamberpot."

66. BAN 51-1-17-122-23; DPIK I 273 no. 32. Abrashev wrote, "the staff knows better than the Ministerial Council how to take Adrianople."

67. BAN 51-1-17-128.

68. 17th ONS 1st IS, speech of Konstantin Kalchev, 1 May 1914, 563, 569. Kalchev asserted that the government did know of his mission.

69. Ibid. 567. Kalchev claimed he had secured Kiamil's agreement to a Turkish withdrawal from Adrianople. This is unlikely.

70. Bobchev, Stranitsi 87-88. Bax-Ironside learned of Kalchev's presence in Constantinople from the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir G. Lowther. BD IX ii 435 n. 5, pg 331.

71. V. A. Zhebokritskii, Bolqarlya v period balkanski voin 1912-1913 g.. g_. (Kiev, 1961) 91.

72. Q-UA V 5089; Bobchev, Stranitsi 87-88.

73. BAN 51-1-17-151-52, Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 41. Abrashev wrote, "Rarely have I seen Geshov in such a blaze of indignation over a minor political matter."

74. 17th ONS 1st IS, speech of K. Kalchev, 1 May 1914. 564-65.

75. See Veleva, 91.

76. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 42.

77. See Griginov, Katastrofa 59-60. On his return Kalchev did meet with Teodorov. 17th ONS 1st IS, Speech of K. Kalchev, 1 May 1914, 577.

78. Prilozhenie II (Savov) 295; Fichev, 258-59.

79. DPIK I 293 no. 79, 294 no. 94, 295 no. 87.

80. Nashata duma (Teodorov) 118.

81. DPIK I 289 no. 68. 192

82. BAN 51-1-17-144. See also Trotsky, 336.

83. Dnevnik no 4213, 22 May 1914. 31/18 December 1912 Savov to Ferdinand; no. 4214, 24 May 1914. 3 January 1913/21 December 1912 Savov to Geshov, 11 January 1913/29 December 1912 Savov to Geshov. On 31/18 December Savov reported that the army was ready to take Adrianople. On 3 January/21 December he stated that the war might be resumed but with little chance of success. Eight days later he warned Geshov that the position of the army was serious.

84. 17th ONS 1st IS, speech of S. Danev, 5 May 1914, 653; DPIK 583 no. 49. Rizov claimed that Venezelos told Bourchier that Greece would settle with Bulgaria as long as Salonika and Kostur fell to Greece. Their environs could be Bulgarian. See D. Rizov, "Kak doide katastrofata," Svobodno mnenie II 4 (1914), 59.

85. 17th ONS 1st IS, speech of S. Danev, 5 May 1914, 653; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 50-51.

86. DPIK I 583 no. 50. The Salonika question engendered strong sentiments in Bulgaria. But Ferdinand exaggerated when he remarked, "Salonika means for Bulgaria what Mecca manes for the Turks." Demetrius Caclamons, "Reminiscences of the Balkan Wars," Slavonic Review XVI (1937-38) 126.

87. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 17. See also Boris Vazov, Durzhavniyat prevrat 16 1 uni 1913 pod (Sofia, 1913) 26.

88. DPIK I 396 no. 10.

89. Ibid. 394 no. 7.

90. O-UA V 5117. See also ibid. IV 4621, 4643, 4644, 4645. this offer was first made on 26/13 November.

91. DPIK I 396 no. 11.

92. For example see Toshev II 77-79, 176-186; Dimitur G. Gotsev, Natsional-osvoboditlnata borba v Makedonia 1912- 1915 (Sofia, 1981) 54-69, 78-79, 96-104.

93. DPIK I 392-94 no. 6; Toshev II 82-83.

94. See above, 163.

95. Kalinkov, 144.

96. DPIK I 681 no. 56. 193

97. Ibid, 681 no. 57, 682 no. 59; Prllozhenle I (Danev) 49, 55.

98. DPIK I 683 no. 63, 684 no. 67.

99. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 34-35.

100. DPIK I 684-85 no. 69; BD IX ii 1069; DDF 3rd ser. V 202.

101. Bobchev, 115.

102. BAN 51-1- 1 &- 158; DPIK I 683 nos 64, 65; Bobchev, 111, 115-16.

103. DPIK I 686 no. 73. The Nationalist members of the Ministerial Council only reluctantly accepted these points and accused Danev of yielding to the Romanian demands for compensation. BAN 51-1-17-154.

104. DPIK 685 no. 71.

105. Rom Doc. 23.

106. BD IX ii 430; Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 319; Kalinkov, 139.

107. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 65.

108. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 35. The next day Geshov, in a more moderate temper, retracted this statement although he insisted that his retraction did not imply a recognition of the Romanian claim.

109. DPIK I 687 no. 76; Rom Doc 28.

110. DPIK I 688 no. 77, 690 no. 84, 694 no. 90.

111. Mir no. 3759, 1 January 1913.

112. DPIK I 296 no. 90; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 69.

113. DPIK I 693 nos 88, 90; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 45.

114. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 44.

115. BAN 51-1-17-172.

116. DPIK I 297-98 no. 93, 298-99 no. 95. 194

117. BAN 51-1-17-165. Also on 9 January 1913/27 December 1912 Teodorov reported from Beograd where he had stopped on his way to Russia that Pashich, while offering aid against Romania, sought concession outside the convention. See ibid, 162. The Ministerial Council rejected this offer. As early as the beginning of the London talks the Ministerial Council had recognized that the allies might offer help in return for territorial concessions. Ibid. 143.

118. BAN-I-17-157; BD IX ii 517, 519; Fichev, 277-78; N. Ivanov. Balkanskata voina 1912-1913 qod (Sofia, 1924) 225 26.

119. Fichev, 279.

120. Geshov. Prestupnoto bezumie 49-50 •

121. BAN 51-1-17-168.

122. Fichev, 277.

123. Geshov. Prestupnoto bezumie 72.

124. Ibid, 50.

125. DPIK I 704 no. 118.

126. BAN 51-1-17-157. On 6 January/24 December 1912 Geshov informed the Ministerial Council of the existence of the 1902 convention with Russia. Ibid. 160.

127. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 71.

128. BAN 51-1-17-158. Ferdinand's reasons for wanting this unpromising port are not clear. Acquisitiveness undoubtedly played a major roll in his thinking.

129. Ibid. 183.

130. DPIK I 706-07 no. 125; Helmreich and Black, "The Russo-Bulgarian Military Convention," 471-72.

131. DPIK I 706-07 no. 125, 708 no. 130, 712 no. 142; BAN 51-1-17-169; Prilozhenle I (Teodorov) 168. See also Toshev, II 137. Paprikov later asserted that after the inconclusive termination of the Russo-Bulgarian talks in St. Petersburg in 1910 the convention was no longer in effect. Prilozhenie I (Paprikov) 169. But Malinov equivocated on the validity of the treaty. Ibid. (Malinov) 284-86. Russo-Bulgarian talks resumed later in 1910 in Sofia and ended soon after the beginning of the new year 195 due to the fatal Illness of the Russian minster there Sementovski-Kurilo. Ibid. Had Sementovski-Kurilo recovered or had Geshov known of these negotiations and continued them to a successful conclusion the course of the Balkan Wars and the First World War might have- been quite different.

132. BAN 51-1-17-164; DPIK I 699 no. 104. Only the generals' protocol presented at the crown council at Karaagach persuaded the government to treat with Romania. See above, 178.

133. Nashata duma (Teodorov) 50; BAN 51-1-17-169. Danev apparently never relayed to Sofia Sazonov's Lavidia disavowal of the previous spring.

134. DPIK I 708 no. 129.

135. Ibid, 715 no. 149. The Austrian minster in Sofia feared that this Romanian pressure would increase the chances for a Russo-Bulgarian alliance and strengthen the position of the ultrarussophiles in the government. O-UA V 5700.

136. BAN 51-1-17-171; DPIK I 707 no. 126.

137. BAN 51-1-17-177; DPIK I 712 no. 142. Ironically these discussions led the well informed British minister in Sofia to speculate that a new Russo-Bulgarian treaty might ensue. Se BD IX ii 534, 560. Sazonov at this time informed his British and French allies of the 1902 convention "as if he considered it valid." Helmreich, Balkan Wars 278.

138. Izvolsky III 707. See also DDF 3rd ser. V 294.

139. Ibid.; O-UA V 5643.

140. DPIK I 301 no. 103; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 73.

141. DPIK I 301 no. 104.

142. See Rossos, 119-20.

143. "Korniyat suvet v Karaach," Dnevnlk no. 4215, 24 May 1914.

144. Fichev, 282; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 49.

145. Fichev, 283; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 52.

146. DPIK I 303 no. 109; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 49. 196

147. DPIK I 304-05 no. 113. See also Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 52; Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 25; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 53.

148. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 53.

149. The Deputy Commander in Chief General Savov and the Chief of Staff General Fichev themselves could not agree on the condition of the army. See Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 25. Furthermore there was no love lost between Savov and Fichev. See for example Fichev, 281.

150. BAN 51-1-17-173; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 51.

151. DPIK I 305 no. 114.

152. Ibid. 306 no. 119.

153. BAN 51-1-17-178. Savov's report provoked an angry reaction from the Tsar. Only the intervention of Geshov, Teodorov and Danev prevented Ferdinand from sacking the Deputy Commander in Chief. Ibid. 187.

154. Ibid. 178; DPIK I 306 no. 118.

155. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 37. See also Rom Doc 54; Kalinkov, 163.

156. DPIK I 711 no. 139.

157. Ibid. 714 nos 146, 147.

158. Rom Doc 61.

159. O-UA V 5565. Geshov had voiced a policy of non- resistance even before the Karaagach crown council. See DDF 3rd ser. V 185.

160. BAN 51-1-17-176. Prominent among these were the Progressive Liberal Minister of Agriculture and State Property Dimitur Hristov, the Progressive Liberal Minister of Commerce, Industry and Labor Hristo Todorov and Geshov's own son-in-law the Nationalist Minister of Public. Buildings Roads and Public Works D. Yablonski.

161. Girginov, Katastrofa 79.

162. See TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 701, 31; Salabashev, 426. In his memoirs Salabashev recorded a colorful scene depicting Danev's displeasure with his Nationalist coalition partners. Danev was then in Vienna on his way back from London to Sofia. Salabashev's details are 197 questionable, especially those concerning the ultrarussophile Danev's consideration of Austrian assistance. Nevertheless Danev undoubtedly resented his coalition partners for their failure to keep him informed. Salabashev recounted a similar story to Geshov during the latter's sojourn in Vienna in June 1913. CHAPTER VI

THE FALL OF ADRIANOPLE

The Young Turk coup in Constantinople on 23/10

January made a renewal of the war certain. Despite the questionable condition of the Bulgarian army Mir boasted:

Further Turkish anarchy in Constantinople is intolerable. For a long time now our army has burned with the desire to go to Constantinople and chase the Turks to Asia Minor in order to end the war so that everyone can get on with his own affairs. No one is afraid of the coming events. The response of the Young Turks is in effect an invitation to our army to go to Constantinople. And our army will go there in order to realize one of the dreams cherished for centuries by the Bulgarian people.*

By the time of the Young Turk coup most of the members of the government favored a renewal of the war. * Only the minister president still opposed more fighting.* The ensuing strain on Geshov was obvious to his colleagues, and rumors of his resignation surfaced.4 Geshov's mood apparently was shared by many people in Sofia, who according to one observer, seemed depressed by the renewal of the war and the need to make further sacrifices.9 Only now had the population begun to comprehend the enormous cost of the war.

198 199

The military itself demonstrated no great eagerness for the fray. Despite his bold proclamation exhorting the

Bulgarian army to, "prepare yourselves for new victories"

Savov on 7 February/25 January informed the Ministerial

Council that at Chataldja and Gallipoli (Bulair) military activity was impossible until spring and that at

Adrianople the Turks had food for a month while the

Bulgarians had artillery shells for only eleven days.*

Even with the two month respite of the armistice the

Bulgarian army had not recovered from the fall campaign.

Notwithstanding his fatigued appearance Geshov sought a more solid basis for the formulation of his policy and a clearer definition of the government's relationship with the high command. On 7 February/25 January he wrote to

Savov and remonstrated the deputy commander in chief for the high command's reticence in its communications with the government. Geshov insisted that the high command inform the government about the military situation, and told Savov:

I repeat, that at Karaagach we learned only what the generals told us. And we did not express an opinion because of our incompetence in military matters. And now, again, realizing our incompetence, we leave to you in the staff and the general command of the four armies to determine what military activity is most suitable for the desired goal. And this goal is to force the enemy to accept our conditions for peace with as few as possible sacrifices by our side.7 200

Geshov indicated that the government did not intend to

interfere in strategic decisions. But this profession of

incompetence was misguided. The government should have

played a role in the formulation of strategy. By doing so

it could have exercised a firmer control over its policy.

The French statesmen Georges Clemenceau once noted that

war is too important to be left to the generals. The

Bulgarian experience in the Balkan Wars aptly demonstrated

Clemenceau's axiom.

In his letter to Savov Geshov did define clearly the

government's objective in the new campaign: to force the

Turks back to the conference table with a minimum of

Bulgarian casualties. The most expedient means was an

assault on Adrianople.• But such an attack undoubtedly

risked significant Bulgarian losses. On 20/7 February

despite his professed disinterest in strategy Geshov

proposed to Savov that the army should take Gallipoli

rather than risk the casualties an attack on Adrianople

would incur, and suggested that the Greek fleet could help

in this operation." But the high command ignored this

suggestion and nothing further developed on an attack at

Gallipoli.

Savov himself lacked a definite strategy for the renewed conflict. On 25/12 February he asked the government if the fall of Adrianople would mean peace and expressed concern over the casualties which would result 201

from an attack on Adrianople.1• Geshov responded that

this inquiry was impossible to answer and insisted that

questions of strategy were the responsibility of the high

command.* * This response was correct in that the

consequences of the capture of Adrianople could not be

foretold. Nevertheless the government might have assumed

the initiative here and specified that Adrianople was the

most desireable objective, Gallipoli was of little value

and Constantinople was out of bounds. This way a clear

line of authority might have been established. But the

government wished to distance itself from the conduct and

the casualties of the war.

Even with the denunciation of the armistice and the renewal of military activity Bulgaria maintained an open channel to the Turks through the services of the Great

Powers. By this means Geshov rejected the idea of a neutral Adrianople on 1 February/IQ January but two days leter agreed to a Great Power request for religious guarantees for Moslems in Adrianople.*• Several weeks later on 25/12 February the Turks offered to cede

Adrianople on the conditions of a St. Sefan-Kirk Kilasse-

Maritsa border; no indemnity; the maintenance of Moslem religious property; and the dismantlement of the

Adrianople and Kirk Kilasse fortifications.‘3 At the same time the Great Powers offered to mediate between the

Balkan allies and the Turks.‘* The Sofia government 202 reacted slowly to this offer. Savov had informed Geshov on 1 March/16 February that Adrianople would fall in no more than fifteen days, and even if it did not, it could be easily taken by an assault because of the weakness of the garrison.18 This information eliminated the need for an immediate response to the Great Power offer.

The Sofia government was not inclined to accept this offer and sought a means to spurn it.1 * Only Geshov favored this proposal.17 But difficulties with the allies also diverted the attention of the government.1• So for some time the Great Power proposal remained unanswered.

Not until 13 March/28 February did the Sofia government, in conjunction with the allies, develop a formula for a response to the powers.1• The conditions contained in this formula included a Rodosto-Midia frontier in eastern

Thrace; the cession of Scutari, Crete, and the Aegean

Islands; reparations payments by Turkey; the rights of the

Orthodox Church in Turkey to be upheld and no cessation of hostilities until the signing of the final peace accord.•*

A note containing these conditions was presented to the powers on the next day.81

The unilateral action of the Balkan allies in the presentation of this note belied the increasing hostility between Bulgaria and the other allies. In an effort to reverse this trend the Greek Premier Venizelos on his way home from London stopped in Sofia for a day on 6 203

February/24 January. There he met with Ferdinand and the

government as well as Nekludov and made a favorable

impression.88 Venizelos indicated that Greece wanted

Salonika and Fiorina and conceded Kavala, Drama and Seres

to Bulgaria.88 While Geshov was inclined to accept an agreement with Greece on this basis Danev demanded that

Bulgaria obtain Salonika.*4 And Geshov refused to distance himself from Danev's position, reminding

Nekludov, "Do not forget that the present cabinet is a coalition cabinet. On such a serious question I cannot disassociate myself from Danev."88 So Geshov missed an opportunity to improve relations with Greece and begin the process of obtaining a Greco-Bulgarian agreement. This meeting between the Greek and Bulgarian statesmen had no practical results. Relations with Greece continued to deteriorate.

Less than one month after Venizelos' visit armed hostilities erupted between Greek and Bulgarian troops in

Subota, Nigrita and several other locations north of

Salonika. Bulgarian casualties resulted.“6 Sofia and

Athens agreed to conduct an investigation into these incidents and to form a mixed commission to avoid further problems.87 Another source of friction resulted from the release of Turkish prisoners of war by Greek authorities while Bulgaria still actively fought the Turks.88 But the major problem between Greece and Bulgaria remained the 204

lack of an agreement on the frontier issue. And the Sofia government had moved no closer to the resolution of this problem than it had the previous autumn.

Bulgarian relations with the other major ally worsened significantly during the second phase of the war.

Ironically during this same time Serbian troops were fighting alongside their Bulgarian allies at Adrianople.

Doubts about Serbian loyalty to the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty plagued the Sofia government. Specifically the Bulgarians feared Serbian attempts to retain portions of Macedonia which were Bulgarian by the treaty but which were occupied by Serbian troops. A Serbian request after the renewal of the war for Bulgarian support for Serbian pretensions to an outlet on the Adriatic in defiance of Austria-Hungary was answered affirmatively.*1 But the Sofia government regarded this request as a subterfuge designed to force

Bulgaria to deny the alliance agreement and provide the

Serbs for an excuse to abrogate it.J* This positive

Bulgarian response indicated that Sofia was determined to maintain the terms of the treaty even an the cost of complications with the powers.

When the Serbs agreed to a Bulgarian request made on

11 February/29 January for siege artillery for Adrianople they reserved the right to specify at a later date what compensation they would require.1‘ Geshov, however, stipulated that only pecuniary compensation would be 205

offered for the guns.11 Then on 22/13 February using this

apparent Bulgarian intransigence as an excuse Pashich

formally requested a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian

treaty. 11 The Bulgarian government responded very

cautiously to this request. First a discreet approach was

made to Pashich to persuade him to withdraw the Serbian

petition for revision.*4 When this failed Toshev was

summoned to Sofia for consultations. There he and the

Nationalist Minister of Education Ivan Peev-Plachkov in

consultation with Geshov prepared a response to the

Serbian demand, carefully refuting each of Pashich's

points.** This response affirmed:

It is clear as day that if it were not possible to organize Macedonia on the basis of autonomy, then by the agreement the only territory to be conceded is the zone between this line (i.e. the northern border of Macedonia) on one hand and the Shar Planina on the other. With clear and categoric decrees the secret appendix to the agreement states that if we are not able to consider among ourselves a fair division of Macedonia, then there is only the question: would this region be better off organized on an autonomous basis within the previously mentioned limits? (i.e. the entire territory of Macedonia) If we cannot make Macedonia autonomous then our only recourse is arbitration according to article two of the appendix to the secret agreement.**

The Bulgarian response rested on a forthright

interpretation of the treaty. Even though Bulgaria had made a de facto concession of Macedonian autonomy during the first phase of the war the advantages of autonomy were still apparent. Above all the treaty had to be 206

maintained because it provided a Russian guarantee that

the greater part of Macedonia would fall to Bulgaria.

But this letter never reached Beograd. The Sofia government decided not to send it because further friction might ensue while Serbian troops were fighting at

Adrianople.*7 Furthermore Geshov instructed Toshev to avoid mention of the issue:

We would not want, Mister Minister, to argue the question raised by the letter of Mr. Minister Pashich, since doing so could have adverse consequences for the stability of our alliance with Serbia, which has already produced such brilliant results and which, according to our deep conviction, is as necessary for the present as it is for the future. But if argument is forced upon us, I retain the right to submit supplemental and detailed arguments in defense of our viewpoint.11

On March 14/1 Geshov disingenuously assured the Subranie,

"above all we are determined to fulfill strictly our alliance obligations, since we are confident that Serbia will loyally fulfill her obligations."*" The Sofia government officially ignored the Serbian request for revision. Any acknowledgement of difficulties with the

Serbs over the convention represented a serious threat to the Geshov-Danev coalition. The convention was a major prop for the foreign policy of the coalition.

But behind the calm facade the Bulgarians burned with resentment. Pashich's request to revise the treaty outraged Geshov.*" On 23/10 March he responded with uncharacteristic determination to a suggestion from 207

Sazonov that Bulgaria might have to make concessions to

Serbia and instructed Bobchev:

Sazonov's hint that we might have to concede something to the Serbs greatly impressed us, since we should not have to pay for the wrongs and errors of others. Energetically insist to him that he should not raise similar questions, since this only encourages the Serbs. Something terrible might happen, because we are determined not to permit a breach of the convention.**

Geshov indicated that he understood that Serbia wanted

Bulgaria to pay the bill for Serbia's failed aspirations

on the Adriatic. He also demonstrated his concern that

the dispute might lead to war.

Danev also was adamant against any concession to

Serbia.** He foresaw further difficulties with Beograd

and, drawing the obvious conclusion, told Geshov on 11

March/26 February , "Let us not fear an eventual agreement

between the Serbs and the Greeks, because any conflict

will be settled by power, and we must fight against both

of them."** Danev, like most other Bulgarians,

underestimated the damage done to the Bulgarian army in

the autumn campaign and overestimated the strength of the

army.** But on 11 March/26 February, after having met

with Hartwig two days earlier, Danev ruefully noted, "If

this disagreement develops into a clear conflict, as it appears it will, I do not know whether it would have been better not to have begun the war with Turkey."*8 The

Sofia government perceived the seriousness of the dispute 208

with Serbia but was prepared to maintain its position, and

uphold its right to Macedonia.

Amidst the gloom and uncertainty which accompanied the renewal of the war one event brought brief cheer to the Geshov government. This was the statement by

Aleksandr Izvolsky, the Russian minister in Paris and former foreign minister, on 3 February/21 January. He averred that Russia, having created Bulgaria, could not allow its dismemberment, whether a convention existed or not.*‘ Shortly afterwards Bobchev reported from St.

Petersburg that highly placed Russians shared these sentiments.47 Such assurances confirmed the expectations of the Sofia government that Bulgaria was bound to Russia with more than mere diplomatic ties and that in the final analysis Russia would preserve Bulgarian territorial integrity against the Romanian pretensions.

However the more immediate problem of negotiations with Bucharest remained. Even with the adjournment of the

Romano-Bulgarian talks in London the Sofia government understood that contacts must continue if only to gain time. On 6 February/30 January the two governments agreed to resume the negotiations in Sofia.4• Kalinkov had urged that the talks continue in Sofia because public opinion in

Bucharest was hostile to Bulgaria.4* These negotiations began on 12 February/30 January with the former Bulgarian minster in Constantinople Mihail Sarafov as the Bulgarian 209 representative. Geshov anticipated no positive results from these meetings.8• His pessimism was justified when the Romanians immediately demanded the cession of

Bulgarian territory north of a Balchik-Silistra line. 81

The Bulgarian counterproposal of Medzhia Tabia, two small enclaves jutting into Romania and a triangle of land on the Black Sea coast was rejected by the Romanians was insufficient.8* Thus the negotiations resulted in an immediate impasse.

The positive impression made by Izvolsky's statement vanished when Sazonov on the same day the Romano-Bulgarian talks opened suggested that Silistra should go to

Romania.83 Geshov responded to Sazonov's suggestion by threatening to resign.8* At the same time he requested

Russian mediation in the dispute with Romania.88 The

Bulgarian minister president strongly opposed the cession of Silistra. He told Nekludov;

□ne of the regiments which has distinguished itself most in the present campaign is the regiment of Silistra, composed of citizens of that town and its environs. How could we suddenly say to the soldiers of this regiment which is before Chataldja,'you are no longer Bulgarians, you are Romanians?'86

Geshov greatly resented Sazonov's suggestion to cede

Silistra. He responded , "We are deeply grieved that with this we are led to believe that Bulgaria, in the most critical moment in its history, has been abandoned by

Russia."87 Underlying this concern was a deeper anxiety 210

that if Sazonov did not support Bulgaria against Romania he might not guarantee the convention vith Serbia.

Geshov's threat of resignation was serious. He was under considerable strain because of the problems with the allies and the problems with Romania not to mention those resulting from the war itself. In a letter of 12

February/29 January Geshov admitted to Madzharov:

I often ask myself, after everything I did for the realization of the alliance, whether I could remain at the head of the Bulgarian government while the alliance is collapsing. Would it not be better if I withdrew and left others to carry on and maybe to fight with the allies? Such a war would be terrible. I had placed such bright hopes in the truth and loyalty of these allies when I negotiated with them and committed myself to them. I have kept the thought of resignation to myself for some time, especially since the terrible reports of Greek and Serbian outrages in the Bulgarian lands they occupy have become more frequent despite my love for peace and loyalty. I hope that our allies come to their senses and that our enemies will not have the satisfaction of seeing things end badly for us. 3 •

Another source of irritation to the minister president was his increasingly cool relations with his sovereign.3* But

Geshov did not resign. He felt a responsibility to the alliance he had created. “ Also he was pressured to remain in office by the Russians.6 * But his energy and resolve had abated.

Geshov's doubts about continuing in office at this time were shared by most of the members of his cabinet.

The entire Ministerial Council, confronted by Russian pressure to cede Silistra, contemplated resignation in 211 order to form a more widely based coalition government to implement this disgrace.6• This idea was abandoned, however, because of projected difficulties in persuading other parties to join a cabinet whose purpose was to surrender Bulgarian territory.4 a A communication from

Sazonov on 17/4 February indicating that he meant only

Medzhia Tabia, not Silistra, should be given to the

Romanians, did little to alleviate the concern of the

Sofia government.64 The wavering policy of St. Petersburg only increased Bulgarian anxieties.

Fearing a collapse of the Sofia negotiations the

Great Powers on 19/6 February offered to settle the

Romano-Bulgarian dispute.4* After some hesitation over the Bulgarian preference for mediation versus the Romanian demand for arbitration, Geshov accepted this offer and acceded to arbitration.44 In this decision he overcame some opposition from his coalition partner. Danev resisted any further negotiations with Bucharest.47 Even after the acceptance of the Great Power offer Danev and most members of his party remained adamant against any territorial concession to Romania.44 But Geshov's moderate view prevailed because Danev offered no real alternative. Resistance was out of the question, as Danev himself admitted.4• So the Great Power proposal was accepted. 212

The agreement to this proposal meant the loss of

Silistra. The day after Sazonov's demarche Geshov

indicated to the other members of the government that

Bulgaria must be prepared to cede Silistra.7* By the next

day, 15/2 February, the entire Ministerial Council had

reluctantly accepted the eventual loss of Silistra.71

With the acceptance of Great Power mediation Geshov

shifted the onus of responsibility for the loss of

Silistra away from his government. This way he could

remain in power to maintain the agreement with Serbia.

Geshov emphasized his moderate approach to the

Romanian problem in a speech in the Subranie:

We shall try to defend the rights of a population which has made such costly sacrifices in the present war. We shall use every means to convince the powers of the necessity of finding a formula which not only settles the present disagreement, but also leaves no seed of future discord between these two nations, which are connected by centuries old ties of good neighborliness and staunch friendship.7•

This statesmanlike declaration was an attempt to create a positive impression in European opinion for the Bulgarian cause. Even the Romanians were satisfied with the speech.7 * At the same time for domestic purposes the speech indicated that the government continued to oppose any surrender of Bulgarian territory.

The powers decided to arbitrate the Romano-Bulgarian dispute in St. Petersburg, with Sazonov as chairman and the ambassadors of the other five countries participating. 213

Bulgarian and Romanian representatives were not invited to

take part. Nevertheless on 13 March/28 February the Sofia

government decided to send the tireless Danev to St.

Petersburg.7* Ostensibly Danev was to observe the

proceedings of the conference. But, as he later wrote,

"My real mission was to inform leading Russian circles on

our views, on the agreements with the allies, and

especially on the agreement with Serbia in connection with the implementation of the written alliance agreement."78

The Bulgarian government regarded Silistra as lost but still hoped to insure official and popular Russian support for the Bulgarian cause against the Greek and especially the Serbian pretensions in Macedonia.

Danev's departure was delayed because of Sazonov's reluctance to receive the Bulgarian statesman in the

Russian capital during the conference.7* But on 19/6

March Sazonov relented and Indicated that Danev might come.77 In St. Petersburg Danev met with Sazonov on four separate occasions. The only important result of these meetings was the resolution of the question of the Turco-

Bulgarian frontier. The standing Bulgarian proposal had been delivered to St. Petersburg back in December by

Teodorov. This was the so-called 'strategic' line and went from Enos on the Aegean Sea along the Erkene River to

Midia on the Black Sea.78 This line brought the Bulgarian frontier close to Constantinople. Sazonov had already 214 indicated that he favored an Enos-Midia line.7* So when

Danev, ignorant of Teodorov's proposal, suggested a straight Enos-Media line Sazonov promptly accepted.1•

Bobchev, the Bulgarian minister in St. Petersburg, had long urged the adoption of the 'strategic' line and was indignant over the manner in which the issue was resolved.•* But Geshov was satisfied to have the matter settled.•• This was another step toward peace.

Nevertheless the resolution of this matter demonstrated a serious lack of coordination in Bulgarian policy.

Danev also pressed Bulgarian claims to Salonika and attempted to link this issue with that of Silistra. In this endeavor he received no encouragement from Sazonov.-*

In an extravagant moment Danev raised Bulgarian claims to

Dibar, an Albanian town then an object of contention between Russia on behalf of Serbia and Austria on behalf of the new Albanian state.-4 He even suggested that

Albania might become a Bulgarian protectorate since

Bulgaria, unlike Greece or Serbia, had no historic connections there.-5 This meddling in the Albanian dispute did little to endear Danev to either side at St.

Petersburg.

Another intemperate impulse caused Danev, during an audience with Tsar Nicholas II, to offer Russia

Constantinople as a token of gratitude for Bulgaria's liberation. The nonplussed tsar responded that such 215

largess was not necessary.** While Russia maintained

historic designs on Constantinople, she did not wish to

receive it as a gift from a client state. Danev's

performance in St. Petersburg did not enhance the

Bulgarian cause. In a situation that demanded subtlety

and tact he managed imprudence and excessiveness.

The Sofia government naturally desired to secure

Great Power support for its position in the dispute with

Romania. And the deterioration of relations with the

allies and the unsteady patronage of Sazonov encouraged

the Sofia government to seek additional Great Power

backing for Bulgarian aims. For this reason Bulgaria began to improve its relations with the other Great Power having important Balkan interests, Austria-Hungary. The first indications of this expansion of policy emanated from the Bulgarian embassy in Vienna. At the beginning of

February/end of January sources in the embassy hinted that

Bulgarian agreements with Serbia, Austria's bete noire in the Balkans, were valid only until the end of the war.*7

Then on 11 February/29 January Geshov emotionally blurted to Count Tarnowski,, the Austrian minister in Sofia,

Lately Bulgaria has had a knife at her throat while she has been in a difficult fight with Turkey. This adversely affects the present feeling for Romania and also for the Monarchy. I want to maintain our good relations with you. These can be more useful to you than those with Romania, with whom you will have difficulties sooner or later, I beg you to help us, not to oppose us. This will secure our gratitude for you.•• 216

After this impassioned appeal Geshov recovered himself and proceeded with greater caution in his pursuit of the Dual

Monarchy. He coyly avoided Tarnowski's attempts to encourage a rapprochement.•* The wary Bulgarian minister president was concerned that Austria-Hungary had an arrangement with Serbia to support that country's pretensions in Macedonia.9• An he had no desire to offend

Russia with any overt move in the direction of the

Habsburg Monarchy.

Danev, although an ultrarussophile, was characteristically less restrained in his approach to the

Austrians. He responded positively to proposals from

Vienna for special economic arrangements in Salonika.91

Most of the other Progressive Liberals in the cabinet shared rhis opinion.9* But the Nationalists more realistically feared that any rapprochement with the Dual

Monarchy risked the loss of Russian protection, and with that the Russian guarantee of the convention with

Serbia.9’ Some Nationalists, notably Teodorov and Peev-

Plachkov, indicated a desire for closer ties to Austria-

Hungary. 9 4 So on 4 March/19 February the Ministerial

Council decided to approach Austria-Hungary for support of

Bulgarian policies in return for financial advantages in

Salonika.99 At the same time the Ministerial Council informed St. Petersburg that Sofia intended to seek economic arrangements with the Dual Monarchy.96 Geshov 217

reacted positively to Berchtold's Idea which linked a

Salonika economic deal with a settlement with Romania.*’

This sort of arrangement was exactly what the Bulgarians

wanted. While no specific agreements were ever made in

this case Geshov implicitly linked them when on 7 March/22

February he informed Tarnowski that the Bulgarian government had confirmed Austrian economic privileges in

Salonika.** But Austrian attempts to secure the agreement at St. Petersburg of the other powers for Bulgarian compensation in return to concessions to Romania met opposition from both Germany and France.•• So neither

Bulgaria nor Austria-Hungary gained any advantage from this affair.

Geshov's rapprochement with the Dual Monarchy was an overt attempt to obtain Austrian and possibly Triple

Alliance support for the Bulgarian cause at the

St.Petersburg conference. Teodorov forthrightly told

Tarnowski:

Our alliance with the Serbs has made a bad impression in Vienna. You can be sure that we concluded this accord only against Turkey. After peace is concluded we shall have no agreements with Serbia or Greece just as now we have no agreement with Russia. We, a Russophile government, are convinced completely of the necessity and possibility of a close friendship with Austria-Hungary and of a rapprochement with the Triple Alliance. We can foresee the rivalry of a Greater Bulgaria with Russia, but we do not foresee any possible differences between our interests and yours. These interests are parallel. As for the Serbs, we are no longer surprised that you have lost patience with them. We can do no more about it. For a long time we 218

have viewed your attitude in the Romanian question with mistrust, but we are convinced of late that you will be impartial and we have confidence that you will continue to aid us. Unfortunately it will be difficult to find a solution that does not leave rancor between Bulgaria and Romania.1'•

Compelled by a strong desire to save Bulgarian land from

Romania, the Sofia government turned to Vienna. This was

a practical course of action which offered certain

economic and political advantages. Berchtold's and

Teodorov's rationales for an Austro-Bulgarian

rapprochement were quite similar. While the Geshov government understood this, its emotional attachment to

the 'Russian liberators' precluded any meaningful action in this direction. Russian influence remained paramount in Sofia. Russophobe opposition leaders warned Tarnowski that above all the Geshov government was Russophile.*•*

And Tarnowski himself acknowledged, "In this land where there are no Russophobes this is the most Russophile government possible.• The flirtation with Austria-

Hungary was never anything more for the Geshov government than a tactic resulting from opposition to territorial concession to Romania and from wounded feelings due to the lack of Russian support on this issue. Bulgaria had to remain a Russian client in order to ensure that the terms of the treaty with Serbia would be upheld.

Soon after the confirmation of economic privileges in

Salonika the Bulgarian government veered away from this 219

rapprochement with Austria-Hungary. This was because of

the Bulgarian victory at Adrianople. On 26/13 March

Adrianople finally fell to a Bulgarian assault.1,1

Unusually severe weather conditions had delayed the

assault for some time.*•* And Savov had been reluctant to

force Adrianople.*■s But the Russian general staff had urged the Bulgarians to take Adrianople by storm.1•* And the government was anxious to finish with the Turks in order to focus attention on the problems with the allies.

The victory at Adrianople aroused great enthusiasm in

Bulgaria.**7 The army had continued the triumphal traditions of Kirk Kilasse and Lule Burgas. Predictably neither Athens nor Beograd demonstrated much excitement over this Bulgarian success. *•• A problem with Serbia arose over conflicting claims regarding the Turkish surrender. The Serbs asserted that the Turks had surrendered to their Timok Division while the Bulgarians insisted that Bulgarian troops had received the Turkish capitulation. The Bulgarians finally determined to the satisfaction of their national honor that they deserved the distinction of the Turkish surrender. *• • This incident aptly demonstrated the growing friction between

Bulgaria and Serbia.

The Bulgarian victory also encountered a tremendous official and popular response in Russia. Danev and

Bobchev received applause from the members of the Duma and 220

crowds in St. Petersburg celebrated the fall of Adrianople

as if it were a Russian victory.1 *• Back in Sofia as

Adrianople was falling Nekludov tearfully gushed to the

Ministerial Council, "We wanted to give it to you, now you

are taking it yourselves. "1 * 1 This effusion of Russian

enthusiasm and sympathy confirmed the Bulgarian

government's final line of defense against all external

problems. The fundamental Bulgarophile feeling of the

Russian people would in the end save Bulgaria.

Soon after this victory Savov ordered an assault on

the Chataldja lines. This attack was undertaken without

the direct knowledge of the government, purportedly in

order to compel St. Petersburg to pressure the Turks to

make peace.* 1 * More likely this was an attempt to rush

Constantinople and present Russia with a fait accompli.1‘*

The attack, although meeting strong Turkish resistance,

caused considerable consternation in St. Petersburg.114

Sazonov even contemplated the dispatch of a Russian fleet

to Constantinople to forestall Bulgarian ambitions there

and invited the participation of the other Entente powers

in this venture.1 * a But Savov ended the attack when ordered to do so by Geshov. who in the meantime had

learned of it.1 * 6

Then on Geshov's insistence a crown council was convened on 5 April/21 March at the Adrianople railway station in the private railway car of the former Turkish 221

Minister of War Nazim Pasha, who had been murdered by the young Turks in their takeover in January. Geshov stunned the council by announcing that Sazonov had promised that

Bulgaria could expect to obtain the disputed zone in

Macedonia if military activity at Chataldja ceased.*17

This was welcome reassurance for the government, which this time lacked all desire to take Constantinople.

Geshov also urged that Bulgaria accept arbitration in the dispute with Greece.* 1• The council agreed.* *• Also at this council the army high command urged that the army demobilize in order to rest the troops.11• Ferdinand's expressed desire for the Aegean island of Samothrace received little attention.* * * This council was an apparent success for Geshov. The war would end, Russia would enforce the Serbo-Bulgarian convention and the dispute with Greece would have a peaceful resolution. An editorial in Mir reflected the positive mood:

We are very grateful to the Russian government for wisely emphasizing that the Balkan Slavs must remain faithful to their alliance. We do not doubt that the Russian tsar and the Russian government will exert all of their influence over the allied Slavs to force them to maintain the holy and sacred obligations undertaken in the alliance agreement concluded among them. Only through the fulfillment of these obligations is the maintenance of the Slavic peace and the Slavic agreements possible.*“*

If Geshov had carried out the crown council program his policy would have been successful and Bulgaria would have attained the national aspiration. 222

Unfortunately this success proved ephemeral. Danev's

return from St. Petersburg on 8 April/26 March caused a

major crisis with domestic and foreign implications. The

domestic problem centered on the tsar's relations with the

government. Ferdinand had been dissatisfied with the

Geshov cabinet for some time.*•* He had treated the ministers with cold disdain at the Adrianople crown council.1®4 And Danev's justifiable reluctance to press the issue of Rodosto at St. Petersburg greatly angered him. He informed the government that he would not receive

Danev for the customary end-of-mission report.1,8 Geshov correctly perceived that this insult was, "directed against the government and especially against me."1*®

This was the first time Ferdinand had emerged from the shadows and openly demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the Geshov government. Geshov himself quickly responded with a telegram to Ferdinand rejecting Bulgarian pretensions to Rodosto. He insisted that claims to the port on the Sea of Marmara were an affront to the Great

Powers, and risked further sacrifices by the nation.1®7

The telegram was intended to force Ferdinand to either dismiss the government or accept its policies.1** But the tsar failed to react. He was aware of the dangers of a change of government during this difficult period.1®* And undoubtedly he did not wish to assume responsibility himself for policy whether it changed or not.11* So the 223

Geshov-Danev coalition remained in power. But the

government failed to act on its advantage. A statement of

support or at least of non-interference from the tsar

might have been exacted here.

Danev's return also caused foreign policy

difficulties. He had accomplished nothing concrete in St.

Petersburg except possibly the settlement of the eastern

frontier.‘a * So major problems still confronted Bulgaria.

Furthermore on his return Danev made known his opposition

to the idea of arbitration with Greece and was joined in

this opposition by the members of his party participating

in the government.1,1 With half of the government now

against arbitration with Greece, the opportunity for a

peaceful resolution of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute passed.

Geshov did not press this issue with his coalition

partner.

On 7 April/25 March the Turkish General Izet Pasha contacted Savov to arrange an armistice meeting.1,1

Despite the Russian pressure to end the fighting Savov did

not want to meet the Turks, because he feared that this

Russian insistence would weaken the Bulgarian bargaining position.tJ4 Geshov concurred, and the Turkish proposal received no response. This Bulgarian concern for negotiation position suggests that the Army's situation was still difficult. Additional Russian pressure to conclude the armistice and assurances that the treaty with 224

Serbia would be upheld were necessary before the

Bulgarians agreed to meet with the Turks.'*8 Finally on

12 April/31 March Geshov instructed Savov to arrange for armistice talks with the Turks, and assured him that the

Turkish obstinacy in the negotiations would not be a problem.'11 The Russians had insured that the Turks would be pliable. The next day the Bulgarian General Toshev met with the Turkish General Galib. The Turks promptly agreed to all the Bulgarian conditions and the armistice was signed.‘*T The armistice became effective the next day and would be renewed every ten days.'*• The fighting with

Turkey was over.

Bulgaria ended the second phase of the war in better condition than she had ended the first phase. Adrianople had fallen to the Bulgarian army and the Russians had promised to maintain the convention with Serbia.

Nevertheless the antagonisms with Greece, Serbia and

Romania had grown stronger and more dangerous. And differences between the government and the Tsar and within the government itself had emerged. At Adrianople Geshov apparently had secured agreement for his foreign policy objectives. But he failed to act quickly and strongly enough to press his advantage. Bulgaria still faced major obstacles in the quest for the national aspiration. 225

FOOTNOTES

1. Mir no. 3774, 18 January 1913.

2. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 176, 179.

3. Bulgarian Historical Archive, hereafter referred to as BIA, 14-72-12.

4. BAN 51-1-17-181. On 2 February/20 January for the first time in six weeks Geshov met with the tsar to discuss the war situation. This prompted Abrashev to speculate that Ferdinand wanted Geshov out of office. Ibid. 180.

5. DDF 3rd ser. V 365.

6. BAN 51-1-17-186. For the text of Savov's proclamation to his troops see Ganchev, II 182-83.

7. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 75.

8. O-UA V 5734. Colonel Romanovskii, the Russian military attache in Sofia, urged the Bulgarians to storm Adrianople. BAN 51-1-17-195.

9. DPIK I 243 no. 58. Some fighting had occurred already at Gallipoli on 8-10 February/26-28 January. See Volnata VII 269-305; Kosev, 121-123.

10. DPIK I 243 no. 59.

11. Ibid. 244 no. 60; BAN 51-1-18-206.

12. DPIK I 307 no. 123; GP XXXIV i 12767, 12779; O-UA V 5568, 5656, 5658, 5667; DDF 3rd ser. V 312.

13. DPIK I 308 no. 125, 310 no. 131.

14. BAN 51-1-18-209; BD IX ii 688 n. 1; O-UA V 5997, 6007; DDF 3rd ser. V 480 n. 1 pg 581; GP XXXIV i 12913 n. 2, 12932.

15. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 77.

16. BAN 51-1-18-209. The Ministerial Council preferred to rely on the services of Russia alone. Ibid. 212.

17. BD IX ii 669.

18. DPIK I 310 no. 132. 226

19. BAN 51-1-18-216.

20. DPIK I 317 no. 150, 318-19 no. 152. Geshov informed the Subranie of these conditions on 14/1 March. See 15th ONS 2nd RS,* speech of I. E. Geshov, 1 March 1913, 417.

21. O-UA V 6157; DDF 3rd ser. 587; BD IX ii 713. According to the British minister in Sofia, Bax-Ironside the demand for Rodosto was "not meant seriously."

22. BAN 51-1-17-184.

23. Nekludov, 140. Nekludov mistakenly places this visit during the first week of March. 138-39.

24. BAN 51-1-17-185; Toshev, II 197.

25. Nekludov, 142.

26. On Nigrita see DPIK I 975-76 no. 34, 976 no. 35. On Subota see Prilozhenie II 377 no. 157, 378-79 no. 159, 379-80 no. 180.

27. DPIK I 982 no. 49.

28. Ibid. 590 no. 63, 64, 597 no. 77.

29. BD IX ii 601; Toshev, II 173-74.

30. Ibid.

31. DPIK I 401-403 no. 119; GP XXXIV i 12786; BD IX ii 657 enclosure 1; Toshev, II 186.

32. BAN 51-1-17-188; BD IX ii 657 enclosures 2, 4.

33. DPIK I 405-08 no. 24, 409-13 no. 25; SD I 278; BD IX ii 693; DDF 3rd ser. V 549. For a summation of Pashich.'s four point demand see Helmreich, Balkan Wars 353-54; Rossos, 165; Herring. 361-62. These three scholars agree that the Serbian case for revision was weak.

34. Toshev, II 189.

35. Ibid. 190; Prilozhenie I

36. BIA II 11188; Toshev, II 190-95.

37. DPIK I 421 no. 38; Prilozhenie I (Peev-Plachkov) 348; Toshev, II 195. 227

38. DPIK I 424 no. 44. However Toshev apparently did leak the terms of the secret agreement, much to the consternation of the Serbs. See BD IX ii 660.

39. 15th ONS 2nd RS, speech of I. E. Geshov, 1 March 1913, 419.

40. Toshev, II 189.

41. DPIK I 421 no. 39.

42. DDF 3rd ser. V 458.

43. DPIK I 316 no. 147.

44. See Toshev, II 197. General Radko Dimitriev, in discussing this eventuality, boasted that the army anticipated further victories.

45. DPIK I 419 no. 157.

46. BAN 51-1-17-181; DPIK I 719 no. 157.

47. DPIK I 727 no. 177.

48. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 38.

49. DPIK I 720 no. 158.

50. Ibid. 723 no. 168.

51. Ibid. 724 o. 172.

52. Ibid. 729 no. 180; DDF 3rd ser. V 402; O-UA V 5822; Kalinkov, 173. This Bulgarian counterproposal was essentially the same as Danev's four pointproposal.

53. DPIK I 725 no. 175; O-UA V5834; Kalinkov, 172.

54. BAN 51-1-17-193; DPIK I 724 no. 174.

55. Ibid. Geshov had requested this mediation earlier on 11 February/29 January. See DDF 3rd ser. V 405, 417.

56. Nekludov, 153

57. DPIK I 725-26 no. 176; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 75-76.

58. Madzharov, Podqotovka 108. 228

59. BAN 51-1-17-180; Nekludov, 142. Ferdinand absented himself from the affairs of state for long periods of time. See above 224, n. 4.

60. Madzharov, Podqotovka 108.

61. Nekludov, 143.

62. BAN 51-1-17 197, 98. Ferdinand did not oppose this formation of a new government but refused to assume any initiative himself. Ibid. 201.

63. Ibid. 198.

64. DPIK I 735 no. 196; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 76; Kalinkov, 175.

65. DPIK I 733 no. 191; DDF 3rd ser. V 437, 438.

66. DPIK I 744 no. 221, 222; O-UA V 6000 Beilage; DDF 3rd ser. V 441, 510; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 76-77. The Romanians had already accepted. O-UA V 5902; Kalinkov, 175. Geshov apparently had known in advance that the Romanians would accept. O-UA V 5972. On the question of mediation or arbitration see, DDF 3rd ser. V 495; 510; Rom Doc 99; BD IX ii 673; O-UA V 5963, 5978.

67. BD IX ii 620, 658; DDF 3rd ser. V 400, 445. The British minister in Sofia attributed Danev's uncompromising position to the Progressive Liberal leader's ambition to succeed Geshov.

68. BAN-I-18-203-04. One Progressive Liberal, D. Hristov, did favor an accommodation with Romania by the cession of Silistra. On Hristov's pro-Romanian views see Toshev, II 190. Ferdinand, to whom Hristov was linked, also wanted an arrangement with Bucharest, and urged the cession of Silistra. See BAN 51-1-17-194; O-UA V 6303.

69. O-UA V 5877.

70. BAN 51-1-17-193.

71. Ibid. 195, 18-218.

72. 15th ONS 2nd RS, Speech of I. E. Geshov, 1 March 1913, 419.

73. DPIK I 751 no. 237.

74. BAN 51-1-18-216, 219. 229

75. Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 30. See also Prilozhenie I (Danev) 50.

76. BIA II D 5379/50-1. See also O-UA V 6209. Sazonov was not alone in his aversion to Danev's visit. Nekludov remarked, "We are afraid Danev will talk too much and mess up everything." O-UA V 6251.

77. BIA II D 5379/50-3. Danev originally intended to leave for St. Petersburg on 15/2 March, and actually left on 21/8 March.

78. BAN 51-1-16-157-58; DPIK I 333-34 no. 197. This frontier was advocated by the high command. See Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 77.

79. BIA II D 5379/50-4.

80. DPIK I 333-34 no. 197; Izvolsky III 789; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 77-79.

81. BIA II D 5379/50-30; DPIK I 333-34 no. 197.

82. GP XXXIV ii 13089.

83. BAN 51-1-18-243; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 77-79.

84. BAN 51-1-18-242; DDF 3rd ser. VI 207. On the Russo- Austrian dispute see Helmreich, Balkan Wars 284-86.

85. DDF 3rd ser. VI 199.

86. BAN 51-1-18-242; Buchanan, 181.

87. O-UA V 5688; Feldmarschall Conrad (Franz, Count Conrad von Hoetzendorff) Aus melner Dienzeit 1906-1918 5 vols. (Vienna, 1921-25) III 164.

88. O-UA V 5757.

89. See for example O-UA V 5851, 5892.

90. DPIK I 414 no. 27.

91. BAN 51-1-17-188. On these proposals see O-UA V 5585, 5586. Berchtold lectured Tarnowski on this subject:

If we are inclined to support the wide ranging national aspirations of Bulgaria and to promote the creation of a Greater Bulgaria extending beyond the San Stefano frontiers, then we must proceed from the concept, that a thoroughly 220

sated and strong Bulgaria will pursue only its own policy interests, which will not conflict with our interests anywhere. Our efforts to secure Salonika for Bulgaria naturally are based on the consideration that Bulgaria would be obligated to declare that city a free port with our very considerable economic interests amply accommodated.

92. BAH 51-1-18 208-09. Abrashev explained Bulgaria's position this way; " We are seeking the help of Austria- Hungary at a time, when Romania blackmails us because we are without a protector, and Serbia wants to blackmail us and take land that by the convention is ours, and in this robbery has taken Greece as an ally." But Abrashev also characterized Austrian aid as a 'greek gift.'

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid. 201; Toshev, II 164, 197-98. In addition some opposition leaders made no secret of the Russophobe outlooks. See for example 15th DNS 2nd RS, speech of Dimitur Tonchev, 2 March 1913, 449.

95. BAN 51-1-18-208-10. See also O-UA V 5996.

96. BAN 5-1-18-212; DDF 3rd ser. V 588.

97. O-UA V 6006, 6020.

98. Ibid. 6060, 6078. Teodorov also linked these two problems. See ibid. 6040. On Austrian rights in Salonika see Cental Tukin, Die politiscen Beziehunqen zwischen Oesterreich-Ungarn und Bulgarien von 1908 bis zum Bukarester Frieden (Hamburg, 1936) 159-60.

99. See BD IX ii 769; Helmreich, Balkan Wars 303-305.

100. O-UA V 6021. Here Teodorov was not completely candid about the Bulgarian arrangement with Serbia, which did have anti-Austrian aspects. Nor was he frank about the lack of an agreement with Russia, although in this case the Russian failure to support Bulgaria against Romania left this an open question.

101. Ibid. 6137, 6210, 6211, 6318.

102. Ibid. VI 6627.

103. On the assault see Voinata V ii 711-1029; Fichev, 326-37; Ivanov, 193-230; Kosev, 126-47; Iliya Iliev, "Ovladyavaneto na Odrinskata krepost--vruh na bulgarskata 231

voina slava," Izvestiya. suppliment to Voennoistoricheski ebornlk vol. 37 (Sofia, 19Q4) 129-40. The Turkish determination to retain Adrianople is explained in a statement the Turkish diplomat Hak Pasha made to Danev in London, "For you Adrianople is a window into our harem.■ BAN 51-1-18-310.

104. DPIK I 244 nos 61, 62; DDF 3rd ser. VI 96.

105. BAN 51-1-18-215. At the same time Savov professed himself anxious to conclude peace on the field of battle in order to impress the Turks and satisfy the army. Dnevnik no. 4218, 27 March 1914, "Katastrofiyata, " (Savov to Geshov, 20 February 1913). Apparently Savov still hoped to defeat the Turks at Chataldja.

106. BAN 51-1-18-218.

107. Ibid. 230; DDF 3rd ser. VI 109.

108. DPIK I 424-29 no. 46, 592 no. 69; Toshev, II 200.

109. Prilozhenie II 397 no. 208, 398 no. 210; DPIK I 430 no. 52; BD IX ii 823; Solarov, 61-62.

110. DPIK I 230 no. 157; GP XXXIV ii 13036; O-UA VI 6566; Bobchev, 107; Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 35. After this outpouring of enthusiasm D. Popovich, the Serbian minister in St. Petersburg, thought that the Bulgarians enjoyed greater Russian support than did Serbia. (SD I 289) But Toshev thought the opposite. (Toshev, II 202-03) Toshev's opinion undoubtedly was influenced by his proximity to Hartwig.

111. BAN 51-1-18-228.

112. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 254; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 106.

113. Ferdinand still craved Constantinople but doubted that Russia would allow him to enter it. Madol, 153.

114. Izvolsky, II 795, 807, III 826.

115. DDF 3rd ser. VI 127, 217; BD IX ii 800, 807; Siebert III 927.

116. DPIK I 323 no. 167; Prilozhenie I (Savov) 254; Fichev, 350. 232

117. TsDIA fond 568 opua 1 a. e. 704, 19; Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 125; DPIK I 430 no. 51; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 106. Sazonov told Danev the same thing in St. Petersburg on 20/17 March. DPIK I 423 no. 43; Nashata duma (Danev) 204. According to Savov Sazonov also insisted that the Bulgarians immediately conclude a secret armistice with Turkey. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 254, II (Savov) 300. See also Rossos, 127.

118. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 704, 19-20, 22; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 106.

119. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 96, 106.

120. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 256; Petur Abrashev, "Zapovedta za strechuyatelnata ataka, " Bulqariya no. 21, 15 October 1913.

121. BAN 51-1-18-235. On Ferdinand and Samothrace see Madzharov, Podqotovka 146; BIA D II 5379/50-36-37; DDF 3rd ser. VI 257. Sazonov procured the assent of the powers for the presentation of Samothrace to Ferdinand as a 'personal gift. ' On Ferdinand's reasons for wanting the island see Constant, 265-66.

122. Mir no. 3844, 31 March 1913.

123. BAN 51-1-18-221.

124. Ibid. 237, 243.

125. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 104-05.

126. Ibid. 105.

127. Ibid.; DPIK I 329 no. 187.

128. BAN 51-1-18-246, 248.

129. Ibid. 222.

130. O-UA V 6271.

131. Ibid. VI 6558.

132. TsDIA fond 568 opus 1 a. e. 704, 19; BAN 51-1-18- 247.

133. BAN 51-1-18-239; Toshev, II 214.

134. DPIK I 326-27 no. 179, 327 no. 180. 233

135. BAN 51-1-18-249; DPIK I 330 no. 189.

136. DPIK I 330 no. 188, 323 no. 194.

137. BAN 51-1-18-251.

138. DPIK I 330 no. 190, 331 no. 191; BD IX ii 857. CHAPTER VII

GESHOV'S PEACE

The signing of the armistice on 16/3 April brought

Bulgaria no respite in its difficulties with the allies

and Romania. Two days after the armistice was arranged

Geshov assured the Subranie that Bulgaria and Serbia were

working together to overcome the problems in Macedonia.*

But in fact the situation had deteriorated further. A

statement by the Serbian Finance Minister Laza Pachu that

the Serbian army would not demobilize until the borders

were settled incensed Geshov. Regarding this threat the

Bulgarian minister president informed all Bulgarian

legations on 15/2 April:

This statement is the first and very sad official acknowledgement that the Serbs intend to deny the arbitration foreseen in our agreement as a means to settle the border question. Their aspiration to obtain more territory than permitted is baseless, because according to the formal military conventions of 19 June and 15 September 1912 they were obligated to do everything necessary for a successful campaign in the Thracian theater of war. •

Furthermore on 18/5 April new reports of anti-Bulgarian activities in Macedonia reached Sofia.J The position of the Bulgarian government in relation to the Serbian problem was precarious.

234 235

Bulgaria could not react to the Serbian provocations

in a manner that would present Beograd with an excuse to

deny the convention. But the Sofia government was

obligated by a sense of duty as well as by public pressure

to defend the Bulgarian population in Macedonia. The defense of this population after all had served as the rationale for the war against Turkey. Justice Minister

Abrashev concisely stated the position of the governments

The indignation against Serbia grows daily. We are not in a position to mitigate the national anger, even if we wanted to do so. And we not only do not wish to stop it, but we are obligated to see this issue to the end. As Bulgarians and as people who have accepted the responsibility of government, we are compelled to defend at any price the rights and interests of the Bulgarian people.4

The government was prepared to confront Serbia on the

Macedonian question.

In this difficult situation the position of Russia was equivocal. Sazonov urged Geshov to meet with Pashich, but the Bulgarian minister president refused. 9 In his view such a meeting would circumvent the convention with

Serbia. Nevertheless the Bulgarian government remained very sensitive to the Russian position in the Serbo-

Bulgarian dispute. Geshov astutely perceived that, "in the case of a fratricidal conflict Russian public opinion would turn away from Bulgaria and Russia would remain an indifferent spectator to the ruin of Bulgaria."* Geshov still based his policy on his perception of the innate 236

Bulgarophile tendency of the Russian people. The

continued validity of the convention depended on the

support of Russian public opinion regardless of the

vacillations of the Russian government. Therefore,

according to Geshov, Bulgaria could not risk the loss of

this support by any aggression against Serbia.

The dispute with the non-Slavic Greeks, however,

offered the Sofia government more freedom of action.

Geshov preferred a peaceful solution to the Greek problem.

On 16/3 April with the support of the Ministerial Council

he renewed his efforts to achieve a settlement with

Athens.7 Geshov indicated that Bulgaria was prepared to

begin negotiations as soon as Greece presented an

'acceptable' frontier line as the basis for talks.* The

Greek Premier Venizelos's peaceful declarations to E.

Demidov, the Russian minister in Athens, had encouraged the Bulgarian minister president.• Also St. Petersburg had pressured Sofia to begin negotiations with the

Greeks.*• But when Athens did submit a proposed frontier

Geshov promptly rejected it. He specifically objected to the extent of the Greek claims in the hinterland of

Salonika and to the magnitude of the Greek pretensions, which surpassed the claims Venizelos had advanced during the talks with Danev in London in December.‘‘ The

Bulgarians wanted a frontier with Greece approximating the

San Stefano border.*• They continued to insist on the 237

principle of proportionality as the basis for this claim.

Venizelos rejected this principle but accepted the

principle of nationality for delineating the border, and

invited the Bulgarians to propose a line.11 Geshov did

not respond to this suggestion. Despite a desire to

settle vith Greece he clung to the presumptuous policy of

proportionality.* 4 By doing so he missed a good

opportunity to resolve the frontier issue with Athens.

Had Geshov adopted a more pragmatic perspective an

agreement on the basis of nationality might have been

reached in April 1913. The insistence on the principle of

proportionality made the Bulgarians appear overbearing and

greedy.

The unrealistic expectations of the Bulgarian

government in the Greek dispute were emphasized in an

incident concerning the Bulgarians garrison in Salonika.

The Bulgarian high command, increasingly concerned about

the strategic situation after the armistice, desired to consolidate the Bulgarian forces. On 26/13 April Savov ordered the Bulgarian troops in Salonika to withdraw.15

These soldiers, surrounded by the Greeks, were in an exposed and potentially dangerous situation. However, this order received a negative response in the Ministerial

Council. The ministers feared that the Greeks would view any such withdrawal as a hostile act of military consolidation. 1 * Furthermore the ministers were reluctant 238

to order the retreat of the military unit that symbolized

Bulgarian aspirations in Salonika. So Geshov, despite his desire to reach an accommodation with Greece and his willingness to forgo Salonika, insisted to Savov that the troops remain.* 7 The minister president explained that their presence was necessary as a bargaining factor.

Savov complied, but bitterly and somewhat hypocritically noted:

Military prudence forces me to concentrate on the soldiers. As long as politics forces the opposite, I shall not bear the responsibility for the consequences. I insist that the question of Salonika is being resolved politically, and we could lose these troops because of politics.*•

Savov's forcast proved correct. Two months later this

Bulgarian detachment was overcome by a superior Greek force.

The tension with the allies increased with an alarming report by Savov on 16/3 April that Serbian and

Greek forces were in an initial strategic position to wage war against Bulgaria.‘• On this occasion and again one week later Savov urged the government to conclude a separate peace with Turkey so that the Bulgarian army could prepare for the new danger.“• The government itself was anxious to reckon with the Serbian and Greek threat.

On 21/8 April the Ministerial Council decided to summon the high command to a meeting to consider the military situation.“‘ The ministers also wanted to use this 239 meeting to clarify their relationship with their tsar.*'

Ferdinand's neglect of the government as an indication of his displeasure was a source of great irritation to the ministers. Yet the government continued to make policy without the ruler, who spent most of his time at the royal residence at Tsarska Bistritsa outside Sofia. Ferdinand's presence obviously was not critical to Geshov's policy.

When the Ministerial Council met with Savov and

Fichev on 28/15 April Ferdinand was absent. The government proceeded without him. The ministers wanted to ascertain the reliability of the army in case of a war with Serbia and Greece.** The generals responded tentatively, and urged that Bulgaria and the allies demobilize with the support of the Great Powers.*4 This general demobilization would negate the initial Greek and

Serbian strategic advantage.But the generals had another reason for wanting demobilization which they did not tell the ministers. The soldiers were becoming increasingly restive. Even before the victory at

Adrianople dissatisfaction had surfaced among the troops, and after the armistice the soldiers of this conscript army manifested a desire to return home.“* Demobilization would disperse much of the dissatisfaction in the army.

On this issue the Ministerial Council split along party lines. The Nationalists favored demobilization.*7

But the Progressive Liberals feared that demobilization 240

would be a "death warrant" tor Macedonia.*" No decision

resulted from this conference. The political division

rendered Geshov incapable of action. On this occasion the

advice of the generals was sensible and could have

precluded any accelerated outbreak of war. The generals

also pressed for the conclusion of peace.8' The problem

was to persuade the Balkan allies to demobilize. This

task might have been beyond the capabilities of Bulgarian

diplomacy even had Geshov favored this policy. This council emphasized the estrangement of the government from the ruler. It also demonstrated that the Geshov government was divided against itself in policy matters.

Furthermore the high command gave the government little cause for confidence. Under these circumstances the resolution of Bulgaria's problems with the allies and with

Romania would be difficult.

The Progressive Liberals were dissatisfied with the results of the military council and with Geshov's leadership.3" At a party conference two days after the military council they considered a withdrawal from the government. But they decided to remain and work for the resignation of Geshov.3‘ The Progressive Liberals were motivated by considerations of patriotism and power. But they were unwilling to leave the government and lose their base of authority. The idea of demobilization was abandoned soon after

the military council. Alarming reports from Danev and

Teodorov who were passing though Serbia on 13 May/30 April

on their way to the continuation of the London conference

and a financial conference in Paris respectively indicated

large Serbian military concentrations near the Bulgarian

frontier.*• The two Bulgarian statesmen contacted Geshov

from Vienna and expressed concern for the safety of

Sofia.* * Both Geshov and Ferdinand feared that a Serbian

attack was imminent.*4 The minister president telegraphed

Savov to take measures against the threat to the

capital.*8 The deputy commander-in-chief responded that

he could not maintain an army in both Thrace and western

Bulgaria.** At most he could spare only one brigade.

Savov did organize a screening force of cavalry to deflect the enemy from Sofia. And on 19/6 May he reassured

Geshov, "I advise you to negotiate courageously and firmly with the allies, and bear in mind that we can defeat and destroy their armies easily."*7 Despite the uncertainty he demonstrated at the military council Savov now appeared confident.

After the military council Geshov renewed his efforts to obtain an agreement with the Greeks. He especially was eager to reach a government consensus on this issue before

Danev left for the London peace conference, because he feared that the Progressive Liberals in Danev's absence 242 would fall to reach a decision.11 Geshov wanted the

Ministerial Council to accept the principal of arbitration to settle the dispute with Greece.*• This represented a change in Geshov's policy. His previous efforts to resolve this problem on the basis of proportionality had failed. As the dispute with Serbia grew more pronounced the Bulgarian position against Greece became more exposed.

Furthermore the results of the military council did not encourage the government to contemplate a military solution to this problem. Geshov was forced to moderate his policy. A letter delivered by James Bourchier to

Geshov dated 26/13 April contained a proposal for a Greco-

Bulgarian frontier which offered the Bulgarians a means to initiate a new perspective in their attitude toward

Greece.4* Geshov utilized this proposal to suggest a frontier of his own based on the chain of lakes north of the Chalcidice Peninsula with Salonika conceded to Greece to bolster his argument for arbitration.41 The Bulgarians projected a positive attitude towards Greece. Mir affirmed:

We feel much more certain about the Greeks, and maintain greater hope, that we can easily reach an agreement with them. Despite the existence of a clear agreement between the Serbs and ourselves, we fear greatly that without force we shall not be able to agree with our fellow Orthodox Slavic brothers.4•

The Ministerial Council considered the Greek frontier question for several days in early May/late April. The 243

Nationalists conceded Salonika to Greece.** The

Progressive Liberals, however, insisted on Bulgarian claims to that port city. Danev even considered an outright seizure of Salonika to present the Greeks and the

Great Powers with a fait accompli.4 4 The tensions between the two governing parties grew so great that Geshov again considered resignation.49 Finally indications from

Ferdinand that he favored arbitration with Greece caused the Progressive Liberals to accept a border proposal.44

This was Ferdinand's first direct intervention in foreign policy since the armistice. The proposed frontier extended west from the Aegean at Cape Eleutherato to the

Bistritsa River to Smezhen Mountain to Gramos Mountain.

In an effort to obtain Danev's consent to arbitration

Geshov delayed the Progressive Liberal leader's departure for London for two days.47 But the additional time in

Sofia did not sway Danev. He felt that arbitration should remain in abeyance until Bulgarian troops were in position in Macedonia.4 • Danev and his Progressive Liberals were a major obstacle to a settlement with Greece.

The Sofia government did decide to send an emissary to Athens to negotiate with the Greeks.49 The man selected for this difficult task was the former Bulgarian minister in Constantinople, M. Sarafov. When Sarafov arrived in Athens he discovered that the Greeks were not disposed to bilateral talks with Bulgaria. They echoed 244

the Serbian position that the leaders of all four allied

states should meet.9• This remained unacceptable to

Sofia. So Sarafov's mission was fruitless.

Despite his failure with Danev Geshov persevered in

his determination to achieve a settlement with Greece.

Renewed fighting between Greek and Bulgarian troops near

Kavala at the first of May/end of April caused

considerable casualties on both sides.3‘ These skirmishes

increased Geshov's determination to achieve a settlement.

He feared that these clashes were the forerunners of a

Serbo-Greek alliance.3• He wanted to avoid further

incidents and instructed Savov to forego armed conflicts

with the Greeks.33 The Bulgarians also signed a protocol

with the Greeks establishing a demarcation line between

their respective forces.34 This line, however, failed to

prevent additional armed incidents.33 But it did

establish some basis for cooperation.

All hope for a peaceful resolution of the Greco-

Bulgarian dispute faded when Danev indicated from London on 28/15 May that he would not endorse the submission of the dispute to arbitration because of the conclusion of a

Greco-Serbian agreement.33 Later on 4 June/22 May he stated that he could accept Russian arbitration only on the condition that Salonika would be guaranteed in advance to Bulgaria.3 7 On the urging of Teodorov Geshov made one final attempt to persuade his colleagues to accept 245

arbitration, but failed.*• With this failure Geshov's

Greek policy ended.

For Geshov a resolution of the dispute with Greece

was the key to Bulgaria's foreign problems. He thought

that Serbia would not attack Bulgaria unless the Greco-

Bulgarian disagreement led to war.s• But his own

insistence on a proportional settlement of the frontier

question and Danev's fixation on Salonika precluded a

peaceful arrangement with Greece. The Sofia government

never considered that the Greeks alone vould dare to

provoke a conflict over the territorial dispute and naively believed that the Great Powers would disallow a war among the Balkan allies.6* And Danev was hardly alone in his aspiration to obtain Salonika.6* The Bulgarian failure to negotiate from strength to determine a frontier before the war was a major cause of the difficulties with

Greece. And throughout their relationship with the Greeks the Bulgarians were hampered by a condescending attitude.

This attitude greatly facilitated the eventual Serbo-Greek alliance directed against Bulgaria.

The problems with Serbia appeared to increase on an almost daily basis. On 24/11 April the Bulgarian minister in Beograd, Toshev, arrived in Sofia and transmitted

Pashich's request for a meeting with Geshov.66 Geshov rejected this request, considering it a means to avoid the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian convention. The next day in 246 the Ministerial Council Geshov read a telegram from

Sazonov to Nekludov that warned against an intra-Balkan war. The Russian foreign minister stated that in the event of such a war Bulgaria would have to reckon with Romania and Turkey and that Bulgaria in this case would not enjoy

Russian sympathy.* * This telegram caused great consternation in the Sofia government.** St. Petersburg appeared to once again renege on the 1902 convention and on its 'moral' obligation to help Bulgaria.

Two days after the telegram was read in council the

Bulgarian government decided to request Russian arbitration for the dispute with Serbia.*9 This arbitration was sanctioned by the Serbo-Bulgarian convention of 1912. Geshov argued that Serbia had damaged intra-allied relations by the request in February for a revision of the convention; that the Serbian Finance

Minister Pachu had adopted a menacing tone when stating that the Serbian army would not demobilize until the dispute with Bulgaria was resolved; and that the Serbian and Greek armies were moving against Bulgaria while the

Bulgarian army was still in Thrace and for these reasons the Serbs were responsible for the breakdown of the agreement.** Geshov persevered in his policy of a strict interpretation of the convention with Serbia. No further concessions were possible after the Sofia government had conceded Skopie and northern Macedonia to obtain the 247

convention. From 1912 on the Bulgarians considered the

remainder of Macedonia as rightfully theirs. Legally they

had a strong case. And no Bulgarian government could

surrender additional territory and survive. This was the

basis for Geshov's request for arbitration.

But the Russian government evaded the Bulgarian

request.4 7 Geshov had not believed that St. Petersburg

might refuse the role of arbitrator.44 After receiving

the equivocal reply from Russia Geshov became depressed

and again spoke of resignation.44 He had good reason to

be upset. Without Russian support for the convention with

Serbia his government stood little chance to overcome the

difficulties with the allies without resorting to war.

The realization that Bulgaria might have to fight

again for the Macedonian legacy rendered a settlement with

Romania imperative. This was not an easy prospect. Even

before the armistice was signed the Bulgarians received an

unwelcome report via Bucharest that the St. Petersburg

ambassador's conference had awarded Silistra to Romania.74

While this news was not unexpected Geshov responded with a

perfunctory protest to Sazonov on 11 April/29 March.74

And on 16/3 April he rejected as premature Romanian

overtures for political and economic negotiations.74 The

loss of Bulgarian territory could not be dismissed callously. But on 18/5 April Geshov indicated that he

would seek a rapprochement with Romania after the conclusion of the St. Petersburg conference. 7 * And he

recalled Kalinkov from Bucharest immediately before the

signing of the St. Petersburg protocol.7* Kalinkov met

with the Ministerial Council on several occasions. He

assured the ministers that Romania would not ally with

Serbia and Greece but warned them that additional

territorial demands might be made on Bulgaria in case of a

war.7* The Ministerial Council reached no consensus on

the problem of Romania.7* Only one minster, the

Nationalist Minster of Education Peev-Plachkov, favored

additional sacrifices to Romania in return for neutrality

in case of a war between Bulgaria and the allies.7 7 Danev hoped to obtain Romanian benevolence with the offer of

Serbian territory in the Timok valley.7* The Ministerial

Council failed to resolve this issue. So Kalinkov returned without clear instructions on how to proceed.7*

The inability of the Sofia government to develop a

Romanian policy reflected the strong hostility toward

Bucharest engendered by the Romanian blackmail and the loss of Silistra. The Bulgarians did not want to surrender any more territory to Romania. As long as no clear indications existed that Bucharest would coalesce with Beograd and Athens, and as long as the threat of war was not immediate, Sofia lacked the desire to act.

Finally on 20/7 May after he received the protocol of the St. Petersburg conference Geshov informed Bucharest 249 that he was prepared for further negotiations.•• He also asked that the announcement of the protocol wait until after the London peace accord so as not to excite unduly

Bulgarian public opinion with the news of the loss of

Silistra.■* Geshov was compelled to act after a hint from the Romanian Prime Minister Majorescu that Bulgaria could gain Romanian support against Serbia and Greece in return for another concession of Bulgarian territory. " Then on

23/10 May Majorescu indicated that Romania wanted

"slightly more" than what Danev had offered in London. 11

The Ministerial Council adamantly refused to make additional territorial sacrifices to Romania.*4 In this difficult position Geshov stalled. He instructed

Kalinkov:

Having the most sincere desire to attain an agreement with the Romanian government we ask it not to make commitments with others until we can consult with the absent Danev and Teodorov. Danev especially as the chief of one of the governing parties must express an opinion. Insist again in the name of the age-old friendship between Bulgaria and Romania that in view of the difficulties of our position they must show a little patience in order for us to reach an agreement.* *

Danev concurred that negotiations with Romania should begin. He wanted to offer Romania commercial advantages and Serbian territory.** Danev's suggestions were not possible for Geshov because Russia had indicated opposition to any anti-Serbian coalition between Bulgaria and Romania.•7 Moreover Teodorov doubted that Romanian 250

friendship could be purchased with more territorial

concessions and urged that the Sofia government secure

Russian support against the Romanian demands or resign.••

Two days after Teodorov proposed the ultimatum to Russia

Geshov did resign without taking any further action on the

Romanian problem.••

He subsequently claimed that arbitration with Greece

precluded the need for an arrangement with Romania, and

that the "friends of Danev" opposed an agreement with

Romania anyway. " Both of these reasons are questionable.

No arbitration agreement with Greece was attained. And one of the most active supporters of an agreement with

Romania was the Progressive Liberal Dimitur Hristov.91

Furthermore, after having facilitated the sacrifice of

Silistra, St. Petersburg opposed any further concessions to Romania. Nekludov advised Geshov to make an adjustment with Serbia instead.9* Geshov himself did not seek the active support of Romania, only Romanian neutrality.9*

Unfortunately neutrality was not an option because Romania was in a position to bargain between Bulgaria and the allies. Geshov's understandable reluctance to sanction additional sacrifices of Bulgarian land left the northern

Bulgarian frontier vulnerable. But his increasingly unreliable Russian patron prohibited any meaningful accord with Romania. In this situation Geshov lacked room for diplomatic manuever. 251

The ultimate success, however, of Geshov's policy depended on the Russian response to the Bulgarian appeal for arbitration in the dispute with Serbia. After previously receiving an indeterminate answer Geshov again requested arbitration on 16/3 May.*4 Bobchev reported from St. Petersburg in reply that Russia would accept the role of arbitrator under the conditions that the decision would be binding and that the alliance with Serbia would be maintained.** This was satisfactory for Sofia as long as the convention remained the basis for the arbitration decision.

Geshov also attempted to contact Serbia informally.

On 17/4 May he instructed Rizov to return to Sofia and on the way from Rome to visit Beograd.*6 Rizov had v participated in the 1911 Serbo-Bulgarian contacts and was considered an expert in Serbian affairs. When he arrived in Beograd Rizov received instructions to investigate a possible settlement with Serbia.*7 He met with Pashich and the Russian minister Hartwig. But Serbian demands for territory in Macedonia beyond the contested zone precluded an agreement.•• Rizov then proceeded to Sofia. His mission was not a serious attempt at a solution to the

Serbian problem. Events had progressed too far for that.

Geshov himself by this time no longer thought that an agreement with Serbia was possible and considered that war with Serbia was inevitable. He did not think the Serbs 252

would accept arbitration.9• Rather Rizov'e mission was a

means to determine the extent of the Serbian pretensions

so that the Sofia government could evaluate possible

results of the arbitration process.

In the meantime, Spalajkovich, the Serbian minster in

Sofia, presented Geshov with a renewed demand for a

revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian convention.1•• The Serbs

claimed that Bulgaria had failed to fulfill all treaty

obligations owed them; that Bulgaria had gained more

territory than envisioned by the treaty, that Serbia had

not acquired the Albanian territory mentioned in he

treaty; and finally that Serbia had made more sacrifices

than required by the treaty. This rationale was quite

similar to the one employed by the Serbs in February when

they first asked for a revision of the treaty.*•1 Geshov regarded this new Serbian request for revision as an attempt to take advantage of the Greco-Bulgarian fighting.1 While he wavered on concessions to Serbia the Ministerial Council refused to consider any revision of the convention.1•* To gain time Geshov agreed to

Pashich's bid for a meeting.1,4 This time would give the

Bulgarians the opportunity to transfer their army to

Macedonia and to prepare to fight.

By mid-May the question of time had become vital to

Bulgaria. The army needed time to face the Serbian and

Greek forces which threatened not only Bulgarian claims in 253

Macedonia but Bulgaria itself. But the transfer of the

Bulgarian army required the finalization of the London peace accord, since the still officially hostile Turkish army confronted them in Thrace. The absence of the

Bulgarian army from Macedonia was regarded in Sofia as a cause of the Serbian pretensions. Mir stated:

We are prepared to meet everything stoically. We are encouraged by the awareness, that the Serbs would not dare to confront us if our army was at home and not at Chataldja. The Serbs lack the courage to meet us in chivalrous battle. They are heroes from ambush.1•s

To hasten the peace process the Sofia government had sent

Danev back to London at the middle/beginning of May.1*4

Even before Danev arrived in London Madzharov received the authorization from Sofia to sign the treaty.*■7 The

Bulgarians wanted no obstacle to the swift conclusion of / the peace negotiations.

Not surprisingly neither Serbia nor Greece demonstrated any inclination to facilitate the peace process. The longer the signing of the peace was delayed the more time they would have to consolidate their own forces in the territories claimed by Bulgaria.Both the Serbs and the Greeks raised objections to the final draft of the peace treaty.1•• The Sofia government understood these delaying tactics.* 1• But Danev and

Madzharov could do little to speed up the peace process.

At the same time the Geshov government came under increased domestic pressure to conclude the peace. * * 1 254

Furthermore Savov constantly demanded a separate peace

with Turkey so that the army could leave Thrace to

confront the Serb and Greek dangers.1 *• Under these

circumstances the Sofia government explored the

possibility of a separate peace. Danev met with the

Turkish representative Osman Pasha in London on 18/5

May.** * The Turks demonstrated some interest in a

separate accord with Bulgaria. * 14 Coincidentally

Salabashev held discrete conversations with Hilmi Pasha,

the Turkish minister in Vienna.11s These contacts with

the Turks, came to an abrupt halt however, after Nekludov

informed Geshov on 19/6 May that St. Petersburg opposed a

separate peace, and warned that if Bulgaria did sign one

Russia would refuse to arbitrate the dispute with

Serbia.11‘

This put the Sofia government in a difficult position. Geshov in response strongly defended Bulgaria's right to conclude a separate arrangement with Turkey and pointedly reminded Sazonov that Russia had forbidden

Bulgaria to take Constantinople and dictate the peace there.**7 On 24/12 May the Ministerial Council decided to warn the Triple Entente that Bulgaria must have a time

limit for signing the peace treaty.* *1 The government's desperation was indicated by its defiance of Russia.

Bulgaria was prepared now to rely on its own resources to solve the dispute with the allies. 255

At this point the British Foreign Secretary Sir

Edward Grey acted to end the impasse. He pressured all

the Balkan delegates to sign the peace.11• On 30/17 May the arrangement of the preliminary peace treaty ended the

Balkan War.18* Danev, after signing the treaty for

Bulgaria, noted with heavy irony:

Today's work marks a historic occasion for the Balkan peoples. In ending the state of war we have reestablished lasting conditions for our countries to resume their former good neighborly relations. The decisive proof of battle has yielded to a multitude of problems concerning our future. For the scope of this peaceful rivalry, the combatants of today have found a band of solidarity which soon will erase all painful memories. In the last resort the world will Judge us by the manner in which we accomplish this task.18 *

Danev's speech was sincere only in relation to Turkey.

Bulgaria, with hostile neighbors to the north, south and west ardently desired good relations with Turkey.

Geshov's rapprochement policy had come full cycle. But in respect to Greece and Serbia Danev's words had little relevance. At most this speech was intended to assure the

Great Powers of Bulgaria's peaceful intentions. The

London peace conference was not the place to rattle a saber.

With the signing of the treaty Savov agreed to transfer the army from Thrace to Macedonia. He had been under strong pressure from Ferdinand to shift the troops, but only acted after the peace accord was signed.188 By this time the army was rife with discontent.183 Several 256

instances of mutiny had occurred.1■* The peasant soldiers

had been under arms for over eight months and were tired

and uncertain of their purpose. Nevertheless Savov

disregarded the seriousness of the incidents and Insisted

that the army was in good shape. He told Geshov:

In view of the singular superiority we would enjoy over the allied Serbian and Greek armies and the absolute guarantee of success in case of an armed conflict, a persistent and energetic language against our faithless allies will force them to agree to our proposals in order to avoid defeat.1,8

In any event the transfer of the army from Thrace to

Macedonia would exact a price on the already weary

Bulgarian soldiers. The signing of the peace treaty did not mean peace for the army.

The conclusion of the peace in London also had a strong political impact in Sofia. The same day the document was signed Geshov resigned as minister president.

He had considered resignation as early as December 1912, when he was confronted by the presence of Konstantin

Kalchev in Constantinople, and had periodically expressed a desire to resign ever since. The deterioration of relations with the Balkan allies, the impasse with

Romania, the lack of solid Russian support as well as the domestic difficulties with the tsar, the high command and the coalition partners all combined to make Geshov's position untenable.‘•6 Despite his failure to resolve any of these difficulties he clung to power tenaciously. He did so to insure the survival of the alliance with Serbia, 257

for which he had been largely responsible. He was very

proud of the Balkan alliance, and termed it the "pride of

Bulgaria."**7 Geshov tried to do everything in his power

to maintain the alliance, and remained in office as long

as possible to preserve it.

A major blow to Geshov's continued service arrived

around 21/8 May in the form of a letter from Sazonov to

Nekludov. In this letter the Russian foreign minister

indicated that he desired Bulgaria to relinquish claims to

Prilep, a town well within the portion of Macedonia

assigned outright to Bulgaria by the convention, and "a

few other places" to avoid a rupture of the alliance.1,1

By suggesting that Bulgaria concede territory in the

Bulgarian zone of Macedonia to Serbia, Sazonov \ demonstrated that the process of arbitration would not be based on a strict interpretation of the convention.

After he saw the letter Geshov became despondent and wanted to resign.1 *• The denial of the convention by

Sazonov assumed a personal importance for Geshov. His

Russophile policy had been betrayed by Russia and he felt isolated.* 3• In these straits he inquired on 29/16 May about the Austrian attitude in case of a Bulgarian war with Serbia. He told Tarnowski, "You can allow a free course of events, or you can stop us by your attitude. Do you want a strong and large Bulgaria, yes or no?"*31 But 258

the same day Geshov made this opening to Austria-Hungary a

domestic event forced his resignation.

For some time Ferdinand had expressed his

dissatisfaction with the Geshov government. 1 * * But he

waited until the peace treaty was signed before forcing

the issue. On 29/16 May Ferdinand met without Geshov's

knowledge with leaders of the opposition parties.13* In

this meeting the tsar averred that the Balkan alliance was

the work of Sazonov and Nekludov.1 * * This was untrue, but

he wanted to separate himself from Geshov and a Russophile

policy. Ferdinand also asked the opposition leaders for

advice on the problems confronting Bulgaria.1*9 After

learning of the meeting from Ferdinand's chef de cabinet

S. Dobrovich, and hearing that the opposition leaders had

demanded a more belliccse policy, Geshov professed his

willingness to resign.1** This promptly was accepted.

Geshov realized that he no longer enjoyed the confidence

of the tsar. Ferdinand's audience with the opposition

leaders was intended to demonstrate this to him. He later

explained:

I was obliged to resign because I was not in unity with the crown and because I was of the opinion that such a critical situation called for a coalition ministry on the broadest possible basis. I had a deep rooted conviction that none of the other parties, once they were in office, would have undertaken the heavy responsibility of a second war.1*7

This supposition about the opposition parties was overly optimistic. 259

Nevertheless Geshov himself was willing to serve in such a coalition.114 But no summons arrived. He recommended that General Paprikov, the former foreign minister and minister in St. Petersburg, form a new cabinet.13* Geshov's bitterness over his dismissal surfaced in a citation from Schiller he used to describe the event, "Der Mohr hat seine Schuldigkeit getan, der

Mohr kann gehen."**• Significantly Geshov did not encourage the other Nationalist members of his cabinet to follow his example. He wanted them to stay in the government and as far as possible maintain his peaceful policy.‘* * This way the Balkan alliance still had a slight chance to remain intact.

Foreign and domestic pressures forced Geshov's V resignation. Abrashev perceived in the resignation a protest not against the allies but against Russia. "His resignation is a protest against the aspirations of

Russian diplomacy to force Bulgaria to give in to Serbia after both Nicholas II and Sazonov had stated categorically that the rights of Bulgaria in the convention would be upheld."1** The inconsistency of

Sazonov's policies weakened Geshov's position and helped to bring about his downfall. A firm indication of support for arbitration and for Geshov from St. Petersburg would have kept Geshov in power. In a parting shot Geshov defended his policy to Russia. On 31/IQ May he stated: 260

From the beginning the royal government always has stood inalterably on its obligations to its allies, and with great loses has repulsed the pressure of the common enemy in order to defend with the blood of Bulgarian sons the common interests of the allies. For the allies the war was over two months after its declaration, while for us it continued until recently. The preliminary peace could have been concluded two months ago, if Bulgaria really was acting selfishly and proceeding only out of its own interests. In the meantime, Serbia and Greece, disregarding every most elementary moral principle, secretly have joined hands against the ally who deserved the most credit for the triumph of allied arms.14J

This defense of his policy demonstrated Geshov's dim hope that his resignation might cause Sazonov to support

Bulgaria against the allies.1 4 4 Bulgaria had borne the brunt of the war with the Turks but was being unfairly deprived of the spoils. But this hope was not realized.

St. Petersburg disapproved of Geshov's resignation.1*®

But no help emanated from the Russian capital to prevent it.

Nor did Geshov receive much support in Sofia. He had known for some time that military circles wanted him out of office because of his peaceful policies.146 And he obtained no support from his coalition partner.14 7 Under these circumstances Geshov's resignation on the receipt of the news of the signing of the preliminary peace treaty allowed him to leave office with some trappings of personal dignity.14•

For the time being Geshov kept his resignation secret. Besides Ferdinand only Nekludov and the Ministerial Council knew of it.*4* The reason for this

secrecy was the meeting with Pashich. By keeping his

resignation secret Geshov retained the slight hope that he

could exercise some authority at the meeting if a

favorable opportunity arose to ease tensions. On 1

June/19 May, accompanied by the Bulgarian minister in

Beograd Toshev, the Serbian minister in Sofia Spalajkovich

and the Bulgarian minister in Rome Rizov, Geshov traveled

in a special train to Tsaribrod (Dimitrovgrad) on the

Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. There Pashich met the Sofia

party in Geshov's railroad car. The Bulgarians did not

have high expectations for this meeting. They agreed to

it only in order to gain time to deploy their army against

Serbia and Greece and to avoid a general meeting of the four allied prime ministers in which Bulgaria would be outnumbered. 1 8• Geshov still wanted to submit the dispute with Serbia to Russian arbitration based on the convention. To this end at Tsaribrod he pressed Pashich to agree to the publication of the secret portions of the convention.* 8 1 The publication of the secret portions of the convention would demonstrate the validity of the

Bulgarian insistence of a legal determination of the dispute and would pressure St. Petersburg to settle the dispute on the basis of the convention. But Pashich only would agree to the publication of the secret portions of the convention if the Serbian king and the Russian tsar 262 also agreed.* 3• Pashich In turn suggested that the four allied prime ministers meet in Salonika or St. Petersburg.

Geshov in principle agreed to this proposal, but wanted to consult with Danev first.*3 * Geshov wanted to avoid commitments, especially since he had resigned. Little else was accomplished at the meeting, and the Bulgarians returned to Sofia after it adjourned.

Geshov realized that the meeting had accomplished nothing. After his return to Sofia he instructed Bobchev:

Emphasize to Sazonov that the Serbs are tempted and encouraged by Romanian and Turkish desires to attack us in case of a war with the allies. Insist that if Russia condemns such a conflict, she must influence our allies not to seek new confederates, and must influence Romania and Turkey not to pour oil on the fire, since they pay positive attention to such demands. Fratricidal war can be avoided only with energetic action in this sense from the powers and especially from Russia.*34

The Russians had forbidden a Romano-Bulgarian alliance and a separate peace between Turkey and Bulgaria. Geshov's insistence that St. Petersburg prevent the Serbs from agreeing with Romania and Turkey was only just. This note demonstrates that Geshov's final diplomatic endeavor had failed. He foresaw in this failure "fratricidal war" and the ruin of his creation, the Balkan league.

The Ministerial Council also thought that war was inevitable.*33 A proposal from Sazonov for a proportional demobilization among the Balkan states was accepted in principle by the government.*34 But any additional action 263 awaited the return of Danev from London. His arrival in

Sofia on 5 June/23 May relieved the exhausted and depressed Geshov of further governmental responsibility.

But Geshov still had one more domestic political task. On 8 June/26 May and again on 10 June/28 May the

Nationalist Party met under Geshov's presidency and decided to participate in any new government committed to a peaceful settlement of the disputes with Serbia and

Greece. 1 87 The Nationalists felt that a peaceful policy was necessary, but suspected that the Progressive Liberals wanted to "force events.31 The Nationalists still hoped that Geshov might be recalled to form a new government.18•

This unrealistic expectation demonstrates an absence of sound political analysis by the Nationalist Party, and wishful thinking by Geshov himself. The temper of the tsar and the country could no longer endorse Geshov's policies. No summons to power arrived. And on 11 June/29

May his resignation was announced officially.‘‘•

This resignation was presented as an act of patriotism. Mir stated:

The resignation of Mr. Geshov, the chief of the Nationalist Party, and until yesterday the chief of the governing coalition, has a historical significance. It was not a resignation forced by petty intra-party or intra-coalition disagreements. It was not a resignation provoked by parliamentary clashes and loss of confidence, nor was the resignation a show of disfavor of the crown toward the cabinet. Rather it was a resignation given in complete unanimity with the outlook not only of the government, but of the entire Bulgarian 264

people. It was in essence a resignation protest, an extreme expression of the agitation and indignation provoked among the Bulgarian people by the disloyal activity of our allies who refuse to fulfill their obligation, as if they have forgotten the oath they gave when they concluded and signed an agreement with us. Mr. Geshov cannot continue to negotiate further with people, who do not keep their word and who do not honor the signature of their king.161

This assessment was not accurate. The tsar had forced the resignation. The statement focused the blame for Geshov's resignation on the allies and not on Geshov's own failings. His service to Bulgaria was over and he departed soon after his resignation for rest and recuperation in France.*6*

Geshov's attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement of the external problems confronting Bulgaria in the aftermath of a costly but successful war was prevented by foreign and domestic obstacles. The major foreign impediment was the attitude of Russia. After forcing

Bulgaria to concede Silistra, St. Petersburg warned against the conclusion of any alliance with Romania. And after guaranteeing the Serbo-Bulgarian convention as recently as April 1913 Sazonov by the end of May had indicated that Bulgarian concessions to Serbia would be necessary. Domestically the usual obstinacy of the tsar and the high command was augmented by policy disagreements between the coalition partners. The intractable attitude of Danev on the Salonika issue for example effectively prevented the settlement of the dispute with Greece. 265

Under these circumstances Geshov, despite a sincere desire to resolve all disagreements peacefully, was unable to act with success on any one dispute. Had he obtained the support of all these elements for the peaceful resolution of just one problem, he might have gained the freedom of maneuver to deal with the others. But such unity was not possible in the spring of 1913. And even though Geshov had seen Bulgaria through the signing of the peace treaty, few believed that this peace would last. 266

FOOTNOTES

1. 15 ONS 2nd RS, speech of I. E. Geshov, 5 April 1913, 768.

2. DPIK I 433-34 no. 59, 203 no. 336.These dates are given in the old style.

3. Ibid. 446-48 no. 78.

4. BAN 51-1-18-255.

5. DPIK I 445 no. 77; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 79-80.

6. Ibid. This is precisely what happened three months later.

7. BAN 51-1-18-254. Abrashevfeared Bulgaria might find itself in the position of fighting Greece to avoid arbitration and fighting Serbia to enforce arbitration.

8. DPIK I 596 no. 73.

9. Ibid. 592 no. 67.

10. Ibid. 445 no. 77, 449 no. 80.

11. Ibid. 598-99 no. 80, 602-03 no. 87. See also ibid. 583 no. 49.

12. DDF 3rd ser. VI 336. Bobchev in St. Petersburg vowed that if Bulgaria received the San Stefano frontier Salonika and Kastoria would be conceded to Greece.

13. BD IX ii 960.

14. See DPIK I 602-03 no. 87; Geshov,Prestupnoto bezumie 81.

15. DPIK I 1032 no. 143.

16. BAN 51-1-18-266.

17. DPIK I 1032 no. 144.

18. Ibid. 1033 no. 146.

19. Ibid. 434-35 no. 61.

20. Ibid. 434-35 no. 61. See alsoFichev, 357. 267

21. BAN 51-1-18-259.

22. Ibid. 260. Abrashev likened the government's relationship with Ferdinand to Bulgaria's relationship vith Serbia and Greece.

23. Ibid. 269. The ministers also considered a meeting among Geshov, Pashich and Venizelos. Fichev, 361.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 276.

27. Dnevnik no. 4220, 3 May 1914, "V navecherieto na tretata voina."

28. BAN 51-1-18-269-70. Danev himself strongly opposed demobilization.

29. Fichev, 362.

30. BAN 51-1-18-262, 264, 267. Abrashev dubbed Geshov a "phantom leader."

31. Ibid. 272-73.

32. Toshev, II 258; Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 183.

33. DPIK I 462 no. 104; Fichev, 367.

34. BAN 51-1-18-291.

35. DPIK I 462 no. 104. Earlier Danev had discussed vith Savov the transfer of two division from Thrace to Macedonia as a demonstration to Serbia. See BAN 51-1-18-263.

36. DPIK I 462-63 no. 105, 464 no. 106; Prilozhenie I (Savov) 257, According to Radko Dimitriev the army secretly began to shift troops to the vest at the end of April. See Madzharov, "Radko Dimitriev," 488. See also BD IX ii 989. Any such transfer of troops vhile Bulgaria vas still technically at var vith Turkey and allied vith Serbia and Greece naturally required secrecy.

37. DPIK I 246 no. 66. Also in Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 86.

38. BAN 51-1-18-286. 268

39. Geshov,. Prestupnoto bezumie 17; Prilozhenie I < Geshov' 146.

40. On this letter see Grogan, 147, The author of the letter, Charles H. C. Pirie Gordon, was a British Journalist and Near Eastern expert. Pirie Gordon had obtained this frontier proposal in conversations with M. Genadius, the Greek minister in London, and Venizelos.

41. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 17-18.

42. Mir no. 3863, 27 April 1913.

43. BAN 51-1-18-280. Teodorov later said that Salonika was a question of the future. With the hinterland in Bulgarian hands, "in ten years every Greek in Salonika will be a salted mackerel. " Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 185, 202. Teodorov himself obviously had aspirations for Salonika.

44. BAN 5-1-18-280.

45. Ibid. 284.

46. Ibid. 281, 286.

47. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 18-19. The ubiquitous Balkan observer Bourchier, who was then in Sofia, also attempted to persuade Danev to accept the principle of arbitration with Greece. Like Geshov Bourchier had no success. Letter from Bourchier to Braham, 29 June 1913. Private collection of Dr. Ivan Ilchev.

48. BAN 51-1-18-285.

49. Ibid. 286.

50. DPIK I 604 no. 93.

51. DDF 3rd ser. VI 539.

52. BAN 51-1-18-298. He was correct.

53. DPIK I 1061 no. 207.

54. Ibid. 1064-65 no. 214, 1079-81 no. 243; Toshev, II 298.

55. O-UA VI 7178; Cassavetti, 317. 269

56. BAN 51-1-18-307; DPIK I 608 no. 100. Teodorov felt that Great Britain and France were Grecophile. He opposed the arbitration of the Triple Entente in the dispute vith Greece. He however was willing to agree to the arbitration of all the Great Powers. The Greco-Serbian protocol, directed against Bulgaria, was signed on 5 May/22 April. This protocol was joined by a military convention on 17/4 May and a final treaty on 1 June/19 May. See Helmreich, Balkan Wars 347- 49; Rossos, 177-78. For the text of the 5 May agreement see BD IX ii 1019-20.

57. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 102.

58. DPIK I 601 no. 101; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 110.

59. DPIK I 607 no. 98; Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 108.

60. Nashata duma (Teodorov) 148.

61. See for example Trotsky, 337. A. Malinov, the former minister president, boasted, "If the Greeks dare to defy us over Salonika, we shall certainly go to war with them. "

62. Toshev, II 232. Pashich initially had raised this issue on 17/4 April and four days later Hartwig had reiterated this request. See ibid. 226, 228-29. Sazonov favored a meeting of all four allied prime ministers. See BD IX ii 881.

63. BAN 51-1-18-265.

64. Ibid. Abrashev wrote, "It simply enraged us all."

65. Ibid. 266.

66. DPIK I 445 no. 77; Toshev, II 232.

67. DPIK I 449 no. 80.

68. O-UA VI 6857.

69. DDF 3rd ser. VI 445.

70. DPIK I 759 no. 255, On the conference see Idris Rhea Traylor Jr. "International Legal Aspects of the Great Powers' Mediation of the Rumanian-Bulgarian Territorial dispute 1912-1913," East European Quarterly XIV 1980 28-29.

71. DPIK I 759 no. 256.

72. Ibid. 257. 270

73. O-UA VI 6677. About the same time Geshov made a bid for Romanian support for Bulgarian clams in Macedonia. Other than the acknowledgement that Bulgarian rule was preferable for the Macedonian Vlachs the Romanians did not respond. See DPIK I 760 no. 259.

74. DPIK I 762 no. 263.

75. BAN 51-1-18-281; Prilozhenie I (Kalinkov) 326.

76. Kalinkov, 192. Kalinkov later wrote, "There were no two ministers of the same opinion. Not only were the ministers of one party opposed to those of the other, but members of the same party opposed their party colleagues.■

77. BAN 51-1-18-293.

78. Kalinkov, 192.

79. Ibid. 193.

80. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1479, 1. For the text of the protocol see Rom Doc 131.

81. Both Danev and Teodorov thought that the protocol should be published immediately to demonstrate to Serbia and Greece that Bulgaria had an agreement with Romania. DPIK I 461 no. 101.

82. DPIK I 763 no. 266.

83. TsDIA fond 176 opus 2 a. e. 1254, 40. For the London offer see above, 171.

84. BAN 51-1-18-295.

85. DPIK I 770 no. 277. The previous day Geshov had tried to gain time by explaining that the Bulgarian parliamentary machinery necessary to sanction a territorial cession was cumbersome. Ibid. 768-69 no. 273.

86. Ibid. 771-72 no. 279.

87. BAN 51-1-18-295.

88. DPIK I 770 no. 280.

89. This was on 30/17 May. See below 257.

90. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 148.

91. Kalinkov, 194-95. 271

92. BAN 51-1-18-309. See also Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 377. Geshov told Rizov that Russia had stated categorically that any direct agreement between Bulgaria and Romania vould be considered as directed against Serbia.

93. O-UA VI 7031.

94. DPIK I 464 no. 108.

95. BAN 51-1-18-295; DPIK I 467 no. 115. Sazonov reiterated on 28/15 May that Russia would accept the role of arbitrator if Serbia concurred. BAN 51-1-18-307.

96. DPIK I 465 no. 110.

97. Prilozhenie I (Rizov) 376.

98. Ibid. See also Rizov, "Kak doide katastrofata," 61.

99. O-UA VI 7054.

100. DPIK I 474-80 no. 121.

101. See above, 203-04.

102. DPIK I 480 no. 122.

103. Toshev, II 279.

104. BAN 51-1-18-305.

105. Mir no. 3887, 17 May 1913.

106. O-UA VI 7004. This was done over the objections of the Nationalists, who thought that Madzharov, the Bulgarian minister in London, could handle the negotiations. BAN 51-1-18-266. Geshov himself had detained Danev in Sofia in a vain effort to obtain his agreement to the use of arbitration in the dispute with Greece. See above, 242.

107. Madzharov, Podqotovka 135; BD IX ii 983; DDF 3rd ser. VI 564; GP XXXIV ii 13296.

108. Rossos, 131-32.

109. Ibid; Helmreich, Balkan Wars 330.

110. See for example DPIK I 245 no. 65; BD IX ii 980. 272

111. BAN 51-1-18-285. Abrashev observed, "The public and especially the army are nervous about the slowness of the peace process and for that reason are ill disposed toward the government. Many colleagues are ready to sacrifice much to achieve the desired end quickly. The Bulgarian people, who to a man wanted the war, now must have the patience to see it through. An honest opposition should not forment discontent because of the quite understandable slowness of the peace process, and indeed should oppose this discontent. But now our opposition seeks only to grab power. We have nothing against giving it to them. But I am certain that this will not hasten the conclusion of peace."

112. For example see DPIK 462-63 no. 105, 341 no. 216; Fichev, 362.

113. DPIK I 353-54 no. 246; Danev, "Londonskata konferentsiya," 36.

114. BAN 51-1-18-295.

115. Salabashev, 463-65.

116. DPIK I 356 no. 251, 360 no. 259. Sir Edward Grey also advised the Bulgarians against a separate peace with Turkey, although not so forcefully as Sazonov. See ibid. 355 no. 250.

117. Ibid. 356 no. 251.

118. BAN 51-1-18-300; DPIK I 365-66 no. 269. Teodorov wanted Geshov to insist that the treaty be signed or the Sofia government would resign. BAN 51-1-18-305.

119. Helmreich, Balkan Wars 330-31; Rossos, 133.

120. For the text of the treaty see Helmreich, Balkan Wars 331. Also BD IX ii 1049-51; DDF 3rd ser. VI 479.

121. BIA 14-2251-1.

122. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 268. Savov's refusal to transfer the army resulted in a strong disagreement between the deputy commander in chief and the tsar. See BAN 51-1-18-307, 309-10. Savov had warned that if Ferdinand continued to meddle in military affairs a Sedan might ensue. Toshev, II 305-06.

123. Zhebokritskii, Bolqariia v period balkanskikh voin. 199-202. 273

124. See Mariya Veleva, "Voinishkite buntove prez 1913 g., " Istoricheski preqled XV <195Q) 3-33.

125. DPIK I 483 no. 126. See also ibid 492 no. 144 on Savov's sanguine assessment of the condition of the army.

126. See Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 193.

127. Nashata duma (Geshov) 250.

128. Toshev, II 270, 298.

129. BAN 51-1-18-298. See also Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 137-38.

130. Toshev, II 298.

131. Q-UA VI 7072. Berchtold responded to this overture positively on 3 June/21 May but by that time Geshov had resigned. See ibid 7265.

132. Ibid. 7089. See also ibid. 6860, 7071.

133. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 194; O-UA VI 7217.

134. P. Peshev, Istorichesklte sttbitiya i_ zhivota ml (Sofia, 1925) 171.

135. Madzharov, Podqotovki 149.

136. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 108.

137. Geshov, Balkan League 91-92. See also Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 135.

138. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 123.

139. Toshev, II 298.

140. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 101. The quote is from Vershwoerunq des Fiesko zu Genua III 4 . "The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can go.■

141. Fichev, 386-87. Fichev's date of 27/14 May for this conversation is probably wrong. Fichev himself resigned as chief of staff shortly thereafter on 12 June/ 30 May.

142. BAN 51-1-18-333.

143. DPIK I 487-88 no. 135.

144. BAN 51-1-18-312. 274

145. Bobchev, Stranitsl 175; Toshev, II 307. The Russians apparently did not have complete confidence in Danev.

146. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 107.

147. Danev later stated that he did not consider the differences of opinion between Geshov and Ferdinand to be significant. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 92.

148. Opinion on Geshov's resignation varies considerably. Some writers castigate him for resigning in the midst of a crisis and for not fighting to retain his position. See Georgi Markov, "Sudbonosnite stupki na Bulgariya v Balkanskite voini (1912-1913 g. )" Istoricheski preqled. IV (1982), 107; A. Girginov, Katastrofa 263; Todorov, 125. Others admit that in his position he could have done little else but resign. Crampton, Bulgaria 418. Perhaps M. Veleva's judgement is the most balanced. "He showed neither nobility nor fear and cowardice, and was forced by external and internal conditions to do this." Veleva, "Pravitelstvenata kriza," 103.

149. Prilozhenie I (Geshov) 147.

150. Ibid (Peev-Plachkov) 350; (Rizov) 377, 379.

151. BAN 51-1-18-315. On the Tsaribrod meeting see also Toshev, II 299-301; BD IX ii 1023; DDF 3rd ser. VII 18.

152. Toshev, II 301; DPIK I 490 no. 141. Because the Serbs would not agree the convention was not published then. DPIK I 498 no. 156.

153. BAN 51-1-18-314. Sazonov also wanted the four prime ministers to meet. Ibid. 313; O-UA VI 7253. See also above, 268 n. 62.

154. DPIK I 490 no. 141.

155. BAN 51-1-18-313.

156. Ibid. 315; DPIK 491 no. 142.

157. Vazov, 28.

158. Prilozhenie I (Peev-Plachkov) 349.

159. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 116.

160. DPIK I 494 no 147. 275

161. Mir no. 3909, 3 June 1913.

162. Geshov, Prestupnoto bezumie 91. CHAPTER VIII

TOWARD THE CATASTROPHE

After several days of political maneuvers a

Progressive Liberal-Nationalist government assumed office on 15/2 June, 1913. This government consisted of essentially the same individuals who had participated in the previous government.1 Danev served as minister president and retained the foreign ministry portfolio.

Teodorov functioned as the de_ facto Nationalist leader.

Ferdinand had wanted a wide coalition government and had empowered Danev to organize it. But the Liberal leader V.

Radoslavov refused to enter such a coalition.“ And Danev himself lacked enthusiasm for a wide coalition government.J Attempts to lure the Democratic Party leader

A. Malinov into a narrower coalition foundered on his insistence that only two parties compose the coalition and on the reluctance of some Progressive Liberal cabinet members to share power with the Democrats.4 So the

Progressive Liberals and the Nationalists remained in the government, with their relative positions reversed from those of the Geshov government.

276 277

Danev assumed office without illusions. He later stated:

I understood that the situation was difficult. Our public opinion was inflamed, and the Serbs insisted that they did not want the agreement. Obviously working in these circumstances was difficult, but I hoped I could compel the Serbs to accept the arbitration agreement. I would suffer the consequences for what might happen if they snipped off part of Macedonia. I did not intend to yield, because we had signed the agreement of 1912. At last we had to act.9

The new minister president maintained a more forceful style than that of his predecessor. He asserted:

Between Mr. Geshov and me there was a difference in tone. That is why as soon as Pashich began to speak against the agreement and to point blank request its revision, I did not act the same way [as Geshov]. I clearly, openly and energetically insisted on our position. I stated that the preservation of the agreement was as vital for us as the revision of the agreement was for the Serbs, and that we were prepared to go to the end.‘

Furthermore Danev adopted a more authoritarian style of leadership within the government. Unlike Geshov he did not read and discuss diplomatic dispatches in the ministerial council and often made policy decisions without consulting the cabinet.1 Danev insisted on the entire undisputed section of Macedonia, part of the disputed zone and Salonika for Bulgaria.• He opposed any compromise. 278

Danev's adamant and contentious style was moderated by the Nationalists. Teodorov had agreed to participate in the government on the condition that Geshov's peaceful policy continue.* The Nationalists insisted on the settlement of the Serbian and Greek disputes by peaceful means and conceded Salonika to Greece.‘• This internal contradiction posed a certain danger to the Danev government.11 Danev's government appeared forceful and threatening. But his Nationalist coalition partners were not prepared to support strong action. The policy of the government was less aggressive than Danev's pronouncements indicated.

After assuming office Danev emphasized the Serbian problem. He thought it would prove easier to settle than the dispute with Greece.1• The major issue in the resolution of the Serbian dispute was the question of arbitration. Geshov had viewed the Russian arbitration foreseen in the 1912 treaty as imperative and had formally requested this arbitration on 26/13 April.‘J Danev also wanted arbitration.14 But when on 15/2 June he received official confirmation of the conditional Russian acceptance of arbitration he had reservations. He was disturbed by the Russian stipulations that the minister presidents of the four Balkan allies must come to St.

Petersburg for the arbitration decision and that the

Balkan allies must demobilize.13 Danev also wanted a 279 joint occupation of Macedonia. He emphasized that a conditio sine qua non for arbitration was the Serbian acceptance of the 1912 agreement as the basis for arbitration.16 The Ministerial Council shared Danev's distrust of a St. Petersburg meeting of the four Balkan minister presidents because of concerns that Bulgaria would be outnumbered at this meeting and would risk an imposed settlement.17 Teodorov, however, strongly dissented form this view and urged Danev to go to St.

Petersburg unconditionally. Danev responded: If you want to go I am prepared to yield my place to you. But I cannot go to St. Petersburg when Serbia rejects arbitration based on the convention. It would be another thing if Russia would give me in black and white that the arbitration would be based on the convention. If you can provide me with such a document, I shall dismiss the soldiers and go. ‘ • Danev demanded a strict interpretation of the arbitration agreement.

On 21/8 June the Ministerial Council learned that

Russia would give a written assurance that the arbitration decision would be based on the convention.‘• At the same time Bobchev reported from St. Petersburg that Serbia had accepted arbitration.8• The next day in an important

Ministerial Council session the government considered the question of war or peace with Serbia. The council was divided on this issue. Danev was in a bellicose temper.

He told the council:

The final hour has come. Without going into a long explanation here I have decided the issue. If the Serbs do not accept joint occupation and a condominium tin Macedonia], or if they do not 280

state that they accept arbitration on the basis of the convention, we must declare war.* *

While most of the Progressive Liberal supported Danev the

Nationalists opposed any immediate action.** Teodorov again urged Danev to go to St. Petersburg for the arbitration decision and then decide the question of a war with Serbia.*1 That way Bulgaria would maintain a policy of legality and could hope to enjoy Russian sympathy if arbitration failed. Teodorov's sensible argument precluded any immediate decision for war by the

Ministerial Council. After the council adjourned

Danev, together with Teodorov and Savov met with Ferdinand and his chef de cabinet Dobrovich at the royal residence at Vrana southeast of Sofia. There Teodorov reiterated his position that Danev should go to St. Petersburg for the arbitration decision.** Teodorov assured the others that an arbitration decision could be reached in seven or eight days.

This question of time had assumed a critical importance in the Bulgarian calculations. The army was in a difficult situation. Great dissatisfaction existed in the ranks.8 s The soldiers were exhausted and wanted to go home. On 16/3 June Savov had come to the Ministerial

Council to urge that the army either fight or disperse.**

At Vrana Savov repeated this demand.87 Under these circumstances a frontier incident or a major lapse in discipline could have had disastrous consequences for 281

Bulgarian policy.•* Danev, however, remained skeptical of the St. Petersburg arbitration process. • • The result of this meeting was a compromise, with Danev agreeing to depart for St. Petersburg at the same time the Serbian delegation departed and with the condition that the arbitration decision be announced within seven days.11

Nekludov then was informed of this decision, and on his suggestion the time limit was increased to eight days.* 1

In Nekludov's presence and with his apparent approval, a telegram containing the Bulgarian decision was composed by

Teodorov and dispatched to St. Petersburg.3*

Danev anxiously awaited a reply.33 On 24/11 June he reiterated to Bobchev that the time limit was Bulgaria's

"final concession."34 But Sazonov responded angrily, accusing Sofia of flirting with Austria-Hungary and telling Bobchev, "you are free...Do not expect anything from us and forget the existence of any of our agreements from 1902 to the present."39 Sazonov's outburst indicated that he must have considered the 1902 agreement valid up until then, even though he had failed to act upon it the previous winter.3* Nevertheless this was not a formal denunciation but only an expression of exasperation and pique.37 Otherwise Sazonov's statement could have been applied to the 1912 Bulgarian-Serbian convention and given

Russia an excuse to refuse to arbitrate. 282

After this incident both Danev and Sazonov became

more moderate.11 Danev immediately responded vith a

telegram denying any involvement with Austria and

explaining, "If we speak of a time limit, this is not from

any frivolity or dishonesty, but because the knife is at

our throats and because the waiting , and the

prolongations, are becomeing fatal."** At the same time

the Ministerial Council decided that since a time limit

had been stated for the arbitration decision, the army

could stand down as long as a cadre remained.4• The next

day Ferdinand, who had been greatly upset by Sazonov's

telegram, urged Danev to go to St. Petersburg.41 At this

point the crisis appeared to have passed. Danev prepared

to travel to Varna where a Russian warship waited on 1

July/18 June to convey him to Odessa.4* The British

minister in St. Petersburg noted that the Russian public

opinion so important in Bulgarian calculations appeared to

favor the Bulgarian position in the dispute with Serbia.4 *

While great problems remained a peaceful resolution to the

Serbian problem appeared possible for Bulgaria.

One of these continuing problems was the dispute with

Greece. St. Petersburg had suggested that this dispute undergo the arbitration process.44 Danev rejected this proposal but assured the Russians that if the Serbian question was settled by arbitration Bulgaria would not fight with Greece.43 For the past year Danev had opposed 283 concessions to Greece and had championed Bulgarian aspirations to Salonika. But he was not alone in his desire to acquire this Macedonian port for Bulgaria. A memo from the Bulgarian Economic Society to the

Ministerial Council warned of the consequences of a

Bulgarian failure to secure Salonika; "Without Salonika

Bulgaria is forever deprived of the most powerful fact for economic development and progress--a great port on the open sea. "4‘ Even the Nationalist paper Mir acknowledged that advantages of a Bulgarian Salonika.47 Only Teodorov was willing to abandon Bulgarian claims there.4'

Danev and his government realized that Salonika would not fall to Bulgaria by arbitration.4* But they lacked a realistic perspective on this issue. When Teodorov asked him how he intended to obtain Salonika Danev responded. "I will insiste that they [the Russians! promise it to us and if they do not we shall not accept arbitration."s* He even considered the seizure of Salonika by a coup de main and discussed this with Savov.3 * This was a ludicrous idea which was certain to provoke a strong reaction throughout Europe and a war with Greece. By this time the hostility of Greece was a foregone conclusion for

Bulgaria. Danev's stubborn insistence on Salonika had been responsible for much of this hostility.

Romania posed another major problem for Danev. The

Bucharest government, dissatisfied with the extent of the 284

St. Petersburg award, obviously intended to take advantage of any conflict between Bulgaria and the allies. Danev approached both Russia and Austria in an effort to restrain the Romanians.3* He emphasized to Nekludov that

Russia had to check Romania since Russia had forbidden a

Bulgarian-Romanian alliance.3* But Russia utilized the

Romanian danger as a lever to force the Bulgarians to come to St. Petersburg.34 The Bulgarians also knew that St.

Petersburg had encouraged Bucharest to mobilize.33 Russia offered no protection against the Romanian threat.

Austria-Hungary, however, was another matter. Vienna indicated interest in helping Bulgaria. Immediately before his resignation Geshov had hinted at a rapproachment with Austria but when pressed by Tarnowski had evaded any commitments.3 * Danev was more forthright and demonstrated overt interest in Austrian aid.37

Berchtold offered Bulgaria the benevolent neutrality of

Austria in case of a Bulgaro-Serbian war and intimated

Austrian intervention on the Bulgarian side.3* But this contact had no results because, as Tarnowski observed,

"Danev expects from us exactly what we cannot give him, pressure on Romania.The Bulgarian government also mistrusted Austrian assistance because of Vienna's past support for Romanian territorial claims against Bulgaria and because of the well known 'secret' Austro-Romanian alliance. “ Furthermore the ultrarussophile Danev 285 realized that questionable Russian support was more important to his policy than questionable Austrian support. Nothing short of a concrete promise of military assistance against both Serbia and Romania could have convinced Danev to embrace Vienna.

The Bulgarian minister president also initiated direct contact with Romania. On 20/7 June he indicated to

Bucharest that he expected benevolent neutrality from

Romania in case of a Serbo-Bulgarian war.6* A little over one week later, on 28/15 June Danev indicated a willingness to discuss a customs union and a Danubian bridge with Romania.6* But he remained intransigent on the only action which would have guaranteed his northern frontier, an additional concession of territory to

Bucharest.6* Danev disregarded the seriousness of the threat from Romania and considered this threat to be a bluff.66 At best he was overly optimistic.65 This was an important miscalculation. He should have indicated an interest in meaningful negotiations with Romania until the issue of war or peace with Serbia had been resolved, possibly even theoretically agreeing to some minor territorial concession as an indication of his good faith.

Then if Bulgaria did decide to fight Serbia, Danev would have to make the necessary concession. This required a degree of diplomatic acumen which Danev lacked. But no other realistic alternative existed. 286

Danev completely disregarded the Turkish threat. He told Nekludov that he did not fear the Turks.** This was foolish given the tenacity of the Turkish resistance at

Adrianople, and the transfer of the Bulgarian army from

Thrace to Macedonia. In this question, as with those of

Serbia and Romania, Danev ultimately expected that Russia would sustain him. He later stated that he never lost faith in Russia.*7 After the Russian record of diplomatic assistance the previous year this was wishful thinking.

Danev's fragile policies and with them the Balkan

League and Bulgarian aspirations were shattered by a

Bulgarian attack on Serbian and Greek positions on the night of 29/16-30/17 June. The attack was initiated by the Deputy Commander in Chief General Savov. This attack occurred at the expiration of the time limit determined at

Vrana. Savov later claimed that the attack was a

•political demonstration"** intended to impart an

"educational meaning".** His orders for the attack indicate limited objectives and a concern for troop morale.7* He later justified the attack by insisting, "In the first days of June everyone, with only rare exception, was for the war, because no one, given the partition of

Macedonia, wanted to sign the death warrant of the national ideal. "7 * The attack occurred on the authority of the tsar.7• Ferdinand wanted Serbian provocations of

24/11-28/15 June answered in kind. 7a Pressure to act 207

before the army disintegrated was another factor in

Ferdinand's decision. On 29/16 June Savov informed the

Tsar that, "the spirit of the soldiers is good and the

thirst for revenge is great."7* Ferdinand also was

concerned about assassination threats from Macedonian

organizations. 75 The Macedonians had demanded the

Bulgarian government and army fight for Macedonia.76 So

under strong pressure from Savov and others, Ferdinand

ordered the attack.

The government was not involved in this order. Danev

denied knowing of the order to attack.7 7 But the attack

cannot have come as a complete surprise to him. Savov had

reminded the minister president on several occasions that

the army faced a time constraint and had to act or

disintegrate.76 Once the attack was underway Danev

realized immediately that it meant war.76 But the other

members of the government were surprised by this action.66

They should not have been surprised, however. The high

command and the tsar had i omonstrated this kind of

independent initiative ever since the start of the war

against Turkey.

After learning of the attack Danev ordered the

fighting stopped.61 He initially denied Bulgarian responsibility but soon sent pacific messages to Athens and Beograd.66 The government fired Savov and considered resignation.63 But this was to no avail. All the states 288 welcomed the opportunity to settle the disputes by the force of arms.** The Second Balkan War had begun.

Contrary to Bulgarian expectations their army fared poorly against the Greeks and Serbs, who were joined in the war against Bulgaria on 10 July/28 June by Romania and two days later by Turkey. The Bulgarian catastrophe ensued, with the loss of most of Macedonia to Serbia and Greece, much of Thrace to Turkey, and the Dobruzha to Romania.

Danev later ascribed the disastrous order of 29/16

June to a duality in the Bulgarian political system.•s

The army was directly subordinate to the tsar as commander-in-chief, and not to the government. “ Thus the tsar and the army high command could act in collusion while ignoring the government. This had happened previously in November 1912 in the Chataldja attack, with disastrous results. The initiator of the attack was

Savov, who rightly feared that his army was about to fall apart. He calculated that the attack would strengthen the resolve of the army and defend Bulgarian aspirations in

Macedonia, and convinced Ferdinand to concur. Savov and

Ferdinand miscalculated both the diplomatic situation and the strength of the army.

A contributing factor in the attack was Danev's adamant style. He was prepared to go to St. Petersburg at the time of the attack. But his forceful and unyielding attitude obscured whatever sincere desire he had for peace. Bulgaria had little choice but to accept the

arbitration process in the dispute with Serbia. The

Bulgarian position depended to a large degree on the good

will of the powers, which could only be obtained by a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Furthermore the

Bulgarian army, which had sustained heavy losses in the campaigns against the Turks and which was rife with discontent, was in no condition to force a settlement on the Greeks and Serbs, let alone defend against the

Romanians and Turks. A clear comprehension of the actual state of the army might have made the government more amenable to a peaceful resolution of the dispute with

% Serbia. But the army was never candid with the government, and itself failed to analyze its own condition. So

Bulgaria, confronted by enemies on four sides and without

Great Power support, lost its best opportunity to achieve the national objectives in Macedonia and Thrace, and began a process of defeats and humiliations from which it only recently has begun to emerge. 290

FOOTNOTES

1. The Nationalists M. Mazharov and A. Burov replaced the Progressive Liberals H. Todorov and A. Frongya, giving the Nationalists a majority of one in the cabinet. General Kovatchev replaced General Nikiforov as Minister of War. See Toshev, I 298; II, 308-09.

2. BAN 51-1-18-328-29.

3. Ibid. 323.

4. Ibid. 328.

5. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 104.

6. Ibid. 85-86. See also ibid. (Teodorov) 187.

7. Ibid. (Peev-Plachkov) 352.

8. BAN 51-1-18-320-21.

9. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 196.

10. BAN 51-1-18-320-21. Danev had expressed complete confidence in the Nationalists. ONS XVII 1st IS, Speech of S. Danev 6 May 14, 713.

11. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct ok the Balkan Wars (Washington D. C. , 1914) 65; Veleva, "Pravitelstvenata kriza," 110.

12. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 92.

13. See above, 245-46.

14. DPIK 500 no. 162; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 62. Danev felt that the Russians could mediate with the Serbs because they exercised the most influence in Beograd.

15. Ibid. 502 no. 166; Prilozhenie I (Danev) 76-77; GP XXXV 13398.

16. DPIK 507 no. 171.

17. BAN 51-1-18-334; Prilozhenie I (Peev-Plachkov) 350.

18. BAN 51-1-18-340, 337. 291

19. BAN 51-1-18-341.

20. DPIK 529 no. 197.

21. BAN 51-1-18-343. See also Prilozhenie I (Peev- Plachkov) 350-51.

22. Prilozhenie I (Peev-Plachkov) 351.

23. Ibid, (Teodorov) 206, 217.

24. Ibid, 207, 218; Vazov 33-37.

25. BAN 51-1-18-336; Trotsky, 351-52; Veleva, "Buntove," 3-33.

26. BAN 51-1-18-334.

27. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 267, 277. Savov told of five hundred Bulgarian soldiers who had deserted to the Serbs.

28. Madzharov. Podaotovka 152-53.

29. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 261, 263-63, 277.

30. Madzharov. Podaotovka 152-53.

31. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 208. 218; (Savov) 261 , 263.

32. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 263. See also DPIK 529- 30 no. 198.

33. BAN 51-1-18-344.

34. DPIK 532 no. 201.

35. DPIK 532-33 no. 205. Sazonov at this time had been suffering from gastric troubles and a kidney problem. BD IX 11 1089. In a letter to Teodorov dated 20/7 June Bobchev had expressed concern about Danev's blunt methods. See Vazov, 24.

36. Danev in fact had the impression that the 1902 pact was invalid. This was the only way he could explain the Russian reaction in the question of Silistra. See DPIK 799 no. 302.

37. Kelmreich and Black, "Convention of 1902," 478.

38. Rossos, 187-88.

39. DPIK 533 no. 206. 292

40. BAN 51-1-18-346.

41. Ibid. 346, 348.

42. Ibid. 351; Madzharov, Podqotovka. 152-53; Toshev, II 330; GP XXXV 13441.

43. BD IX ii 1089. Buchanan wrote, "I do not think moreover that an anti-Bulgarian policy will commend itself to Russian public opinion and there is always the danger of driving Bulgaria into the arms of Austria. So far as I can judge from the utterances of the press and from speeches in the Duma, public sympathy is rather more on the side of Bulgaria than that of Serbia. Though a certain exasperation is felt at the former's attitude, her claims to Macedonia have been recognized by Russia in the treaty of San Stefano, and are supported both on historical and ethnographic grounds. Serbia's claims are therefore regarded as unfounded." See also BD IX ii 1093. Danev also felt that Russian opinion favored Bulgaria. See Prilozhenie I (Danev) 62.

44. BAN 51-1-18-349; DPIK 529 no. 197.

45. DPIK 620 no. 127.

46. BIA II D11189. To further this end the Bulgarians addressed themselves to the considerable Jewish population residing in Salonika and emphasized the advantages of Bulgarian rule. See Aron Astruc Gueron, Salonique et son avenlr (Sofia, 1913).

47. Mir no. 3908, 9 June 13. Mir argued that a Bulgarian Salonika was more advantageous for Serbia than a Greek Salonika, thu3 seeking at this late date both Russian and Serbian support for Bulgarian claims.

48. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 209.

49. BAN 51-1-18-338-39.

50. Prilozhenie I (Teodorov) 210. Danev obviously had little understanding of the arbitration process. He had acted in the same way in the case of Struga during the negotiations with Serbia in the winter of 1912. See above, 64.

51. BAN 51-1-18-338; Prilozhenie I (Savov) 280. Danev had proposed this in the Spring of 1913. See above, 242.

52. Prilozhenie I (Danev) 76. 293

53. BAN 51-1-18-338, 341. Dn the Russian prohibition of a Romano-Bulgarian alliance see above, 248.

54. Ibid. 350.

55. Ibid. 350-51; DPIK 783 no. 315.

56. 0. -u. A. VI 7202, 7214, 7301, 7326.

57. Ibid. 7448, 7449, 7498, 7499. Vienna did not view the advent of Danev to power with great sympathy. Salabashev, 481.

58. 0.-U. A. VI 7486. See also Bridge, 353-354; Hantsch, II 441-443.

59. 0. -U. A VI 7511.

60. BAN 51-1-18-345; DPIK 782 no. 310.

61. DPIK 777 no. 269.

62. Ibid. 780 no. 304.

63. BAN 51-1-18-350.

64. Rizov, "Katastrofata," 62. Danev knew of Romanian preparations for mobilization and that Romania would mobilize in case of a war. See DPIK 781 nos. 305, 308.

65. Aleksandur Ganchev, Mezhdusuyuznicheskata voina 1913 qodina (Sofia, 1940), 99.

66. BAN 51-1-18-341.

67. Nashata duma. (Danev) 223. See also Crampton, Bulgaria 424.

68. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 279.

69. BAN 51-1-18-351.

70. Velcho T. Velchev, Tselnata 1stina po pooroma. (Sofia, 1913), 14-15. The attack order read in part "In order that we are not silent against the Serbian attacks which reflect badly on the morale of our army and to press the enemy further, I am ordering you to attack the enemy by the most energetic means along the entire line, without completely disclosing your strength and without becoming carried away in a prolonged battle.■ Helmreich stated, "The Bulgarian attack of 29/30 June is explainable only as part of a policy of arbitration and not as one directly 294

opposed to it." Balkan Wars. 366.

71. General M. Savov, "General Savov govori," Dnevnik no. 4022, 7 November 1913. The emphasis is Savov's.

72. DPIK, 1202. According to legend Ferdinand consumed a bottle of mastica, the fiery Bulgarian anise flavored brandy, before giving the order to attack.

73. Prilozhenie I (Savov) 278.

74. DPIK 536 nos. 218, 219.

75. Helmreich, Balkan Wars. 361-62, 365; Toshev, II 346. Danev was threatened by the Macedonians with assassination if he went to St. Petersburg. P. Gabe, Rusiya. Avstriya. i^ Bulqariya v_ bulqarsklya pogrom. (Sofia, 1914) 102; Velchev, 24.

76. Kosta Todoroff, "The Macedonian Organization Yesterday and Today," Foreign Affairs VI (1928) 476.

77. XVII ONS 1st IS, Speech of S. Danev, 5 May 14, 652. Savov and Peev-Plachkov later alleged that Danev had known of the attack order. BAN 51-1-18-397, 398.

78. "16 juni predreshen," Savov to Danev 22/9 June 1913, Dnevnik no. 4235, 14 June 14; "Rusiya i arbitrzhut," Savov to Danev 26/13 June 1913, Dnevnik no. 4236, 15 June 14; "Kak ce provokirashi armiyata," Savov to Danev 28/15 June 1913, Dnevnik no. 4239, 18 June 14. Danev was not in contact with Ferdinand at the time of the attack. Pirilozhenie I (Danev) 94.

79. BAN 51-1-18-351.

80. Abrashev even speculated that the order to attack originated in a hostile foreign state. See P. Abrashev, "Zapovedta za stremiteyalnata ataka, " Biilqariya no. 21, 15 October 13.

81. Prilozhenie I (Danev), 83; (Savov) 262.

82. DPIK 537-38 no. 225, 622 no. 131; Toshev II 357-59.

83. BAN 51-1-18-354; Madzharov, Podqotovka. 154-55. Savov was fired twice, by Danev because of the attack and by Ferdinand for stopping the attack. Ferdinand refused to accept the resignation of the Danev government submitted on 2 July/19 June. The government finally succeeded in resigning on 14/1 July and was replaced by a Russophobe government headed by the Liberal leader Radoslavov. 295

84. Helmreich, Balkan Wars. 365.

85. Zarla. no. 62, 17 June 14.

86. Black, 291. Chapter II article 11 of the Bulgarian Constitution. A similar situation in Germany would cause problems during the First World War. CONCLUSION

Ivan E. Geshov's tenure as Foreign Minister and Prime

Minister of Bulgaria was one of the most important in modern Bulgarian history. Like all of his predecessors he was confronted with the legacy of San Stefano and the problem of the Bulgarian population in the Ottoman Empire.

Geshov chose to face these problems on a moderate and pragmatic basis. He was compelled to take account of popular opinion in Bulgaria and aware that radical

Macedonian bands would attempt to force their own solution to the Macedonian question if the Bulgarian government did not enforce its own. Geehov perceptively compared his position to that of Cavour. He wanted, as had Cavour with

Italy, to unify Bulgaria on a safe and conservative basis.

After he assumed office he immediately initiated an activist policy of rapprochement with Turkey. Meanwhile he greatly strengthened his own position within Bulgaria by securing the passage of the amendments to the constitution. These amendments enhanced his authority to conduct foreign policy and added to his prestige.

When the Turks failed to responded to his overtures for rapprochement, Geshov sought alliances with the other

296 297

Balkan states. He first turned to Serbia and offered to

resolve the dispute over the division of the Ottoman lands

with a partition of Macedonia. This was a step of some

consequence as no previous Bulgarian statesman had been

willing to consider a division of the San Stefano legacy.

On the basis of the partition of Macedonia Geshov

negotiated a sound alliance with Serbia which was backed

by the power and prestige of Russia. This was the

cornerstone of the Balkan League.

However the alliance agreement with Greece, which

followed that with Serbia, was inadequate. This

agreement, also negotiated by Geshov, contained no

provision for a division of the Ottoman spoils. This was

a major mistake because such an agreement could have

precluded later acrimony between Bulgaria and Greece after

the successful conclusion of the First Balkan War.

With the addition of Montenegro to this matrix of

alliances Geshov had achieved the first pan-Balkan

alliance. By the end of the summer of 1912 he was at the

acme of his power and prestige. Bulgaria was poised to

accomplish its national goal and realize the attainment of

the San Stefano legacy and national unity. In this

endeavor he had the support of the overwhelming majority

of the Bulgarian people. When the war with Turkey began on 18/5 October 1912 Geshov was at the pinnacle of his power and prestige in Bulgaria. 298

Once the war began, however, Geshov and his

government were increasingly isolated from the events at

the front by the deliberate policy of the high command.

The unexpected success of the Bulgarian Army made

unnecessary the government's plan to call for Great Power support to end the war. Also Geshov had no program to utilize the great Bulgarian military victories. The high command arrogantly proceeded with its own policies, which ended with the disastrous attack on the Chataldja fortification' Geshov never fully reasserted his authority. He did threaten to resign when the high command sent its own envoy to Constantinople to negotiate an armistice. But he remained uninformed about the extent of the defeat at Chataldja.

During the peace negotiations Geshov strove to uphold the alliance agreement with Serbia. Eventually he even concluded that some concessions would be necessary for

Greece. The vexing problem of a territorial concession to

Romania confounded Geshov, especially when Russia indicated support for the Romanian claims. He never developed a viable response to the Romanian demands. Only territorial concessions could have saved the situation there. Geshov had already made such concessions to Serbia in 1912. In the absence of Russian support, he should have done the same with Romania. But had Geshov succeeded in placating Greece with a territorial arrangement which 299

included the Bulgarian recognition of Greece's claims to

Salonika, and had the dispute with Serbia over the division of Macedonia been left to Russian arbitration,

Geshov would have been recognized as one of Bulgaria's greatest leaders. Unfortunately S. Danev, Geshov's coalition partner, refused to consider any territorial concessions to Greece. Before the dispute with Serbia was submitted to Russian arbitration, Geshov, exhausted by the diplomatic imbroglio and the internal squabbles, resigned.

His successor, S. Danev, did nothing to improve

Bulgaria's situation. He lacked the diplomatic finesse to solve the outstanding problems with Serbia, Greece and

Romania. The unsteady condition of the army panicked the

High Command and the Tsar. They then ordered the attack on Serbian and Greek positions on 30/17 June which resulted in the Bulgarian disaster. Geshov demonstrated intelligence, firmness and finesse during the first half of his tenure in office. However he lacked the military knowledge and the personal strength to carry through his policies during the fighting. Even after the armistice in

1912 Geshov never again regained his position of power in

Bulgaria. He expected that others would conduct themselves with the same courtesy and integrity that he demonstrated in his career of public service, and failed to learn from his numerous disappointments in these expectations. 300

Geshov's failings were not only the result of his

character. He had to contend with a constitutional system

which, like that of many other European states at that

time including imperial Germany, left the command of the

military in the hands of the monarch and allowed the

government little opportunity to exercise any real

authority. Furthermore in the implementation of his

policies, Geshov faced three unusually stubborn and

ambitious individuals, Tsar Ferdinand, General Savov and

Dr. Danev. Also to his dismay he discovered at the

beginning of 1913 that Russian support was fickle and

unreliable.

Bulgaria's catastrophe was not inevitable. Had

Geshov made a territorial arrangement with Greece in 1912,

had he insisted upon greater access to information from

the front and a greater voice in military councils, had he

taken the difficult but ultimately necessary step of

making a concession to Romania, he might have been

remembered as the Bulgarian statesman who achieved the San

Stefano legacy. Now, because he came so close to

achieving this goal by employing reasonably forthright

methods, he remains a tragic figure.

The Balkan Wars remain an important aspect of

Bulgarian history. Had Bulgaria achieved its aims in this

war this history of the Balkans and all Europe during the past seventy years might have been completely different. 301

A sated Bulgaria would have been a force for stability in the Balkans and would very likely have supported its

Russian patron in the First World War. This support would have greatly facilitated the seizure of the straits and

Constantinople. The Bulgarians might have taken Chataldja this time, and opened the way for Entente supplies to reach Russia. These supplies might have precluded the

Russian collapse in 1917. And The Bulgarian state would have been much more self-assured and independent after having attained its national aspiration.

Recently the Bulgarians themselves have shifted their attitude toward the Balkan Wars. The First Balkan War in particular, has been the object of considerable patriotic attention in Bulgaria.* In the spring of 1983, the seventieth anniversary of the fall of Adrianople to the

Bulgarians, the Balkan War was acknowledged in Sofia with an art exhibition and a history conference. In this context the Balkan Wars and the Geshov tenure in office represent a high point in the history of the modern

Bulgarian state. This was perhaps the last time that all

Bulgarians, convinced of the justice of their cause, acted in unison for a common goal. They came very close to the achievement of this goal. For this reason this era remains an important one to modern Bulgarian and European history. FOOTNOTE

i. On this point see Patrick Moore, "Balkan Report Balkan Politics : March-May 1983," South Slav Journ VI (1983) pp 40-41. o

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Panaiotov, Lyubomir. Borbata na BPSDP (t. s. ) protiv zavoevatelnata i. avantvuriatichna politika na bulqarakata burzhoaziya v perioda na voinite (1912- 191B). Sofia: BTllgarskata komunisticheska partiya, 1956.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. A History of Modern Serbia. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. 2 vol.

Protich, Stefan (Balkanicus). The Aspirations of Bulgaria. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. Ltd., 1915.

Puaux, Rene. De. Sofia a. Tchataldla. Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1913.

Rankin, Lt. Colonel Reginald. The Inner History of the Balkan War. London: Constable, 1914.

Rossos, Andrew. Russia and the Balkans. Inter- Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Policy 1908- 1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.

Rothschild, Joseph. The Communist Party of Bulgaria. Origins and Development 1883-1936. New York: Columbia, 1959.

Savov, Nikola. Vinovnitsite za dvete katastrofi na Btflgariya. Vratsa: Tsentralna, 1918.

Schmitt, Bernadette E. The Annexation of Bosnia 1908-09. Cambridge: University, 1937.

Seton-Watson, R. W. A, History of the Roumanians. Cambridge: University Press, 1934

Sforza, Count Carlo. Fifty Years of War and Diplomacy in the Balkans. Pashlch and the Union of the Yugoslavs. New York: Columbia, 1940.

Shipchanov, Ivan. Vestiteli na bolna slava. (Voennite korespondenti prez Balkanskata volna ot 1912-1913 g. ) Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 1983.

Shopov, Atanas. Kak ni se nalozhl Balkanskata voina. Sofia: Gutenberg, 1915.

Slivensky, Ivan. La Bulgarie depuis le Traite de 316

Berlin et la Paux dans les Balkans. Paris: Jouve, 1927.

Solarov, K. Balkanelyat suyuz i. osvobodltelnlte volni prez 1912 i 1913. Sofia: Glushkov, 1926.

- La Bulgarle et la Question macedolenne. Les Causes des Guerres balkaniques Sofia: Imprimerie de l'Etat, 1919.

Sosnosky, Theodor von. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Unqarns seit 1Q66. Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutshe Verlags-Anstalt, 1914. 2 vol.

Stanev, Nikola. Nai-nova lstoriya na Btflqarlya 1878- 1920. Sofia: S. M. Staikov, 1925.

Statelova, Elena. Politika. partii. pechat na btflqarskata burzhoazlya 1909-1912. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1973.

Stavrianos, L. S. The Balkans since 1453. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1958.

Stojanov, Petar. Makedonija vo vremeto na balkanskite i. prvata svetska vo.lna 1912-1918. Skopje: Institut za Natsionalna Istorija, 1969.

Thaden, Edvard C. Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912. University Park, Pennsyslvania: University of Pennsylvania, 1965.

Todorov, Petur. Poqromite na Bulqariya. Sofia: Knipegraf, 1930. 2 vol.

Todorova, Tsvetana. Diploroaticheska istoriya na vunshnlte zaemi na Btflqariya 1888-1912. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1971.

Treadway, John D. The Falcon and the Eagle. Montenegro and Austria-Hungary 1908-1914. West Lafayette Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1983.

Trotsky, Leon, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913. New York: Monad Press, 1980.

Tukim, Cemal. Die politischen Beziehunqen zwischen Oesterreich-Unqarn und Bulgarien von 1908 bis zum Bukarester Frieden. Hamburg: Hans Christians Druckerei, 1936.

Vazov, Boris. Durzhavniyat prevrat 16 yuni 1913 god. 317

Sofia: Iskra, 1913.

Velchev, Velcho T. Kum pogrom: Kak se provallha narodnlte ldeall. Sofia: Gutenberg, 1926.

- Tselata 1stlna po poqroma. Sofia: Den, 1913.

Vlahov, Tushe. Krizata v bulqaro-turskite otnosheniya 1895-1908. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiya na naukite, 1977. 7 - Otnoshenlyata mezhdu Biilqar iya i_ tsentralnlte sili po vreme na voinite 1912-1918 g. Sofia: Btflgarskata komunisticheska partiya, 1957.

Wagner, Lieutenant Hermengild. With the Victorious Bulgarians. London: Constable and Company ltd., 1913.

Young, George (Diplomatist). Nationalism and War in the Near East. Oxford: Clarendon,, 1915.

Zhebokritskii, V. A., Bolgariya nakanune balkansklkh voin. Kiev: Izdatelstvo Kievskogo Universiteta, 1960.

- Bolgariya vo period balkansklkh voin 1912-1913 qg. Kiev: Izdatelstvo Kievskogo Universiteta, 1961.

VI. ARTICLES

Abrashev, P. "Obyasnitelnata zapoved ot 17 yuni," BCflqarlya no. 27, 23 October 1913.

- "Zapovedta za stremitelnata ataka,■ Bulqariya no. 21, 15 October 1913.

Antonov, Georgi. "Uchastieto na bClgarskiya voenen flot v Balkanskata voina (1912-1913 g. )," Voennoistoricheski sbornlk. 2 (1983) 62-72.

Bourchier, J. D. "Articles on the Origins of the Balkan League," London Times 4, 5, 6, 11, and 13 June 1913.

Bozhilova, Rumyana and Bobev, Bobi. "Bulgariya i albanskiyat vupros v nachaloto na XX vek," 1storicheski preqled XXXVIII (1982) 23-41.

Bozhinov, Voin. "La politique francaise et la Bulgarie au temps des guerres balkanique 1912- 1913," Etudes balkanique. 4 (1974) 71-78. 3ia

Crampton, R. J. "The Balkans as a Factor in German Foreign Policy 1912-1914,■ Slavonic and East European Review. LV (1977) 370-90.

- "The Balkans 1909-1914,■ in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 256-70.

Dakin, Douglas. "The Diplomacy of the Great Powers and the Balkan States 1908-1914," Balkan Studies III (1962) 327-74.

Damyanov, SimeOn. "Aspects economiques de la politique francaise dans les Balkans au debut de XXe siecle," Etudes balkanique 4 (1974) 8-26.

- "Evropeiskata diplomatsiya i Bulgariya v navecherieto i po vremeto na purvata balkanska voina (1912-1913 g. ), " Voennoistoricheski sbornik. IV (1982) 23-45.

- "La France et la Bulgarie a l'epoque des Guerre balkaniques 1912-1913," Etudes balkanlques. 2 (1971) 18-46.

Daneva-Milova, Christina. "La France et les evenements aux Balkans en 1908-1911, " Etudes balkaniques. 4 (1971) 31-41.

Djordjevich, Dimitrije. "Pashich i Milovanovich u pregovorima za balkanski savez 1912 godine," Istoriski Chasopis IX-X (1959) 467-86.

Dnevnlk (Sofia) nos 4218-4241, 12 May-20 June 1914. Series of articles focusing on the role of the Bulgarian military in the Balkan Wars.

Droz, Jacques. "Les affaires balkaniques et les origines de la premiere guerre mondiale d'apres les travaux de Fritz Fisher," Etudes balkaniques. 4 (1974) 27-30.

Faissler, Margarita A. "Austria-Hungary and the Disruption of the Balkan League," Slavonic Yearbook. XIX 141-57.

Flaningam, M. L. "German Economic Controls in Bulgaria 1894-1918," American Slavonic and East European Review. XX (1961) 99-108.

Girault, Rene. "Les Balkans dans les Relations 319

Franco-Russes en 1912," Etudes balkaniques 4 (1974) 49-70.

Grancharov, Stojcho. "The Bulgarian Bourgeois Democracy,■ Bulgarian Historical Review II (1982) 31-48.

Helmreich, E. C. "The Conflict between Germany and Austria over Balkan Policy 1913-1914, " in Essays In the History of Modern Europe. Freeport H. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968.

- "Ein Nachtrag zu den serbisch-bulgarischen Abkommen von 1912," Berliner Monatshefte XIII (1935) 1073- 76.

Helmreich, E. C. and Black, C. E. "The Russo- Bulgarian Military Convention of 1902," Journal of Modern History IX (1937) 471-482.

Hering, Gunnar. "Die Serbisch-Bulgarischen Beziehungen am vorabend und waehrend der Balkankriege," Balkan Studies III (1962) 297-326; IV (1963) 347-378.

Howard, Henry H. "The Balkan Wars and their Significance for Turkey," Balkan Studies III (1962) 267-76.

Hristov, Dimitur. "Na moite obviniteli," Svobodno mnenle II 9 (1914) 166-169.

Ilchev, Ivan. "Vunshnopoliticheska propoganda na bulgarskata natsionalna kauza prez Balkanskite voini (1912-1913 g.)," Voennoistoricheski sbornik 4 (1982) 80-98.

Iliev, Iliya. "Ovladyavaneto na Odrinskata krepost- vrtlh na Balkanskata voina slava," Izvestlya na 1stitut za voenna lstoriya XXXVII (1984) 129-40.

Langer, W. L. "Russia, the Straits Question and the Origins of the Balkan League, 1908-1912," Political Science Quarterly. XLIII (September 1928), 321-63.

M. "The Balkan League, History of its Formation," Fortnightly Review. XCII (March 1913), 430-39.

Madzharov, M. "Radko Dimitriev za mezhdusuyuznicheskata voina,• Bulqarska misul XV (1940) 485-491. 320

Markov, Georgi. "The Bulgarian Delegation at the London Peace Conference (December 1912-May 1913)," Bulgarian Historical Review IV (1984) 29-45.

- "Bulgariya i neinite suyuznitsi prez balkanskata voina (1912-1913 g. ), " Istoricheski preqled 1 (1983) 31-48.

- "SUdbonosnite stupki na Bulgariya v Balkanskite voini (1912-1913 g. ), " Istoricheski preqled 4 (1982) 103-113.

Michel-Durandin, Catherine. "La Bulgarie, allie possible de la France? Le point de vue de l'attache militaire francais a Sofia en 1912-1913," Etudes balkaniiues 4 (1974) 79-86.

Mishev, D. "Avtorite na bulgaro-srubskiya dogovor,■ Svobodno mnenie II 3 (1914) 2-6.

- "Ideologiya na dogovora," ibid. 4 53-56.

- "Osnovite na dogovora," ibid. 5 69-72.

- "Otgovorite za katastrofata," ibid. 7 101-04.

- "Territorialnite kompensatsii," ibid. 6 85-87.

Mitev, Iono. "Bulgaro-srubskiyat suyuzen dogovor ot 1912 g. i diplomaticheskata podgotovka na Balkanskata voina 1912-1913 g.,■ Izveativa na Intituta za voenna istoriya XXXVII (1984) 40-47.

Moore, Patrick. "Balkan Report, Balkan Politics: March-May 1983,■ The South Slav Journal VI (1983) 37-50.

Mosely, Philp E. "Russian Policy in 1911-1912," Journal of Modern History XII (1940) 69-86. i Panaiotov, Georgi. "Rumuniya i Balkanskata voina (1912-1913 g.)," Izvestiya na Instituta za voenna istoriva XXXVII (1984) 68-77.

Panaiotov, Ivan. "Velikite sili v istoriyata na tretoto bulgarsko tsarstvo," Rodina II (1939) 23- 41.

Panaiotov, Lyubomir. "Balkanskyat s*uyuz i voinata ot 1912-1913 g.," Voennoistoricheski sbornik 4 (1982) 3-22. 321

Pantev, Andrei. "Britain and Bulgaria 1879-1915," Southeastern Europe VII (1980) 191-204.

Pantev, Andrei et. al. "The Foreign Policy of the Opposition Parties in Bulgaria 1900-1914," Bulgarian Historical Review 3 (1975) 28-59.

Petkova, M. and Genovska, M. "Materiali na Balkanskata voina (1912-1913 g.),■ Izvestiya za durzhavnite arkhivi VI (1962) 250-258.

Pitassio, Armando and Guida, Francesco. "La politica estera italiana e gli slavi del sud nei rapporti delle lagazioni di Belgrado e di Sofia nei period 1904-1908 e 1911-1913," offprint from Annali della Facolta di Scienze Politiche Universita di Perugia XV (1978-79), 59-103. "Aspetti e problemi della politica italiana verso gli slavi del sud nei periodo precedente la I guerra mondiale."

Popov, Radoslav. "Balkanskite durzhavi i krayat na krizata ot 1908-1909 g. , ■ in V Chest na Akademik Dimitur Kosev. Sofia: Bulgarska akademiya na naukite, 1974. 253-63.

Popov, Radoslav and Samardzhiev, Bozhidar. "Problemi na Balkanskata voina v novata balkanska istoriografiya," Vekove 4 (1972) 49-56.

Rappaport von Arbengau, Alfred. "Spalajkovich," Berliner Monatshefte XIII (1935) 555-576.

Rizov, Dimitur. "Kak doide katastrofata," Svobodno mnenie II 4 (1914) 57-63.

Savov, General M. "General Savov govori,■ Dnevnik no. 4022, 7 November 1913.

Schmidt, Hans-Theodor. "Oesterreich-Ungarn und Bulgarien 1908-1913, ■ Jahrbuecher fuer Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven XI (1935) 503-609.

Statelova, Elena. "Bulgaro-grutskite politicheski otnosheniya v navecherieto na Balkanskata voina," Izvestia na Institute za voenna istoriya XXXVI (1984) 48-58.

- "Za bulgaro-srubskite otnosheniya v periods 1909- 1911 g." Istoricheski pregled 5 (1969) 20-38.

- "L'idee d'un rapprochement balkanique et la presse bourgeiose en Bulgarie (1909-1912) Etudes 322

balkaniouee 2 <1970) 74-89.

- "Ideya sblizheniya balkansklkh narodov v Bolgariya v pervom desyatiletii XX-go Veka,■ in Zbornik radova prikazanih na Med.lunarodnom nauchnom skupu Velike cile i. Srbila pred svetska pat. Beograd, 1976. 109-131.

- "Nyakoi harakterni cherti na bfilgarskiya burzhoazen partien pechat v navecherieto na Balkanskite voini 1909-1912," Izvestiya na Instituta za istoriya XXI (1970) 173-202.

- r,Sur la Question des Relations bulgaro-turques au cours de la periode 1909-1911," Etudes Historiques V (1970), 443-60.

- "Rusko-bulgarski politicheski otnosheniya," Istoricheski preqled. XXIX (1973), 3-17.

Stoyanov, Stoyan. "Bulgariya na Londonskata mirna konferentsiya <1912-1913 g. ), " Izvestiya na Institut za voenna istoriya XXXVII (1984) 78-89.

Steinitz, Eduard von. "Berchtolds Politik vaehrend des ersten Balkankrieges,■ Berliner Honatsheft IX (1931) 229-248.

Todoroff, Kosta. "The Macedonian Organization Yesterday and Today," Foreign Affairs VI <1927-28( 472-482.

Traylor, Idris Rhea Jr. "International and Legal Aspects of the Great Powers' Mediation of the Rutnanian-Bulgarian Terrritorial Dispute 1912-1913,■ East European Quarterly. XIV (1980) 23-37.

Turczynski, E. "Oesterreich-Ungarn und Suedosteuropa waehrend der Balkankrieg," Balkan Studies V (1964) 11-46.

Velev, Alesandr. "Politicheskie partii v Bogarii i Balkanskie voiny (1912-1913)," Etudes historiques IV (1968) 437-70.

Veleva, Mariya. "Voinishkite buntove prez 1913 g.,■ Istoricheski preqled XIV (1958) 3-33.

- "Politicheskata kriza v Buflgariya prez 1913 g.," in Purvi konqres na bulqarskoto istorichesko druzhestvo. Sofia: Btflgarska akademiya na naukite, 1972. vol. I. 323

- "Pravitelstvenata kriza prez mai-yuli 1913 g. , " Godlshnlk na Sofiiskiya unlversitet. Fllosofsko- istorIcheski faklltat. LIX (1965) 83-128.

Vlahov, Tushe. "Vunshnata politika na Ferdinand i Balkansklya suyuz," Istoricheski preqled VI (1950) 422-444.

Woods, H. Charles. "The Armies of the Balkan League," Fortnightly Review XCII (1912) 1060-70.

Zarya (Sofia) no. 61, 17 June 1914. Statements of Bulgarian politicians on the events of 29/16 June 1913.

Zhebokritski, Viktor and Kulinich, Ivan. "Iz istoriyata na rusko-btflgarskite otnosheniya po vreme na purvata Balkanska voina 1912-1913," Istoricheski preqled XVIII (1962) 70-78.

VII. UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATIONS

Pace, Eleanor Damon. "Roumania and the Balkan Wars." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1944.

Traylor, Idris Rhea. "The Double-Eagle and the Fox: The Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria, 1911-1913." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, Durham, 1965.