The Triumph of Style Over Substance: Kennedy's Inner-Circle and Vietnam Decision-Making, 1963

By

Steve Grainger

Bachelor of Arts, Honours History, Co-operative Program, Honours Applied Studies, Co­ operative Program, University ofWaterloo, 2005

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts in the Graduate Academic Unit of History

Supervisor: David A. Charters, PhD, History

Examining Board: Gary K. Waite, PhD, History, Chair Jeffrey S. Brown, PhD, History Paul Howe, PhD, Political Science

This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK

April, 2007

Steve Grainger, 2007 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Vote reference ISBN: 978-0-494-56538-4 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-56538-4

NOTICE: AVIS:

The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par ('Internet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extra its substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondares ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis.

•+• Canada For Ruwan and for myself;

for both of us. Abstract

American policy towards the conflict in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration was strongly influenced by the style and method of conduct of the

President and his advisors. This study will critically assess Kennedy's presidential leadership style through an examination of his decision-making processes and the use of intelligence. Specific cases from the Vietnam War during the Spring and Fall of

1963 will be used to illustrate my argument that the Kennedy administration deepened the U.S. commitment to Vietnam through its dependence on optimistic military reporting and as a result of the leadership, management, and decision-making styles employed by Kennedy and his advisors.

The legacy of these factors was a creeping escalation of the American commitment to South Vietnam that was intended as stopgap measures to address the ever-worsening political situation in Saigon. This policy failed to consider the long- term implications of such actions, and ultimately resulted in the Kennedy administration supporting the overthrow of Diem, a decision that left the U.S. in a precarious position regarding the future of South Vietnam and the American commitment to the fight against Communism in Asia.

in Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. David Charters, whose guidance, knowledge and support helped make this thesis possible. I would also like to thank the Department of History at UNB for its willingness to help, listen, and participate in the completion of this work. Most of all I am indebted to Ruwanmali Samarakoon, whose unceasing love, encouragement and support have mattered most during my two years in Fredericton.

IV Table of Contents

Dedication Abstract Acknowledgements

Introduction 1. Historiography 2. The Establishment of the Kennedy Style 3. Shooting the Messenger: The Struggle Over Intelligence 4. Crisis Management in the Summer of 1963 Conclusion

Bibliography Curriculum Vitae

v 1

Introduction

The Vietnam War has been a topic of near constant study since the conflict began following the Second World War. As successive governments in the U.S. inherited the conflict from the administrations that preceded them, presidents and their advisors, influenced by their respective styles and methods of conduct, shaped the nature and degree of the American involvement in Southeast Asia. The inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in January 1961 brought forth a new administration, one that possessed a remarkable faith in its own ability to deal with the increasing tensions of the world in a manner that relied on new systems of decision-making and policy construction.

This study will critically assess Kennedy's presidential leadership style through an examination of his decision-making processes and the use of intelligence.

I will use specific cases from the Vietnam War in 1963 to illustrate my argument that the Kennedy administration deepened the U.S. commitment to Vietnam in two ways that were reflective of the administration itself.

First, Kennedy and his advisors sought out and accepted only 'good news intelligence' about the 'progress' of the war. These optimistic reports, prepared by the military, rarely addressed the severity of the political situation in Saigon, and refused to acknowledge the potential impact of the political crisis on the Diem regime's ability to fight the insurgency in his country. Instead, 'good news intelligence' focused on military achievements and depended on the use of statistics that were often based on unreliable South Vietnamese sources. These reports depicted the situation in South Vietnam far more optimistically than their critics charged. Such 2

portrayals were upheld and solidified by special fact-finding missions authorized by

the President. Their recommendations were routinely privileged over more

pessimistic CIA and State Department estimates. The advisors deployed to assess the

situation in light of these intelligence disputes were drawn from within Kennedy's _

inner circle. These men already favoured a military response to the insurgency in

South Vietnam, having helped construct the framework within which the existing policy operated.

As members of the president's inner circle, the participants of these missions

already possessed great influence with Kennedy, and given the informal nature in which the president preferred to work, the recommendations from these high-level missions proved much more influential than the pessimistic civilian reports that often provided the impetus for these missions in the first place.

The preference for the recommendations of these missions to the warnings and criticisms of civilian intelligence agencies was multiplied by the weakness in leadership and the low stature of the leaders of these civilian agencies, namely

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and to a lesser extent the Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI), John McCone. These men existed outside of the president's inner circle, and so lacked the power and influence of those participating in the fact-finding missions. As such, Kennedy's preference for the opinions of trusted insiders limited his access to sources of information that disagreed with or criticized his policies. It was working within these restrictions of opinion that enabled the administration to

sink further into the morass in South Vietnam while continuing to believe their

existing policy was being implemented successfully. .3

The second manner in which the Kennedy administration deepened the conflict in Vietnam in a way that reflected its own character was through the leadership, management, and decision-making styles of Kennedy and his advisors.

Abandoning established means of decision-making while retaining the commitments of previous administrations, Kennedy and his advisors changed the way the American government managed foreign policy. The president preferred the use of small, informal groups of experts to derive policy rather than the more ponderous system of information gathering and policy formation created under presidents Truman and

Eisenhower. Kennedy's dismantling of the National Security Council (NSC) upon taking office is illustrative of his desire to construct new methods of government. He preferred to rely on personal relationships that favoured 'insiders' over 'outsiders.'

Decision-making bodies deemed too cumbersome were abandoned, resulting in the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a few close advisors who the president relied on more and more as the conflict worsened. While Kennedy and his advisors created new methods to deal with the ever-increasing list of foreign policy problems, their focus on these new initiatives did not include a basic reassessment of the American commitment to South Vietnam. Rather, the administration assumed the cause was just, and focused on how the old initiatives of policy implementation could be improved by employing its new methods of decision­ making and policy construction. In short, it was a triumph of process over substance.

Given that these new methods were untested, the Kennedy administration would seem to have been embarking on a risky course of action. Its failure to reevaluate Vietnam policy, coupled with its informal decision-making style, led the 4 administration to a series of short-term incremental commitments and reckless decisions, such as the support for the coup against Diem, that failed to consider long- term implications. Combined, these measures elevated the American commitment to

South Vietnam prior to Diem's overthrow and tied the two countries ever more tightly into the cycle of chaos and confusion that followed.

This study begins its analysis with a survey of the literature on the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam under the administration of President John F. Kennedy.

This is followed by an overview of the first two years of the Kennedy administration's foreign policy in South Vietnam and an examination of the key foreign policy issues facing the president during this time. The administration's response to crises in Cuba, its arduous relationship with the Soviet Union, and its reaction to the Communist insurgency in Laos will be used to examine how the

Kennedy administration dealt with such matters, and how these conflicts influenced the administration's approach to the insurgency in South Vietnam. This background illuminates the context that informed Kennedy's initial understanding of the conflict, and shows how the interaction of Kennedy and his closest advisors came to determine policy in Southeast Asia.

The development of the administration's relationship with South Vietnamese

President Ngo Dinh Diem is an important factor in this study. Tracing this relationship presents a pattern of interaction between the two nations that demonstrates the frustrating and often contradictory aims and initiatives of their governments while illustrating how each group came to respond to the demands of .5 the other. The Kennedy-Diem relationship is all the more important given the stark changes in mood and approach of the American government in the summer of 1963.

These events are chronicled in chapter three, where an examination of the ideal intelligence producer/consumer relationship is used to evaluate how the

Kennedy administration interacted with the intelligence community during the critical year of 1963. Specific examples taken from this period—the outcome of the battle of

Ap Bac, the drafting and forced redrafting of National Intelligence Estimate 53-63, the recommendations of the McNamara/Taylor mission and the subsequent challenge posed to its findings by State Department document RFE-90—all illustrate how, given the description of the 'ideal' intelligence producer/consumer relationship, the

Kennedy administration failed to exhibit even the most basic characteristics judged necessary for the successful interaction between intelligence input and policy construction.

The dysfunction that characterized the intelligence/policy relationships of the

Kennedy administration is further illuminated in the final chapter, where the leadership, management, and decision-making structures of the Kennedy presidency are discussed against the backdrop of the political crisis in Saigon during the summer and fall of 1963. This final chapter traces the development of the Buddhist crisis, the repressions and acts of violence that characterized Diem's response to it, and considers how this series of events led to the Kennedy administration's support for the overthrow of the Diem regime.

As this study will show, Kennedy's support for the coup against Diem was not a policy decision made in isolation or one made out of desperation. Rather, it was the 6

product of his presidential style, one which, based on his faith in the abilities of his

advisors, narrowed the scope of acceptable intelligence and opinion, which in turn

isolated the president from contrasting theories as to the progress of the war. This is

not to say that Kennedy was in the dark as to the reality of the situation in South

Vietnam. But his reliance on 'good news intelligence' and preference for fact-finding

missions to settle disputes over policy empowered those advocating optimistic reports

while marginalizing pessimistic and critical reports. In addition, Kennedy tended to

delay his decisions until the last possible moment, preferring to compromise when

deciding policy in order to satisfy the demands of as many segments of his

administration as possible. The result was a policy defined by incremental, short-term

commitments that acted more as a series of stop-gap measures to address the

immediate needs of a growing crisis than the bold and decisive plan the Kennedy

administration's rhetoric promised. These 'middle of the road' initiatives were neither the aggressive proposals of the military or the more cautious approaches advocated by the civilian intelligence agencies. Rather, the president attempted to find a common

ground between these two factions that would still address the concerns of the

growing insurgency in South Vietnam. The legacy of this policy was a creeping

escalation of the American commitment in the form of increases in aid and advisors.

While buying time for the administration to consider the value of larger

commitments, these acts often proceeded without consideration of their long-term

implications. This expansion of the war, coupled with the administration's failure to

reassess the situation and its political requirements, set a precedent for the military's

increasing involvement in the conflict; subsequent commitments were often difficult 7 to reverse once the initial decisions had been made; The strength of the military's voice in decision-making further eroded the influence of those advocating a political solution to the insurgency. This left many in the intelligence community frustrated as they watched the administration employ military means and tactics in what amounted to a political conflict.

The repercussions of this presidential style would climax in the November

1963 coup against Diem, an event that serves as a perfect example of the consequences of Kennedy's presidential style. During the confused atmosphere in which the instructions of American support for the South Vietnamese generals plotting Diem's overthrow were drafted, the U.S. failed to fully assess the significance and potential repercussions that such a decision entailed. By not taking the time to properly evaluate the character and ability of those plotting the coup against Diem, nor adequately examining their prospects for success, months of cautious indecision, influenced by Kennedy's presidential leadership style and coupled with his ineffective relationship with the intelligence community, had combined to produce a policy initiative that held dire consequences for the future stability of South Vietnam, and the United States' relationship to it. 8

Chapter One: Historiography

Like most modern conflicts, the Vietnam War was a complex and multi- faceted event, prone to conflicting interpretations and analyses. When discussing the war, current scholars, researchers, and former policy-makers focus on several dominant themes believed to explain the expanded commitment of the U.S. government and the subsequent escalation of the conflict by the Kennedy administration. These themes carry the bias of their proponents, be they ideological biases of particular authors or selective (and often self-serving) memories of individuals involved in the formulation of U.S. policy.

Three central themes emerge from a wide cross section of histories, memoirs, academic sources, journals, and primary source documents from the Kennedy

Library. They will be used to illustrate the process by which the American government came to entangle itself in the longest and most unsuccessful war in its history. These themes include first, the role of personalities, focusing on president

Kennedy, his leadership style, and influence over his most important advisors.

Various characteristics of these high-level policy-makers will be addressed, including their Cold War perceptions, overconfidence, and views towards negotiations and peace talks.

A second important theme is the interaction between intelligence and policy.

An examination of this relationship will illustrate to what extent intelligence shaped policy construction. This chapter will compare the administration's unquestioned acceptance of South Vietnamese intelligence and the optimistic American reporting from Saigon with its response to more realistic but often pessimistic estimates 9 produced by various agencies in the U.S. This theme will also include a discussion on the lack of alternatives and absence of any re-evaluation of American priorities by the

Kennedy administration, including the President's tendency to follow the middle path in lieu of developing a clear strategy of his own in Vietnam.

Finally, the relationship between the United States government and its South

Vietnamese ally will be addressed. The shifting and often opposing views of the

Kennedy administration toward the Government of Vietnam will illustrate how the major crises and events afflicting South Vietnam affected U.S. government perceptions of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's regime. American culpability in the 1963 coup against Diem will illustrate how this relationship characterized the American misunderstanding of the situation and contributed to the

American escalation of the conflict. By examining these three themes, this chapter will offer an understanding of the current debate surrounding the events, the personalities, and the relationships of those involved in the deepening American commitment in Vietnam.

Beginning with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, an examination of the attitudes and ideologies of his administration provides a window into the decision-making and policy construction processes of the Kennedy era. While the youth of the president and his new administration marked a "passing of the torch to a new generation,"1 Cold War ideologies and a deeply ingrained anti-Communist mindset prevailed between Kennedy and his advisors. Historian Robert Mann argues

1 Taken from John F. Kennedy's inaugural speech, January 20, 1961, United States Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy - Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President - January 20 lo December 31, 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register; National Archives and Records Service, 1962), 1-3. 10

that following the "anticommunist crusades" of the 1950s, the Kennedy government

was led by a "group of determined but pragmatic Cold Warriors, whose attitudes

toward Communism in Asia" had been shaped by the previous political turmoil.

Arguing, "Few American leaders cared to examine the nuances and subtle differences

in the various ideologies that thrived under the label of Communism," Mann asserts

that most U.S. leaders believed Communism to be a "monolithic Soviet conspiracy to

rule the world." He claims such thinking led U.S. foreign policy leaders "to believe

that 'nationalism' was simply the fraudulent label that Asian Communists used to

conceal Soviet designs on the region," where North Vietnam's political ideology was judged to far outweigh their alleged desire for Vietnamese independence.

Howard Jones offers a similar view, proposing that the Kennedy

administration followed the lead of other post-World War II presidents who became

"hostages" to the Cold War. He argues that traditional rules of engagement no longer

applied after 1945, alleging instead that the critical standard for assessment of any

regime in the Cold War era was its opposition to Communism. Accordingly, the

United States supported one unsavory leader after another as long as they were anti-

Communist. In a similar vein, Michael Latham argues that the Kennedy

administration considered every setback a danger to its credibility and evaluated

international conflicts less on their own terms than in terms of their place in the larger

ideological struggle between American and Soviet power. Consequently, Kennedy

Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 225. 3 ibid., 68. Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2. 11 and his advisors turned to Vietnam as a "vital, high-profile test of American commitment."5

When explaining these beliefs in monolithic Communism, scholars identify other conflicts facing the Kennedy administration and observe the increasing importance placed on Vietnam as struggles elsewhere began to destabilize. During pre-inaugural meetings with President Eisenhower, president-elect Kennedy was informed of the great importance and delicacy of the situation in Laos, where

Communist Pathet Lao forces had intensified their struggle against the U.S.-backed government.6 Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara maintains that the main thrust of the meeting was Eisenhower's stress on the importance of not letting the country fall to the Communists, even at the risk of war. Despite the lack of any concrete advice from the departing president on how to achieve this goal, McNamara shows clearly that Eisenhower's warning had a major impact on the incoming administration and its subsequent approach to Southeast Asia.

In the midst of concern over the state of affairs in Laos, President Kennedy

o authorized Operation Zapata, the ill-fated CIA-organized invasion of Cuba. William

Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 164. Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Times Books, 1995), 35-37. For more detail on events in Laos, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere; American Policy Toward Laos Since J954, (Boston, Beacon Press 1972); and Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, (Rutherford N.J. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1973). 7 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 36-37. The attacking Cuban exiles were annihilated within seventy-two hours of their landing; the planned popular uprising against Fidel Castro failed to materialize. William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, (New York: Scribner, 1985), 32; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 230-231. For more on the Bay of Pigs fiasco, see Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). For documentary histories of the decision-making processes that led up to the invasion, see Luis E. Aguilar and Maxwell D. Taylor, Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of 12

Rust describes Kennedy's anger at the CIA for launching the invasion and his loss of confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for approving the plan. He argues further that consequences of the defeat were great for the JCS; future military operations were marked by "unprecedented civilian involvement in operational details."

Andrew Preston analyses the National Security Council (NSC) during the Kennedy administration in his new book, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and

Vietnam, and argues that the Bay of Pigs failure contributed to the growing power of the NSC, believing that as the authority of the CIA/JCS waned, and the impotence of

State became more widely known, it was the NSC that benefited. McGeorge Bundy, the president's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, surpassed Dean Rusk in his influence with Kennedy.

At the same time, Preston acknowledges the shock expressed by some within the administration at Kennedy's preference to do away with a basic national security policy, illustrating his critics' belief that the Bay of Pigs fiasco demonstrated the NSC system under Kennedy operated on improvisation and poorly executed crisis management.10 This sentiment is echoed by H.R. McMaster, who notes that the more influential NSC staffers who remained after the dismantling of the Eisenhower-era structure of the NSC diminished the voice of the JCS in national security matters, resulting in the loss of direct access to president and thus real influence on decision­ making. Maxwell Taylor also takes issue with Kennedy's style of leadership,

Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981); and Mark J. White, The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1999). Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 32. 10 Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 47. 11 H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 5. 13 claiming his aversion to the use of the NSC following the Bay of Pigs disaster led to his dependence on improvised task forces. These generally were comprised of junior officials who operated on the principle of consensus by compromise, what the former general and ambassador calls "a sure formula for flaccid leadership and faltering performance."12

The failure in Cuba made Kennedy adamant to not repeat this loss in Laos, where a cease-fire was brokered with the Communists to ensure Laotian neutrality.

Rust notes that while avoiding a military commitment to Southeast Asia for the time being, Kennedy's support of a neutral Laos, coupled with his defeat in Cuba, raised doubts about the new president's leadership ability, with domestic critics charging he lacked the resolution to effectively deal with Communism. Historians are nearly unanimous in arguing the foreign policy setback in Laos and Cuba spurred the

Kennedy administration to take action in Vietnam, with George C. Herring noting that "the unwillingness to intervene militarily in Laos appeared to increase the symbolic importance of taking firm stands elsewhere."1 Kennedy's intimidating meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in June further convinced the young president that he needed to prove his. fiber by taking a strong stand against

Communism. But as journalist David Halberstam suggests, while the Kennedy administration was often reminded of the ever-present threat of the Cold War, its

"own very eagerness to be tested would in fact accelerate it."15

12 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 250. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 33. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 77; Jones, Death of a Generation, 39-40; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 232; Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 163-164. 15 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, (New York: Random House, 1972), 77. 14

As David M. Barrett observes, Kennedy (and later Johnson) wanted to avoid a major war in difficult terrain amid the dangers of Soviet or Chinese intervention, so

"each president did enough to prevent the fall of Vietnam but not enough to win the war."16 The decision to not re-evaluate the U.S. government's China policy during the

Kennedy era is discussed at length in David Halberstam's seminal work The Best and

The Brightest, where he argues "the McCarthy period had frozen American policies on China and Asia." Halberstam argues "the failure to come to terms with China and with the McCarthy period was costly, because without looking realistically at China, the [Kennedy] Administration could not look realistically at the rest of Southeast

Asia."17 Orrin Schwab agrees, alleging the Kennedy administration's depiction of

China as the greatest threat in Southeast Asia reinforced its view of the need to remain strong and avoid any actions that could be interpreted by the Chinese as acts of appeasement.

The over-confidence exhibited by the Kennedy administration is another factor that historians attribute to the escalation of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Robert

Mann notes the hubris and arrogance of Kennedy and some of his advisors - "bright, young, energetic professionals recruited from some of the nation's best universities and corporations." They were convinced that "by force of intellect and will they could produce the desired results," and that newer military techniques, additional aid and a more activist management style could solve Vietnam's problems.19 Halberstam

David M. Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam Advisers, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 5. 17 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 104. Orrin Schwab, Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961-1965, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 12, 26. 19 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 228. 15 agrees, noting the remarkable over-confidence that permeated this time. National

Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were both comfortable members of the Kennedy camp, exuding a blinding faith that "sheer

90 intelligence and rationality could answer and solve anything."

Most historians argue that such over-confidence blinded the Kennedy administration to the true political nature of the conflict in Vietnam, resulting in what

Southeast Asian expert George Kahin described as "an unprecedented effort to shape 9 1 and control a country's political character." For Latham, this sort of arrogance is implicit in the ideology of modernization. He argues that an "overwhelming sense of

American confidence in the nation's ability to engineer sweeping, progressive change...prevented planners and strategists from recognizing the evidence 99 challenging its validity."

Most scholars agree that this overconfidence, combined with the administration's anti-Communist views, contributed to its negative attitude towards negotiations, neutrality or withdrawal from Vietnam. Robert McNamara admits to erring seriously in not exploring the neutralization option, fearing that a solution involving a neutral South Vietnam (SVN) would still favour the Communists.

Latham describes the U.S. position on negotiations as one characterized by fear of damaging American credibility and the amplification of the Communist threat to other Southeast Asian states.24 Herring's book again identifies the importance of Cold

20 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 44, 123. 21 George McTurnan Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, (New York: Knopf, 1986), ix. 22 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 181. 23 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 62-63. 24 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 165. 16

War rhetoric for Kennedy's attitude toward negotiation, observing that the setbacks in

Laos and Cuba and a fear of domestic political attacks led Kennedy's advisors to view the credibility of America's commitments as essential. Herring continues:

Should the nation appear weak, its allies would lose faith and its enemies would be emboldened to further aggression, a process which, if unchecked, could at some point leave it with the awesome choice of a complete erosion of its position in the world or nuclear war.

In a Presidential address he delivered to The Society for Historians of

American Foreign Relations in January of 2006, David L. Anderson isolated this historical outlook as belonging to the "liberalist camp," which places the conflict in

Vietnam within the containment strategy that shaped U.S. foreign policy for forty years after the Second World War. Anderson attributes these beliefs to the "Cold War consensus" that emerged in the postwar world, one that dictated:

The United States alone among the major nations had the power and moral standing to create a secure international order, that U.S. security interests were necessarily global, and that Soviet-inspired subversion was the greatest threat to world peace. Such thinking led to eventual U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in an effort to prevent Communist-led North Vietnam from exercising power over the whole . 26

country.

While personalities and decision-making style are important factors in the debate on the U.S. escalation in Vietnam, they alone cannot fully explain the decision-making process. Within this theme lies a debate on the impact of the president's use of high-level fact-finding missions and their subsequent policy recommendations, proposals that often contradicted the findings of more pessimistic

" Herring, America's Longest War, 82. 26 David L. Anderson, "One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy." Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (2006): 2-3. 17 intelligence products from the CIA or the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), a topic that will be the focus of my own research in later chapters. This essay will now focus on how these characteristics influenced their responses to reports from the intelligence community and estimates on the situation in Vietnam from the president's inner circle. It will examine the impact of intelligence on policymaking, and what specific factors contributed to the construction and implementation of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

The overconfidence and hubris of the Kennedy administration was supported by a reliance on optimistic intelligence reports that reflected the confidence of U.S.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and the self-assured character of policy-makers in Washington. The optimism and faith of American officials in their own abilities led them to privilege positive intelligence estimates while dismissing more pessimistic ones as defeatist. When the available intelligence proved too pessimistic or contradictory to the established policy goals of the administration,

President Kennedy sent trusted members of his own staff to Vietnam to evaluate the situation firsthand. This outsourcing of intelligence collection from within the president's inner circle demonstrates Kennedy's preference for relying on several key figures within his administration, whose judgements and expertise he sought at the expense of the intelligence community.27 In this way the personalities of decision­ makers were influential in the interpretation of intelligence, given that Washington's own optimism was interjected into the intelligence sphere through the use of inner-

These menincluded MclSamara, Bundy, Taylor and State Department aide Walt Rostow, among others. 18 circle intelligence gathering, as reflected in various fact-finding missions deployed during Kennedy's time in office.

Robert Mann contends that the first step toward major American military intervention in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration began in April of 1961 when the president appointed Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric to lead a

Presidential Task Force on Vietnam to develop a "program of action to prevent

Communist domination of South Viet-Nam."28 Robert McNamara is dismissive of the impact of the task force's recommendations, noting that Kennedy's response was a

"modest increase" of 100 advisors and 400 Special Forces troops in order to train

South Vietnamese forces in counterinsurgency techniques. Despite such criticism,

Mann is adamant that "while these actions might seem limited," Kennedy was moving the U.S. military gradually and steadily into South Vietnam, setting in motion

"the first escalation of direct American military involvement in Vietnam during his administration."

One policy-shaping mission that is uniformly recognized by historians was the

Maxwell Taylor/Walt Rostow fact-finding mission of October 1961. The president's

Special Military Advisor and State Department aide were tasked with assessing the

U.S. position in South Vietnam. The report drew attention to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam and urged the president to work more closely with the

Diem regime. In addition, Taylor advocated the deployment of a limited number of

28 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 232; Document No. 52. National Security Action Memoranda No. 52, 11 May, 1961, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter referred to as FRUS), 1961-1963 - Vietnam. Vols. I-IV, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988-1991), I, Vietnam, 1961, 132-134. 29 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 37. J Mann, A Grand Delusion, 233. 19

American soldiers to work under the cover of a flood relief force, an action which

McNamara felt would have little to no effect.31 Kennedy responded to the report by authorizing increased economic aid, additional military advisors, the use of

Americans for airlift and air reconnaissance operations, and the continued support of

faltering South Vietnamese President Diem, although Kennedy refused the report's request for American troops.32

Jones describes Taylor's plan for the introduction of an American flood relief force as "seductively simple but highly dangerous," for it not only laid the groundwork for a potential long-range military commitment, but also led to what he refers to as the "central enigma" regarding any U.S. troop commitment: how many soldiers would be enough? Jones is critical when noting the paradox in Taylor's plan; the introduction of a flood relief force would signal a major escalation in the United

States' military involvement in Vietnam, but would not provide enough men to make a difference in the war. Jones argues that accepting Taylor's proposal would "force the Kennedy administration to abandon counterinsurgency measures in favor of military escalation."

Andrew Preston notes the high profile of the mission ensured it wide attention and high expectations, while the mission's legacy was its division of the Kennedy administration into three groups: "hard" hawks, who favoured the deployment of

American troops, "soft" hawks, who supported the U.S. commitment but not the use

of troops, and doves, who wanted complete disengagement following a diplomatic

settlement. He also stresses the mission's overwhelmingly military composition,

31 ibid., 245; 211. Memorandum for the Record, November 6, 1961, FRUS, 1, Vietnam, 1961, 532-534. 32 Jones, Death of a Generation, 108. 33 ibid., 112-113. 20 noting two-thirds of the team were military officers, while the State Department sent only two representatives. Preston maintains this was due to Rusk's own desire to not get involved in Vietnam policymaking, as he saw the conflict as a military problem, but also reflected Kennedy's lack of faith in the Secretary of State and his high regard for Rostow and Taylor.34 David Halberstam argues that Kennedy had "loaded the dice" by selecting Taylor and Rostow to head the mission, the two men he identifies as the most interested in fighting a limited antiguerilla war. Halberstam concludes that by sending in more advisors, the U.S. changed its commitment but not the war, thereby making Vietnam a more important country in American foreign policy.

Scholars also point out the absence of re-evaluation or the search for alternatives by policy-makers before taking this crucial step towards the militarization of the American response to the conflict in Vietnam. Maxwell Taylor maintains that his mission was tasked not with reviewing the previously established policy objectives (to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam), but "the means being pursued for their attainment."38 This lack of re-evaluation is echoed by David

Halberstam, who argues that the Kennedy administration sought to "upgrade and modernize" the means of implementing policies long out-of-date from the

Eisenhower years rather than to re-examine the assumptions of the era - particularly in Southeast Asia.

'M Preston, The War Council, 89-90. j5 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 156. 36 ibid., 200. " SeeFRUS, I, Vietnam, 1961, 132-134. j8 Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 226. J9 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 122. 21

The impact of the failure to reassess the situation in South Vietnam and to re­ examine the nature of the insurgency in the south is a common feature in Vietnam scholarship. It is reflected in George Herring's analysis of the justifications used by

American policy-makers in explaining their decision to raise the number of advisors in South Vietnam following the Taylor/Rostow mission. This decision openly broke the Geneva Accords and reflected the Kennedy administration's continued acceptance of the Eisenhower-era belief that the insurgency in the south was the product of infiltration from the north. The release of a white paper titled ^4 Threat to the Peace:

North Viet Nam's Effort to Conquer South Viet Nam detailed alleged North

Vietnamese breaches of the Geneva Agreements, using Hanoi's renewal of aggression in South Vietnam as justification for American violations.4 President

Johnson used a similar argument in his own book, denouncing North Vietnamese infringements of the Geneva Agreements and Laotian neutrality in explaining the ever-worsening situation in the South by 1963, noting "the failure to obtain North

Vietnamese compliance with the Laos Accords of 1962 was a bitter disappointment to

President Kennedy."41

Discussing the white paper on North Vietnamese infiltration, Jones argues the debate highlighted the central dilemma for the Americans in Vietnam—that of defining the conflict. Jones argues the Americans viewed the situation as a war of aggression waged from the outside by the North Vietnamese on the South, while

Anderson concludes that the "true source of the revolutionary upheaval in much of

East and Southeast Asia was a postcolonial demand for independence and social

40 Herring, America's Longest War, 84. 41 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point; Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969, (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 60. 22 betterment rooted in emotion and local conditions." Jones identifies the conflict as a revolutionary war, reasoning that as such, it was up to the Americans to convince the world that South Vietnam was under siege from external, Communist-led forces.

Thus, the United States was burdened with having to prove North Vietnamese aggression in an unconventional conflict, a situation that guaranteed confusion in defining the enemy among U.S. policy-makers and world opinion.

The nature of the insurgency in the south was not an issue for discussion during the Kennedy administration, as Herring notes critically, "Kennedy and most of his advisors accepted, without critical analysis, the assumption that a non-Communist

Vietnam was vital to America's global interests." For Kennedy, South Vietnam's value to the United States was not for its location or economic value, but for proof that his administration could stand up to the challenges presented by the Communists.

Herring argues further that Kennedy refused to face the hard questions in Vietnam, reacting to crises in an improvised manner that "seldom examinfed] the implications of his actions."44 McNamara provides a more comprehensive analysis when lamenting the senior leaders' failure to rethink "the basic questions that had confronted first Eisenhower and then Kennedy: Would the loss of South Vietnam pose a threat to U.S. security serious enough to warrant extreme action to prevent it?

If so, what kind of action should we take?" And so U.S. policy-making was focused on tactical disputes in the military realm, and not, as Richard Walton notes, a "debate

Anderson, One Vietnam War Should Be Enough, 12. Jones, Death of a Generation, 28, 85. Herring, America's Longest War, 106. McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 101. 23 as to whether the United States had any business being in Vietnam in the first place."46

Kennedy's strategy in Vietnam is another area where scholars are divided in their interpretation. Among those more critical are Robert Mann, William Rust,

George Herring, George Kahin, and Leslie Gelb and Richard Berts, who represent an intellectual enclave that Dennis Showalter and John Albert refer to as "the Tribe of

Statesmen."47 This group concentrates on Vietnam in its policy-making context, focusing their critical analysis on the domestic aspects of the U.S. commitment.

Walton labeled Kennedy's policies those of a counterrevolutionary, guilty of two enormous miscalculations: "the conviction that the United States had the right to change the natural course of events within other sovereign countries, and the belief that it had the power to do so."48 Writing in David Anderson's book, Shadow on the

White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1974, Gary R. Hess depicts

Kennedy's desire to opt for what seemed to be the minimum level of involvement that would sustain the U.S./GVN enterprise but also avoid any detailed analysis of the

49 situation.

Critical of what he sees as Kennedy's middle-of-the-road policies, George

Herring portrays Kennedy as "cautious rather than bold, hesitant rather than decisive, and improvisational rather than carefully calculating." He goes on to note that

Kennedy's delay in making a firm commitment to South Vietnam and his wariness of

Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution; the Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy, (New York: Viking Press, 1972), 167. 47 Dennis E. Showalter and John G. Albert, An American Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964-1973, (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993), 3-5. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 166. 49 David L. Anderson, Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 68. 24

domestic and international consequences led to a "cautious middle course, expanding

the American role while trying to keep it limited," a plan which offered numerous

advantages in the short term but proved dangerous in the long run.50 Norman

Graebner expands this argument, stating that the Kennedy administration did not regard each successive step as the last, but only "the next step in the pursuit of the

constant goal of denying victory to Vietnam's Communists forces."5 Freedman is

even more critical, claiming that without a shared appraisal of the situation by the relevant government departments and agencies, there was no basis for an honest

debate on alternatives. As such, he claims Kennedy was happy to defer a problem that

was currently far from a crisis point, so that a message that all was well, even if he

suspected it untrue, was still welcome in the White House. These scholars argue that despite trying to keep the American role limited, the administration no doubt understood that its current policy actions would not be their last.

More sympathetic to Kennedy's policies are Robert McNamara and David

Halberstam. The latter argues that the sheer number of foreign policy issues facing the president made his ad-hoc approach necessary. In this view, Kennedy was fully

aware of the piecemeal fashion in which he dealt with problems, feeling he had little

choice but to put off long-term solutions and thoughtful changes until his second

term. Certainly, other presidents before Kennedy faced daunting tasks during their

time in office. Sympathetic portrayals of the President have less to do with the

challenges he faced, however, than with the singular mystique of the Kennedy

50 Herring, America's Longest War, 175. Showalter and Albert, An American Dilemma, 17. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 358. 5j Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 102. 25

Presidency. As the emotion and idealism of those years has passed, more critical analysis of the Kennedy years has appeared, as illustrated in books by William Rust,

Robert Mann, and George McT. Kahin.54

Newer works that are supportive of Kennedy include those by Jones and

Kaiser, who both maintain that it was the president who kept the administration from escalating the American involvement in South Vietnam much sooner. Each author places the blame on Kennedy's advisors, specifically those in the military, who proposed solely military and interventionist policies to the president. The resulting increases in aid and U.S. involvement in South Vietnam under Kennedy are described as compromises by Kaiser, who argues they were designed to fend off an overly aggressive administration that wanted to intervene directly.55 While supportive of

Kennedy, Jones adds that such a strategy was risky for it "encouraged the hard-liners to believe that the door remained open for a military solution."56

Jones also argues that Dean Rusk abdicated his responsibility as the Secretary of State by delegating the problem of Vietnam to McNamara, focusing instead on

Berlin, Cuba, and issues of collective security. McNamara then reduced the conflict to a war of numbers, according to Jones, with the Defense Department using its vast resources to fight a war based on body counts and kill ratios rather than political reforms and development. Without Rusk's support, more politically minded personalities at State faced an uphill battle against the more militant elements of the

54 To compare these with more sympathetic attitudes on Kennedy, see Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest; McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect; Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 3. Jones, Death of a Generation, 4. 57 ibid., 6-7, 445'. Defense Department. Hess notes that by the time divisions between the State and

Defense departments surfaced, the militarization of American policy in South

Vietnam made it very difficult for the State Department to regain influence.58 In this way, military solutions circumvented political analyses as the tendency for a stronger military to play a stronger role led invariably to what Walton calls an iron rule of foreign policy: "the more available military methods are, the more likely they are to be used. Peace through Strength becomes Intervention through Capability."59

Academics are nearly unanimous in their criticism of the American government's unquestioned acceptance of South Vietnamese intelligence. Former

Saigon Ambassador Maxwell Taylor recalled that under Diem, South Vietnam had seven intelligence agencies in operation, none of them working together and few working properly. "Under such circumstances it was not surprising," Taylor concludes, "that Washington plans and programs often did not correspond to the realities of the situation in Vietnam."60 Walter Laqueur alleged that the South

Vietnamese and police services used by the U.S. for intelligence gathering were penetrated by Viet Cong, and were accordingly inaccurate, and sometimes dangerous, sources of human intelligence.61 Laqueur also criticizes the lack of knowledge and experience of many CIA officials and senior U.S. army intelligence officers, especially the small number of CIA case officers who could speak Vietnamese. This situation was exacerbated by the average one-year tour of duty, which left little

58 Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 75. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 167. Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, 236-237. Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: the Uses andLimts of Intelligence, (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 172-173. 27 opportunity for American servicemen to develop an understanding of the Vietnamese mentality or grasp the enemy's military and political behaviour.

Many scholars base their criticism of South Vietnamese intelligence on evidence of careerism and unprofessionalism among Saigon officials, who falsified their reports for political or economic incentives. William Rust argues that it was only after Diem's overthrow that the corrupt Vietnamese reporting system, upon which

American assessments of the war up to that time had been made, was exposed.62 Rust believes that following the coup American leaders were optimistic that the new military junta might perform successfully against the Communists, given that the worst-case predictions of the coup's consequences had not materialized. Rust concludes that this initial optimism, coupled with Kennedy's death, "ended whatever possibility existed of a fresh look at U.S. policy in Vietnam."63 Johnson, McNamara, and Hess are identical in their analysis of South Vietnamese intelligence, concluding that much of the information and statistics from the country consisted of little more than what the governments of South Vietnam and the United States wanted to hear.64

Freedman goes further, arguing that in addition to telling the Americans what they wanted to hear, the South Vietnamese denied them access to contested areas where the Americans might have formed a more critical opinion, while simply making up any requested information they lacked. 5

" Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 11, 180. 63 ibid., 180. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 63; McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 47; Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 75-76. 65 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 357. 28

In terms of American intelligence, most scholars are critical of the optimism that characterized American military reporting during this time. David Halberstam maintains that up until 1961 the reports had been reasonably accurate, clear, and unclouded by bureaucratic ambition, reflecting awareness of Diem's flaws and the ambivalence of the American commitment to him.67 Much of his criticism focuses on

General Harkins, head of MACV from 1962 to 1964. Halberstam criticizes the attitude and style of MACV under Harkins' command, labeling its military reporting as "forceful, detailed and highly erroneous," reflecting not what was happening in the field, but Harkins' Washington orders - making sure things looked good on the surface.68 Robert Mann agrees, labeling the public face of the American role in

Vietnam as nothing but upbeat, with Harkins imposing his own optimism on his staff, where "MACV officials processed and fed only positive information to administration officials, who eagerly accepted it as accurate and objective." 9

David Kaiser puts forth the argument that Kennedy was misled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the Pentagon into believing that the war was going well, thereby putting off the need to reevaluate American policy, so that at the time of his death in Dallas in November 1963, Kennedy believed, mistakenly, that the war was still going well.70 John Newman agrees, but argues that McNamara was also deceived, this time by military elements within MACV, who wanted to use the

Secretary of Defense as their messenger to pass falsely optimistic reports that the war

66 For multiple examples of this optimistic reporting, see Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968, (Langley, Va.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), 3-6. 67 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 179. 68 ibid., 179, 186. 69 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 260. 70 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 4. 29 was being won to the president. Through such optimism, MACV could demonstrate the success of American military escalation in South Vietnam and stress the value of its continued support, thus enabling the continuation of the war without reevaluation.71 Finally, Kaiser claims it was the general optimism among Kennedy's advisors that was responsible for their being against any discussion of such "radical alternatives" as negotiation or neutralization. Historians use the "sugar-coating" of intelligence or, as Kaiser and Newman argue, the deception of the president, to explain how the Kennedy administration was able to continue on the path of military escalation despite the ever-worsening situation.

Going against this line of argument is Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a former

Kennedy 'insider,' who is forgiving of the optimistic MACV and American Embassy reporting. He says those American journalists critical of its reports, and especially of

American support for Diem, misunderstood that the officials in the U.S. Embassy really believed their own reports - "they were deceiving not only the American government and people but themselves."73 William Rust takes a similar view, quoting former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst George Allen, who recalled: "it wasn't dishonesty, intending to deceive the people back home, it was self-delusion, magnified by the 'can-do' spirit that pervades military organizations, the Boy Scouts, and the Salvation Army."7 Jones holds that this problem was due to the military's control over policy, and quotes Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs

Averell Harriman commenting that American soldiers were trained to paint the "best

John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power, (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992), 229. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 279. 7j Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 984. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 78. 30 face" on every situation to maintain morale and were "taken in by their own statements." Civilian advisors, Jones argues, were not fooled by such practices.75

This is not to say there was a total absence of accurate intelligence reports available to those in power. Scholars have drawn attention to some truly accurate and prescient estimates from numerous U.S. agencies and sources. Why were such reports so often overlooked in favour of more optimistic and militarily based estimates? Most scholars point to the culture of competition between the State and Defense departments in grappling with this question. They focus on the inability of the State

Department to compete with Defense as a major reason for the lack of intelligence from the former and the flood from the latter. In comparing State and Defense,

Walton notes how the Pentagon, through the use of such tangible tools as charts, lists, and maps, could provide the "pseudo-precision" that appealed to President Kennedy, whereas the State Department could only speak in such imprecise and subjective areas as personalities, parties, and possibilities.7

Examining this imbalance, Hess and Halberstam both add that those in the

State Department were never as firm as the military in advocating their position, and

State tended to prohibit itself from making judgments on military possibilities, while the military made its opinions known in all areas.77 Maxwell Taylor cites a serious unevenness of performance among the executive departments that arose from the great concentration of power in the Pentagon, noting that an imbalance of personnel and financial resources between State and Defense resulted in Pentagon and CIA-

Jones, Death of a Generation, 379. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution, 167. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 359; Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 74-75. 31

sponsored programs developing faster than their political, economic, and information

78 counterparts.

Scholars note that when critical reports did come in, they were not always welcome. John Prados maintains that the State Department objected to "any analysis that Vietnam had become apolitical problem, since it could then be argued that State had failed in its political role."79 Mann discusses a fact-finding mission led by Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield in the fall of 1962 where the Senator came to question the notion of the overriding national security interests of the U.S. in

Southeast Asia. Briefing the president upon his return, Mansfield wrote that Kennedy questioned, at times aggressively, his conclusions and argued that they were in contrast to his own intelligence, finally noting that the president's "reaction was not a very happy one."80 William Rust records another such encounter, where, following two divergent briefings after another fact-finding trip to South Vietnam, he quotes

President Kennedy saying: "This is impossible, we can't run a policy when there are such divergent views on the same set of facts."81

One example used frequently by scholars to depict both the apprehension with which pessimistic intelligence reports were received and the division between the

State and Defense departments is RFE-90, a document produced by the State

Department's INR. Entitled "Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show

Unfavorable Trends," it was released on October 22, 1963, and warned of the decline

Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 249. 9 John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1995), 32. 0 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 270-276. 1 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 137. 32

Si.') in the military situation in addition to the sharp deterioration in political stability. In his critical analysis of the U.S. military in Vietnam, Andrew Krepinevich argues that the report caused the uproar it did because the study was based on MACV's own statistics, and contradicted the optimistic views that were characteristic of the military's own assessments while questioning "the basic foundations upon which

MACV had set its counterinsurgency program."83 This document and the reaction to it will be discussed in chapter three.

The case of INR's RFE-90 supports Paul Kattenburg's claim that for those agencies that possessed some expertise in the complexities of Vietnam and which were unbiased by expectations or desired results, the less optimistic, and sometimes pessimistic intelligence reports were "dismissed or ignored as unwarranted conclusions by professional pessimists or particularistic analysts." Mann concludes that like Eisenhower and Truman before him, Kennedy "preferred the soothing reassurances of his military and diplomatic advisors over the honest and discomforting reports" that others counseled.85 The problem was not only bringing such realistic reports to the attention of the high-level policy-makers, but also persuading an often-unsympathetic or belligerent audience to accept such negative reporting.

Perhaps the most critically examined aspect of the Kennedy Administration by scholars in this field is the relationship of the U.S. and the Government of South

82 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 268; Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 419-420. 83 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 89. Paul M. Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980), 179. 85 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 299. 33

Vietnam (GVN). In discussing this relationship, and how each country saw their respective ally, scholars are again seemingly uniform in their analysis: the Americans expected too much while the Vietnamese could never do enough. American scholars, however, devote only limited attention to the actual South Vietnamese perspective.

Harold Ford emphasizes the widespread American ignorance about Vietnam and the

Vietnamese, asserting, "Many decision-makers did not have a good appreciation of

what had gone before in Indochina, and of why the various Vietnamese players behaved as they did." Ford believes U.S. policy-makers underestimated the capabilities, resourcefulness and staying power of the enemy, all the while being distracted by crisis situations in Berlin, Cuba, and Laos, which placed Vietnam low

among American foreign policy priorities.

For example, an unsuccessful coup attempt against President Diem in

November 1960 received little notice in the Kennedy administration, despite its

symbolism as evidence of the serious instability of South Vietnamese politics, the

0*7 pillar upon which future U.S. policies would be built unsuccessfully. Robert Mann

continues: "in the White House, Kennedy's advisors.. .did not see a country whose primary need was economic and social reform. They saw, instead, a government

under increasingly fierce attack from armed Communist subversives." Lawrence

Freedman proposes that because Washington was focused not on the governance of

South Vietnam but achieving victory in the war against the Communists, the United OQ States was never able to develop a coherent plan for dealing with the Diem regime.

86 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 11. 87 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, xvii; Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 65. 88 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 243. 89 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 380. 34

In short, for the U.S. Vietnam was a test of strength against Communism, not an exercise in nation-building.

David Anderson states the goal of U.S. policy in Vietnam was to create a viable popular regime friendly to American interests. While American pacification efforts to connect the GVN to the people of Vietnam had some temporary success,

Anderson observes it did not have a lasting effect, and this feat was never fully realized. Portraying the American decision to go to war in Vietnam as being shaped primarily by Washington's desire to maintain the credibility of U.S. power and purpose, he explains that the foreign policy of any nation, by its very nature, is the

"protection of its interests in the international environment," not the "determination of the domestic life of other nations." Anderson reasons that American intervention showed little appreciation for the internal historical factors of Vietnam itself, as over time it became obvious that the democratic ideals and American superiority in military and economic power made little difference given the physical and cultural environment in Vietnam.90 Jeffrey Record concurs with this view, arguing that

American policy-makers dismissed the Communist leadership as alien to Vietnamese nationalism and ignored the presence of genuine revolutionary grievances in South

Vietnam when mistaking a "Communist-led, nationalist revolution... for an extension

of a centrally directed international Communist movement." He concludes that such

attitudes were characteristic of the time period, reasoning, "Communist aggression by

Anderson, One Vietnam War Should Be Enough, 21. 35 definition had to be 'foreign,' and therefore illegitimate; otherwise, no convincing case could be made for military intervention to stop it."91

Many scholars note the much-publicized mantra of the Kennedy years that the

U.S. should not do what the South Vietnamese could not do for themselves, but as the situation worsened and Diem refused to reform, it was the U.S. who bent under the pressure. Herring explains why support for Diem was a logical choice, especially given the lack of alternatives: most Americans close to the government were ignorant of Diem's unpopularity and separation from his own people until the end of the 1950s

09 since his strong anti-Communist views obscured many of his faults. Recalling the

Kennedy administration's belief in its ability to "manage affairs," and its faith that the

South Vietnamese could win if they could be taught to fight like Americans, Robert

Mann notes this view included Diem himself. National Security Council aide Robert

Komer viewed the conflict in Vietnam as an American operation and President Diem 0^ • • as their "chosen instrument" for its implementation. Examining U.S. support for

Diem, Halberstam focuses on McNamara's emphasis on top-down government reform and liberalization of the South Vietnamese society as the preferred means of reviving a sick society. Putting its faith and finances behind Diem while seeing no viable alternative, the U.S. government felt its best course was to try to persuade

Diem to change. In the words of Robert McNamara, "by threatening to reduce U.S.

91 Emphasis in original. Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 61. 92 Herring, America's Longest War, 66. 93 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 228. 94 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 176. 36 help or even actually reducing it, we thought we could...convince him to modify his

destructive behavior."

In the end, however, it was the U.S. that modified its own behaviour, dropping any of the reform conditions originally impressed upon Diem as a condition to the

continuation of U.S. aid. The "limited partnership" that Maxwell Taylor proposed for

South Vietnam was based on the notion that in exchange for American aid, Diem would reform and reorganize his government, as well as allow the U.S. a share in its

decision-making process. When these conditions were presented to Diem, he quickly refused, a response against which the U.S. initially stood firm, but soon acquiesced,

shifting the emphasis of the new relationship from reform to efficiency.96

Arthur Schlesinger writes that by 1962, U.S. policy had come to be dominated by those who saw Vietnam as strictly a military problem and who advocated unconditional support of Diem as the way to solve it.97 William Rust notes that while

Diem refused to enact any sort of viable reforms, Kennedy enlarged the U.S. military

commitment without establishing the political base in South Vietnam that was necessary to support the effort. In responding to this imbalance, Rust isolates the perceived international and domestic consequences of American withdrawal as the

Achilles heel of the U.S. relationship with its South Vietnamese ally, for American

officials knew they could not credibly threaten to abandon the country if their

conditions for reform were not met. Norman Graebner argues that this precedent was

set by Eisenhower, who, by assigning to Vietnam the burden of containment in

Southeast Asia, rendered the Kennedy administration hostage to the Diem regime as

95 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 54. 96 Herring, America's Longest War, 85. 97 Schlesinger,^ Thousand Days, 982. 37

Eisenhower had been to the French during his own presidency. As such, despite the

Diem regime's dependence on the United States for its very existence, Washington

was never able to control the South Vietnamese leader.98 Knowing that the U.S.

would be loath to desert the country to the Communists, South Vietnam's former

ambassador to the U.S. recalled "some [South Vietnamese officials] got the wrong

impression that, 'Well, no matter what we do, the Americans are going to be here to

help us.'"99 This would prove a false assumption, at least for Diem, for when

American leaders finally resolved that the South Vietnamese President could not be

molded into an American puppet, they authorized and supported his overthrow.

The November 1, 1963 coup against Diem and its subsequent effects is one of

the primary events in the study of America's descent into war in Vietnam. In the period leading up to the coup, scholars focus on Kennedy's reluctance to authorize

any such action. They cite the lack of an alternative government, the risk to American prestige, as well as the prospect that South Vietnam would be identified as an

American "puppet."100 Events in South Vietnam played a role in dividing the

administration, with civilian advisors advocating Diem's removal while the military

argued Diem was essential.

Scholars note that the Buddhist crisis in the summer of 1963 contributed

greatly to this division of opinion over Diem's future, but it was the pagoda raids of

late August that swung the balance of opinion against Diem and marked the end of

his usefulness in the eyes of some Kennedy advisors. The Buddhist crackdowns are

another example used to illustrate the Americans' lack of influence over the South

98 Showalter and Albert, An American Dilemma, 15. 99 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 59. 100 ibid., 147 . 38

Vietnamese president. U.S. officials had urged Diem to seek religious reform following the events of the early summer, only to be caught off guard by the expanded repression in August.101 Kaiser and other historians charge that the crisis reflected Diem's limitations, and illustrated the separation between him and his U.S. supporters. Accordingly, many Americans felt that after the events of the summer of

1963, the U.S. could not continue supporting his government.

Following the August repression and amidst the confusion in the Kennedy administration over what steps to take, three of Diem's strongest detractors from the

State Department took advantage of the absence of principal decision-makers from

Washington and drafted a message instructing the new ambassador in Saigon, Henry

Cabot Lodge, Jr., to offer U.S. support to military leaders plotting the overthrow of the Diem government.103 Speaking of this initiative to remove Diem, Ellen Hammer notes that a handful of Americans had sold and oversold the South Vietnamese leader to the American government and press, resulting in "inflated and unreal expectations in the United States for which Diem (and Vietnam)" would pay dearly.104

The process by which the cable was authorized is a focal point among scholars.105 William Rusts notes the "hurried and irregular fashion in which the

August 24 cable had been drafted, cleared, and sent triggered a furious backlash

' ' Herring, America's Longest War, 96-97; Taylor, Swords and Ploughshares, 289, 291; Johnson, The Vantage Point, 60. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 214; Jones, Death of a Generation, 248; Schwab, Defending the Free World, 58-59. ltb Mann, A Grand Delusion, 286. 104 Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, 1st ed. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 45. For a more detailed account of the August 24 cable, see chapter three. Also, Jones, Death of a Generation, 3.15-316; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 230-231; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 286-287. 39 among the president's senior advisors."106 Most former participants and observers are critical of the cable, with Maxwell Taylor charging, "the anti-Diem group centered in

State had taken advantage of the absence of the principal officials to get out instructions which would never have been approved as written under normal circumstances."107 David Halberstam maintains there were those who supported the cable and the proposed actions against Diem, but stresses the second thoughts of some senior advisors, particularly as they learned of the misgivings of others upon their return to Washington.108 Arthur Schlesinger recalls that the president was shocked and furious when he realized that he had viewed and approved a draft of the cable where the departmental clearances did not represent the agreement of his senior advisors, and that both McNamara and John McCone of the CIA would have opposed the cable had they seen it.109 The compartmentalized nature in which the cable was endorsed was representative of the division of opinion among leading military and foreign policy advisors within the Kennedy administration regarding the future of

American support for Diem.

While many scholars mention Kennedy's angry reaction to the cable, Herring notes significantly that Kennedy did not retreat from the established policy of the cable, instead advising Lodge to proceed cautiously while reaffirming his initial instructions, authorizing him "to repeat to the [South Vietnamese] generals assurances that the United States would not assist a coup but that it would support a

Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 116. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 292. 108 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 263-264. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 234; Jones, Death of a Generation, 318-319; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 287. 40 new government that appeared to have a good chance of success."110 Howard Jones claims Kennedy had allowed a vocal minority within his administration to rush him into a judgment that should have only come after careful deliberation. Calling the

August 24th cable a "momentous decision," Jones reasons that by choosing to not change the policy, Kennedy fostered a coup and put his administration in the position of having "authorized direct involvement in reshaping South Vietnam's government."111

Many authors cite the Kennedy administration's naivety for believing it could manage the coup. Scholars refer to numerous examples of Kennedy and his advisors refusing to let events unfold "naturally," citing Washington's belief in its ability to effectively orchestra a coup d'etat: "Believe our attitude to coup group can still have a decisive effect on its decisions;" "we do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup."112 Rust is again critical of the arrogance which he saw as characterizing the Kennedy years when he describes the last instructions Lodge received before the coup: "once a coup under responsible leadership has begun.. .it is in the interest of the U.S. government that it should

in t succeed." Freedman argues that Kennedy did not choose to overthrow Diem, but his indecision had the same effect. He contends that the lack of analysis of the political repercussions of the coup drew the U.S. in deeper, for with Diem in power the U.S. could say it was operating in the country at the invitation of an independent 110 Herring, America's Longest War, 99. 111 Jones, Death of a Generation, 319-320. 112 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 158-160; Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William. Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 262; Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 394; William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II: 1961-1964, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986, 158. 113 Rust, Kennedy in Kietnam , 160. 41 regime, but American responsibility in the coup created an obligation for the U.S. to deal with the consequences of the post-Diem period.114

In contrast to those critical of American involvement in the Diem coup, Kaiser argues that Diem lacked the skills necessary to unite non-Communist South

Vietnamese and had already lost significant support by 1961. He cites the failure of the counterinsurgency effort and the continued deterioration of the GVN, concluding that Diem and Nhu were responsible for their own overthrow. Arthur Schlesinger argues that "what lay behind the coup was not the meddling of Americans.. .but the long history of Vietnamese military resentment against Diem;" that it "was almost inevitable that, at one point or another, the generals would turn against so arbitrary and irrational a regime."116 McNamara's book examines Kennedy's preference for delegating responsibility for the coup plotting to the South Vietnamese generals while emphasizing the frightening reality of facing a political vacuum following Diem's death.117

Kennedy's shock at the murder of the Ngos is recorded in many books, with

William Rust arguing that the true effect of the Diem coup on the president was the realization that the U.S. could influence events in Vietnam but not control them, which led him to doubt the country's manageability.118 As American leaders would soon learn, perception and reality of American control over the South Vietnamese were very different things.

1,4 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 397. 115 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 4. 116 Schlesinger,^ Thousand Days, 997. n7 McNamara and VanDeMark, In Retrospect, 85. 118 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 179. 42

Looking back, Lyndon Johnson, who never supported the coup against Diem, called the cable a "hasty and ill advised message" and a "serious blunder" that ushered in a "period of deep political confusion in Saigon that lasted almost two years."119 Even more critical of the cable is Maxwell Taylor, who thought it sent a confusing and contradictory message that gave Diem little room to reform if he chose to do so, left unclear the level of support being offered by the U.S., and presented an open-ended encouragement to the plotters to move against Diem at any time.120 While

Robert Mann argues that Kennedy's approval of the August 24 cable was akin to releasing the "genie from the bottle," he notes there was little the Americans could do to stop the overthrow of Diem "short of warning Diem and confessing U.S. complicity in the plot." Nevertheless, Kennedy's decisions in Vietnam represented a

"sometimes na'ive and politically motivated policy," according to Mann. He quotes former Mike Mansfield aide and noted Asian scholar Francis Valeo, who argues that

American support for Diem's overthrow and the search "for a Vietnamese administrator in lieu of Diem who would do [the United States'] bidding more readily" was symptomatic of the greater misunderstanding of the Kennedy administration: their view of Vietnam's problems and the American hubris involved in the pursuit of a solution to those perceived problems.1 l

David Kaiser and Lawrence Freedman challenge these claims regarding the importance of the coup against Diem. Freedman argues that the coup was not the lightening rod that others think, believing instead that the regime was on a collision course set months before due to the deterioration of Diem's government, while Kaiser

Johnson, The Vantage Point, 61. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 292-293. 121 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 288, 298. 43 notes the Counterinsurgency Plan in South Vietnam was a failure long before the

Buddhist crisis, maintaining it was only the last of a series of crises that made the

Diem coup inevitable. While other scholars continue to stress the Diem coup, most agree with Freedman and Kaiser that the decay of Diem's control during the months leading to his overthrow was a crucial development in the American escalation of the conflict.

This historiography illustrates a wide range of opinions about America's descent into war in Southeast Asia. Despite these differences of opinion and interpretation, I have stressed that the most important central themes are the issues of personality, the link between intelligence and policy, and the relationship of the

United States and the Government of South Vietnam. The various sub-themes discussed in the preceding analysis have illustrated the range of opinions expressed by those debating these issues in their own work.

The selection of themes and sub-themes also reflects my own views of the circumstances and decisions most important to the escalation of American intervention in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration. While attempting to present the various sides to these debates, my sympathies lie with those scholars who question the decision-making processes and the ideological views of the Kennedy administration. Like so many of the authors cited in this work, I will argue that the refusal, or as some might argue, the inability, to honestly seek out negotiations or political solutions to the conflict in Vietnam was the greatest contributing factor to the American escalation during the time period under examination.

Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 370; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 4, 214. 44

My reading of this extensive historiography and my research in the primary sources has led me to support the views of Mann, Jones, and Kaiser. However, I take issue with some of the conclusions of Jones and Kaiser, namely those concerning

Kennedy's intentions for future military withdrawals. I believe as historians we can only evaluate people by their actions, not their intentions.

At the time of JFK's death his administration had dramatically increased the number of advisors in South Vietnam, while the president's oral commitments in speeches and newscasts placed the country in the awkward position of supporting the unpopular and increasingly violent regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. I believe the actions and decisions of the Kennedy administration narrowed the foreign policy options available to the United States by increasing the American commitment to and exaggerating the strategic importance of South Vietnam even as the administration's participation in the coup against Diem left them morally responsible for his successors. Of course, we will never know what Kennedy may have done in regards to Vietnam policy, but the legacy of his decision-making in Vietnam left his successor a complex and dangerous scenario that an inexperienced Lyndon Johnson was ill-equipped to negotiate. 45

Chapter Two: The Establishment of the Kennedy Style

On January 20, 1961, the day of his presidential inauguration, John F.

Kennedy spoke of promoting an activist foreign policy with increased intervention,

welcoming the opportunity to defend freedom in its hour of maximum need. The

President informed the audience collected at the White house that his administration

wished to "let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay

any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to

assure the survival and the success of liberty. To those peoples in the huts and

villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery," Kennedy

pledged America's "best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is

required."1 This confident and strong-willed stance would come to characterize the

Kennedy administration's foreign policy.

One day prior, President-Elect Kennedy had met with his predecessor, Dwight

D. Eisenhower, to discuss the pressing foreign policy matter in Laos, where leftist

guerillas were fighting and defeating American-backed government soldiers. At the

meeting, attended by the department secretaries of the Eisenhower and Kennedy

administrations, the outgoing president spoke of Laos and the need for American

determination to preserve its independence, and the consequences of it falling to the

Communists. Believing "that the Communists had designs on all of Southeast Asia,

United States Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy - Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President - January 20 to December 31, 1961, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register; National Archives and Records Service, 1962), 1-3. 2 For more detail on events in Laos, see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles A. Stevenson, The End of Nowhere; American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954, (Boston, Beacon Press 1972); and Martin E. Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, (Rutherford N.J. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press 1973). 46 and that it would be a tragedy to permit Laos to fall," Eisenhower was of the opinion

"that if Laos should fall to the Communists, then it would be just a question of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would collapse." Eisenhower further approved the need for a political settlement in Laos, stressing that if such efforts were fruitless, the U.S. must intervene with its allies, and be prepared to act alone if other countries were not persuaded to act with them.

Alarmed at the emotion with which the outgoing president spoke of Laos as the key to Southeast Asia, Kennedy inquired whether the situation seemed to be reaching a climax. Eisenhower "stated the entire proceeding was extremely confused but that it was clear that this country was obligated to support the existing government in Laos."4 He mentioned the possibility of some difficulty between

Russia and China over the former's concern over Communist pressure in Laos and

Southeast Asia emanating from China and North Vietnam, before lamenting the disappointingly low morale of the pro-government forces in Laos. Clark Clifford noted that Eisenhower's "explanation was that the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sense of dedication on the part of its adherents, while there was not the same sense of dedication on the part of those supporting the free forces." Eisenhower finished by informing Kennedy "the entire problem of morale was a serious one and would have to be taken into consideration as [the U.S] became more deeply involved."5

' Document 97. Memorandum of Conference on January 19, 1961 between President Eisenhower and President-Elect Kennedy on the Subject of Laos, United States Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel ed., 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), II, 635-636. 4 ibid., 637. 5 ibid., 637. 47

There have been several accounts of this meeting within the Vietnam War

historiography. The above citations, from a memorandum by attendee Clark Clifford,

differed from that of Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, who

suggested that Eisenhower was actually sending a mixed message to the incoming president and was himself "deeply uncertain of the proper course of action."6 In his

1995 memoir, McNamara noted that Eisenhower did not answer Kennedy's question about what could be done to keep the Chinese Communists out of Laos, while going

on to note that the incoming administration "received no thoughtful analysis of the problem and no pros and cons regarding alternative ways to deal with it." Of the meeting with Eisenhower, McNamara felt Kennedy and his aides "were left only with the ominous prediction that if Laos were lost, all of Southeast Asia would fall," and that "the West would have to do whatever was necessary to prevent that outcome."7

While the meeting may have been inconclusive, McNamara does note the profound impression it made on the Kennedy administration and their subsequent approach to

Southeast Asia.

Kennedy's views on Southeast Asia had been formed long before he entered the White House. He had visited the Middle East and Southeast Asia in 1951 as a thirty-four-year-old congressman, sharing the belief of many American officials of the time who saw the problem in Indochina in terms of an outdated French colonialism. The young politician returned to Washington critical of the French reliance on military solutions, and convinced that a noncommunist nationalist

6 Robert S. McNamara and Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (New York: Times Books, 1995), 36. 7 ibid., 37. 8 David L. Anderson, Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975, (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 68. 48 movement would emerge if the French would grant the people of Indochina genuine independence. Kennedy put his faith for this future movement in the educated nationalist elite, a minority who, alienated by the harsh methods of the Communists, were left sitting on the fence between their country's two conquerors: the French and the Communists.9 Kennedy believed that, while the semiliterate peasantry's "main concern is their bowl of rice," the hope of the future rested with this isolated nationalist minority, who, combined with a trained corps of military officers, would be the future leaders of a nationalist, anti-Communist Vietnam. Kennedy reasoned the peasants would follow leaders who would provide them with economic security and national independence.10 This view was supported by widely held beliefs among

American leaders that Communism and nationalism were incompatible, and that the

Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians shared the Americans' conception of nationalism.'l Only later would the Americans find this assumption to be incorrect.

As a senator in 1953, John Kennedy had urged the Eisenhower administration to use foreign aid to force a French grant of independence to the Vietnamese. In a speech to the Senate during the Dien Bien Phu crisis, Kennedy warned against providing military support for the French as he viewed their policies as undermining the U.S. objective of fostering nationalism. After the French withdrawal from

Vietnam in 1954-1955, Kennedy looked upon Diem's government as the embodiment of the genuine aspirations of the Vietnamese, praising the new South Vietnam in early

9 Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Thomas G. Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 225. 10 ibid., 226. Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: the Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 33-34, 86-91. Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 69. 49

June of 1956 as "the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike," "a proving ground of democracy in Asia," and "a test

1 "3 of American responsibility and determination."

By the time Kennedy had taken office such praise had begun to wane as many

American policy-makers became concerned with Diem's leadership style. Diem's penchant for appointing members of his own family to important cabinet posts, and the concentration of power which occurred as a result, were troubling to American observers. Diem's familial concentration of power also led to bureaucratic overcentralization, with Diem reserving for himself the power of decision in minute matters, as well as his refusing to delegate authority to subordinates, which resulted in the impairment of an administrative system already crippled by the absence of French civil servants.14 This leadership style would not change during Diem's time in power, and would later be a definitive factor in the American decision to seek alternatives to his rule.

One reason Kennedy and others favoured the South Vietnamese president was

Diem's past success in crushing several armed gangs in Saigon, most notably the Hoa

Hao and the Cao Dai, two powerful religious sects that maintained their own armies.

Saigon and the Chinese-populated town of Cholon were dominated by the Binh

Xuyen, yet another private army belonging to a gangster sect. 5 Despite these odds,

Diem succeeded in breaking the power of the sects in a series of battles interspersed 13 William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part 1: 1945-1961, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), SOS- SOS. 14 Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 34; The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., I, 300. 15 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation; the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 416-417. 50

with political maneuverings, disarming sect troops or incorporating them into the regular Vietnamese forces.16 These victories enabled Diem to survive the pressures of

some of his Western allies who had been determined to replace him, while also

enabling him to hold a referendum in the fall of 1955 where he unseated the French puppet Emperor Bao Dai and established himself as President and Chief of State.

By 1956 Diem had eliminated his political opposition and established his authority over the provincial capitals and the countryside. However, the Pentagon

Papers point out that, "Diem's military victory over the sects, while impressive, was by no means complete, and certainly not as decisive as some Americans were led to believe."17 As the Defense Department study notes, the sects were not completely eliminated as sources of opposition to Diem's regime; remnants of various groups

continued to wage war on the GVN well into the 1960s:

While Diem's victory over the sects was impressive, it was not wholly conclusive, and the very obduracy and determination which won him early tactical success seemed to impede his inducing the remaining sect dissidents to perform a constructive role in the nation. Rather, his 7 18

policy invited a Viet Cong-sect alliance against him.

That such opposition still remained in Saigon was clearly illustrated in

November of 1960, when a military coup attempt failed at the last minute.' Roger

Hilsman notes that the coup, perpetrated by elite paratroops, "revealed that

dissatisfaction had spread beyond politicians and intellectuals to government officials

and military officers, the very center of the anti-Communist elements of society on

16 ibid., 417. 17 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed. I, 305. 18 ibid., I, 305. 19 For more on the 1960 coup attempt, see Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, 1st ed. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 131-133; William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, (New York: Scribner, 1985), 1-3. 51

70 which the struggle against the Communist guerillas depended." The CIA was in touch with both sides during the coup attempt, ultimately counseling both the rebels and the palace to negotiate. Embassy policy was endorsed in a strongly worded cable from Washington: "we consider it overriding importance to Vietnam and Free World that agreement be reached soonest in order avoid continued division, further bloodshed with resultant fatal weakening [of] Vietnam's ability [to] resist

Communists."21 In addition to making Diem suspicious of U.S. actions during the coup, historian Ellen Hammer argues that the November 1960 coup attempt caused

Diem and Ngo Dien Nhu, Diem's younger brother and principal advisor, to tighten their control over the government and the army, but also forced them to deal with the 77 realization that they had lost the unequivocal support of the United States.

Upon taking office in January of 1961, the Kennedy administration saw little alternative to Diem, and so worked for ways to win back the South Vietnamese

President's confidence. Within a week of his inauguration, in his first official action regarding Vietnam, Kennedy approved a plan to offer Diem $41 million in support for a 20,000-man increase in South Vietnam's army, in addition to a U.S.-proposal to train and equip a 32,000-man Civil Guard at a cost of $12.7 million.23 This package was in addition to the current annual $200 million aid program, and was made in response to a January 1961 report prepared by the Country Team Staff Committee, a group of leading U.S. military and civilian officials in Saigon, entitled "Basic

Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 418. 21 Hammer, A Death in November, 131-133; Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 7-20. 22 Hammer, A Death in November, 132-133. 2j Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 164. 52

Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam."24 The twelve-page report warned of the

"mounting increase" of Viet Cong "terrorist activities and guerilla warfare" in South

Vietnam, while recommending that Diem's regime offered "the best hope for defeating the Viet Cong threat.. .if necessary corrective measures are taken and adequate forces are provided."25 The overall plan was gradually developed during

1961, and was the basis for the expansion of U.S. assistance in Vietnam during

Kennedy's presidency.

The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) shifted South Vietnam's military emphasis from defense against a conventional invasion by North Vietnam to internal security operations against the Communist-supported insurgency, a response by the

77

Kennedy administration to Khrushchev's support for "wars of national liberation."

From the beginning the plan had a military focus, with priority going to military assistance in the form of American personnel training South Vietnamese in counterguerilla warfare.28 Despite Kennedy's outspoken support for counterinsurgency, many in his administration preferred military solutions, as they were unwilling to devote the patience and time the CIP required. Historian Howard

Jones notes that in addition to their lack of confidence in Diem, those proposing a

Document No. 1. Paper Prepared by the Country Team Staff Committee, "Basic Counterinsurgency Plan for Viet-Nam," January 4, 1961, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter referred to as FRUS), 1961-1963 - Vietnam. Vols. I-IV. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988-1991),!, Vietnam, 1961, 1-12. 25 ibid., I, 7. 26 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 6; Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 25-26; Jones, Death of a Generation, 27-28. 27 ibid., 27-28. 28 ibid., 34. 53 military solution had little faith in the ability of the South Vietnamese to win the war by themselves.29

These feelings of unease towards the South Vietnamese president are interesting in historical perspective. They presented a paradox for the Kennedy

Administration. Diem's cooperation was a major requirement for a successful counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam, yet he was at the same time an obstacle to its success. The CIP was initially dependent on Diem's consolidation of the ARVN's chain of command, where his strict control of his officers and provincial chiefs led to overlapping lines of military authority which hindered the war effort against the insurgents.30 The plan was also conditional on Diem making civil reforms in his government, with Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow refusing to grant the "green light" to proceed with the proposed aid increases until Diem actually signed decrees implementing his intention to reform. Diem's stubbornness in the face of reform, coupled with the Military Assistance Advisory Group's (MAAG) strong desire to begin executing their own military actions, pressured Kennedy's foreign policy team to eventually proceed with the aid increases despite the South Vietnamese president's reluctance to initiate any kind of substantial reforms.32

The decision to move ahead with the program is central to many historians' assessment of Kennedy's policy towards South Vietnam. By abandoning the reform conditions on which the CIP was based, the U.S. was left financing a leader who rejected any governmental changes he deemed detrimental to his regime, but which

29 ibid., 50. 30 Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 25-26. Jl The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 6,27; Jones, Death of a Generation, 34, 37-38. 32 The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 27. 54 the U.S. regarded as crucial for victory. This factor led to what National Security

staffer Robert Komer referred to as a misuse of leverage, whereby "the GVN used its weakness far more effectively as leverage on [the U.S] than [the U.S.] used [their] strength to lever it."34

Knowledge of Diem's stubbornness was illustrated in National Intelligence

Estimate 50-61 of March 28, 1961, which warned of Diem's continued opposition to reforms and showed concern for his virtual one-man rule, his toleration of corruption, and his inability to rally the people in the fight against the Communists in the face of

Viet Cong terror.35 These findings reflected a greater problem: Diem's inability to protect his people from the Communist insurgents. Facing this dilemma, American policy makers favoured military correctives as the top priority for the proposed counterinsurgency plan, thereby reducing the importance of the social, political, and economic recommendations contained in the CIP.

One official who advocated that the U.S. proceed in its support of Diem was

General Edward Lansdale, a former Air Force Colonel then working in the Pentagon, who told the new administration that the revolution was rapidly gaining ground.37

Lansdale had worked with the CIA in Vietnam prior to its division following the

French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and was well known for his work in helping

Jones, Death of a Generation, 35. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. - GVN Performance in Vietnam, (Santa Monica: Calif. Rand, 1972), vi. 35 NIB 50-61, "Outlook in Mainland Southeast Asia," 28 March 1961, in David F. Gordon and United States, National Intelligence Council, Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975, (Washington, D.C; Pittsburgh, PA: National Intelligence Council; Government Printing Office, 2005) Documents from this source are collected on a CD-ROM, and so page numbers will not be used. Jortes, Death of a Generation, 51; 42. A Program of Action to Prevent the Communist Domination of South Vietnam, May 1, 1961, end. in Gilpatric to JFK, May 3, 1961, FRUS, I, Vietnam, 1961, 97, 100. Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 162. 55

to defeat an insurgency in the Philippines. He had just returned from a trip to Vietnam

when he recommended the U.S. demonstrate strong support for Diem immediately.38

The March 1961 NIE confirmed Lansdale's alarming report, warning of the

increasingly difficult situation in South Vietnam due to rising guerilla strength and

declining internal security but also dissatisfaction with the Diem government.

As the Kennedy administration evaluated its South Vietnamese ally, events in

Cuba seized and held its attention for much of Kennedy's first two years in office.

The seizure of power in Cuba by Fidel Castro in 1959 and his subsequent pro-Soviet

stance had caused considerable alarm in Washington. A plan to infiltrate American- trained and equipped Cuban nationalists back onto the island had been developed

during the Eisenhower administration, and the new president had been briefed on the

mission in November 1960. Initially impressed with the intelligence briefings presented by Eisenhower's Director of Central Intelligence (DO) Allen Dulles and

Richard Bissel, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (operations), Kennedy's earlier

"grave doubts" about the mission were alleviated. The president's faith in Bissell, whose eloquent advocacy of the mission left his audience "transfixed," coupled with

Kennedy's initial favourable impression of the CIA, "helped to blind him to the

disastrous limitations of the covert operations" planned in Cuba.40 After a meeting of the National Security Council on January 28, during which Dulles reported that Cuba was "now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state," President Kennedy

Document 1. Memo for Secretary of Defense, 17 January, 1961, United States. Dept. of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, (hereafter referred to as USVR), 12 vols., (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1971), Book 11, 1-12. 39 NIE 50-61, in Gordon, Estimative Products on Vietnam. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the Presidency from Washington to Bush, (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995), 260. 56 authorized the CIA to proceed with its plans for "increased propaganda, increased political action and increased sabotage," while also ordering the Defense Department to review "CIA proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on

Cuban territory."

The CIA trained a Cuban opposition brigade in Guatemala for the proposed operation, which landed at the Bay of Pigs in the early hours of April 15, 1961. The force of 1,500 Cuban exiles waded ashore, only to be opposed with unanticipated speed and vigor by Castro's forces. The poorly planned and badly executed operation was a failure; the Cuban military killed or captured every member of the small group of Cuban exiles involved in the landing, and Castro publicly lambasted the White

House for engineering the coup attempt.4

The immediate effect of the defeat at the Bay of Pigs was one of internal reassessment by President Kennedy, whose faith in the CIA was greatly shaken, leading him to abandon the cheerful confidence that had characterized his administration up to that point. While the President restrained himself from the immediate dismissal of Dulles and Bissel (both were allowed to quietly retire),

Kennedy was privately furious at the CIA for advocating the plan, reportedly threatening to scatter the agency to the wind.43 Kennedy's faith in the Joint Chiefs of

Staff was also shaken, leaving him far more skeptical of military advice from the

41 Luis E. Aguilar and Maxwell D. Taylor, Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981), 9. Jones, Death of a Generation, 38. For a full account of the Bay of Pigs Fiasco, see Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979). For documentary histories of the decision-making processes that led up to the invasion, see Aguilar and Taylor, Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs,, and Mark J. White, The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1999). Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 32. 57

Pentagon. As Robert Kennedy recalled, in later foreign policy discussions the president "started asking questions that were not asked at the Bay of Pigs," and began relying more on his White House staff, especially his main personal advisors.

Kennedy's unfamiliarity with operating at the head of a large staff organization made the president's relationships with his personal advisors extremely important given his reliance on an ad hoc, collegial style of decision-making in national security and foreign affairs. Christopher Andrew notes that following the

Bay of Pigs disaster, Kennedy began regular meetings with his National Security

Staff and other presidential foreign policy advisors.45 These men were Kennedy's most trusted advisors, and formed the 'inner-circle' of the administration's foreign policy team. They met in ad hoc groups to analyze particular problems and pressing foreign policy issues and participated in high-level fact-finding missions to Vietnam when ordered by the president.

The Kennedy administration's reputation as "the best and the brightest" was based on the fact that these advisors shared several key characteristics. In the words of H.R. McMaster, "Kennedy placed a premium on academic qualifications and superior intellect," and sought individuals who "shared his broad interests and could engage in wide-ranging, informal discussions."46 McMaster argues that perhaps the most important factor in determining each man's relative influence within Kennedy's inner sphere rested "with his ability to establish a close personal rapport with the

Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 231; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 266. 45 ibid., 266. H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Ledto Vietnam, Is'Ed. (New York: HarperCollins 1997), 4. 58 president."47 For example, David Halberstam notes that Rusk had difficulty adjusting to Kennedy's "free-wheeling, deliberately disorganized system," and was more formal in his view of the world than the president. Halberstam argues that Rusk's preference for more established procedures and protocol created a lack of intimacy between the president and his Secretary of State, and left Rusk, more than any other senior official, socially distant from the president and off the Kennedy wavelength.48

These personal links to the president shaped the administration's decision-making in

Vietnam, as it was Kennedy's inner circle who controlled and presented information from the intelligence community to the president. The appointment of these high- level advisors to presidential task forces and fact-finding missions reflected their closeness and high stature with the president, relationships that would prove decisive when contrary reports or opinions from outside sources threatened to disrupt established policy initiatives advocated by Kennedy's inner circle.

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs disaster, attention shifted once again to Laos, where the president no longer automatically accepted military advice from the JCS.

When questioning JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer on the proposals for U.S. action in Laos, Kennedy's newfound skepticism was evident in his displeasure with the unprepared and seemingly haphazard JCS responses.49

Kennedy's doubts as to the advisability of an operation in Laos were laid to rest in an April 27 meeting with more than a dozen House and Senate leaders. As historian Robert Mann notes, "because the United States did not yet have any significant military presence in Laos, congressional leaders undoubtedly found it

47 ibid., 4. 48 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 36. 49 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 230. 59 easier—and without political risk—to advise caution."5 Appalled at the sketchy nature of the military planning for Laos and more cautious after his failure in Cuba, in

April 1961 Kennedy participated along with Britain and the Soviet Union in calling for a fourteen-nation conference in Geneva to resolve the Laotian question. A neutralized Laos was quickly agreed upon, where Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna

Phouma was instructed to form a coalition government consisting of representatives of the right, center, and left in Laotian politics.51 For the time being it appeared as if the crisis in Laos had been contained.

As the situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate, Kennedy instructed Assistant Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to head a presidential task force to appraise the current status and future prospects of VC actions in South

Vietnam in order to recommend a series of actions to prevent Communist domination of the GVN. Submitting his report on May 1, 1961, Gilpatric labeled the situation

"critical, but not hopeless," and advocated that the U.S. explicitly declare its firm commitment to do whatever necessary to defend South Vietnam. The report recommended a drastic increase in American military, political and economic actions in Vietnam, and proposed that Kennedy increase the military mission, then totaling

685 men, to around 3,000. As David Halberstam notes, President Kennedy greeted these recommendations with the "greatest distaste."34

50 ibid., 230. Norman A. Graebner, American as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1984), 228. 52 31. Editorial Note, FRUS, I, Vietnam, 1961,14. 53 A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam, May 1, 1961, enclos. in 42. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President, May 3, 1961, ibid., 92-115. 54 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 128-129. 60

Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts note that the report went through some redrafting before Kennedy approved a revised version that softened the statements of unqualified commitment on May 11.55 In what became National Security Action

Memorandum (NSAM) 52, Kennedy decided against a JCS recommendation for sending U.S. combat troops, preferring instead to deploy 400 Special Forces for training purposes, while maintaining the U.S. objective "to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam." Gelb and Betts continue, saying that "the essential significance of NSAM 52 was to commit the United States but not unequivocally.

The President was not going any further overboard than immediate circumstances required."56 The Pentagon Papers comment that with NSAM 52, the President "took note" of the possible size and composition of forces which might comprise a possible commitment of troops to Southeast Asia, but made no decision on the issue of troop commitment itself.57

Given Kennedy's maneuvering around the troop issue, and with the impending neutrality of Laos still unsolidified, the President announced at a press conference that Vice President Johnson would soon be leaving for a fact-finding mission to Asia. The trip, which lasted from May 9th to 15th, 1961, was aimed at restoring Diem's confidence in the U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and to South

Vietnam in particular. Historian Howard Jones characterized Johnson's mood during the trip as "garrulously upbeat;" too much so given the deteriorating military situation in South Vietnam. Johnson's public comparisons of the South Vietnamese President

55 Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), 72. 56 ibid., 72-73. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 10. 61

to Winston Churchill and George Washington "did not fit with the Vietcong's

successes, the feeling of insecurity and questionable loyalty among the populace, and

CO

the sullen defeatist demeanor that permeated the South Vietnamese army." Jones

continues that despite Johnson's fervent praise of Diem (and the latter's ability to see

through the transparent flattery of his American guest), Johnson was working to

reassure the premier that South Vietnam would not be subjected to the neutralization

currently underway in neighbouring Laos.

Arriving in South Vietnam at the same time as the Vice President was

America's new ambassador to South Vietnam, Frederick Nolting. Nolting, a Foreign

Service officer then working at NATO headquarters, was sent to replace a very tired

and frustrated Elbridge Durbrow. Durbrow's continual hard line and insistence on

reforms from Diem had so weakened their relationship that Nhu had suggested

Durbrow be sent into exile as an ambassador to a foreign country.39

Nolting, in contrast, had been sent to South Vietnam to develop a warm and working relationship with Diem while distancing the U.S. from his predecessor's pressure tactics in an attempt to "get on Diem's wavelength."60 Nolting's appointment marked a dramatic shift in American-South Vietnamese relations, with the U.S.

exhibiting a much more accommodating stance towards Diem.

Johnson's report on his Southeast Asian trip concluded that, "the mission

arrested the decline of confidence in the United States. It did not.. .restore any

Jones, Death of a Generation, 61. Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 129. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 3. 62 confidence already lost."61 "The country can be saved," it continued, "if we move quickly and wisely. We must decide whether to support Diem—or let Vietnam fall."

While the Vice President declared that Asian leaders did not want American troops at the time, Johnson was firm in stating, "the most important thing is imaginative, creative, American management of our military aid program." Reiterating his main conclusions, Johnson closed, stating:

The fundamental decision required of the United States...is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. This decision must be made in a full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decision of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our other efforts fail. We must remain master in this decision.

Johnson's final words were a recommendation to proceed with a clear-cut and strong program of action, an opinion that would appear more attractive following

Kennedy's visit with Nikita Khrushchev later that summer.

In June 1961 Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for a two- day summit meeting in Vienna. The meetings were tense, with the Soviet leader particularly aggressive towards the new and unproven president, violently attacking the U.S. on its international imperialism, and particularly its presence in Berlin. The meeting culminated with Khrushchev threatening to make a separate peace with East

Germany, forcing the West to negotiate with the East Germans for continued access to West Berlin if the Americans did not leave the divided city by the end of the year.

61 18. Vice President Johnson Memorandum to President Kennedy, 23 May 1961, USVR, Book 11, 160. 62 ibid., 166. 63

The two leaders tested each other's resolve, with Khrushchev threatening: "If the

West tries to interfere, there will be war," to which Kennedy replied: "It is going to be

a cold winter."63

Despite the rhetoric coming from both sides, Kennedy knew he had been bested, and was described as "shaken and angry" by James Reston of the New York

Times, who interviewed the president shortly after his encounter with the Soviet

leader. As the president explained to Reston, "I think I know why he treated me like

this. He thinks because of the Bay of Pigs that I'm inexperienced. Probably thinks I'm

stupid. Maybe more important he thinks that I have no guts."64 The president

continued: "if he thinks I'm inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove those

ideas we won't get anywhere with him. So we have to act."65 Following the Vienna

summit, Kennedy was convinced of Khrushchev's intent to test American mettle

around the world, particularly in Vietnam, where the United States would have to prove their resolve by defending their national interests.66 As Kennedy told Reston,

"now we have a problem making our power credible, and Vietnam looks like the place."67

Kennedy's firm stance against the Soviet Union had already been fueled by a perceived challenge from Khrushchev on the eve of the new president's inauguration.

In a January 6, 1961 speech, the Soviet premier pledged Soviet support for "wars of national liberation," a remark that alarmed Kennedy's foreign policy team and only

Jones, Death of a Generation, 70. 64 ibid., 71. 65 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 76. 66 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 240; William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II: 1961-1964, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 48. 67 Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, 76. 64

furthered their inclination to believe that unconventional warfare was likely to be extremely important in the 1960s. Alarm over Khrushchev's speech was compounded by a feeling among policy-makers in Washington that America's position in the world had been eroded by the U.S.S.R; anything that could be construed as American weakness vis-a-vis the Soviets was to be avoided. The president in particular was determined to regain American strength, prestige, and influence.69 The need for the United States to be prepared to confront Communist insurgencies throughout the Third World was apparent, and in Vietnam, where the struggle had been underway for several years, the increase of Viet Cong activity

• 70 seemed to confirm Khrushchev's threat of Communist initiatives.

Recovering from the disastrous failure in the Bay of Pigs and his recent meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna, Kennedy dispatched two of his most trusted advisors to Vietnam. The president instructed General Maxwell Taylor, his personal military advisor, and Walt Rostow, a State Department aide, to assess the situation in

South Vietnam, and, as directed by the president, "to evaluate what could be accomplished by the introduction of SEATO or United States forces into South

Vietnam."71 Publicly billed as an "economic survey," the team's true intention, in the words of Roswell Gilpatric, was "to look into the feasibility from both political and military standpoints" of a plan for "military intervention."72

The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 21; Jones, Death of a Generation, 27. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 6. 70 Gary R. Hess, "Commitment in the Age of Counterinsurgency: Kennedy's Vietnam Options and Decisions, 1961-1963," in Anderson, Shadow on the White House, 70. 71 157. Draft Instructions From the President to His Military Representative (Taylor), October 11, 1961, FRUS, I, Vietnam, 1961, 345. 72 ibid., 344-345. 65

In a telegram to the Department of State, Taylor outlined the essential conclusions of the mission, asserting that a critical political-military situation existed in South Vietnam, brought on by the fear of a Communist take-over in Laos, the continued build-up of the Viet Cong and their recent successful attacks, and the hardships brought on by a massive flood in the Mekong Delta. Taylor drew attention to the ineffectiveness of military operations against the VC due to the absence of reliable intelligence on the enemy and the incoherent command structure and ineffectiveness of ARVN soldiers.

Upon his return, Taylor presented the findings of the mission to President

Kennedy on November 3. The report warned of "Communist strategy aims to gain control of Southeast Asia by methods of subversion and guerilla war which by-pass conventional U.S. and indigenous strength on the ground," while noting there existed in South Vietnam "a double crisis in confidence: doubt that U.S. is determined to save

Southeast Asia [and] doubt that Diem's methods can frustrate and defeat Communist purposes and methods." The report urged "that what is now required is a shift from

U.S. advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese.

The present war cannot be won by direct U.S. action," but South Vietnamese performance could be "substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems."75 According to Mann, this new

U.S./Vietnamese relationship "meant a drastic increase in the level of American involvement: joint planning of offensive military operations, better coordination with

73 190. Telegram from Taylor to Rusk, October 25, 1961, ibid, 427-429. 74 Paper Prepared by the President's Military Representative (Taylor), enclos. in 210. Taylor to President, November 3, 1961, ibid, 479. 75 ibid, 491. 66

South Vietnamese intelligence, increased covert operations throughout Vietnam and in Laos, three new helicopter squadrons and additional light aircraft, and 'a radical increase' of U.S. trainers at every level, as well as additional special forces."7 Most significant for Mann was the recommendation of sending eight to ten thousand

American soldiers thinly disguised as flood relief workers, a figure that Defense

Secretary McNamara, in a meeting with Defense and State Department personnel, felt

• 77 would "not convince anyone of our resolve."

While the Secretary of Defense may not have found the prospect of deploying such numbers of American troops to be alarming, the proposal met resistance from various members of the Senate and from within the administration itself. Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield issued Kennedy a four-page memorandum cautioning against such a move, while Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and Averell

Harriman, the United States' chief negotiator at the Geneva talks on Laos, argued the

U.S. should not "stake its prestige in Vietnam" by making a commitment to Diem before the Laotian situation was resolved.78 Instead, Harriman proposed that if the negotiations in Laos proved successful, the U.S. could expand the Laotian conference to include South Vietnam in order to seek an overall settlement based on the 1954

Geneva Accords.

Kennedy flatly rejected a negotiated settlement. The administration had pledged to wage the Cold War vigorously, but its setbacks in Cuba and Laos, and later Berlin (where the Russians had begun construction of the Wall in August of

76 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 245. 77 ibid., 245; 211. Memorandum for the Record, Meeting to Discuss the Recommendations of the Taylor Mission to South Viet-Nam, November 6, 1961, FRUS, I, Vietnam, 1961, 532-534. 78 George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 81-82. 67

1961), had left Kennedy and his administration open to charges of weakness. As

Herring argues, it was these accusations that disheartened the president and left him fearful that a negotiated settlement in Vietnam would unleash domestic political attacks on him as severe as those President Truman experienced after the fall of China

in 1949.79

Kennedy was determined to prove his mettle to the Soviets, as it was becoming increasingly clear that establishing the credibility of America's commitments was essential in a divided and dangerous world. Should the nation appear weak, its allies would lose faith while America's enemies would be emboldened to further aggression, "a process which, if unchecked, could at some point leave it with the awesome choice of a complete erosion of its position in the world or nuclear war."80

The Taylor report and its recommendations triggered a series of memos within the administration, commenting on the report and advocating various actions in response to it. Many of these proposals, including recommendations from McNamara,

Rusk, and Rostow, called for a much stronger U.S. commitment to the GVN and more substantial troop deployments than the 8,000-man flood relief task force found

in Taylor's report. Kennedy himself was wary of committing U.S. troops in Asia after being warned that their presence might jeopardize the Laotian negotiations or provoke an escalation of the conflict in Vietnam itself.81 Still, his advisors supported

a strong U.S. presence and commitment, despite the findings of Special National

79 ibid., 82. 80 ibid., 82. 81 Memorandum for the President, South Viet-Nam, November 11, 1961, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 112. 68

Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 10-4-61, published just days after the Taylor report. The estimate concluded that the Communists were confident in their ability to handle any

U.S escalation of the conflict. In this event, the North Vietnamese were prepared to broaden the conflict and intervene as necessary should U.S. initiatives begin to seriously threaten the Communist movement.

In a White House meeting on November 11 1961, Kennedy asked a series of pointed questions of his advisors, focusing mainly on how the U.S. commitment was tied to its relationship with Diem, the situation in Laos, and the U.S. ability to furnish the levels of troops requested. Kennedy thought it unlikely that his administration would be able to count on its major European allies, who were involved in their own colonial struggles. The president also worried that sending U.S. troops to support

Diem's repressive regime would leave him exposed to criticism from liberal

Democrats and possibly provoke a military response on the part of the Chinese or the

Soviets.84

Concerns over the appearance of the U.S. relationship with Diem were nothing new for the Kennedy administration, whose policies were characteristically fluid when it came to supporting the South Vietnamese President. While decision­ makers rarely questioned South Vietnam's strategic importance to U.S. interests,

Diem's place in American policy was less concrete. Debates over whether or not to continue to support Diem were common throughout Kennedy's presidency: the

SNIE 10-4-61, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions in South Vietnam," 7 November 1961, in Gordon, Estimative Products on Vietnam, 15. 8j Jones, Death of a Generation, 126. For the list of questions prepared by the president, see 235. Questions for the Meeting on South Vietnam 12:00, November 11, 1961, FRUS, 1, Vietnam, 1961, 576-577. 84 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 165. 69 administration recognized the importance of maintaining the American commitment to the struggle in South Vietnam, while subtly reevaluating the worth and necessity of continuing to support its leader. Since the administration's counterinsurgency plan was dependent on the cooperation of Diem, subtle disengagements from the South

Vietnamese President were common as the political situation in Saigon wavered.85

The president's final decision on these matters were outlined in NSAM 111, issued on November 22, 1961. Rejecting the call for a "categorical commitment to prevent the loss of South Vietnam," Kennedy's decision amounted to what historian

Fredrik Logevall called a "down-the-middle approach;" increasing the level of aid and advisors while rejecting the alternatives of negotiating a peace settlement or deploying combat forces. Such decisions would allow for the deployment of U.S. combat troops at a later time, if necessary. By not taking an unequivocal stand against combat troops, the supporters of intervention were encouraged to continue planning for an eventual deployment.87 Kennedy soon realized that regardless of the level of commitment made, it might not have been enough. As future events would demonstrate, any expanded commitment, once made, could not easily be kept limited.88 According to Walt Rostow, Kennedy "took the minimum steps he judged necessary to stabilize the situation, leaving its resolution for the longer future, but quite conscious that harder decisions might lie ahead."

Jones, Death of a Generation, 48, 173. 86 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 32. 87 Jones, Death of a Generation, 127; Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 165-167; Logevall, Choosing War, 32-33. 88 Herring, America's Longest War, 85. 89 Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: an Essay in Recent History', (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 278. 70

The increase in aid outlined in NSAM 111 was contingent on the reorganization and reform of the GVN, while also authorizing the U.S. to share in the decision-making, a clause which, when taken in conjunction with the U.S. refusal to send combat troops, amounted to providing the South Vietnamese government with less while asking more of it.

Unsurprisingly, Diem responded harshly to these demands, angrily protesting the limited nature of the American commitment and the proposed new relationship, arguing his country "did not want to become a protectorate."91 The crisis provoked by the American demands, coupled with the inability to find a suitable replacement for

Diem, caused the Kennedy administration to back down, a decision which George

Herring argues removed the strings from American aid and created a new relationship that shifted the emphasis from reform to efficiency. This decision would set a dangerous precedent for any future attempts to have Diem reform his government, and would greatly decrease the leverage available to the Americans when dealing with the South Vietnamese President in the tumultuous summer of 1963.

Having decided against sending U.S. combat forces, Kennedy and his advisors turned towards an alternate use of military power, one that could be coordinated with programs designed to strike at the political and social roots of the insurgency in South

Vietnam. In the fall of 1961, Sir Robert Thompson, a British counterinsurgency expert who had helped defeat the Communist insurgency in Malaya in the mid 1950s, arrived in Saigon to help advise Diem. Thompson's plan was to be implemented

The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 5, 120. 91 Herring, America's Longest War, 84. 92 ibid., 85. Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 166. 71 under Diem's direct supervision, and focused on the Mekong Delta, the most populated area of the country and the center of Viet Cong strength.94 The Ngos enthusiastically accepted the plan, but the U.S. was initially critical before coming to embrace the plan following a trip by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research director Roger Hilsman in January 1962.

Thompson's plan called for the movement of peasants from dispersed villages into more concentrated settlements. Once ARVN forces and their American advisors had "cleared" an area of the South Vietnamese countryside of insurgents, peasants were persuaded or forced into "strategic hamlets," defended outposts more easily subjected to military and government control. Defending the hamlets with barbed wire, ditches, and bamboo stakes, it was hoped the hamlets would deny the VC access to the Vietnamese peasantry, their main sources of food, intelligence, and recruits. As historian David Kaiser notes, the plan "emphasized identifying and controlling the population, improving administration and public services, and very carefully applying military power."

Anticipating a positive reception from those living within the secured hamlets, the U.S. hoped a new political culture would be created. By instilling in the people a sense of nationalist loyalty to Diem's South Vietnamese government, the peasants would look beyond their isolated communities and develop an allegiance with the

Diem regime instead of Ho Chi Minh's revolution. Michael Latham argues that

Kennedy administration strategists envisioned that the supply of aid and security

David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 167. Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 154. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 167. 72 against the VC, in addition to community-building programs and participation in elections, would empower once-passive farmers. Realizing the benefits of their new lives within the strategic hamlet program, peasants were expected to take up arms against the insurgents once they realized the threat Communist forces posed to the

07 newfound security that Diem's government had helped them achieve.

While Diem eagerly accepted the plan for strategic hamlets, the implementation of the program was quite different from the original suggestions made by Robert Thompson and Roger Hilsman. Thompson urged that the hamlets be constructed in an "ink blot" fashion, spreading out from secure, government- controlled areas and then slowly spreading outward to prevent the reestablishment of insurgent forces.98 Under the supervision of Diem's brother Nhu, however, the

Government of Vietnam's approach focused more on reclaiming villages in heavily

Communist-infiltrated areas than the village development envisioned in Roger

Hilsman's Strategic Concept for South Vietnam."

While Hilsman maintained the GVN would have to win the "hearts and minds" of the peasantry through improvements in popular welfare, the program under

Diem lacked land reform while other benefits were slow in coming, with unpaid peasants often forced to purchase the building materials and barbed wire they used to construct their own fenced-in hamlets.100 Despite these shortcomings, the construction of hamlets moved at an increasingly accelerated pace, with 784 97 Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 154. For a more detailed look at Robert Thompson's plan for Strategic Hamlets, see his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency. A good summary of his ideas can be found in Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 173-175. 98 ibid., 180. 99 Report, A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam, February 2, 1962, "Strategic Concept for South Vietnam" folder, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3, John F. Kennedy Library. 100 Thomas G. Paterson, Kennedy's Quest for Victory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 240. 73 constructed within the first month, 453 more under construction, and with over 6,000 more scheduled to be built during 1962 alone. Concern over such figures, in conjunction with the above-mentioned shortcomings, gave U.S. officials pause.

William Trueheart, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Saigon, worried that Nhu might try to build hamlets "all over the country simultaneously without priorities," which

1 07 would, "of course, kill everything." Despite these problems, the Americans recorded generally positive reviews of the program during its initial phase, giving policy makers a false sense of optimism that would only be shattered in the wake of

Diem's overthrow in November of 1963.

In January of 1962, as part ofNSAM 124, the administration established the

Special Group Counterinsurgency (C.I.), whose task was ensuring "the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency.. .in friendly countries." The group consisted of the Deputy

Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense, chairman of the JCS, the DCI, the Special Assistant to the president for National Security

Affairs, and the administrator of the Agency for International Development. The group was under the chairmanship of the president's military advisor, General

Maxwell Taylor, who called it "a sort of Joint Chiefs of Staff.. .for all agencies involved in counterinsurgency."104

Review of the Status of Civic Action in Vietnam, enclos. in 98. Paper Prepared for the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), March 7, 1962, FRUS, 11, Vietnam, 1962, 205. 102 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 171. For more on problems of hamlets, see Herring, America's Longest War, 89. 103 107. National Action Security Memorandum No. 124, January 18, 1962, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 660-661. 104 Jones, Death of a Generation, 153; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 272. 74

In addition to establishing broad lines of counter-insurgency policy and insuring a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs, the

Special Group (C.I.) was to ensure that everyone in the government understood that

"wars of national liberation" were insurgencies and therefore "a major form of politico-military conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare."105 Kaiser and

Jones both note that the creation of the Special Group (C.I.) was a move by Kennedy in order to unify the U.S. military in support of his counterinsurgency plans without raising the chances of having to use conventional combat forces. In a document accompanying NSAM 182 of August 1962 entitled "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense

Policy," the president explained that the goal of counterinsurgency was to "minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities," while also noting counterinsurgency policies "must be indigenous since insurgency is a uniquely local problem involving the aspirations and allegiance of local people."107 Kaiser concludes that sadly, the American military never fully adopted these concepts with respect to their policies in South Vietnam.108

The unwillingness of the U.S. military to shift its emphasis from the military sphere to the political was illustrated with the creation of Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam (MACV), which came to surpass the older Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG), which had been working in South Vietnam since 1950.

This move reordered the American military mission in South Vietnam, so that

105 107. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 660-661. 106 Jones, Death of a Generation, 153. 107 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 140. 108 An excellent critique of the conventional mindset of the U.S. Army in Vietnam can be found in Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For an analysis of the Kennedy years, see pages 27-90. 75

American officers would now be training and assisting the country's rapidly expanding army, instead of merely advising the South Vietnamese.109 As Robert

Mann mentions, in a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

January 12, 1962, Ambassador Frederick Nolting, attempting to defuse criticism and worry over what he expected to be "a long, drawn-out, hard campaign," hastened to assure the committee: "These are not combat forces. They are service forces."110 With such limited and often inaccurate information coming from the Kennedy administration, committee members were often left in the dark as the American commitment in Vietnam continued to expand.

General Paul Harkins was chosen to command the new group, having experience as the current army commander under Commander in Chief, Pacific

(CINCPAC) as well as having been the commander of forces prepared to land in Laos in the spring of 1961, though, as Jones notes, Harkins had no experience with counterinsurgency warfare.1 l Kennedy, faced with a military focused on conventional methods of battle, and on the advice of Rusk, McNamara and General

Taylor, approved the appointment of General Harkins and the MACV terms of reference in Palm Beach on January 3, 1962, giving Harkins equal status with the

117

American ambassador.

Ambassador Nolting and MAAG commander General McGarr expressed concerns about the emphasis on conventional military orientation of this new command structure, while CINCPAC worried that the new American commitment

109 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 254. 110 ibid., 255. Jones, Death of a Generation, 139. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 126. 76

"might easily become a first step toward greater American involvement in a

1 1 T conventional, long-foreseen war against Asian Communism." Fearing such charges, the State Department changed the title of the new senior American officer to

"Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam," rather than "Commander,

Military Assistance Forces, Vietnam," a title suggesting a slightly less direct

American role. MACV officially began operations from its base in Saigon on

February 8, 1962.

While the Americans were expanding their commitment and infrastructure in

South Vietnam, events in Laos continued to deteriorate throughout 1962. With the spring neutrality agreement of 1961 unraveling in the face of continuous Communist advances, the Pathet Lao appeared more dangerous than ever, prompting Kennedy to raise the stakes in an attempt to force compliance with the neutrality accord.1 M As

Communist forces threatened to cross the Thai border, the president persuaded Thai officials to request assistance under the terms of SEATO. In an uncharacteristically intrepid action, Kennedy moved air and naval forces into the area and dispatched more than five thousand Marines and Army personnel toward the Thai-Laotian border, where they joined forces from Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

The bold move worked; an uneasy truce emerged as the Pathet Lao backed down, thus enabling the Geneva talks to produce a coalition government dedicated to the country's neutrality.115 After it was decided that the Americans would not take military action in Laos, President Kennedy told Ted Sorenson: "Thank God the Bay

1,3 ibid., 126. 114 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 231. 115 ibid., 232. 77 of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise, we'd be in Laos right now—and that would be a hundred times worse."116

The decision to not intervene in Laos made perfect sense, but when seen in conjunction with the defeat in Cuba, Kennedy feared that his critics would interpret the Laotian settlement as just another example of the administration failing to successfully confront Communist advances. After Kennedy's decision to support a coalition government in Laos, many in Washington felt that Southeast Asian leaders now doubted the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to the area, compelling American policy makers to do something to restore confidence, demonstrate U.S. resolve, and dispel any idea Moscow may have that the U.S. intended to withdraw from Southeast

Asia. ' As such, the events in Laos and Cuba were of great influence in the development of policy in Vietnam. While the events in Southeast Asia continued to be of concern for the Kennedy administration, South Vietnam would again be placed on the backburner as the United States focused its attention on Cuba.

While the story of the Cuban missile crisis lies outside the scope of this project, I will discuss key points of the event as they have proven so relevant in the study of foreign policy under JFK, and especially his conduct of affairs in Southeast

Asia. Since the defeat of the U.S.-backed Cuban nationalists forces at the Bay of Pigs and prior to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 16, 1962, the

Kennedy administration considered military intervention on the island. In November

1961 President Kennedy approved operation Mongoose: a plan to sabotage the Cuban regime and provoke an internal uprising that would provide a pretext for U.S.

1,(5 ibid., 231. 1,7 ibid., 232; Jones, Death of a Generation, 61. 78 intervention. Meanwhile, Edward Lansdale, now working on Cuba, endorsed a plan to initiate a revolt in October of 1962. At the time of the discovery of the missiles, the

Pentagon had ordered the American military to begin planning for air strikes and the

no invasion of Cuba, to be readied by October 20. Characteristically, as Kaiser asserts, the administration had not reached any decision to act prior to the discovery of the missiles, but that Kennedy had, not for the first time, set a chain of events in motion without having decided where it would lead. Once the missiles were discovered,

Kennedy responded with a naval quarantine instead of the planned air strikes or invasion, eventually settling for a trade with the Soviets: Khrushchev offered to withdraw his missiles from Cuba if the U.S. pledged not to invade the country while agreeing to remove the American Jupiter missiles located in Turkey.

It is important to note that this "missile trade" was not only kept from the U.S. public, but was little-known in the Kennedy administration itself, save for those involved in its planning. With the appearance that Khrushchev had backed down, the

Kennedy administration could claim a Cold War victory. This stress on saving face would continue to mark the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration, especially given the lows experienced in the Bay of Pigs and the Laotian settlement. With the missile crisis behind them and the administration appearing strong in its confrontation with the Soviets, events in South Vietnam continued to move ahead, with the insurgency progressing in its violent methods and scope. Having survived the many foreign policy crises of 1962, President Kennedy would again be forced to focus on

118 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 145. 119 ibid., 146-147. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Missile Crisis, see A. A. Fursenko and Timothy J. Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964, 1st Ed. (New York: Norton, 1997), especially pages 257-289. 79 events in South Vietnam in 1963, a year of major decisions and catastrophic consequences for U.S. policy-makers. It was also a year that revealed the limitations of the Kennedy leadership style and its relationships with the intelligence community. 80

Chapter Three: Shooting the Messenger: The Struggle Over Intelligence on Vietnam

On January 2, 1963, in a small hamlet forty miles southwest of Saigon, two

Viet Cong companies engaged more than three South Vietnamese battalions in the village of Ap Bac, defeating the much larger South Vietnamese force that had been supported by U.S. attack helicopters, armour, artillery, fighter-bombers and napalm.1

The inferior VC forces managed to destroy five helicopters, kill about 80 Army of the

Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers and three American helicopter pilots while losing only 18 of their own in what the American Army headquarters called "one of the bloodiest and costliest" battles of the war. MACV, however, claimed the battle had little long-term significance, with General Harkins portraying Ap Bac as a partial

South Vietnamese victory since the VC did not attempt to hold their positions.

These views were in sharp contrast to the observations of Lieutenant Colonel

John Paul Vann, a senior U.S. advisor to the South Vietnamese forces engaged in the battle, who concluded that the operation was a failure, calling the battle "a miserable fucking performance, just like it always is." Scholars have since pointed out that such poor performance characterized many of the ARVN's military operations during this period. The absence of unity of command in the South Vietnamese forces was

Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 223-224; David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 180-185; Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 358; Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968, (Langley, Va.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), 4. For a comprehensive account of the battle of Ap Bac, see Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1988), 203-265. 2 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 182; 1. Editorial Note, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter referred to as FRUS), 1961-1963 - Vietnam. Vols. I-IV. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988-1991), III, Vietnam, Januaiy-August, 1963, 1. 3 ibid., 1; Vann quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, a History, (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 262. 81 designed by Diem to guard against coup plotting, but also constrained the ARVN leadership.4 Freedman charges that the South Vietnamese generals had been fearful lest they annoy Diem by becoming too successful (and thus threaten his power) or by suffering too many casualties, hence their reluctance to engage the enemy despite their superior forces.5 Many argue that the more significant issue illustrated by the defeat at Ap Bac was the need for a reassessment of strategy, since the Communist victory undermined the general impression of military progress that the American government was trying so hard to create.6 The views of Colonel Vann aside, MACV's uncritical portrayal of the events at Ap Bac demonstrated the military's penchant for optimistic reporting, their unwillingness to criticize a military ally, and their desire for intelligence to "get on the team." This unreceptive attitude to criticism was characteristic of the military, and often resulted in distortions of intelligence - in the case of Ap Bac, a battle portrayed as a military victory rather than an abject failure.

Interference by the military often led to misinterpretation, which in turn threatened the credibility of intelligence and reduced its use to policy-makers.

An excellent example of the distortion of intelligence occurred when the

Office of National Estimates (O/NE) released National Intelligence Estimate (ME)

53-63, a document assessing the situation in South Vietnam shortly after the South

Vietnamese defeat at Ap Bac. The estimate, entitled "Prospects for South Vietnam," was released in its final form on April 17, 1963, after its first draft had been rejected

4 John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power, (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992), 303. 5 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 358. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 180; Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 304. 7 John Macartney, "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 4 (1988): 478. 82 due to political interference from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John

McCone and pressures from the military. John Prados calls it "one of the key intelligence estimates of the Vietnam War," and its analysis will provide a powerful example of the consequences of consumer interference in the production of intelligence.8

The dubious performance of the ARVN forces at Ap Bac supported O/NE's initial NIE 53-63 findings, which were released on February 25, 1963. The conclusions of this draft addressed American concerns about the lack of aggressive leadership, poor troop morale, and the inept tactical use of forces by the South

Vietnamese military. All of these elements were present at the battle of Ap Bac. Vann had wanted to strike at the enemy on January 1, but South Vietnamese commander

Colonel Bui Dinh Dam had refused to advance until the following day, lamely asserting that American helicopter pilots needed to sleep off their raucous New

Year's Eve celebrations. When VC forces downed five helicopters, Vann, trying to direct the action from a spotter plane, ordered the armoured personnel carriers to rescue the survivors from the helicopters, their commander refused; when ARVN forces finally did begin to move in on the VC, the attack was uncoordinated, giving the enemy plenty of time to escape. The list went on, revealing numerous defects in command and training among the South Vietnamese forces: their preference for avoiding combat, the refusal to engage the enemy, their lack of aggressiveness - all of these factors were reflected in the initial draft of NIE 53-63, but were removed from the final version.

8 John Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1995), 32. Jones, Death of a Generation, 223; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 181-182; Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 358; Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 303. 83

Harold P. Ford, who was then chief of O/NE's Far East Staff, recalls that the story of NIE 53-63 began in September 1962, when pessimistic O/NE staffers persuaded the Board of National Estimates to undertake a new NIE on Vietnam.10

O/NE was responsible for collecting the best intelligence data from all U.S. government agencies and producing draft "estimates," reports representing the considered opinion of the intelligence community. These estimates, if approved by the other members of the intelligence community, were said to be "coordinated" and were published as the official opinion of the DCI.11 The first draft of NIE 53-63 was submitted to the Board of National Estimates on February 25, 1963, and warned that the struggle in South Vietnam would be "protracted and costly," noting "very great weaknesses remain and will be difficult to surmount." These included:

lack of aggressive and firm leadership at all levels of command, poor morale among the troops, lack of trust between peasant and soldier, poor tactical use of available forces, a very inadequate intelligence system, and obvious Communist penetration of South Vietnamese military organization.

The estimate came before the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for deliberations on February 27, where DCI McCone took issue with the draft and its creators for having prepared an NIE whose judgments contrasted so greatly with those of "the people who know Vietnam best." Ford, who had attended the February meeting, recalled that McCone then named a number of such individuals (almost all of whom were senior policy advisors) and ordered that the NIE be re-drafted to

Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 14. 1' Prados, The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, 3 ] Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 1. 84 include their views.13 The opinions of these men who supposedly knew Vietnam

"best," none of whom were intelligence analysts, were unanimous; they believed that the draft was too pessimistic. MACV's General Harkins wanted the draft to acknowledge the "steady and notable progress" in the fight against the VC, while the

Army's Chief of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, provided a Joint Chiefs assessment that "the principal ingredients for eventual success have been assembled in South

Vietnam." Critics of the draft NIE were most bothered by the lack of confidence in the ARVN, and while O/NE staffers defended their judgments, the DCI and the draft's policy-making critics overruled them.14 A revised, final version of the estimate was produced on April 17. While the estimate remained skeptical of the Diem government's ability to translate military successes into lasting political stability, its conclusions illustrate the change in tone that the critics of the original draft had produced:

We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving...Improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet Cong can be contained militarily and that further progress can be made in expanding the area of government control and in creating greater security in the countryside.

Ford observes that several months later, as the situation in Vietnam went from bad to worse, McCone admitted he had been wrong, and apologized "for having had

13 ibid., 12. 14 ibid., 14-17. 15 NIE 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," April 17, 1963. David F. Gordon and United States, National Intelligence Council, Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975, (Washington, D.C; Pittsburgh, PA: National Intelligence Council; Government Printing Office, 2005). Documents from this source are collected on a CD-ROM, and so page numbers will not be used. 85 senior program officers impose on a draft NIE optimistic judgments about their own operational progress." He promised he would not do it again.16

But the damage had been done. Ford argues that the importance of the distortion of NIE 53-63 was that, unlike other occasions of high-level policy-makers paying scant attention to NIEs, in this instance "top policymakers did embrace NIE

53-63's flawed judgments because they so validated their own uncertainties." Ford also notes that the optimistic nature of the estimate helped bolster the mistaken confidence of its consumers, especially given that its judgments at the time were widely accepted as authoritative.17 Such confidence in the war effort led many to believe that if certain political obstacles could be removed (i.e. Diem), military progress would continue. In fact, the redrafted NIE 53-63 was used to support arguments in favour of a coup. In the case of NIE 53-63, consumer interference contaminated the recommendations of an intelligence product, while the military's excessive influence within the intelligence community had disastrous consequences for the political actions of the U.S. Government.

As historian Michael Handel asserts, coordinating intelligence derived from multiple sources and managing the inevitable biases that result hinges on the number of organizations participating in the process, their character, and relative strength. He notes that 80 percent of the U.S. intelligence community is military and that the

"national intelligence estimates are a composite of judgments of the CIA, the DIA, the INR and the service intelligence agencies. Compromises among these perspectives often lead to estimates that project an exaggerated military oriented

16 Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers, 17-18. 17 Emphasis in original, ibid., 12, 20. 86 view."18 The re-drafting of NIE 53-63 is a perfect example of the bias that results from the compromise inherent in the coordination of intelligence products. As Handel notes, "the search for consensus may also reduce the objective quality of estimates in the sense that truth becomes a vector of the relative power and influence of each of the participating organizations - rather than the result of the best and most professional judgment."19 In this case, the opinions of the DCI and the strength of the military were shown to be greater than those of O/NE's analysts, who were forced to bow to the pressure of their critics and re-draft their initial estimate. The inaccuracy of the judgments found in the final draft version of NIE 53-63 were all the more important given the South Vietnamese defeat at Ap Bac barely three months before.

Diem's paranoid control of the military prevented its officers from performing in the manner required for the kind of offensive approach the U.S. military deemed necessary. Rather than accept that a change in strategic concept was necessary or re­ examine the U.S. Government's relationship with Diem, U.S. policy-makers preferred instead to assume that victory would only take longer than expected. Had the U.S.

Government been able to accept the notion that its policies in Vietnam were not working properly, those advocating a re-examination of policy, negotiation or even withdrawal would have been better equipped to counter arguments running in favour of escalation.

The battle of Ap Bac did not incite any such re-examination, but further illustrated the power and influence of the military among policy-makers in Vietnam.

18 Michael 1. Handel, "The Politics of Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 4 (1987): 18-19. 19 ibid., 19. 20 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 184; Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 358. 87

This same military optimism encouraged DCI McCone to push for the redrafting of the original NIE 53-63 in February of 1963, resulting in another lost chance to honestly re-evaluate the policies and arguments supporting America's involvement in

Vietnam during this crucial period. In addition, the revised draft of the estimate, released in mid-April, circulated barely a month before the Buddhist crisis exploded in May of 1963, an event which, as we will see in the next chapter, proved to be fatal for the Diem regime and further called into question not only the optimism of the re­ worked draft, but the strategy of the Kennedy administration itself. Given the negative trend of events occurring both before and after the draft and final release of

NIE 53-63, one can only wonder what the outcome might have been had O/NE's original estimates been accepted, and whether such honest pessimism might have forced a reevaluation of U.S. policy in Vietnam during the summer of 1963.

Concern about the political crisis and the increasingly repressive nature of the

Diem regime during the chaotic summer months of 1963 led Kennedy to dispatch another fact-finding mission to South Vietnam in September. Kennedy chose his

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Maxwell Taylor, to undertake the mission because of his "desire to have the best possible on-the-spot appraisal of the military and paramilitary effort to defeat the Viet

Cong." In a memorandum to McNamara shortly before the mission's departure,

Kennedy spoke of the political crisis, it's effect on the war effort, and the need to evaluate the necessity for political reforms by the GVN. Kennedy acknowledged the interconnection between American political and military efforts in South Vietnam,

21 142. Memorandum From the President to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), September 21, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 278-279. 88 and instructed McNamara and Taylor to consult with Ambassador Lodge in order to appraise the political and social questions relating to the military and para-military effort to defeat the VC. Kennedy concluded by emphasizing the importance of the mission, stressing that the team should take as much time as necessary for a thorough examination. The trip would last ten days.

McNamara and Taylor were accompanied by representatives from various government agencies: William Colby represented the Central Intelligence

Organization (CIA), and Michael Forrestal the White House, while William Bundy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and older brother of the president's

National Security Advisor, was selected by McNamara to accompany the mission since he was responsible for coordinating the military aid programs. Michael

Forrestal recalled the president didn't want any high-ranking State Department officers on the trip, preferring instead "to make it a Defense mission essentially." As such, William Sullivan, Averell Harriman's assistant, was chosen to represent the

State Department.23 On the flight out to Saigon, the mission members were given large books that contained a draft of the report they were supposed to write at the conclusion of the trip. The conclusions, as Forrestal recalled, were all "carefully spelled out, [with] all the statistics to back them up." Forrestal found it a "dreadful visit" where everyone tried to impress upon the mission members "phony statistical" evidence that accentuated rather than solved the disagreements between the civilians and the military.24

William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, (New York: Scribner, 1985), 140. 23 Michael Forrestal OH, April 8, 1964, JFKL. 24 Michael Forrestal OH, JFKL. 89

The mission arrived in South Vietnam on September 23, and met with the

Vietnam Country Team on September 25, where they found the U.S. mission divided.

During the meeting, General Harkins spoke optimistically of the war, emphasizing the progress of the strategic hamlet program, and the generally improved ARVN position, despite the increase in VC activity and the political turmoil of the past few months. Lodge offered a pessimistic view of the political situation, and cast doubt on the statistical data upon which MACV's assessments lay.

The mission spent most of its time meeting with U.S. officials in various parts of the country before speaking with Diem on September 29. During the meeting, the

Americans were subjected to a two-hour monologue in which the South Vietnamese

President defended himself and the actions of his regime, while praising the success of the strategic hamlet program. When given the chance to speak, McNamara voiced his government's concern over the political repression that threatened both the war

Oft effort and the American support for it. Diem ascribed these concerns to misunderstandings in the U.S. of the real situation in Vietnam due to the vicious attacks of the American press on his government, himself, and his family. McNamara asserted there existed a crisis of confidence in the government of Vietnam both in

Vietnam and in the United States, and warned that American public opinion

"seriously questioned the wisdom or necessity of the United States Government's aiding a government that was so unpopular at home and that seemed increasingly unlikely to forge the kind of national unity or purpose that could bring to the war to 25 United States Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel ed, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), II, 248. 26 158. Memorandum of Conversation, Gia Long Palace, Saigon, September 29, 1963, 2:30-5:30 p.m. FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 311. 90

an early and victorious conclusion." Diem rebutted these points and displayed "no

97

interest in seeking solutions or mending his ways."

The meeting continued in this fashion, touching on numerous American

concerns while Diem responded in a detached manner before reaching the subject of

the recent Buddhist controversy. On this topic Diem surprised his guests by admitting

he bore some responsibility in the matter: his kindness and assistance to the Buddhists

had helped bring on the trouble by leading them to demand more than they deserved.

Diem spoke for twenty minutes on the Buddhist problem, in which he accused the

religious group of various outrageous acts and plots before his American guests could

again bring him to task. General Taylor repeated McNamara's concerns, and

reminded Diem that regardless of the explanations that he offered for the political

instability in his country, a serious crisis of confidence was developing in the U.S.

and it was vital for the government of Vietnam to respond to these American 98 concerns. In spite of their best efforts, however, the mission members left the palace feeling apprehensive of the meeting's effect on Diem. General Taylor later recalled

Diem's lack of comprehension of McNamara's remarks, stating: "You could just see

it bouncing off him."29

The following day, McNamara and Taylor had a more illuminating

conversation with South Vietnamese Vice President Tho, who offered his American visitors a much different version of the strategic hamlet program than that related by

Diem. Tho spoke of serious discontent in the villages, due mainly to villagers having to pay excessive taxes to the village agent and then another tax to the Viet Cong. 27 ibid., 317. 28 ibid., 321. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 143. 91

When Taylor observed this should not be the case in a well-fortified hamlet, Tho replied "there are not more than 20 to 30 properly defended hamlets in the whole country." Tho then asked his guests how would they account for the growth of the

Viet Cong over the last two years despite their increased casualties. Tho disregarded

Taylor's suggestion of intimidation, arguing "Intimidation can make them join, but it cannot stop them from running away." Noting that the VC could offer the villager

"neither food nor shelter nor security," Tho answered his own question, "they stay in the Viet Cong army because they want to, and the reason they want to is their extreme discontent with the Government of Vietnam."30

The mission continued to encounter such pessimism for the remainder of its trip. McNamara spoke with professors from Dalat, Hue, and Saigon who charged that

Diem's government had transformed the country into a police state, where torture was used against any enemy of the regime. Other members of the mission were informed of the very real possibility that Nhu might make a deal with Hanoi and order the

Americans out of the country. An American provincial advisor informed Taylor of the "lousy" progress of the war effort, setting out the gruesome details "very convincingly," according to Forrestal. The young officer's comments encouraged other officers to speak out, and "all hell broke loose." Forrestal was careful to qualify this example, stating "this was the one time that this happened."31

William Bundy, who was chosen to accompany the mission due to his perceived impartiality toward Diem (based on his lack of involvement in the August

30 159. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, September 30, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 321-323. 160. Memorandum of a Conversation by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), September 30, 1963, ibid., 323-325; 161. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Sullivan), September 30, 1963, ibid., 325-326; Michael Forrestal OH, JFKL. 92

24 cable), met with several American journalists, including David Halberstam and

Neil Sheehan. By the end of the trip, Bundy "became aware for the first time of how immensely diverse the war was in itself." Particularly stunning was the Viet Cong's control of Long An, a populous province just outside Saigon. "I was left, as I think

McNamara was, with a lasting skepticism of the ability of any man, however honest, to interpret accurately what was going on. It was just too diffuse, and too much that was critical took place below the surface." Upon leaving Saigon, most of the mission members concluded that "an unchanged Diem regime stood only a small chance of holding South Vietnam together and carrying the conflict with the Viet Cong and

Hanoi to a successful conclusion. What Diem and Nhu were doing was not merely repugnant, but seemed calculated to end in chaos."

According to Forrestal, the McNamara-Taylor report—written hastily on the plane—was a "mishmash of everything." Despite their awareness of the contrary, the authors asserted that "the military campaign has made great progress," notwithstanding the "serious political tensions in Saigon," where Diem and Nhu were becoming "increasingly unpopular." Labeling the political situation one of "high tension," the report stressed it had yet to significantly affect the military effort, but warned that further repressive actions by the GVN could affect the "present favorable military trends." Should the political crisis result in a GVN ineffective in the conduct of the war, the U.S. would review its support for the government. Illustrating the preeminence placed on the military situation, the report stated that while the U.S.

Government was "deeply concerned by repressive practices," the determining factor

Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 257-258. 33 Michael Forrestal OH, JFKL. 93 in its relations with the GVN would continue to be the Diem government's "effective performance in the conduct of the war."

The report recommended that the U.S. employ a series of selective pressures to express its disapproval with Diem's political program, including the suspension of funds to the food import program (which the Saigon regime sold on the local market to make money to pay its civil servants). In addition, funding for Diem's Special

Forces unit—which was stationed in Saigon as his personal protection force—would end unless these units moved their operations outside the city and into the countryside. This latter action, according to Forrestal, would encourage the South

Vietnamese generals advocating a coup. "It was the first sign the generals had ... that maybe the United States was serious about this."

Officially, the report discounted the possibility of a coup and ordered that "no initiative be taken to encourage actively a change in government." The U.S. policy should be to "identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership if and when it appears," while Lodge was instructed to use the aid suspensions to engage the GVN in talks to address the key issues of the effectiveness of the war effort, the maintenance of popular support, and the relief of strains on the U.S./GVN relationship.36

William Bundy later admitted that the McNamara-Taylor report contained a

"clear internal inconsistency" between its military assumptions—that South Vietnam could win the war if the government made political reforms—and its political

142. Memorandum for the President, Report of the McNamara-Taylor Mission to South Vietnam, October 2, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 751, 752, 754, 758. 35 ibid., 752-753; Forrestal quoted in Bird, The Color of Truth, 258. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 753; 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, October 5, 1963, FRUS, IV, August-December, 1963, 371-379. 94 analysis, that Diem was unlikely to make the necessary reforms. After only two hours sleep during the twenty-seven-hour flight home, Bundy was exhausted, and later commented: "Neither draftsmanship nor judgment is likely to be at its best under such working conditions." Despite its flaws, this report would act as the blueprint for the

Kennedy administration in the coming crisis.

The president approved the recommendations of the report during a meeting with the NSC on October 5. Militarily, the report declared that given changes in approach and tactics, an improved Vietnamese military performance should allow

"the bulk of U.S. personnel" to withdraw by the end of 1965. In accordance with the program to train the Vietnamese to perform and take over essential military functions from the Americans, the Defense Department should announce plans to withdraw one thousand U.S. military personnel by the end of 1963. The report repeated that the overall objective of the U.S. in South Vietnam was denying the country to

Communism, though victory in the McNamara-Taylor report consisted of reducing the insurgency "to proportions manageable by the national security forces of the

TO

GVN, unassisted by the presence of U.S. military forces."

Kennedy made these decisions public in a White House press release that reiterated the U.S. commitment to the struggle against the VC, announced the 1,000- man troop withdrawal, and disassociated the U.S. from Diem's repressive policies. It did not announce the aid suspensions. According to Fredrik Logevall, the

McNamara-Taylor recommendations resulted in a policy that was designed to induce

" Bird, The Color of Truth, 258. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed.,11,752-753. 39 170. Record of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963, FRUS, IV, August-December, 1963, 353-354. 95 changes in Saigon without in any way impairing the war effort.40 On October 11, the president signed National Security Action Memorandum 263, a document that officially made the recommendations of the McNamara-Taylor report national policy.41

Eleven days after this new declaration of American policy in Vietnam, a document was released whose opposition to the conclusions of the McNamara-Taylor report would make it one of the most controversial intelligence products of the war.

On October 22, 1963, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research

(INR) released RFE-90, a report entitled "Statistics on the War Effort in South

Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends." The study, based on MACV field reports, documented the increase in scale and effectiveness of Viet Cong attacks and noted

"an unfavorable shift in the military balance" since the previous July. The INR analysts, however, also criticized MACV sources, asserting that statistics were "only partial and not entirely satisfactory indicators of progress in the total counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam." They questioned the completeness of certain statistics, criticized their sources (largely South Vietnamese) and their viability for measuring such factors as morale and popular attitudes toward the VC, which were "extremely difficult, if not impossible, to handle statistically."

Nonetheless, the study found that statistics proved effective in evaluating "certain

Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: the Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 55. 41 146. National Security Action Memorandum No. 263, October 11, 1963, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 769-770. 96 significant aspects of the military situation and provide a guide at least to trends in the fighting."42

The report contrasted statistics on Viet Cong casualties, weapons losses, defections and desertions with ARVN figures, warning that trends "suggest that the military position of the Vietnam Government may have reverted to the point it had reached six months to a year ago." Even more damning, the report noted that these trends coincided with the sharp deterioration of the political situation during the summer of 1963, arguing that,

Even without the Buddhist crisis and the more serious political difficulties following in its wake, it is possible that the Diem government would have been unable to maintain the favorable trends of preceding periods in the face of the accelerated Viet Cong effort since July 1963.

Such appraisals went against virtually all military intelligence reporting up to that time. The conclusions of RFE-90 threatened the idea that the war was being won, a proposition that underlay not only the McNamara-Taylor report and the Pentagon's established policy, but also the military's opposition to the proposed coup against

Diem.43 Instead of encouraging a re-examination of the situation, however, RFE-90 was rejected by Kennedy policy-makers.

The INR report enraged the Pentagon and provoked a flurry of responses. One of the first to prepare a written response to the study was the JCS, whose draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense highlighted the many criticisms the Chiefs had regarding INR's findings. While the JCS accepted that the document was

42 INR, Research Memorandum RFE-90, Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam Show Unfavorable Trends, October 22, 1963, "Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on Unfavorable Trends of War Effort, 11/14/63" folder, Hilsman, box 4, JFKL. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 268. 97 prepared using data compiled by Defense intelligence agencies, they were critical that

INR had neglected to coordinate the memorandum and its conclusions with the

Department of Defense. The Chiefs were most critical of the timeframe and limited scope of the report, observing that the study relied on "a few select statistical indicators.. .while ignoring many others," which placed it "at variance with the longer range findings of qualified military observers." The JCS declared the memorandum itself had "little importance," but worried about the forty-odd copies of the document that had been distributed to the White House, various offices of USIA, AID, CIA, and the Departments of State and Defense. The Chiefs were concerned the

"interpretations attached to its publication could be highly significant," since

"evidence of disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense on military affairs can only lead to embarrassment of both Departments and of the

Government." The JCS appraisal emphasized the inappropriateness of the INR study since it went outside the realm of State's authority and contradicted publicly announced Defense Department military estimates. The JCS urged that McNamara be requested to bring the matter to Rusk's attention.44

McNamara forwarded the INR report and the JCS comments to Rusk, recommending the paper be withdrawn. He included the following note: "If you were to tell me that it is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department the matter will die."45 If ever

Talking Paper for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the JCS Meeting, November 4, 1963, "Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on Unfavorable Trends of War Effort, 11/14/63" folder, Hilsman, box 4, JFKL. 45 Note From Secretary McNamara, November 7, 1963, "Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on Unfavorable Trends of War Effort, 11/14/63" folder, Hilsman, box 4, JFKL. 98 the State Department's submission to the military regarding policy-making in

Vietnam was in question, Rusk's reply to McNamara left no doubt:

It is not the policy of the State Department to issue military appraisals without seeking the views of the Defense Department. I have requested that any memorandum given interdepartmental circulation which includes military appraisals be co-coordinated with your Department.

Despite Rusk's personal acquiescence, he included a memorandum from then INR director Thomas Hughes with his note to McNamara that defended the study and addressed the JCS criticisms. Hughes reiterated that the statistics used for the study were of military origin and challenged JCS allegations regarding the limited scope of the indicators found in the report. He stated that the statistics used were among those regularly highlighted in intelligence products formulated by MACV and the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), in addition to being the very same indicators that

Generals Krulak and Wheeler had previously demanded be given greater emphasis in estimates. Hughes justified States' venture into the sphere of military reporting, stating that

the unique and varied political factors involved in the insurgency in South Vietnam and the continuing political crises since May led us to investigate the possibility that the counterinsurgency effort may have been adversely affected during this period.47

46 Letter from Rusk to McNamara, November 8, 1963, "Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on Unfavorable Trends of War Effort, 11/14/63" folder, Hilsman, box 4, JFKL. INR, JCS Comments on Department of State Research Memorandum RFE-90, November 8, 1963, "Vietnam, JCS Comments on RFE-90 on Unfavorable Trends of War Effort, 11/14/63" folder, Hilsman, box 4, JFKL. 99

Hughes concluded by noting that the CIA had just released an independent study that "concurred with our findings using essentially the same statistical indicators and the same time period."

Despite these attempts to salvage the report, the military's efforts to discredit

RFE-90 ultimately succeeded; its conclusions were neither re-examined nor did they trigger any sort of reassessment by decision-makers within the Kennedy administration. Though its conclusions about increased VC capabilities and the continued deterioration of ARVN's effectiveness would prove prescient during the

Johnson administration, the challenges and criticisms against RFE-90 prevented its successful dissemination and the report's warnings were ignored.

The story surrounding RFE-90 is important because it illustrates problems typically experienced by producers and consumers of intelligence. There are few better examples of the imbalance of power within the intelligence community, an imbalance that favoured the military, than that afforded by RFE-90. The case demonstrates how rigid the military was when it came to re-examining its own figures or allowing their use in another organization's estimate. The competition between civilian and military intelligence branches is plain to see, but the effects of the larger power struggle over whose influence would most affect policy is even more striking.

Rusk's initial inclination to leave American policy in Vietnam to the military was reinforced by the position he took when this particular study came under attack. His abdication of political responsibility is clear in his letter to McNamara; here he bent to the latter's criticism over the issue of State reporting military appraisals. The

48 This document has not been found; "Memo from Hughes to Rusk," November 8, 1963, FRUS, IV, August-December, 1963, 584, n. 5. communication between the two secretaries is reminiscent of a parent-child relationship, with McNamara firmly in the position of control with Rusk acting like a child who had been scolded for doing something wrong.

If there is one positive lesson that can be gleaned from the troubled history of this document, it concerns the activities of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Though its department secretary should have worked to ensure that the study received more attention than it ultimately did, INR can be commended for its fearlessness in presenting an intelligence product that went against virtually all previous reports that were based on MACV data. Despite its poor reception, Thomas Hughes responded to his critics and attempted to explain and justify the study's findings to those who sought to stifle them. He received no reply. Though in the end the consumer ultimately rejected the INR study, its members performed nearly all the required tasks in order to ensure their product would be accepted at the consumer or policy-making level. As was the case with many such products during the Vietnam War, the hubris that fed the policy-makers' desire for optimistic reporting was too strong, while

Rusk's decision to leave such matters to the military gave civilian intelligence little means of ensuring that its product was understood, let alone influential.

Re-examining the relationship between the McNamara-Taylor report and the subsequent battle over RFE-90 brings us to another practice that threatened president

Kennedy's relationship with the intelligence community: his use of fact-finding missions. Freedman argues that these missions were representative of Kennedy's displeasure with the quality of information he received from the U.S. mission in

Saigon (the source of most intelligence), and his belief that a visit by his senior 101 advisors would give him a more accurate idea of the situation. These missions came to characterize Kennedy's method of dealing with conflicting intelligence reports, for as the military's optimism was challenged by civilian intelligence agencies, the president sought out other opinions in order to determine policy. The practice of consumers seeking such outside advice will be discussed in the analysis that follows.

What made these missions different from those described in Shlomo Gazit's article,

"Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," is that Kennedy was not seeking outside opinions due to the loss of objectivity by his current intelligence sources.

Rather, he was seeking information that would help explain the divisions in the intelligence community while avoiding the more threatening prospect of re-evaluating the nature of the American commitment in Vietnam that was so desperately needed.51

More important to Kennedy's handling of intelligence was his approach to this 'outside' information. Instead of seeking impartial, specialist sources from outside the administration, Kennedy delegated the task to high-level members from within his own inner circle of close-knit and like-minded policy-makers. The president's 'outsourcing' of intelligence to members within his own cabinet had unforeseen consequences both for the intelligence community and for the nature of policy construction in Vietnam.

The individuals sent on these fact-finding missions were often those who supported military escalation as the preferred instrument of U.S. policy, as was the

49 Freedman, Kennedy's Wars, 319. Gazit promotes the use of outside' analysts when the objectivity of existing intelligence collectors is in question. See Shlomo Gazit, "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker," Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (1988): 270 51 Anne E. Blair, Lodge in Vietnam: a Patriot Abroad, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 62- 63. case when Kennedy chose Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow to lead one such mission in the fall of 1961. These men were not objective outsiders seeking to advance their own agenda, but 'team players' who would not challenge the basic assumptions of an established policy they themselves had helped create. As H.R.

McMaster asserts, "the members of Kennedy's inner circle protested their ideas with ideological fervor." He quotes a memorandum from Colonel Julian Ewell, Taylor's assistant, which described the uniformity of foreign policy deliberations under

Kennedy. The President's inner circle was formed by "loose associations of second- level officials in the White House and the Defense and State departments," who worked "across channels by personal contact" and called on their associates who were

"members of the club, and whom they [could] count on to agree with them." The result was that more often than not, these missions returned from South Vietnam echoing the optimistic sentiments of the military presentations with which they were briefed during their trip. Mission members often came back feeling justified in their optimism, having seen "progress" (from the military's point of view) with their own eyes. This caused them to be all the more suspicious of pessimistic reporting from other, non-military intelligence agencies, such as INR's RFE-90, which challenged the findings of the fall, 1963 McNamara/Taylor mission.

Another important characteristic of these fact-finding missions was that the persons chosen to report back to the president were already the most influential when it came to constructing policy. While the members of the intelligence community, specifically the civilian agencies, struggled to have their voices heard, Kennedy's

H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 21. 103 reliance on hand-picked 'fact-finders' strengthened the influence of an already powerful group of inner-circle advisors. These men, already close to the president, assumed even greater authority, and with their optimism reinforced by military briefings in Vietnam, made it that much more difficult for more critical intelligence products to receive a fair hearing from Kennedy's policy-making elite. The informal committees responsible for certain policy issues, from which members of fact-finding missions were often drawn, also conducted closed deliberations which produced papers that were sent directly to the president, which further shut out alternative interpretations from the intelligence community.53 As such, the military's optimism came to be viewed as authoritative among the highest levels of the administration.

Kennedy's preference for fact-finding missions undercut the efforts of civilian intelligence agencies that questioned the American role in Vietnam.

The Pentagon Papers offered one of the first critiques of policy-making by special mission:

It is hard to believe that hasty visits by harried high level officials with overloaded itineraries really add that much in the way of additional data or lucid insight. And because they become a focal point of worldwide press coverage, they often raise public expectations or anxieties that may only create additional problems for the President.54

While the value of information obtained during these trips was debatable, the optimistic recommendations they produced satisfied Kennedy's true intentions. The president's sympathy toward the optimistic views of the military was thus reinforced by the recommendations derived from these missions. This enabled Kennedy and his advisors to use these optimistic reports to support their dismissal of pessimistic or

ibid., 21. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Ed., II, 205. critical intelligence products produced by the civilian intelligence community. The administration would then appear as if it had given equal attention to the differing views among the intelligence community, and had made their decision based on the recommendations from these fact-finding missions, using their optimistic findings as a sort of tiebreaker against the pessimism of other intelligence agencies. As such, optimism reigned in the Kennedy administration while civilian intelligence producers continued to fight an uphill battle for a hearing.

The administration's response to RFE-90 is illustrative not only of the power of the military's influence in intelligence matters, but the style of decision-making among Kennedy elites. The ad hoc and collegial style of Kennedy's foreign policy team approached issues in a cautious way, and was not easily swayed by long-range and in-depth studies, whether they reflected positively or negatively on current policy initiatives. Kennedy preferred to accumulate a variety of views over time, weigh his options and then, incrementally, to make a decision. There are few examples of the president changing course due to even an optimistic intelligence report, for these were seen as merely support for the established view, and therefore did not require an alteration to policy. This method, as practiced by Kennedy and his advisors, makes the confrontation over RFE-90 all the more important, since the INR document did advocate such a policy shift. The contempt with which such proposals were met indicate the extent to which Kennedy's advisory system limited real power in the hands of his inner circle, and treated others more like sources of opposition than of useful advice.55

McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 41. Over the last twenty years, scholars in the field of intelligence and policy­ making have identified the essential components of a productive and effective intelligence producer/consumer relationship.56 While acknowledging that such an ideal relationship between these two groups is rarely attained, the analysis that follows will illustrate how the Kennedy administration, and the President in particular, failed to employ even the most basic practices judged necessary for the successful use of intelligence for policy construction. These practices were not new at the time; they had been followed by the Eisenhower administration.

Arthur S. Hulnick's theoretical approach defines consumers as users of intelligence. Here, consumers are most commonly referred to as policy-makers or decision-makers, "those officials within the executive or legislative branches of government who formulate, choose and implement policy." Hulnick defines producers as those within the intelligence community "who create intelligence reports from information sources."57 In this paper, intelligence will refer both to unevaluated data obtained from human sources as found in cables and situational reports, as well as to finished analysis produced by any member of the intelligence community (the study will focus on intelligence products from the CIA and INR.)

Scholars in the field of intelligence and foreign policy place paramount importance on the relationship between producers and consumers. This link is essential to the effective use of intelligence and informed decision-making. In "Using

Many of the sources used for this analysis were themselves previous members of the intelligence community before moving on to the realm of scholarship, among them Hulnick, Gazit, Ford, Hughes and Macartney. As such, they speak from experience, but may also carry bias when commenting on the intelligence producer/consumer relationship. Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach," Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 2 (1986): 213. 106

Intelligence," Amos Kovacs describes intelligence, in its applied form, as "a practical and service oriented occupation, whose sole raison d'etre is to facilitate political and military action and decision making." "The goal of intelligence," he notes, "should be to be of service, the hub of intelligence work should be the end-user," the consumer.58

This brings us to what many in the field consider the most important aspect of the intelligence cycle: dissemination - "getting it into the hands of consumers."59 Writing in the Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, John Macartney describes this stage as critical; "intelligence failures" are rarely caused by a lack of information, but by a failure in dissemination, "which is dependent on the relationship between intelligence and policy." Macartney insists that both intelligence officers and policy­ makers must pay close attention to this critical and often strained relationship, since the two groups "come together in almost total ignorance of each other's business."60

Such ignorance contributes to what Shlomo Gazit refers to as the "marketing" problem of the intelligence producer: how to ensure the acceptance of an intelligence estimate. To Gazit, "acceptance" refers both to the physical delivery of the intelligence product, and the need for it to "be cognitively accepted, analyzed and understood." Gazit stresses the "chemistry" between the decision-maker and the intelligence producer is very important, noting that mutual trust is a necessity if "all aspects and ramifications of the intelligence estimate [are to] be understood."61

Amos Kovacs, "Using Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (1997): 145. At its most basic, the intelligence cycle consists of: -> collection->analysis->dissemination. See Kovacs, Using Intelligence, 145, and Hulnick, The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage, 219; Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 474. 60 ibid., 474, 480. Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Dec is ion-Maker, 264. 107

Harold P. Ford explores this theme more deeply in his examination of some of the factors that hinder the effectiveness of the producer-consumer relationship.

Observing that those individuals whom intelligence producers "are most desirous of influencing are the very officials who have the least available time and energy to absorb intelligence," Ford proceeds to depict the plethora of inputs other than intelligence that routinely inundate decision-makers and policy leaders. Gazit concurs, observing that many busy policy-leaders employ a 'reader,' whose job is to classify incoming intelligence material and "decide which of it, and what part thereof, ends up on the decision-maker's desk." He acknowledges the importance of such a position but cautions against allowing the 'reader' to ever take over the process. 3

McGeorge Bundy's position as the president's Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs enabled him to perform this role during the Kennedy administration, allowing him to 'filter,' and thereby control, the availability of certain types of intelligence while limiting the president's exposure to others.

In addition to constraints that hinder the effective dissemination and acceptance of intelligence by policy-makers, Ford's article also illustrates the gulf between the personalities of those involved in intelligence production and those of the policy-maker. He describes the forces of ambition, hubris, and misunderstanding that are inherent in the making of policy, noting that decision-makers are often experts on world developments, or believe themselves to be, making them "hesitant to accept the views of often unknown intelligence officers, especially if the latter's judgments seem

Harold P. Ford, "The US Government's Experience with Intelligence Analysis: Pluses and Minuses," Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (1995): 50. Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker, 271 -272. 108 to challenge their own pet assumptions or policy commitments." Macartney adds that since military commanders and government policy-makers who consume intelligence invariably are part of the intelligence community's chain of command, for those producing intelligence, the consumer is the boss. This hierarchy makes it all the more difficult for the intelligence producer to deliver a product that might contradict, challenge, or undermine established policy or organizational interests.

They fear that their product might be resented or rejected outright by an unsympathetic or unreceptive consumer.65 Given the difference between the two groups involved in the production and consumption of intelligence, attaining a harmonious relationship often proved difficult.

Since intelligence scholarship is such a large field, I will not attempt to list all of the factors that contribute to the creation and dissemination of "good" or "bad" intelligence, though I will mention a select few that relate directly to my analysis.

Given the multitude of agencies actively producing intelligence within the United

States, competition among these different organizations is inevitable. Michael Handel notes the unavoidable tendency of intelligence organizations to reflect their political interests in the intelligence they produce. Commenting on the imbalance of power within the U.S. intelligence community during the Vietnam War, he observes,

"military intelligence officers are not likely to produce estimates and analyses contradictory to their superiors' interests and beliefs. The tradition of obeying orders, remaining loyal to the service and friends, and furthering their careers may influence

Ford, The US Government's Experience with Intelligence Analysis, 50. Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 475. them consciously." Handel observes it is "only natural to find at least some degree of distortion in an intelligence unit representing a specialized professional point of view," as each organization "works to broaden its influence on the decision-making process, its budgets, personnel, and missions."67

As each organization skews its analysis to support its interests, an ambiguity is created that, combined with the "lack of objective criteria for analysis and absence of common analytical standards," renders the intelligence process susceptible to political interference. Handel claims this ambiguity "legitimizes' different interpretations, allowing politically-minded parties to select the one they prefer," where "the absence of clarity may also strengthen the tendency of some statesmen to become their own intelligence officers."68

Moreover, intelligence co-coordination among different intelligence agencies creates biases, which are generated during the integration of the collection, research, and estimative efforts of multiple organizations. Since this process involves "forming a consensus as well as co-ordination and common reporting, it is, in a sense, a search for a common denominator in which the final 'truth' is not necessarily the best possible product but rather the most generally acceptable one." This, in turn, introduces "another type of political bias that transcends the particular interests of any single organization." Thomas Hughes, former Deputy Director of INR, comments on this "drive for consistency" in his book The Fate of Facts in a World of Men -

66 Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, 18. 67 ibid., 17. 68 ibid., 15. Handel also notes that "organizations usually find it more advantageous to avoid mutual criticism and may even form mutual-support coalitions if the competition is intense." Such was the case with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's RFE-90 and the subsequent State Department refusal to contradict the military's optimistic reporting, which has already been discussed. Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, 18-19. 110

Foreign Policy and Intelligence MakinR. He asserts that consistency is not a goal of intelligence. Instead, he argues, "intelligence is supposed to provide current unimpeded judgments. As a vehicle for ventilating a variety of viewpoints, the intelligence process should be highly suspicious of consensus." Hughes concludes that, "the freedom to be inconsistent is a major argument bolstering the independence... of the intelligence community."70 Hughes speaks with the authority of first-hand experience; it was his own memorandum that challenged the critics of

RFE-90. The cases of NIE 53-63 and RFE-90 are prime examples of the intelligence community's independence coming under fire from optimistic and consensus-seeking elements of the Kennedy administration. These reports explain a great deal about the intelligence-policy relationship of the Kennedy administration.

Since policy-makers are at the top of the decision-making hierarchy, they are responsible for determining how their policy initiatives will be informed by intelligence. As Michael Handel notes, "the very fact that a leader is elected to implement a specific policy gives him the right and duty to make political decisions contrary to the evidence or advice provided by the intelligence community."71 Handel is clear in affirming the 'primacy of politics' or political control in the relationship between the intelligence producer and consumer, but distinguishes this political authority from political interference.

One way to reduce political interference is for intelligence managers to establish and maintain a feedback loop with policy-makers. In his article "The

Intelligence Producer - Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach," Hulnick

Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making, (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976), 49-50. Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, 14. Ill advocates the implementation of such a measure "to determine that intelligence inputs will be packaged properly, delivered at the right time, and be relevant to the issues at hand." He maintains that this feedback mechanism requires that "analysts have their own links to policy-makers in addition to the links set up by intelligence managers," and the "development of informal ties to key staff and other 'working groups' within the intelligence community."7 Gazit promotes a similar idea, whereby the intelligence system attempts to 'plant' one of its own analysts at the decision-maker's side. This 'agent' is then able to solve many problems based solely on his or her presence alongside the policy-maker. From this position, the intelligence producer can communicate information deemed particularly important to the decision-maker.

The relationship can also work in reverse: the 'agent' bringing back comments and reactions from the consumer about the substance, form, or style of analysis.73 Gazit recalls from his own experience that such feedback greatly enhanced the product's chances of acceptance, though Hulnick is careful to warn that the unwary analyst may find him or herself under pressure to "deliver judgments that support policy, feed the ideological biases of policy consumers, or mask some contentious issues."74

Accordingly, it is important that intelligence analysts network and share their information with their counterparts at other agencies in order to be aware of what type of information their contemporaries are reporting and to maintain the autonomy of the intelligence community. This last point leads us to the steps consumers can take to ensure they are getting the most from their intelligence producers.

Hulnick, The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage, 228, 231. Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker, 266, 268. Hulnick, The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage, 228. 75 Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 481. 112

The tendency for policy-makers to disregard, resent, or challenge intelligence that goes against established policy objectives is the single greatest obstacle in the path of a harmonious intelligence producer/consumer relationship. Scholars have gone to great lengths to determine how policy-makers should react when confronted with adverse information so as to make use of all available information rather than only relying on those products that meet the decision-maker's preconceived notions of policy.

First and foremost, scholars are unanimous in their call for policy-makers to be receptive to dissenting views, and to welcome and invite objective reporting, fully realizing that such reports will sometimes clash with established beliefs and policies.

Gazit claims that the right to state unpopular opinions is "the highest expression of the reciprocal relationship" between producer and consumer, adding, "the intelligence man who is forbidden to speak his mind cannot perform his job properly," and must, in doing his duty, maintain the position of devil's advocate. Macartney notes that policy makers cannot expect to receive good quality, objective intelligence without granting "academic freedom" to their analysts. Should such objectivity produce a report that runs contrary to the tenets of established policy norms, the policy-maker is then free to challenge the analyst and ask tough questions, but must never order intelligence reports be changed to suit their own predispositions.77

This does not mean that policy-makers are obliged to incorporate the views of every intelligence analyst when creating policy. Indeed, such a practice would make the creation of a coherent and feasible policy impossible. As Gazit notes, "for

Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker, 269. Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 482. 113 decision-makers consciously to decide against an intelligence estimate is entirely legitimate," as long as "the decision-maker knows and understands the intelligence estimate but has found reason to decide against it." This, of course, does not apply when a policy-maker objects to the content of an estimate on the grounds it conflicts with his or her own views on a particular subject, as in the case of NIE 53-63 and

RFE-90. It is up to the decision-maker to make an informed decision based on as many sources as possible. By doing so, it is inevitable that some intelligence will be disregarded in the process, but in understanding the views of each particular intelligence agency and by making a judgment based on all accounts, the decision­ maker will have made an informed decision. At the same time, it is crucial that the decision-maker be able to articulate why he or she disregarded that intelligence which was not used if their decision is to be truly informed.

To maintain the effectiveness of intelligence and ensure that policy-makers clearly understand the intelligence they receive, John Macartney stresses the importance of intelligence being brought into the policy arena, "close enough to be in tune with the policy-maker's goals [and] close enough to understand the context of the policy struggle." He describes those commanders and decision-makers who make the best use of intelligence are those who "bring intelligence into their inner circle of decision, ... demand first-rate support and clearly communicate their expectations to their intelligence staffs." Macartney urges consumers to not make the mistake of expecting an intelligence producer to become a policy advocate, or a

Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker, 263. Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 478. 114

"team player," for doing so threatens the credibility of intelligence and compromises its usefulness to the policy-maker, setting the stage for failure.

Gazit similarly cautions against the loss of objectivity among intelligence analysts, noting "their participation in political deliberations and close contact with decision-makers may lead to an identification with policy to such an extent that they may ignore facts and dangers that contradict that policy." John McCone's order to re­ draft NIE-53-63, provides but one example. Gazit does recommend a partial solution, easy to suggest but difficult to implement: the consumer should solicit the advice of expert 'outside' analysts. The difficulty inherent in such a plan rests in the bureaucratic response to the presence of "'outside' analysts involved in any secret intelligence consultation," and in offending the consumer's own m-house analysts.

I will provide an examination of President Kennedy's penchant for such

'outside' intelligence, as seen in the form of presidential fact-finding missions, in the next section. While some feel that such interaction threatens the objectivity of the intelligence community (and others question the possibility of such objectivity at all), I agree with Macartney when he describes the job of a consumer's intelligence staff as knowing what information is available and delivering the required intelligence when it is needed. To do so requires the intelligence community to anticipate the needs of the consumer by knowing what the consumer is thinking and intending, an impossible feat without open and frank communication between

0 ibid., 478, 481. Gazit, Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker, 270. 2 See Handel, The Politics ofIntelligence, 37-38. 115 producer and consumer. Only by working to nurture the ops-intel relationship,

Macartney insists, will the consumer be served well.

Handel's article, "The Politics of Intelligence," argues that the political level of acceptance by consumers often proves to be the weakest link in the intelligence process. Handel views correct analysis as a "necessary but not sufficient condition for success," arguing that "the performance of the intelligence community in a democratic system will rest primarily on the responsibility and dedication of all participants (the leaders in particular) to a cause which transcends their own immediate political or material interests."84 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones offers a similar argument in his book, The CIA and American Democracy, commenting that the success of the CIA, [and, I would argue], that of all intelligence agencies, has

"depended not just on the quality of its analysis but also on its power to persuade."

In short, intelligence is only as good as its audience is receptive.

The cases used in this study—the varying interpretations of the battle of Ap

Bac, the forceful re-drafting of NIE 53-63, the McNamara-Taylor fact-finding mission, and the debate over RFE-90—have illustrated how Kennedy's close relationship with his foreign policy advisors enabled these men to use their influence to overpower adverse interpretations from the civilian intelligence community in order to shape Vietnam policy and decision-making. Understanding how these relationships were established will require an analysis of the leadership, management, and decision-making structures of the Kennedy administration. How did the

83 Macartney, Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide, 482. 84 Handel, The Politics of Intelligence, 34-35,38. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),!. 116

"Kennedy style" influence policy decisions and the use of intelligence during the fateful summer of 1963? 117

Chapter Four: Crisis Management in the Summer and Fall of 1963

This chapter examines the situation in Vietnam and American decision­ making during the summer and fall of 1963. Assembled from a variety of intelligence documents, reports, and studies, as well as from secondary sources, it is intended to provide the reader with a sense of the types of information and recommendations that were available to the president and his advisors during this tumultuous period.

Concentrating on intelligence products from the CIA and INR, the following analysis will act as a window through which the policy and decision-making actions of

President Kennedy and his top advisors, as well as the decision-making structure of the administration, can be evaluated against the "ideal" characteristics of the intelligence producer-consumer relationship discussed in the previous chapter.

The summer of 1963 would prove to be the most significant period of

Kennedy's presidency in regard to his administration's decision-making on Vietnam.

Prior to this time, disaffection towards Diem's leadership in South Vietnam had been well documented and discussed among American policy-makers, but the effects of this discontent had failed to make more than a cursory impact. Opposition to his regime was disorganized and ineffectual, most often kept out of the political discourses in Saigon. Many of those who were dissatisfied with the rule of the Ngo family kept their opinions to themselves, fearful of retribution from Nhu's Special

Forces. Their voices joined the apathetic majority who were either too far removed from the political epicenter in Saigon, as were most of South Vietnam's rural peasantry, or simply too meek or disinterested, as were many civil servants and the majority of the student population. However, these groups and others would soon be 118 brought together in an open and often violent confrontation with the Diem regime beginning in the early summer months of 1963.

On the night of May 8, in the former imperial capital of Hue, a demonstration against the Government's ban on the display of Buddhist flags during Buddha's birthday celebration became a violent demonstration of Buddhists against the Diem regime. When authorities cancelled a speech scheduled by the head bonze (cleric), exhortations by the leading bonze and province chief to disperse the crowd failed.

The police attempted to physically remove the crowd using fire hoses, a tactic which proved ineffective in dispersing the crowd of some 3,000 people. It was then that government forces, including eight armored cars, a company of Civil Guard, one of the ARVN, and local police, were called in. In the melee that ensued, shots were fired into the air and a grenade exploded on the steps of a radio station, killing four children and one woman; three more people died in the chaos that followed, bringing the total casualties to eight killed and four wounded.1

On May 9 a telegram was sent from the American State Department to the

Embassy in Saigon suggesting that the GVN be encouraged to "take no repressive measures against Buddhists, offer sympathy and funeral expenses to families of demonstration victims, [and] make any other appropriate gestures toward [the] restoration of order and amity between religious groups." Two days later the

Buddhist clergy published a manifesto calling for the retraction of the order

1 Report, USMACV Headway Addenda to Ops 135, Unknown Date, May 1963, "May 1963: 16-20" folder, John M. Newman Papers, box 12, John F. Kennedy Library. 2 Document No. 115. Rusk to Lodge, May 9, 1963, United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (hereafter referred to as FRUS), 1961-1963 - Vietnam. Vols. l-IV, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988-1991), III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 283. 119 prohibiting the display of the Buddhist flag, equal status with Catholics, an end to arrests of Buddhists, freedom of religion for Buddhists, and for the GVN to make proper compensation for those killed and punishment for those responsible in the Hue incident.3 Diem offered "assistance" when presented with the Buddhists' five demands at a meeting with a delegation of Buddhist leaders on May 15, but insisted that the deaths had resulted from a grenade thrown by Viet Cong terrorists.4 So, he felt no apology on his part for the deaths was necessary.

Historian Howard Jones notes that due to the long and often rocky relationship between the Diem regime and the Buddhist community in South Vietnam, GVN silence to American requests for accommodation was expected, since "the Diem regime believed what it said—that the Viet Cong was using the Buddhists to achieve its own ends and that the cry of religious oppression had no basis in fact." Diem, failing to recognize the threat posed by the crisis, continued to refuse to accept responsibility for the deaths in Hue, fearing that any concessions would lead to more demands, a position that only damaged GVN credibility and further irritated the

Buddhists.6

Jones and Ellen Hammer note that both Diem and Nhu believed the Buddhists were an instrument for the Viet Cong cause. They were seen as supportive of neutralism in foreign affairs and were considered likely to seek an accommodation

3 118. Manifesto of Vietnamese Buddhist Clergy and Faithful, May 10, 1963, ibid., 287-288. 4 Report of the Special Study Mission to SEA, November 7, 1963, "House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Zablocki Delegation Trip to SEA, Trip Report, 10/63" folder, James C. Thomson Papers, box 5, JFKL. Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 252. 6 129. Telegram From Nolting to the Department of State, May 18, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 311. 120 with the Communists if the regime fell from power.7 The Ngos concluded that political power was more important to the Buddhists than their principled call for religious equality. A prescient INR report of June 21 identified the incident in Hue as the spark which turned what appeared to be an isolated incident into a national crisis that "crystallized long-standing resentment of what Buddhist leaders regard as the privileged position occupied by the minority Roman Catholic church of which

President Diem, his family, and a disproportionate number of civil and military officials are members."

If the Americans were unconvinced by the Buddhist allegations, events would soon persuade them of Diem's inability to cope with the increasingly hostile Buddhist situation. While funeral ceremonies for victims of the May 8 attacks went unmolested in Saigon and Hue on May 21, the imperial city was once again the scene of unrest.

This time there were more than 60 people injured, some of them seriously, when

GVN forces used tear gas against a June 3 Buddhist youth group gathering. Martial law was declared in Hue and the Saigon government accused some of the leading bonzes of being Viet Cong.9

The deteriorating situation reached its climax on the morning of June 11, when, as American photographers and reporters looked on, an elderly Buddhist monk burned himself to death in front of the Cambodian Embassy. A MACV report identified the bonze who died as Thich Quang Due, while observing that Buddhist

Jones, Death of a Generation, 254; Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, 1st ed. (New York: E.P. Button, 1987), 140. U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Memorandum RFE-55, Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam, June 21, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General 6/16/63- 6/24/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL. 9 144. Telegram From Trueheart to the Department of State, June 3, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 343-344. 121 spectators had used loud speakers to proclaim that he died to emphasize the five demands made upon the South Vietnamese Government after the May 8 incident in

Hue.10 The episode was photographed by Malcolm Brown of the Associated Press, whose picture, taken seconds after the bonze was engulfed in flames, was published around the world. It provided what foreign correspondent John Mecklin called "a shock effect of incalculable value to the Buddhist cause, becoming a symbol of the state of things in Vietnam."11 For William Colby, the top CIA official on Vietnamese matters, "the party was almost over in terms of the imagery that was affecting

American opinion."

American reaction to the suicide was swift: INRs Roger Hilsman, with

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern affairs Averell Harriman's clearance, sent a telegram to the American embassy in Saigon threatening to dramatically shift U.S. policy, citing the Buddhist situation as "dangerously near the breaking point." The telegram said it was essential that the GVN take immediate and dramatic actions to regain the confidence of Buddhists through the acceptance of their five original demands, noting that unless the GVN was willing to immediately take such actions, the "U.S. will find it necessary to publicly state that it cannot associate itself with the

GVN's unwillingness to meet the reasonable demands of the Vietnamese Buddhist leaders." Should Diem refuse, the telegram concluded, "we will have to reexamine our entire relationship with his regime."13 This was little short of an ultimatum.

10 163. Telegram From Trueheart to the Department of State, June 11, 1963, ibid., 374, n. 2. John Mecklin, Mission in Torment; an Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 157. Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 284. lj Telegram 1207, Amembassy Saigon Operational Immediate, June 11, 1963, "June 63:10-16" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. 122

While Hilsman and Harriman were prepared to cut Diem loose, President

Kennedy was not. Upon learning of the Hilsman/Harriman telegram, Kennedy immediately banned any more threats or formal statements of dissociation without his approval.14 Despite Kennedy's concern, however, the American threat seemed to have worked. On June 16 the government and the Buddhists issued a joint communique announcing an agreement to the five Buddhist demands, including a settlement on the conditions and circumstances for flying national and religious flags, and an investigation into the May 8 incident and punishment of those responsible. 5

The government refused, however, to accept responsibility for the killings in Hue.1

Diem's handling of the crisis would prove characteristic of his actions during the rest of his presidency: a slow reaction time coupled with an often aggressive and violent response, followed by a refusal to accept responsibility and to make what the

U.S. viewed as the necessary concessions to defuse the situation. Two weeks prior to the June 16 compromise, a CIA report noted that despite an increased concern over recurrent Buddhist demonstrations, the GVN "still appears unwilling to take more than limited, piecemeal steps to ease the situation." The report notes that while Diem had made limited concessions to the Buddhists, he believed outright acceptance of their demands to be politically impossible. Diem insisted that the VC were

David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 216. 15 177. Telegram From Trueheartto the Department of State, June 16, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 396; 178. Editorial Note, ibid., 397-398. 16 Report, The Religious and Political Crisis in Vietnam - A Background Study, September 25, 1963, "Diem Coup, Background and Congressional Inquiries" folder, James C Thomson Papers, box 24, JFKL. 123 responsible for the attacks, and believed that making concessions to the Buddhists

1 7 could lead to further demands.

In evaluating Diem's responses to the crisis, William Trueheart, the U.S.

Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, who was in charge of the Embassy during

Nolting's vacation, explained that the GVN had underestimated the threat posed by the Buddhists, assuming they would bow quickly to forceful measures. More important, from the beginning the GVN regarded the Buddhist "revolt" as a political problem that posed a real threat to the future and stability of the regime. Furthermore, while the GVN appeared internally divided about how to cope with the Buddhists, the consensus was that satisfying the Buddhists would only lead to further demands by

Buddhists and other malcontents.18 Hilsman's June 11 State telegram acknowledged this possibility, but advised the GVN to be prepared to face further demands, "unless they are so substantive as to endanger [the] GVN defense effort."1 Despite the crisis with the Buddhists, American concerns in South Vietnam remained focused on the country's ability to fight Communism.

The events in Saigon during the months of May and June had blindsided the

Kennedy administration, attracting the president's daily attention for the first time in his term of office. As a Catholic President in a non-Catholic country, Kennedy was particularly sensitive to religious persecution and was shocked by the Buddhist crisis.

"How could this have happened?" Kennedy asked NSC staff member and Harriman

17 Buddhist Demonstrations in South Vietnam, June 3, 1963, "June 63: 6-9" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. 18 Telegram No 1155, Trueheart to Rusk (section 1 of 2), June 11, 1963, "June 63:10-16" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. 19 Amembassy Saigon Operational Immediate, June 11, 1963, "June 63:10-16" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. aide Michael Forrestal. "Who are these people? Why didn't we know about them before?"20 Howard Jones argues that American advisors had underestimated the consequences of the Buddhist crisis. Ambassador Nolting, believing the situation had eased after the initial incident in Hue, had left the country for a long-postponed vacation on May 23. He later called this decision "one of my big mistakes, big misfortunes," for "during that period all hell broke loose in Vietnam." Nolting blamed

Trueheart and the State Department for not keeping him abreast of developments, alleging that Harriman wanted him "out of there so that Diem would have enough rope to hang himself." General Harkins agreed that Trueheart "wanted to get rid of

Diem," and Trueheart himself confessed years later that "nobody guessed the

Buddhists had such an important role to play. We had zero knowledge of Buddhism.

Nobody ever thought it important to look at their organization."22

Despite the American government's ignorance about Buddhists in Vietnam, the American intelligence community took serious note of the actions of the Buddhist leadership, even during this preliminary phase of the crisis. Intelligence reports illustrated the politicization of what had been a religious crisis and attributed it to the slowness of the GVN's reaction to the initial demands. The reports argued that this delay intensified the political significance of the Buddhist dissent. Intelligence reports speculated that Buddhist questioning of GVN intentions led some leaders to wonder whether the GVN, as presently constituted, would ever deal fairly with the

Buddhist community. There were reports that some Buddhists had sought non-

20 William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, (New York: Scribner, 1985), 102. Jones, Death of a Generation, 271. 22 Anne E. Blair, Lodge in Vietnam: a Patriot Abroad, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 28. 23 Trueheart to Rusk (section 1 of 2), June 11, 1963, "June 63:10-16" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. 125

Communist and Communist political support while at the same time urging a more militant approach, one which even contemplated the overthrow of the Diem regime.24

An INR study, characterizing the Diem regime as "conspicuously dilatory, inept, and insincere in handling Buddhist matters," noted that "disaffection within the bureaucracy and the army, coupled with popular discontent and disorders, would almost certainly give rise to coup efforts." The study concluded that a coup was not only likely, but desirable. If led by upper-level civil and military officials, the coup had a good chance of serving U.S. interests given that this group was largely Buddhist as well as anti-Communist.

A State memo from Roger Hilsman in early August characterized the situation as "tense, volatile and potentially explosive," noting signs that Buddhist leaders would attempt to prolong the conflict until the GVN was overthrown, and speculating that Buddhist leaders felt they could no longer afford "patience and conciliation."26

Diem's fears of a Communist sub-plot to the crisis had no basis in fact, though some reports did cite that radical elements of the Buddhist leadership were willing to accept help from all factions to remove the Ngo family from power. Moreover, a

MACV report detailing the contents of a captured VC document concerning the

Buddhist uprising indicated a VC interest in utilizing the crisis to further its own cause, but provided no hint that the original uprisings were VC instigated. Instead, the documents identified the movement as "The Struggle of Buddhist Followers" which

24 ibid.; Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam, June 21, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General 6/16/63-6/24/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL. 25 ibid. 26 Status Report, The Buddhist Problem in Vietnam, August 6, 1963, "Vietnam 2/1/63-3/21/63" folder, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3, JFKL. 27 Buddhist Demonstrations in South Vietnam, June 3, 1963, "June 63: 6-9" folder, Newman, box 12, JFKL. the VC had failed to properly evaluate and exploit. The VC admitted to overlooking

"the question of providing guidance for the Buddhists; [or] to adopt overt measures to support the struggle; and to improve its effectiveness."

Diem's claims of Communist infiltration and participation in the crisis were refuted by the intelligence community, which was almost unanimous in its position that there was little or no evidence of Communist responsibility for the events in Hue, though it could be expected that the present conflict and any future crisis would be exploited by the Communists.29 A CIA Special Report concluded that the greatest opportunities for Communist exploitation of the conflict lay in the VC's ability to

"effect popular and government morale," and while the degree to which the crisis had affected the conduct of military efforts was negligible, "considerable governmental attention has already been diverted from the counterinsurgency problem."

In the general calm following the June 16 agreement, the attention of

President Kennedy and his White House staff returned to other foreign policy matters.

The crisis in South Vietnam was once again placed on the backburner. With the attention of Washington policy-makers focused elsewhere, unrest in South Vietnam continued to escalate. The month of July saw continued demonstrations and clashes between Buddhists and police, the latter reacting violently, resulting in large-scale arrests on July 17. In a radio address the following day Diem pledged to carry out the

Memorandum, Viet Cong Documents Concerning Buddhist Uprising in the Republic of Vietnam, September 16, 1963, "Sept 63: 16-18" folder, Newman, box 15, JFKL. 29 The Buddhists in South Vietnam, June 28, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General, 6/25/63-6/30/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL; USMACV Headway Addenda to Ops 135, Unknown Date, May 1963, "May 1963: 16-20" folder, Newman Papers, box 12, JFKL; Telegram No. 1083, Trueheart to Rusk, May 31, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General 5/18/63-5/31/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL. 30 The Buddhists in South Vietnam, June 28, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General, 6/25/63-6/30/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL. 127

June 16 agreement and announced steps to release Buddhists under arrest and remove barricades that had been set up around major pagodas.31

Such conciliatory measures were negated by an August 3 speech by Madame

Nhu, Diem's outspoken sister-in-law and Nhu's wife, who referred to the Buddhists as traitors and claimed they were under the influence of foreigners and Communists.

Following another Buddhist suicide by fire in early August, Madame Nhu again provoked outrage by describing the immolations as "barbeques," telling an American correspondent that Buddhist behaviour was madness and that she would clap her hands at another suicide.

Summarizing the situation in early August, a State Department memo described the continued lack of cooperation by the GVN and the persistent vocal attacks on Buddhists by the Nhus, warning that continued unrest would play into the hands of coup groups known to be plotting Diem's overthrow. Roger Hilsman predicted a 50-50 chance of a coup attempt in the following months with a 50-50 chance of success. He believed that if Diem was not overthrown, it was increasingly likely that he would attempt to solve the Buddhist problem through repressive means.

Hilsman therefore advocated that U.S. policy should neither encourage nor discourage coup attempts; with the future of the Diem regime unknown, the U.S. could not afford to back a loser but were not yet in a position to pick a winner with

31 Report of the Special Study Mission to SEA, November 7, 1963, "House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Zablocki Delegation Trip to SEA, Trip Report, 10/63" folder, James C. Thomson Papers, box 5, JFKL. j2 The Religious and Political Crisis in Vietnam - A Background Study, September 25, 1963, "Diem Coup, Background and Congressional Inquiries" folder, James C Thomson Papers, box 24, JFKL; Report of the Special Study Mission to SEA, November 7, 1963, "House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Zablocki Delegation Trip to SEA, Trip Report, 10/63" folder, James C. Thomson Papers, box 5, JFKL. 128 any confidence.33 Despite the degree of coup talk around Saigon, viable candidates for Diem's replacement had not yet materialized.

Given the critical situation in South Vietnam, Jones notes that America's interventionist policies had placed the U.S. in a precarious position, as both those conspiring for a coup and those still undecided looked to Washington for guidance.

Any U.S. position was thus saddled with the responsibility of determining whether a coup would take place because White House action or inaction would be read as a signal to everyone involved: silence or any distancing from Diem's policies would appear to be an endorsement of a coup, while U.S. support for Diem would discourage a coup.34 If an American-backed coup proved successful, the United

States would enjoy considerable influence over^Diem's successor. On the other hand,

U.S. support for Diem would discourage a coup, a move which a State Department report warned would come at a heavy price as "a victory in these circumstances would greatly reinforce Diem's view that he is indispensable, that he knows best what the situation requires, and that he cannot trust anyone outside his immediate family."35 National Intelligence Estimate 53-63 also spoke of this concern, questioning Diem's willingness to reform, especially if the military situation improved.36 Howard Jones argues that it was from this standpoint, coupled with the administration's increasing frustration over Diem's stubbornness and mounting Cold

33 The Buddhist Problem in Vietnam, August 6, 1963, "Vietnam 2/1/63-3/21/63" folder, Roger Hilsman Papers, box 3, JFKL. j4 Jones, Death of a Generation, 279. ~'5 Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam, June 21, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General 6/16/63-6/24/63" folder, NSF, box 197, JFKL. 36 N1E 53-63, "Prospects in South Vietnam," 17 April 1963, in David F. Gordon and United States, National Intelligence Council, Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975, (Washington, D.C; Pittsburgh, PA: National Intelligence Council; Government Printing Office, 2005) Documents from this source are collected on a CD-ROM, and so page numbers will not be used. War tension over Berlin, that the White House saw no alternative to adopting a hard- line position toward Diem that it knew could encourage a coup.

The change to a tough-stance with Diem necessitated a change in U.S. policy that began with the appointment of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. as the new American

Ambassador to South Vietnam. Replacing Nolting, he would act as the president's

"personal representative," reporting directly to Kennedy rather than to Rusk.

Nolting's absence in mid-May and the tougher stance taken by Trueheart created the opportunity to replace Nolting. This would mark a shift in policy and a change in the

U.S./Diem relationship.

In a 1966 oral history interview, National Security Council staffer Chester

Cooper opined that changing ambassadors at this time signaled to Diem that he would have to prove himself anew to the U.S. given Lodge's appointment not only signified a change in personnel, but also of policy. Nolting's instructions to appease Diem and gain his support were no longer in fashion. Cooper also commented that not having personal commitments to Diem gave Lodge much greater flexibility than Nolting.

The point was echoed by Averell Harriman. An outspoken critic of Nolting, he accused the former ambassador of being captivated by Diem and refusing to pressure the South Vietnamese president to initiate the kinds of changes in his regime that the

Americans deemed necessary.40 Lodge was a dashing and debonair Republican who lost to Kennedy in both the 1952 Senate race and again in 1960 in the run for vice

37 Jones, Death of a Generation, 279. 38 ibid., 280. 39 Chester Cooper Oral History Interview, Arlington, Virginia, May 6, 1966, by Joseph E. O'Connor, JFKL. 40 Averell Harriman Oral History Interview, Hobe Sound, Florida, April 13, 1964, by Michael V. Forrestal, JFKL. 130 president under Richard Nixon. More importantly, Lodge's Republicanism would serve Kennedy well should the quagmire in Vietnam prove insolvable, as both political parties would share in the failure.41

The Government of Vietnam reaction to Lodge's appointment was defiant, with Diem telling Nguyen Dinh Thuan, his leading palace assistant, upon learning of

Nolting's chosen replacement: "They can send ten Lodges, but I will not permit myself or my country to be humiliated, not if they train their artillery on this

Palace."42 In Nolting's final meeting with the South Vietnamese President before his departure, Diem asked "Does your departure mean that the American government has changed its policy from what you and I agreed two and a half years ago?" "No, Mr.

President, it does not," replied Nolting. When Diem proved unconvinced, Nolting presented a telegram from Rusk affirming a continuation of policy under his replacement, to which Diem remarked, "Mr. Ambassador, I believe you, but I don't believe the telegram that you have received."4 Jones reasons that Diem's suspicions were correct, arguing that Lodge's selection illustrated a need for bipartisan support for an imminent shift in policy toward South Vietnam, one that would encourage

Diem's opposition to believe that the U.S. no longer supported him.44 Nolting's departure from Saigon on August 15 left the United States without an official

Ambassador in South Vietnam until Lodge's scheduled arrival on August 26th.

During this time, three months of mounting tension exploded, which forced the U.S.

41 ibid., 280. 42 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 217. 43 Hammer, A Death in November, 162-163. 44 Jones, Death of a Generation, 281. 131 to re-evaluate its relationship with the GVN and signaled the end of American support for the Diem regime.

Following a series of Buddhist suicides in early August, crackdowns on South

Vietnam's Buddhist population continued, including strict curfew regulations in Hue and Nha Trang despite Diem's comments to an American reporter on August 15 calling his government's policy of reconciliation "irreversible."45 Tensions climaxed on the night of August 20th when troops of the Army's Special Forces and units of

Combat Police raided major pagodas throughout South Vietnam, arrested numerous monks and nuns, destroyed sacred objects and sacked the pagodas. Fearing a coup, the GVN declared martial law and gave the army "full authority in all matters," justifying their actions by asserting that political opponents were using the pagodas as centers of opposition to the Government.47 The violent attack on the pagodas repudiated Diem's avowed policy of conciliation, and prompted Nolting to write the

South Vietnamese president: "This is the first time you have ever gone back on your word to me."

253. Telegram From Nolting to the Department of State, August 14, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 566, n.3; The Religious and Political Crisis in Vietnam - A Background Study, September 25, 1963, "Diem Coup, Background and Congressional Inquiries" folder, James C Thomson Papers, box 24, JFKL. 46 The Religious and Political Crisis in Vietnam - A Background Study, September 25, 1963, "Diem Coup, Background and Congressional Inquiries" folder, James C Thomson Papers, box 24, JFKL. 47 Research Memorandum RFE-75, Diem versus the Buddhists: The Issue Joined, August 21, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam, General, 8/21/63-8/23/63" folder, NSF box 198, JFKL; Report of the Special Study Mission to SEA, November 7, 1963, "House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Zablocki Delegation Trip to SEA, Trip Report, 10/63" folder, James C. Thomson Papers, box 5, JFKL. 48 Hammer, A Death in November, 187. In a telegram from Saigon on August 13, Nolting reported that at a farewell dinner in his honour on the evening of August 12, Diem promised to take U.S. advice and issue a declaration conciliatory to the Buddhists. According to Nolting, Diem implied that his declaration would also repudiate Madame Nhu's inflammatory denunciations of the Buddhists. 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 13, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 564, n.2. 132

Lodge was in Honolulu undergoing last-minute briefings with Nolting and other officials when news of the raids reached him. The new ambassador left for

Tokyo, where he was instructed to leave immediately for Saigon. He arrived in the capital city half an hour past the 9:00 P.M. curfew on August 22, 1963.49

Lodge's arrival in Saigon in the aftermath of the pagoda raids was a watershed moment in the relationship between the Americans and the Diem regime. It ushered in a new era of criticism and distrust by American policy-makers towards the

Government of Vietnam that had never before been vocalized so explicitly.

Representative of this new mood, Lodge himself felt there was no doubt that the pagoda raids marked the beginning of the end for the Diem regime. Later stating that the GVN had "ceased to exercise the effective powers of government" since the previous April, he believed it only a matter of time before the regime crumbled.50

American reaction to the raids was immediate. Having sent Lodge to Saigon early to assess the situation, American policy-makers began to examine the actions of the South Vietnamese military and government in an attempt to discover who had ordered the martial law declaration and the subsequent raids on the pagodas. On

August 22, Hilsman cabled Lodge three possible scenarios for the exercise of power that resulted in the raids: that the military had taken control, that Diem had used the military to strengthen his position, or that Nhu was calling the shots.51 Lodge replied

Hammer, A Death in November, 168; Mecklin, Mission in Torment, 189. 50 Henry Cabot Lodge Oral History Interview, Washington, DC, August 4, 1965, by Charles Bartlett, JFKL. 51 268. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 22, 1963. FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963,604-605. the next day saying the palace seemed to be in control, that Nhu's power had not diminished, and that the military was split along pro- and anti-Diem lines.

On August 24, the ambassador forwarded two accounts of conversations by

Rufus Phillips, the chief American advisor to the strategic hamlet program. The first, an August 23 conversation with General Le Van Kim, General Don's deputy for public relations, was a bitter account of Kim's denial of the military's involvement in the pagoda raids, which he blamed on Nhu and Colonel Tung's Special Forces and whom he held responsible for the people blaming the army for the raids. He said the army was not united, but if the U.S. took a clear stand against the Nhus and showed support for the army removing them from government, the military would act. Kim also informed Phillips the army was forced into signing an oath of loyalty to Diem that fully supported the actions taken by the government against the Buddhists. He said the U.S. must not believe this document since most of the army and general signatories, most of whom were Buddhists themselves, did not approve of the repressions but were coerced into agreement out of fear of elimination by Nhu.53

The second telegram described a conversation with General Nguyen Dinh

Thuan, Diem's Secretary of State and Minister of Defense, who suggested the U.S. encourage the military to remove the Nhus from the government, and that under no circumstances should the U.S. acquiesce in what the Nhus had done. Thuan echoed

52 269. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 23, 1963. ibid., 605-606. 5j 274. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 24, 1963. ibid., 613-614. 134

Kim's claim that the South Vietnamese military would turn against Nhu if it knew the

Americans would not support a government with the Nhus in control.

An August 24 Information Report from the CIA detailed a conversation between General Tran Van Don, Commander of the Army of the Republic of

Vietnam, and Lucien Conein, a veteran CIA operative, where the South Vietnamese general denied the army's involvement in the raids and attempted to clarify the military's role in recent events. Don took responsibility for the decision for martial law, claiming that ten generals had reached it on August 18, and that Diem had endorsed the idea when it was presented to him on the night of August 20. Don claimed to have been caught off guard by the attacks on the pagodas, and blamed the

U.S. for broadcasting a Voice of America (VOA) transmission that announced the military initiated the action against the pagodas, thereby stimulating Vietnamese public opinion against them. He identified General Ton That Dinh, the new military governor of Saigon, and Colonel Tung, commander of the Special Forces, who took orders directly from the palace and were not subject to military control. He also stated

"the Generals hate Tung's guts."55

Don also spoke of the special position the Nhus held within the palace, describing Nhu as the President's "thinker" and Madame Nhu as his "platonic wife," adding that while Diem was responsible for final decision-making in the palace, Don felt it would be impossible to remove the Nhus given the special positions they held.

273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 24, 1963, ibid., 611-612. CIA, Information Report: General Tran Van Don Details the Present Situation and the Future of SVN, 23 August 1963, Paul Kesaris, Robert Lester, and United States. Central Intelligence Agency, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Anonymous, (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1983). 135

Don gave no evidence of any plan to overthrow the Ngos, but strongly noted the military's preference for Diem's leadership as opposed to Nhu taking control.56

Following the pagoda raids of August 20-21, the Bureau of Intelligence and

Research questioned the degree to which Diem would be able to count on the army to suppress future Buddhist actions. Military elements had been consistently critical of the repression and violence that had characterized Diem's handling of the Buddhist crisis to date. The unrest among ARVN forces resulted in "a flurry of reported coup plots against the Diem family by military and civil officials."57 Another CIA cable described widespread and intense feelings of discouragement and frustration among more junior ARVN officers, a situation that had grown worse since the attacks on the pagodas and the declaration of martial law. The report notes that while the will to fight the Viet Cong had not diminished, many officers believed the war un-winnable given the present situation in South Vietnam. In a series of cables appraising the attitudes of the Vietnamese population towards the Diem-Nhu regime, MACV observed that most of the top level military admitted the necessity for strong measures to silence the Buddhists, but objected to the severity of the actions taken by the GVN and the violence used against the monks and nuns within the pagodas.59

Lodge sent a telegram on August 24 that summarized a series of discussions on the incident, suggesting that while Nhu, probably with full support from Diem and the generals, had a large hand in the planning of action against the Buddhists, none of

56 ibid. 57 Diem versus the Buddhists: The Issue Joined, August 21, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam, General, 8/21/63-8/23/63" folder, NSF box 198, JFFCL. 58 CIA Information Report Telegram, Frustration and Discouragement Among Vietnamese Army Officers, August 23, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General, 8/21/63-8/23/63" folder, NSF, box 189, JFKL. 59 Telegram, COMUSMACV to Rusk No J01 7384, September 11, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General, 9/11-17/63, Defense Cables" folder, NSF box 199, JFKL. 136 the generals with military strength in Saigon wanted to remove Diem or Nhu. He dismissed the suggestion that the generals would act against Diem if encouraged by the U.S. as overly simplistic, preferring instead to continue to watch the situation closely since "action on our part in these circumstances would seem to be a shot in the dark."60

Later intelligence reports came to similar conclusions regarding Nhu's role in the raids, with many drawing attention to his increased role and growing power since the attacks. A CIA memorandum entitled "Review of Recent Developments in South

Vietnam," released on August 26, reported the growing influence of Nhu within the palace, even suggesting he was acting without Diem's consent. The memo characterized the raids as largely the work of the police and Special Forces, who operated directly under the presidency, asserting that the armed forces were not unified and if a military coup were attempted there was the danger of clashes breaking out among competing elements. Public opinion was recorded as resentment against both the military and the government, with some ill feeling directed against the United States as well.61

Other intelligence products focused on the American response to Nhu's ascent in power, calling it a "shift in the character of the leadership of the Vietnamese

Government" which the U.S. did not find "healthy or helpful to the cause of a Free

Vietnam." The report also notes with consternation the clear implication that since the pagoda raids and imposition of martial law occurred just before the arrival of the new

60 276. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 24, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 620-621. 61 CIA Central Intelligence Memorandum, Review of Recent Developments in South Vietnam, August 26, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam, General, 8/24/63-8/31/63, Memos and Misc." folder, NSF, box 198, JFKL. 137

American ambassador, Lodge was to be confronted with & fait accompli by the Diem regime.62

The defiant and self-assured manner in which the GVN employed violence during the August 20-21 raids was seen as "the last straw" by several American policy-makers. For some, the events of the late summer confirmed that the United

States could no longer tolerate the Diem regime's now constantly violent practice of governance in South Vietnam. Michael Forrestal felt by the summer of 1963 the situation had "reached the point where the city of Saigon was very near a complete breakdown and a complete revolt," making it quite clear that "either we got Diem to change, or we would have a terribly hard time justifying continued support of

Diem."63

These sentiments were portrayed in telegram 243, drafted by Harriman,

Hilsman, and Forrestal, three of Diem's most prominent detractors, and sent to Lodge on August 24. In a memorandum to the President accompanying the cable, Forrestal emphasized that Hilsman and Harriman both wanted to send out the instructions

"before the situation in Saigon freezes."64 The "August 24 cable," as it came to be known, demanded immediate action:

It is now clear that whether military proposed martial law or whether Nhu tricked them into it, Nhu took advantage of its imposition to smash pagodas with police and Tung's Special Forces loyal to him, thus placing onus on military in eyes of world and Vietnamese people. Also clear that Nhu maneuvered himself into commanding position.

The Religious and Political Crisis in Vietnam - A Background Study, September 25, 1963, "Diem Coup, Background and Congressional Inquiries" folder, James C Thomson Papers, box 24, JFKL. See also Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation; the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 482. 63 Michael Forrestal Oral History Interview, April 8, 1964, JFKL. 64 Memorandum, Forrestal to the President, August 24, 1963, "Aug 63:24" folder, Newman, box 13, JFKL. US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available. If, in spite of all your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.

Believing that "immediate action must be taken to prevent Nhu from consolidating his position further," Lodge was instructed to tell key military leaders that the U.S. would not be able to continue supporting the government unless the

Nhus were removed, and to promise them "direct support" in any "interim period."

Lodge was also authorized to make public statements at his discretion absolving the

South Vietnamese military from any connection to the pagoda raids, and was instructed to examine possible alternative leadership and begin making plans as to

"how we might bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary."

Although Washington was unable to provide detailed instructions "as to how this operation should proceed.. .we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives."

Lodge replied to these instructions on August 25, approving the proposed course of action but objecting to making any approach to Diem first as he believed the chances of him meeting U.S. demands were "virtually nil." Instead, Lodge proposed going straight to the South Vietnamese generals with these new U.S. directives, as he felt contacting Diem would only give Nhu a chance to forestall or

Telegram, AmEmbassy Saigon - Operational Immediate 243 to Lodge, August 24, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam, General, 8/24/63-8/31/63, State Cables" folder, NSF, box 198, JFKL. 139 block action by the military, a risk that was too great with Nhu in control of the

Special Forces.66

The August 24 cable and Lodge's response set in train decisions and actions that eventually culminated in the November coup against Diem, who was killed in the process. As such, it represented a dramatic shift in American policy. However, the process by which the August 24 cable was approved and cleared by the president and his top policy-makers is infamous in the study of the Vietnam War, and deserves a thorough examination.

Throughout the drafting process, Michael Forrestal kept in close contact with

Harriman and Hilsman while participating in drafting the cable and keeping the president informed. On Saturday afternoon, Forrestal phoned the President in Hyannis

Port, Massachusetts, seeking verbal approval for the cable. "Can't we wait until

Monday, when everybody is back?" Kennedy asked. Harriman and Hilsman "really want to get his thing out right away," Forrestal replied. "Well," said the president, "go and see what you can do to get it cleared."

With virtually all of the administration's senior officials absent from

Washington, this was not an easy task. George Ball, the official who would sign the telegram in Rusk's absence, recalled Harriman and Hilsman appearing at a golf course where he was finishing a round with Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis

Johnson, to inform him of the cable. Ball invited everyone back to his house where the proposed cable was discussed, though Ball refused to send it without the president's clearance. Ball phoned the president to bring him up to date and inform

66 Telegram, CAS Saigon 292 from Lodge to Rusk and Hilsman, August 25, 1963, "Countries— Vietnam, General, 8/24-31/63, State Cables" folder, NSF, box 198, JFKL. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 112, 114. him of the relevant passages. According to Ball, the president seemed favorable to the proposed message, though "he recognized the risk that, if a coup occurred, we might not like Diem's successor any better than Diem himself." Finally, the president concurred, stating "If Rusk and [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Gilpatric agree,

George, then go ahead."

Ball then called Rusk, who was in New York on United Nations business, and told him of the telegram and his talk with the president. Ball found Rusk "cautious, but made it clear that, if the president understood the implications, he would give a green light." Years later Rusk explained his concurrence in the telegram: "If Ball,

Harriman, and President Kennedy were going to send it out, I wasn't going to raise any questions."69

On Saturday afternoon, Forrestal reached Gilpatric by telephone at his

Maryland farm and assured him that both the president and Rusk had approved the telegram. Gilpatric, in a line of thinking similar to Rusk's, concurred, stating "If Rusk went along with it and the president went along with it, I wasn't going to oppose it."

Gilpatric believed the telegram was a matter between the State Department. "In

McNamara's absence I felt I should not hold it up, so I went along with it just like you countersign a voucher." General Krulak similarly cleared the matter for the JCS without contacting General Taylor, while Richard Helms, the CIA's deputy director of plans, did the same by not referring the matter to John McCone, who was on

70 holiday in California.

George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), 371. ibid., 371-372; Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 115. Jones, Death of a Generation, 316; Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 115. With the approval of every interested agency in the government, Forrestal again called the president, who by now had a copy of the telegram in front of him.

Informed that his advisors had concurred with the telegram, the president responded without comment: "Send it out."

Howard Jones observes that the most noteworthy aspect of this "bizarre decision-making process" was that no one in the Kennedy administration made a decision but merely "signed off on one that they all thought someone else had made."72 The clearance of the August 24 cable is perhaps the most telling illustration of Kennedy's laid-back and informal leadership and decision-making style. While this apparently chaotic process appears irresponsible in light of the common procedures for advocating government policy measures, the long-term effects of the cable were of even greater importance.

Among recent works, both David Kaiser and Howard Jones are critical of the cable, and argue its roots were based on a situation that several U.S. policy-makers had constructed in their minds but were not solid in fact nor supported by the intelligence community. Kaiser argues the telegram rejected the Saigon Embassy's view, that South Vietnam was far from being on the verge of a coup, and that the cable was based on sensational and clearly subjective anti-government media reports of the Buddhist crisis by the likes of David Halberstam.73 When shown a copy of the cable, Maxwell Taylor found it reflected the long-standing desire of Hilsman,

Harriman, and Forrestal to get rid of Diem, but had not received sufficient

Jones, Death of a Generation, 316; Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam, 116. Jones, Death of a Generation, 316. Kaiser, American Tragedy, 232. interdepartmental staffing, and that McGeorge Bundy, had he been present, would never have allowed it to go out.74

The senior national security team convened at the White House on Monday,

August 26 for the first of a series of meetings that lasted through Saturday, August

31, in what Kaiser called the first instance in nearly two years whereby Vietnam was given the concentrated attention of the highest levels of the Kennedy administration.7

Immediately upon returning to his office, McNamara voiced his displeasure with the actions of the weekend. Robert Kennedy, Maxwell Taylor, Vice President Johnson, and John McCone, among others, shared his concern. Kennedy showed anger after learning that what he thought had been a unified counsel of his foreign policy advisors turned out to be anything but.

Throughout this week of ExCom—the Executive Committee of the National

Security Council—meetings, the Kennedy administration would show itself to be split between what John McCone identified as two schools of thought with respect to the Diem Administration: one school of thought felt Diem was a liability to the country and to the goals of the United States, a feeling which prevailed in many sections of the White House and the State Department, in certain sections of Defense and some sections of the CIA. This group generally favoured going ahead with a coup. According to McCone, the other school felt there was:

Really no apparent replacement for Diem, that the greatest pressures should be brought onto him to revise some of his policies, to improve his relationship with the people at large in South Vietnam, and to

74 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 292; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 232. 75 ibid., 234. 143

improve his image throughout the world and most particularly in the United States.76

The military and civilian branches of the Pentagon, including McNamara and

Taylor, were among this latter group, who were more cautious and preferred to give

Diem another chance. Robert Kennedy said it was the only time "that the government

• 77 was broken in two in a very disturbing way."

Arguing against a coup during the August 27 meeting, McNamara and Taylor relied on Nolting's assessments of Diem. The former ambassador defended Diem and

America's support for his regime, arguing the generals were divided, had no 7R leadership, did not control the military, and lacked the "guts of Diem and Nhu."

When queried by the president on the degree of military support for a coup, Nolting replied there was none, and that military officers would support a coup aimed at Nhu, but not one at Diem. He then characterized the brothers as Siamese twins "who could not be forced apart. If the generals moved against Nhu, Diem would go down with him in the palace." Nolting felt it impossible to separate them; the only possible way would be to get Diem to send Nhu abroad. Nolting closed arguing the U.S. should not act until a more promising chance came along. Hilsman countered, arguing, "the longer we wait the harder it would be to get Diem out." Rusk felt the crucial factor was whether the domestic unrest interfered with the war. "If Vietnamese opposition 7Q to Diem is great, it is very hard for us to support Diem."

John McCone Oral History Interview, August 19, 1970, by Joe B. Frantz, JFKL. 77 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 287. 78 303. Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, August 27, 1963, FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 659-665. 79 ibid., 659-665. 144

Despite the president's annoyance at the divisions within his cabinet, Kennedy did not retract the cable or change the direction of this new policy. The series of meetings during the last week of August avoided confrontations over the placement of blame for the clearance of the August 24 cable, but did provide a means through which the opposing sides arguing for and against a coup could be discussed. There was also frustration within the administration over an August 26 VOA broadcast in

Saigon that not only blamed Nhu's secret police for the raids on the pagodas without the knowledge of the military, but warned the United States might cut its aid to

Vietnam if the officials responsible were not removed from office.

The President's position during these meetings was one of caution, showing concern for the protection of American citizens and stressing that the media must not influence U.S. policy. Kennedy saw no reason to support a coup without a good chance of success, but was troubled by the conflicting assessments of his advisors. He instructed Lodge and Harkins to report "their estimate of the prospects of a coup by the generals," whether the U.S. should proceed with the generals or wait, and finally what to do if the situation deteriorated further.81 Reporting back to the president on

August 28, his prior hesitancy gone, Lodge replied: "On [the] basis of what we now know both General Harkins and I favor [the] operation."82 A more definitive response came the next day:

We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning back: the overthrow of the Diem government. There is no turning back in part because U.S. prestige is already publicly

287. Voice of American Broadcast, Saigon, August 26, 1963, ibid., 636. 81 303. ibid., 659-665. 82 306. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 28, 1963, ibid., 668-671. committed to this end in large measure and will become more so as the facts leak out. In a more fundamental sense, there is no turning back because there is no possibility, in my view, that the war can be won under a Diem administration, still less that Diem or any member of the family can govern the country in a way to gain the support of the people who count, i.e., the educated class in and out of government service, civil and military—not to mention the American people...I am personally in full agreement with the policy which I was instructed to carry out by last Sunday's telegram.

Lodge rejected Harkins' suggestion that he approach Diem to get rid of Nhus, arguing that the generals would view it negatively and invite delay, but reported that

Harkins concurred with the rest of the telegram.

Kennedy wrote the Ambassador privately on August 29th to emphasize his support and to clarify his personal opinion on the prospects of a coup in South

Vietnam. Asserting from his own experience that "failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision," Kennedy declared that up until the time the generals were given the signal to act, he must reserve the right to change course and reverse previous instructions: "when we go, we must go to win, but it will be better to change our minds than fail."

While these cables demonstrated a new resolve by some American policy­ makers to support a coup, the initiative still lay with the generals in Saigon. In a meeting between the Army Chief of Staff General Tran Thien Khiem and Conein on

August 27, the CIA operative was told which South Vietnamese generals were involved in the planning, which had to be "neutralized," and that a coup would occur

Telegram, Action Department 375, Information Operational Immediate, August 29, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam, General, 8/24/63-8/31/63, State Cables" folder, NSF, box 198, JFKL. 84 Memorandum, Personal for the Ambassador From the President, August 29, 1963, "Meetings on Vietnam, 8/24/63-8/31/63" folder, NSF, box 316, JFKL. within a week. An August 30 telegram from the CIA reported rumours that Nhu would begin arresting dissident generals within 24 hours, while in a telegram from

Lodge, the ambassador emphasized the prime objective of removing the Nhus, but noted "this certainly cannot be done by working through Diem.. .he wished he had more Nhus, not less." Lodge was still opposed to making any new approach to Diem, but noted the mission faced a growing problem of "inertia" on the part of the generals: "The days come and go and nothing happens."

The sluggish pace of coup plotting came to a sudden end on the morning of

August 31 when Harkins met with General Khiem and was informed that the generals, under the leadership of Duong Van "Big" Minh, the ARVN Field

Commander, had stopped coup planning the day before. Claiming they did not have enough forces under their control compared to those of the GVN, Khiem told Harkins that the generals had met with Nhu the day prior and were assured that South

Vietnam would be able to continue fighting the war. The generals were considering proposing to Diem that he bring in senior officers into certain Cabinet positions with

Nhu in charge. Harkins called the situation "organization de confusion," with everyone suspicious of everyone else and none desiring to take any positive action as of right now. "You can't hurry the east."87 Upon hearing of this meeting, Lodge concluded, "this particular coup is finished."

85 299. Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, August 27, 1963. FRUS, III, Vietnam, January-August, 1963, 653-655. 86 19. Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, August 30, 1963, ibid., IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 36; 20. Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, August 30, 1963. ibid., 38-39. 87 33. Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor), August 31, 1963, ibid., 64-66. 88 32. Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon to the Agency, August 31, 1963. ibid., 64. 147

With senior American officials left trying to understand what had happened,

Kaiser argues that the biggest flaw in the August 24 cable lay in its assumption that after the raids the generals felt double-crossed by the assaults on the pagodas and wanted to move against the GVN. Instead, planning for the coup started after August

24, and was far from finished.89 A CIA report confirmed that the plotting was not finished by recounting another meeting between CIA operatives and South

Vietnamese General Kim, who accused Khiem of having misled Harkins. Kim affirmed that while planning would continue, Nhu was clearly expecting a coup and had put Tung's Special Forces on full alert. Kim was vehement in declaring, "under no circumstances would Nhu be acceptable," that the generals did not lack will, but

"at the moment they lacked the means." Kim said it was because of the Americans' previous support of Nhu that it was impossible for the generals to act in just a few days, concluding that most Vietnamese officers were uncertain of U.S. support. Kim emphasized that the U.S. must "indicate by actions, as well as words, that they do not support Nhus or their creatures."90

Jones contends that such conversations illustrate the conspirators' need for

U.S. support, and that when help did not come the coup talks failed to materialize into action.91 Likewise, Rusk followed a similar theme in a telegram to Lodge on August

30, declaring it appeared that the generals had no plan and little momentum, and that the "prospect of changing government by strong and concerted Vietnamese elements seem very thin." He lamented that "if there is to be a change, it can only be brought

89 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 243. 90 46. Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency in Saigon to the Agency, September 2, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 86-88. 91 Jones, Death of a Generation, 346. 148 about by American rather than Vietnamese effort." Unhappy with the lack of "bone and muscle" exhibited by the generals, Rusk closed: "The distinction between what is desirable and what is possible is one which we may have to face in the next few days."92

Rusk would be left waiting several months before subsequent coup planning reached a level of sophistication capable of supporting its implementation. In the days and weeks that followed, threats and rumours flourished, and the stability of the Diem regime was no clearer than it had been since the Buddhist crisis had begun the previous May. With the summer over, Diem's position, in the eyes of the Kennedy administration, was still undetermined.

For American policy-makers, the fall of 1963 was spent in much the same way as the last week of August: uncertainties and intermittent plotting characterized the administration process. American desire for a change in leadership in South

Vietnam was still strong despite the stalled coup planning of the summer, as Kennedy remarked in a television interview with CBS News' Walter Cronkite on September 2:

I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisors, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists.

When asked whether the GVN would be able to regain the support of the people, Kennedy felt it possible "with changes in policy and perhaps in personnel I think it can. If it doesn't make those changes, I would think that the chances of

31. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, August 30, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963,63. winning it would not be very good." Kennedy's allusion to a change in personnel was an obvious reference to the Nhus, indicating their removal was still a priority for the U.S., but he also established limits for U.S. intervention by emphasizing the conflict as a Vietnamese affair, one the Kennedy administration would not regard as a vital interest.94 As such, Kaiser notes that U.S. policy-makers would spend the fall struggling to resolve their internal differences while trying to find a way to make their policy work without a coup.

On the same day as Kennedy's television interview, Lodge, still avoiding contact with Diem, met with Nhu and was informed he intended to lift martial law, quit government service, and move to the resort town of Dalat after "certain U.S. agents who.. .are still promoting a coup d'etat have left." He also indicated that

Madame Nhu would be leaving the country to attend the Interparliamentary Union in

Yugoslavia.95 Writing the Department of State on September 4, Lodge called Nhu's offers "largely scenery," and expounded on his belief that it would be useless for him to try to contact Diem given Nhu's perceived increase in power and the subsequent

American decline in leverage.96

Washington disagreed. In an NSC meeting on September 6, Rusk stressed the importance of having Lodge open a dialogue with Diem in order to discuss "the steps

United States Government Printing Office, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy - Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President - January 1 to November 22, 1963, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register; National Archives and Records Service, 1964), 650-653. 94 Kaiser, American Tragedy, 247. 95 44. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, September 2, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 84-85. The decrease in American leverage was in reference to Kennedy's statement during the Cronkite interview that the U.S. would not pull out of South Vietnam, a declaration that "no doubt" reassured Nhu, according to Lodge. 58. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, September 4, 1963. ibid., 107-108. 150 that Diem should take to make it possible to support him." Discussing the matter of presenting Diem with an ultimatum for reform, Rusk felt Lodge must first impress upon Diem American displeasure, including the problem of international and U.S. public opinion, and the presence of Madame Nhu. Citing the lack of information and the need to reassess the question of issuing an ultimatum, it was decided that General

Krulak and State Department representative Joseph Mendenhall would be dispatched immediately to Saigon to "sample opinion among American military advisers and

American civilian advisers as to the effects of recent events on the Vietnamese at all levels."97

As instructed, Lodge met with Diem on September 9, stated President

Kennedy had doubts that victory was possible without changes in policy and personnel, and that without such changes, the risk of an aid suspension was a real possibility. When Lodge suggested that Nhu leave the country until the renewed foreign aid had been approved, an aghast Diem replied, "it would be out of the question for him to go away when he could do so much for the Strategic Hamlets."

Diem proceeded to pronounce the Buddhist problem solved, to associate recent student protests with Communist plots, and to claim that the success of the Strategic

Hamlet Program had driven the insurgents to concentrate on the cities and abandon the idea of taking over the countryside. Putting the onus on Lodge to persuade

Congress to maintain U.S. assistance to South Vietnam, Diem remarked that given the state of public opinion that Lodge described, it was up to the Ambassador to

"disintoxicate" American perceptions. Lodge closed his report of the meeting

97 Memorandum of Conversation, Viet-Nam, recorded by Hilsman. September 6, 1963, "Vietnam White House Meetings, 8/26/63-10/29/63, State Memcons" folder, Hilsman, box 17, JFKL. 151 observing that Diem did not appear interested in what he had to say and was "totally absorbed with his own problems here and was justifying himself and attacking his enemies.

On September 10, Krulak and Mendenhall briefed the administration on their findings following their weekend trip to Vietnam. Rather than bring consensus to the questions plaguing Kennedy's foreign policy, the two men offered vastly different and often opposing views on the situation in South Vietnam." Krulak reported that

"the shooting war is going ahead at an impressive pace," stating that the impact of the political crisis was "not great," and that the war would be won "if the current U.S. military and sociological programs are pursued, irrespective of the grave defects in the ruling regime."

Mendenhall's briefing was bleak, with the former Saigon Deputy Chief of

Mission reporting that civil government in Saigon had broken down, and that the

"war" against the government had taken precedence over the war against the Viet

Cong. Mendenhall concluded that the war "could not be won if Nhu remains in

Vietnam." An exasperated Kennedy said, "The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?" Krulak explained the differences by stating that Mr. Mendenhall was reporting on urban and metropolitan issues while his own report represented

"national" attitudes, with Hilsman declaring the opposite views were the result of differences between a military and a political view.100

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, September 9, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 140-143. 99 Report of the Krulak/Mendenhall Trip, Visit to Vietnam, 7-10 September, 1963, "Meetings on Vietnam, 9/1/63-9/10/63" folder, NSF, box 317, JFKL. 100 Memorandum of Conference with the President, Vietnam, recorded by Bromley Smith, September 10, 1963, "10 September, 1963" folder, Newman, box 14, JFKL; Memorandum of Conference with the 152

Following the disparity of views resulting from the Krulak-Mendenhall trip, two alternative proposals for dealing with Diem were prepared by Roger Hilsman.

The first, a "pressures and persuasion track," would use an escalatory set of pressures to force Nhu's departure on Diem, Nhu, and his supporters while the second, the

"reconciliation track," involved American acquiescence in recent events in the GVN, recognition that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and an attempt to salvage as much as possible from a bad situation.101 Adopting the first policy, a telegram drafted by

McGeorge Bundy gave Lodge authority to use as he saw fit the suspension of

American aid to bring about desired changes in the GVN, in addition to informing the ambassador that President Kennedy had decided to send the Secretary of Defense and

General Taylor to Vietnam to assess the military situation, both "in terms of [the] actual progress of operations and of [the] need to make [an] effective case with

Congress for [the] continued prosecution of the effort."

Returning to Washington on October 2, the McNamara-Taylor mission submitted its conclusions and recommendations during a morning NSC meeting. As noted in chapter three, President Kennedy accepted the report's recommendations nearly in full as the new American policy in Vietnam.

In the coming weeks the administration began implementing several of the

"selective pressures" outlined in the report, including the approval of the planned aid suspension of the Commodity Import Program (OP), ending support to Colonel

President, Vietnam, recorded by Hilsman, September 10, 1963, "10 September, 1963" folder, Newman, box 14, JFKL. 101 Memorandum, United States Objectives in South Viet-Nam, 11 September, 1963, "Meetings on Vietnam, 9/11/63-9/12/63" folder, NSF, box 317, JFKL; Memorandum, Hilsman to The Secretary, Vietnam, September 16, 1963, "Countries—Vietnam General, 9/11/63-9/17/63, Memos and Misc Part II", NSF, box 199, JFKL. 102 125. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Vietnam, September 17, 1963. FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963,252-254. 153

Tung's forces, and, most notably, the recall of CIA Station Chief John Richardson, known to be a close acquaintance of Nhu whose identity had recently been compromised in a news article. Richardson's removal was a signal to the GVN that it had lost one of its closest supporters and signaled the Americans' determination to not co-operate with a government that continued to leave Nhu in a position of

103 power.

While the recommendations of the McNamara/Taylor report were not specifically designed to stimulate a coup, they did have the effect of making Diem more vulnerable, thereby encouraging the generals to step up their coup planning and to seek further assurances from the United States.104 General Don met Lucien Conein at Tan Son Nhut Airport on October 2, and attempted to arrange a meeting between

Conein and General Minh. The CIA operative was told the generals "now had a plan," but Conein was instructed by Trueheart to neither encourage nor discourage any coup thinking or action. General Minh told Conein on October 5 that he had to know the American government's view toward a regime change in South Vietnam.

Minh said he did not expect any specific American support but needed assurances that the U.S. Government would not attempt to thwart his plan. He stated he had no political ambitions and only desired to win the war, for which the continuance of

Jones, Death of a Generation, 390; Hammer, A Death in November, 241; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 515; John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power, (New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992), 411. 104 Mann, A Grand Delusion, 296; George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), 103. 154

American aid would be necessary. Conein was noncommittal when presented with various scenarios, one of which involved assassination.1 5

Lodge, after consulting with Harkins, wrote Washington to urge that in his next meeting, Conein be authorized to assure Minh that the U.S. would not thwart his plans, offer to view them (save for those involving assassination), and promise support to any government committed to gaining the support of the people and winning the war against the Communists. The White House replied on October 6 that:

While we do not wish to stimulate [a] coup, we also do not wish to leave impression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing [the] effectiveness of [the] military effort, ensuring popular support to win [the] war and improving working relations with [the] U.S.106

These instructions stressed security and American deniability in such approaches to the South Vietnamese generals, but welcomed information that would help the U.S. Government assess the character of any alternate leadership prospects.

Whereas these messages illustrate there could be no question that the Kennedy administration was supporting a coup against the Diem regime, concern over

American association and identification with the change in government remained paramount during the month of October 1963.

Following communications from Washington over the viability of the General

Minh/Conein relationship and concern over the lack of firm intelligence on the

171. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Agency, October 3, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 354-355; Telegram, To State from Lodge, October 5, 1963, "Vietnam Subjects, Top Secret Cables Tab C, 10/3/63-10/27/63" folder, NSF, box 204, JFKL. 106 jyg Telegram From the Embassy in Saigon to the Department of State, October 5, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 367-358; Telegram, CIA to Lodge No 74228, October, 6, 1963, "Vietnam Subjects, Top Secret Cables Tab C, 10/3/63-10/27/63" folder, NSF, box 204, JFKL. 155

Generals' plot, Lodge tried to assure McGeorge Bundy in an October 25 cable that the CIA Station in Saigon was prepared for Lodge to disavow Conein at anytime should the coup abort or fail in any way.107 Arguing in favour of a coup, Lodge felt it an even bet "that the next government would not bungle and stumble as much as the present one has" while arguing that a coup was "the only way in which the people in

1 OR

Vietnam can possibly get a change in government." Bundy did not reject the argument, but warned against "direct involvement," fearing an unsuccessful coup

"will be laid at our door by public opinion almost everywhere." Bundy then emphasized Washington's desire to have the option to judge and be warned of any plans with poor prospects of success. The original copy of the cable concluded with an edited passage not found in the final draft, reading: "The difficulty is of course that we want to be able to judge these plans without accepting responsibility for them; the impossible takes a little longer."10

On Sunday, October 27 Lodge accompanied President Diem to the resort town of Dalat, where the daylong conversation produced few results. Diem casually asked about the resumption of the CIP before attacking American activities in Vietnam.

Lodge stressed the importance of public opinion in American government policy, but when asked what he would do regarding specific American requests for reform, Diem changed the subject. Towards the end of the conversation, Lodge said, "Mr.

President, every single specific suggestion which I have made, you have rejected. 107 Telegram, McBundy to Lodge, CAS 78161, October 24, 1963, "Vietnam Subjects, Top Secret Cables Tab C, 10/3/63-10/27/63" folder, NSF, box 204, JFKL; Telegram, Lodge to McBundy, October 25, 1963, "Vietnam Subjects, Top Secret Cables Tab C, 10/3/63-10/27/63" folder, NSF, box 204, JFKL. 108 Telegram, Lodge to McBundy, October 25, 1963, "Vietnam Subjects, Top Secret Cables Tab C, 10/3/63-10/27/63" folder, NSF, box 204, JFKL. '09 Telegram, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge and Harkins, October 25, 1963, "Vietnam General, 10/15/63-10/28/63, CIA Reports" folder, NSF, box 201, JFKL. 156

Isn't there some one thing you may think of that is within your capabilities to do and that would favorably impress US opinion?"110 Diem did not reply but again changed the subject. Lodge took Diem's silence as a deliberate refusal to make any concessions to the Americans; the Ambassador's frustrations confirmed his conviction that the United States could no longer work with Diem."'

The coup planning had reached a fever pitch on October 28 when Conein was informed during a meeting with General Don that a coup was likely to take place very close to the time Lodge was scheduled to return to Washington for consultations. Don promised to notify the U.S. of its plan four hours in advance, contrary to his previous assurance they be given 48-hours notice.112 Lodge wrote Washington to report a coup was imminent, to restate the American position ("that we will not thwart a coup; that we will monitor and report"), and that no action by the United States Government

ill short of informing Diem and Nhu could prevent a coup.

Bundy objected to Lodge's implication of American powerlessness in stopping a coup, believing that U.S. attitudes would still have a "decisive effect" on the decisions of the coup group. A memorandum of a conference with the president indicates Kennedy's concern over the military strength of the generals and the emphasis he placed on having the generals prove their ability to successfully

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, October 28, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 442-446. ''' Hammer, A Death in November, 267-268; United States Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, The Senator Gravel ed., 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), II, 219. 112 Memorandum, From Lodge to the Department of State (section one of two), October 29, 1963, "Vietnam General, 10/15/63-10/28/63, CIA Reports" folder, NSF, box 201, JFKL. 113 226. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State, October 29, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 453-455. 157 overthrow the Diem government, for "if we miscalculated, we could lose our entire position in Southeast Asia overnight."11

Lodge responded by again stating he did not think the U.S. had the power to

"delay or discourage a coup," noting further he felt the U.S. had "very little influence in what is essentially a Vietnamese affair." He also thanked the President for furnishing him a jet for his scheduled return to Washington, which would enable him to stay longer should the situation in Saigon prove unstable in the coming days.

Acknowledging Kennedy's concern over losing the American position in Southeast

Asia due to miscalculation, Lodge countered by asserting the tremendous risk involved if the United States did nothing.1'

Ever fearful of a failed coup attempt and desiring to redefine and restate the policy guidance, Bundy wrote Lodge again on October 30, affirming Washington's belief that they held the power to delay or discourage a coup. Lodge was instructed to

"take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success." The cable ordered

Americans not take sides during a coup, but concluded that "once a coup under responsible leadership has begun...it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that it should succeed."116 Believing a coup to be imminent, Lodge deferred his return to

Washington. Bundy's October 30 cable would be the last instructions Lodge received from Washington before the coup began.

114 236. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge), October 29, 1963 ibid., 473-475; 235. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, October 29, 1963. ibid., 472-473. 115 242. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge) to the Department of State, October 30, 1963, ibid., 484-488. 116 Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy to Lodge, October 30, 1963, "Vietnam General, 10/29/63- 10/31/63, CIA Reports" folder, NSF, box 200, JFKL. 158

On the afternoon of November Is, 1963, the generals launched their assault.

Seizing several key commanders and surrounding the Presidential Palace, the generals told Diem and Nhu that they must surrender immediately or face an attack.

Diem phoned Lodge at 4:30 to inform him of the coup and inquire about the attitude of the U.S. Government. Lodge declined to give an American position, but offered to do anything he could to assure Diem's safety. As rebel soldiers marched towards the palace, Diem and Nhu escaped through an underground tunnel and sought refuge in the Chinese district of Saigon.117 Early the next morning, Diem telephoned General

Staff headquarters to surrender in exchange for safe transport to the airport. An armoured personnel carrier was sent to pick them up, but they never arrived. Diem and Nhu were shot and killed inside the vehicle on the way to Joint General Staff

i i O headquarters. Coup leaders initially announced the two had committed suicide.

News of the murder of Diem and Nhu shocked President Kennedy, who discounted the generals' explanation of suicide and was deeply troubled by the deaths.119 But the coup and the deaths were to a large degree the products of

Kennedy's policies and of his policy-making processes. In particular, the 'Kennedy management style,' which de-centralized decision-making and which favoured

'insiders' over established structures and institutions diffused responsibility for policy-making and policy execution. The result was the series of incremental,

1,7 251. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Director of the National Security Agency (Blake), November 1, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam., August- December, 1963, 505; 252. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Saigon to the Director of the National Security Agency (Blake), November 1, 1963, ibid., 505-506; Mann, A Grand Delusion, 296-97; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 274-75; Hammer, A Death in November, 293. us 273 Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, November 2, 1963, FRUS, IV, Vietnam, August-December, 1963, 531-533. 119 Jones, Death of a Generation, 425-427. 159 uncoordinated decisions and actions that characterized American policy on Vietnam in the summer and fall of 1963. How did this ad hoc process come into being?

The most striking factor for many observers of the new Kennedy administration was its dismantling of the National Security Council (NSC). Under

President Eisenhower, the NSC had acted as an advisory body whose secretary, the

Special Assistant, worked as a facilitator of policy but who rarely contributed substantively to the decision-making process. According to Andrew Preston, the

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in the Kennedy administration,

McGeorge Bundy, significantly changed this arrangement, re-creating the NSC as a

"small, cohesive group of area and policy experts who would analyze, devise, and propose policy options of their own."120 Kennedy convened meetings of the full NSC much less frequently than his predecessor and did not use it as a decision-making body, preferring instead an informal policy process that relied more on personal interaction and crisis management techniques than on its previous bureaucratic structure. The NSC offices were moved to the White House basement, giving them greater access to the president and, combined with their small staff, allowed them to outmaneuver the large and unwieldy State Department. Andrew Preston argues that although Rusk was a hawk, "the State Department was a haven for doves," who questioned the value of Vietnam as an ally, who preferred a political solution through negotiations, and who were less aggressive in their opinions regarding U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. Preston concludes that with their smaller numbers, physical and bureaucratic proximity to the president and the power and influence of McGeorge

120 Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7, 36. 160

Bundy, "the NSC staff was able to outflank the dovish policy emanating from the

191

State Department and steer decision making toward military escalation."

Intent on changing the style and direction of many of his predecessor's foreign policies, Kennedy abolished the NSC Planning Board, which had written the national security policy statements of the Eisenhower administration, and the Operations

Coordinating Board (OCB), which had supervised the implementation of these policies. The president and his National Security Advisor felt such machinery was too cumbersome, and began appointing ad hoc task forces to deal with specific crises instead of relying on broad policy statements, changes which David Kaiser argues

"fundamentally changed the structure of foreign policy making."

With the elimination of the OCB and the Planning Board, Bundy and his NSC staff took on those responsibilities themselves, with Bundy assuming the duties of the

OCB, while previous Planning Board officials were split into geographic specialties that focused on creating new policy. In effect, they were usurping State's influence by 1 9^ creating what was essentially a mini-State Department. To further maximize White

House control over the foreign policy process, Kennedy ensured that every important incoming cable from the Departments of State and Defense would go through the

NSC, with Bundy serving as the president's foreign policy filter.124 As such, the prestige and power of the 'new' NSC, and Bundy in particular, rose to unprecedented heights while other departments struggled to have their opinions heard.

Kaiser, American Tragedy, 38. 123 Preston, The War Council, 40-41. 124 ibid., 42. 161

Despite the attempt to streamline the NSC and make it more effective,

Kennedy's reorganization did cause problems. Chester Cooper, the Assistant for

Policy Support to the Deputy Director for Intelligence for the CIA, recalled that despite the best efforts of Bundy and his staff to compensate for the functions of the

Planning Board and the OCB, the U.S. government,

Is too complex and the world is too complicated and fast moving to really substitute a small, albeit, dynamic and bright, staff for the more elaborate arrangements which had been developed under [Harry S] Truman and Eisenhower...the changes made by the Kennedy administration in a sense temporarily broke the link between the policy 1 ?S

maker and the intelligence analyst.

Kennedy's Executive Secretary of the NSC, Bromley Smith, offers a similar point when recalling an argument he used with Bundy against abolishing the OCB, noting that "many of its actions were taken primarily to get information out of State and Defense and CIA. Part of the OCB papermill was merely to establish lines so the

White House would know what was going on." On Bundy's single-handed control of the information system, he felt that "doing away with the NSC-OCB structure didn't give the president an effective way to discuss new ideas or to pin responsibilities on individuals." Smith also recollected a charge laid against Bundy that only favourable things were reported to the president, an accusation that called into question the integrity of his work as the president's information filter.

Given Bundy's powerful new role in the NSC, the secretaries of other government departments had to work much harder to ensure the views and recommendations of their subordinates were taken into consideration. The Defense 125 Chester Cooper OH, JFKL. 126 Bromley Smith Oral History Interview, Washington, DC, July 16, 1970, by Dennis J. O'Brien, JFKL. 162

Department had an effective and vocal proponent in Robert McNamara, but

Kennedy's choice of Dean Rusk for his Secretary of State did not help State's chances of gaining the confidence of the new administration. As will be shown,

Rusk's tenuous relationship with the president affected the influence of his department, which in turn limited the impact of its intelligence branch, the Bureau of

Intelligence and Research (INR), its analysis, and therefore its influence in the planning of policy in Vietnam.

An article by former Kennedy aide Theodore C. Sorensen in the journal

Foreign Affairs entitled "The President and the Secretary of State," notes "the president should select a strong-minded Secretary of State who shares his view of the world but possesses independent stature," an individual who would be the president's principal "advisor, spokesman, negotiator and agent in foreign affairs." Sorensen continues that while the relationship between the president and his Secretary of State need not be close, "between them loyalty, confidence and respect must flow both

197* ways." Examining the relationship of Dean Rusk and president Kennedy, many of the above factors were strained or missing entirely.

Thomas Zeiler describes Dean Rusk as a neo-Wilsonian, a Cold War liberal in search of security first and global harmony later; a man consumed by the premise that aggression was aggression, and no matter its size or level of intensity, it had to be dealt with by force. In this manner, Rusk shared many of President Kennedy's own views towards America's role in the international sphere and the need to defend the

127 Theodore C. Sorensen, "The President and the Secretary of State," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (1987/88): 245-246. Thomas W. Zeiler, Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000), xi-xv, 111. freedoms of the West against the tyranny of Communism. With such similar mindsets, one would assume that Kennedy would have no problem delegating responsibility for America's foreign policy to Rusk, but as Andrew Preston argues,

Kennedy intended to act as his own Secretary of State, and needed to fill the actual post with a rather weak figure. Given the youth and vigor that characterized the

Kennedy administration, Rusk's reticence and unwillingness to express, much less impose, his own views, on the president or the State Department, combined with his own belief that "the secretary of state was an agent of the president... [whose] job was simply to act on the president's will," kept Rusk from mobilizing his department like McGeorge Bundy could the NSC or McNamara did with defense.129 As such, a very small group of individuals inside the White House wielded an inordinate amount of influence in shaping American foreign policy in Vietnam. Dean Rusk was not one of them.

In terms of Rusk's relationship with the president, Maxwell Taylor recalled that Kennedy held him in very high regard as an individual, but viewed the State

Department as "institutionally weak." One reason for such thinking rested with the inequity of resources between the State and Defense Departments. While the military, with its greater budget and larger workforce, could move forward rather quickly,

State was constantly lagging due to its responsibilities involving "the much more difficult, much more subtle program for getting some political stability in a country that had never known political stability."130 Taylor also argues Kennedy came into office prejudiced against State based on his previous assumptions of the department,

129 Preston, The War Council, 44-45. 130 Maxwell Taylor, Oral History interview, Washington, DC, October 22, 1969, by Larry Hackman, JFKL. and therefore "didn't have any feeling of reliance in them and hence leaned very heavily on his immediate advisors." 131 Taylor argues Kennedy's impression of the

State Department was lowered even further when he realized how smart and able

Bundy was; his tendency was "to let Mac be the de facto Secretary of State."132

Though Taylor notes Bundy resisted such treatment, Rusk's standing in the White

House, and more so the Department of State's, was off to a shaky start.

In regards to the administration's Vietnam policy, Rusk's lack of support for

Kennedy's beloved counterinsurgency doctrine further distanced the secretary from the inner circle of decision-making.133 Rusk's preference for more conventional warfare coincides with his critics' charge that he abdicated responsibility for Vietnam to Robert McNamara and the Defense Department due to his own beliefs that the conflict in Vietnam represented a conventional conflict, best handled by the

Pentagon.134

The president also exhibited more faith in the CIA than in the State

Department. Christopher Andrew argues that "the CIA as a whole initially impressed the president more favourably than the State Department." He claims Kennedy looked at the State Department as symbolic of the cumbersome bureaucracy of the

Eisenhower era, and quotes the president saying, "if I need some material fast or an idea fast, CIA is the place I have to go. The State Department is four or five days to

'-" ibid. 132 ibid. 133 Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet- Nam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 16. 134 See W. Averell Harriman Oral History Interview, Hobe Sound, Florida, April 13, 1964, by Michael V. Forrestal, 102-05, 111, JFKL; Jones, Death of a Generation, 6, 445; Preston, The War Council, 7, 90; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 421; Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 545. answer a simple yes or no." But when it came to influencing policy, the former's influence nearly matched the latter's.

Kennedy's view of the CIA and his relationship with its Director, John

McCone, is important not only in the discussion of intelligence, but also when considering the impact of Kennedy's leadership and management styles and their subsequent effect on policy construction in Vietnam. In an oral history interview, the

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) John McCone commented on his relationship with the president, noting that "occasionally the President would call upon me for my personal judgment on a policy decision and when I would give it I would qualify it by saying that doing so it was beyond my competence as Director of Central

Intelligence.. .1 didn't want to get in the position somebody might suspect that our intelligence reports were slanted because I might have a particular personal view on a

1 O £ policy matter." As we have seen, McCone's conduct in the drafting of NIE 53-63 was anything but objective, but the above quote does illustrate the DCI had a relationship with the president, despite the unpopularity of the CIA's often pessimistic views.

As with the President's selection of Dean Rusk for his Secretary of State,

Walter Laqueur argues that Kennedy had several intentions behind his selection of

McCone as DCI. McCone, a wealthy California Republican and unapologetic cold warrior, had been undersecretary of the air force under President Truman and head of the Atomic Energy Commission during the Eisenhower administration. According to

Laqueur, the president sought a competent administrator at the helm of intelligence, 1 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the Presidency from Washington to Bush, (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995), 259. 136 John McCone OH, JFKL. 166 but also wanted to keep the DCI and the agency free from the appearance of being

1 ^7 politically partisan, therefore his choice was this prominent Republican. With the removal of Allen Dulles as DCI following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy wrote a memorandum to McCone explaining his duties and role within the administration, outlining his desire that McCone serve as "the Government's principal foreign intelligence officer," a position that required he undertake "the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States foreign intelligence effort." Kennedy described McCone's role as the president's personal representative for foreign intelligence policy matters at the national level, and his responsibilities to "assure the proper coordination, correlation, and evaluation of intelligence from all sources and its prompt dissemination to [the president] and to other recipients as appropriate."

In a memorandum to the president on October 25, 1961, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. advised that "the head of CIA must be essentially an arbiter and not an advocate," as he felt it "particularly important to have somewhere a counterweight to check and control intelligence estimates proceeding from the Pentagon." He also found coordination between the CIA and the State Department imperative, observing "the

Director of CIA should concentrate particularly on developing close and effective relations with State so that CIA will not cut across the essential directions of US foreign policy." But, statutory authority under the National Security Act notwithstanding, McCone exercised no real authority over defense intelligence, which

Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: the Uses and Limits of Intelligence, (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 79. 138 Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from John F. Kennedy, undated, "Reorganization State-CIA Relations, 5/11/61-10/19/62" folder, Hilsman, box 5, JFKL. 139 Memorandum for the President, Meeting with Mr. McCone, October 25, 1961, "CIA - 8/60-5/62" folder, Arthur Schlesinger, box WH-28, JFKL. constituted the majority of the U.S. intelligence community. And as his actions over

NIE 53-63 demonstrate, he was no match for defense intelligence when it came to bureaucratic infighting. Like Rusk, he was emasculated.

During the crisis in Saigon in the summer of 1963, and the Kennedy administration's response to the crisis, it became clear that neither the CIA nor the intelligence branch of the State Department possessed the capacity to influence policy to the degree required to change the established policies of the administration. As the president's leadership and decision-making structures led Kennedy to increasingly rely on his inner circle for intelligence in support of his policies, civilian intelligence agencies were left out in the cold, contributing what many Kennedy insiders considered to be ineffectual, and often unwanted, defeatist, proposals. As the crisis in the summer led to the fateful decisions of the fall, the reports of the CIA and INR found an increasingly unresponsive audience.

At a time when political tensions in Saigon had reached a boiling point and the concerns of the civilian intelligence agencies regarding the state of the war against the Communists were growing, the risks of American involvement in Vietnam were at their peak, and the need for unbiased and truly informed decision-making had never been greater. As the preceding account demonstrates, the Kennedy administration had a wealth of information available to them that represented the views of various intelligence and military agencies, in addition to the personal views of the members of his administration. In spite of these resources, the president's leadership, management, and decision-making style often had a greater impact on the production of policy than the experts whose job it was to inform such processes. 168

Conclusion

The optimism that characterized the Kennedy era was shattered by an assassin's bullet on November 22, 1963. The "best and brightest," the president's inner circle and the most powerful policy advisors of his administration, remained, many of them choosing to continue their service under Kennedy's successor. The escalation of the conflict under Lyndon Johnson and the subsequent results are well known. I would argue, however, that the precedent for the escalation of the American involvement in Vietnam was set under John F. Kennedy, a product of his leadership and decision-making styles, combined with his ineffective relationship with the intelligence community. What began with an increase in American advisors beyond the level permitted in the 1954 Geneva Accords ended with the administration's complicity in the coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

The evidence presented in the preceding chapters demonstrates that it was this event that deepened an already volatile political crisis in Saigon and, more important, bound the United States to support Diem's successors in their fight against the Viet

Cong. As the years passed and the conflict widened, this commitment required greater amounts of U.S. aid and involvement. I believe that the true legacy of American culpability in the plot against Diem was the psychological straight jacket it placed on the future of American relations with South Vietnam. With Diem gone and American culpability an open secret, disengagement from the conflict would become a much more difficult prospect for JFK's successors. Whether such discourse was merely eyewash to mask the further militarization of the conflict, or a convenient scapegoat for future presidents, the fact remains that under the presidency of John F. Kennedy, 169 the U.S. Government became more morally and physically committed to the welfare of South Vietnam than ever before.

Given the optimism and vitality that so many Americans perceived in the

Kennedy presidency, it is sad that Kennedy and his advisors laid the foundations for yet another war in Asia, a war which could have been avoided had certain precautions been taken and decision-making procedures been opened up. Kennedy's escalation of the conflict was particularly disappointing, moreover, because it squandered a real opportunity to re-evaluate the commitment that had been inherited from Eisenhower in 1961. Paying only modest attention to the crisis during the first two years of his presidency, the Kennedy team never gave the growing crisis in Southeast Asia the attention it deserved. It preferred instead to uncritically maintain responsibilities inherited from the Eisenhower administration, and to believe that personal expertise and new decision-making structures would provide ample means to deal with yet another Communist brushfire in a far away land.

The administration of John F. Kennedy was guided by the faith of its members in their own abilities and characterized by a belief that Cold War challenges had to be met with new strategies and techniques. New visions called for new measures, and so

Kennedy and his advisors set out to dismantle and re-align those aspects of the

Truman and Eisenhower security apparatus they found cumbersome and outdated.

The dismantling of the National Security Council changed the way that issues of national security were identified and handled, replacing what was seen as a bureaucratic and time-consuming institution with informal policy processes which

1 Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 228. 170 relied on personal interaction and crisis management techniques. The dissemination and control of information became the responsibility of a select few. These privileged individuals, meanwhile, grew increasingly selective about their sources of intelligence, preferring that they remain optimistic and supportive of existing policy initiatives rather than question them.

The pattern of Kennedy's delegation of responsibility to his most trusted advisors was another factor in determining how policy was constructed. His reliance on personal relationships with and among the members of his cabinet reflected the trust and mutual admiration that existed between the president and the members of his inner circle, but it also illustrated the President's selectivity in matters of advice and intelligence. To be inside of this group, as were National Security Advisor McGeorge

Bundy, Defense Secretary McNamara, General Taylor and others, was to be on even ground with the president. Those who possessed this privilege entered into dialogue that created policy and influenced the president's decision-making process. For those outside of Kennedy's inner circle, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk and DCI

John McCone, the experience of attempting to inform decision-making was a frustrating task given that access to the president was controlled by individuals who kept pessimistic reports from reaching him.

This hierarchy of relationships within the Kennedy cabinet was reflected in the use of fact-finding missions, which the president employed for a variety of reasons. In his memoir, former Undersecretary of State George Ball called fact­ finding missions a Washington tradition, which could serve as a substitute for a

2 Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 7. 171 policy.3 While I agree the president's use of these missions were responsible for delays in decision-making, I believe they also reflected the president's dislike of pessimistic reporting and his preference for intelligence sources from within his inner circle. Another reason for these fact-finding missions was Kennedy's practice of weighing divisive intelligence issues against the recommendations from these trip reports, the majority of which supported the military's optimistic point of view. As such, Kennedy could honestly say he had considered all avenues of information before dismissing the concerns of civilian intelligence agencies and siding with the purveyors of'good news intelligence.'

These missions usually consisted of members of Kennedy's inner circle, men who had drafted and supported the established aims of Kennedy's policies in

Vietnam. Being privileged members of Kennedy's inner circle, no individuals were more attuned to the type of information the president sought when such missions were announced. By selecting aggressive members of his inner circle to head these missions, Kennedy ensured that he received a specific type of answer upon their return: one that did not deviate too far from the established policy, or require any sort of fundamental re-evaluation of U.S. priorities in South Vietnam. Thus, by matching their analysis to that of the president, Kennedy and his inner circle isolated themselves from criticism and pessimistic reports, and justified their views through a series of self-serving fact-finding missions that reaffirmed the long-held beliefs of high-level decision-makers and optimistic military reports.

The cohesion of Kennedy's inner circle, as demonstrated by these fact-finding missions, shows how the president's leadership style and decision-making approach

3 George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 1982), 373. 172 led him to rely increasingly on his inner circle for intelligence in support of his policies. Those agencies and individuals denied access to Kennedy's inner circle, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his INR, and to a lesser degree, DCI

McCone and the CIA, possessed vast amounts of prescient and valuable intelligence, but lacked the status to gain influence with those in a position to use it.

The preference for optimistic intelligence reporting was another characteristic of the Kennedy administration that led to its deepening of the U.S. commitment in

Vietnam. As is demonstrated by the re-drafting of the Office of National Estimate's

NIE 53-63 and the debate over the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's RFE-90,

Kennedy's inner circle often challenged such pessimistic reporting. It became increasingly intolerant of such material as the war continued and the American commitment deepened.

This problem was exacerbated by weaknesses in the personalities and positions of those who represented the agencies behind these pessimistic documents.

In the case of NIE 53-63, pressure from McCone, coupled with the criticisms of the military, forced the re-drafting of a document that was much more accurate in its initial draft than its final version. The military's virulent objections to RFE-90 were representative of the power imbalance between the State and Defense departments, both in terms of resources and in the influence of their respective secretaries, Dean

Rusk and Robert McNamara. Dean Rusk, by absolving himself of responsibility for the planning of policy relating to the conflict in Vietnam, encouraged the militarization of the decision-making process. This gave the military preeminence in policy construction and diminished the influence of the civilian intelligence 173 community. Had the Secretary of State not removed himself from the cycle of decision-making, Vietnam policy might not have followed the escalatory path it did.

All of these factors contributed to the piece-meal escalation of the American commitment in Vietnam that culminated in the coup against Diem. The decisions that led to the administration's support of this initiative have been documented in this study, and will not be repeated here. However, given the desire of several key figures within the State Department to have Diem removed (and the opposite views of those in the military), I believe that the president's decision to not retract the August 24 cable was not merely a decision by Kennedy to choose State over the military, nor his own desire to abandon Diem after the tumultuous summer of 1963. Rather, the sequence of events that led first to the drafting and clearance of the August 24 cable demonstrates that the decision to move forward with plans to remove Diem arose from the ad hoc nature of Kennedy's leadership and decision-making styles, not from the influence of State Department officials advocating Diem's removal. As we have seen, warnings and policy recommendations from both the State Department (which largely supported Diem's removal) and the CIA (which did not) had no sustained impact upon the inner circle of Kennedy's decision-making team. In this arena, non conforming views were labeled defeatist or uninformed.

Kennedy's desire for consensus conditioned him to take incremental steps in policy making. He was reluctant to rock the boat among his inner circle. Ever wary of the split between the military and civilian members of his cabinet, the president chose to support the policy objectives outlined to Ambassador Lodge as described in the

August 24 cable. The clearance of these instructions left the administration bitterly 174 divided, but there was also concern among Kennedy's advisors about the state of

American credibility in the eyes of the South Vietnamese generals, whose plans to overthrow Diem were dependent on American support.4 Rather than face this challenge and the danger posed to the unity of his advisors and the opinions of the

South Vietnamese generals, Kennedy chose to maintain a policy that, in the long run, had far-greater consequences than any cabinet split ever could have created.

Kennedy spent his time as president attempting to maintain his independence of action with respect to the conflict in Vietnam. He refused both to commit large- scale military forces, or to seek a negotiated settlement. Instead, the president sought a middle course that maximized his options and reflected the informality of his leadership, management and decision-making style. Pursuing this policy required that the president mollify those within his administration who advocated forceful measures as well as those who proposed the use of political means to achieve

American objectives. In seeking consensus among these varying elements of his administration, Kennedy came to rely increasingly on a small group of policy advisors who proposed moderate means to sustain the established policies and commitments of the Eisenhower administration. This 'down the middle' approach failed to reassess the situation in South Vietnam as they had inherited it from their predecessor, and produced a gradual escalation in the American involvement that ultimately tied the interests of the two countries together.

See Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 246, 356; Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963, 1st ed. (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987), 156, 197; David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 243. 175

Kennedy's reliance on 'good news intelligence' further masked this escalation behind optimistic assessments and predictions for the outcome of the conflict. Having the ear of many within Kennedy's inner circle, the military's optimism was pervasive among Kennedy administration elites, while more pessimistic and critical reporting struggled to find an audience. Lacking influence and existing outside Kennedy's inner circle, the CIA and INR were often seen as dissidents, their intelligence products and recommendations more commonly treated as threats than sources of information.

Truly, the Kennedy administration's relationship with the intelligence community left much to be desired, for the president and his advisors had so vigorously sought to control the flow of information within the policy-making process that they cut themselves off from the very sources of information that offered them the balanced viewpoint their policies so desperately needed.

Relying on the optimistic encouragement of his closest advisors rather than the potentially divisive reassessments of his civilian intelligence agencies, Kennedy's wait and see approach to policy construction kept options open while slowly escalating the American commitment. This gradualism resulted in a slow increase in

American aid and advisors while further aligning the United States with the regime of

Ngo Dinh Diem. As the South Vietnamese president's hold on his country began to wane in the summer of 1963, the relationship between the two countries became a threat to American interests in the fight against Communism, and so the decision was made to support Diem's removal. In keeping with Kennedy's previous policies, the decision to act against Diem reflected the administration's preference for crisis management. Thus the president was able to postpone decision-making until the last 176 possible moment. In the case of U.S. support for the coup against Diem, the decision was made with little consideration of the strategic consequences. The coup moved forward incrementally, and despite delays and questions about the viability of this course, Kennedy did not reverse his support for the coup, naively believing that he could control events should they become unfavourable to American interests.5

In the end, president Kennedy could no more control the consequences of the coup than Diem could prevent it. The makeshift policies of the administration had produced what it had always sought to avoid: a definitive decision that narrowed U.S. maneuverability and increased American commitment to South Vietnam. The overthrow of Diem stemmed from Kennedy's avoidance of hard policy decisions; his failure to retract the orders of American support for the coup proved the ineffectiveness of Kennedy's administrative policies. Seeking safety and flexibility while ignoring the warnings of the civilian intelligence community, Kennedy and his inner circle found themselves supporting an action that would tie the two countries tighter in a conflict that would come to divide one country, and nearly destroy the other.

5 Memorandum, Personal for the Ambassador From the President, August 29, 1963, "Meetings on Vietnam, 8/24/63-8/31/63" folder, NSF, box 316, JFKL. 177

Bibliography

Primary Sources John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts Roger Hilsman Papers John F. Kennedy Papers National Security Files Countries—Vietnam Meetings and Memoranda John M. Newman Papers James C. Thomson Papers Oral Histories Chester Cooper Michael Forrestal W. Averell Harriman Henry Cabot Lodge John McCone Bromley Smith Maxwell Taylor

Secondary Sources

Books

Aguilar, Luis E., and Maxwell D. Taylor. Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive"Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1981.

Anderson, David L. Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945- 1975. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

Andrew, Christopher. For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the Presidency from Washington to Bush. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1995.

Ball, George W. The Past has another Pattern: Memoirs. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1982.

Barrett, David M. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1993.

Bird, Kai. The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998. 178

Blair, Anne E. Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

Castle, Timothy N. At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

FitzGerald, Frances. Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam. 1 st ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1972.

Ford, Harold P. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes 1962-1968. Langley, Va.: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.

Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Fursenko, A. A., and Timothy J. Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1997.

Gallucci, Robert L. Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Viet-Nam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Gelb, Leslie H., and Richard K. Betts. The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979.

Gibbons, William Conrad. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, 4 vols. Part I: 1945-1961. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Gibbons, William Conrad. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, 4 vols. Part II: 1961-1964. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Gordon, David F., and United States, National Intelligence Council. Estimative Products on Vietnam 1948-1975. Washington, D.C; Pittsburgh, PA: National Intelligence Council; Government Printing Office, 2005.

Graebner, Norman A. American as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1984.

Halberstam, David. The Best and the Brightest. New York: Random House, 1972.

Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. 1st ed. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1987.

Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. 179

Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation; the Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. 1st ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967.

Hughes, Thomas L. The Fate of Facts in a World of Men: Foreign Policy and Intelligence- Making. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1976.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The CIA and American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point; Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

Jones, Howard. Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Kahin, George McTurnan. Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1986.

Kaiser, David E. American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam, a History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

Kattenburg, Paul M. The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980.

Kesaris, Paul, Robert Lester, and United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1983.

Komer, Robert W. Bureaucracy Does its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. - GVN Performance in Vietnam. Santa Monica: Calif. Rand, 1972.

Krepinevich, Andrew F. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Laqueur, Walter. A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. New York: Basic Books, 1985.

Latham, Michael E. Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Mann, Robert. A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam. New York: Basic Books, 2001.

McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. 1st ed. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. 180

McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books, 1995.

Mecklin, John. Mission in Torment; an Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam. 1st ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.

Newman, John M. JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power. New York, NY: Warner Books, 1992.

Paterson, Thomas G. Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Prados, John. The Hidden History of the Vietnam War. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1995.

Preston, Andrew. The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.

Record, Jeffrey. Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2002.

Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: Macmillan, 1972.

Rust, William J. Kennedy in Vietnam. New York: Scribner, 1985.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days; John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Schwab, Orrin. Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961-1965. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.

Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. 1st ed. New York: Random House, 1988.

Showalter, Dennis E., and John G. Albert. An American Dilemma: Vietnam, 1964-1973. Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993.

Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W. W. Norton, 1972.

United States Department of Defense. The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. The Senator Gravel ed. 4 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.

United States. Dept. of Defense. United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967. [The Pentagon Papers]. 12 vols. WashingtonD.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971.

United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 - Vietnam. Vols. I-IV Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988-1991. 181

United States Government Printing Office. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy - Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President - January 20 to December 31, 1961. 3 vols. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register; National Archives and Records Service, 1962.

United States Government Printing Office. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy - Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President - January 1 to November 22, 1963. 3 vols. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register; National Archives and Records Service, 1964.

Walton, Richard J. Cold War and Counterrevolution; the Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy. New York: Viking Press, 1972.

White, Mark J. The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History. Chicago: I.R.Dee, 1999.

Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.

Zeiler, Thomas W. Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2000.

Articles

Anderson, David L. "One Vietnam War Should be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy." Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (2006).

Ford, Harold P. "The US Government's Experience with Intelligence Analysis: Pluses and Minuses." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (1995).

Gazit, Shlomo. "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 {\9U).

Handel, Michael 1. "The Politics of Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 4 (1987).

Hulnick, Arthur S. "The Intelligence Producer-Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 2 (1986).

Kovacs, Amos. "Using Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (1997).

Macartney, John. "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 4 (1988).

Sorensen, Theodore C. "The President and the Secretary of State." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (1987/88). Curriculum Vitae

Steve Grainger:

University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, September 2000 - April 2005 Bachelor of Arts, Honours History, Co-operative Program, Honours Applied Studies, Co-operative Program