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Kennedy's Inner-Circle and Vietnam Decision-Making, 1963

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Kennedy's Inner-Circle and Vietnam Decision-Making, 1963 The Triumph of Style Over Substance: Kennedy's Inner-Circle and Vietnam Decision-Making, 1963 By Steve Grainger Bachelor of Arts, Honours History, Co-operative Program, Honours Applied Studies, Co­ operative Program, University ofWaterloo, 2005 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate Academic Unit of History Supervisor: David A. Charters, PhD, History Examining Board: Gary K. Waite, PhD, History, Chair Jeffrey S. Brown, PhD, History Paul Howe, PhD, Political Science This thesis is accepted by the Dean of Graduate Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK April, 2007 Steve Grainger, 2007 Library and Archives Bibliotheque et 1*1 Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Canada Your file Vote reference ISBN: 978-0-494-56538-4 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-56538-4 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library and permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par ('Internet, preter, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le loan, distribute and sell theses monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur worldwide, for commercial or non­ support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou commercial purposes, in microform, autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats. The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in this et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni thesis. Neither the thesis nor la these ni des extra its substantiels de celle-ci substantial extracts from it may be ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement printed or otherwise reproduced reproduits sans son autorisation. without the author's permission. In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la Privacy Act some supporting forms protection de la vie privee, quelques may have been removed from this formulaires secondares ont ete enleves de thesis. cette these. While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans in the document page count, their la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu removal does not represent any loss manquant. of content from the thesis. •+• Canada For Ruwan and for myself; for both of us. Abstract American policy towards the conflict in Vietnam during the Kennedy administration was strongly influenced by the style and method of conduct of the President and his advisors. This study will critically assess Kennedy's presidential leadership style through an examination of his decision-making processes and the use of intelligence. Specific cases from the Vietnam War during the Spring and Fall of 1963 will be used to illustrate my argument that the Kennedy administration deepened the U.S. commitment to Vietnam through its dependence on optimistic military reporting and as a result of the leadership, management, and decision-making styles employed by Kennedy and his advisors. The legacy of these factors was a creeping escalation of the American commitment to South Vietnam that was intended as stopgap measures to address the ever-worsening political situation in Saigon. This policy failed to consider the long- term implications of such actions, and ultimately resulted in the Kennedy administration supporting the overthrow of Diem, a decision that left the U.S. in a precarious position regarding the future of South Vietnam and the American commitment to the fight against Communism in Asia. in Acknowledgements I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. David Charters, whose guidance, knowledge and support helped make this thesis possible. I would also like to thank the Department of History at UNB for its willingness to help, listen, and participate in the completion of this work. Most of all I am indebted to Ruwanmali Samarakoon, whose unceasing love, encouragement and support have mattered most during my two years in Fredericton. IV Table of Contents Dedication Abstract Acknowledgements Introduction 1. Historiography 2. The Establishment of the Kennedy Style 3. Shooting the Messenger: The Struggle Over Intelligence 4. Crisis Management in the Summer of 1963 Conclusion Bibliography Curriculum Vitae v 1 Introduction The Vietnam War has been a topic of near constant study since the conflict began following the Second World War. As successive governments in the U.S. inherited the conflict from the administrations that preceded them, presidents and their advisors, influenced by their respective styles and methods of conduct, shaped the nature and degree of the American involvement in Southeast Asia. The inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in January 1961 brought forth a new administration, one that possessed a remarkable faith in its own ability to deal with the increasing tensions of the world in a manner that relied on new systems of decision-making and policy construction. This study will critically assess Kennedy's presidential leadership style through an examination of his decision-making processes and the use of intelligence. I will use specific cases from the Vietnam War in 1963 to illustrate my argument that the Kennedy administration deepened the U.S. commitment to Vietnam in two ways that were reflective of the administration itself. First, Kennedy and his advisors sought out and accepted only 'good news intelligence' about the 'progress' of the war. These optimistic reports, prepared by the military, rarely addressed the severity of the political situation in Saigon, and refused to acknowledge the potential impact of the political crisis on the Diem regime's ability to fight the insurgency in his country. Instead, 'good news intelligence' focused on military achievements and depended on the use of statistics that were often based on unreliable South Vietnamese sources. These reports depicted the situation in South Vietnam far more optimistically than their critics charged. Such 2 portrayals were upheld and solidified by special fact-finding missions authorized by the President. Their recommendations were routinely privileged over more pessimistic CIA and State Department estimates. The advisors deployed to assess the situation in light of these intelligence disputes were drawn from within Kennedy's _ inner circle. These men already favoured a military response to the insurgency in South Vietnam, having helped construct the framework within which the existing policy operated. As members of the president's inner circle, the participants of these missions already possessed great influence with Kennedy, and given the informal nature in which the president preferred to work, the recommendations from these high-level missions proved much more influential than the pessimistic civilian reports that often provided the impetus for these missions in the first place. The preference for the recommendations of these missions to the warnings and criticisms of civilian intelligence agencies was multiplied by the weakness in leadership and the low stature of the leaders of these civilian agencies, namely Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and to a lesser extent the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), John McCone. These men existed outside of the president's inner circle, and so lacked the power and influence of those participating in the fact-finding missions. As such, Kennedy's preference for the opinions of trusted insiders limited his access to sources of information that disagreed with or criticized his policies. It was working within these restrictions of opinion that enabled the administration to sink further into the morass in South Vietnam while continuing to believe their existing policy was being implemented successfully. .3 The second manner in which the Kennedy administration deepened the conflict in Vietnam in a way that reflected its own character was through the leadership, management, and decision-making styles of Kennedy and his advisors. Abandoning established means of decision-making while retaining the commitments of previous administrations, Kennedy and his advisors changed the way the American government managed foreign policy. The president preferred the use of small, informal groups of experts to derive policy rather than the more ponderous system of information gathering and policy formation created under presidents Truman and Eisenhower. Kennedy's dismantling of the National Security Council (NSC) upon taking office is illustrative of his desire to construct new methods of government. He preferred to rely on personal relationships that favoured 'insiders' over 'outsiders.' Decision-making bodies deemed too cumbersome were abandoned, resulting in the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a few close advisors who the president relied on more and more as the conflict worsened. While Kennedy and his advisors created new methods to deal with the ever-increasing list of foreign policy problems, their focus on these new initiatives did not include a basic reassessment of the American commitment to South Vietnam. Rather, the administration assumed the cause was just, and focused on how the old initiatives of policy implementation could be improved by employing its new
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