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Learning from Our Past How a Vietnam-Era Pacification Program Can Help Us Win in Afghanistan

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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2009-09 Learning from our past how a Vietnam-era pacification program can help us win in Afghanistan Bumgarner, Amy S. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4662 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LEARNING FROM OUR PAST: HOW A VIETNAM-ERA PACIFICATION PROGRAM CAN HELP US WIN IN AFGHANISTAN by Amy S. Bumgarner September 2009 Thesis Co-Advisors: Thomas H. Johnson Sophal Ear Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2009 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Learning from our Past: How a Vietnam-era 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Pacification Program Can Help us Win in Afghanistan 6. AUTHOR(S) Amy S. Bumgarner 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Weak, failing, failed and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day. The stabilization and development of faltering states is in both the short- and long-term interests of the United States because stable states pose fewer security challenges. Afghanistan is a failed state that presents security challenges on a global scale as well as a classic case study on insurgency that needs a strong counterinsurgency response. A successful counterinsurgency needs an explicit strategy for winning the trust and confidence of the local population. Ultimately, the biggest problem is recognizing the importance of human terrain and understanding the population. Currently, operations in Afghanistan are managed at the provincial level. Only operations pushed down to the district and village level can capture these intricacies. This is where and how lessons from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program used in Vietnam apply. CORDS combined the previously separate civilian and military pacification efforts in Vietnam into one program and resulted in what may have been the only truly integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history. This thesis will assess the lessons learned from fighting a counterinsurgency in Vietnam via CORDS and how they apply in Afghanistan. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support; Vietnam; Pacification; 15. NUMBER OF Afghanistan; Provincial Reconstruction Teams; Counterinsurgency; Stability Operations PAGES 117 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited LEARNING FROM OUR PAST: HOW A VIETNAM-ERA PACIFICATION PROGRAM CAN HELP US WIN IN AFGHANISTAN Amy S. Bumgarner Major, United States Air Force B.A., Southeastern Louisiana University, 1991 M.A., Southeastern Louisiana University, 1994 M.A., Webster University, 1999 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2009 Author: Amy S. Bumgarner Approved by: Thomas H. Johnson Thesis Co-Advisor Sophal Ear Thesis Co-Advisor Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Weak, failing, failed and post-conflict states pose one of the greatest national and international security challenges of our day. The stabilization and development of faltering states is in both the short- and long-term interests of the United States because stable states pose fewer security challenges. Afghanistan is a failed state that presents security challenges on a global scale as well as a classic case study on insurgency that needs a strong counterinsurgency response. A successful counterinsurgency needs an explicit strategy for winning the trust and confidence of the local population. Ultimately, the biggest problem is recognizing the importance of human terrain and understanding the population. Currently, operations in Afghanistan are managed at the provincial level. Only operations pushed down to the district and village level can capture these intricacies. This is where and how lessons from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program used in Vietnam apply. CORDS combined the previously separate civilian and military pacification efforts in Vietnam into one program and resulted in what may have been the only truly integrated civilian-military command in U.S. history. This thesis will assess the lessons learned from fighting a counterinsurgency in Vietnam via CORDS and how they apply in Afghanistan. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. THESIS RELEVANCE...................................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................3 C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ................................................................5 D. METHODS AND SOURCES..........................................................................6 E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSION................................................7 II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................9 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9 B. DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................9 1. Nation-building ..................................................................................10 C. COIN STRATEGY: CLASSIC VS CONTEMPORARY ..........................14 1. Population is the Center of Gravity .................................................16 2. Legitimacy ..........................................................................................18 3. Conventional Tactics .........................................................................20 4. Role of Intelligence.............................................................................21 5. Combined Effort ................................................................................23 D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................24 III. CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT...................................................................................................................27 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................27 B. VIET CONG ASSESSMENT PRIOR TO 1965..........................................29 C. MILITARY BATTLE VERSUS POLITICAL STRUGGLE?..................33 D. THE OTHER WAR.......................................................................................34 1. Improve 1968 Pacification Planning ................................................38 2. Accelerate Chieu Hoi .........................................................................38 3. Mount Attack on VC Infrastructure (VCI).....................................39 4. Expand and Improve RVNAF Support to Pacification..................41 5. Expand and Supplement RD Team Effort ......................................42 6. Increase Capability to Handle Refugees..........................................43 7. Revamp Police Forces........................................................................44 8. Press Land Reform ............................................................................45 E. OTHER AREAS OF EMPHASIS ................................................................45 1. Importance of People.........................................................................46 2. Measuring Performance....................................................................47 F. CORDS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? ...........................................................48
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