Texas National Security Review

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TERRA INCOGNITA N C O G N I T A Volume 2 Issue 4

Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153

MASTHEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS

Staff: The Foundation

Publisher: Executive Editor: Associate Editors: 04 Wars with Words? Ryan Evans Doyle Hodges, PhD Galen Jackson, PhD Francis J. Gavin Van Jackson, PhD Editor-in-Chief: Managing Editor: Stephen Tankel, PhD William Inboden, PhD Megan G. Oprea, PhD The Scholar

Editorial Board: 10 More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: Todd Hall Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD 38 The Collapse Narrative: The , Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953 Gregory Brew Robert J. Art, PhD Kelly M. Greenhill, PhD John Owen, PhD Richard Betts, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD Patrick Porter, PhD 60 The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century John Bew, PhD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Thomas Rid, PhD David Betz and Hugo Stanford-Tuck Nigel Biggar, PhD Richard H. Immerman, PhD Joshua Rovner, PhD Philip Bobbitt, JD, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Brent E. Sasley, PhD Hal Brands, PhD Colin Kahl, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD Joshua W. Busby, PhD Jonathan Kirshner, PhD Kori Schake, PhD The Strategist Robert Chesney, JD James Kraska, SJD Michael N. Schmitt, DLitt Eliot Cohen, PhD Stephen D. Krasner, PhD Jacob N. Shapiro, PhD 90 Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Sarah Kreps, PhD Sandesh Sivakumaran, PhD Andrew Rhodes Theo Farrell, PhD Melvyn P. Leffler, PhD Sarah Snyder, PhD Peter D. Feaver, PhD Fredrik Logevall, PhD Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD 110 To Regain Policy Competence: The Software of American Public Problem-Solving Rosemary Foot, PhD, FBA Margaret MacMillan, CC, PhD Monica Duffy Toft, PhD Philip Zelikow Taylor Fravel, PhD Thomas G. Mahnken, PhD Marc Trachtenberg, PhD Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD Rose McDermott, PhD René Värk, JD James Goldgeier, PhD Paul D. Miller, PhD Steven Weber, PhD Michael J. Green, PhD Vipin Narang, PhD Amy Zegart, PhD Correspondence

130 Contrasting Views on How to Code a Nuclear Crisis Policy and Strategy Advisory Board: Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long Mark Bell and Julia Macdonald Chair: Adm. William McRaven, Ret. Hon. Elliott Abrams, JD Hon. Kathleen Hicks, PhD Dan Runde The Roundtable Feature Stephen E. Biegun Hon. James Jeffrey David Shedd Hon. Brad Carson Paul Lettow, JD, PhD Hon. Kristen Silverberg, JD 142 No One Lost : Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond Hon. Derek Chollet Hon. Michael Lumpkin Michael Singh, MBA Lisel Hintz Amb. Hon. William J. Lynn, JD Adm. James G. Stavridis, Ret., PhD Hon. Eric Edelman, PhD Kelly Magsamen Hon. Christine E. Wormuth Hon. John Hamre, PhD Gen. , Ret.

Designed by We are Flint, printed by Linemark The Foundation Wars with Words?

In his introductory essay for Vol. 2, Iss. 4, Francis J. Gavin, the chair of TNSR’s editorial board, discusses academic combat, debates over “isms,” and how to truly advance knowledge through intellectual exchange.

hough we are loath to admit it, we unending, contentious debates over which “ism” Francis J. Gavin all enjoy a good academic fight. The best explained how the world worked. Like other recent passing of two noted, brilliant, young scholars, I followed these arguments with but problematic intellectual pugilists rapt attention, rooting for my “ism” with the —T the historian Norman Stone and literary critic same irrational passion I have long devoted to Harold Bloom — has made me wonder whether my often emotionally crippling attachment to the such battles are the best way to advance scholarly Philadelphia Eagles. This model of intellectual arguments and expand our understanding of the battle was how I thought scholarship and world.1 knowledge advanced. I was certainly trained in the arts of intellectual I no longer see things this way. The pursuit of combat. As an undergraduate, I had a front row wisdom is not about scoring points or attempting seat to what had been called “the great 3:1 pissing to defeat adversaries. Most of the issues we match,” an intense debate over whether NATO wrestle with in international security, foreign conventional forces could withstand an attack policy, and grand strategy are complex, contested, from larger Soviet forces, and how to assess the and difficult, defying parsimonious explanations military balance on the central front in Europe or generalizations. Most people — both in the (3:1 is the concentration of forces needed to break academy and in the policy world — explore these through a well-established front).2 Reading Greg issues in good faith. Brew’s new article, “The Collapse Narrative: The The correspondence in this issue of TNSR United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the between Mark Bell, Julia Macdonald, Brendan Coup Decision of 1953,” brought back memories Green, and Austin Long is, to my mind, an of my first academic clash. Twenty years ago, an exemplar of how such exchanges over scholarly article I published on the same issue received a differences should take place: in a serious but skeptical review at H-Diplo.3 I remember locking respectful manner. All four are terrific scholars. myself in my office for 48 hours, pulling out file And the fact is, the issue they are dealing with — after file of primary documents, and consulting how to define and understand a nuclear crisis — with friends and mentors, all in order to craft the is an epistemological nightmare. What is a nuclear right response.4 crisis? Is it any contest involving a nuclear armed In the academic world I was raised in, a state, which is how some political scientist have negative review had to be met — immediately coded it, or does the use of nuclear weapons have and with great force — with a sharp rejoinder. to be explicitly mentioned? Nuclear weapons have The pursuit of knowledge was often framed as perverse and puzzling effects on state behavior, a bitter contest between competing theoretical dampening crises that might have otherwise have schools, where no side could concede an inch to emerged (the Long Peace!) yet creating dangerous its opponents. The leading journal, International situations — like the Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Security, devoted scores of pages in the 1990s to Missile Crisis — that make no sense in a non-

1 Eric Homberger, “Harold Bloom, Obituary,” The Guardian, Oct. 15th, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/oct/15/harold- bloom-obituary; Falstaff Agonistes, “Obituary: Harold Bloom Died on October 14th,” The Economist, Oct. 24, 2019, https://www.economist.com/ obituary/2019/10/24/obituary-harold-bloom-died-on-october-14th; Richard J. Evans, “Norman Stone Obituary,” The Guardian June 25, 2019, https:// www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jun/25/norman-stone-obituary; Marcus Williamson, “Norman Stone: Outspoken Historian and Writer Whose Work Polarised Academic Opinion,” Independent, July 1, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/norman-stone-death-obituary-news- historian-dead-a8974476.html. 2 While there were several competing articles published on the subject, the gist of the dispute can be found here: John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, “Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment” International Security 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989): 128–79, https://www.jstor.org/ stable/2538782. 3 Francis J. Gavin, “Politics, Power, and U.S. Policy in , 1950-1953,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 58–89, https://doi. org/10.1162/15203970152521890. 4 Francis J. Gavin, “Author’s Response,” H-Diplo, Oct. 8, 1999, https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/Gavin-response.pdf.

5 The Foundation Wars with Words?

nuclear world. And the bomb is always present, or interrogate the mental maps to understand connect knowledge to larger social purposes. hovering like a dark shadow over world politics, how space and geography affect international Perhaps the way our current academic system even when nuclear weapons appear irrelevant or policy and world politics. Borrowing from Ernest operates when it comes to studying foreign policy no one is talking about them. I’ve made the point May and Richard Neustadt’s famous Harvard and international security could use a similar elsewhere that coding anything involving nuclear Kennedy School class and book, Rhodes says helpful nudge. weapons is hard, since the “Ns” we really care we must learn to “think in space.” Jaehan Park I learned a lot sitting on the sidelines watching about are nine (the number of nuclear weapons makes the case that much of the international the great 3:1 pissing war. What I remember most states), two (the times atomic bombs have been relations theory that developed after World War as it unfolded in 1988 and 1989, however, was used in battle, both within days of each other in II was aspatial. Some of this had to do with the the strange allocation of intellectual resources. 1945), and, most importantly, zero (the number nuclear revolution, but much of it was driven Intense, passionate, and even intemperate clashes of thermonuclear wars). In the nuclear realm, by “emotional repugnance, as in the case of over the military balance in central Europe were certainty is elusive and most of our assertions Morgenthau, or of ‘physics envy,’ in the academy taking place just as the Cold War was ending and are historical interpretations. I am not sure I in general.” Systems analysis and game theoretic the Soviet Union unraveled. In just a few years, am convinced by either approach. Yet, all four models thus replaced traditional geopolitical the great pissing war would be forgotten, the term are to be commended for their efforts, as the models for understanding international relations.5 “Fulda Gap” would largely disappear, and the issues involved could not be more important. Rhodes’ piece is difficult to categorize, either in participants would move on to other intellectual From a social science perspective, small Ns are terms of a school of thought or a methodology. It battles, with no one questioning whether this a nightmare. In the world of nuclear weapons, is eclectic and smart, precisely the kind of article particular war of words had been especially however, small Ns are a miracle of history and that is difficult to place in traditional disciplinary fruitful. At TNSR, we enjoy and encourage policy, and we should continue our rigorous journals but finds a most welcome home atTNSR . sharp, big arguments. But any debate should be intellectual examination of these questions in our This is not to suggest we abandon sharp respectful and measured, while recognizing how unending quest to keep those numbers — nine, intellectual debate — quite the contrary. People hard it is to get definitive answers. Most vital of two, and zero — exactly where they are. may have important disagreements over how all, such debates should be important to people The scholarly focus on competing theoretical Todd Hall explains what is driving the Sino- beyond the silos and ivory towers in which we frameworks can also blind us to how policymaking Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyo often find ourselves. We hope you agree with us actually works and why it often fails. Philip islands, or how David Betz and Hugo Stanford- that this issue passes that test. Zelikow’s important new article, “To Regain Tuck portray urban warfare. Such contestation Policy Competence: The Software of American is to be welcomed, even encouraged, because the Francis J. Gavin is the chair of the editorial Public Problem-Solving,” identifies what he sees issues these scholars tackle matter enormously. board of the Texas National Security Review. He is as a steep decline in the United States’ ability to The 1953 Mossadegh coup analyzed in Brew’s the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and conduct effective, competent statecraft. To be article, for example, plays an outsize role in both the inaugural director of the Henry A. Kissinger clear, Zelikow is not so much worried about which Tehran and Washington in explicitly and implicitly Center for Global Affairs at SAIS-Johns Hopkins grand strategy or school of thought animates U.S. shaping contemporary U.S.-Iranian relations. It is University. His writings include Gold, Dollars, and policy: Trendy academic debates over restraint, important that we rigorously examine and test our Power: The Politics of International Monetary primacy, or off-shore balancing miss the point in assumptions about the origins and consequences Relations, 1958–1971 (University of North Carolina the same way the battle of the “isms” did in the of this critical event. Press, 2004) and Nuclear Statecraft: History and 1990s. His contention is that the skills needed to There is a balance to be had. During the late 16th Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell University carry out successful policy should be thought of and early 17th century, scholarly debates at the Press, 2012). His latest book, Nuclear Weapons and like engineering; an interactive process between world’s most prestigious universities, Cambridge American Grand Strategy, will be published by assessment, design, and implementation. The and Oxford, were often shaped by arid, formal, and Brookings Institution Press later this year. good news is that these skills are teachable, and bitter theological and philosophical disputes with Zelikow’s urging that universities update their little connection to the larger world. At the same pedagogy accordingly should be heeded. time, a new, unheralded institution emerged in Sometimes intellectual insight emerges that London — Gresham College — which was later to defies easy categorization by “isms” or schools of become the Royal Society of London for Improving thought, yet this insight reveals a whole new way Natural Knowledge, or the Royal Society. Its of understanding old problems. Andrew Rhodes’ members, pursuing science for the larger public “Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in good, helped transform our understanding of the National Security Decision-Making,” is such physical world; including, most consequentially, an article. Rhodes identifies an irony: The the navigation of the sea. Oxford and Cambridge contemporary tools available to scholars and soon caught up and surpassed Gresham College. policymakers to understand geography are The world, however, should be grateful for its extraordinary. Yet, rarely do we understand efforts to escape academic “inside baseball” and

5 Jaehan Park, “The Case for Geopolitics,” unpublished chapter from his forthcoming dissertation, The Age of Geopolitics: Japan, Russia, and the United States in the Far East, 1895-1905.

6 7 8 The Scholar 9

The Scholar

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of scholars. Our aim is for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and policy desks from Washington to Tokyo, and to be cited as the foundational research and analysis on world affairs.

8 9 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are presently the focus of a dangerous contest between the People’s Republic of China and Japan, one that even now has the potential to spark a military conflict that could draw in the United States. How has this come about? Whether seen from a strategic, economic, or historical perspective, the value of the islands does not appear to merit the risks of such a contest. Consequently, what has driven the escalation is not anything particular to the islands themselves, but rather the increasing symbolic stakes attached to them, their role within the domestic politics of both sides, and the measures Todd Hall each side has taken to shore up its respective claims.

t 00:50 on June 9, 2016, in the East the ambassador conveyed that escalation was China Sea, a frigate belonging to the undesirable and that he would report back to Beijing. Chinese navy1 entered the contiguous The Chinese naval vessel subsequently exited the zone surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu contiguous zone at 03:10.3 IslandsA on a course toward the islands’ territorial Unlike previous “white-on-white” engagements waters.2 While ships belonging to various Chinese — a label denoting the color of the ships’ hulls agencies had entered both the contiguous zone and — between the Japanese Coast Guard and non- the territorial waters around the islands in the past, military Chinese vessels, this incident held the this was a first for a Chinese naval vessel. A Japanese potential of becoming a dangerous “gray-on-gray” Self Defense Forces destroyer following the vessel’s military showdown. Had the Chinese naval ship movements hailed it, advising it to change course — entered the islands’ territorial waters, it is highly to no avail. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, a team assembled conceivable that the Japanese government would inside the crisis management center of the prime have authorized the Japanese Self Defense Forces minister’s office to monitor the situation. In the to employ force. Saiki would later reflect that there early hours of the morning, the Chinese ambassador was real concern at the time that the situation would was summoned to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, escalate into a serious confrontation between the where Vice Minister Saiki Akitaka met him with a Chinese and the Japanese forces.4 The tensions of demand for the vessel’s immediate withdrawal. that night reflect the stakes involved: Intentionally While declining to formally accept this demand, or unintentionally, actions by either side could

1 For the purposes of this piece, uses of the term “China” post-1949 shall refer to the People’s Republic of China. 2 The Japanese name for the islands is “Senkakushotō,” while the People’s Republic of China uses “Diaoyudao”; for the purposes of neutrality, this piece uses “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.” A “contiguous zone,” as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, consists of the waters extending not more than 24 nautical miles “from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured” in which states may “exercise the control necessary to (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; [and] (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” See: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accessed on July 9, 2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/ unclos_e.pdf. 3 This account is reconstructed from contemporary reporting and interviews with anonymous Japanese officials. For Japanese news reports, see: “Senkaku ni gunkan, mimei no kinpaku,” [Chinese warship near Senkaku, early morning tension], Asahi Shimbun, June 9, 2016, Morning Edition, 2; “Senkaku setsuzoku suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 9, 2016, 1; “Senkaku setsuzoku suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 2016. 4 Vice Minister Saiki Akitaka, author’s interview, Tokyo, July 14, 2017. Subsequent analysis suggested the People’s Liberation Army Navy was not engaged in a planned provocation, but rather reacting to Russian warships transiting the contiguous zone from the south, returning to Vladivostok. See, “Chūgoku gunkan ga Senkaku shūhen no setsuzoku suiiki-hairi…” [Chinese warship enters contiguous zone around Senkaku…], Reuters, June 9, 2016, https://jp.reuters.com/article/china-frigate-senkaku-idJPKCN0YU2NF; Some, however, suggested Sino-Russian collusion. See, “Senkaku setsuzoku suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 2016.

11 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

have sparked a military escalation involving the dynamics have raised the profile of the dispute The Puzzle of Escalation compared to 312 in the five years after.10 In Japanese world’s three largest economies. and increased pressure on policymakers to take officialdom, that these events marked turning Consisting of five core islands and a number of firmer action. The third dimension is competitive. Prior to 2010, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were points in the dispute is evidenced by parliamentary other minor features, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands The islands have become the concrete focus of an a relatively peripheral issue in Sino-Japanese references: As one study demonstrates, 2010 are claimed by Japan, the People’s Republic of China, ongoing set of escalatory, interactive dynamics, relations. On Sept. 7, 2010, however, a Chinese fishing marked a watershed for the islands’ salience within and Taiwan.5 Although Japan has administered in which actions taken by one side to improve its trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard ships parliamentary debates, with mentions increasing the islands since 1972 — when the United States standing in the dispute elicit counter-measures in the waters surrounding the islands, resulting exponentially over previous years.11 As for the transferred control — and continues to maintain from the other. These spiralling dynamics continue in the Japanese detention of the ship and crew popular prominence of the dispute, the Chinese that no dispute exists, its position has increasingly to play out across a variety of domains and remain and the arrest of been challenged by the presence of official Chinese a source of further potential conflict. the captain. This vessels in the islands’ adjacent waters.6 The United In brief, since late 2010 the islands have increased spiraled into a major States, while not taking a stance on the sovereignty in significance as a symbol, as a domestic political diplomatic incident, of the islands, nevertheless has committed itself football, and as an object of ongoing, competitive as Beijing applied to come to Japan’s defense should it be attacked jockeying. Existing work has highlighted certain increasing pressure in the exercise of its administrative control.7 The aspects of these roles in isolation, but I argue that on Japan for their islands thus constitute a potentially dangerous we must view them as the interwoven pieces of a return. Japan first flashpoint in East Asia, highlighted by a number of whole. The islands became increasingly salient as released the ship analyses as a possible trigger for armed conflict — a domestic political issue in no small part because and crew, and then if not war — in the region.8 of their growing symbolic significance. But at the eventually also the My goal in this paper is to supply an evidence- same time, the symbolic import of the islands captain, after which based, theoretically informed account of recent benefitted immensely from being championed by tensions subsided. developments in the contest over the Senkaku/ domestic politicians, activists, and others who But in 2012, tensions reignited when — despite search engine, Baidu, shows few online searches Diaoyu Islands. To do so, I draw upon primary latched onto the issue, whether opportunistically Beijing’s objections — the Japanese government for the islands in the five years prior to 2010. In and secondary source material in Japanese and or out of sincere conviction. As the island’s chose to preempt an initiative by the nationalist September 2010, there was a sudden burst in Chinese, as well as extensive interviews in both symbolic and domestic political importance rose, mayor of Tokyo to buy several of the islands from Chinese interest, which was subsequently dwarfed countries. I argue that, objectively speaking — so too did the respective pressures on the leaders a private owner by purchasing the islands itself. in 2012 with searches increasing nearly six-fold.12 apart from the mere fact that the Senkaku/Diaoyu managing the contest to take stronger action. This unleashed a new round of conflict involving In Japan, Google Trends shows little interest in are tangible features in the East China Sea to which This set in motion competitive spirals of move popular protests and official tensions. As Sheila the islands in the years before the 2010 incident as Tokyo and Beijing both lay claim — the particular and counter-move between Tokyo and Beijing. Smith has written, “Until 2010, what had largely well. Interest first shot up massively in 2010 and details of the disputed islands in themselves are by The friction this generated has, in turn, helped been perceived as a manageable difference between then again in 2012.13 and large irrelevant. to further feed into the islands’ symbolic and Tokyo and Beijing, of interest only to small groups of Seven years on, the prominence of the dispute Rather, to explain why the islands have become domestic political significance. The different facets nationalist activists in both countries, had blown up has subsided somewhat; however, the situation the flashpoint they are today, we must look at how of the islands’ increasing significance are therefore into a major confrontation between the two states.”9 in the waters around the islands remains a far their significance within Sino-Japanese relations closely interconnected. The 2010 collision and subsequent 2012 purchase cry from the status quo ante. Since 2012, official has grown in ways that have little to do with their This paper proceeds in six parts. First, it lays out why were thus decisive turning points in the nature of Chinese maritime vessels have conducted regular actual, inherent value. Specifically, there are three the escalation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu incursions into the islands’ territorial waters, and important dimensions to the increased significance 2010 is so puzzling. Second, it investigates arguments Islands. This is evidenced by substantial shifts in official Chinese aircraft have repeatedly appeared of the islands. The first dimension is symbolic. Since concerning the material value of the islands. Third, it the official and popular prominence of the dispute. in the airspace above them.14 In 2013, Beijing late 2010, the islands have increasingly become a examines the potential non-material value attached Consider the attention the islands have received announced an Air Defense Identification Zone proxy for an array of latent and newly emerging to the islands before 2010. Fourth, it evaluates the from the People’s Daily, the Chinese government’s including the airspace over the islands, raising intangible concerns, frustrations, resentments, possibility that leaders on either side actively sought official mouthpiece: Only 16 articles referenced the the risk of aerial confrontation. Though there and anxieties on both sides. These have given to initiate the dispute for self-interested reasons. islands in the five years before the 2010 collision has been progress since then — most notably a the islands import and salience by raising the Fifth, it offers an alternative explanation, arguing perceived stakes involved. The second dimension that we need to examine the increasing significance 9 Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Press, 2015), 190. is domestic. The emergence of an active contest of the islands within Sino-Japanese relations with a 10 Full-text search of People’s Daily articles for “钓鱼岛” comparing the period between Sept. 6, 2005, and Sept. 6, 2010, to the period between over the islands generated both opportunities and focus on three dimensions. Finally, it concludes by Sept. 7, 2010, and Sept. 7, 2015. For longer-term analysis showing a similar trend, see, Yasuhiro Matsuda, “How to Understand China’s Assertiveness vulnerabilities within the domestic political sphere considering potential paths forward. since 2009: Hypotheses and Policy Implications,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Strategic Japan, April 2014, 4. of each state. At crucial moments, these domestic 11 Yasuo Nakauchi, “Ryōdo O Meguru Mondai to Nihon Gaikō ― 2010-Nen Ikō No Ugoki to Kokkai Rongi” [Territorial issues and Japanese diplomacy — Developments after 2010 and Parliamentary Debate], Rippō to chōsa, 342 (2017): 3. 12 Baidu Zhishu query for the personal computer search history data for “钓鱼岛,” using 5 This paper focuses primarily on relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China concerning the islands. Relations between Japan http://index.baidu.com/ (Baidu account necessary for use) accessed July 12, 2018. Interestingly, closely tracking this was searches for “钓鱼岛地图” and Taiwan and between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China concerning the islands are outside the purview of this article. (Diaoyu Islands map) suggesting many people were trying to locate the islands. 6 See, “Senkaku Islands Q&A,” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html. 13 Google Trends query for “尖閣” search history in Japan, 7 Mark Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: US Treaty Obligations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016). https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=JP&q=尖閣, accessed Aug. 7, 2018. Notably, the most interest appears in November 2010, ostensibly due to the video scandal discussed below. 8 Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 176–78; Michael McDevitt, Senkaku Islands Tabletop Exercise Report (Suffolk, Virginia: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017); Eric Heginbotham and 14 See, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response,” Ministry of Richard J. Samuels, “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge,” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 148, Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 8, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html; “China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace,” https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00313. Ministry of Defense of Japan, accessed June 26, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/.

12 13 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

maritime communication mechanism between The Question of Material Value along the Ryuku archipelago.20 Apart from mobile, isolated: They are over 60 miles (100 km) from the Japanese Self Defense Forces and the People’s land-based missiles stationed across the chain, either the nearest Japanese islands or Taiwan and Liberation Army15 — as well as a more general A number of existing approaches explain Japan can also deploy guided-missile patrol boats, more than 180 miles (300 km) from the Chinese improvement in the tone of relations, the area territorial disputes according to the tangible submarines, and even mines to block critical mainland. Resupply under combat conditions around the islands has become more crowded and benefits possession of a disputed territory can passageways.21 Correspondingly, Japan does not would pose major logistical difficulties.27 What is the possibility for serious conflict remains. supply. These include strategic advantage, natural need control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to more, such capabilities can be placed elsewhere. The above broadly describes what happened, resources, control of trade routes, an increased obstruct the Chinese navy’s movement through its To cite a former Japanese defense official, “you but not why. Looking to the existing literature on population or tax base, or extra land to settle.16 portion of the first island chain. Therefore, as one could get the same result from putting radar on territorial disputes, one approach to seeking an Given that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are small analyst has noted, to break through the chain the the Senkaku as from putting it nearby on a ship, explanation would be to ask what it is about the and uninhabited, most material arguments have Chinese military would likely attempt capturing or, alternately, by flying AWACS [Airborne Warning contested islands’ material value — be it strategic focused on their strategic or economic value. islands such as Miyako and Ishigaki for control of And Control Systems] you could get information or economic — that has motivated such tensions. the strait that lies between them.22 Certainly, Japan from farther away.”28 Not only do ship-mounted Another approach would be to examine the islands’ Strategic Value could do more to increase its defenses on these and airborne capabilities have the advantages preexisting non-material value — religious, ethnic, islands.23 But taking them remains a daunting task of mobility, the latter also have the advantage of or historical. A third approach would be to adopt a One argument for the strategic value of the involving the long-distance transport of an invasion altitude, providing a much farther radar horizon.29 cynical perspective, investigating the potential of a islands is that possessing them would aid the force. Chinese possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu So, while the strategic value of the islands is not “wag-the-dog” scenario in which the governments Chinese military in breaking through the first Islands would not markedly change that fact. zero, it is quite low. According to one former involved intentionally initiated the dispute to island chain separating continental China from the A second argument for the strategic value of Japanese vice admiral, they are “just junk rocks, no distract from domestic concerns or, alternately, to Pacific Ocean. Alternately, were Japanese forces the islands is that they would provide a platform strategic value.”30 gain bargaining leverage in other areas. to possess them, it would help prevent a Chinese for placing strategically useful assets — such as Still, one could argue that Beijing’s behavior This paper examines each of these explanations military breakthrough.17 The first island chain radar installations or missiles — closer to either in the South China Sea — including fortifying in turn and finds them wanting. The material stretches from the Korean peninsula southward the island chain or the Chinese continental tiny features with military hardware despite value of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is, at best, across the Japanese Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, coastline, respectively, as well as nearby sea lines international condemnation — demonstrates questionable. Nor does it explain why tensions and beyond to the Philippines.18 The Senkaku/ of communication.24 And yet, such an advantage the value it places on such outposts. There did not begin until 2010. If anything, estimates of Diaoyu Islands are located inside this island chain, would be marginal at best. For one, anything placed are, however, several crucial differences. First, the islands’ economic value have been repeatedly northeast of Taiwan on the western edge of the on the islands would be highly vulnerable. Only compared to the relatively isolated Senkaku/ adjusted downward. Regarding non-material Okinawa Trough. one of the islands — Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island — has Diaoyu Islands, the outposts built by the People’s value, the islands are uninhabited and host no But while nearer to the first island chain than the a surface area greater than half a square mile (or Republic of China in the South China Sea sit sites of major religious or ethnic meaning. If there Chinese continental coastline, the Senkaku/Diaoyu 1 sq km). But at less than 1.4 square miles (3.6 sq within a crowded cluster of contested features, have been revisions to their perceived historical Islands are, at their closest, still at least 60 miles km.) it is just “a bit larger than New York City’s where other claimants have already competitively significance, these have arguably occurred as a (100 km) away from any feature in the chain.19 Central Park.”25 Accordingly, the islands have scant established military footholds to cement their function of post-2010 developments. And lastly, Consequently, even if the People’s Republic of China space to hide assets or develop redundancies. In a position.31 Second, while Chinese military assets all available evidence suggests neither side was possessed the islands, penetrating Japanese-held conflict scenario, assets on the islands would offer on these small outposts are similarly vulnerable initially seeking escalation. The following three sections of the chain would still require Chinese easily identifiable targets unlikely to survive an to U.S. attack, they nevertheless offer intimidating sections lay out these findings in detail, leaving the military vessels to transit a considerable distance opening salvo.26 Moreover, the islands are relatively advantages against less well-equipped competitors developments in the years since 2010 a mystery. and pass through one of several bottlenecks, most prominently the Miyako Strait, between the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako. These islands already house formidable Japanese 20 Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Costal Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Australian military capabilities, including mobile, surface-to- National University Press, 2015), 11, 103. 21 Toshi Yoshihara, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry at Sea: How Tokyo Can Go Anti-Access on China,” Orbis 59, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 69–71, https://doi. ship missiles covering the strait’s entrance, and a org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.11.006. submarine sound-surveillance system extending 22 Yoshihara, “China’s Vision of Its Seascape,” 306–07. 23 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Active Denial.” 24 Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The Plan’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Saunders, et al. (Washington, DC: CreateSpace, 2011), 53–54; Zhu Fenglan, “21 Shijichu De Riben Haiyang Zhanlue,” 15 “Japan, China Launch Maritime-Aerial Communication Mechanism,” Mainichi Shinbun, June 8, 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/ in Yatai Diqu Fazhan Baogao, ed. Zhang Yunling and Sun Shihai (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 249. articles/20180608/p2a/00m/0na/002000c. 25 For the dimensions, see, “The Senkaku Islands: Location, Area, and Other Geographical Data,” Review of Island Studies, Feb. 17, 2015, https:// 16 Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2002), 14–18; Paul Diehl, A Road Map to War: www.spf.org/islandstudies/info_library/senkaku-islands/02-geography/02_geo001.html; for the quote, see Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), x–xi; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal Islands Dispute,” 1. of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 187–89, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343313515695; Paul Hensel, “Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (March 2001): 81–109, https://doi. 26 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, US Airsea Battle, and Command of org/10.1111/0020-8833.00183. the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249. 17 Li Ran, “Zhuanjia cheng riben kanzhong wo guo diaoyudao zhanlue jiazhi,” [Experts claim Japan is focused on the strategic value of our 27 Anonymous interviews, Japanese Self Defense Force officials, Tokyo, April–May 2017. country’s Diaoyu Islands], Renmin Wang, July 7, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0717/c115361-18534590.html; Akimoto Kazumine, 28 Anonymous interview, former Japanese Defense Ministry official, May 2017. “The Strategic Value of Territorial Islands from the Perspective of National Security,” Review of Island Studies, Oct. 9, 2013, https://www.spf.org/ islandstudies/research/a00008/. 29 Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific,” 23–24. 18 Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Vision of Its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower,” Asian Politics and Policy 4, no. 3 (July 2012): 30 Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, author’s interview, Tokyo, April 19, 2017. 293–314, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01349.x. 31 “Occupation and Island Building,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/ 19 Measured from Taisho-jima/Chiweiyu. island-tracker/.

14 15 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

in the South China Sea “whose navies barely rate confirm actual reserves, only hypothesizing their In short, although potential as coast guards.”32 Placing assets on the Senkaku/ existence given the area’s geological structure. At Diaoyu Islands would not grant such advantages the time of the report’s release, Taiwan and Japan with regards to Japan, a more formidable adversary. (both claimants) entered into joint development oil and gas resources may Lastly, to date, the People’s Republic of China negotiations; however, these ended in 1970 when has only militarized features in the South China the People’s Republic of China voiced objections.36 have initially generated Sea that it has already controlled for decades. Since then, there has been no exploratory drilling, Militarizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, however, due to the contested nature of the area, and thus would require first expelling Japan and risking a the actual presence of oil and gas reserves remains an interest in the islands wider conflagration with the United States. In this unsubstantiated. regard alone, the potential strategic value of the Nevertheless, this has not stopped speculation. decades ago, it currently islands pales in contrast to the costs and dangers One figure for the fossil fuel prospects of the entire of such a confrontation, even assuming the Chinese East China Sea that has frequently appeared in military were to prevail. Nor would preventing Chinese academic writings is 109.5 billion barrels.37 remains unclear what Japan from militarizing the islands stop the latter This number, however, is of apparently dubious from shifting capabilities westward. In fact, Japan provenance, allegedly stemming from a 1969 New resources actually lie in the has already moved assets westward by stationing a York Times article in which a Japanese official defense facility, complete with radar, to the south quotes findings from the U.N. report. The report, of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on another island, however, contains no such number.38 Another surrounding seabed... Yonaguni.33 All said, it is difficult to argue that the common figure is 3 to 7 billion tons — purportedly marginal strategic benefit the islands would offer put forward by official Chinese experts in 1982 either side justifies risking war to obtain them. without any hard evidence.39 Other similarly high Chinese estimates exist, but as a U.S. Energy Economic Value? Information Administration report notes, they remain without corroboration and “do not take But what of their economic value? A central into account economic factors relevant to bring factor is the potential 200-nautical-mile exclusive them to production.”40 In fact, one source from a economic zone entitlements assumed to be major Chinese oil company confided that “inside conferred on the state with sovereign rights to the [Chinese] oil industry, you do not hear anyone these islands under the United Nations Convention making big claims about oil and gas around the on the Law of the Sea. Given overlapping claims, islands these days, especially given the limited one study has calculated that potentially 19,800 findings in other parts of the East China Sea.”41 square nautical miles of exclusive economic zone Indeed, other recent estimates are more entitlements are at stake.34 conservative. In 2006, one Japanese official These entitlements are seen as valuable primarily estimated oil and gas reserves on Japan’s side due to a 1969 U.N. Economic Commission for Asia of its self-proclaimed East China Sea median and the Far East report, which suggested the line — including potential Senkaku/Diaoyu area “may be one of the most prolific oil reserves entitlements — at approximately 500 million kilo- in the world.”35 Importantly, the report failed to liters, equivalent to less than a year’s worth of

32 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” National Interest, May 2, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450. 33 Ball and Tanter, Tools of Owatatsumi, 22–27. 34 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 436–39. 35 Cited in James Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 43. 36 Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 44. 37 See, for instance, Caihua Ma et al., “Diaoyudao Ziyuan Jiazhi Tanjiu “ [Study of the resource value of the Diaoyu Islands], Zhongguo Yuye JIngji, no. 6 (2012): 126. 38 See Lengcui Fei, “Diaoyudao Daodi Cangle Duoshao Shiyou?” [How much oil do the Diaoyu Islands really contain?], Qingnian yu Shehui, no. 11 (2012): 34; for the original, see, “Japan Will Press Efforts to Exploit Major Oil Find,” New York Times, Sept. 1, 1969, 2. 39 Qian Song, “Haiyang Shiyou--Shiyou Shengchan Zengzhang De Qianli Suozai “ [Offshore oil- the potential for growth in oil production], Zhongguo shiyou he huagong jingji fenxi, no. 2 (2006): 46. 40 “East China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Sept. 17, 2014, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics. php?RegionTopicID=ECS. 41 Anonymous interview, Beijing, July 2018.

16 17 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Chinese consumption at 2015 levels.42 The Energy in the East China Sea.48 This decline, together with confines and thus ownership would depend on from having sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Information Administration has estimated “proved factors including increasing fuel costs for travel to further exclusive economic zone entitlements.54 Islands when entering into such proceedings are and probable reserves” in the entire East China Sea the islands, has put off many local Japanese fishers And yet, it is far from certain an international very uncertain and possibly quite trivial. This also at approximately “200 million barrels of oil” and from traveling to the islands.49 court or arbitral tribunal would grant the Senkaku/ assumes such proceedings would even occur. As “between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet” of natural gas.43 A third potential source of economic value is Diaoyu exclusive economic zone entitlements. one legal scholar notes, “the unpredictability of At China’s 2015 consumption levels, that equals seabed mining, primarily of polymetallic manganese Specifically, to qualify for an exclusive economic litigation, the probable domestic illegitimacy of any just 16 days’ worth of oil and between 55 to 100 nodules or polymetallic sulfides.50 But polymetallic zone or continental shelf entitlement, the features adverse result, and the lack of any means short of days of natural gas.44 In short, although potential sulfides and economically viable concentrations of in question need to be capable of sustaining human force to enforce a judgment all work to discourage oil and gas resources may have initially generated manganese nodules are generally limited to deeper habitation or economic life of their own.55 Given the litigation or arbitration.”58 an interest in the islands decades ago, it currently waters, the former around underwater vents.51 In stringency with which the 2016 Permanent Court remains unclear what resources actually lie in the the East China Sea, the chief concentrations are in of Arbitration ruling applied this requirement to Evaluating Material Motives surrounding seabed, and recent estimates have the depths of the Okinawa Trough, in the vicinity the South China Sea, it is questionable whether the tended to decrease expectations significantly.45 of undisputed Japanese islands in the Ryukyus.52 small, uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would Asked in 2016 if the islands have strategic or A second potential source of economic value is The shallower waters of the continental shelf floor qualify.56 economic value, former Japanese Prime Minister the fishing resources around the islands. At present, surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would Let us assume, nevertheless, that one or more of Yasuo Fukuda replied, “No, no, using all that petrol under a 1997 agreement, each side has agreed not thus appear to offer considerably less of potential the Senkaku/Diaoyu features were found to meet for patrols … I think it is a waste.”59 Strategically, to enforce its laws on the “nationals and fishing value, while sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu the legal requirements for generating an exclusive the islands are isolated and easily targeted, vessels” of the other in the waters 12 nautical Islands would make only a relatively minor economic zone entitlement. In negotiations or and attempting to militarize them would entail miles beyond the islands. The friction, however, is difference for claims in deeper waters.53 judicial proceedings to allocate exclusive economic substantial risk for marginal advantage. The fishing within the narrow 12-nautical-mile bands of water There is a further issue concerning the economic zones between claimants in the East China Sea, stocks are in decline while potential oil and gas surrounding the islands. The Japanese government value of the islands: Settling the question of such an entitlement might still only receive reserves remain unconfirmed and have repeatedly claims these as territorial waters to which the 1997 sovereignty over them would still leave unresolved reduced consideration or be wholly discounted been re-estimated as lower than previously agreement does not apply,46 and Chinese fishing the problem of who is entitled to the resources due to a variety of factors. These include the thought. Moreover, it remains uncertain what — boats thus face being chased off by the Japanese in and below their surrounding waters. Granted, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ relatively small size, lack if any — advantage sovereignty over the Senkaku/ Coast Guard when approaching.47 These waters, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of of population and economic activity, and distance Diaoyu Islands would provide in negotiations however, constitute only a small fraction of the the Sea, the state with undisputed sovereignty over from other features.57 Even if the Senkaku/Diaoyu or judicial proceedings over the delimitation of disputed East China Sea exclusive economic zone the islands would have claim to 12 nautical miles of Islands’ entitlements to an exclusive economic zone maritime resource entitlements, should these ever area. Moreover, due to over-fishing in the general territorial waters around each of the features above were granted full effect in the process of drawing even occur. area, the fishing stocks in these waters have water at high tide. But as noted above, many of the borders, they would still need to be weighed against Nevertheless, one could argue it is perceptions, declined precipitously in line with broader trends resources under dispute lie outside these narrow all the other potential exclusive economic zone not the actual value, that matter. Policymakers may, and continental shelf entitlements that extend after all, still be driven by perceived material aims. 42 Diet Session 164, Sangiin gyōsei kanshi iinkai, April 24, 2006. Calculated based on consumption figures provided by the U.S. Energy Information from Taiwan, continental China, and the Japanese For instance, retired Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan claims Administration: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/beta/ international/data/browser/. archipelago and also require consideration. the islands are “treasure islands” and have “great 60 43 “East China Sea.” With all these overlapping entitlements, the final geostrategic significance.” But we should be 44 Calculated based on consumption figures provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy determination of the exclusive economic zone careful in taking such publicly presented rationales Information Administration, accessed Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/. boundaries in the East China Sea is far from at face value, particularly when they come from 45 Paul O’Shea, “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute,” Asian straightforward. Given that the processes of Chinese military hawks who are active in public Survey 55, no. 3 (May/June 2015): 555–56, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.548. negotiation or third-party arbitration pertaining affairs.61 In truth, if Beijing’s aim is installing 46 Nobukatsu Kanehara and Yutaka Arima, “New Fishing Order-Japan’s New Agreement on Fisheries with the Republic of Korea and with the to maritime borders is highly complicated and stationary military outposts in the East China Sea, People’s Republic of China,” Japanese Annual of International Law, no. 42 (1999): 27–28, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ jpyintl42&div=4&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals. unpredictable, the actual benefits to be reaped it has easier options. In fact, having already built 47 Hirose Hajime, “Kaijōhoanchō Ni Yoru Senkaku Keibi No Rekishi” [A history of Japanese Coast Guard policing of the Senkaku], Sōsa kenkyū 65, no. 9 (2016). 54 Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 48 Makomo Kuniyoshi, “Senkakushotō Ni Okeru Gyogyō No Rekishi to Genjō” [History and current state of Senkaku fisheries], Nippon Suisan no. 29 (2007): 931, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/upjiel29&div=27&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals. Gakkasishi 77, no. 4 (2011): 707; Tseng Katherine Hui-yi, Lessons from the Disturbed Waters: The Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Disputes 55 See, Article 121, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accessed on July 9, 2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_ (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 75–78. Given that fish generally do not pay attention to borders, this is not surprising. agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 49 “Fuon’na ryōba/Senkaku” [Turbulent fishing grounds/Senkaku], Ryuku Shimpo, March 1, 2013, 3. 56 The requirement was clarified as, “the objective capacity of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or 50 Thomas Peacock and Matthew H. Alford, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Worth It?” Scientific American 318, no. 5 (May 2018): 72–77, https://www. economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature.” See, “The South China Sea Arbitration (the Republic scientificamerican.com/article/the-race-is-on-to-mine-and-protect-the-deep-seafloor/; G.P. Glasby, “Deep Seabed Mining: Past Failures and Future of the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China),” Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release, The Hague, July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/ Prospects,” Marine Georesources and Geotechnology 20, no. 2 (2002): 165, https://doi.org/10.1080/03608860290051859. en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/; Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute,” 1. 51 Nobuyuki Okamoto et al., “Current Status of Japan’s Activities for Deep-Sea Commercial Mining Campaign,” paper presented at the 2018 OCEANS-MTS/IEEE Kobe Techno-Oceans (OTO), 2018. 57 Clive Schofield, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Progress and Challenges in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries since the Drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” in 30 Years of UNCLOS (1982-2012): Progress and Prospects, Guifang Xue and Ashley White 52 Satoshi Ueda and Nobuyuki Okamoto, “Nihon Shūhen Kaiiki Ni Bunpu Suru Kaiteinessuikōshō No Kaihatsu Purojekuto No Gaiyō,” [The Overview (Beijing: China Universtiy of Political Science and Law Press, 2013). of Project for Developing Seafloor Massive Sulfides in the EEZ of Japan (sic)], Journal of MMIJ no. 131 (2015). 58 Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” 907. 53 And this would depend on the People’s Republic of China asserting an exclusive economic zone on the basis of sovereignty over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, which it has not yet done. Such a claim on these resources, particularly those more northerly, would more likely be based on 59 Former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, author’s interview, Tokyo, July 10, 2017. continental shelf entitlements. See, Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian 60 Yuan Luo, “Diaoyudao Bu Shi Wuzuqingzhong De ‘Huangdao,’” Huanqui Shibao, Sept. 4, 2012. Perspective 31, no. 1 (2007): 139, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704579. For the Chinese claim, see, “Submission by the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea,” United Nations Division for Ocean 61 Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA’s Hawkish Faction (Part One),” China Brief 13, no. 15 (2013), https://jamestown. Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Dec. 14, 2012, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive summary_EN.pdf. org/program/propaganda-not-policy-explaining-the-plas-hawkish-faction-part-one/.

18 19 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

several oil and gas rigs in the East China Sea further economic value now appears less than originally Prior to 2010, both sides had adopted a delaying to the north, abutting the Japanese-demarcated thought, suggests other things at work. strategy regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.72 median line, the Chinese government could erect Indeed, in 1972 Zhou stated he did not want to more such structures to the south, along its side of discuss the dispute,73 and in 1978 Chinese leader the median line near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Non-material Value? Deng Xiaoping suggested shelving the issue for the and adjacent important sea lanes. Such rigs can next generation to solve.74 Neither actively sought host radar and missile emplacements. Indeed, Another potential approach, also drawn from to raise the dispute and were responding to its the Japanese side has already accused Beijing of the literature on territorial disputes, would be to having been brought up by the Japanese side. And installing military-use radar on its northerly rigs.62 examine preexisting non-material factors, such while Tokyo never publicly acknowledged — and If Beijing desires a tripwire between Japan and as the historic or religious value of the contested in fact repeatedly denied — shelving the dispute, Taiwan, these could serve the purpose. space, or the ethnic heritage of its population.68 in practice, both countries subsequently worked Alternately, if the driving motive is economic, joint The actual disagreement between Japan and the to minimize the issue while Japan continued to development would offer considerable gains over People’s Republic of China over the islands, however, exercise administrative control.75 the status quo without the risk of costly conflict. is of relatively recent provenance, beginning Admittedly, there were points of friction. In In actuality, this may be the only feasible option for when Beijing first publicly challenged Japanese 1978, when members of the ruling Japanese Liberal Tokyo, as underwater topography is unfavorable to sovereignty with its own claim in 1971.69 Before Democratic Party criticized their leadership for unilateral Japanese development of what is likely to that, the islands had a relatively trivial existence: not leveraging Treaty of Peace and Friendship be natural gas.63 The Japanese government has itself They had no religious or historic meaning of note, negotiations to get Beijing to cede its claim, admitted as much.64 Ironically, running a pipeline to no Chinese citizens had ever lived there, and a claim to the islands they became a core national hundreds of Chinese fishing ships appeared near the Chinese coast is far more feasible.65 One might Japanese fish-processing factory that had been interest.71 Additionally, critics could also point to the islands.76 The Chinese central government, argue it still makes sense for Japan to defend its there before the war had long been abandoned. the overlapping claims to the islands advanced by however, later described the incident as claim in order to prevent China from taking all the At the time Beijing raised its claim, the islands Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, thus “accidental,” generating speculation that this was spoils. But Beijing has already, on multiple occasions, were uninhabited, with several of them leased to linking the issue to the larger question of Chinese the result of internal divisions over the treaty.77 In proposed joint development while shelving the the United States for target practice. Strikingly, in national unification. But even if one were to concede 1992, the People’s Republic of China passed the sovereignty issue.66 Admittedly, such cooperation 1972, when Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei these points, they still do not explain the historic Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, would require ironing out many details. And yet, brought up the islands with Chinese Premier Zhou variation in how the dispute has unfolded within which explicitly names the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands there are successful precedents: In 1974, Japan and Enlai during normalization negotiations, Zhou’s Sino-Japanese relations. General concerns over as its territory. This move was reportedly fiercely the Republic of Korea agreed to jointly develop response was, “Because oil has emerged, that is sovereignty fail to explain why certain territories debated internally and done under pressure from highly anticipated petroleum deposits in waters why this is a problem.”70 It is, therefore, difficult might be valued more than others. Concerns the military.78 But as both Beijing and Tokyo were where both shared overlapping claims, although to argue the islands possess any distant historical over national sovereignty or unification are also more focused on the Japanese emperor’s upcoming they subsequently found little of value.67 lineage of value. longstanding and static and thus do little to explain visit to China, there was limited fallout.79 In 2008, It is extraordinarily difficult to prove a negative. Even today, the islands remain nothing more how the willingness of both sides to risk conflict official Chinese ships entered the territorial waters Yet, if the core motives for escalating the contest than small, isolated, uninhabited features without over the islands has changed over time. around the islands for the first time.80 In light of over the islands were material, we should have any population, meaningful infrastructure, or There remains important historic variation that other high-level efforts to improve relations at expected the protagonists to act in ways that sites of major religious or historical consequence. needs explaining, particularly between the nature the time, including a Sino-Japanese East China maximize advantages or gains in these categories. Critics might simply retreat to saying that territory of the dispute in the pre- and post-2010 periods. Sea joint development agreement — concluded That we have not, and the prominence of the is an issue of national sovereignty, and that dispute has increased even while the islands’ regardless of their history, once both sides laid

62 Ankit Panda, “A New Chinese Threat in the East China Sea? Not So Fast,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/a- new-chinese-threat-in-the-east-china-sea-not-so-fast/. 71 Alessio Patalano, “Seapower and Sino-Japanese Relations in the East China Sea,” Asian Affairs 45, no. 1 (2014): 37, https://doi.org/10.1080/03 63 Rongxing Guo, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation: Some Options for the East China Sea (Washington, DC: Brookings 068374.2013.876809. Institution, September 2010), 9, 19, https://www.brookings.edu/research/territorial-disputes-and-seabed-petroleum-exploitation-some-options-for- 72 Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Press, the-east-china-sea/; Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 154. 2008). 64 “Sekō keizai sangyō daijin no kakugigo kishakaiken no gaiyō” [Press conference with METI Minister Sekō after Cabinet Meeting], Ministry of 73 Ishi et al., Nitchu Kokkou Seijouka, Nitchu Heiwa Yuukou Jouyaku Teiketsu Koushou, 68. Economy, Trade, and Industry, Sept. 13, 2016, http://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2016/20160913001.html. 74 Masato Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku [Resolving misunderstandings surrounding the Senkakus] (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōhōsha, 65 Guo, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation, 19; Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 154. 2016), 92; Lili Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi [History of Relations between Japan and the new China] (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 66 Reinhard Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: Between the Materialization of the “China Threat,” 2016), 146. UNISCI Discussion Papers 32, no. 32 (May 2013): 26, http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44789; “Sangiin gyōsei kanshi iinkai,” Diet 75 Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku, 16–17, 79–97; Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute,” in Getting Session 164, April 24, 2006. the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis, Ryosei Kokuburn, and Jisi Wang (Washington, DC: Brookings 67 Clive Schofield and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Choppy Waters Ahead in ‘a Sea of Peace Cooperation and Friendship’?: Slow Progress Towards Institution Press, 2010). the Application of Maritime Joint Development to the East China Sea,” Marine Policy 35, no. 1 (2011): 28–29, https://econpapers.repec.org/ 76 Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian Survey 18, no. 12 (December 1978): 1235–49, https:// RePEc:eee:marpol:v:35:y:2011:i:1:p:25-33. doi.org/10.2307/2643610. 68 Diehl and Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, 19–20; Toft, “Territory and War,” 189. 77 Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978, 1243; Hajime, “Kaijōhoanchō Ni Yoru Senkaku Keibi No Rekishi,” 114–16; Ryosei Kokubun et al., 69 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu shengming (1971 nian 12 yue 30 ri)” [Chinese People’s Republic Foreign Ministry Statement (1971 Nitchūkankeishi [History of Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Aruma, 2014), 133. December 30)],” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, accessed April 5, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/ 78 Mori Kazuko, Nitchū Hyōryū [Sino-Japanese Drift] (Tokyo: Iwatami Shinsho, 2017), 89, 215. t1304543.htm. 79 Kazuko, Nitchū Hyōryū, 90; Kokubun et al., Nitchūkankeishi, 179–80. 70 Akira Ishi et al., Nitchu Kokkou Seijouka, Nitchu Heiwa Yuukou Jouyaku Teiketsu Koushou [Concluding Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Normalization, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2010), 68. 80 Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 74–75.

20 21 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

despite internal Chinese opposition — some have the later generations resolve it.”87 Erica Downs and dispute as bargaining leverage to gain concessions Japanese minister in charge of the Japanese Coast attributed this to dissenting Chinese hardliners.81 Phillip Saunders argue that in the past this policy from Japan on other disputed issues.”92 Guard at the time, subsequently claimed to be More prominently, however, it was small activist to contain the dispute was due to concerns about All available evidence, however, suggests the following an “arrest manual” inherited from a previous groups on both sides that generated problems. In the its possible impact on bilateral economic relations.88 initial incident in 2010 was neither planned nor administration.98 Even if Maehara did see a chance to 1970s, the dispute had already galvanized “Protect Given mainland China’s economic growth, one could welcomed by either side. The trawler’s captain was assert Japanese jurisdiction, little preparation was the Diaoyu” groups in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the suggest that economic relations with Japan are not reportedly intoxicated when arrested, and thus made for what to do afterwards. The Kan Naoto United States. In Japan, various nationalist groups currently as crucial to Beijing as they were when was not likely a covert Chinese agent.93 Though administration was left scrambling for ways to also rallied to the cause, the most prominent being Downs and Saunders were writing. But the fact is initially feted upon returning home to mainland contain the damage, fearful of being forced to pay the the Nihon Seinensha.82 Attempts by these actors that even now Japan still remains a major economic China, he was subsequently forbidden to fish and political price for intervening in the legal process in to land on the islands, or alternately, in the case partner. As recently as 2017 Japan ranked as subjected to a “soft” house arrest.94 Additionally, order to end the incident.99 Facing increasing pressure of Nihon Seinensha, advance the cause by building China’s third largest export destination and second the Chinese government’s response — far from from Beijing, a Japanese foreign ministry delegation and registering lighthouses, constituted an ongoing largest import partner, as well as a key source seeking to immediately leverage the incident — gave a presentation to the local prosecutor’s office, irritant, particularly in the 1990s.83 Additionally, in of investment.89 Moreover, Taylor Fravel, writing was restrained at first. Although protesting to the ostensibly at the latter’s request.100 The following day, 2004, after multiple failed attempts, members of in 2010, also noted a number of other reasons we Japanese ambassador and canceling visits and the prosecutor announced the captain’s release. As the mainland China-based “Chinese Federation should have expected both sides to avoid conflict, East China Sea joint-development negotiations, Maehara himself admits, the handling of the situation for Defending the Diaoyu Islands” landed on one including the deterrent effect of U.S. commitments, in the first week after the captain’s arrest, Beijing was a “mishmash” (chūtohanpa).101 of the islands for the first time. In response, the the desire by both to maintain a regional reputation suppressed protests and conveyed to Tokyo Notably, both countries subsequently sought to Japanese government simply repatriated the as “constructive and benign powers,” and the prior through back channels, “Somehow, please just get mend the relationship. Kan met with Wen on the Chinese activists back to the Chinese mainland. ability of all sides to manage the dispute.90 Given all this settled without a fuss.”95 Only after the Japanese sidelines of a summit in October 2010, where both The government in Beijing, for its part, prevented these countervailing factors, an explanation is still side decided to extend the detention of the fishing agreed to promote a mutually beneficial strategic further attempts by the group to travel to the needed for the substantial change that took place captain despite releasing the ship and crew did relationship. When the triple disaster of March 11 islands.84 On the whole, both Tokyo and Beijing after the 2010 collision incident. Beijing escalate its response. Chinese Premier Wen struck Japan in 2011 — the earthquake, tsunami, repeatedly worked to contain the impact of their Jiabao publicly pressed for the captain’s release, and meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear plant — activists: Beijing suppressed press coverage and reports emerged of an alleged Chinese embargo on Beijing expressed condolences and provided aid in prevented organized protests, while Tokyo refused Intentional Conflict? rare-earth exports to Japan, and Beijing detained an effort to improve relations.102 Preparations thus to officially recognize the efforts of its nationalist four Japanese citizens.96 Nothing here suggests an began to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Sino- groups and sought to limit their activities.85 A third potential explanation would be that official Chinese conspiracy or reactive opportunism. Japanese normalization. As Kan’s successor, Noda All in all, Japanese policy prior to 2010 could be the 2010 confrontation was intentional. One In reality, Beijing was likely responding to an initially Yoshihiko, recalls, in 2011 he “had no premonition” summarized with the words of Japan’s foreign conceivable reason for deliberately provoking perceived loss: Tokyo had asserted its domestic law that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would again become minister, Sonoda Sunao: “eschew provocative, an escalation of the dispute would be to distract in the waters around the islands.97 a problem.103 propagandizing behavior … only carefully, calmly from internal issues and improve the domestic Neither would this seem to be a clever plot planned Consequently, when in April 2012 the mayor of do what is necessary for domestic political needs.”86 popularity of each country’s respective leadership, by the Japanese government. Maehara Seiji, the Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, proposed purchasing the The policy of the People’s Republic of China, in a position commonly advanced under the rubric turn, could, with few exceptions, be summed up in of “diversionary war theory.”91 Another possibility 92 Krista Wiegand, Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement (Athens, GA: University of Chinese Vice Premier Gu Mu’s words: “[The Diaoyu is that the escalation demonstrates, as Krista Press, 2011), 98. Islands] have always been Chinese territory. … [W] Wiegand has argued, an intentional effort at “issue 93 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 190. e can temporarily shelve the sovereignty issue. Let linkage” in which Beijing sought to use “the islands 94 “Senkaku oki shōtotsu jiken no chūgokujin senchō ga “jitaku nankin” jōtai, shutsugyo mo kinshi” [The Chinese captain from the Senkaku sea collision under ‘house arrest,’ also forbidden to fish], Searchina, May 24, 2011. 95 Citing a Japanese official, Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Antō: Senkaku Kokuyū-Ka [Secret Battle: The Senkaku Nationalization] (Tokyo: Shinchō bunko, 2013), 23. 96 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 23–26, https:// doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115; Linus Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 81 Mori Kazuko, Nitchū Hyōryū, 208–11. Miyamoto Yūji, former Japanese ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (2006–2010), author’s Incident in 2010,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 282–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos011. Johnston disputes interview, Tokyo, May 12, 2017. Importantly, this also resulted in a strengthening of the Japanese security operations around the islands. See, Bush, the embargo using Japanese import data. This, however, overlooks the pervasive “quasi-smuggling” on the People’s Republic of China side — many The Perils of Proximity, 74–75. 2010 rare earth exports were not classified as such when leaving the People’s Republic of China but registered in Japanese import data upon arrival. 82 Jinxing Chen, “Radicalization of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement in 1970s-America,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 5, no. 2 (2009); Smith, See, Nabeel A. Mancheri and Marukawa Tomoo, Rare Earth Elements: China and Japan in Industry, Trade and Value Chain (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Intimate Rivals, 127–34, 212–17, https://doi.org/10.1163/179303909X12489373183055. Institute of Social Science, 2016), 159–60. At the time, multiple Japanese firms did report sudden stoppages, and officials from the People’s Republic of China reportedly confirmed the embargo to U.S. counterparts privately. See, Richard McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning: The Struggle for Global 83 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of : China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security Dominance (London: Penguin UK, 2017), 265. The evidence, however, remains inconclusive at best. Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion in 23, no. 3 (Winter 1998/1999), https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539340; Smith, Intimate Rivals, 127–34; Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9, 2017, 85–90, https://www. Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 116–18. csis.org/analysis/countering-coercion-maritime-asia. On the detention of Japanese nationals, see: Smith, Intimate Rivals, 191; Hagström, “‘Power 84 Shi Jiangtao, “Protesters Barred from Diaoyu Mission,” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2004, 5. Shift’ in East Asia?” 281. Hagström suggests the timing could be coincidental. 85 Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 120–25; Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism.” 97 M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining China’s Escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” Global Summitry 2, no. 1 (2016): 24–37, https://doi. org/10.1093/global/guw010. 86 Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku, 81. 98 Maehara, author’s interview. 87 Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi, 153. 99 Sunohara, Antō, 16–17, 36. 88 Downs and Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism.” 100 Sunohara, Antō, 39–43. 89 “The World Factbook, East and Southeast Asia: China, 2017,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on March 13, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 101 Maehara, author’s interview. 90 Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute,”159. 102 Sunohara, Antō, 49; Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi, 299. 91 Tir, “Territorial Diversion.” 103 Noda Yoshihiko, former prime minister, author’s interview, Tokyo, Sept. 5, 2017.

22 23 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

The Three Dimensions fears over how other states will evaluate a of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ given state’s resolve.109 Such concerns may be Increased Significance particularly salient for state actors who believe their international standing does not reflect In examining the evidence, three dimensions what they are due, or alternately, perceive their of the islands’ increased significance emerge as status and prestige to be slipping away. Apart important in explaining how the Senkaku/Diaoyu from global concerns, there may also exist Islands have developed into the flashpoint they are intangible concerns that are particular to certain today. Those dimensions are symbolic, domestic, relationships between specific states. These and competitive. The initial catalyst for the islands include not only particular fixations with relative to begin growing in significance was the 2010 status and hierarchy vis-à-vis key counterparts, collision incident. The 2012 Japanese purchase of but also historical resentments and grievances, the islands exacerbated this even further. stories of unrectified humiliation and betrayal, and even mutual suspicion and prejudices.110 The Symbolic Dimension Even before 2010, Sino-Japanese relations had experienced various episodes of contention Surveying official statements, news reports, and over intangible issues. In the early 2000s, issues comments from government officials regarding concerning the legacies of Japanese aggression the islands, it becomes clear that the dispute over against China — the “history problem” as it is the islands rapidly came to implicate much more called — loomed large. In particular, Japanese than their immediate, tangible value. Political Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s annual visits scientists have long suggested that international to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 relations are populated with a variety of Japanese Class A war criminals are enshrined, intangible concerns. State actors care about were an especial irritant — by the end of his reputation, status, prestige, and honor within the administration the top Chinese leadership refused international community.107 In some cases, these to even meet with him.111 This was exacerbated, are ends in themselves, such as, for instance, among other things, by disputes over textbook when international prestige satisfies a need for content and ongoing wartime compensation national self-esteem or a certain international issues.112 Beijing’s official position was that Japan status constitutes an important element of a was not taking the proper attitude toward its state’s national identity. In other cases, they can history, while for many on the Japanese side, the be a means to an end — for example, in order Chinese government was also responsible for to increase the international deference a state cynically playing up history and exaggerating the enjoys and ease its ability to achieve its desired threat of Japanese militarism.113 Indeed, in a 2010 outcomes.108 The pursuit of intangibles — such poll, the majority of Chinese respondents blamed as reputation — may even stem from mistaken a lack of Japanese historical consciousness for the

107 Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science no. 17 (May islands, it was a development unwelcome to both This plan failed, however, when in July 2012 a Japanese 2014): 371–93, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wolhlforth, eds., Status in governments. Ishihara was well known as a right- newspaper made the story front-page news and Noda World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63; Barry O’Neill, wing nationalist and there were concerns he would was forced to publicly announce his plans to pursue Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations provoke Beijing such that “Sino-Japanese relations a potential purchase.106 Compounding the damage, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status would enter an extremely dangerous state.”104 To this announcement also coincided with an important Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 105–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000308. contain the situation, the new Noda administration wartime anniversary, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident 108 Dafoe et al., “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” 382–83. began quietly exploring the possibility of preemptively in 1937 which had precipitated Imperial Japan’s full- 109 Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,”Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 34–62, https://doi. org/10.1080/09636410591001474; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Daryl Press, buying the islands. Behind the scenes, it also reached scale military invasion of China. Even still, the Chinese “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/2005): out to Chinese officials, arguing it was better for the government only began meaningfully escalating 136–69, https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288043467478. Japanese government to hold title to the islands. its response in mid-August, suggesting it, too, had 110 Reinhard Wolf, “Resentment in International Relations,” paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on Status Claims, Recognition, and Emotions in International Relations, Mainz, March, 2013; Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke, “A Clash of Emotions: Initially, the Japanese government thought it might initially wished to handle the issue quietly. But The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009), https://doi. be making headway in gaining tacit acceptance from despite the apparent initial intentions of both sides, org/10.1177%2F1354066108100053; Paul Saurette, “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” Review of International Studies 32, Beijing of this point.105 The hope was to surreptitiously the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands subsequently became a no. 3 (2006): 495–522, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40072200; Richard Herrmann et al., “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September 1997): 403–33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600790. transfer the islands’ ownership without any publicity. highly salient flashpoint. Yet it remains unclear why. 111 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 59; Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 260. 104 Yoshihiko, author’s interview. 112 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 105 Sunohara, Antō, 173–83, 253–55. 113 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 95–96; Karl Gustafsson, “Recognising Recognition through Thick and Thin: Insights from Sino-Japanese Relations,” 106 Sunohara, Antō, 189–91. Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (2016): 255–71, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836715610594.

24 25 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

history problem between the two countries, while and challenged the outcomes of the victory of the in the region and beyond.125 Indeed, as Smith disregarded Beijing’s warnings.132 In the words of Japanese respondents primarily blamed China’s World Anti-Fascist War.”119 notes, in Japan the 2010 incident earned the title a general in the People’s Liberation Army, “Japan anti-Japanese education.114 Nevertheless, these Granted, these diverging historical arguments “Senkaku shokku [shock],” as it demonstrated should view these warnings very clearly, today’s controversies over history played out primarily in existed prior to the 2010 incident, and were known how a “hostile” China might behave.126 Some in China is different from the China of the past.”133 the realm of rhetoric and, occasionally, protests — to activists and specialists. With the dispute thrust Japan even began suggesting a domino logic — The China of the past may have been preyed upon not military planning. The flare-up of the dispute into the limelight by the events of 2010 and 2012, “If we give them Senkaku, next it will be giving due to its weakness, but the strong China of today over the islands, however, supplied these struggles however, the islands became implicated in the over Yonaguni Island or even the main island of deserved to have its wishes respected. That Japan over history a concrete focal point.115 larger “history problem” for the domestic publics Okinawa.”127 These concerns resonated with poll did not do so spoke to larger suspicions in China The official Japanese position is that the islands in both states, with all the perceptions of bad faith results revealing unfavorable popular perceptions that Japan “cannot acknowledge any other Asian were terra nullis when declared Japanese territory that entailed. of Chinese people more generally, likely influenced country, cannot accept any other Asian country’s in 1895. In the decades that followed, China did not The islands became more than just another by recent negative press concerning poor behavior development, believes Japan should stand challenge Japanese use of the islands, and neither vessel for historical disagreements, frustrations, by mainland Chinese tourists in Japan as well as eternally at the head of the Asian powers.”134 This did it object to U.S. administration of the islands and grievances, however. They also came to a high-profile scandal involving poisoned Chinese corresponded to more general views recorded in after World War II. From the Japanese perspective, implicate higher matters of justice. In China, food imports, but also suggesting possible racist polls: Large majorities of Chinese respondents the Chinese government’s 1971 claim thus appeared this is exemplified by a sudden uptick after the undertones of longer lineage within certain parts of perceived the Japanese people as arrogant, suspicious so close on the heels of the publication People’s Daily referred to Japan as “stealing” the population.128 On the eve of the 2010 collision, nationalistic, and violent.135 of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and (qiequ) the islands in 2010.120 The language of theft only a small percentage of Japanese people The islands thus became a symbol of something the Far East report suggesting the existence of was also used in Japan, where, as one Japanese reported viewing mainland Chinese as peaceful, larger for both countries. In the words of a former significant petroleum deposits.116 In this view, by commentator noted, the logic took the following altruistic, or trustworthy, and a majority in earlier high-ranking Japanese defense official, “it is not making a historical claim Beijing was duplicitously pattern: The events triggered a “[the islands] ‘may polls described mainland Chinese people as greedy, a struggle over economic interests … it is not inserting itself into the game retroactively when it be stolen’ victimhood-consciousness,” resulting in nationalistic, and rude.129 All this further echoed something that would affect the military balance, appeared there was material gain to be had, again “an instantaneous ‘we cannot let [them] be stolen’ and bled into larger anxieties over Japan’s place and so what is left is honor—it is a nationalistic twisting history to its own political ends.117 reflexive response.”121 Certainly, if, as each country in the world given its declining population and symbol.”136 Similarly, a former Japanese vice admiral The official Chinese position, however, is that insists, the islands are its “inherent” territory,122 internal malaise.130 stated that the islands “are a kind of psychological China first discovered and administered the islands the other country cannot but have criminal intent For Beijing, however, Japanese behavior belied symbol … politically and psychologically we cannot and that Japan only secretly incorporated them and is acting unjustly. the notion that other states would accord China allow China to take them.”137 Former Japanese after gaining the upper hand in the 1894–1895 Sino- All the above erupted against the larger backdrop greater respect in line with its growing strength. ambassador Miyamoto Yūji framed the stakes even Japanese War. The islands were thus Japanese of Sino-Japanese relations, in which China was seen The inverse logic of the Chinese axiom “those more poignantly: “We consider giving them up, spoils of war, ceded with Taiwan, and therefore in both countries as increasingly overshadowing who are backwards will be bullied”131 is that great what will they do next, does Japan really want to be subject to return under the 1945 terms of the Japan politically, economically, and militarily.123 powers should receive greater deference. Yet, a part of China, dominated by Chinese influence? … Japanese surrender. But they were not returned, Notably, 2010 was the year China’s gross domestic from the official Chinese perspective, Japan was If Japanese lose the guts to defend the Senkaku, we and the People’s Republic of China was excluded product surpassed Japan’s, becoming second showing no such deference: It obstinately refused become, ‘Yes, I follow your orders, China, king.’”138 from the 1951 peace treaty process. Therefore, in only to the United States’.124 Consequently, within to acknowledge the dispute, unilaterally abrogated Alternately, multiple Chinese interviewees 1971, as the United States prepared to transfer the Japan, Beijing’s conduct crystallized fears of how a the implicit agreement between the two countries in academia and at think tanks also privately islands to Japan, Beijing made its position clear.118 stronger China might behave in the future: bullying to shelve the issue, and repeatedly and flagrantly conveyed the islands’ value to be neither strategic In this reading, Japan is again white-washing past and ignoring the rules and using its military aggression and distorting history, and has “rejected and economic might to assert its prerogatives 125 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 189–236; Shogo Suzuki, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of ?” Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970049; Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia?” 275–80. 126 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 189. 127 Okada, Senkaku Shotō Mondai, 3. 114 “Dai 6-kai nitchū kyōdō seronchōsa” [The Sixth Japan-China Joint Attitude Survey], Tokyo-Beijing Fōramu, Aug. 12, 2010, http://tokyo- beijingforum.net/index.php/survey/6th-survey. 128 Yuko Kawai, “Deracialised Race, Obscured Racism: Japaneseness, Western and Japanese Concepts of Race, and Modalities of Racism,” Japanese Studies 35, no. 1 (2015): 23–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2015.1006598. 115 For detailed analysis, see, Reinhard Drifte, “The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands–Between ‘Shelving’ and ‘Dispute Escalation,’” Asia-Pacific Journal 12, no. 30 (2014), https://apjjf.org/2014/12/30/Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.html. 129 “Dai 6-kai nitchū kyōdō seronchōsa” [The Sixth Japan-China Joint Attitude Survey], Tokyo-Beijing Fōramu, 2006, http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/ index.php/survey/6th-survey; “China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength,” Pew Research Center, Sept. 21, 2006, 4, https://www. 116 “Senkaku Islands Q&A.” pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2006/09/GAP-Asia-report-final-9-21-06.pdf. 117 The common Japanese term is ato dashi janken — entering a game of paper-rock-scissors after the other side has shown its hand. See, 130 Hagström, “’Power Shift’ in East Asia?” 292. Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku, 6. 131 “Luohou jiu yao ai da.” See, Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Oakland: University of California Press, 118 “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 2012, http://english.gov.cn/ 2004), 50–51. archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm. 132 Guo Jiping, “Diaoyudao shi zhongguo lingtu, tiezheng rushan” [The Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory, the mountain-high evidence is 119 “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China.” ironclad], Renmin Ribao, Oct. 12, 2012, 3. (Guo Jiping being the pseudonym for authoritative foreign affairs commentaries.) 120 Chisako Masuo, “Lun Zhongguo Zhengfu Guanyu ‘Diaoyudao’ Zhuzhang De Fazhan Guocheng “ [The Development Process of Chinese Official 133 Jin Yinan, Shijie Dageju Zhongguo You Taidu [The grand international setup, China has an attitude] (Beijing: Beijing Lianhe Chuban Gongsi, Discourse on Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands], Contemporary Japan and East-Asia Studies 2, no. 2 (2018): 17. 2017), 66. 121 Takashi Okada, Senkaku Shotō Mondai: Ryōdo Nashyonarizumu No Miryoku [Senkaku Islands Problem: The Attraction of Territorial Nationalism] 134 See, Wang Fan, Daguo Waijiao [Great Power Diplomacy] (Beijing: Beijing Lianhe Chuban Gongsi, 2016), 279. (Tokyo: Sososha, 2010), 3. 135 “China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength,” 4. 122 Both even use the same word, 固有 (Japanese: koyū, Chinese: guyou). 136 Yanigisawa Kyōji, former assistant chief cabinet secretary for national security (2004–2009), author’s interview, May 24, 2017. 123 Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Springer, 2016); Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 39–63. 137 Koda, author’s interview. 124 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 21. This was mentioned repeatedly in interviews on both sides. 138 Miyamoto, author’s interview.

26 27 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

nor economic, but primarily symbolic and to differentiate themselves from their competitors and was angry with the Japanese government’s it involves conventional forces, the Japanese Self political.139 As one scholar noted, the islands are by playing to popular hawkish biases.142 behavior leaked the footage.147 The leak, in turn, Defense Forces would win.”156 worthless, but one cannot say so because the issue That said, for the leaders managing the territorial ignited a further controversy over the ruling party’s Afraid of what would happen should Ishihara is too emotional. He continued, “The islands are contest, the dispute over the islands constituted control of its own officials.148 The overall effect purchase the islands, the Noda government thus emotionally important. They are just a few rocks, a point of exposure that domestic opponents was a blow to the Democratic Party of Japan. As entered into a covert contest with him to buy them but we cannot back down. Japan took the islands could leverage on a domestic playing field that one parliamentarian who belonged to that party first. Although the Japanese government may when China was weak.”140 was not fully level. Not holding power, political relates, after 2010, “we were in a different political eventually have sought ownership of the islands In sum, following the 2010 incident, the dispute opponents were at liberty to criticize without climate … much of the criticism, or even I would regardless so as to control their use, Ishihara over the islands quickly became about much more offering solutions or, alternately, to propose say hatred towards the DPJ [Democratic Party of accelerated its timeline, limited its options, and than the islands themselves — they became concrete tactics that play well domestically regardless of Japan] stems from that, that we were seen as being brought unwanted publicity.157 Complicating proxies in larger morally and emotionally charged their international ramifications. Importantly, the weak … almost having a collusive relationship with matters, the islands’ owner was slow and fickle, struggles over history, reputation, recognition, conflict also erupted at a difficult time for the the Chinese.”149 causing some drama as both sides sought to curry victimization, and status. There is, therefore, an leadership in both countries. The Democratic Party This, in turn, set the stage for 2012. By announcing favor with him.158 Even after securing the owner’s important symbolic dimension to the significance of Japan, a relatively new party without previous his plan to purchase the islands, Tokyo’s mayor, agreement to sell, the Japanese government worried of the islands within Sino-Japanese relations. Their ruling experience, had assumed power. In China, a Ishihara, cast himself as defending the national he might change his mind. Initially, the Japanese increased symbolic meaning elevated the dispute’s leadership struggle was underway. The conflict thus interest where the Democratic Party of Japan government was hopeful that its counterparts in salience and raised the perceived stakes involved. was a potential source of vulnerability for those had failed: “The government should buy them, Beijing might be amenable to its efforts. As events in power and a potential but it doesn’t. Tokyo will defend the Senkaku.”150 progressed, however, Japan’s top officials came to source of ammunition for Ishihara was known for his antipathy toward the believe that Beijing would object irrespective of the their critics. People’s Republic of China — frequently referring timing and thus it would be better to finish with Within Japan, the ruling to it with the derogatory term shina.151 But this was buying the islands quickly before the upcoming Democratic Party of Japan also a political opportunity. As Noda observed, “He transition in China’s leadership.159 All the same, quickly came under fire was the mayor of Tokyo, but after that he founds the forcefulness of the Chinese side’s response for giving the appearance a new party, and becoming ambitious towards exceeded their expectations.160 that the captain had been national politics, he may have been looking for Even with the purchase completed, the islands released due to pressure something with which to appeal to the public.”152 remained a prominent domestic political issue from Beijing. Linus In the wake of 2010, that is exactly what happened: in Japan. In the September 2012 leadership race Hagström has chronicled One early poll showed 69 percent support for within the Liberal Democratic Party — which was how policymakers, elites, Ishihara’s plan.153 The Liberal Democratic Party playing out against the backdrop of violent Chinese and the press in Japan followed suit, adding the purchase of the islands protests — all candidates but one advocated viewed the episode: to its manifesto.154 Ishihara quickly amassed a large increasing Japan’s “effective control of the islands.161 The Domestic Dimension “a diplomatic defeat,” “caved in to pressure,” number of public donations worth 1.4 billion yen, Chief among these was Abe Shinzō, the victor, who “a humiliating retreat,” “a fiasco.”143 Above all, both increasing his leverage and making it difficult proposed solidifying Japanese control by building In examining how the dispute developed after the Democratic Party of Japan was attacked as to back down.155 Ishihara was also quite cavalier a small harbor or structure to house officials on the 2010 incident, it is equally impossible to ignore “spineless.”144 Even the Japanese ambassador in about the risks. Speaking privately with Noda, he the islands.162 He continued a hawkish line going the domestic dynamics that were set into motion in Beijing was criticized for responding to late-night suggested that even if China were provoked to into the December lower-house elections, attacking both countries. Domestically, the Senkaku/Diaoyu summonses from the Chinese government.145 The military action, things would be fine, because “if the Democratic Party of Japan for “three years of Islands became a major political football. Much opposition also called for the Democratic Party has been made within the international relations of Japan to release the coast guard footage of the literature of “outbidding,” whereby domestic incident to clarify who was at fault. Chief Cabinet 147 Masaharu Isshiki, Nani Ka No Tame Ni [For something] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Chuban, 2011), 87. political actors seek to raise their profile and Secretary Sengoku Yoshito argued the video was 148 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 207–09. political chances by taking hardline foreign policy evidence and could not be made public, but this 149 Kitagami Keiro, Japanese Parliamentarian, author’s interview, Tokyo, June 6, 2017. 141 positions. The conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu was ridiculed as deferring to Chinese sensibilities 150 Sunohara, Antō, 78. Islands supplied an opportunity par excellence for while Beijing spread untruths, such as the claim 151 “Shina” was a term used by Imperial Japan. such outbidding. Advocating harsher measures, that the captain was innocent.146 Consequently, a 152 Noda, author’s interview. On Ishihara’s political ambitions, see also, Okada, Senkaku Shotō Mondai 16–20, 104. domestic politicians and political activists were able coast guard official who had access to the video 153 “Gaikō, kiki kanri’ seronchōsa kekka” [Diplomacy, crisis management poll results], Shizuoka Shinbun, June 18, 2012, 2. 154 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 224. 139 Anonymous interviews, Beijing, June 18–July 5, 2017. 155 Approximately $15,000,000. “Senkaku kifu-kin jōto” [Transfer of Senkaku donation money], Sankei Shinbun, 7 September 2012, 1. 140 Anonymous interview, Beijing, June 2017. 156 Noda, author’s interview. 141 Michael Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse University Press, 2005), 20, 29–35 157 Nagashima Akihisa, special advisor to Noda for foreign affairs and national security (2011–2012), author’s interview, Tokyo, July 19, 2017. 142 Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Hawkish Biases,” in American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11, ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (New York: Routledge, 2009). 158 Sunohara, Antō. 143 Hagström and Jerdén, “Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations,” 276–79. 159 Noda, author’s interview. 144 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 208. 160 Noda, Nagashima, author’s interviews. 145 Niwa Uichiro, Pekin Retsujistu [Scorching Beijing Days] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 2013), 15. 161 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 234. 146 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 206. 162 “Jimintōsōsaisen - shin sōsai ni Abe moto shushō” [LDP presidential election – new president, former PM Abe], Mainichi Shinbun, Sept. 27, 2012.

28 29 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

diplomatic failure.”163 The Liberal Democratic Party drawn international media coverage.”171 Although it islands, even providing media coverage.175 Several Xi could prove his mettle by supporting them, won, making Abe prime minister. In office, he has was unclear at the time, we now know the Chinese Japanese scholars have argued that political which apparently he did.181 Xi continued to take a maintained a firm position, which arguably has Communist Party secretary of Chongqing at the adversaries used the dispute to attack Hu and gain hard line toward Japan in the years that followed, played to his advantage as he has sought to increase time, Bo Xilai, was engaged in a fierce political leverage in the leadership struggle, with some even siding with the People’s Liberation Army in 2013 Japanese defense spending and loosen legal struggle for a top leadership position. One of his suggesting the demonstrations were part of a plot — over objections from the foreign ministry — on restrictions on the Japanese Self Defense Forces.164 methods of gaining support was an unorthodox by the subsequently deposed security chief, Zhou the plan to establish an Air Defense Identification Domestic dynamics within the People’s Republic of campaign to foster mass popularity. That Bo might Yongkang.176 Even if this was not the case, Hu likely Zone over the disputed islands.182 The political China are less clear, but internal political pressures have sought to leverage the conflict for political was politically on his heels, with a close aide under logic makes sense: When he was first in office, also appear to have been at work. Scholars have long gain is not inconceivable — it would have helped fire for corruption.177 Consequently, it is doubtful Xi was embroiled in fierce domestic battles, most noted the importance of Sino-Japanese relations to bolster even further his populist credentials while he could have tolerated letting the contest with prominently the massive anti-corruption campaign the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, putting pressure on the center. Japan become an additional source of vulnerability. that has become one of the defining elements of his this being a domain of particularly strong perceived Bo eventually fell in 2012 — embroiled in a drama Unsurprisingly, when Hu encountered Noda at rule. Taking a hardline stance prevented criticism, nationalist emotions.165 Nevertheless, prior to the involving the murder of an expat. This scandal, an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference appealed to key constituencies in the military and 2010 incident, the administration of President Hu along with the larger leadership succession on Sept. 9, 2012, he strongly conveyed Beijing’s security apparatuses, and bolstered his popularity Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had been actively struggle within the Chinese Communist Party objections. As Noda recalls, he approached Hu as a strong leader. It would be two years before working to improve relations with Japan, reaching prior to the 18th Party Congress, unfolded at the to give his condolences and offer support for a Xi would first meet Abe, and only after both sides a controversial agreement to jointly develop oil and same time as Tokyo was moving closer to buying recent earthquake, but “not at all responding to had hammered out statements seemingly agreeing gas resources in the East China Sea. The agreement the islands. The Japanese purchase thus came that, what came back was ‘[we] absolutely cannot to disagree about the existence of a disagreement attracted internal domestic criticism and at the at a very difficult time for Hu and Wen.172 As the accept nationalization of the islands ….’”178 Hu’s over the islands.183 time was pushed through despite objections from then-Japanese ambassador recounts, from July warning did not dissuade Noda. The following The combination of vulnerability and opportunity members of various maritime security agencies.166 2012 onward, Beijing repeatedly communicated to day he announced the purchase of the islands. As therefore pressured leaders in both countries to The Japanese arrest of the fishing captain put Hu Tokyo that it should desist with efforts to purchase the then-Japanese ambassador has observed, the adopt a harder line. But numerous minor actors and Wen in a difficult position, as it suggested their the islands, conveying the message: “The Party timing “was a bit diplomatically rude.”179 For Hu, it on both sides — too many to list here — also saw concessions were for naught. Not surprisingly, the Congress is in November, this will be an extremely was a clear attack on his authority. opportunity in the conflict. This extended beyond joint agreement was an early casualty of the 2010 large problem.”173 For Hu’s successor Xi, however, it presented an the many nationalist activists on both sides who confrontation.167 Wen, in turn, became the face of The exact details of the leadership struggle opportunity and a crucial trial. Xi was reportedly mobilized for the cause — online and in the China’s criticism of Japan, sharply attacking the remain a mystery — including Xi Jinping’s sudden charged with heading a leading small group — a streets — and the tabloids supplying sensationalist arrest as “eliciting the anger of all Chinese at home disappearance in September, officially due to a key policy body reporting to the Politburo — to reporting. The conflict also became the subject of and abroad.”168 “back injury.”174 What is clear, however, is that a respond to the Japanese purchase.180 If true, this pulpy books for the general public, ranging from The incident also elicited domestic protests, considerable hardening of Beijing’s position vis-à- constituted an important test of his leadership the People’s Liberation Army Rear Admiral Zhang although these were subject to official restraint.169 vis Tokyo occurred in mid-August 2012, following a abilities and offered Xi the chance to project Zhaozhong’s History of Disputed Islands to former Interestingly, in 2010, Chongqing was both one Chinese Communist Party leadership conference in strength in contrast to Hu. The safest course for Japanese Coast Guard official Isshiki Masaharu’s of the earliest sites of anti-Japanese protests Beidaihe. Online censorship of nationalistic posts him was arguably a harsh response, provided account of leaking the collision footage.184 and one of the last — the final demonstration concerning the islands dropped precipitously it did not escalate out of control. As there were Conspiracy theorists also found an outlet, occurred after the central government had begun starting August 18, and in mid-August Chinese already calls to increase patrols around the islands, suggesting, for instance, that the 2010 collision officially discouraging protests.170 This protest was authorities became more permissive toward apparently tolerated by local authorities, given that nationalist activities, allowing demonstrations and calls for the rally had “circulated days in advance and attempts by Hong Kong activists to land on the 175 Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson, “Real-World Islands in a Social Media Sea: Nationalism and Censorship on Weibo During the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis,” China Quarterly no. 225 (March 2016): 23–49, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741015001708; Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 198–205. 163 “Shūin-sen kōyaku bunseki - gaikō TPP” [Lower house election analysis – diplomacy, TPP], Yomiuri Shinbun, Dec. 14, 2012, 11. 176 Kokubun et al., Nitchūkankeishi, 245–46; Kokubun Ryosei, Chū Kuni Seiji Kara Mita Nitchūkankei [Sino-Japanese relations from the perspective 164 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Security Policy in the “Abe Era”: Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift?” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3 of Chinese politics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2017), 223–24. (May 2018), https://doi.org/10.15781/T29S1M35C. 177 Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era, 23–24. 165 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); William Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation 178 Noda, author’s interview; see also, McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning, 267–69. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Gries, China’s New Nationalism. 179 Niwa, author’s interview. 166 Anonymous interviews, Beijing, June 18–July 5, 2017; Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 151; Bush, The Perils of Proximity, 79–80; Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 162–64. 180 McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning, 270–71; International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters,” 7. Linda Jakobson, “How Involved Is Xi Jinping in the Diaoyu Crisis?” The Diplomat, Feb. 8, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/02/how-involved-is-xi-jinping-in-the-diaoyu-crisis-3/. Michael Swaine, 167 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 191. “Chinese Views Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute,” Chinese Leadership Monitor, 41 (Spring 2013), 9-11, https://www.hoover.org/ 168 “Wenjiabao zongli zai niuyue qianglie duncu rifang liji wutiaojian fang ren” [Premier Wen Jiabao in New York strongly presses the Japanese research/chinese-views-regarding-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute The group is potentially the “Leading Small Group for the Protection of Maritime side for an immediate and unconditional release], Zhongyang Zhengfu Menhu Wangzhan, Sept. 22, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2010-09/22/ Rights and Interests,” whose full membership is unclear, but it first appears in September of 2012 on the CV of at least one People’s Republic of content_1707863.htm. China cadre; see, “Liu Cigui, Jianli,” Difanglingdao ziliaoku, accessed on Sept. 5, 2018, http://ldzl.people.com.cn/dfzlk/front/personPage11962.htm. 169 Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 160–88. 181 Andrew Chubb, “Assessing Public Opinion’s Influence on Foreign Policy: The Case of China’s Assertive Maritime Behavior,” Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2019): 14, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2018.1437723. 170 Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 182. 182 Anonymous interviews, Beijing, June 18– July 5, 2017. See also, Feng Zhang, “Should Beijing Establish an Air Defense Identification Zone Over 171 Weiss, Powerful Patriots. the South China Sea?” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/04/should-beijing-establish-an-air-defense-identification- 172 McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning, 272–74; “Report 245/Asia: Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” International Crisis Group, zone-over-the-south-china-sea/. April 8, 2013, 7–8, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-rocks. 183 Adam P. Liff, “Principles Without Consensus: Setting the Record Straight on the 2014 Sino-Japanese ‘Agreement to Improve Bilateral Relations,’” 173 Uichiro Niwa, Chūgoku No Dai Mondai [China’s Major Issues] (Tokyo: PHP Shinsho, 2014), 143. Working Paper, Nov. 8, 2014, http://www.adamphailliff.com/documents/Liff2014_PrinciplesWithoutConsensus.pdf. 174 McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning, 279. 184 Zhang Zhaogong, Shishuo Daozheng [History of Disputed Islands] (Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe, 2014); Isshiki, Nani Ka No Tame Ni.

30 31 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

was a Chinese plot or that the death of a Chinese here actions taken to improve one side’s position paramilitary — domain, whereby each side seeks to maintain a “24/7 presence” around the islands, a panda on loan to Japan was deliberate.185 Jiun Bang, in the dispute were detrimental to the other’s, advantage through acquiring and deploying 50 percent increase in coast guard tonnage, and the in her excellent work on nationalist kitsch, has thus eliciting counter-measures. Such positional relevant capabilities. Most strikingly, official creation of an amphibious force capable of retaking mapped the myriad ways private entrepreneurs in competition did not just take military form, Chinese vessels and aircraft have become a regular remote islands.200 Japan has also repeatedly sought both Japan and China capitalized on the dispute.186 it also unfolded within the domains of public presence around the disputed islands, challenging U.S. support, receiving assurances that their defense Merchandise included stickers, keychains, shirts, diplomacy, legal contestation, and even historical Japanese control. Following the 2010 arrest of the agreement covers the islands and successfully food, and even alcohol — one example being the research. Through move and counter-move, a Chinese trawler captain, Beijing successively sent a seeking revisions to the bilateral defense guidelines 106-proof “Diaoyudoa patriotic liquor” available set of interactive dynamics emerged that even number of official vessels into the contiguous zone so as to better respond to potential contingencies in an artillery-shell-shaped flask. Private investors now continue to propel escalation of the dispute surrounding the islands. After the 2012 purchase, involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.201 even sought to purchase the trawler from the 2010 forward. The islands are thus also significant in these increased markedly: Sixty-six patrols collision to house a sarcastically named “Sino- that they became a concrete, enduring target for all entered the islands’ territorial waters over the Japanese Friendship Restaurant.”187 In China, the these positional struggles. subsequent year.194 In the latter half of 2013, these conflict spawned videogames, from the cartoonishly Things began with the disagreements over the stabilized into regular patrols two or three times racist “Protect Diaoyudao,”188 to the more realistic Japanese arrest of the trawler captain and the per month,195 and were accompanied by increasing “Glorious Mission,” which was designed by the subsequent purchase of the islands, both of which Chinese air patrols as well.196 The initial Japanese People’s Liberation Army.189 All served to further generated strong reactions from both countries. response was to shift half of its entire coast guard cement the dispute within the public sphere and In response to the latter, in particular, Beijing to the area surrounding the islands and keep up a raise its salience. launched a “diplomacy of anger,”190 expressing constant pace of scrambling fighters to intercept In sum, there has been a clear domestic outrage, suspending meetings and exchanges, and approaching Chinese aircraft.197 dimension to the significance of the Senkaku/ taking various punitive measures. As one Chinese The longer-term response on both sides, however, Diaoyu Islands. Developments concerning the scholar writes, “to defend the sovereignty of the has been a qualitative and quantitative increase in islands generated both opportunities for domestic Chinese Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government both the capabilities deployed in the immediate political actors and private entrepreneurs and adopted a series of forceful countermeasures” vicinity of the islands as well as the overall portfolio potential vulnerabilities for each country’s ranging from sending maritime surveillance ships of capabilities that both sides possess. Beijing leadership. Those not in power had incentives to and aircraft into the area, to the official publication has steadily increased military spending and has The overall consequence of the above developments play up the drama and the intangible stakes of of basepoints and baselines around the islands, to also invested heavily in its paramilitary maritime is a much more crowded maritime environment the contest for selfish ends — whether personal, even introducing daily televised weather forecasts forces.198 Certainly, this is a trend that predates coupled with a greater increase in the potential force ideological, or commercial. For those in power, for the islands.191 Beijing also permitted protests 2010 and involves a multitude of factors. But this both sides can bring to bear. As Adam Liff and Andrew the stakes of the contest — for better or worse — in over 200 cities, some involving violence and the spending includes capabilities that would be useful Erikson note, “Despite … the fact neither Beijing nor potentially included their own political fate. The destruction of stores, restaurants, and property for a scenario involving the islands. Indeed, official Tokyo wants conflict, the post-2012 operational status overall impact domestically was to direct attention associated with Japan.192 Japan, in turn, was host to Chinese ships appearing in adjacent waters have, of quo has significantly increased the possibility of even to the contest and exert pressure on policymakers various forms of activism, as well as protests and late, become larger and more militarily capable, with an unintended miscalculation or incident.”202 There to take ever stronger actions in response. denunciations of China’s behavior.193 Although the a number of Chinese navy vessels being repurposed have been close encounters, including incidents in vehemence of these immediate reactions appears as coast guard ships.199 Correspondingly, Japan has which Chinese military vessels have locked onto The Competitive Dimension to have subsided, both states also took further increased its military spending and responded with Japanese counterparts with fire-control radar and measures to solidify their respective standing in a variety of measures, including the construction of episodes of “mock dogfighting” between both sides The 2010 incident — and the subsequent the dispute, setting in motion various forms of new Japanese Self Defense Forces and Japanese Coast in the air.203 As each state seeks to materially defend 2012 purchase even more so — sparked not just positional competition that remain ongoing. Guard facilities on nearby islands, the creation of a or improve its position, the potential danger of the immediate retaliatory gestures but also a variety “dedicated Senkaku Territorial Waters Guard Unit” situation increases. of concurrent forms of positional competition Military Competition between the two countries. Akin to the security 194 Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 75,142–44; Fravel, “Explaining China’s Escalation Over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” 32–33; dilemma, in which actions by one side to improve Perhaps the most prominent form of positional Adam Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations in the East China Sea and Japan’s Response,” in China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, ed. its security render the other side less secure, competition has been in the military — or Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019); “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels.” 195 Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” 9. 196 “China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace.” 185 Nani Ka No Tame Ni, 49–50. McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning, 264. 197 Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia, 143. 186 Jiun Bang, ““Commodification of Nationalism,” Unpublished Manuscript, (2017). 198 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, (Washington, DC: United States 187 This was thwarted by the government. “Senkaku shōtotsu no Chūgoku gyosen wo nitchūyūkō no resutoran-sen ni?” [The Chinese ship from the Department of Defense, 2018). Senkaku collision to be a Japan-China friendship restaurant?], Searchina, May 24, 2011. 199 Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” 13. 188 “‘Baowei diaoyudao’ youxi xiajiahou, yansheng duoge shanzaiban” [After the ‘Protect Diaoyudao’ videogame took off, it spawned many imitations], Renminwang, July 12, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0712/c1002-18499038.html. 200 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?: China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security 39, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 73–78, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00176; Liff, “China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations,” 17–21; 189 J. T. Quigley, “Diaoyu Island Assault,” The Diplomat, Aug. 2, 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/diaoyu-island-assault-pla-designed-video- Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’and Balancing China’s Rise,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 2 (Summer 2016): game-simulates-sino-japanese-conflict/. 144–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow004. 190 Todd Hall, Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 39–79. 201 Manyin, „Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute,“ 6–8. 191 Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi, 300–01. 202 Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan’s Post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino- 192 International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Waters,” 10–11; Weiss, Powerful Patriots, 160–218. Japanese Crisis (In)stability,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 5 (2017): 604, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293530. 193 Smith, Intimate Rivals, 224–28. 203 Liff and Erickson, “From Management Crisis to Crisis Management?” 605. Although the Chinese government denies the radar incidents.

32 33 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Public Diplomacy Legal and Historical Contestation however. For example, in 2013, two Chinese Thinking in Three Dimensions scholars published a piece in the People’s Daily However, the ongoing, interactive material The public diplomacy campaigns intersected arguing not only that the Diaoyu Islands belonged The recent increase in significance of the Senkaku/ competition is not the only one in play. Positional with two other domains in which Sino-Japanese to Taiwan, but that even Japanese claims to the Diaoyu Islands has three key dimensions. The first jockeying has also unfolded in the realm of public positional struggles were unfolding: those of Ryukyu Islands had a troubled history.213 According is the symbolic dimension, which consists of the diplomacy, with each country appealing for legal contestation and historical scholarship. to one of the authors, the goal was to point out, expanding, intangible stakes that were projected support internationally. As the conflict proceeded, Legal imperatives, in particular, can have quite “If one says that the Ryukyus in early history were onto the islands and elevated their prominence. Beijing became particularly active in broadcasting pernicious effects, motivating competitive not part of Japan, what evidence does Japan have The second, the domestic dimension, encompasses its position — mobilizing diplomats to author “displays of sovereignty” to avoid any sign of to prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese the ways in which the islands became a political op-eds in foreign newspapers, encouraging acquiescence and to counter every move made territory[?]”214 Ostensibly intended to discredit football, generating increased internal pressure demonstrations abroad, releasing a new white by the other side.209 In particular, this has driven Japanese claims to the islands as “inherent on leaders on both sides to take firmer measures. paper, and creating a multi-language pamphlet contests between Chinese and Japanese vessels territory,” in Japan, the essay was interpreted And the third is the competitive dimension, which for international distribution.204 Kitagami Keiro, over jurisdictional control in the waters off the much more ominously, with conservative papers refers to the role the islands have played as an an aide in Noda’s administration, recalled Noda islands. Legal argumentation also incentivizes each proclaiming, “not just the Senkaku, China’s object of various positional struggles that continue presenting him the Japanese-language version side to promote self-serving interpretations while blatant intention to seize all of Okinawa has to unfold. Even as the relationship has now taken of the pamphlet, saying, “one of my friends denying any legitimacy to the position of the other, become visible.”215 The article only provided an apparent turn for the better, various forms of visited China for business purposes and they reinforcing a sense of self-righteous victimization. further confirmation of Chinese malevolence to positional competition are still operative and a gave him this. … We have to give our side of As noted above, the Japanese legal claim contends hawks in Japan arguing that the islands were just collision at sea or in the air could easily set off a the argument.”205 Consequently, Japan began the islands were terra nullis and that, for decades, the first domino. new round of tensions. producing its own pamphlets and videos, and it exercised effective control with Chinese consent, In short, the islands have also grown in Unquestionably, the three-dimensional account diplomats were given orders to respond where while Beijing argues its legal claim on the basis significance as the focus of ongoing positional outlined here draws significant inspiration from possible — at the United Nations, at international of prior discovery and the Japanese conditions of competition across a variety of domains. They existing, process-focused strands within the conferences, and in the opinion pages of major surrender in 1945.210 Discrepancies between these act as a concrete object for both sides to continue literature on territorial disputes. First, it echoes foreign newspapers.206 At times, this bordered justificatory histories feed the impression that to struggle over. As each side has mobilized its approaches that highlight the symbolic dimension of on the absurd, as when Chinese and Japanese each side’s national cause is just and the other’s diplomats, soldiers, scholars, and lawyers for territorial disputes, including concerns about rivalry, diplomats in Britain traded public accusations as is duplicitous. Thus, as both countries seek to their respective efforts, the result has been ever reputation, and symbolic entrenchment.216 But it does to which was more akin to Voldemort, the villain legitimate their claims, they become cemented in hardening positions and more points of friction not promote any one concern — such as reputation from the Harry Potter books.207 The core message positions ever less amenable to compromise. within Sino-Japanese relations. Even after the — over the others, arguing that a multiplicity of each country endeavored to convey, however, was To supplement their legal claims, both immediate tensions subsided, these various forms intangible concerns have simultaneously been in more serious. Beijing sought to portray Japan countries have also resorted to competitive of competition have continued to unfold, shaping play, including prejudices, moralized judgments, as an unrepentant, militaristic challenger to the historical documentation and research. Each mutual perceptions and setting the stage for further status issues, and resentment. Second, it builds on post-World War II order, while Tokyo sought to side has sought to support its position with tensions. Perhaps most crucially, these different work that stresses the importance of the domestic portray itself as upholding a rules-based order in historical maps, documents, and sympathetic forms of competition appear to be taking on lives dimension.217 But it does not treat these dynamics the face of broad Chinese revisionism in both the scholarship.211 History has also been marshalled of their own irrespective of the original value of as necessarily more pronounced in democracies,218 East and South China Seas.208 to fortify domestic support through historical the stakes involved. Indeed, it is, in general, not nor does it focus only on the domestic coalitions exhibitions and updated textbooks.212 Historical the place of those tasked with achieving positional that involvement in these disputes engenders.219 argumentation can work in destabilizing ways, advantage to question the aims — only to find the It additionally highlights how a wide variety of best way to execute their mandate. actors — journalists, academics, activists, and 204 “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China”; “China Publishes Pamphlet on Diaoyu Islands,” Beijing Review, Sept. 21, 2012, http://www.bjreview. even economic opportunists — participated in com.cn/special/2012-09/21/content_485502.htm. elevating the domestic salience of the dispute. 205 Kitagami, author’s interview. Lastly, it resonates with work that explores the 206 Kitagami, author’s interview; Linus Hagström, “The Sino-Japanese Battle for Soft Power: Pitfalls and Promises,” Global Affairs 1, no. 2 (2015): interactive nature of disputes in terms of positional 129–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2015.990798; Pugliese and Insisa, Sino-Japanese Power Politics, 103–27. “Japanese Territory: Reference Room,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, accessed Sept. 10, 2018 at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/senkaku/page1we_000012.html. competition — whether this involves argumentation 207 Tyler Roney, “The Sino-Japanese Voldemort Wars,” The Diplomat, Jan. 9, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/01/the-sino-japanese-voldemort- 213 Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, “Lun maguantiaoyue and diaoyudao wenti” [Discussing the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu Islands wars-chinas-doomed-pr-battle/. Question], Renmin Ribao, May 8, 2013, 9. 208 Hagström, “The Sino-Japanese Battle for Soft Power”; Pugliese and Insisa, Sino-Japanese Power Politics, 103–27. 214 “Renminribao kan wen zhiyi liuqiu guishu” [The People’s Daily publishes an essay questioning the ownership of the Ryukyus], Zhongguo 209 Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” 906; Paul O’Shea, “Sovereignty and the Senkaku/Diaoyu guangbowang, accessed Sept. 11, 2018, http://china.cnr.cn/xwwgf/201305/t20130510_512557847.shtml. Territorial Dispute, Working Paper 240,” (Stockholm: EJIS Stockholm School of Economics, 2012). 215 “Chūgoku no Okinawa ronbun” [China’s Okinawa essay], Sankei Shinbun, May 10, 2013, 2. 210 “Senkaku Islands Q&A”; “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China.” 216 Hassner, “The Path to Intractability”; Barbara Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Review 5, no. 211 “Commissioned Research Report on Archives of Senkaku Islands,” Office of Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty, Cabinet 4 (December 2003): 137–53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186399; Colaresi et al., Strategic Rivalries in World Politics; Monica Toft, “Indivisible Office, Japan, accessed Sept. 10, 2018, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/report/senkaku.html; “Diaoyu Dao: The Inherent Territory of China,” Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War,” Security Studies 12, no. 2 (2002): 82–119, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410212120010. National Marine Data and Information Service, accessed Sept. 10, 2018, http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/. 217 Sumit Ganguly and William Thompson, Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games (Redwood City, CA: Stanford 212 “Shenyang ‘9-18’ lishibowuguan: jiang zengjia diaoyudao shishi zhanlan neirong” [Shenyang 9-18 history museum: will increase content University Press, 2011). of Diaoyu Island historical exhibit], Renminwang, Sept. 15, 2012, http://japan.people.com.cn/35467/7949966.html; “Ryōdo shuken tenji-kan 218 Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, “Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes,” Journal of hōmupēji” [National Museum of Territory and History Homepage], Japan, accessed Sept. 11, 2018, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo/tenjikan/; “New Conflict Resolution 46, no. 6 (2002), https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002200202237928. Chinese Textbook Lays Claim to Senkakus, Dates Start of War with Japan to 1931,” Japan Times, Sept. 1, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/2017/09/01/national/new-chinese-textbook-lays-claim-senkakus-dates-start-war-japan-1931/; “Japanese Textbooks Toe Government Line on 219 Stacie Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (January 2006): Disputed Islands,” Nikkei Asian Review, April 7, 2015, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japanese-textbooks-toe-government-line-on-disputed-islands. 35–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060024.

34 35 The Scholar More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

or militarization — but broadens the focus to include support, his threat to purchase the islands would contest over the islands is distinctly characterized Todd Hall is an associate professor in the arenas of international public diplomacy, legal have lacked credibility. Without the domestic by being initially unwelcome by both sides and the Department of Politics and International rationalization, and historical research.220 significance of the islands as a source of political seemingly detached from the actual, tangible stakes Relations and tutor in politics at St Anne’s College. Beyond this, however, it is crucial to note that vulnerability — whether for the beleaguered involved. Given the potential dangers implicated His research interests extend to the areas of none of the developments outlined above played Democratic Party of Japan government or during in this dispute, making sense of it is an important international relations theory; the intersection of out in isolation. Quite the contrary. At various the troubled leadership transition in Beijing — both task in and of itself. Moreover, understanding the emotion, affect, and foreign policy; and Chinese times, when one facet of the islands’ significance governments would have perhaps had more room dynamics at work can help inform how we consider foreign policy. Recent publications include articles increased, the other dimensions were affected as to delay, downplay the issue, or seek alternative potential paths forward. on the dynamics of crises in East Asia, provocation well. The island’s growing symbolic significance, courses of action. Lastly, without the significance That said, there is no erasing the past. The in international relations, and the lessons of for instance, rendered them more attractive for use of the islands as a concrete and enduring focal politicized nature of the dispute means the options World War I for contemporary East Asian as a domestic political football. Indeed, a variety of point of positional jockeying that continues even available for reversing the developments of the past international politics. Professor Hall is also the substate actors in the domestic realm — politicians, now on multiple fronts, the potential risk of new several years are quite limited. However, one could author of Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion journalists, online commentators, demonstrators, cycles of conflict involving the islands would be endeavor to call public attention to the limited on the International Stage (Cornell University even businesses producing nationalist kitsch such significantly reduced. tangible worth of the islands. Taking into account Press), which was named co-recipient of the as “Diaoyu Beer,” sporting the exhortation to both the tremendous value of stable economic and International Studies Association’s 2016 Diplomatic “drink the Diaoyu, strengthen your patriotism!”221 political relations between Japan and the People’s Studies Section Book Award. — leveraged the symbolic import of the islands to Conclusion Republic of China, not to mention the massive their own ends. But at the same time, the symbolic potential damage even a minor armed clash over Acknowledgements: This paper is the result of meaning of the islands also grew in return as a In many ways, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have the islands might produce, the concrete value of much time, attention, and assistance from many result of their activism. Ishihara, in particular, was played the role of what the famous British film the islands pales in comparison, especially in individuals. I want to thank Andrea Bjorklund, a key protagonist in this regard, stoking concerns director Alfred Hitchcock labeled a “MacGuffin” light of their relative unimportance for individual Ja Ian Chong, Janina Dill, Reinhard Drifte, Sarah that “before we know it, Japan could become the — an object that the protagonists of a narrative citizens’ lives and livelihoods. Framing the dispute Eaton, Erik Gartzke, Chenchao Lian, David Leheny, sixth star on China’s national flag.”222 find themselves struggling to obtain. For instance, in this manner would create political incentives to Kate Sullivan de Estrada, and anonymous reviewers The rising symbolic and domestic stakes attached “in crook stories it is always the necklace and spy contain or shelve the conflict and work to detach for this journal for their extraordinarily helpful to the islands, in turn, increased the weight of stories it is always the papers.” 223 For Hitchcock, the islands from the intangible significance they feedback, as well as participants in sessions at the demands on policymakers to take firmer measures, the attributes of the MacGuffin were more or less have come to accrue. But at the same time, there University of Oxford, the University of Cambridge, both in the waters around the islands and in the irrelevant. The MacGuffin was only important are parties on either side who might strongly the University of Goettingen, the University arena of international public opinion. These actions, because it gave the main characters something push back against such attempts — and indeed, of Tokyo, and the 2019 International Studies however, set in motion their own escalatory, to fight over, thus driving the plot forward and a number of China hawks already have225 — thus Association Annual Meeting in Toronto for their interactive dynamics, generating additional points rendering the film compelling. In Hitchcock’s words, rendering this option decidedly difficult. comments. Rosemary Foot deserves special thanks of friction. The People’s Daily article on the “the logicians are all wrong in trying to figure out And while recent efforts to set up crisis for suffering through multiple drafts and offering “unresolved” status of Okinawa mentioned above is a the truth of a MacGuffin, since it’s beside the point. communication mechanisms are to be welcomed, so many brilliant insights. I am very grateful to the prime example of this — an escalation in the realm of … To me, the narrator, [it is] of no importance more needs to be done to decrease the possibility Social Science Research Council’s Abe Fellowship historical argumentation that provided ammunition whatever.”224 Similarly, the argument here is that of dangerous incidents in the vicinity of the islands. for funding and supporting research for this project, to Japanese hawks while exacerbating more general asking after the “truth” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu One avenue would be an agreement to mutually and especially to Nicole Restrick Levit and Tak Japanese concerns over China’s intentions. Moves Islands, in terms of their prior strategic, economic, reduce or limit deployments to the area coupled Ozaki — who went way beyond the call of duty — such as this only served to further heighten the or historic value, is not of much analytical use. with the explicit understanding that this would for all their support. I am also very indebted to the symbolic and domestic import of the islands. Rather, we should look to the roles they play in alter neither side’s legal position. Even better, Institute for Social Studies at the University of Tokyo Conversely, while counterfactuals are always the larger story. They are significant within Sino- declaring the islands and their territorial waters a for hosting me, and Maeda Hiroko, Kawashima problematic, there exists a strong logical argument Japanese relations as a symbol, a domestic political mutually recognized nature sanctuary would offer Shin, Matsuda Yasuhiro, Gregory Noble, Takahara that were one to have stripped away any one of football, and an object of various forms of ongoing good reason to keep ships out of the vicinity.226 Akio, and so many more ( for whom I will err on these dimensions of the islands’ significance, positional competition. Currently, however, this option is unlikely to find the side of caution in leaving anonymous) for being events might have played out quite differently. The purpose of this article has been to provide much domestic support in either country. so welcoming to me while I was in Tokyo. A similar Without the ineffable anxieties, frustrations, and an evidence-based, theoretically informed account Whatever measures are taken, the eventual goal debt of gratitude goes to all those in China who took resentments that became symbolically attached of how and why the contest over the Senkaku/ should be to return the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands the time to speak with me and who also, for obvious to the islands, the islands would arguably have Diaoyu Islands has turned into what it is. The to the periphery of Sino-Japanese relations. After reasons, will remain anonymous. Megan Oprea been less salient a political issue for domestic three-dimensional approach taken here may apply all, despite the swirl of anxiety and resentment, provided excellent editing help in getting this article opportunists to exploit. Here, too, Ishihara to other disputes to greater or lesser degrees as political struggles and intrigue, and contests for polished for publication. It goes without saying, the looms especially large. Had he not been able to well, and this could offer an interesting avenue for military and diplomatic advantage, at the center of views and errors of this paper are mine. leverage the issue for sizable donations and public future research. But it should also be noted that the this dispute lies just a set of uninhabited rocks — rocks of questionable substantive value at that. Photo: Al Jazeera English 220 Goddard, “Uncommon Ground”; Hassner, “The Path to Intractability”; Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited, 110, 424–25. 221 “Diaoyudao pijiu,”[Diaoyu Islands Beer] Lecuntao.com, https://www.lecuntao.com/shop/item-362723.html. 222 Yuka Hayashi, “Ishihara Unplugged,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2012, http://on.wsj.com/19sZwZI. 225 Jin, Shijie Dageju Zhongguo You Taidu, 62–63. 223 Fred R. Shapiro, The Yale Book of Quotations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 360–61. 226 Reinhard Drifte, “Moving Forward on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Issue: Policy Context and Policy Options,” Kokusai-hō gaikō zasshi 224 François Truffaut, Hitchcock (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 192. [International Law Diplomacy Journal] 113, no. 2 (2014): 67–68.

36 37 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

On Aug. 19, 1953, elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’état that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize America’s fear of communism or its desire to control oil as the most important factor influencing the Gregory Brew decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Mossadegh. American policymakers believed that Iran could not survive without an agreement that would restart the flow of oil, something Mossadegh appeared unable to secure. There was widespread skepticism of his government’s ability to manage an “oil-less” economy, as well as fears that such a situation would lead inexorably to communist rule. A collapse narrative emerged to guide U.S. thinking, one that coalesced in early 1953 and convinced policymakers to adopt regime change as the only remaining option. Oil and communism both impacted the coup decision, but so did powerful notions of Iranian incapacity and a belief that only an intervention by the United States would save the country from a looming, though vaguely defined, calamity.

n Aug. 19, 1953, the streets of Tehran shah spent the subsequent years consolidating his exploded into violence. Clashes broke rule inside Iran, maintaining a close relationship out between rival crowds at the with the United States until his fall from power city’s major radio station and central amidst the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79. Though squares,O while an armored column surrounded the various Iranian factions and figures took part in home of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, the downfall of Mossadegh, the coup would not peppering it with machine gun fire. Shouts of have been possible without the participation of the “Zendebad shah!” — “Long live the shah” — filled Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British the air as Mossadegh’s government secret intelligence services. fell from power. From the ashes rose a new A pivotal moment in the history of U.S.-Iranian government, led by former Gen. Fazlallah Zahidi relations, modern Iranian history, and the history of and the young shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, covert operations, the coup of 1953 — the Mordad who returned from a brief exile on August 20. The Coup, or Operation TPAJAX, as it is sometimes

38 39 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

known — has received considerable scholarly needed to resolve the crisis.6 Nevertheless, some Ann Heiss argues, for U.S. policymakers in early Both arguments have their shortcomings. attention. No fewer than four monographs, dozens gaps remain: Britain’s involvement in the coup, 1953, a coup appeared necessary “to save Iran from Nationalization resulted in Iran’s isolation from the of articles, two edited volumes, and countless code-named “Operation Boot” by the intelligence communist domination.”9 Other scholars like Steve global oil economy — by 1953, none of the major oil chapters have been published that illustrate, in services, is still relatively unknown, due to the lack Marsh and James F. Goode have offered similar companies needed Iranian oil and the success of a vivid detail, both the coup itself and the preceding of declassified documents.7 interpretations of the coup decision, while Francis J. British-led embargo had reduced Iran’s oil exports oil nationalization crisis that consumed Iran, Great The insights provided by this new volume of Gavin argues that a shift in the Cold War balance of to zero.15 While Great Britain hoped to remove Britain, and the United States.1 Among this mass Foreign Relations of the United States are crucial power proved critical in motivating the Eisenhower Mossadegh in order to reverse nationalization and of scholarship, there is a broad consensus on how to understanding Operation TPAJAX. While administration to act against Mossadegh.10 restore British control over Iran’s oil industry — the coup took place.2 In 2000, much is known about how the coup took place, Another explanation for the coup centers on where a British oil company had been dominant published an internal CIA history of the coup there remains some disagreement as to why oil. According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, since the early 20th century — the U.S. position written in 1954 that revealed major operational the United States decided on covert action or Mossadegh’s nationalization of the oil industry was much more complex. Continuous negotiation details.3 Other official histories have been why this decision was made in early 1953. Mark posed a grave risk to Western domination of global efforts from 1951 to early 1953 were aimed at declassified, though some pages remain redacted.4 J. Gasiorowski argues that U.S. actions in Iran oil supplies, particularly the oil concessions held restarting the flow of oil. A final offer was made to While the original volume in the State Department’s were largely motivated “by fears of a communist by major Western oil companies in Saudi Arabia, Mossadegh that would have left Iran “master of its venerable Foreign Relations of the United States takeover.” Viewed within the broader context, the Kuwait, Iraq, Venezuela, and elsewhere. The industry,” though there were conditions attached series focusing on Iran from 1951 to 1954 contained decision to remove Mossadegh emerges “as one coup was therefore necessary to restore Western that ultimately made the offer unacceptable to no information on the coup operation, in 2017 the more step in the global effort of the Eisenhower control over Iranian oil and reduce the threat of Mossadegh.16 Thus, oil played a role in the coup Office of the Historian released a retrospective Administration to block Soviet expansionism.”8 nationalization in other oil-producing regions.11 This decision, as will become clear, but regaining control Foreign Relations of the United States volume.5 Iran was a strategically important country due to view is a popular one, particularly in light of what of Iranian oil, overturning nationalization, or Documents in the new volume confirm major details its position athwart both the Soviet Union and the occurred after the coup: The shah’s government serving the commercial interests of the companies from existing sources, but they also reveal much Middle East oil fields, which held roughly 50 percent signed an agreement with oil companies that were not the paramount concerns.17 that had hitherto remained obscure. In particular, of the world’s oil reserves. Mossadegh had chosen effectively reversed nationalization, awarding Furthermore, Iran’s communist Tudeh Party, the 300 documents included in this volume shed to nationalize Iran’s oil industry, setting off an American firms 40 percent of a consortium that while well organized and increasingly active in considerable light on the perspectives of various international crisis that exacerbated Iran’s internal would control the flow of Iranian oil for the next street demonstrations, lacked “the intention or U.S. policymakers at the time, including their politics. There were also worrying signs that he 20 years.12 Viewed from this perspective, the coup the ability to gain control of the government.”18 thoughts and feelings toward Iran, Mossadegh, would soon ally himself with Iran’s communist was part of an effort to control oil resources in The new Foreign Relations of the United States oil nationalization, and the course of action organization, the Tudeh Party. As historian Mary developing countries, which formed the foundation volume has illustrated, according to Gasiorowski’s for the global economy constructed and supervised recent study, that the Tudeh threat was small in 13 1 Accounts of the coup include, Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks (New York: Cambridge by the United States. This take emphasizes an 1953 and that the U.S. decision to oust Mossadegh University Press, 2015); Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, The CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations (New York: New Press, 2013); aspect of covert action that Abdel Razzaq Takriti has “was not made on the basis of strong evidence Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’Etat Against Mossadeq,” in, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 227­–60. A popular, though far less rigorous account, is, Stephen Kinzer, All the noted in multiple coup operations: The hegemon’s that a Communist takeover might otherwise soon Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004). For general studies of the crisis intervention is motivated by “global contestations occur.”19 New documentary evidence indicates that precipitated the August 1953 coup, see, James A. Bill and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil (London: Tauris, 1988); Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); over political and economic sovereignty,” and chiefly British officials approached the United States in Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil: Crisis in Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); James F. Goode, The United States revolves around the control of natural resources and late 1952 “disposed to bring about a coup d’etat in and Iran: In the Shadow of Musaddiq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and Its the restriction of popular political will.14 Iran,” but were rebuffed by Truman administration Aftermath (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1992); and Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988). A few of the more notable articles published concerning the coup and nationalization crisis include, Steve Marsh, “The United States, Iran and Operation ‘Ajax’: Inverting Interpretative Orthodoxy,” Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 3 (2003): 1–38, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263200412331301657; Francis J. Gavin, “Politics, Power, and US Policy in Iran, 1950-1953,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 56–89, https://doi.org/10.1162/15203970152521890; and Andreas Etges, “All That Glitters Is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup Against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran,” Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 4 (2011): 495–508, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2011.580603. 9 Heiss, Empire and Nationhood, 172. 2 A new revisionist school has attempted a re-evaluation of the coup, arguing that foreign intervention was relatively unimportant. See, 10 Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup, 60–61; Marsh, Anglo-American Relations, 152–53, Goode, The United States and Iran, 110. Gavin, “Politics, Darioush Bayandor, Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited (Houndsmill: Basingstoke, 2010); Ray Takeyh and Steven Simon, The Pragmatic Power, and US Policy in Iran,” 56–89. Superpower: Winning the Cold War in the Middle East (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2016), 53–89; Ray Takeyh, “What Really Happened in Iran: The CIA, the Ouster of Mosaddeq, and the Restoration of the Shah,” Foreign Affairs93, no. 4 (July/August 2014): 2–14, https://www. 11 Abrahamian, The Coup, 5. foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-06-16/what-really-happened-iran. For a detailed response to this revisionism, see, Fakhreddin Azimi, 12 Elm, Oil, Power and Principle, 276; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New “The Overthrow of the Government of Mosaddeq Reconsidered,” Iranian Studies 45 no. 5 (2012): 693–712, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00210862.201 York: Harper & Row, 1972), 412–20. For the formation of the consortium, see, Mary Ann Heiss, “The United States, Great Britain, and the Creation of 2.702554. the Iranian Oil Consortium, 1953-1954,” International History Review 16, no. 3 (August 1994): 511–35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40107317. 3 Donald Wilber, CIA Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953, ed. Malcolm Byrne, 13 David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins published online by the National Security Archive, Nov. 29, 2000, 1–3, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/. University Press, 1986), 173–99. 4 Scott A. Koch, “Zendebad Shah!”: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953 14 Abdel Razzaq Takriti, “Colonial Coups and the War on Popular Sovereignty,” American Historical Review 124, no. 3 (June 2019): 880, https:// (Washington DC: CIA, June 1998); and The Battle for Iran, published online by National Security Archive, June 27, 2014 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/ doi.org/10.1093/ahr/rhz459. NSAEBB/NSAEBB476/. 15 Mary Ann Heiss, “The International Boycott of Iranian Oil and the Anti-Mosaddeq Coup of 1953,” in, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup 5 Carl N. Raether and Charles S. Sampson, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951-1954, Volume X (Washington D.C.: in Iran, ed. Malcolm Byrne and Mark J. Gasiorowski (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 178–200. U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1989) [hereafter FRUS X]; James C. Van Hook, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951- 1954, Second Edition (Washington DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2018) [hereafter FRUS Retrospective]. 16 Henderson to Acheson No. 2425, December 27, 1952, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland, [USNA] Record Group [RG] 59, Central Decimal File [CDF], Box 5510, 888.2553/12-2652. 6 In September 2017, the Wilson Center organized a seminar on the new FRUS volume. Included among the participants were Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcolm Byrne, David S. Painter, Wm. Roger Louis, Bruce Kuniholm, Barbara Slavin, and others. 17 For a response to Abrahamian’s “control of oil” argument, see, Mark J. Gasiorowski, “Review of The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations, by Ervand Abrahamian,” Middle East Journal 67, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 315–17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698055. 7 One British operative published a memoir that touched on coup planning in 1953. See, C.M. Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982). 18 Zendebad Shah!, 11. 8 See Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup D’etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 3 (August 1987): 275, https:// 19 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat in Iran During the Mossadegh Era,” Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 3 www.jstor.org/stable/163655. See also, Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’Etat Against Mossadeq,” 227–60. (Summer 2019): 37, https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00898.

40 41 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

officials who thought it too risky.20 Why, then, did on communist support. Preventing collapse by not be thought of as an intelligence failure. Rather, Chaotic and Corrupt Conditions policymakers reverse this decision, and organize a stabilizing Iran’s political system and resuming it constitutes a moment when policymakers, coup in Iran with British help a few months later? the flow of oil, thereby solving the government’s surrounded by uncertainty and driven by a fear In the aftermath of World War II, Iran This article addresses that question by re- financial problems and ensuring a stable source that the worst-case scenario was just around the emerged as a particular point of concern for U.S. examining the coup of August 1953 from the point of revenue for Iran’s economic development, was corner, chose to undertake a radical action in the policymakers. While nominally pro-Western, the of view of U.S. policymakers in Washington and the primary motivation for Operation TPAJAX. belief that it was the last remaining viable option. country appeared vulnerable to destabilization Tehran. It utilizes the archives of the U.S. Embassy The coup was not about countering an imminent In the American hierarchy of motives — which by the Soviet Union, with which it shared a long in Tehran, as well as records from Britain’s National communist threat — rather, it rested on fears of included forestalling the spread of communist border. Iran’s ruling elite, land-owning aristocrats Archives and the archival collections of major oil an uncertain future, concern over an ill-defined influence, ending the oil crisis, and promoting a who dominated the parliament, or Majlis, were led companies.21 In particular, this article seeks to collapse of Iran’s internal stability through pro-Western regime in Iran — preventing collapse by the shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, a young use revelations from the 2017 Foreign Relations economic and political disintegration, and a deeply emerged as a broadly felt justification for covert and fairly inexperienced figure at the time. To of the United States volume to re-evaluate the engrained skepticism of Iran’s ability to avoid action. In that sense, the operation was a success American observers, Iran’s greatest weakness was 1953 coup decision. It draws on similar studies of catastrophe without foreign intervention. — Iran did not collapse, its government remained its “backwards” economy, as well as the paucity formal decision-making by Philip Zelikow as well as Scholars such as Douglas Little and Matthew pro-Western, and the oil crisis was resolved in a of managerial expertise among the country’s elite. Alexandra T. Evans and A. Bradley Potter, to isolate Jacobs have noted the tendency of American way that satisfied Iran’s need for revenue and the Foreigners tended to emphasize Iran’s “feudal” state, the factors involved and lay out a hierarchy of policymakers to “Orientalize” governments oil companies’ desire for control. Yet, the coup where, according to one author, “95% of the people motives influencing a key foreign policy decision, and individuals in the Middle East, assembling decision had significant implications for the future are impoverished, ignorant and inarticulate.”26 Iran one that would have momentous consequences, a “hierarchy of race and culture” built on of Iran and its relations with the United States, was a country, wrote Ambassador John C. Wiley both for the United States and Iran.22 assumptions of Arab and Iranian inferiority and narrowing subsequent U.S. policy and staining in 1950, “of archaic feudalism,” where economic Specifically, this article examines the formation the struggle of Middle Eastern cultures to adapt the shah’s post-coup government with a mark of conditions “involving hunger and despair…are an of a “collapse narrative” that emerged based on to Western concepts of modernity.24 Persistent illegitimacy. obvious invitation to subversive activities.”27 State intelligence assessments of the internal conditions notions of Iranian incapacity, born out of prior The first section of this article details the Department officials observing Iran’s attempts in Iran in the years leading up to the coup. This experiences and bolstered by broader views of historical background, including American views of at economic development after World War II narrative shaped policy in a way that made covert the Middle East, affected U.S. thinking and fed Iran before 1951, the rise of Mossadegh, and the oil advocated for “a complete revolution of the action in Iran more likely. The collapse narrative into the collapse narrative. Officials viewed Iran nationalization crisis. The second section analyzes present system of management,” which could only incorporated concerns over oil with the well- as backward, feudal, and vulnerable to social the collapse narrative put forward by various U.S. be accomplished “under the temporary control articulated fears of Iran “falling behind the Iron revolution. American thinking emphasized officials at the time based on assessments of Iran’s of foreigners.”28 Wiley suggested an aggressive Curtain.”23 Faced with an embargo on oil exports, economic development driven by central state oil-less economy and Mossadegh’s capacity to policy of economic and military assistance: Aid Mossadegh launched a series of policies in late 1952 growth as a cure for these apparent ills — a view manage it effectively. The third section considers disbursements, “properly controlled,” would give designed to render Iran “oil-less.” While his policies that prioritized security over democracy and thus the coup decision itself, the option of taking the United States the ability “to shape [the] course may have worked in time to detach Iran from the favored authoritarian modernizing regimes over covert action, and the circumstances surrounding of events; though of course our control should influence of oil, the notion of an oil-less Iran filled popular democratic coalitions.25 Establishing such the Eisenhower administration’s deliberations remain imperceptible.”29 Max Weston Thornburg, the United States with dread. The collapse narrative, a regime in Iran, backed with U.S. support and in early 1953. The fourth and final section lays a former oil executive who served as economic a predictive analytical framework for viewing funded through oil revenues, seemed the only way out the hierarchy of motives that went into the adviser to the shah’s government from 1948 to developments within Mossadegh’s Iran that soon to prevent an Iranian collapse — an outcome that coup decision and explores the coup’s aftermath. 1951, summed up the problem in a dispatch to permeated policymaking discourse in both Tehran would have had disastrous strategic ramifications I argue that Operation TPAJAX was meant to Wiley: “The practical difficulty of turning money, and Washington D.C., rested upon two foundations: for the United States and would have impaired prevent a collapse in Iran — a vaguely defined ideas and good intentions into real works, however that oil-less economics was not sustainable for future access to Middle Eastern oil. though omnipresent fear in the minds of American simple, by people who don’t know how to do it.”30 Iran in the long term, and that, without an oil While certain policymakers, particularly CIA policymakers — and restore the flow of Iranian oil, Iran’s access to oil revenues seemed to offer agreement, the National Front government was not Director Allen Dulles, exaggerated the threat of not for the sake of American oil companies, but as the nation a way toward lasting stability. Oil was capable of managing Iran’s affairs without leaning collapse, the decision to remove Mossadegh should a way to “save” Iran from a future without oil and discovered in 1908 in Iran’s southwestern province put it back on the path toward progress. of Khuzestan, and, by 1950, Iran was the fourth- 20 Memo, Jernegan to Matthews, October 23, 1952; Byroade to Matthews, November 26,1952; Memo of Conversation, December 3, 1952. Thanks largest oil producer in the world. The oil industry in to the National Security Archive for making these documents available: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup- Iran, as in other Middle Eastern states, was owned new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. and operated by a foreign company: in this case, 21 Documents from Record Group 59 and Record Group 84 (RG 59 and RG 84) were viewed in the Main Reading Room, United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland. British Petroleum Archive (BP) at the University of Warwick, Coventry, UK. 26 A.C. Millspaugh, “The Persian-British Oil Dispute,” Foreign Affairs II, no. 3 (April 1933): 521–25, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united- 22 Philip Zelikow, “Why Did America Cross the Pacific? Reconstructing the U.S. Decision to Take the Philippines, 1898-99,” Texas National Security kingdom/1933-04-01/persian-british-oil-dispute. Review 1 no. 1 (December 2017): 36­–67, https://tnsr.org/2017/11/america-cross-pacific-reconstructing-u-s-decision-take-philippines-1898-99/; Alexandra T. Evans and A. Bradley Potter, “When Do Leaders Change Course? Theories of Success and the American Withdrawal From , 27 Telegram, Wiley to Acheson, Feb. 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Vol. V, ed. Herbert A. Fine et al., no. 217, 1983-1984,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 10–38, https://tnsr.org/2019/02/when-do-leaders-change-course-theories-of- (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d217. success-and-the-american-withdrawal-from-beirut-1983-1984/. 28 From USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 7243: Memo by Dean Acheson, August 17, 1946, 891.50/8-1746; Memo of Conversation, October 8, 1948, 23 Wilber, CIA Clandestine Service History, 1. 891.50/10-848; “Need for Improving the Economic Conditions in Iran,” 891.50 SEVEN YEAR PLAN/6-2248; “Memorandum on the Naficy Plan,” March 12, 1948, 891.50 SEVEN YEAR PLAN/6-2248, U.S. Embassy No. 179, June 22, 1948, Enclosure No. 3; Memo of Conversation, February 28, 1946, USNA 24 Quote from Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945, 3rd Edition (Chapel Hill: University of RG 59 CDF, Box 7244, 891.51/2-2846; Allen to State, no. 575, June 28, 1947, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 7245891.60/6-2847. North Carolina, 2008), 28. See also, Matthew F. Jacobs, Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 12–27. 29 Wiley to State, no. 179, February 1, 1950, USNA RG 84 U.S. Legation & Embassy, Tehran, Classified General Records[USLETCGR] 1950–1952, Box 35; Richards to Acheson, No. 673, April 13, 1950, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR 1950–1052, Box 35. 25 For an example of this trend in thinking, see, Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). For development ideology in the Cold War, see, Michael E. Latham, The Right 30 Thornburg to US Ambassador, March 5, 1950, recovered from World Bank General Archives, WB IBRD/IDA MNA Folder ID 1805823, http:// Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development and US Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/162371403270473426/wbg-archives-1805823.pdf.

42 43 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later renamed Mossadegh was one of the first postcolonial a powerful political force. Failure to satisfy this total quantity of rials in circulation by 20 percent.37 British Petroleum, or BP). The company was deeply nationalist politicians to emerge in the Middle sentiment at a time of intense internal instability Mossadegh’s embrace of Keynesian economics unpopular in Iran. Royalty payments, which had East, and his program of nationalization provided a in Iran could potentially lead to a worse outcome. provided a temporary boost to the marketplace. lagged behind company profits and tax payments blueprint for other leaders, including Egypt’s Gamal At the same time, officials in the Truman Iran’s agricultural sector, which accounted for 80 to the British government, were considered unfairly Abdel Nasser, who would nationalize the Suez administration were unwilling to abandon the percent of its gross national product, thrived in low. Great Britain had historically interfered in Canal in 1956. Rather than take sides in the Cold British, an important Cold War ally, and were the midst of the oil shutdown. Good harvests in Iran’s internal affairs and thus the Anglo-Iranian War, Mossadegh sought to maintain a middle path. conscious of protecting American oil companies 1951–52 and 1952–53 improved rural employment Oil Company was widely seen by most Iranians, His outlook, while largely pro-Western, was neutral from further nationalizations. Any resolution to and cut back on the need for imports. It is particularly an emerging class of nationalist and emphasized Iran’s independence. Mossadegh the crisis in Iran had to contain the “contagion” possible an Iranian economy without oil would politicians, as a front for British power.31 was also not a communist — in fact, when he first of nationalization, preventing it from spreading have succeeded, provided Mossadegh had been With the United States standing aloof, tensions came to power, Soviet propaganda vilified him as elsewhere. Thus, between May 1951 and March able to maintain political stability.38 within Iran increased, much of them focused on the an “American puppet.”33 Even so, Mossadegh was a 1953, the United States focused on facilitating an But that’s not how U.S. policymakers saw things. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This was exasperated challenge that the United States and Great Britain oil agreement between Mossadegh and the United Rather, they perceived an oil-less Iran under by frustration with the country’s corrupt political were ill equipped to face. Kingdom. While Iranian nationalism would Mossadegh’s leadership to be a recipe for disaster. system and socio-economic inequality. In March The British, for whom the Iranian oil industry have to be satisfied, in the interests of global oil While the Truman administration rejected the 1951, a supporter of nationalizing Iran’s oil industry represented a major economic and political asset, and out of respect to the British the American idea of covert action in November 1952, the assassinated the shah’s prime minister, Ali were fairly straightforward in their policy: remove proposals focused on ways to accept the principle Eisenhower administration reversed course, Razmara. In the chaos that followed, nationalists Mossadegh and reverse nationalization. The of nationalization while keeping control of Iranian gave up on further negotiations with Mossadegh, in the Majlis nominated their leader, Mohammed British, as well as the major oil companies, hoped oil in British hands. Naturally, Mossadegh found and approved funding for a coup in April 1953. Mossadegh, as the new prime minister. Mossadegh to prevent Iran’s nationalization from spreading such proposals unacceptable.35 The administration made the decision for a host called for nationalization as well as the expulsion to other oil-producing nations, like Saudi Arabia, In July 1952, a political crisis resulted in of different reasons, but crucial among them of foreign influence from the country. The shah, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, or Indonesia. Working in Mossadegh temporarily stepping down as was an emerging narrative emphasizing Iran’s fearing the new government’s massive popular tandem, the United Kingdom and these companies prime minister. The United States, according inevitable collapse. Included in this narrative support, signed Mossadegh’s nationalization bill placed an embargo on the nationalized Iranian oil. to declassified documents in the 2017 Foreign were perceptions of Iran’s vulnerability, the into law on May 1, 1951.32 The embargo was very effective: The companies Relations of the United States volume, moved weakness of the Mossadegh government, and the controlled the global tanker quickly to support a new government led by importance of restarting the flow of oil revenues. supply and were able to increase conservative politician Ahmed Qavam, who oil production elsewhere to make immediately expressed his willingness to up for the Iranian oil shutdown. By negotiate an acceptable oil settlement “as soon Judging Collapse: Measuring September 1951, Iran’s oil exports as possible.”36 But before any progress could Oil’s Importance to Iran had been reduced to zero. The be made, massive demonstrations broke out in British hope was that economic Tehran. Nationalists, as well as members of the Did Iran need oil? Was it possible for Iran to pressure would force Mossadegh communist Tudeh Party, took to the streets to survive as an oil-less state? For U.S. policymakers, from power, thus leading to a new, protest. Qavam lost his nerve and resigned. The such questions were difficult to answer. When more “reasonable” government shah bowed to public pressure and reinstated nationalization first occurred, U.S. officials amenable to an oil agreement that Mossadegh. Once back in power, Mossadegh worried that a showdown between Iran and suited British interests, and they undertook a series of measures designed to the British would bring internal chaos to Iran, were prepared to be patient in transform Iran into an oil-less economy. Imports making a collapse into communist rule “a distinct The rise of Mossadegh, a 69-year-old Iranian executing this goal. The major oil companies were plummeted while non-oil exports increased. To possibility.”39 The Tudeh Party was viewed as the aristocrat and prominent nationalist icon, able to maintain their control of the global oil make up the budget deficit left by the absence of oil country’s only properly organized political party, revolutionized Iranian politics. Oil nationalization supply fairly easily and, by early 1952, oil markets revenues, Mossadegh turned to deficit financing. one that received considerable moral and material was the most popular political program in had recovered from the shock of the Iranian Two billion rials, Iran’s currency, were released support from the Soviet Union. Even before the modern Iranian history. Support for Mossadegh shutdown.34 between July 1952 and January 1953, increasing the United Kingdom and the Western oil companies and his governing coalition, the National Front, American thinking was more conflicted. was particularly strong in urban areas among While there was little support for Mossadegh, 35 The various phases of negotiation are described in detail in Heiss, Empire and Nationhood. the working class and middle-class intelligentsia. policymakers recognized Iranian nationalism as 36 Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, July 18, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 84, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1951-54IranEd2/d84. See also, Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, July 18, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 85, https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d85; Telegram, U.S. State Department to U.S. Embassy London, July 18, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 86, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d86;, Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, July 19, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 31 James Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Anglo-Iranian Years, 1928–1954, Vol. 2 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 88, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d88. University Press, 1982); and James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism, Vol. 3 (Cambridge, UK: 37 Iran Economic Papers, no. 8, “Imports and Exports,” January 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953–1955, Box 60; US Embassy Iran, no. 46, July 18, Cambridge University Press, 2000). 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953–1955, Box 60; Henderson to State, no. 1245 September 23, 1952, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1950–1952, Box 36 501; 32 For the narrative of the nationalization crisis, see Abrahamian, The Coup, 9–80. Middleton to Foreign Office, no. 292 (E), September 22, 1952, United Kingdom National Archives [UKNA] Foreign Office [FO] 371/98625 EP 1112/29. 33 Maziar Behrooz, “Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 3 (August 2001): 364, 38 Patrick Clawson and Cyrus Sassanpour, “Adjustment to a Foreign Exchange Shock: Iran, 1951-1953,” International Journal of Middle East http://www.jstor.org/stable/259456. Studies 19, no. 1 (February 1987): 10–11, http://www.jstor.org/stable/163025. Homa Katouzian, “Oil Boycott and the Political Economy: Mosaddeq and the Strategy of Non-Oil Economics,” in, Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, ed. Bill and Louis (London: IB Tauris, 1988), 212–14. 34 For the British view of the Iran crisis, see, Steven G. Galpern, Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1945-1971 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 80–141; Wm Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab 39 Telegram, Acheson to Gifford, June 22, 1951, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. X: Iran 1951-1954 [FRUS X], no. 30, https://history.state.gov/ Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 632–89; Heiss, “The International Boycott of historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d30; Statement of Policy Proposed by National Security Council: Iran, June 27, 1951, FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. X: Iranian Oil,” 178–80. Iran 1951-1954, no. 32, , https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d32.

44 45 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

have earned £10 million worth of rials from the was to blame for Iran’s existing financial woes, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s operating expenses, and the country possessed the resources to another £12.2 million from sales of sterling survive for some time, “if the burden was at differing exchange rates, and £28 million properly distributed.”52 The State Department in royalties. Under these conditions, the oil agreed, arguing that Iran’s government could pay company would contribute 4.5 billion rials in state its bills for up to a year, “without any benefits revenue, more than one-third of its entire budget, whatsoever from oil resources.”53 Eventually, including projected development expenses.47 This fears of collapse subsided, with Nitze admitting was an estimate of a single year: A conservative in February 1952 that Iran’s economic conditions estimate was that the British-controlled — its gold reserves, internal credit facilities, and company contributed roughly half of Iran’s state prospects for a strong harvest — meant a general expenditures. Carr and U.S. Ambassador Loy disintegration was unlikely, though the country’s Henderson chose to express it as “forty percent politics remained unstable.54 of the total budget.”48 In addition, oil royalties But fears of a collapse began to mount again, and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s internal particularly after July 1952, when Mossadegh purchases constituted around 60 percent of Iran’s returned to office and began to implement his foreign exchange balance. Nationalization and the oil-less economic policies. Carr and his staff at British embargo removed these lucrative sources the embassy viewed such policies with deep of revenue and foreign exchange. By September skepticism. Minor reforms designed to boost 1951, with exports at zero and royalty payments imports and save foreign exchange would provide from the oil company suspended, Iran faced a “superficial” improvements, masking symptoms trade crisis, a state budget crisis, a balance-of- of an “economic and financial deterioration.”55 To payments crisis, and a defunct development fund the government, Mossadegh turned to deficit plan.49 financing, which the embassy believed would In 1951, these figures produced considerable produce disastrous inflation: “The printing press imposed an embargo against Iran, American external Soviet support à la Czechoslovakia in alarm. Senior officials like Secretary of State Dean has become a source of government revenue.”56 It officials believed Mossadegh’s crusade against the February 1948, seemed likely if a solution to the Acheson, Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze, and was feasible that a government possessed of greater oil companies would end in disaster, particularly if oil crisis was not found.424344 McGhee scrambled to implement an oil settlement will, “sufficiently able, demagogic and dictatorial,” the British pushed him too far: “Any test of will … Heiss argues that U.S. officials exaggerated the and “keep Iranian oil moving.” “[O]nly in this way could balance the budget and survive without oil in the light of the highly irrational and emotional effects of the embargo, misjudged the importance can we hope to prevent the Iranian economy from revenues, perhaps indefinitely. But Carr, as well as view of the Iranians, [would] not be successful,” of oil, and treated Iran as an industrial society collapsing.”50 As Acheson explained to British others at the U.S. Embassy, doubted Mossadegh’s according to Assistant Secretary of State George rather than an agricultural one.45 Indeed, 80 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in November of competence or the abilities of his government to C. McGhee. It was crucial that the “uninterrupted percent of Iran’s economy was agricultural. While that year, failure to reach an oil settlement — thus guide the country. Mossadegh’s reforms were flow of oil” be maintained.40 The CIA thought an the oil industry employed around 50,000 skilled producing a prolonged oil embargo — would lead evidence of growing state involvement in the oil shutdown would promptly lead to “bankruptcy, and nonskilled workers, it existed as an enclave to the weakening of Iran’s armed forces, political economy, characterized by interventions from internal unrest, and at worst Communist control and had few linkages to the rest of the economy, a assassinations and social unrest, “and the rapid the “already overgrown and none-too-competent of the state.”41 With negotiations stalled and the phenomenon that was (and still is) quite common movement toward the Tudeh Party’s taking over.”51 bureaucracy.” The increased involvement of the United Kingdom turning to pressure tactics, in oil-producing countries.46 Information on Iran’s But Carr initially downplayed the risk of an state, necessitated by the extreme conditions policymakers in Washington grew increasingly economy was hard to come by in the early 1950s: imminent collapse. According to him, Iran’s produced by the oil crisis, presaged a slow worried about Iran’s ability to resist communist The chief source of intelligence was the U.S. agricultural economy would show “considerable slide down a familiar slope: “[T]he reformers pressure. While estimates varied, it appeared that Embassy in Iran, particularly reports written by resistance” to the oil shutdown, while Mossadegh are the apostles of the typical ‘bureaucratic five to ten thousand members of the Tudeh Party the embassy’s economic counselor Robert M. could draw on gold and foreign exchange reserves revolution,’ complete with the statism, controls came from Iran’s industrial working class and the Carr. According to Carr, for the Iranian year 1330 to fill the budget and trade gap. Mismanagement and neo-Keynesian economics which have become intelligentsia. Communist domination as a result (March 1951–March 1952), had nationalization of an internal coup led by the Tudeh Party, with not occurred, the Iranian government would 47 US Embassy no. 574, October 31, 1951, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1950–1952, Box 39; Iran Economic Paper no. 2, Government Budget, January 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953–1955 Box 60; US Embassy no. 712, March 5, 1951, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5503, 888.2553/3-551. 48 Henderson to Acheson, November 6, 1951, FRUS X, no. 122, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d122. 40 Memo of Conversation, July 12, 1951, FRUS X, no. 40, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d40; Memo from 49 Henderson to State No. 3781, Drafted by Carr, April 4, 1952, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR 1950–1952 Box 36. McGhee to Acheson, April 20, 1951, RG 59 888.2553/4-2051. 50 Villard to Nitze, Policy Planning Staff, October 9, 1951, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5507, 888.2553/10-951. 41 Intelligence Memorandum, July 11, 1951, FRUS Retrospective, no. 39, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d39. 51 Memo of Conversation, November 4, 1951, FRUS X, no. 120, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d120. 42 Gasiorowski, “U.S. Perceptions of the Communist Threat,” 13, 17. 52 US Embassy No. 185, October 4, 1951, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR 1950–1952, Box 35; Henderson to State, no. 3781, Drafted by Carr, April 4, 43 US Embassy no. 866, Contributions of the AIOC to the Iranian Embassy, April 27, 1951, USNA RG 59 CDF Box 5504, 888.2553/4-2751. 1951, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR 1950–1952, Box 36. 44 Iran Economic Paper no. 9, Balance of Payment, January 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953–1955, Box 60. 53 “Prospects for Economic Stabilization in Iran After Oil Nationalization,” July 23 1951, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5505A, 888.2553/7-2351. 45 Heiss, “International Boycott of Iranian Oil,” 198. Heiss bases her conclusion on figures from Jahangir Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, Iran: 54 Memo of Conversation, February 14, 1952, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5506 Nitze-Linder Working Papers. Economic Development Under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 21. 55 US Embassy Tehran, no. 555, January 17, 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953­–1955, Box 60. 46 Hossein Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,’’ in, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of to the Present Day, ed. M.A. Cook, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 443–67. 56 US Embassy Tehran, no. 824, April 8, 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1953–1955, Box 60.

46 47 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

increasingly questioned elsewhere.”57 To make an the right circumstances: Henderson believed that intransigence during oil negotiations, preventing living indices were relatively stable, and imports had oil-less economy work, Mossadegh would either Mossadegh received “Tudeh-slanted advice,” an agreement and continuing the oil-less economy. fallen while non-oil exports had risen. One estimate need to take full control over Iran’s state and that a number of cabinet ministers were, in fact, Following his victory in the 1952 presidential from October 1952 noted how the loss of oil revenues economy or lean on outside support. Without U.S. “Tudeh tools,” and that “infiltration of this kind election, Dwight D. Eisenhower was briefed had not “seriously damaged” Iran’s economy, thanks assistance, his only option would be to turn to the might result in communists creeping almost by President Harry Truman and Acheson. The in part to an “excellent harvest.”70 Nevertheless, the Soviet Union. imperceptibly into power.”64 In steering Iran situation in Iran, they said, had developed to a emerging consensus in Washington was pessimistic. Carr’s concerns were shared by his boss, toward oil independence, Mossadegh would either “critical point.” Mossadegh’s approach to the According to Acheson’s recollection, “[the] situation Henderson. A career foreign service officer, fail or be forced to lean on Tudeh support. Either crisis was irrational: The Iranians were more was deteriorating … various people put it at four, Henderson had been among the State Department’s way, the outcome would be the same. interested in defying the British “than they were six, seven or eight months,” but sooner or later, most aggressively anti-communist voices, “a By late 1952 and into early 1953, these views in the economic benefits which might come to “we would reach … the point of no return.”71 Fear hard-line anti-Soviet diplomat,” according to his were becoming well represented elsewhere in the them from the oil industry.” The stalemate at of the future, skepticism of Iranian capacity for self- biographer.58 While Carr’s reports rarely made it all Truman administration, State Department, and the negotiating table and the ongoing British oil government, and an overriding sense that the Tudeh the way to Washington, his views were regularly CIA. According to Carr’s figures, Mossadegh still embargo “had led to very grave disintegration” Party would profit from continued uncertainty synthesized by Henderson, whose impact on retained some flexibility: Iran’s hard currency within both the government and the “social formed an omnipresent fear of collapse that gripped U.S. policy was far more significant. “Iran is [a] and gold reserves, as well as Iran’s agricultural structure” of Iran. Hard evidence would suggest the Truman administration in its last months in sick country,” he wrote, “and [Mossadegh] is economy, meant he could probably stave off that the National Front could survive for a year office, despite signs that Iran’s economy was actually one of its most sick leaders.”59 An oil agreement spiraling inflation, “unless there is a serious crop if it acted “reasonably,” but Acheson and Truman managing the oil shutdown fairly well. No one would halt a “financial collapse towards which failure or an unfavorable export market.” But this no longer thought that likely. “They would act could claim with any confidence when this collapse [Iran] was heading so rapidly.”60 Without access did not allay fears of a collapse. Without a return emotionally,” perhaps breaking relations with the would take place, or even what it would look like. to oil revenues, no government could improve of oil revenues, “further currency expansion” United States and cutting the number of public “If present trends continue unchecked,” however, “the miserable social and economic conditions” was inevitable.65 The National Security Council employees or reducing wages for the army, which there was thought to be a growing chance that Iran pervasive throughout the country. In the absence policy document completed in November 1952 would increase internal unrest. “[I]n a very short would drift away from the West “in advance of an of meaningful reforms and improvements, “[the] concluded that Mossadegh’s government had time [they] might have the country in a state of actual communist takeover.”72 The question galling discontent of [the] people is bound to attract stoked “popular desire for promised economic chaos.”69 Acheson, Truman, Nitze, and others was how to them towards [the] extreme of Communism.”61 and social betterment,” increasing the social prevent this collapse from occurring. Like Carr, Henderson did not think collapse unrest already evident prior to 1951. Furthermore, was imminent, but he pointed to “insidious “nationalist failure to restore the oil industry has disintegration” stemming from the financial led to … deficit financing to meet current expense, The Coup Decision situation.62 Mossadegh lacked the capacity to and is likely to produce a progressive deterioration lead Iran effectively. An oil-less economy would of the economy at large.”66 Deputy CIA Director Allen Dulles, deputy director of the CIA beginning need “skillful, strong and ruthless dictatorship,” Robert Amory concluded that, without oil, Iran in August 1951 and director after February 1953, was the kind only the Tudeh Party “was capable would succumb to “economic and political a noted skeptic of the Mossadegh government. In of furnishing.”63 Since the National Front took disintegration.”67 Secretary of Defense Robert A. May 1951, just after nationalization of the oil supply, power, “there has been a marked deterioration Lovett felt urgent action was needed “to prevent the forceful and gregarious Dulles suggested of forces making for steady administration and the strategic collapse of Iran’s loss to communism,” the United States cooperate with the British and for [the] stability [of the] country.” Communist and suggested a course of economic and military intervene directly: “[T]hrow out Mossadegh, influence within the government, whileaid. 68 But others in the government worried that close the Majlis … at a later date a premier could apparently quite small, could grow quickly under aid for Mossadegh would just encourage further be installed with our help.”73 In late 1952, as his superiors deliberated, Dulles turned to Thornburg 57 US Embassy Tehran, no. 555, January 17, 1953, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR, 1950–1952, Box 36. for advice. The former oilman-turned-international- 58 John J. Harter, “Loy Henderson and the Cold War: An Interview with the Biographer of ‘Mr. Foreign Service,’” Foreign Service Journal (April By late 1952, there was a growing feeling consultant who had acted as economic adviser 1992): 41–45, http://www.afsa.org/foreign-service-journal-april-1992. throughout the Truman administration that an oil- to the shah’s government before 1951 was one of 59 Telegram, Henderson to State, January 4, 1952, FRUS X, no. 139, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d139. less Iran under Mossadegh’s rule would lead to the few self-described “Iran experts” known in 60 Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, January 29, 1952, FRUS X, no. 153, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d153. disaster. However, there were few outward signs that Washington. Thornburg enjoyed “unusual access” 61 Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, October 22, 1951, FRUS X, no. 116, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d116; economic collapse was imminent — inflation inside to both Dulles and the Department of State and Henderson to Acheson, no. 1869, November 20, 1951, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5507, 888.2553/11-2051. Iran had not yet reached crisis levels, the cost of he offered policy advice in meetings, memos, and 62 Telegram, Henderson to Gifford, February 28, 1952, FRUS X, no. 164, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d164. 63 Henderson to Acheson No. 1857 November 5, 1952, USNA RG 84 USLETCGR 1950-1952 Box 36. 69 Memo of Conversation, November 18, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 146, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d146. 64 Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, November 5, 1952, FRUS X, no. 235, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d235. 70 Special Estimate: Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran, October 14, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 132, https://history.state.gov/ 65 Special Estimate-33, Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran, October 14, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 132, https://history.state. historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d132. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d132; National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-75), November 13, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 143, 71 Dean G. Acheson Papers, Box 81, Princeton Seminar, May 15, 1954, from the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d143. 72 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council: The Present Situation in Iran, November 20, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 147, 66 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, The Present Situation in Iran, November 20, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, No 147, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d147. NSC 136/1, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d147. 73 Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, May 1, 1951, FRUS Retrospective, no. 20, https:// 67 Robert Amory Jr., Memo for General Smith, November 28, 1952, CIA CREST On-Line. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d20; Memo, Langer to Smith, July 6, 1951, FRUS Retrospective, no. 37 https://history. RDP79-01041A000100020058-0.pdf. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d37; Minutes of Meeting with Director of Central Intelligence Smith, May 9, 1951, FRUS 68 Lovett for Acheson, November 12, 1952, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5510, 888.2553/11-1252. Retrospective, no. 25, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d25.

48 49 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

messages sent from his personal island in the policy paper that the National Security Council the young shah seemed paralyzed. Arguably Lovett insisted that the United States “must get .74 adopted in November 1952 was much more alarmist the second-most powerful man in Iran was the the oil flowing” in order to prevent the situation Thornburg scoffed at Iran’s nationalistthan similar papers published a year before.78 The populist demagogue Ayatollah Sayyed ʻAbu al- from deteriorating to the point where a military government. Supporters of Mossadegh “are not policy mentioned the threat of an “attempted or Qasim Kashani. While a member of Iran’s Shia intervention became necessary.89 According to the kind of men who can carry out any practical actual communist seizure of power,” and included clerical leadership, Kashani was more notable for Nitze, Iran needed to be pushed into a deal that program.” Rather, the men governing Iran were provisions for “special political operations in Iran” his hardline position on oil negotiations. He was would provide “sufficient revenues to meet its “political flaneurs” interested only in advancing to support noncommunist forces.79 The CIA had opposed to any deal with the oil companies and had economic problems.”90 Talk of financial aid to their own careers. According to him, establishing been active in Iran since 1948, combatting the condemned oil revenues as a “curse rather than a Mossadegh continued after Eisenhower took office a “democratic government” was not necessary. Tudeh Party through an operation code-named blessing.” Should Mossadegh retire or die in office, in January 1953. The president, despite taking “What is necessary is that each of these countries TPBEDAMN and setting up a “stay-behind” a new nationalist government would probably a more flexible position than his predecessor, have a stable government dedicated to the welfare mission in case Iran’s government were to fall coalesce around Kashani. From a U.S. point of view, seemed preoccupied with the problem of how to of its people.”75 Otherwise, the risk was instability under communist influence.80 The United Kingdom, it was better to have Mossadegh remain in power aid Mossadegh. “If…I had $500,000,000 of money and, eventually, collapse leading to communist rule. which had long sought Mossadegh’s removal from than to have such an unpredictable figure assume to spend in secret,” he said during a meeting of his Thornburg felt that this could best be prevented by office, was expelled from Iran in October 1952, a position of authority.84 National Security Council on March 4, “I would give backing a right-wing strongman. A “responsible” after which British officials reached out to the For these reasons, the British offer was rebuffed. $100,000,000 of it to Iran right now.”91 While the regime led by the shah — a figure most American United States for help.81 The British, conscious “You may be able to throw out Mossadegh,” United Kingdom felt the new administration would officials viewed as indecisive and weak-willed of U.S. concerns and anxious to elicit assistance, remarked Smith, “but you will never get your be “more robust,” initially there was continuity in — could impose martial law, rule by decree, and emphasized the threat of an internal coup through own man to stick in his place.”85 While Dulles felt policy. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John reach a suitable oil settlement, thereby freeing up Tudeh Party subversion. The risk did not arise that an operation could be carried out “in such a Foster Dulles focused on continuing negotiations funds for a new development scheme. The key “from the country’s bad financial situation,” but way that British and American connection with with Mossadegh, though it was clear that a for Thornburg was changing the political balance rather from Mossadegh’s unwillingness “to check it could never be proven,” officials in the State settlement was unlikely, given the disagreements in Iran. The goal should not be “how to make an the growth of communist strength.” To that end, Department, like Byroade and Freeman Matthews, between Mossadegh and the British over terms to oil agreement that will bolster up the government they were “disposed to bring about a coup d’etat were skeptical.86 By late 1952, Carr’s reports and settle the 1951 nationalization.92 in Persia, but how to bolster up the government in Iran,” and hoped for U.S. help in replacing Henderson’s analysis convinced policymakers An important turning point in the crisis came in Persia so it can make an oil agreement.”76 The Mossadegh with a more “reliable” prime minister. in Washington that an Iranian economy without in late February 1953. Mossadegh’s position in necessary consequence of that conclusion was It was, in their opinion, “our best chance to save oil was not sustainable, and that, without an oil Iran had grown unstable. Aware that conservative removing Mossadegh from power. Iran.”82 According to one agent’s recollection, the settlement, Mossadegh would lead the country forces were maneuvering against him, in February Documents in the 2017 Foreign Relations of the offer was favorably received by Dulles and Frank into disaster. But a coup to remove him did not 1953 Mossadegh demanded the shah abandon United States volume indicate that U.S. officials Wisner of the CIA.83 seem viable. Nitze informed the United Kingdom his few remaining prerogatives and subordinate considered removing Mossadegh at various times But senior U.S. officials, including CIA Director that the United States would not dismiss the himself to the government. Henderson, exhausted throughout 1951 and 1952. After Mossadegh’s Walter Bedell Smith and Acheson, could not see idea, but would, for the time being, proceed with after months of negotiating and frustrated with consolidation of power in July 1952, Assistant a viable alternative to Mossadegh among Iran’s a new round of negotiations: “We would keep the the prime minister’s “one track mind,” “hyper- Secretary of State Henry F. Byroade had plans conservative politicians. Mossadegh had placed his suggestion in mind.”87 sensitive attitude,” and “suspicious character,” drawn up “as to possible alternatives to Mossadeq, own supporters in key army posts: He could not be Instead of a coup, the focus turned to the had come to think further negotiations were method of bringing such a government into power, easily deposed through a military coup. Moreover, question of propping up Mossadegh and staving pointless.93 Moreover, he regarded the shah as and the type of encouragement and support that no conservative political figure possessed the off collapse. Byroade suggested an oil settlement or “a potentially powerful anti-commie element.” would be necessary in such circumstances.”77 The prestige to challenge the National Front, while “substantial financial assistance and a program of Mossadegh’s assault on the monarch prompted economic development” as the two best options.88 Henderson to take action, despite conventions 74 Zendebad Shah!, 119. The island had been a gift from the ruler of Bahrain, with whom Thornburg forged a relationship while serving as a representative of the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL). See, Linda Wills Qaimmaqami, “The Catalyst of Nationalization: Max Thornburg and the Failure of Private Sector Developmentalism in Iran, 1946-1951,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 1 (January 1995): 1–31, https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1995.tb00575.x. 84 Special Estimate: Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran, October 14, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 132, https://history.state.gov/ 75 Memo of Conversation, August 20, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 116, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d116. historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d132; Memo Prepared in the Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, March 31, 1953, 76 Memo Prepared by Thornburg, August 22, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, No. 118, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- FRUS Retrospective No. 181, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d181. 54IranEd2/d118; Memo from Dulles to Smith, Attached Letter Thornburg to Dulles, February 19, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 154, https://history. 85 Zendebad Shah!, 15. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d154. 86 Byroade to Matthews, November 26, 1952, National Security Archive, Briefing Book no. 601, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/ 77 Memo, Byroade to Acheson, July 29, 1952, FRUS Retrospective Iran, no. 101, emphasis mine, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. frus1951-54IranEd2/d101. 87 Memo of Conversation, December 3, 1952, National Security Archive, Briefing Book no. 601, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/ 78 Gavin, “Politics, Power, and US Policy in Iran,” 78–80. iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. 79 Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council: The Present Situation in Iran, November 20, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 147, 88 Memo from Byroade to Matthews, October 15, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 133, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d147. 54IranEd2/d133. 80 Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The CIA’s TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran,” Journal of Cold War Studies 15, no. 4 (Fall 2013): 4–24, 89 Lovett to Acheson, October 24, 1952, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5510, 888.2553/10-2452; Lovett for Acheson, November 12 1952, USNA RG 59 https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00393; and Gasiorowski, “The US Stay-Behind Operation in Iran, 1948-1953,” Intelligence and National Security CDF, Box 5510, 888.2553/11-1252. 34, no. 2 (February 2019): 170–88, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2018.1534639. 90 Nitze for Acheson, November 6, 1952, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5510, 888.2553/11-652. 81 For British interest in removing Mossadegh, see Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup, 11–33. 91 Memo of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 4, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, No. 171, https://history.state. 82 Memo Jernegan to Matthews, October 23, 1952; Byroade to Matthews, November 26,1952; Memo of Conversation, December 3, 1952, gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d171. National Security Archive, Briefing Book no. 601, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents- confirm-british-approached-us-late. 92 The best account of these discussions can be found in Heiss, Empire and Nationhood, 135–66. 83 Woodhouse, Something Ventured, 117–18. 93 Henderson to Acheson no. 2518, January 3, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511, 888.2553/1-353.

50 51 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

in February indicated his desire to rule as dictator, that Iran’s economy was in the midst of a slow but if he were to die or resign, “a political vacuum deterioration. “The need for foreign exchange has would occur … and the Communists might easily become acute. …[L]ocal currency needs have been take over.”98 met in the printing press route. …[T]he inflationary While John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower were effect of this is only just beginning to be felt.” On focused on negotiating with Mossadegh during the the political side, the confrontation in February March 4 National Security Council meeting, they had increased Mossadegh’s reliance on the Tudeh were noticeably more skeptical of Mossadegh at a Party, “the only organization which can give him second meeting on March 11. They felt there was the kind of support in the streets.” Henderson little hope of Mossadegh agreeing to new oil terms, and the secretary of state discussed four potential while financial aid would only delay the inevitable courses of action, which included breaking off and irritate the British. The risks of doing nothing negotiations, proceeding with emergency aid, or were high: Should Iran be lost, the entirety of the removing Mossadegh through covert action. Doing Middle East’s oil resources would be lost with it.99 nothing, however, would quicken Iran’s “drift Dulles instructed Henderson that there would be no into chaos.”104 It is difficult to say with certainty, new offers to Mossadegh and that all his requests but it would appear that the decision to remove for economic assistance were to be rebuffed.100 Mossadegh was made sometime in March or April, Discussion in Washington turned toward “assets with Henderson’s May meeting with Secretary of which could be rallied to support a replacement State Dulles representing a final consultation. By [for Mossadegh].” The National Security Council June, Operation TPAJAX was in motion.105 policy adopted in 1953 outlined plans to be undertaken “prior to an identifiable attempted or actual communist seizure of power,” while The Hierarchy of Motives preparations were made for “special psychological and the Collapse Narrative measures” in connection with the “special political operations” authorized in November 1952.101 Funds The decision to topple Mossadegh emerged prohibiting U.S. diplomats from intervening in local inside the CIA, had the intelligence estimate for Iran for operations were released in early April.102 from several factors. Like their predecessors in the politics.94 “I dislike remaining inactive,” he wrote altered in January. If current trends were allowed to Henderson warned that conditions in Iran Truman administration, officials in the Eisenhower defiantly, “when [the] monarchical institution… continue “beyond the end of 1953,” internal tensions were becoming critical. “Practically all sections administration hoped to resolve Iran’s oil crisis. is in grave danger.” Henderson went to the shah and the “continued deterioration of the economy” of the Iranian public,” he wrote, were growing While the embargo remained in effect, Secretary and implored him to remain in the country. He would lead to a “breakdown of governmental increasingly frustrated with the West, “as they of State Dulles worried that Iran would soon start then met with Mossadegh, making it clear that the authority” and the “gradual assumption of control note the deteriorating conditions of the country. … “dumping” oil on the international market at rock- shah’s departure would “weaken [the] security by the Tudeh.”96 In his report for Eisenhower, Allen Only those sympathetic to the Soviet Union and to bottom prices or sell oil to the Soviet Union.106 CIA [of the] country,” an open show of support for Dulles, by then director of the CIA, contended that international communism have reason to be pleased Director Allen Dulles supplied figures indicating the monarchy. Shortly after their meeting, crowds conditions in Iran had been steadily deteriorating at what is taking place in Iran.”103 In May, Henderson Iran could produce and export as much as 3.7 organized by the prime minister’s opponents, since 1951, “building up…a situation where a met with Secretary of State Dulles in Karachi. The million tons (74,000 barrels per day).107 Such actions including Ayatollah Kashani and several pro-shah Communist takeover is becoming more and more ambassador, drawing on Carr’s analysis, reported would negatively impact the global oil economy and organizations, assaulted Mossadegh’s house, of a possibility.” He then noted that CIA agents had forcing him to climb over a 10-foot fence to take resources inside Iran, “a considerable supply of 98 Memo of Discussion at the 135th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 4, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 171, https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d171. refuge in the house next door.95 small arms…[and] a considerable amount of cash,” th 97 99 Memorandum of Discussion at the 136 Meeting of the National Security Council, March 11, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 176, https://history. Events in January and February 1953 indicated which could be quickly supplemented. During a state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d176. increasing political instability in Iran, which meeting of the National Security Council on March 100 Foster Dulles to Henderson no. 2387, March 13, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511A, 888.2553/3-1353. prompted a more alarmist assessment in 4, the CIA director laid out the situation in Iran in 101 Memo for the Record, March 18, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 179, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d179; Washington. Allen Dulles, together with others the bleakest possible terms: Mossadegh’s actions Progress Report to the National Security Council, March 20 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 180, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1951-54IranEd2/d180; Memo from Morgan to Allen Dulles, April 3, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 183, https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d183. 94 Telegram, Henderson to State, October 22, 1951, FRUS X, no. 116, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d116. 102 Memo, Roosevelt to Allen Dulles, April 4 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 184, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- 54IranEd2/d184. 95 Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup, 49–59; CIA Briefing Note for Dulles, Undated, FRUS Retrospective, no. 159, https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d159; Telegram, Henderson to State, February 25, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 161, https://history.state. 103 Memo, Smith to Eisenhower, May 23, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 211, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d211. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d161; Telegram, Henderson to State, February 26, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 162, https://history. 104 Memo, Mattison to Henderson, May 19, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 206, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d206. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d162; Telegram, Henderson to State, February 27, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 165, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d165; Telegram, Henderson to State, February 28, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 166, 105 A meeting between Henderson and several CIA officials, including Kermit Roosevelt, on June 6 makes it clear that the ambassador was https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d166. aware of the operation to remove Mossadegh. See, Memo of Conversation, June 6, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 216, https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d216. Roosevelt’s memoir includes a meeting held on June 25 when high-level approval was given, but no 96 National Intelligence Estimate, November 13, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 143, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- record has been found elsewhere. See Roosevelt, Countercoup, 1–10. Two CIA histories mention authorization for TPAJAX was given by Secretary 54IranEd2/d143; National Intelligence Estimate, January 9, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 152, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ Dulles and Eisenhower on July 11, but no record has been found to confirm this. See, Editorial Note, FRUS Retrospective, no. 225, https://history. frus1951-54IranEd2/d152. The quotes indicate passages of the original national intelligence estimate which were altered for the January draft. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d225. 97 Memo prepared in the Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, March 31, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 181, https://history. 106 Foster Dulles to Holmes, no. 5294, February 10, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511, 888.2553/2-1053. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d181; Memo, Allen Dulles to Eisenhower, March 1, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 169, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d169. 107 Allen Dulles, Memo for Secretary of State, February 18, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511,888.2553/2-1853.

52 53 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

do nothing to alleviate the economic conditions in at the time indicated that the communist group November 1952, Nitze had queried whether CIA Preventing collapse by changing the internal Iran, since the oil would be sold at low prices and was not ready to challenge the government.114 assets could be used against the Tudeh Party and political dynamics of Iran — “bolstering up” a in relatively small amounts, yielding little revenue. The CIA had infiltrated the organization and had Kashani, whose aggressive form of nationalism was government so it could then reach an oil agreement At the March 4 and March 11 National Security up-to-date information on key decisions.115 Allen viewed as particularly destabilizing.119 If matters and forestall the fall into chaos and communism, as Council meetings, both the Dulles brothers and Dulles and Henderson chose to emphasize the were left to drift and Mossadegh became suddenly Thornburg put it — was the goal of TPAJAX.123 The Eisenhower expressed concern over losing access “imperceptible” increase in the Tudeh Party’s incapacitated, Kashani’s leadership of the National operation was not meant to prevent a communist to Middle Eastern oil. On March 11, Eisenhower power, and the “gradual assumption of control” it Front was more or less assured. Avoiding this coup, but to reverse conditions that might result noted that an agreement with Mossadegh “might could engineer.116 The February crisis was decisive: outcome was another reason the United States in a communist government, while producing the not be worth the paper it was written on,” and Mossadegh broke with the shah and his former opted for covert action.120 conditions necessary to restart the flow of oil. might disrupt concessions elsewhere if the terms ally Kashani, and adopted a more lenient attitude In the hierarchy of motives behind Operation This becomes clear when examining the planning were “too favorable” to Iran.108 toward the communist organization. As one Iranian TPAJAX, concerns over Iran’s oil nationalization phase of the coup and the operation’s immediate Such comments have led historians to speculate minister explained to the U.S. embassy in Iran, and the communist threat were both important, aftermath. In 1952, the State Department’s John that the Eisenhower administration, which enjoyed Mossadegh could not fight both his conservative but they were not, by themselves, crucial to the Leavitt was considering potential strategies close ties to the American oil industry, sought to opposition and the communists, and had opted for final decision to back the coup. Instead, both oil should Mossadegh be removed from power. A new remove Mossadegh in order to gain access to Iranian a marriage of convenience.117 Mossadegh may have and communism factored into the decision through government would be given a sizable loan with oil and protect Western oil interests elsewhere.109 been acting strategically, but his maneuver seemed the predictive analytical framework of the collapse further aid “contingent on a satisfactory solution Such motivations did influence policy, but were to confirm Dulles and Henderson’s warning of a narrative represented in the reports and writings of of the oil issue.”124 The oil issue, however, was to probably not decisive on their own. Both the creeping Tudeh influence over the government. But Carr, Henderson, Thornburg, and Allen Dulles: They be downplayed during and immediately after the United Kingdom and the oil companies themselves this threat was never characterized at the time as describe the deterioration of the oil-less economy, operation. According to John Stutesman, director doubted Iran’s ability to ship large quantities of imminent. the consequent increase in communist or extremist of the State Department’s Bureau of Greek, Turkish, “unclean” oil when cheaper sources, like Saudi Documents in the 2017 Foreign Relations of the influence, and the final nightmare scenario in which and Iranian Affairs and formerly Henderson’s Arabia and Kuwait, were available.110 The Petroleum United States volume and other declassified sources Iran could break away from the West, become a political counselor at the embassy in Tehran, the Administration for Defense, a branch of the indicate that avoiding a Kashani government was Soviet satellite, and threaten Western access to United States “should avoid any statement that the Department of the Interior tasked with monitoring as important to U.S. officials as preventing the all Middle East oil. And yet, no one in either the oil question is involved in a change of government the global oil supply, felt there was no market for rise of the Tudeh Party. Worries that Mossadegh Truman or Eisenhower administration articulated in Iran,” and the new regime should be deterred Iranian oil and that it would take two years for would die or resign once again prompted concerns what collapse would look like in completely lucid from raising the oil question publicly for at least Mossadegh to claw back market share.111 With only over who would succeed him — something that terms. Hence, its characterization as a narrative: a several months.125 The United States had been 28 tankers of its own, the Soviet Union could not had preoccupied the Truman administration. story of how the future in Iran might unfold, should funding agricultural relief operations through the move large quantities of Iranian oil.112 Rather than With conservative opposition too weak to mount the United States do nothing. Once the narrative Point Four foreign aid program since 1951. These focusing on saving the oil companies, which were an effective opposition effort, Mossadegh would came to dominate policy, a form of groupthink took programs were to continue, even as operations never consulted by the Eisenhower administration be succeeded by another member of the National over. According to the CIA record, Allen Dulles against Mossadegh proceeded, in order to keep at any point in early 1953 (something noted by Front. Ayatollah Kashani was the most likely dismissed intelligence provided by the agency’s Iran’s agrarian economy “afloat.”126 After the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden113), the candidate, given his prominence, popular following, analytical wing, relying on advice from “experts” coup, “substantial economic assistance” would be United States focused on conditions inside Iran. and powerful street presence. As prime minister, it like Thornburg, who shared his interventionist provided to Iran’s new government. Such aid would Fear of collapse stemming from a prolonged oil was unlikely Kashani would seek an oil agreement. proclivities. Anything “incompatible with the keep the post-coup government on its feet while shutdown and a lack of oil revenues for the Iranian Rather than reach a deal with the British, “[h]e planned covert political action … did not dissuade also giving the U.S. leverage over its approach to state outweighed worries of a global oil economy has … urged that Iran forget its oil resources the President, Secretary of State … from executing the oil question.127 without Iran. and develop a self-sustaining economy and TPAJAX.”121 At least one CIA report on the Fazlallah Zahidi, a former general, was selected The precise imagining of this collapse was governmental structure not dependent on them.”118 limitations of U.S. resources in Iran was produced to lead the post-coup government. He possessed linked to the threat of the Tudeh Party. Reports When the idea of a coup was first suggested in but never utilized. Dulles must have either ignored the necessary ambition, was “energetic,” and the report or had it suppressed.122 committed to pursuing an oil settlement “on a 108 Memorandum of Discussion at the 136th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 11, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 176, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d176. 119 Memo of Conversation, December 3, 1952, National Security Archive, Briefing Book no. 601, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/ iran/2017-08-08/1953-iran-coup-new-us-documents-confirm-british-approached-us-late. 109 Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 120–21. 120 Kashani helped organize crowds on August 19 that supported the coup against Mossadegh. There is as yet little evidence to suggest he was 110 Holmes to Foster Dulles no. 4663, February 20, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511, 888.2553/2-2053. paid by the CIA or the British. See, “New Findings on Clerical Involvement in the 1953 Coup in Iran,” National Security Archive, Briefing Book 619, 111 Note to Linder from PAD Deputy Administrator, February 4, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511, 888.2553/2-453. published March 7, 2018, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2018-03-07/new-findings-clerical-involvement-1953-coup-iran. 112 Holmes to Foster Dulles no. 4663, February 20, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511, 888.2553/2-2053. 121 Koch, Zendebad Shah!, Appendix E, 118­–19, 120. This particular appendix detailing the scope of divisions within the CIA was not declassified until 2017. 113 Foreign Office to Makins No. 716, February 18, 1953, UKNA FO 371/104612 EP 1531/158. 122 Memo Prepared by the Directorate of Plans, CIA, March 3, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 170, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ 114 CIA Memo, Undated, FRUS Retrospective, no. 138, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d138; Gasiorowski, “U.S. frus1951-54IranEd2/d170. Perceptions of the Tudeh Threat,” 30–32. 123 Memo from Allen Dulles to Smith, Attached letter Thornburg to Dulles, February 19, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 154, https://history.state. 115 Information Report Prepared by the CIA, April 6, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 185, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d154. 54IranEd2/d185. 124 Leavitt to Roosevelt, September 22, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 122, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d122. 116 Telegram, Henderson to Acheson, November 5, 1952, FRUS X, no. 235, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d235; National Intelligence Estimate, January 9, 1953, FRUS X, no. 152, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d152. 125 Memo, Stutesman to Richards, Undated, FRUS Retrospective, no. 256, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/ d256; Nash to Cutler, Undated, FRUS Retrospective, no. 299, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d299. 117 Memo, Warne to Henderson, May 20, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 207, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d207. 126 Memo of Conversation, June 2, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 215, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d215. 118 Memo Prepared in the Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, March 31, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 181, https://history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d181. 127 CIA Memo for the Record, August 19, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 282, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d282.

54 55 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

realistic basis.”128 An estimate prepared by Donald about the speedy return of oil revenues to help Wilber for the CIA noted that Zahidi, who had Iranian finances, in order to bolster Zahidi and led a number of abortive coup attempts against the shah. To accomplish this, however, Iran would Mossadegh in 1952 and early 1953, was “anxious to need to reach a deal with the major oil companies: settle the oil issue.” Once in power, he would be According to Dulles, this would require the “partial “presented with a draft of an oil agreement,” which negation of Iranian nationalization,” to facilitate would be implemented as soon as his government corporate cooperation and the rapid recovery of was “firmly established,” with a promise of further production.135 U.S. loans and cash grants once the agreement Intercorporate documents gleaned from the was signed.129 Zahidi was also outwardly eager to archive of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later launch a sweeping social and economic reform BP) make it clear that the companies had no need program tied to the new oil agreement.130 Planning of Iranian oil, as the global market was in a state of throughout 1953 was slow, however, due to the over-supply and an Iranian recovery would depress shah’s “unwillingness to take any initiative.”131 prices. The American oil companies initially argued It took months to convince the wary monarch that it would be better for the British to return to participate. Henderson, who had gone out of to Iran alone, permitting the Anglo-Iranian Oil his way to aid the monarchy in February 1953, Company to recover its nationalized assets. But suggested the shah could be replaced if he proved John Foster Dulles and others rejected this as uncooperative.132 politically impossible. Even with Mossadegh out of On August 19, military units loyal to the shah and power, the Iranian public would react violently to a Zahidi overwhelmed Mossadegh’s forces, and after British return, unless it was suitably camouflaged. a lengthy battle captured the prime minister at his The Eisenhower administration directed the five house. The CIA transferred to Zahidi the funds major U.S. firms to take over Iran’s oil industry “in that were left over from the operation (around $1 the security interest of the United States … to permit million), while Secretary of State Dulles approved the reactivation of the petroleum industry in Iran an emergency grant of $45 million. As per the and to provide to the friendly government of Iran U.S. strategy, this aid was applied judiciously: It substantial revenues.”136 Their participation came was used to push Zahidi into quickly confirming “at the request of the United States government, an oil agreement. “The most difficult problem and for the primary purpose of assisting Iran … confronting us,” argued John Foster Dulles, “was to improve and stabilize its economy.”137 The U.S. how to develop revenues for Iran out of her oil.”133 companies were given a 40-percent stake in the Henderson told the shah in straightforward terms new “Iran Consortium,” with the Anglo-Iranian Oil that a new oil arrangement would hand effective Company receiving 40 percent of its own and the control back to the companies, while providing remaining 20 percent split between Royal Dutch/ Iran “income in [the] immediate future from its Shell and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles. oil.” According to Manuchehr Farmanfarma’iyan, The shah’s government was in no position to an Iranian oilman, the proposal was essentially argue with the companies’ terms and approved an ultimatum. If the “principle” of foreign control the final agreement in October 1954. In legal terms, was not admitted, there would be no deal and no Iran’s nationalization remained in effect — U.S. aid.134 Again, the administration’s goal was to bring officials recognized that to do otherwise would

128 Memo of Conversation, May 16, 1952, FRUS Retrospective, no. 73, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d73; CIA Memo for the Record, August 19, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 282, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d282. 129 Memo from Waller to Roosevelt, April 16, 1953, Attachment no. 1, “Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq,” Undated, FRUS Retrospective, no. 192, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d192. 130 Dispatch from the Embassy in Iran to the State Department, May 20, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 208, https://history.state.gov/ historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d208. 131 CIA Briefing Note, April 21, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 194, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d194. 132 Memo of Conversation, June 6, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 216, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d216. 133 Memo of Discussion at 160th Meeting of the National Security Council, August 27, 1953, FRUS Retrospective, no. 304, https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d304. 134 Manucher Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince (New York: Random House, 1997), 302–03; Henderson to Foster Dulles no. 949, October 22, 1953, RG 59 888.2553/10-2253; Henderson to Foster Dulles no. 958, October 23, 1953, RG 59 888.2553/10-2353. 135 Dulles to Henderson, September 23, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511A, 888.2553/9-2153. 136 Quoted in, Multinational Oil Corporations and US Foreign Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (Washington: 1975), 68. 137 “The American Group’s Further Views: Basis for the Settlement with Anglo-Iranian,” British Petroleum Archive, Coventry UK [BP] 66232, March 16, 1954.

56 57 The Scholar The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953

only inflame Iranian nationalism. But the reality adviser and coup chronicler Wilber.143 The same not believe the problem can be solved merely by He also writes on the geopolitics of energy at The of nationalization was effectively reversed, and notion found traction in the shah’s Iran, which attempts to unseat Mossadegh.”146 His uncertainty FUSE. Find him @gbrew24. the Western oil companies would control the flow charged Mossadegh with “tyrannical” acts, was prescient. Iran’s new government came to of Iranian oil for another 20 years.138 The new oil including the printing of new rials. The failure power marred by illegitimacy and dependent upon Acknowledgements: This article is based on agreement was very unpopular in Iran. Together of his economic policies acted as justification for coercion and repression. Despite his apparent a paper presented at the 2019 annual meeting of with the coup, the agreement identified the shah’s his subsequent imprisonment, despite his sincere strength, the shah fell from power amidst the the Society for Historians of American Foreign new government with foreign influence, staining it arguments that the country “could sustain itself tumult of the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79, his Relations. The author would like to thank the panel with a mark of illegitimacy that would never truly without oil revenues.”144 Within the Eisenhower allies in Washington watching in disbelief as participants who read and commented on the paper, disappear. administration, it was agreed that the coup had another cadre of “irrational” leaders took over the including Mary Ann Heiss, Mark J. Gasiorowski, For American policymakers, however, these been necessary, while the efficacy of covert action Iranian state. Roham Alvandi, Malcolm Byrne, and David S. issues were of secondary importance. Without was proven a second time in 1954 when the CIA But all that lay in the future. There was an Painter. The author would also like to acknowledge an oil agreement, Iran would lurch “from crisis to assisted in the removal of Guatemalan president obvious sense of relief among U.S. policymakers in the excellent editorial assistance of the staff at the crisis,” depending on aid “to meet emergencies” Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. “Whatever we have the aftermath of the coup, as oil dollars and U.S. aid Texas National Security Review and both peer- and the shah’s legitimacy would remain shaky done, good or bad … we can at least have the flooded into Iran and the shah’s military decimated review readers. following the coup. Such a strategy would do little satisfaction that we saved Iran from communism,” the ranks of the Tudeh Party and National Front. to create “real stability, permit development or concluded Eisenhower in 1957.145 According to Carr’s successor Spencer Barnes, avoid future emergencies.”139 The new agreement The collapse narrative provided the foundation most aid was wasted and its positive economic was needed to support the government, which for the decision to remove Mossadegh. The effect “sterilized.” Yet, the psychological impact could use oil to fund programs of economic threat posed to the global oil market by Iran’s of regime change and the hope for a new oil development, “[to] meet popular aspirations,” and nationalization remained inchoate and the settlement would offset that waste: “The economy forestall the country’s slip toward communism.140 communist threat to Iran was not imminent. But of Iran has considerable resistance and flexibility Once the Consortium Agreement was ratified by the threat of collapse, imagined through a predictive … [and] political factors are often more important the shah’s new Majlis in October 1954, the chief analytical framework and articulated in terms than economic [ones],” while ongoing deficit U.S. negotiator, Herbert Hoover Jr., offered his either of a progressive economic deterioration spending could probably continue for months, congratulations to Iran’s foreign minister. The or a political crisis brought on by Mossadegh’s “perhaps even a year or so,” before becoming news marked a “significant victory” for those death or incapacitation loomed on the horizon if “disastrous.”147 Nevertheless, the collapse narrative “dedicated to the principle that Iran is to move the United States failed to act. Fears of a collapse did not go away, although the sense of urgency toward social and economic development.”141 Iran had percolated throughout the policymaking did. Subsequent administrations continued to had been saved. The coup was complete. apparatus for months and were evident in the doubt Iranian competence: “What they lack is economic reports of Carr and the political analysis the capacity for sustained, dynamic effort,” wrote of Henderson. CIA Director Dulles was a crucial Kennedy adviser Robert Komer in October 1962. Conclusion supporter of intervention, but while he may have “They don’t have what it takes to run a country accepted the collapse narrative, he did not form themselves.”148 The collapse narrative formed by Carr, Henderson, it entirely on his own. Although covert action was The shah’s form of top-down modernization, Dulles, and Thornburg carried over into the official initially rejected, by March 1953 other options — lubricated by billions in oil revenues, seemed the histories of the coup. According to one internal CIA aiding Mossadegh, pushing for an oil settlement, only viable cure for Iran’s chronic instability. The account, “[Iran] seemed headed for an economic or doing nothing — appeared unsuitable. Once coup of 1953 returned Iran to a state of “stability” collapse and political anarchy,” a state of affairs the coup decision was made, there was no going that American policymakers could comprehend. that would inevitably lead to its transformation back. Among those directly involved in launching More importantly, TPAJAX ensured that Iran into a “Soviet satellite.”142 The coup was necessary, Operation TPAJAX, Henderson voiced the strongest would never again be “oil-less.” “as the alternative to certain economic collapse reservations. Though he supported the action, he in Iran … [due to] the dangerous and advanced doubted whether TPAJAX would bring about the Dr. Gregory Brew is a post-doctoral fellow at stage of illegal deficit financing,” concluded CIA stability the United States craved in Iran: “I do the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University. A historian of U.S.-Iranian 138 The legal means behind the “façade of nationalization” put in place by the 1954 agreement were complex. See, Heiss, “Creation of the Iranian relations and the political economy of international Oil Consortium, 1953-1954,” 511­–35. oil, his work has appeared in Iranian Studies, 139 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, January 2 1954, FRUS Retrospective, no. 355, https://history.state.gov/ International History Review, Mediterranean historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d355; Memo from the Office of National Estimates, March 29, 1954, FRUS Retrospective, no. 365, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951-54IranEd2/d365. Quarterly, and The Oxford Research Encyclopedia. 140 National Intelligence Estimate, December 7, 1954, FRUS Retrospective, no. 375, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951- 54IranEd2/d375. 146 Memo by Stutesman, May 8, 1953, Attachment, Henderson to State no. 4348, May 7, 1953, USNA RG 59 CDF, Box 5511A, 888.2553/5-853. 141 Foster Dulles to Henderson, October 28, 1954, FRUS X, no. 502, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502. 147 Barnes to Henderson, Conversion of US Aid Dollars to Rials, September 21, 1953, USNA RG 469 Records of U.S. Foreign Aid Agencies, Iran 142 The Battle for Iran, 1. Branch, Subject Files 1952–1959, Box 2; Barnes to Warne and Henderson, Utilization of Grant Aid Funds, October 14, 1953, USNA RG 469 Records of 143 Wilber, Clandestine Service History, 1, Appendix B: “‘London’ Draft of TPAJAX Operational Plan.” U.S. Foreign Aid Agencies, Iran Branch, Subject Files 1952–1959, Box 2. 144 Quoted in Katouzian, “Oil Boycott,” 209. 148 Paper by Komer of the National Security Council Staff, October 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. XVIII Near East 1962-1963, no. 85, https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d85. 145 Memo of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, February 7, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Vol. XII, no. 391, https://history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v12/d391.

58 59 The Scholar The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century

Contrary to what is often supposed, urban warfare is not more difficult than other types of warfare. The combat environment is neutral, just like every other environment. Urban warfare is, however, likely to be more prevalent in coming years, which is why it is important that Western armies learn to do it confidently. The current approach to this type of fighting is wrong because David Betz it is burdened by bad history. The problems of urban combat are Hugo Stanford-Tuck not new. Moreover, they are solvable through a combination of hard training, changes in command mindset, and technological innovation. We propose a “strongest gang” model as a realistic solution to the problems of urban conflict that cannot be addressed by the current dominant methods that are too positively controlled, too manpower-intensive, too cautious, and cede too much initiative to objectively weaker and less capable opponents.

The truth is that the jungle is neutral. It provides of three years of behind-the-lines jungle fighting any amount of fresh water, and unlimited cover for against the Japanese in Malaya during World friend as well as foe—an armed neutrality, if you War II, the British soldier F. Spencer Chapman like, but neutrality nevertheless. It is the attitude attributed his success to the principle that the of mind that determines whether you go under or environment is intrinsically neither good nor bad survive. ‘There is nothing either good or bad, but but neutral. What is true for warfare in the jungle thinking makes it so.’ The jungle itself is neutral.1 — an environment that inflicts its own demands — F. Spencer Chapman every bit as severe as those of the city — ought to be true for urban warfare. he urban environment is complex And yet, although conflict in cities is more and difficult. Tactically, it strains prevalent now than in the past on account communications, overloads sensory of demographic trends and urbanization, the capability, and pushes the decision- supposedly challenging nature of urban warfare makingT onus to the lowest level. Strategically, it is — as opposed to warfare in other “simpler” complex because tactical actions are amplified and environments — is contradicted by many the speed at which local and international audiences historical and contemporary examples. There are are informed has never been faster. American obvious difficulties that fighting a war in an urban and British environmental doctrine emphasizes environment poses, but they are surmountable the significant operational challenges that this through a combination of realistic hard training, environment presents.2 In truth, however, the changes in command mindset — at the strategic and urban setting is neutral. It affects all protagonists political level as much as at the tactical level — and equally, even if it does not always appear to do technological innovation (in order of priority). In so. In The Jungle is Neutral, the classic account some ways, the urban environment is a rewarding

1 F. Spencer Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral (London: Chatto and Windus, 1950), 125. 2 See the list of urban warfare characteristics in, Joint Urban Operations, Joint Publication 3-06 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nov. 20, 2013), I-5–I-9.

60 61 The Scholar The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century

one in which to fight because those best prepared nonstate or quasi-nonstate actors. All of this will “to point out lessons [per se], but to isolate things early-modern European fortress warfare.10 We also to leverage the neutral environmental factors can take place under the unblinking stare of the camera, that need thinking about.”9 excluded cases where, although significant fighting use them to magnify their comparative strengths. bringing the local to the global stage and the global We conducted fieldwork in the United Kingdom, continued on the streets after the outer defenses There is no reason why professional, regular armed to the local stage. France, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Israel had failed, the historical accounts of said fighting forces, such as predominate in the West, ought not Together, these factors create a monster — like between 2014 and 2017, which included lengthy were patchy and therefore there was little for us to be the best prepared to fight in this domain. the mythical hundred-eyed Greek giant Argus visits to urban warfare training facilities, including to say about it.11 Our two examples were chosen The factors that threaten an army’s equanimity Panoptes — that looms in the consciousness of observing and embedding in military exercises because they superbly illustrate the rapid political, when it comes to fighting in an urban environment generals and statesmen.5 Seemingly grave tactical for periods of several days at a time. We also economic, and diplomatic impacts of urban warfare. are the same for all belligerents. They do not impact challenges are mixed with strategic unpredictability participated in numerous professional symposia on Moreover, because they preceded the advent of regular Western soldiers more than irregular, in a context of strict limitations on the use of force the subject, seminars, simulations, and wargames, the “information age,” which so preoccupies and non-Western challengers, who are thought to be and acceptance of casualties. British doctrine mostly with the British Army (though nearly always confounds contemporary analysts, by about two unaffected by, or even gain an advantage from, these describes the near future of war alliteratively with an international presence), as well as NATO. millennia and two centuries, respectively, they serve factors. This thinking comes from an entrenched as congested, cluttered, connected, contested, All told, we conducted over 40 interviews with as particularly apt correctives to the hype that often mindset that insists on the uniqueness of the and constrained.6 Likewise, the notable strategic veteran officers and noncommissioned officers, surrounds the topic of urban warfare today. urban environment and holds firmly to certain thinker David Kilcullen goes for three related Cs: urban warfare trainers and course designers, In the third section, we show how a narrow view shibboleths about urban warfare that are equivocal, crowded, complex, and coastal.7 doctrine authors, and subject-area specialists. of the history of urban warfare, particularly one if not outright ahistoric. The better trained and There has developed a sort of orthodoxy, going This paper proceeds in five sections. In the first that is resolutely focused on the experience of one better equipped soldier should be comfortable in back at least 20 years, which holds that population section, we seek to establish the fundamental titanic and highly peculiar battle — Stalingrad — the chaos of the city — or at any rate as comfortable growth, urbanization, and interconnectedness characteristics of urban warfare, making reference distorts perceptions of the problem at hand and as he or she would be in any other environment. — the driving forces of change in the global to canonical works on the history of the city; its potential solutions. Other World War II battles, This is true not only for confrontations between political economy — are pushing war into modes specifically, works on war and the city. This includes, and a range of post-1945 conflicts up to the present regular and irregular forces, but also for “near- and contexts that conventional armed forces are first and foremost, how the city’s connections with day, call into serious question the validity of the peer” conflict. The advantages afforded to the finding, and will continue to find, vexingly difficult other urban conglomerations and the density of the “lessons” of Stalingrad, such as the tendency for better trained, equipped, supported, and mentally — in particular, the city. Whether this orthodoxy civilian population causes a distinctive compression commanders to lose control of the battle, the prepared soldier are magnified by this environment, is correct is debatable. The strength of its grasp of the levels of war such that the tactical and symbolic resonance of cities that causes politicians which rewards tactical skill. on the military mind and the defense policy political become inextricably entangled. In the to invest greater strategic meaning in them than they The line that “the future of war is not the son establishment, however, is not. second section, we use two historical examples — ought, the permanent advantages of the defender, of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya This paper is the joint effort of an academic and the Roman sacking of Jerusalem in 70 AD and the the high force ratios necessary to succeed, and the and Somalia” is a staple of the literature on a professional soldier with 18 years of experience British invasion of the contemporary strategic affairs.3 It was written by in infantry command, including multiple tours River Plate during the former United States Marine Corps Commandant in and Iraq. It uses an ethnographic Napoleonic Wars — Gen. Charles Krulak as part of a speech at the Royal approach, a technique that has been increasingly to demonstrate that United Services Institute in London in 1996 in applied to contemporary defense policy and the problems of urban which he also coined the oft-quoted term “strategic strategic studies.8 It draws heavily on the subjective warfare are not new, corporal.” His overall argument was as follows: On experience of practitioners with recent experience as is often supposed account of the increasing interconnectedness of of urban warfighting, which we evaluate alongside or intimated. These the world, the West will inevitably be drawn into a range of historical cases and extant doctrine examples serve as an “someone else’s wars” — which is to say, wars of from the United Kingdom, the United States, and important reminder choice that feature limited political commitment NATO. In this respect, this paper also employs the to practitioners of the on the part of intervening forces.4 Those wars will techniques of applied history, which we understand centuries of military increasingly be centered in large, poorly governed in the sense described by the naval historian and strategic wisdom urban areas, and will be fought against well-armed Geoffrey Till as the illumination of the present and accrued by their and capable opponents who will most likely be future through resonant historical examples, not predecessors who faced similar dilemmas — and idea that superior weaponry, training, and mobility sometimes even solved them. inevitably become less important or useful in In choosing the examples noted above, we focused city fighting. The fourth section shifts focus from only on cases that took place prior to World War I diagnosis to prescription. Here, we suggest a rather 3 Charles C. Krulak, “The United States Marine Corps in the 21st Century,” RUSI Journal 141, no. 4 (1996): 25, https://doi. org/10.1080/03071849608446045. and are well-documented. We excluded numerous prosaic, albeit fundamental, reform: the substantial 4 Krulak writes in his article that “we” will be drawn into such wars, referring to the United States Marine Corps. It is apparent from context, though, cases of besieged cities in which capitulation upgrading of training protocols, urban warfare speaking to a British audience for publication in a Western professional military journal, that his message was aimed at the United States and its allies. occurred after the exterior defenses were breached, facilities, and tactical training systems to allow 5 We thank independent scholar Lily Betz for this apposite allusion to mythology. or where a defending commander surrendered when armed forces to better familiarize themselves with 6 Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035, U.K. Developments, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, U.K. Ministry of Defence, a breach looked inevitable — a typical occurrence in urban warfare, and to practice and experiment in 2015, 21, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/646821/20151203-FOE_35_final_ v29_web.pdf. 9 Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macmillan, 1982), 224. 7 David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (London: Hurst, 2013), chap. 5. 10 Christopher Duffy, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860 (London: Greenhill Books, 1975), 188. 8 For more on which, as well as a good example of such, see Amanda Chisholm, “Ethnography in Conflict Zones: The Perils of Researching Private Security Contractors,” in, The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods, ed. Alison J. Williams et al. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 11 The cases considered were: Jerusalem 70, Rome 410, Constantinople 1453, Londonderry 1689, Gibraltar 1779–83, Acre 1799, Sevastopol 1854, chap. 11. Lucknow 1857, Paris 1870–71, Plevna 1877, Mafeking 1899–1900, and Port Arthur 1904–05.

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convincing settings that can accommodate large to require that it be exercised where the people The Limits of Avoiding the City history suggests that there are conceivably many combined-arms teams. The bulk of this section actually live, generate wealth, and conduct political, humanitarian, and legal reasons for even is based on extended visits to a range of such collective public life. It is, therefore, important to For practically all of history, generals have loathed pacific liberal states to intervene in foreign cities, facilities in several countries, as well as interviews recognize that the fundamental problem of urban the prospect of fighting in cities and have sought such as to conduct a strategic raid on specific with training staff to identify the central problems warfare, the one that pervades it from the heights to avoid it. Sun Tzu advised fighting in cities only facilities (e.g., weapons laboratories), to evacuate and best practices. There is no equivalent scholarly of strategy to the minutiae of house-clearing, is if “absolutely necessary, as a last resort.”16 For noncombatants, or to forestall genocide. (Imagine, research on this subject in the civil sphere, and we the inextricability of the tactical from the political. 2,500 years, generals have happily agreed with the for example, a raid on Radio Mille Collines, suspect, based on our research, in military circles Politics dictate what range of tactical options strategic wisdom of this maxim, whether or not they effectively the command-and-control system of either.12 the practitioner can choose against which have read ancient Chinese military philosophy. Even the massacre of the Rwandan Tutsis.) On the other In the fifth section, we propose an approach opponents in all contexts — this is a truism of today, while decision-makers acknowledge that they hand, such intervention risks becoming bogged to urban operations that we argue is in greater war as applicable in cities as in rural areas, in are going to have to fight in an urban environment down in a form of warfare that can exact a great accordance with both the logic of projected force cyberspace as well as outer space. For years now, at some point, when left to their own devices in toll on civilians and civilian infrastructure. sizes, as compared with the current and imagined there has been growing skepticism of the utility wargames and experiments, NATO generals elect to How can commanders maximize their forces’ size of global megacities, and with our understanding of the concept of “levels of war,” in which tactics bypass cities without hesitation. military effectiveness, which is necessary given of the best practices of military operations and nest hierarchically within operations, which nests Urban terrain poses a number of challenges for the high costs of keeping personnel and equipment leadership in all other environments — including within strategy, all of which are superseded by combat operations. Clausewitz described action in in the field, while maintaining domestic and simultaneity, tactical boldness, coordinated action politics. This, essentially, is the essence of the war as being like movement in a resistant medium. international support in a media-saturated of small units, and clarity of intent. The “strongest aforementioned “strategic corporal” effect. The elements that make up the atmosphere of war, environment, where that support is dependent gang” model, as we call it, is a realistic solution There is an urge, therefore, to separate these he said, were danger, physical exertion, intelligence, in large part on keeping casualties and collateral to the problems of urban conflict that cannot be levels for analytical purposes. But this would be and friction.17 Each of these is supposedly intensified damage below an indeterminate threshold of addressed by the current prevalent methods, a mistake. The urban environment has a tendency in the city. The profusion of places to hide in this public acceptability?20 The 1992–93 American-led which are too positively controlled, too manpower- to amplify the negative effects of viewing multidimensional environment means engagement U.N. intervention in Somalia remains a textbook intensive, too cautious, and cede too much initiative the relationship between politics and tactics typically occurs at very short distances and fire example of this problem: It was a humanitarian to objectively weaker and less capable opponents. as hierarchical, discrete, and unidirectional. fights are swift and brutal. The continuous high- operation initially that ended ignominiously as a In this section, we also discuss several potential According to this manner of thinking, it is level alertness required for close action, combined small war following a vicious battle in the streets contributions of technology to the successful possible to rationalize isolating tactics from the with extreme physical discomfort, is thought to of Mogadishu in which two American helicopters conduct of 21st-century urban operations. study of policy — and sometimes strategy — hasten the onset of battle fatigue.18 Command and were shot down, 18 American soldiers were killed, Overall, we accept that the reality of demographics because the latter two purportedly matter much control is bedeviled by communications problems 72 were wounded, and a pilot was captured.21 and geopolitics means that warfare will increasingly more. Although there is certainly good cause to caused by buildings that block both vision and It is no wonder, then, that when at all feasible occur in urban environments. Nevertheless, we believe that, in the long term, great tactics cannot radio signals. This, in turn, causes city battles to the most politically desirable operation is one that argue this is not, in itself, a development to be compensate for bad policy, tactics are both the fragment rapidly into isolated and uncoordinated involves no troops on the ground at all, no matter feared. If this represents a change, then it is one base for and servant of strategy and ought not be low-level fighting. If this kind of fighting is hard what the terrain. The 1999 Kosovo War, which of degree not of fundamentals and is manageable left aside.14 for professional soldiers who are trained in taking NATO conducted almost entirely from the air, with the right mindset — one that is sensitive to In cities, this is particularly true because the initiative, confident in their equipment, and epitomized this line of strategic reasoning. Wesley both opportunities and threats — and with bold sheer density of people in a highly networked physically prepared for the rigor involved, then Clark, the commanding general of the campaign, and creative leadership. environment magnifies the degree to which politics how much harder is it for the less well-trained — wrote in his account of the war about the political and tactics are interwoven. Contemporary British or even untrained — conscript or amateur? wrangling that took place over conducting a ground doctrine, both in general as well as in regards Meanwhile, the presence of civilians in the offensive and the likely casualties that would ensue. The Challenges of Urban Warfare: to urban environments, illustrates this with its urban environment adds a complicating element He remarked, Political and Tactical Entanglement emphasis on the concept of “integrated action,” of friction that pervades every level, from tactics defined as the orchestration and execution of through strategy to policy. Indeed, Alice Hills, there was no military answer to the problem War is a “continuation of political intercourse, operations “in an interconnected world, where author of perhaps the most significant academic of urban warfare in Belgrade. Or the carried on with other means,” wrote Clausewitz,13 the consequences of military action are judged study on the challenges of urban warfare, describes determined resistance of the Serb population while politics, since the days of Plato’s ideal by an audience that extends from immediate the intractability of the problem as moral and along the way. The northern approach polis, has been wound up tightly with the affairs participants to distant observers.”15 normative in nature and therefore a particular included the classic invasion routes, which of the city. To impose political will upon a group concern for liberal states.19 On the one hand, the Yugoslav military would be well prepared of people through the use of force would seem

12 The United States Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group based at Twentynine Palms, CA, has the longest established and most extensive 16 Sun Tzu, The Art of War in, Classics of Strategy and Counsel Vol. 1: The Collected Translations of Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Publications, experience in this subject area. The urban warfare group in the Modern War Institute at West Point is a more recent initiative but has done excellent 2000), 74. work in the public domain. 17 Clausewitz, On War, 139–41. 13 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Parker (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993), 99. 18 Gregory J. Ashworth, War and the City (New York: Routledge, 1991), 121. See also Todd C. Helmus and Russell W. Glenn, Steeling the Mind: 14 On the interaction of bad policy with tactics, see, David Betz and Hugo Stanford-Tuck, “Teaching Your Enemy to Win,” Infinity Journal 6, no. 3 Combat Stress Reactions and their Implications for Future Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 39–67. (Winter 2019): 16–22, https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/212/Teaching_Your_Enemy_to_Win/. A compelling case for the rectification of the 19 Alice Hills, Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma (London: Frank Cass, 2004). relative isolation of tactics from scholarship on war is made by B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017). 20 Hills, Future War in Cities, 229 and chap. 9. 15 See, Land Operations, Land Warfare Development Centre, Army Doctrine Publication AC 71940, (2017), 4-01; see also Operations in the Urban 21 See Theo Farrell, “Sliding Into War: The Somalia Imbroglio and US Army Peace Operations Doctrine,” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 2 (1995), Environment, Land Warfare Development Centre, Doctrine Note 15/13, (2010), 59–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533319508413551.

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to defend. I knew that the political problems midst of a major concentration of noncombatants. for NATO would be insuperable.22 At some point, one eventually gets to or Mosul, or to Aleppo or Raqqa. Then what? Since the advent of the “War on Terror,” avoiding The history of warfare is littered with instances of putting “boots on the ground” has been far more urban fighting. As the great historian of cities Lewis difficult from a tactical perspective, particularly Mumford put it, war and the city are inextricable: after the invasion of Iraq in March and April 2003. “As soon as war had become one of the reasons The appetite of all Western governments, including for the city’s existence, the city’s own wealth and the United States, for the large-scale deployment power made it a natural target.”26 If you choose to of conventional forces has diminished markedly fight “wars amongst the people,” as today’s wars since the early days of the conflicts in Iraq and have been described, then you must literally get Afghanistan. As a case in point, Britain embarked among them.27 more or less enthusiastically on the Iraq War, with In the mind of the contemporary Western Parliament voting 412 in favor and 149 against in politician, conflict in the urban environment — 2003.23 However, by August 2013, the Cameron getting “amongst the people” — is synonymous government’s proposal to join American-led air with Stalingrad, and, as such, is beyond the public’s strikes in Syria was defeated narrowly by a vote of tolerance in terms of expenditure of “blood and 285 to 272. Even so, fully detaching from ongoing treasure.” In order for the military to be able to conflicts has proven extremely difficult. present politicians with a full spectrum of credible More recently, Western involvement in wars in and usable options, this assumption needs to be the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Ukraine, challenged. Currently it is based upon extant has primarily involved airpower alongside special military doctrine — and, presumably, on the private forces and small advisory teams in support of local advice of generals to policymakers — which says forces — a far more politically palatable approach. that urban conflict requires an approach that is The character of operations, however, has still reliant upon massive firepower and overwhelming been typified by the attack and defense of fortified manpower. But reports from practitioners at locations, or urban areas that can be rapidly the tactical level and in training establishments, fortified (whether deliberately or as a by-product coupled with examples from military history, falsify of combat), and operations that unfold over weeks this thesis. It is wrong — there is a different way. and months, not hours and days. Ukrainian officers, for instance, characterized the months-long defense of the Donetsk Airport — a “serpentine Nothing Fundamental Has Changed grid of tunnels, bunkers, and underground communications systems” — against rebel forces It is hard to gainsay Hills’ conclusions, of the Donbass Republic as a “mini-Stalingrad.”24 particularly with regards to the primacy of politics. In the Philippines, meanwhile, government forces And yet, while she is cautious not to overemphasize needed five months to clear a force of about 1,000 the novelty of the problems she describes, writing Islamic State-affiliated Abu Sayyaf militants from that the “characteristics and tactical constraints Marawi, a town of 600,000 inhabitants that was of urban operations have remained remarkably significantly damaged in the process.25 consistent over the past 60 years,” because she Undoubtedly, what primarily distinguishes rejects a longer historical approach, she misses that cities from other theaters of conflict is the level to this statement would have been just as true 2,000 which they are intermingled with civilian life. But years ago.28 The challenges of urban warfare that population centers can only be bypassed for so long confront this generation of soldiers and statesmen in the hope of avoiding a military operation in the are, for the most part, not new. Even the challenges

22 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 318. 23 “Iraq — Declaration of War — 18 Mar 2003 at 22:00,” The Public Whip, March 18, 2003, https://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division. php?date=2003-03-18&number=118&display=allpossible. 24 Oliver Carroll, “Inside the Bloody Battle for Ukraine’s Donetsk Airport,” Newsweek, Feb. 3, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/02/13/inside- bloody-battle-ukraines-donetsk-airport-304115.html. 25 165 government troops, 45 civilians, and practically all of the Abu Sayyaf fighters were killed. The damage to the city may be seen in this photo essay: “Marawi in Ruins After Battle Against Pro-ISIL Fighters,” Al Jazeera, Oct. 23, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2017/10/ marawi-ruins-battle-pro-isil-fighters-171023071620271.html 26 Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects (London: Harvest/HBJ, 1986), 43. 27 Rupert Smith, The Utility Of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005). 28 Hills, Future War in Cities, 243.

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that might seem new, such as the prevalence of the That this battle involved swords and clubs rather by resonating powerfully in international politics, even those locals who were happy to see the end of media, are only superficially different or, at most, than M-4s and AK-47s matters little — just replace causing upheaval in global markets, or impacting the Spanish rule to doubt the long-term intentions of an amplified echo of the past. “archers” and “arrows” with “close combat attack” mood of distant populations — has been true for at the British, which in turn caused political unrest. Two examples from history show that and “armed aviation” and the scene has an obvious least two centuries, possibly even two millennia. Second, Santiago de Liniers y Bremond, a Knight of governments have long been drawn into faraway contemporary resonance. Moreover, the tactics For instance, in late June of 1806, British forces the Order of Malta in the service of Spain, played urban conflicts with nonstate actors, and found of the Jewish rebels differed little from those of, under the command of Adm. Sir Home Popham upon the unpacified mood of the population to them hard to fight, for reasons including political say, Islamic State insurgents in the months-long landed at the Rio de la Plata, Argentina, with the aim organize a powerful insurgency out of a ragbag of interconnectedness, media influence, and tactical battle for Mosul in Iraq. Zealots among Jerusalem’s of capturing Buenos Aires and ultimately seizing escaped regular soldiers, angry civilians, and thrill- complexity. Consider first the following scene from defenders murdered all moderate Jewish leaders one of the greatest and richest Spanish colonies in seeking gauchos. Flavius Josephus’ The Jewish War, which recounts and burnt the city’s dry food supply, which would South America. It was not a strategically planned The result was a bitter humiliation for Great a critical battle in the siege of Jerusalem by Roman have fed the population for a year or two, on the gambit. In fact, Popham had acted independently Britain, which resulted in the court-martial of the legions under the command of Titus, son of the logic that it would compel noncombatants to join on his own judgment as a commander, having officer in charge of operations. Ironically, this was emperor Vespasian in the year 70 AD: the fight. In fact, it only compounded the tragedy. convinced himself that the people of the region not Popham, who escaped immediate blame by More Jews died of the starvation brought on by were “groaning under the tyranny” of Spain and moving on before things came to a head, but Gen. Threatening death to any of the populace the zealots than were killed by the Romans in the eager for liberation. He also considered it an John Whitelocke, who had arrived in May 1807 who would breathe a word about surrender, collective punishment that followed the defeat of opportunity to counter Allied setbacks in the with a small army of 6,000 troops under orders and butchering all who even spoke casually the revolt. European theater — notably Napoleon’s victory at to recover the worsening situation with another about peace, they attacked the Romans who The wider political complexity of the campaign the Battle of Austerlitz in December 1805.33 assault on Buenos Aires. had entered. Some confronted them in the and its distinct and immediate connections to But ministers in London, once they learned of The fighting in the capital and the surrounding streets, some assailed them from the houses; politics in the Roman capital over 2,300 miles the event, thought he had vastly exceeded his area proved insurmountably difficult for the British, while others, rushing forth without the wall away are equally noteworthy.30 At the time of the authority. Their fury, however, was largely assuaged who discovered that the thick walls and flat roofs of through the upper gates, so disconcerted battle, Vespasian had been emperor for just one by the initially agreeable results: A superior Spanish the Spanish colonial urban landscape cut through the guards at the ramparts, that they sprang year and the defeat of a Roman army, especially military force was quickly routed at the cost of a by narrow alleys provided endless opportunities down from their towers and retreated to one commanded by his son, would have greatly handful of British casualties and Buenos Aires was for ambushes. In scenes reminiscent of Titus’ their camp. Loud cries arose from those undermined his power. Also bear in mind that occupied. The then vast sum of $1,086,000 was sent premature foray into Jerusalem, British soldiers within, who were surrounded by enemies on Flavius Josephus was not an objective historian back to Britain by frigate along with six wagon-loads were assailed from the roofs by a great proportion all sides, and from those without, in alarm but rather a hagiographer. Famously described of other booty — primarily Jesuit’s bark (a valuable of the population with hand grenades, musket fire, for their comrades who had been left behind. as the “Jewish Benedict Arnold,” he was quite antimalarial) and mercury. A large quantity of arms stones, and boiling water, while at nearly every literally owned by Titus and was conscious of the and ammunition was also seized from abandoned major street corner they were attacked by Spanish The Jews, constantly increasing in numbers, need to preserve and advance the celebrity of his and surrendered Spanish armories. Financial cannons loaded with grape-shot, which were and possessing many advantages in their master.31 Thus, one must read between the lines markets in London soared in anticipation that the stationed behind deep ditches that were reinforced knowledge of the streets, wounded many of this account to see that what it describes is a good times would continue to roll. Unfortunately, by by sharpened stakes. of the enemy, and drove them before them tactical blunder by Titus, who advanced his troops the time that these treasures had arrived in Britain, The war has generally been forgotten by Britons, by repeated charges; while the Romans prematurely through a too-small breach, and and reinforcements had been dispatched, events but not Argentinians, for whom it was a precursor continued to resist mainly from sheer was then rescued from disaster by a competent had already turned decidedly for the worse. to revolution and independent nation-building.35 It necessity, as they could not escape in mass subordinate, in addition to artillery support. While the British certainly did plunder the assets was unquestionably a “hybrid” battle with a mix owing to the narrowness of the breach; and In the introduction to her final chapter, “The of the deposed Spanish regime, they took some of regular and irregular modes of warfare.36 It also had not Titus brought up fresh succours, all Logic of Urban Operations,” Hills writes that the care not to “exasperate” the local population, as included the exploitation of clan, tribal, and illicit who had entered would probably have been most important reason for examining urban battles counter-insurgency doctrine has wisely advised for networks in order to sustain the insurgent fighting cut down. Stationing his archers at the end of is that they have the potential to become a critical over a hundred years.34 Thus, private property was forces. In the final battles on the streets of Buenos the streets and taking post himself where the security issue in the 21st century on account untouched; the population, which was regarded as Aires, de Liniers achieved the operational and enemy was in greatest force, he kept them at of, inter alia, demographic trends, globalization, liberated rather than conquered, was protected; tactical feat of deploying the most primitive arms bay with missiles. Domitius Sabinus, who in and powerful nonstate adversaries. Cities are, local government, courts, and tax authorities were alongside what were then cutting-edge ones. this engagement, as in others, showed himself moreover, not just politically significant but also permitted to continue as normal; and the place of This is to say nothing of the political complexity a brave man, aiding his exertions. Caesar held economically significant as “base points” in a global the Catholic Church in society was left untouched. of the conflict, which was substantial and wide- his ground, plying his arrows incessantly, and web of production and markets, which conflict It was to little avail, however, for two reasons. First, ranging. Tactical decisions in the local contest checking the advance of the Jews, until the would disrupt.32 And yet, the idea that the impact the improvisational nature of the campaign caused between Spanish colonial rulers, indigenous last of the soldiers had retired.29 of urban warfare is increasingly strong — whether

33 The section of this paper dealing with the British in Argentina in 1806–07 is based upon Ian Hernon, The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the 29 Flavius Josephus, The Jewish War, Vol. 2, trans. Robert Traill (London: Houlston and Stoneman, 1851), 143. Nineteenth Century, (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2000). 30 Indeed, it is arguably one of the most consequential battles of all history. Without the destruction of Jerusalem, religious scholars reckon that 34 The advisement not to “exasperate” is one of the characteristically economical and wise principles of the British counterinsurgency guru C.E. Christianity might not have arisen as the dominant faith of the West centered on Rome. See Diarmaid MacCulloch, Christianity: The First Three Callwell in his classic, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd ed. (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1906). The contemporary influence Thousand Years (London: Penguin, 2009), 111. In colloquial Spanish, a phrase probably brought by Sephardic Jews and their descendants fleeing the of the work is discussed in, David Betz, “Counter-insurgency, Victorian-Style,” Survival 54, no. 4 (2012): 161–82, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2 massacre, “mas malo que Tito” (worse than Titus), survives in common use to this day. 012.709395. 31 For a discussion of the merits of the traitorous appellation of Flavius, see William den Hollander, “Was Josephus a ‘Jewish Benedict Arnold?’” 35 A painting entitled “La Reconquista de Buenos Aires” by the French artist Charles Fouqueray showing the dejected British commander, Gen. Mosaic, Nov. 14, 2014, https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/uncategorized/2014/11/was-josephus-a-jewish-benedict-arnold/?print. Beresford, surrendering to de Liniers hangs proudly in the Argentine National Historical Museum, Buenos Aires. 32 Hills, Future War in Cities, 242. 36 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).

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people, and their British liberators-cum-conquerors cities — a key advantage, and one that normally resonated very quickly in the distant capitals of accrues to irregular more so than regular forces. London, Madrid, and Paris. Likewise, the effect Fourth, fighting in cities consumes far more troops on financial markets was a powerful factor driving than planners usually imagine while the urban political and military decision-making. There was a environment diminishes the advantages of superior media dimension as well: first, in the enthusiastic conventional weaponry, mobility, and training.37 celebration of Popham — who was acutely Beevor concludes that “there is something conscious of his celebrity — and, second, in the pitiless about urban warfare.” All of these lessons, public pillorying of Whitelocke. including particularly the last one, are surely true One of the main conclusions of important of Stalingrad, and, in one form or another, one finds scholars like Hills is that, although tactics of them repeated in British, American, and NATO urban warfare have changed little, the strategic doctrine.38 The trouble is, however, that none of context has evolved considerably as a result of these lessons are generalizable, and thus it can be globalization, demography, and urbanization. And misleading when they are treated as such. yet, based on examples from history, it would seem that the strategic context has not actually changed The Myth of Intrinsic Difficulty: Is Urban in any fundamental way. Terrain the Hardest?

Beevor claims that the urban environment is “Stalingraditis” and intrinsically difficult. This difficulty, however, is Other Urban Legends neutral, manifesting differently, but with equal impact, upon all sides. It is perhaps truer to say To say that there is little in today’s world that that the urban environment is more difficult the political situation is amenable. Moreover, a Peniakoff, one of the most colorful officers of has not been seen or dealt with in the past is not to fight in for a commander who is not down at less firepower-intensive approach is likely to be British military history, who was commander of to say that there is nothing new at all. Likewise, the small-team level. But tactical and operational a factor in maintaining political will and public “Popski’s Private Army” — a legendary desert to say that present-day strategists exaggerate how victories are made up of small-team successes. consent. reconnaissance and raiding force in North Africa. much they are affected by the connectedness, The commander in charge of a small team can, in Nevertheless, small-unit maneuvering in a Peniakoff described the manner of his operations complexity, and sheer riskiness of the world relative real time, take advantage of the multiple approach dispersed manner within cities presents some and planning in this way: to their forebears is not to say that they do not routes, the variety of possible sources of fire obvious challenges. These include having fewer face challenges. It is, rather, that strategists today support, and the opportunities for surprise that safe rear areas and fewer heavily protected What I like to do is to go myself beforehand will be better able to deal with such challenges if the environment presents. The closeness of the routes for supply and reinforcement and medical over the country and get the feel of the plains, they are clear-eyed about what is new and what is terrain often allows commanders at this level to get evacuation. There are, however, technological the mountains, and the valleys; the sand, the not, and what lessons can be generalized — so long further forward than would otherwise be possible changes that may significantly alleviate these rocks, and the mud; at the same time, I listen as they do not sever themselves entirely from the and thus leads to them making rapid decisions concerns, as discussed below. to the local gossip; find out who commands experience and knowledge of the past. with better information. It is frequently observed that one of the great the enemy and what are his pastimes—who In a recent keynote speech on the past, present, In the urban context, a main benefit of a high- advantages of operating in “uncluttered” places my friends are and how far they are prepared and future of urban warfare, the British military tempo maneuver operation over a methodical like deserts, as opposed to cluttered urban centers, to help me and what are the presents that will historian Antony Beevor, author of numerous firepower-driven one is that the former deprives is that, whereas the former presents a logistical please. Then, when I come back later with works on World War II, including the classic the defenders of the time to fortify, particularly challenge, the dearth of civilians is an advantage. my men to carry out my evil schemes, I can Stalingrad, detailed a number of lessons that by employing improvised explosive devices A German general captured by the British during let the plan take care of itself.41 can be gleaned from that battle. First, he argued, (IEDs), which have proven a difficult challenge for the North Africa campaign in World War II put commanders lose control of the battle more rapidly attacking forces, as well as a serious impediment it this way: Desert fighting was a “tactician’s In other words, while the presence of civilians in in urban environments than they do in others — it to post-war rebuilding efforts. For instance, in the paradise and the quartermaster’s nightmare.”40 the city is indeed a factor that adds to the complexity is, according to Beevor, intrinsically more difficult recent fighting with Islamic State forces in Mosul, This is based, however, on something of a of the operating environment, this is also the case terrain on which to fight than any other. Second, Iraq, it was discovered that a single hospital misapprehension — that in environments outside in other environments, even ones that seem, at first cities are imbued with a symbolic resonance that complex had been laced with approximately 1,500 of towns and cities one is not operating among glance, to be relatively uncluttered. Replace plains, makes them dangerous objectives for politicians. IEDs.39 In this context, maintaining operational the people. mountains, and valleys with boulevards, streets, This makes them wont to devote more resources tempo could allow the attacking commander to Even in the Libyan deserts, on the tracts of the and alleys, or sand, rocks, and mud with apartment to them than their strategic value merits. Third, continue to make military gains and deny the desolate Sahara, a military commander is still complexes, shopping malls, and industrial parks, the defender usually determines the tactics in enemy time to place such devices, so long as operating amid a civilian population that may and it does not fundamentally change Peniakoff’s exert a direct impact on his operations. One can admonition about how to plan and lead a military 37 Sir Antony Beevor, “Keynote Speech,” Urban Warfare: Past, Present, and Future Conference, Royal United Services Institute, Feb. 2, 2018. see this, for example, in the memoirs of Vladimir operation. Though the density of habitation may 38 Joint Urban Operations, Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nov. 20, 2013, I-5-I-9,https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/ pubs/jp3_06.pdf. 39 Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Context of the Ninewa Operations and the Retaking of Mosul City, 17 October 2016-10 July 40 Quoted in James Holland, Together We Stand: Turning the Tide in the West: North Africa, 1942-1943 (London: HarperCollins, 2005), 24. 2017, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, undated, 2, http://www.uniraq.org/images/factsheets_reports/Mosul_report%2017Oct2016- 10Jul201731%20October_2017.pdf. 41 Emphasis added. Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army (London: The Reprint Society, 1953), 55.

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change, war remains a human endeavor that takes for information operations or deception purposes. If Fallujah had been renamed George Bush-ville measures would have clashed with the diffident place among people.42 When it comes to warfare Finally, the dependence of some adversaries on one after the first battle there in 2004, or if Sadr City political goals of the intervention, according to the on land, there is no unpeopled place where combat or more urban areas for their own sustainment — was renamed City after the Obama U.S. ambassador to . Moreover, given that can occur without reference to noncombatants, as logistics, popular support, and so on — are potential administration took over the Iraq War, then a before the attack the facility had been visited by no though in a gladiatorial ring where bloodied fighters centers of gravity that can be attacked. comparison with Stalingrad would perhaps be a bit fewer than 24 generals and admirals, the question are clearly sequestered from the onlookers.43 The enormous logistical advantages of operating more apt. The fact is, though, that American and arises why the local commander’s putative errors Urban warfare is undoubtedly fraught with in proximity to working port facilities was noted British urban operations in Iraq after 2003 were, were not remarked upon and rectified.47 The fact serious difficulties, but so too is warfare in frequently by those we interviewed and studied. on the whole, characterized by a decided lack is that the Marines were in a tactically indefensible every environment. Rote pronouncements of its Indeed, it is striking in speaking to and reading the of sustained political concern as politicians and posture because policymakers decided the political supremely challenging nature are unhelpful. Rarely accounts of commanders of many post-Cold War military-strategic headquarters back home urged situation required it and generals advised them are the potential advantages of operating in an operations how little they highlight the difficulties caution and retreat on local commanders for fear incorrectly about the risks, or argued inadequately urban environment considered. When questioned of urban environments as compared to other of costly entanglement. Towns and cities were as to their severity. on this, however, our interlocutors remarked on complaints. Problems of logistics, as always, feature thus repeatedly cleared, or at any rate temporarily For the Marine Corps, the Beirut attack was several such advantages. For one thing, civilian prominently. An Australian commander in the 2000 pacified, only to be subsequently abandoned to a major blow — the worst loss of life in a single observation and digital connectedness could be East Timor operation, for example, described how insurgents. Clearly neither city held particular day it had suffered since the Battle of Iwo Jima an intelligence resource to friendly forces. For he had to have four transport ships run ashore on symbolic importance for the United States or in 1945. For the United States as a whole, it another, the wealth of possible routes into and the beach at Suai, where engineers cut the hulls Great Britain. Instead, lack of will has tended to was an embarrassing setback, but it was not around the city could enable small unit movements open with oxyacetylene torches so that desperately be more typical of urban battles in recent years. terribly consequential. Indeed, on the day of and offer plentiful cover and concealment. The needed supplies could be removed with a front-end It must be said that Britain lately has been more the attack, President Ronald Reagan signed the relatively short range of engagements can lead to loader — a triumph of improvisation but hardly an guilty of this than the United States. The reasons order authorizing the military intervention in greater visibility of the enemy allowing precision ideal manner in which to operate.44 why are not terribly mysterious: As the junior Grenada.48 This illustrates something that has and, therefore, a possible reduction in the need to For all the difficulties of operating in urban partner in the expeditionary campaigns of the typified the West’s “limited wars” since the era use indirect fire and a concomitant reduction in settings, as long as the city is still functioning to “War on Terror,” Britain’s political and military of decolonization: that although not always “low collateral damage. some degree, the opportunities for “living off the leadership has perceived that it has less skin in intensity” from the point of view of the immediate land” are significantly greater than in most other the game and less responsibility for the ultimate participants, politicians have always considered it environments. Fuel, electricity, water, food, shelter, outcome.45 The best example of this lack of will a strategic option to pack up and go home (i.e., to medical facilities, communications facilities, places is the British occupation of Basra, Iraq, which is lose), or move on to a different small war. where repairs can be done, and the equipment described frankly in a vignette in the most recent Stalingrad, on the other hand, was unlimited. with which to do such repairs are abundant in British Army doctrine. It shows that much of the In fact, it was arguably the most completely metropolitan settings — and in short supply United Kingdom’s difficulties in southern Iraq committed battle of history’s most total war to date, outside of them — precisely because of the densely stemmed from a lack of political will and an excess rivaled only by the Battle of Berlin in the spring of interconnected nature of the city. of caution in London. In essence, they were quite 1945. As an illustration, consider the radio speech willing to give up Basra to insurgent control more delivered by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering Triumph of the Lack of Will? On the Symbolic than once.46 in late January 1942 as the German defenses were Importance of Cities When looking for an example of how political collapsing: equivocality and strategic lassitude can exert a The evidence surrounding the symbolic baleful influence on tactics in urban operations, it [L]ike a mighty monument is Stalingrad… . importance of cities and its hold on the minds of is hard to beat what took place on the morning of One day this will be recognized as the politicians is also quite mixed. One of the major Oct. 23, 1983: A truck packed with 12,000 pounds greatest battle in our history, a battle of problems with using Stalingrad as a benchmark is of TNT was driven by a Shiite commando into heroes… . We have a mighty epic of an that it was extremely unusual in the strength of the headquarters of the 22nd Marine Amphibious incomparable struggle, the struggle of the its political symbolism. For Stalin and Hitler, both Unit in Beirut, where it exploded, killing 241 Nibelungs. They, too, stood to the last.49 unbridled totalitarian autocrats, the battle was a Americans almost instantaneously. A congressional Moreover, outflanking the enemy is easier, as is proxy for a personal and ideological contest — a inquiry into the attack concluded afterward that Despite Goering’s bombast, there is a kernel of isolating enemy positions. In sporting terminology, it test not only of each other’s will but of the total security had been “inadequate” and that the local truth to what he said: Stalingrad was undeniably is easier to create the “one-on-ones” that afford the national strength they could command. Thus, commander had made serious errors of judgment. stupendous and practically incomparable. Thus, to team’s best players the opportunities to use their skills neither could contemplate retreat or surrender, Yet, security was inadequate by design, though not employ it as the yardstick by which all urban warfare to the team’s advantage. In addition, the presence causing both men to hurl division after division the local commander’s. Taking stronger security is measured in perpetuity is deeply problematic. of the media need not be seen as a bad thing, as it into the cauldron of fire. This has not been the 45 For further elaboration on this, see, David Betz and Anthony Cormack, “Iraq, Afghanistan and British Strategy,” Orbis 53, no. 2 (Spring 2009), could allow commanders to focus world attention case, however, in more recent urban battles. 319–36, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.004; and David Betz, Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military Power (London: Hurst, 2015), esp. chap. 5. 42 Jim Storr, The Human Face of War (London: Continuum Press, 2009). 46 Betz, Carnage and Connectivity, 31. 43 A point made particularly clearly by Smith in, The Utility of Force, 284–85. British urban warfare doctrine specifically notes Smith’s paradigm of 47 See, the chapter on Beirut and the Reagan era intervention in Lebanon in Peter Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of “war amongst the people” as a key driver of the need of the aforementioned concept of “integrated action.” See, Operations in the Urban Environment, U.S. Military Engagements, 1975-2000 (London: Viking, 2003), 45–64. 59. 48 Huchthausen, America’s Splendid Little Wars, 62. 44 Duncan Lewis, “Lessons from East Timor,” in, Future Armies, Future Challenges: Land Warfare in the Information Age, ed. Michael Evans, Russell Parkin, and Alan Ryan (Crows Nest NSW, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004). 49 Quoted in, William Craig, Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad (London: Book Club Associates, 1973), 373.

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The Myth of the Defensive Advantage: thoroughfares, and using the interior of buildings the defense over the offense — the Irgun was attacks at vulnerable locations and warding off re- Who Really Determines the Tactics? as roads rather than a series of impermeable walls. quite successful at both in the same battle. It also infiltration of cleared areas soaks up troops.57 The raises questions about the argument, discussed Soviet General Staff is reputed to have calculated Good militaries increase in competence as they We interpreted the alley as a place forbidden below, that urban operations are necessarily highly on the basis of its experience during World War fight. Learning the hard lessons that a tenacious to walk through, and the door as a place demanding in terms of manpower given that the II that the optimum ratio of attacker to defender adversary can teach and armed conflict serves to forbidden to pass through, and the window as Irgun were decidedly outnumbered.55 in urban environments was 10 to one. This would cement is part of war.50 For example, one might a place forbidden to look through, because a The defending force can only determine the be a major impediment to anyone contemplating contrast the battles of Caen and Groningen, the weapon awaits us in the alley, and a booby trap tactics of the attacking force so long as the attacker fighting in a city, and is a clear case of Stalingrad- former in June 1944 and the latter in April 1945. awaits us behind the doors. This is because does not put the defender under cognitive as well itis. Other major battles of the war, however, Both were urban conflicts and involved the same the enemy interprets space in a traditional, as physical pressure. A steady, deliberate approach would point to an opposite, or at any rate more protagonists — the British and Canadians versus classical manner, and I do not want to obey at the tactical level allows the enemy time to orient nuanced, conclusion. the Germans. Caen was a costly Allied victory, slow this interpretation and fall into his traps.52 himself to the threat and then bring assets to bear First, in October 1944, two battalions of the and nearly Pyrrhic, with a heavy toll of civilian to counter it. The attacker is then forced to win American 26th Infantry Division (with armor casualties caused by high-level bombing and The reference to interpretation and through the combination of weight and accuracy and engineering attachments) soundly defeated artillery barrages. Groningen, on the other hand, reinterpretation of space shows the influence of of firepower. The object of the attacking force a much larger entrenched German force of 5,000 was a quick fight. It was decisive and caused few postmodern and post-structuralist theory, which ought to be to put the defending force into a state troops in nine days of fighting in the city of civilian casualties and involved the use of lighter, was popular in Israeli military thinking at the of material surprise, a condition in which, even if Aachen.58 Seventy-five Americans were killed and more discriminate weapons. time. This was unfortunate because it obscured it is aware of the presence of the attacker, it will the German force that had been ordered by Hitler It was not that the tactics themselves changed what otherwise was solid advice to commanders be unable to prepare accordingly for contact.56 The to fight to the last man was essentially wiped out. much between the two battles, but that they thinking about urban operations.53 The fact is that deliberate approach is expensive in materiel if not Second, in April 1945, elements of the 2nd Canadian were simply better executed.51 As a military force no army that has fought in an urban environment manpower and can kill many civilians and heavily Division defeated a German force of equal size increases in tactical proficiency, it is able to secure for much time interprets space in a “traditional” damage infrastructure. However, if the attacking that was trying to hold on to the Dutch city of political objectives without recourse to the kind manner. It adapts. It quickly learns to keep infantry force overwhelms the defending force’s ability to Groningen. In that case, only 100 civilians were of overwhelming firepower that destroys the city. off narrow streets that are easily raked by fire from make decisions at the lowest level through speed, killed alongside 43 Canadians and approximately Concurrently, as victory comes closer to hand, the entrenched positions, and to move forward by aggression, and simultaneous action in as many 150 Germans — a remarkable feat given that minds of politicians turn more toward thoughts of “mouseholing,” using the outer walls and roofs of places as possible at the same time, then the the civilian population was present throughout “winning the peace” and thus the military becomes buildings as natural cover under which to approach defender will be unable to choose the tactics. It will the fierce fighting.59 Finally, also in April 1945, a tactically less free to employ destructive measures enemy positions and blow them up. be too busy trying to survive to dictate the terms battalion of the 6th Gurkha Rifles, supported by such as mass aerial bombing and artillery barrages. Arguably, no army knows this as well as Israel’s. of any engagement. tanks of the King’s Hussars, defeated a large, It is not true, as Beevor argues, that the defender After all, one of the preeminent examples of well-equipped, well-led, and highly experienced usually determines the tactics employed in urban successful urban warfighting comes from Israel’s Numbers in Urban Warfare: Force Competence force from the German 9th Parachute Division fighting. There are so many examples to the War of Independence. In just six days of intense Trumps Force Size that was holding the small northern Italian town contrary that, at best, it might be said that this fighting beginning on April 26, 1948, a lightly armed, of Medicina. The German unit also had tank is sometimes the case. Israel, for instance, has 600-strong force of Irgun — a Jewish paramilitary- There is perhaps no idea about urban warfare and artillery support. In a short, decisive battle repeatedly been successful in determining the cum-terrorist group headed by Menachem Begin, that is more firmly fixed than the idea that urban lasting a few hours, much of it hand-to-hand, in tactics in its fights with entrenched Palestinians who later became prime minister — dislodged operations are unusually manpower-intensive. which tanks blasted holes through the walls of in the West Bank and Gaza at various times since an entrenched and well-armed Arab military Towns and cities are typically thought to have structures through which the Gurkhas advanced, the high point of violence of the Second Intifada force more than twice its size from the city of the potential to absorb enormous numbers 100 Germans were killed, while the British lost in the early to mid-2000s. One oft-cited example is Jaffa. The Irgun then defended its gains against of soldiers — even if they are undefended. only seven men.60 the way the Israelis conducted their attack on the counterattacks by a much larger British combined- This stems, it is argued, from the size and Each of these instances featured unorthodox town of Nablus in 2002 by “inverting the map” or arms force, which had the benefit of naval gunfire geographical and architectural complexity of tactics; aggressive, rapid combined-arms action; “walking through walls … like a worm that eats its and air support.54 The example of Jaffa contradicts the environment. Guiding a force through all the and close-quarter fighting in which the allied way forward” — using roads as barriers rather than the argument that urban warfare necessarily favors potential bottlenecks of a city is time-consuming troops had to guard against civilian casualties. and difficult, while guarding against potential And yet, in each, the attacking side prevailed, at 50 Alec Wahlman credits American success in urban operations, despite the lack of consistent effort to prepare for it specifically, to two factors: transferable competence (i.e., the applicability of skills, techniques, and equipment not designed specifically for urban conflict), and battlefield 55 The historiography of the Jaffa battle is complex and contested. The post-1948 Israeli Defense Forces had good reason to downplay the adaptation, in, Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam (Denton, TX: University of North Texas contributions of the Irgun. In the Irgun Museum in Tel Aviv, the battle is portrayed as a triumph. There are no good detailed accounts from the British Press, 2015), 237–46. side. It is apparent though, for obvious reasons, that in 1948, the eagerness of British forces to fight was small as they were withdrawing from 51 A point that Jim Storr argues holds true for the Allied armies in general in World War II. See, The Hall of Mirrors: War and Warfare in the Twentieth Palestine. Thanks to Dr. Eitan Shamir from the Political Science Department at Bar Ilan University for reviewing the Hebrew sources on our behalf. Century (Warwick, UK: Helion and Co., 2018), 155. 56 See, Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War, 2nd ed. (Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace, 2017), 180. 52 Quoted in, Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (New York: Verso, 2012), 198. 57 See, Lutz Unterseher, “Urban Warfare,” in, Brassey’s Enclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, ed. Franklin D. Margiotta (London: Brassey’s, 53 Weizman, Hollow Land. The insistence of Israeli military strategists in the Operational Theory Research Institute on using such terms did much 2000), 1099. harm to their cause insofar as it freighted a good deal of common sense with language that made it incomprehensible to those who needed it. A 58 Christopher R. Gabel, “Knock ‘em All Down: The Reduction of Aachen, October 1944,” in, Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations, ed. point remarked upon by the post-2006 Lebanon War report on the perceived Israeli failings there. See, Winograd Commission: The Commission to William G. Robertson (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 84–85. Investigate the Events of the 2006 Lebanon Campaign, State of Israel, January 2008 [in Hebrew]. See also Eyal Weizman, “Walking Through Walls: Soldiers as Architects in the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict,” Lecture at the Arxipelago of Exception conference, Centre de Cultura Contemporania de 59 Ashworth, War and the City, 150. Unlike Aachen, where the Americans made decisive use of heavy artillery, the Canadian commander forbade Barcelona, Nov. 11, 2005. the use of indirect-fire artillery and aerial bombing in order to mitigate collateral damage. 54 Benjamin Runkle, “Jaffa, 1948,” in, City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam, ed. John Antal and Bradley 60 The battle is ill-remembered outside of the Gurkhas. This account was given to us in the officers’ mess of the modern Gurkha Regiment, where a Gericke (New York: Presidio Press, 2003), 289–314. painting by Terence Cuneo depicts it.

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less cost to itself than the defender, and (with on major transport routes. Then, neighborhoods Sweat Saves Blood: Training changed slightly to ensure that soldiers are not the partial exception of Aachen) without massive were cleared one by one in operations normally in the Right Environment “learning the range” but instead are learning to damage to the civilian infrastructure, let alone the starting with the rapid fortification of small understand and solve the dynamic underlying kind of wanton slaughter of noncombatants that combat outposts from which small-unit actions The lessons of Iraq notwithstanding, Krulak is problems. Then the exercise is run again. Finally, was seen in Stalingrad.61 would be conducted. Meanwhile, the pacified still fundamentally right that warfare is likely to the exercise is run once more without leaders More recent examples similarly suggest that the areas were gradually handed over to Iraqi police. be even more centered on urban environments present, to ensure that the unit as a whole has assumption of the high demands of manpower in The techniques employed in the Ramadi in the future. Western politicians will continue absorbed the relevant lessons and is able to act urban operations is exaggerated. In early April operations were extraordinarily time-consuming to have the urge to intervene militarily in other accordingly in an organic manner. Far less ideal 2003, for instance, while pundits were predicting — the campaign took nine months. But they had countries for one reason or another, whether good, is when lessons are conducted straight out of a a protracted and bloody siege of Iraq’s capital and the effect of keeping al-Qaeda in Iraq off balance. bad, or imagined. How then to give Western forces pamphlet (i.e., in accordance with a checklist and a the Iraqi government spokesman was declaring 1st Brigade Combat Team was ordered to “Fix the ability to operate confidently in cities, and to generic scenario authored by someone other than that there were no American troops in the city, Ramadi, but don’t do a Fallujah,” and that is innovate and develop new methods that maintain the commander). How these exercises are run is tanks and armored personnel carriers of the what it did. This goal was achieved, moreover, and extend the gap in competence between them also contingent on factors relating to the particular 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division were without the evacuation, voluntary or otherwise, and their likely opponents? One part of the answer scenario at hand — which is dependent, in turn, on conducting “thunder runs,” blasting their way of the civilian population.64 Military force can is prosaic, but nevertheless vital: training. ever-shifting complexities of the real world — and down Baghdad’s main thoroughfares.62 Until this create the minimum conditions to allow normal In January and February 2001, the U.S. Marine the character and capabilities of the units involved. point, it had been widely supposed that armored civilian life to continue, by killing, capturing, Corps Warfighting Laboratory conducted a But regardless, having the right environment in vehicles could not successfully operate in urban demoralizing, or deterring insurgents65 — but the series of battalion-level urban warfare exercises which to train is the most important factor. environments. This was largely based on the effect is temporary. For it to take hold requires the dubbed “Project Metropolis,” building on earlier As for what is the “right” environment, based defeat dealt to Russian mechanized forces in late emergence of good government, administration, experiments in the 1990s that had highlighted on our interviews it comes down to three factors: December 1994 and early January 1995 by Chechen and policing. To say that this is difficult would alarmingly high casualty rates among friendly authenticity, scale, and recoverability of lessons. secessionist fighters in Grozny. be an understatement, as the last 18 years have forces in such environments. The experiments Does the training area look — and ideally feel, sound, The Chechens used “swarms” of loosely shown. It is wrong, however, to place the blame showed that the high initial rate of casualties and smell — like the real thing? Is it sophisticated coordinated, highly capable small units to ambush for the confusion one sees in contemporary experienced by Marine units dropped sharply after enough to accurately simulate the effects of Russian columns with rocket-propelled grenades counter-insurgency theory and practice on the they had received hard and realistic training.67 The various weapons? What feedback is being given to and machine guns in the canyons created peculiarities of the urban environment. report detailed a number of other technological the soldier who is “hit”? Does he or she experience by multistory tower blocks lining the city’s The key problem is not the urban terrain and and tactical improvements, but the gist was that minor pain or an inconvenience or simply a loss of thoroughfares. Two mechanized brigades were all the extraordinary demand for large numbers of training made the difference. In nearly all of the pride from being defeated? The instant and often but destroyed, with at least 200 armored vehicles troops that it is supposed to cause. Rather, as interviews with British unit commanders conducted uncomfortable result of using modified personal burnt up and 1,500 Russian troops killed.63 The we have discussed already, it is about the policy for this research, whether at the Infantry Battle service weapons firing paint pellets accurate up to superiority of the weaponry of the Russian forces objective: What is the political effect that the School’s Urban Warfare Instructor’s Course or at least 100 feet sharpens the mind. Increasing the was diminished and the mobility of their armor military force is supposed to achieve in the city? with the urban warfare group at the Land Warfare variety and range of the weapons being simulated proved to be fragile and contingent. And yet, And is it actually achievable by military force, Centre, we heard words to this effect: “[A]t first or using a different feedback method would likely Baghdad, a much larger and equally dense city, whatever its size? my battalion/company/platoon was alarmingly pay huge dividends. Can exercises be recorded was captured in April 2003 by an armored force When it comes to the numbers and effectiveness poor at urban warfare but after training in the right and played back (as, for example, one might see comprising around 1,000 men, suffering only a of weapons, the most important thing is the tactical environment I was much more confident.”68 in some video games), so that all commanders can handful of casualties in the process. aptitude and leadership qualities of the combat It is not that new training methods or new learn from mistakes and successes, their own as Consider also the 1st Brigade Combat Team, forces involved. In this respect, the Russian military techniques are needed per se, because the old well as others’? Is the environment big enough for which was responsible for the city of Ramadi of the mid-1990s was staggeringly bad compared to methods and techniques are still important. It large units to practice macro-level combined arms in Iraq from 2005 to 2006. Ramadi is four times the Chechen irregulars they faced, who were highly is rather that training in the relevant methods and support functions simultaneously, not just larger than Fallujah, where a year earlier heavy motivated, skilled, and well equipped.66 In the requires the correct environment. It is the training micro-individual or small-unit battle drills? operations by the U.S. Marine Corps consumed case of Baghdad in 2003, the roles were reversed: environment that allows commanders to simulate far more than the resources of one brigade in two The attacking American marines and soldiers the scale and complexity of the challenges troops Urban Warfare Training: major battles. Nevertheless, the end result was were supremely capable and their boldness will face in an urban battle. How the actual training International Comparison more or less positive: At a cost of 83 American lives, paid off against a demoralized, half-routed, and is done depends on the commander organizing it. the city was cleared of al-Qaeda in Iraq insurgents, uncoordinated enemy that was decidedly back on British commanders, for instance, are encouraged Few countries possess facilities approaching the 1,500 of whom were killed. First, insurgents in its heels. The years that followed showed that, while to brainstorm down to the junior noncommissioned ideal standards. Although it has a large number of the city were isolated from external support to urban operations are far from easy, the challenges officer level, then run their units through an small sites for practicing close-quarter battle, the the maximum extent possible by checkpoints they pose are not insurmountable. exercise. After that, the operative scenario is United States currently has no facility for training

61 The solvability of urban combat is a powerful theme in Wahlman, Storming the City, passim and 6. 67 Project Metropolis: Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain, Battalion Level Experiments, Experiment After Action Report, Marine Corps 62 The definitive account of this is, David Zucchino, Thunder Run: Three Days in the Battle for Baghdad (London: Atlantic Books, 2004). Warfighting Laboratory, May 7, 2001. Project Metropolis has recently been restarted. See, Todd South, “How This Urban Warfighting Experiment Could 63 Louis A. DiMarco, Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq (Oxford: Osprey, 2012), 162. Transform How Marines Fight in Cities,” Marine Times, Jan. 7, 2019. 64 DiMarco, Concrete Hell, 196. 68 American colleagues, including Col. Douglas Winter, chair of the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations U.S. Army War College at the Changing Character of Warfare conference, Oxford University, June 27, 2019, and Maj. (ret.) John Spencer, chair of Urban Warfare Studies at 65 William F. Owen, “Killing Your Way to Control,” British Army Review, no. 151 (Spring 2011), 34–37. the Modern War Institute, West Point at War in the Global City conference, Warwick University, Dec. 11, 2018, echoed the same things our British 66 See, Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), esp. chap. 8. interlocutors told us.

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Britain has a degree of access to CENZUB in railway station, and an airport.73 However, the accordance with the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty key innovation of this facility is the “Legatus” on defense and security cooperation between the simulation system developed by the weapons two countries, which could offset the relatively low and engineering company Rheinmetall AG. In quality of its own facilities. Certainly, the British addition to recording exercises as described soldiers and commanders with whom we have above, it can purportedly accurately model the spoken who have trained there are very positive effect of weapons fired externally on targets inside about the experience. However, when defense buildings or otherwise obscured by cover.74 If budgets are under pressure, savings are often true, this would represent a major advancement found by cutting travel alongside other activities. over existing optical laser-based training systems, CENZUB is only useful if you can get there. which work well in relatively open terrain, where The best existing urban warfare training facility there is limited cover, but fail in cluttered urban is in Israel’s Negev desert on the Tze’elim army environments where cover is plentiful and varies in base. Nicknamed “Baladia,” the Arabic word for ballistic resistance. “city,” the training area was built in 2005 in part Although most Russian bases, like American and by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at a cost of British ones, usually include just a few buildings, $45 million. It consists of around 6oo different occasionally ruins, in which small units practice buildings, including five mosques, a casbah, a urban combat drills, Russia is investing substantially clinic, a town hall, and an eight-story apartment in new facilities.75 At the Mulino base near Nizhny building. The environment provides a highly Novgorod, for instance, the new 333rd Combat realistic simulation of a Middle Eastern town, right Training Center operates a range of sophisticated down to a sound and pyrotechnic system able to training simulators and a “battle town,” which recreate the ambient noises of normal civilian life is said to be large enough to accommodate a full (e.g., calls to prayer, music, road noise) as well as battalion on exercise.76 Additionally, the Chechen very convincing indirect fire attacks and IED blasts. provincial government operates on behalf of the The whole facility is controlled through a central federal Russian army an impressively large and monitoring station that can track and record all thoughtfully planned facility that is nearly 400 elements of large units through exercises for after- hectares in size and includes a range of building action review.72 sizes. Like CENZUB, it features a permanent cadre As a testament to the authenticity of Baladia, of trainers with extensive practical experience with while one of us was writing up notes in a Tel urban combat. However, the facility is reserved for large units in realistic urban environments.69 “enemy force” roles: regular, irregular, and hybrid. Aviv bar after a visit to the facility, the bartender, Spetznaz units (Russian Special Operations Forces) Likewise, Britain’s urban training areas are A U.S. Marine Corps senior noncommissioned an Israeli Defense Force reservist, recognized exclusively and is almost entirely focused on generally considered inadequate by its users — officer who visited the facility in the summer of the crude sketch of the facility seen below and counter-terrorism operations, thus its benefits are too small and too much like a central European 2017 was particularly impressed by the relative remarked that he had spent many weeks in training not available to Russian general-purpose forces.77 village, the sort of urban environment the army degree of seriousness with which the French there. In his words, after a few days on exercise envisaged it would need to fight in when they were treated urban training, remarking, there it was hard sometimes to tell the difference Lessons Learned and Not Learned in Urban built in the 1980s. There is a mock Afghan village between Baladia and actual operations in Gaza, Warfare Training in the Stanford Training Area in Norfolk, U.K., A significant aspect of this quality training is where he had seen combat as a sharpshooter. run by the Operational Training Advisory Group, that the OpFor [Opposition Force] is staffed Germany is nearing completion of an urban Whatever the environment, soldiers must be which is an up-to-date and generally convincing with quality soldiers who plan and fight with warfare training area at Schnöggersburg in taught to outthink the adversary, to get inside portrayal of operating conditions in Helmand the will to win. I observed the OpFor actually Saxony-Anhalt, which will rival Baladia in scale the enemy’s decision-action cycle using violence province. But it does not pretend to approximate “winning the battle” on several occasions. and sophistication. It includes a range of building and tempo and then stay there, because keeping the conditions of a city.70 In a sense, this training has an element of types set in neighborhoods including an “old the enemy on its heels, reeling backward and France has very good facilities at CENZUB in “free play” in that while scripted in a way, town,” a shanty town, a light industrial area, a struggling just to survive, is universally recognized Sissonne, which features a large number of well- the CENZUB staff creates conditions for free 71 designed buildings of various types, and a standing thinking on both sides. 72 See, “Preparing for More Urban Warfare,” Economist, Jan. 25, 2018. opposition force able to perform a variety of 73 The base can be seen in this report by Gunnar Breske: ‘Häuserkampf in Schnöggersburg- Bundeswehr baut Geisterstadt,” Tagesthemen, ARD television, Oct. 2, 2015, in German but with English subtitles, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDzUWFrbmMI. 74 “Rheinmetall Presented Its Latest Legatus Live Urban Operations Training Systems at Eurosatory 2018,” Army Recognition, June 22, 2018, http:// 69 John Spencer, “The Army Needs an Urban Warfare School and It Needs It Soon,” Modern War Institute, April 5, 2017, https://mwi.usma.edu/ armyrecognition.com/eurosatory_2018_official_news_online/rheinmetall_presented_its_latest_legatus_live_urban_operations_training_systems_at_ army-needs-urban-warfare-school-needs-soon/. Some of our interlocutors advised that a new facility has been approved in the United States that is eurosatory_2018.html large and, by international standards, lavishly well funded (reputedly at $6-9 billion). The key feature of this facility is meant to be its relatively large and impressively realistic civilian population. However, as far as we have been able to determine thus far, there has been no official announcement of 75 Interview with former senior Russian Ministry of Defence official, Moscow, Oct. 6, 2017. this nor have we seen any written documentation of it. 76 J. Hawk, Daniel Deiss, and Edwin Watson, “Russia Defense Report: Fighting the Next War,” South Front, March 19, 2016, https://southfront.org/ 70 See, “Troops Train in the Middle East of England,” U.K. Ministry of Defence, Jan. 18, 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/troops-train-in- russia-defense-report-fighting-the-next-war/. Interestingly, the simulation system at Mulino was originally supposed to be provided by Rheinmetall, the-middle-east-of-england. presumably a variant of the Legatus system, under a €100 million contract from which the Germans withdrew after the imposition of sanctions in 2014. 71 Taken from an unclassified and unpublished trip report provided us by one of our Marine Corps interlocutors, June 27, 2017. 77 Interview with former senior Russian Ministry of Defence official, Moscow, Oct. 6, 2017.

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as key to a successful operation. “The battle always famously, T-walls were a key element of the 2008 as happy moving through service tunnels and These included: various enhancements to C2ISR goes to the quickest,” was how the famous German Battle of Sadr City, a large Shiite suburb of Baghdad, across rooftops as on sidewalks and roads.86 Armed (command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and general, Erwin Rommel, once put it.78 Yet, whereas where they were used effectively to enable friendly forces have long recruited directly, or otherwise reconnaissance), improving the ability of friendly most Western armies have plenty of big spaces force maneuver. Isolating operational areas with sought as trainers or guides, the likes of poachers forces to see and understand the operational with varied natural terrain in which to experiment rapidly deployable walls deprived the insurgents of and backwoodsmen for their specialist fieldcraft environment in real time in complex detail; a range and practice how to do these things, the same mobility, concealment, support, and initiative. As skills. Why should the urban environment be any of autonomous weapons and logistics systems is not true with regard to urban environments. a RAND study of the battle concluded, “Concrete different?87 to reduce the exposure of soldiers to the highest Despite the fact that most of the soldiers that enlisted time on the side of the counterinsurgent,” Urban warfare is not intrinsically more risks; several measures to improve mobility and make up modern armies themselves live in cities, which is quite a remarkable accomplishment.81 For difficult than other forms of warfare. It creates force protection; and some concepts for helping command and training establishments treat city all its success, though, the method of deploying certain challenges but at the same time creates commanders to better influence the information fighting distinctly differently — they are more risk- the barriers was extremely ad hoc, relying on opportunities. The ability to overcome the former environment.89 Many, if not all, of these technologies averse and less bold, more rule-bound and less civilian top-hooking cranes hired by the day, which and exploit the latter rests ultimately on the quality and ideas could prove useful and will soon be or imaginative, and ultimately less able to innovate. needed to be unhooked from the blocks by hand of training. To return to Rommel, whom we quoted are already available. British soldiers, for example, are told from the by a military engineer who was exposed to fire earlier, the kind of quick and fluid action that he moment training begins that they are part of the in the process.82 Eleven years later, it is still ad sought in his troops begins long before the fight: most professional fighting force in history, that hoc: There have been no changes to any systems they are the best equipped, best trained, and best or equipment sets, such as the number of cranes The commander must always strive to supported soldiers in the world, and that they assigned to engineer or maneuver units. There make his troops aware of the latest in need not fear anyone, or any environment. This is no doctrine for emplacing concrete barriers tactical theory and developments, with a message changes, however, during the few days of or for the consideration of logistic packages that view to learning and applying the practical urban warfare training they are allocated as part include concrete walls. And the technique for their experience on the battlefield. …The best care of their six-month Combat Infantryman’s Course.79 emplacement is not practiced in training centers.83 of troops is founded in good training, as this Soldiers are told that in other environments the Why not change in response to what seems to be a reduces casualties.88 use of initiative is not only tolerated but positively significant lesson of modern warfare?84 encouraged. However, in the urban environment, One area where the training of soldiers is being What is required to realize this is twofold: they are discouraged from aggressively pursuing adjusted for the urban environment is physical first, training facilities that are big enough for an enemy who is almost certainly less well trained conditioning. Both the American and British armed large combined-arms units with supporting and equipped. The soldier is taught to fear the forces, among others, have shifted the emphasis logistic, medical, and intelligence elements, and threats of a fast tempo — isolation, outflanking, a of physical training away from the high endurance realistic enough to approximate real-world battle reduction in the fire support that can be brought forced march toward developing all around stronger conditions; and second, a mindset among those to bear — but not taught to embrace these things soldiers who are trained in the sort of repeated training soldiers in urban warfare that tells soldiers as opportunities that can work in his or her favor. anaerobic bursts of activity typically required in they can adapt to and thrive in this environment as An example from the American forces also urban operations, like hauling themselves, their well as in any other. illustrates this curiously hidebound attitude. It is equipment, and perhaps wounded comrades, over widely agreed that one of the most effective pieces walls and through windows.85 Still, more could be of equipment in the arsenal of the urban counter- done. To prepare a soldier for urban warfare, he or Tempo, Pressure, Pursuit: insurgency in Iraq was the collection of concrete she also needs to conceive of moving through the The Strongest Gang barriers of varying sizes, called “T-walls” on city quite differently than most civilians — to think More important than changes in technology, account of their cross-sectional appearance.80 Most like an urban explorer, the sort of person who is Western armies have a longstanding habit of however, are changes in how urban operations seeking solutions to tactical and strategic problems are conducted generally, something with which in technology because this plays to the strengths the British and American armies are already of Western countries. In a March 2017 NATO urban experimenting. We will deal with these first before warfare game, for instance, the teams played with looking further at developments in C2ISR and 39 different hypothetical and actual technologies. logistics. Combined arms operations, including 78 Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, Rommel and His Art of War, ed. John Pimlott (London: Wrens Park, 2003), 133. 79 It is perhaps instructive that a British infantry soldier under training spends more time on the drill square learning to march than learning the core skill of fighting in an urban environment. 86 For insight into the philosophy and techniques of “place hacking,” a good place to start is, Bradley L. Garrett, Explore Everything: Place-Hacking 80 As convincingly recounted in, Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008), 330. the City (London: Verso, 2013). For this research, we interviewed a place-hacker in October 2017 who illustrated for us, with photos as an example, a typical hack of our own university — an adventure that encompassed crawling through generally unknown (and publicly inaccessible) service tunnels, 81 David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), climbing decorative surface features of structures, and traversing the rooftops of several central London landmarks over a space of three city blocks. 108, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR160.html. Another worthwhile text for opportunistically reshaping the way cities are envisioned is, Geoff Manaugh, A Burglar’s Guide to the City (New York: 82 For an illustration see the photos in Johnson, Markel, and Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, 75–76. Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2016). 83 Correspondence with Maj. (ret.) John Spencer, chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute, Nov. 16, 2017. Spencer was a company 87 Our interlocutors at the British Army Infantry Battle School’s Urban Warfare Instructor’s Course half-joked that a good number of private soldiers commander in the Sadr City battle and also served in Iraq in 2015–16 as an adviser on barrier systems. brought to the table extensive burglary and other relevant skills from their civilian lives. The special forces and intelligence agencies sometimes actively seek out such recruits for specialist work, notably surveillance. However, except for a few one-off and ad hoc consultations with waterworks 84 We were unable to obtain from our interviewees a consistent or plausible answer to this question. It was supposed by several, including Spencer and sewage utilities, we came across no systematic engagement by regular forces with a range of urban specialists, whether licit or (as we would (see note 83), that perhaps the Army did not think it would have to do it again, which runs contrary to the stated assumption that urban warfare is suggest that they also do) semi-licit or illicit ones. going to be more common and is therefore perplexing. 88 Quote from, Rommel, Rommel and His Art of War, 133–34. 85 Sean Kimmons, “Army Combat Fitness Test Set to Become New PT Test of Record in Late 2020,” Army News Service, July 9, 2018, https://www. army.mil/article/208189/army_combat_fitness_test_set_to_become_new_pt_test_of_record_in_late_2020. 89 Urbanisation Seminar Game, NATO Defence College, Rome, Sept. 28–Oct. 7, 2017.

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the use of armor, are likely to continue to have a Currently, Western soldiers are likely to be impose positive control upon their subordinates, as it is both an expansive and elusive subject, significant role in any future major urban conflict. part of a force that is loath to let them use those requiring them to seek authorization for firing their and its effects on the battlefield are pervasive We would not seek to suggest that light forces advantages because the politicians that control weapons or moving. and indirect. A main point we wish to stress, can, or indeed should, be the sole answer to that force are often uncertain as to the value of However, these concerns should be of however, is that technology should be an enabler the problem. As ever, force packages should be the prize, which makes them risk-averse. It has decreasing importance. Western armed forces are of the strongest gang theory — allowing dispersed configured to deal with the threat presented by long been a truism of military history, as observed unlikely to employ overwhelming firepower in a operations of the sort idealized above. In practice, the enemy. However, regular force tactics must earlier, that no amount of tactical acumen can make congested battlespace where there are so many technology is too often an impediment when it is evolve. In a world containing urban clusters of up up for defective strategy. But now it is worse than noncombatants, because a) in most conceivable employed to reinforce a top-down, positive control- to 150 million people, saturating a city with soldiers that even — bad policy actively drives bad tactics, contingencies it would exceed the limits of political oriented command model that squelches small cannot be the answer — as was prescribed by old while making strategy largely irrelevant. Even the acceptability, and b) in most instances there are unit initiative. Technology is important, but it can field manuals and doctrine.90 The numbers simply best fighting force in the world, if it is deployed viable, or better, alternatives. Notably, technological become a problem when you let it drive the cart, will not add up. statically and is permanently restrained from being advances in the form of precision-fire weapons as it were. Moreover, as we have stressed in other What is needed is a substantial shift in thinking proactive, is still eminently vulnerable to a fanatic supported by unmanned aerial vehicles reduce the respects, it can be a neutral factor that affects all from extant, industrial-era, positive-control- in a bomb vest, with all the strategic impacts that requirement for conventional artillery, even if they belligerents the same, for better or worse. oriented approaches, to one in which the regular that entails. It is ironic that in the pursuit of the do not replace them altogether. For example, in some ways, technological force is simply the strongest gang in a given area. laudable goal of limiting risk, specifically casualties It is helpful to reflect on the remarks made half a developments in this field have seriously benefited The key to fighting in the morass of the urban to their own forces and to noncombatants, century ago by the Brazilian Marxist revolutionary irregular forces. For example, in addition to their environment is not necessarily using divisional- governments dictate strategies and prescribe Carlos Marighella, who wrote what was essentially extensive use of IEDs while fighting the Iraqi Army, level maneuvering to shatter an enemy general’s tactics that, in practice, increase the risk and likely a gangster warfighting manual dressed up with Islamic State forces also employed vehicle-borne plan, but successfully overwhelming the adversary’s predetermine failure.91 ideological claptrap: IEDs (VBIEDs) as a precision weapon, including cognitive abilities at the team and individual level At the command level, the “maneuvrist approach” armored variants. These were used in combination — all in an effort to achieve a given policy aim. The is the first tenet of the British Army’s philosophy for The urban guerrilla must possess initiative, with other weapons. What allowed them to army fighting in this context should seek to create operations and a frequent reference point for allied mobility, and flexibility, as well as versatility operate in this manner was the group’s relatively a thousand small outflanking maneuvers together armies.92 Applying this philosophy in the urban and a command of any situation. Initiative sophisticated C2ISR system, which included to generate the conditions to destroy their enemy’s environment demands that commanders fight especially is an indispensable quality. It is modified, off-the-shelf drones. With the aerial ability to put together a response. the urge to control in real time. Control measures not always possible to foresee everything, perspective afforded to them by such devices, Beyond being an efficient method of killing the are essential, but they need to be simple, robust, and the urban guerrilla cannot let himself Islamic State commanders were able to control enemy, this approach could allow the attacking and as unrestrictive as possible. The fragmenting become confused, or wait for instructions. and direct multiple VBIED attacks over a large area, force to gain geographically distinct, localized tendencies of the city require everyone to be His duty is to act, to find adequate solutions including on moving columns or columns that had control in a short timeframe. This would, of comfortable operating in the pursuit of a well- for each problem he faces, and to retreat. It briefly halted. course, require enough soldiers to achieve articulated goal while not requiring minute-by- is better to err acting than to do nothing for In response, Iraqi units were forced to construct multiple, simultaneous actions and in so doing minute direction. Perhaps being the strongest gang fear of making a mistake.93 ditches and other barriers around themselves and create a situation complex enough to overwhelm is most similar to how naval doctrine conceives of throughout the city to slow and control the threat.94 the enemy’s ability to comprehend it. But it would sea control — interventions that are limited in time The truth of the matter is that this perfectly Ultimately, all major road movements would be also require commanders at all levels to have and scale of ambition and are characterized by a sensible tactical advice to the urban guerrilla is just accompanied by a bulldozer on a flatbed truck. When the courage to allow their subordinates to seize high degree of ruthless, independent action. as pertinent now to the regular Western soldier. forced to halt, instead of simply setting out pickets opportunities as they are created. The current doctrine of strict control measures Marighella and his followers and admirers were and heavy weapons pointed in the direction of To make the best use of the advantages regular and positive control is no longer entirely fit for never so numerous or powerful as to be able to potential attack, the bulldozer would be used to dig soldiers have over their irregular and less well- purpose, fixed as it is in the ground-holding physically dominate the entirety of the cities in a ditch and berm enclosure, thus providing a good trained adversaries, conventional military thinking concepts of land warfare. The underpinning logic which they chose to operate. Neither is any Western measure of defense against truck and car bombs.95 must be turned on its head. At an individual level, of this doctrine is twofold. First, it is generally army up to such a task without an extraordinary There are many advantages to operating in regular soldiers are more lethal than their irregular still supposed that urban battles involve the use concentration of effort that is politically implausible such a manner, including fewer civilian casualties, adversaries, are in better physical condition, shoot of massed artillery to buy the time and space and therefore strategically tenuous. as potentially jittery soldiers are less likely to straighter, and are from a military culture that (in to maneuver and cause the maximum possible open fire on unidentified vehicles approaching theory) regards initiative as a key criterion for destruction of the enemy’s combat power before The Technological Contribution: C2ISR and their perimeter. The disadvantages, though, are professional advancement. Put simply, Western any attempt is made to engage in direct combat. Logistics significant: For one thing, it cannot work without soldiers have numerous advantages over the Second, the lack of visibility and the fluidity of the wrecking whatever civilian infrastructure is enemy. To focus only on their disadvantages is battle make it very difficult to discern friend from Before moving to our conclusion, it is worth present, such as sewers, water mains, utility cables, ceding the psychological high ground before the foe. In an effort to avoid friendly fire and civilian dwelling briefly on the existing and likely impacts of and road surfaces. Conducting such an operation in first shot has been fired. casualties, therefore, commanders are wont to technology on urban warfare, starting with C2ISR, an urban setting, when garnering and maintaining

90 “China Is Trying to Turn Itself Into a Country of 19 Super-Regions,” Economist, June 23, 2018, https://www.economist.com/china/2018/06/23/ china-is-trying-to-turn-itself-into-a-country-of-19-super-regions?frsc=dg%7Ce. 93 Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969), 4. A version of this manual can be read here: https://www.marxists.org/archive/ marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm. 91 Clausewitz was not the first to repeat this sentiment, but his formulation of it is especially adroitly put, “the mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst.” See, Clausewitz, On War, 84. This category of mistake, however, is by far the most common in contemporary Western strategy. 94 What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the Force, Mosul Study Group, no. 17-24 U, U.S. Army, September 2017, 36, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/ On which point also see, Betz and Stanford-Tuck, “Teaching Your Enemy to Win.” Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/Mosul-Public-Release1.pdf. 92 Land Operations, 5–2. 95 Interview by authors with a British Army officer who was part of an advisory team in Iraq during Mosul operations, Brecon, Wales, March 2018.

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the good will of the local population is a main planning, simulation, and training are significant, if to the age of autonomous air taxis and Domino’s is potential benefits, however, are numerous. objective, is very challenging. it can be made robust enough for the field, and if the already experimenting with the aerial drone delivery For starters, it produces less actual — as Some potential solutions are already emerging scanning devices are light enough to be deployed on of pizzas fresh from its ovens to its customers’ opposed to perceived — risk to the soldier because in military engineering conferences and in the an unmanned aerial vehicle. The first question the backyards, then it stands to reason that urban a fractured and retreating enemy is less able to marketing brochures of firms selling defensive senior officer in the room asked was how close to military logistics, from resupply through medical coordinate resistance than one that is continually barriers and counter-mobility systems, the real time these simulations could be delivered.99 evacuation, are likewise set for a shake-up.101 given time and space in which to reorganize latter very often focused on changes to urban The apprehensions that animated both senior Urban air mobility may have started with a civilian and to evolve new tactics.103 It also reduces the infrastructure for domestic counter-terrorism officers noted above are consistent with those preoccupation with the frustrations of commuting demand for indirect (i.e., non-precision) fire. It is purposes.96 One of these firms, Kenno, a Finnish that pertain in any environment. Commanders and the perceived need for just-in-time delivery of a methodology that maximizes the strengths of manufacturer of laser-welded, steel-sandwich want to have intimate knowledge of the terrain, everything from machine parts to snacks, but its a well-trained and equipped force and minimizes components, has, with the Finnish army, developed including where their own forces are or will be, potential military applications are significant. the time spent fighting in places where people what is essentially a surface-mounted, reusable, where their enemy is and may be going, and what actually live in dense concentrations. While modular fortress that can be assembled without their intentions are (such as they can be gleaned). Accepting Risk, Avoiding Self-Defeat the “strongest gang” approach does render an specialist tools by a small team in a few hours.97 Additionally, they want this information in a form attacking force vulnerable to counter-tactics from What the above illustrates is that changes in that they can, quite literally, walk through with The essential point here is that many of the the enemy, this will only be an issue if that force civilian technologies — including robotics and their subordinate commanders during the planning perceived problems of urban warfare are, in fact, is not very effective. The assumption that this microelectronics, miniaturization of batteries, phase of an operation — and for all of this to happen self-imposed. They emerge from a constraint on the would be the case is a disappointing and self- and communications — enabled a nonstate actor, more swiftly and accurately than for the opponent. way military force is used together with the growing defeating foundation from which to make military the Islamic State, to acquire one of the primary Peniakoff would have asked for the same thing, as capability for real-time, friendly-force tracking, decisions and shows a disturbing lack of trust advantages of airpower (i.e., aerial reconnaissance) would have Wellington, or Marlborough, or any of which reduces the risk of soldiers accidentally down the chain of command. Applying multiple at a fraction of the cost of an air force. This, in turn, the great captains of history all the way back to attacking their own side. Yet, constraining soldiers points of pressure to the enemy would allow a has caused the regular forces operating against the Alexander the Great. Developments in C2ISR seem too tightly also reduces their ability to maximize force to achieve the mission while affording the group to reinvent technologies and tactics that to be making that more possible in the city than their chances of victory against a determined commander the opportunity to judge where and would have been recognizable to a Roman legionary previously thought. enemy. The solution is to ruthlessly and efficiently how to commit resources to exploit success. There constructing a marching fort in hostile territory at Clearly, when forces are operating in relatively apply the maneuvrist approach at the tactical level. is little here that should offend or frighten modern the end of a day’s march. small numbers in a dispersed manner in a city Senior commanders must become comfortable commanders. Boldness, simultaneity, coordinated It has also required regular forces to develop in upheaval, there will be concerns about the with formulating a plan and then trusting in the action, and the like are principles of combat that their own new techniques for utilizing new security of supply chains. Technology may have skill of their most junior subordinates to see that have long been taught and applauded in every technologies, allowing them to operate in smaller some useful answers here also, which are worth plan succeed. Commanders at all levels must see other tactical environment. Why not the city? teams in a more dispersed manner. For instance, discussing in a bit more detail. Consider, for the urban battlefield as a series of disparate and at a recent conference of urban warfare specialists instance, that NASA and the U.S. Federal Aviation lightly connected nodes of activity.102 The apogee in New York, a senior officer highlighted the Administration have recently initiated the Urban of this approach would be for small groups of Conclusion need to constantly develop new techniques while Air Mobility Grand Challenges, modeled partly soldiers, whose activities are lightly coordinated recounting an observation made to him by a young on the DARPA Grand Challenges that began and de-conflicted, to exert pressure upon the The urban environment is a challenging setting Australian special forces officer working with Iraqi experimenting with autonomous ground vehicles adversary in multiple places at the same time. Each in which to fight — as are all environments. forces in the fight against the Islamic State in more than a decade ago. The main thrust of this small team would be given the freedoms and the Undoubtedly, the key constraint is the potential 2017: “The most effective weapon on the current effort is to alleviate a civilian problem, specifically resources to allow it to overwhelm the adversary intermingling of civilians and civilian infrastructure battlefield is a joint and inter-agency-enabled the traffic jams that plague life and commerce through superior skill, tactics, and equipment. with combat operations. Yet, civilians may be combined arms team with an armed ISR platform in big cities, through the development of a new The reticence on the part of Western armies to evacuated, limiting their exposure to harm, and it is (i.e., a ‘drone’) flying above.”98 class of air vehicles that will bypass congestion accept an approach that is distinctly less oriented sometimes possible to fight in a way that mitigates Similarly, in a workshop on conflict in urban by flying over it. “I happen to believe that this is a toward positive control, where local commanders collateral damage, even when civilians are present environments which we attended in Britain, a revolution coming in aviation,” were the words of are freer to maneuver more boldly and aggressively, throughout the battle. Unequivocally, significant London-based company showcased a civilian one of the NASA officials involved — a revolution accepting a higher degree of political risk, is based political consequences may follow from a soldier technology that it had developed for creating precise that has significant military impact too.100 on admirable concerns. Senior commanders pulling the trigger. But history and the experience 3D-renderings of urban infrastructure using laser- If the head of the U.S. Federal Aviation are uncomfortable with what could be seen as of recent urban operations show that soldiers and scanning, which allowed them to be experienced in Administration’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems abandoning the individual soldier to a fight that commanders — properly trained and equipped — virtual reality. The military applications of this for Integration Office can say that he is looking forward pits him against his adversary. In this approach, can act judiciously and achieve the goals of their the commander would have to effectively wash mission despite the odds seeming to be against 96 These are discussed in greater detail in, David Betz, “World of Wallcraft: The Contemporary Resurgence of Fortification Strategies,” Infinity his hands of the ability to affect the outcome once them. Journal 6, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 18–22. the soldier has made contact with the enemy. Its Military operations invariably have an impact 97 Technical data and a video of the Balpro system may be seen on the company’s website: “Force Protection Balpro Protector – Fast Fortification System,” Kenno, http://www.kenno-shield.com/balpro/force-protection-balpro-products/. 98 Maj. Gen. Rick Burr, “Future War in Cities: Australian Thoughts,” Multi-Domain Battle in Megacities Conference, Fort Hamilton, NY, April 3–4, 2018, 101 David Reid, “Domino’s Delivers World’s First Ever Pizza by Drone’, CNBC, Nov. 16, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ah1ogq_mHw&list=PLx2Zn7hPXT7d1zDzuqt00NOsI4ZzyTXUu&index=6. 102 A related thought suggests it be treated as an organism. See, John Spencer and John Amble, “A Better Approach to Urban Operations: Treat 99 Urban Warfare Study Day at British Army, Land Warfare Centre, Warminster, July 10, 2018. Cities Like Human Bodies,” Modern War Institute, Sept. 13, 2017, https://mwi.usma.edu/better-approach-urban-operations-treat-cities-like-human- bodies/. 100 Alan Boyle, “NASA and FAA Cast a Wide Net to Get Set for Revolution in Urban Air Mobility,” GeekWire, Nov. 2, 2018, https://www.geekwire. com/2018/nasa-faa-cast-wide-net-get-ready-revolution-urban-air-mobility/. 103 On which point, see, Betz and Stanford-Tuck, “Teaching Your Enemy to Win,” 16–22.

84 85 The Scholar The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century

on the urban landscape — even small arms can ungoverned conurbations against little-understood not actively practiced. The city is a harsh and be devastating to structures — and there is no enemies preying on collapsing civil societies. The complex place in which to fight. But, like Spencer straightforward, correct answer to whether and best thing is not to fight at all, anywhere — as Sun Chapman’s jungle, it is neutral. In the pursuit of to what extent it is acceptable to damage a city Tzu quite rightly said. sound policies, Western militaries possess the in pursuit of a political objective. It depends on Nevertheless, there are a wide range of very skills and capabilities to master warfare in the many factors — military necessity and justness of plausible limited contingencies — strategic raids city, if only leaders have the courage to let them cause, in particular — and the answer may vary on certain facilities and noncombatant evacuation get on with it. even within the same conflict. Take for example operations spring most readily to mind — that will operations in northwest Europe against Germany propel armed forces into urban environments to David Betz is Professor of War in the Modern during World War II. Allied generals faced very one degree or another. It is possible to make some World in the War Studies Department at King’s different political strictures on tactics at the end of progress on the tactical side that will improve College London. He is head of the Insurgency the campaign than they did at the beginning. the chances of such actions being successful — Research Group, deputy director of the King’s Centre Critics exaggerate the impact on the city when namely, doing what is known to work, but doing for Strategic Communications, and senior fellow of they speak of combat operations “killing the city” it better and more consistently. For that to occur, the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia). and of “urbicide,” purportedly a renascent war however, Western armies must first stop deploying He has written on information warfare, the strategy that targets the “destruction of buildings and re-deploying the same hoary old scare stories future of land forces, the virtual dimension of qua representatives of urbanity.”104 In reality, there about what seems likely to be the normal operating insurgency, propaganda of the deed, cyberspace are no major cities that have been destroyed by environment for the foreseeable future. Tactics can and insurgency, and British counter-insurgency in war. Groningen and Aachen — and even Berlin, be adjusted and training improved to master the such journals as the Journal of Strategic Studies, Stalingrad, Hiroshima, and Carthage for that neutrality of the environment. the Journal of Contemporary Security Studies, and matter — were all back in business soon after being Military and strategic thought is most compelling Orbis. His latest book is Carnage and Connectivity: blasted to smithereens in warfighting that verged and practically useful when it is empiric, pragmatic, Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military on the exterminatory. Sometimes, nature may and phlegmatic. Commanders will never be totally Power (Hurst/Oxford University Press). He is now destroy a city, but man, despite his best efforts, right in their decisions. They ought, though, to try working on a new book entitled Walled Worlds, does not.105 to be “right enough” — to be able to determine the which explores the contemporary resurgence of Technological change is a constant that touches big picture goals, such that they are decisive and fortification strategies. upon every aspect of urban warfare. Weapons are incisive enough to be turned into clear orders. And more powerful as time passes and communications they must have the moral courage to let subordinate Hugo Stanford-Tuck is a lieutenant colonel are more rapid and dense. Overall, there has commanders get on with the task unburdened by in the British Army’s Royal Gurkha Rifles, a light been an acceleration of the transnational flow of micromanagement or bullying. Methodologies of infantry regiment specializing in air assault and people, ideas, and things across the global political strict cause and effect in complex problems of jungle operations. He has commanded infantry economy that seems, at first glance, to be a major warfare, urban or otherwise, ought to be distrusted. soldiers on operations in Sierra Leone, the Balkans, complicating factor in politics and warfare. There Too often they are flawed by bad history — “just-so Iraq, and Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Stanford-Tuck has has also been a change of scale: Cities are simply stories” that are based on habit and legend dressed planned military campaigns at the political-strategic bigger by an order of magnitude than they were in up as authoritative models.106 level, disaster relief activities at the operational the past because there are vastly more people in Moreover, the combination of Moore’s Law with level, and combat operations at the tactical level. the world and fewer of them are needed to work in the ubiquity of technology and its ever-decreasing He has written about counter-insurgency, combat, agriculture. At the end of the day, however, these cost ought to remind us that the context of and the entwined Darwinian relationship between are changes in form rather than substance. The contemporary operations is one in which having adversaries. He is currently studying for an MBA challenges faced by the British Army in Basra in the technological edge is no longer decisive on at Warwick Business School and next year will be 2005 were not all that different from those that it its own, if indeed it ever was. Thriving in the establishing and then commanding a new battalion faced in Buenos Aires 200 years earlier. urban environment requires that statesmen and of Gurkha Specialized Infantry. The reason the words “urban guerilla” cannot yet commanders settle clearly and wisely on policy be replaced with “British soldier” in Marighella’s aims that military power has a chance of achieving. Photo: Eden Briand quote is the misalignment of policy with strategic That is what will enable placing a greater emphasis realities and tactical common sense. The problem on tempo and exploiting the greater tactical of the urban terrain is both political and tactical. flexibility and individual lethality of the modern However, it is beyond our remit and ken to solve the Western soldier in the conduct of operations. problem of a highly risk-averse political context, as These injunctions would, we believe, result in we described it earlier. Western politicians probably operations more truly in line with the maneuvrist ought not to pick fights in the world’s sprawling, approach that is now frequently invoked but is

104 Martin Coward, Urbicide: The Politics of Urban Destruction (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 15. 105 A point treated with great perspicacity recently in, John Spencer, “The Destructive Age of Urban Warfare; or, How to Kill a City and How to Protect it,” Modern War Institute, March 28, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/destructive-age-urban-warfare-kill-city-protect/. 106 Storr, The Human Face of War, 199.

86 87 88 The Strategist 89

The Strategist

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of current and former senior policymakers, members of the military, and civilian national security practitioners. The Strategist Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making

Being able to “think in space” is a crucial tool for decision-makers, but one that is often deemphasized. In order to improve its ability to think in space, the national security community ought to objectively assess how effectively it is employing geographic information and seek every opportunity to sharpen its skills in this area.

Only statesmen who can do their political and is not the golden age of spatial thinking in national Andrew Rhodes strategic thinking in terms of a round earth and a security policymaking. The challenges confronting three-dimensional warfare can save their countries the national security community require learning from being outmaneuvered on distant flanks. new ways of spatial thinking — and relearning old ones — on a global scale. -Nicholas Spykman1 The ability to “think in space” is more than mere navigation, map-reading, or geographic eaders who fail to think in space do so literacy. The basic assumptions laid out in Richard at their own peril. Nicholas Spykman Neustadt and Ernest May’s classic study Thinking published the above warning on the in Time, which explores how decision-makers can importance of mental maps in the make better use of history, are germane to this contextL of World War II and the global challenges type of thinking.2 The first assumption is that busy it presented, but his argument regarding the decision-makers and their advisers are presented importance of spatial thinking to the nation’s with a tremendous quantity and diversity of security has never been more relevant. Thinking information every day. Thus, when it comes to in space has long been an essential tool for thinking in space, such individuals can consume thinking critically and communicating clearly when only a small amount of the geographic information it comes to national security decision-making. available to them. Second, the pressures of time The importance of mental maps and geographic and limited information do not lend themselves communication are only growing in an era of to thinking critically or, in the case of thinking new global challenges and renewed great power in space, questioning the geographic renderings competition. Strategists and diplomats would they are presented with. Third, it is nevertheless benefit from gaining greater insight into the ways possible to achieve marginal improvements — in geographic information shapes national security this case, in the use of geographic information — decision-making. Moreover, understanding this and be, as Neustadt and May put it, “more reflective impact can help produce recommendations for and systematic.”3 how American strategists can more effectively This article seeks to advance the conversation think in space. about how geographic information shapes national The tools and resources needed to elevate the security decisions. While many have agreed with spatial thinking of those charged with conducting Spykman that “geography matters” and although America’s foreign policy and securing the there is a substantial literature on cartography national interest are all available. Unfortunately, as a form of communication, there has been little American strategists are currently not making analysis of how geography “matters” when it full use of geographic information, inhibiting the comes to contemporary national security decision- policymaking process as well as the government’s making.4 This article begins by considering the ability to communicate global policy. Despite position of national security decision-making at the national security decision-makers having intersection of the art and science of cartography unprecedented access to geographic information and visualization, the unique cartographic and tools with which to visualize the world, this consciousness of American strategists, and the

1 Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1942), 165. 2 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). 3 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, 2. 4 Ken Jennings, Maphead: Charting the Wide, Weird World of Geography Wonks (New York: Scribner, 2011). Harm de Blij, Why Geography Matters: More than Ever (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 16.

91 The Strategist Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making

various theories of geopolitics. These three elements The Individual Level: Capturing “white lies” and the informed map reader knows single sheet or wall, a “compromise” projection are analogous to the three “images” Kenneth Waltz and Interpreting Space on a Flat Surface which lies the map contains and why. provides a balance that accepts, but minimizes, identified to discuss international relations: the Scale and projection are both practical distortions to the distance, area, and shape.15 The individual, the national, and the global.5 In the Individuals must interpret and describe their cartographic “lies.” A wall-sized world map cannot creator of one of the best compromise projections, sections that follow, I discuss the interaction of geographic context, whether exploring a new city contain the same detail as a state highway map, Arthur H. Robinson, called for map creators to heed technology and geography, arguing that the ability as a tourist or formulating wartime strategy. It is, but both have their purpose. Projection allows the principles of graphic design just as an author “must of decision-makers to think critically in space has therefore, essential to understand fundamental transfer of three dimensions to two but entails employ words with due regard for many important not kept pace with the advances of technology. issues of cognition and spatial reasoning, which some distortions in the process: No projection can structural elements of the written language, such The article then turns to the structure and process have been an important part of human evolution preserve true distance, area, and shape in the same as grammar, syntax, and spelling.”16 for employing geography in U.S. national security and can vary widely among individuals and even map. For example, many map users are familiar Symbolization is another area in which institutions and the importance of thinking in cultures.6 Some may possess Clausewitz’s inner eye with the Mercator projection’s heavy distortion of cartographers must tell necessary “lies.” To make space in order to tackle 21st-century national — the military thinker wrote that spatial cognition distance and area.12 While the unlikely hold of the a road, river, or small island visible on a map, security challenges. Finally, the article closes with is a commander’s “special gift.” His version of Mercator projection on American education is an the cartographer often must make it far wider or recommendations for making the national security thinking in space was a “sense of locality” through instructive history of addiction to lazy conventions, larger than it actually is at that scale. Abstract workforce more effective and identifies areas for which abstract space was “vividly present to the there is nothing technically inaccurate about symbolization provides a powerful language further research. mind, imprinted like a picture, like a map, upon the the projection itself, which was a remarkable through which cartographers can communicate, brain, without fading or blurring in detail.”7 Others, technological achievement that facilitated global but can also easily become a source of inadvertent however, might be what the Japanese call “hōkō trade and exploration.13 The essential point is that blunders or deliberate deception. The design Three Levels of Thinking in Space onchi,” someone who is “directionally tone-deaf.”8 mapmakers must select an appropriate projection choices that cartographers make significantly One famous study found unique patterns of activity and scale to facilitate accurate interpretation impact the ways in which individuals will perceive Echoing Waltz, thinking in space occurs at three and even structural changes in the hippocampus of by the map user, and informed map users must geographic information. Even if scale and levels of national security decision-making: the the brains of London taxi drivers who mastered the understand the reasons for those choices. projection are appropriately and effectively used, individual, the governmental or national, and the encyclopedic knowledge required to pass the city- There is no perfect answer when it comes to the employment of line, color, information density, global. Examining each of these three levels in wide driver licensing exam.9 choosing a map projection, though there are many text labels, and symbols bear on accuracy and sequence allows a careful review of the existing Cartography is the way in which geographic wrong ones. One map familiar to many in the U.S. ease of interpretation. Because maps can feature research, historical context, and theoretical information is communicated to and interpreted military is “The World with Commanders’ Areas of centrally in national security decision-making, this foundations of different aspects of thinking in by the individual. The maps we study shape our Responsibility,” which uses the Miller Cylindrical is particularly important to bear in mind. space. These three perspectives also provide spatial understanding, and the maps we make projection to delineate the regional combatant useful analogies and suggest frameworks for reflect deliberate choices to describe and simplify commands under the Unified Command Plan. The National Level: Development of American evaluating contemporary issues. At the most basic a complex reality. Lewis Carroll and Jorge Luis The standard world wall map produced for the Cartographic Consciousness level, thinking in space is the act of an individual Borges both explored the idea of a fictional Department of Defense also uses the Miller seeking to make sense of space when it is out “perfect” map, on a one-to-one scale, which would projection, which has the advantage of being Zooming out from the individual to the national of sight and perhaps beyond his or her direct be difficult to consult as “it would cover the whole rectangular and fitting neatly onto a sheet or level, one can see how a unique American experience. On the national level, American society, country, and shut out the sunlight.”10 A perfect map wall, but is only slightly less distorted than the cartographic consciousness has evolved with including its vast national security bureaucracy, is impossible, and thus every map is a simplified, Mercator projection in terms of high latitudes.14 the nation, shaping the way that Americans — has developed its own uniquely American national two-dimensional abstraction of three-dimensional The Miller projection is inappropriate, for including national security decision-makers — geographic consciousness, with implications for space. According to one provocative argument, example, for a planner in the Pacific seeking to view the world. Every nation, and its government, how Americans use geographic information. At “not only is it easy to lie with maps, it’s essential.”11 understand or convey the tyranny of distance in has its own relationship with maps. The national the highest level, geographic conceptualization These lies could be accidental misrepresentations that theater. When distance is the central issue map is a critical dimension of national identity and of the international system — that is, geopolitics or deliberate deceptions, but the best maps make to a planning team, an equidistant projection, of governments have a vested interest in the regular, — bounds and focuses diplomacy and national intentional and transparent choices, trading some which there are many kinds, is most appropriate. public declaration of the extent of their sovereignty. security decisions. distortions for others, such as scale, projection, However, American officials rarely use equidistant Kosovo and Cyprus, for example, put the outline of and symbolization. Thus, the mapmaker only tells projections, possibly because they look unfamiliar their borders on their national flags. and distort shape while preserving distance. When America’s cartographic consciousness developed comparing the size of two areas or mapping the over several principal phases. Spatial thinking may 5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Revised Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). distribution of data, such as population density, have had an early hold on the national psyche 6 M.R. O’Connor, Wayfinding: The Science and Mystery of How Humans Navigate the World (New York: St. Martin’s, 2019). Lera Boroditsky and Alice Gaby, “Remembrances of Times East: Absolute Spatial Representations of Time in an Australian Aboriginal Community,” Psychological Science an equal-area projection is most appropriate and in a nation founded by traders and explorers — 21, no. 11 (2010): 1635, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0956797610386621. accurate. When mapping the entire world onto a George Washington himself had an early career 7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf (Everyman’s Library), 1993), Book I, chap. 3, 127. 12 The original manuscript for this article included several original maps created by the author to illustrate the points made here. Unfortunately, because of space constraints, they do not appear in the print version. You can view these maps in the online version of this article at, https://tnsr. 8 Joshua Hotaka Roth, “Hōkō onchi: Wayfinding and the Emergence of ‘Directional Tone-Deafness’ in Japan,” Ethos 43, no. 4 (December 2015): org/2019/11/thinking-in-space-the-role-of-geography-in-national-security-decision-making/. 402–22, https://doi.org/10.1111/etho.12098. 13 Mark Monmonier, Rhumb Lines and Map Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 9 Eleanor A. Maguire et al., “Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 97, no. 8 (2000): 4398–403, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.070039597. 14 “Mapping Customer Operations,” Defense Logistics Agency, accessed Jan. 18, 2019, http://www.dla.mil/Aviation/Offers/Products/Mapping/ Topographic/. 10 Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded (London: Macmillan, 1893), 169. Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” in, Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998). 15 J.A. Steers, An Introduction to the Study of Map Projections, 15th Edition (London: University of London, 1970). 11 Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps, Second Edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1. 16 Arthur H. Robinson and Randall D. Sale, Elements of Cartography, 3rd Edition (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), 250.

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as a surveyor before his military and political maritime and international focus. The acquisition period of cartographic lethargy.”24 He also attacked Harvard affair, as did McCarthyite accusations that life. The colonial era was marked by exploration, of Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines forced an the “psychological shackles of conventional university geography departments were a “haven colonization, and conquest of the interior, expansion of the national map that included the maps” that prevent Americans from effectively for socialists.”29 after which national independence marked an vast scale of trans-Pacific distances. And although conceptualizing geographic challenges, and held Also in decline from a relative high point during inflection point as the young republic sought Mahan did not achieve the same popular acclaim particular disdain for the “invariable placing of World War II was the effectiveness of geographic to craft its own geographic identity.17 Before and in his own country that he enjoyed in Europe, he North at the top [as] geographical cant in its most discourse between national leaders and the public, after independence, there was a grand spatial had a clear impact on key leaders like Theodore pernicious form.”25 which did not carry forward to Vietnam. Former dimension to America’s commitment to territorial Roosevelt, who, as assistant secretary of the Navy The popular atlases and magazine maps of World Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara wrote late expansion. This was evident in the colonial era and later as president promoted the development War II created the defining spatial conception of in life that Indochina had been effectively “terra but grew rapidly in the years after independence, of the United States into a global naval power.20 global threats facing America — Henrikson called incognita” for the Kennedy-Johnson national most notably with the Louisiana Purchase and the Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime leadership this new global awareness “air-age globalism” — security team.30 But the United States employed Jefferson administration’s sponsorship of the Lewis demonstrated the value of thinking in space: He that continued into the early years of the Cold ample cartographic resources in support of combat and Clark expedition. Susan Schulten, a leading had an innate spatial sense that strengthened War.26 The threat of nuclear scholar of the role of cartography in American his critical thinking and he employed maps in attack by strategic bombers society, highlights important links between communicating with his administration. But, in and intercontinental ballistic geographic education and the development of the addition to creating a White House map room and missiles brought new military early republic. Emma Hart Willard, a prominent attaching hand-annotated maps to memoranda, challenges into sharper focus, educator of the period, explicitly connected the Roosevelt employed geography to explain national such as the strategic value of teaching of geography with national development strategy to the public, most famously in his Feb. the Arctic. Maps with azimuthal and promotion of an American identity.18 23, 1942, radio address, for which newspapers equidistant projections centered The Civil War represented a watershed moment nationwide printed accompanying world maps. on the North Pole became in popular mapping, as newspapers published Roosevelt directly contributed to a new national essential to understanding the battle maps and Americans both north and south consciousness of strategic issues in World War II threat axis. Those emphasizing followed the progress of the war. Some of the first that Alan Henrikson called a “revolution … in the the cartographic perspective American maps to shade or color code the different way Americans visually imagined the earth and of air-age globalists reached states (i.e., choropleth maps) distinguished slave represented it cartographically.”21 their peak with Alexander de and free states, while the Lincoln administration The career of cartographer Richard Edes Harrison Seversky whose maps depicted the Arctic as the and economic development efforts in Vietnam. closely studied maps detailing the distribution of exemplified this revolution.22 In the 1930s, Harrison “area of decision” situated most directly between Furthermore, at various stages of America’s slave populations in the South. The 1874 publication began producing maps emphasizing nontraditional the industrial heartlands of the United States and military involvement in Vietnam, President John of the Statistical Atlas of the United States, charting projections and perspectives — particularly Soviet Union.27 F. Kennedy, McNamara, and President Richard data from the 1870 census, opened a new era of orthographic projections, which provide a realistic Although remarkable technical achievements Nixon all used maps in televised press conferences the American government using cartographic “globe” view, but in which shapes and areas are in cartography continued throughout the Cold on the Vietnam War, but the effect was somehow data in support of policymaking.19 This period distorted and only one hemisphere is viewable War, geography’s place in academia did not keep less compelling than Roosevelt’s radio address. also saw growing institutional commitment to the at a time. He sacrificed convention to enable pace. Indeed, despite the demand for geography Johnson, for his part, studied a terrain model of study and advancement of geography, as seen in visualizations that better reflect the reality that skills during World War II, Harvard eliminated its Khe Sanh as he directed his advisers to avoid a the establishment of the American Geographical the world is three-dimensional than do most flat, geography department in 1948. Neil Smith argues repeat of Dien Bien Phu, perhaps reflecting the Society in 1851 and the National Geographic Society two-dimensional maps.23 Harrison’s 1944 Look at that Harvard’s decision marked a key moment in an broader tendency to fixate on operational and in 1888. It was also at this time, in 1878, that Harvard the World: The Fortune Atlas for World Strategy “academic war over the field of geography,” in which tactical situations, rather than the strategic level of appointed its first geography professor. includes dozens of original maps of war zones the institutionally weak discipline faced challenges war in that conflict.31 At the end of the 19th century, a truly outward and from multiple perspectives and advances several in establishing itself as a true science, something Over the course of the Cold War, the associated international perspective to America’s cartographic arguments about how different nations’ unique more than a set of technical skills and distinct from cartographic imagery became more ideological consciousness began to emerge. The Spanish- spatial perceptions influenced the making of good the other physical and social sciences.28 Personal than geostrategic, reflecting the global contest American War, the “Great White Fleet,” and Alfred or bad strategy. Harrison made an impassioned and academic rivalries also played a role in the for influence between the two superpowers.32 Thayer Mahan’s writings on global sea power plea for the importance of “geographical sense” to shifted America’s cartographic consciousness to a Americans who had been forced by the war from “a 24 Richard Edes Harrison, ed., Look at the World: The Fortune Atlas of World Strategy (New York: Fortune, 1944). 25 Harrison, ed., Look at the World. 17 Susan Schulten, “Map Drawing, Graphic Literacy, and Pedagogy in the Early Republic,” History of Education Quarterly 57, no. 2 (May 2017): 26 Timothy Barney, Mapping the Cold War: Cartography and the Framing of America’s International Power (Chapel Hill: University of North 185–220, https://doi.org/10.1017/heq.2017.2. Carolina Press, 2015), 30. 18 Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 75. 27 Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), map following page 312. 19 Susan Schulten, Mapping the Nation: History and Cartography in Nineteenth-Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 2012. 28 Neil Smith, “’Academic War over the Field of Geography’: The Elimination of Geography at Harvard 1947-1951,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77, no. 2 (June 1987): 155–72, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8306.1987.tb00151.x. 20 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy 1890-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 11. 29 Smith, “Academic War,” 166. 21 Alan K. Henrikson, “The Map as an ‘Idea’: The Role of Cartographic Imagery During the Second World War,” The American Cartographer 2, no. 1 (1975): 19, https://doi.org/10.1559/152304075784447243. 30 Robert S. McNamara, “We Were Wrong, Terribly Wrong,” Newsweek, April 16, 1995. 22 Susan Schulten, “Richard Edes Harrison and the Challenge to American Cartography,” Imago Mundi 50, no. 1 (1998): 174–188, https://doi. 31 Conor Friedersdorf, “The Battle of Khe Sanh and Its Retellings,” Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ org/10.1080/03085699808592886. archive/2018/01/the-battle-of-khe-sanh-and-its-retellings/551315/. 23 Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 230. 32 Barney, Mapping the Cold War, 11–16.

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The Cold War map simplistically reduced the reflect on the uniqueness of their own cartographic defensively at their own borders or within their foreign policy establishment, from realists to world (on a Mercator projection) to color-coded perspective, national leaders may not realize it own territory. Spykman also studied the difference liberal internationalists, has been firmly rooted in countries aligned to either the United States or the when they invoke geopolitical theories or engage between how land powers and sea powers think in Spykman’s concept of forward engagement for the Soviet Union. It is not yet clear how to describe in some of the great debates of geopolitics. In space, writing in 1938 that “[a] land power thinks better part of a century. Spykman also discussed the American cartographic consciousness in the other words, policymakers may not be interested in terms of continuous surfaces surrounding a the possibility that the Asian littorals might one post-Cold War or post-9/11 world. The low level in geopolitics, but geopolitics is interested in them. central point of control, while a sea power thinks day “be controlled not by British, American, or of geographic literacy among Americans in an The principal early proponent of geopolitical in terms of points and connecting lines dominating Japanese sea power but by Chinese air power.”46 age of globalization is a popular and longstanding thought was Halford Mackinder, who elaborated an immense territory.”41 Spykman perceived that He would doubtless be amazed at the geographic complaint.33 In one recent study, conducted at a the concept of a Eurasian “heartland,” control the unpopularity of foreign engagement created tools — from GPS to Google Earth — available time of high tension on the Korean peninsula, only of which determined global power. Mackinder’s a natural cycle among great powers — especially to the average person and the geospatial support 36 percent of American respondents could correctly career overlapped with Mahan’s, but they advanced the United States — of war, isolation, alliance, and provided to American national security decision- identify North Korea on a map, while only 16 percent very different arguments about where the seat of renewed war. Furthermore, Spykman explicitly makers, but at the same time dismayed at their of Americans could correctly locate Ukraine in a global power rested. Mackinder, writing at a time connected the structure of the international inability to “do their thinking in terms of a round similar 2014 study.34 But these results are nothing when Mahan’s theories of sea power had reached system to domestic and foreign policy, calling the earth and three-dimensional warfare.”47 new: In December 1950, with the Korean peninsula peak popularity, argued that the true pivot of tension between interventionism and isolationism In order to critically analyze national security in crisis, the New York Times front page highlighted world power was on land, and that advances in “the oldest issue in American foreign policy.”42 decision-making, it is essential have a greater the poor results of a survey on geographic education the technologies of land power diminished the Spykman’s perspective helped shape policy awareness of how thinking in space takes place on in American schools and colleges.35 Indeed, for all importance of maritime trade and naval power.37 throughout the Cold war, but the politics and the individual, national, and international levels. of the geopolitical turbulence of recent decades, However, Mahan the historian and Mackinder structure of the immediate post-Cold War world These national security decisions occur within America’s cartographic consciousness and the the geographer shared a common geographical initially appeared dramatically different than the a specific context on all three levels, often in way that the American national security apparatus model and common assumptions about the role preceding centuries of great power competition ways decision-makers may not be fully conscious functions have been remarkably consistent since of military power and conflict in determining and traditional geopolitics. However, in his 2012 of. As Robert Jervis writes, “the roots of many the end of the Cold War. a nation’s status in the international system.38 book, The Revenge of Geography, Robert Kaplan important disputes about policies lie in differing This enduring understanding of a world in which highlighted the enduring importance of geopolitics perceptions. And in the frequent cases when the The International Level: regional centers of power compete within a closed following the end of the Cold War. Not only does actors do not realize this, they will misunderstand The Theory and Context of Geopolitics system has profoundly influenced how strategists he begin his first chapter with an argument for their disagreement and engage in a debate that is conceive of global space. “recover[ing] our sense of geography” that was unenlightening.”48 The preceding theoretical and At the international level, geographic context Nicholas Spykman fused Mahan and Mackinder lost with the end of the Cold War, but he devotes historical foundation therefore serves as the basis and literacy are closely related to how decision- in his analysis of great power competition for a full chapter to the 21st-century importance of for the following portion of this article, which makers perceive the structure of the international regional and global influence.39 Spykman accepted Spykman’s Rimland thesis.43 More recently, Jakub focuses on the practical considerations of how well system and the nature of the powers that define it. much of Mackinder’s geographic conceptualization, Grygiel updated Spykman’s thinking for the new the national security establishment thinks in space Saul Bernard Cohen defines modern geopolitics as but argued that the critical geostrategic region century. Grygiel’s 2017 book, The Unquiet Frontier, and how it might improve. the “scholarly analysis of the geographical factors was not the Eurasian heartland but the coastal co-authored by Wess Mitchell, makes a geopolitical underlying international relations and guiding “Rimland” that surrounds Eurasia, an area that argument for resisting the lure of isolationism The Use of Geography in political interactions.”36 Geopolitics shapes the Mackinder referred to as the “inner or marginal and sustaining American engagement abroad to National Security Institutions way national leaders view the outside world and crescent.”40 According to Spykman, a strong counter Chinese and Russian probing for weak how they make national security decisions. Just as power like the United States should, therefore, points in America’s international position.44 There is little data on how exactly government individuals may not comprehend the distortions of support buffer states (i.e., in the Rimland) and The context and theory of geopolitics are not institutions employ the vast amounts of geographic the map they are looking at and Americans may not fight its enemies abroad, as only weak states fight merely academic. Contemporary strategists debate data and finished cartographic products created by whether Mahan or Mackinder holds more sway in the U.S. government. Public strategy documents, guiding China’s rise. The answers to that debate congressional testimony, and some declassified 33 Kevin Quealy, “If Americans Can Find North Korea on a Map, They’re More Likely to Prefer Diplomacy,” New York Times, May 14, 2017, https:// www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/14/upshot/if-americans-can-find-north-korea-on-a-map-theyre-more-likely-to-prefer-diplomacy.html; hold important implications for how America products offer the public a small but limited Kyle Dropp, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Thomas Zeitzoff, “The Less Americans Know About Ukraine’s Location, the More They Want U.S. to Intervene,” should compete with China over the long term.45 view of the frequency with which cartography is Washington Post, April 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/07/the-less-americans-know-about-ukraines- The thinking of individuals across the American utilized in discussions on issues of defense and location-the-more-they-want-u-s-to-intervene/. “What College-Aged Students Know About the World: A Survey on Global Literacy,” National Geographic Society and the Council on Foreign Relations, September 2016, https://www.cfr.org/global-literacy-survey. “Final Report: 2006 Geographic Literacy Study,” National Geographic Society and Roper Public Affairs, May 2006, https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/file/ 41 Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy II,” American Political Science Review 32, no. 2 (April 1938): 224. Emphasis added. I am indebted NGS-Roper-2006-Report.pdf. to Jakub Grygiel, for whom I once worked as a research assistant, for highlighting this passage: Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 10. 34 Quealy, “If Americans Can Find North Korea on a Map”; Dropp et al., “The less Americans know about Ukraine’s location.” 42 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 5. 35 Benjamin Fine, “Geography Almost Ignored in Colleges, Survey Shows: Yet Most Educators Deem It Vital to Good Citizenship-Students’ 43 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate (New York: Random Knowledge of Subject Found Woefully Inadequate,” New York Times, Dec. 18, 1950, 1. Barney also references this article in juxtaposition to early House, 2012), 3. Cold War headlines on the same day relating to the Korean War: see Barney, Mapping the Cold War, 96. 44 Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power (Princeton, NJ: 36 Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 2nd Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009), 11. Princeton University Press, 2016). 37 Martin Glassner, Political Geography (Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), 325. 45 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, 2nd Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018). 38 Jon Sumida, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 22, no. 2-3 (1999): 42, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402399908437753. 46 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 469. 39 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics. 47 Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics, 165. 40 Francis Sempa, “The Geopolitical Realism of Nicholas Spykman,” in, Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008). 48 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 31.

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foreign policy and the quality of such cartography. implementation of the policies they prescribe. capability has been almost exclusively allocated the elimination of certain specialties or their The extent to which officials employ cartography For example, those who developed the 2018 to the intelligence community has important merger with other disciplines.56 Government and visualization to explain a decision is relevant, National Defense Strategy consulted maps while implications. The intelligence community, by organizations have also been hampered in and potentially a meaningful proxy, to how much considering new operating concepts, testing these nature and by design, resides primarily in a geostrategic thinking by the shift from general “thinking in space” went into that decision. concepts in war games, and presenting National classified domain, which allows it to take the and thematic cartography to specialized geospatial Thinking in space is not just useful during the Defense Strategy themes to key stakeholders.54 sensitive information it collects and present it intelligence. A subtle difference is apparent in the decision-making process itself. It is also central to However, these cartographic efforts were ad hoc through geospatial visualizations. But working different treatment of geography at the National effectively communicating how a given decision and largely incidental to the process of developing with classified systems can also hinder the Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the CIA. will be implemented. Using text and cartography and implementing the strategy. employment of the full range of software and The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s together in public documents can help explain Whether considering grand strategy, military data that is available, as security policies can doctrinal definition of geospatial intelligence is a national security issue to the public more capability, national cartographic consciousness, or slow the adoption of commercial or open-source that it “consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, effectively, as well as guide the execution of policy individual spatial cognition, to exclude geographic software suites and data repositories. In recent and geospatial information,” emphasizing imagery at the lower levels of government.49 content fails to make use of a valuable tool. years, many successful geography applications and data over cartography.57 By contrast, the It is notable that neither the 2017 National Geographic expertise and resources are scattered have emerged from open-source software models CIA’s cartography center emphasizes cartography Security Strategy nor the 2018 National Defense widely and inconsistently across the national that emphasize crowd-sourced development and as a form of communication “to present the Strategy includes any maps.50 Similarly, the security enterprise, but many organizations have collection of data by a wide array of volunteers information visually in creative and effective National Defense Strategy Commission’s 2018 some sort of department that produces cartographic — as in the case of OpenStreetMap — but ways for maximum understanding.”58 This focus assessment of the National Defense Strategy, the or geospatial products, often in conjunction with government agencies prefer traditional models on visual communication may be narrower, more 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Navy’s 2018 other graphic design services. That some parts of software development and data collection traditional, and less technical, but it is probably Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, and of the government employ geography in their from established corporations.55 A more subtle more consistent with promoting thinking in space. the 2017 Defense Posture Statement, all lack maps, public messaging and others do not could reflect challenge arises from the relationship between although they were laid out by professional graphic deliberate choices about the most appropriate or the intelligence community and policymakers, designers and include other visual aids, such as most effective ways to make an argument. More in which intelligence seeks policy relevance Visualizing and Communicating photographs and charts.51 Despite their purpose likely, however, is that the differences are the result but avoids making policy prescriptions. High the Geography of Coming Challenges being to explain global strategy, these documents of widely varying cartographic capabilities across standards of security and objective independence use maps with less frequency than a typical the government, unevenly distributed geospatial from crafting policy are vital principles within the The contemporary environment and the threats issue of the Economist. By contrast, the annual resources, and long-unquestioned institutional intelligence community, but when it is the only that loom on the horizon present new challenges, report to Congress titled, “Military and Security processes. one with cartographic resources, these firebreaks and a few opportunities, for thinking in space. The Developments Involving the People’s Republic of The National Security Council, the Office of the can also serve to keep the best maps and most American national security enterprise has a chance China,” mandated since 2000, includes 14 maps in Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff would compelling geographic communication out of the to regain the skills it has lost. Now is a time when its 2018 edition, including a diverse set of scales all benefit from a much greater ability to produce hands of decision-makers. those charged with thinking in space in defense of and projections.52 Although released by the Office original geographic content in house. These The government, with some exceptions, has the nation can gain a new and more sophisticated of the Secretary of Defense, it is important to note organizations are among the most influential in generally treated geography and cartography as a understanding of the geographic information they this report is fundamentally an intelligence product the interagency policymaking process — indeed service to be provided to customers, rather than consume, the limits of their own expertise in using and is largely compiled by the Defense Intelligence the National Security Council is its central as a core capability for decision-makers. That it, and ways to cope with ambiguity. Although Agency. Similarly, the Defense Department’s 2019 coordinator — and yet they lack their own is, cartography is a support function assigned lacking any maps, as noted above, the 2018 National Missile Defense Review includes a few small and cartography capabilities. Policymakers at the to technical specialists, rather than a skill, like Defense Strategy uses spatial language to argue for informative maps but is also produced by the National Security Council, Office of the Secretary effective writing, to be prized by policy advisers a reappraisal of the nation’s strategic position. The intelligence community.53 The lack of maps in the of Defense, and the Joint Staff may be avid or senior officials. This has been particularly true strategy document argues that “every domain is majority of these documents does not mean that consumers of maps, and they all certainly have in the military, which has considered mapmaking contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace,” cartography and spatial thinking played no role access to quality geographic products through an enlisted function and not a skill set needed that battles are conducted “at increasing speed in their development and presentation or the the intelligence community. However, that this in the officer corps. The military has diminished and reach,” and that “the homeland is no longer even the enlisted focus on cartography through a sanctuary.”59 By naming the leading competitors 49 Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Cheshire, CT: The Graphics Press, 2001). Michael P. Verdi and Raymond W. Kulhavy, “Learning with Maps and Texts: An Overview,” Educational Psychology Review 14, no. 1 (March 2002): 27-46, https://doi. org/10.1023/A:1013128426099. 55 “About Page,” OpenStreetMap, https://www.openstreetmap.org/about. 50 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, January 2018, https://dod.defense. 56 “Careers and Jobs: Geospatial Engineer (12Y),” United States Army, https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job- gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. categories/construction-engineering/geospatial-engineer.html; “Careers and Jobs: Geospatial Intelligence Imagery Analyst (35G),” United States 51 National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ Army, https://www.goarmy.com/careers-and-jobs/browse-career-and-job-categories/intelligence-and-combat-support/geospatial-intelligence- uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; 2018 National Defense Strategy; Providing for the Common Defense, National Defense Strategy imagery-analyst.html. Commission, Nov. 14, 2018, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense; Nuclear Posture Review, Department of 57 “Publication 1.0: GEOINT Basic Doctrine,” National System for Geospatial Intelligence, April 2018, https://www.nga.mil/ProductsServices/ Defense, February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; Pages/GEOINT-Basic-Doctrine-Publication.aspx. The Department of Defense defines imagery as “a likeness or presentation of any natural or man- A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0, United States Navy, December 2018, https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/ made feature or related object or activity, and the positional data acquired at the time the likeness or representation was acquired, including: Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf; 2017 Defense Posture Statement: Taking the Long View, Investing for the Future, Department of Defense, products produced by space-based national intelligence reconnaissance systems; and likeness and presentations produced by satellites, airborne February 2016, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE_FINAL_MAR17UpdatePage4_WEB.PDF. platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other similar means.” DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) (Washington, 52 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 115. Aug. 16, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF. 58 “The Mapmaker’s Craft: A History of Cartography at CIA,” Central Intelligence Agency, Nov. 10, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/ 53 Missile Defense Review, Department of Defense, Jan. 17, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/Experience/2019-Missile-Defense-Review/. featured-story-archive/2016-featured-story-archive/mapmakers-craft.html. 54 Personal experience of the author in 2017 and correspondence with principal members of the National Defense Strategy drafting team in 2019. 59 2018 National Defense Strategy, 3.

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or pacing threats, the language of the National These weighty national security decisions require of science education posters, there are few wall Undersea Defense Strategy allows for more geographic clarity critical analysis of complex data. Thinking in space charts or reference atlases of various satellite than similar previous documents that referred must play a part in these decisions, even if spatial constellations. Such charts — unclassified base The undersea domain has captured less only generically to capabilities or regions. Stating visualization proves difficult. maps of space — do not yet adorn the walls attention in the popular press than space and explicitly that China, followed by Russia, should of conference rooms in which policymakers cyberspace, but it is nevertheless a vital strategic be the strategic focus of the U.S. military, puts a Space discuss investing in this vital domain. In part, domain that challenges the geographic thinking of geographic frame on planning discussions. the nature of orbitology makes a static or “flat” national security leaders. In contrast to the cyber Chinese military modernization has reintroduced Preparing for, deterring, and executing reference product on paper problematic, thus, and space domains, shortfalls in thinking about old lessons about the tremendous expanse of the operations in the space domain requires decision- animation or interactive displays may foster more undersea space derive more from disinterest and Pacific theater. Preparing for a high-end conflict makers to think spatially. Outer space may be far understanding. Although creating, transporting, lack of imagination than technical or bureaucratic that emphasizes the air and maritime domains from the earth’s surface where map coordinates and displaying a digital interactive product has challenges. Anti-submarine warfare was a high might require relearning the cartography of the are plotted, but it remains fundamentally spatial. major practical limitations, it would almost priority in World War II, but submarine operations air-age globalism that took hold in the 1940s. Thus, we can analyze and visualize space in certainly be more accurate and effective than of that era were only partially an undersea Invoking the “tyranny of distance” has become a some of the same ways we approach traditional static products, in part because objects in space contest. Competing for mastery of the undersea standard talking point for officials highlighting the geographic problems. The coordinates that move very fast and static maps cannot accurately domain reached its height in the Cold War ocean difficulties of rapid response and the importance of describe the three-dimensional position of a portray location in time.63 surveillance networks and reliance on submarine- forward deployment and foreign partnerships in the satellite are no different than those of an airplane, launched ballistic missiles for strategic deterrence. Pacific. But there is insufficient geographic content except that they change much more rapidly, the Cyberspace Such issues of military use of the undersea domain to support these points beyond rudimentary atmosphere is not a factor, and the distances are have become prominent again, but technology — and often inaccurate — range rings. If China so great that communication delays are a more Visualizing cyberspace in recent years has been has also dramatically increased the commercial is the primary concern for force planners, they important factor, even at the speed of light. an interesting artistic endeavor, but practical importance of the undersea environment. The must employ better mental and physical maps of mapping of the domain in support of national overwhelming majority of global communication the Pacific. Well-articulated spatial content, with security decision-making remains undeveloped. rides on seabed fiber-optic cables and the growing geographic arguments supported by cartographic Gaining a better understanding of the overlap feasibility of extracting seabed resources requires communication, would help strategists present between physical and virtual domains has become an enhanced understanding of the undersea a more effective case to their audience. The true vitally important for senior officials. There have geography that determines competing claims implications of the tyranny of distance and the been a variety of official and unofficial efforts to and the accessibility of those resources. These key geographic relationships of the Pacific theater generate comprehensive, global maps of internet challenges raise the importance of making need to be fully understood by strategists and traffic and devices, and books like The Atlas of national security leaders familiar with the shape clearly argued before the national leadership, the Cyberspace have compiled different conceptual and science of the undersea world. Those who American people, and key U.S. allies.60 visualizations.64 These efforts highlight that the develop and implement national strategy will In particular, there are three domains that are private sector dominates both the visualization have to become more spatially conversant in crucial when it comes to constructing both mental and the management of the physical infrastructure presenting and considering the strategic issues of and actual maps if decision-makers want to be that supports internet traffic,65 while private the undersea domain. prepared for coming challenges. Space, cyberspace, companies play an increasingly central role in and the undersea environment are essential American policymakers seeking to accurately discovering and responding to cyber attacks. strategic domains whose physical infrastructure envision the spatial context of objects above They also own and manage the majority of the key Challenges to Thinking in Space is difficult to visualize spatially. Very few humans the Karman Line probably fare little better than information for visualizing the internet, such as have navigated a submarine or charted the motion American high school students trying to locate charts of cables and switches and raw data on the Getting policymakers and military leaders to of a spacecraft and while cyberspace has become a Iraq on a world map. Supporting decision- paths through which internet traffic is routed. 66 think in space more effectively is easier said part of ordinary life, few can explain the physical makers in analyzing this domain will require a One author found the researchers from a leading than done. There are a number of challenges to infrastructure of the internet. Leading Chinese mix of traditional and unconventional geospatial visualization firm, TeleGeography, to be part of a enhancing geographic skills — some of these strategists have emphasized that these domains materials. There is not a widely available body of “small global fraternity that knows the geography challenges are more cognitive and abstract, while are critical, calling space and cyber the new accessible reference material for visualizing earth of the internet” and has robust mental maps of the others are more practical and procedural. But they “commanding heights” of military capability that orbits. The established standard, Systems Tool Kit geographic movement of traffic on the internet’s must be described so that they can be understood could “determine the outcome of future wars.”61 (formerly known as Satellite Tool Kit) contains a physical cables.67 and overcome. As discussed above, technology has Making smart investments to prepare for future powerful visualization engine, but, as with many made possible some remarkable uses of geography conflict and compete with peer adversaries in Geographic Information Systems suites, it is in the digital age, but technology is a double-edged these domains requires the commitment of a host designed for experts, not generalists, in order to of political, technological, and financial resources. analyze complicated physics problems.62 Outside 63 “Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits,” NASA, Sept. 4, 2009, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/OrbitsCatalog. 64 Betsy Mason, “Beautiful, Intriguing, and Illegal Ways to Map the Internet,” WIRED, June 10, 2015, https://www.wired.com/2015/06/mapping- the-internet/. 60 Andrew Rhodes, “Go Get Mahan’s Yardstick,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 145, no. 7 (July 2019): 19–23, https://www.usni.org/magazines/ 65 Martin Dodge and Robert Kitchin, Atlas of Cyberspace (London: Pearson, 2002). proceedings/2019/july/go-get-mahans-yardstick. 66 Adam Segal, The Hacked World Order: How Nations Fight, Trade, Maneuver, and Manipulate in the Digital Age (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016), 41. 61 Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], “‘Operational Cloud’ Promotes Joint Operations to a Higher Level [“作战云”把联合作战推向更高层次],” People’s 67 Andrew Blum, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 33–34. Mapping Communication (Carlsbad, CA: Liberation Army Daily [解放军报], Jan. 5, 2016. TeleGeography, 2018). Electronic book is available at https://blog.telegeography.com/free-ebook-telecom-history-telegeography-map-portfolio, 62 “Space Support,” Analytical Graphics, Inc., accessed July 26, 2019, agi.com/products/space-support. accessed Jan. 24, 2019.

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sword that creates tradeoffs for the decision-maker cognition and digital maps discuss “navigational Center, which allows operational commanders Dealing with Ambiguity: relying on a digital reference or navigational aid. efficiency,” suggesting the ideal geospatial tool to think spatially with new sensors (radar), new Dangers of Dependence and Excessive Trust Similarly, there are tradeoffs in the specific ways would reach maximum efficiency by requiring no displays (the Plan Position Indicator scope), that national security organizations use geographic geographic knowledge or critical thinking.69 and networked communications (radio).74 For Despite the trend in spatial de-skilling, information, with implications for the quality and Digital navigation is the ubiquitous and essential all of the advances of integrated sensors and technology has deepened our addiction to certain efficiency of the decisions these groups make. means by which many people around the world communications in modern military systems, some types of geographic information and changed Confronting the nature of these tradeoffs suggests engage with the mapped environment. But the contemporary military officers have noted issues the way we consume it — with a less critical eye national security decision-makers would benefit ease of use and narrow purpose of navigational with spatial cognitive de-skilling within the officer and without context. But what would happen from adapting their tools and processes to improve tools and digital map applications have also led corps due to using these digital tools in place of if that technology was suddenly unavailable? their ability to think in space. to what researchers identify as “spatial cognitive analog processes and paper charts. Moreover, Unexpectedly being denied the availability, deskilling” — people who use certain tools and digital screens limit the size and resolution of quality, and accuracy of geographic information The Effects of Technology on Thinking interfaces actually acquire less spatial knowledge the map display and the hardware and software that technology currently provides will impair in Space in the 21st Century than they otherwise would.70 A visual display that that integrate sensors, processors, databases, decision-making at the strategic, operational, demands less skill of the user and strips away and displays require significant maintenance. and tactical levels. There is a need for greater The idea that technology impacts the spatial context can have clear benefits. Henry Grabar The Navy now relies on digital charts that can be research on what happens when strategic thinking of its users is not a new one. In 1913, notes this is perhaps most evident in the way that updated more readily than paper charts, but the decision-makers, conditioned to highly accurate Gerard Stanley Lee wrote that “the telephone a transit diagram, technically a “cartogram” rather system needs constant information technology and unambiguous spatial information, are changes the structure of the brain. Men live in than a map, allows a tourist to navigate the New support for the maintenance and integration of suddenly denied that information or presented a wider distances, and think in larger figures, and York subway or London Underground. However, various electronic components. Developing skilled deliberately deceptive spatial image. become eligible to nobler and wider motives.”68 Grabar also points out that such navigational tools navigators necessitates specialized training with The increasing sophistication and broader A growing body of research has examined the abandon geographic accuracy and provide little to analog and digital systems alike. proliferation of technology that is shaping effects of technology on spatial thinking as digital no context of the surrounding environment. Having Digital systems require their users to be especially strategic situational awareness present new systems replace analog techniques in cartography “small screens and egocentric perspectives, mobile conscious of the quality and sources of the data challenges to decision-makers. Rebecca Hersman and navigation and indicates that technology can navigation systems function like blinders, reducing displayed.75 One study of flight skills among pilots and Bernadette Stadler argue that many of the core both aid and hinder thinking in space. Geographic the landscape to the width of a street. They narrow found that certain basic skills were declining due concepts of crisis management were developed information systems technology encompasses the world.”71 Indeed, a broader view of the world to reliance on advanced instruments and that during the Cold War; however, decision-makers the collection, manipulation, analysis, and display provides a reminder of the tendency for technology pilots consistently overestimated their level of have not kept pace with changes in technology of increasingly rich data sets, empowered by to narrow the perspective by abandoning the skill in the event of losing advanced systems.76 One since 1990.78 Furthermore, they argue the global navigation systems, the storage of big data context. A remarkable 2018 New York Times map of critique of the Army’s digital systems, under the “emerging strategic situational awareness collected in the field, space-based imaging sensors, every structure in the United States, produced in Command Post of the Future, is that these new environment” will require policymakers to and the computing power to process it all. This both paper and online interactive forms, prompted tools are not expedient for field use since they have develop a more sophisticated understanding technology has become an essential tool for an ever- Harvard’s Susan Crawford to remark on how maintenance requirements that are too steep for of the technology through which they visualize broadening set of organizations, from businesses modern technology denies individuals important deployment in austere environments. Moreover, and maintain awareness of complex security seeking more efficient supply chains to local spatial context, saying that “we lose what’s they can introduce as much noise as signal into challenges. Natural fog and friction are reason governments managing public services and utilities fascinating about a place by not having this bigger a geographic display because of a bias toward the enough to build cognitive tools for dealing with and nongovernmental organizations conducting picture.”72 most-accessible data layers displayed on a base ambiguous geographic information. However, disaster relief. The essential skills for developing Small navigational displays in cars replicate map (such as auto-generated vehicle locations) an adversary presenting deliberately deceptive geographic tools and manipulating geographic a capability that has been available in military rather than the most important data. Some officers, geographical information creates crucial information, i.e., geographic information systems cockpits for decades. Various studies have therefore, find digital systems to be less effective challenges for decision-makers. Sharp power technology, has become much more an exercise examined how to optimize displays for tactical than analog alternatives for conveying clear spatial and information warfare are on the rise, and in computer programming and development of situational awareness.73 Recent studies of U.S. information among higher- and lower-echelon the United States has proven itself ill-prepared user interfaces than of traditional cartography. Navy doctrine have praised the development, commanders.77 to deal with the deception and disinformation Scientists studying the interface between human circa 1943, of the shipboard Combat Information 74 Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945 (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 2018), 206. Trent Hone, “Learning to Win: The Evolution of U.S. Navy Tactical Doctrine During the Guadalcanal Campaign,” Journal of Military History 82, no. 3 (July 68 Gerald Stanley Lee, Crowds: A Moving-Picture of Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 1913), 65. 2018): 817–41. 69 Stefan Münzer, Hubert D. Zimmer, and Jörg Baus. “Navigation Assistance: A Trade-Off between Wayfinding Support and Configural Learning 75 Edward H. Lundquist, “Surface Warfare Officers School Employing New Technology and Training Methods,” Defense Media Network, Aug. 22, Support,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 18, no. 1 (2012): 18–37, https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/a0026553. 2018, https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/surface-warfare-officers-school-employing-new-technology-training-methods/. 70 Klaus Gramann, Paul Hoepner, and Katja Karrer-Gauss, “Modified Navigation Instructions for Spatial Navigation Assistance Systems Lead to 76 John P. Young, Richard O. Fanjoy, and Michael W. Suckow, “Impact of Glass Cockpit Experience on Manual Flight Skills,” Journal of Aviation/ Incidental Spatial Learning,” Frontiers in Psychology 8, no. 193 (2017), https://dx.doi.org/10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2017.00193; Claudio Aporta and Eric Aerospace Education and Research 15, no. 2 (Winter 2006), https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2006.1501; John Zimmerman, “The Truth About the Higgs, “Satellite Culture: Global Positioning Systems, Inuit Wayfinding, and the Need for a New Account of Technology,” Current Anthropology 46, iPad,” Air Facts, Sept. 29, 2011, https://airfactsjournal.com/2011/09/johns-blog-the-truth-about-the-ipad/; Ron Rapp, “Teaching Flight Planning: no. 5 (December 2005): 729–53, https://doi.org/10.1086/432651. Digital vs. Paper,” The House of Rapp, June 7, 2011, http://www.rapp.org/archives/2011/06/flight-planning/; Michael W. Gillen, Degradation of Pilot 71 Henry Grabar, “Smartphones and the Uncertain Future of ‘Spatial Thinking,” Citylab (Atlantic Monthly blog), Sept. 9, 2014, https://www.citylab. Skill, Master’s Thesis, University of North Dakota, 2008. com/life/2014/09/smartphones-and-the-uncertain-future-of-spatial-thinking/379796/. 77 John Q. Bolton, “Modifying Situational Awareness: Perfect Knowledge and Precision Are Fantasy,” Small Wars Journal, June 10, 2018, https:// 72 Quoted in, Tim Wallace, Derek Watkins, and John Schwartz, “A Map of Every Building in America,” New York Times, Oct. 12, 2018, https://www. smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/modifying-situational-awareness-perfect-knowledge-and-precision-are-fantasy; John Bolton, “Overkill: nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/12/us/map-of-every-building-in-the-united-states.html. Army Mission Command Systems Inhibit Mission Command,” Small Wars Journal, Aug. 29, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/ overkill-army-mission-command-systems-inhibit-mission-command. 73 Maura C. Lohrenz, Michael E. Trenchard and Melissa R. Beck, “Clearing Up the Clutter,” Defence Management Journal (2008). Maura C. Lohrenz, et al., “Optimizing Cockpit Moving-Map Displays for Enhanced Situational Awareness,” in, Situational Awareness in the Tactical Air Environment: 78 Rebecca Hersman and Bernadete Stadler, “When Is More Actually Less? Situational Awareness and Nuclear Risks,” War on the Rocks, Aug. 2, Augmented Proceedings of the NAWC 1st Annual Symposium (1997), chap. 13, 363–87, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508998.pdf. 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/when-is-more-actually-less-situational-awareness-and-nuclear-risks/.

102 103 The Strategist Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making

campaigns at which an adversary like Russia Practical Challenges of Incorporating excels. Although geographic information has not Geography into National Security Institutions yet been tampered with in the same way as other forms of communication, cartography will not Some of the challenges to thinking in space are be spared from the phenomenon of “deepfakes” rather practical. As discussed above, cartography and will inevitably be involved in what a recent skills are in surprisingly short supply within the RAND study called “truth decay.”79 Department of Defense. A broad survey of the Following the Gulf War, discussions about distribution of Defense Department cartographic navigation warfare began to shift toward the resources would help leadership study the operational impacts of protecting and attacking possibility of equipping policy offices and planning a combatant’s positioning, navigation, and staffs with some of the capabilities currently found timing systems on weapons guidance, command only in the intelligence community. Cartographic and control, and a variety of other operational consultants could embed within planning teams, functions.80 But little attention has been paid to not to give them reference material, but to help the possibility of a systemic attack that, beyond add quality geographic content to documents and crippling GPS and communications networks, presentations. However, even if staff officers and fundamentally degrades or denies the ability of decision-makers were able to create and edit better the senior leadership to make geographically maps, they would still face practical challenges informed decisions. The 2002 Millennium in sharing and displaying them. Cartographers Challenge exercise highlighted just how poorly have always published maps in a wide variety of U.S. military commanders fare at processing shapes and sizes, but the contemporary national a highly dynamic common operating picture, security community is narrowly limited to the particularly when a deceptive foe pollutes that letter-size sheets that are easily reproduced picture with false information.81 It is increasingly and included in briefing books. Amateur and easy to envision a conflict in which the national professional cartographers alike must struggle command authority will have to issue new with the tradeoff of creating the most compelling strategic guidance with no confidence in its and accurate product possible while recognizing knowledge of enemy and friendly positions and that the limitations of printers and formatting might have to act counter to a geographic picture may require a black-and-white image in “portrait” it suspects of being deceptive. orientation. The geographic information that supports The U.S. military’s devotion to “slideware” can obscure or misuse the underlying geographic content and can even support animation. A very and empowers national security decisions can predates the arrival of Microsoft PowerPoint, but data. PowerPoint itself, and the broader system early glimmer of how such technology might be both part of the problem and part of the the dangers of the current PowerPoint addiction, of storing, transmitting, and displaying its files, prove useful to support national security goals solution in future challenges. Cartography has which is antithetical to critical thinking, are well presents important limitations similar to those appeared in the use of animated terrain models always been an art that manages the ambiguity established in formal and informal critiques, of printer paper and briefing books. PowerPoint through a program called PowerScene during the of the geographic environment and, when used such as the “Creed of the PowerPoint Ranger.”83 locks in a specific aspect ratio that is perfect for 1995 negotiations for the Dayton Accord.84 U.S. carefully and effectively, can serve as an essential PowerPoint has some advantages when it comes to a map of North Dakota, but not for countries officials, led by Richard Holbrooke, reportedly heuristic to aid strategic decisions even in an displaying maps and other geospatial information, like Vietnam or Chile, which have a major north- used PowerScene to great effect with Serbian uncertain environment. However, to improve providing a common format and platform for south extent (unless, of course, one follows President Slobodan Milosevic to demonstrate the performance in these decisions, senior leaders easy sharing of files by email. PowerPoint allows Harrison’s advice to abandon the arbitrary “north advantages and infeasibility of different proposed in the U.S. national security community would the easy import and annotation of base maps, up” convention). Because file sizes grow quickly border demarcations. 85 benefit from moving away from what Gary Klein empowering any user to attempt thematic with high-resolution images — such as a quality Visualization of detailed three-dimensional calls an “impoverished mental model” to a “rich cartography by layering crude symbols, but it is map — the imperative quickly becomes reducing models is widely employed by the U.S. military for mental model” in their consumption and use of very much a double-edged sword. The ease of the resolution of embedded images, which in mission planning, but the promise of systems like geographic information.82 manipulating images and adding new symbols effect deliberately reduces the quality of a map. PowerScene to support national-level decision- To support necessarily large files of quality making or multilateral diplomacy, as seen at 79 Robert Chesney and Danielle Citron, “Deepfakes and the New Disinformation War: The Coming Age of Post-Truth Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs geographic products, information technology Dayton, has not materialized. The technology 98, no. 1 (January/February 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-12-11/deepfakes-and-new-disinformation-war. Jennifer Kavanagh and Michael D. Rich, Truth Decay: An Initial Exploration of the Diminishing Role of Facts and Analysis in American Public Life (Santa departments should seek better integration with demonstrated at Dayton is now widely available Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2314.html. and adoption of alternatives to email for simple for free: The desktop edition of Google Earth 80 “Lockheed Martin Selected for U.S. Air Force Navigation Warfare Study,” Business Wire, Aug. 21, 1996. and secure transfer. supports fly-through control with a joystick or 81 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2005), 99–147. Digital displays have advantages in that they gamepad. If deployed more widely and if users 82 Gary Klein, Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 104. cheaply and easily display an array of dynamic develop a natural facility with the interface, future 83 T.X. Hammes, “Dumb-dumb Bullets,” Armed Forces Journal, July 1, 2009, http://armedforcesjournal.com/essay-dumb-dumb-bullets/; Spencer Ackerman, “Colonel Kicked Out of Afghanistan for Anti-Powerpoint Rant,” WIRED, Aug. 27, 2010, https://www.wired.com/2010/08/ 84 Mark W. Corson and Julian V. Minghi, “Powerscene: Application of New Geographic Technology to Revolutionise Boundary Making,” IBRU anti-powerpoint-rant-gets-colonel-kicked-out-of-afghanistan; Edward R. Tufte, The Cognitive Style of PowerPoint: Pitching Out Corrupts Within, Boundary and Security Bulletin, Summer 1996, 34–37. 2nd Edition (Cheshire, Conn: Graphics Press, 1942, 2006). “PowerPoint Ranger: Where the Battle Staff Commiserates” Powerpoint Ranger, https:// powerpointranger.com/. 85 Ethan Watters, “Virtual War and Peace,” Wired, March 1996, https://www.wired.com/1996/03/virtual-war-and-peace/.

104 105 The Strategist Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making

government officials might use such a tool for learning how to think, then both are required for of a mapmaker on call. Rather, these advisers Conclusion studying a problem or presenting policy options, thinking in space. would serve as mentors to help students conceive although the low level of geographic literacy and National security professionals, whether on a geographic arguments and provide resources for Geographic analogies are powerful instruments, unsophisticated employment of cartographic military staff or at the National Security Council, gaining practical skills with tools like geographic though they run the same risks of cognitive bias tools detailed above suggest that simpler and could be more effective if equipped with the information systems software. and shallow analysis as other simplifications, more straightforward solutions would pay greater practical skills to develop original geographic ArcGIS, produced by ESRI, is the overwhelmingly such as historical analogy. The shortcomings dividends in the near term. Furthermore, those content. They should be able to make their own dominant geographic information systems of historical analogy have been well studied by employing and using this kind of visualization tool maps, their own geographic arguments, and software suite, with a market share akin to that of scholars who warn against the “tyranny of the should do so conscious of the dangers of spatial know what went into them. These practical skills, PowerPoint. The U.S. government is ESRI’s largest past upon the imagination,” and the dangers de-skilling.86 though mechanical in many ways, are potentially customer and ArcGIS licenses are widely available awaiting those who “do not examine a variety The quality of digital screens has improved as valuable as the mechanical skill of proper throughout different parts of the national security of analogies before selecting the one that they dramatically in recent years, accompanied by falling citation in academic writing that receives such community. Where licensing costs are prohibitive, believe sheds light on their situation.”94 The great prices in high-resolution displays. Nevertheless, heavy emphasis at the war colleges. Just as the the leading open-source alternative to ArcGIS is military historian Michael Howard highlighted the screens still struggle to compete with paper war colleges stress critical thinking skills to turn QGIS, which can serve most of the geospatial dangers of overlapping analogies in both history when it comes to resolution, a major factor when successful operational-level leaders into effective analysis and cartography needs of a typical and cartography, writing that historical battlefield rendering the fine details that the human eye participants in the interagency policymaking military officer or foreign policy generalist. The maps, with “neat little blocks and arrows moving can pick out of a good map. Large-format paper process at the strategic level, these institutions sophistication of software like ArcGIS and QGIS in a rational and orderly way…are an almost maps also have their own downsides. Paper maps would be ideal places to build upon the practical can present steep learning curves to novices. blasphemous travesty of the chaotic truth.”95 are static, paper is expensive (and heavy in large navigational skills of pilots, sailors, and battalion Moreover, these software suites have capabilities Just as one ought not to depend on a single quantity), and printers are notoriously fickle. But commanders in order to help them create more that go far beyond the needs of those seeking historical analogy, a senior official or policy analyst paper maps transport easily, roll out on any table, sophisticated and strategic mental maps.88 Civilian to merely incorporate effective cartography into could constrain their thinking if relying on a single and work even when computers, networks, and and military graduate programs rightly require their communication. There are, however, several geographic perspective. Geography can be just as projectors do not cooperate. The Department of students to master clear and effective writing. other free and user-friendly options available subjective as history, and those who desire to think Defense and national security organizations might These future decision-makers would similarly for quickly generating base maps tailored to the more effectively in space should seek out multiple consider shifting some of their resources away benefit from receiving training in the modern tools purpose required. ESRI offers an online “My Map” perspectives in the maps they study and their from large digital displays to make large-format available for analyzing and presenting geographic portal that provides basic geographic information own mental maps. As mentioned above, Richard color printers and plotters more widely available. information. systems services and a library of base maps in Edes Harrison argued that a critical first step is to Studies at the graduate level should involve different styles, with more powerful services dispense with persistent conventions that inhibit more than just remedial familiarity with maps available with a subscription.90 The “Natural Earth” a “flexible view of geography,” such as always Growing a National Security and should emphasize skills for mastering spatial project, sponsored by a consortium including placing north at the top of the map. Harrison also Workforce Equipped critical thinking. Over the longer term, curriculum the North American Cartographic Information wrote, in a wartime article co-authored by Robert to Think in Space changes could create a broader reservoir of Society, provides an extensive set of well-curated Strausz-Hupé, that “the main pitfall to avoid is the geographic expertise at senior levels. Professional public domain data for use in map making.91 The continual use of one map, for the mind is inexorably Although national security professionals military education requirements already cartographer Cynthia Brewer, who has published conditioned to its shapes. It begins to look ‘right’ undoubtedly score higher in geographic literacy highlight critical thinking and briefly mention several practical guides to effective cartographic and all others ‘wrong.’”96 Take as an example a map than the general population, proper surveys of geographic factors, but the Joint Staff ought to design, also maintains a website for effective and of the Taiwan Strait rotated 55 degrees. Such a map these issues would surely reveal gaps and areas amplify the importance of spatial thinking and reliably reproduced color schemes that can quite will look “wrong” at first, but has the benefit of for improvement. Jakub Grygiel has argued communication, alongside reading and writing, in literally help the amateur cartographer or designer forcing the viewer to give fresh consideration to that “the education profession is failing” the the senior schools.89 Civilian and military schools to “paint by numbers.”92 With a small investment the key distances and geographic relationships. needs of national security.87 Better foundational should draw on a well-established academic in expert instruction or self-guided study, a skilled Despite the pace of technological development education on geography would help enrich the curriculum for all levels of cartography and computer user can learn to create custom maps at and geopolitical shifts in the last two decades, geographic mental models of policymakers. visualization with commercial and open-source no cost, choosing among appropriate projections the fundamental processes of national security Students receiving a master’s degree in national software suites, including free online courses. in QGIS and layering data from Natural Earth.93 institutions have changed remarkably little and security or international relations — civilian or Other near-term solutions include the addition are not conducive to the flexible view advocated military — ought to receive both education and of courses on geographic skills in elective training for using geography. The differences programs, or the creation of a geography adviser between education and training are subtle but to aid students in incorporating geography and

tremendously important: If training is learning cartography into their work. Such an adviser, or a 90 “ My Map,” ArcGIS, accessed Nov. 7, 2019, https://www.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html. how to perform a specific task and education is “geography center,” would not be the equivalent 91 “Home Page,” Natural Earth, https://www.naturalearthdata.com/. 92 Cynthia A. Brewer, Designing Better Maps: A Guide for GIS Users (Redlands, CA: Esri Press, 2015). Cynthia Brewer, Mark Harrower, and the Pennsylvania State University, “COLORBREWER 2.0: Color Advice for Cartographers,” http://www.colorbrewer2.org/. 86 Eric Van Rees, “AR, VR and GIS Have Finally Found Each Other,” Spar3D, Oct. 10, 2017, https://www.spar3d.com/blogs/all-over-the-map/ar-vr- gis-finally-found/. 93 “Projection Wizard” is an excellent tool for amateur cartographers needing assistance selecting a projection and importing it to software like QGIS. See, http://projectionwizard.org/. 87 Jakub Grygiel, “Educating for National Security,” Orbis 57, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 201–216, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.02.001. 94 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 217–18, 281–82. 88 Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education,” Orbis 58, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 119–31, https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2013.11.009. 95 Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Royal United Services Institution Journal 107, no. 625 (1962): 4–10. 89 “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 18001.01E, May 29, 2015 96 Richard Edes Harrison and Robert Strausz-Hupé, “Maps, Strategy, and World Politics,” Infantry Journal, November 1942, 40.

106 107 The Strategist

by Harrison and Strausz-Hupé above.97 The improves its own ability to think in space. bureaucratic circulatory system continues to Thinking in space is only one tool available to rely on strategy documents, memos, email, decision-makers and is no panacea to crafting briefings, and PowerPoint slides with anemic successful strategies and avoiding tragic blunders. geographic content. The current distribution of But more sophisticated geographic thinking and cartographic capability and the standard forms communication will sharpen national security of communication within the government are decision-making and help decision-makers to stagnant and may actively contribute to spatial de- better communicate their plans to the public. The skilling.98 Thus, the national security community national security community must be a learning needs to sharpen its understanding of the problem and adaptive organization. It needs an objective and consider different processes. There is limited evaluation of how effectively it is employing data on questions of geographic literacy, trends in geographic information and it must seek every the use of geographic data, or the effectiveness of opportunity to sharpen its skills in order to think spatial thinking within the U.S. national security effectively in space. establishment. More research is needed to understand the institutional dimensions of how Andrew Rhodes is a career civil servant who the U.S. government thinks in space, where the has served as an expert in Asia-Pacific affairs in strengths and weakness are, what credible options a variety of analytic, advisory, and staff positions for improvement exist, and what barriers inhibit across the Department of Defense and the their employment. Collection of such data would interagency. He earned a BA in political science enable meaningful evaluation of how effectively the from Davidson College, an MA in international U.S. government’s geospatial tools and products relations from The Johns Hopkins University School support decision-makers and would undoubtedly of Advanced International Studies, and a certificate suggest ways to improve the government’s use of in Geographic Information Sciences from the geography and fix technical gaps and problems. University of North Dakota. He recently graduated Broad surveys of America’s national security with highest distinction from the U.S. Naval War institutions could not only identify any persistent College and is an affiliated scholar of the Naval War holes in basic geographic knowledge but could also College China Maritime Studies Institute. highlight conceptual strengths and weaknesses in employing the art and science of cartography. The contents of this paper reflect the author’s own The findings of such investigations would provide personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by valuable information to the civilian and military the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, academic institutions of higher learning that shape or the United States government. future policymakers. There is much work to be done in studying Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Peter and improving the way the U.S. national security Dutton, Michael O’Hara, Megan Rhodes, and many apparatus uses geography. However, another vital other Naval War College classmates, faculty, and question for future scholars and analysts will be staff who provided valuable insights for this article. how America’s potential adversaries think in space. Succeeding in a long-term strategic competition Photo: CIA requires a deep understanding of the thought processes, priorities, and blind spots of the other side. It is crucial to understand the persistent distortions that exist in an adversary’s world view, what inefficiencies endure in the ways they process new and ambiguous geographic information, and what cartographic messages resonate best with their national security system.99 But this will not be possible until the U.S. national security community

97 Wolf Melbourne, “Naval Intelligence’s Lost Decade,” US Naval Institute Proceedings 144, no. 12 (December 2018): 44–48, https://www.usni.org/ magazines/proceedings/2018/december/naval-intelligences-lost-decade. 98 Claude Berube, “How to Avoid a Naval Intelligence Jutland,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 18, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/getting- back-to-basics-how-to-avoid-a-naval-intelligence-jutland/. 99 For one example of Chinese scholars discussing the nexus of cartography and geopolitical analysis, citing many of the same issues raised here, see, He Guangqiang and Song Xiuju (何光强, 宋秀琚), “Map Projection and Geopolitical Analysis: A Perspective of Spatial Cognition (地图投影与地 球政法分析：一种空间认知的视角),” Human Geography (人文地理), no. 2, 2014.

108 The Strategist To Regain Policy Competence: The Software of American Public Problem-Solving

American policymaking has declined over the past several decades, but it is something that can be regained. It is not ephemeral or lost to the mists of time. The skills needed to tackle public problem- solving are specific and cultural — and they are teachable.

olicymaking is a discipline, a craft, recent decades than it was throughout much of the and a profession. Policymakers apply 20th century. This is not a partisan observation — specialized knowledge — about other the decline spans both Republican and Democratic countries, politics, diplomacy, conflict, administrations. economics,P public health, and more — to the I am not alone in my observations. Francis practical solution of public problems. Effective Fukuyama recently concluded that, “[T]he overall policymaking is difficult. The “hardware” of quality of the American government has been policymaking — the tools and structures of deteriorating steadily for more than a generation,” government that frame the possibilities for useful notably since the 1970s. In the United States, work — are obviously important. Less obvious is “the apparently irreversible increase in the scope Philip Zelikow that policy performance in practice often rests of government has masked a large decay in its more on the “software” of public problem-solving: quality.”1 This worried assessment is echoed by the way people size up problems, design actions, other nonpartisan and longtime scholars who have and implement policy. In other words, the quality studied the workings of American government.2 of the policymaking. The 2003 National Commission on Public Service Like policymaking, engineering is a discipline, observed, a craft, and a profession. Engineers learn how to apply specialized knowledge — about chemistry, The notion of public service, once a noble physics, biology, hydraulics, electricity, and more calling proudly pursued by the most talented — to the solution of practical problems. Effective Americans of every generation, draws an engineering is similarly difficult. People work hard indifferent response from today’s young to learn how to practice it with professional skill. people and repels many of the country’s But, unlike the methods taught for engineering, leading private citizens. … The system has the software of policy work is rarely recognized evolved not by plan or considered analysis or studied. It is not adequately taught. There is no but by accretion over time, politically inspired canon or norms of professional practice. American tinkering, and neglect. … The need to improve policymaking is less about deliberate engineering, performance is urgent and compelling.3 and is more about improvised guesswork and bureaucratized habits. And they wrote that as the American occupation My experience is as a historian who studies of Iraq was just beginning. the details of policy episodes and the related In this article, I offer hypotheses to help explain staff work, but also as a former official who has why American policymaking has declined, and analyzed a variety of domestic and foreign policy why it was so much more effective in the mid-20th issues at all three levels of American government, century than it is today. I offer a brief sketch of including federal work from different bureaucratic how American education about policy work evolved perspectives in five presidential administrations over the past hundred years, and I argue that the from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama. From this key software qualities that made for effective policy historical and contemporary vantage point, I am engineering neither came out of the academy nor struck (and a bit depressed) that the quality of U.S. migrated back into it. policy engineering is actually much, much worse in I then outline a template for doing and teaching

1 Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2014), 469. 2 On other quality critiques, see, e.g., Donald Kettl, Escaping Jurassic Government: How to Recover America’s Lost Commitment to Competence (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2016); and Paul Light, “A Cascade of Failures: Why Government Fails, and How to Stop it,” Brookings Institution, July 2014, https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/Light_Cascade_of_Failures_Why_Govt_Fails.pdf. 3 Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century, National Commission on Public Service, chaired by Paul Volcker (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003), 1–2.

111 The Strategist To Regain Policy Competence: The Software of American Public Problem-Solving

policy engineering. I break the engineering much to do with bad software. level policy professionals is radically insufficient skills and knowledge (e.g., finance, accounting, methods down into three interacting sets of Good software is also one of the few defenses to prepare them to do action-focused analysis and personnel management), relevant technical analytical judgments: about assessment, design, against bad hardware. For instance, amid all the assessment, high-quality written policy design work, knowledge (e.g., hydrology, criminology), and some and implementation. In teaching, I lean away from public controversies about law in America, the and adaptive, people-centered implementation. knowledge about emerging social sciences. new, cumbersome standalone degree programs United States still does reasonably well upholding Usually this training simply does not exist. The Training School for Public Service, founded and toward more flexible forms of education that the rule of law and the administration of justice. Second, whatever the talents of individual in 1911, was typical among pioneering public can pair more easily with many subject-matter Why? One reason is because the American legal politicians or officials or commentators, they administration institutions. At first not associated specializations. I emphasize the value of practicing profession has established very strong norms about will remain idiosyncratic unless the craft is with any university, it was instead part of the New methods in detailed and more lifelike case studies. what constitutes appropriate legal reasoning and institutionalized in a canon of professional education York Bureau of Municipal Research, founded in I stress the significance of an organizational quality legal research and writing. This is software. and the related ideas are better understood. 1906. In 1931, the Training School in New York City culture that prizes written staff work of the quality Such norms are no sure cure for partisanship, Third, even if certain professional or graduate broke up. Part of it went to Columbia University and that used to be routine but has now degraded into caprice, incompetence, and corruption. But, in the schools (e.g., in public policy, law, political science, part to the important Maxwell School of Citizenship bureaucratic or opinionated dross. American legal world, generally accepted norms for or economics) had an effective canon of this kind, and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, which Many former officials share such concerns, as will legal research and writing do help constrain excesses, which I believe they do not, such programs — as was founded in 1924 with six public administration become apparent.4 My suggestions use a relatively clarify arguments and evidence, and expose sloppy currently configured — simply will not reach, or students. The Woodrow Wilson School was simple template, making it easy for people to learn work. They provide a common vocabulary for are effectively unavailable, to the large majority established at Princeton University in 1930. In and use it. But, as in engineering, knowing the evaluation and analysis. In American public policy of people who will find themselves actually filling Washington, DC, Robert Brookings founded a steps for good policy design is much simpler than design, however, there are no comparable norms most senior and mid-level policy jobs. research institute and graduate school in the early implementing them in professional practice. That that distinguish professional craft. There is no Modern American political history offers support 1920s, later reduced just to research. Between 1914 is why in-depth case work in training and a strong commonly understood set of habits that routinely for these premises, as I outline below. As this sketch and 1930, several dozen institutions created small organizational culture in practice are so important, force out necessary questions and naturally highlight reveals, the best practices that made the software programs in public or municipal administration.7 and so difficult. gaps in information or analysis. of American policymaking successful in the mid- Diplomacy escaped all formal professionalization Of course, some will point to dysfunction in Good software, rigorous training, and strong 20th century neither came out of the academy nor until early in the 20th century. Diplomats, as the hardware of American politics and policy as organizational culture can decisively improve migrated back into it. They were never adequately distinct from consuls, did not begin to have to a cause of the decline in policymaking prowess. performance. One of the more interesting social- turned into canonical methods, “carefully crafted pass examinations until the mid-1920s. “Then, as But whatever the other issues, surely part of the science experiments ever conducted for policy work, training,” or an organizational culture of well-run now, many of the higher diplomatic posts remained solution to improving American policymaking must the University of Pennsylvania and U.C.-Berkeley’s analytical teams. ‘spoils.’”8 include better performance in analyzing, crafting, “Good Judgment Project” led by Philip Tetlock, In the United States, expertise in statecraft was and implementing solutions to public problems. Barbara Mellers, and Don Moore, funded by the often equated with experience in the principles and Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, A Brief History of Preparing practice of international law. To foster its study, ran from 2011 to 2015. It included work from more Policymakers the American Society of International Law was Policymaking: Hardware vs. Software than 25,000 forecasters making more than a million founded in 1906. Some indication of the society’s predictions about world developments. The study’s American education for public service “has stature can be gathered from noting that its first The software of substantive public problem- basic conclusions: “First, talented generalists often differed from such education in most if not all president was Elihu Root (1906–24), who had been solving overlaps with the formal procedures of outperform specialists in making forecasts. Second, other parts of the world.”6 Outside of the Army and Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of war and then government, but it is really a different subject. The carefully crafted training can enhance predictive Navy, the notion of professional “careers” in public secretary of state. When Root stepped down, his software of policy is about how policies are crafted acumen. And third, well-run teams can outperform service did not emerge in America until the late 19th place was taken by the then-secretary of state (and within a given set of processes and constraints. individuals.”5 Consider that an illustration of what is century. The passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883 future chief justice of the Supreme Court), Charles Software includes methods or routines for the way possible in just one facet of work. created the first national civil service in America and Evans Hughes (1924–29). In those years, the society the substantive work is done, at the level of the many states adopted similar reforms. These laws regularly held meetings at the White House and was individual professional and the institution. At every required competitive examinations for entry into addressed by the president. stage, the software includes organizational cultures Preparing to Make Policy public service — although the educational levels In addition to skill in the practice of international for getting and evaluating information, for doing required were not high. Basic literacy and numeracy law, skill in foreign policy work was also often analysis, and for recording what is being done. Bad policymaking is almost unavoidable when were desired, as was some knowledge of accounting associated with the knowledge of international By contrast, the tools and structures that frame policymakers undertake complex and difficult and some constitutional history. business. Familiarity with diplomatic history was the possibilities for useful work may be described work without adequate training or preparation. A loosely defined field of “public administration” a plus, as was knowledge of foreign languages, as the hardware of policymaking. Explanations for Unfortunately, a lack of adequate training or arose during the early 20th century. The impetus for geography, and culture. failures of policy tend to focus on the structure of preparation seems to be the norm among American it was a delayed reaction to the rapid urbanization The new law schools could well have become government. While hardware constraints are real, policymakers today. Why? I offer three premises: of America, one of the great social upheavals in a broader base for training policymakers. But the in my experience, problems often have at least as First, general training among senior and mid- the history of the country. The field of public formative ones, such as Harvard Law under Dean administration combined general administrative Christopher Langdell, sought to foster as their 4 A group of former officials who are also educators, and have thus worked on both sides of the fence, recently joined me in publishing a “Statement on Education for Public Problem Solving,” posted at a website that also includes some suggestive scholarship: https://fsi.stanford.edu/ 6 Alexander Keyssar and Ernest May, “Education for Public Service in the History of the United States,” in, For the People: Can We Fix Public publicproblemsolving/docs/statement-working-group-public-problem-solving. Service? ed. John D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye Jr. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), 225. 5 Paul J. H. Schoemaker and Philip E. Tetlock, “Superforecasting: How to Upgrade Your Company’s Judgment,” Harvard Business Review, 7 Keyssar and May, “Education for Public Service in the History of the United States,” 232. May 2016, 4, https://hbr.org/2016/05/superforecasting-how-to-upgrade-your-companys-judgment; see generally Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: Broadway Books, 2015). 8 Keyssar and May, “Education for Public Service in the History of the United States,” 230.

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distinct intellectual identity a new science of legal officials, there would be a scientific basis for action, thinking, its principles to be discovered through and that this was better than just a lot of nostalgic, the study of cases. In this context, “administrative virtuous philosophizing.10 law” became a field within law schools, conceived This model for a school of public administration of as an effort to decode the legal principles that added some value. Various disciplines gathered guided court review of administrative decisions.9 valuable information about social conditions and theories about social behavior. Public administration was then informed by such knowledge. But neither the early schools, like Maxwell, nor the emerging discipline of “political science,” developed a canon for how best to apply scientific knowledge to higher-level policy design.11 Political science was built up as a discipline to consider policymakers objectively, as objects of study. Such scientists view the behavior of policymakers much as entomologists view the behavior of insects. Neither set of scientists are necessarily concerned with giving “how to” advice to their subjects. In saying this, I am not trying to join a culture war decrying the relevance of social science. I simply observe the way such scientists tend to formulate their problems and questions, which then affects everything else. Much of the debate about relevance in those disciplines is a supply-side argument: that if they produced different scholarship, such work Very early, the public administration schools would be more influential. My argument in this moved away from older styles of training in governing article is different. It is a demand-side argument. philosophies, political thought, and civic virtue, the It is that, as the software of policy work has kinds of educations urged by men like Thomas deteriorated, the people doing policy work no longer Jefferson, James Madison, Abraham Lincoln, or do the analysis — or articulate the questions — to John Stuart Mill. Like the founders of American seek out and use relevant knowledge, whatever its political science, these academic leaders thought source. I think it will be most impactful to fix the such educational agendas were old-fashioned and demand side of the problem. too concerned with formal structures. Instead, the new leaders of these schools wanted The Golden Age of American Policymaking to move beyond discussions of political philosophy and civic virtue. They wanted to build policies on Policy staff work of all kinds achieved a relative quality policy work on grand strategy, logistics, First, no one should overly romanticize the the scientific study of social conditions and political high point with the crises of the 1940s. The craft and problem-solving of every kind. The German often quarrelsome, wasteful, and chaotic world of behavior. They hoped that “scientific — ‘what is’ and discipline of policymaking was already surging and Japanese high commands were comparably Washington during these years. There were many — studies would replace public-spirited — ‘what because of the public responses to the Great deficient in all these respects.12 Paul Kennedy mistakes, some of them deadly and disastrous. Nor did should be’ — studies.” Their argument was that by Depression. But World War II produced a vast calls this software advantage the “most important the skills come from a well-thought-through template understanding the sociology of criminal behavior, mobilization of talent to tackle a staggering array of variable of all.” Analytically, he noticed “a support of the kind proposed in this paper. They emerged the economics of labor unrest, the public health of military, economic, and governance problems. system, a culture of encouragement, efficient piecemeal from vast and stressful experience, amid cities, or the patterns of behavior among elected The Allied successes included extremely high- feedback loops, a capacity to learn from setbacks, plenty of bureaucratic rivalry and confusion. an ability to get things done.” All of this could permit Second, the experience arose from years of trial 9 See William Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative Government (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), “the middlemen in this grinding conflict the freedom and error in managing the most challenging rival 29–49. to experiment, to offer ideas and opinions, and to sets of claims and arguments on a global scale. With 10 “Scientific,” Ralph Ketcham, Public-Spirited Citizenship: Leadership and Good Government in the United States (New York: Routledge, 2015), 13 102 (discussing the address of Harvard president A. Laurence Lovell to the new American Political Science Association in 1910). A perceptive cross traditional institutional boundaries.” their long experience in doing this, including the Chinese political thinker of the early 20th century, Liang Qichao, much influenced by the work of John Dewey, was worried in 1919 about the trend From these tremendous accomplishments, I note challenges of managing resources, shipping, and in American political science toward “the omnipotence of science” amid a presumed social Darwinism of struggle among conflicting interests. Liang, five observations: manpower, the British staffing systems were the trying to adapt Western ideas to his more Confucian sensibility, believed these trends were neglecting the older concentration on civic virtue and defining the public good. Ketcham, Public-Spirited Citizenship, 104–05. 12 On the deficiencies of high-level German military staff work, especially on higher-level strategy, intelligence assessment, resource management, 11 Ketcham, Public-Spirited Citizenship, 101–30. Ketcham illustrates his argument with an appendix that offers a sharply observed history of and logistics, see, e.g., Geoffrey Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). the evolution of the Maxwell School at Syracuse (see pages 205–52). Both William Mosher, at Syracuse, and Charles Merriam, at the University of Chicago, produced early exemplary textbooks that tried to balance their social scientific observations of American public life with hortatory 13 Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (New York: Random House, 2013), 362, statements of their idealistic hopes for American government planning. Reviewers noted the “unresolved” tension between the specific science and 372. A similar argument is made by Richard Overy, in Why the Allies Won (New York: Norton, 1997), who does not delve as deeply into the software the sermonizing idealism about how it should be applied in practice. Ketcham, Public-Spirited Citizenship, 226–27. that made the structures he praises so functional.

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most evolved. British staffing practices were envied general talk or vague formulae – by what Lincoln The Microeconomic Turn of trained manpower into the public service.” A and then emulated by the Americans. called ‘pernicious abstractions.’ They require presidential task force recommended new programs Third, the relevant qualities did not, by and large, concrete solutions for definite and extremely The mid-20th-century academic paradigm of to train these “enormous new drafts.” Foundations migrate from the American universities. Nor did the complicated questions.”16 policymaking assumed a relatively neat separation like Carnegie and Ford took on the role that the qualities migrate back to them. The military and business cultures of the United between “policy” on the one hand (often equated Social Science Research Council had played in an Fourth, the relevant qualities did emerge from States in this period were intensely oriented with lawmaking) and “administration” on the earlier generation. some distinctive cultures and leaders. One big toward practical problem-solving. They emphasized other, presumably informed by good social science. All this momentum produced one of the most tributary was the very strong, decentralized problem- meticulous written staff work: unending flows of By the 1960s, this older paradigm seemed more and significant changes in professional higher education solving culture of American business in the 1920s, information and estimates, habitual preparation of more out of date. Although intellectuals recognized of that generation. “At the heart of this shift [during 1930s, and 1940s.14 In that era, the paradigmatic meeting records or minutes, constant and focused the huge intermediate space that was being filled the 1960s and early 1970s] was a growing faith in discipline of American business and industry was debates about priorities and tradeoffs, and guidance by policymaking, academia had trouble figuring the power and prestige of economics as a field, a engineering, and the paradigmatic figure was that of directives drafted with concise precision that a out how to teach it. Older public administration method, and even a science.” For instance, “in the ingenious tinkerer who deeply understood both lawyer would envy. programs suffered an institutional identity crisis. and around Robert McNamara’s Department of design and production and knew his way around The result, especially by 1943 and afterward, was The private foundations that had helped build Defense, economists put into practice techniques the shop floor. Bill Knudsen at General Motors, who marked in dozens of projects from the atom bomb up that field in the 1930s lost interest. The field of program analysis and benefit-cost measurement, started his career in bicycle and auto parts, and as to the Marshall Plan to the Berlin Airlift. Any close of public administration fell into lower repute as which President Lyndon Johnson then forced on all a builder of steam engines, was a typical and well- study of such efforts reveals superior construction compared with the rising social sciences. domestic departments involved in building his Great known exemplar. of large-scale, complex multi-instrument policy Partly in response, a new trend in public policy Society.” One scholar involved in this shift recalled Another great tributary was the managerial packages, including frequent adjustments. education took shape. The social sciences were culture inside the armed forces, fostered by specific The point about constant adjustment and developing new techniques for the systematic visiting the office of a cabinet secretary in individuals. The military leaders during the war iteration is notable. Even in military technology, analysis of public policies using analytic models, order to explain to him a several-hundred- who set the tone for the high-level staff work were most of the key Allied innovations turned out to be many derived from economic theory, along with page booklet on policy planning budget strategic managers — men like George C. Marshall or second-generation innovations. In other words, they quantitative methods. The federal government systems, one of the hallmark techniques of the civilian resource manager, Ferdinand Eberstadt, were not the airplanes or ships that were available was pouring money not only into the expansion of the era. He came upon the secretary fingering rather than “warriors” like Douglas MacArthur. It was or in production at the start of the war. Instead, government services, but also into training programs. the booklet and asking, ‘What is this piece of no accident that Marshall elevated his most trusted they were new or improved models of every kind, In 1958, the Government Employees Training Act shit?’ He had the pleasure of responding, ‘That staffer and planner in 1942, Dwight Eisenhower, to several of which had not even been imagined before became law, while grants from the Civil Service piece of shit, sir, is what the president of the top command. Marshall and Eisenhower had strong the war. They were developed with agility and on a Commission helped to subsidize large numbers of United States has directed that you introduce views about the organizational culture of effective massive scale by a number of agencies and scores of mid-career students. Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson into your department.’17 policymaking. Underperforming staff officers or companies in response to ongoing lessons learned, School was transformed by a 1965 gift from Charles program managers were frequently relieved and lessons that were constantly, consciously being and Marie Robertson. In 1968, the University of The triumph of the RAND analysts, as some called reassigned. extracted and studied. Michigan converted its public administration it, put a lasting mark on education for public service. Fifth, the wartime and immediate postwar It is difficult for those who have not pored through institute into an institution for “public policy The core curriculum for that degree and similar experience profoundly influenced organizational the archives to appreciate the scale and scope studies.” Also in 1968, Harvard scrapped its former foundational programs, like the one at Berkeley, culture for another generation or so. A great many of this work, ranging from economic statecraft school of public administration, established a then set a widely imitated paradigm which claimed Americans had been drawn into the work of higher- to amphibious operations to science policy. The new John F. Kennedy School of Government, and that it taught “policy analysis.” level policy design on numerous topics. “One extraordinary sets of official history volumes from developed an entirely new academic program for it. Economic tools for analyzing policy were analyst referred to [the war] as the largest program World War II, familiar to historians of the period, During that same academic year, the University of regarded as novel. They fostered evidentiary in postdoctoral education for faculty in the nation’s give a sense for the work. They are also a striking California created a new Graduate School of Public discussion of outcomes. And, because the tools history.” There was a similar impact on the nation’s illustration of the organizational culture that would Policy at its flagship Berkeley campus, awarding came from “demanding social science disciplines,” lawyers.15 produce such meticulous and admirable historical a new “public policy” degree to replace its earlier they “helped give the curriculum of the fledgling The breadth of experience summed up by these analyses. offering in public administration. public policy schools a certain kind of legitimacy in five observations about policy culture and staff The organizational culture that accomplished Dedicating one of the new buildings at the the academic world in which they were struggling work carried over into postwar efforts. In 1947, as so much during the war was passed along mainly Woodrow Wilson School in May 1966, President for academic respect.”18 secretary of state, Marshall used his first national through imitation and apprenticeship. But the Lyndon Johnson proclaimed that “the public servant “But left open, however,” one of the founding radio address to the American people to remind best practices did not migrate into standardized today moves along paths of adventure where he is deans of such schools recalled, them that, “Problems which bear directly on the training or academic degree programs. helpless without the tools of advanced learning.” He future of our civilization cannot be disposed of by said the country would need “enormous new drafts

17 Keyssar and May, “Education for Public Service,” 234; and Graham Allison, “Emergence of Schools of Public Policy: Reflections by a Founding 14 See, for example, Thomas McCraw and William Childs, American Business since 1920: How It Worked, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley Blackwell, Dean,” in, Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert Goodin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 64. 2018), 26–28, 72–75 (emphasizing the decentralized management approaches of both Alfred Sloan at GM and Ferdinand Eberstadt in organizing See generally, telling this triumph of the microeconomic turn as a success story, Beryl Radin, Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age war production). Explaining the “deindustrialization” of the 1970s and 1980s, they stress that, by then, “American management became more (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000). Radin’s conception of policy analysis is triumphantly exclusive. It seems to simply ignore the enamored with ‘financialization’ than with creating new products and services.” See page 232. existence of lawyers, diplomats, and health care policy wonks, among the many categories of people who believe they do such work. 15 Keyssar and May, “Education for Public Service,” 233. 18 Allison, “Emergence,” 68. Allison recounts that he focused much of his agenda as dean on offsetting this curricular bias by building up the 16 Marshall radio address, April 1947, quoted in Philip Zelikow, “George C. Marshall and the Moscow CFM Meeting of 1947,” Diplomacy and public management curriculum, fostering executive programs, and raising funds for problem-focused research centers. This work did help the school Statecraft 8 no. 2 (1997): 97, 116, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299708406045. take off and become relatively successful. But, even from his account, it is not clear that he ever fully addressed the two questions that bothered him from the start.

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were the answers to two further important As a result, even as it triumphed in this part of History and social science continue to be children who were brought up in the same house questions: first, the extent to which schools academia, the microeconomic paradigm of policy invaluable resources for evidence about trends and but were raised by different tribes and aren’t so of public policy intended to train individuals analysis was passing out of fashion in much of causes in social behavior. The gap remains in the friendly with one another.”25 to participate effectively in the governmental government. In the world of foreign policy, the application of this knowledge to the solution of One part of the problem is that policy engineering process as policy makers as well as policy microeconomic paradigm never gained much practical problems. This is not because academics is complicated. Assessing a policy situation is a analysts; and if so, how individuals trained traction to begin with, except in segments of do bad work. Their work varies, as always. But, as classic problem of “thick description.” In academia, to be policy analysts, or policy makers … development work.21 I mentioned earlier, their work is fundamentally if readers will forgive me for lapsing momentarily would relate to the political processes that Some studies have been done on the alumni of oriented to answering questions that are meaningful into academic-speak, thick description were an inevitable part of policy making in a this kind of policy analysis education to see how within their scholarly fields. These questions are democratic society.19 well it worked for them in practice. The results very different from the kinds of questions actually accurately describes observed social actions seriously question the value of encountered in the application of their knowledge and assigns purpose and intentionality to such core curricula. The alumni to the solution of practical problems. There is a these actions, by way of the researcher’s told the investigators that they similar divide between the world of laboratory understanding and clear description of wished they had learned more science disciplines and the world of engineering. the context under which the social actions about topics like “policy design.”22 Chemical engineering is not just applied chemistry. took place. Thick description captures the While the study of policy It is a distinctive discipline with canonical methods thoughts and feelings of participants as well analysis was taking its of its own. In the engineering disciplines, this point as the often complex web of relationships microeconomic turn, the study was grasped more than a hundred years ago. among them. Thick description leads to of “public administration” went Law schools have become principal producers thick interpretation, which in turn leads to through its crisis and advanced of the people who are actually going into the thick meaning of the research findings. … forward. It was revived as a field policy jobs. Lawyer-officials have ready gifts. Thick meaning of findings leads readers to of “public management.” That They know how to make an argument. They are a sense of verisimilitude, wherein they can field, fortunately, has continued usually experienced writers. On a good day, they cognitively and emotively ‘place’ themselves to mature and advance.23 are relatively rigorous in attending to factual and within the research context.26 Further, in the new curricula the definition of legal detail. The tradeoff for these “generalist” “policy analysis” was narrowed. In this paradigm, Social Science and the Return of the Lawyers skills, however, is a lack of much subject-matter or For readers who got bogged down in that policy analysis teaching would focus on “economics, foreign expertise. Experienced as advocates who definition, the punch line is in the last sentence. statistics, and quantitative analysis.” After World War II, law and lawyers became can pick evidence to defend a position, lawyers are Consider the Marshall Plan, for example. The In such core curricula, at least half of the more and more powerful in establishing paradigms not necessarily trained to weigh and sift positions simple memory of this might be that Americans courses are in economics and statistics.20 They for domestic policymaking in the United States. on both sides. Experienced in being asked to wisely displayed exceptional generosity and focus especially on cost-benefit analysis and the In foreign policy, the story was very different. The decide what “can” be done, lawyers are not trained foresight in committing a lot of money to help microeconomic fields of behavioral economics, older paradigm for expertise, that of international to analyze what “should” be done, even in policies rebuild Europe. But that level of understanding game theory, and operations research. Any law, lost its dominant standing. No critic was more having to do with policing or the administration barely begins to comprehend the qualities of the student who masters this curriculum and the influential than the famous former diplomat George of justice. They have no necessary experience in work involved in developing and implementing the relevant statistics applications would be equipped Kennan, who published a set of polemical lectures policy design, analysis, or implementation. European Recovery Program. to contribute to certain kinds of policy-related on “American Diplomacy” in 1951 attacking what he Perhaps above all, a lawyerly cast to government The genius of the program is found in the details research. The student could model theories of regarded as a legalist-moralist strain in American tends to emphasize process over substance. of the design, which are difficult to summarize action for certain kinds of public problems. statecraft.24 Kennan himself had no particular Meetings proliferate. Sides are heard. The quality quickly but include the way the plan involved the But most policymaking challenges, and the use for social science. He spent the rest of his life of written staff work takes second place. Europeans in working out the program designs related staff work, call upon different sets of skills. writing history and historical reflections. and new ways to cooperate within Europe, the way The Teaching Problem the program set up and used local “counterpart” funds for acquisitions in each of the participating 19 Allison, “Emergence of Schools of Public Policy,” 65. and “Thick” Cases European countries, and the way it rallied wary 20 Such courses are currently 16 of the 30 credits in the Harvard Kennedy School’s first-year master in public policy core curriculum: “Degree Requirements,” Harvard Kennedy School, accessed Aug. 26, 2019, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/educational-programs/masters-programs/master- The World War II generation learned much U.S. congressmen with elements that appealed to public-policy/degree-requirements. about effective policy work, but never quite figured the businessmen in their districts. Even at the level 21 As I saw firsthand when chairing part of the Harvard Kennedy School’s core curriculum during the 1990s, several of the founders of the Harvard out how to teach it. Data for the microeconomic of higher strategy, the Marshall Plan reflected a Kennedy School were deeply dissatisfied with the way the school’s core curriculum had developed. They believed the school had succumbed to the desire of much of the faculty to join the “third best economics department in Cambridge.” Richard Neustadt quoted in Graham Allison, “Institution sort of policy analysis is also rarely connected choice of where to commit resources and energy Builder,” in, Guardian of the Presidency: The Legacy of Richard E. Neustadt, ed. Matthew Dickinson and Elizabeth Neustadt (Washington, DC: to the data about implementation. Experts in — in this case, a massive commitment to Western Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 146–47. program evaluation and experts in performance Europe amid the simultaneous clamor for a 22 For articles that focus on alumni of the Harvard Kennedy School, see, Carol Chetkovich, “What’s in a Sector? The Shifting Career Plans of Public management became estranged, “a tale of two commitment instead to America’s favored side in Policy Students,” Public Administration Review 63 no. 6 (November 2003): 660–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6210.00330; and Mark Henderson and Carol Chetkovich, “Sectors and Skills: Career Trajectories and Training Needs of MPP Students,” Journal of Public Affairs Education 20 no. 2 (2014): 193–216, https://doi.org/10.1080/15236803.2014.12001782. 25 Donald F. Kettl, “Making Data Speak: Lessons for Using Numbers for Solving Public Policy Puzzles,” Governance 29 no. 4 (October 2016): 573– 23 The modern field of public management has innovated and matured into a global movement, borrowing much from management innovations 79, https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12211; “a tale of two children,” Donald Moynihan quoted in Katherine Barrett and Richard Greene, “Government’s in the private sector. At the level of day-to-day job performance and integrity, federal bureaucrats seem to do at least as well as employees in Data-Driven Frenemies,” Governing, March 17, 2016, http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/gov-performance-measurement-program- private firms. See Donald Kettl, The Global Public Management Revolution, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005); and Hal Rainey, evaluator.html. Understanding and Managing Public Organizations, 5th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2014), chap. 14. 26 Joseph Ponterotto, “Brief Note on the Origins, Evolution, and Meaning of the Qualitative Research Concept Thick Description,” Qualitative 24 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Report 11 no. 3 (2006): 538, 543, https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol11/iss3/6/.

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China’s civil war. requires too much reading or assumes too much culture that was so essential in the software of the historians, although that was a factor. It was done Many public policy problems are like this, “thick” background knowledge. Students like stories. But, American organization for victory in World War II because such records were considered essential for with successive stages of problem-solving, each in the classroom, memorably thin descriptions and and its most effective public problem-solving in the good government. It forced reflection on what had with layers of analysis and context. Such thick colorful anecdotes are preferred. Even classes that postwar years. This part of the software is made up been said or not said. It helped others stay current if problems are relatively resistant to social science use a case method rarely devote multiple classes, of formal and informal routines for activities that they had a need to know what was going on. generalizations. They also confound quests for much less weeks, to microexamination of a single seem mundane, but are not. These habits were so thoroughly ingrained that generic forecasting. The problem has spawned an case, however rich it may be. These cultural routines and habits define the way even when President Eisenhower met one-on-one extensive literature about the craft of analyzing and One popular solution to teaching about problem- the key organizations distribute information about with his secretary of state, almost invariably one or sifting specific information, although in America solving is to stage a simulation. Yet, simulations in what is going on, including the ways top officials get both men would routinely prepare a written record much of this work is mainly known and taught such simplified thin cases “devolve rather rapidly their information every morning; comment upon or of what they had just said to each other. The secret among professional intelligence analysts.27 into theater.” International crisis simulations “clear” incoming reports or policy papers; delegate recording systems used by Presidents Kennedy, All this is hard to translate to the classroom for reinforce the notion of diplomacy as “an event policy work; interact with “the field”; analyze issues Johnson, and were an extension a variety of reasons. First, many teachers do not or series of events, of crisis management or for higher-level discussion and decision; resolve of such habits, as dictabelts and tape machines have the requisite knowledge of policy-relevant negotiations done in a matter of days.” To a veteran differences, either through written work or in made their way into offices. Henry Kissinger’s details, because they have never been involved in practitioner, “Diplomacy is to simulations as the meetings; record and brief about policy discussions staff prepared excellent records of about 15,000 of the subject-matter specialization and because their practice of medicine is to the TV show ‘ER.’”29 and decisions; and critique their work. his meetings and telephone calls. These routines scholarly disciplines do not usually expect (or even Another practice in contemporary teaching There are great variations in these practices. remained relatively strong through the 1970s and want) them to master such problem-solving skills. about policy work enjoins students to try writing American practices are different than in other even well into the 1980s, though they were starting Second, hiring practitioners does not necessarily “options” papers, modeled on policy memos. A governments. They even vary greatly over time to fade. help. When ex-practitioners go into the classroom, typical policy memo in contemporary American within the same agency. It is now rare to find any good records kept of what they can often tell stories. They remember some government consists of some discussion of Two specific examples, both in the foreign policy is said at meetings among American officials. The of the details. Yet, they have no canon for how to what is going on, something about process, and world, illustrate this point. Through World War II quality of the records of meetings with foreigners teach about their experiences. One expert who recommended talking points. If there is any policy and the postwar years, daily information about what has also deteriorated. The usual excuse given is the surveyed courses in diplomacy all over America analysis at all, it rarely advances much beyond op- was going on in the world was provided to top leaders horror of leaks. But that horror was perfectly familiar found that the differences were enormous. Across ed style argument. by diplomatic and military reports, from the State to officials of the wartime and postwar generation academics and practitioners alike, she concluded, As if to learn to imitate this mediocrity, students Department and the armed services. Beginning in as well. Though constantly irritated by leaks, those “I could not find a common core.” Instead, what writing options papers are often urged to keep the 1960s, and evolving very slowly during the next past officials thought that the net value of routines of she found were courses that just elide the messy their papers short — op-ed length — supposedly 30 years, the CIA took over the job. The CIA became good governance took precedence. The real reasons challenge of how to solve problems, especially if so they can learn how to engage the attention of a systematic primary source of daily publications for the change are likely more banal. There was no they involved other governments. busy policymakers. The would-be experts thus and briefings to tell top leaders what was going on conscious policy choice across the administrations Some courses focus on acquiring transnational learn to be experts by dumbing themselves down. in the world. The armed forces’ products quickly to quit preparing good records. It is just hard to do expertise, “without distrusted national Such training does not prepare students to engage receded in importance and the quality deteriorated. it. Without a routinized discipline, it vanishes from governments getting in the way.” Other courses professionally with the messy details of the policy By the 2000s, the State Department’s daily morning the day-to-day culture. dodge engagement by being aimed more at instruments being used or the messy details of the product had disappeared altogether and was In the postwar period, detailed written estimates Americans who view the world as “a pathological local circumstances in which these concepts may abolished. and policy staff work were the norm. Papers were mess” and just want protection from it. Then they actually be tested. Intelligence agencies have very particular subjected to constant peer review from colleagues focus on security studies, including intelligence, strengths and weaknesses in what they follow and who were similarly trained and experienced. Very like the study of how to diagnose a disease, without what they do. So, reliance on the intelligence agencies busy officers were accustomed to writing and attempting to teach about how to solve a foreign The Organizational Culture Problem for the morning “papers” has very large effects on reading lengthy papers of this kind every day. problem.28 what policymakers see about the world. It also has Thousands of Americans acquired such experience. Third, college courses prefer “thin” cases that The usual focus in the study of organizational very damaging effects on the incentives and quality They could be found operating at the highest are easy to digest and understand in a single class culture is on the culture of operators, of the “street- surrounding diplomatic and military reporting. But levels in Marshall Plan development (such as before moving on to the next topic. The structure level bureaucracy,” as the title of one classic work put this growing reliance on the daily worldview of the the famed economists Charles Kindleberger and of a course usually leaves little time for students it.30 These studies tend to neglect the organizational intelligence community (not necessarily drawing Edward Mason), occupation governance (such as to delve very deeply into the details, personalities, culture of higher-level policy work. from foreign field presence or experience) was not the young Kissinger), strategic planning, research and issues in any specific episode. To do so Yet, it was just that part of organizational the product of a conscious policy choice. It evolved and development (for example, Vannevar Bush’s incrementally, with little notice or reflection. team at the wartime Office of Scientific Research Records of policy discussions provide another and Development and later in the creation of the 27 An introduction to this literature is available through the essays collected in Roger George and James Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners’ Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014). example of the variation of organizational cultures National Science Foundation), and much more. over time. Through the war and postwar years, One pattern in the War Department culture was 28 Donna Marie Oglesby, “Diplomacy Education Unzipped,” Foreign Service Journal (January/February 2015): 27, 28, https://www.afsa.org/ diplomacy-education-unzipped. careful records were usually kept for all high-level that responsibility for planning and responsibility 29 (a retired diplomat and current director of Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy), “Teaching Diplomacy as Process meetings among American officials. This is hard for operations were inseparable. A planner had to (Not Event): A Practitioner’s Song,” Foreign Service Journal (January/February 2015): 21, 24. to do. It was not done mainly out of regard for be willing and able to convert his work into action.31 30 E.g., Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, 30th anniv. rev. ed. (New York: Russell Sage, 2010). For an example in the case of U.S. diplomats, see Kenneth Weisbrode, The Atlanticists: A Story of American Diplomacy, rev. ed. (Santa Ana, CA: Nortia Press, 2015). 31 See, for example, the detailed portrait in Ray Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, in the Historical Series on the U.S. Army in World War II, subseries for the War Department (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951).

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Developing these habits, the Americans during Johnson administration. Back then, this sort of [w]hen the Cold War ended, those investments to textbook or teacher to teacher. Common the 1940s were strongly influenced, through high-quality review was not so strange. There could not easily be reallocated to new formulas have five or seven steps. MIT’s fine common work in various Allied organizations, by were other searching, internal self-examinations, enemies. The cultural effects ran even deeper. course on “Engineering Innovation and Design” long-established and relatively high-quality British like the ones done after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, or In a more fluid international environment in its renowned Gordon Engineering Leadership processes for collective policy analysis and staff after the swine flu vaccine mess during the Ford with uncertain, changing goals and interests, Program has a 10-step design process.36 work. Eisenhower was both a product and exemplar administration. It is hard now to imagine the intelligence managers no longer felt they could “Design” has become a fashionable concept of such Allied experience. kind of American government that would even afford such a patient, strategic approach to during the last 10 years. Although the usages Although the origins are almost forgotten, the commission an internal study as meticulous as long-term accumulation of intellectual capital. overlap, they vary in important ways. In the 1947 creation of America’s National Security Council the Pentagon Papers, or the kind of studies the A university culture with its versions of books business world, “design thinking” has become system was greatly influenced by the model of Kennedy and Ford administrations ordered to and articles was giving way to the culture of a term synonymous with a search for greater British systems, including the British War Cabinet examine their own failures.34 the newsroom.35 creativity in thinking about what the firm is trying system. Many of the Americans had come to know, Outsiders — and even many insiders, especially the to do. A leader in this field is the Hasso Plattner imitate, and grudgingly admire those staffing less-experienced ones — are unconscious of most With the disappearance of these organizational Institute of Design at Stanford’s d.school. Its guide methods. They consciously adapted analogous of this software, and how much it varies. Historians cultures, largely unnoticed, the software of to design thinking breaks down a process with five habits of systematic paper preparation, record- rarely notice such things or compare contrasting policymaking that went with them also faded away stages (with sub-methods for each): empathize keeping, historical evaluation, peer commentary, routines over time. Although the details of such about a generation ago. (with the user), define (the challenge), ideate, lucid guidance, and collective decision-making. staffing practices have been extensively studied in The deterioration in policymaking software has prototype, and test.37 Eisenhower well understood this background about Britain, I do not know of any comparable published had a huge impact, as several recent policy episodes, At the end of the 2000s, reacting to a very why the National Security Council was created and work on these practices in the United States. including the Iraq War, have made clear. Yet, the difficult and complex set of wars in Iraq and how it was originally expected to function. He was One way to spot the decline in the quality of present generation of policymakers and politicians Afghanistan, the U.S. Army decided it needed the last American president who did.32 written policy work is to notice if the paper simply are, understandably, not even aware of what has to add the concept of “design” to its basic field The Pentagon Papers on the decisions made describes what is going on and then moves on to happened or how the government has changed. manual for “the operations process.” Officers now during the Vietnam War, the subject of the 2017 statements of what “we” want, with “talking points.” argue about what “Army design methodology” film, “The Post,” were an anachronism in more than In this environment, PowerPoint slides replace A Template for Policy means in practice. At a minimum, it is the Army’s one way. As bad as the Vietnam decisions were, the prose analysis. Engineering: Assessment … way of urging commanders who are confronting policy papers were long, detailed, and rigorous. The As the quality of written staff work declines, fewer Design … Implementation complex or unfamiliar problems to stop and think Pentagon Papers were such a revelation because decisions can be made based off the paperwork. harder about what they are trying to do. Officers this underlying policy work, and the dilemmas being High-level meetings proliferate. They become a “Design process” is a phrase that is foundational are urged to at least “give a bit of structure to presented, were relatively lucid and self-revealing. surrogate for good written analysis and advocacy. in engineering education, in which students are those periodic conversations any commander has Suppose contemporary officials actually opened In such oral processes, delegation of analysis and trained in how to apply knowledge to the solution with his staff officers to improve his appreciation up and read some of these documents about action is more difficult. More and more policy work of practical problems. One of the main purposes of the mission.” This should at least take the form Vietnam today. Suppose they contrasted the gets pulled up to the level of overworked principals, of an engineering design process is to generate of four questions, about what is going on, what quality of the memos written in the 1960s with and their own ill-documented oral meetings. better questions and focus them constructively. exactly is the desired end state, what is the theory the papers they have seen cross their desk more Meanwhile, senior agency officials turn more and Such focused questions then drive more specific, of strategic action to get that result, and how to act recently, say, on policy toward Afghanistan or more into functionaries. As they know their work or in-depth assessment. and speak to make good on that theory.38 Iraq. These officials might be a bit bewildered. In views are less meaningful, the trend reinforces the Engineers are often taught a set of steps they Meanwhile, within academia, some scholars their own working lives, they may never have seen downward cycle. must memorize, steps that are put on a card they of public management have pressed for a turn written staff analyses of this kind, work that was so The older organizational culture naturally placed carry in their wallet. The specific steps memorized toward a “new” study of policy design, what commonplace 50 years ago.33 a high value on in-depth knowledge and analysis. by engineering trainees vary from textbook they call “design 2.0.” These experts reject the The sheer existence of the Pentagon Papers In the CIA’s analytic world, for instance, Cold project is another revealing symptom of a vanished War-era estimates “could draw on a deep base 35 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), organizational culture. This work of thoroughgoing of knowledge,” the 9/11 Commission observed in 91. I was the commission’s executive director. This particular passage of the report was drafted with the input of a former deputy director of the historical reflection was done at the direct behest 2004. But, CIA and the former head of the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, both of whom were on our staff. During the 2000s and 2010s, reacting to of Secretary of Defense McNamara, during the problems in analytic tradecraft, exemplified by the Iraq weapons of mass destruction catastrophe, the intelligence community built up a National Intelligence University, operated by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The CIA has developed its Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis. The substance of the CIA’s analytic training has improved, although some of those involved in these innovations believe the intelligence community needs to make further significant progress. 32 The initial proposal for a national security council, in the Eberstadt Report, was modeled on the British War Cabinet system and the wartime State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which had also been modeled on British practice. Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State 36 The ten steps are: 1) identify needs (what’s the problem?); 2) information phase (what exists?); 3) stakeholder phase (what’s wanted and who (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 89. For background on the Roosevelt practice, see also, Matthew Dickinson, Bitter Harvest: FDR, wants it?); 4) planning/operational research (what’s realistic and what limits us?); 5) hazard analysis (what’s safe and what can go wrong?); 6) Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Though this is mostly forgotten specifications (what’s required?); 7) creative design (ideation); 8) conceptual design (potential solutions); 9) prototype design (create a version of now, President Harry Truman was suspicious of the national security council proposal. He was suspicious precisely because he understood that it the proposed design); and 10) verification (does it work and, if not, redesign). From the version of MIT’s course 6.902 taught in Fall 2012 by Blade was modeled on the British War Cabinet and, like that system, was meant to dilute the power of the head of government and constrain him in a Kotelly and Joel Schindall and available through MIT OpenCourseWare. more deliberate, analytical, and collective decision-making system. 37 See, e.g., “An Introduction to Design Thinking: Process Guide,” Hasso Plattner Institute, accessed Aug. 26, 2019, https://dschool-old.stanford. 33 When national security officials of the Obama administration reflect on the best written policy work they encountered, the two standouts seem edu/sandbox/groups/designresources/wiki/36873/attachments/74b3d/ModeGuideBOOTCAMP2010L.pdf. to have been the preparatory work done before the May 2011 Bin Laden raid into Pakistan and the policy support work on Iran that culminated in 38 “Field Manual 5-0: The Operations Process,” Department of the Army, March 2010; “ADP 5-0: The Operations Process,” Department of the the Iran nuclear deal of 2015. But I think those episodes stand out so much to them because the fine quality of that written policy work was not Army, May 2012. The impetus for the “design” movement appears to have come from the Army’s Command and General Staff College and School the norm. for Advanced Military Studies, both at Fort Leavenworth. The quote and questions, paraphrased, are from Lt. Col. Celestino Perez, “A Practical 34 As illustrations see, for example, the studies published in Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK: Skybolt in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Guide to Design,” Military Review, March-April 2011, 43–45, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/ University Press, 1999); Richard Neustadt and Harvey Fineberg, The Swine Flu Affair: Decision Making on a Slippery Disease (Washington, DC: MilitaryReview_20110430_art008.pdf; see also Heather Wolters, “Army Design Methodology: Commander’s Resource,” Department of the Army, Feb. Government Printing Office, 1978). 2012, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a558054.pdf.

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stock analyses that just relate tools to outputs, a what is known, unknown, and presumed; To offer a simple illustration of how such a Policy Education Should superficial “means-ends understanding of policy constructing scenario analyses; assigning framework could be applied, just consider one Not Stand Alone formulation.” Instead, they call attention to the specific probability weights; and weighing part, the “operational objectives,” in the Trump multilayered and deeply context-dependent nature generic probabilities from other cases administration’s trade and tariff policy toward The wartime and postwar science adviser, public of modern policy design.39 against the distinguishing features China. official, and longtime president of Harvard, James In the world of business schools, the field of of the case at hand; and Are they to gain a trade deal that would more fairly Conant, regarded Harvard’s public administration “decision analysis” — a required part of the usual • the right team to bring the expertise and recouple the American and Chinese economies? If school, established in the late 1930s, as his greatest first-year MBA curriculum — consists substantially analytic rigor to bear in a specific case.43 so, what would be a concrete definition of success? failure. He observed that two approaches had to be of teaching students how to assign number Or the operational objectives could be the balanced. Such public affairs education should not, weights to values and probabilities and then work Design opposite — to decouple the two economies. Again, he thought, duplicate business schools by trying up equations that integrate the calculation of these what would be a concrete, working definition of to build an entirely separate faculty. He thought variables.40 It does not, however, actually teach a Design is the choreography of action. A more whether that objective had been attained? such education should draw on the resources of policy design framework. academic definition of policy design, developed by Or the operational objectives could be defined the university as a whole. At the same time, Conant A process for policy work, which itself is often scholars working in Canada and Singapore, calls it: as a targeted increase in U.S. manufacturing thought it was important to have a curriculum called a “design process,” is all about assessment, “an activity conducted by a range of policy actors at employment, or as a reduction of U.S. bilateral that did not emphasize a science of public design, and implementation. 41 different levels of action in the hope of improving current account deficits. And so on. administration separated from its policy content.46 policymaking and policy outcomes through the Obviously, the analysis of these different Colleges of arts and sciences, and the major Assessments accurate anticipation of the consequences of operational objectives then open up quite different professional schools (law, business, engineering, government actions and the articulation of specific questions about the best theories of action and medicine) all turn out women and men who Assessments are judgments about circumstances. courses of action to be followed to achieve different choreographies of what should be done. Yet, since work on public policy. In fact, despite the growth These appreciations are always a compound of levels of policy goals and ambitions.” Such design at the moment (September 2019) no one can tell of the policy schools, these older institutions assessments of reality, what we or “they” think is work occurs “within the context of designing what the operational objectives are for the U.S. empirically still contribute the great majority of going on; assessments about values, what we or complete policy packages. … [So] each policy and policy, the policy becomes inherently incoherent. the citizens who work on such problems, including “they” care about; and preliminary assessments program is a complex arrangement of ends and at the higher levels of policymaking. Yet, none of about action — what, if anything, might be done. means-related goals, objectives, instruments, and Implementation those “regular” schools are, or can be, primarily In this context, the action judgment is simply calibrations that exists in a specific governance interested in public policy or education for public the threshold cognitive judgment — can we do and temporal setting, and these contexts must be Implementation is the final part of the policy work. service. Even at the leading policy schools, only a something about this? — that then influences how taken into account if effective program design is to It is attentive to local circumstances, the realities of fraction of their graduates actually go into public much attention we give to the problem. result from design efforts.”44 the field, and the many stakeholders involved. At service.47 There are various heuristic aids to assessment: To put this a little more simply, the “design” part every stage, the software includes the organizational The challenge, then, is in how to offer a distinctive weighing alternative interpretations of available of a policy design process includes choices about: cultures for getting and evaluating information, for preparation for citizen involvement in public policy. evidence, weighing alternative futures and • Operational objectives — converting doing analysis, and for recording what is being done. Aside from the general education of citizens, the scenarios, assigning probabilities, and more.42 Good values into a concrete, working As with the other elements, implementation is not professionals who are most likely to identify a assessment has at least four elements: definition of success; separate from assessment and design. It interacts need for more professional training tend to be in • detailed knowledge with regard to the issue, • Strategic theories of action — that spell with them, as implementation informs ongoing government, including the military, foreign service, though not necessarily from out the presumed relations of means reevaluation of everything else.45 intelligence, and legislative staff; law, including as a professional specialist; to these ends; This whole template — conscious methods for a possible addition to law school work; business, • unpacking the assessment into its • Choreographies/blueprints of required assessment, design, and implementation — is itself including as a possible addition to business school component variables or presumptions; action — who does what and when, just a kind of heuristic tool. As with the engineering work; academia, including as a possible addition to • using heuristic tools, such as distinguishing using what instruments and institutions. trainees memorizing the steps on their wallet cards, PhD or MA programs; applied science, including such tools are both a discipline and a defense. They engineering, public health, and medical practice; are a kind of analytical checklist that provides a bit and nonprofit organizations. 39 One template for policy design, derived from domestic policy experience, offers a five-level framework: high-level abstraction, program-policy linkages, program-level operationalization, program implementation linkages, and specific measures. Michael Howlett, Ishani Mukherjee, and Jeremy more protection against so many insistent claims Many of the key jobholders already in Rayner, “Designing Effective Programs,” in, Handbook of Public Administration, 3rd ed., ed. James Perry and Robert Christensen (San Francisco: that divert and distract attention. government are primarily trained in specialized Jossey-Bass, 2015), Table 10.5, 196. See generally Michael Howlett, Ishani Mukherjee, and Jun Jie Woo, “From Tools to Toolkits in Policy Design Studies: The New Design Orientation Towards Policy Formulation Research,” Policy & Politics 43 no. 2 (April 2015): 291, 297-99, https://doi.org/10 field and technical duties. Their often-admirable .1332/147084414X13992869118596. For more on this notion of “design 2.0” as a research agenda, see also Howlett and Mukherjee, “Policy Design: From Tools to Patches,” Canadian Public Administration 60 no. 1 (March 2017): 140–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/capa.12209. 45 For more on this emphasis on local, ground-level knowledge, see generally, written more in the context of domestic policymaking, Tara Dawson 40 See, e.g., Paul Goodwin and George Wright, Decision Analysis for Management Judgment, 5th ed. (New York: Wiley, 2014). McGuinness and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The New Practice of Public Problem Solving,” Stanford Social Innovation Review, Spring 2019, 27–33, https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_new_practice_of_public_problem_solving. For some promising work on how to implement effective programs 41 Earlier and different versions of this design framework were first tried out in Philip Zelikow, “Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice in the realm of state institution building, what they call “Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation,” see Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett, and Michael and Back Again,” International Security 18 no. 4 (Spring 1994): 143–71, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539180. This framework has been tried out in the Woolcock, Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). In more of a conflict/security context, see classroom at Harvard and elsewhere. At Stanford, Jeremy Weinstein and Francis Fukuyama are developing an analogous framework in their teaching. the pair of outstanding recent case study illustrations of analysis from the ground up, offered in Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser: Thirty 42 See, e.g., the illustrations catalogued in Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right (New York: Henry Holt, 2009); and Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) (the paperback edition has a valuable afterword reflecting on Steven Johnson, Farsighted: How We Make the Decisions that Matter the Most (New York: Riverhead, 2018). more recent U.S. efforts); and Illusions of Victory: The Anbar Awakening and the Rise of the Islamic State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 43 These four elements are a synthesis of methods suggested in Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 46 Allison, “Emergence of Schools of Public Policy,” 67; James Conant, My Several Lives (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Decision-Makers (New York: Macmillan, 1986), along with the way Neustadt, May, and I then developed and taught these ideas. See also Tetlock 47 Such placement trends led to a major lawsuit against Princeton, in which the members of the Robertson family that had originally donated and Gardner, Superforecasting. I’m indebted to Michael Morell for discussions about the most basic elements of good assessment. See also the the funds to enlarge the Woodrow Wilson School sued because the school no longer seemed to be using the gift to educate students for public good discussion in Bodine, “Teaching Diplomacy as Process (Not Event),” 21–26. service. Part of the 2008 settlement required Princeton to sponsor a $50 million foundation dedicated to that mission. Tamar Lewin, “Princeton 44 Howlett, Mukherjee, and Rayner, “Designing Effective Programs,” 195. Settles Money Battle Over Gift,” New York Times, Dec. 10, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/education/11princeton.html.

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training does not include adequate preparation for cyberspace, or public order. The curriculum should practical education. At some policy schools, such “everything was falling apart … the administration policymaking challenges outside their traditional instead be designed and delivered so that it can cases as exist have been prepared by professional was contaminated and vile.” The scholar, Bao functional and managerial skillsets. complement many such specializations. “casewriters” who often do not have substantive Shichen, “found himself drawn toward more Traditional graduate studies related to policy Such a curriculum could have at least three training in the topic and whose work may not practical kinds of scholarship that were not tested work tend to bifurcate into two very distinct tracks especially distinctive features: first, instruction and reflect the best scholarship or expert analysis. The on the civil service exams.” — a professional master’s degree program and an practice in analysis of detailed information and the range of possible studies of this kind is enormous. Bao “would in time become one of the leading academic PhD program. Both of these programs assessment of situations. These assessments must Such studies can bring “thick” problems and figures in a field known broadly as ‘statecraft’ serve important purposes, but they leave a major grow out of a relatively deep ability to understand fateful choices to life. scholarship, an informal movement of Confucians gap. The PhD students develop rigorous research and imagine governance in unfamiliar institutions. who were deeply concerned with real-world issues skills to investigate theories in their fields, but are Second, instruction and practice in a conscious Conclusion of administration and policy.”51 Tragically, for Bao largely insulated from consideration of real-world policy design process: This process can teach and many of his reformist allies, though their policymaking.48 Professional master’s students are students how to break down complex policy There are obviously several major ways to explain efforts made some headway, it was not enough. exposed to some complexities and challenges of problems. Then they can learn how to unpack the decline in government performance and the They could not reverse the decline of their empire. practice. The strength of these programs can be and identify critical questions or choices, using a collapse in public trust in the U.S. government The United States government has plenty of training in quantitative analytic methods, public common conceptual vocabulary. since the high-water marks of the late 1950s and problems too. Fortunately, it is not yet at the point administration, and advocacy. For various reasons, Finally, the curriculum could make extensive early 1960s. Since the early 1960s, the government the Qing dynasty reached. Americans can reflect they do not provide rigorous training in the kind of use of detailed case studies, both historical and has tried to do much more — around the world and on a proud heritage, not far in the past, when strategic and design thinking needed for problem- contemporary, as projects in which students can at home — and it is perceived to have usually fallen Americans were notorious across the world for solving, nor do they impart enough relevant develop a series of specific skills in working with short, sometimes catastrophically so. their practical, can-do skills in everything from substantive knowledge.49 situations of potential cooperation and conflict. It is not very useful to blame the anti-Washington fixing cars to tackling apparently insurmountable In addition, students are forced to make a fateful These projects can be sustained over weeks, to discourse. Such scapegoating of Washington is not problems, public as well as private. These seemingly choice early in their studies. They can either pursue give a sense of iterative change and adjustment. new. It is an old, old theme in American history. Nor bygone skills were not in their genes or in the air. the law or master’s degree, which opens the path Some programs have tried such “policy task forces/ do I blame incompetent delivery of basic services, They need not be consigned to wistful nostalgia. to the world of practice yet can mean foregoing workshops.”50 which are still reasonably good in America. The skills were specific. They were cultural. And a career in teaching and research. Or they can The skills to develop in such extended exercises Part of the story is a record of policy failures: the they are teachable. pursue the academic PhD and sharply steer away can include attention to the routine habits of tendency to react to events rather than drive them, from training in practical problem-solving. effective staff work. They include familiarity with poorly specified objectives, confusing guidance, Philip Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller An alternative approach would be to develop a the role of budgeting in policymaking, crafting reliance on weakly evidenced suppositions, little Professor of History and J. Wilson Newman relatively flexible curriculum. It would be conceived public statements, participation in policy debates, grasp of organizational capacities, inability to adapt Professor of Governance at the Miller Center of not as an alternative educational pathway, but role-playing to understand the perspectives of organizations to new problems, overreliance on Public Affairs, both at the University of Virginia. His as a broadening or extension of a core path that others and gain experience with negotiation, ill-managed contractors. These are all symptoms. books and essays focus on critical episodes in a student or professional has already chosen. and learning to orchestrate and evaluate the They are symptoms of policies that are badly American and world history. A former civil rights Rather than forcing students to choose between implementation of a policy. designed. attorney and career diplomat, he has served at all a traditional “major” or career track and public Such an educational initiative carries with it Weak knowledge of the history of certain issues levels of American government. He was the executive service, the purpose of the curriculum would be a major agenda for research. More and better or even of the government’s own policy record, director of the 9/11 Commission and, before that, to help students learn how to apply their core “thick” case studies are needed, of the kind that a superficial grasp of other communities or directed the Carter-Ford commission on federal interest (and others they may discover) to public are indispensable in other realms of professional institutions, and a preoccupation with reactions election reform. He has also worked on international service. This complementary curriculum thus need education. The traditional scholarly disciplines to daily news: These, too, are symptoms. They are policy in each of the five administrations from not emphasize in-depth subject-matter education have a specific understanding of what “case symptoms of a weakening capacity for in-depth Reagan through Obama. in particular regions of the world or in functional studies” mean for their investigations, but those professional assessment. specialties like development, public health, case studies are rarely very useful for this kind of Of course, the marked tendency to militarize Photo: Nicepik policy, to rely on military instruments and military policymakers, is no cure. It is another symptom 48 This depiction of the academic market failure draws in part from arguments developed by Jim Steinberg and Frank Gavin for the Carnegie International Policy Scholars program. The academic PhD programs suffer from another problem. Unlike the policy schools, which are often home of the breakdown, as American policymaking is to faculty from a variety of social science disciplines, and in some cases the natural sciences and engineering, PhD programs in international affairs dumbed down and becomes praetorian. are designed, taught, and administered in discipline-based departments, primarily political science. This arrangement may make sense for scholarly training in that discipline. But it is counterproductive for interdisciplinary policy training. That problem has been compounded by the long-term Some of these problems can be blamed on bad decline of area studies programs within political science departments. structures and on polarized, dysfunctional politics. 49 The professional master’s degree programs, typically one to two years, focus on professional skills training for future practitioners. These But that’s not all of the story. degree programs are the core of most APPAM (Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management) and APSIA (Association of Professional As the immensely powerful Qing empire in Schools in International Affairs) schools. To the extent they have a canon, they too reflect the “microeconomic turn.” There are usually also courses that provide background information on international relations, current issues, and particular regions. As a nod to practical training, such schools China began to decay in the early 1800s, a leading frequently hire faculty as professors of practice and adjuncts who are current and former practitioners. They frequently draw from their experience scholar began calling for reform of the Confucian to tell good policy stories and offer suggestive illustrations. This helps. But they then lack an established teachable canon for rigorous professional education. system that selected and trained the country’s 50 There are some useful precedents in the “policy analysis exercises” used at some of the public policy schools. At Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson administrative elite. He looked around and saw School, Bodine describes policy task force/workshops as “more practical than the conventional academic approach and more conceptual, structural and historical than simulations or even case studies.” Each focuses on a single major ongoing policy issue. Students produce a set of detailed 51 Stephen Platt, Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China’s Last Golden Age (New York: Knopf, 2018), 233 (following the work of papers on each facet of it. Bodine, “Teaching Diplomacy as Process (Not Event),” 25. The CIA’s Kent School of Intelligence Analysis has had some William Rowe). success using an analogous approach in training intelligence analysts.

126 127 Response Essay Rubles, Dollars, and Power: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Economy and Long-Term Competition

Correspondence

From time to time, TNSR will publish thoughtful responses to arguments and articles published previously in our journal, and give the original author or authors the opportunity to respond. Correspondence Contrasting Views on How to Code a Nuclear Crisis

In this issue’s correspondence section, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long offer up an alternative way to code nuclear crises in response to Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald’s article in the February 2019 issue of TNSR. Bell and Macdonald, in turn, offer a response to Green and Long’s critique.

In Response to “How to Think To the extent that this problem can be ameliorated About Nuclear Crises” — although it cannot be resolved entirely — the solution is to employ the best possible conceptual Brendan Rittenhouse Green Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long and measurement standards for each key variable. Austin Long Below we provide best practices for coding the n their article in the February 2019 issue of the nuclear balance, with particular focus on Bell and Texas National Security Review, Mark S. Bell Macdonald’s interpretation of the Cuban Missile and Julia Macdonald make a cogent argument Crisis. We argue that, following much of the extant Mark S. Bell that all nuclear crises are not created equal.1 literature, Bell and Macdonald make interpretive Julia Macdonald WeI agree with their basic thesis: There really are choices that unintentionally truncate the history different sorts of nuclear crises, which have different that underlies their coding of the nuclear balance in risk and signaling profiles. We also concur that this case. In our view, they incorrectly conclude that the existence of a variety of political and military the United States had no military incentives to use dynamics within nuclear crises implies that we nuclear weapons first in 1962. should exercise caution when interpreting the results Below, we analyze their interpretation of the Cuba of cross-sectional statistical analysis. If crises are not crisis by examining two indicators that might be in fact all the same, then quantitative estimates of used to establish the nuclear balance: the operational variable effects have a murkier meaning.2 We should capabilities of both sides and the perceptions of key not be surprised that, to date, multiple studies have U.S. policymakers. We conclude by drawing out some produced different results. broader implications of the crisis for their conceptual Nevertheless, the article also highlights an alternate framework, offering a friendly amendment. hypothesis for nuclear scholarship’s inconsistent findings about crisis outcomes and dynamics: What Were the Operational Capabilities on Both Nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to interpret. The Sides in 1962? balance of resolve between adversaries — one of the most important variables in any crisis — is influenced Bell and Macdonald’s characterization of the nuclear by many factors and is basically impossible to code balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis is a central part of ex ante. The two variables identified as critical by their argument, as it is their sole empirical example of Bell and Macdonald for determining the shape of a a crisis that “was not characterized by incentives for crisis — the nuclear balance and the controllability deliberate first nuclear use.” They base this assertion of escalation — are only somewhat more tractable on a brief overview of the balance of U.S. and Soviet to interpretation. The consequence is that nuclear strategic forces in 1962, followed by a claim that “[t]he crises are prone to ambiguity, with coding challenges U.S. government did not know where all of the Soviet and case interpretations often resolved in favor of the warheads were located, and there were concerns that analyst’s pre-existing models of the world. In short, U.S. forces were too inaccurate to successfully target nuclear crises suffer from an especially pernicious the Soviet arsenal.”4 interdependence between fact and theory.3 Yet, any calculation of the incentives for deliberate

1 Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 40–64, http:// dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944. 2 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 42, 63. 3 For an excellent treatment of this problem in the international relations context, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 154–72. 4 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55.

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first use must be based on the full context of the more in the test sites and so on. As for the Soviet detected and some forced to surface, confirms their The Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing to Kennedy military balance. This hinges on the operational bombers, they were in a very low state of alert.”8 efficacy, as Bell and Macdonald acknowledge in their on SIOP-62 is evidence, contrary to Bell and capabilities of both sides in the crisis, which includes Of course, Kaysen’s assessment of the balance of description of an attack on a Soviet submarine during Macdonald’s interpretation, of American nuclear a concept of operations of a first strike as well as the forces in 1961 might have been overly optimistic or the crisis.13 superiority in 1962. Bell and Macdonald make ability of both sides to execute nuclear operations. no longer true a year later during the Cuban Missile much of the briefing’s caution that “Under any The available evidence on operational capabilities Crisis. Yet, other contemporary analysts concurred. How Was the Nuclear Balance Perceived circumstances—even a preemptive attack by the suggests that a U.S. first strike would have been likely Andrew Marshall, who had access to the closely held in 1962? US—it would be expected that some portion of the to eliminate much, if not all, of the Soviet nuclear targeting intelligence of this period, subsequently Soviet long-range nuclear force would strike the forces capable of striking the United States, as we described the Soviet nuclear force, particularly its Bell and Macdonald offer three data points for their United States.”20 But interpreting this comment as summarize briefly below. bombers, as “sitting ducks.”9 James Schlesinger, argument that U.S. policymakers did not perceive evidence that the United States did not possess Any concept of operations for a U.S. first strike writing about four months before the crisis, noted, meaningful American nuclear superiority during “politically meaningful damage limitation” would have been unlikely to rely solely, or even “During the next four or five years, because of nuclear the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, Secretary of Defense capabilities makes sense only if one has already primarily, on relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles, dominance, the credibility of an American first-strike Robert McNamara and other veterans of the Kennedy decided that the relevant standard for political as Bell and Macdonald imply. In a sketch of such an remains high.”10 The authors of the comprehensive administration attested retrospectively that nuclear meaning is a perfectly disarming strike.21 Scott attack drafted by National Security Council staffer History of the Strategic Arms Competition, drawing superiority did not play an important role in the Cuba Sagan, in commenting on the briefing, underscores and Deputy Assistant Secretary of on a variety of highly classified U.S. sources, reach a crisis.14 Second, President John F. Kennedy received a that “although the United States could expect to Defense Harry Rowen during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, similar conclusion: Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing on the Single Integrated suffer some unspecified nuclear damage under any the strike would have been delivered by a U.S. bomber Operational Plan (SIOP) — the U.S plan for strategic condition of war initiation, the Soviet Union would force rather than with missiles. As Kaysen and Rowen [T]he Soviet strategic situation in 1962 might nuclear weapons employment — in 1961, which confront absolutely massive destruction regardless describe, all Soviet nuclear forces of the time were thus have been judged little short of desperate. reported that Soviet retaliation should be expected of whether it struck first or retaliated.”22 “soft” targets, so U.S. nuclear bombers would have A well-timed U.S. first strike, employing then- under all circumstances, even after an American Crucially, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued for been more than accurate enough to destroy them. available ICBM [intercontinental ballistic pre-emptive strike.15 Third, the president expressed maintaining a U.S. first-strike capability in a Moreover, a carefully planned bomber attack could missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ambivalence about the nuclear balance on the first memorandum to McNamara commenting on his have exploited the limitations of Soviet air defense ballistic missile] forces as well as bombers, day of the Cuba crisis.16 plans for strategic nuclear forces for fiscal years in detecting low flying aircraft, enabling a successful could have seemed threatening to the But this evidence is a combination of truncated, 1964–68. This memorandum, sent shortly after surprise attack.5 Kaysen would retrospectively note survival of most of the Soviet Union’s own biased, and weak. The retrospective testimony of the crisis, argues that the United States could not, that U.S. missiles, which were inaccurate but armed intercontinental strategic forces. Furthermore, Kennedy administration alumni is highly dubious. in the future, entirely eliminate Soviet strategic with multi-megaton warheads, could also have been there was the distinct, if small, probability that McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge forces. Yet, the memorandum continues: “The included in an attack, concluding, “we had a highly such an attack could have denied the Soviet Bundy, and others were all highly motivated political Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a first-strike confident first strike.”6 Union the ability to inflict any significant actors, speaking two decades after the fact in the capability is both feasible and desirable, although Kaysen’s confidence was based on his retaliatory damage upon the United States.11 context of fierce nuclear policy debates on which the degree or level of attainment is a matter of understanding of the relative ability of both sides they had taken highly public positions, as Bell and judgment and depends upon the US reaction to a to conduct nuclear operations. In terms of targeting The Soviet nuclear-armed submarines of 1962 were Macdonald acknowledge in a footnote.17 The problems changing Soviet capability.”23 In short, not only did intelligence, while the United States may not have likewise vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine warfare, as with giving much weight to such statements are the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude the United States known where all Soviet nuclear warheads were, it they would have had to approach within a few hundred especially evident given the fact that, as Bell and had a meaningful first-strike capability in 1962, had detailed knowledge of the location of Soviet long- miles of the U.S. coast to launch their missiles. As Macdonald acknowledge,18 these very same advisers they believed such a capability could and should range delivery systems. This intelligence came from early as 1959, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made remarks during the Cuba crisis that were much be maintained in the future. a host of sources, including satellite reconnaissance Gen. Nathan Twining testified that while “one or more favorably disposed to the idea of American As for Kennedy’s personal views, it is important and human sources. U.S. intelligence also understood two isolated submarines” might reach the U.S. coast, nuclear superiority.19 not just to consider isolated quotes during the the low readiness of Soviet nuclear forces.7 As Kaysen in general, the United States had high confidence would later note, “By this time we knew that there in its anti-submarine warfare capabilities.12 The were no goddamn missiles to speak of, we knew that performance of these capabilities during the Cuban 13 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 56. See also, May, Steinbruner, and Wolfe, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 475; and Owen Coté, The Third Battle: Innovation in the US Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: there were only 6 or 7 operational ones and 3 or 4 Missile Crisis, when multiple Soviet submarines were Naval War College, 2003), 42. 14 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55, 59. 5 See Memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor from Carl Kaysen, “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Sept. 5, 1961, from National Archives, 15 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55. Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB56/BerlinC1.pdf. 16 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55. 6 Marc Trachtenberg, David Rosenberg, and Stephen Van Evera, “An Interview with Carl Kaysen,” MIT Security Studies Program (1988), 9, http:// web.mit.edu/SSP/publications/working_papers/Kaysen%20working%20paper.pdf. 17 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 59, fn 96. For more on Bundy, see, e.g., McGeorge Bundy et al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 4 (Spring 1982): 753–68, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1982-03-01/ 7 Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of nuclear-weapons-and-atlantic-alliance. Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 44–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150. 18 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55. 8 “An Interview with Carl Kaysen,” 9. 19 Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 88. 9 Quoted in Long and Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike,” 46. 20 Sagan, “SIOP-62,” 50. 10 James R. Schlesinger, “Some Notes on Deterrence in Western Europe,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, June 30, 1962), 8. 21 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55. 11 Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas M. Wolfe, History of the Strategic Arms Competition 1945–1972, v.1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), 475. 22 Sagan, “SIOP-62,” 36, and esp. n. 49. 12 Quoted in Scott Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” International Security 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987): 34, 23 Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum 907-62 to McNamara, Nov. 20, 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, Vol. 8, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538916. 387–89, quotation on 388, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d109.

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Cuban crisis — after all, he made several comments get around all these complexities [about the precise sorts of risk to a crisis. We argue that operational Type B crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald’s that point in opposite directions.24 One has to state of the nuclear balance] was to strike first,” capabilities and policymaker perceptions in the “brinksmanship” model.33 These have a significantly consider the political context of the Cuban affair Bundy “said that of course the President had not Cuba crisis show that such incentives are more greater risk profile, since they also contain genuine writ large: the multi-year contest with the Soviets reacted with any such comments, but Bundy’s clear common than generally credited. risks of uncontrolled escalation in addition to over the future of Berlin, and effectively, the NATO implication was that the President felt that way.”28 So, we would build on Bell and Macdonald’s political risks. Crisis outcomes remain dependent alliance. Moreover, Kennedy had deliberately central insight that different types of nuclear on the balance of resolve, but signaling is easier built Western policy during the Berlin crisis on a Broader Implications crisis have different signaling and risk profiles by and can be much finer-grained than in Type A foundation of nuclear superiority. NATO planning modestly amending their framework. We suggest crises. The multiple opportunities for uncontrolled assumed that nuclear weapons would ultimately be Our argument about the nuclear balance during that there are three types of nuclear crisis: those escalation mean that there are simply many more used, and probably on a massive scale.25 the Cuban Missile Crisis, if correct, requires some with political bargaining incentives for selective things a state can do at much lower levels of actual As Kennedy put it to French President Charles friendly amendments to Bell and Macdonald’s nuclear use (Type A); those with risks of both violence to manipulate the level of risk in a crisis. de Gaulle in June of 1961, “the advantage of striking framework for delineating types of nuclear crisis. selective use and non-rational uncontrolled For instance, alerting nuclear forces will often not first with nuclear weapons is so great that if [the] Our discussion of the operational capabilities escalation (Type B); and those with political risks, mean much in a Type A crisis (at least before the Soviets were to attack even without using such and policymaker perceptions during the Cuba non-rational risks, and military incentives for a moment of conventional collapse), since there is weapons, the U.S. could not afford to wait to use crisis underscores that Bell and Macdonald’s first nuclear first strike (Type C). no way things can get out of control. But alerting them.” In July, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that variable — “the strength of incentives to use Type A crises essentially collapse Bell and forces in a Type B crisis could set off a chain of “he felt the critical point is to be able to use nuclear nuclear weapons first in a crisis”29 — probably Macdonald’s “staircase” and “stability-instability” events where states clash due to the interaction weapons at a crucial point before they use them.” In ought to be unpacked into two separate variables: between each other’s rules of nuclear engagement, January of 1962, expecting the Berlin Crisis to heat military incentives for a first strike, and political incentivize forces inadvertently threatened by up in the near future, he stressed the importance of bargaining incentives for selective use. After all, conventional operations to fire, or misperceive operational military planning, and of thinking “hard whatever the exact nuclear balance was during each other’s actions. Any given military move will about the ways and means of making decisions 1962, the United States was certainly postured for have more political meaning and will also be more that might lead to nuclear war.” As he put it at that asymmetric escalation. The salience of America’s dangerous. meeting, “the credibility of our nuclear deterrent is posture is thrown into especially bold relief once Type C crises are similar to Bell and Macdonald’s sufficient to hold our present positions throughout the political context of the crisis is recognized: “firestorm” model.34 These are the riskiest sorts of the world” even if American conventional military The Cuban affair was basically the climax of the nuclear crisis, since there are military reasons for power “on the ground does not match what the superpower confrontation over Berlin, in which escalation as well as political and non-rational risks. communists can bring to bear.”26 American force structure and planning was built Outcomes will be influenced both by the balance of But the president recognized that this military around nuclear escalation. Indeed, this is how resolve and the nuclear balance: either could give strength was a wasting asset: The development policymakers saw the Cuba crisis, where the fear states incentives to manipulate risk. Such signals of Soviet nuclear forces meant that the window of of Soviet countermoves in Berlin hung as an ever- will be the easiest to send, and the finest-grained of American nuclear superiority was closing. For this present cloud over discussions within the Executive any type of crisis. But because the risk level jumps reason, Kennedy thought it important to bring the Committee of the National Security Council.30 so much with any given signal, the time in which Berlin Crisis to a head as soon as possible, while According to Bell and Macdonald, either kind of models, and are relatively low risk.31 Any proposed states can bargain may be short.35 the United States still possessed an edge. “It might incentive is sufficient to put a case into the “high” nuclear escalation amounts to a “threat to launch a In sum, Bell and Macdonald have made an be better to let a confrontation to develop over risk category for deliberate use. But in truth, political disastrous war coolly and deliberately in response important contribution to the study of nuclear Berlin now rather than later,” he argued just two incentives to use nuclear weapons selectively — to some enemy transgression.”32 Such threats are escalation by delineating different types of crisis weeks before the Cuba crisis. After all, “the military even if only against military targets — are ever hard to make credible until military collapse has with different risk and signaling profiles. We believe balance was more favorable to us than it would be present. They are just seldom triggered until put a state’s entire international position at stake. they understate the importance of American later on.”27 Two months after the crisis, his views matters have gone seriously awry on the battlefield. Outcomes of Type A crises will be decided solely nuclear superiority during the Cuban Missile were little different. Reporting on a presidential trip In short, we believe Bell and Macdonald were right by the balance of resolve. We disagree with Bell Crisis, and that these coding problems highlight to Strategic Air Command during which Kennedy to expend extra effort looking for military first- and Macdonald’s argument that the conventional some conceptual issues with their framework. was advised that “the really neat and clean way to strike incentives, which add genuinely different military balance can ever determine the outcome In the end, though, our amendments appear to of a nuclear crisis, since any conventional victory us relatively minor, further underscoring the 24 For example, consider his remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that “My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody stands only by dint of the losing side’s unwillingness importance of Bell and Macdonald’s research. We would use nuclear weapons,” before strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use. See ExComm Meeting, Oct. 29, 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: to escalate. But the lower risks of a Type A crisis hope that they, and other scholars, will continue to Press, 1997), 657. mean that signals of resolve are harder to send, build on these findings. 25 For excellent accounts of Kennedy’s Berlin policy and his views on nuclear superiority, which we draw upon heavily, see Marc Trachtenberg, A and must occur through large and not particularly Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 8; Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), chaps. 2–3. selective or subtle means — essentially, larger 26 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 292, 293, 294, 295. conventional and nuclear operations. 27 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 353, 351. 31 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 46, 47–49. 28 Legere memorandum for the record of the White House daily staff meeting, Dec. 10, 1962, National Defense University, Taylor Papers, 32 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97. Chairman’s Staff Group December 1962-January 1963; quoted in FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 8, 436. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1961-63v08/d118. 33 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 46, 49. 29 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 43. 34 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 46, 49–50. 30 See, e.g., Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 353, n. 3. 35 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 102.

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first-use incentives and low controllability). the Cuban Missile Crisis. In short, they argue Each of these ideal types exhibits distinctive that there were substantial military incentives dynamics and offers different answers to important for America to strike first during the crisis and questions, such as, how likely is nuclear escalation, that these were understood and appreciated by and how might it occur? How feasible is signaling American leaders.38 within a crisis? What factors determine success? For While space constraints meant that our analysis of example, crises exhibiting high incentives for nuclear the nuclear balance in the Cuban Missile Crisis was first use combined with low crisis controllability briefer than we would have liked, we certainly agree — firestorm crises — are particularly volatile, and that the United States possessed nuclear superiority the most dangerous of all four models in terms of over the Soviet Union during the crisis.39 The debate likelihood of nuclear war. These are the crises that between us and Green and Long is, therefore, statesmen should avoid except under the direst primarily over whether the nuclear balance that we circumstances or for the highest stakes. By contrast, (more or less) agree existed in 1962 was sufficiently where incentives for the first use of nuclear weapons lopsided as to offer meaningful incentives for nuclear are low and there is high crisis controllability — first use, and whether it was perceived as such by the stability-instability model — the risk of nuclear the leaders involved. In this, we do have somewhat use is lowest. When incentives for nuclear first different interpretations of how much weight to use are low and crisis controllability is also low — assign to particular pieces of evidence. For example, brinkmanship crises — or when incentives for first we believe that the retrospective assessment of key use are high and crisis controllability is also high — participants does have evidentiary value, although the staircase model — there is a moderate risk of we acknowledge (as we did in our article) the biases nuclear use, although through two quite different of such assessments in this case. Given the rapidly processes. For the brinkmanship model, low levels shifting nuclear balance, we place less weight on of crisis controllability combined with few incentives President John F. Kennedy’s statements in years In Response to a Critique incentives to launch a nuclear first-strike during for nuclear first use mean that escalation to the prior to the crisis than on those he made during the Cuban Missile Crisis and their proposal of an nuclear level would likely only happen inadvertently the crisis itself,40 which were more consistently Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald alternative typology for understanding nuclear crises. and through a process of uncontrolled, rather than skeptical of the benefits associated with U.S. nuclear deliberate, escalation. On the other hand, high levels superiority at a time when the stakes were at their e thank Brendan Rittenhouse Our Argument of crisis controllability combined with high incentives highest.41 We also place somewhat less weight than Green and Austin Long for their for nuclear first use — characteristic of the staircase Green and Long on the 1961 analysis of Carl Kaysen, positive assessment of our In our article, we offer a framework for thinking model — mean that escalation would more likely given doubts about whether his report had much of work and for engaging with our through the heterogeneity of nuclear crises.37 While occur through a careful, deliberate process. an effect on operational planning.42 And finally, we argumentW so constructively. 36 Their contribution the existing literature on such crises assumes that put less weight on the Joint Chiefs of Staff document represents exactly the sort of productive scholarly they all follow a certain logic (although there is First-Use Incentives in the Cuban Missile Crisis from 1962 cited by Green and Long in support of debate we were hoping to provoke. As we stated in disagreement on what that logic is), we identify their argument, given that it acknowledges the U.S. our article, we intended our work to be only an initial factors that might lead nuclear crises to differ from First, Green and Long address the extent of inability to eliminate Soviet strategic nuclear forces effort to think through the heterogeneity of nuclear one another in consequential ways. In particular, incentives for launching a nuclear first strike during — thus highlighting the dangers of a U.S. nuclear crises, and we are delighted that Green and Long we argue that two factors — whether incentives are have taken seriously our suggestion for scholars to present for nuclear first use and the extent to which 38 One minor correction to Green and Long’s argument: The Cuban Missile Crisis is not the “sole empirical example” in our article of a crisis continue to think in more detail about the ways in escalation is controllable by the leaders involved characterized by a lack of incentives for first use. In the article we also argue that the 2017 Doklam Crisis between India and China lacked strong which nuclear crises differ from one another. Their — lead to fundamentally different sorts of crises. incentives for first use, and we suspect there are plenty more crises of this sort in the historical record. Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About arguments are characteristically insightful, offer a These two variables generate four possible “ideal Nuclear Crises,” 60–61. range of interesting and important arguments and type” models of nuclear crises: “staircase” crises 39 Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” 55. suggestions, and have forced us to think harder (characterized by high first-use incentives and high 40 The quote from the crisis that Green and Long cite does not really support their argument. Green and Long state: “consider [Kennedy’s] remark, just after the peak of the crisis, that ‘My guess is, well, everybody sort of figures that, in extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons,’ before about a number of aspects of our argument. controllability), “brinkmanship” crises (low first- strongly implying massive U.S. preemption would be preferable to tactical use.” In fact, consider the full quote: “My guess is, well, everybody sort of In this reply, we briefly lay out the argument we use incentives and low controllability), “stability- figures that, in extremis, everybody would use nuclear weapons. The decision to use any kind of a nuclear weapon, even the tactical ones, presents such a risk of it getting out of control so quickly.” Kennedy then trails off but “appears to agree” with an unidentified participant who states, “But made in our article before responding to Green instability” crises (low first-use incentives and Cuba’s so small compared to the world.” This suggests that Kennedy was expressing deep skepticism of any sort of nuclear use remaining limited, as and Long’s suggestion that we underestimate the high controllability), and “firestorm” crises (high well as doubts about the merits of taking such risks over Cuba, rather than making any sort of clear comparison between the merits of tactical use and massive pre-emption as Green and Long suggest. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 657. 36 This work was supported by U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Project on Advanced Systems 41 For a recent analysis of Kennedy’s behavior during the Cuban Missile Crisis that concludes that he was deeply skeptical of the benefits of nuclear and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) award FA7000-19-2-0008. The opinions, findings, views, conclusions or recommendations contained superiority during the crisis, see James Cameron, The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or Arms Limitation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29–37. implied, of USAFA, DTRA or the U.S. Government. 42 For example, see Francis Gavin’s assessment that “little was done with” Kaysen’s plan, a claim which echoes Marc Trachtenberg’s earlier 37 Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear Crises,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 2 (February 2019): 40-64, http:// assessment that “it is hard to tell, however, what effect [Kaysen’s analysis] had, and in particular whether, by the end of the year, the Air Force was dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/1944. For additional applications of our framework, see Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “Toward Deterrence: The Upside prepared in operational terms to launch an attack of this sort.” Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age of the Trump-Kim Summit,” War on the Rocks, June 15, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/toward-deterrence-the-upside-of-the-trump-kim- (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 38; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 225. summit/; Mark S. Bell and Julia Macdonald, “How Dangerous Was Kargil? Nuclear Crises in Comparative Perspective,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 135–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626691.

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first strike — as well as focuses on future force likely left a number of American cities destroyed an interesting proposal and we have no fundamental across nuclear crises that we observe. In particular, planning in the aftermath of the crisis. (and potentially more), even in the aftermath of objections to their typology.47 After all, one can separating incentives for first use into “political We would also note that our assessment that a U.S. first strike, nonetheless provided strong categorize the same phenomenon in different ways, bargaining incentives” and “military incentives” U.S. nuclear superiority in the Cuban Missile military incentives for first use. By contrast, our and different typologies may be useful for different is an intriguing proposal but we are not yet fully Crisis did not obviously translate into politically view is that the threshold should be somewhat purposes. Space constraints inevitably prevent persuaded of its merits. Given that one of Green meaningful incentives for first use is in line with higher than this, though lower than Green and Green and Long from offering a full justification for and Long’s goals is to increase the clarity of the standard interpretations of this case, including Long’s characterization of our position: We do their typology, and we would certainly encourage typology we offer, and given that they acknowledge among scholars that Green and Long cite. For not, in fact, think that the relevant standard for them to offer a more fleshed out articulation of the difficulties of coding the nuclear balance, Marc Trachtenberg, for example, “[t]he American political meaning “is a perfectly disarming strike.” it and its merits. Their initial discussion of the demanding even more fine-grained assessments ability to ‘limit damage’ by destroying an enemy’s Part of our motivation in wanting a threshold different types of signals that states can send within in order to divide incentives for first use into two strategic forces did not seem, in American higher than “any damage limitation capability” different types of crises is especially productive and separate (but conceptually highly connected) eyes, to carry much political weight” during the is that it increases the utility of the typology we goes beyond the relatively simple discussion of the components may be a lot to ask of analysts. Cuban Missile Crisis.43 Similarly, the relative lack offer by allowing us to draw the line in such a way feasibility of signaling that we included in our article. Moreover, given Green and Long’s assertion that of incentives for rational first use in the crisis that a substantial number of empirical cases exist We offer two critiques that might be helpful as they “political incentives to use nuclear weapons motivated Thomas Schelling’s assessment that on either side of that threshold. Green and Long, (and others) continue to consider the relative merits selectively…are ever present,” their argument in only an “unforeseeable and unpredictable” process by contrast, seem more satisfied to draw the line of these two typologies and build upon them. fact implies (as mentioned above) that political could have led to nuclear use in the crisis.44 in such a way that cases exhibiting very different First, it is not clear how different their proposed incentives for first use are not a source of interesting incentives for first use — a typology is from the one we offer. At times, for variation within nuclear crises. We disagree with crisis with North Korea today example, Green and Long suggest that their this conclusion substantively, but it is worth noting compared to the Cuban Missile typology simply divides up the same conceptual that it also has important conceptual implications Crisis, for example — would space we identify using our two variables, but does for Green and Long’s typology: It means that their both be classified on the same so differently. For example, they argue that they three types of crises all exhibit political incentives side of the threshold.46 Green are essentially collapsing two of our quadrants for nuclear first use. If this is the case, then political and Long’s approach would (stability-instability crises and staircase crises) incentives for nuclear first use simply fall out of ignore the important differences into Type A crises, while Type B crises are similar the analysis. In effect, crises without political between these cases by treating to our brinkmanship crises and Type C crises are incentives for nuclear first use are simply ruled out both crises as exhibiting similar to our firestorm crises. If so, their typology by definition. This analytic move renders portions strong incentives for nuclear does not really suggest a fundamentally different of their argument tautologous. For example, they first use. This would be akin understanding of how nuclear crises vary, but argue that the conventional balance cannot “ever to producing a meteorological merely of where the most interesting variation determine the outcome of a nuclear crisis,” but map that rarely shows rain occurs within the conceptual space we identify. this is only because they assume that there are Regardless of whether participants in the Cuban because the forecaster judges the relevant The key question, then, in determining the relative always political incentives to use nuclear weapons Missile Crisis understood the advantages (or lack threshold to be “catastrophic flooding.” There is merits of the two typologies, is whether there is first, and thus, “any conventional victory stands thereof) associated with nuclear superiority, in nothing fundamentally incorrect about making important variation between the two categories only by dint of the losing side’s unwillingness to some ways, our disagreement with Green and such a choice, but it is not necessarily the most that Green and Long collapse. We continue to escalate.” More broadly, this approach seems to us Long is more of a conceptual one: where to draw helpful approach to shedding light on the empirical think the distinctions between stability-instability at least somewhat epistemologically problematic. the threshold at which a state’s level of nuclear variation we observe in the historical record. crises and staircase crises are important. Although In our view, it is better to be conceptually open to superiority (and corresponding ability to limit both types of crises are relatively controllable the existence of certain types of crises and then retaliatory damage) should be deemed “politically An Alternative Typology of Nuclear Crises and have limited risk of what Green and Long discover that such crises do not occur empirically, meaningful,” i.e., sufficiently lopsided to offer call “non-rational uncontrolled escalation,” they than it is to rule them out by definition and risk incentives for first use. This is a topic about which Second, Green and Long offer an alternative have very different risks when it comes to nuclear discovering later that such crises have, in fact, there is certainly room for legitimate disagreement. typology for understanding the heterogeneity of use: lower in stability-instability crises and higher taken place. “Political relevance” is a tricky concept, which nuclear crises. Green and Long argue that there are in staircase crises. The factors that determine In sum, while we are not fully persuaded by Green reinforces Green and Long’s broader argument three types of crisis: “those with political bargaining success in stability-instability crises — primarily and Long’s critiques, we are extremely grateful that “nuclear crises are intrinsically hard to incentives for selective nuclear use (Type A); those the conventional military balance due to the very for their insightful, thorough, and constructive interpret” — a point with which we agree.45 But with risks of both selective use and non-rational low risk of nuclear escalation — do not necessarily engagement with our article and look forward to Green and Long seem to view any ability to limit uncontrolled escalation (Type B); and those with determine success in staircase crises, in which their future work on these issues. We hope that retaliatory damage as politically meaningful, since political risks, non-rational risks, and military the nuclear balance may matter. As a result, we they, along with other scholars, will continue to they argue that a nuclear balance that would have incentives for a nuclear first strike (Type C).” This is think that collapsing these two categories is not explore the ways in which nuclear crises differ necessarily a helpful analytical move. from one another, and the implications of such 43 Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985), 162, Second, to the extent that their typology differs differences for crisis dynamics. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2538793. from our own, it does so in ways that are not 44 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 97. necessarily helpful in shedding light on the variation Photo: U.S. Navy 45 Indeed, at the risk of adding even more complexity, the relevant threshold likely varies with the stakes of the crisis: Leaders are likely to view lesser damage limitation capabilities as politically relevant when the stakes are higher than they are when the stakes involved are lower. 46 For discussion of the North Korean case, see Bell and Macdonald, “Toward Deterrence,” and Bell and Macdonald, “How to Think About Nuclear 47 We do, however, suggest that our labels offer somewhat more joie de vivre than the alphabetic labels that Green and Long offer. Crises,” 61–62.

138 139 The Roundtable Feature

Roundtables are where we get to hear from multiple experts on either a subject matter or a recently published book. Roundtable No One Lost Turkey: Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond

In this featured roundtable essay for Vol. 2, Iss. 4, Lisel Hintz discusses the future of Turkey’s foreign policy and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s vision for a “New Turkey.”

recent and impressively comprehensive the United States. Hardliners at Washington, assessment of the challenges in U.S.- D.C., think tank talks I attended in June warned Turkish relations asked the question: of a “rough summer ahead,” arguing that while “Who Lost Turkey?”1 That question has Turkey is a valuable ally it is not an irreplaceable beenA posed many times by various news outlets one. Others pragmatically cautioned that Turkey and think tanks over the past several years, going was too big to fail, and reminded those concerned back as far as 2006, when the European Union froze about losing access to Incirlik airbase that America accession talks with Turkey.2 More recent concerns had sanctioned Turkey in the past over Cyprus about Turkey drifting toward Russia and Iran are without substantial fallout. Lisel Hintz prompting U.S. analysts to reassess the reliability In fact, the summer of 2019 proved to be much of a country that was meant to be both buffer less tumultuous for U.S.-Turkish relations than against and bridge to a difficult set of neighbors. decision-makers and analysts in Washington The October 22 agreement signed following talks predicted. As President stalled between Russian President Vladimir Putin and on imposing sanctions on Turkey through the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Sochi Countering America’s Adversaries Through regarding joint Turkish-Russian efforts to expel Sanctions Act, relying instead on his ability to Syrian forces from a safe zone originally negotiated negotiate with fellow populist strongman Turkish with the United States seems to provide further President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, attention became evidence that Turkey’s cooperation with Russia is focused on the progress being made in negotiations undercutting, if not contravening, U.S. interests in between the two countries over Syria.6 Despite the Middle East.3 While many American citizens no repeated threats to launch a unilateral military doubt support President Trump’s (badly bungled) offensive if the United States did not adhere to decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria – agreed conditions on the establishment and patrol although many seem positioned to move to Iraq of the security mechanism on Syria’s northern rather than coming home – the Sochi deal gives border east of the Euphrates, as well as Turkish Russia considerable leverage in determining the Defense Minister Hulusi Akar’s obliquely menacing outcome of Syria’s civil war.4 references to plans B and C,7 the agreement on To understand how we got to the point where what was known as the “safe zone” seemed to some are proclaiming the United States has “lost” be holding. Moreover, America had committed to Turkey to Russia and other non-Western allies, address Turkey’s very real security concerns about we need to take a step back. Following Turkey’s the presence of the Kurdish People’s Protection decision to complete its purchase of the S-400 Units forces on its southern border. The group, missile defense system from Russia in July,5 which the United States supported as part of observers employed a range of apocalyptic terms the larger Syrian Democratic Forces in the fight to capture what they foresaw as the impending against the Islamic State, has organic links to rupture in ties between NATO allies Turkey and Turkey’s Workers’ Party, which both

1 Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “Who Lost Turkey?” Foreign Policy, July 19, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/19/who-lost-turkey- middle-east-s-400-missile-deal-russia-syria-iraq-kurdish-united-states-nato-alliance-partners-allies-adversaries/. 2 Owen Matthews, “Who Lost Turkey,” Newsweek, Dec. 10, 2006, https://www.newsweek.com/who-lost-turkey-105633. 3 Kareen Fahim and Sarah Dadouch, “Russia, Turkey Agree to Jointly Remove Kurdish Fighter’s Along Turkey’s Border in Northern Syria,” The Washington Post, Oct. 22, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/turkeys-erdogan-meets-with-putin-in-russia-to-discuss- syrian-operation/2019/10/22/764abcea-f43f-11e9-b2d2-1f37c9d82dbb_story.html. 4 Sune Engel Rasmussen and Isabel Coles, “U.S. Troops Withdrawing from Syria Draw Scorn,” The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 2019, https://www. wsj.com/articles/u-s-troops-cross-into-iraq-as-they-withdraw-from-syria-11571649101. 5 “US sets Turkey deadline to give up Russian missile deal,” Deutsche Welle, June 7, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/us-sets-turkey-deadline-to-give-up-russian-missile-deal/a-49108079. 6 Metin Gürcan, “Cryptic Safe-Zone Deal between Turkey, US,” Al Monitor, Aug. 13, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/08/ turkey-united-states-syria-safe-zone-deal-divided-public.html. 7 “Turkey Has Plan B if US Fails to Keep Promises for Syria Safe Zone: Defense Minister,” Hürriyet Daily News, Sept. 3, 2019, http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-has-plan-b-if-us-fails-to-keep-promises-for-syria-safe-zone-defense-minister-146257.

142 143 Roundtable No One Lost Turkey: Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond

Turkey and the United States consider a terrorist suggested they betrayed U.S. forces in World War membership as a partitioned state,14 and the use of its territorial integrity. Justice and Development organization. This tenuous arrangement forestalled II because they “didn’t help us with Normandy.”11 highly discriminatory language by top E.U. officials. Party-led initiatives meant to establish Turkey’s any previously imminent attack on a U.S. ally (i.e., Meanwhile, the United Nations warned that Turkey As for Turkey, the regime and society look much legitimacy in its new activist role include attempts the People’s Protection Units) by a U.S. ally (i.e., may be responsible for war crimes against Kurdish different today than they did when Ankara lobbied to resolve the international community’s concerns Turkey). That is, until October 9. civilians committed by its jihadist militia allies so fervently to join NATO after initially being over a nuclear Iran by brokering a deal, to support The implosion of the agreement was as bewildering loosely organized under the new Syrian National denied membership along with Greece in 1950. In a Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, and as it was fraught with serious implications for Army.12 As for U.S.-Turkish relations, although its formative decades, Turkey by no means had a to first moderate and later oust Syrian President U.S.-Turkish relations. A sudden declaration via a Trump appeared to give Erdogan a green light for starry-eyed, pro-Western orientation. Founding Bashar al-Assad.18 White House statement on October 6 that Turkey the incursion by saying the United States would not father and first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Notably, each of those initiatives failed. would be moving into northern Syria and that get involved, the U.S. president, facing immense used weapons from Russia in his fight against Allied Erdogan’s estimation of his ability to use U.S. forces “would not support or be involved in domestic blowback, later declared in another series occupation in Turkey’s War of Liberation. Later, culturally-based soft power to bolster Turkey’s the operation”8 followed a phone call between of surreal tweets that, in his “great and unmatched Atatürk viewed entrenchment in transatlantic leadership in regional politics appear as presidents Trump and Erdogan in which one wisdom,” he could “totally destroy and obliterate” relationships as the surest way to protect Turkey’s miscalculated as his formula for low inflation leader apparently convinced the other that Turkish the Turkish economy if Turkey crossed some as- hard-won borders and affirm its natural, if warily through low interest rates.19 Just as new Turkic forces could handle the problem of remaining yet-undefined line.13 defensive, place in the West. states such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were Islamic State fighters and that the United States’ From the U.S. perspective, policymaking on Today’s Turkey, under the consolidated rule of skeptical of a Turkish “big brother” intervening in work in Syria was done. The question of who was Turkey has been, in a word, chaotic. It thus might Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, does their affairs following decades of Soviet control,20 doing the convincing and whether one or both seem to make sense to pose the question, “Who not share the same belief in Western identity states occupying former Ottoman territory reject were attempting to bluff remains unclear,9 but the lost Turkey?” and place the blame on some aspect and Western values as the United States does. the notion that Istanbul’s legacy as home of the dynamic recalls a similar exchange and declaration of the U.S. foreign policy-making establishment. Yet, Arguably, it does not even share the same interests. sultanate and caliphate endows Ankara with any of U.S. troop withdrawal in December 2018 that led it is worth examining the underlying attitudes that Erdogan’s vision for a “New Turkey,”15 as he calls it, special influence. Secretary of Defense James Mattis to resign.10 prompted this much-discussed question, as “Who depicts a country that has thrown off the shackles Where the Justice and Development Party The sudden policy shift — including the lost X?” is a relatively common trope employed by of its previous power asymmetries and is no longer government has been more successful is in being abandonment of U.S.-allied Kurdish forces and U.S. foreign policy critics. Important to recognize, beholden to the West. In line with what my recent confrontational, not negotiating and mediating. a lack of planning for the detained Islamic State however, is that this form of analysis is based on the book terms an “Ottoman Islamist” understanding Erdogan became, even if only briefly, a hero of the fighters that the People’s Protection Units had disturbing assumption that X was someone’s to lose of Turkish national identity,16 Turkey’s foreign Arab street when he walked off the World Economic been guarding — happened immediately during in the first place. The question reveals a pervasive policy under the 17-year-rule of Erdogan’s party Forum stage after lambasting Israeli President the October 6 call. Taking advantage of this belief that X is simply a passive object — whether has sought not only to take advantage of religious Shimon Peres for Israel’s attacks on Gaza.21 Equally shift, Turkey launched its incongruously named referring to Iran, Pakistan, Hungary, or another and cultural ties with neighbors in the Middle East fiery and at times anti-Semitic rhetoric following “Fountain of Peace” operation in northern Syria former ally. This logic implies that, had America and the Balkans, as prescribed by now-sidelined a deadly Israeli Defense Forces raid on a Turkish three days later. In addressing the now-abandoned just done something differently, Turkey, in this case, Justice and Development Party foreign policy flotilla attempting to break the Gaza blockade allies that had done the majority of the fighting would have remained quiescently within the fold. guru Ahmet Davutoğlu,17 but to reclaim its role as generated nationalist support at home as well as against the Islamic State at the United States’ This denial of Turkey’s agency is pure hubris. the leading (Sunni) Muslim power in the region. Muslim solidarity abroad.22 Accusing others of the behest, Trump waffled in his position toward what This activist, and even aggressive, foreign policy same kind of divisive identity politics in which he referred to as “the ” — a homogenizing contrasts sharply with the previously dominant he himself engages has also served Erdogan well. objectification that does damage to the many Recognizing Turkish Agency “Republican Nationalist” vision for the country, Shaming Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki for national, linguistic, political, and other differences which saw Turkey’s natural and most secure stirring up sectarian tensions won him temporary among Kurds. A stream of Trump’s tweets in the What U.S. foreign policymakers continually place as being in the West, but remained wary favor among Sunni Arab leaders.23 Standing up 24 hours following the incursion variously stated refuse to recognize is that the maintenance of of foreign entanglements that could jeopardize to some of those same leaders by asserting that that the Kurds were Turkey’s “natural enemies,” partnerships and alliances is a two-way street. but also “special people and wonderful fighters.” Any reasonably informed discussion of Turkey’s 14 Doğa Ulaş Eralp and Nimet Beriker, “Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations,” Similarly perplexing, he reminded his followers turn away from the European Union, for example, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2005. that the United States was still helping the Kurds must include the major missteps made by Europe, 15 Umut Uras, “Erdogan Promises a ‘New Turkey,’” Al Jazeera, July 12, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/erdogan- “financially/[with] weapons!” but then erroneously such as the decision to allow Cyprus to gain E.U. promises-new-turkey-20147127316609347.html. 16 Lisel Hintz, Identity Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation and Foreign Policy in Turkey (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018). 8 Statement from the White House Press Secretary, Oct. 6, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press- 17 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001). secretary-85/. 18 Hintz, Identity Politics Inside Out, 111-18. 9 Jonathan Swan “Behind the Scenes of the Trump Bluff That Kicked Off Turkey’s Invasion,” Axios, Oct. 13, 2019, https://www.axios.com/trump- erdogan-turkey-syria-invasion-bluff-fc761d8f-e33b-473b-8ece-d0b8b3a51f26.html. 19 Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008; Onur Ant, “Behind Erdogan’s Strange Ideas about Interest Rates,” Bloomberg.com, Aug. 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-02/ 10 Jack Detsch, “Mattis Exits over Mideast Policy Split with Trump,” Al Monitor, Dec. 21, 2018, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ behind-erdogan-s-strange-ideas-about-interest-rates-quicktake. originals/2018/12/mattis-exit-trump-mideast-policy-split-syria.html. 20 Bayram Balcı and Thomas Liles “What Remains from Turkish Soft Power in the ,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Apr. 24, 2019, http:// 11 Aaron Blake, “‘They Didn’t Help Us with Normandy’: Trump Abandons the Kurds – Rhetorically If Not Literally,” The Washington Post, 9 October turkishpolicy.com/blog/31/what-remains-from-turkish-soft-power-in-the-caucasus. 2019: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/09/trump-has-abandoned-kurds-least-rhetorically/. 21 Jamal Dajani, “ Find a Hero,” Huffington Post, Feb. 3, 2009, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/arabs-find-a-hero_b_162497. 12 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdogan Defies International Outcry over Syrian Incursion,” Al Monitor, 15 October 2019: https://www.al-monitor.com/ pulse/originals/2019/10/erdogan-defies-international-outcry-syria-incursion.html. 22 Raphael Ahren, “Turkish MP: Erdogan’s Anti-Semitism Is Hard to Reverse,” Times of Israel, Feb. 5, 2014, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/arabs- find-a-hero_b_162497. 13 Felicia Sonmez, “Trump Hails His Own ‘Great and Unmatched Wisdom’ in Warning to Turkey,” The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2019, https://www. washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-hails-his-own-great-and-unmatched-wisdom-in-warning-to-turkey/2019/10/07/13c65990-e935-11e9-9306- 23 Fehim Taştekin, “Turkey’s Sunni Identity Test,” Al Monitor, June 21, 2013, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/turkey-sunnism- 47cb0324fd44_story.html. sectarian-rhetoric.html.

144 145 Roundtable No One Lost Turkey: Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond

the Gulf Cooperation Council’s blockade of Evaluating Turkey’s “Russia Turn” Indeed, it was precisely the memory of these provided the justification for firing and arresting violated Islamic values and stepping in with aid conflicts — or, perhaps more accurately, the over 100,000 individuals supposedly linked to earned Erdogan much-needed Qatari support This is not to say that Turkey, or even Erdogan, memory of them among Turkish voters — that has the movement,38 it also allowed Turkey to blame from Turkey’s one remaining close ally as the lira does not still need the West. As persuasively as spurred Erdogan’s open criticism of Russia. While a member of the Gülen movement for the rift in plunged last summer.24 some analysts have argued that Turkey’s behavior selective in his rhetorical critique — likely also a Russia-Turkey relations. Just a few days after the The confrontational reputation Erdogan has augurs a precarious warming of relations with function of voter preferences, specifically among failed putsch, two officers with alleged links to the cultivated through these interactions helps him Russia,30 NATO membership remains the best ethnic or “Pan-Turkic Nationalist” voters whose Gülen movement were detained in connection with communicate to domestic audiences a narrative that form of defense against Moscow’s aggression in support Erdogan has counted on to achieve the the downing of the jet, and Ankara’s mayor, Melih nefarious foreign elements are attempting to thwart the region and is a collective security guarantee majority his presidency requires33 — when he takes Gökçek, a member of the Justice and Development Turkey’s rise. For his supporters, “New Turkey” decision-makers in Ankara will likely be unwilling on Russia for its abuses against ethnically Turkic is independent and should take orders from no to sacrifice — even as they repeatedly test Crimean Tatars, for example, he is forceful. The one, especially not its former patrons in the West. the boundaries of that membership.31 Turkey’s Turkish president repeatedly criticized Moscow’s From this perspective, when supposedly refused relationship with Russia today hinges upon the actions in as an “illegal annexation” of the the option to purchase a Patriot missile system economic, energy, and security interests the latter peninsula,34 stating in November 2018 that “we do from the United States that included technology can help the former meet, but Moscow expects not and will not recognize” Russian sovereignty transfer and co-production provisions,25 why to get something in return. Thus, far from any over the territory.35 shouldn’t Turkey purchase an S-400 system from notion of partnership, bilateral ties between the the Russians? When the United States cooperates two countries might best be characterized as a militarily with a group the Turkish government distinctly asymmetrical form of transactionalism. Assessing Turkey’s Position defines as a terrorist organization threatening its That is, each country gains something out of national security,26 why shouldn’t it take steps to the relationship but Moscow stands to benefit Remarkably, all of this criticism has come after defend itself? Why should Turkey agree to adhere to much more. As much as Turkey needed Russia’s a so-called rapprochement between the two fresh, unilateral sanctions against Iran because the acquiescence, at the very least, for its forays into countries in 2016 — one which notably followed the United States says it should? Answers abound as to Syria, the Soviet aspirations of greater control deft use of sanctions by Russia to squeeze Turkey’s why Turkey should understand U.S. frustrations, in the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits (the economy through bans on Turkish imports, tourism including the S-400’s NATO-incompatible and Bosphorus and the Dardenelles) that motivated packages, and construction projects, while also intelligence-compromising technology,27 Turkey’s Turkey to seek security in the NATO alliance in suspending work on the TurkStream pipeline.36 The initial hesitation in fighting the Islamic State,28 and the first place loom just as powerfully in modern sanctions came as swift and severe punishment an unprecedented oil-for-gold sanctions-busting Russia. From an identity perspective, thinking of after the downing of a Russian warplane by two scheme implicating Turkish officials at the highest Turkey’s geostrategic position in Ottoman Islamist Turkish F-16s in November 2015.37 Feeling the bite level.29 But these do not fit neatly into a story in terms, Turkish decision-makers would be remiss of economic pressure, Erdogan demonstrated his which the West does its best but cannot succeed in not recalling the number of wars lost to the renowned pragmatic capacity to execute sudden in cowing a powerful and independent New Turkey Russians between the 16th and 20th centuries, the 180-degree shifts in foreign policy when necessary, into submission. amount of territory lost, and the lives of millions of while at the same time spinning the account of what Party, declared the incident part of a plot to disrupt Turkic who were deported or massacred happened in his favor. Erdogan’s June 2016 letter Russia-Turkey relations.39 Putin himself gave as a result of Russian campaigns.32 to Russian President Vladimir Putin expressing his credence to this explanation,40 which removed any personal condolences for the death of the Russian reason for hard feelings among the two countries’ 24 Ercan Gürses and Aziz el Yaakoubi, “Turkish President Says Qatar Isolation Violates Islamic Values,” Reuters.com, June 12, 2017, https:// pilot was sent shortly before a coup attempt that leaders. Remarkably, this reduction in tension www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar/turkish-president-says-qatar-isolation-violates-islamic-values-idUSKBN1931YW; Onur Ant and Aslı Kandemir, “Qatar Comes to Rescue as Turkey Moves to Avert Financial Crisis,” Bloomberg.com, Aug. 15, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ the Turkish government blames on its ally-turned- even survived the assassination of the Russian articles/2018-08-15/qatar-comes-to-rescue-as-turkey-moves-to-avert-financial-crisis. foe, the Gülen movement. ambassador to Turkey while at an art exhibition in 25 Dorian Jones, “Allure of Domestic Arms Drives Turkey toward Russian Missiles,” VOANews.com, July 19, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/ In the same way that the July 2016 coup attempt Ankara. Again, the assassin was accused of being a europe/allure-domestic-arms-drives-turkey-toward-russian-missiles. 26 Anne Barnard and Ben Hubbard, “Allies or Terrorists: Who Are the Kurdish Fighters in Syria?” New York Times, Jan. 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes. com/2018/01/25/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-syria.html; “Turkey Says U.S. Support for YPG Kurds Was a ‘Big Mistake,’” Reuters.com, Nov. 18, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-usa/turkey-says-u-s-support-for-syrian-kurdish-ypg-a-big-mistake-idUSKCN1NN09I. 33 Hintz, Identity Politics Inside Out, 37-41. 27 “US to Turkey: S-400s Aren’t Compatible with NATO Tech,” Military.com, July 17, 2017, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/07/17/us- 34 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdogan: Kırım’ın Yasa Dışı İlhakını Tanımadık Tanımayacağız,” Akşam Gazetesi, Oct. 9, 2017, https://www.aksam.com.tr/ to-turkey-russian-s-400s-arent-compatible-with-nato-tech. siyaset/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ukraynada-konusuyor/haber-667769. 28 Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “In Turkey, a Late Crackdown on Islamist Fighters,” Washington Post, Aug. 12, 2014, https://www. 35 “Erdogan: Kırım’ın Yasa Dışı İlhakını Tanımayacağımızı Tekraren Vurguladık,” Yeni Asya Gazetesi, Nov. 3, 2018, http://www.yeniasya.com.tr/ washingtonpost.com/world/how-turkey-became-the-shopping-mall-for-the-islamic-state/2014/08/12/5eff70bf-a38a-4334-9aa9-ae3fc1714c4b_ gundem/erdogan-kirim-in-yasa-disi-ilhakini-tanimayacagimizi-tekraren-vurguladik_477328. story.html. 36 Selin Girit, “Turkey Faces Big Losses as Russian Sanctions Bite,” BBC News, Jan. 2, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35209987. 29 Benjamin Weiser, “Erdogan Helped Turks Evade Iran Sanctions, Reza Zarrab Says,” New York Times, Nov. 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/11/30/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-iran-sanctions.html. 37 Mehmet Çetingüleç, “Will Russia’s Economic Restrictions on Turkey Backfire?” Al Monitor, Dec. 13, 2015, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/ originals/2015/12/turkey-russia-steep-costs-of-downing-of-russian-jet.html. 30 See, for example, Aaron Stein, “Ankara’s Look East: How Turkey’s Warming Ties with Russia Threaten Its Place in the Transatlantic Community,” War on the Rocks, Dec. 27, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/ankaras-look-east-how-turkeys-warming-ties-with-russia-threaten-its-place- 38 Lisel Hintz, “Turkey’s Post-Putsch-Purge,” The Boston Globe, July 28, 2016, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2016/07/28/turkey-post- in-the-transatlantic-community/. putsch-purge/F0jXxjTkNvuMKQVyQn7BuJ/story.html. 31 Oya Dursun-Özkanca, “Turkish Soft Balancing against the EU? An Analysis of the Prospects for Improved Transatlantic Relations,” Foreign Policy 39 “Turkish Pilots Who Downed Russian Jet Detained,” Al-Jazeera, July 19, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/turkish-pilots- Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2017. downed-russian-jet-detained-160719132950496.html. 32 See, for example, Suat Kınıklıoğlu and Valeriy Morkva, “An Anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations,” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea 40 “Ex-Turkish PM: I Was Told Pilot Who Shot Down Russian Jet Was Not Linked to Gülen Network,” Hürriyet Daily News, Jan. 12, 2017, http:// Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2007. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ex-turkish-pm-i-was-told-pilot-who-shot-down-russian-jet-was-not-linked-to-gulen-network-108436.

146 147 Roundtable No One Lost Turkey: Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Quest for Agency with Russia and Beyond

member of the Gülen movement, as well as having do well to remember his less than conciliatory name,50 those who blame U.S. meddling for Turkey’s expert Richard Haass argues, in order to increase jihadist links.41 stance during so-called reconciliation with Israel currency crisis found a variety of non-traditional the likelihood that sanctions will compel or deter This serves as a reminder that Turkey’s bilateral discussed above.47 outlets for venting their frustration. particular actions, they should adhere to several relationships can, at times, be quite volatile, and These examples help to demonstrate Turkey’s Of course that frustration did not appear in a general criteria.54 These include multilateral are often infused with rhetoric that casts Turkey as tendency to shift its stance and recalibrate its vacuum. Erdogan, whose multiple speeches per participation, narrow and tough targeting of the the victor. Another example is Turkey’s supposed relationships under Erdogan’s leadership. Thus, day are broadcast live on nearly every Turkish individual(s) responsible, clear standards for rapprochement with Israel following Prime Minister not despite but because of its Ottoman Islamist television station, was the one who called for a compliance, and relatively low stakes issue for Benjamin Netanyahu’s apology for the Mavi vision, Erdogan’s “New Turkey” is built on the boycott on U.S. products, including electronic target state. None of the coercive steps the United Marmara deaths: Pro-government media outlets premise that it is beholden to no one and need goods. As part of a broader “rally ‘round the States has implemented as it continues to weigh emphasized the concessions Israel would be forced not choose between the West or the East. The flag” strategy of stoking nationalist pride and its options regarding the Countering America’s to make, including making financial reparations lesson for the United States is that what U.S. placing responsibility for his country’s intensifying Adversaries Through Sanctions Act meet any of and allowing Turkey to provide humanitarian aid policymakers view as reasonable expectations economic woes on anyone but himself, Erdogan has these criteria fully, much less all of them. The to Gaza. A Yeni Şafak headline expressed this — don’t attack U.S. Kurdish allies in the fight declared repeatedly that Turkey will defy all foreign decision to sanction two of Turkey’s defense view well: “Israel’s Press: We Surrendered, Hamas against the Islamic State — is viewed by Turkey attempts to bring its people “to their knees.”51 While and energy ministries and freeze the assets of and Turkey Won.”42 Two other journalists posed as hypocritical imperialist demands — leave this not specifying exactly whom he blames other than three ministers in the wake of Turkey’s October the question of whether Turkey’s negotiated particular terrorist group alone because its fighting “them,” Erdogan casts the United States in the role operation in Syria appears relatively toothless, achievement should be deemed a “victory” (zafer) presence reduced the need for U.S. boots on the of saboteur seeking to halt Turkey’s rise through given that Erdogan’s invitation to the White House or a “thrashing” (hezimet).43 ground. Expecting Turkey to fall in line will only “economic war.”52 still stands as of this writing.55 Furthermore, Vice European leaders’ experiences dealing with continue to disappoint Washington. By tweeting that he was doubling tariffs on President Mike Pence’s trip to Ankara along with Erdogan can also be instructive to U.S. foreign Turkish steel and aluminum imports at the exact Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and special envoy policymakers attempting to identify trends in the moment Turkish Treasury and Finance Minister on Syria and the Islamic State James Jeffrey Turkish ruler’s behavior in the international arena. The Effects of Sanctions (and Erdogan’s son-in-law) Berat Albayrak was produced an outcome favorable to Turkey in which E.U. heads of state are cautious about assuming that trying to assert control over the economy last the United States agreed to lift the minor sanctions steps such as Turkey’s normalization of relations Furthermore, despite the efficacy of sanctions in summer,53 Trump unwittingly stepped neatly into that had been imposed. The deal achieved there, with the Netherlands and its release of Greek the Russian case, the U.S. threat of sanctions may the role the Turkish president scripted for him. including a temporary halt to the conflict to allow soldiers44 — taken at a time of heightened tensions actually help Erdogan garner domestic support.48 Erdogan and his various media mouthpieces Kurdish troops to withdraw from a region in with the United States and Turkey’s own economic Indeed, he can channel his citizens’ frustrations have been conspiratorially accusing the West northern Syria specifically designated by Ankara, crisis — constitute any substantive or lasting form with what they perceive as the United States of scheming to disrupt the Turkish president’s seemed distinctly more of a “gift” to Erdogan than of rapprochement. A more cooperative Turkey throwing its weight around by standing up to a consolidation of executive and personal power a punishment.56 In brief, Turkey received much of is certainly desirable, particularly for German would-be bully with a defiant “ey Amerika!” (“Now for the past five years — in the 2013 Gezi Park what it initially wanted in Syria without having Chancellor Angela Merkel and others concerned see here, America!”)49 The wide-ranging spectrum protests, and the 2016 coup attempt, for example. to wage a protracted war that could risk waning about a potential influx of Syrian refugees from of anti-American protests in which Turkish citizens The fact that Trump helped prove Erdogan right domestic support were Turkish troop and civilian Idlib, but cannot be assured. Indeed, Erdogan has engaged after the United States imposed sanctions in the case of the lira crisis only bolsters pre- casualties to rise. threatened in the past to open Turkey’s borders against Turkey in August 2018, for example, was existing anti-American sentiment that has served The problem of Washington’s unclear and when he did not receive the concessions he believed impressive. From smashed iPhones to canceled to shore up pro-government support and legitimize inconsistent messaging through various were due to him.45 The Dutch and Germans, whom cowboy Westerns to a man named Ferhat Dolar a foreign policy re-orientation. Tensions between channels and delegations is arguably the biggest Erdogan has called fascists and Nazis,46 would also applying to change his now much-maligned last Washington and Ankara have not pushed the obstacle — other than Turkish recalcitrance — to latter to turn elsewhere, but they provide a nice successfully deterring Turkey through credible justification for doing so. threats. Namely, Trump actively undermines Trump’s tempestuous tweets aside, the sanctions his own bureaucratic organizations’ efforts to 41 “Erdogan Resmen Açıkladı: Suikastçı FETÖ Mensubu,” Milliyet Haber, Dec. 21, 2016, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/siyaset/erdogan-resmen- whose direct and indirect effects on the Turkish convince Turkey that the threat of penalty will acikladi-suikastci-feto-mensubu-2365707. people U.S. policy-makers are willing to stomach be forthcoming and unsustainably severe. Before 42 “İsrail Basını: Teslim Olduk, Hamas ve Türkiye Kazandı,” Yeni Şafak Gazetesi, June 27, 2016, http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/israil-basini- are unlikely to produce the desired movement on threatening to inflict obliterating punishment on teslim-olduk-hamas-ve-turkiye-kazandi-2487428. any of the issues mentioned. First, as sanctions the Turkish economy, Trump repeatedly bragged 43 Yasın Altıntaş and Berrin Naz Önsiper, “Türkiye-İsrail Anlaşması: Zafer mi Hezimet mi?” Tesnim Haber Ajansı, Aug. 22, 2016, https://www. tasnimnews.com/tr/news/2016/08/22/1164807/t%C3%BCrkiye-israil-anla%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1-zafer-mi-hezimet-mi. 50 “ABD’ye Tepki için Soyadını Değiştirmek İstiyor,” Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, Aug. 29, 2018, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/video/video_ 44 “Turkey, Netherlands Agree to Normalize Ties,” Reuters.com, July 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-netherlands/turkey- haber/1067762/ABD_ye_tepki_icin_soyadini_degistirmek_istiyor.html?platform=hootsuite. netherlands-agree-to-normalize-ties-idUSKBN1KA1L0; “Turkey Releases Two Greek Soldiers,” Hürriyet Daily News, Aug. 14, 2018, http://www. hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-court-releases-two-greek-soldiers-135803. 51 Daren Butler, “Erdogan Invokes Patriotism, Islam as Lira Remains under Pressure,” Reuters.com, Aug. 20, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-turkey-currency-erdogan/erdogan-invokes-patriotism-islam-as-lira-remains-under-pressure-idUSKCN1L50OA. 45 Lisel Hintz and Caroline Feehan, “Burden or Boon? Erdogan’s Tactical Treatment of the Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Middle East Institute, Jan. 10, 2017, https://www.mei.edu/publications/burden-or-boon-turkeys-tactical-treatment-syrian-refugee-crisis. 52 Hümeyra Pamuk, “Turkey Is a ‘Target of Economic War,’” Reuters.com, Aug. 11, 2018, https://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKKBN1KW08S. 46 Turkey’s Erdogan Calls Dutch Authorities ‘Nazi’ Remnants,” BBC News, Mar. 11, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39242707. 53 “Trump Doubles Metal Tariffs on Turkey,” Ahval News, Aug. 10, 2018, https://ahvalnews.com/donald-trump/trump-doubles-metal-tariffs-turkey. 47 Shashank Joshi and Aaron Stein, “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement,” Foreign Policy, Apr. 3, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/03/the- 54 Richard Haass, “Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing,” Brookings Policy Brief Series, June 1, 1998, https://www.brookings.edu/ turkey-israel-rapprochement/. research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/. 48 Lisel Hintz and Blaise Misztal, “Hitting Erdogan Where It Hurts, Not Where It Helps,” War on the Rocks, Nov. 3, 2017, https://warontherocks. 55 Tal Axelrod, “GOP Senators Say Erdogan White House Invitation Should Be Revoked,” The Hill, Oct. 16, 2019, https://thehill.com/homenews/ com/2017/11/hitting-erdogan-where-it-hurts-not-where-it-helps/. senate/466075-gop-senators-says-erdogan-invitation-to-white-house-should-be-revoked. 49 “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdogan: Ey Amerika, Ey Trump Sen Bunları Görmedin mi Ondan Sonra ‘Dünyanın En Güçlü’” Haberler.com, Dec. 17, 2017, 56 Ishaan Tharoor, “Trump’s Enormous Gift to Erdogan,” The Washington Post, Oct. 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ https://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ey-amerika-ey-trump-sen-10358274-haberi/. world/2019/10/18/trumps-enormous-gift-erdogan/.

148 149 Roundtable No One LostThinking Turkey: in Space: Erdogan’s The ForeignRole of Geography Policy Quest in forNational Agency Security with Russia Decision-Making and Beyond

to Erdogan that he could temper his legislative worried about when they ask “Who lost Turkey?” branch’s push for sanctions and has boasted to However, framing the question in this way displays his own staff about his ability to get the Turkish precisely the attitudes that help bolster Erdogan’s leader on his good side.57 The penalties from quest, however foolhardy it may be, for agency, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through independence, and even leadership in a region that Sanctions Act are yet to be specified much less has been dominated by larger powers since the applied. The confirmation of U.S. Ambassador collapse of the Ottoman Empire. David Satterfield will hopefully clear up some of the mixed messaging that took place after Dr. Lisel Hintz is an assistant professor of the post was vacated in October 2017. Yet, even International Relations and European Studies at the most talented envoy cannot correct for a Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced president sabotaging — whether unwittingly or International Studies. Her first book,Identity deliberately — efforts to deter a state’s behavior Politics Inside Out: National Identity Contestation through threat of sanctions. Failure to uphold and Foreign Policy in Turkey (Oxford University best practices of deterrent coercion through Press, 2018) investigates how contestation over sanctions aside, what the U.S. foreign policy various forms of identity (e.g., ethnic, religious, establishment failed to grasp sufficiently was gender, regional) spills over from domestic politics to that the United States cannot persuade Turkey shape, and be shaped by, foreign policy. Her current whenever it wishes. The identity of Erdogan’s book project examines state-society struggles over Turkey demands that it resist. identity in Turkey through the lens of pop culture. Dr. Hintz’s work is published in Survival, European Journal of International Relations, International Conclusion Journal of Turkish Studies, Project on Middle East Political Science Series, and Turkish Policy Given the widespread (and by no means Justice Quarterly. She contributes to Foreign Policy, the and Development Party-specific) anti-Americanism Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and BBC that has proven so politically useful, why should World Service, as well as to government, think tank, Erdogan adhere to U.S. demands, particularly when and academic discussions on Turkey’s increasing they are so haphazardly made? Why should he act authoritarianism, civil society struggles, foreign in ways that are contrary to his vision for Turkey’s policy shifts, and Kurdish and Alevi issues. foreign policy role in the region? Why wouldn’t he remind voters that the United States refused to Photo: The Kremlin hand over the man whom much of Turkey blames for the July 2016 coup attempt that cost over 260 Turkish citizens their lives? Admittedly the underlying logic of the argument made here does not help advance the debate of how to persuade Turkey to comply with U.S. suggestions, demands, or threats. Indeed, I argue that even taking such an approach toward Turkey’s current recalcitrance sets U.S. foreign policymakers up for disappointment. Even mired in an economic crisis and facing impending sanctions, Turkey pursued an aggressive course in the Eastern Mediterranean over the summer of 2019, demonstrating that Erdogan’s Turkey will not be deterred from seeking its own path to energy independence. In one sense, the United States could see this as a positive development: What Greece and the Republic of Cyprus deem to be Turkey’s “illegal” drilling may indicate a desire to avoid becoming too dependent on Russia and Iran for energy. This is the same dependence U.S. policymakers and analysts are

57 Pınar Tremblay, “Erdogan’s Friendship with Trump Has Extra Benefits,” Al-Monitor, 9 October 2019: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2019/10/turkey-united-states-why-akp-supporters-pray-for-trump.html.

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