DOCSLIB.ORG

Transformation Und Monarchische Prärogative: Der Niedergang Des Amerikanischen Reformismus, 1962-1963

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Transformation Und Monarchische Prärogative: Der Niedergang Des Amerikanischen Reformismus, 1962-1963 V. Transformation und monarchische Prärogative: Der Niedergang des amerikanischen Reformismus, 1962-1963 V. 1. Das Scheitern des «Amini-Experiments» und die Re-Etablierung der Schah- Autokratie Noch im Oktober 1961 konnte man den Eindruck gewinnen, dass die amerikanische Entschlossenheit, das „Amini-Experiment“ in Iran zu einem erfolgreichen Ende zu führen, ungebrochen ist. Im Anschluss an die anglo-amerikanische Intervention zugunsten der Reformregierung schien tatsächlich ein neues, einigen Optimismus rechtfertigendes Verhältnis zwischen Ministerpräsident Amini und Mohammad Rezā entstanden zu sein.1 Chester Bowles stattete in seiner neuen Rolle als Sonderbeauftragter des Präsidenten für die Dritte Welt im Februar 1962 Teheran einen Besuch ab, der in erster Linie das fortgesetzte Interesse der Administration an Iran dokumentieren sollte. Bowles schätzte im Anschluss die Situation als „kontrollierbar“ ein.2 Tatsächlich war diese Stabilität nur von kurzer Dauer. Im März berichtete die Botschaft erneut von einer niedergeschlagenen Stimmungslage des Monarchen, der sich bitter über die Undankbarkeit und Vernachlässigung seitens der USA beschwerte. Angesichts des fehlenden Verständnisses für seine exponierte und gefährdete Position als Folge seiner pro-westlichen Haltung und der ausbleibenden Zusagen über größere Militärhilfe sei er womöglich gezwungen, als Oberkommandierender der Streitkräfte abzudanken.3 Bezeichnend für die sich wandelnde Stimmungslage in Washington war, dass diesen im Grunde altbekannten Drohungen nun erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit zuteil wurde. Auf Vorschlag des State Department wurde der Besuch des Schahs daher auf den April vorverlegt mit der Begründung, dass nur so eine Abdankung verhindert werden könne, die zwangsläufig in politischem Chaos resultieren würde.4 Wenigstens konnte Bob Komer vorerst vereiteln, dass das geplante MAP-Programm 1 Amini wehrte sich erfolgreich gegen die vom Schah geforderten Kabinettsänderungen, unterstützt vom SAWAK- Direktor Pākrawān. Holmes kommentierte: „Amini is in new relationship with Shah and there is hope that with latter’s backing [...] reform program in this country can move ahead.“; Tehran #A-123, 6.11.61, ‚Iran General 10/28/61-11/9/61‘; Tehran #369, #370, #378, #403, 10-22.11.61, ‚Iran General 11/10/61-12/10/61‘, NSF, Countries, Box 116, JFKL. 2 Bowles‘ Kurzbesuch ersetzte die zuvor geplante Visite Robert Kennedys. Vgl. Brubeck Memo, 30.1.62, CF 60- 63, 788.11/1-3062; vgl. Cairo #1208, 15.2.62, 788.5/2-1562; Tehran #630, 19.2.62, 788.5/2-1862, CF 60-63; Tehran #A-3, 13.2.62, ‚Iran General 1/19/62-2/28/62‘, NSF, Countries, Box 116; Komer Memo, 5.2.62, ‚Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 2/62‘, NSF, M&M, Box 322; Cairo #A-274, 17.2.62, encl. to Komer Memo, 24.3.62, ‚Iran General 3/1/62-3/26/62‘, NSF, Countries, Box 116. 3 Ein deprimierter Mohammad Rezā hatte seine Abdankungsabsichten während eines Skiausflugs mit Yatsevitch und dem britischen Botschafter geäußert. Vgl. Tehran #693, 7.3.62, FRUS 61-63, XVII, S. 508-11; ebd., S. 508 n1; Hughes Memo, 6.3.62, ‚Iran, 1961-1962 [Folder 2 of 2]‘, NSF, RWK, Box 424, JFKL; Harrisons Bericht nach London in ähnlichem Tenor, allerdings mit dem Hinweis: „Of course there is a certain element of indirect blackmail of the Americans.“; Harrison to FO, No. 221, 5.3.62, PREM 11/3845, TNA:PRO. 4 Botschafter Holmes empfahl die Vorverlegung des Besuchs. Die Bemerkungen des Schahs über eine mögliche Abdankung wurden dieses Mal so ernst genommen, dass GTI sogar zur Abfassung eines Memorandums über die möglichen Folgen angewiesen wurde. Offenbar wurden Berichte über den Gemütszustand Mohammad Rezās sogar Kennedy vorgelegt. Vgl. Holmes Letter, 4.3.62, 788.11/3-462, CF 60-63; Miner Memo, 12.3.62, ‚I. The © Der/die Autor(en) 2021 293 R. Popp, Vor der Revolution, Globale Gesellschaft und internationale Beziehungen, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33888-6_5 Kapitel V: Niedergang des Reformismus – AID, das State Department und das Pentagon hatten sich in der Zwischenzeit auf eine Größenordnung von $330 Millionen geeinigt – dem Schah bereits vor dem Besuch mitgeteilt wurde, was ohne Zweifel eine neue iranische Kampagne gerichtet auf Erhöhung der in Aussicht gestellten Hilfe ausgelöst hätte.5 Kaum waren die Vorbereitungen des Staatsbesuchs angelaufen, zeigte sich jedoch, wie sehr sich die Haltung der Kennedy-Administration inzwischen der Schah-zentrierten Politik der Vorgänger-Administration angenähert hatte. Selbst Komer gab als primäre Devise für den Besuch aus, die Sorgen des Monarchen zu zerstreuen: Last May the President approved a new policy aimed at supporting a reformist government in its effort to achieve a ‘controlled revolution’ rather than an uncontrolled one. This remains our basic aim, but an indispensable element is to keep the Shah committed to or at least tolerant of our efforts to this end. Once before he threatened to dump Amini, he might do so again. If he himself left the throne, it would be equally disastrous. Hence we regard his continued presence and support of the Amini (or like) government as indispensable to Iranian stability over the next several years. There is no feasible alternative which would serve US interests as well.6 Die amerikanische Iranpolitik hatte sich von der Idee einer konsequenten Unterstützung einer Reformregierung in Iran – notfalls gegen die Interessen des Schahs – mit dem Ziel, eine alternative politische Synthese alternativ zur höfischen Autokratie zu schaffen, verabschiedet. Im Frühjahr 1962 ging es dagegen nur noch darum, eine gemäßigte, vornehmlich ökonomische Reformanstrengung mit der nun kaum noch in Frage gestellten monarchischen Prärogative in Einklang zu bringen.7 Komer wollte den Schah überzeugen, dass „we vigorously support him“ sowie versuchen, durch verschiedene Präsentationen über die militärischen Kraftverhältnisse in globaler und regionaler Hinsicht und eine Bekräftigung der bestehenden Hilfszusagen der USA Shah & Court (and Govt) 1962‘, Box 4; Talbot Letter, 9.3.62, ‚I-C. Corresp[…] 1962‘, NEA, GTI: RIAD, 1958- 63, Box 5; ähnlich Harrison to FO, No. 220 und 221, beide 5.3.62, PREM 11/3845, TNA:PRO zur Vorverlegung des Staatsbesuchs vgl. Battle Memo, 8.3.62, FRUS 61-63, XVII, S. 516ff.; siehe ebd., S. 511 n3, 516 Anm. o.N. 5 Vgl. ebd., S. 518 n7; die Antwort auf NSC Action 2447 war Anfang März erfolgt und plädierte wie der Steering Group Report für eine Reduzierung der Sollstärke der iranischen Streitkräfte um 25% und ein auf fünf Jahre angelegtes MAP-Program in Höhe von maximal $330 Millionen – dies waren zwar $30 Millionen mehr als die Steering Group vorgesehen hatte, blieb aber dennoch weit unter Holmes‘ Forderungen, die in der Zwischenzeit sogar auf eine Größenordnung von $421 Millionen angewachsen waren. Vgl. Hamilton Memo, o.D. [8. bzw. 9.3.62], ebd., S. 512-6; State #624, 16.3.62, ebd., S. 532f., und ebd., S. 533 n1, n2; Holmes Letter, 5.2.62, ‚I-C. Corresp[…] 1962‘, Box 5; Miner Memo, 6.2.62, ‚Office Memoranda, 1962‘, NEA, GTI: RIAD, 1958-63, Box 4; die NEA-Entwürfe in ‚3-A/1 […] (MAP), Jan. 1- June‘, Box 6, ebd.; Komer hatte Kennedy empfohlen, vorerst keine endgültige Entscheidung über die Größe der zukünftigen Militärhilfe zu leisten, nicht zuletzt da mit zusätzlicher notwendiger Wirtschaftshilfe für den 3. Siebenjahresplan in Höhe von etwa $400-600 Millionen zu rechnen war. Vgl. Komer Memo, 9.3.62, ‚Iran Subjects, Shah Visit 1/31/62-3/20/62‘, NSF, Countries, Box 117, JFKL; Komer hatte bereits zuvor angemerkt, ein $300 Millionen-Programm entspreche ungefähr $50 Millionen per Jahr. Der jährliche Beitrag zwischen 1956 und 1961 betrug $62 Millionen, und somit beinhalte das neue Programm im Grunde nur eine geringfügige Kürzung der MAP-Hilfe. Vgl. Komer Memo, 19.1.62, ‚RWK Chron, Jan.-June 1962, Box 2‘, DSDUF, LBJL; vgl. Kitchen Memo, 2.2.62, ‚MAP, Steering Group Report [Folder 2 of 2]‘, NSF, RWK, Box 432, JFKL. 6 Komer Notes, 20.3.62, ‚Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer 3/62‘, NSF, M&M, Box 322, JFKL; Assistant Secretary Talbot vertrat in einem Treffen der NSC Standing Group eine ähnliche Meinung: „we very much need the Shah in the next few years.“; NSC Standing Group Meeting, 23.3.62, FRUS 61-63, XVII, S. 539f. 7 William Polk vom Policy Planning Council brachte diesen Ansatz auf den Punkt: „The most striking fact about Iranian development is that it depends upon a mere handful of people. [...] If we undermine the Shah’s confidence in them – he already distrusts them as potential enemies – we may do terrible damage to our program.“; Polk Memo, 29.3.62, ‚Iran‘, Lot 69 D 121, S/P Records: 1962, Box 216. 294 Kapitel V: Niedergang des Reformismus die diffusen externen Bedrohungsvorstellungen Mohammad Rezās zu revidieren. Der Schah sollte von der eigentlichen Hauptbedrohung durch indirekte Aggression überzeugt werden, deren Grundvoraussetzung, wirtschaftliche und soziale Instabilität, durch extensive Aufrüstung noch verstärkt werden würde.8 Während für Komer der Schahbesuch „largely an exercise in psychotherapy“ war, sah man gerade auf Seiten des State Department eine Gelegenheit, den reformistischen Interventionismus der Administration weiter zurückzudrängen. Die Diskussionen über die tatsächliche strategische Lage Irans hatten zu der Einsicht geführt, dass es im Grunde keine geeigneten Maßnahmen gab, um den amerikanischen Beistandsverpflichtungen eine größere Glaubwürdigkeit zu verleihen.9 Damit wurde nicht nur die Grundidee in Frage gestellt, derzufolge man durch Demonstration der eigenen militärischen Kapazitäten und der eigenen Entschlossenheit, Iran im Ernstfall zur Hilfe zu kommen, wiederum
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1. Quincy Wright, a Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, First Published 1942) Pp
    Notes 1 Introduction 1. Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, first published 1942) pp. 65-7. 2. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) p. 244. 3. Aron, p. 24. 4. Aron, p. 243. 2 Resources and Strategy to 1914 1. See Martin van Creveld, 'The Origins and Development of Mobiliza­ tion Warfare' in Gordon H. McCormick and Richard E. Bissell (eds) Strategic Dimensions of Economic Behavior (New York: Praeger, 1984) pp. 26-43. 2. Arnold Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth (Oxford: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1976) p. 88. 3. Geoffrey Kemp and John Maurer, 'The Logistics of Pax Britannica' in Uri Ra'anan et al. (eds) Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Hamden: Archon, 1982) p. 30. 4. See Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 5. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) pp. 244-5. 6. John Evelyn, Navigation and Commerce (1674). Quoted in Aron, p.245. 7. Gordon H. McCormick 'Strategic Considerations in the Development of Economic Thought' in McCormick and Bissell, p. 4. 8. McCormick, p. 5. See Eli F. Heckscher, Mercantilism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1955); 'Revisions in Economic History, V, Mercantilism', The Economic History Review, vol. vii, 1936; and Jacob Viner, 'Policy versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the 17th and 18th Centuries', World Politics, vol. i (1948-49). 9. Heckscher, Mercantilism, vol. ii, p. 43. 10. See John H. Maurer, 'Economics, Strategy and War in Historical Perspective', in McCormick and Bissell, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • TNSR Journal Vol 2 Issue 4 Book Final.Pdf (12.61Mb)
    Texas National Security Review Texas T E R R A I TERRA INCOGNITA N C O G N I T A Volume 2 Issue 4 Volume Print: ISSN 2576-1021 Online: ISSN 2576-1153 MASTHEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS Staff: The Foundation Publisher: Executive Editor: Associate Editors: 04 Wars with Words? Ryan Evans Doyle Hodges, PhD Galen Jackson, PhD Francis J. Gavin Van Jackson, PhD Editor-in-Chief: Managing Editor: Stephen Tankel, PhD William Inboden, PhD Megan G. Oprea, PhD The Scholar Editorial Board: 10 More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: Todd Hall Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD 38 The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953 Gregory Brew Robert J. Art, PhD Kelly M. Greenhill, PhD John Owen, PhD Richard Betts, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD Patrick Porter, PhD 60 The City Is Neutral: On Urban Warfare in the 21st Century John Bew, PhD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Thomas Rid, PhD David Betz and Hugo Stanford-Tuck Nigel Biggar, PhD Richard H. Immerman, PhD Joshua Rovner, PhD Philip Bobbitt, JD, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Brent E. Sasley, PhD Hal Brands, PhD Colin Kahl, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD Joshua W. Busby, PhD Jonathan Kirshner, PhD Kori Schake, PhD The Strategist Robert Chesney, JD James Kraska, SJD Michael N. Schmitt, DLitt Eliot Cohen, PhD Stephen D. Krasner, PhD Jacob N. Shapiro, PhD 90 Thinking in Space: The Role of Geography in National Security Decision-Making Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Sarah Kreps, PhD Sandesh Sivakumaran, PhD Andrew Rhodes Theo Farrell, PhD Melvyn P.
    [Show full text]
  • Why NATO Endures
    This page intentionally left blank Why NATO Endures Why NATO Endures develops two themes as it examines military alli- ances and their role in international relations. The first is that the Atlantic Alliance, also known as NATO, has become something very different from virtually all pre-1939 alliances and many contemporary alliances. The members of early alliances frequently feared their allies as much if not more than their enemies, viewing them as temporary accomplices and future rivals. In contrast, NATO members are almost all democracies that encourage each other to grow stronger. The book’s second theme is that NATO, as an alliance of democracies, has developed hidden strengths that have allowed it to endure for roughly sixty years, unlike most other alliances, which often broke apart within a few years. Democracies can and do disagree with one another, but they do not fear one another. They also need the approval of other democracies as they conduct their foreign policies. These traits constitute built-in, self-healing tendencies, which is why NATO endures. Wallace J. Thies, a Yale Ph.D., has held full-time teaching positions in political science at the University of Connecticut (Storrs), the University of California, Berkeley, and the Catholic University of America. Why NATO Endures is his third book. His two previous books are When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict (1980) and Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO (2003). He has also published articles in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Strategic Studies, International Interactions, Comparative Strategy, and European Security and has served as an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, working at the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense : Robert S. Mcnamara
    The Ascendancy of the Secretary ofJULY Defense 2013 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Cover Photo: Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and President John F. Kennedy at the White House, January 1963 Source: Robert Knudson/John F. Kennedy Library, used with permission. Cover Design: OSD Graphics, Pentagon. Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 1961-1963 Special Study 4 Series Editors Erin R. Mahan, Ph.D. Chief Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense Jeffrey A. Larsen, Ph.D. President, Larsen Consulting Group Historical Office Office of the Secretary of Defense July 2013 ii iii Cold War Foreign Policy Series • Special Study 4 The Ascendancy of the Secretary of Defense Contents This study was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate U.S. Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The study is an official publication of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreword..........................................vii but inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it must be construed as descriptive only and does Executive Summary...................................ix not constitute the official position of OSD on any subject. Restructuring the National Security Council ................2 Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source credit line in included.
    [Show full text]
  • Housing Policy in the Great Society, Part Two
    Joint Center for Housing Studies Harvard University Into the Wild Blue Yonder: The Urban Crisis, Rocket Science, and the Pursuit of Transformation Housing Policy in the Great Society, Part Two Alexander von Hoffman March 2011 W11-3 The research for this working paper was conducted with the support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Ford Foundation, and the Fannie Mae Foundation. © by Alexander von Hoffman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Off we go into the wild blue yonder, Climbing high into the sun Introduction Of the several large and important domestic housing and urban programs produced by Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society administration, the best-known is Model Cities. Although it lasted only from 1966 to 1974, its advocates believed Model Cities had promised a better tomorrow for America’s cities and bitterly lamented its termination—blaming Richard Nixon’s policies, diversion of funds for the Vietnam war, and the nation’s lack of commitment to social progress. Yet the legislation that created Model Cities was ambitious, contradictory, and vague. As such, it vividly expressed the idealistic impulses, currents of thought, and reactions to events that converged, however incoherently, in national urban policy of the 1960s. At the center of the fervor for domestic policy was the president of the United States, Lyndon Johnson, who hungered for dramatic new programs that would transform the country the way New Deal policies had reshaped America in his youth.
    [Show full text]
  • WOOOROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER for SCHOLARS Smif H-Iut~Iminstitti F ;On Building Washington D.C
    WOOOROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Smif h-iut~imInstitti f ;on Building Washington D.C. WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Director, James H. Billington Deputy Director, George R. Packard Created by Act of Congress in 1968 as an institute for advanced study and as a "livin memorial ' to the 28th President, the Wilson Center supports serious scholarship and its interaction with the world of affairs. The Center-and The Wilson Quarterly-seek diversity of scholarly enterprise and of points of view. THE WILSON QUARTERLY Editor: Peter Braestrup Associate Editor (Essays): Philip S. Cook Associate Editor (Periodicals): Cullen Murohv Associate Editor (Books): ~oisDecker 0'~;ifl Associate Editor (Production): Anna Marie Torres Assistant Editors: Fred Howard, Stuart Rohrer Contributing Editors: Beryl Lieff Benderly, John Brown, Malcolm B. DeBevoise, Michael J. Glennon, Steven A. Grant, John E. Kocjan, Peter Kovler, Andrea MacLeod, Gustav Magrinat, Raphael Sagalyn, Dody Wilson Smith Administrative Assistant: Melanie Davis Editorial Secretary: Rita B. Miller Production Assistant: Lucy S. Gregg Research Associates: Mark Foley, David M. Friedman, Bruce Jenks, Craig Lingel, Kathleen O'Pella, Jane Spivak Librarian: Zdenek David Art Director: Elizabeth Dixon Business Manager: William M. Dunn Circulation Coordinator: Michael W. Frenkel Editorial Advisers: Prosser Gifford, Abraham Lowenthal, Richard Seamon, S. Frederick Starr, Samuel F. Wells, Jr. Published in January, April, July, and'October by the Woodrow Wilson Interna- tional Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20560. Copyright 0 1978 by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. THE WILSON QUARTERLY is a registered trademark. Subscriptions: one year, 572; two years, S2I; three years, $30.
    [Show full text]
  • Learning from Our Past How a Vietnam-Era Pacification Program Can Help Us Win in Afghanistan
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection 2009-09 Learning from our past how a Vietnam-era pacification program can help us win in Afghanistan Bumgarner, Amy S. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4662 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LEARNING FROM OUR PAST: HOW A VIETNAM-ERA PACIFICATION PROGRAM CAN HELP US WIN IN AFGHANISTAN by Amy S. Bumgarner September 2009 Thesis Co-Advisors: Thomas H. Johnson Sophal Ear Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2009 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Learning from our Past: How a Vietnam-era 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Pacification Program Can Help us Win in Afghanistan 6. AUTHOR(S) Amy S. Bumgarner 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 a Dissertation Presented
    The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Robert Thomas Davis II August 2008 © 2008 Robert Thomas Davis II All Rights Reserved ii This dissertation titled The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 by ROBERT THOMAS DAVIS II has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by ______________________________ Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History ______________________________ Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences iii Abstract DAVIS, ROBERT THOMAS II, Ph.D., August 2008, History The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 (422 pp.) Director of Dissertation: Peter John Brobst This study is a reappraisal of the strategic dilemma of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Cold War. This dilemma revolves around the problem of articulating a strategic concept for a military alliance in the nuclear era. NATO was born of a perceived need to defend Western Europe from a Soviet onslaught. It was an imperative of the early alliance to develop a military strategy and force posture to defend Western Europe should such a war break out. It was not long after the first iteration of strategy took shape than the imperative for a military defense of Europe receded under the looming threat of thermonuclear war. The advent of thermonuclear arsenals in both the United States and Soviet Union brought with it the potential destruction of civilization should war break out. This realization made statesmen on both sides of the Iron Curtain undergo what has been referred to as an ongoing process of nuclear learning.
    [Show full text]
  • I Will the CORDS Snap?
    Will the CORDS Snap? Testing the Widely Accepted Assumption that Inter-Agency Single Management Improves Policy-Implementation by Patrick Vincent Howell Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Peter Feaver, Chair ___________________________ David Rohde ___________________________ Kyle Beardsley, Supervisor ___________________________ Henry Brands Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2018 i v ABSTRACT Will the CORDS Snap? Testing the Widely Accepted Assumption that Inter-Agency Single Management Improves Policy-Implementation Title by Patrick Vincent Howell Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ Peter Feaver, Chair ___________________________ David Rohde ___________________________ Kyle Beardsley, Supervisor ___________________________ Henry Brands An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2018 Copyright by Patrick Vincent Howell 2018 Abstract Since the end of the Cold War, the US Government’s difficulties in implementing policies requiring integrated responses from multiple agencies have led to a number of calls to reform USG inter-agency policy-implementation; similar to how the 1986
    [Show full text]
  • The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation occasional paper series. RAND occasional papers may include an informed perspective on a timely policy issue, a discussion of new research methodologies, essays, a paper presented at a conference, a conference summary, or a summary of work in progress. All RAND occasional papers undergo rigorous peer review to ensure that they meet high standards for research quality and objectivity.
    [Show full text]
  • JFQ 47 Chinese Sailors Man the Rails As Download As Computer Wallpaper at Ndupress.Ndu.Edu Qingdoa Enters Pearl Harbor
    4 pi J O I N T F O R C E Q uarterly Issue 47, 4th Quarter 2007 New Books from NDU Press Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University JFQ Congress At War: coming next in... The Politics of Conflict Since 1789 by Charles A. Stevenson Homeland Defense Reviews the historical record of the U.S. Congress in authorizing, funding, overseeing, and terminating major military operations. Refuting arguments that Congress cannot and should not set limits or conditions on the use of the U.S. Armed Forces, this book catalogs the many times when previous Congresses have enacted restrictions—often with the acceptance and compliance of wartime Presidents. While Congress has formally declared war only 5 U.S. Northern Command times in U.S. history, it has authorized the use of force 15 other times. In recent decades, however, lawmakers have weakened their Constitutional claims by failing on several occasions to enact measures either supporting or opposing military operations ordered by the President. plus Dr. Charles A. Stevenson teaches at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins Uni- versity. A former professor at the National War College, he also draws upon his two decades as a Senate staffer Download as computer wallpaper at ndupress.ndu.edu on national security matters to illustrate the political motivations that influence decisions on war and peace Defense Support of Concise, dramatically written, and illustrated with summary tables, this book is a must-read for anyone inter- Civil Authorities ested in America’s wars—past or present.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceptions and Policies Concerning
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Texas A&M University THE TURNING POINT: PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES CONCERNING COMMUNIST CHINA DURING THE KENNEDY YEARS A Thesis by JEFFREY PETER CREAN Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved by: Chair of Committee, Jason C. Parker Committee Members, Terry H. Anderson Di Wang William J. Norris Head of Department, David Vaught December 2012 Major Subject: History Copyright 2012 Jeffrey Peter Crean ABSTRACT When analyzing the policies of the John F. Kennedy administration towards the People’s Republic of China, previous historians have focused on the lack of substantive change, emphasizing the continuity of action with the prior polices of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. At the same time, a number of historians have noted that it was during the years Kennedy was in office that a majority of the American people began viewing communist China as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union. However, none have sought to explain this sizeable shift in public opinion, or analyze its potential impact on policy. This thesis incorporates archival materials with contemporary print and visual media to make a connection between the sources of public opinion shifts and a change in the assumptions upon which U.S. China policy was based. Almost from the moment the new president assumed office, Robert Komer at the National Security Council and Chester Bowles at the State Department began pushing for changes in China policy based on the assumptions that the communist regime was not a “passing phase,” would only become more powerful and over time constitute an inexorable greater threat to U.S.
    [Show full text]