http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/edit.html

From the Editor

The more the world changes, the more it remains the same. Yes, today's smaller, predominately US-based Army, deploys on more real-world missions and keeps soldiers away from their families more than at any time in the recent past. However, the need for a well-equipped, well-trained force manned by quality people and led by skilled leaders remains constant.

This expanded edition o f Military Review looks at how soldiers have responded to two of these missions-Haiti and Bosnia-and explores their possible impact on doctrine and the conduct of future operations. Lieutenant General L.D. Holder, the former US Army Combined Arms Center commander, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, culminates these operational retrospectives with a review of the Center for Army Lessons Learned mission and its value to our Army.

Even as the Army executes 1990s-style humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, its senior leaders are planning for the Army of tomorrow throug hForce XXI and th e Army After Next. Force XXI's technological aspects have been much discussed, and the Army is studying its implications for force structure, doctrine and training via the Advanced Warfighting Experiments at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. But what wil Forcel XXI mean for future leaders? Will it change the way units build cohesion and teamwork? What will it mean for soldiers? How will it change their lives? Will it fundamentally alter combat's human element? Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer offers his perspective on the challenges ahead. Likewise, Congressman Ike Skelton, ranking member of the House National Security Committee, chronicles a congressional view of providing for the country's defense.

As Military Review's 42d editor in chief, I look forward to maintaining the magazine's 75-year tradition of serving as an open forum for analysis and debate; to not only inform, but challenge; and to stimulate Army officers to read, think critically and communicate their ideas. Th Militarye Review editorial staff will strive to give an idea a chance, to keep institutional biases in check and to deal with controversy without being controversial.

LJH

1 of 1 3/11/98 12:18 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

Cambodia Ousted From ASEAN

It is often difficult to predict sudden political changes in the Third World-surprises occur frequently. This certainly is the case in Cambodia, and affects the accuracy of my article "ASEAN: Coming of Age," which appeared in the May-June 1997 Military Review. When I completed my final manuscript review, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) officials were on record for more than a year that they would, at ASEAN's July 1997 30th anniversary meetings, admit to full membership the observer countries of Burma, Cambodia and Laos. This would bring about a cherished goal of having all 10 Southeast Asia countries as full members.

However, on 4 July 1997, Hun Sen, the Second Co-Prime Minister of Cambodia, ousted First Co-Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranarridh from power. In three days of violence in Phnom Penh, Sen succeeded in routing Ranarridh's military and political supporters.

ASEAN announced shortly thereafter that Cambodia's admission would be indefinitely postponed. In fact, ASEAN has approached Sen to restore the two-party leadership system in-stalled in 1993 after elections won by Ranarridh's FUNCINPEC (National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) party over Sen's Cambodia People's Party. Sen has insisted on a strong role in Cambodia's government and compromise arrangements were made to include him and his party.

ASEAN will surely move behind the scenes to persuade Sen to make concessions. Perhaps more realistically, the pressure from foreign aid contributors, such as the United States, Japan and the European Community, will also bring some form of compromise between the present situation and the May 1998 national elections. ASEAN will eventually admit Cambodia to full membership once an acceptable solution to the present crisis presents itself.

In the meantime, the swiftness of change in Cambodia and the ASEAN region is a lesson to even the best-informed Third World analysts-things are never exactly as they seem. Colonel John B. Haseman, USA, Retired, Grand Junction, Colorado

Treaty Responsibilities

Colonel John B. Haseman's article (May-June 1997) on the emerging and potential political, economic and military role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides an excellent overview of the current situation in one of the most dynamic regions of the world. US military officers, who often focus on and understand the European security environment (such as NATO expansion, the Bosnian conflict and the Partnership for Peace with the states of the Former Soviet Union), very much need to be exposed to the increasingly important geopolitical environment in Asia. The fact that two members of ASEAN-Thailand and the Philippines-are treaty allies of the United States highlights our ties with the region. Understanding our treaty responsibilites and security concerns in Asia must go beyond our key Pacific allies-Northeast Asia, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

1 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

There are both lessons to be learned and pitfalls to be avoided in analyzing ASEAN's inclusion of and constructive engagement with states that have repressive regimes and nondemocratic governments. Both the United States and ASEAN share concerns over the People's Republic of China and its rising nationalism, ongoing economic boom, internal political dynamics and relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, the inclusion of Burma, Cambodia and Laos set ASEAN and the United States on a difficult diplomatic course. ASEAN's refusal to seat Cambodia in July of 1997 as promised in the aftermath of Hun Sen's strong-armed takeover and consolidation of the government of that troubled state may be a step in the right direction.

The United States has a key role to play in Southeast Asia. The United States must also recognize the nationalism and jealously guarded diplomatic independence of these nations that have gained their full sovereignty from foreign colonial and occupying powers over the last 50 years. Haseman's article provides an excellent overview of the key elements that must be understood to begin to appreciate the uniqueness, dynamism and potential of this important Asia region. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G.D. Babb, USA, Retired, Department of Joint and Combined Operations, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

The Forgotten Soldier -Authentic Fiction by a Real `Guy'

In response to Lieutenant Colonel Doug Nash's letter in the March-April 1997 Military Review, I wish to offer a few short observations, then let the matter rest. By seeking primary-source information, this time, instead of relying solely on secondary-source library materials, I believe Nash has presented a more effective defense of "Guy Sajer," but not for the authenticity of The Forgotten Soldier. I am still skeptical. Dr. Richard Swain, author of Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm, states, "It is authentic bad history? But it's O.K. because Sajer . . . was a real guy?" (No pun intended.)

The real issue Nash obscures by his continual fixation on whether or not The Forgotten Soldier is a factual account of a German soldier's experiences on the Eastern Front is the one that motivated my earlier critique-the publisher's dust-jacket claims that The Forgotten Soldier is an authentic autobiography. My main point continues to be that it is not.

Regardless of how autobiographical the experiences the author relates, he did not create a true autobiography. World War II historians cannot (or should not) cite passages from the book as an official record of the author's unit as they might from General Dwight D. Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe or Field Marshal William J. Slim's Defeat Into Victory to document the combat actions of each of these commander's respective units while researching and writing histories of the European Theater or Burma.

Sajer wrote, as many soldiers have done, what in literary terms is known as a roman a clef-a novel based on real persons and events. The roman a clef is a powerful literary form that permits the author the literary license to create characters for dramatic effect, move events forward or backward in time, assign the experiences of several individuals to one central character, or disguise the identify of the novel's principal character by using an assumed name. All of these devices are used in The Forgotten Soldier.

Thus, the book is similar to Siegfried Sassoon's Memoirs of an Infantry Officer or Erich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front. Although these deal with World War I, both novels are powerful evocations of their respective authors' experiences in the cauldron of combat. Both novels contain incidents and events, written in prose narrative, that trace their central characters' experiences, many of which are based on fact. For example, Sassoon actually participated in the Battle of the Somme

2 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

as a British subaltern. Therefore, these novels are authentic. However, what they are not are autobiographies, regardless of how authentic they may seem and despite their authors' participation in historical events that provided them with inspiration.

Nash's correspondence with Gross-deutschland veteran Hans-Joachim Schafmeister-Berckholtz is a classic case of not seeing the forest for the trees. Interestingly, Schafmeister-Berckholtz has a phenomenal memory. Nash writes that Schafmeister-Berckholtz now recalls the famous "Sajer" -the same "Sajer" who uses the non de plume "Guy Sajer" to protect his anonymity. Schafmeister-Berckholtz says to Nash, "At the mention of the name Sajer, my ears pricked up, because we did have a Sajer in the 5th Company, 1st Grenadier Battalion." Wait a minute. Doesn't "Sajer" himself say that the name "Guy Sajer" was not his name but only a cover? I think attorneys consider this "coaching" the witness. In other words, Schafmeister-Berckholtz now remembers the famous "Sajer" as a member of his unit when he is prompted with the name.

Nash's current research is more scholarly than his original work, but some of the most important pieces, the analyses, are still flawed. It's the quantity of errors in toto and the lack of corroborating specific information that make the book suspicious. Any good writer with access to open-source archival material on the Grossdeutschland could do what "Sajer" has done-match many real dates, places and units to known historical events. Michael Shaara's The Killer Angels is my favorite example of this.

Nash's interpretation of my articles seems to indicate that I think everything in The Forgotten Soldier is wrong. Not so. The use of John Le Breton's weak argumentum ad hominem adds nothing of substance to Nash's thesis. There are some things that are right. But enough blatant misrepresentations and incorrect information occur to cause me serious concern for its use as a legitimate historical reference. I have never denied that it is interesting and good reading.

"Sajer's" refusal to answer my correspondence only makes my suspicions more acute. Somehow Nash has broken the code in corresponding with "Sajer." However, I did not approach "Sajer" in the same corroborative manner as Nash. I simply wanted honest answers to questions that might prove the veracity of The Forgotten Soldier, none of which would have violated "Sajer's" privacy or revealed his true identity. "Sajer's" and the various publishers' lack of response to my inquiries sends a fairly negative and unequivocal message.

Nash's efforts in researching "Sajer" are commendable. However, I would caution him to not let his significant emotional involvement cloud his reason as a professional soldier. I sincerely hope that "Sajer" is a real German Army veteran because I like the story he tells. I wish there weren't so many errors in the book that make it implausible as a historical autobiography. However, I will not throw out my first edition, hardback version of the book because of its faults. My challenge of The Forgotten Soldier is for professional soldiers. They should question supposed autobiographies or histories with honest skepticism and curiosity until such are proven authentic. The problem with The Forgotten Soldier is that we cannot be certain it is not fiction. The Forgotten Soldier is great literature and has been recognized as such, but it is neither an official history of the Grossdeutschland division nor an autobiography of "Guy Sajer."

Nash's arguments are getting better, but they are still flawed. My friend, the author and former Grossdeutschland officer, Helmuth Spaeter, has not abandoned his position despite what Nash implies. Therefore, long live Grossdeutschland veteran "Guy Sajer" and his outstanding novel.

Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Kennedy Jr., USA,

3 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Clausewitz' "Paradoxical Trinity"

Captain Vittorio A. Stella is a 1997 US Army Command & General Staff College graduate. His "Letter to the Editor" is in response to the ongoing debate over Carl Von Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity" which has been frequently discussed in several different forums within Military Review this past year.-Editor

Clausewitz' "paradoxical trinity" is no longer the only interplay of elements that suspend war and allow us to fully analyze its characteristics. Government, army and people are not the only "magnets" that exert force on the warfare characteristics of reason, chance and passion. Today, the operating environment includes more attributes than in the past. Combat can occur anywhere and could involve national armies and irregular forces, terrorist groups or criminal organizations, international and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Coalition operations will become the norm if armies must preserve the ability to act unilaterally. Since the Soviet Union's dissolution, the resurgency of 19th century ideologies has affected national politics, government policies, international relationships and army structures.

Today, military and civilian capabilities are more tightly integrated, thus monetary costs and economic principles are as important as human capabilities in organizing, training and equipping militaries. The information technology explosion and smart communications networks have created brain-like military systems armed forces define as an "organism of organisms."

Thus, both doctrine and training em-phasize the effective combination of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, eco-nomic and security factors in military operations. That means that civilian agencies as well as armed forces should be ready to execute necessary contingency plans, manage crises and allocate resources. US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states, "Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations other than war together with a variety of government and NGOs." Nearly all major wars in the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century were fought by civilians who had become soldiers only a few weeks before being sent to war. Therefore, it is critical for an army to field many assets using both Active and Reserve components.

According to R.B. Oakley in "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States," in the summer 1996 edition of Joint Force Quarterly, a necessary condition for every military involvement strategy during total mobilization is to share political and resource burdens while ensuring more capability and credibility. Rules of engagement (ROE) oblige commanders to conduct warfare in compliance with international laws. If such coordinated activities among national and international, military and civilian agencies and NGOs are absent, operations will be less effective. Unexpected, unplanned and unbudgeted demands on military capabilities will be the natural consequence.

Twentieth century wars have tended to be more ideological than in the past. Nations have built an immense standing military apparatus supported by extensive research and development establishments that have absorbed a great amount of national budgets. In the "wars in time of peace" era since World War II, all governments have proved their unpreparedness for war. P.F. Drucker, in his book

4 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

Post-Capitalist Society, states that with the Berlin Wall's fall and German reunification, "Communists have been the ultimate distillation and apotheosis of the doctrine of the sovereign nation-state as the one and only organ of power." Authoritarian governments have collapsed en masse. The nation-state now shares more power with other organs, public sentiments, institutions, special-interest groups and policy makers, thus becoming more transnational and complex. Ideologies that enabled governments to gain and control power have lost most of their effectiveness. They have become weaker against special-interest groups, indeed becoming powerless to govern, wage war, make decisions and enforce them without support.

World War I played a critical role in the breakdown of ideals based on the assumption that reason would inevitably rule humankind and government policies. This belief caused the collapse of positivism and the renewal of the romantic impulse of "modernism." This and following currents of thought were antitraditionalist and lavished admiration on whatever was simple, spontaneous and not rational.

While the nation-state was the sole political reality until the last century, it has transformed itself profoundly in the last 100 years mutating into a megastate. The nation-state was designed to protect a citizen's most important values: life, liberty and property. However, the megastate began influencing citizens' lives mostly at its discretion. At the same time, governments transitioned from active to passive roles in which the trend focused toward more democracy and respect for human rights and individual freedoms.

With the introduction of air power during World War I, and with its continuing development in World War II, warfare became more total, calling at first for the return to offensive strategies after almost a century of attrition warfare. However, the use of new, sensitive weapon systems, available to many countries, combined with a high kill probability ratio, gave promise of returning to a defense strategy. Circumstances suggested that a future war would allow no time for preparation. Consequently military prowess would depend less on skillful warriors and more on capable managers and technicians who rely less on chance.

Modern technology has changed the global posture. It requires a permanent wartime society and an economy continually updated on new weapon systems and threat. FM 100-5 says that US strength is manifested in part by the breadth and diversity of its technological base. It is also influenced by the economic instrument of power. Therefore, America has created a professional Army that, while seeming to be more separated from the civilian sector, requires a closer relationship with that sector's technological evolution and economic means. W.J. Koenig, in Americans at War-From the Colonial Wars to Vietnam, says that "Coalition warfare, global warfare and high-tech-nology warfare require soldiers who are diplomats, managers, engineers and technocrats as much as fighters and commanders." In this more integrated society, the job of the soldier is becoming more interchangeable with that of his civilian counterpart than in the past.

Each modern operational concept incorporates the strength of high-quality people and information-age technological advances. Information superiority dramatically affects how well armed forces can perform their duties. To achieve this superiority, we have jointly integrated all military forces institutionally, organizationally, intellectually and technologically with closer ties to the people and the government that has to sustain it. The primary resource in an army of a post-capitalist society is knowledge.

What we now call knowledge is information that is effective in action and focused on results. Because information's function is as a tool, process and product, we must institutionally organize it for constant change. Therefore, military doctrine and concepts, organizations and command structures, relationships

5 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/lets.html

and responsibilities must change drastically. The introduction of structural and organic information into an army means eliminating many management levels. It requires everyone to assume more responsibility for the organization's objectives, contributions and behavior.

Stable systems and predictable dynamics are the exceptions both in nature and in social and military affairs. The world as a whole, and warfare in particular, does not work in a mechanistic, deterministic and schematic way. Complex international, ideological, political and social relationships, as well as pure military and technological innovations, economic power and ideologies in transition, represent new factors that suspend war and affect warfare. Intricate, multiple and two-way relationships between new magnets now make the study of warfare more art than science. We can no longer subject the innovative process in warfare to reductionist solutions in which the magnets are limited, easily identifiable and isolated from one another.

Captain Vittorio A. Stella, Italian Army, Italian Consulate, Washington, D.C.

6 of 6 3/11/98 12:19 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough

by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Scalard, US Army

The author cautions that the term lessons learned "imparts the notion of a transcendent, universal truth invoked to guide all future actions." Due to the challenging and constantly changing nature of global political and economic landscapes, the Army must indeed address the various challenges its commanders will encounter in potential theaters and develop doctrine and a responsive leader education system that supports the soldier on the ground with essential combat and basic skills. As the author succinctly states, "History expands the near horizons of our own experience" and can be an invaluable aid in preparing the next generation of leaders for war and other operations. To be successful, we must draw on history and the collective experience of those who have gone before us, while at the same time developing a broader-based military education system that will help leaders validate the lessons they learn when applied outside of their original context.

Whither America's legions today-Bosnia, Albania, Zaire? Probably never before in history have the members of America's Armed Forces so closely followed the quarrels of "far away countr[ies] between people of whom we know nothing."1 The reason for our intense interest is obvious: Under current US national strategy of engagement and enlargement, we have entered an age where virtually every regional or local crisis on the globe is considered a potential occasion for US military intervention.2 With the real possibility of deployment in support of peace operations facing every American servicemember at some point in his or her career, military leaders face the challenge of educating a steadily increasing portion of our forces on the conduct of unconventional missions.

Today, America's military is engaged in at least 12 ongoing peace operations.3 The seemingly endless array of world trouble spots, each with its own special problems, keeps military planners busy year round preparing for contingency missions related to peace operations. While many units are actively engaged in preparing for or conducting one of these undertakings, others are incorporating elements of peace operations into all aspects of their training programs, to include Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and home-station field exercises.

The frequency and variety of recent peace operations have stimulated a healthy debate on how to train for and conduct such missions. Within the Army, this debate has filled the pages of Military Review, Parameters, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletters and other professional journals.4 Most of these articles deal with "nuts and bolts" training issues. They cover a host of mundane, yet critical, tasks units must perform to ensure success in peace operations, from conducting secure convoys to knowing how to deal with mines and booby traps.5 Many articles are based on practical experience and highlight "lessons learned," encouraging the Army to incorporate these lessons into doctrine.

Common to most of these studies is a focus on training for the myriad quantifiable tasks and skills

1 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

associated with peace operations. What is lacking, unfortunately, is an appreciation for the role of leader education. This shortcoming is especially egregious considering Army doctrine emphasizes the point that leader development "may be the single most important factor in achieving success" in peace operations.6 This article discusses the crucial need to supplement unit and individual task training for peace operations with a broader-based military education.

Peace Operations: Training, Doctrine and Feedback Analysis

I recognize that "essential combat and basic soldier skills" are critical when conducting successful peace operations.7 Here I refer to that "kitbag" full of items that include a deploying unit's mission-essential task list (METL), plus additional individual and collective tasks not on the METL but expected to be required for the mission.8 Although these are on the unit's wartime METL, their application in peace operations requires "an adjustment of attitude and approach."9 Further, predeployment training for peace operations also includes indoctrination of the mission's specific rules of engagement (ROE) and information briefings, both to familiarize leaders and soldiers with the overall situation into which they are being committed and, presumably, to instill the requisite "attitude and approach" to the operation that doctrine demands.10

Despite these preparations, commanders can never foresee all the tasks their units will be expected to perform. Indeed, the general rule in peace operations is that participating units begin to experience "mission creep" from the outset. US interventions in Lebanon (1982-1984), Somalia (1992-1994) and Haiti (1994-1995) provide ample evidence of this phenomenon. Notwithstanding the most thorough mission analysis and the best intentions of civilian and military leaders, units and soldiers deployed on peace operations all too often find themselves performing unanticipated tasks for which they have neither been trained nor given specific guidance. A sound military education can pick up where the unit training program left off and provide leaders with the intellectual skills to improvise successfully in these situations.

Leaders begin developing these skills with the study of doctrine. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, states that doctrine "provides the basis for planning and executing peace operations" by guiding the Army on how "to think about peace operations and provid[ing] fundamentals for these operations."11 Doctrine covers the "gray areas" between the unit's mission statement and its execution orders. Well-written doctrine imparts general guidance that serves to inform leaders' decisions and ensure military participants at all levels in peace operations cooperate in a common effort. Doctrine suggests, rather than dictates, possible courses of action. Taught in the Army school system and reinforced and implemented in unit training, doctrine is the foundation for unity of effort and, therefore, is an essential ingredient for success in modern peace operations. Yet, even familiarity with doctrine, combined with the training regimen mentioned earlier, is not sufficient preparation for the unexpected.

For one thing, proper application of doctrine relies heavily on unit leaders' judgment. Because doctrine offers only broad guidelines and considerations for analysis, it often seems vague or ambiguous. Doctrine does not supply a "school solution" for any given situation. Unlike our precisely written operations orders and mission training plan (MTP) tasks, the application of doctrine often demands intuition, originality and moral courage from the leader. It requires interpretive skills that put the leader's judgment "on the line." This is particularly true in peace operations, where detailed ROE and a tendency toward micromanagement by higher headquarters often exude an air of intolerance for either innovation or mistake.

Furthermore, doctrine is by no means immutable-it must adapt with the times to accommodate political,

2 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

cultural and technological change. Sometimes it changes dramatically. During the course of the Philippine Insurrection (1899-1904), the US Army had to shift from fighting a conventional war to a guerrilla war virtually overnight. In the protracted "pacification" campaign that followed, the Army tried as many as three fundamentally different approaches to end the conflict. A succession of innovative, flexible leaders adjusted their pacification plan to meet the military and political requirements of the changing situation and, in doing so, succeeded in establishing peace and stability in the archipelago.12

The current debate over the next FM 100-23 version and the "Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Concept" indicates we are in the midst of a period of dramatic change.13 Woe to the leaders who are not aware that their doctrine is changing, or who do not understand the forces driving that change. Officers must continuously supplement the formal doctrinal education imparted in the Army's school system with a reading program that spans professional journals and follows current doctrine assessment.

To overcome doctrine's ambiguity and hone commanders' judgment, the Army uses CALL teams to collect and analyze information from ongoing operations and training exercises and provide feedback to commanders in the form of "lessons." These lessons provide vicarious experience for other units to prepare them for, and orient them to, unfamiliar situations. CALL's lessons also suggest imminent problems and their solutions and provide an extensive and growing data base accessible to all Armed Forces' members.

Sometimes, however, CALL's feedback may be too immediate, too close to the ongoing operation. In October 1994, CALL published a lessons learned report on Operation Able Sentry, the US peacekeeping (PK) operation in Macedonia. When examining the US task force's training program, the report highlighted differences between the American approach to peace operations and that of an elite UN "Nordic" battalion. The authors noted the contrast between the aggressiveness inculcated in American troops trained to execute AirLand Battle doctrine and the nonconfrontational Nordic troops, who were trained to internalize UN doctrine on the use of "minimum force" in peace operations. So much was this notion instilled that the UN troops "routinely cite[d] vignettes from Lebanon where surrender of arms, permitting the encirclement of UN troops; overhead, harassing fire and threats of violence brought no response from the UN stiffer than a formal protest."14

Despite the apparent danger to which implementation of this UN doctrine exposes PK troops, the report proclaims that the Nordics "believe in their methods."15 Highlighting the Nordic troops' discipline, the study noted how "a Nordic sergeant will willingly surrender weapons and allow his patrol to be handcuffed and arrested." It cited a Finnish officer who boasted he had never fired his weapon, despite having been fired on "many times in various PKOs." In yet another example, a Nordic instructor training US troops in border patrol techniques told his class, "You've got to be shot [as opposed to shot at] first before you can return fire." To which one American soldier laconically replied, "Ain't gonna be that way."16

The report concluded, among other things, that the US Military Code of Conduct is inconsistent with PK training. In other words, the notion that an American soldier should "never surrender of his own free will" is supposedly incompatible with the requirements of modern PK ROE. The study laments that an American sergeant probably does not understand "his authority to lay down arms and surrender his patrol." The report's recommended solution was to train our soldiers in these vignettes and teach them that adherence to the Code of Conduct may be detrimental to mission accomplishment. It did not note that its conclusions repudiate the Principles of OOTW outlined in FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 100-23 and therefore contradict US Army doctrine.17

3 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

Discussion of this CALL report illustrates the danger of relying entirely on feedback from current operations to guide either preparations for upcoming missions or the direction of future doctrine. It is akin to driving down the highway at 65 miles per hour with your eyes focused immediately in front of your car. You will be safe as long as the road is straight and clear, but should it curve sharply or meet an obstacle, you will not be prepared to react. Peace operators need vision that penetrates beyond the daily situation report and recent lessons learned.

A more subtle danger is the manner in which we embrace the term "lessons learned" itself. Lessons learned imparts the notion of a transcendent, universal truth invoked to guide all future actions. What commander wants to be accused of ignoring the lessons learned from previous experience? But lessons learned may not be valid when applied outside of their original context. The CALL recommendations for US troops to adopt UN peace operations philosophy may have served the limited requirements along the Macedonian border, but that approach was clearly not called for in Operation Joint Endeavor.18 In recommending that the Army rethink the utility of the Code of Conduct and, implicitly, the American interpretation of the right of self-defense, the report was, in effect, calling for new doctrine based entirely upon a narrow examination of one operation and the opinions of Nordic "experts."19

This is an extreme example of the misuse of lessons learned and admittedly an exception to the volumes of excellent work CALL produces. But the exceptions prove the rule that we must be wary of the "lessons" we learn. We must understand their context in terms of time, place, participants and situational dynamics. It is only by understanding the lessons' context that we can derive the full benefit of CALL and the professional journal articles that tout such lessons.

Key Issues of Perspective

Thus far I have argued that MTP task training, ROE training, doctrine study and feedback from current operations do not sufficiently prepare units for the unexpected things that may occur during peace operations. This shortcoming is frequently exacerbated by the cultural bias that we carry into the troubled lands we go to help.20 We often make only half-hearted efforts to understand the people with whom we will be dealing. Our peace operations doctrine-like our warfighting doctrine-is predicated on the notion that our commanders will invariably impose their will on the various factions involved and the course of events.21 One might conclude that understanding these local conditions is of secondary importance, but as a US Marine Corps general with extensive peace operations experience told a 1994 US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) Class, "You have to under-stand the culture you're getting involved in. We never do a good job of cultural intelligence, of understanding what makes people tick, what their structure is, where authority lies, what is different about their values and their way of doing business."22 Cultural bias limits our ability to understand what is going on around us and often prevents commanders from making informed decisions.

A clear cultural blindness example was observed by a US Army lieutenant colonel charged with training the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) headquarters staff which replaced the multinational force after Uphold Democracy. While assembling his training team, he obtained the services of Brian Freeman, an American Haitian affairs scholar with over 30 years of experience. When the officer tried to include Freeman in the training program, he was stymied at almost every turn by officers who saw no requirement for such expertise.

Despite this indifference, Freeman deployed to Haiti. During his stay, some US Psychological Operations (PSYOP) forces members asked him to comment on a flyer they had prepared for dissemination in the local community. Freeman read the flyer, which was printed in French, and

4 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

suggested they print the next flyer in Dutch. When the curious PSYOP officers asked, "Why Dutch?" Freeman told them that most Haitians were as familiar with that language as French. The local community-the intended audience-spoke Haitian Creole. Only Haiti's elite spoke French.23

Problems caused by cultural bias are compounded by our planning process and staff procedures. Indeed, Army command and staff decision process method-ologies, if not properly applied, may further restrict our comprehension of the difficulties faced on peace operations and thus limit our available solutions.

Military decision-making analytical tools taught at USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and implemented throughout the Army, are models of efficiency and thoroughness. The procedures for analyzing a mission and developing courses of action (COA) are exceptionally well suited for integrating and analyzing large amounts of information in order to generate a comprehensive set of tasks designed to promote success. Yet these procedures have a "down side." They channel our thought processes and limit our perspective and thus our potential understanding of peace operations' complexities.

To begin with, our staff procedures tend to inflict us with "mission fixation" or a "watch your lane" mentality. We try to define, as narrowly as possible, those tasks we must perform in order to succeed, and we actively resist any efforts to change a mission once it is defined. In the current military lexicon, "mission creep" is a disdainful term and an effect to be avoided at all costs. Unfortunately, in the ambiguous and often fluid conditions of peace operations, the commander who embraces an outdated mission too tightly puts his command and the operation itself at risk. A stark example of this is the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) experience in Beirut in October 1983. There, American leaders clung to the mission of demonstrating a vaguely defined and neutral "presence" long after local militia and terrorist groups had decided Americans were the enemy. The results of this self-delusion were catastrophic.24

Another aspect of mission fixation is a tendency to analyze all phenomena in a context of whether or not they support the mission. In other words, that which advances the mission is good, or "friendly," while anyone or thing perceived as hindering the mission is an obstacle, or an "enemy." This Manichaean approach to the world often works well in war, but in peace operations it can lead to disaster. Mohammed Farrah Aideed's unwillingness to have his faction disarmed by UN peacekeepers in Somalia led American leaders to treat him as an enemy.25 As a result, he became one and helped bring about the untimely end to the US mission to Somalia.26 Conversely, when Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hadd's 2d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, was blocked by the tanks of General Fu'ad Shehab's Lebanese Army in the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958, the American ambassador and the ranking US military officer on the scene negotiated with the general and worked out an accommodation. Although the initial American reaction to Shehab was negative, he quickly proved invaluable in helping US forces understand the local situation and adapt their mission to actual conditions. The outcome was a model peace operation.27

Just as our staff procedures potentially constrict our understanding of a given peace operation, so too can misplaced reliance on so-called "experts." Such is the case of Able Sentry noted above, where Nordic peacekeepers were seen as models for US troops in future PK operations.28 Events showed that the UN approach would not bring peace to Bosnia. When the Bosnian Serbs overran the UN "safe havens" of Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995, the United States and NATO responded with air strikes. Abandonment of nonviolent UN methods helped move the more intransigent factions to the Dayton Accords. US forces participating in the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed into Bosnia in December 1995 with ROE that recognized their right of self-defense. In fact, the chain of command went far to demonstrate that American peacekeepers in the Bosnian IFOR were definitely not operating under

5 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

the same rules as their UN predecessors. In January 1996, a US military policeman who let a Serb hold his rifle was relieved of his duties for presenting the mere appearance of surrendering his weapon.29 If the current success of Joint Endeavor cannot be credited entirely to the no-nonsense US approach to peacekeeping, it is hard to deny that the two-fisted US entry into that country had an intimidating effect on the warring factions.

We have seen that sound predeployment training, well-written plans and ROE do not fully prepare units for peace operations' unexpected eventualities. CALL lessons learned reports give some insight into the dynamics of an ongoing peace operation, but they may not prepare us for dramatic changes in that operation or for entirely new operations elsewhere. A thorough grounding in doctrine and the current debate on that doctrine, as provided by the Army school system and professional journals, offer a general COA in such cases. But doctrine provides only broad principles and guidelines that sometimes reveal contradictions when a commander tries to apply them in the field. Such is traditionally the case, for example, when reconciling the principle of security-protecting your force-with the principle of restraint-restricting the means by which you deal with those who would harm your force. Our staff procedures, if rigidly and unimaginatively applied in such circumstances, may actually cause more harm than the original problem.

The problems noted above seem daunting. Where is the soldier to turn if his doctrine is ambiguous, training incomplete, experts fallible and analytical processes unreliable? Must we rethink our doctrine, training programs, and staff procedures to adapt to the new trend in peace operations? There are those within and outside of the military today who are recommending exactly that, along with force structure realignment for good measure. I believe their sweeping solutions are both unnecessary and distracting from the Army's main focus-to fight and win the nation's wars.30

Well-educated leaders can overcome or ameliorate any problem noted above. Such leaders are tactically and technically proficient in their wartime skills, and can make the adjustment in attitude and approach necessary to teach soldiers to perform their tasks successfully in a peace operation. Well-educated leaders are intimately familiar with doctrine and can derive its intent without being intimidated by its ambiguity. They can use the military decision-making process to expedite or facilitate mission analysis and generate COA, but do not let it hinder their efforts to understand the complex issues that lay beneath the operation's surface.

Historical Study Integrates Training, Doctrine & Experience

A well-educated leader possesses the qualities of sound judgment, critical thought and imagination. Coincidentally, these qualities accrue to the leader who intelligently studies his profession's history. Careful military history study helps the leader transcend "conventional wisdom" as it is defined by personal experience, current doctrine and US culture.

Military historians have long touted their discipline as the bedrock of a professional military education. Through military history, today's leaders study the experiences of their predecessors and glean insight into the nature of war. In his classic essay "Military Science in an Age of Peace," Michael Howard noted the value of history during long spells of peace, when military leaders could not gain actual warfighting experience.31 His bottom line was that despite occasional revelations from smaller wars that demonstrate some new weapons capabilities or techniques, when the next big war comes, "Usually everybody starts even and everybody starts wrong."32

Superficially, Howard's "age of peace," where armies lack feedback to prepare for war, does not compare

6 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

with our situation today, where the continuous parade of peace operations provides constant feedback, but there are similarities. The diversity of peace operations today creates difficulty in distinguishing patterns of individual circumstances. Each of the peace operations in Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia called for significantly different, even unique, approaches to the mission. Moreover, while the pool of experience in peace operations is growing for the Armed Forces as a whole, many individual leaders' experience is only "one deep." That is, many leaders are informed by lessons learned from their own, often limited, experience, or culled from the most recent US deployment. The problem: the "lessons" an infantryman carries away from Somalia might not be applicable in Haiti.

In addition, soldier perceptions are colored by the position they held on previous deployments and the organization in which they served. Like the blind men trying to describe an elephant, each participant recounts a different experience based on his location and duties on that operation. A particularly bizarre example of this phenomenon occurred in Sarajevo during Joint Endeavor. There, a US soldier serving under US Army, Europe (USAREUR) command assumed a dramatically different force protection posture than did a fellow soldier standing next to him but serving under NATO command. Though exposed to exactly the same threat, one wore complete "battle rattle" while the other only wore battle dress uniform.33

Historical study provides an understanding of context. It helps us meet the challenge of dealing with endless permutations of peace operations where every situation appears unique. Through multiple examples, it helps perceptive officers draw analogies between ongoing peace operations and those of the past, allowing them to discern patterns in current operations that resemble, if not mirror, patterns from history. They will be able to shape their response to events based on critical analysis and informed judgment. US forces may have faired better in Somalia had their leaders kept in mind the Marine debacle in Beirut in 1983, another situation where the fervent desire to appear peaceful could not be reconciled with escalating military confrontation.

This is not to say that the so-called lessons of history will prevent mistakes and disasters. These may well occur despite the most presumptive rhetoric about shaping the battlefield and controlling events through seizure of the initiative. But mistakes need not be fatal. Howard notes that "When everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes."34 This critical ability to understand and quickly adapt to the unexpected can be facilitated by the study of history.

History expands the near horizons of our own experience. In an age where information is touted as the solution to most problems, well-educated officers realize that military history is the largest data base of experience available to the profession. It documents the way our predecessors dealt with similar problems. Also, it analyzes those problems from countless perspectives. In the documented histories of prior peace operations, we see how our forebears dealt with mission creep, culture clash, unrealistic political expectations and the wild twists of fate that defy even the most comprehensive plans. Military history might be called the "battle lab of experience." In its pages we can find examples of how others attempted to solve the problems of small wars, low-intensity conflicts, stability operations and the other terms we embrace today under the rubric of "peace operations." Their experiences do not offer solutions so much as insights. They will not tell us what will work in peace operations but may suggest how things work. It is these insights that form our theoretical approach to peace operations and, therefore, our doctrine. Understanding them is the first step to truly understanding doctrine.

Howard tells us the history of war must be studied in breadth [width], depth and context.35 The same formula applies in the historical study of peace operations. Through such an approach, the military

7 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

professional gains an appreciation of the long practice of these operations by many cultures in differing environments and circumstances. He gains insight into the variety of problems and creative solutions. More important, the military professional sees examples of the many different ways good ideas can go bad. History bestows upon its students a healthy skepticism of "experts" and simple solutions to complex problems. It helps the serious professional place current operations into their wider historical context, both in terms of regional and doctrinal development. Quite simply, the student of history is able to think "outside the box" into which his culture, training and personal experience have placed him.

Through the ages, military history has guided and informed the actions of the great captains. Military professionals have long turned to history to validate doctrine in peacetime and lend insight into the problems of war. Now it is time to use this tool to complete our leader education for peace operations. Military history, it's not just for war anymore.MR

1. The phrase comes from British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's BBC broadcast 27 September 1938, in which he explained why he was not prepared to lead the British Empire into war merely for the sake of Czechoslovakia. It captures the essence of isolationist sentiment, and in the context of the Munich agreement, provides a well-spring of irony. In less than a year, the consequences of policy derived from that sentiment immersed Britain in a six-year world war with and for "people of whom [she] knew nothing." Christopher Thorne, Approach of War 1938-39, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 80. 2. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, February 1996, US Government Printing Office (GPO). "The United States recognizes that we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a great power and, at times, our global interests and ideals lead us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors.", iii. "Because problems that start beyond our borders can now much more easily become problems within them, American leadership and engagement in the world has never been more important.", 2. 3. There were 12 recognized active peace operations as of September 1996, according to the Department of Defense, 1996 Defense Almanac (GPO, Washington DC, 15 September 1996), 43-44. This does not count the many UN and regional alliance operations to which the US military provide staff personnel. 4. Three examples from a large population: COL F.M. Lorenz, USMC, "Forging Rules of Engagement: Lessons Learned in Operation United Shield," Military Review (November-December 1995), 17-25; Center for Army Lessons Learned, "ROE Training," Newsletter No. 96-6, (US. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May, 1996); and Major Michael K. Robel, "Simulating OOTW," Military Review (November-December 1995), 53-56. 5. US Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, December 1994), 87. 6. FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 87-88. 7. Ibid., 38. 8. Ibid., 38, 86. 9. Ibid., 86. 10. Ibid., 87. 11. Ibid., iv. 12. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 289-97. The Army did not have officially recognized counterinsurgency doctrine during this period. However, each of the Army's various approaches to pacification in the Philippines may be argued to be a deviation from previously accepted principles and practices. One such change occurred when the Army shifted its efforts to "civilize" the Philippines with "schoolbooks" (including education, medical aid, political action, and so forth) to civilizing the islands with "Krags" (Krag Jorgensen rifles-pacification through military action).

8 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

13. See Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking OOTW," Military Review (November-December 1995), 34-41, and LTC John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," Military Review (September-October 1996), 3-9, among many others. The term "OOTW" itself is controversial. While its derivative, "MOOTW" (Military Operations Other Than War) is currently in Joint doctrine, the Army is trying to get away from OOTW. In October 1995, the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), citing a 31 August 1995 message from the Joint Staff, issued a message which noted that "We have reached a point in our post-Cold War doctrinal development so we can now speak with more precision about Army operations in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peacemaking, and other specific missions. Since "OOTW" has served its purpose, we should begin to retire the term, while maintaining and enlarging the vital lessons learned in specific areas. . . . There may be some initial difficulty with those who have grown accustomed to having a general term like "OOTW" that classified a whole category of military operations. But as understanding and doctrine have evolved, we no longer need a catch-all phrase that in some cases may be misleading." Message, Commander TRADOC, P 272016Z Oct 1995, Subject: Commander TRADOC's Philosophy on the term "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW). 14. Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Operation Able Sentry, June 1993 Through May 1994," Lessons Learned Report, (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 1994), 17. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. Italicized comments are mine. 17. The OOTW principle of security states: "Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage." FM 100-23, Peace Operations, 16. See also US Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1993), 13-3 to 13-4. 18. The UN approach did little to stop three years of warfare and atrocities in Bosnia, many of them happening under the noses of UN forces such as in the UN-proclaimed "safe havens" of Srebrenica and Zepa. See Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1995), 401-424, for a list of 132 UN resolutions and demands issued between 25 September 1991 and 12 January 1995 to stop the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia. 19. FM 100-23 states, when discussing the OOTW principle of security, "In peace operations, commanders should not be lulled into believing that the nonhostile intent of their mission protects their force. The inherent right of self-defense, from unit to individual level, applies in all peace operations at all times." FM 100-23, 16-17. Italics are mine. 20. We also carry our cultural blinders into war, often at our own peril. Douglas Pike used Aldous Huxley's phrase, "vincible ignorance" ("that which one does not know and realizes it, but does not regard as necessary to know") to describe how America's leaders ignored Hanoi's strategic thinking during the Vietnam War. Douglas Pike, "Conduct of the Vietnam War: Strategic Factors, 1965-1968," The Second Indochina War: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Arlington, Virginia, 7-9 November 1984 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1986), 109-111. 21. FM 100-23, 31. 22. Spoken in a briefing on operations in Somalia to the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 30 November 1993. Comments made by guest speakers to CGSC are generally nonattributional. 23. Nonattribution interview conducted by LTC Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann and John Fishel at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 November 1995, for the US Army Center of Military History. The interviewed officer worked with Operations Group D, Battle Command Training Program, in developing the training plan for UNMIH. He is currently on active duty and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science. Brian Freeman ultimately became an adviser to MG Joseph Kinzer, UNMIH commander. 24. Department of Defense, "Report of the Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International

9 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

Airport Terrorist Act, 23 October 1983" (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 20 December 1983), 24-28, 35-56. 25. See pages 31-33, FM 100-23, for a discussion of how the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) "translated its security mission to clearly defined end states at the operational level during the relief stage of Operation Restore Hope." The first "bullet" of that end state was that "People live in peace without reliance on their own weapons for protection." In order to obtain that end state, American leaders believed they had to disarm the Somalis. That disarmament implied a lasting political, and possibly cultural, change that some Somali leaders were unwilling to permit. 26. Patrick J. Sloyan, "Mission to Somalia, Part 1: Somalia Mission Control; Clinton called the shots in failed policy targeting Aidid," Newsday, 5 December 1993. Note: A bizarre example of this aspect of mission fixation is found in a recent draft of the TRADOC Digital Publishing Implementation Plan (DPIP). The goal of this plan is to "digitize" most publications currently printed on paper. In a draft of the document I reviewed, the authors characterized those people in the Army who disagreed with their approach as the "enemy" and placed them appropriately in paragraph 1c of a five-paragraph plan. 27. Roger J. Spiller, Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), 20-25. See also Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Inc., 1964), 400-401. 28. Imitation of the "experts" can be seen as far back in history as the Roman adaptation of Greek-style armor and tactics. In the 1860s, when the French were widely considered to have the best army in the world, French-style military uniforms and drill were adapted by armies around the globe. Many of these same countries were quick to switch to Prussian-style uniforms after France's humiliating defeat by that country in 1870. 29. Vince Crawley, "MP dismissed from post for letting Serb hold rifle," Stars and Stripes (3 February 1996), 1, 3. 30. FM 100-5, Operations, v. 31. On 3 October 1973, historian Michael Howard presented a lecture titled "Military Science in the Age of Peace" about the problems militaries faced in preparing for the next war. Among the most important problems was the inability to "verify your calculations"-that is, to test new doctrine in actual conditions. In a famous analogy, he noted that soldiers in peacetime are like sailors navigating by dead reckoning. They must extrapolate from the experiences of the last war to determine how to fight the next. Naturally, the greater the distance from the last war, the greater the chances for error in extrapolation. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1974), 3-9. 32. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 119 (March 1974), 6. His case in point was World War I, where military leaders around the world examined and reexamined some 40 years of battlefield evidence and came up with a number of creative, diverse and uniformly incorrect solutions to the military problem of 1914. 33. See LTC Walter Kretchik's "Force Protection Disparities" in this edition of Military Review. 34. Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1974), 6. We often lose sight of the fact that just as we have to adapt to changing situations so, too, do others. Even as US forces had to deal with the growing intransigence of Mohamed Farah Aidid in Somalia in 1993, Aidid had to adjust to the increasing danger of his own situation. 35. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," Parameters (March 1981), 15, from a lecture given to the Royal United Service Institute on 18 October 1961.

Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Scalard is the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) executive officer, US Army

10 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM People of Whom We Know Nothing: When Doctrine Isn't Enough http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sca.html

Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy (USMA) and an M.A. from Duke University. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including III Corps Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise officer; S3, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry; and Combat Arms Division chief, Readiness Group Snelling. He has taught military history and theory at USMA and USACGSC. He was instrumental in organizing a CSI team to analyze current peace operations from historical perspectives.

11 of 11 3/11/98 12:26 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control

by Robert F. Baumann ©

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

Perhaps the greatest challenge the military faces in conducting operations other than war (OOTW) today-by whatever terminology we choose to describe them-is setting realistic goals and identifying meaningful measurements of success.1 US civilian policy makers and military leaders have been wrestling with the problem in one form or another for over two centuries. In fact, such operations have been more common than wars. Simply put, confusion stems from three principal sources:

Military operations that rely heavily on show of force, presence or peace enforcement occur in an inherently ambiguous environment, especially in the area of rules of engagement. They offer few concrete objectives or sign posts that permit an intervening force to reliably determine the success of its efforts.2 The placement of combat forces in situations that put a much higher premium on restraint and adaptability than on warrior skills, which form the main focus of soldier training and indoctrination, creates an inescapable tension.

Each of these sources of complexity is magnified several times over by virtue of the fact that OOTW typically entails working in a foreign cultural environment most soldiers can little understand. Indeed, Americans in general, whether working for military or civilian agencies, are not renowned for their cross-cultural awareness.

Probably no recent case better illustrates the finely nuanced difficulty of such deployments than Operation Uphold Democracy. The US Army's deployment to Haiti reflects an attempt to learn from past mistakes. The operation was wildly popular with the native populace and, by most accounts, scored some notable successes. However, there is cause to question what we actually did accomplish in a strategic sense. The following discussion looks at what the US Army actually did and the situation we left behind.

Rationale and Mission

Notwithstanding the high level of approval that greeted the performance of American, multinational and UN forces in Haiti, Time correspondent Johanna McGreary issued a challenging mission appraisal in February 1996: "When the post-Cold War book of rules for global intervention is written, the lesson of the Haiti chapter will be this: define your goals so minimally that it will be easy to meet them, declare victory and go home."3 McGreary went on to assert that the mission's most critical element was the timely departure of American soldiers, thereby ensuring that US engagement in Haiti would not become protracted, costly and politically unpopular. The assessment's most damning aspect was the conclusion that in the end, Haiti remains a basket case with bleak future prospects.4 Whatever the US mission accomplished, it produced little change to suggest that the beleaguered nation, born of history's only

1 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

successful revolution engineered by slaves, is retreating from the abyss of social chaos and deepening human tragedy.

In a separate but equally blunt 1996 critique by the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College, Donald Schultz maintained that overall neither American politicians nor their Haitian counterparts were anxious to address the Caribbean republic's root problem: the existence of an embedded system of behavior and values that cripples the development of a stable, democratic polity, economic growth and a social infrastructure beneficial to the average, impoverished citizen. The reasons, Schultz maintains, are that Americans are disposed to seek a "quick fix" which will not require a commitment to nation building.5 On the other hand, most Haitian politicians and their co-nationals living abroad resent the notion that Haiti's problems are fundamental, reaching to the core of their political culture. They prefer to believe the "predatory state" that has dominated their country for so long owes its existence to a picked group of corrupt leaders and their paid henchmen.6 The implication is that good leaders, backed by international aid, can turn Haiti's fortunes around.7

In a larger sense, Schultz concludes that the US-sponsored mission in Haiti, whatever its short-term achievements, will fail in historical terms because of a widespread lack of will to face an unpleasant real-ity. Worse yet, "The danger facing the United States and the international community is that they will have raised Haitian expectations only to dash them through an unwillingness to do what is necessary to give the democratic experiment a real chance of success."8 By inference we can expect an eventual return to domestic turmoil accompanied by a flood of refugees who will once again be looking north for sanctuary.

The complex of circumstances that prevailed in Haiti in 1993 argued vigorously that something be done. Historically impoverished and politically unstable, Haiti was in desperate straits even by its own humble standards. Its people lived in the most abject poverty found in the Western Hemisphere, and its democratically chosen president carried on in exile in the United States while a military junta headed by General Raoul Cedras ruled by blood and terror at home. In addition, the human tragedy confronting President Bill Clinton was the flotillas of pathetic refugees eager to face peril at sea rather than remain in Haiti. As fugitives stacked up in holding camps and the Cedras regime stalled in implementing the Governors Island Accord provisions-which directed return of power in Haiti to the elected government-a response was imperative.

The arrival of the USS Harlan County at Port-au-Prince harbor, intending to deliver a firm message to the junta, backfired. Lacking clear authorization to use force if necessary, either to pull into port or to protect his vessel, the captain withdrew when a few small, armed Haitian patrol boats and a throng of rowdy, hostile demonstrators on shore threatened to turn Haiti into the "next Somalia."9 Thus, the signal actually delivered was that the United States and the international community lacked the resolve to risk bloodshed over Haiti. This perception emboldened the junta and its allies and hung international aid and human rights workers inside Haiti out to dry.10

At last, however, the stage was set for Operation Uphold Democracy. At the National Command Authority's direction, US Atlantic Command initiated joint planning based on two clear options. According to Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370, the XVIII Airborne Corps operated as Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 with the mandate to execute a violent seizure of key sites in Port-au-Prince in order to wrest authority from the illegal junta. The second option, expressed in OPLAN 2380, formed JTF 190 around the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] to conduct a permissive entry into Haiti, based either on acquiescence by the Cedras regime or a handover of control from JTF 180 in the aftermath of a forcible entry. In the meantime, just to be on the safe side, 10th MD (L) planners prepared for the

2 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

contingency that a permissive entry might be less than completely permissive. In short, JTF 190 had a "takedown option" of its own, if needed.

No one could anticipate the actual sequence of events by which US forces would enter Haiti. US Army Captain Berthony Ladouceur, who served as adviser and chief linguist for JTF 180 commander Lieutenant General H. Hugh Shelton, openly speculated that the Cedras regime would back down at the last possible moment to avoid a face-off with a US invasion force. He believed resistance would be minimal.11 What "thickened the plot" was the late-breaking negotiation mission to Haiti headed by former President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn.12 Talks continued up to D-Day, 19 September, as the window for heading off an invasion closed. Only a phone report by a spy working for the junta in Haiti that US aircraft were departing Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, brought about the Cedras government's capitulation.

The last-minute accord averted violence but also struck directly at the soft seam between the forcible entry plans of JTF 180 and the handoff to JTF 190. The forcible entry plan was already under way and 82d Airborne Division elements were in flight to Haiti when conditions on the ground changed. Recalling the 82d and putting the 10th MD (L) in motion was not in itself difficult. The catch was that critical support and logistics assets had been committed to implement the forcible entry plan and could not be instantly diverted to the 10th MD (L) and associated units. Consequently, port and airfield organization, not to mention establishing living areas for US soldiers, suffered severe dislocation. Originally, planning had fully accounted for either JTF 180 going in and, after about a week, handing off control and assets to JTF 190, or for JTF 190 to go in on its own with all support assets under its control from the start. Planning had not allowed for the abortion of a forced entry by JTF 180 hours after it deployed.

On the Ground in Haiti

Rapidly changing circumstances imposed the unwelcome burden on Shelton to improvise new rules for the game as it was being played. As Shelton put it, ". . . never in my wildest imagination did I think I would be coming in here with the mission of cooperating and coordinating in an atmosphere of mutual respect."13 Completely unforeseen was the necessity of working out arrangements with Cedras and collaborating in the streets with Haiti's widely despised army and police-the Forces Armes d'Haiti (FAd'H) -to effect a smooth return to democratic rule.

Scarcely less difficult was the psychological adjustment required of US commanders and soldiers; they had to scrap the mission to defeat the "bad guys," then become partners with them in implementing political transition. The change in US posture not only clouded the soldiers' sense of purpose but baffled the Haitian populace as well. Inclined to view the Americans as liberators-at least initially-ordinary Haitians experienced bewilderment and unfulfilled expectations. Many Haitians expected, even thirsted for, an orgy of revenge against their oppressors. This Shelton could not permit. Realization that a deal had been cut and that the leaders of the military would go unpunished caused palpable disappointment among most Haitians.14

Shelton had to convince Cedras and the FAd'H that, although he was not there to seize and arrest them forcibly, he would brook no interference with his mission, the center of which was their removal from positions of power and authority. According to Ladouceur, Shelton adopted the right public pose from the start. He arrived at Port-au-Prince International Airport in battle dress uniform and beret, exuding the assurance of one who knows he is in charge-though in fact he had no way of knowing whether all the official and unofficial armed factions in Haiti would honor the Carter-Cedras Agreement.15

3 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

A more delicate problem was controlling the decompression of Haiti's societal tensions. Immediately dissolving the existing police force would create a vacuum that neither US military police (MP) nor international police monitors were prepared to fill. Yet, neither could the police be permitted to carry on as before or simply be trusted to mend their ways. Thus began the complex task of supervising the police force in the streets-which frequently meant defending it from angry citizens prepared to seek the full measure of mob justice-while discreetly purging it of its most notorious human rights abusers. The multinational force laid a foundation for creating an interim police force even as it organized a training program to establish an entirely new, professionally indoctrinated one.

Soldiers enter a building suspected to contain a cache of weapons, Cap Haitien, October 1994.

The new police force's credibility in the Haitian public's eyes as well as those of international observers was a constant source of anxiety. The UN's intent was to build a new force within the constraints imposed by the overall timetable for the international presence in Haiti. As a practical matter, it was expedient to retain FAd'H officers who were found relatively untainted by the organization's abysmal human rights record.16 However, such retention troubled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and others. Even while acknowledging that "the scorned Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) has achieved some successes," attorney William O'Neill, a consultant to the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees based in New York City, believed the program was seriously flawed. For example, O'Neill noted, "These interim police officers received just four days training and hardly ever left their barracks except when accompanied by the United Nations International Police Monitors." Even more serious, he contended, was the assignment of former police officers to the new one: "These officers have not only been exposed to the vicious military/police culture of the Haitian army, but they have not received the rigorous four-month academy training."17

Key to buying time for the police forces' maturation and the staging of elections was establishing a "safe and secure" environment across Haiti. What that meant in concrete terms was left to the discretion of commanders on the ground. Some disagreement in approach would be natural and predictable; however, in this instance, the divergence of approaches reflected something deeper.

There was a marked difference in operational styles between the 10th MD (L) in Port-au-Prince and US Army Special Forces (SF) teams distributed across Haiti's remote interior and coastal towns. From its arrival in Haiti, the 10th MD (L) put a premium on force protection-the physical security of its soldiers on the ground. Force protection is always a central concern when US troops are deployed and the parents of every US soldier in Port-au-Prince expected no less. Equally demanding in this respect were the politicians at home and proponents and critics of the Haiti mission. The abrupt US policy change in Somalia following the deaths of 18 US Army Rangers in Mogadishu etched this concern indelibly in the memory of every officer and soldier assigned to the 10th MD (L). Its leaders soon realized the Haitian scenario was different but chose to err on the side of caution.

The force protection focus manifested itself from D-day on. As US soldiers massed at the Port-au-Prince International Airport, 10th MD (L) leaders vigorously forbade any fraternization with the throngs of friendly Haitians just across the fence. As the Americans established their living compound at the Light Industrial Complex, they wore helmets and body armor virtually anytime they were outdoors, despite the

4 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

intense heat. In general, US soldiers rarely left the guarded living compound, with the exception of daytime patrols, MP units and PSYOP teams. From a leadership perspective, the policy not only ensured force security, it was conducive to the preservation of soldierly standards of good order and discipline. To the populace, the intended message was that we would not let our guard down. However, not all force members were comfortable with that posture. According to a study on stress and psychological readiness of US troops in Haiti, many soldiers thought that they were contributing little in Haiti, that the obsession with force protection was "unnecessary" and that they were being micromanaged.18

In any case, after securing the airfield, ports and living compound, three broad tasks remained. First, the 10th MD (L) had to neutralize all possible armed factions in the city, locating as many hidden weapons caches as possible. This became one primary role of civil affairs (CA) officers assigned to JTF 190. Infantry, MP and tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) successfully induced elements of the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and attachés to surrender and relinquish their weapons with scarcely any resort to violence. PSYOP teams broadcast surrender

warnings and terms in Creole, and to the collective relief of all, the message was almost universally heeded.19 The PSYOP role across Haiti was mainly informational-an especially important and persuasive role in a country not accustomed to being kept informed by its leaders. Radio Democracy and Television Democracy kept the mission's progress and associated thematic messages before the public. The effect was both to increase the multinational presence's legitimacy and prepare public opinion for developments to come. Still, Haitian violence in the streets remained a problem. TPTs were dispatched on 22 September 1994 aboard helicopters and in high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). The teams were to emphasize peaceful assembly in their communications.20

After the mission's first few days, the perception developed at JTF 180 headquarters-which remained in Haiti to support Shelton and the political mission to orchestrate the departure of Cedras and the return of Aristide-that the 10th MD (L) was slow in getting out of its compound to establish a real presence and interact with the populace. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Anderson, a JTF 180 CA officer, noted, "There was clearly no appreciation [in the 10th] for the fact that the only way to conduct an operation like this is to get out and see people, meet people and gain their confidence." He added, "If you treat the population as hostile, that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy."21 In the same spirit, the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) advised Major General David Meade that US patrols should establish a more visible presence in the streets to avoid a "siege mentality" characteristic of recent operations in Somalia.22

5 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

A 10th MD (L) soldier searches a man turning in a weapon during the Gourds for Guns Program, September 1996.

By 2 October, the JPOTF and the JTF 180 staff on board the USS Mt. Whitney discerned another disquieting trend in the Haitian perception of the multinational mission. The appearance of joint US-FAd'H patrols and the impunity with which the hated attachés continued to operate in Port-au-Prince undermined the mission's credibility. Finally, Colonel Jeffrey Jones, the JPOTF commander, bluntly asserted in a memorandum to Shelton that US forces appeared "impotent, and to some degree irrelevant."23

The prodding apparently had an effect. Just a day later, Task Force (TF) 2-22 executed weapons seizures at five sites in Port-au-Prince. At about the same time, Operation Mountain Strike began to clean out known FRAPH gathering spots. Most surrendered in response to broadcast warnings, and even the holdouts gave up when infantrymen commenced building clearing operations, obviating any concerns about exchanges of gunfire.24

As security concerns abated, engagement in the capital began to increase. In mid-October, 10th MD (L) soldiers began contributing to the "Adopt-a-School" program to help repair and distribute supplies. Shortly thereafter, multinational forces (MNF) contingents began arriving. Overall, JTF 190 and 10th MD (L) soldiers conducted themselves professionally, avoiding unnecessary clashes with Haitians and inordinate dependence on the MNF.

In Cap Haitien, after receiving a handoff from the US Marines on 2 October, the 10th MD (L)'s 2d Brigade, under Colonel James Dubik, quickly established an atmosphere of order and stability. At the year's end, the mission's turnover in Port-au- Prince, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [25th ID (L)], was about as smooth as could be expected, thanks to advance coordination, country visits by Tropic Lightning personnel and orientation briefings and training materials provided by analysts from the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The training package included not only TPT-related lessons, but situational vignettes drawn from actual unit experiences in Haiti. The result was that the 25th ID (L) arrived ready and showed no hesitation in establishing its presence in the streets, although it, too, emphasized force protection.25 In March, when mission control passed to the UN, the 25th ID (L) was running smoothly, and calm prevailed in Port-au-Prince. Engagement became ever more central to the mission. After arriving in October 1995, Colonel John Donovan, 1st Brigade commander, 101st Airborne Division, and Zone V commander in Haiti, made it policy that "every person on the staff" walk patrols so as to better grasp local conditions.26

In the meantime, SF teams, arrayed from the beginning across Haiti in a "hub and spoke" network, arguably accomplished even more with less in an economy of force role. Projecting outward from forward operating bases in Jacmel, Cap Haitien and Gonaives, SF A-Teams assumed an astonishing variety of functions. Lacking both large numbers and resources, the teams demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to local conditions and take the initiative.

This is not to say that SF did not experience similar difficulties as the 10th MD (L), especially as a result of the switching of entry plans in midstream. For instance, as the forcible entry mission screeched to an

6 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

unexpected halt, SF troops found themselves without aircraft to deploy into Haiti.27

Once in-country, however, SF quickly implemented a posture of maximum engagement of the populace. SF elements recognized the low level of the threat and expanded their reach accordingly. They established contact with community leaders, explained the purpose of their presence and moved proactively to stabilize the political environment. SF teams arrested the worst criminals and human rights abusers as identified by the local populace, made clear to outlying FAd'H garrisons they expected full cooperation and operated as instructors in basic civic philosophy and practical principles of town government. Where necessary, they prodded judges to clear up huge backlogs of unresolved cases, many of which had resulted in the prolonged detention of citizens without hearings or formal charges. On occasion, as when SF soldiers entered Les Cayes, they found extremely grim conditions in the local prison.28 SF teams directed the police to correct the horrendous prison conditions, called town meetings and organized citizens to tackle basic cleanup and repair projects. They took pains to limit their role to providing initiative and organizational assistance while demanding that Haitians themselves develop the self-reliance to bring plans to fruition.

Perhaps most remarkable of all, SF teams under-took many tasks without resorting to elaborate security measures or the "bunker mentality" that initially kept the overwhelming majority of the force in Port-au-Prince confined to its compound. Small and scattered as they were, SF teams needed all hands to execute the mission of engaging the populace and reinvigorating civil life in scores of rural towns and villages.

SF teams got invaluable support from PSYOP and CA officers and the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Port-au-Prince. Equally crucial was the availability of emergency "back-up" in the form of helicopter mobile quick reaction forces provided by Army Rangers and infantry from the 10th MD (L). For instance, after an SF soldier in Les Cayes was shot, Rangers quickly deployed to the scene to demonstrate the vast combat power constantly "on call" to remote A-Teams. More than anything else in Haiti, this arrangement demonstrated the complementary employment of SF, SOF and conventional forces.

In reality, the overall working relationship between SF and conventional forces troops in Haiti was awkward, at times even disagreeable. Friction between the two stemmed largely from basic differ-ences in branch culture. The training and indoctri-nation of SF soldiers emphasizes individual self-reliance, flexibility and pragmatism that do not always neatly conform to the sense of strict order and discipline which pervades the culture of conventional units. As soldiers who have worked in both cultures sometimes attest, a certain amount of mutual misperception is common because different kinds of performance are expected.29

An Army officer questions a man believed to be the president of the FARPH organization for the southhern region of Haiti.

History suggests that to some degree this has always been so. Though not perfectly analogous to 20th century SF forces, soldiers in France's colonial expeditionary forces during the 19th century also operated in relatively small contingents and had to adapt extensively to local conditions. Of course, they did not operate in small, elite teams or live like native villagers, but as a consequence of operating for extended periods in utterly foreign environments where they waged unconventional wars,

7 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

they were perceived by their home armies as "different." Opinion back at general staff headquarters in Paris often held that colonial soldiers had "gone native" and were sometimes given to display a disturbing informality.30 By the same token, soldiers operating on Russia's imperial borderlands tended to see officers from the home army as inflexible and poorly suited to warfare on distant frontiers.31

Mutual misperceptions were not altogether unfamiliar to US troops in Haiti. For example, in a noteworthy incident at Camp D'Application in Port-au-Prince, SF and conventional forces soldiers had an awkward encounter resulting in about equal measure from poor prior coordination and divergent purposes. SF soldiers from 3d Group had arrived first to take control of the camp, including the training academy, barracks and equipment. Their mission was to secure the FAd'H's compliance and cooperation with the MNF in Port-au-Prince. Army SF elements firmly but politely explained the rules of their new working relationship, including the plan to share the barracks, and began to establish a rapport. This process no sooner began than a conventional unit from the 10th MD (L) arrived to secure all the hardware belonging to the FAd'H special weapons company, believed to pose one of the few significant military threats in Haiti. Accordingly, they showed up with armored vehicles and assumed a menacing, combat-ready posture that directly contravened the SF's work. Members of the FAd'H suddenly felt like prisoners rather than partners, and the SF felt their credibility had been undermined by the intimidating actions of their conventional counterparts. Subsequently, a gesture by a SF soldier to ease the tension elicited hard feelings on the conventional side. Hoping to convey to now-fearful FAd'H members that the situation was not as grave as it appeared, the SF soldier managed to lead the assembled multitude in performing "a wave." Now the conventional soldiers felt their credibility was being questioned and a flurry of complaints and charges ensued.32

Perhaps no episode better reflected the ambiguity of the environment into which US troops were thrust in Haiti. At times, some SF and conventional forces alike believed the mission in Haiti placed them in roles that did not correspond to their primary training and purpose. They nevertheless carried on.

The Haiti We Leave Behind

US planners defined "exit strategy" in Haiti to mean "the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed on its behalf by peace operations forces."33 In the opinion of scholar Michael Mandelbaum, "The exit strategy became the mission."34 Still, key preconditions for departure-basic order, the return of Aristide and the conduct of a presidential election resulting in a peaceful transfer of power-were met.

Beyond this, by the Army's own internal standards, its units on the whole performed well. Logistics, communications, PSYOP, CA, public affairs, aviation, MP, Rangers and medics showed proficiency in their designated roles, often overcoming much adversity along the way.

Of course, the full withdrawal of international forces, including a small number of US soldiers, did not occur on schedule and is still pending at this article's writing. The most obvious reason is that not much has really changed in Haiti. The new Haitian National Police, while not doing badly for a fledgling force, is struggling to control the streets, especially in the expansive slums of City Soleil. Politically motivated violence has not ceased and newly elected President René Préval has been forced to clean up his own security force. Above all, the fractious and violent nature of Haitian political life persists. Extreme poverty, a poor climate for foreign investors, overpopulation, ecological ruin and deep-seated racial (mulatto versus black) and class antagonisms remain fundamentally untouched by nearly three years of intervention. Perhaps more could and should have been done, but the prospects for long-term success would still have been problematic and a protracted foreign presence would have risked wearing out its

8 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

welcome in Haiti.

Yet, it may be premature to label the mission that began with Uphold Democracy a wasted effort. Haitians have been granted a brief respite from turmoil and despair. To date, the international intervention can claim three substantive accomplishments: the restoration of a semblance of order, the return to electoral politics and the rapid formation of a new police force indoctrinated in basic democratic civic values. As a result, the operating climate for international assistance agencies has improved. Democracy, though not firmly planted, has had a chance to sprout new roots. The Haitian National Police holds at least some promise for an improvement in civil life, although the judicial system on the whole functions poorly.35 Finally, US Army engineers and others carried out carefully targeted improvement in the national infrastructure such as assistance in repairing roads, restoring electrical power and rehabilitating crumbling buildings.

None of this has brought fundamental change, however. As Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Adams noted in a recent issue of Military Review, Americans still have difficulty comprehending the depth and intractability of Haiti's social problem, although it would be fair to say that we are neither as naive nor arrogant in this respect as during the first major US intervention.36

Maybe, if nothing else, US forces left behind the germ of an idea. In the words of US Army Major Tony Schwalm, "We left an example of power under control."37 The embracing of that concept alone, so contrary to its traditions, would do much to improve civil life in Haiti. And, unlike the last US departure in 1934, this time most Haitians may actually regret our leaving. This may be important if only because, should Haiti collapse into chaos and repression once again, we may find ourselves compelled to return.MR

1. LTC John B. Hunt, "OOTW: A Concept in Flux," Military Review (September-October 1996), 3-9. 2. Kevin C.M. Bensen and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," Parameters (Autumn 1996), 69-80. 3. Johanna McGreary, "Did the American Mission Matter?", Time, 12 February 1996, 36. 4. Ibid., 36-39. 5. Donald E. Schultz, Whither Haiti? (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1996), 20. 6. For a discussion of the "predatory state," see Robert Maguire, "Defanging the Predatory State," Hemisphere, Volume Seven, Number One, 1996, 14-16. 7. Schultz, 2-4. 8. Schultz, x. 9. LCDR Peter Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," unpublished paper presented at the Mid-American Latin American Studies conference at Fort Leavenworth, September 1996. 10. Bryant Freeman, keynote address delivered at the Mid-American Latin American Studies conference at Fort Leavenworth, September 1996. 11. Major Berthony Ladouceur, oral history interview conducted by LTC Walter Kretchik and Robert Baumann at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 10 March 1997. 12. For Powell's account, see Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 581-86. 13. Interview with LTG H. Hugh Shelton, CINC JTF 180, 22 October 1994, conducted by LTC Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1996), 62. 14. LTC Thomas Adams, oral history interview conducted by John Fishel, LTC Walter Kretchik and

9 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

Robert Baumann at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 16 November 1995. 15. Major Berthony Ladouceur, oral history interview. 16. COL David Patton, oral history interview, conducted by John Fishel and Robert Baumann, 13 January 1996, at the Light Industrial Complex, UNMIH, Port-au-Prince. 17. William O'Neill, "Building a New Haitian Police Force and Justice System," Haiti Insight (October-November 1995), 1, 3, and 8. 18. Faris R. Kirkland, Ronald R. Halverson and Paul D. Bliese, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," Parameters (Summer 1996), 85. 19. Steven D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy," Military Review (September-October 1996), 69. 20. MAJ James Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision: Psychological Operations in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY," 17, unpublished paper submitted for independent research elective at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 1996. An edited version of this paper will appear in an anthology of focused research articles to be published by the Combat Studies Institute, CGSC. 21. LTC Edward J. Anderson, JTF 180, J3 civil affairs officer, oral history interview, 10 October 1994, by LTC Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy oral history interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1996), 386. It is possible that had the 10th MD (L) assumed a more active role from the start, the famous incident involving Captain William Rockwood, who entered the Haitian National Prison to seek an accounting of prisoners against orders, would not have occurred. A minority of soldiers have expressed some sympathy for Rockwood's position in interviews. In any event, it is worth noting in the context of selling the mission to the Haitian public that Rockwood's action was much admired among Haitians. This issue will be considered at greater length in the forthcoming history of Uphold Democracy. 22. Boisselle, 17. 23. Ibid., 20. The author cites the 2 October memorandum in note 28. 24. Ibid., 20-21. 25. MG George A. Fisher, unpublished Joint History Interview Transcript, Multinational Force Haiti, conducted by MAJ Burton Thompson Jr., 8 May 1995; MAJ Chris Hughes, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann, MAJ Christian Klinefelter, and MAJ Marty Urquhart, March 1996, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Hughes also develops this subject in his CALL briefing, 2 November 1994. 26.COL John Donovan, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and MAJ Robert Shaw, 16 January 1996, at the Light Industrial Complex, UNMIH, Port-au-Prince. 27. COL Mark Boyatt, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and LTC Walter Kretchik, 7 March 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 28. COL John C. Alterburg, JTF 180 Staff Judge Advocate, oral history interview conducted by LTC Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy oral history interviews (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military history, 1996), 325. 29. MAJ Tony Schwalm, oral history interview conducted by MAJ John Cook, 11 February 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; MAJ Tony Schwalm, oral history interview conducted by Robert Baumann and LTC Walter Kretchik, 20 March 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; US Army LTC (name not yet released) interviewed by Robert Baumann, 28 February 1997, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 30. Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 376-78. 31. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Leavenworth Paper Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 35-36, 76-7. 32. Interview with SF soldier (name not yet released) in Port-au- Prince, 16 January 1996. MAJ Gary

10 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bau.html

Brockington, oral history interview conducted by MAJ Donald McConnaughhay and Robert Baumann, 6 February 1996, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Brockington did not witness the "wave" incident but confirmed that reports of the incident came to him as the deputy staff judge advocate at US Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg. 33. Bensen and Thrash, 72-3. 34. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs (January/February 1996), 25. 35. However, a recent article in Time magazine suggests otherwise. See "A Constabulary of Thugs," 17 February 1997, 62-63. The article's subtitle reads, "Haiti's U.S.-trained police force has turned into a gang of rogue cops who torture and murder." 36. Adams, 54. 37. Schwalm interviews.

Robert F. Baumann is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Dartmouth College and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale University. A specialist in Russian military history, he was a researcher in residence at Moscow University from 1979 to 1980 and taught history at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, from 1983 to 1984. In the fall of 1992, he was a visiting professor at Bashkir State University, Ufa, Russia. He is the author of Leavenworth Paper No. 20, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan: 1801-1989, published in 1993. His article "Historical Perspectives on Future War" appeared in the March-April 1997 issue of Military Review.

11 of 11 3/11/98 12:23 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html Operation Uphold Democracy: Old Principles, New Realities

by John T. Fishel

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

In addressing the US Army's effectiveness in Operation Uphold Democracy and its transition to the follow-on UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), we must take into account former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell's premise that the modern American way of war is joint warfare, as articulated in the first edition of the new series of joint doctrine manuals, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Thus, in Powell's view the Army never again will go to war alone; it will always fight as a joint team. And if Uphold Democracy is indeed a harbinger of the future, then in the future the Army will invariably participate as a member of a joint, interagency or multinational team.

This article considers the operation's sequential phases in terms of how well or poorly it was executed in accordance with standardized principles of US Army and joint doctrine-the nine principles of war and the six principles of military operations other than war (OOTW).1 There is significant overlap between the two sets on three of the principles as illustrated in the figure. Note that unity of command (war) and unity of effort (OOTW) are similar.

Uphold Democracy can be divided into five phases for analytical purposes: planning, deployment, employment, transition and redeployment.2 I address each phase with respect to its principles of war and OOTW application. I discuss four possible outcomes: the principle was applied successfully during a particular phase; it was either not applied or applied in inappropriate ways, resulting in failure; the principle's application by the force was to varying degrees appropriate or not, resulting in a mixed outcome; or the principle in question was not applicable to the particular operation phase.

Planning

With few exceptions, the principle of the objective was well satisfied during the planning phase of Uphold Democracy because it was stated clearly in several UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) on Haiti. These all required that the democratically elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, be returned to office and the military junta that had replaced him be removed. The conditions required to permit the return of Aristide-a secure and stable environment in Haiti-were also the conditions necessary to turn the mission over to the UN. Such an environment was never clearly articulated as an end state at the strategic level, but this failing was more than adequately addressed on the ground at the operational level. Long-term security and stability were linked to the political objective of restoring democracy, which while never clearly defined, generally seemed to manifest itself as returning Aristide to office and

1 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

holding a series of subsequent "free and fair" elections culminating in the election of a new president and his inauguration.

In the planning process, the principle of the offensive was well and fully served. The US Army today is "offensive minded." Hence, the concept of Operations Plan (OPLAN) 2370 was offensive violence inflicted suddenly, from air and sea, with overwhelming but appropriate force. By contrast, OPLAN 2380 was developed for a permissive entry but still sought to land large numbers of well-armed troops in an offensive, combat-ready posture. OPLAN 2375 took a position somewhere in between, and when it was further modified and executed as 2380+, it retained the offensive capabilities inherent in OPLANs 2370 and 2380. The one planning failure appears to have been in clarifying the rules of engagement (ROE) for 2380+ before it was executed.

Mass was the certain complement to the offensive in all the plans. It was clear from the beginning that large numbers of forces were going to have to be landed in Haiti in a short period of time to quickly make their presence and power felt in two centers of gravity (COG)-Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. Thus, mass was built into all versions of the several plans. The mirror image of mass is economy of force. Here the planners' record was mixed. With respect to US forces, the plans called for the use of special operations forces (SOF) in this role as they were to occupy the towns and villages of the hinterland. Nevertheless, Uphold Democracy was never a unilateral US operation. All the plans called for multinational elements, to be led by the Caribbean common market (CARICOM) battalion, to either enter with the US forces in a permissive environment or as follow-on forces after a forcible entry. In no case, however, did the plans treat the CARICOM contingent with the detail they deserved.3 In addition, military planning appears not to have taken into account either additional multinational forces or the follow-on UN mission force, even though this is specified in UNSCR 940.4 In short, as planners moved from a US-only military operation to a multinational one, as well as one that involved interagency players, planning proved less and less complete.

This discussion leads directly to consideration of the principles of unity of command and unity of effort. As suggested above, planners left any multinational and interagency operations considerations to be addressed in detail later or elsewhere. Although planning for Uphold Democracy included an interagency plan for the first time in any modern operation, it was in no way on par with the joint OPLANS, nor was it entirely integrated with those plans.5 In addition, there were numerous problems in joint planning, especially in the integration of OPLAN 2380 with 2370. The latter was the product of the XVIII Airborne Corps as Joint Task Force (JTF) 180 while OPLAN 2380 was being developed by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] as JTF 190. The division staff was insufficient to command and control a JTF without augmentation, let alone plan for one, and the augmentation was less than instantaneous in both coming and achieving full integration. Also, much of the combat support and combat service support planning was in the hands of the same planners who were developing it for JTF 180 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This entailed many flights back and forth between Fort Bragg and Fort Drum, New York, with some degradation of the planning effort due to lost time, compartmentalization and sheer fatigue.6

2 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

Black Hawks with the first wave of 10th MD (L) troops lift off from the USS Eisenhower, September 1994.

All OPLANS stressed security in two senses. First, security was developed to comply with force protection and ROE. Second, the mandate for Uphold Democracy and the multinational force (MNF) dictated that the mission would be complete "when a secure and stable environment [had been] established and UNMIH [had] adequate force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions. . . ."7

The US military is perhaps the most maneuver-dependent force in the world at both strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) commander in chief (CINC) chose to enhance his maneuver capability by making use of the adaptive joint force packages he had been experimenting with over the previous two years. As a result, Army helicopters were positioned aboard USS America and Eisenhower for SOF and 10th MD (L) forces respectively. This innovative use of aircraft carriers significantly enhanced the JTF's flexibility at both levels and permitted a much more rapid transition from a forced entry plan to the revised permissive entry plan.

This capability was used in an attempt to ensure operational and tactical surprise. Still, with the deliberate sacrificing of strategic surprise for political reasons-we hoped that the demonstration of what we were capable of doing would result in a negotiated Haitian junta departure and return of President Aristide; maintaining the operation's secrecy was highly problematic. In fact, it was the discovery of the force's departure from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, and its reporting to General Philippe Biamby during ex-President Jimmy Carter's mission negotiations that both nearly derailed the settlement and made certain that it was accepted.8

It is hard to exercise simplicity in forced entry operations. While the overall concept was quite simple-"seize Port-au-Prince by airborne assault and Cap Haitien by amphibious landing at night spreading out over the entire country the next day"-the air operations around the capital were extraordinarily complex. At one time there were more than 300 aircraft all operating within the same confined airspace-an air traffic control nightmare.

The final principle considered in the planning is the single most important one in OOTW-legitimacy. At the international level, legitimacy was granted by UNSCR 940. In Haiti, the planners concluded that legitimacy would be gained by restoring Aristide and dismembering the hated FAd'H and their auxiliaries variously known as attachés or simply as macoutes.9 Finally, the operation would gain and maintain legitimacy in the United States to the extent that it was conducted with only limited American casualties and perceived as meeting the objectives of stopping Haitian-on-Haitian violence and ending illegal waves of Haitian migration to the United States.

Deployment

3 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

The operation's deployment phase began as soon as the president, through the secretary of defense, issued the order to execute OPLAN 2370, which he did on 18 September 1994. From that moment, forces began to deploy.

The principle of the objective was adhered to scrupulously during deployment. The strategic objective of restoring democracy depended completely on successfully attaining the mission's operational objectives. These were clearly stated in all the plans and, indeed, remained the same no matter which plan was being executed. In essence, the operational objective was to establish a stable and secure environment in Haiti to return Aristide to office. At the operational and tactical levels, this meant taking control of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, previously identified as COGs. The follow up objectives included controlling the rest of the country using SOF. The deployment from Fort Bragg by air and Norfolk, Virginia, by sea was designed to seize the COGs in a swiftly executed coup de main.

Likewise, mass was essential to all of the plans. OPLAN 2370 put SOF and 82d Airborne Division (82d Abn Div) soldiers into Port-au-Prince concurrently with the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF's) arrival at Cap Haitien. Immediate follow-on would involve the landing of 10th MD (L) forces from the USS Eisenhower by helicopter. These forces were more than sufficient to overwhelm anything the FAd'H could mobilize to defend against them. Once the execute order was given, airborne forces began deploying while the ships carrying the command and control elements, the Special MAGTF and 10th MD (L) moved into assault positions. Thus, forces were effectively massed for OPLAN 2370's execution (or any variation of 2370 or 2380).

Economy of force was achieved by SOF units deployed to control the Haitian countryside. Strategic maneuver was, in itself, the essence of the deployment phase and was executed like clockwork by both sea and air. Operational and tactical maneuver did not become relevant until the employment phase; it was sufficient that deploying the force was extremely well developed in the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and had been well practiced by US military forces over many years, including Panama in 1989, Desert Shield in 1990 and Somalia in 1992. Thus, while there were some innovative refinements such as CINC ACOM's use of the carriers as a base for his adaptive joint force packages, this was merely an incremental stressing of the strategic maneuver system.

During the deployment phase, the principle of unity of command clearly took precedence over unity of effort. Although generally successful, there were some real problems with air traffic control at Port-au-Prince International Airport. Nevertheless, the problems were handily resolved and had no significant or lasting effects on the deployment. Security was addressed by the emphasis on force protection and ROE, which, during the anticipated combat phase, were quite robust. Legitimacy was inherent in the execution of a UN mandate, the safe and peaceful arrival on the ground of US forces and the initial enthusiastic welcome by the Haitian people.

Finally, restraint was evident when the deployment was changed from forcible entry to permissive entry. The flexibility of the US military was demonstrated when the 82d Abn Div was turned around in mid-air and the 10th MD (L) was directed to land by helicopter in an ostensibly peaceful environment on 19 September. In short, the deployment phase represented the highest order of success that can be expected in a real military operation.

Employment

Operation Uphold Democracy's objectives were clear enough during the planning and deployment phases but rapidly became more ambiguous when the forces landed in Haiti. This was partly due to the

4 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

change from OPLAN 2370 and/or 2380 to 2380+. Although neither the strategic objective of "restoring democracy" nor the operational objective of establishing a secure and stable environment changed, the

supporting objective to achieve both became fuzzy. Did these objectives not require that the FAd'H be replaced? But did not the agreement worked out with General Raoul Cedras require that the FAd'H be treated as an ally? What then was a 10th MD (L) soldier to do if he encountered Haitian-on- Haitian violence being perpetrated by his erstwhile FAd'H allies under the terms of the peacetime ROE he had been told were in effect? Accordingly, the level of confusion was extremely high in Port-au-Prince.

By contrast, the Marines in Cap Haitian had interpreted the ROE to permit the use of deadly force in self-defense when they perceived that deadly force was about to be directed against them. This security interpretation resulted in a fortuitous firefight between the Marines and FAd'H elements, which established in Cap Haitien, and later the rest of Haiti, the intervention force's legitimacy despite the apparent Carter/Cedras agreement "sell-out." This fight not only bought time for the JTF and MNF headquarters in Port-au-Prince to adjust the ROE so that 10th MD (L) troops would be directed to intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence but also determined that this ROE modification would become a supporting objective. The bottom line: on the ground, the principle of the objective needed a significant amount of redefinition, and that redefining hindered effective mission prosecution.

Mass was somewhat misapplied in the operation's early stages. While the selection of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien as COGs did dictate the massing of forces in those two cities, there was too much mass in the capital and it was poorly utilized. Initially, 10th MD (L) soldiers did not conduct night patrols, leaving the streets to the thugs.10 Moreover, the division's soldiers were not used to any significant degree to patrol outside the confines of Port-au-Prince, which resulted in some fairly significant irritation on the part of CINCACOM.11

Economy of force also had problems during the operation's execution. First, SOF troops were appropriate for an economy of force role and were well used to bring stability and a sense of order and security to the countryside. However, the need for the division's heavier forces was strongly felt to enhance SOF's credibility. Thus, although Colonel James M. Dubik did conduct active patrolling in his sector to support the scattered SOF elements, JTF 190 headquarters in the capital seemed reluctant to mount similar operations, both in the city and in the countryside. This reluctance resulted in missing a significant opportunity to put the troops together with the people on the streets and seems to have been the result of an overemphasis on force protection based on the drawing of false analogies with Somalia. In this manner, the principle of economy of force, like mass, was somewhat compromised.

Although it did not break down in the technical sense, unity of command neither resulted in unity of effort nor, in some cases, coordinated actions among the command's separate components. As noted, there was considerable difficulty in getting the 10th MD (L) to conduct night patrols to meet the requirement to establish security in Port-au-Prince as well as to begin conducting patrols from the capital into the interior. Unfortunately, there was a real lack of coordination between the 10th MD (L)'s conventional infantry and SOF.

There were significant discrepancies between JTF 190 and 180 as well as with various MNF elements and interagency players. By contrast, joint operations in 2d Basic Combat Team's (2BCT's) area of operations went much more smoothly. Nevertheless, interagency operations had much room for improvement. This was due more to the interagency player's lack of preparation than any problems

5 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

within the military operation itself.

Finally, it must be said that as the employment phase progressed, unity of effort also began to fall into line. With respect to the MNF, effective unity of effort was not achieved until the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [25th ID (L)] replaced 10th MD (L) as JTF 190. This change of players had its greatest impact on the way the MNF began to conduct business with a shift in the emphasis from force protection to legitimacy.

While security generally was a strong suit during the employment phase, it was not the rousing success that some of the initial post-operation discussion made it seem. Security must be considered both in terms of force protection and attaining a stable and secure environment. The early emphasis that the 10th MD (L) put on force protection-and retained throughout its deployment-impacted negatively on ROE interpretation so that, initially, it did not stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence and was reluctant to aggressively patrol the capital at night or outside the city's perimeter at any time. Neither observation pertains to the 2BCT in Cap Haitien. However, the 1BCT and TF Mountain did become more aggressive as time went on. The result was an increasing balance between security as force protection and security as achieving a secure and stable environment.

The mayor of Cap Haitien makes a speech about the swearing in of the first police officer graduates. The US ICITAP agreed to train the police force .

Military force employment during Uphold Democracy clearly reflected the principle of simplicity. With the Carter mission's success, the need for a complex air operation disappeared. The only complicating factors came from the MNF and the interagency players. The MNF complication was solved by adherence to the principle in assigning the national contingents operating sectors where they were under the MNF commander's tactical control (TACON).12 While control of interagency players was not established, the solution to the problem they presented was found in the simplicity of treating them as elements in support of the operation as a whole and gaining their cooperation by request.

Although the perception of the MNF's legitimacy improved significantly from the first days in Port-au-Prince, there was considerable movement to and fro on the issue. First, the degree of legitimacy varied from zone to zone depending on what force or unit was in charge. Generally, legitimacy was greater in the Cap Haitien zone. However, there was more overt political activity in Port-au-Prince, which presented the force commander and his political advisers with greater problems. Among these were the prisons, which were not fully brought under control until the 25th ID (L) relieved TF 180. In the meantime, the issue resulted in the court-martial of an over zealous Army intelligence captain who sought to end what he suspected were human rights abuses in the prisons by taking actions in violation of direct and legal orders from his superiors.13 Also complicating the legitimacy issue were a number of things the military forces did not control, such as establish-ing both the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF)

and new Haitian National Police (HNP) as well as reestablishing civilian government agencies. Although military forces were not in charge, they were blamed by the populace when these efforts were not as successful as anticipated. Therefore US forces took a more active role than they desired. Finally, legitimacy was greatest in the interior of the country, where the SOF held sway and applied their doctrine with a great deal of success.

6 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

Restraint was successfully applied throughout the employment and subsequent operations phases. Even though the military was criticized at the beginning for being too restrained, over the operation's course US forces carried out their missions with a high de-gree of professionalism, innovation and restraint. The result: enhanced credibility and legitimacy.

Transition

Operation Uphold Democracy was never meant to be a long-term, US-led mission. Indeed, UNSCR 940, establishing the mandate, also ordered establishing a UNMIH advance party and directed "that the multinational force will terminate its mission and UNMIH will assume the full range of its functions . . . when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure. . . ."14 Thus, the mandate not only established the objective for the mission but also determined the objective for a transition from a member-led mission to a UN peace operation, one that would also change from being conducted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (threats to the peace) to one conducted under the terms of Chapter 6 (peaceful settlement of disputes).

COL Tom Jones, commander of the 2d Marines, briefs ongoing operations to Ambassador William Swing and JTF 180 commander LTG H. Hugh Shelton.

Together, the MNF and UNMIH advance team made significant progress in determining the objective and its measurement.15 The determinants of a secure and stable environment had been developed on the ground largely by Dubik in Cap Haitien and then transferred to the rest of the country.16 In effect, it meant that Haitian-on-Haitian violence had been significantly reduced, Aristide restored to office, ministries beginning to operate, the IPSF established while the new HNP was being trained and the MNF being reduced to the strength that the replacement UNMIH would have. With these conditions developing, on 30 January 1995 the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 975 extending the UNMIH mandate for six months and directing that the transition from MNF to UNMIH be completed by 31 March 1995.

As stated above, the UNMIH force was going to be much less robust than the MNF with only 6,000 troops. While this was adequate to the threat, it raised some questions about the effective use of the principle of mass. Would there be enough forces available to control the two COGs and the other population centers, or was the force going to assume significantly more risk by accepting an economy of force role in more places than desirable? To make the combination of mass and economy of force work, the newly appointed UNMIH force commander, US Army Major General Joseph Kinzer, developed a vision/intent statement toward the end of 1994. In it he identified the tenets of the mission as "unity of command, simplicity, economy of force, objective, security, safety and fiscal stewardship of our resources."17 To exercise the principle of mass and attain adequate force protection, Kinzer emphasized readiness and stated that "We will design and exercise a reaction force capable of response within the ROE across the spectrum from guard and patrolling to combined operations."18 Key to carrying out Kinzer's intent with respect to economy of force was the retention of US SOF capability, a point which had been heatedly discussed.19

While the official record of unity of effort in the transition to UNMIH is one of unquestioned success, the reality is that there were many strains in the process. First, there was the problem faced by the UNMIH advance party, which was directed to maintain its distance from the MNF even though its

7 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

mission was to plan the transition from MNF to UNMIH.20 Second, during the MNF period and the early days of UNMIH, significant friction between the UN Development Programme (UNDP) chief in Haiti and the mission staff was resolved only when New York replaced the UNDP official in question.21 Third, although Kinzer stated, "I see interagency cooperation and unity of effort as the keys to successful overall mission accomplishment," several reports indicate that delay and conflict among the agencies-civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental-continued to a greater or lesser extent throughout the mission.22 Symptomatic of the problems in the interagency arena were complaints by a Canadian "civilian police" (CivPol) officer about the lack of communication between his organization and the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which had complementary responsibilities in training the HNP.23

Eventually, these issues were sorted out, and the multinational staff worked well together in the UNMIH environment. This was especially true of the relationship between Kinzer and the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), Lakdar Brahimi. Kinzer also found that his Canadian chief of staff, Colonel Bill Fulton, was an invaluable source of information and sound advice in dealing with the UN.24 Among the trickier points was the need to separate bilateral US- Haitian relations from those with the UN, because Kinzer was dual-hatted as the US forces commander in Haiti. The resolution was that his US deputy undertook all bilateral representations in conjunction with US Ambassador William Swing.

Transition to UNMIH significantly increased the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of nearly all the relevant audiences. The American public was largely assuaged by the fact that UNMIH was commanded by a US Army general and that the operation had gone so well that US forces had been reduced to 2,400, roughly 10 percent of what they had been at the operation's peak. The Haitians were pleased with the transition because it reduced whatever residual fears Aristide and his supporters may have had over a repetition of the US Marine Corps occupation from 1919 to 1934. As a practical matter, it gave Aristide somewhat more room to maneuver than he had during the US-led and dominated MNF. Nevertheless, the fact that the force commander was an American and that the largest troop contingent was US reassured the Haitian public that the thugs were not going to return to power in the near future.

The mandate's extension for six months in January 1995, and again in July was significant in reinforcing both the legitimacy of UNMIH and indicating that the UN was willing to persevere until the mission was completed. The follow-on extensions of the mandate-although the force would no longer include US troops-reinforced both perceptions. When coupled with bilateral US support in the forms of ICITAP, economic assistance and a US support group to coordinate military engineer and medical exercises, Haitians began to see that the international community, including the United States, was prepared to help them help themselves over the long haul. Finally, UN forces, like the MNF before them, exercised admirable restraint in the use of force. Presence was extremely effective when coupled with behavior that was restrained but brooked "no nonsense." The unanswered question with respect to the use of military forces in a peacekeeping operation remains whether more is gained by regularly moving among the people with kevlar helmets and body armor than is lost by not presenting a view that the environment is adequately secure and stable.

Redeployment

With the end of the mandate's third extension in December 1995, UNMIH began to plan and execute the end of major US participation. A new force commander, Canadian General d'Aigle, was named and UNMIH chief of staff Fulton had to execute the transition from exactly the opposite position he had occupied during the transition to UNMIH.25 This final transition marked the redeployment of all US

8 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

forces, including the US support group.

Colonel David Patton, US support group commander, had planned to stay in Haiti continuously through the changeover from a US-commanded UNMIH to a Canadian command. On Christmas Eve, 1995, Patton briefed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili on the support group's plans, which included leaving its 70-person headquarters in place. Shalikashvili complimented him on the plan but said that for political reasons-the administration had promised that all US troops would come out of Haiti-the support group was coming out too. It would return after a short but decent interval.26 Thus, the US sent mixed signals with this action. First, it indicated to the UN, Haitians, the American public and all concerned that the US government thought its mission in Haiti was over. This both delegitimized continuing US involvement and indicated that the United States was not willing to persevere to achieve a long- term solution to Haiti's problems. Second, the support group's return and its continued operation reinforced both the legitimacy and perseverance of the US involvement.

Redeployment of all US military forces along with some UN contingents clearly deemphasized the principle of mass while stressing the principle of economy of force. Indeed, redeployment extracted the economy of force forces, SOF elements and most other combat forces, replacing them with undertrained and weakly commanded HNP supported by a CivPol that would be reduced from 900 to 300 over the next year. The US ICITAP, under a five-year contract that continues with the Haitian government today, was trying to train the police at a new academy. As stated before, coordination between ICITAP and CivPol was hardly perfect, and there is little indication that it has improved to any great extent. As a result, security in Haiti has been reduced somewhat from the days of the original transition to UNMIH to the extent that President René Préval had to request US assistance to retrain his executive protection service after it was found to have been infected with a severe case of "politicization." In short, all the measures of long-term strategic success for the operation are mixed at best.

What was accomplished by Operation Uphold Democracy? In simple terms, a bunch of thugs were finally removed from Haiti, and the government was returned to the president who had been elected by the people. A series of free and relatively fair elections were held to legitimize the holders of legislative and municipal office and, finally, a new president was elected who took the office peacefully from his elected predecessor-a first for Haiti since 1804. But democracy is more than elections, and the efforts to restructure the economy and the judiciary have lagged far behind while the international community led by the United States has been rapidly losing interest. The indications as the UNMIH mission wound down were that Haiti would most likely revert to the kind of authoritarian regime it has almost always known since it won its independence from France, what Haiti scholars have dubbed "a predatory regime."MR

1. These principles are found in US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, Washington, DC, 1993; and Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC, 1993; and Joint Pub 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War, Washington, DC, 1995. The OOTW principles are in both FM 100-5, where they are called principles of operations other than war (a subtle difference), and the joint publications. 2. Transition refers to the transition from the UN sanctioned US/Multinational Force operation to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) operation, as well as to the second phase of UNMIH when US forces turned the operation over in its entirety to a Canadian-led UN task force.

9 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

3. See LTC Walter Kretchik, "Planning for Intervasion," draft manuscript chapter for a US Army Command and General Staff College press publication due out in 1998. 4. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940, 31 July 1994. 5. Kretchik, 13-16. 6. Ibid. 7. UNSCR 940, 31 July 1994, paragraph 8. 8. Interview with Robert Pastor, Carter team member, September 1995. 9. The tonton macoutes, a creole phrase meaning boogeyman, were the secret police of the Duvalier regimes. 10. Robert F. Baumann and John T. Fishel, "Operation Uphold Democracy: The Execution Phase," unpublished manuscript, 1997. 11. US Atlantic Command briefing slides, nd, circa October 1994. 12. Tactical control (TACON) allows commanders below combatant command level to apply force and direct the tactical use of logistic assets but does not provide authority to change organizational structure or direct administrative and logistical support. Functional component commanders frequently exercise TACON over their forces. 13. For a more complete description of this case see Baumann and Fishel, 1997. 14. UNSCR 940, 31 July 1994, paragraph 8. 15. Interviews with UNMIH advance party operations officer, COL William Greenawald, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1995, and UNMIH chief of staff, COL Bill Fulton (Canada), Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 1996. 16. John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack," paper prepared for conference on Haitian recovery, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, September, 1995. 17. MG Joseph W. Kinzer, "Military Commander's Vision/Intent," draft, not dated, circa December 1994. 18. Ibid. 19. Greenawald interview. 20. Ibid. 21. Interviews with a US officer involved with UNMIH staff training, spring 1995, and with Bryant Freeman, director, Haitian Studies Institute, University of Kansas: and MICIVIH member and Kinzer's staff, various times, 1995. 22. Kinzer. See also briefing slides, "Haiti Unconventional Operations," 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), from 12 November 1994 through 22 March 1995. Also interviews with officers and staff in Haiti, January 1996. 23. Interview with Canadian Civilian Police (CivPol) officer, January 1996. CivPol is the part of UNMIH that is responsible for day-to-day Haitian National Police supervision. 24. Interviews with Major John Charlton, aide de camp to MG Kinzer, March 1997 and Fulton, UNMIH chief of staff, January 1996. 25. Fulton interview. 26. Interview with COL David Patton, US Support Group commander, Haiti, January 1996.

John T. Fishel is a professor of National Security Affairs at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from Dartmouth College and an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Indiana University. As a US Army Reserve officer, he served several active duty assignments as chief of Policy and Strategy for the United States Southern Command; deputy chief of the Public Force Liaison Division, and Special Adviser to the Commander, US Military Support Group-Panama; and as a strategic analyst, US Army Strategic Studies Institute. He has written extensively on political-military affairs in Latin America. Among his recent works are Civil Military Operations in the

10 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/fis.html

New World and The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama. He is also a contributing author in Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict, Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder and Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success.

11 of 11 3/11/98 12:24 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html The USS Harlan County Affair

by Lieutenant Commander Peter J.A. Riehm, US Navy

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

From a balcony of the Montana Hotel over-looking Port-au-Prince harbor, UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo stood with his mouth agape, his breath gone. His eyes were fixed on the fleeting fortunes of the UN's diplomatic solution to the festering crisis in Haiti.1 What he saw was a simple gesture, but a powerful and pervasive one. The USS Harlan County had weighed anchor and was quietly steaming out of Port-au-Prince harbor. The haze-gray hull, so small on the horizon, carried away with it the credibility of the international effort to restore democracy to Haiti.

Haiti's experiment with democracy in the post-Duvalier era had been short-lived. Less than a year after becoming the freely elected president of Haiti in 1991, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted by the head of his military, General Raoul Cedras. In the months that followed, the international community labored feverishly to restore elective government to Haiti. These efforts seemed to bear fruit when, in July 1993, the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN brokered the Governors Island Accords that provided for the return of Aristide from exile, the military junta members' early retirement and the lifting of international trade sanctions. The agreement also contained provisions for US and Canadian military advisers to reform the Haitian military and retrain the Haitian National Police (HNP).

To implement the Governors Island Accords military provisions, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) created Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG) and placed US Army Colonel J.G. Pulley, then 7th Special Forces Group commander at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in command.2 JTF HAG was an ad hoc group that included various subject matter experts from all services. By August 1993, its assigned personnel converged on a makeshift headquarters set up in an obscure room in the USACOM compound at Norfolk, Virginia. Equipment and material were scarce; chairs became a precious commodity: individuals arriving at the headquarters had to wait for someone to leave before they could sit down. The assembled talent was impressive, but lacking standing operating procedures for a JTF staff and any experience in working together, staff members experienced several days of complete chaos.3

Less than a week into his command, Pulley gathered his principal players at the Norfolk Naval Base Officers Club where they laid out the overarching objectives for JTF HAG:

Separate the HNP and military. Reform and professionalize the Haitian military.

It was understood that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police would retrain the HNP.4

The planning challenge was formidable and implementation would be difficult. Real-world pressure was already bearing down on the JTF staff, as the National Command Authority (NCA) wanted President Aristide back in power by the end of October. It was imperative that JTF HAG be operating in Haiti

1 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

before Aristide's return. Pulley had little opportunity to work matters out with his new staff. His superiors within the US and UN command structures demanded most of his time, and he found himself inundated with insubstantial guidance from all quarters. To complicate matters further, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jones, the Special Forces

(SF) Battalion commander of the site survey team in Haiti, informed the JTF staff on 16 September 1993 that the Haitians wanted only equipment, not personnel, and that the UN was adamant that Haitians would not be trained in small-unit tactics.5

Despite this initial turmoil, the JTF staff persevered, producing a detailed plan that, in its final version, reflected the individual talents of each member. The first formal briefing to the JTF commander was on 23 September. After that briefing, another plan, already in existence, was discovered, a particularly frustrating occurrence for the JTF staff.6

By September's end, two US Navy tank landing ships (LSTs) were ready to transport most of the JTF to Haiti. An advance party headed by Pulley flew ahead to Port-au-Prince. Of the two LSTs, the USS Harlan County left first. JTF HAG embarked in one day and departed at 0630 the next. Although a planning team from the Harlan County had briefed someone at USACOM, only scant instructions for embarkation were passed to those actually getting onto the ship. Consequently, JTF HAG straggled aboard over a period of 24 hours. Military personnel from around the country showed up throughout the night, with the last Navy doctor running up the brow as it was being taken in. No manifest of equipment or list of passengers was prepared before embar-kation. In typical "can-do" spirit, Marine Warrant Officer "Gunner" Hayes expertly loaded whatever showed up. The Harlan County got under way at 0630 with 225 JTF HAG personnel from staff and field units on board.7

The largest contingents were an Army SF company and a Marine Corps Military Police platoon. En route to Port-au-Prince, the Harlan County stopped at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, Puerto Rico, to embark a Navy construction battalion and a detachment of engineers from the Royal Canadian Air Force. The ship waited several days in Puerto Rico, because of developments in Haiti. Cedras had begun demonstrating a mounting dissatisfaction with the Governors Island Accords. Yet, despite Cedras' mood, US military personnel continued to discuss the mission in Haiti in terms of a permissive environment.8

Despite its chaotic embarkation and the delay in Puerto Rico, JTF HAG seemed to be on track and it seemed the transportation phase would soon end. However, the peculiar command structure in effect for the operation started to show strains foreboding imminent internal conflict. USACOM had tasked the Navy to transport JTF HAG to Haiti, and the Navy had provided the Harlan County and USS Fairfax County for this purpose. During the transportation phase, neither ship was subordinate to JTF HAG or a part of it. However, upon mooring in Port-au-Prince, the Harlan County was to provide "hotel services" to JTF HAG until all its personnel were established ashore. What no one realized was the impact this seemingly innocuous arrangement would have on the principle of unity of command.

After the Harlan County finally departed Roosevelt Roads for Port-au-Prince, the operations officer informed the ship's commanding officer, US Navy Commander Marvin E. Butcher Jr., of Pulley's desire to host a reception for local dignitaries aboard the Harlan County upon arrival. Pulley wanted to make the point that JTF HAG was coming to Haiti in peace. A reception on the ship would help alleviate any fears the Haitians might harbor as to the purpose of the US military presence. Butcher balked at this suggestion. US Navy regulations strictly prohibit the inspection of US warships by foreign citizens. Furthermore, Butcher felt his position at Port-au-Prince would be strengthened if the local populace retained a healthy respect for his warship. With this in mind, he did not want Haitians coming aboard

2 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

and assessing the Harlan County's actual capabilities. In response to Pulley's request, Butcher said he would provide a topside tour, but the visitors would be closely escorted and denied access to the internal equipment of the ship.9 As it turned out, neither commander had the opportunity to wrangle over the details of a reception.

As the Harlan County arrived at Port-au-Prince at 0200 on Monday, 11 October 1993, it found the approaches to the harbor manned by a maze of ships anchored strategically around the reefs in what appeared to be a posture designed to preclude the entry of unannounced visitors. The Harlan County safely negotiated through this apparent obstacle course and anchored in the inner harbor by 0500. At dawn, Butcher surveyed the harbor and observed HNP forcing the civilian crews off the merchant ships moored pierside.10

The previous Friday, an attaché from the American Embassy, a US Coast Guard commander, had arranged with the Port Authority for the Harlan County's arrival and berth at the pier. What Butcher now observed from his anchorage in the inner harbor was that the port area and piers were locked. An old Cuban tanker blocked the berth designated for the Harlan County. Without a clear berth for mooring, Butcher decided to launch one of his small boats for a closer look at the situation.11 With Hayes and an Army SF major in the boat with him, Butcher maneuvered to within 50 feet of the pier, on which he could see HNP police units but little else. The Coast Guard commander also made it to the pier but informed the ship that he was leaving because of gunfire. The boat and its small scouting contingent were not fired on, but they could hear the sound of small-arms fire and a mob coming from just outside the pier gates. The assumption of a permissive environment, on which the mission was based, was now in question. Butcher and his party returned to the Harlan County for consultation with higher authority and to reassess the situation.12

Once aboard ship, Butcher instructed JTF personnel to go to their rooms and wait. He also directed all unauthorized personnel to stay below decks. In the harbor, "bum boats"-assorted small craft with various menial purposes, some legitimate, others dubious-surrounded the Harlan County. Some of these bum boats were flying the ton-ton macoutes flag, Haiti's dreaded secret police under the Duvaliers. Butcher had the crew man the ship's mounted .50 caliber machineguns. The bum boats dispersed and the flags disappeared.13

On learning of the port obstructions, Nikki Huddleston, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Haiti, decided, against Pulley's counsel, to go to the port to resolve the problem. She was denied access to the port area and spent about an hour in her armored sedan before departing. Unfortunately, during that hour several Haitian demonstrators exploited her presence for CNN cameras, as they beat on her car with ax handles.14 There were no injuries, but the video of a scowling American official having her car assaulted certainly raised questions concerning the operation's viability.

The mob that Butcher had heard just outside the locked gates of the pier area was bussed in about 0700. Beer and liquor carts arrived with them. Pulley, who was also at the port, estimated the mob to be about 40 unruly drunks, many shouting anti-American slogans and some firing weapons recklessly into the air in what he perceived as a celebration-like manner. While he was there, Pulley witnessed two dead bodies being dragged off a bus and tossed into the midst of the demonstration. He also noted a 14-foot-high and 2 1/2-foot-thick masonry wall separating the demonstrators from the pier area. In his assessment, the mob was disorganized and, without access to the pier, posed minimal threat to the Harlan County. He also felt that the mob would disperse once faced with US troops.15

From the Harlan County, Butcher was in a three-way conversation with Pulley and a representative from USACOM. Pulley recounted his observations and offered his assessment of the environment as "tense

3 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

but still permissive." Butcher disagreed and expressed grave concern over what he believed were gunshots down the pier. Pulley reemphasized the mob's disordered nature and his belief that the apparent violence was staged. Butcher then offered to land a contingent of armed Marines to intimidate the loosely gathered crowd and, if necessary, respond to any real violence. While this approach probably would have worked, any show of force was contrary to the perception the NCA and UN sought to create. In keeping with that intention, all JTF vehicles had been painted white and emblazoned with a simple "UN" and all JTF personnel once ashore were to don the blue UN beret.16 Also to consider was the fact that the berth was still physically blocked and would have to be cleared before any attempts to land the JTF. Consequently, the three agreed the prudent course was for the Harlan County to remain at anchor about 1 nautical mile off the pier while officials ashore attempted to negotiate a solution to the impasse.17

These troubling developments raised a highly controversial issue-the arming of JTF HAG. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's position was that US armed forces would go nowhere without a self-defense capability. However, the State Department and President Bill Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, were strictly opposed to a US assistance mission going ashore in any way that smacked of a show of force, although they did agree to an ambiguous compromise that would allow the mission's members to carry sidearms.

The UN, while concerned about a smooth entry, was more concerned about the necessity of ensuring any entry, since the failure of JTF HAG's mission would put the entire Governors Island Accords in jeopardy. UN representatives were anxiously pressuring Pulley to guarantee success. For its part, USACOM, in the immediate aftermath of the Somalia catastrophe in which 18 Army Rangers were killed, was cautiously advising Pulley that any US casualties were unacceptable. Separated from his task force, which was embarked on a vessel not yet under his command, the colonel was caught between the UN and USACOM with essentially no assets at his immediate disposal.18

Later Monday morning, HNP boats began patrolling near the Harlan County but remained well clear when they noticed that the ship had remanned its .50 caliber machineguns. The rest of the first day passed without incident. As darkness settled on Port-au-Prince harbor, SF and Military Intelligence personnel aboard the ship diligently used all available means to reconnoiter the shore. The night was relatively quiet. However, at one point, several cars parked in a line along the shore with their headlights pointed at the Harlan County. The occupants then turned their high beams on the ship in an apparent attempt to blind US Night Vision Devices (NVDs). However, US Forces had NVDs that could filter out forward light. When the headlights came on, shipboard personnel observed trucks and other combat equipment moving into the area. Observers thought they saw two VF-150s (armored personnel carriers equipped with a 90mm gun) being hidden in the pier area. At close range, these vehicles could present a potent threat to a moored ship. This discovery appeared to some as concrete evidence that this was indeed not a permissive environment.19

The next morning the lone LST lay anchored in the harbor defiantly played a loud and rousing national anthem for morning colors.20 Officials ashore and afloat were busy investigating alternatives. Pulley favored an over-the-beach landing just north of Port-au-Prince. He had had some of his advance team survey the beach, but Butcher said a complete survey by Navy SEALS was required before he could try to beach his ship. Butcher favored using landing craft to transport the JTF from the ship at anchor to the pier. For the time being, the consensus still was to wait until the berth and pier could be cleared.21

Later that morning, Butcher received a radio call from the American Embassy directing him to recover all boats. He refused on the basis that he was using his two landing craft to maintain a security perimeter around his ship. A few moments later, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) called

4 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

Butcher and asked if the commander could at least pull his boats in close. While this conversation was occurring, two Haitian gunboats emerged from Admiral Killick Naval Base to the south. These 25-foot Montauk motor vessels mounted twin .50 caliber machineguns. An unusual and disconcerting nuance was that there were Haitian navy, army and police personnel on the boats. This variance only added to the concerns that this was not a permissive environment. Furthermore, the Haitians were manning their machineguns and the two gunboats were approaching the Harlan County at a rapid speed. The ship quickly manned all .50 caliber machineguns and 25mm guns and stationed sniper teams topside. Butcher promulgated his rules of engagement (ROE) to his troops: if the Haitians touched the triggers of their machineguns, the Americans were to open fire. Noticing the activity on the Harlan County, the gunboats circled the ship but did not fire.22

Butcher was perturbed with the American Embassy because he felt they knew the gunboats were coming and had not warned him. He knew the Haitians were monitoring the ship's unsecured VHF bridge-to-bridge communications, so he called the embassy with a message for Haitian consumption. He reported the incident and his dismay that there had been no information on the gunboats forthcoming from the embassy. He asserted that his principal priority was his ship's protection. Therefore, if any Haitian gunboats came within 1,000 yards of the Harlan County, he intended to destroy them. Soon after Butcher stated his intentions, the gunboats retired. They returned about 2 hours later but maintained a safe 2,500-yard distance.23

About 1400 Tuesday, Butcher reassessed the situation. The military equipment he believed to be hidden in the pier area was still a formidable threat. The berth was still blocked with no apparent resolution imminent. He considered all proposed alternative plans unsound and imprudent for short-fused execution. The most significant factor was the tenuous situation with the Haitian gunboats. During the day, he could adequately monitor them, but the confusion of darkness could precipitate mistakes by either side that might result in violence. Therefore, he assessed the environment as no longer permissive. He called CINCLANTFLT with his assessment and stated that he was leaving. The CINCLANTFLT watch officer asked if he could wait for Admiral Henry H. Mauz Jr.'s concurrence. Butcher replied that he was setting "sea and anchor detail" and leaving regardless. About 35 minutes later, just as the Harlan County was weighing anchor, CINCLANTFLT called back. Mauz said he would defer to Butcher's judgment and support his decision.24

Television cameras captured the Harlan County turning and steaming out of Port-au-Prince harbor. CNN broadcast the tape of the unceremonious withdrawal with the commentary that the ship had been thrown out of Haiti. The Front for Advancement of Progress in Haiti (FRAPH), an anti-Aristide political organization, celebrated the first-ever Haitian repulse of the US Navy.25 The ship was subsequently ordered to proceed to the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to await further instructions. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported later that the Harlan County had been ordered from Haiti to Cuba because Cedras could not guarantee the safety of the ship and personnel.26 Within days, the JTF HAG advance team was ordered out of Haiti, to be closely followed by all UN and OAS personnel.27 Thus, the departure of one warship precipitated the hasty exit of the entire international presence. Thereafter, the political ramifications forced the NCA to acquiesce to the on-scene decision due to the overriding desire not to enter a UN nation-assistance operation under forced circumstances or with a forceful attitude. Despite valid security concerns, the Harlan County incident was a clear loss of military face that, among many Haitians, created a perception of weakness and unreliability regarding US and UN resolve and credibility.

One curious dimension to this incident was the identity of the unruly mob. FRAPH had organized the protesters. According to its leader Emmanual Constant, the anti-Aristide political organization had been

5 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

formed in mid-1993 at the urging of the Defense Intelligence Agency and was paid by the CIA to balance what some US agencies perceived as pro-Aristide-Lavalas extremism.28 This nearly coincides with the signing of the Governors Island Accords where the Cedras regime agreed to reinstate Aristide to power in Haiti. It thus appears that FRAPH was intended to be a counterpoise to Aristide's liberation theology.29

By October 1993, the nascent FRAPH was still without any real political clout. It needed a vehicle to shape an image and establish credibility. Fearing retribution should Aristide return, many protesters were reluctant to seek publicity. Persuaded and bribed with whiskey, FRAPH members were thrilled when they realized they had successfully thwarted the US Navy's attempt to enter Port-au-Prince. The Harlan County's departure signaled the solidification of FRAPH as a viable political entity in Haiti.

As Constant stated, "My people kept wanting to run away. . ., but I took the gamble and urged them to stay. Then the Americans pulled out! We were astonished. That was the day FRAPH was actually born. Before everyone said we were crazy, suicidal, that we would all be burned if Aristide returned. But, now we know he is never going to return."30

By the time the Harlan County reached Guan-tánamo Bay, Pulley was publicly stating that American troops would not return until the Haitian military could guarantee their security.31 JTF HAG, still aboard the Harlan County, waited and wondered for 10 days if there would be a marshaling of forces at Guantánamo for a possible forced entry. Finally, USACOM directed the Harlan County to return to home port and for JTF HAG to stand down. They would not be part of any operation in the near future.32

Pulley was standing on the pier when the Harlan County again moored in Little Creek Naval Amphibious Base, Virginia. He wanted personally to thank all the troops for their hard work and dedication. After that, JTF HAG quietly faded away. Within military circles, the Harlan County affair was regarded as another setback in the realm of military operations other than war. Regardless of the multitude of factors driving the events in Haiti, the Harlan County's withdrawal became an ignominious reminder of the confusion, ambiguity, complexity and dynamism that generally accompanies unorthodox operations.MR

1. Interview with Bryant Freeman, 27 September 1996, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 2. The US Atlantic Command was referred to as LANTCOM until 1 October 1993, when it became USACOM. For the purposes of clarity and consistency, we will refer to US Atlantic Command by its new name, USACOM. 3. Interview with retired Army LTC Philip J. Baker Jr., 8 August 1996, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Baker was the commander of US troops aboard the USS Harlan County. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Telephone interview with US Navy Commander Marvin E. Butcher Jr., 26 September 1996. 10. Ibid. 11. Baker interview. 12. Butcher interview. 13. Ibid.

6 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rieh.html

14. Telephone interview with retired Army COL J.G. Pulley, 16 September 1996. 15. Telephone interview with Pulley, 18 September 1996. 16. In the elusive effort to appear nonthreatening, UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo actually wanted all US military members to don civilian clothes. He had already forbidden Pulley and his advance team from wearing uniforms in Haiti without his permission. The only reason he acquiesced on the issue with respect to the bulk of the JTF was that the troops aboard the ship did not have civilian clothes with them.

17. Baker interview. 18. Ibid. 19. Butcher interview. 20. Baker interview. 21. Butcher interview. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Baker interview. 26. US Atlantic Command, "Haiti History Team Chronicle: 4/93-9/94," Norfolk, VA, 10. 27. Freeman interview. 28. Allan Nairn, "Haiti Under the Sun," The Nation, 8-15 January 1996, 11; Nairn, "He's Our SOB," The Nation, 31 October 1994, 481; Kenneth Freed and Doyle McManus, "Aristide Foe Talks, U.S. Listens," Los Angeles Times, 8 October 1994, A12; and Freed and McManus, "Aristide" and "Notebook," The New Republic, 25 December 1995, 8. 29. MAJ Phillip G. Pattee, "Special Operations Forces and Nonstate Actors in OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: A Case Study," Master of Military Art and Science thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 49-50. 30. Ian Martin, "Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 73. 31. USACOM, "Haiti History Team Chronicle," 10. 32. Baker interview.

Lieutenant Commander Peter J. A. Riehm, US Navy, is the staff intelligence officer, Allied Naval Forces South, Naples, Italy. He received a B.A. from the University of Houston and an M.M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, the Middle East, Europe and the Caribbean, to include surface operations officer, Destroyer Squadron 24, Mayport, Florida; combat systems officer, USS Flately, Mobile, Alabama; staff officer, Navy Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and in the Operations Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy missions in Haiti.

7 of 7 3/11/98 12:28 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html Integrating Conventional and Special Operations Forces

by Major Robert C. Shaw, US Army

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

Operation Uphold Democracy is now complete. This article discusses the tactical-level relationship that existed between conventional and special operations forces (SOF) in Haiti and focuses on the problems that arose between these two groups in the country's central sector, which included the Port-au-Prince (command post) operations area.1

Units participating in Uphold Democracy conducted after-action reviews (AARs) and produced reports assessing the overall mission's results. The AARs indicate that the operation-with minor exceptions-was a complete success.2 However, interviews I conducted on the interaction and integration of conventional and SOF in Haiti produced a decidedly more negative tone than that found in the official AARs. As a Special Forces (SF) officer, I have personal and professional interests in exploring the problems that occurred while conventional and SOF worked together in Haiti.

Uphold Democracy was a peace operation, yet ironically, before, during and after the operation, a combat mind-set existed in the principal US conventional unit in theater, the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)]. A 10th MD (L) AAR quotation stated: "Every movement outside of a compound is a COMBAT OPERATION."3 This type of "warrior" sentiment during and after Uphold Democracy was not generally shared by SOF troops.

One reason for these divergent views stemmed from the dynamic situation in Haiti at the time US troops were committed and from the concerns about force protection that followed. The operations plan began as an invasion, anticipating violence and resistance, thus instilling the combat mind-set on the part of planners and combat troops alike. Security measures in a combat operation include the "protection of soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment in all locations and situations."4 force protection is "accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services; supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs."5

Uphold Democracy was executed in a permissive or semipermissive environment, as opposed to the nonpermissive environment assumed in the original invasion plans. The actual mission statement for Multinational Force Haiti, of which the 10th MD (L) was the principal component, was "To establish and maintain a stable and secure environment."6 The last-minute change to the forceful entry operation entailed a dramatic shift from the combat operations that had been planned and, thus, required a different mind-set. A distinct difference in the two operations types is the technique used to ensure force protection.

1 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

Operations other than war (OOTW) also requires force protection measures. US Army and joint authoritative doctrine on OOTW define the relationship in terms of principles that relate to both types of operations. "OOTW principles are an extension of warfighting doctrine. Embodied in these principles is the dominance of political objectives at all levels of military operations other than war. . . ."7 A political consideration commanders dealt with was the unacceptability of casualties. After the tragic events in Somalia, the US military fully understood that casualties in Uphold Democracy would not be tolerated.8

During Uphold Democracy, commanders had to establish a secure and stable environment, then enforce the peace, all while avoiding casualties. They were keenly sensitive to the political ramifications of potential casualties and to the consequences of failing to establish peace on the streets of Port-au-Prince and in the Haitian countryside. Therefore, their mission necessitated balancing the required amount of force protection with the techniques of enforcing peace, especially on Port-au-Prince's streets. Commanders wanted to make a show of force without having to use it lest they risk raising the level of tension, thereby putting US troops in greater danger.

OOTW Principles and Operational Necessities

During Uphold Democracy, the US military used different techniques to try to convince the Haitians that an area was secure and ready for them to return to their normal way of life. One technique soldiers employed was to tailor their appearance and actions in a way that simulates a secure environment. Wearing-or not wearing-certain items of equipment sends a nonverbal message to the civilian population concerning the mission's success. Commanders and planners must make assessments and strike a balance between wearing the items needed for protection and sending a message that peace is being enforced. In Uphold Democracy, commanders assessed a high enough threat level to US soldiers to warrant wearing Kevlar combat vests.9 These vests certainly provided the soldiers protection against threats, but did not send a message that the streets were safe and secure.

Although Kevlar combat vests are available to both conventional and SOF troops, a problem over force protection posture arose at several locations where the two forces worked together. One such place was Camp d'Application, an installation identified as a primary target in the US invasion plan. Camp d'Application housed the 55-man 22d Company of the Forces Armes d'Haiti (FAd'H) and was considered by US planners to be a more serious threat than other military targets in country. As one planner stated, "If we anticipated any significant counterattack or fight, it would probably come from that unit."10

In the invasion plan, Camp d'Application was initially a SOF target for the US Army Rangers.11 Once the invasion was canceled, however, the target remained part of the peaceful entry operation. Because of its high threat potential, the camp was initially occupied by a strong US force from the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The SOF troops had orders to identify and inventory weapons and remove the V-150 armored vehicles and other, larger military weapons from the area and render them unserviceable. The task did not promise to be easy-the two forces trying to work together could just as easily have been trying to kill one another had the invasion occurred.

While conducting their mission in the sweltering heat, the SOF troops welcomed the FAd'H's help in counting and uncovering cached weapons. This assistance came through careful and purposeful negotiations designed to convince the FAd'H to cooperate. Uncertain of its own purpose and position as an army, the FAd'H had initially made the situation "very tense." Both forces were trying to get used to one another, yet not lose an ounce of credibility. Over time, each began to earn the other's trust to the point where SOF soldiers could lessen their defenses and shed their Kevlar vests and helmets, allowing

2 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

them to work more comfortably in the heat. Cooperation replaced confrontation. The turning point came when FAd'H soldiers stopped carrying their weapons and began helping SOF soldiers.12

At one point during the Camp d'Application disarming process, a 10th MD (L) element drove up to the front gate to replace the SOF soldiers. These conventional troops arrived in armored vehicles and were wearing their Kevlar vests and helmets. With guns aimed at the FAd'H soldiers, they demanded entry into the camp. One SF officer at the camp explained that this was totally unexpected.13

As soon as the armored vehicles arrived at the gate, the FAd'H soldiers resumed the highest level of security.14 The SOF soldiers who had persuaded the FAd'H to cooperate, even to the point of putting down their weapons, instantly lost the trust the SOF had worked so hard to obtain. The difference in methodology and degree of necessary force protection between SOF and conventional forces clearly affected this operation.

The conventional force did not understand the SOF methodology employed. The whole episode strained the relationship the US forces had established with the FAd'H in terms of who was in charge and who they could trust. It also strained relationships between the US units involved. At one point, a conventional force commander criticized the SOF for "being out of uniform," for not conducting what he believed were appropriate security measures in the camp and for not applying the "appropriate level of force protection."15 In this case, the SOF troops did not wear the Kevlar vests because they had lowered the level of threat from the FAd'H at the camp. Clearly, there was a different mind-set over the force protection issue.

OOTW principles applied during this event may provide insight into what happened between the SOF and conventional forces. The SOF objective seemed clear-inventory the weapons and render the camp secure and safe for later use. The conventional force's objectives were also clear. They were to relieve the SOF, occupy the camp and take over the inventory and security tasks, thus freeing up the SOF for other operations. Although the objectives for each force were clear and definable, they were never communicated in advance.

Unity of effort. This was clearly a problem at the camp. The two US forces did not work together in preparing and planning for integration on the target site. Not only was this a failure in unity of effort, but also a failure of each US force to understand the other's methodology, as well as who was in charge of what at the camp. Doctrine directs forces to "seek unity of effort in every operation," not just in the initial planning.16

3 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

Security. This principle was not a problem. The SOF managed security at Camp d'Application at a realistic level over time. That level rose immediately to a higher state when the 10th MD (L) troops arrived on the scene. This heightened security at the camp resulted in an increased sense of distrust by the FAd'H, leading to "everyone carrying guns." In true warrior fashion, the conventional troops tried to force the FAd'H to give up their weapons. What the changed situation clearly required was an appropriate level of restraint.

Restraint. Another OOTW principle, restraint should "apply the appropriate military capability prudently."17 In this case, the SOF had lowered the requirement for security and use of force through their ability to gain the FAd'H's trust. The conventional forces were not used to working under these conditions, and with the operations in Somalia fresh in their minds, they failed in this case to use the appropriate level of restraint required.

Perseverance. In peace operations, a vital ingredient is the preparation for the "measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims."18 In the Camp d'Application example, the type of decisive resolution the occupying conventional force used was not the best answer. The techniques used by SOF personnel to gain FAd'H trust was gradually creating an atmosphere of stability. Unfortunately, the conventional force upset the balance when they showed up ready to fight. Their intent may not have been to "take down" the camp in true military combat style, but that possibility certainly seemed real enough to the FAd'H. Not knowing or understanding the time it had taken to build FAd'H trust worked against the conventional force because of a failure to understand the perseverance necessary to complete the mission more successfully. The conventional troops did not provide the FAd'H with sufficient justification for the level of force protection being used.

Legitimacy. US forces must work toward a "condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality or rightness of a set of actions."19 The SOF convinced the FAd'H that the United States was the new legitimate military force on the ground and that there was no point in trying to resist. SOF techniques allowed the FAd'H to remain a professional military force and, along with US troops, to conduct the military procedures required to ensure the camp's security. The conventional force used "strong-arm" tactics against the FAd'H. These were two distinctly different techniques by the two distinctly different forces. In this case, the strong-arm method did not work, thereby making other tasks in the camp much more difficult to accomplish under the "new" conditions set by the 10th MD (L). Of course, there are situations in which both techniques will work.

The integration of SOF and conventional forces at Camp d'Application was strained and problematic. Both techniques were valid, but neither force understood the reasons behind the techniques the other chose. Obviously, both forces thought they were conducting the mission appropriately, using an acceptable force protection level.

Force integration was difficult to plan for and even more difficult to execute. The difficulty of implementing OOTW principles was evident at Camp d'Application. This analysis also suggests how important the principles are in planning and conducting integrated efforts. Planners must consider each principle in order to achieve success in an operation like Uphold Democracy.

4 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

There were several other situations that arose during the US occupation of Haiti concerning SOF and conventional force integration. One case involved relocating the forward operating base (FOB) at the Light Industrial Complex (LIC) in Port-au-Prince. The LIC was the warehouse complex for the Port-au-Prince port facility and airport. Within the compound, SOF and conventional forces planned and worked together. The LIC was also a secure base of operations for each unit and had separate warehouse-style areas to use for planning and living. The conventional force conducted patrols and operations directly from this complex. The SOF used this complex for planning and, because much of their work was out of the city, for relaxation and preparation for the next mission.

Because the LIC compound was a secure area housing US troops, it required an appropriate military appearance. Certain rules applied inside the compound, such as speed limits, off-limits areas and proper uniforms and protocol - all of this strictly in the sense of conducting a military operation within standards. However, there were certain unwritten rules that placed the SOF at a distinct operational disadvantage while living within a compound dominated by a conventional force's rules.

Unwritten rules inside the LIC ranged from SOF soldiers not being allowed to use a weight room facility controlled by a conventional force element, to minor on-the-spot corrections made on SOF soldiers returning from lengthy field operations. The environment was described by some soldiers as almost discriminatory.20 The rules extended outside the compound as well, adding to the friction. Because of the "warrior" mind-set conventional force commanders took into the operation, SF units found themselves required to wear the Kevlar vest for protection at all times once outside the secure LIC compound.21

I listened to over 70 hours of interviews, many of which contained typical soldier gripes from good soldiers trying to do their jobs. The LIC compound was supposed to act as the operation's hub-the place where the planning occurred and soldiers could get a little rest before going back out to field locations where they worked most of the time. It was a home away from home for the SOF and conventional forces alike, a place where they could get a hot shower, good meal and a break away from the operation. But given the compound's "hostile environment," SOF in general "feared returning to the LIC" and "would rather stay out in the villages in some cases versus going back to the LIC."22 The circumstances at the LIC did not promote the proper cooperative relationship between the two forces but distracted each from the operation's overall purpose.23 That such negative feelings should exist between SOF and conventional forces, especially during an ongoing operation, is very alarming.

The LIC case serves as a reminder for careful planning in setting up a secure administrative environment that will operate efficiently. Again, two OOTW principles are as applicable here as in the Camp d'Application case. There is, for example, no evidence of either force lacking a clear objective while at the LIC. Although each conducted operations separate from the other, both had specific objectives to provide command and control and to conduct necessary coordinations within the compound. Doctrine mentions the problem of "varying views of the objective," and some of the operations themselves were not as clear as the commanders may have wanted, but the daily planning for operations and responsibilities was clear and was doctrinally correct as the forces worked together.24

Unity of effort was not always evident at the LIC. This principle was difficult to implement because of the sometimes strange and complicated command arrangements between the SOF and conventional forces, and the UN and other governmental and nongovernmental participants. Still, doctrine states that OOTW calls for heavy reliance on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.25 The environment described in the interviews does not support this. At higher echelons though, AARs show that the "integration of special operations forces and conventional forces worked well throughout the

5 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

operation."26

The situation at Camp d'Application and LIC both point to the difference in perceptions at different levels within the military. The view from the tactical level by SOF and conventional forces can be very different from the view presented by those who write the final AARs. Lower-ranking individuals in the military sometimes find release in grumbling about their situation, although their complaints may be overstated. Conversely, higher-ranking officers sometimes seem to paint a more general and optimistic view of the same situation. In assessing both perspectives, the actual truth of a situation can be difficult to uncover.

It is important for both SOF and conventional forces to understand the difference in methodology between the tactics, techniques and procedures unique to each. The diverse techniques used by these two force types may aim at the same eventual end state, but differ in the way the end state is achieved. Now that doctrine establishes various types of organizations, such as the Special Operations Command and Control Element and the Special Operations Coordination Element, the degree of cooperation between SOF and conventional forces should improve. Commanders and their planners must facilitate continued coordination and discussions in order to alleviate future problems such as those encountered during Operation Uphold Democracy.MR

1. Commanders in other sectors of Haiti, notably the country's northern sector, did not report problems similar to those discussed in this article. A logical explanation for this is the physical distance from the daily command influence of the headquarters in Port-au-Prince. Another factor may be the more cooperative leadership styles of both the conventional and special operations forces (SOF) in those areas.

2. I attended several after-action reviews (AARs) once the initial missions were completed, between October 1994 and January 1995. Most AARs were with the Special Forces (SF) or SOF units involved with the initial invasion plan. Additional information concerning AARs can be found in subsequent endnotes. This research was consolidated from a series of interviews I conducted in February 1996 and several others from the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as part of a Haiti study effort focused on the official history of Operation Uphold Democracy. 3. 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)], Operation Uphold Democracy, OPERATIONS IN HAITI Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 Thru January 1995, 22-30. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. From Multinational Force Haiti Mission Statement in ibid, 1-6. 7. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Final Draft (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO), January 1995), II-8. 8. This reference is to the 3 October 1993, military operation in Mogadishu, Somalia. Sixteen SOF soldiers died in a battle when two helicopters were shot down and US Army Rangers were surrounded by hundreds of Somali militia. 9. Photographs show soldiers wearing Kevlar vests as they conduct "peaceful" patrols on Port-au-Prince streets. The Kevlar vests are made to stop small-caliber projectiles and smother the effects of larger projectiles. US Congress, United States Army Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 96, Statements of Togo D. West and General Gordon R. Sullivan, Selected Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, February 1995, 104th Congress, 1st session (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), 19. 10. Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, 26 February 1996, 13. Camp d'Application was the heavy weapons company stronghold for the Haitian army. It housed several

6 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sha.html

Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored cars equipped with heavy machineguns. This target was key because of its unknown storage areas and the condition of weapons located in these caches. The quote was attributed in the article to Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Bonham, XVIII Airborne Corps plans director. 11. Ibid. 12. I conducted this interview in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 13 January 1996. 13. At this time in the operation, it was still considered "normal" for 10th MD (L) soldiers to wear all of their force protection equipment based on command guidance and their personal situation assessment. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. There was a complete failure of the conventional force to try to understand what the SOF were trying to do and how they were doing it inside the camp. The two types of forces were forced to work this problem out on the ground inside the camp, in front of FAd'H soldiers who were already confused about what was going on. 16. US JCS, Joint Pub 3-07, II-2. 17. Ibid., II-3. 18. Ibid., II-4. 19. Ibid. 20. Oral interview with a SOF "A" Team leader and an operations noncommissioned officer assigned to 3d Special Forces Group, 16 January 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 21. From a protocol officer briefing for me upon my arrival at the low-intensity conflict, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 1995. The briefing concerned the rules, regulations and safety measures to observe while visiting units living at the LIC. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. Throughout the operation there were different levels of planning and sectors developed to meet the requirements of the operations with forward operating bases (FOB) to support and control SOF elements. Under circumstances not unlike those at the LIC, one SF FOB initially set up at Camp d'Application moved to Fort Lamentine, about an hour away, due to the conventional force environment. The reason the FOB moved out is important. It shows that SOF planners would rather move away than have to put up with the distractions caused by conventional forces. 24. US JCS, Joint Pub 3-07, II-2. 25. Ibid. 26. 10th MD (L), Operation Uphold Democracy, OPERATIONS IN HAITI, 22-2.

At the time he wrote this article, Major Robert C. Shaw was working on a second M.M.A.S. degree as a student in the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the Citadel and an M.M.A.S. from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in special operations units, including the 3d Ranger Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He also served as a planner and special operations task force commander in support of Joint Task Force (JTF) 120, JTF 160, JTF 180 and JTF 188 during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

7 of 7 3/11/98 12:29 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html The Counterinsurgency Paradox

by Sergeant First Class John T. Broom, US Army ©

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

The American experience in Vietnam has been paralleled in this century by the Soviets in Afghanistan, the French in Algeria and Indochina, the British in Northern Ireland and, in a slightly different manner, the Israelis in Palestine and the Rhodesians in Zimbabwe. During this century, especially over the past 45 years, the suppression of insurgencies has been difficult. However, in the preceding century the experience of the major powers was much different. What changed and how did the change reduce the counterinsurgent's ability to defeat the previously troublesome but normally unsuccessful insurgents?

Certain warfare elements clearly change and evolve over time. Weapons, modes of transport, ancillary technologies and the tactics used to employ them are the most easily identifiable. However, these factors fit into the matrix of leadership, firepower, mobility and protection. While the matrix is dynamic, "puzzling it out" is essentially a simple military problem. The evolution of these factors alone would seem to indicate either a great degree of disparate results or a high degree of similarity throughout the period. Success and failure should be spread evenly across both time and space. If the resolution of counterinsurgency were simply a matter of leadership, firepower, mobility and protection; the basic equation in any period should solve the riddle of both conventional and unconventional war equally well. Instead there is a clear preponderance of success in one half of the period and failure in the other.

The difference cannot be attributed to a generally efficient military system in one period or a generally inefficient military system in the other. In fact, the success in conducting small wars appears to be independent of the success in conducting great war. In both periods, armies succeeded in one style of war and failed in the other, sometimes almost simultaneously. For example, the French, who were consistently successful through the 1870s and 1880s in suppressing or at least containing rebellions and insurgencies across the empire, failed miserably in Europe against the Germans in 1870 to 1871. Something other than the traditional military dynamics of leadership, firepower, mobility and protection must be at work.

For simplicity's sake, this article will not differentiate between 19th-century "small wars" and 20th-century counterinsurgencies. Local resistance forces are described as insurgents or guerrillas. The forces attempting to suppress the guerrillas, whether indigenous or foreign, are described as counterinsurgents or counterguerrillas when they are operating to halt an insurgency. They are called anti-insurgents or antiguerrillas when they are attempting to undercut the insurgency by striking against it by using the guerrillas' own tactics against them.

Between 1800 and 1914, the European powers and their American cousins fought quite literally hundreds of what were known as "small wars." In nearly every case, these were successfully prosecuted. However, there were interesting anomalies.

One such exception was the unconventional campaign in Iberia against Napoleon.1 In fact, this war

1 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

originated the term guerrilla, meaning "little war" in Spanish. The example of Spain and Portugal can be drawn too far, however. For Napoleon, this war was not the main theater. If he had concentrated on destroying the British Peninsular Army under Duke Arthur Wellington and suppressing the Spanish Insurrection, the result may have been significantly different. In 1809, Napoleon began a campaign against Austria, followed by another campaign in 1812 against Russia. In both campaigns, Napoleon employed his best marshals and his best troops. In both instances, and in the campaigns that followed, Napoleon faced the rising tide of nationalism.

In the Spanish campaigns, significant forces were employed and losses equivalent to the losses incurred in Russia were suffered, though over a much longer period. The foundation of the resistance to the French was the Spanish people's insurrection against French occupation. That resistance created the conditions that permitted British and Portuguese forces under Wellington to carry the war to the French in 1813 and 1814.

Are there significant commonalties between this early 19th-century example and events of the past 45 years that may shed light on recent experience? There are four notable similarities among these events:

The most significant was the direct and indirect support of a major power.

The intensely ideological nature of the struggle between the Spanish people and the French occupiers and their supporters.2 The availability of a sanctuary for insurgent forces.3 The approximate technological parity between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.

These four factors are the key to understanding the difference between 19th-century small wars and the counterinsurgencies of the 20th century. They appear-in various combinations and strengths-in virtually all the successful insurgency movements and are either not present or are controlled.

Major Power Support

In Spain's case, Great Britain provided a source of financial resources, technical assistance and professional expertise not normally available to the insurgents. Throughout the 19th century, the major powers were involved in continued "imperial" expansion and maintaining a balance of power between themselves. They were fairly well united in their future vision and took a similar approach to the non-European world. During the 19th century, the major powers chose not to compete through surrogates. Instead, they engaged in an open competition for territorial empires, culminating in the "Scramble for Africa." Their direct conflicts were limited to either trade wars or conflicts over significant issues in Europe itself. In a few selected cases, a major power did provide at least limited support for the insurgents-the Russians and the British in Afghanistan and perhaps the Germans in the Boer Republics. It is interesting that neither the British nor the Russians were able to achieve effective control of Afghanistan and that the Boer War was one of the most difficult of Britain's small wars.4

The Europeans shared a view of themselves as inherently more advanced and superior to the non-European regions they were conquering-Europe was destined to control the world. This common view united the powers in opposition to insurgent forces. It was too dangerous to support insurgencies against another power, since the trouble could overflow into a "supporting" power's territory, undermining stability there. Thus, the great powers operated under a policy of competition combined with restraint.

2 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

A significant example of this restraint is seen between the United States and Canada. The Canadians effectively closed their borders to Native American bands seeking sanctuary from pursuing US military formations. While on a number of occasions, Canadian officials permitted bands to enter Canada, they also insisted on controlling those bands effectively, thus rendering them impotent as effectively as if US forces had killed them or driven them back to the reservation themselves.5

Another example of cooperation was the suppression of the Apache. Although Mexican government officials were not eager to have US forces conduct hot pursuit into Mexico, they frequently either cooperated with US forces or turned a blind eye to cross-border incursions. They occasionally protested these raids or pursuits after the fact but rarely made a concerted effort to prevent US forces from conducting them.6

As the 20th century progressed, differing world views emerged in what had been a fairly homogeneous Europe. Fascism, communism and various other movements began to make serious inroads into the European consensus. The powers became much more willing to support insurgencies and wars of national liberation in areas belonging to a competing power around the world. This resulted in logistic and diplomatic support not available to 19th-century insurgents. Examples of major power support to insurgencies abound, from Soviet and Communist Chinese support of the Vietnamese, to American, British and Islamic support of the Afghan resistance. Ideology's Role

The Spanish Insurrection against the French and their Spanish sympathizers had a distinctly ideological content. Although a modern political scientist might disagree that an ideology was involved, the Spanish Insurrection had many facets that can be interpreted as early manifestations of an ideological competition. The insurrection centered on three main groups: the clergy, the minor nobility and the emerging Spanish intelligentsia. All three groups appealed to the peasantry for support. The clergy's opposition to the French and their supporters was founded on the French Revolution's antireligious opinions and actions. The minor nobility's opposition was built around a loyalty to the Spanish crown as a check on the Grandees' power and wealth. The emerging intelligentsia's opposition to the French was more modern in its roots. Though most of the educated "liberal" urban classes in Spain supported the French, a sizable minority did not. A sense of nationalism was afoot in Europe, which the educated classes led. This movement inspired a faith in the power of the "nation" to solve its own problems and deal justly with its own people. These groups had a personal and high stake in the outcome of the insurrection, which raised the conflict to a level of intensity unseen again in Europe until the maquisard and partisan rising against the Germans in World War II.

During other 19th-century small wars, this ideological element was rarely seen in full flower. In only four cases did it have a significant long-term impact:

In Afghanistan as a virulent xenophobia. Resistance to both British and Russian penetration prevented either power from establishing any form of stable control until the Anglo-Russian Entente of the early 20th century. In the Sudan as a fundamentalist Islamic nationalism. The British lost control of the upper Nile Valley for nearly 13 years and regained it only through a major expedition. In Abyssinia as an expression of national independence resisting Italian Colonial expansion. The Italians were soundly defeated at the battle of Adowa and did not try to conquer Ethiopia again until the 1930s, succeeding then only with the aid of armor, aircraft and chemical weapons. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State as a religious and nationalist separatism. This resulted in the

3 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

two Boer Wars of the 1880s and 1898 to 1902.

Most resistance or insurgent movements in the 19th century were tribally or personality based. They lacked the ability to gain influence and power outside a narrow circle. In other cases, nascent ideological movements failed to gain a broad enough base of support or were successfully suborned by the expanding European powers. Examples include the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and the resistance to French expansion in North Africa.

The powers in their small wars reacted in two ways to the nascent ideological movements in their path:

They would woo a significant portion of the target population to support the "invaders" with promises of economic, religious or political advantages. This method was most successful if it followed an expansion into neighboring areas, serving as both an example of the results of cooperation and the uselessness of resistance. They would wage a war of annihilation and extermination against the insurgents until resistance collapsed. The counterinsurgent forces would either drive the insurgents off ancestral, arable land and hunting grounds or squeeze them into an area too small for survival. The instinct to survive would then normally compel surrender.7 This method was successful when only a limited area or population was involved. A variation on this method resulted when resistance depended on the power of a single leader who was killed or captured, leading to the insurgency's collapse, a common occurrence in Africa where loyalty centered on the tribal chief.

The United States was successful in its westward expansion because it was generally able to leverage existing divisions among the Native American tribes to further alienate them from one another, which sometimes increased internal tribal divisions. A classic example is the use of the Crow tribe as scouts against the Sioux and Cheyenne, traditional Crow enemies.8 In addition, the sheer number of settlers moving westward doubtless demonstrated the inevitability of defeat to many native leaders. The eastward trips of Red Cloud led him to accept that armed resistance was futile, at which point he became an obstructionist rather than an openly hostile war leader.9 Many instances of "resistance collapsing" can be traced to the killing or capture of individual leaders such as Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and Geronimo.

Continual westward expansion and settlement may be seen by some as a form of "extinction campaign," which in many ways it was. A more open expression of this occurred twice in southern Africa. The Boers effectively exterminated or enslaved all native tribesmen in their path.10 Also, German colonial force campaigns against the Hereros in German Southwest Africa has been likened to genocide.11

As the 20th century progressed, the education of native elites, initially supported by the "colonial" powers to ease the administrative burden and improve the people's lot, led to a growth in "Western" values such as individual liberty, economic freedom and national identity. These Western ideas inspired the newly conscious elites to agitate for the same for their own nations. When the agitation was met by opposition from the colonial power, the contradiction led the elites to organize open guerrilla warfare against the "oppressors." The insurgents combined the Western ideals, regional loyalties and perhaps religious affiliations to create a powerful, motivating force.12

Later in the 20th century, the insurgents would again draw on the West-specifically Marxism-to add economic equality to the mix. As conflicts evolved from "colonial powers against nationalist insurgents" to a more localized conflict, the Marxist elements became increasingly important. When out-side forces intervened, such as the United States did in Vietnam, the entire mix came into play, as nationalism joined with its seeming enemy-Marxism-to mobilize large portions of the population in resistance. The

4 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

Soviets faced a similar ideologically charged resistance in Afghanistan-this time in the form of a fundamentalist Islamic resistance combined with a pro-Western faction, both of which generated outside support. The Islamic elements drew support from Saudi Arabia and its ally the United States, as well as from the more radical Iranian Islamic Republic. The pro-Western elements garnered support from the United States and interestingly enough, given Afghanistan's history, Great Britain.

The first method of subduing an insurgent population became difficult to achieve in this environment. There were simply too many motivations for too many of the local population to support the counterinsurgent forces. The second method lost its effectiveness as popular support in the colonial states declined and an increasingly dim view was taken of such a brutal and obviously morally flawed method. Today, in an era of instant or nearly instant media coverage, such a policy by a Western power would be met with a firestorm of reaction both within the offending power itself and from most other nations. Even relatively mild repressive actions draw hostile reactions.13

Sanctuary's Role

The third essential element in the combination of factors was the presence of a sanctuary for the insurgent forces. In Spain, sanctuary took two forms. The first was the zone of Spain and Portugal occupied by British and coalition forces. Guerrilla forces, threatened by superior French troops, either retreated to British-occupied territory until French forces withdrew or scattered in search of more guerrillas. The second form of sanctuary was found in the rugged nature of the Spanish countryside. Local guerrillas could simply "melt" away into Spain's vast interior, seeking refuge in its mountains and back country where there were insufficient local supplies to support a large French force.

These two types of sanctuary were denied to 19th-century insurgents. The first was only to be found if a viable sovereign state or colony would afford them protection, a rare event in small 19th-century wars. Most colonial powers were not sympathetic to the plight of insurgent forces near their own colonial holdings. The example of success was too dangerous to their own rule. The Canadian policy toward Native American tribes, previously discussed and similar examples from Africa, where French colonial forces prevented the flight of insurgent tribesmen from British or Belgian territory from using French possessions as a refuge, come to mind.

The second form of sanctuary also disappeared to a large extent in the 19th century. The successful development of food preservation techniques, medicines for tropical diseases, steam-powered river boats and railroads permitted colonial powers to operate in territory that had previously been denied to them.14 Campaigns led by Sir Garnet Wolsey penetrated to the heart of Canada, into the Ashanti territory of West Africa and to the depths of the Sudan on the Nile. Railroads opened the American West to mass settlement, and late 19th-century medical developments allowed European forces to penetrate deep into malarial areas and survive, something that 50 to 100 years earlier would have been impossible.

In the 20th century, sanctuary returned. Increasing post-colonial national sovereignty created the inviolable national frontiers needed to create "untouchable" sanctuary. Newly independent states encouraged insurgent forces in neighboring areas still under European control and provided them with a safe haven. If the state was also a member of a power bloc opposed to the colonial government, the chances of sanctuary being granted increased even more. The French in Indochina and Algeria were the first to encounter this problem. Later, Americans in Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, the British in Northern Ireland, encountered the same problem.

Two solutions have been attempted to solve this dilemma. The first is to isolate the insurgents physically or politically. The British used this with outstanding success in the Malaya emergency by isolating the

5 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

"communist terrorists" in a small area of the peninsula, and again in Ireland by drawing the Republic of Ireland into the containment of the Irish Republican Army. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the US-advised and sometimes US-led Filipino forces also used this solution in dealing with the localized Huk rebellion. This solution is difficult to employ in most cases. Physical and political geography must cooperate in order to achieve success. The territory itself must operate to isolate the insurgents, as in the Malay Peninsula or Philippine examples. The insurgents also must present a significant security risk to a state that could offer sanctuary, as in the case of Ireland.

The second solution is to violate the sanctuary. This has been attempted by France, the United States, Israel and Rhodesia. This solution presents its own problems because the insurgents can simply retreat farther into the sanctuary state, the incursion can be met by opposition from the invaded state, the invaded state could begin to actively support the insurgents or the international or domestic community could impose political or economic sanctions on the counterinsurgent state. A temporary advantage may be gained, but unless the sanctuary can be permanently denied to the insurgent forces, the eventual result will likely be counterproductive.

Sanctuary has also been created by the increasing technological sophistication of modern armies. Twentieth-century armies have become tied to permanent facilities and the road networks linking them. While the helicopter's advent has to some extent relieved the problem, aircraft can only fly over territory. In order to control ground, troops must hold it or be able to dominate it with fire. At some point in time, the infantry must dismount from carriers and pursue and destroy insurgent ground forces. Once the infantry has dismounted, it surrenders its mobility advantage and perhaps a significant portion of its firepower advantage as well. Rugged terrain, especially wooded or jungle regions providing overhead concealment, has again become a viable sanctuary.

Equivalent or Balancing Technology

The fourth factor in successful insurgencies is a comparable level of technology. The weaponry available to the average French infantry small unit engaged in subduing Spanish guerrillas was virtually identical to that used by the guerrillas themselves. During the latter half of the 19th century, the weapons employed by the colonial powers normally were significantly more effective in range, rate of fire and accuracy than the insurgents' weapons. Simply put, a small number of well-equipped, marginally trained native levies could dominate their insurgent opponents. If the colonial power chose to commit regular forces, the dominance was even more pronounced.

The Boer War demonstrates this factor's importance. Effective weapons, knowledge of the terrain and conditions and rudimentary militia training equalized the fight, and on many occasions, the Boers dominated their British opponents, both tactically and technologically. This pattern began during the fighting's conventional phase and continued into the unconventional phase, with a few serious and many embarrassing minor defeats for the British.15

The 20th century has seen this repeated again and again. Insurgents' and counterinsurgents' light weapons were similar. The main reason for this development was the increasing support either a major or regional power gave to insurgents. This support often provided insurgents with technologically advanced light weapons. The Soviets could not rely on close air support (CAS) after the appearance of the Stinger missile in Afghanistan. Rockets gave insurgents a capability to attack heavily defended installations with relative impunity.

It is the Afghan example that shows the interplay of the four elements: major power support, ideology,

6 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

sanctuary and equivalent or balancing technologies. In the 19th century, Afghanistan represented the imperial frontier between the continental empire of Russia and the maritime empire of Great Britain. For the British it was the northern land route to the "Jewel of the Empire"-India. For the Russians it was either the southern bulwark protecting their Central Asian empire or a passageway into the wealth of India.

Beginning in the 19th century's earliest days, both sides grew increasingly aware of the importance of this barren mountainous area. An invasion of India was proposed as early as 1801 by the Russian Czar Paul. However, it was not until later in the century that the conflict assumed the contours of a small war. The British empire in India had reached the Afghani frontier and the struggle began in earnest. British agents penetrated into Afghanistan, seeking influence to quiet the border tribes. Russian agents entered Afghanistan from the north seeking information and influence, both to secure their southern frontier in Central Asia and to explore the possibility of using Afghanistan as a passageway to India.

The two major powers waged a "see-saw" struggle for regional preeminence. At various times, the British attempted to establish direct control, the most notable attempt being the first Afghan War, in which an entire British army was destroyed as it tried to withdraw from Kabul in 1839 to 1840. This action had been precipitated by perceived growing Russian influence in the court of titular Emir Dost Mohammed. As Russian influence grew in this disaster's wake, the British resorted to less-obtrusive means to reduce this growing power. For the next 60 years, both parties waged a clandestine and sometimes open campaign to gain control of the critical region. The Afghanis took advantage of the rivalry to maintain their independence by playing the British and Russians against each other.

In the 1970s, the great game in Afghanistan was renewed. This time it was the Soviets who took the lead. Concerned about growing Islamic militancy in the Muslim world, especially the Shia of Iran boiling over into their own Central Asian republics, and desiring access to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region, the Soviets supported a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. Eventually dissatisfied with the regime's performance, they chose to intervene directly, establishing what amounted to a puppet regime in a coup de main in 1979. This direct action, combined with increasing pressure on an independence-minded Poland, finally convinced the Carter administration that the Soviets were indeed a real threat and were entering an expansionist phase.

Within a short time, an indigenous resistance movement composed of fundamentalist Islamic Afghans and pro-Western Afghans sprang up. Called the Mujahidin, they at first were poorly supported. Within a short period, however, they had successfully established bases in Pakistan and in Afghanistan's high mountains. Their call for an Islamic republic fell on the receptive ears of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, which began supporting them financially and with limited arms supplies and training. The United States and Great Britain also began supplying them with arms and, to a much lesser extent, clandestine training and technical advice.

Soviet forces, primarily heavy, road-bound mechanized units, soon found themselves at a disadvantage in the rugged Afghan hill country. Soviet heliborne strike forces and CAS aircraft were the dominant forces against the Mujahidin. As the situation for the Afghan resistance worsened, the United States and Great Britain began supplying antiaircraft missiles to the Mujahidin. From training base camps in Pakistan, the newly rearmed Afghans fanned out across their country. The missiles, while not totally negating the effectiveness of Soviet airpower, at least restored a balance between the insurgent forces and the Soviets. After almost a decade of war in Afghanistan, the Soviets were worn out-morally and financially. The fierce ideologically charged Afghan resistance, able to withdraw to Pakistan or hide in their own rugged mountain country, politically supported and armed by the West and fellow Islamic

7 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

states, was able to defeat the militarily formidable Soviet forces and their Afghan puppet allies.

This article isolates four elements that seem to separate the Victorian small war from the 20th-century counterinsurgency experience. The support of a significant regional or major power, the presence of a significant ideological content in the struggle, the existence of a sanctuary and a comparable level of technology between the insurgents and the counterinsurgent forces seem to be the critical distinctions between either insurgent force dominance or counterinsurgent force dominance.

It is interesting to note that in both the Napoleonic era Peninsular War and the 1980s' Afghan war, there is another common bond. In the Spanish case, the insurgents had the British forces of Wellington to support them. This forced the French to concern themselves with more than a guerrilla war. In the Afghan case, the insurgents had the distant support of a rearming United States and NATO, which forced the Soviets to devote ever-increasing resources to a conventional and nuclear threat from the West. This seems to support another possible element first described as "compound war" by Thomas Huber.16 Although this idea is much older, no one had previously named the phenomenon. In instructional materials for the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, "The Evolution of Modern War," Huber describes and amplifies the idea that an insurgency supported by a conventional force multiplies the effectiveness of both many times over.

What does this tell us about "small wars" or counterinsurgencies? The four factors by themselves cannot predict the outcome, but to ignore these when considering which policy options to pursue is foolish. Obviously, more work needs to be done. A military rather than an ideological study needs to examine the roots of widespread counterinsurgent success during the 19th century and equally widespread failure in the 20th.MR

1. David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War. W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1986. Gates writes one of the few English language accounts that deals extensively with the guerrilla campaign as well as Wellington's main force campaign. 2. Ideology in this article means more than a simple political difference. It implies a fundamentally irreconcilable difference between the two sides in a conflict and includes political, religious or nationalist differences. Although this term is an oversimplification, it conveys the general concept well. 3. The term sanctuary describes both a geographical area secure from attack, a geographical area difficult or impossible for the counterinsurgency forces to penetrate or the ability to utilize the native population as a shield against effective counteraction. 4. Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War. Random House, New York, 1979. 5. The surrender of Sitting Bull's band after the Little Big Horn is the most famous of these incidents. 6. Colonel Ranald MacKenzie's Kiowa raid and the campaigns of George Crook and Nelson Miles against the Apache are the principal examples on the Mexican border. 7. Colonel C.E. Callwell Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook For Imperial Soldiers. Presidio Press, Novato, CA; 1990. Robert Asprey, War in the Shadows, Doubleday, New York, 1975. Both authors discuss these approaches: Callwell in terms of the British in the 19th century; and Asprey in a broader more inclusive way. 8. Generally, these were not actually campaigns of extermination, though they had that character. The example of Sherman raising the cost of the Civil War to the civilian population may have provided an example which US Army officers followed in the later campaigns against the Native American Plain's tribes. In most American West and colonial frontier cases, the effect was the same-raise the cost of the war beyond the native's willingness to pay it. 9. The Crow scouts.

8 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bro.html

10. James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem. Bison Books, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1975. Olson describes Red Cloud's change from resistance by combat to obstructionism as a direct result of his visit to the East Coast in 1870. 11. Thomas Pakenham. The Scramble For Africa. Random House, New York, 1991. Pakenham discusses this case in Chapter 33, "The Kaiser's First War." 12. Pakenham discusses the Bushmens' near extermination and enslavement of other tribes. 13. Mahatma Gandhi in India represents perhaps the most important example of this even though he used only nonviolent means. 14. The Intifada in Israeli-occupied territory and the attempted suppression of the African National Congress in South Africa are two examples. 15. Daniel R. Headrick, "The Tools of Imperialism: Technology And the Expansion of European Colonial Empires in the Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Modern History, 1979, Volume 51, Number 2, 231-63. 16. Thomas Huber. C-610 Term I Book of Readings and Course Syllabus. US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1996, 155-65.

Sergeant First Class John T. Broom is an instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Minnesota, an M.A. from Norwich University and a Ph.D. from Union Institute. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including special assistant to III Corps Commander, Fort Hood, Texas; instructor, US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; Headquarters Platoon SGT, 3-77 AR, Mannheim, Germany and is a Major in the US Army Reserve. He has had articles published in various publications, including "A New Dawn for Armor or the Last Sunset?" cowritten with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Bruno, Armor Magazine, August-September 1990; "Summary of Deliberate Breaching Operations Experience in Three Selected World War II Battles," Desert Readings for Armor Leaders.

9 of 9 3/11/98 12:30 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes

by Lawrence A. Yates

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

A Marine major general discussing his role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia concluded, "We aren't prepared for these operations very well." An Army colonel recalling his staff officer duties in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti stated, "The single hardest thing that I've had to do in my military experience was to come up with an OOTW [operations other than war] campaign plan. . . ." A Special Forces lieutenant colonel, generalizing from his own experience in Haiti, implored fellow officers to anticipate "different environments" in which they would be required to perform tasks for which they had little or no training. A Ranger lieutenant had learned the same lesson several years earlier in Panama during Operation Just Cause when he engaged in night combat operations at Rio Hato-the "easy part," as it turned out. At dawn, he was informed his platoon was to move out immediately to administer to a small Panamanian town. He later conceded that he had not clearly understood, nor had he been trained to do, any of the half-dozen tasks given him as a part of this new, highly sensitive mission.

These brief examples and countless others like them illustrate the difficulty many, if not most, US officers have in coming to grips with unorthodox military operations-operations that fall outside what is generally regarded as the military's primary focus and traditional role of fighting conventional wars. OOTW, the current doctrinal terminology for such nontraditional undertakings, covers a broad spectrum, ranging "from support to US, state and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation and peace enforcement."1 Other nontraditional operations include humanitarian assistance, strikes and raids, antiterrorist activities and, as some would argue, overseas interventions designed to maintain, restore or change the status quo in the target area. Some interventions include combat operations, often intense, but usually too brief to qualify as "general," or even "limited" war.2

That US officers often find themselves adrift in such operations is not without a touch of irony in that these undertakings are nothing new; they have not been spawned or even accelerated, as some commentary would suggest, by the post-Cold War environment. Rather, the US military has engaged in these nontraditional, unorthodox operations throughout its history, far more often than it has waged conventional warfare, as depicted in the figure on page 52.3 Figure

1 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

The historical record is readily available for any officer to study. Furthermore, for at least several decades now, there has been a growing body of doctrine that discusses nontraditional military activities within the framework of the terminology in vogue: stability operations and counterinsurgency in the 1960s, low-intensity conflict in the 1980s, and operations other than war, military operations other than war, and stability and support operations today.4 Why is it then that the body of testimony regarding the lack of preparation for such operations continues to mount?

The answer is complex, the reasons numerous. One significant cause is the various ways in which many US officers approach the history of their own profession with respect to these operations. To begin with, there are officers who are convinced that, for one reason or another, military history is largely irrelevant to their current concerns and operations, whether conventional or unorthodox. Whatever might be gleaned from history is not worth the time expended studying the past.

Analogies

Others do consult the historical record, but selectively, often regarding anything that happened before World War II-or as the years creep by, Vietnam-as "ancient history," and therefore of marginal relevance for today's military professional. It is not, they acknowledge, that there is nothing to learn from analyzing the Second Seminole War of 1836 to 1842; Captain William Clarke Quantrill's exploits during the Civil War or the Reconstruction of the South that followed; the Philippine-American War at the turn of the century; or the Sandino Affair in Nicaragua. They merely argue that whatever value can be extracted from these distant episodes can be derived with greater profit from more recent case studies.

Perusing contemporary history is often a priority for officers engaged in or about to embark on a nontraditional operation. With the exceptions noted below, the search for relevant precedents usually focuses on the most recent operations-usually only one or two-that appear to have something in common with the current one. In 1988, a staff officer helping to plan what would eventually become the US

2 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

invasion of Panama combed the after-action reports (AAR) on the 1983 intervention in Grenada, while a general officer managing the ongoing crisis in Panama for most of two years prior to Operation Just Cause garnered insights from a book on the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965. After US troops toppled the regime of Manuel Antonio Noriega in December 1989, Just Cause and its civil-military extension, Promote Liberty, became the reference points for future contingency operations. Thus, when the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] prepared to deploy to Somalia, its staff contacted people with information on the Panamanian crisis. A year later, a US staff officer going into Port-au-Prince discovered a monograph on Promote Liberty that gave him some idea of what duties he might be called on to perform in stabilizing Haiti.

Besides propinquity, personal experience also enters into the search for relevant precedents. A brigade commander's memories of his experience as a lieutenant in the Dominican crisis gave him much on which to reflect as he prepared to take his paratroopers into Grenada nearly 20 years later. And when the 10th MD (L) deployed to Haiti in 1994, it had its own experience as the quick reaction force in Somalia fresh in mind.

The selection of historical precedents can also be based on the previous deployment of US troops to the target area, at least within recent memory. Thus, it was only natural for Marines entering Lebanon in 1982 to take note of the situation their counterparts a generation before had encountered around Beirut in 1958. However, forces deploying to Haiti for Op-eration Uphold Democracy apparently made little attempt to study in detail what US Marines had done in that country from 1915 to 1934-another case of ancient history.5

Finally, the experiences of foreign countries in seemingly analogous operations might also be consulted, albeit on an infrequent basis. US policy makers coping with the growing insurgency in Vietnam in the early 1960s turned to recent British efforts in Malaya and to the suppression of the Huks in the Philippines as successful and applicable examples of counterinsurgency.

As these examples suggest, the search for historical precedents by units set to deploy is not necessarily systematic or comprehensive. Rather, given the press of other requirements, it is more likely to be haphazard, superficial and limited in scope. To be sure, attempts to relate only one or two previous operations to the current or pending one can yield relevant insights and useful "tricks of the trade." But there are shortcomings to this selective use of historical records. For one, the operations overlooked might have offered more relevant experience and guidelines than the ones consulted. A second, even more critical, shortcoming concerns the general caution that must be used in applying any "lesson" from past experience to present concerns. The process of reasoning by analogy, as the preceding discussion indicates, assumes that if two or more things agree with each other in some respect, they will probably agree in others as well. Yet, while two military operations may be similar, they will not be identical. History, in reality, does not repeat itself. Each occurrence or phenome-non is unique, a premise readily accepted, then just as promptly ignored, by many who study history. When similarities that are assumed to exist between past and current operations do not in fact exist, the result can be the adoption of facile, even false, analogies.

Determining what is a false analogy is no easy endeavor. Take, for example, the ongoing debate over force protection measures in both Haiti and Bosnia. Presumably one cause of the controversy is what some have called the Somalia Syndrome. The tragic fire fight in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 linked the perceived success or failure of US policy to the number of American casualties incurred. As a result of the fire fight, force protection issues, always of critical importance, became overriding considerations for several commanders deploying to Haiti and Bosnia. In both of these peace operations, the force

3 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

protection measures commanders imposed on certain units were so stringent that, once operations were well under way, fellow officers began to question whether the combat posture or "bunker mentality" of the troops was not, in fact, hindering accomplishment of assigned missions. This debate has not been resolved, nor has the issue of whether the analogy the Somalian experience provided was useful or false.6

Hindsight makes the task of identifying facile and false analogies easier by allowing for a more disinterested look at how and why a historical example was chosen and employed and the ramifications it had. Historians call this critical analysis. Decision makers often refer to it as "second guessing." After Vietnam, for example, the limitations of the Munich analogy were much more apparent than they were to the World War II generation of civilian and mil-itary leaders who accepted without question the consequences of "appeasement" and who, during the Cold War's first 20 years, found themselves making critical military and foreign policy decisions based, in part, on that reading of history.

For leaders who must make quick decisions based to some degree on historical analogies, Harvard professors Richard Neustadt and Ernest May suggest that the first step toward determining the viability of a historical example or guideline is to compare "then" and "now" by listing and analyzing the ways in which the example in question is similar to the current situation and the ways in which it is different. While no guarantee that a facile or false analogy will be discovered, the step at least provides some method for determining if a historical parallel will prove useful in clarifying objectives or choosing options.7

The point to be made here is: Use historical records as part of the preparation for OOTW. As Neustadt and May advise, broaden the search for historical par-allels (the more the better) including whatever ancient history might prove relevant. More comprehensive historical research turns up more examples and analogies to choose from, thus broadening the experiential data base and lessons available to units about to embark on nontraditional operations. The process of selecting which of the numerous analogies are applicable and how they can be applied to the current operation should itself hone faculties for critical analysis and innovative thinking, both of which can be put to good use in planning and executing OOTW.

Patterns and Themes

A more comprehensive approach to the historical record offers another benefit. As information from various case studies is accumulated, it will begin to reveal certain patterns and recurring themes that have characterized OOTW and, in many ways, set them apart from conventional operations. Contributing authors of generalized field manuals tend more than most officers to employ a broad range of historical information and to address patterns and themes in the doctrine they write. But doctrine, while grounded in history, is not a history lesson and is not promulgated to provide officers a detailed narrative or analysis of what has actually happened. Indeed, OOTW AARs often emphasize the tremendous gap between doctrinal guidelines and what a particular situation demanded. Thus, while patterns and recurring themes may be discussed in doctrine, a solid appreciation of their implications is generally acquired only through experience or through a study of the past.

A comprehensive presentation of OOTW patterns and themes requires a separate volume. However, it is possible, in the space remaining here, to hint at what such a presentation might touch on with respect to the following, but by no means inclusive, topics:

Nontraditional environments.

4 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

The enemy. Noncombatants. The political-military dimension. Changing missions and mission creep. Operational constraints, including rules of engagement (ROE). The role of combat troops. Cross-cultural interaction.

Although listed separately, these topics should not be regarded in isolation. They are, in fact, closely interrelated.8

Nontraditional environment. Generally, US military forces participating in unorthodox military operations will be inserted into complex, unstable, even chaotic situations that are highly dynamic and fraught with ambiguity and in which US political leaders want to "hold the line" or effect a change without resorting to war. In this environment, US troops will confront a broad spectrum of challenges in a variety of locations. One theme linking this diversity is a negative one: rarely is the battlefield the site of conventional combat between enemy forces operating along what appears on a map to be a linear front. The OOTW "battlefield" is more likely to be characterized by the nonlinear disposition of troops, the absence of a clearly defined-or, at very least, conventionally oriented-enemy and the presence of noncombatants, whether indigenous population, representatives of humanitarian and various other governmental and nongovernmental organizations, reporters, political authorities, observers or others. The preferred responses to the challenges presented generally fall within the realm of diplomacy, not combat, although force or a military presence might be essential for furthering negotiations among the interested parties. Not surprisingly, military concerns are generally subordinated in this environment to political considerations. US troops, in essence, are present in a supporting role.

The enemy. The ramifications of working in this nontraditional environment are widespread. Despite longstanding counsel to remain open-minded and flexible, officers with a conventional mind-set who are wed to "doing it by the book" can experience a high degree of frustration in OOTW. To begin with, there are problems associated with the traditional concept of the "enemy." In peace operations, doctrine tells us, US forces must demonstrate that they are neutral and impartial. Yet, in situations like those in Lebanon in both 1958 and 1983 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965, some of the parties contending for power may engage in fire fights with US forces or at least be sniping at them. However, for political reasons those doing the shooting may not be classified as the enemy lest military battle lines be drawn to the detriment of the peace process. These political calculations are often lost on US forces who, when coming under fire, tend to define those trying to kill them as the enemy. The inability to do so can have disorienting and demoralizing effects.

Conversely, in situations where there is no hostile force, there may be a tendency on the part of conventionally oriented officers and policy makers to create one. One Marine Corps general in Somalia saw this "need to have an enemy" as a fatal flaw in the military's approach. Replacing an effective strategy advocated by Ambassador Robert Oakley of "don't make any enemies, don't pick sides with the Somalis, let the Somalis arrive at their own solution, stay in touch with them and coordinate with them," a new, potentially disastrous approach called for US forces to "isolate, marginalize and minimalize" General Mohammed Farrah Aideed, the most powerful faction leader in Somalia. The hunt for the newly designated "enemy" led directly to the 3 October fire fight and subsequent US withdrawal from the country.9

Noncombatants. Almost as perplexing as dealing with hostile forces in OOTW is determining how to

5 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

interact with the numerous noncombatants almost sure to inundate the scene. To begin with, there are the local inhabitants who may be friendly, hostile or indifferent to the presence of foreign troops on their soil. How to behave toward the indigenous population, what signals and messages to send, how to protect the force without alienating the people the troops were probably sent to help in the first place-all of these and similar considerations require careful analysis and sophisticated responses.

Other noncombatants will belong to formal organizations, many of which have their own and, from the military's perspective, very different agenda, procedures and concerns. US government civilians performing various mandated activities compose one such group. Where these US officials are required to work closely with their military counterparts, friction can arise if each party lacks an appreciation of how the other operates. Turf battles can also erupt when the issue of who is in charge is not clearly established at higher levels. Close cooperation and coordination are also required to ensure that all necessary tasks are carried out and efforts are not duplicated.

In certain nontraditional operations, various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer organizations (PVOs), both US and foreign, are likely to be present. It is also highly likely that the military mission's success will depend on establishing a close working relationship with these groups, despite obstacles posed by the presence of mutual suspicion and different "values, organizational structure and motivations, decision-making processes and execution or implementation processes."10 In Somalia, US commanders chafed when certain humanitarian agencies ignored basic safety measures, hired armed members of different factions to protect them, and, in general, made life difficult for the military command. The consequent friction, however, did not remove the need to work together to feed a starving people.

The interaction between US forces and the media is also a potential, even probable, source of friction. Since the mid-1960s, military leaders have generally regarded the news media in adversarial terms: reporters are often seen as interfering with operations, violating operations security, jeopardizing the lives of US troops in some cases and, when all is said and done, presenting to the world a superficial, biased, distorted and inaccurate account of what happened. Yet, as recent operations have demonstrated, the news media, for better or worse, will be well represented wherever US troops are committed in large numbers. One need only recall the incongruous image of Marines coming ashore at night in Somalia being met by a mob of reporters and a bank of bright camera lights. Similarly, Army troops arriving in Port-au-Prince were seen on television trying to secure the airport as reporters swarmed around them. Delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia was disrupted when automobiles driven by the media wove in and out of the convoys.

Upon hearing these and similar stories, many officers have sworn that, in similar circumstances, they will take whatever measures necessary to prevent reporters from interfering with ongoing operations. Officers who make such vows, of course, are suffering from the delusion that they will be the ones determining military policy toward the media in their sectors. Furthermore, while placing restrictions on reporters and, in general, demonstrating contempt for the news media may prove highly therapeutic for the officers involved, such actions can also prove counterproductive for the mission. Like it or not, the news media have more impact than most other agencies on how an operation is perceived by the outside world. In light of that power, a more productive approach than open hostility toward the media on the scene is to recognize why they are there and what they want, to disseminate as much information as possible, to be as forthright as possible (that is, do not give the impression of lying or hushing up embarrassing information), to allow reporters access to places and troops without grossly violating operations security and, in general, appear accommodating while recognizing that the interests of the military and those of the media do not have to coincide. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's adept

6 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

handling of reporters during the Gulf War should not be lost on officers engaged in OOTW.

The political-military dimension. Besides NGOs, PVOs, and the media, US officers in OOTW will often have to work closely with a variety of political authorities: national and local leaders of the country in which the operation is taking place, the US ambassador or a presidential envoy or a senior UN representative. In some cases, a ranking civilian on the scene may be in charge of the whole undertaking. All of this raises issues about chains of command and who answers to whom. In some cases, US commanders and their troops have been placed under foreign officers and, in at least one operation, under a foreign government. In other cases, mission success has hinged on the US ambassador and ranking US commander's ability to establish a harmonious working relationship.

One negative example may illustrate this last point. When the first US Marines landed in Lebanon in 1958, they came ashore in battalion strength south of Beirut. Waiting for the battalion commander on the beach were military attaches from the US embassy with instructions for the lieutenant colonel to reload his men on the landing craft, move to the Port of Beirut, and come ashore there. To march on the city from the south ran the risk of a confrontation with the Lebanese army, the only institution then holding the country together. The Marine commander refused to comply, arguing that his chain of command ran back to the ships at sea. In plain words, it was not the ambassador's place to give him orders. Two days later, this officer's force found itself muzzle-to-muzzle with the Lebanese army. Only the timely arrival of the ambassador, the senior US officer in the theater and the Lebanese army commander prevented a fire fight that would have had disastrous consequences for the US mission to prevent a communist takeover of the country and restore peace and stability. One positive point came out of the near disaster: following the incident, the ambassador and the senior US commander established a working relationship that became a model of political-military cooperation and coordination.11

Changing missions and "mission creep." The political-military ramifications of nontraditional operations are widespread. When the US government commits military personnel to a well-publicized undertaking that may affect the nation's security and the president's prestige, the operation in question will assume a high degree of political sensitivity. Commanders on the scene can expect daily inquiries and directives from the White House, State Department and Pentagon. To the extent that a crisis situation is extremely dynamic and fluid, political guidance aimed at achieving a solution may change frequently to keep pace. This runs counter to traditional military thinking that commanders should be given clearly defined missions and then be left to carry them out without changes and other forms of interference from political authorities.

The 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic demonstrates the impact a dynamic, politically sensitive situation can have on military calculations. The original mission seemed clear enough: prevent the fall of the country to communist-led rebels. As US marines and paratroopers entered the capital city of Santo Domingo, their officers assumed that they would be allowed to accomplish the mission through combat operations. Limited combat did succeed in isolating the bulk of the rebels and denying them the military victory they sought, but before US troops could finish them off, President Lyndon Johnson decided to seek a political settlement to which all but the most extreme Dominican factions would be a party. At that point, a combat operation became a peace operation that passed through several phases, each accompanied by changes in the military mission and associated tasks. The US commander, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, accepted the fact that in a situation "more political than military," it "is inevitable that Washington is going to take direct control."12 A subordinate, traditional-thinking 82d Airborne Division commander was not so accommodating. His continued advocacy of a military solution compelled Palmer to have him removed from the country.

7 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

Closely related to changing missions and tasks is the concept "mission creep," a relatively recent term used to describe an age-old phenomenon. In some nontraditional operations, the original mission may remain the same, but in pursuing it, commanders may be forced to take on additional missions and tasks. Mission creep is currently portrayed as a negative phenomenon that can be eliminated through thorough planning and careful analysis. There is some validity to this reasoning, but generally speaking, mission creep accrues more to the logic of a dynamic situation in which the success of the original mission depends on picking up additional missions. In describing his experience in Somalia, a Marine general bemoaned the amount of mission creep he experienced, but his narrative made it clear that US forces had no choice but to pick up the additional missions if they hoped to accomplish their original mission of providing security to humanitarian relief efforts.13 Poor staff work and capricious politicians were not to blame-only reality and logic. Thus, rather than announce in advance that there will be no mission creep during a given operation, it is best simply to be prepared for it and make the necessary adjustments when it occurs.

Operational constraints. Since the military generally assumes a supporting role in nontraditional operations, few political leaders will allow it a free hand in determining how an operation should be conducted. In an effort to avoid violence or escalation, political authorities and military commanders may impose operational constraints on the troops involved. These may take the form of areas that are off limits, activities that are forbidden and so forth. For example, in Lebanon in 1958, political considerations forbade US forces from entering the Basta, a center of antigovernment activity and a source of sniper fire against the US soldiers and Marines. In the two-year crisis in Panama leading up to Just Cause, US troops pulling guard duty or going on patrol were not allowed to have rounds chambered in their M-16s lest a breakdown in fire discipline result in a shooting incident that would give Noriega the "moral high ground."

Perhaps the best-publicized operational con-straints are ROE-guidelines that inform US troops when they may defend themselves and the degree of force they can employ in doing so. Even for conventional combat operations, ROE often contain admonitions about using minimal force and avoiding indiscriminate fire and "collateral damage." In OOTW, ROE are usually even more restrictive. The use of certain weapons might be prohibited in built-up urban areas for fear of starting a conflagration, or troops might be instructed to initiate a series of intermediary steps before employing deadly force in a threatening situation.

ROE vary from operation to operation, and in most cases, troops trained to close with and destroy enemy forces using everything in their inventory of tactics and equipment will adjust to the constraints without much difficulty. But there have been exceptions. To begin with, ROE may change frequently during an operation's course. ROE may also differ from one location to another at any point of a crisis. Together, these ROE aspects can create uncertainty among the troops involved as to what rules are in effect and where. There have also been cases in which ROE imposed unacceptable constraints on troops. In the 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic, ROE prohibited US forces from firing on those shooting at them unless US positions were in danger of being overrun. This restriction was tantamount to declaring open season on US troops by rebel snipers, a condition that caused extreme anger, frustration and demoralization among the force. In Panama during the two-year crisis prior to Just Cause, US forces doing guard duty were instructed to challenge armed intruders verbally before chambering a round or opening fire. Field officers, especially Marines who lived daily with the haunting memory of the Beirut bombing, objected that the ROE unnecessarily placed their men in jeopardy.

An interesting point regarding ROE in both the Dominican intervention and Panama was that these constraints were not imposed by political authorities on reluctant military commanders. Rather, the rules

8 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

in each case were promulgated by military commanders who, while certainly following political guidance, truly believed the constraints were necessary and appropriate for mission accomplishment. That troops in the field held a different view was a challenge for small-unit leaders and for field officers performing liaison duties in higher headquarters.

The role of combat troops. Nontraditional operations often require combat units. In some cases, combat is a prelude to OOTW; in others, the threat of combat may permeate the operation. In either event, units involved will have to adjust and adapt not only to restrictive ROE but to the missions they will be called on to perform. Virtually every nontraditional operation case study involving combat units is replete with a litany of complaints that the troops were not prepared or trained to perform many of the noncombat tasks assigned to them. Such tasks have included distributing food, manning checkpoints, collecting money for weapons, serving as military police, quelling civil disturbances, picking up garbage, administering to cities and towns, providing a "presence," reassuring local inhabitants, negotiating with civic leaders, arbitrating between contending factions, rebuilding infrastructure and escorting VIPs, just to name a few. The "warrior" mind-set so essential for combat operations can be the source of anger, confusion, frustration and failure when applied unmodified to OOTW. With this in mind, three points need to be made:

Staff officers planning combat operations should not ignore OOTW aspects of their overall mission just as OOTW planners cannot afford to ignore possible combat operations. Combat troops should be prepared for the variety of noncombat tasks they will inevitably be called on to perform in OOTW. Whether they should train for these tasks is a controversial point, but morale and efficiency dictate that they should at least be briefed about adjustments they may have to make. Combat unit commanders should recognize that a conventional mind-set or warrior mentality may be highly inappropriate, even counterproductive, to the task at hand and may need to be tailored for nontraditional operations.14

What is required, in short, is adaptability. As one general put it, "Rigid military thinking that's inflexible and not innovative does not apply; it gets you in more trouble."15

Cross-cultural interaction. Perhaps the most difficult adjustment troops must make is to the target area's culture. On this point, the study of history is critical. It reveals to officers how the current situation arose, together with the complexity and nuances of that situation. Of no less importance is that by addressing cultural issues history can prepare officers for the society they will encounter and the range of actions culturally acceptable in solving the problem at hand.

Ethnocentrism and cultural arrogance often accompany US troops into foreign countries. As Edward Lansdale, a proponent of counterinsurgency in the Philippines and Vietnam, once conceded, "I took my American beliefs into these Asian struggles." So, too, did a Marine general going into Somalia, where he was ill-prepared at first to negotiate with clan and faction leaders imbued with a sense of communal responsibility as opposed to the sense of individual responsibility found in the West.16 By revealing the cultural diversity the world has known since ancient times, history can help officers better understand non-Western societies, interact with people within those societies and adapt to cultural differences in ways that will facilitate rather than impede mission accomplishment.

An awareness of cultural differences might also temper overoptimistic progress reports, reveal the fallacy of short-term solutions to long-term problems and caution against unrealistic end states. Over the last century, the United States has intervened militarily in several countries to create stability by

9 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

establishing democratic governments backed by professional military forces patterned after the US model. These objectives may be essential for gaining public support for overseas ventures, but it is the troops on the ground who quickly realize-and often pay the price for-imposing Western institutions on countries whose historical odyssey has taken them in other directions.

The themes and patterns discussed here are by no means exhaustive of those to be found in nontraditional operations. What this article suggests is that the task of better preparing officers for OOTW can be furthered by a thorough analysis of the historical record, first to uncover relevant analogies, patterns and recurring themes and second to understand the implications of each for current and future operations. This comprehensive approach to the historical record is a time-consuming task that cannot be performed on the eve of deployment. Rather, it should be an integral part of an ongoing professional education. At the least, an officer should possess an in-depth awareness of a series of case studies relating to nontraditional operations.17

All US officers-especially those in the combat arms-preparing to participate in a nontraditional operation should deploy with a mind-set at odds with much of what they have been taught about war. They should be prepared to see many traditional assumptions of their profession violated. They should not expect clear guidance, at least not while a situation is still highly fluid, but should learn to live with ambiguity. They should not expect to operate in a political vacuum, even at the tactical level, and they should not expect to find themselves in a black-and-white "morality play" pitted against an easily identifiable enemy located across a clearly demarcated line. They should expect changing and additional missions and tasks, but should not expect to be allowed to use every means at their disposal to carry out those missions. They should expect to be ordered to perform tasks for which they have never or rarely trained. They should expect to be called on to demonstrate restraint, together with a keen sensitivity to political considerations and to alien cultures, either or both of which they might find repugnant or unintelligible. They should expect ambiguity, fluidity, constraints, dejection, frustration and the unknown-in short, they should expect the worst. If these expectations are not realized, they will be pleasantly surprised. If the worst does occur, officers and soldiers will be better prepared to deal with the situation.MR

1. US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 13-0. 2. Doctrine categorizes interventions such as Operation Just Cause in Panama as "limited war" because they entail armed conflict. But the combat, while often extensive and intensive, is usually constrained and over in a matter of hours or a few days at most, after which noncombat tasks come to the forefront. From another perspective, to categorize these contingency operations as "limited war" would, for some, put them on an equal footing with Korea and Vietnam. For these reasons, and without in any way minimizing the combat experience of the participants, I and others would place such interventions under operations other than war (OOTW). Doctrine itself concedes that OOTW will not always be peaceful actions. See FM 100-5, 2-1, 13-2. 3. This figure is by no means comprehensive, nor does it employ today's doctrinal terms. Further, some might dispute the placement of specific operations or wars in certain categories. For example, it could be argued that certain Vietnam war aspects qualify it as unconventional warfare rather than mid-intensity conflict. These qualifications aside, however, the figure is designed to demonstrate the preponderance of nontraditional, unorthodox operations in US military history. 4. For a discussion on how nontraditional, unorthodox operations have been categorized since the early 1980s and the implications thereof, see David Fastabend, "The Categorization of Conflict," Parameters (Summer 1997), 75-87. It is not my intention in this article to debate terminology and categorization. Therefore, I chose to use the terms "nontraditional operations" and "unorthodox operations" in an

10 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

evocative manner and leave precise definitions to others. 5. One succinct argument for the relevancy of the Marine experience in Haiti in the first half of the century can be found in LTC Thomas Adams' "Intervention in Haiti: Lessons Relearned," Military Review (September-October 1996), 45-56. 6. For a more detailed discussion of force protection issues in Bosnia and Haiti, see the articles by LTC Walter Kretchik and MAJ Robert Shaw in this issue. It has been suggested that the conduct of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) [10th MD (L)] in Operation Restore Hope, the first phase of US involvement in Somalia, might have been a more apt analogy to apply to Haiti and Bosnia than that same division's experience as the quick reaction force during the UN phase of the Somalia operation, the phase during which the 3 October fire fight took place. 7. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). Generally, historians and political scientists make these calculations as a matter of course. Douglas Pike, one of America's leading authorities on Vietnamese communism, was once asked what he would advise to ensure a successful outcome to the US counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador in the 1980s. The question assumed, of course, that the war in Vietnam was a suitable analogy to the war in El Salvador. Pike answered by noting the tremendous differences between the two cases and concluded by saying that his advice would be to remove all Vietnam veterans from El Salvador. 8. The patterns and themes presented here have been selected because they reveal ways in which OOTW differ in kind or degree from conventional operations. Thus, problems involving command and control, planning, intelligence, logistics, joint and combined operations and so forth will not be addressed unless they illuminate some significant difference between the two kinds of operations. This is not to imply that they are not present in OOTW. 9. Remarks of a Marine Corps general officer (In accordance with Command and General Staff College's nonattrition policy for statements by visiting speakers, further reference will be "Marine general.") Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The search for enemies can have a constructive, as well as tragic, side. A US brigade commander in Haiti employed traditional terminology in an innovative way when he defined his "enemy" as anyone impeding him from accomplishing his mission. On a given day, the enemy might be the mayor of a town, the local priest or a fellow officer up the chain of command. Defeating the enemy meant finding imaginative ways, well short of deadly force, to overcome the impediments. Another problem arising from a conventional view of the enemy is the disorientation experienced by US troops in operations requiring them to work alongside forces clearly regarded as hostile. This happened in Panama, where as soon as major combat operations against the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) ended, US soldiers found themselves patrolling the streets of Panama City with armed PDF remnants, people who, just a few days before, they had been trying to kill or had been trying to kill them but who were now being reconstituted as the new Panamanian police force. Many US soldiers who helped patrol talked about the difficulty of the adjustment they had to make and about the wisdom of walking at port arms a few steps behind a Panamanian. In Haiti, there was no combat, but US soldiers nevertheless expressed some initial confusion and wariness about working with General Raoul Cedras and members of the Haitian armed forces (FAd'H), an organization that had been targeted for destruction in US contingency plans for combat operations in the country. Given the situation's ambiguity, differences arose within the US military, specifically between Special Forces and 10th MD (L) units stationed in Port-au-Prince, on just how to interact with members of this "hostile" and despised organization. 10. On the issue of military-nongovernmental organizations/private volunteer organizations cooperation and the "cultural differences" that impede cooperation, see COL Guy C. Swan III, "Bridging the Nongovernmental Organization-Military Gap," Military Review (September-October 1996), 30-37. 11. Roger J. Spiller, `Not War But Like War': The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper No.3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 20-22, 24-25. In contrast to Lebanon, where the ambassador established his authority only after a near miss with disaster, the

11 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/yat.html

American ambassador to the Dominican Republic clearly dictated when and where US troops would come ashore in 1965. The civilian and military chains of command remained separated during the crisis, but the Pentagon used the military chain to notify ranking officers on the scene to follow the ambassador's instructions. The early phase of the operation had its share of problems, but few if any were related to a breakdown in political-military cooperation and coordination. 12. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth Paper No.15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), 73. In the Dominican Republic, the US forces' mission changed frequently in response to the fluid situation; the opposite was true during the Marine operation in Beirut from 1982 to 1984. There the situation changed, but the mission remained the same, with tragic consequences. There is, of course, always the possibility of being deployed with no mission at all. The Eisenhower administration's troop commitment to Lebanon in 1958 offers an example of this possibility. The crisis' urgency seemed to require a US military response, but because the situation was unclear and unstable, determining that response remained an open question while the administration assessed day-to-day developments. In the meantime, the US Army troop commander arriving in Lebanon greeted them by admitting, "What our future mission may be, I cannot tell you." Historians have judged the Lebanon intervention in 1958 a successful political-military operation. It is difficult today to imagine US troops being committed to such an open-ended situation with such limited guidance. 13. Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 14. One example may serve to illustrate this last point. Rangers in Just Cause continued wearing camouflage paint after the fighting had ended, and one of their primary missions was to assist in the restoration of security and stability. After a few days, it became apparent that the face paint was having a negative effect on the local citizens, the vast majority of whom supported the US invasion of Panama. Given the new and, for many Rangers, frustrating noncombat mission, the decision was ultimately made to drop the camouflage. Rules against accepting food from the grateful Panamanians remained in place, however, lest the locals come to expect something in return. 15. Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 16. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New York: Random House, 1989), 348; Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

17. A suggested reading list for nontraditional US military operations in the 20th century can be found in the "Bookshelf" section of this issue. Lawrence A. Yates is chief of the Historical Services Committee, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, where he teaches courses in military history and operations other than war. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from the University of Missouri at Kansas City and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas. He has written a book on the 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic and has published several scholarly articles dealing with nontraditional military operations. He is currently writing a history of Joint Task Force Panama and the Panama crisis.

12 of 12 3/11/98 12:32 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html Task Force Eagle

by Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie, US Army

During the summer of 1994, while serving as the deputy chief of staff G2/G3, Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), I was told I would become the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M) of the 1st Armored Division (1st AD). After the initial euphoria of being selected for this position, I realized my ARRC planning and close coordination experience concerning deployment to Bosnia might come in handy if a peace plan of any sort could be cobbled together.

My association with Bosnia and potential deployment as a peacekeeper actually began in March 1993 while on temporary assignment to Allied Forces, Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) headquarters in Naples, Italy. I was hastily summoned to the headquarters and told to be prepared to brief the commander in chief SOUTH in 48 hours about the ARRC proposal to command and control NATO ground forces sent to Bosnia in support of the then Vance-Owen Peace Plan.

My G2/G3-led core planning team members had been alerted and were already on their way when I received the mission. Over the next 48 hours, deep in the AFSOUTH bunker complex, we hacked out some crude "yardstick" assumptions and the first cut at the troop task requirements.

From this point, life as an ARRC staff member-as far as deployment to Bosnia goes-was an "on again-off again" roller-coaster affair. Between March 1993 and my departure in November 1994, I had several "recces" in Bosnia searching for the best ARRC head-quarters site, as well as attempting to judge where potential contributing nations' sectors might be.

The spring through autumn 1994 months involved much ARRC-1st AD planning, coordination and "what if" drills. We looked at several alternate deployment options and worked up a set of plans for each.

I then bade farewell to the ARRC and assumed my duties as 1st AD ADC-M. For a while at least, life was fairly normal in the division, with Bosnia planning on the back burner. However, activities in and around the enclaves of Srebrenica, Gorazda and Zepa caused us to start planning possible land extractions for personnel in the enclaves. Later that summer, the 1st AD lent its support to a United States Army Europe (USAREUR) training effort for the llth Aviation Brigade and 3d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Brigade, as they participated in certification training for possible employment as an aviation-based extrication force. After the enclaves "fell," Bosnia planning once again played second fiddle to coordination and preparation for autumn "IRON THUNDER" gunnery and Combat Maneuver Training Center rotations.

As I recall, we had just started the September gunnery rotation when the Bosnia peace talks took on new meaning. The factions appeared to have reached their culminating points, and the negotiators were now talking of a monumental meeting in Dayton, Ohio, where a peace treaty would be outlined.

Preparation. The division was fully immersed in gunnery qualification, but the reality of deployment now seemed to be upon us. In early October we began preparation for certification and deployment as the US contribution to the newly created Implementation Force (IFOR). This preparation was the most strenuous training regimen I had been exposed to in my then 31-year career. As depicted in Figure 1, the

1 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

events cover nearly every possible contingency-every type event we thought might be encountered once we deployed.

Each crew was required to qualify their vehicle according to standard USAREUR policy. Nonstandard training included a political-military (Pol-Mil) day, when we were exposed to Bosnia's history and heard firsthand accounts from people who had served there. We were also prepped by leading media authorities on what to expect from the media and were put through the paces by the V Corps staff, acting as USAREUR Forward, in a series of tough command post exercises (CPXs) and fire coordination exercises (FCXs). We also experimented with how to establish a zone of separation (ZOS), separate factions and conduct joint military commissions (JMCs) in an exercise dubbed IRON WARRIOR.

After conducting the toughest, most-concentrated training our Army has ever done, we were well along the road to readiness. Since the treaty had not yet been signed, a pre-condition for any deployment, we began a series of in-country reconnaissance visits and kicked off this series with a commander's recon, which we conducted jointly with our anticipated new headquarters, the ARRC.

This brief but crucial recon set the stage for another series of events illustrated in Figure 2. These exercises were designed to familiarize us with the country and to "set" the conditions for deployment. Perhaps the most important reconnaissance effort was 1st AD Chief of Staff Colonel John Brown's recon, designed to stake out headquarters base camp locations, meet with local officials and set up initial contracts.

Following this critically important recon, I led two commander's recons myself. We got to do the first two but were overtaken by events when the treaty's signing preempted the second group of brigade commanders entering the country. However, we still had time for one last CPX to ensure we had not lost our sharpness.

Other readiness activities we had to accomplish while the leaders were undergoing Exercise MOUNTAIN EAGLE events included:

Training and certification. Personnel readiness. Force modernization. Equipment readiness. Rear detachment preparation. Family support groups (FSGs).

Other noteworthy items included the attention that was paid to FSGs, rear detachment personnel and force modernization. Our commander, Major General William L. Nash, made a series of great calls when he stacked the Division REAR with the best commanders and staff. This quality in the rear detachments paid big dividends and was the perfect complement to a strong FSG organization. Our operational planners also allowed time for force modernization-America will not send its soldiers into harm's way without the most modern equipment. Everything from state-of-the-art cold weather gear, tactical satellite communications and "up-armored," high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles came our way while we were preparing for deployment.

2 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

As you might imagine, this same attention to detail was given to soldier and unit certification, as well as the headquarters and its personnel. The notable items are too numerous to list here with the exception of mine-awareness training. I firmly believe the quality of this training is the primary reason we had so few mine casualties, even with the vast mine pollution in Bosnia.

The Task Force (TF) Eagle mission statement's language was specific: "On order, TF Eagle deploys to SECTOR TUZLA, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and conducts peace enforcement operations to compel compliance with the peace accord; ensures force protection." We wanted to compel the factions to comply so that over a short time, it would almost become rote on their part. Compel has a rather negative ring to it, but it was clear we were not to bully but to encourage, approaching any interface with the respective factions from a position of professionalism and strength.

Paramount in everything we planned and accomplished was a concentration on force protection. We addressed force protection issues in many ways, from uniform policies-flak jackets, helmets and weapons-to forming special staff groups designed to stay abreast of all issues relevant to force protection.

Any complex operation normally requires breaking it into manageable "chunks," which we call phases. This operation was no exception. Phase One preparation began with alert and ended when the last TF Eagle unit was certified and prepared for deployment. Tasks we considered key were:

Continued contingency planning. Designing the force and allocating sectors. Forming, training and certifying the force. Conducting in-theater reconnaissance visits. Deploying enabling forces. Conducting information operations.

TF Eagle accomplished all of these except the second tier of reconnaissance visits and the deployment of enabling forces. Our vision of "enabling forces" included special operations forces, early communications packages and contracting specialists, just to name a few. As a result of the "no deployment un-til the treaty is signed" parameter, we did without the crucial benefit of having "enablers" in-country before D-day.

Force composition. TF Eagle was composed of the units shown in Figure 3, which depicts the true "flavor" of this multinational TF. The TF headquarters was the standard 1st AD headquarters with add-on specialties that allowed us to successfully function in a peace enforcement (PE) environment. The base US force, apart from the headquarters element, consisted of two heavy brigades totaling approximately 4,400 soldiers and approximately 100 tanks each. We also deployed with one attack squadron and one lift squadron and were augmented with CH-47 Chinooks from Hungary. We also took our entire division artillery, which not only always stayed trained

3 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

and ready to fire but conducted several disparate missions such as being the Equipment Site Verification Headquarters and Minestrike Analysis Headquarters, both of which they performed with distinction.

Our Engineer brigade had two additional battalions-over and above its assigned direct support battalions-as well as an medium girder bridge and corps support element company. USAREUR also decided to give us an entire corps support package that included a military intelligence brigade, military police brigade, medical brigade, signal brigade and a corps support group. This was in addition to the 1st AD Division Support Command, which formed the support base for TF Eagle.

Rounding out TF Eagle were two Russian parachute battalions totaling almost 1,500 soldiers; a Turkish force built around a large Turkish mechanized infantry battalion with its supporting tank company and artillery battery; and the NORD/POL Brigade composed of Nordic forces and a Polish parachute battalion. As Figure 3 suggests, it is a large brigade of more than 4,500 soldiers built around a Swedish battalion, a Nordic logistic (NorLog) battalion and a Danish tank company-all of which had served as part of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). TF Eagle comprised about 22,500 soldiers. As I recall, US soldier in-country strength never rose much above 17,500 troops.

Timelines and sectors. Figure 4 portrays several critical timelines that dictated how we did business. G-day, when the peace treaty was signed, was the date when factions would cease fire and begin preparations along a timeline that required us to assume control of the operation in our sector four days later at a point called "Transfer of Authority" (TOA).

On G-day we planned to begin our airflow, which had two parts. First, TF Eagle's initial command and control (C2) elements and assault CP would deploy to Tuzla by air and prepare to assume control of selected UNPROFOR units, specifically the Swedish battalion, NorLog battalion, Turkish battalion and two Pakistani battalions, which were in the process of redeploying. Second, the 3d-325th Parachute Infantry Battalion would fly in and secure Tuzla air base.

Our task timeline started at TOA; 30 days later we were to have accomplished the tasks outlined in Figure 5. Although the "mission clock" was running, we had no forces in-country yet. We were to have separated the factions along the 310-kilometer (km) confrontation line in our sector, established the ZOS, cleared routes through it and marked and cleared minefields. Although other tasks needed to be done, we had only a minimal force package to accomplish what had to be done in the first 30 days.

4 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

TF Eagle had responsibility for the northeast quadrant of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in Figure 6. We had planned to move in and assume Sector NORTHEAST (SNE), UNPROFOR headquarters. We deployed to Bosnia and resided in both the Federation and the Republic of Serbska, which lay outside the Federation and stretched to our boundary.

and around the shaded area outlined in Figure 6. During TF Eagle's year in-country, over 4,332 mine belts containing more than 15,000 minefields and an estimated 3 million mines were located. It was here that the training we received in Germany paid great dividends.

In establishing operations bases, we were extremely careful to ensure we were equally represented in Serbska as well as the Federation. For example, the Turkish headquarters was in Muslim (Federation) territory, the Russian headquarters was in Serbska, with one battalion on each side of the cease-fire line. The US headquarters was likewise counterpoised to balance representation in each of the two largest former warring faction zones.

Transition operations. One of the operation's most sensitive phases was the transition between UNPROFOR forces and their leadership and TF Eagle. On our reconnaissance visits, we gathered data on all UNPROFOR unit locations and agreed on how we would transition the air base to IFOR control. We also agreed to do relief in place operations where we could, and arranged for selected training for newly assigned UNPROFOR units to TF Eagle. Other coordination items were force "bed down" locations and our most probable force composition assessment. Much of what was discussed was based on "best available" information, but we at least understood one another before the flow into country started.

Along with this transition discussion, we developed a list of "early musts" necessary for success. We knew we had to quickly establish permanent liaison with SNE. Since two US officers had been in SNE headquarters, we readily adopted them into the TF Eagle fraternity.

We soon realized that contracting across a broad range of activities was an immediate need to support the rapid buildup of forces flowing into this immature theater. We also realized that we had to get our

5 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

civil affairs and media operations apparatus into high gear early. Last, early enhancements to the Tuzla airfield were an absolute necessity if we were to establish an effective deployment and sustainment "air bridge."

Predeployment intelligence. Our intelligence and information exchange among UNPROFOR, TF Eagle and the ARRC proved to be very good. The factional unit distribution and headquarters locations shown in Figure 7 were nearly 100-percent correct. We had been provided with solid information, reinforced by face-to-face conversations with UNPROFOR representatives during the commander's reconnaissance. Additional intelligence, which proved to be highly accurate over time, predicted the potential flashpoint areas shown in Figure 8. After deploying, we learned these areas were fairly predictable due to both the large amount of ethnic cleansing and relocation that occurred before the treaty and the population's desire to return to the status quo immediately after IFOR's occupation.

Deployment concept. A simple overview of our deployment concept follows:

Airflow from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, to Tuzla Air Base; and from Vicenza, Italy, the home of the 3d-325th Parachute Infantry, also to Tuzla. The bulk of the force came by rail from their bases in Germany to the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) in Kaposvar, Hungary, then by road march south through Zupanja, Croatia, across the Sava River into our sector. A subsequent deployment route exited Germany by rail to Slavonsky Brod, Croatia, then on to staging area (SA) HARMON at Zupanja, then across the Sava into AOR TUZLA.

Figure 9 illustrates our headquarters echelonment C2 nodes. Our plan had the ASSAULT CP flying in, beginning on G-day. The initial REAR CP embryo moved to SA HARMON in Zupanja, and the Division MAIN CP moved via rail and road over the deployment route into the sector and collocated with the ASSAULT CP around the old SNE UNPROFOR headquarters at Tuzla Air Base.

6 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

The initial C2 structure had the ADC-M establishing the ASSAULT CP (soon joined by the TF commander), the ADC-Support running the REAR CP, the chief of staff running the MAIN CP and the REAR CP detachment commander running the Division MAIN(-), otherwise called the Deployment CP, in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

Initially, we used a combination of US and UN communication systems already in place. Of critical importance was establishing communications connectivity with the ARRC. We had a terrible time trying to keep communications equipment on a high-priority list for airlift from Ramstein to Tuzla. After being "bumped" several times, US and British communicators had equipment pieces sent from Kiseljak over the mountains and fabricated a single-access node from scratch that effectively established connectivity with the ARRC.

River crossing and entry. The lead TF Eagle element into Bosnia was TF 3-325, which was airlifted into Tuzla to secure the air base. The initial ground force deploying over land was the Ready First Combat Team from the 1st Brigade, 1st AD, which would cross the engineer bridge, move south and establish a combat-force presence along objectives CADILLAC, LOTUS and BUICK, which formed a bridgehead line dubbed Phase Line PRINCE.

Once sufficient combat power crossed the bridge, the 1st Brigade pushed farther south along the main highway later dubbed Route ARIZONA and established a second series of objectives named MARY and JANE, as seen in Figure 9. During this deployment's phase, our mission was "On Order, TF Eagle conducts a deliberate river crossing to project combat power across the Sava River and continue movement into Sector TUZLA."

Since there was no guarantee our deployment into Bosnia would be entirely permissive, we had to do all the minute planning and preparation for a deliberate river crossing. It was to be a division-controlled operation using a large measure of higher headquarters engineer assets. The mission was to be conducted on a narrow front with rapid movement into the Possavina Corridor with the 1st Brigade leading, followed by the 2d Basic Combat Team then by the multinational brigade, later named the NORD/POL Brigade.

Under normal conditions, this 200- to 300-meter-wide river, with banks needing preparation, is difficult to cross. Add severe winter weather, thigh-deep mud and the worst flooding in the century, and it became an unbelievably complex operation; it required extreme flexibility and agility, initially to recover and then to drive on to mission completion. The Sava bridging effort story is beyond the scope of this article, but I will tell you it was a magnificent achievement accomplished by young, tireless American soldiers who just did not know the meaning of the word "quit."

Implementation. Phase III, Implementation, started on D-day (G+4) and was completed when we had established the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) and the ZOS was established within the TF Eagle area of responsibility (AOR). Tasks we accomplished during this phase included establishing freedom of movement within the sector and across the ZOS; continued flow from ISB into key locations in the

7 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

AOR; developing military infrastructure; enforcing the General Framework for the Agreement of Peace (GFAP); assisting the withdrawal of UNPROFOR units; safeguarding the movement of civilians; assisting humanitarian efforts within capabilities; and expanding the force in the AOR.

These tasks were done concurrently while we were supervising the withdrawal of factional forces and heavy weapons, locked in hand grenade throwing range, back 2 km from the IEBL across the entire 310 km in our sector.

We accomplished this mission with minimum troop strength through a series of coordination meetings, called JMCs, wherein we reviewed GFAP tenets and demonstrated, through confidence-building measures, that we were impartial and would ensure that the other factions did not take advantage of voluntary movement 2 km back from the IEBL.

In some cases, we had to show force to effect factional movement, but thankfully there was a much higher than anticipated degree of compliance by all concerned. This compliance made mission accomplishment with minimum soldiers "doable" within the tight parameters laid down by the negotiators in Dayton, Ohio.

Measures of success-tracking mechanisms. It became obvious early in the operation that there was a nonstandard requirement to develop a system capable to track hundreds of bits of critical information and display them in a rapid, easily understood manner. This was an evolutionary process to be sure, but one that was an absolute necessity. We initially focused on the ZOS where the "bedrock" treaty mission focused. We decided to break the 310-km ZOS into bite-size, manageable chunks on which we could focus when desired.

Most of these blocks were from 4 to 6 km in size and were numbered sequentially commencing in the southwest with the Turkish sector. Each block was delineated on the map and labeled with a number between Zl and Z60. Placed at the boundary of each ZOS block was an arrow-like, color-coded (red, amber or green) indicator (see Figure 10) that gave a quick visual reference of the operations status in that particular block. These indicators were easily readable anywhere in the operations "pit."

For the nightly roll-up briefing, we consolidated the blocks into sector-size roll-ups and displayed the same data as on the map. This mechanism was only one of many stylized visual presentations developed over time to meet the TF Eagle's commander's C2 needs. I liken the day-to-day control and manage-ment of TF Eagle operations as more of a gigantic citywide construction project with thousands of information bytes that needed to be monitored.

JMCs. I had the privilege to head the first unofficial JMC for TF Eagle on D-2. It was conducted directly astride the cease-fire line on a road only recently cleared of mines, with members of all three factions and my UNPROFOR sponsors attending. This briefing's purpose was to introduce all participants to IFOR and, more important, to set the stage and ground rules for the first official JMC meeting to be conducted immediately after TOA by the TF commander.

We called these JMC coordination meetings "a forum for military and civilian authorities to coordinate implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement." These forums were used to convey the commander's intent to each of the former warring factions normally, (but not exclusively) in a trilateral meeting. They were also used as mechanisms to issue instructions to the parties, for arbitration and for

8 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

facilitating negotiations. This organization was built from scratch by Colonel Hank Stratman, a special staff officer brought on board by Nash specifically to handle these missions. Over time, it matured into a full-up staff section that became a focal point for operations in Bosnia.

Figure 11 depicts how the JMC operated. Using the peace accord's outline of military "musts," Stratman assembled indicators from across the staff and provided the commander with a status of factional compliance and the effects on TF Eagle's success.

During the actual JMC meetings, Nash would issue color coded red, amber or green status sheets-a report card of sorts-to each factional representative. These reports showed each representative how they were doing as well as how the other factions were doing. This "carrot and stick" approach worked extremely well in furthering the desire to willingly comply with all peace accord aspects.

Continue mission. From D+45 through D+91, TF Eagle was involved in TOA security in areas that had been contested and were occupied by factional troops. The treaty mandated that these areas be returned to another faction at D+45. As one might imagine, this was a highly emotional issue and required physical TF Eagle force presence to preclude violence. Following this mission, we oversaw the movement of all heavy weapons to designated storage sites, the movement of factional armies to cantonment areas and demobilization of the majority of their forces. Subsequently, we were tasked to provide security for the initial national elections.

When I left Bosnia on 11 June 1995, we had an accurate count and location of each faction's heavy weapons and were routinely inspecting those sites ourselves, as well as assisting the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in their official inspection efforts. Our force was preparing for election support and beginning the initial planning excursions for redeployment to home station.

Since my participation in TF Eagle, I am often asked about the "train-up" versus "retraining for employment" as a part of a major theater war package. I honestly believe combat forces are the right forces for PE missions. The signal that is sent when your credentials are the materials of war is a powerful motivator of compliance. This opinion was shared by at least one Bosnian corps commander who, when pointing to 4,500 of his troops in formation, stated: "All my men out there are fighters, not yet soldiers. You Americans are soldiers. You all dress alike, you all have discipline, you have clean weapons at the ready, you always travel in four vehicle convoys, even your helicopters fly in formation. Soldiers do that and we notice it."

I believe that continuing to train in conventional ways to the extent possible as we did with our tanks, Bradleys and dismounted rifle squads in Hungary, and our small arms in-country, helps reduce conventional warfighting "decay." This "on deployment" training helps to reduce the time it takes to get back into major theater warfighting fitness. After the 1st AD completes its training package, we will be able to assess about how long it takes to "come back" from PE to conventional readiness.

Another question I am often asked is, "Was our effort worth it?" During the fighting, dozens of people were killed daily, schools were closed, shops were locked up and terror reigned. Since the deployment of IFOR, and now the Stabilization Force, this has stopped. The killing has stopped, the schools are open,

9 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/che.html

shops and trade flourish and genocide has ceased .You make the call!MR

Brigadier General Stanley F. Cherrie is the assistant chief of staff for Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Rutgers University and an M.S. in Public Administration from Shippensburg University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, the British Army Staff College and the Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver, 1st Armored Division; G2/G3, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps; G3 VII US Corps; commander, 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Forward); and commander, 3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. His article "Multi- National Minestrike Recovery Operation" appeared in the July-August 1997 Engineer Journal.

10 of 10 3/11/98 12:33 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html Force Protection Disparities

by Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik, US Army

The term force protection appears in this article 78 times. For brevity, in this article only, we use the acronym FP. Readers should understand that FP is not an approved acronym.-Editor

[T]he IFOR commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission from any Party, . . . to protect the IFOR.1

--Dayton Peace Accords

Force protection (FP)* is a planned and integrated security program designed to protect soldiers, facilities and equipment in all locations and situations.2 The commander establishes soldier FP levels to include the wearing of body armor, helmets and other equipment as the threat warrants. The commander also analyzes and compensates for other force threats such as disease, weather, crime, complacency, terrorism, morale, safety and other considerations. A commander who fails to examine FP requirements exposes his force to hazards that can cause his unit's attrition over time. A thoroughly analyzed FP policy, integrated throughout the operation, is an essential element for mission success.

During Operation Joint Endeavor, the NATO peace enforcement (PE) operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a disparity in FP policy arose within the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). Unlike their fellow American soldiers who were assigned to NATO, US troops under US European Command (EUCOM) General Order Number One were forbidden from consuming alcohol. NATO soldiers, including assigned US forces, roamed the streets of Sarajevo enjoying shopping, alcohol and restaurants, while US EUCOM soldiers in the same location under the 1st Armored Division's (1st AD) Task Force (TF) Eagle were prohibited from drinking alcohol, wore Kevlar helmets and body armor and were confined to post during off-duty hours.

IFOR soldier's reactions to the FP policy differed. Most NATO US troops enjoyed their personal freedom and took advantage of it. Numerous EUCOM soldiers complained bitterly about the restrictive FP policy in letters to Stars and Stripes newspaper.3 Meanwhile, most allied IFOR soldiers performed their duties without body armor or helmets. Swedish members of the Nordic/Polish (NORD/POL) Brigade under TF Eagle jokingly labeled their US EUCOM counterparts "ninja turtles." 1st AD staff members countered that comment by referring to NORD/POL soldiers as "hillbillies."4

This article examines "why" and "how" the IFOR FP disparities originated. It is hoped that by examining the IFOR FP policy we can determine its effect on the IFOR mission and the force and its implications for future PE operations.

Common Vision: The Conflict's Nature

On 27 November 1995, President Bill Clinton announced he was sending US troops into Bosnia to support NATO operations there. Although this was to be a PE operation, the president warned that casualties were expected. He also noted that US forces, part of the Dayton Peace Accord-approved IFOR, would be commanded by a US general and capable of protecting themselves.5

1 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

Soon after the president's Bosnia deployment announcement, then Secretary of Defense William H. Perry noted that US forces needed to posture themselves for mid-intensity conflict.6 That position was reflected by US commanders during national command backbriefs. US commanders planned a show of force, complete with tanks and armored vehicles,

designed to intimidate the former warring factions. When the US Army's 1st AD troops crossed the Sava River float bridge into Bosnia and Herzegovina on 31 December 1995, they arrived astride tanks and armored vehicles and wore Kevlar helmets and body armor for personal protection. Reminiscent of President Theodore Roosevelt's naval "World Tour," the US Army force demonstration attempted to convince the former warring factions that US IFOR could protect itself if the need arose.7

The French and British commanders, during their portion of the national command backbriefs, did not reflect the US national view or the US commander's mission assessment. Instead, they mirrored their own national views that Joint Endeavor was a peace operation. Some allied forces relaxed their FP posture after assessing the threat situation, by reverting to berets and soft caps and removing their body armor.8 US commanders, after conducting their own threat assessment, continued to enforce the same FP uniform in which they deployed. In effect, each national command saw the threat differently. Military commanders therefore analyzed the mission from divergent national perspectives and deployed their troops in a variety of FP postures.

Twisting Chains of Command

IFOR's lack of common national vision was reflected in national chain of command lines. IFOR used the command structure noted in the figure.9

The IFOR allied national chain of command was fairly clear. Most IFOR allied nations traced their national command authority (NCA) channels through either the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SAC-EUR) (US) or the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) (US) to a national liaison officer (LNO). The chain then went through or around the Commander Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) (UK) to each national unit.10

US forces had two national chains, depending on who commanded them. US NATO troops received their national direction from the NCA to SACEUR to the Commander IFOR (COMIFOR) (US) in his US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR) capacity, then to the COMARRC and TF Eagle, if applicable. US Army Europe (USAREUR), as the US EUCOM Army Service Component Command, retained command of US Army forces less NATO Operational Control (OPCON) after transfer of authority (TOA). The 1st AD received its NCA orders through US EUCOM

2 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

to USAREUR to USAREUR Forward, then to the 1st AD/TF Eagle.

The COMARRC or COMIFOR resolved any FP issues for US soldiers he controlled. CINCUSAR-EUR resolved FP issues for 1st AD, but that left COMIFOR, a US CINC, out of the FP decision process for the US Army TF Eagle soldiers over whom he held NATO OPCON. Any US Army FP policy conflict between COMARRC and TF Eagle went to either the CINCEUR or the NCA for resolution.

Logistics, Personalities and Politics

The US Army's Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) attempted to correct the Army's dual command channel by suggesting a single national chain of command that would run from the NCA to CINCEUR to USNAVEUR, to include US Army personnel assigned to the ARRC and anywhere else in-theater, to TF Eagle.11

The BCTP recommendation was considered unworkable for several reasons. In NATO, logistics is a national and service responsibility. EUCOM is responsible for US force sustainment. Moreover, USAREUR is charged with sustaining US Army forces in Europe. USAREUR therefore created a logistic National Support Element (NSE) to support the 1st AD in TF Eagle. The NSE was primarily a USAREUR element, with little responsibility for sustaining services other than the Army.12

USNAVEUR could have commanded the NSE, with augmentation, under the supporting CINC to supported CINC concept. However, several USAR-EUR staff officers believed the CINCUSAREUR did not want to give up Army theater assets to USNAVEUR. Moreover, USAREUR officers also believed that USNAVEUR lacked the requisite staff expertise to sustain a reinforced armored division.13

USAREUR staff members believed that both the CINCUSAREUR and the V Corps commander were skeptical of NATO's ability to deploy and protect US Army forces, specifically a reinforced armored division. Both commanders indicated to their staffs that an Army corps headquarters needed to provide the command and control node necessary to deploy, protect and sustain the force. Moreover, neither commander wanted to give up total control of the 1st AD.l4 The V Corps commander, convinced that the 1st AD needed a US corps headquarters to ensure mission success, told his plans officers in September 1995 to design an operational headquarters for Bosnia that spanned the strategic and tactical levels of war. He also told his staff that he wanted the headquarters to be about 90-percent logistical and 10-percent operational. Finally, he stressed the importance of FP and developing a concept for assisting TF Eagle with that concern.15

At the end of October 1995, the V Corps staff created "USAREUR Forward (F)," an operational-level headquarters using the V Corps jump tactical operations center as a base. With USAREUR concurrence, V Corps then manned the 250 soldier plus headquarters in Taszar, Hungary.16 The USAREUR (F) headquarters, located at the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB), worked with the NSE in Kaposvar, Hungary, to ensure USAREUR's troops were sustained and protected. USAREUR now had a US Army corps headquarters, albeit under a different name, in proximity to the theater.17 Since USAR-EUR retained command of TF Eagle, less NATO OPCON after TOA, US Army FP also remained a

3 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

USAREUR responsibility.18

US Army commanders took great care in examining every potential risk to deploying troops. The V Corps commander was especially fearful of terrorism and continually emphasized that to his staff. The V Corps G2 scrutinized the 1983 US Marine Corps Beirut bombing incident results in order to prevent such an occurrence. Furthermore, V Corps brought in outside expertise from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and elsewhere to break the FP concept down into functional areas and to plan accordingly.

The USAREUR (F) staff, under deputy chief of staff for intelligence (DCSINT) direction (in reality the G2 V Corps), formed a force protection working group (FPWG) to assist US Army forces under USAREUR command in-theater. The FPWG, primarily managed by two Army Military Intelligence majors, met several times each week with the staff to scrutinize the various aspects of FP. The group produced threat assessments, recommendations, policies and directives for the force as a whole. The FPWG also provided base camp assistance teams to monitor FP concerns at ports of debarkation, routes into the theater, the ISB and US Army base camps. The FPWG played a large role in helping 25,000 US troops enter Bosnia without a fatality or serious injury and with only three cold weather injuries.

Force Protection Disparities

The FPWG inadvertently contributed to friction within the coalition when it went to Sarajevo to examine living conditions for US soldiers and other FP issues. The FPWG reported that US Army soldiers, as well as other services under NATO command, were not wearing helmets and body armor.19 In Sarajevo, COMARRC had FP responsibility for IFOR ARRC headquarters troops, including US Army soldiers under NATO command. The ARRC US Army soldiers, like their allies, wore soft caps while walking the Sarajevo streets. Conversely, TF Eagle 1st AD soldiers in Sarajevo wore the same FP Kevlar helmets and body armor as the US Army soldiers in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Similar FP disparities existed throughout the theater.20

The variance in FP posture led to a disagreement between COMARRC and the US Army chain of command. The ARRC headquarters rationale for their FP policy was that body armor and helmets did not project the political objective that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was returning to normal. From the COMARRC's perspective Joint Endeavor was a peace operation, not combat. Further, ARRC leaders thought that the threat situation in Sarajevo at the time warranted the elimination of helmets and body armor. For USAREUR (F) and TF Eagle, however, the lack of FP gear smacked of command negligence. USAREUR (F) quickly pointed out that it had indicators of a higher threat to US Army forces than the ARRC perceived.21 To the USAREUR (F) chain of command, American soldiers are "worth more target points" in international politics than are other nations' soldiers and therefore require greater FP measures.22 The USAREUR (F) deputy commander (V Corps commander) went to Sarajevo to discuss COMARRC's FP level for US Army personnel. He was told politely that the ARRC FP level would remain the same.23

A similar IFOR FP disparity occurred at Eagle Base in Tuzla. Multinational Division North NORD/POL, Turkish and Russian brigade commanders provided TF Eagle with LNOs. However, those allied LNOs did not don the TF Eagle-command directed FP equipment US Army personnel wore.

US Army TF Eagle soldiers, but not IFOR allies, were ordered initially to wear their body armor and helmets on Eagle Base to protect themselves from potential snipers, mines and mortar threats. Yet, those same US soldiers went to sleep in canvas tents or UN metal shelters without wearing body armor. Soldiers were confused as to why they were wearing helmets and body armor every day to protect

4 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

themselves from "incoming," yet were not sleeping in hardened bunkers. The policy later changed to keeping body armor and protective masks nearby rather than wearing them.24

For FP reasons, IFOR soldiers were supposed to wear a helmet and body armor, carry a protective mask and be armed when leaving any base camp. When traveling by convoy, IFOR soldiers were required to take a minimum of four vehicles, with an automatic weapon on the front and rear vehicles. Like their US counterparts, allied IFOR soldiers complied with the "four-vehicle rule" but their personal FP levels again varied from nation to nation. While traveling throughout the IFOR area of responsibility one could see allies without helmets, body armor or carrying weapons to seeing allies in complete FP regalia. Some US Army officers, after observing the variances in uniforms, were convinced that American officers valued the lives of their troops more than their allied counterparts did.25

Coalition Force Protection Issues

Since FP was a national responsibility, it therefore was subject to interpretation. The IFOR's FP differences occurred initially because international operations views did not mesh. US commanders postured for a combat operation.26 The IFOR allies viewed Joint Endeavor as a peace operation. Without political agreement, IFOR FP policies lacked synchronization across the entire force.

Lack of a common operational vision was further reflected in IFOR chains of command. Because IFOR was a coalition of NATO and non-NATO members, each military force traced its national chain of command and FP policies through various channels. The IFOR allies, with one national chain of command, were able to resolve most national FP concerns fairly easily. US forces, particularly US Army forces, had problems. US soldiers under NATO wandered potential hotspots such as Sarajevo in the same uniform as their allies. US service personnel assigned to TF Eagle took a more war-like posture. The disparity in uniforms became so obvious that some US soldiers suffered morale problems, and allies ridiculed their partners. Some soldiers questioned the motives behind the entire policy. As one USAREUR sergeant put it, "Our officers don't trust us and simply want to keep incidents down."27

We can dismiss the lamentations about FP disparities as every soldier's right to gripe. However, the complaints say much about the US military in peace operations. It appears that the US military services lack a common vision for FP posture. A US soldier serving in Sarajevo under NATO or US command carries the same "political points" for those individuals who seek them. Why then was one US soldier in body armor and another in the same location, not? The answer: the US troops were under two different US national chains of command. Yet, if a US soldier under ARRC command was killed, COMIFOR-not the British ARRC commander-would have had to explain that to the US NCA. Since the "no body armor" policy for NATO ARRC troops was universal in Sarajevo, COMIFOR believed that US ARRC soldiers were adequately protected. However, the CINCUSAREUR and the V Corps commander did not accept that assessment and put their troops in the "ninja turtle" posture.28 The consequences of that flag-officer disagreement was that US FP policy in Sarajevo, especially for US Army soldiers, looked schizophrenic not only to IFOR, but also to the US EUCOM Army soldiers who endured it.

FP posture divergence also indicates that senior US Army commanders are extremely conservative in their decision making regarding potential casualties. While COMIFOR, a US Navy admiral, was willing to accept reasonable risk to achieve political objectives, US Army commanders clearly were not. While some would argue that wearing FP gear in Sarajevo was common sense, that was not the view of the COMIFOR or our IFOR allies.

The US Army's attitude toward FP might be explained by what some call "Desert Storm Syndrome,"

5 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

an unwarranted perception that the American Public now believes we can do military operations casualty free.29 Yet, the president himself told the nation when he ordered troops into Bosnia that casualties were to be expected. Surely, a commander cannot disregard casualties and will take prudent steps to protect his force. However, over-protecting soldiers in some situations, especially with coalitions, can be seen as timidity. As one NORD/POL officer told a US Army major, "I know you Americans wear all that gear because you are afraid, but don't worry, we'll protect you."30 US Army commanders might be thinking that they have to justify and explain every casualty to the NCA and the American people. If that is the case, we are heading down a dangerous road where "FP syndrome" will drive military courses of action and detract from mission accomplishment.

The FP dilemma between COMIFOR and USAR-EUR placed the SACEUR, as the common link between chains of command, in the ignoble position of US FP arbitrator. One national command chain, as suggested by BCTP, that ran through an IFOR combined joint TF (CJTF) headquarters-with USAR-EUR in support-could have reduced, if not eliminated, the FP discord. The CJTF commander, not the SACEUR, could have resolved the FP issue at a much lower level.

One can certainly argue that NATO's organization can be blamed for the multiple command-chain problems and US FP disparities in Sarajevo and elsewhere. However, coalition disharmony also stems from jointness issues, personality conflicts and parochialism. While some may argue that NATO does not totally understand the CJTF concept, NATO showed great adaptability in accommodating former communist bloc non-NATO force contributions during Joint Endeavor. NATO is probably more flexible than some imagine.

The lack of command jointness in Joint Endeavor seems to be more a US problem than a NATO one. US EUCOM, by allowing USAREUR to possess Title 10 authority and control of US Army forces less NATO OPCON, involuntarily created a dual US Army FP posture that competed in-theater with IFOR. USAREUR, by committing an entire corps headquarters and tremendous theater assets to support a reinforced division, was prone to retain Title 10 authority. Because of service and command intrigue, the FP issue became an irritant between the ARRC and USAREUR (F).

US commanders, especially those in V Corps, continually monitored FP throughout the operation. The commanders can point proudly to their FP record as a measure of mission success. The V Corps-designed FPWG, a nondoctrinal concept, had a lot to do with that accomplishment. However, FP affects the force as a whole and should be the staff responsibility of the deputy chief of staff for operations

(DCSOPS). The USAREUR (F) DCSINT's control of FP was personality- and situation-driven. That arrangement worked in the Balkans but may not be suitable for future peace operations. The services might want to examine the FPWG concept as a mechanism for synchronizing future FP measures.

Winston Churchill once said the only thing worse than fighting with allies was fighting without them.31 The IFOR mission was a military success despite FP anomalies. However, the outcome might have been different if the lack of coalition FP cohesion spread into other mission areas. A command that prides itself on "One Team-One Fight" needs to examine how it protects its entire force to ensure that future coalition peace operations accomplish the same ends with less fuss.32MR

1. Bosnia Peace Agreement, Article Vl, Deployment of the Implementation Force, signed in Paris, 14 December 1995.

6 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

2. US Army Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 1994), 106. 3. Carlos Bongioanni, "Liberties not uniform in Bosnia, GIs Find," Stars and Stripes, 1 April 1996, 1 and 5. 4. Bongioanni, 1. Judi Erickson, "U.S. troops in Bosnia `prisoners' of policies," Stars and Stripes, 21 April 1996, 1 and 5. Soon after the article appeared, I heard 1st Armored Division (1st AD) staff members in Tuzla using the term "hillbillies" when referring to officers of the Nordic/Polish Brigade (NORD/POL). Also related in my oral history interview with a NORD/POL liaison officer, conducted on 8 June 1996 in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Oral history material is used throughout this article without reference to individual names. Most transcripts have not been reviewed yet and are therefore protected by nonattribution. Unless otherwise stated, I personally viewed events referred to in this article. 5. "Gambling the presidency," The Economist, 2 December 1995, 22-23. 6. Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) Observations, 1. 7. Oral history interview with TF Eagle staff officer, 2 April 1996, in Slavonski Brod, Croatia. 8. Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Brings Bosnia Tactics That Tamed Wild West," The Wall Street Journal, 27 December 1995, 7. 9. BCTP Observations, 1. The diagram simplifies the command channels for the Russian and NORD/POL brigade units, some of which are not in NATO and therefore not under NATO operational control. 10. Some IFOR-contributing nations are not in NATO. Therefore, their respective chains of command either went through or around the ARRC depending on national agreements. As an example, Russia agreed to provide forces only if they were under US command vice NATO. 11. BCTP, Observations, 2. 12. Ibid. 13. In US joint doctrine, US EUCOM could have designated USNAVEUR as a combined/joint task force. The ARRC, as the ground component commander, would have sustained US forces through a national support element task-organized for force requirements. USAREUR, however, would have given up control of a large piece of Army theater assets to do that. BCTP observers, officers representing the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and many individuals within USAREUR and USAREUR Forward (F) believed that US EUCOM did not play a strong role in sorting out command and support relationships. Therefore, USAREUR did what it thought best for the Army. US Army plans officers at Air Force South also related similar concerns. Source: oral history interviews I conducted March through June 1996 at various locations. 14. The V Corps commander personally emphasized the importance of USAREUR (F) with many congressional delegations and other visitors during visitor briefings in the USAREUR (F) command post, Taszar, Hungary. Several experienced USAREUR and V Corps logisticians, as well as BCTP observers, noted the woeful failings of the NATO deployment system. An ongoing Pentagon study is addressing the problem. Many USAREUR (F) staff officers noted that the ARRC could not have done what was required to move the 1st AD into Bosnia. These observations are based on oral history interviews with USAREUR and USAREUR (F) officers in Taszar, Hungary, and Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and with USAREUR and V Corps staff officers in March and April 1996 in Taszar, Hungary. 15. Oral history interview with several V Corps plans officers at USAREUR (F), Taszar, Hungary, 13 April 1996, and oral history interviews with V Corps plans officers conducted by 90th Military History Detachment in Heidelberg, Germany. 16. A high-ranking USAREUR (F) staff member stated that USAREUR (F) was a facade for ensuring that the V Corps headquarters was in the theater. Since certain V Corps headquarters individuals did not trust the NATO or IFOR headquarters to deploy forces, it was imperative that a command and control

7 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

node be positioned where it could control the deployment and possibly fight into or out of Bosnia if things got bad. Oral history interview conducted at USAREUR (F), Taszar, Hungary. 17. Oral history interview with several USAREUR and USAREUR (F) operations and logistics officers, February through April 1996, at Taszar, Hungary. The Intermediate Staging Base was not in the designated Joint Endeavor Area of Responsibility. The National Support Element was under the control of USAREUR (F). Several V Corps staff officers stated that the corps needed to play a role in the operation in case the deployment turned into a combat operation. They did not believe that the ARRC was the right headquarters to command the 1st AD if a combat situation developed. 18. BCTP, Observations, 2. USAREUR and USAREUR (F) had US Code Title 10 authority over US Army forces not under NATO command in-theater, including the 1st AD. USAREUR (F) Force Protection (FP) Document dated 8 February 1996, signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence established FP standards for Task Force Eagle, 21st Theater Army Area Command (F) and 7th Signal Brigade. 19. Bongioanni, 1,5. See the 1 April 1996 Stars and Stripes cover for a photo of Joint Combat Camera personnel in Sarajevo in various degrees of FP apparel. Page 5, same issue, describes a US Army NATO officer operating in Serb-controlled territory without body armor or helmet. 20. CINCUSAREUR designated various officers throughout the theater as responsible for FP since USAREUR soldiers were not under NATO or IFOR command. The situation was extremely complex, confusing and frustrating. For example, CINCUSAREUR designated the NSE commander as being responsible for FP in Hungary. When a soldier who worked in Hungary went to Zagreb, he fell under yet a different officer who had a different standard. FP levels varied from place to place as did the threat. This fact was not always clear to the individual soldier who began to wonder if his chain of command knew what it was doing. Oral history interviews with numerous officers, noncommissioned officer's and enlisted soldiers conducted during the period February to August 1996 throughout the theater. 21. The USAREUR (F) DCSINT continually pointed out that US national intelligence systems provided much more information than the ARRC was aware of. The V Corps commander was concerned about potential Muslim extremists attacks on US soldiers for political reasons. That point became even more important after the bombing incident in Saudi Arabia. The ARRC staff did not share the above views. Personal interview with the USAREUR (F) DCSINT in Taszar, Hungary, 18 June 1996. 22. USAREUR (F) staff officer oral history in Taszar, Hungary, May 1995. 23. Comment by V Corps commander upon return from Sarajevo. Reinforced in oral history interview with Force Protection Work Group members, Taszar, Hungary, April, 1996. 24. The tent sides, while reinforced with plywood, were not sandbagged and there was no overhead cover. Oral histories in March 1996 in Tuzla, Bosnia, and Taszar, Hungary. 25. I witnessed the variety of uniforms in my travels throughout the area. One USAR-EUR (F) FP officer related that several former warring factions senior officers told him Americans were consistent and were always wearing their combat equipment, while the allies seemed to wear what they wanted when they wanted. Oral history interview March 1996, Taszar, Hungary. 26. BCTP, Observations, 1. 27. Oral history interviews with many V Corps staff officers suggest that the soldier in question was not far from being correct. One officer noted that "The USAREUR and V Corps commanders do not want the same stuff here that occurs in Heidelberg every day. Anyone can hold their breath for a year." 28. The CINCUSAREUR and V Corps commander discussed the issue over the command Video Teleconference Briefing frequently as well as in person in Taszar, Hungary. 29. In Haiti, during Operation Uphold Democracy, US Special Operations Command soldiers from general officers down to the lowest enlisted soldier walked the countryside in soft caps while 10th Mountain Division (Light) soldiers wore "ninja turtle" uniforms. It is clear the US military has divergent service cultures at work that send mixed signals to their own troops and our allies. It remains to be seen how those cultural signals are being viewed by the threat.

8 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/kre.html

30. Oral history interview with 1st AD staff officer April 1996, Tuzla, Bosnia. 31. Winston Churchill, quoted in Jay M. Shafritz Words on War (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), 14. 32. The CINCEUCOM motto for his theater command.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik is Chief, Special Research Projects, Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and served as the US Army Component Command Historian for Operation Joint Endeavor. He holds a B.A. in History from the University of Arizona, an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Louisville, and an M.M.A.S. in Theater Operations from the Command and General Staff College. He is currently working on his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Kansas. He has presented numerous academic papers on Peace Operations and is completing a concise history of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 US intervention into Haiti. A former corps-level Chief of Plans, he is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

9 of 9 3/11/98 12:34 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html Roots of Bosnian Realities Combined Air Operations in Bosnia

by George W. Gawrych

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government office or agency.-Editor

Most written accounts of the Bosnian problem explain the collapse of Yugoslavia and the subsequent "ethnic cleansing" as a natural product of communal hatreds and internecine warfare spanning centuries. Some authors have gone as far back as the medieval period to identify wounds that have festered for nearly a millennium. But this picture proves insufficient. Recently, two noted US Balkan historians encapsulated the Bosnian problem: "Public debate about policy options in the former Yugoslavia appears to be deeply mired in false dichotomies, flawed analogies, gross historical exaggerations and well-worn shibboleths with little foundation in historical reality."1 To help readers appreciate the ongoing problems in Bosnia, this ar-ticle analyzes the region, its people and history within the larger context of the Balkans, in general, and Serbia, in particular.

Geography has played a major role in shaping the character of the Balkan peoples and their history. The word Balkan means mountain range in Turkish, an appropriate name for this Texas-size peninsula noted for the numerous mountains crisscrossing it in all directions. These mountains serve to fragment the peninsula, encouraging both localism and regionalism. The resultant presence of so many different nationalities in so small an area is unusual for the European continent. Bosnia, by its location in the northwestern part of the Balkan peninsula, ex-perienced the vicissitudes of history associated with areas situated on the periphery between competing civilizations.

The Balkan peoples have proved unable to unite themselves into a single state. Unity has had to come from the outside. Two major empires united the Balkans politically; first the Romans and then Ottoman Turks. Because of the terrain's divisive character, neither empire imposed a centralized system of rule able to transcend regional identities to create anything resembling a melting pot. Despite failing to create a single cultural identity, each empire left a significant imprint on the Balkan landscape. The Romans made a lasting impact in Romania where natives speak Romanian, a language closely related to Latin. Ottoman Turks, for their part, brought Islam with them when they first crossed into the Balkans in the 14th century. As a result of 500 years of Ottoman rule, Muslims today form a majority in Albania (70 percent), and sizable Muslim communities exist in Bosnia (44 percent in 1991), parts of Bulgaria and western Thrace in Greece. Eastern Thrace, which forms part of the Republic of Turkey, is close to 99-percent Muslim and Turkish.

Of all the local empires established in the medieval period, the Byzantine empire, centered at Constantinople from the 6th to mid-15th centuries, had the greatest impact. The Byzantine Greeks established the Christian Orthodox faith on the peninsula, but Byzantine rule never covered the entire peninsula. Conversion to Eastern Orthodoxy resulted from missionary work by traveling monks. To this day, the Orthodox religion serves as a dividing line between the two civilizations: between Western

1 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy; between Rome and Constantinople.

Linguistic diversity

Five major ethno-linguistic groups inhabit the Balkans, making the peninsula a mosaic of diverse peoples: Greeks, Albanians, Romanians, Turks and South Slavs. Greek and Albanian are separate languages unrelated to any in Europe. Romanian is a Romance language related to Latin, whereas Turkish belongs to a Ural-Altaic linguistic family that originated in Central Asia. The fifth major linguistic family group, however, South Slavic, includes various nationalities.

In the late sixth and early seventh centuries, tribal units from a single Slavic confederation (Slaveni) settled much of the Balkans. The second quarter of the seventh century saw the settlement of two new tribes-the Croats and Serbs. Both tribes possessed some Iranian roots, as evidenced by the names of their early tribal leaders. Either the Croats and Serbs were two Iranians tribes that absorbed Slavic culture and language while migrating from Iran to Europe, or they were originally Slavs who experienced some form of Iranian rule. Whatever their exact origins, the Serbs and Croats had absorbed Slavic culture and customs by the time they settled the Balkans. Those Slavic peoples living in the Balkans today are known as South Slavs or Yugoslavs. They comprise five major nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians and Macedonians. The latter three possess their own Slavic language. However, Serbs and Croats speak the same language-Serbo-Croatian. Religion and history, not language, separate the Serbs and Croats-Croats are Catholic; Serbs are Orthodox.

In this mosaic of diverse peoples, Bosnia stands as the "microcosm of the Balkans," reflecting on the micro level the communal differences and divisions present in the peninsula as a whole. Bosnia derives its name from the Bosna River, which begins just outside Sarajevo and flows north to the Sava. Bounded by Dalmatia and the Dinaric Mountains in the west, the Sava River in the north, the Drina River in the east and a mountainous border with Montenegro in the south, this region has often been referred to as Bosnia-Herzegovina, reflecting a further division with the society.

In the Middle Ages, the surrounding mountains and rivers provided Bosnia with a modicum of privacy from larger events around it, spawning a unique mix of localism and regionalism. By the 13th century, Bosnia and Herzegovina each had a ruling dynasty, feudal nobility and customs. Bosnia, centered at Sarajevo, leaned to the Catholic religion, the Latin alphabet and a Western European culture like its northern neighbor the Kingdom of Croatia. Meanwhile, Herzegovina, formed around the Mostar region, tended toward the Orthodox faith, Cyrillic script and Byzantine culture as did its eastern neighbor, the Kingdom of Serbia. As early as the medieval period, Bosnia-Herzegovina had emerged as a frontier between two competing civilizations: Western Christianity and Eastern Orthodoxy. Catholic Croats appeared to populate Bosnia, whereas Orthodox Serbs settled Herzegovina.

The Medieval and Ottoman Periods

History forms an integral part of the Balkan peoples' psyche. Each nation looks to the ancient and medieval periods for identity and pride, often distorting the past in the process. Greeks embrace Alexander the Great, the classical period with its high level of civilization and the Byzantine Empire. Other nations have their heroes as well: the Bulgarians' Simeon (893-927); the Serbs' Stephen Dusan (1331- 1355); the Albanians' Skenderbeg (1443-1468); and the Romanians' Stephen the Great (1457-1504) of Moldavia. Even Bosnia gave birth to its own great ruler, Tvrtko (1353-1391), who briefly ruled as King of Bosnia and Serbia. In addition to a pantheon of national heroes, each Balkan people possesses a litany of epic events. The Serbs, for example, sanctify, in a mystical fashion, the

2 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

battle of Kosovo where the Turks dealt the Serbian people a major defeat on 28 June 1389. In addition to a source of identity and pride, medieval empires have been used to justify territorial claims.

The Balkan peoples, and many Western authors, have developed a warped view of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans that followed the medieval period. Ottoman soldiers first appeared on Balkan soil in the 14th century, gradually expanding until reaching the gates of Vienna in 1526. The Ottoman period is generally viewed as the dark ages in Balkan history, where nascent nationalism was suppressed by repressive Ottoman rule. As noted by an American historian of the Balkans, "during the almost five centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan peoples had no history. Time stood still for them. Consequently when they won their independence in the 19th century their point of reference was to the pre-Turkish period-to the medieval ages and beyond."2

The Ottoman Turkish conquest of the Balkans played a significant role in Balkan history, and the impact was not all bad. Ottoman rule initially brought law and order to the peninsula, creating a Pax Ottomanicum much like the peace Romans brought to their captured territories. Ottoman sultans established their empire on the basis of indirect rule and religious tolerance. The Orthodox Church enjoyed a measure of autonomy. Christians and Jews were allowed to practice their faith, albeit as second-class citizens according to 20th century standards. But they did live under their own religious laws and traditions when it came to matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and death. In addition to institutionalizing religious tolerance, the first sultans reduced taxes and fostered economic development. Christian merchants thrived in international trade with Europe.3

Islam, generally rejected in most of the Balkans, took deep root in Bosnian society. No major conversions took place during the Ottoman conquest (1463-1482). The Bosnian Church, unlike Christianity in Serbia and Croatia, was weak. Therefore, its inhabitants were more inclined to convert to Islam. After 150 years of Ottoman rule, Muslims constituted a population majority in both Bosnia and Herzegovina. These Muslims were not new settlers, but Serbs and Croats who accepted the Islamic religion and kept their Slavic surnames. Conversion to Islam was far more common in the towns, though the countryside saw the emergence of a class of feudal Muslim landowners who lorded over both Christian and Muslim serfs into the 19th century. As regards identity, Bosnian Muslims generally referred to themselves as Bosnians, whereas Serbian and Croatian Christians called them Turks.4 Modern nationalist identity had not yet taken root in Bosnian society.

The modern Yugoslav state's origins go back to the Ottoman period and Serbian revolt of 1804. In that year, a group of Serbian notables, merchants and peasants rebelled against a reign of terror instituted by a Muslim military clique in power since 1801. Initially, the rebels affirmed their loyalty to the Ottoman sultan but also demanded reforms and the ouster of the oppressive military leaders. Russian intervention on the side of the Serbs helped transform the rebellion into a revolution demanding independence. But Russia was too distracted by wars with Napoleon to give Serbs consistent support, so Serbian leaders reached a compromise with the sultan.

In 1815, the Serbs received "semiautonomous status" under their own leader, Milos Obrenovic. The Serbian area within the Ottoman empire was small, centered in Belgrade. For the next 15 years, Obrenovic concentrated his efforts on consolidating power, building a government, creating a small army and bringing economic growth. In 1830, after being defeated in a war against Russia, the Ottoman sultan recognized Obrenovic as a hereditary prince and granted autonomy to Serbia. Full independence finally came in 1878.5

The First Bosnian Crisis

3 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

The Ottoman feudal landowning system continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina into the 19th century. In the summer of 1875, after a bad harvest, Christian peasants revolted in Herzegovina against high taxes. The rebellion quickly spread to Bosnia, taking on the character of a communal conflict between Muslim landowners and Christian peasants. To put down the unrest, the Ottoman government dispatched additional troops. According to some accounts, over 100,000 refugees escaped to neighboring areas. The Bosnian problem might have ended in 1875, but in 1876 the unrest spread into Bulgarian areas of the Ottoman Empire. Stories soon circulated in European newspapers describing Muslim troops and villagers massacring helpless Christians.

In June and July 1876, the rulers of Serbia and Montenegro, both bowing to popular clamor in their own countries, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Montenegro invaded Herzegovina, leaving Serbia to attack Bosnia on its own. The Ottomans defeated both armies in piecemeal fashion. To prevent a major Balkan disaster, Russia declared war on the Ottomans, eventually defeating the Ottoman army and coming within artillery range of the walls of Istanbul. The Russian tsar began dictating peace terms to the defeated Ottoman empire.

Rather than allow Russia to resolve the Balkan crisis on its own, the major European powers convened a congress in Berlin under the auspices of the great German statesman Otto von Bismarck. Russia had already promised Vienna control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Berlin Congress of 1878 awarded full independence to Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian empire was permitted to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina under the guise of protecting the Christian population and en-suring reform implementation. Though officially an Austrian protectorate under Ottoman suzerainty, Bosnia-Herzegovina essentially became a colony for the Dual Monarchy. Austrian officials replaced Ottoman bureaucrats, and Muslims had to perform military service in the imperial army.

Serbia was most dissatisfied with the Congress of Berlin. European statesmen awarded Serbia only 200 square miles, including the city of Pec. Meanwhile, Russia had abandoned the Serbs for the Bulgarians in the hope of gaining access to the Aegean Sea through the port town of Kavalla. Moreover, Austria occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in large measure to prevent Serbian expansion westward toward the Adriatic Sea. Austrian diplomats feared Serbia would act to unify the South Slavs, which would threaten the interests of the Dual Monarchy. Blocked in the west, Serbia's leaders had no alternative but to focus their energies on expansion southward into Macedonia, which still belonged to the Ottoman Empire but was also coveted by Bulgaria and Greece.

The First Bosnian Crisis brought dramatic changes to Bosnia. Demographically, the Muslim population had been slightly less than a majority before the crisis. Now, the Orthodox Serbs formed the largest religious group, with the Muslims constituting less than 40 percent in 1879. Muslims lost a third of their population either to violence or migration to the Ottoman Empire. Though Austrian rule was rather benevolent for the next 40 years, the Muslim community lost its position of political dominance and had to learn to compete within the parliamentary system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Political consciousness grew among the Muslim community as a result. Eventually, Muslim leaders organized their own political party in order to have their interests represented in Vienna.6

4 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

Balkan Violence

The 19th century was certainly a violent period in Balkan history. A number of conventional wars were waged involving European powers, the Ottoman Empire and the fledgling Balkan states. But the 1800s were also the era of nationalism, with some violence within societies taking on the character of national struggles. In addition to clashes between different nationalities, political violence took place within communities as well, pitting Serbs against Serbs and Bulgarians against Bulgarians as individuals and groups jockeyed for power. Secret organizations, such as Union or Death in Serbia, embraced revolutionary rhetoric and practiced terrorist tactics. The political culture of violence spawned the emergence of the hero-martyr-assassin figure, men such as Gavrilo Princip who murdered Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, sparking World War I's outbreak.

Serbia had its share of political violence. Of the nine Serbian rulers between 1804 and 1945, four were assassinated and four were exiled, all for political reasons. Two Serbian incidents illustrate the Balkans' bloody and turbulent history. In 1817, Obrenovic had his arch rival George Petrovich, better known as Karageorge or Black George, murdered and his head shipped to Istanbul. This political murder instituted a rivalry between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevic families for control of the Serbian throne. In a 1903 coup, conspirators killed King Alexander Obrenovic, the queen, prime minister, interior minister, two brothers of the queen and a number of loyal officers. This bloody event shocked Europe. Such political violence was all too common in the Balkans, while the internecine communal struggles surfaced during economic crises or wars and appeared more as a result of political instability than historic hatred.

World War I and Royal Yugoslavia

World War I led to the Yugoslav state's creation. The Great War began, in part, because of Austria's determination to prevent Serbia from expanding westward into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In defeating Serbia, Vienna hoped to leave Serbia as a "rump state," with much of Serbian territory going to Bulgaria. Serbian resistance, however, surprised everyone. The Austrians finally defeated the Serbs in 1915, but only after Germany provided its own troops and Bulgaria invaded Serbia from the east, sealing the country's fate.

Serbian politicians demanded territorial compensation for their sacrifice in resisting the Central powers. In turn, the victorious Western powers supported the creation of Yugoslavia under Serbia's lead. The crucible of World War I resulted in the union of South Slavs in a single state. By the 20th century, increasing numbers of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were advocating the creation of Yugoslavia to replace the moribund Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serbia became the centerpiece of this idea, in large measure because the Serbs alone among the three nationalities had an independent state to form the nucleus of a new kingdom. Unification came after the Great War, with the Karadjordjevic family providing a member for the throne. Croats and Slovenes joined the state from the Hapsburg Empire. The new kingdom, which included all lands held in June 1914, added Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. Croats, Slovenes, Muslims and others entered the union expecting equal partnership with the Serbs in a federal state. A burning issue since the creation of Yugoslavia has been how much power sharing would take place between the Serbs and other nationalities. Had the war created a Greater Serbia with centralism in Serbs' hands or a true Yugoslavia with equal power sharing by all nationalities?

Serbian chauvinism won out during the interwar period. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed on 1 December 1918. The 1921 constitution, based on Serbia's prewar constitution, centralized power in the king and Belgrade. Political parties, formed around highly personalized leadership, fractionalized along regional and religious lines-Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, Muslim-rather

5 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

than a Yugoslav concept. The small communist party was the exception, representing a broad spectrum of nationalities.

In 1929, rather than ease growing nationality tensions with a more liberal government, King Alexander opted to establish a royal dictatorship and changed the country's name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He instituted an even more centralized administration, with Serbs continuing their government dominance and the armed forces at the federal level and exerting considerable control and influence throughout Yugoslavia. In 1929, provincial boundaries were redrawn to create nine administrative units called banovinas. By gerrymandering, the king ensured that Serbs constituted a numerical majority in six of the nine units. In Bosnia, elected Muslim mayors were replaced by Serbs appointed by the king. Serbian dominance remained consistent throughout the interwar period. From 1920 to 1939, for example, every chief of the army was a Serb, and only one non-Serb served as prime minister.7

The other nationalities grew frustrated with Serbian dominance, leading to the radicalization of politics. The Croats, having enjoyed a measure of federalism under the Dual Monarchy, were the strongest opponents to the centralized Yugoslav state. Croatian extremists formed the Ustashe movement and began advocating independence for Croatia. Organization members assassinated King Alexander during his visit to France in 1934. On the eve of World War II, tensions were high between Serbian and Croatian political activists.

World War II to the Second Bosnian Crisis

World War II unleashed a flood of violence, hatred and enmity throughout Europe. Yugoslavia witnessed several different kinds of wars, exacerbating tensions among the various nationalities. First, the Axis Powers defeated the Yugoslav army in less than three weeks and then conducted irregular warfare against resistance movements in Yugoslavia. At least two civil wars were also waged among Yugoslavs. Croat fascists (Ustashe) fought Serbian ultranationalists, a struggle the Axis Powers fostered by creating the Independent State of Croatia, which incorporated Bosnia and Herzegovina into Croatia's territory. And the two major resistance movements engaged in fratricidal warfare. Marshal Josip Tito led the Communist-dominated Partisans, whereas Colonel Draza Mihailovic headed the Cetniks, a Serbian movement loyal to the Karadjordjevic dynasty exiled in London. Best estimates place the number of Yugoslav deaths in World War II at one million; the majority of these were Yugoslavs killed by fellow Yugoslavs.8

To rule defeated Yugoslavia, the Axis Powers implemented a brutal "divide and rule" policy. Axis troops razed villages and conducted summary executions in reprisal for attacks on their soldiers. Croatia became the most favored nation during the war. Germany and Italy created the Independent State of Croatia, although each Axis state occupied a section. Ante Pavelíc was appointed to do the bidding for Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Pavelíc's organization, Ustashe, had only 12,000 members in Croatia before the war. Now it was transformed into a mass organization much like the Nazi Party. Croatian fascists played on the theme of the Iranian, hence Aryan, origins of the Croat nation. Thus, World War II violence took on the character of religious and ethnic warfare, unprecedented in Balkan history. Croats and Serbs each talked of cleansing their lands of other nationalities, mainly through mass deportations. All sides performed summary executions, though in varying degrees.

6 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

During the war, despite the carnage of ethnic cleansing, hope emerged for a true Yugoslav state. Of the major organizations, the Communist Party alone possessed an effective organization that cut across ethnic and religious lines. Rejecting the Serbian chauvinism of the interwar kingdom, Tito, himself a Croat, promised a federalism based on the Communist Party and the armed forces. Edvard Kardelj, the party ideologue, was Slovene. Anton Rankevich, the secret police chief, was a Serb. Milovan Djilas, a confidant and liaison to Stalin, was Montenegrin. Even clergy from all faiths flocked to the Yugoslav cause. Father Vlada Zechevich, a Serb Orthodox priest, left the Cetniks and joined the Partisans, who were the only group fighting the Axis Powers.9

After the war, Tito remained faithful to his promise of creating a true Yugoslav state. The country was organized into six federal republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, along with the autonomous region of Voyvodina with less than a quarter Magyar population and the autonomous province of Kosovo-Metohiya with its Albanian majority (90 percent). Five nationalities were officially recognized: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians. Tito's federalism did somewhat limit the power and influence of the Serbs, although the Croats and Slovenes complained that their resources were squandered on other parts of country, in particular, on Serbia with its federal government. Moreover, Serbs continued to maintain a disproportionate amount of power and influence, but nowhere near the levels of Royalist Yugoslavia. By the census of 1971, Tito's state permitted Bosnian Muslims to identify themselves as a separate nationality, Bosnian Muslim, as distinct from Bosnia's Croats and Serbs.

Though each republic or region had its own minorities, none was more heterogeneous than Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the 1991 census, Muslims formed 44 percent of the population, with Serbs and Croats constituting 31 and 17 percent respectively. The vast majority of Serbs still identified with Orthodoxy; the same held true for Croats and Catholicism. When the state of Yugoslavia collapsed in 1991, each federal republic, with the exception of Bosnia, possessed a sizable ethnic majority to hold firmly onto the reigns of power.

In this regard, Bosnia was a logical choice for becoming the major battleground after the collapse of Yugoslavia, but not because of perpetual animosities among the various nationalities. To a greater degree than the rest of Yugoslavia, Bosnia had made progress as a pluralistic society. As of February 1993, for example, the Bosnian cabinet comprised nine Muslims, six Serbs and five Croats. Fully one-third of the Territorial Defense Forces then defending Sarajevo were Serbs, including the deputy commander.

7 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

And, according to pre-civil war calculations, 30 to 40 percent of the marriages in urban areas had been mixed among the three major communities.10 As Yugoslavia began unraveling, Bosnians fell prey to the cycle of ethnic violence.

Once the violence became widespread, individuals became infected by the ideology of chauvinistic nationalism. To survive, people had to find shelter within their own ethnic and religious communities. In this tragic civil war, pluralism and tolerance surrendered to the passions inflamed by policies of ethnic cleansing. Once again, Yugoslavia plunged into civil war. This time, however, ethnic cleansing resulted from the collapse of the Yugoslav state in 1991 and the scramble for control of Bosnia by the newly emerging independent Balkan states of Croatia and Serbia.11

The Balkan peoples have not consistently hated one another over the centuries as depicted in the media and popular literature. Communal violence, inspired by modern nationalist ideology, appeared in the 19th century only as a sporadic phenomenon. Much of the violence occurred within nationalities in the struggle for political power. Ethnic cleansing as policy first surfaced during World War II and then during the collapse of the Yugoslav state. In the interim, some progress occurred in developing a pluralistic society under a communist regime.

Today, former Yugoslav citizens lack a Tito to unite them around the Yugoslav ideal. To fill the vacuum, the United States and Europe dispatched peacekeepers to Bosnia, in a fashion similar to the Dual Monarchy occupying the region to bring order during the 19th century. In 1878, however, the Congress of Berlin awarded the Austro-Hungarian Empire permission to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina permanently, in part to stop Serbian irredentism. In the 1990s, the United States and its European allies entered Bosnia for a limited period as a coalition, this time to stop designs by Croatia and Serbia to annex Bosnian territory. The challenge facing the United States is to help bring stability to Bosnia, but set a reasonable time limit on US involvement.MR

1. Robert Donia and John V.A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 3. 2. L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), 13. 3. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 3-25. 4. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, revised edition (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 51-69, 82-106; Colin Heywood, "Bosnia Under Ottoman Rule, 1463-1800," in The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, edited by Mark Pinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 22-53; W.G. Lockwood, "Living Legacy of the Ottoman Empire: The Serbo-Croatian Speaking Moslems of Bosnia-Hercegovina," in The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern, edited by Abraham Ascher (New York, 1979), 211-15. 5. Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 26-37 and 53-67; Stavrianos, Balkans Since

8 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/gar.html

1453, 230-68. 6. Malcolm, Bosnia, 131-55; Jelavich, Establishment of the Balkan National States, 141-57; Justin McCarthy, "Ottoman Bosnia, 1800 to 1878," in Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 78-82; Mark Pinson, "The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 1878-1918," in Ibid, 84-128; Robert Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle: The Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914 (New York: Columbia Press, 1981). 7. For a brief discussion of Yugoslavia between the two world wars, see Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 120-35; Wayne S. Vucinich, "Interwar Yugoslavia," in Contemporary Yugoslavia, edited by Wayne S. Vucinich (Berkeley: California University Press, 1969), 3-58; Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, 616-43. 8. Malcolm, Bosnia, 174. 9. Robert Lee Wolf, The Balkans in Our Times (New York: Norton, 1956), 207-9. 10. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 6-9. 11. In addition to the sources cited in previous notes, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1995).

George W. Gawrych is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. A specialist in Middle East history, he has taught history at the University of Hawaii in Manoa, the University of Kansas and the School of International Studies, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is the author of Research Survey No. 7, Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, published in 1990; and Leavenworth Paper No. 21, The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory. His article "Jihad in the 20th Century" appeared in the September-October 1995 issue of Military Review.

9 of 9 3/11/98 12:36 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/car.html Combined Air Operations in Bosnia

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Caravella, US Army, Retired

Sun-Tsu said, "Know your enemy and your- self and you will never lose." That 2,500- year-old battlefield principle is the basis on which our Army is forging into the 21st century. This new Army's foundation is knowledge-based, with the ability to apply overwhelming firepower. Through successive experimentation, from squad to corps level, the US Army is sculpting Army XXI, a force to be reckoned with.

Our 21st-century Army, however, will not fight alone. The US Air Force possesses a vision, a perspective and expertise to rival our own. Army leaders should consider its sister service's point of view before allowing the "clay to dry" on the Army XXI mold. For the past several months, the Air Force has used the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy, as its Battle Lab to experiment with prototype command information systems. The CAOC's successful experimentation enhances joint intelligence, planning and operations functions while promoting air and ground synchronization.

To illustrate the CAOC's viability, I have rewritten an excerpt from a November 1993 ARMY magazine article on Force XXI, adding the air components perspective.

The task force began to converge in width and depth with its trail vehicles speeding up as it came on line to deliver fires. Movement was coordinated instantaneously between vehicles through an automatic exchange of digital information. Progress was controlled using each vehicle's integrated positionnavigation capabilities.

Battlespace situation information exchange was automatic-the C2V (command and control vehicle) knew precisely where everything was and where it was supposed to be-and the weapon platforms also knew-there was no guessing or mistaken identity. The task force commander studied his battlefield display, switched on the recognized air picture (RAP) relayed to him from the Army's Forward Area Air Defense System and then queried his air counterpart via the video teleconference net on his work station. "Chariot, this is Delta Six. Confirm aircraft en route to target area."

From his work station in the air operations center (AOC), the battle staff director (BSD) placed a pointer on top of a computer symbol and said, "Roger, Delta Six. Hornet 75 en route. ETA 10 minutes."

"Roger, Chariot. Have aircraft on my screen."

The defender was alert, well armed and ready. New training technologies, long-range, precision antitank weapons and specially armored tanks had given him confidence.

Overhead circled two small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), providing real-time targeting, fire adjustment and battle damage assessment. These miniature aircraft were loaded with weight-reduced, imaging infrared, millimeter wave and optical correlators designed to exchange information with other

1 of 5 3/11/98 12:37 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/car.html

combined arms team members. One UAV, "tethered" by a fiber optic cable to a C2V, provided a jam-proof battlefield display. The RAP showed the close air support (CAS) aircraft converging on enemy positions. The C2V commander froze a frame from the real-time UAV video on the computer. Using the graphics software, he annotated enemy and friendly unit positions on the frame. He pushed a send button he knew would relay the picture frame to the ready display in each cockpit and the AOC.

The BSD studied the UAV image on the work-station and compared it to his target imagery showing the designated mean impact points. Both images corresponded with attack plans. He said, "Delta Six, we have target correlation."

The Hornet 75 flight commander finalized the attack preparations and ordered the attack. Hornet 75 struck the enemy positions with pinpoint accuracy, using precision-guided munitions. The C2V commander monitored both air and ground pictures to ensure he was prepared for any eventuality. As soon as the aircraft cleared the air space, friendly artillery fired with deadly accuracy.

The defender was no match for the violent assault force. What he saw was a one-sided battle, resulting in an almost instantaneous blanket of destruction directed with unimagined accuracy across his entire force.

Both the C2V commander and BSD displayed their Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) moving target indicator data on the work- station to watch for any reciprocal movement. Several bright symbols began moving along a road toward the attacking ground force. The C2V commander directed a UAV to that area to help identify the moving vehicles. Apparently, the defender's reaction force had been held in defilade but was now accurately located by the UAV. The C2V commander switched back to his RAP display and contacted his attack helicopters waiting in a "hide position" as planned. Again, he froze the UAV picture and sent it to the helicopter cockpit displays while the aircraft prepared to attack from 5 kilometers south of the converging vehicles. The helicopters struck with relentless, unforgiving lethality. Within minutes, the reaction force was destroyed and the C2V commander focused on the next objective. He informed the AOC, "Chariot, this is Delta Six. We're moving forward along Route Gray."

The BSD pushed his CAS sorties to refueling aircraft. He would turn them around at least once more if necessary to support continued ground attacks. His alert aircraft could be there within 60 minutes if needed. To launch or not launch was always the key question, but his battlefield situation display would provide the best updates for him to react to the ground commander's requirements.

As illustrated by this scenario, the CAOC's goal is to put the right air assets over the right targets at the right times . . . and report results quickly and accurately. This goal might be in support of ground force operations or an air component commander's (ACC's) objective, but to accomplish this goal effectively, current Air Force battle management technologies will not do the job. The Air Force believes that full spectrum dominance requires an interactive common battlespace picture, so with the air staff's support, CAOC leaders decided to exploit the latest information technologies, integrating functions and feeds, developing what they call the Bosnia Common Operational Picture (BCOP). BCOP

All services agree to the requirement for a joint common operational picture to support theater planning and operations, but few agree on the specific display information and applications necessary to perform

2 of 5 3/11/98 12:37 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/car.html

the missions. The CAOC focused its attention on the air requirements to perform the Bosnia operational mission while also synchronizing data with the land component commander (LCC). They demanded near-term solutions and achieved most of their objectives. The capabilities illustrated in the scenario already exist in the Vicenza CAOC. Not all capabilities are integrated into one workstation, but they are available to the CAOC battle staff.

Experimentation started in August 1995 when the US Air Force Staff delivered to the CAOC a prototype information system called the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) Situational Awareness System. This system provided the information platform CAOC leaders hoped would integrate intelligence, planning and operational functions and provide the BCOP. CAOC leaders believe BCOP functionality enhances air operations and could help synchronize air/ground operations if shared with the LCC. The requirements for a COP differ between services and theaters, but the BCOP's functionality deserves strong consideration by those leaders building the Army's future.

The BCOP is based on a UNIX workstation whose data base uses standard Defense Mapping Agency map and spot imagery data for the area of responsibility (AOR) as in Figure 1. Overlaid on this map/imagery background are computer-generated air tracks from the RAP. The ACC uses the RAP to command and control friendly air assets in a contingency. The system provides the ability to overlay all airspace control measures that might affect current air operations, such as air corridors and restricted operations zones. Real-time intelligence products, such as the Tactical Information Broadcast Service and Tactical Related Applications, are fused into the system for immediate alerts, essential for safe air operations against any dynamic air defense threat. These "intel" messages automatically alert, audibly and visually, CAOC operators to a possible air defense threat in their AOR.

Specific joint targeting board target descriptions were added and marked on the map data base. The Air Force requires precise information about targets-buildings, bunkers, bridges or radars-where the targets are and what is in the immediate vicinity-tall buildings, hills, rivers or power lines-and how they are defended. Depending on the target's construction, various types of bombs, with different delivery means, are required. If there are hills, tall buildings or power lines around the targets, the pilots need to know so they can find the target in the clutter and avoid flying into an obstacle. How well the target is defended dictates what type of aircraft will attack and how many supporting aircraft will be required. Beyond this technical information, the entire target list is prioritized because there are rarelyenough aircraft to hit everything at once. Annotated target imagery with "CAOC to cockpit" communications allows the CAOC director maximum flexibility to change an air mission's focus or target.

3 of 5 3/11/98 12:37 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/car.html

Since the Implementation Force commander was not initially generating a fully recognized ground picture for the Bosnia theater, it was decided to develop a CAOC ground picture by fusing ground information from two sources as in Figure 2. The Army's Warlord system provided the data base for the former warring factions in Bosnia, while United Kingdom system, Thistle, provided specific data on friendly troop locations, plans and situation. This friendly data base was linked to a server that was automatically updated at the CAOC when the corps headquarters in Bosnia updated its data base. Army unit locations were depicted as standard map symbols indicating divisions, brigades, battalions and sometimes smaller units. Although the data base was not real time, both ground and air headquarters shared access to the same ground data bases. The data specificity was solely dependant on the amount of information supplied to the corps headquarters from lower command elements. When a ground incident developed, these data bases provided a starting point for the JFACC and his staff to plan possible responses to an incident.

To receive a real-time update on ground activity in a local or tactical area, video from Predator or Gnat UAVs or EP-3 surveillance aircraft was integrated into the BCOP and placed into a separate graphics box on top of the digital map. Voice communication with ground personnel allowed CAOC operations personnel to better anticipate and react to a specific ground commander's situation and provide effective support.

To analyze a broader and larger ground situation, the J-STARS moving target indicator data provided another view of potential enemy force movement illustrated in Figure 3. Without reference information, J-STARS data was difficult to interpret. Data base ground information supplemented by organic communications with the ground tactical operations centers added relevancy to the J-STARS data for both the intelligence and operations communities. Due to technical difficulties, J-STARS data was never integrated into the BCOP but this objective is certainly achievable with continued software development.

The above capabilities define the BCOP. However, to share and realize BCOP's full potential, a workstation video teleconferencing capability is deemed necessary so air and ground operational headquarters can truly synchronize near real-time decision making.

In any dynamic situation, air and ground opera-tions officers could use the BCOP to assess a situ-ation and clarify the facts. Data, in all forms, could be integrated on the screen from various sources. Air and ground options would be presented, resulting in shortened decision cycles and more effective use of scarce joint assets. Air and ground activities would be synchronized because the ACC and LCC would be working as one-battlefield effects should be synergistic.

4 of 5 3/11/98 12:37 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/car.html

In growing toward Army XXI , the Army has taken a "bottom-up" approach. This approach is fundamentally sound, but we should realize that tactical solutions must be seamless with operations and strategic solutions. At the operational level, air and ground information systems must support near real-time intelligence, planning and operations. All services agree that a COP should have a synergistic effect on the battlefield, denying the enemy a chance to react decisively or effectively. The CAOC's BCOP functionality demands that the Army look hard at its experimental results and incorporate pertinent capabilities into its core acquisition programs. Through the CAOC in Vicenza, the Air Force has proved that the information technology is available today to reach our joint goal of synchronized air and ground operations .MR

Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Caravella, US Army, Retired, is the principal scientist/engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company, Huntsville, Alabama. He received a B.S. from the University of Nevada, an M.S. from New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, to include Air Operations Officer, Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, Italy; Chief Air Defense Lab and Chief, Concepts, Fort Bliss; Associate Professor, US Military Academy, West Point, New York and XO, 2-44 ADA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. His article, coauthored with Colonel Allen P. Hasbrouck, "Why Move ADA to the USAF?" appeared in the September 1993 issue of Military Review.

5 of 5 3/11/98 12:37 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

The Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in Unpreparedness

by Congressman Ike Skelton

This article is adapted from three speeches given by the Honorable Ike Skelton, US House of Representatives, to the 105th Congress between 28 April 1997 and 12 May 1997. Addressing his concerns about the US military's future and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which the Department of Defense (DOD) delivered to Congress in May, he discusses the missions our Armed Forces must accomplish within the QDR's new strategy guidance: shape the international security environment in ways favorable to US interests; respond to the full spectrum of crises when in our interest to do so; and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. Mr. Skelton challenges Congress to fulfill its constitutional and national security responsibilities under the law and military leaders to safeguard their most precious resource-people, the men and women who serve in the Armed Forces, and the civilian personnel who support them.

Congress is responsible for ensuring US Armed forces are prepared to preserve and protect the United States' security. The key phrase in this statement is Congress is responsible. Under the US Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, it is Congress' duty, not the president's-let alone the secretary of defense or the joint chiefs of staff-to determine the size and composition of our Armed Forces. Article I, Section 8, assigns to Congress the power "To raise and support armies . . .; provide and maintain a navy; [and] make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."1

Therefore, it falls to Congress to ensure our military strength is adequate to defend our nation and national interests. Indeed, there is no more important duty for Congress than to provide for the common defense. We have a duty to our fellow citizens today and future generations of Americans. We must not squander, through shortsightedness and neglect, the sacrifices that generations before us have made to secure the peace and security with which we are blessed. We must pass on the legacy of peace, prosperity and freedom bequeathed to us. Congress, therefore, is ultimately responsible for approving a strategy to guide US military policy and, above all, to establish a proper balance between national strategy and resources available.

Shaping US Military Strategy

Historically, Congress has often failed in this responsibility. Since the Cold War's end, many commentators have noted how badly the nation has handled the aftermath of major 20th-century conflicts. Following World Wars I and II, Korea and again after Vietnam, we allowed military forces to deteriorate to a degree that cost us dearly in subsequent conflicts.

A speech made in 1923 by then Army Major George C. Marshall decried a similar pattern of failure even earlier in our history. Major Marshall, of course, later became this century's most distinguished American soldier and statesman as Army chief of staff during World War II, secretary of state in the Cold War's early years and secretary of defense during the Korean conflict. "[F]rom the earliest days of this country," Marshall said "[the Regular Army] was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity. . . ."2 Marshall felt it was perhaps understandable that there should be a reduction in the military's size following a war, but the pattern was not quite so simple.

1 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

Often, following a war, the Active Army's size increased above what it had been before the conflict. Then within a few years-or even within a few months-it decreased below the prewar level. "[I]t appears," Marshall explains, "that when the war was over every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned. . . . So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the war and the reasons therefore and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons."3

This pattern was seen at the century's turn, after the nation had just won a short, popular war against Spain. The pattern was repeated in 1917 where Marshall recalled seeing US soldiers in France marching through the ice and snow "without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks"-Valley Forge all over again.4 Yet in 1923, the public had already forgotten that war's lessons and the cost of unpreparedness. Support for military expenditures quickly dissolved. Less than 20 years later, the United States was engaged in an even more destructive global war, for which we were, again, terribly unprepared.

Today, after the Cold War's successful conclusion, we are well on our way to repeating the same mistake of denuding ourselves militarily. Today's world is no less turbulent or dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Regional threats, along with rising terrorism and the possibility of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation, should cause us to keep up our guard.

What is the Enemy?

I am frequently challenged by a question that has surely echoed before: "What is the enemy?" That question raises many others. Why continue to support more spending for defense when the Cold War is over? Why plan for two major regional contingencies (MRCs), when a second threat did not materialize during the Persian Gulf War? Why continue to pursue expensive new, advanced weapons when US technology was so dominant in Operation Desert Storm and when no other nation is spending nearly what we do on military hardware? Why keep a robust force structure and a fair-size personnel level?

There are no clear and simple answers. Indeed, there were no clear and simple answers in 1923. Any attempt to see into the future is like looking into a kaleidoscope. New patterns are constantly emerging; the only constant is that the colors will remain the same. In viewing international affairs' future, we cannot foresee a "new world shape," but we know the colors are those of the human condition, including the character traits and circumstances that lead men to war. The need to prepare for conflict has not diminished merely because an era of conflict with a particular foe has ended and a new era, of yet uncertain pattern, has emerged.

"What is the enemy?" I must honestly say there is no precise answer. However, Congress will fail in its constitutional responsibilities if, once again, it allows the Armed Forces to become unprepared. In fact, for two reasons, a failure to support a strong military today would be even more unfortunate, and more unforgivable, than in the past. First, the United States is the only nation able to protect the peace. In the past, we were fortunate that our allies were able, often by the narrowest of margins, to hold the line while we belatedly prepared for war. Otto von Bismarck once said, "God protects fools, and the United States."5 Today, no one nation can prevent conflict from arising or respond decisively to a major threat. And, while I trust in God, I believe God has given us the tools we need to keep peace. It is our task to

2 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

use them wisely.

Second, if we fail to maintain US military power, the United States and, indeed, the entire world, may lose an unprecedented opportunity to construct a lasting era of relative peace.

Our military strength is the foundation of a relatively secure international order in which small conflicts, though endemic and inevitable, will not decisively erode global stability. Our military strength is also a means of preventing the growth of one or more new powers that could, in time, constitute a threat to peace and evolve into the enemy we do not now foresee. Therefore, the additional investment required to maintain our military strength is disproportionately small compared to the ultimate benefits. Harry S. Truman stated this clearly: "We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war."6 Truman's assessment is no less true now than when he first spoke those words.

These two premises-that the United States alone is able to protect the peace; and that adequate, visible US military power may prevent new enemies from arising in the future-are the cornerstones of a sound strategy for the years to come. These are the pre-mises I use to evaluate the current reassessment of defense policy.

The QDR Strategy

What are the QDR strategy process, strengths and how might it be improved? Although I will refer, at times, to a draft QDR statement of strategy recently printed by Inside the Army, it had not yet been officially released. Nonetheless, I refer to the draft because it reflects the thinking within the Pentagon to date, and is a good start in defining military strategy for the future. However, I do not at all agree with the judgment, which appears to be emerging from the QDR, that the new strategy can be supported with a force smaller than the force determined to be necessary by the QDR's predecessor, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

The new strategy's key theme includes three principle elements. First, US military forces must be able to shape the international security environment in ways favorable to US interests. This requires forward deployment of US forces; various means of defense cooperation with allies, including security assistance; and joint training with allies and others. Second, we must be able to respond to the full spectrum of crises when it is in our interest to do so, which requires the ability to execute the full spectrum of military operations, including showing the flag to deter aggression; conducting multiple, concurrent, small-scale contingency operations; and fighting and winning major theater wars, including the ability to prevail in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Third, the force needs to prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. This requires adequate size forces for air, sea and land; increased investments in weapons modernization; robust efforts to exploit the evolving revolution in military affairs; and investments in research and development that hedge against the evolution of unexpected, but potentially dangerous, developments in future military technology.

Some say this strategy statement will fail because it is not selective enough in defining the challenges for which US military forces should prepare. Some might complain that US military forces are used too often in response to crises- such as Bosnia-that do not directly threaten US security. I sometimes agree with those complaints. Others, with whom I do not agree, argue that the United States should give up the strategy of being prepared to prevail in two, nearly simultaneous MRCs-now called major theater wars-and instead prepare for one such conflict plus smaller peace operations. Still others say we should focus less effort on current challenges to our security and devote more attention to preparing for potential future threats from a peer or near-peer military competitor.

3 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

The QDR draft strategy statement is preferable to any of these alternative views. From a commitment standpoint, the emerging QDR strategy statement reflects that US presidents have long been able to commit large numbers of troops to sometimes long-lasting operations abroad pretty much as they see fit. President Bill Clinton has done so more than others, but he is not alone in asserting his authority as commander in chief to undertake major new missions abroad. Since presidents can define which US interests abroad are vital enough to require the commitment of US forces, the military must be prepared to perform an extraordinarily broad range of operations short of war. It would be misleading, for military planning purposes, if a strategy statement identified only a narrow range of missions, when in fact, the military can be called on at any time to carry out any imaginable mission while still preparing for major wars. Indeed, the Bottom-Up Review's key flaw is that it fails to take account of the demands put on forces by missions other than the requirement to be prepared to fight two MRCs.

To give up the Bottom-Up Review's two-MRC requirement is a prescription for giving up our superpower status. If we lack the ability to respond to a second crisis after a first arises, in every case we would be hesitant in committing our forces to action in the first instance. Would we really respond to Saddam Hussein at the cost of critically weakening our deterrent posture in Korea? That is a choice we should never have to make.

For those who would spend less on maintaining current readiness in order to invest in future technology, I do not agree. Recent evidence reveals the post-Cold War world as more turbulent than ever. We must be prepared to deal with today's conflicts, or we may be critically weakened in confronting future challenges.

A new strategy statement that calls for forces able to shape, respond and prepare would be a valuable contribution to the debate on US military preparedness. It is a demanding strategy and, under current circumstances, one that will be challenging to fulfill. I am concerned that portions of the QDR are at odds with the requirements implied by the new strategy statement. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen assured the National Security Committee that the QDR process would be driven by strategy, not budget.

The new strategy, it seems, requires forces perhaps larger and certainly more flexible than the forces the Bottom-Up Review requires. The QDR strategy maintains the requirement to prepare for two major theater wars and recognizes the need to shape the environment, respond to lesser crises and prepare for the future. Yet, it calls for cuts in force structure. Indeed, the draft strategy statement suggests more reliance on Reserve Component (RC) forces and our allies.

These are merely transparent excuses for making reductions in forces because of budget constraints, not strategy considerations. The bulk of RC forces are already built into war plans in a wholly integrated fashion, and other forces constitute a valuable strategic reserve. To depend on allies to carry out our strategy is the height of folly. Dependence on allies might force us to limit our strategic goals or make us hesitant to act. Also, it is not clear we can depend on allies to provide quality troops compatible with our own. We can and should expect allies to contribute in major conflicts-as they did during the Persian Gulf War-but we cannot afford to assume allied participation when making our own plans. The strategy emerging from the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding. The QDR, however, should address frankly which forces and what weapon investments are needed to execute it.

Congress must not repeat the mistakes of the past-mistakes that led to unpreparedness and battlefield disasters, such as the costly defeat at Kasserine Pass in North Africa during World War II and Task

4 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

Force Smith's destruction during the Korean War. The price of unpreparedness is paid for in blood and lives of young Americans. If we let security erode, we may not have the strength to keep smaller-scale conflicts from weakening international stability. I also fear that major new threats will evolve that could have been prevented had we maintained our strength. Marshall's warning in 1923, though not heeded by his generation, should be heard by ours. Congress must not fail in its responsibilities.

QDR Budgetary Issues

Once again, as in the past, Congress appears unwilling to pay the price for peace. Since the mid-1980s, the DOD budget has declined by 40 percent in real, inflation-adjusted dollars. Weapons procurement funding has declined by 67 percent since 1985. We are now spending one-third as much on new weapons as we did in the mid-1980s. These reduced spending levels cannot continue without critically weakening our military capabilities. The proposed defense budget does not restore even modest growth rates in military spending. On the contrary, the administration's recently proposed budget plan projects that defense spending will continue down in Fiscal Year 1998 (FY 98).

The budget agreement announced in May allocates inadequate levels for defense across the board-both in budget authority and budget outlays. More important for long-term planning purposes, the QDR is being enacted on the assumption that defense budgets will be frozen at about $250 billion per year. Therefore, the military services must conduct planning on the assumption that any real growth in costs must be offset by reductions in other programs. Avoiding growth in costs is unlikely if we are to maintain a viable military.

The price of peace is small. The reluctance to support modest growth in defense spending is all the more tragic because it is so unnecessary. Looked at from a reasonable, long-term perspective, the price of peace today is extraordinarily small. In 1997, the defense budget was 3.4 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP). Under the new Budget Plan, by 2002, it will decline to 2.7 percent. As recently as 1986, defense spending was over 6 percent of GDP, and even at its lowest level in the mid-1970s, it was about 5 percent. Defense spending has declined to about 16 percent of the federal budget share, down from 25 percent in the mid-1970s and 1980s, and down from 42 percent in 1970.

Real growth in defense spending is necessary to maintain a well-equipped, high-quality, well-trained force. Suppose we were to allow military spending to decline to 3 percent of GDP and then grow at no more than 1 or 2 percent in real terms each year thereafter. At this spending level, the defense budget would represent less than half the burden on the economy it did at the Cold War's end. This is a disproportionately small price to pay for the benefits we derive from having a force that can maintain a significant, visible US military presence abroad, respond to crises across the spectrum of con-flict and still prepare for future advanced technological challenges.

However, instead of trying to bolster public and congressional support for so modest a defense burden, current leaders are trying to support its defense strategy with budgets that start out "two sizes too small" and which will become tighter and tighter as the years go by. As mentioned, DOD strategy articulated in the QDR is appropriately broad and demanding and is an improvement over the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. It recognizes that activities short of major theater war impose great strains on the current force structure. This must be taken into account in shaping future forces.

The Pentagon's civilian leadership is mandating force reductions in the QDR to find savings with which to finance a modest increase in weapons modernization. Why this inconsistency? The QDR is actually being driven by budget, not strategy. Force cuts have to be considered because budgets cannot support existing

5 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

force levels as well as increase funding for new weapons.

I would support budget-driven force cuts as a one-time deal. My concern, however, is that maintaining smaller forces with flat budgets will lead to perpetual budget shortfalls, cuts in weapon procurement programs, reductions in maintenance and training and pressures to cut forces further. If current conditions continue, we will experience an erosion in our military capabilities until, with our forces no longer present in key regions of the globe, we must forego responding to important threats to the peace, which will encourage others to challenge us in strategic locations.

The need for defense budget growth. It is ill-advised for DOD to conduct planning based on flat budgets. Until recently, DOD insisted that modest growth was necessary in the long term. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry told the National Security Committee how DOD planned to reverse the decline in weapons procurement. Funding to "recapitalize" the force, he said, would come from three sources:

The four rounds of military base closures, at considerable cost, would soon begin to achieve savings, and the entire increment would be used to boost procurement funding. Savings from acquisition reform, though not assumed in the budget, would also be allocated to procurement. Modest growth in defense spending, then projected in administration plans, would also go for weapons modernization.

But how will we recapitalize the force now and in the future? How much can we count on saving from infrastructure reductions, outsourcing, inventory cuts and other efficiencies to substitute for a growth in spending? Currently, DOD must reduce force levels in order to fund weapons procurement.

Historically, we have not been able to support a force of a given size with flat defense budgets. Recently, the Congressional Research Service did a study that measured the trend in defense spending relative to the force's size from FY 55, just after the Korean War, projected through the year 2000 under the administration's plan. The study found that defense budgets have grown by about 1.7 percent per year in real, inflation-adjusted prices per active duty troop.

For defense budget analysts, this is not a surprising finding. For example, in the late 1970s, there was a debate over whether to increase defense spending by 3 percent per year. The premise was that defense budgets should increase in real terms over time for several reasons, one of which was to keep quality people in the force by providing a quality of life equal to that of the civilian sector. Also, the costs of modern, advanced weapon systems grow from one generation to the next. For instance, each generation of aircraft typically doubles in price, in real terms, compared with the previous generation. Although the services have always hoped that new weapons would be more reliable and cheaper to operate and maintain, this has never been the case. Since weapon systems are designed to maximize performance, operation and maintenance costs typically grow in real terms.

If DOD believes that the long-term cost of doing business has changed, it should explain why. A number of factors should make it more difficult to limit cost growth. For one thing, we have not been able to reduce the defense infrastructure's size in proportion to cuts in the force size, and I am doubtful Congress will approve another round of base closures in the near future. That means we have to maintain a relatively large support structure, which drives up costs relative to the force's size. We must also try to use technology to substitute for force size. Therefore, the capital investments required will be relatively large compared with the force size.

6 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

Moreover, with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), it is more important than ever to protect the quality of life. In recent years, we have skimped on military pay raises. Much military housing is in terrible condition and we have only belatedly begun efforts to improve it. We have also deferred maintenance of military facilities for many years, and the backlog of requirements will inevitably catch up with us. Also, we have projected savings in military health care costs that will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Finally, requirements that the military comply with environmental regulations and with health and safety norms are increasing costs in every sector of society.

So the requirement to conduct planning on the basis of a flat budget is a prescription for perpetual underfunding of long-term defense requirements and the steady erosion of our military strength. Modest, steady, sustainable rates of real growth in military spending are necessary to maintain a well-equipped, well-trained, high-quality force large enough to carry out US military strategy and protect US national security interests.

Beware false economies. For some, the notion that defense spending should grow over time seems alien. However, the notion that defense budgets should increase follows straightforwardly from clear thinking about defense. The only proper way to decide how much to spend on defense is to first decide on a military strategy that ensures national security. Then we must determine what size force we need to support that strategy. Finally, we must calculate what resources we need to ensure the force's quality.

Often, extraneous arguments about defense spending obscure this clear line of thinking. One common argument against defense spending is that today's potential enemies appear to spend less than the United States. The implication is either that threats are not so great as our planning assumes or that the US military should be able to maintain its strength with much less money. The flaws in such reasoning are legion. For one thing, to maintain stability in their own regions, potential enemies must simply be strong in only one area of military capability. However, possible challenges to US security interests come from so many different directions and in such a wide variety of forms that the United States must maintain strong military capabilities of all types. It must not be barely stronger than the "Iraqs" of the world.

Fundamentally, it is not enough for those who want to cut military spending to cite how much possible enemies spend. Instead, those who call for cuts should identify specific aspects of US military strength they would give up. If they argue that North Korea is not as great a threat as US military planners assume, then we should consider whether or not to weaken the US military posture in Korea. Viewed from this perspective, the argument is harder to sustain. Despite whatever North Korea spends, our intelligence assessments tell us how threatening their military capabilities are. Anyone who looks closely at the situation is aware of how much damage North Korean forces could wreak even if confronted by strong US and South Korean troops. Few, therefore, would want to encourage aggression by weakening our deterrent posture. So an argument based on North Korean, or Iraqi or Iranian levels of military spending is irrelevant. The real issue is: What are the threats and what US posture is needed to address them?

Another argument for cutting defense spending is that the United States is spending about as much today on defense in inflation-adjusted dollars as it did during the Cold War. The assumption is clear-with the Cold War over, we should be able to spend less. This argument is flawed. To maintain forces of a given size costs more over time because of the need to improve the quality of life, pursue advanced technology and operate increasingly sophisticated weapons. The fact is, we have cut the force's size substantially since the Cold War's end. In 1987, the Active Duty force level was about 2.1 million. Today, it is about 1.4 million-about one-third less. A force this size understandably should cost more than a larger force

7 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

did 25 or 30 years ago, but it is nonetheless substantially smaller and less costly than a force of the size that would be necessary if the Cold War had continued.

Four Guiding Principles

How should we think about defense spending? How much is enough for national defense? Two years ago, I prepared an alternative defense budget I believe is adequate to maintain US military strength over the next five years. It calls for spending about $45 billion more on defense than the administration was projecting. I still think that an "alternative" budget is wise. In light of the new QDR, however, I want to discuss four guiding principles Congress should apply in deciding "how much is enough."

Maintain force levels. We should not cut force levels further. Reports that the QDR may include a decision to reduce total defense end-strength by as much as 144,000 individuals disturb me. Such reductions are destructive because they break faith with the men and women of the Armed Forces. Recent defense drawdowns have reduced total force levels by about one-third. This reduction imposes an immense burden on military personnel. People must change jobs more frequently to replace others who are leaving. Reduction imposes an immense strain on the military education and training system, and often people must begin new jobs without complete training. Reduction also makes the military personnel system brutally competitive. The pressure to force people out often means a single mistake can cost a good soldier his or her career.

Military planners call this "force turbulence." It has caused great turbulence in people's lives as well. I believe the Armed Forces have suffered this turbulence long enough. For years we have told them the problems would ease once reductions ended. We told them to "hang in there," that things would get better. It is not right to ask these people to go through another period of such turbulence.

For strategic reasons, we cannot afford to further reduce force levels. The services are being strained to the breaking point. They must perform multiple requirements imposed on them by the demands to be trained and ready for two major wars and to be actively engaged in the multiplicity of smaller operations that have proliferated since the Cold War's end. Already the Army is short 40,000 support position slots. This means that to conduct operations in Bosnia, support personnel must be taken out of Continental United States-based units in order to fill out deploying units. The support personnel left behind must then do twice the work they should just to keep up. "Thinning" Army ranks further will inevitably make these shortfalls worse.

Increase weapons modernization funding. We should increase weapons investments enough to get back to a steady-state replacement rate for major equipment items. Reportedly, a key QDR goal is to find funds to substantially increase weapons procurement. For several years, the target has been $60 billion a year. This requires a 33-percent increase above the $45 billion currently spent on procurement. I hope that the QDR will get there, though not at the cost of cuts in force size. I am doubtful, however, that $60 billion a year will be enough.

Currently, the Air Force and Navy have about 3,000 fighter aircraft in their inventories-2,000 in the Air Force and 1,000 in the Navy. If we assume a 20-year average service life for fighters-which is getting pretty "long in the tooth"-we must buy 150 aircraft a year to maintain a steady-state replacement rate. For the past few years, we have bought about 28 to 42 fighter aircraft per year. By my calculations, we must increase aircraft procurement by at least 400 percent to get to an adequate level.

The Navy needs a minimum of about 350 battle-force ships. If we assume an average service life of 35

8 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

years, we must buy 10 ships a year. Lately we have been buying four or five, so we need to double shipbuilding budgets to get back to a steady-state replacement rate.

Add to those increases the need to modestly raise spending each year to exploit new technology. What are we giving up by not modernizing as fast as we should, and how will we adjust to projected shortfalls? We may be able to keep some equipment going longer by pursuing upgrades instead of new systems. We may be able to limit cost growth between generations of new weapons by careful attention to cost, as reflected in the services' plan for the Joint Strike Fighter. All of these adjustments come at a price in reduced military strength. Compromises should be kept to a minimum.

Protect military readiness. We should not allow military readiness to decline. I am skeptical of DOD budget plans that show operation and maintenance costs declining in the future relative to the force's size. Base closures may produce some savings and better business practices, but it is unrealistic to expect training costs to decline or to plan on reduced maintenance costs for major weapon systems.

Improve DOD business practices. While improving DOD business practices can achieve some savings, I am skeptical about claims that we can achieve large savings. It may be true there is waste in defense business practices, but waste is not a line item in the budget that we can easily eliminate. I am concerned that proponents of revolutionary changes in government procurement practices are vastly overstating the achievable savings.

These four principles-maintaining force levels, increasing weapons modernization funding, protecting military readiness and not overstating savings from improved business practices-force me to conclude that currently projected defense spending levels are not enough. If defense spending is not frozen at current levels, we will see the erosion of US military strength and, as a direct result, the slow decline of US global leadership.

QDR People Issues

The men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, and the civilians who support them, are the most important resource the nation has in protecting its security. An ambitious strategy accompanied by inadequate resources places tremendous strain on these people. It is easy to lose focus when resources are tight. The money Congress provides for defense, the weapons the services buy, the logistics infrastructure undergirding the force, the military doctrine strategists pronounce, the campaign plans commanders devise-everything comes down to the soldier at the "point of the spear." Therefore, our Armed Forces' men and women deserve sufficient materiel and moral support to allow them to do what we ask of them. In peacetime, however, we often forget the costs of war and neglect to pay the price of peace.

In assessing how we treat our people, I am torn between two strong feelings: I am concerned that the pressures put on service members and DOD civilians are growing to the breaking point; and I do not want to discourage those who are willing to serve from joining the Armed Forces or from staying in. On the contrary, I hope to encourage those who are willing and able to serve their country.

The fact that we are now at peace and no single enemy threatens us does not mean military service is any less necessary or any less valued than in the past. The burden of maintaining peace lies on the shoulders of those who serve, and it is no less critical a mission than any soldier, sailor, Marine or airman has ever had before. The bottom line is, we need the dedicated, patriotic people defense requires.

9 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

Focus on People

One of the things that most impressed me about former Secretary of Defense Perry was his focus on people. When he became defense secretary, he went to military bases around the world to talk with service people. "Management by walking around," he called it. A direct result of his "walking around" was renewed emphasis on improving quality of life.

For us who knew him to be a hardware expert, his focus on people was greatly welcomed. The value of his focus on people was the message he sent to the troops. It was noticed throughout the military and did much to prevent an unbridgeable rift between the administration's civilian leaders and the men and women in uniform. The example he set is one we in policy-making positions should take to heart. The US military is a complex human culture. We must always consider its human dimension in making choices on strategy, budgets, programs, social rules and regulations or any other aspect of policy.

I believe it was a mistake that the QDR did not include a separate panel on "people." The QDR comprised six panels: strategy, force structure, modernization, readiness, infrastructure and intelligence. An integration panel linked it all together.

So many of the issues the QDR addresses come down to people. For example, what stresses and strains does strategy put on people, given the force structure available to implement it? How does quality of life in the military affect mission readiness? How does military training, education and leadership development affect the military's ability to effectively exploit new technology? How will reductions in the defense infrastructure affect morale? All QDR panels touched on people issues to some extent-but did not address many critically important people issues. Do military people understand how their jobs contribute to the common defense? How do the changes in society as a whole affect the military-changes that include increasing opportunities for women, growing proportions of two-income households, sexual harassment problems and race-relations dynamics? Is there, as many fear, a growing gap between military culture and civilian society, and how will this affect public support for national security and the willingness of future generations of Americans to serve?

The answer to these questions have as much to do with national security as the budget's size or the quality of new weapons technology. If the pressures on our Armed Forces do not ease, the military may begin to lose many of its best and brightest people. Those I have talked to often cite three reasons why good people leave the force: the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) is too high; they have concerns about their families; and they are uncertain about the future.

Stretched and Stressed-High OPTEMPO

A most pressing issue is how current demands on the force are affecting troops. Two years ago, Lieutenant General Theodore Stroup, Army deputy chief of staff for Personnel, was asked what it was like for soldiers who served in an Army that was then composed of 520,000 Active Duty (AD) personnel. Soldiers, he said, were "stretched and stressed" by the demands being put on them. When asked what the effect would be when the number dropped to 495,000, as was then planned, he answered, "Stretched and stressed all the more."

Recently, DOD has proposed reducing the Army's size to 475,000, which the Army resists. Meanwhile, actual strength has eroded to about 490,000, even though the official end-strength target required by current law remains at 495,000. It is widely reported that the QDR will reduce Army end strength by 15,000 or more. So Army people will be "stretched and stressed all the more." At what point does all this

10 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

stretching and stressing reach the breaking point?

Each of the services faces the same issues. Recently, a senior Navy official testified before the National Security Committee about the difficulty the Navy has had keeping forces on station as much as it had planned. In large part, this is because the Navy, to its credit, rigidly tries to limit overseas deployments to six months and puts other constraints on the amount of time units may be away from home. In the same testimony, however, the official defended the decision to reduce the Navy's end strength by 11,000 in order to find money for equipment maintenance. The two issues cannot be separated-as end strength declines, we can either increase personnel deployment times, or we can reduce deployments, which means we can not fully support military strategy.

For those of us who frequently talk to people in uniform, this message comes across loudly. Last Thanksgiving, in Hungary, I visited soldiers from Missouri and asked each of them how many military deployments they had been involved in during current enlistment periods. Several had two deployments, a few had three and one sergeant had five.

Every time I visit the troops, I hear similar stories. I am convinced that current measures do not adequately identify the extent of the problem. Even in the Navy, the pace of deployments for individual sailors is not directly measured and limited. And in the other services, there is no systematic way to measure the extent of individual deployments, so we really do not know how much stress we are putting on individuals.

Another thing the QDR does not address is how to measure the strain put on individuals in the uniformed services and a means of controlling it. I recently saw a draft list from the Air Force of some things we should be measuring. It poses numerous questions, including the number of:

People who have temporary duty assignments of less than 90 days a year; 90 to 120 days; over 120 days a year? If too many people deploy on a constant basis, that is a sure sign of an excessive OPTEMPO. People who work 40 to 45 hours per week; 45 to 55; over 55? Some jobs require long hours, but if the trend over the whole force is up, that is a major stressor. Aircraft crews that receive waivers of training-hour requirements? If the trend is up, too many people are doing too many other things than their primary jobs. Major exercises people are engaged in, on average, per year. People who are delayed in meeting training qualification requirements for position upgrades. Enlisted personnel who are pursuing college degrees, and how many officers are pursuing advanced degrees. How many of each fail to complete course work? A decline in the number of people pursuing advanced education is a good measure of stress on the force. People who have accrued leave exceeding 60 days? Fathers who have missed a child's birth due to a temporary duty (TDY) assignment. How many have been assigned TDY within 30 days of a child's birth?

The list is extensive. I am convinced measures such as these show a dramatic increase in all of the services' OPTEMPO. Unless we can manage the degree of strain put on the force and do something to control it, we will have real trouble in retaining good people.

What are the causes of such apparent problems? To me, the root cause is a tendency to underestimate requirements for military operations while still preparing adequately for full-scale war. In the past, the military services worried less about the impact of small-scale military operations because the force was

11 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

relatively large, so a small deployment was not felt. Smaller military operations were also relatively rare. That is the main reason why current measures of stress on the force are inadequate.

Now the force is smaller, and military operations have become more frequent and of longer duration. One calculation in this year's Army Posture Statement is striking. Over the 40 years from 1950 to 1989, the Army was engaged in 10 deployments. In the seven years between 1990 and 1996, the Army was engaged in 25 deployments. Meanwhile, the Army's size declined by one-third and the budget dropped by 39 percent.

Aspin's 1993 Bottom-Up Review did not come to grips with the impact of a larger number of operations on a smaller force. The Review simply assumed a force designed to fight two MRCs would be large and diverse enough to handle any number of smaller operations. Only now are the services beginning to understand why this Cold War thinking will not do. For each Army unit deployed in an ongoing operation, four units are needed in the force: one unit deploys; another prepares to deploy; a third is coming off deployment; and a fourth is depleted because some of its troops were drawn on to fill out a deployed or deploying unit.

Also, only a part of the Army is available for deployments due to education and skills training re-quirements, in transit or in support functions and other troop positions. According to the General Accounting Office, 63 percent of AD Army troops are deployable at a given time. So, out of the 495,000 total, 312,000 troops are available for operations. By 1996's end, 35,800 Army troops were deployed, mostly to Bosnia. This does not count the number of troops forward-deployed in Korea. Multiply 35,800 by 4, and the number of troops affected by deployments is 143,200, which is 46 percent of the deployable force. The other 54 percent of the force is supposed to be training hard to be ready to fight two major theater wars.

This is why I am concerned about the impact of further reductions in Army force levels. At any one time, a large part of the Army is either involved in operations or is directly affected by them. Now the plan is to further reduce the overall number of personnel without reducing the number of divisions or missions. If the reductions come from division strengths, some specialties will have even lower manning levels. I do not believe DOD adequately understands the strains that further reductions will put on the force.

So how can we resolve these problems? Each service has been searching for ways to manage resources to meet the needs, but how successful are the solutions or, if successful for the present, how viable will they be in the future? One solution has been to use RC volunteers to fill out deployed units. A key issue here is, when will we reach the limit of Reserve availability? Reservists willing and able to volunteer have come forward already for one duty tour in either Haiti or Bosnia. There may not be enough volunteers available in the future, and involuntary RC mobilization would soon cause many Reservists to quit. Also, RC mobilization is expensive. Reservists receive full pay and benefits once activated. Congress continues to offset supplemental funding for military operations with rescissions, forcing costs to be absorbed within the overall defense budget.

Another potential solution may be to reduce nondivision support troop levels in order to fill out division slots, but too often we lose sight of the fact that support personnel perform assignments critical to mission effectiveness. Intelligence collection, for example, is a support function, yet operations cannot proceed without adequate, timely and usable intelligence. Nor can operations proceed without supplies, medical care or any other basic services that support activities provide.

Military Families

12 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

The second reason for personnel leaving the services is concern for their families. Today's AVF is quite different from past draft armies. People who choose the military as a career make up a larger share of the force. This is a positive trend; sophisticated weapon systems require highly trained professionals. Our Armed Forces set the standard to which other nations aspire.

As a whole, troops are older than in the past. Today, 64 percent of Active Army personnel are married, and except for the Marine Corps, the proportion is similar in the other services. The modern US military cannot maintain its high quality without adequately taking care of military families-"We enlist soldiers, we reenlist families."

In the early days of the AVF, we did not adequate-ly care for families. Military pay levels eroded. Military housing and other facilities were in awful condition. Social problems that plagued the rest of society-including drug use and racial tensions-also affected the military.

Since then, attention to needs has improved dramatically. Pay raises in 1979 and 1980, and more attention to family needs, have been tremendously beneficial. The military has led the way in responding to social problems.

However, I am fully aware of continued shortcomings. Strains on military families are growing, and we are not doing as good a job as we should in protecting them. Many of the strains, of course are inherent in the nature of military life. Military personnel are necessarily away from home for extended periods of time. Military families move frequently, making it difficult for spouses to build careers; which, itself, strains marriages. It is all the more important then that we devote special care and at-tention to military families.

The most important correction needed is to limit OPTEMPO so military personnel are not away from their families for longer periods than necessary. It is especially important that TDY be kept within limits. We also need to ensure that military pay keeps up with civilian sector pay.

In addition, we must preserve some of the benefits military families rely on. I am disturbed by proposals to eliminate commissaries and exchanges. Also, because of the military's demands, it is critically important to assist military families in having access to quality child care. We must also protect quality health care. Military families care deeply about education for their children, and we need to ensure the availability of the highest quality education. One of the most important initiatives DOD has undertaken recently is improving housing. While some housing is very good, much of it is not. I have seen housing with broken appliances, cracked walls, warped floors, peeling tile, inadequate heat and stopped up drains-with very poor responsiveness from main-tenance staffs. This must change; we have to do it as quickly and efficiently as possible. The QDR will suffer from a major gap if it does not address the military family's quality of life.

Uncertainty and Turbulence

A third reason people leave the force is uncertainty about the future. Many military people tolerate the stresses placed on them because they believe things will get better. If things do not get better, the best people could throw in the towel and leave.

There has already been a defense drawdown that reduced Active Component force levels by about one-third. This drawdown imposed immense burdens on military personnel. People had to move to new

13 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

jobs much more frequently because of the need to replace the large number of people leaving the service. The drawdown imposed a strain on the military education and training system and has made the military personnel system brutally competitive.

These factors directly affect people's abilities to meet career goals. Officers cannot count on receiving the education they need to advance. The amount of time officers spend in command assignments-where they can learn their trade-has declined significantly. Officers once had two years of previous command experience at lower levels before rising to battalion command. Now they have 12 to 18 months. As a result, our officers are not adequately seasoned which sets them up for potential failure.

These changes, together with a high OPTEMPO, create much uncertainty about the future. Unless we stabilize the force, pay adequate attention to training and education and allow good people to progress through the ranks in a predictable manner, the best people will not remain in the force.

Already good people are leaving. It would be wrong to attribute the exodus to external factors. For example, many say pilots are leaving in large numbers because airlines are hiring again. That may be a factor, but not the main one. The best people in the services will always be confident of opportunities in the civilian sector. Those we want most to keep in the force are precisely the people who can always find lucrative careers on the outside. The issue, then, is not what lures people away, but what drives them to leave. Good people do not sign up for the military as a career because they expect to make a lot of money-they need enough to provide security for their families, but they are not going to be lured away simply by higher salaries. Good people leave either because military service no longer offers them the rewards they expected or because the burdens of service have become too great.

Civil-Military Relations

There are other people issues the QDR should address. One is the broad issue of civil-military relations. The issue has many aspects. There is a widening cultural rift between those in the military and the civilian society they serve.

We ask a great deal of the people in uniform. Sometimes, we may expect too much. Failures in military conduct seen in sexual harassment allegations at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, or in the "Tailhook" episode-reflect a cultural gap that will continue to widen unless all parties are careful in their judgments. When such issues arise, some military personnel react by criticizing civilian society for imposing too much on the Armed Forces. "Outsiders" conclude that military culture itself is flawed. In my opinion, both are wrong. Yes, I think there are failures within the military, but I also believe the military can be counted on to identify and correct its failures. No, I do not think the military can be exempted from advancing social norms-including requirements for sexual and racial equality. I also recognize that the military is not identical to civilian society. Congress has a special responsibility to take care of the military personnel from whom we ask so much. It is incumbent on us to close the gap between military and civilian society before it grows into a gulf.

In this article I have called attention to the fact that Congress has often failed in its responsibility to provide for the common defense, and that I fear we are again embarked on a course which will leave our forces ill-prepared for future challenges. I have also argued that a failure to maintain military strength will encourage the evolution of new international threats that otherwise would not arise to challenge US security.

This is a strong, but sincere message. It is one many will find difficult to accept. I have tried to make my

14 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/ske.html

point carefully, explain my reasoning and use good facts and figures to support my conclusions. Sometimes, however, an argument needs something stronger. This reminds me of a passage in General Douglas MacArthur's autobiograph yReminiscences in which he discusses a meeting he had with President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the mid- 1930s. MacArthur was then Army chief of staff, and he and Secretary of War George Dern were making an appeal to the president for more defense spending. Secretary Dern, wrote MacArthur, quietly explained the deteriorating international situation and appealed to the president not to economize on the military. Roosevelt, was unmoved and reacted to Dern with biting sarcasm. Then MacArthur joined the argument, which became more and more heated. Mac-Arthur explained that "In my emotional exhaustion, I spoke recklessly and said something to the general effect that when we lost the next war, and an American boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his belly and an enemy foot on his dying throat, spat out his last curse, I wanted the name not to be MacArthur, but Roosevelt. The President grew livid. `You must not talk that way to the President!' he roared. He was, of course right, and I knew it almost before the words had left my mouth. I said I was sorry and apologized. But I felt my Army career was at an end. I told him he had my resignation as chief of staff. As I reached the door his voice came with that cool detachment which so reflected his extraordinary self-control. `Don't be foolish, Douglas; you and the budget must get together on this. . . .' Neither the President nor I ever spoke of the meeting, but from that time on he was on our side."8

I hope this Congress will not require an appeal like MacArthur's to remember the lessons of the past-that the price of unpreparedness is paid in war. The price of peace is much less. Therefore, let us treasure the Americans who wear our country's uniform-let us appreciate them, encourage them, but most of all, let us take care of them. After all, it is they who bear the burdens of defending America's most precious virtue-freedom.MR

1. United States Constitution, ARTICLE I, SECTION 8. 2. George C. Marshall (Major George C. Marshall, Jr.), address to Military Schools and Colleges Association, March 1923. The speech originally appeared in "Factors Contributing to Morale and Esprit de Corps," by General L.R. Gignilliant in 1923. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Quote is attributed to Otto von Bismarck. Anonymous. 6. This quote has been popularized over the years and is attributed to Harry S. Truman. Truman actually said, "We can well afford to pay the price of peace. Our only alternate is to pay the terrible cost of war." Quote Magazine, 5 August 1951. 7. General Douglas MacArthur , Reminiscences (New York: MacGraw Hill, 1965), 101.

The Honorable Ike Skelton, US House of Representatives, Democrat, Missouri, has represented Missouri's Fourth Congressional District since 1977. He is a senior member of the National Security Committee, ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Military Procurement and member of the Subcommittee on Military Personnel. He has authored three other articles for Military Review: "JPME: Are We There Yet?" (May 1992 and January-February 1997), "Joint and Combined Operations in the Post-Cold War Era" (September 1993) and "Inspiring Soldiers to Do Better than Their Best" (January-February 1996).

15 of 15 3/11/98 12:38 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html Challenge and Change: A Legacy for the Future

by General Dennis J. Reimer, US Army

The changes inherent in the Cold War's aftermath are truly dramatic, but they are only the most recent examples of a condition that has been an integral part of the US Army throughout the entire 20th century. In fact, change has been a consistent aspect of our organizational environment since the United States emerged as a world power earlier this century.

General John J. Pershing laid the foundation for the modern Army during World War I. His refusal to allow American units to be broken up and individual soldiers used as replacements established the principle that cohesion and leadership at every level would be an American Army hallmark. US soldiers would not be used as fodder to be consumed in the pursuit of an attrition strategy that relied on the relentless application of techniques which did not reflect an understanding of the strategic and technological environments in which operations were being prosecuted. Pershing established a tradition of responsibility that every soldier understands and exemplifies today: Army leaders must ensure that soldiers are well trained, organized, equipped and led to accomplish whatever mission they are assigned.

General George C. Marshall and others understood that principle and did all they could to ensure that the leaders of American soldiers would be prepared for the next war's demands. The value of experimentation with new doctrine, organizational schemes and operational concepts was demonstrated vividly in the early 1940's Louisiana Maneuvers. More important, however, was the lesson that remains with us still: balance is the key to success. What we have come to call the six imperatives-quality soldiers; forward-looking doctrine; the right mix of forces; tough, realistic training; continuous modernization; and competent, confident leaders-are critical for battlefield success. What the interwar years taught us is that without the appropriate balance of these imperatives, US soldiers will pay a heavy price at the opening bell of the next war.

After World War II, President Harry S. Truman reminded the nation that "We must be prepared to pay the price for peace, or assuredly we will pay the price of war." Unfortunately, our experiences in the years after World War II taught us how not to reshape an army in the aftermath of a great victory, and we paid the price of that lesson in blood in the early days of the Korean War. The Cold War's onset focused our efforts on the need for a sustained effort to oppose a committed and capable global competitor.

The Army's experience in Vietnam reminded us of our core values' importance. The 1980s training revolution and modernization programs refocused our attention on the need to balance the six imperatives to produce a credible force capable of carrying out the nation's bidding. Incorporating new technologies and harnessing microprocessor power in the 1990s are but the Army's latest instances of adapting to the environment in which it finds itself.

The point here is simple: change is nothing new. Army leaders throughout the 20th century have lived with change all their careers. The challenges we face today are no different than those our predecessors have faced and mastered. What this century's history teaches us is that the Army's real strength is its

1 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

ability to change and adapt to the period's requirements. Our ability to change was the key to victory in two world wars and a cold war, and it will be the foundation for our future success.

Change in the Post-Cold War World

The Soviet Union's disintegration removed the paramount security concern of the last half of the 20th century, but it left other dangers undiminished. Indeed, the demise of Soviet power may even have promoted new and potentially destabilizing trends. The rise of new economic centers of influence, political organizations and regional military powers may presage new competition for territory or resources. The breakup of nation-states, such as in the former Yugoslavia, can have a significant impact on regional peace and stability. Uneven economic development will prolong poverty throughout many parts of the globe, promoting terrorism and malignant drug-based economies. Traditional national and ethnic enmities will sustain the demand for high-technology weaponry, further retarding economic development while raising the cost of conflict. Ethnic divisions that were suppressed by the Cold War can erupt with suddenness and ferocity, as the tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated all too vividly.

A variety of social and economic factors also promote significant changes in the international environment. The gap between rich and poor societies has expanded dramatically, separating nations and continents into fundamentally different worlds. The collapse of communist regimes could leave millions threatened with insecurity and conflict. The United States cannot take for granted the development of democratic institutions and practices in former Soviet Union nations.

International drug trafficking poses a seemingly intractable problem. The drug-producing industry is growing, particularly in Latin America. While the United States has made counterdrug operations a national priority, sustained progress has been elusive. Political, economic and military relations with many of the critical nations of the Western Hemisphere are affected by the drug problems.

Modern military technology proliferation continues, particularly in developing countries. At least 56 countries already are capable of engaging in mid- intensity conflict, each having military forces that include at least 700 tanks or armored personnel carriers, 100 combat aircraft, 500 artillery pieces and more than 100,000 soldiers. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are also more prevalent. At the turn of the 21st century, as many as eight developing countries could have nuclear weapons, up to 30 could have chemical capabilities, 10 could possess biological weapons capabilities and 15 could be producing ballistic missiles.

Long lists of military hardware do not automatically constitute a threat. However, such capabilities in the hands of those who might oppose US national interests, for whatever reason, will be an all too prevalent characteristic of the international environment for the foreseeable future. A number of such regimes already exist; both North Korea and Iraq, for all their internal difficulties, represent states that combine the enmity and modern military capability to threaten US interests and disrupt stability in two vital regions of the world.

Conflict today is marked by increased precision and firepower across expanded battlefield dimensions, increased speed and tempo, the ability to see the enemy at any time and anywhere and the means to take the battle to him continuously. Precision-guided munitions and high-technology weapon's proliferation among developing nations will make future battlefields, even in the developing world, high-risk environments. Increasingly lethal weapons, along with enhanced sensors, sophisticated countermeasures and reduced signature platforms, will provide regional adversaries with capabilities that are

2 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

disproportionate to overall force size or level of economic development.

Steady undercurrents of resurgent nationalism-a source of many conflicts over the past millennium -continue to incite demands to redraw political boundaries or redress ancient grievances. The notion of nationalism based on "ethnic purity" contains the seeds of endless and intractable conflicts. Some fundamentalist religious movements advocate violence and vengeance. While the emergence of a global competitor against the United States in the next quarter-century seems unlikely, regional powers armed with modern weapons certainly will be an international security environment feature, and great powers such as Russia and China may well assert their will in areas they deem within their sphere of influence, thereby challenging US national interests.

The end result of post-Cold War changes is the replacement of the global Soviet threat with an ambiguous and diverse security environment, one filled with the potential for peace and prosperity, but one that also carries significant risks to the interests of the United States and its allies. The world has changed; we know that while there are new opportunities for peace and stability, the world remains an unpredictable and potentially dangerous place.

Strategy Has Changed

US national security strategy has changed to reflect the changes in the international environment. Engagement, a national security strategy, posits three critical objectives for the protection and advancement of US interests:

Enhancing security by maintaining a strong defense. Bolstering prosperity by working to open foreign markets and spur economic growth. Promoting democracy by supporting the newly emerging democracies throughout the world.

This emerging defense strategy is based on a strategic assessment that there will be no global peer competitor between now and 2010, the United States will continue to be involved in regional and small-scale contingencies and US forces will be committed to multiple concurrent operations worldwide.

The defense strategy's critical elements are shaping the international environment, responding rapidly to crises wherever they occur with relevant force packages and preparing for the uncertain world of 2020 and beyond.

Shaping requires engagement. Shaping requires the United States to be involved, face-to-face with our allies and friends, sharing the hardships and risks while promoting the development of stable regimes and regional stability. The ultimate objective of our shaping efforts is the enhancement of mutual understanding, trust and confidence. The United States has the strategic opportunity to structure an international environment that focuses on economic prosperity and cooperation rather than political confrontation and conflict.

Responding to crises. Responding with appropriate levels of force requires the sustainment of credible forces that are trained and ready to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. For the Army, we must be prepared for everything from peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities, to small-scale contingency operations, to major theater wars. Heavy, light and special operations forces (SOF) must be capable of imposing our nation's will on an adversary in a variety of possible operational, geographic and climatic environments.

3 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

Preparing to meet future demands. In preparing to meet the demands of 2020 and beyond, planners must recognize that the future geostrategic environment will be increasingly urbanized, requiring forces that can discriminate between combatants and noncombatants and which can apply appropriate combinations of lethal and nonlethal force. Future forces will also have to deal effectively with asymmetric challenges, including the use of WMD, terrorism, information warfare, special operations or clandestine forces and attempts to deny regional access and allies to US forces. Future adversaries will not try to match their forces directly against ours where the United States has overwhelming superiority. Instead, they will exploit perceived political and operational weaknesses, thereby trying to negate US high-tech systems' advantages.

Requirements Have Changed

US national military strategy (NMS) has changed to reflect the new national security environment's requirements. Whereas the Cold War strategy of containment led to the forward deployment of a sizable portion of America's conventional forces to deter the expansion of Soviet influence, today's military strategy relies on the strategic concepts of overseas presence and power projection to protect US interests in a much less predictable world than its Cold War predecessor.

The three critical components of today's military strategy, peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention and the ability to fight and win the nation's wars, have important consequences for how the Army conducts its responsibilities and how it contributes to the accomplishment of the NMS requirements.

The Army Has Changed

The last eight years have signaled enormous change for the US Army. The Army has transformed itself from being a forward-stationed Cold War force designed primarily to conduct large-scale operations on the plains of Europe, to being a power-projection force capable of rapidly delivering decisive military force anywhere in the world. This transformation came about during a time when the Army participated in 27 operational deployments and when it had been downsized by nearly 40 percent.

Perhaps the most obvious change has been the Army's size reduction. The Active Component has been reduced from 781,000 soldiers in 1989 to 495,000 today; Army Reserve and National Guard strength has gone from 776,000 to 575,000; and our civilian work force has been reduced from 402,000 to 236,000. Active divisions have been reduced from 18 to 10, while Reserve Component divisions have gone from 10 to 8. In 1989, there were 235,000 soldiers stationed permanently in Europe; today there are 65,000. The Army has closed 91 installations in the United States while realigning 15 others. It has returned more than 630 overseas bases to host nation control. All nuclear weapons have been removed from the Army's inventory. Budget resources have shrunk by 39 percent.

While the reduction in size may be the most visible aspect of change in the post-Cold War Army, it is not the most important. At the same time the physical size and structure of the Army were being altered so dramatically, the Army reconfigured itself conceptually and doctrinally to meet the requirements of the new environment and strategy. The Army's full-spectrum, power-projection capability is the greatest indicator of the extent to which the Army has changed to meet the requirements of the post-Cold War era.

The Army has invested heavily in making its forces more strategically mobile, and we have significantly improved our "fort-to-port" infrastructure. The nation's strategic mobility assets, both fast sea-lift ships

4 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

and transport aircraft, have been upgraded, and the use of pre-positioned equipment reduces the time needed to quickly put capable forces on the ground. The continuing purchase of C-17 strategic transport aircraft and fast, modern sealift ships configured to carry Army equipment ensures that potential adversaries must reckon with the US Army's ability to quickly project decisive combat power anywhere in the world.

A vivid demonstration of the Army's enhanced capability to project credible power quickly over extended distances occurred in December 1994 when Saddam Hussein made threatening gestures toward Kuwait again. Once President Bill Clinton approved the deployment of an armored brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Kuwait, the 5,000-soldier brigade from the 1st Cavalry Division was positioned in Kuwait, with its complete combat vehicle set-drawn from pre-positioned stocks, ready to conduct combat operations-in less than 120 hours. Ultimately, the Army will have eight brigade sets of heavy equipment pre-positioned afloat or ashore in critical locations around the world.

Peacetime engagement's purpose is to shape the international environment through a broad range of noncombat activities that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, bolster prosperity, relieve suffering and enhance regional stability. Toward these ends, thousands of US Army soldiers are engaged daily in activities that promote peace and stability. Military-to-military contact, particularly in the emerging democracies of former Soviet nations, provide opportunities for Army soldiers to teach their counterparts everything from squad tactics to the military's role in a democracy. These contacts take place not only abroad, but at home as well. Currently, the Army is training soldiers from 134 countries at our installations throughout the United States.

Despite the reduction in numbers, soldiers permanently stationed abroad are the most visible symbol of America's commitment to its alliance partners. Forward-stationed soldiers enhance regional stability, thereby providing the opportunity for the growth of democracy and economic prosperity in important world regions. Forward-stationed forces, particularly in Europe and Korea, contribute directly to deterrence in these vital regions, as do forces participating in peacetime engagement activities.

The presence of Army soldiers also contributes directly to conflict prevention. The Army has provided a 600-soldier contingent to the multinational peacekeeping force in the Sinai for more than 14 years. For the past five years, more than 500 US soldiers have been deployed to Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Balkan conflict. Until recently, more than 20,000 soldiers were deployed in Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Accords. Today, 10,000 Army soldiers remain as an integral part of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Also, there is a 60-soldier contingent deployed along the border between Ecuador and Peru to prevent that dispute from erupting into violence.

The Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win our nation's wars as part of a joint team. The NMS requires the Armed Forces to be able to fight and win two major theater wars. To meet that requirement, the Army maintains a mix of heavy, light and SOF that give it the ability to apply decisive force across the entire spectrum of military operations. The combination of quality soldiers, innovative doctrine, realistic training and modern equipment produces a land force without equal, a strategic force capable of imposing its will on an adversary with minimum casualties on both sides. The results of Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf provide ample evidence of the Army's ability to deliver decisive victory.

However, the Army is not resting on its laurels. Army units continue to train at its combat training centers: National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Combat Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. These world-class facilities provide

5 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

units from squad to brigade, and commanders at every level, the opportunity to operate in the most strenuous simulated battlefield conditions possible.

The Army must be prepared to meet today's requirements and also the demands of the international security environment in the years ahead. The Army XXI initiative is designed to ensure that Army forces are ready to meet the future requirements. In March 1997, we conducted a major Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) at the NTC that tested new organizational structures and the effects modern communications and information-processing capabilities will have on future military operations. The lessons learned from that AWE provide the basis for doctrinal innovation, organizational restructuring and the insertion of information-dominance capabilities in our existing weapon platforms. The Army XXI initiative ensures we retain operational overmatch capabilities against any potential opponent in the years ahead.

The Army Campaign Plan

The Cold War's end provides the United States a strategic window of opportunity. For all of the current international environment uncertainties and dangers, there is no global competitor to challenge US worldwide interests. This strategic situation provides us with the opportunity to think imaginatively about the future as we try to divine what capabilities will be possible and necessary in the decades ahead.

We do know what we want the Army's characteristics to be in 2020. The Army-and our sister services-should be:

Joint by design, not by accommodation. Capable of fully exploiting information-age technologies. Led by streamlined headquarters elements. Mobile-strategically, operationally and tac-tically. Versatile, with units that can perform multiple, disparate functions. Flexible, with units that can deftly transition between the use of lethal and nonlethal force, as the situation dictates. Logistically unencumbered-"just-in-time," rather than "just-in-case." Capable of implementing the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010: Dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection and focused logistics. A force that trains the way it fights.

To develop a military force that reflects these characteristics, we must incorporate the technological advancements and organizational adjustments required to implement a true revolution in military affairs (RMA). All of the services should commit to a force development strategy that eschews marginal improvements in capabilities that result from the incorporation of "creep-ahead" technologies and focuses instead on an approach which produces revolutionary improvements in capabilities through the incorporation of "leap-ahead" technologies. The Army has developed a campaign plan designed to incorporate just such technologies into its force structure while ensuring we retain our operational overmatch capabilities against any potential adversary as we build the Army of the future.

The campaign plan is based on a two-phase development program. In the first phase, we will develop and deploy digitized units that reflect the lessons learned from the AWE series. This approach defers decisions on major new platform procurement until we identify and sufficiently develop technologies that offer true leap-ahead capabilities.

6 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

We will maintain operational overmatch by inserting information dominance technologies into our current family of platforms. We will extend the life of current systems rather than procure creep-ahead systems with only marginal improvements. That approach would divert critical research and development resources to the procurement of Cold War capabilities in ever-smaller force packages, given current fiscal realities. The Army will focus on leap-ahead technological capabilities in propulsion, mobility, weapon systems, reconnaissance and surveillance and protection, to name just a few areas that hold enormous promise in the not-too-distant future.

The first phase of the Army's future campaign plan will take place between now and 2010. The objective of this phase is the fielding of Army XXI, a digitized force that reflects product improvements in current combat systems and the addition of information technology. Army XXI also will reflect force design changes made possible by digitization and validated by our AWEs. Operational doctrine will evolve to incorporate Army XXI's enhanced warfighting and situational awareness capabilities. Our research and development program will focus on identifying and developing leap-ahead technologies that will significantly enhance our capabilities in the years after 2010.

Army XXI will maintain and improve America's warfighting edge. It will be more versatile and flexible than the current force. It will be a power-projection force that is more agile, lethal and, most important, better able to provide the nation full-spectrum dominance. Army XXI will have the capabilities to win the nation's wars, establish order, prevent conflict and sustain operations as long as required. In short, it will be a force capable of shaping the strategic environment as well as responding in decisive fashion to whatever missions it is called on to perform.

The campaign plan's second phase will combine leap-ahead technologies with doctrinal innovations and new organizational concepts. Together, the combination of technological advancements, doctrinal change, and organization redesign will provide the synergistic effects to produce a true RMA. This phase's objective is to field the Army After Next (AAN)-a logistically unencumbered force with greater lethality, versatility and strategic and operational mobility.

The AAN will provide the nation with overmatch capabilities across the spectrum of operations. It will reflect the results of our strategic approach to force structure design and modernization. The critical technological advancements of the next 20 years will be incorporated into new operating systems and weapon platforms, thereby ensuring the AAN's capability to protect the nation's interests against any peer competitor.

Creating the Future Joint Force

The US Armed Forces are at a strategic crossroads. We have the opportunity to fundamentally reshape 21st century Armed Forces in a manner consistent with national strategy and emerging geostrategic realities. We can chart a clear and steady course that offers the potential for dramatic improvements in defense capabilities and greater returns on investments. This course has three essential components: a process for joint experimentation and integration; a realigned defense modernization strategy; and a revolution in the business practices of the Department of Defense (DOD).

Joint experimentation and integration. Each service has established battle labs and has recognized the usefulness of experimentation to effectively manage change and evaluate new operational concepts, technologies and organization designs. An integrated approach to experimentation significantly enhances the ability to design, test and field new joint organizations. We can now electronically connect the service battle labs and the southwest United States service training facilities-Fort Irwin; Twenty-Nine

7 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

Palms, California; Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada and China Lake, California-in a consortium of joint battle labs. A joint experimental force-a Joint Task Force (JTF)-can incorporate the advances the services have already made individually and serve as the test-bed for future developments in joint operational concepts and doctrine.

For example, the Deep Attack/Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS) indicates that we can significantly enhance our survivability and lethality beyond what was previously assumed through innovative employment of rotary wing aviation and deep-fire assets. This type of emerging concept and the implied refinements to existing tactics, techniques and procedures would be fertile ground for a standing experimental JTF. The JTF would be equipped with new capabilities developed through a reformed acquisition process that links troops, combat developers, materiel developers, testers and industry for rapid prototype development, experimentation, testing and fielding. The JTF would also provide the vehicle by which we could develop full-spectrum joint training. In the process, the JTF would serve as the catalyst for the cultural changes that will lead to truly integrated joint forces and unequaled joint operational effectiveness. Concurrently, we can expand our partnership with industry to build on these lessons and further reform defense acquisition to reduce costs, technical risks and time required to field new capabilities.

Defense modernization strategy. Our current capabilities are adequate-with some focused enhancements-to successfully implement the NMS at least through the year 2010. Accord ingly, it appears prudent to delay large-scale modernization of some capabilities during the next decade while we invest more significantly in the development of leap-ahead capabilities. In the near term, we have an opportunity to recapitalize joint capabilities that support the NMS and insert appropriate new technologies that increase operational performance or system cost effectiveness. We also should "product-improve" existing and soon-to-be-fielded systems with "Appliqué" command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to achieve battlefield information dominance across the joint force. We should refocus DOD research and development efforts on high-payoff, leap-ahead capabilities and skip the procurement of next-generation systems that offer essentially incremental improvements in traditional approaches, except where absolutely required to maintain technological overmatch against likely adversaries.

We must identify leap-ahead technologies that make previous generations of equipment and operational concepts obsolete. In so doing, we will at the same time identify those capabilities that ensure we will maintain overmatch capabilities against any competitor for the next 50 years. Refocusing defense modernization on leap-ahead, rather than creep-ahead, systems will contribute directly to effective changes in the way joint forces think, plan, organize, train and fight.

Revolution in business practices. We also have a strategic opportunity to bring DOD-wide business practices into the 21st century through an expanded partnership with industry and Congress. DOD must adopt the best possible practices within the framework of free and open competition, consistent with the requirement to sustain critical defense industrial base components. DOD must benchmark the best business practices of American industry to streamline, downsize, outsource and otherwise ensure the best possible return on our investments. We must also undertake efforts to streamline our headquarters, reduce infrastructure and provide incentives for the efficient management of defense agencies. The result of these enhanced business practices will be a joint force with enhanced operational agility, one that can deploy faster, with a smaller logistic tail. It also will be a force that reflects the most effective possible resource stewardship committed by the American public to produce and sustain it.

Army Values Will Not Change

8 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/rei.html

Despite future changes, one thing will not change-the Army will continue to be a values-based organization. The values on which we have created the premier land combat force in the world will also be critical to our success in the years ahead. The Army is and will remain an institution with an enduring set of values. Those values-honor, integrity, selfless service, courage, loyalty, duty and respect-are more than just words. They are the creed by which soldiers live. Common values create the strong bonds that inspire the sense of purpose necessary to sustain soldiers in the brutal realities of combat and help them deal with the demanding requirements of all other military operations. Army values will continue to provide the foundation for everything we do.

Another constant is the need for America's Army to be able to conduct the range of its missions. In the last eight years alone, the Army has conducted operations ranging from theater-level war in the Persian Gulf to humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Macedonia are but a few of the places Army soldiers have carried out the nation's bidding, while the soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea continue the vigil begun in 1950 to bring peace to that divided land.

In the end, the commitment of American soldiers is the ultimate expression of national resolve. What will never change is the readiness of America's Army to answer the call, whatever or wherever the challenge.MR

General Dennis J. Reimer is the US Army chief of staff. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S. from Shippensburg State College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in joint and allied assignments in the Continental United States, Europe, Korea and Vietnam, including commander, US Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; US Army vice chief of staff, Washington, D.C.; deputy chief of staff, Operations and Plans, US Army, Military Staff Committee, United Nations, Washington, D.C.; commander, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado; assistant chief of staff, C3/J3, US Combined Forces Command, and chief of staff, US Army Element, Combined Field Army, Korea; commander, III Corps Artillery, and deputy assistant commandant, US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and chief of staff, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bad Kreuznach, Germany. His article "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It" appeared in the July-August 1996 edition of Military Review.

9 of 9 3/11/98 12:40 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html On Perspective and the United States Army

by Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. O'Neill, US Army

Perspective (per spek0tiv), n 1. a: the technique or process of representing on a plane or curved surface the spatial relation of objects as they might appear to the eye; specif: representation in a drawing or painting of parallel lines as converging in order to give the illusion of depth and distance; b. a picture in perspective 2. a: the interrelation in which a subject or its parts are mentally viewed ; also: POINT OF VIEW b: the capacity to view things in their true relations or relative importance 3. a: a visible scene; esp: one giving a distinctive impression of distance: VISTA b: a mental view or prospect 4: the appearance to the eye of objects in respect to their relative distance and positions.

- Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition

The past year has been particularly difficult for the US Army. Charges of impropriety, breakdowns in the chain of command and a continuing downward spiral in the resources the nation is willing to expend on the military dominate the headlines. Ironically, training pace and operational deployments have increased at the same time. A smaller Army has consistently been called on as the "force of choice" to respond to the full spectrum of challenges facing the nation today. For many in field or staff duty throughout the Army, these factors' combined weight is overwhelming and casts a pall over our institution's future, to which our professional soldiers and their families have dedicated their lives. In times such as these, it is critically important to America and its Army that leaders at all levels maintain a clear perspective.

Hard is Relative

Hard is December 1951 in Korea. The temperature is well below zero with a wind that just doesn't quit. At least they have cold weather uniforms this winter. The rifle company commander reconstitutes his command following a brutal three weeks of combat that saw his 150-man company reduced to nine effective soldiers. That was October-in an action the reporters were calling the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge. Reconstitute . . . the captain has done this twice before, and he has developed some expertise in training the new men in the skills they will need to survive their first encounters with "the elephant" during battle. He has been in Korea since the summer of 1950 when his unit hastily deployed from occupation duty in Japan to brunt the attack from the north. He does not know how long the war will go on. There are rumors of peace talks, but he has seen little evidence of peaceful intentions. He is in this thing until it is finished. He recalls that his older brother left for the Pacific in January 1942 and did not return until January 1945, and then only because his wounds precluded his return to the line.

The captain's wife of two years is in their hometown in Alabama, where she gave birth to their first child the month he arrived in Korea. He has not seen his son except in pictures. He wonders how long this new group of soldiers will survive. They look pretty good. He hopes they will be lucky. He hopes his

1 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

luck will continue to hold too. He misses his wife. He would like to hold his son. He moves down the hill to check the line. This is hard. Hard is relative.

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

Martin Luther King Jr. once said, "The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy." We have all heard this euphemism many times over the years and yet it is a truism that is easily forgotten. Perspective is often the first thing lost when adversity is confronted. Those in senior positions today remember all too well the Army that struggled from the ashes of Vietnam. Tell them they lack the grit, determination and force of will to do the right thing. The 1970s- now there were some hard times. It was definitely worse then: drugs, racial violence, the ranks filled with society's outcasts-uneducated, undisciplined and untrainable. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, on which the US Army has historically depended for professional leadership, had been decimated by the war in Southeast Asia. Society viewed those in uniform as a lower life form to be viewed with contempt. Our warfighting and training doctrine was outdated and in serious need of radical reform.

This was not the first time the Army had faced such a crisis. The first battles of what would become the nation's longest war, jungle warfare in Vietnam's Ia Drang Valley, found an Army struggling to come to grips with a new and fierce enemy. Looking back, the battles fought by Task Force Smith during the opening weeks of what became the Korean War were a real cause for panic. The early days of World War II, at Pearl Harbor and the Kasserine Pass, were crises that shook the Army and the nation to their very foundations. The historian can go further back in our nation's short history and find numerous other examples. It seems that we, as a nation and an Army, are prone to setting ourselves up for failure, then paying for that failure in blood. Yes, it can be worse.

January 1977-it is cold and raining. The beginnings of crusty ice are forming in the puddles created by soaked boots stomping to keep warm. It is dawn, the seventh consecutive day of this field problem. His platoon, fully manned but devoid of NCOs (the best junior enlisted men were made "acting jack" sergeants to assume squad and team leader positions) like other platoons in the company, had performed fairly well during most phases of last night's attack.

"Boy, this is miserable-absolutely the worst," said the lieutenant as he switched his remaining glove (the other had been lost in a trench hours ago) over to his other hand. "How can they expect us to continue under these conditions." He went on, "This is too hard. Our soldiers cannot be expected to continue under these conditions. We need a break, a chance to regroup and rest."

The battalion command sergeant major has spent the night walking with the platoon. He smiles, hauling himself up from the stump that he used as a resting place. He has served for nearly 30 years, in two wars, in both commissioned and noncommissioned positions, and will retire the following month. He has seen something worth developing in this young officer, something he has seen before in others who led platoons, companies and battalions . . . others who rebuilt an army.

"Well Sir, it can always be worse. Your problem is that you just ain't got nothing to compare this with. Just you stick around this Army for awhile. You'll see worse," and after a brief pause, "you'll see better. Just don't lose your perspective, because when you do, you cease being the leader and become one of the led-and you'll be just as cold."

As the two moved stiffly down the ridge to check their defenses, the sergeant major adds, "Oh, and

2 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

remember, you are `they' now!" Where you stand depends on where you sit.

Somehow, it Just Got too Hard

If you believe the pundits and self-styled military experts, America's Army is on the skids. Sexual harassment, extremist groups, unprovoked assaults, a zero-defects mentality and failures in leadership-the list of ethical and moral lapses seems to have no end. America's enlisted soldiers are overworked and underpaid, and their families are living in substandard housing, scraping by on food stamps. Our senior uniformed leadership, so frequently derided in the syndicated columns, is out of touch, does not care about America's sons and daughters and is hopelessly mired in bureaucratic infighting focused on padding their already plush nests. "Political correctness," not combat effectiveness, is the standard by which these leaders judge all persons and policies. Most disturbing, note these critics, are the falling readiness indicators that warn of a potential failure to accomplish the missions the nation expects the Army to be able to perform at any time.

Our elected and appointed political leaders, increasingly devoid of personal military experience, are certainly not a source of comfort and optimism according to these same critics. It is "open season" on those in uniform, with consistently lower annual budgets, eroding benefits and a new social engineering initiative debated in hearings or on Sunday talk shows every week. And if that were not enough, these officials have committed our Army to more missions- 27 deployments since 1989 compared with 10 from World War II's end to the Soviet Union's collapse-more than at any time in the past. As for the media, they never did care much for those in uniform and they are enjoying our predicament immensely.

January 1997-The major wipes at an oil smudge on his parka in a futile attempt to restore its appearance. Too many other stains from previous days. The cold German rain does little to improve the gloomy mood in the motor pool. The brigade, just returned from a grueling six-month deployment to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, is now actively engaged in returning the unit to full combat readiness. The brigade's soldiers and leaders are exhausted, but there is no respite on the horizon. Most have been deployed away from home for more than 180 days. Some marriages did not survive the deployment. There are families experiencing financial difficulties and the emotional stress that goes along with a stretched checkbook.

The pressure for a quick return to readiness in maintenance and training has frayed nerves and shortened tempers. The brigade's officers and NCOs, all seasoned professionals who have been together for well over a year, enjoy the camaraderie of working together. They love their soldiers-the best they have ever seen-and their unit, but some are losing faith in their Army. A growing "zero defects" climate stifles the initiative and enthusiasm that used to make working in the outfit so much fun. Each day brings a new requirement that demands immediate attention and resource expenditure. Their teams, squads and platoons are understrength and, in some cases, have been zeroed out to fill formations in other units. They have families and futures to plan, but they can't get a straight answer from their assignment officer at the US Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), even when they are able to get through to them. Promotions are slow, particularly for NCOs, and each day brings news of yet more erosion of benefits that once compensated for low pay and long hours. The major, and most of his NCOs, had always planned on a career in the Army. Now, they cannot count on it.

The recent drawdown saw the Army shrink from 18 active divisions to 10. There are rumors that two more may disappear soon. The Army's buying power has shrunk by nearly 40 percent since the Soviet Union's fall. The only trend line that seems to climb is the number of tasks the Army is called on to execute.

3 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

Awaiting a crack in the military's shiny armor, the media depict an Army mired in sexual and ethical impropriety, where political correctness has gone berserk. It is an Army, they say, led by persons incapable of doing the right thing. The public appears to revel in the Army's discomfort. Their Army. The officers and NCOs doubt that can go on like this. They have families to think about. It is just too hard.

Soldiers now find themselves in the throes of a massive drawdown, a personnel management system that is unresponsive at best and indifferent far too often, charges of sexual misconduct, budget problems, too many missions and too few units, families and bank accounts strained by frequent moves and separation, a public that appears indifferent to its citizens in uniform and a leadership seemingly adrift. These problems and others define the angst felt in our Army's ranks. This discomfort, fed continually by a press corps reflexively circling a struggling institution, acts like an anchor that digs in ever deeper as the institution struggles to move forward. It often appears that nothing can be done to stop the cycle of pain and recrimination. Somehow, it just got too hard.

It Can Definitely be Worse

If the business of defending the nation were an easy task, the nation would not need a professional army. If the Army were an easy organization to be a part of, it would not require great soldiers and great leaders. No one said it would be easy, but our soldiers can't be expected to continue under these conditions.

Compare today's soldiers with their predecessors. Smarter and better educated than their Vietnam, Korean or World War II counterparts-95 percent are high school graduates; 27 percent have some college education-today's soldiers are just as responsible and full of initiative as those who established the legacy of the American soldier. Today's soldier is all of this and more: 66 percent are married, 14 percent (69,000) are women, and 38 percent represent minority groups.

Today's soldiers live in barracks and family housing that are significantly better than those inhabited by their predecessors. Their wages and other benefits are also significantly more generous than those of soldiers in the past. Granted, not all barracks or family housing units are in the best shape, and no argument will be made here that our soldiers are adequately compensated for service to their country, but there have been tremendous strides made and the leadership is committed to continuing those improvements. Following World War I, active duty pay was cut, promotions were virtually frozen and funding for modernization and training was negligible. It can definitely be worse.

July 1932-the Army, now a mere shadow of the organization that went to Europe as the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917, is actually "marching on its own." Promotions have stagnated along with the intellectual development of most of the officer corps. A few visionary thinkers-Marshall (see his speech on page 136 of this issue), Eisenhower, Stilwell, Bradley-are trying to move the Army forward, but it is far from certain they will survive. The nation's mood is somber as the economy falters. Undermanned, poorly equipped and reduced to a riot-control force, America's Army faces hard times. "Bonus Marchers," former soldiers and their families, have provoked a nervous President Herbert Hoover to order their forcible removal from the "Hooverville" erected in Anacostia, Maryland.

The US Army that went to war in the summer of 1950 was not unlike the Army that went to war in 1917 or 1941. Undertrained, ill-equipped and struggling to match tactics, techniques and procedures with the latest threat, the Army entered each of these conflicts with a skeleton force that was forced to gamble it

4 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

could mobilize and prepare for combat in time for the crucial part of the conflict. Compare these forces with the Army that went to fight in December 1989 for Operation Just Cause or with that which routed the Iraqi army in Operation Desert Storm a little over a year later. It can always be worse.

Without a doubt, America's Army has earned its pay in the past few years. Since Operation Desert Storm, soldiers have responded to hurricanes and forest fires at home, fed the hungry in Somalia, restored democracy in Haiti, provided security and safe haven for refugees from Haiti, Cuba, China, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, ensured the sovereignty of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and restored peace and provided hope for a brighter future in Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia. America's Army has fought the war on drugs, walked the border between Peru and Ecuador to help keep the peace, battled floods, trained with allies around the world and with the US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps at home and abroad. All of this has happened while America's soldiers have been forward deployed in Europe, Korea, Panama, Japan and in embassies and military assistance groups the world over. America's soldiers, and their families, pay freedom's price every day. Our soldiers and their families are a lot tougher than we give them credit for; a quick check of record reenlistment rates in many units will attest to this. They are dedicated to their nation, asking only that they be dealt with honestly and with fairness. This is hard, but it can definitely be worse.

Remember, You Are `They' Now

America's Army today is well-trained, led and equipped. It is not perfect, and there are a host of challenges we face now and in the future. Operational tempo is high, and this pace will be maintained or increased in the future. We protect and defend the United States of America. We will continue to be required to balance scarce resources, politically imposed constraints and restrictions and a seemingly endless array of tasks. America's Army has had to do this since its birth, sometimes with more difficulty than at other times, but the requirement has always been there. To serve and to fight the nation's wars. This is what we do. Remember, you are `they' now.

Our leadership-elected, appointed and in uniform-battle to get the balance of things right. They do not always succeed, but they do fight for what is right for America, the Army and its soldiers. There are leaders at all levels who fall short of our ideal-this has always been the case. By and large, they serve honorably and with a dedication rarely matched in the private sector. As for the media, they are not now nor have they ever been "the enemy;" they are but a part of the American landscape we are committed to defend. The media report the news. That is what they do. Remember, you are `they' now.

What's Your Point of View?

Our Army is going through a rough period. It's cold and raining out there. We have been downsized and we face the possibility of further reductions in end strength. The personnel management system is often unresponsive, reactive and too impersonal. Our leaders and the quality people at PERSCOM are working to fix this system. There are too many soldiers on food stamps. Our elected leaders are working to alleviate this situation. Discrimination, because of race or gender, is a very real problem for too many of our soldiers. Our Army is committed to eliminating any condition that demeans the dignity of any soldier. Some senior leaders are out of touch with the Army in the field. However, the vast majority of our senior leadership is first rate and working day and night for soldiers and their families. The strain on families due to deployment and dislocation is severe. Army leadership is working to reduce turbulence for soldiers and their families and to ensure they are adequately compensated when they deploy or move. Social initiatives imposed by our elected leaders do have an impact on the force. Not all of these initiatives contribute to the Army's ability to accomplish its primary mission-to fight and win the nation's

5 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

wars. But sometimes the Army moves our society forward with an initiative that could not have been accomplished by a lesser institution. All of this is true. Much of this has always been true. All of these challenges exist, yet America's Army is still the best in the world. Just don't lose your perspective, because when you do, you cease being the leader . . . and you'll still be cold!

The fact is, we have inadvertently drifted into the "victimization syndrome" most of us despise. It is too convenient and easy for us to blame our institutional and personal problems on our political and Army leadership. Divorce and spouse abuse are too prevalent throughout American society, not just in the Army. Anxiety over finances is hardly unique to military families. No one ever suggested that a family of four could live comfortably on a new private's pay. No one ever said that a tour in the Armed Forces of the United States of America was devoid of personal sacrifice. Congress may appear to be stingy with dollars and too quick to criticize, but legislative support for our nation's military has been more consistent and generous over the past 20 years than at any other time short of all-out war.

To protect and defend, to fight and win our nation's wars; this is what we do. While endless grousing may make us feel better and make for energetic discussion in orderly rooms and officers clubs, it will not solve anyone's problems. Each man and woman in uniform brings individual talents to the table. Each soldier and Army family must work to build a firm foundation based on Army values: duty, honor, courage, loyalty, integrity, respect and selfless service. The whole, when combined with proactive and concerned leadership, determination and a bit of luck, is greater than the sum of the parts. Stick around this Army for awhile. You'll see worse-you'll see better.

I do not suggest that these very real and very serious problems can be wished away or that all is well in our Army. No one can argue that all has ever been well with the Army. However, if we engage in less hand-wringing and work with less acrimony, much of the angst will fall away. We should be mature enough to place at least as much faith in the character of our leaders at all levels as we do in the omniscient "experts" who castigate our institution without bearing any responsibility. We must be patient enough to place our Army's current problems in perspective and acknowledge what we know in our gut to be true-there are no quick and easy solutions to complex problems. We should be able to dig deep enough to benefit from the wisdom of an old sergeant major who sees the larger picture.

Throughout our Army's history, tough times have served as the catalyst for profound change, and they have always produced great leaders: Washington, Grant, Lee, Pershing, Stilwell, Marshall, Patton, Eisenhower, Abrams, Cavazos, Schwarzkopf, Franks, Powell, Vuono and Sullivan. These leaders were able to maintain their perspective during the dark days when everything seemed to be going wrong with America's Army. They were able to see the possibilities, stay focused on the Army's crucial value to the nation and be in a position to play their role in history. It is 1997. Today's senior leaders are no less capable and no less dedicated than those who preceded them. This is a hard business and we all have a role to play. Let's move out and check the line. Sure it's cold right now and we are all feeling a bit miserable, but stick around . . . we'll see better.

January 2010-the general observes the ongoing battle at the National Training Center (NTC). The night attack is proceeding well. Planned quickly and on the move, the attack's apparent success is the result of target acquisition and digital command and control systems produced during past and ongoing advanced warfighting experiments. It will all be over within the hour. The general remembers many previous trips to the NTC and the other combat training centers. Each rotation teaches new lessons. When combined with the lessons learned during virtual learning and training systems now common throughout the Army, the experience playing out in the desert below will continue to allow America's Army to dominate any foe. The regiment's soldiers conducting the attack are the best the general has ever seen. He remembers a

6 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/one.html

night attack many years ago when times were worse. He remembers an old soldier teaching him about the importance of perspective.

The attack approaches its conclusion and the general hauls himself up from the rock that he has used as a seat. It is cold, and his back aches. This is not as easy as it used to be. The years that have passed since that other attack so long ago have been pure magic. They have not always been easy and were often filled with uncertainty and no small amount of institutional and personal pain. Yet, through it all, service in America's Army has been the adventure of a lifetime. He wonders how much longer he will be allowed to stick around to help the Army continue to grow. He knows that he'll see worse, but he'll also see better.MR

Lieutenant Colonel Mark E. O'Neill is an Army Initiatives Group member, office of the deputy chief of staff for Operations and Plans, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and a M.A. from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College, the Defense Language Institute and the British Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School, Hong Kong. He has held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Asia, including commander, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York; deputy G3, brigade S3 and battalion S3, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and assistant Army attaché, American Embassy, Beijing, People's Republic of China.

7 of 7 3/11/98 12:41 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html The Center for Army Lessons Learned: Winning in the Information Age

by Lieutenant General L.D. Holder, US Army, Retired, and Colonel Edward J. Fitzgerald, US Army

Winning in today's dynamic and varied conditions requires understanding and preparing for the specific conditions surrounding a mission. Therefore, training and planning with the most current information is vital to success. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, actively supports the information operations of US Army units as they work to understand and adapt to global and military information environments.

Every day, 75 military and civilian information warriors at CALL collect, analyze, archive and disseminate tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs) and research materials in support of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). CALL Combined Arms Assessment Teams (CAATs) deploy to real-world contingency operations and Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to collect operational documents and expert observations. CALL analysts assess the information and produce analyzed feedback for Army leaders and soldiers. CALL information and computer specialists digitize both the Center's own lessons and supporting operational documents and place them online for access by the Total Army via a world wide web (WWW) Gateway. These efforts help ensure that soldiers and leaders will begin the struggle for information dominance with the greatest possible initial information advantages.

Since its inception in 1985, CALL has enjoyed a reputation for high-quality, practical support to leaders, trainers and soldiers. Over the course of its 12-year history, CALL has repeatedly sent collection teams with Army units to the CTCs and on contingency operations around the globe. Its written reports regularly find their way into unit training offices, S3 shops, commanders' in-boxes and service school classrooms. Their observations and insights also appear in doctrinal publications and the TTPs taught by CTC observer controllers. In Bosnia, Task Force Eagle reviewed the observations made by the CALL CAAT daily, then immediately circulated those the commander considered valid to leaders and soldiers.

Today, CALL operates permanent collection cells at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany. It also collects lessons learned from the corps and division staff exercises the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) conducts. And, most important, CALL subject matter experts serve with deployed soldiers in Bosnia, as they have previously in Haiti, Macedonia, Somalia and the Sinai.

Training the trainer has been CALL's traditional mission. The Center earned its spurs as a training support facility and is determined to maintain its focus on ensuring that leaders and soldiers train and fight to win. However, the information age's rapid pace requires that CALL first and foremost support

1 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

operational commanders' information requirements to provide the educational, training, force and materiel developers with the knowledge sets they need to improve the force over the long term. To succeed in an ever-changing political, military, economic and social world environment, CALL continually adapts to new or changed conditions to provide the Army with the best information and analysis. Those who understand CALL only in terms of its traditional written reports and products are missing out on a most dramatic advance in Army training history.

This article describes these changes and the US Army Combined Arms Center's (CAC's) vision for CALL's future. It also aims to promote greater field use of CALL's unique capabilities in support of Army readiness and leader development. CALL's recent experience in cooperation with federal agencies outside the Army and with foreign armies is also worth relating, because it serves to highlight what is both possible and increasingly required in a rapidly changing world.

Capturing Lessons Learned

By the mid-1980s, Army leadership realized that despite its huge investment in the NTC, it had no means of capturing lessons from this Mojave Desert training. To fill that void, CALL's initial publications focused on successful TTPs used by Continental United States units in their NTC training. Success at the NTC led to the creation of companion CTCs-the JRTC for light forces (now located at Fort Polk, Louisiana); CMTC at Hohenfels for heavy forces positioned forward in Europe; and BCTP at Fort Leavenworth for division and corps commanders and staffs. As the CTCs matured, CALL applied its expertise to the whole system. Shortly thereafter, its mission included collecting and distributing insights on all Army exercises.

From the start, CALL looked back to the Army's actual experience for the context in which the lessons being learned should be seen. By 1989, CALL leadership recognized the need to support the Army's combat operations with fast-reaction collection teams that would deploy with fighting forces. This system of combat collection made its debut in December 1989 during Operation Just Cause. The CALL "system" performed ably in Panama and later proved just as useful in noncombat operations, such as disaster relief in the wake of Hurricane Andrew and peacemaking in Somalia and Bosnia. The next step was to develop an electronic archiving and dissemination capability that would bring TTPs and research materials to Army leader and soldier desktops.

During his tenure as Army chief of staff General Gordon R. Sullivan developed the concept of an Army Knowledge Network (AKN), a system of linked and cross-referenced data bases constituting a complete collection of all military, political, social and economic information pertinent to operations. His concept found its first expression in an automated archiving project undertaken by the CALL Gulf War Special Study Group, led by Major General Thomas Tait. From 1991 to 1993, a CAC planning group-consisting of personnel from the CAC History Office, CALL, the Defense Printing Service, the Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) and the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL)-met the flood of Gulf War data with a concept for an online Army "archives without walls." The challenge of collecting, storing and disseminating that information to users throughout the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) propelled the effort. Based on the planning group's work, CAC established an electronic archive. Then US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander General Frederick M. Franks Jr. was interested in capturing operational documents and lessons learned electronically from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and making them available to the Total Army.

In the fall of 1992, Franks expanded the electronic archives without walls to encompass an online "library without walls" and designated CARL as the centerpiece of an Army Tactical and Operational

2 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

Research Library. The following year, the director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4) selected the CAC system as the Army's automated archives for contingency operations. In September 1994, CAC's electronic archival repository expanded yet again to encompass the documentary record of Army collective training exercises at the CTCs. The rapid expansion in the roles and missions of the CAC History Office prompted CAC Commander Lieutenant General John E. Miller to establish an AKN Directorate as the institutional basis for an Army and Joint Archives and library without walls.

By 1996, the AKN automated archival data base had grown to 1.5 million pages and had earned national recognition as a pioneering online information system, winning both Vice President Al Gore's Hammer Award and an honorable mention Smithsonian-Computer World Award. The Hammer Award recognized the CAC automated archives team for its support of President Bill Clinton's National Performance Review principles of customer support, elimination of bureaucratic red tape and the empowerment of employees. The Smithsonian- Computer World Award recognized AKN's visionary use of information technology and included placement of the archival data base into the Smithsonian Institution National Museum of American History Permanent Research Collection on the history of information.

While AKN's electronic archives grew, CALL initiated its own version of electronic collection, archiving and lessons distribution. As part of its collection efforts at the CTCs and its involvement in contingency operations, CALL gradually solidified the basic components of a standardized "lessons learned process" which is systematized in Army Regulation 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program. Beginning in 1995, CALL began to communicate digitally with its CAATs and CTC cells using the CALL Collection Plan and Observation Management System (CALLCOMS). At the same time, CALL began pioneering new WWW technology as a dissemination vehicle for CALL products.

In March 1996, CAC fused AKN and CALL into an integrated effort charged with providing timely and relevant lessons learned, TTPs and research material to Army units around the world. Uniting these two activities was both logical and expedient. CALL had a decade-long tradition of excellence in analyzing Army contingency and collective training operations and providing relevant lessons learned feedback to field commanders, staffs and soldiers. AKN had built a national reputation in the electronic archiving and dissemination of archival documents and secondary literature. Each activity complemented and strengthened the other. AKN information systems, when coupled with emerging CALL WWW expertise, for example, solved longstanding CALL problems in disseminating vital information throughout the Army. Association with CALL, however, gave AKN capabilities a critical mission focus on CCIR that would simultaneously serve educational, training, doctrinal and other Army information needs.

The CALL System Today

Despite considerable change in technique and capabilities, CALL's mission remains the same: to provide timely and relevant lessons learned, TTPs and research material to Army units around the world. CALL collects lessons learned and TTPs passively and actively. In the passive mode, personnel from the field

3 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

provide input in the form of articles, which CALL then disseminates to the Army. In the active collection mode, CALL deploys CAATs to contingency and Army collective training operations to collect operational documents and expert observations. Together with CALL's Lessons Learned Division analysts, CAATs publish products that address field problems soldiers and leaders experience at the tactical and operational levels, and provide information to follow-on deployments or to units facing similar situations.

Commanders, trainers, planners, teachers and writers worldwide endorse the changes daily in their use of CALL's products. Demand for observers and observations remains high. Use of the CALL Internet site has grown explosively over the past year. In June 1996, CALL homepage access stood at 10,000 "hits" per week. A year later, the figure had expanded to 150,000 hits per week, with growing usage from deployed units and foreign callers.

CALL teams support every Army deployment for contingency operations or CTC collective training. Since 1994, CALL has participated in such operations as: Advanced Warfighting Experiment (NTC) 97-06, Operation Vigilant Warrior, Saudi Arabia (1995); Operation Able Sentry, Macedonia (1994 to 1996); Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti (1994 to 1996); and Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia (1995 to present). CALL produced Initial Impression Reports and subject-tailored CALL newsletters for each of these operations and placed important research materials online on the CALL data base (CALL DB) for Army and DOD use.

Within the CTC arena, CALL plays a key role in the Focused Rotation Program. Under this program, TRADOC schools, centers and battle labs use the CTCs to help identify, develop and solve warfighting issues. Using its extensive information resources, CALL provides training support packages tailored to specific unit requirements. It distributes these packages to units approximately six months before their scheduled rotation. CALL also publishes topical newsletters and CTC orders to assist in training brigade and battalion staffs.

CALL also performs a critical function for the Army by executing the TRADOC Remedial Action Program (T-RAP). In accordance with T-RAP, CALL uses observations from actual contingency and collective training operations to identify issues requiring correction. CALL assists issue proponents designated by TRADOC headquarters in solution development by providing methodological guidance, coordinating with the CTCs to examine a particular issue in a focused rotation and offering research support via the CALL Gateway. CALL tracks solutions as they are implemented and validates with TRADOC those that succeed as true lessons learned.

The CALL Research Division-formerly AKN-uploads unclassified operational lessons learned, TTPs and research materials into the CALL DB. This information has been collected by the CTCs, CAATs, military history detachments or Joint Combat Camera, or received through records management channels and unit staffs in either hard copy or digital format. Once online, the information is disseminated via the CALL Gateway across the WWW to the Total Army and DOD communities. The CALL Research Division also maintains a classified CALL DB, accessible via the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). The CALL DB electronic archives contain operations orders, situation reports and key briefings on post-1973 Army contingency operations. CALL DB also includes take-home packages, final exercise reports and other documentation from the CTCs. CALL DB has been so successful as an electronic records repository and dissemination vehicle for this information that the Army vice chief of staff's Support to Organizational Training Functional Area Analysis has recommended that the Army upload all training lessons learned and feedback into the CALL DB.

4 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

CALL's system has been widely studied and emulated throughout DOD by academic institutions and even by private sector institutions searching for the Army's secret of how to become a "self-correcting" institution. The work to automate lessons learned observations creation, coordination and dissemination is well under way in the development of CALLCOMS. When fully implemented, CALLCOMS will support CAAT operations and issue tracking within the TRADOC and Army Remedial Action Programs. CALLCOMS may affect the Joint Uniformed Lessons Learned System (JULLS) as well, since Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness Louis J. Finch directed that it be reviewed as a possible replacement for the outdated JULLS.

A recent Wall Street Journal article praised the Army for devising a system "to decide what does and does not work." Correctly identifying CALL as this system's cornerstone, the article further stated that because of the efforts of organizations such as CALL, "Management experts say that the Army outstrips many companies in learning from experience." The Harvard Business School and Boston University's School of Management, which recently conducted Army lessons learned program case studies, agreed. The former, which produced an extremely popular video on the Army lessons learned system, wrote: "The Army has perfected a remarkably efficient process for correcting its mistakes and sustaining its successes." Both schools agreed that CALL played a vital role in ensuring that the Army, essentially a flourishing organization with the earned reputation as the best-trained, best-equipped military force in the world, refused to become complacent because of its dominant position.

Current Initiatives

In February 1996, the National Technology Alliance (NTA), established by Congress to determine the "best of class" commercial and government off-the-shelf information technologies, evaluated the CALL DB and determined that it was two years-and orders of magnitude-ahead of the other top 1,600 digital libraries in the United States. After conducting separate reviews, DOD command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), the Moynihan Commission and the National Archives concurred with the NTA evaluation. In June 1996, CAC and the NTA signed a memorandum of agreement to establish a Defense Information Technology Test Bed (DITT) within a congressionally funded Federal Information Technology Test Bed (FITT).

Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I Emmett Paige Jr. designated CALL as the DITT site on 23 May 1997. Both DITT and FITT integrate emerging technologies and methods into the CALL Gateway and existing CALL DB through a modular "plug and play" approach to evaluating best-of-class systems and software. CALL retains the "best" technology and methods, incorporating them into the gateway. These technological enhancements enable CALL to provide commanders with the right information at the right place and time. They also provide a federal model for electronic records management, archives and protection and reduction of secrecy in government.

DITT includes the resources, partnerships and technologies necessary to reengineer the Military History Education Program (MHEP). This reengineering effort's goal is to transform MHEP into a technology-enhanced program, enabling remote access to a digital library able to support assigned and recommended reading as well as independent research. CALL serves as the facilitator for the TRADOC Military History Office, securing both resources and technical support, while several other agencies play key roles in this effort: The Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, provides subject matter expertise and develops training support packages; the National Information Display Laboratory provides interactive, web-based multimedia technology; and the University of Nebraska provides essential reengineering expertise.

5 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

The combined DITT/FITT initiatives will result in the largest, most capable digital library in history, with CALL DB storage expanded from the current 250 gigabytes, through 16 terabytes, to 5 petabytes over the next several years. Except for the requirement to maintain the already funded core human and technical infrastructure, none of the needed funds are scheduled to come from the Army.

Next to DITT, the CALL Gateway is the single most important CALL-NTA partnership project. The CALL Gateway uses commercial and government off-the-shelf technology to provide Army and other DOD users access, through web browsers, to a wide variety of open-system, client-server and distributed data architectures. In the future, CALL Gateway will use software tools developed for the Central Intelligence Agency under the Pathfinder-Sentinel Program. By 1997's end, these tools will enable users to simultaneously access 10,000 pages through related data subgroups. Using artificial intelligence to graphically display information by "themes," related data is grouped together to enable users to rapidly sort and retrieve what they need. CALL and NTA will also upgrade US Navy Radiant Mercury software to provide multilevel security, search and retrieval and redaction capability across CALL Gateway and DB.

In addition to Gateway, CALL and NTA will establish Army infrastructures, processes and standards for multimedia storage and network presentation. CALL and NTA are currently executing a three-phase CALL Multimedia Test Bed for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). During the first phase, the Multimedia Test Bed is archiving unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) footage from Bosnia as a prototype while simultaneously developing video server and digital video indexing and retrieval to make still and full-motion video resources available to users.

The CALL Multimedia Test Bed fits into NIMA plans for a National Image Library (NIL) with six Command Image Libraries (CILs). One CIL will be dedicated to digital video and other documents from the UAV Program and be managed by the Defense Air Reconnaissance Office (DARO). The multimedia UAV CIL will be the pilot, multimedia component and model for the rest of the NIL. In November 1996, the TRADOC deputy commander for Combined Arms approved UAV CIL. Based on initial success in the Test Bed's first phase, NIMA/DARO expressed interest in CAC (CALL/DOIM) fielding this CIL. While both CAC and NIMA are interested in this option, a Rough Order Of Magnitude is required to underpin decisions by NIMA to offer, and TRADOC to accept, the UAV CIL charter, mission and resources.

Gateway to the Future

CALL's goal is to design and field a state-of-the-art capability to support units preparing for, engaged in or returning from operations, by providing them with the knowledge they need to plan, train and execute in the present. CALL, in turn, will derive lessons learned and research materials from this operational experience. These lessons and materials can support follow-on units as they prepare for and conduct future operations.

Soon, Army leaders and soldiers will access CALL Gateway from home station over established computer networks and in contingency theaters via satellite. When fully implemented, CALL Gateway will permit desktop or laptop computer users on land, at sea or in the air to query multiple data bases to meet their information needs. These data bases will contain information on theaters of operations, filed overhead imagery, commercial news services and tactical lessons learned.

The CALL DB will contain software that can summarize search findings of 20 million pages of documentary information into a 400-word summary. CALL Gateway will also enable users to access 50

6 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

million pages of information using artificial intelligence routines to present information according to its relationship to other data. Software engines will search classified, unclassified and public domain repositories, permitting access to information according to the user's clearance level. In line with President Clinton's Executive Order 12958 to reduce secrecy in government and maximize the benefit derived by the Army and DOD from the free flow of information, CALL Gateway will declassify, redact and sanitize classified and sensitive archival information to make it more accessible to the public.

Thanks largely to CALL's progress, the Army is recognized governmentwide as an information age leader. The Army Training Digital Library (ATDL), administered by the Army Training Support Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, provides Army users online access to current field manuals, mission training plans, training circulars and soldier training publications. The 50,000-plus pages of ATDL material can already be searched on the WWW via CALL Gateway. In the US Army Gulf War Declassification Project, the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) possesses a state-of-the-art digitization and online declassification capability compatible with the CALL electronic archives. Moreover, by establishing an Army Operational Records Center, PERSCOM promises to capture and convert immense amounts of documentary information from Army contingency operations and make them available to Army and DOD users via CALL Gateway.

TRADOC Commander General William W. Hartzog has lauded CALL's pioneering efforts in providing the table of organization and equipment Army with the opportunity to become "learning units" as well as "training units," by taking "information to where the troops are." Hartzog challenged CALL to lead the way in transitioning toward "greater use of the dynamic opportunities digitization is providing the force." He also suggested expanding CALL exposure in Army CAPSTONE and Pre-Command Course (PCC) programs and was pleased to learn that CALL had already begun educating PCC participants about the information available to them via the CALL Gateway.

In the 1980s, CALL helped launch the information age within DOD by establishing an effective mechanism to "feed back" lessons learned from training and contingency operations to the Army. CALL's leadership enabled the Army to learn from within and emerge victorious against the myriad threats to national security. In the 1990s, CALL remains at the point in the information age fight, tackling the difficult challenge of providing Army users with global access to vast data bases while enabling their quick and effective use to support the rapid operating tempo of the current and future Army.MR

Lieutenant General L.D. Holder, US Army, Retired, held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS) and Europe, including deputy commander for Combined Arms, US Army Training and Doctrine Command; commandant, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC); and commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; commander, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Würzburg, Germany; deputy chief of staff for Support, Central Army Group (NATO), Heidelberg, Germany; commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Nürnberg, Germany, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm; G3, 2d Armored Division, and special assistant to the commander, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas; and commander, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Bliss, Texas. His article "Prairie Warrior: A Joint and Combined Exercise," co-written with Colonel Rolland A. Dessert Jr., appeared in the July-August 1996 issue of Military Review.

Colonel Edward J. Fitzgerald is the director for the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth. He received a B.S. from Seton Hall University, an M.S. from Long Island University, he is

7 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/hol.html

a graduate of the USACGSC and the Army War College. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, Korea and Turkey to include deputy chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, Ankara, Turkey; chief, Army Directorate, Joint US Mission for Aid to Turkey; G3, 7th Infantry Division (ID), Fort Ord, California; and commander, 5th Battalion, 6th ID, Fort Polk, Louisiana; and XO, 1st Brigade, 5th ID, Fort Polk.

8 of 8 3/11/98 12:43 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

US-Russian Cooperation in IFOR: Partners for Peace Major Charles J. McLaughlin, US Army

The overwhelming success of combined US-Russian operations in the Implementation Force's (IFOR's) Task Force (TF) Eagle has shattered any misconception that American and Russian soldiers, who faced each other as opponents for so long, could not work side-by-side in the cause of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, the years of studying each other across Cold War boundaries worked to the newfound coalition's favor; the two forces already knew, respected and grudgingly admired each other. Officers and soldiers from both countries spent years studying the other's arms, equipment and organization. When political leaders formed the IFOR partnership, military professionals of both nations immediately began transforming a relationship based on potential conflict to one of real cooperation.

The success of that transformation is all the more significant because it is so quiet. The relationship of the US-led TF Eagle and the separate Russian Airborne Brigade is one of operational normalcy. The Russian Brigade, one of five TF maneuver brigades, operates smoothly and seamlessly with its US headquarters and multinational sister units. This success was not an accident: it is a result of careful planning, a common strategic objective and unparalleled professionalism.

The crowning achievement of US-Russian cooperation in Bosnia is the support provided to the Bosnian national elections on 14 September 1996. The TF Eagle staff-in full consultation with the Russian Brigade-planned, resourced and executed this election support without significant shortcomings. The election support represented team-work at its finest because US and Russian:

Logisticians arranged for the delivery, transport and collection of thousands of ballots and voting materials. Civil affairs (CA) personnel co-ordinated with representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and local election committees. Intelligence personnel collected and shared information on the election area. Commanders jointly planned patrols and aerial reconnaissance to avert the outbreak of civil disturbances. Soldiers performed the vital work of loading, unloading and guarding the election materials.

Those who took part in this historic effort will proudly recollect that history was made in two ways: American and Russian soldiers worked side-by-side for peace, and the Russian Army was a force for democracy.

The election period achievements were possible because the two armies had become accustomed to working together. From the beginning, operations in TF Eagle included a never-ending series of joint operations and partnership events across each battlefield operating system (BOS).

Command and control. The close personal relationship of the TF commander and the Russian Brigade

1 of 15 3/11/98 12:44 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

commander ensured close coordination and synchronicity of intent. The commanders maintained coordination through daily conference calls, use of redundant voice and data communications and effective use of liaison officers (LNOs). Russian LNOs at TF Eagle headquarters helped coordinate and resolve Russian Brigade issues with the TF staff. US LNOs ensured the commanding general's intent was clear to the Russian commanders. US LNOs, all temporarily assigned from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany, were positioned at TF Eagle headquarters, the Russian Brigade headquarters and at field locations during actual operations.

Combat service support. A US CA team was permanently stationed with the Russian Brigade and aided the deputy Russian Brigade commander for Civil Affairs in the administration of election activities, civilian claims and other civil-military operations issues. The Russian Brigade legal officer closely coordinated with the TF staff judge advocate to process legal claims against IFOR by local civilians. The Russian Brigade was self-sustaining in all classes of supply and services. However, Russian and American logisticians coordinated the conduct of all combined operations.

The US finance officer provided limited finance support to the Russian finance officer. The Russian and US medical officers routinely conducted physician exchanges and hosted multinational medical conferences at their respective facilities. US medics regularly worked with the Russian staff in the Russian Brigade medical station. Medical service personnel from both nations had conducted joint surveys of local civilian medical facilities and joint medical evacuation training. Finally, the TF Eagle chaplain provided limited chaplain support to the Russian Brigade, which included providing Russian language Bibles.

Maneuver. Every week, the Russian Brigade conducted joint patrols with a different US brigade. These patrols demonstrated the unity of the US-Russian peacekeeping team to the local population and gave small unit leaders-future colonels and generals -practical experience under operational conditions. TF Eagle provided the Russian Brigade commander air transport, air assault and attack helicopters to support his scheme of maneuver. Russian and US forces improved their in-teroperability by conducting joint weapons familiarization on small arms ranges. The armies demonstrated their interoperability by performing joint Dayton Peace Accords inspections of Former Warring Faction (FWF) weapons storage sites.

Intelligence. The Russian Brigade S2 received intelligence from, reported to and coordinated with the TF Eagle G2. The S2 conducted this coordination through the Mini-Deployable Intelligence Support System. This computerized intelligence-processing workstation, manned by three US military intelligence soldiers, was in the Russian Brigade's S2 office. The US troops worked as part of the Brigade S2's intelligence team to receive, analyze, gather and report information. The TF G2 readily shared information, including overhead imagery and unmanned aerial vehicle downlinks, as it related to the Russian Brigade. As part of the coordinated US-Russian reconnaissance plan, Russian personnel flew in US helicopters weekly and conducted aerial reconnaissance of selected sites in the Russian Brigade sector.

Fire support. The 1st Armored Division's (1st AD's) Artillery Brigade provided a fire support element on a permanent basis to the Russian Brigade. These US artillery soldiers helped the Russian artillery chief coordinate US and Russian fire support planning. The TF Eagle psychological operations (PSYOP) officer coordinated his efforts with the Russian Brigade PSYOP officer, who actively sought advice and lessons learned from his US counterpart to help transform Russian Army PSYOP from its Cold War status to one more appropriate for a democratic country's army.

2 of 15 3/11/98 12:44 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

Mobility and survivability. US and Russian engineers worked closely together and reduced the mine threat throughout the Russian Brigade area of responsibility. Russian Brigade engineers coordinated FWF de-mining operations through the TF Eagle Mine Action Center and also consolidated and evaluated FWF mine data and published maps that aided de-mining operations and helped all soldiers avoid the deadly Bosnian mine threat. Chemical troops from both nations conducted interoperability training under the joint supervision of 1st AD's chemical officer and the Russian Airborne force's chief chemical officer.

Air defense. US and Russian air defense personnel regularly shared air order of battle information.

Interest in unit-level or BOS-level coordination should not eclipse the importance of individual-level cooperation. In many cases, a soldier's personal impressions from his first real contact with soldiers from the other side of the old East-West divide will last a lifetime. One such case illustrates this point. Early in the summer of 1996, TF Eagle began its voter assistance effort to ensure soldiers had the opportunity to register to vote before the November US elections. Voting-related posters went up around the TF headquarters and a voting assistance officer set up a booth to provide registration forms. A Russian LNO, a lieutenant colonel and former Communist Party member, took a great interest in all of these preparations. He was seen by a US acquaintance reading a voter assistance guide. The US officer asked jokingly whether the Russian officer found the reading interesting. The Russian officer responded in all seriousness that he was studying the voter assistance guide and he felt other Russian officers should do the same. He felt the Russian army needed to learn how to support their own elections and should study the American example to develop techniques and procedures.

The exchange between this Russian officer and his US counterpart illustrates better than any other example how US-Russian cooperation in TF Eagle executed the national strategy of engagement and enlargement. An entire cohort of Russian servicemembers will return home with strong impressions of how militaries operate in mature democracies. An even larger cohort of US servicemembers will return home seeing the Russians as partners instead of adversaries.

As Cold War memories fade, a new era of security cooperation has begun. It was the sincere desire of all commanders in TF Eagle-Russian, American and multinational-that the US-Russian partnership forged in Bosnia will anchor the growing friendship between our nations and be a signal to the world that cooperation between former enemies is never out of reach.MR

Major Charles J. McLaughlin is a senior fellow, Institute For Eurasian Studies, George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, where he is completing his training as a Eurasian Foreign Area Officer (Functional Area 48E). He recently served as a liaison officer to the Russian Brigade in the Task Force Eagle Implementation Force, Operation Joint Endeavor. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, with 7th Special Operations Support Command (Theater Army); 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Stuttgart, Germany; and 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Bamberg, Germany .

3 of 15 3/11/98 12:44 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

What Makes an Alliance Strong? NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Retrospect

Wallace J. Thies and Monica Podbielski

The Warsaw Treaty Organization's (WTO's) speedy collapse in 1989 and 1990 fostered a new conventional wisdom that sees the Soviet empire's demise as historically inevitable given the inherent weaknesses of command economies, totalitarian rule and aging leaderships unable to adapt to a changing world. The WTO's monolithic unity, enforced conformism and slavish adherence to Soviet doctrine and practice weakened it so much from within that the alliance shattered soon after the winds of change began blowing through Eastern Europe.1

The widespread recognition that the WTO was but a pale NATO imitation should not obscure the depth and intensity of the fears the organization once inspired. For much of the Cold War, the West widely believed the WTO was militarily and even politically superior to NATO.2 Many reasons were behind that judgment, but the three cited most frequently during the NATO-WTO rivalry years were:

The WTO's use of standardized, Soviet-supplied weapons. The WTO's acceptance of a unified military doctrine derived from Soviet practice. The WTO members' willingness to echo Soviet views on important political and economic issues. In contrast, NATO seemed hopelessly divided by parochial preferences for weapons manufactured at home, by democratic military establishment idiosyncrasies and by annual crises over burden sharing, out-of-area deployments and the like.

The 1989 revolutions called into question beliefs about the strengths and efficacies of NATO and the WTO. However, the ideal of marching in unison toward greater standardization, doctrinal unity and political harmony continues to cast its spell on would-be NATO reformers. Indeed, the temptation to remake NATO appears to have grown in direct proportion to its emergence as the alliance everyone wants to join, including former WTO members-even Russia itself.3

This is all the more surprising considering that only a decade ago, conventional wisdom was that NATO had virtually ceased to exist as a military alliance and it was only a matter of time before funeral rites were conducted.4 The WTO collapse, NATO's ability to overcome doubts about its mortality and the profusion of suggestions for remaking NATO for the post-Cold War world suggest that we re-examine what makes an alliance durable and strong.

Western Perceptions of WTO Strength

Students of alliances have often argued that if an alliance is to endure, its members must share similar perceptions of the opponent and his potential to do them harm, similar foreign policy objectives and a similar political culture.5 Relative to the WTO, the core of agreement within NATO was more extensive and more firmly grounded in the attitudes of elites and publics. Yet, the West also believed an alliance of democracies was "a real impediment to military efficiency," "less able to bear the stress of a changing world order than the [WTO]," and more likely to fly apart than an alliance "forged, and sustained, by tight central control."6

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that students of NATO were envious of the Soviet Union's ability to

4 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

compel its WTO partners to purchase weapons and equipment produced by the Soviet military-industrial complex.7 The West believed the WTO greatly benefitted from this standardized approach.

Although NATO members were wealthier than WTO members, NATO's defense expenditures were often criticized for being frittered away on multiple designs of the same weapon, built by separate, inefficient production lines and serviced by separate, duplicated supply systems.8 It was widely believed that WTO members allocated resources more efficiently than NATO. "NATO is still heavily outproduced by the Warsaw Pact: Their defence rubles are spent more productively than our defence pounds, dollars and Deutschmarks."9 Within NATO, lack of cooperation in research, development and production resulted in "high unit costs and wasteful duplication."10 In contrast, Soviet procurement cycle dominance avoided duplication and allowed the WTO to outproduce NATO in every weapon category except general purpose warships.11 NATO defense industries were widely seen to be more interested in competition than coop-eration. Each NATO member hoped to develop systems that would capture the market, but the result was a "gross waste of Western defense funds and . . . inferior, or more often incompati-ble, products."12

Standardized weaponry multiplied the WTO's offensive striking power, while NATO's units had "different equipment and cannot even talk to each other."13 This produces clear weak links which the Soviets would be well able to exploit.14 "Soviet equipment is used throughout the Warsaw Pact . . . [which] makes storage and spare parts requirements much easier to handle and standardizes maintenance as well."15 NATO forces were judged to be inferior because they were less standardized than WTO forces, more varied in size and type and chained to separate and duplicative supply systems.16 NATO's ability to counter the WTO's high-speed offensive warfare was further complicated by NATO members' insistence on maintaining the full range of functions within their armed forces rather than specializing in those they performed best. National commanders were often reluctant to depend on allies for any combat or logistic support-even allies they trusted to hold the adjoining sector of the NATO defense line.17

In view of the WTO's standardization advantages, many analysts concluded that NATO's survival depended on its becoming more like the WTO. "NATO's future as an effective alliance will depend on whether [it] can evolve from 15 separate and distinct defense programs to a single coordinated effort."18 NATO governments should "decide now that one country or one consortium will build [the next generation of main battle tank] for use by NATO as whole."19 "If the Dutch or the UK make the best minesweepers . . . then they should build all the minesweepers for NATO. If we [the US] make the best fighter then we get to make that."20

Unified doctrine. Western observers also were envious of the Soviet Union's ability to impose its doctrine on Warsaw Pact armies. Doctrinal unity was believed to endow the WTO with advantages NATO could not equal.

In the WTO, "Soviet doctrine defines alliancewide norms for the organization and standardization of the components of the national armed forces and also defines the internal and external missions of the alliance."21 In NATO, "there is really no such thing as a NATO defence posture, only a collection of heterogeneous national postures."22 Because non-Soviet WTO forces were subordinate to the Soviet Supreme High Command in Moscow, WTO armies would fight as a unified force.23 NATO members' zealousness in guarding their prerogatives meant that NATO's most striking feature was "the immensity of the organization. . . . Its awkwardness is extreme. Organisms like SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe] are virtually ungovernable."24 Other NATO observers were even more acerbic: "Never in the history of human conflict have so few been commanded by so many."25

5 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

Because the Soviets imposed doctrinal unity, the WTO could presumably formulate and execute decisions faster than NATO.26 Within NATO, important "decisions are made by committee and are implemented through a process of negotiation, compromise and consensus."27 NATO was expected to be severely disadvantaged in any prewar situation because basing arrangements and logistic support were national, not integrated under one coordinating power. NATO's lack of an enforcement agent to motivate individual members to meet alliance goals exacerbated its inherent efficiency disadvantages.28

As with standardized weaponry, the solution to NATO's problems was often seen as moving closer to the WTO model of a single alliancewide defense program. "The task before NATO is to move toward a single efficient defense program, despite the continued independence of its members."29 "[A]ll Allies, including the United States, need to start `thinking NATO,' rather than thinking primarily in terms of national programs, while paying mostly lip service to common goals."30

Political conformity. Rigid conformity with Soviet political and economic positions was a third source of perceived WTO strength, because this allowed the Soviets and their allies to avoid debilitating political crises that seemed endemic within NATO. East European political leaders were often hand-picked by Moscow; hence, their political future was tied to the Soviet Union. WTO military integration and the pre-eminence of Soviet doctrine also bound the East European officer corps to the Soviet Union. Although Soviet domination of Eastern Europe predated the WTO's formation in 1955, the formal alliance was useful because it institutionalized Soviet control of the East's political and military affairs.31

In contrast, NATO was seen as unlikely to survive, much less win, a prolonged competition with its Eastern rival. After World War II, US policy makers tried to avoid dividing Europe into Soviet and US spheres of influence because it "would merely temporarily postpone an eventual clash with the Soviet Union under conditions infinitely worse for the United States and Great Britain." As a dictatorship, the Soviet Union "would be able to consolidate into an absolute bloc its sphere of influence while the Western democracies by their very nature would be unable to do the same in theirs."32 Once this division was formalized, Western observers quickly concluded that NATO's armed forces were greatly inferior to their WTO counterparts, because democracies could never match the ability of the Soviet Union and its satellites to field armies and air forces.33 The WTO was "an instrument, if not a mere extension, of Soviet military power in Europe," whereas "an alliance of 16 consenting sovereign states is an uncommon and often unsteady enterprise."34 In the event of war, WTO mobilization was expected to proceed smoothly and efficiently, while NATO's was expected to lag behind.35

The cleavages within NATO were believed to be especially deep: nuclear strategy, burden sharing and Soviet Union assessments. Nuclear strategy was especially divisive because doctrine and weapon discussions invariably raised objections from those who feared their country would be devastated if NATO escalated too rapidly and those who feared their country would be overrun if NATO escalated too slowly.36 An alliance riven in this fashion "can hardly be expected to last for another 30 years without a major breakdown or a major transformation."37

Burden sharing was at the heart of many NATO problems. Particularly during the 1980s, several European members felt intense public pressure to reduce defense spending, resulting in what was often judged to be a rising tide of Western European neutralist and pacifist sentiment.38 US insistence that Europe contribute more to the alliance created a dilemma, because attempts to equalize burdens through central direction would likely undermine the solidarity NATO was created to promote.39 In contrast to the WTO's monolithic unity, NATO appeared "prosperous and purse-conscious in matters of defense, but fractious and only intermittently cooperative."40

6 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

NATO members diverging perceptions of the Soviet threat caused discord-particularly at the start of the 1960s. NATO observers suggested that certain Western European states which had benefitted disproportionately from détente could no longer be regarded as full-fledged alliance members and that NATO itself had virtually ceased to exist.41 With the basic tenet of NATO's justification for existence seemingly undermined, "The ultimate price to be paid by the Europeans for keeping the dividends of détente may therefore have to be the dissolution of the Atlantic Alliance itself."42

Suggested solutions to Western disunity often centered on making NATO more like the WTO: "[T]he reorganizers' argument is essentially a simple one-we face defeat if we do not improve our efforts; one obvious weakness is a lack of unity among the allies; therefore, we must mend our coordinating machinery."43 "If the Soviets in fact seek to fragment NATO by exploiting the psychological vulnerabilities of the alliance, then we must seek just as assiduously to turn those vulnerabilities into strengths, to reverse the emerging trend of alienation and polarization, to create one mind where there are now many."44

Elements of Strength Reappraised

In contrast to NATO's open splits and frequent crises, the WTO's enmities and antagonisms were often cloaked by Soviet-imposed secrecy and control. Thus, the WTO presented a facade of strength and cohesion. But while its force structure was large and impressive, the WTO's political and economic supports were faulty. In retrospect, we see that the very elements which made the WTO appear to be a military colossus-standardized weapons, a uniform military doctrine and seemingly monolithic unity-were actually corrosive agents sapping its vitality.

Standardized weapons. Imposed standardization was attractive to the Soviets for two reasons:

Mass production of standardized designs made economies of scale possible. Thus, WTO forces were much larger than NATO forces. NATO's equipment designs were built by limited production runs of competing designs. The more Eastern Europe depended on Soviet arms, the more difficult it was for them to contemplate military action without Soviet logistic support.45

WTO standardization, however, was never as extensive as many Western policy makers believed. Condoleezza Rice notes that there are "so many national versions of the Kalashnikov assault rifle and machine gun that it is impossible for the personnel of WTO armies to learn to use all of them."46 In the Cold War's latter years, the WTO maintained five different main battle tanks and eight different armored personnel carriers that had four different track systems and seven different engines.47 This great variety of equipment dispersed throughout the WTO complicated the repair and replacement system.

Standardization limits also resulted from generational differences in WTO equipment. Equipment sent from the Soviet Union was often obsolete.48 The Soviet penchant for unusually long production runs of relatively untested equipment, combined with a reluctance to take anything out of service, resulted in large amounts of troublesome equipment lingering in the inventory. Thus, while the WTO carried standardization and interoperability further than NATO, it did not quite "yield the absolute advantage with which it is sometimes credited."49 More important was the clumsy and heavy-handed way the Soviets compelled their allies to accept Soviet decisions on which weapons to buy and where they should be produced. The Soviets pushed not only for standardized WTO weaponry but for a division of labor among Eastern European arms producers.50 Largely as a result of Soviet pressures, "a nascent East

7 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

German aircraft industry was dismantled in 1961. Poland renounced further work on advanced jet aircraft in 1967."51 Moscow called this policy efficient, but East Europeans saw it as an economic shock resulting in dislocation of important production facilities, temporary unemployment and the need to retrain substantial numbers of workers.52

Viewed from the perspective of WTO members, standardization, cou-pled with enforced specialization, was inherently divisive. WTO members resented enforced specialization because it gave arms producers fewer product lines to offer their customers, thereby restricting the lucrative arms trade between Eastern Europe and the Third World. National pride was also at stake. Soviet allies in the WTO resented being told they were incapable of producing certain kinds of weaponry.53 One result of the resistance to Soviet-imposed weapon decisions was that the WTO gradually evolved from a Soviet-dominated quasisupranational organization into an international organization of members with, at times, sharply different national interests.54

Within NATO, the absence of Soviet-style leadership meant that standardized weapons were the domain of international consortia which divided production tasks among the members, resulting in multiple inefficient assembly lines but also in member competition for a slice of the next lucrative contract. NATO's ability to muddle through despite members' parochialism suggests that an alliance's resilience and durability vary directly with the amount of duplication and overlap in member activities and inversely with the intensity of efforts to eliminate duplication and overlap. Duplication, higher costs and diminished combat capability are not the cause of policy conflict but the alternative to it.55

Doctrinal uniformity. A second component of the WTO's enforced integration was the Soviet attempt to prohibit any national military doctrine distinct from the Soviet doctrine. East European WTO members did not control their defense establishments and thus, did not have the capability to organize and deploy their forces to defend their own territories.56 The Soviets needed three devices to control their nominal allies: the WTO's officer education system, network of political administrations and unified military commands.

The WTO's officer education network did not offer training in the theory or practice of territorial defense. The political education system also enabled Moscow to compete with East European political leaders for officer corps obedience. The Soviets did this by enlisting high-ranking East European officers into a "greater socialist officer corps commanded by Soviet marshals" and by prescribing joint missions defined by Soviet doctrine.57

WTO members' political administrations concentrated on three points:

Socialist patriotism, defined as loyalty to the party and state hierarchies of the socialist fatherlands. Proletarian internationalism, defined as joint defense of socialism against internal and external enemies. Class hatred toward the imperialist enemy, defined for each WTO member according to its historical experience with the West in general and Germany in particular. This political framework was formulated to hide the fact that Russians and East Europeans have been fighting each other off and on for the past 600 years.58

The Soviets used the WTO's unified commands to impose considerable practical integration of WTO members' armed forces for joint missions in the event of war. However, in retrospect, a strong case can be made that Soviet insistence on doctrinal uniformity was a source of weakness rather than strength. Declining rates of economic growth meant that force modernization by Eastern Europe lagged behind

8 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

Soviet modernization. For example, by the mid-1980s, Polish forces were roughly two generations behind the Soviets and at least a full generation behind German, Dutch and Danish forces.59 Lagging force modernization meant that even if their political reliability was assured, Eastern Europe's armed forces probably could not execute the missions prescribed for them by Soviet doctrine.60 Doctrinal unity is hardly an asset if allies cannot perform in combat.

This problem could not be solved merely by providing non-Soviet WTO members with easier access to advanced weapons. The "commonly held vision of military robots of the Warsaw Pact, armed to the teeth with the latest fully interchangeable and compatible weapons systems" concealed a Soviet dilemma.61 Without access to the latest Soviet weaponry, the East Europeans could hardly be expected to join enthusiastically in a Soviet-led offensive against NATO's sophisticated forces.62 But how could the Soviets provide modern weapons to allies who could not pay with hard currency, who might use Soviet aircraft to defect to the West or who might even turn their weapons on Soviet forces if the Soviets invaded an ally?63

Within NATO, disputes between the United States and its European allies over doctrine and strategy are common, but NATO members have been able to overcome these differences without invading or threatening one another. An alliance of democracies is superior in resolving doctrinal disputes for three reasons:

In democratic societies, questioning established policy is the norm rather than the exception and thus, is rarely viewed as a challenge to ally. Changes of government occur frequently in democratic societies, providing regular opportunities to re-examine old policies and develop new ones. Democratic societies typically offer multiple paths to power. Those identified with a discredited policy can retreat to think tanks, corporate boardrooms or parliamentary back benches, where they can lay the intellectual foundation to return to power. Politics in such a milieu is not an all-or-nothing struggle among the contenders for high office. This gives democratic politics a resilience and flexibility authoritarian systems generally lack.

Political conformism. The West widely assumed that "the East European political and military system is a monolithic bloc, in which the Soviet leadership is fundamentally dominant."64 However, WTO political unity was always more apparent than real. Poland was threatened with invasion and Hungary actually was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1956; Albania withdrew from the WTO in 1961; conflict between the Soviet Union and Romania simmered throughout the 1960s-although it never reached the invasion flashpoint; Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968; and Poland was threatened with invasion again in 1981.

Within the WTO, imposed conformism masked resentment and even anger among members, especially that felt by Eastern Europeans toward the Soviet Union. The WTO had no safety valves to relieve the pressures building up around its internal fault lines. The result was a facade of unity that collapsed once the Soviets lost the will to continue to hold the east Europeans in line.

In contrast, NATO had constant disagreements and even annual crises that were frequently said to bring the alliance to the point of disintegration. However, the very act of publicly thrashing out disagreements relieved tensions. Thus, NATO was able to change, adapt and persevere despite the appearance of disunity and disarray.65

Politically, Soviet coercion and dominance within the WTO contributed to Soviet satellite instability.

9 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

Morale was often low among East European conscripts, and the indigenous populations generally viewed the Soviet Union as an occupying power. Even Eastern European leaders, with strong political ties to Moscow, could not remain immune forever to their people's nationalist aspirations. In essence, the WTO grew weaker because Soviet control fostered disillusion and anger in the satellite countries because they were treated as underlings, not as allies.66

The democratic nature of NATO's members contributed to the alliance's longevity and resilience in the face of adversity. While independent states are prone to disagreements, arrangements negotiated between equals are generally longer lasting and politically more viable than arrangements imposed by force or the threat of it. NATO also had the wherewithal to support its military efforts without severely hampering economic development, and NATO members' popularly elected governments had a vested interest in promoting the success of their policies.

What Makes an Alliance Strong?

Some Western observers saw through the WTO unity facade, recognizing that the "imposing monolith of totalitarian states often obscures their latent weaknesses."67 The secrecy surrounding the WTO prevented many others from recognizing just how weak and vulnerable the WTO was becoming vis-à-vis NATO.

In a sense, even this outcome could be construed as a Soviet success. For 30 years the Soviets paralyzed the West with fear and exploited Western public opinion's aversion to increased defense spending. Discussions of the military security situation in Europe frequently had a schizophrenic quality. When discussing NATO, Western analysts often argued that too great a leadership role for the United States would be self-defeating because it would only promote European parochialism and separatism. In words that echo through decades of debates over burden sharing, Alistair Buchan wrote in 1963 that "it is only by asking the European allies to assume greater responsibility for participation and direction than their present contribution entitles them to that they can be given the impetus to assume a larger proportion of the total burden."68 However, when discussing the WTO, Western analysts frequently cited Soviet direction and control as a source of efficiencies and economies of scale in peacetime and greater military effectiveness in wartime. US leadership was said to be a hindrance to effective cooperation in NATO, yet Soviet hegemony supposedly stimulated effective WTO cooperation. Is there any reason to believe that this disparity should have held true?

Robert Osgood has noted that an alliance is in essence a "latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually cultivate to preserve mutual confidence in each other's fidelity to specified obligations."69 Democratic states encourage the continual cultivation of cooperation, because political power is widely diffused among individuals, groups and even separate branches of government. Without such cooperation, the people's business is left undone, governments fall, elections are lost and ambitious politicians prematurely retire. As an alliance of democracies, NATO benefitted from habits of consultation and cooperation that are naturally ingrained in the soldiers, civil servants and political leaders who grew to maturity and pursued careers in such a political culture.

In contrast, the WTO was the product of Soviet-imposed weaponry, doctrine and conformity. Consultations aimed at cultivating habitual cooperation are time-consuming and often frustrating, because the reluctance of one's partners to agree can easily be interpreted as obstinacy, vindictiveness or just plain "blockheadedness." If cooperation can be enforced rather than elicited, the temptation to impose one's views can be overwhelming. Over the long run, this tendency is likely to prove fatal to an

10 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

alliance.70

Alliances last longer when composed of stable, independent states that freely join an organization of like-minded entities. While WTO members had standardized weapons, a uniform military doctrine and monolithic unity, they lacked NATO's advantages in political stability, economic strength and poli-tical legitimacy. These factors, when supported by a respectable military, are what make an alliance strong.MR

1. Charles Gati, The Bloc That Failed (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990); Michael Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe (New York: Prentice Hall Inc., 1991), chapters 5 and 6; Robert Kaiser, "The Miracle of 1989," Washington Post (24 December 1989), C-l; Michael Dobbs, "E. Europe Owes Peaceful Change to Gorbachev," Washington Post (31 December 1989), A-22; and Otto Pick, "The Demise of the Warsaw Pact," NATO Review (April 1991), 12-15. 2. See comments by former President Ronald Reagan and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins, cited in John Mearsheimer, "A Strategic Misstep," International Security (Fall 1986), 3n. 3. See the proposals in NATO after Forty Years, edited by Lawrence Kaplan, et al. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990); NATO in The Fifth Decade, edited by Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan (Washington, DC: National Defense University (NDU) Press, 1990); European Security Policy After the Revolutions of 1989, edited by Jeffrey Simon (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1991); Jan Willem Honig, NATO: An Institution Under Threat? (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1991); Keith Gardner, "Technology Development in NATO," NATO Review (February 1993), 23-27; Robin Beard, "NATO Armaments Cooperation in the 1990s," NATO Review (April 1993), 23-28; and Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1993), 28-40. 4. Wallace J. Thies, "The `Demise' of NATO: A Post-Mortem," Parameters (June l990), 17-30. 5. Henry Kissinger, "A Plan to Reshape NATO," Time (5 March 1984), 20. 6. Elliot Cohen, "Toward Better Net Assessment," International Security (Summer 1988), reprinted in Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy, edited by Steven Miller and Sean Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT] Press, 1989), 182; Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, US Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 1; and John Lewis Gaddis, "Theory and the End of the Cold War," reprinted in The Cold War And After: Prospects For Peace, rev. ed., edited by Steven Miller and Sean Lynn-Jones (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 353. Goddis describes an idea proposed by Morton Kaplan in System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), 37. 7. John Erickson, "Military Management and Modernization Within the Warsaw Pact," in The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means, edited by Robert Clawson and Lawrence Kaplan (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1982), 213; Cohen, 182; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), xii; Robert Komer, "Looking Ahead," International Security (Summer 1979), 110-11; and Robert Komer, "The Trick is How to Get It," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1981), 70. 8. BG Richard Bowman, "Effects of the Middle East War," Defense Planning for the 1980s and the Changing International Environment (Washington, DC: National War College, 1974), 158-59; Kenneth Hunt, "The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer Men," The Adelphi Papers, No. 498 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1973), 8; Komer, "Looking Ahead," 111; Robert Komer, "NATO's Long-Term Defence Programs, NATO Review (June 1978), 12; and Robert Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1982), 1141.

11 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

9. Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Europe's Role in NATO's Fifth Decade," RUSI Journal, (Summer 1989), 4. See also SEN Sam Nunn, "NATO Challenges and Opportunities: A Three-Track Approach," NATO Review (June 1987), 4. 10. Howe, 4; Nunn, 4; and Robert Lucas Fischer, "Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces," The Adelphi Papers, No. 4127 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976), 14-15. 11. COL William R. Bowman, Limiting Conventional Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1985), 21. 12. Audrey Kurth, "Western Defence: Is Existing Strategy Obsolescent?," Ditchley Conference Report, No. 8 (1983/1984), 3-4. See also Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," 1135-36; and R. Bowman, "Effects of the Middle East War," 164. 13. Jorg Hoensch, "The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States," in Clawson and Kaplan, The Warsaw Pact, 44. See also Danish Defence Intelligence Service, Warsaw Pact Aggression Possibilities Against Denmark (1986), 20. 14. James Adams, "Memo to NATO: Shape Up Before America Ships," Washington Post (15 May 1988), B-4. See also Diego Ruiz Palmer, "Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the Conventional Defense of Central Europe," Comparative Strategy 6, No. 4 (1987), 498-99. 15. James D. Hessman, "NATO Overview," Sea Power (October 1979), 34; and Edgar O'Ballance, "The Three Southern Members of the Warsaw Pact," in Clawson and Kaplan, The Warsaw Pact, 51. 16. NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), 47. 17. CBO, xii; and R. Bowman, "Effects of the Middle East War," 164. 18. R. Bowman, 163. See also Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., "The Shifting European-Atlantic Military Balance-Some Avenues of Redress," in Atlantic Community in Crisis, edited by Walter Hahn and Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press Inc., 1979), 130-31; and Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defence," 1142. 19. Lord Carrington, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Future Relationships and Strategies," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (December 1987), 5. See also GEN John Galvin, "NATO After Zero INF," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1988), 58 and 6O. 20. Philip Merrill, quoted in Patrick Osler, "Europeans Shelving Rivalries Over Big Weapons Contracts," Washington Post (11 September 1991), C-3. 21. Christopher Jones, "Agencies of the Alliance: Multinational in Form, Bilateral in Content," in Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 146. See also Christopher Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1981), chapter 6. 22. Robert Komer, "Ten Suggestions for Rationalizing NATO, Survival (March-April 1977), 68; Fischer, 14-15. 23. Jeffrey Simon, "Institutional Developments," in NATO Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, edited by Jeffrey Simon (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1988), 47; and Jeffrey Simon and Trond Gilberg, "Conclusion: Implications for US Security," in Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 298. 24. GEN André Beaufre, NATO and Europe (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 45 and 46. 25. Hanson Baldwin, "NATO's Uneven Stops Toward Integration," The Reporter (11 March 1965), 33. 26. CBO, 21; and R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe," The Adelphi Papers, No. 119 (Autumn 1975), 7. 27. CBO, 27. 28. James B. Steinberg, "Re-thinking the Debate on Burden Sharing," Survival (January-February 1984), 64. 29. R. Bowman, "Effects of the Middle East War," 166. 30.Komer, "Ten Suggestions for Rationalizing NATO," 68.

12 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

31. Lawrence and Record, 7-9; Daniel Nelson, Alliance Behavior in the Warsaw Pact (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 1-2; and Benjamin Lambeth, Conventional Forces for NATO (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, February 1987), 34. 32. Charles E. Bohlen, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1982), 52. 33. Even NATO conceded inferiority in this regard. See, NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1982), 7-8. The NATO inferiority complex is discussed more fully in Wallace Thies, "Learning in US Policy Toward Europe," in Learning in US and Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 167ff. 34. Lawrence and Record, 7; and John Newhouse, "Arms and Allies," The New Yorker (28 February 1983), 64. 35. Colin Gray, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," Policy Review (Fall 1982), 108-9; Lambeth, 3; and Lothar Ruehl, summarized in "Across the Great Divide," Newsweek (14 March 1988), 33. 36. Wallace Thies, "On NATO Strategy: Escalation and the Nuclear Allergy," Parameters (September 1988), 18-33. 37. Pierre Lellouche, "Europe and Her Defense," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1981), 828. 38. Walter Laqueur, "Europe: The Specter of Finlandization," Commentary (December 1977), 37-41; Laqueur, "Euro-Neutralism," Commentary (June 1980), 21-27; and Laqueur, "Hollanditis: A New Stage in European Neutralism," Commentary (August 1981), 19-26. 39. Steinberg, 64. 40. Cohen, 211. 41. Josef Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Enduring Crisis," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1981), 841-42; Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?," The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1979), 45-53; Earl Revenal, NATO's Unremarked Demise (Berkeley, CA: University of California: Institute of International Studies, 1979); Walter Hahn, "Does NATO Have a Future?," International Security Review (Summer 1980), 151-72; Theodore Draper, "The Western Misalliance," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1981), 13-69; Flora Lewis, "Alarm Bells in the West," Foreign Affairs 60, No. 3 (1981), 551-72; Robert W. Tucker, "The Atlantic Alliance and its Critics," Commentary (May 1982), 63-72; James Goldsborough, "The Roots of Western Disunity," New York Times Magazine (9 May 1982), 48ff; William Pfaff, "The Waiting Nations," The New Yorker (3 January 1983), 57ff; Irving Kristol, "What's Wrong With NATO?," New York Times Magazine (25 September 1983), 64ff; and Francois Heisbourg, "Can the Atlantic Alliance Last out the Century?," International Affairs (Summer 1987), 413-23. 42. Lellouche, 833. 43. BG E. Vandevanter Jr., Some Fundamentals of NATO Reorganization, RM-3559-PR (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1963), 3. See also Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s, rev. ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1963), 61. 44. Gregory Footer, "Public Opinion: The Fulcrum of Alliance Cohesion," in Alliances in US Foreign Policy, edited by Alan Ned Sabrosky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 97. 45. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, 230. 46. C. Rice, "Defense Burden-Sharing," in The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition, edited by David Holloway and Jane Sharp (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), 70. 47. Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 41. See also Erickson, "Military Management and Modernization within the Warsaw Pact," and John Binder and Robert Clawson, "Warsaw Pact Ground Forces," both in Clawson and Kaplan, The Warsaw Pact, 220-24 and 247. 48. Daniel Nelson, "The Bulgarian People's Army," in NATO Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization, 467. See also Richard Martin, "Warsaw Pact Force Modernization: A Second Look," in Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 199-214; and Dale Herspring, "The Soviet Union and the East

13 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

European Militaries: The Diminishing Asset," in The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Mickiewicz (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., l986), 253-54 and 257-59. 49. Binder and Clawson, 247. 50. Rice, 65 and 70; and Erickson, 215. 51. Herspring, 249. See also Erickson, 215; and Rice, 67. 52. Rice, 67 and 72. 53. Ibid., 72-76. 54. Ivan Volgyes, "The Warsaw Pact: A Study of Vulnerabilities, Tension and Reliability," in The Future of European Alliance Systems, edited by Arlene Idol Broadhurst (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 171. 55. Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 416-17. 56. Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, 151-63. 57. Ibid., 206 and 226. 58. Ibid., 172. 59. Martin, 204; and Herspring, 253-59. Concerning non-Soviet WTO members' economic weaknesses, see Lincoln Gordon, "The Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe," in Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe, 29-48; Keith Crane, "Soviet Economic Policy Toward Eastern Europe," in Continuity and Change in Soviet-East European Relations, edited by William Potter and Marco Carnovale (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 75-133; and Gati, 104-35. 60. Martin, 206. 61. Erickson, 214. 62. East European reluctance to fight against NATO is discussed by Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "Poland," in Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II, Volume 2, edited by Rakowska-Harmstone, et al. (Ottawa: Department of National Defense, 1984), 165ff; Martin, 199-214; and Gati, 136-57. 63. Dale Herspring, "The Soviets, the Warsaw Pact and the East European Militaries," in Central and Eastern Europe: The Opening Curtain?, edited by William Griffith (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 145-46. See also Gati, 149. 64. Ivan Volgyes, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization in the 1980s," in National Security Affairs Conference, The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1981), 199-200. See also Volgyes, "The Warsaw Pact," 159-60. 65. Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 142. 66. Steve Kime, "The Navies of the Warsaw Pact," in Clawson and Kaplan, The Warsaw Pact, 275-77. 67. Henry Kissinger, quoted in Dibb, The Soviet Union, 3. 68. Alistair Buchan, "Partners and Allies," Foreign Affairs (July 1963), 633. 69. Robert Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 18-19. 70. See Richard Ned Lebow's insightful discussion of the Soviet dilemma in Eastern Europe, "The Soviet Response to Poland and the Future of the Warsaw Pact," in The Future of European Alliance Systems, 185-236.

Wallace J. Thies is an associate professor in the Department of Politics, Catholic University of America, Washington, DC. He received a B.A. from Marquette University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Yale University. In 1979 and 1980, he was an International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, US State Department, Washington, DC; as a NATO Research Fellow in 1989, he worked in The Hague, Copenhagen, Bonn and London. He is the author of When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict (1980) and The Atlantic

14 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/bob.html

Alliance, Nuclear Weapons and European Attitudes: Re-examining the Conventional Wisdom (1983).Monica Podbielski is a legal assistant with ABN Holding Company in Chicago, Illinois. She received a B.A. from the University of Chicago, an M.A. from DePaul University and a Ph.D. from the Catholic University of America. From 1990 to 1992, she was a teaching assistant in the Catholic University of America History Department.

15 of 15 3/11/98 12:46 PM PSYOP & CA Course Now in CGSC Curriculum

Major Doug Wallace, USAR Kansas City, Missouri

Academic Year 1996-97 US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students were the first CGSC class to have the opportunity to take a course specifically focused on psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs (CA).

Offered during the third term of the Command and General Staff Officer Course as part of the Advanced Applications Program (AAP) curriculum, this course provided AAP CGSC students the opportunity to enhance personal and professional growth while conducting advanced studies related to the core curriculum. AAP consists of several components including areas of concentration, focused programs, graduate degree programs, unrestricted electives an dPRAIRIE WARRIOR. Each student must complete a minimum of 210 hours in advanced application to satisfy graduation requirements.

In the past, PSYOP and CA have only been addressed as part of introductory lessons on Special Operations Forces within Joint Operations core courses, or as lessons within Special Operations Forces AAP courses.

Army Lieutenant Colonel Jim Ladd, former Joint Task Force Bravo commander in Honduras, and a Functional Area 39 (PSYOP/CA) officer, was assigned the task of developing the PSYOP/CA course for CGSC. Ladd designed the course to expose students to the application of PSYOP and CA at the operational level. A significant part of the learning process in this course is in the research and papers that the students do themselves. Additionally, each student researches a historical case study from a PSYOP or CA perspective and makes a class presentation on the topic.

This course is one of several ongoing initiatives to bring more focus on PSYOP and CA at Fort Leavenworth. The Battle Command Training Program includes significant PSYOP and CA integration in WARFIGHTER Exercise scenarios, and representatives from the Special Warfare Center and School have been involved in coordinating PSYOP and CA input into PRAIRIE WARRIOR 97.

15 of 15 3/11/98 12:47 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/alman.html

"The Bitter Lesson of Unpreparedness"

Major George C. Marshall Jr.

Marshall's 1923 speech is quoted in its entirety by Congressman Ike Skelton of Missouri speaking on the "Future of the US Military" in the House proceedings for the US Congressional Record, 105th Congress, First Session, 28 April 1997, vol. 143, no. 52. The speech was first presented at the annual meeting of the Military Schools and Colleges Association in March 1923 and originally appeared in "Factors Contributing to Morale and Esprit de Corps," by General L.R. Gignilliat in 1923.-Editor

Mr. President and Gentlemen:

I must ask your indulgence this afternoon because, until General Gignilliat requested me to make this talk the latter part of the morning, I had no expectation of participating in this meeting.

You gentlemen, I am sure, are all interested in the National Defense, and I would like to talk to you for a few minutes regarding the effect of our school histories on this question.

The Army, which is the principal arm we depend upon for the defense of the country, can hardly be called the result of a slow growth. Its history has been a series of ups and downs, a con-tinuing record of vicissitudes, with which you may be somewhat familiar in more recent years, but I cannot believe many people understand or are aware of what has happened in the past, because it seems improbable that what has happened should continue to happen if our citizens were familiar with the facts.

In looking back through the history of the infantry component of the Regular Army, we find that from the earliest days of this country, it was materially increased in strength and drastically reduced with somewhat monotonous regularity. From eighty men immediately after the Revolutionary War, it was increased to sixteen regiments, about as many regiments of infantry as we have today. In 1798, two years later, it was reduced to eight regiments. With the War of 1812, it was increased considerably and then decreased immediately afterwards. I am not talking about the temporary army, but the Regular Army. Another increase came during the Mexican War, about trebling its size; and immediately thereafter came the inevitable reduction. In the early months of the Civil War it was increased from about eight regiments to sixteen. But the odd phase of this policy develops in 1866. Then the war was over, but the infantry was increased to forty-six regiments, and suddenly, but a few years later, reduced to twenty-five regiments, with which we entered the war with Spain. In 1901, this number was increased to thirty. Just before our entry into the World War, Congress provided for sixty-five regiments. Thereafter you cannot get an accurate parallel, because the Congress varied its method. Instead of authorizing regiments, it gave us numbers.

When the World War was over, in the summer of 1920, they gave us 285,000 men. Nine months later this was cut to 175,000. Three months later, came a cut to 150,000; followed six months later by a further cut to 125,000. And just by the skin of our teeth we got through this last Congress without a further cut to 75,000.

1 of 5 3/11/98 12:48 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/alman.html

The remarkable aspect of this procedure to me, and I think to anyone, is that both increases and reductions should have been ordered after the war was over and all within a brief period of time, which can be measured in months. A decrease following the establishment of peace is readily understood, but the combination of two diametrically opposed policies is difficult to comprehend.

In searching for reasons to explain this inconsistency, it appears that when the war was over every American's thoughts were centered on the tragedies involved in the lessons just learned, the excessive cost of the war in human lives and money. So the Congress, strongly backed by public opinion, determined that we should be adequately prepared for the future, and accordingly enacted a law well devised for this express purpose. However, in a few months, the public mind ran away from the tragedies of the War and the reasons therefore, and became obsessed with the magnitude of the public debt and the problem of its reduction. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter lesson of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction of the Army, which their representatives had so recently increased for very evident reasons. Now what has occurred but recently has many precedents in the past. There are numerous ramifications of the same general nature, but the astonishing fact is, that we continue to follow a regular cycle in the doing and undoing of measures for the National Defense. We start in the making of adequate provisions and then turn abruptly in the opposite direction and abolish what has just been done.

Careful investigation leads to the belief that this illogical course of action is the result of the inadequacies of our school histories so far as pertains to the record of our wars, and in a measure, to the manner in which history is taught. During the past few months, the War Department has been concerned as to what might properly be done to correct the defects in the school textbooks which are now being published. Naturally, it is a matter that must be handled very carefully. The Department is loathe to take any positive action, because immediately the Army would be open to the criticism of trying to create a militaristic public opinion. Furthermore, criticism of the existing textbooks would probably arouse the hostility of the publishers, and particularly, of the authors.

Following a discussion between General Pershing and a prominent publisher, several of the more recent school histories were submitted to the Historical Section of the War College, and each reviewed by a number of specially qualified officers. When these reviews were assembled and digested, it became apparent that what had been done in the past, was again in the process of repetition. A reading of these reviews convinces one that our military history would probably suffer another repetition.

It is apparent that you can talk about the present National Defense Act as much as you please and of the scheme of military education provided in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps units, but we will repeat our errors of the past unless public opinion is enlightened, and public opinion in these matters depends in a large measure on the written word of our histories, except for a few months immediately following such a National calamity as the World War. It is almost purposeless for the War Department to attempt to make an impression on Congress which is not in accord with public opinion.

When a boy goes to school he studies history. Thereafter I believe less than five per cent of the men of the country continue this study. You gentlemen are of a class apart, and if you were not familiar with the important facts of our military history, certainly no other class of men will be. The lasting impression of the American man on what has happened in the past, is absorbed from his school history. I remember studying Barnes' American History, and I still have, I suppose, the same feeling I acquired then regarding the English nation and the British Army, so depicted in Revolutionary [War] days. In the course of my present occupation it has become necessary for me to learn something of the actual facts in the case, which I have found are often strikingly at variance with many of the ideas Mr. Barnes implanted in my mind.

2 of 5 3/11/98 12:48 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/alman.html

You gentlemen are no doubt familiar with most of these facts, but I believe there are some of them of which even you are not aware. Certainly the average man is in the dark as to the difficulties our military leaders have invariably encountered. Take the history of the Revolutionary War for example; I imagine there are but few men today who have even a vague idea of Washington's troubles in main-taining his Revolutionary Army- what they actually were and the causes that lay behind them. Virtually the same difficulties continued to arise in the history of our Army and with the same basic reason for their recurrence. Is the average boy given an idea of the lessons of these incidents?

What has the American youth been taught of the War of 1812-that it was one of the most ignominious pages in our history-wonderful on the sea, splendid at New Orleans-but in almost everything else, a series of glaring failures and humiliating occurrences? Were you given any such idea as this? In the Mexican War the operations of our armies were carried out in very shipshape fashion, thanks to a long period in which to prepare. But I doubt if there are more than a few people who know that after the capture of Vera Cruz, General Scott's army, preparing for its advance to Mexico City, was well nigh emasculated and rendered impotent by the policy of the Government which permitted a large proportion of the volunteers to secure their discharges and return home. It has been alleged that this course was intended to wreck any political aspirations of General Scott. But it was an American Army on foreign soil far from home, that was imperiled in this fashion.

We find almost an exact repetition of this incident in the Philippines in 1809, when the obligation of the Government to return home the state volunteer troops, left a small force of the Regular Army besieged in Manila until fresh quotas of volunteers could be raised in the United States and dispatched seven thousand miles to its support. We do not realize how fraught with the possibility of National tragedy were these occurrences. Think what the result might have been had our opponent been efficient and made us pay the penalty for such a mistaken policy.

Until recently the Civil War formed the major portion of our military background. In your study of the history of that period was your attention drawn to any conclusions? As to why, for example, the North experienced so many difficulties and failures during the early years of the war, and the South was so uniformly successful? There are very definite reasons for this and therefore, lessons to be drawn, but the one-time school boy when he casts his vote at the polls, or represents his District in Congress, must as a rule, base his action on false and misleading premises.

Popular American histories of the World War would more than startle the German reader. It is possible that he might think he was reading of some other struggles in which his country had no part. I will venture the assertion that for every boy who comes out of our public schools realizing that over a year elapsed before America's soldiers could make their first attack on the enemy-for every youth so informed, there will be a thousand whose attention is not called to this, but who can recite the date on which we entered the war. This may seem a small matter, but it will have a definite effect on every paragraph of legislation attempted for the National Defense.

We talk of Valley Forge in Revolutionary days, and do not realize that American soldiers experienced something very like Valley Forge over in France in the fall of 1917. I have seen soldiers of the First Division without shoes and with their feet wrapped in gunny-sacks, marching ten or fifteen kilometers through the ice and snow. You do not have to go back to Washington's army at Valley Forge for a period of hardships experienced, because of unpreparedness. I have seen so many horses of the First Division drop dead on the field from starvation, that we had to terminate the movements in which they engaged. One night I recall Division Headquarters being notified that the troops in an adjacent village were out of

3 of 5 3/11/98 12:48 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/alman.html

rations and the animals were too weak to haul the necessary supplies. The question to be derived was, should the men be marched to the rations and the animals left to die, or would it be possible to secure other transportation. That was in the fall of 1917. It was a small matter but it reflects the general condition of unpreparedness with which we entered the war, and it was only the strength of our Allies who held the enemy at bay for more than a year, that enabled us to fight the victorious battles which ended the war. The small boy learns that we were successful in the end, but he is carefully prevented from discovering how narrow has been the margin of our success. Good luck has always seemed to be with us and the attending circumstances seem to prove Bismarck's saying that "God takes care of the fools and the United States."

Some of these days, now that we are a dominant, if not the dominant power in the world, we may have to make good without Allies or time or fortuitous circumstances to assist us.

There seems to have been a conspiracy to omit the pertinent facts or the lessons of our military history which would prepare the boy to be an intelligent voter or legislator. So long as this is the case, we will continue in a series of the errors I have been describing.

The study of ancient history reveals innumerable occurrences which have that exact parallel in modern times. There must be some lesson to be drawn. For example, General Pershing recently called attention to the fact that while the Peace Conference was sitting in Paris in 1919, building up the Treaty which we did not accept, there were English soldiers at Cologne, American soldiers at Coblenz, and French soldiers in Mayence, and a general reserve at Treves, (General Pershing's own Headquarters). Eighteen hundred years before, during a prolonged peace, Roman Legions were stationed at Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence, with a reserve of ten thousand at Treves. The setting was identical with the recent deployment of the Allied troops along the Rhine. There must be some lesson to be drawn from this repetition of history, that is of much more moment that a recollection of the date of the signing of the Peace Treaty.

The other day I had occasion to look up something regarding Phillip Sheridan, who was one of the five Generals of the Army, of which General Pershing is the most recent, and General Washington was the first. After locating my information, I read a little further and came across, what to me, was a most remarkable coincidence.

General Sheridan after the Civil War was sent abroad to observe the operations of the Prussian Army in the Franco-Prussian War. He joined the Staff of the Emperor William, west of Metz on the eve of the Battle of Gravelotte. The day after this fight, riding in the carriage of Bismarck, he drove through Point-a-Mousson. This town was the right flank of the American army in the St. Mihiel operation. Turning west, Bismarck and Sheridan drove on to Commercy and were billeted there for the night. They followed the exact route of the American troops being transferred from the St. Mihiel front to the Meuse-Argonne. From Commercy, Sheridan passed on to Bar-le-Duc, and he describes how he stood on a little portico of that town and watched the Bavarians marching through the Central Place as they turned north towards the Argonne in the great maneuver to corner McHahon's French Army on the Belgian frontier. American troops followed this same route and executed the same turn to the north, and I happened to have watched them pass through the Central Place of Bar-le-Duc. With Bismarck, Sheridan drove north to Clermont, following the principal axis of the advance taken by the American Army in September 1918. After a night's billet in that village, they drove through a series of towns, later to be captured by the Americans from Bismarck's descendants, and billeted in Grandpre at the other tip of the Argonne Forest.

Now comes a more remarkable coincidence. General Sheridan describes how he drove from Grandpre

4 of 5 3/11/98 12:48 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/alman.html

through the Foret de Dieulet into Beaumont, where a French division had on that morning been surprised and captured by the Germans, this was the opening phase of the Battle of Sedan. Our Second Division passed through that identical Forest at night and surprised Germans at roll call in the early morning in the streets of Beaumont.

Accompanying the entourage of the Emperor William, General Sheridan pressed on to Wadelincourt, and from a hilltop nearby looked down across the Meuse at the French Army, cornered but not yet captured, at Sedan. A battalion of the Sixteenth American Infantry on November 7, 1918, pressed forward to that same hill and looked down on the Germans in Sedan. Is not this a remarkable coincidence, and does it not point to the uncertainties of the future and the necessity of being prepared for almost any eventuality?

I hope you will pardon my very disjointed remarks and I deeply appreciate your kind attention.MR

George Catlett Marshall (1880- 1959), US Army officer and statesman, graduated from Fort Leavenworth's Infantry Cavalry School in 1907 and from the Army Staff College in 1908. At the time of this speech, Marshall was an aide to General John J. Pershing, Army chief of staff. Putting into practice what he espoused, Marshall immediately began an enormous expansion of the Army and reorganization of the General Staff when he became chief of staff in September 1939. It was largely due to Marshall's vision and energy that America went into World War II with a sound framework on which to build a well-prepared armed force. · Insufficient individual protective equipment is available for sustained operations and there is need for a collective protection capability.

MAJ C. William Robinson, USA, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

5 of 5 3/11/98 12:48 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Nuclear Terrorism: Published Literature Since 1992

Timothy L. Sanz

Titles of some articles and books on terrorists' potential use of nuclear materials are indeed foreboding:

"When Terrorists Go Nuclear"; "It's the Ultimate Nuclear Nightmare: Terrorist with the Bomb"; Time Bomb: How Terrorists and the Russian Mafia Threaten the World with a Nuclear Nightmare; "Arms Experts Fear Nuclear Blackmail"; Nuclear Terrorism: Rethinking the Unthinkable; "Nukes on the Loose: The End of the Cold War Has Made Nuclear Terror More Likely"; "When Terrorists Go Nuclear: The Ingredients and Information Have Never Been More Available"; "Be Very Afraid"; and "Smuggling of Nuclear Materials - Deadly Game."

Just how real is the threat and, most important, what can be done to combat or prevent it from occurring? These are vital questions not only for this country but also for the entire world's population. Scholars, scientists, government and military officials all have a pressing need to access and analyze the literature on this topic to produce and refine an effective and coherent security policy. This bibliography serves to fill that need by identifying and assembling in one place citations to the multitude of publications on this topic.1

Much has been written about this topic in the open-source press.2 I used the research sources of a multitude of data bases, CD-ROMs and indexes, including those of the Rand Corporation, UCLA Library, National Defense University Library, Pentagon Library, Georgetown University Library, Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and World Wide Web (WWW) sites.3

A large part of the literature on this topic addresses the security of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union (see Section I below). Other articles or books assess the threats posed by individuals, terrorist groups or even nations (see Sections II and III). Section IV compiles citations concerning the security of nuclear power plants. Of utmost importance, if the threat is real or imminent, what preventive or legal measures can world governments take to stave off this possibility or punish those responsible for it? Sections V and VI provide citations to articles addressing these issues. Section VII lists WWW sites dealing with nonproliferation issues and provides myriad links to other sites dealing with this issue. Following all the citations is a synopsis of publications that I believe are of special importance and relevance to Department of Defense and N.A.T.O. officials who are currently or will be working in the future to counter this threat.

Summary of Categories

Under each section, the citations are listed alphabetically by author, or by title if no author is given. Brief synopsis of many articles follow their citations.

I. Nuclear Weapons Security in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

1 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

II. Threat Assessments

III. Threats by Nation States

IV. Security of Nuclear Facilities

V. Countermeasures/Prevention

VI. Legal Aspects of the Problem

VII. World Wide Web Sites

Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials

I. Nuclear Weapons Security in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Allen, Arthur. "Operation Hades." New Republic, 21-28 August 1995, 12-13. Investigates nuclear smuggling.

Allison, Graham T., et al. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. CSIA Studies in International Security, no. 12. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1996. Presents concerns that nuclear material from nuclear-warhead dismantlement in Russia will be released into a nuclear establishment ill-prepared to deal with it and that a resulting nuclear black market might bring about the collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation system based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; provides several concrete proposals that Western governments and Russia's MinAtom should accomplish to solve the proliferation problem.

Andreyev, Igor. "CIS Special Services Unite, but Later Than the Criminal World." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 12 April 1995, 21-22. Agreement to cooperate on fighting organized crime, nuclear terrorism and other crimes.

Barry, John. "Future Shock." Newsweek, 24 July 1995, 32-5. Weakening of Russia's control over nuclear weapons.

"Basayev's Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Assessed." Rossiya, 23-29 August 1995, 1-2, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-163, 51-52.

Beck, Michael, Gary Bertsch and Igor Khripunov. "The Development of Nonproliferation Export Control in Russia." World Affairs (Washington, DC) (Summer 1994), 3-18.

Belyaninov, Kirill. "Nuclear Nonsense, Black-Market Bombs, and Fissile Flim-Flam." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1994), 44-50. Undercover journalists deal with the nuclear black marketeers or "ventilators."

Bolsunovsky, Alexander and Valery Menshchikov. "Security Lacking at Nuclear Weapons Depots." Moscow News, 9-15 December 1994, 14. Includes list of nine facilities in dire need of protection and

2 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

control.

Booth, Ken. "Loose Nukes and the Nuclear Mirror: The Dangers and Opportunities Resulting from the Breakup of the Soviet Union." Arms Control, no. 1 (1992), 140-50.

Bukharin, Oleg A. "Meeting the Challenges of Dismantlement." Transition, 17 November 1995, 30-33. Describes factors compromising safety during dismantlement.

______and William Potter. "Potatoes Were Guarded Better: Stealing Nuclear Fuel from the Storage Building at Sevmorput Was-and May Still be-Easy." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May-June 1995), 46-51.

______. "Nuclear Safeguards and Security in the Former Soviet Union." Survival (Winter 1994-95), 53-72.

______. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism and the Physical Security of Nuclear Installations and Materials in the Former Soviet Union. Monterey, CA: Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1992.

"Chelyabinsk: Special Unit Formed to Fight Nuclear Terrorism." ITAR-TASS, 14 April 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-073, 33. Unit formed in closed town of Ozyorsk, formerly Chelyabinsk.

Combating Fissile Material Smuggling in the Former Soviet Union. Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force (USAF) Institute for National Security Studies, June1995.

Combating Fissile Materials Smuggling Workshop #2, 5 December 1995. Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 1995.

Cooperman, A. and K. Belianinov. "Moonlighting by Modem in Russia." U.S. News & World Report, 17 April 1995, 45+. Scientists working for countries trying to produce nuclear weapons.

Davydov, Valery. An Annotated Bibliography of Soviet and CIS Studies on Nuclear Proliferation. Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 1992.

DeWing, Martin J. The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal: Problems of Command, Control, and Maintenance. Monterey, CA: Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 1993.

Edwards, Rob. "Germany Issues Nuclear Smuggling Alert." New Scientist, 20 August 1994, 5.

"Estimated Russian (C.I.S.) Stockpile, September 1995." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1995), 62-63+.

"Even the CIA Does Not Know How Much Uranium Do We Have, and Neither Do We." Russia & CIS Today, 26 November 1993, 4-5. Estimated by Victor Mikhailov of the Ministry of Atomic Energy to be 1,200 metric tons; originally published in Novaya gazeta, 25 November 1993, 1.

Galdi, Theodor. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Soviet Weapons

3 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, CRS Report 93-1057F Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 29 December 1993.

"General Discusses Status of Nuclear Arsenal." Krasnaya zvezda, 26 November 1993, as translated in FBIS-SOV-93-228. Interview with General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate.

Gordon, Michael R. and Matthew L. Wald. "Russian Controls on Bomb Material are Leaky." New York Times, 18 August 1994, A1.

Gordon, Michael R. "Russian Aide Says Gangsters Try to Steal Nuclear Material." New York Times, 26 May 1994, A5. Statement by Mikhail Yegorov of the Organized Crime Control Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that organized crime is attempting to infiltrate military facilities.

Hanley, Charles J. "Russian Nuke Security Examined." Associated Press, 28 March 1995. Database online. Available from Lexis-Nexis.

Heinemanngruder, A. and M. Petersen. "Nuclear Proliferation from the CIS." Osteuropa, no. 5 (1993), 429-40. Text in German.

Heinrich, Andreas and Heiko Pleines. "Russia's `Nuclear Flea Market' Tempts Smugglers." Transition, 17 November 1995, 9-11. Discusses some myths and hazards of transporting and storaging of these materials.

Hersh, S.M. "The Wild East." Atlantic Monthly (June 1994), 61-63. Describes organized crime and the security of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

Hibbs, Mark. "`Fairy Tales' in Munich." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November/December 1995), 5-7. Reviews the facts about the 1994 plutonium smuggling and the trial.

______. "Attali Bombshell a Real Dud." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September/October 1995), 5-6.

______. "Nuclear Smuggling-Czechs Seize Migrating Uranium." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March/April 1995), 13-14.

______. "Plutonium, Politics, and Panic." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November/December 1994), 24-31. Stolen nuclear material discovered in Munich on 10 August 1994.

Hileman, Bette. "Nuclear Theft Poses Growing Security Threat." Chemical & Engineering News, 11 September 1995, 24-25. Hearings headed by US Senator Richard Lugar on preventing terrorists' access to nuclear materials in Russia and other former Soviet states.

______. "Tighter Nuclear Safeguards Needed to Stop Thefts." Chemical & Engineering News, 12 September 1994, 17-18. Natural Resources Defense Council experts recommend that International Atomic Energy Agency's threshold amounts be lowered.

______. "U.S. and Russia Face Urgent Decisions on Weapons Plutonium." Chemical & Engineering News, 13 June 1994, 12-25. Possible removal of up to 150 metric tons of plutonium from weapons.

4 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

"How to Steal an Atom Bomb." Economist, 5 June 1993, 15-16.

Hughes, David. "Uranium Seizures Heighten Terrorism Concerns." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 April 1995, 63-64. Recent discoveries of smuggled uranium in the Czech Republic, Ukraine and other countries.

______. "Arms Experts Fear Nuclear Blackmail." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 January 1993, 61-62. Enriched uranium and plutonium from the dismantling of former Soviet weapons.

Imal, Ryukichi. "Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union." Plutonium no. 3 (1993), 18-32.

Isby, David C. and Thomas H. Johnson. "Post-Soviet Nuclear Forces and the Risk of Accidental or Unauthorized Limited Nuclear Strikes." Strategic Review (Fall 1993), 7-21.

"Istochniki yadernoy opasnosti." [Sources of Nuclear Danger] Segodnya, 5 January 1994, 6. Includes a map showing risks at various nuclear power plants in Russia.

Ivanov, Igor. "Nuclear Safety and Security in the Modern World. International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 3 (1996), 65-71. The author is the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

Josephson, Paul R. "Russian Scientific Institutions: Internationalization, Democracy and Dispersion." Minerva (Spring 1994), 1-24. Possibility of Russian nuclear scientists working for terrorists.

Kamp, Karl-Heinz. "Die Sicherheit der sowjetischen Atomwaffen." [Security of Soviet Atomic Weapons] Europa Archiv, 25 October 1991, 593-600.

Kaufman, Jonathan. "Poland Moves to Stop Nuclear Smuggling." Boston Globe, 21 October 1992.

Kaurov, Georgiy. "SShA opasayetsya za nashe yadernoye oruzhiye." [The US is Fearful of Our Nuclear Weapons] Kontinent, 10 November 1995, 8. MinAtom official criticizes US concerns over the disposition of Russia's nuclear facilities.

Kirichenko, Elina. "Sistema eksportnogo kontrolya Rossii v tselyakh nerasprostraneniya oruzhiya massovogo unichtozheniya." [Russia's System of Export Control for the Nonproliferation of WMD] Yadernyy kontrol' (May 1995), 15-17. Discusses Russia's export controls on nuclear weapons which meet all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) standards.

Kisliak, S. "A New Dimension of Nuclear Security." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 3 (1996), 119-27. The author is the director of Russia's Department on Safety and Disarmament Issues.

Kukanov, Dmitry and Natalya Timashova. "Will Russia's Nuclear Umbrella Be Left Without Proper Supervision." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 11 October 1995, 23. Presidential order no. 350 concerning inspections of facilities; originally published in Izvestiia, 15 September 1995, 1-2.

Kulik, Mikhail. "The Great Uranium Caper." Moscow News, 8-14 December 1995, 10. Problem of storing nuclear materials with the Northern Fleet.

5 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

"Kurchatov Institute Guards against Nuclear Terrorism." Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian, 18 October 1995, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-202, 38. Concern about the Shamil Basayev terrorist groups.

Kurchatov, Alexander. "Nuclear Arsenals for Terrorists." Moscow News, 11-17 September 1996, 4. Raises questions about the nuclear submarine Komsomolets, which sank in the Norwegian Sea with 116 kilograms of reactor-grade uranium and over 6 kilograms of plutonium-239 in two nuclear warheads.

Lee, Rensselaer W. III. "Post-Soviet Nuclear Trafficking: Myths, Half-Truths, and the Reality." Current History (October 1995), 343-48. A summary of smuggling of nuclear materials since 1991.

"Lithuania Shuts Reactor." New York Times, 15 November 1994), A7(N), A12(L).

Lockwood, Dunbar. "U.S., Russia Reach Agreement for Plutonium Site Inspections." Arms Control Today (April 1994), 22.

Markushin, Vadim. "Russia and Germany: Together Against Nuclear Terrorism." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 14 September 1994, 6. Originally published in Krasnaya zvezda, 24 August 1994, 3.

Masland, Tom, et al. "For Sale." Newsweek, 29 August 1994, 30-32. Plutonium from Russia on the European market.

Mikhailov, Victor, et al. "Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy and Nuclear Weapons Safety." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 3 (1996), 72-102. The author is the Minister for Nuclear Power of the Russian Federation.

______. "Establishment of Bilateral System of Response to Nuclear Weapons Crisis Situation." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 3 (1996), 103-118.

"Minister Mikhaylov on Safeguarding of Nuclear Materials." Yadernyy kontrol' (February 1995), 9-11, as translated in FBIS-SOV- 95-046-S, 2-5. Interview with Russian Federation minister of Atomic Energy.

Morrocco, John D. "U.S. Takes Charge of Uranium Cache." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28 November 1994, 27. Uranium from weapons in Kazakhstan.

"Moscow Summit on Nuclear Security and Safety." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 3 (1996), 1-64. A summary of the summit held in Moscow, 19-20 April 1996. Contains the following subsections: Russia's Position on Nuclear Issues; Declaration of the Moscow Summit; Program for Combating Nuclear Trafficking; Statement on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; Statements on Ukraine and Middle East; B. Yeltsin and J. Chirac: Press Conference after the Summit; Russia and the World: Cooperation in the Nuclear Field; The Main Aspects of Nuclear Security; and Nuclear Power Plants in Russia.

Mueller, Harald. "Fissile Material Smuggling: German Politics, Hype and Reality." Arms Control Today (December 1994), 7-10. Discusses incidents of smuggled Russian materials.

"MVD General Reports No Theft of Nuclear Weapons Materials." Moscow INTERFAX in English, 10

6 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

October 1995, as reported in FBIS-SOV-95-196, 45-46. Interview with General Andrey Terekhov of the Russian Interior Ministry.

National Public Radio. "Nuclear Safety and Security in Russia." 4-part series, 16-19 April 1996. May be ordered under transcript #1847, segment #5; transcript #1848, segment #6; transcript #1849, segment #5; transcript #1850, segment 6.

Nelan, Bruce W., et al. "Formula for Terror: The Former Soviet Arsenal is Leaking into the West, Igniting Fears of a New Brand of Nuclear Horror." Time, 29 August 1994, 46-52.

"Nuclear Facilities' Defenses Prepared for Terrorism." INTERFAX in English, 9 February 1995, as reported in FBIS-SOV-95-028, 12-13. Interview with Georgiy Kaurov, head of the Information Department of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry on possible Chechen extremist actions.

"Nuclear Materials Security Said Ineffective." Rossiya, 21-27 September 1994, 4, as translated in JPRS-TND-94-019, 304.

"Nuclear Safeguard System Reliable, Costly." Krasnaya zvezda, 17 June 1995, 3, as translated in FBIS-TAC-95-014-L.

"Nuclear Smuggling." Maclean's, 5 September 1994, 28.

"Odin shag vpered, dva nazad." [One Step Forward, Two Back] Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 October 1995, 6. Report of the Russian Nuclear Radiation and Safety Supervision Committee-Citing reports of 19 radioactive materials incidents at unsecure locations in the first half of 1995.

"Operation Sapphire." Maclean's, 5 December 1994, 35. Sale of uranium by Kazakhstan to the US to prevent terrorists' access.

Orlov, Vladimir. "No Buyers, but Sellers are Ready." Moscow News, 18 August 1995, 4. Officials working to find a solution to the theft problem.

______. "A Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Exists in Russia." Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 19 July 1995, 26-27. Interview with General Yevgeniy Maslin stating that a real threat of nuclear terrorism exists in Russia; originally published in Moskovskiye novosti, 25 June-2 July 1995, 14; also published in Moscow News, 7 July 1995, 14.

______. "Black Holes of Red Mercury." Moscow News, 13 August 1993, 11.

"O pervoocherednikh merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy uchota i sokhrannosti yadernikh materialov." [On Immediate Measures to Improve the Inventory and Protection System of Nuclear Materials] Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21 September 1994, 4.

Ostanin, Sergey. "General Rules Out Nuclear Terrorism in Russia." ITAR-TASS, 11 January 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Senior military leader sees no chance of this possibility because of strict security measures fully financed by the state.

Parrish, Scott. "Nuclear Arms-A Soviet Legacy." Transition, 17 November 1995, 6-8. Problems of avoiding nuclear proliferation and complying with international agreements.

7 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Piest, Jochen and Matthias Schepp. "Stoking up the Nuclear Bazaar." World Press Review (November 1994), 10-11. Translation of Stern article on confiscated radioactive material on airplane from Moscow to Munich.

"Poka chto ni odin yadernyy boyepripas v Rossii ne propadal i ne byl pokhishchen." [For Now Not One Nuclear Stockpile in Russia has been Lost or Stolen] Yadernyy kontrol' (May 1995), 9-14. Interview with Yevgeniy Maslin, director of the 12th Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense; asserts that Russia safely transports nuclear materials and that smuggling is no worse in Russia.

Potter, William. "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States." Arms Control Today (October 1995), 9-16. Leakage is not necessarily inevitable if corrective measures are taken.

______et al. Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States. Monterey, CA: Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993.

______. "Nuclear Exports from the Former Soviet Union: What's New, What's True." Arms Control Today (January/February 1993), 3-10.

"Psst for Plutonium." Economist, 30 July 1994, 26. Attempts to keep plutonium away from clandestine bomb makers.

Romanenkova, Veronika. "Russian Ministry Sounds Tough Over Nuclear Threats." ITAR-TASS, 9 February 1995. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Response of the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry to Dudayev's threats that "nuclear terrorism in Russia is possible."

"Rossiyskiye militsionery i atomshchiki oprovergayut mify o `russkoy yadernoy mafii'." [Russian Police and Atomic Scientists Refute the Myths about the "Russian Nuclear Mafia"] Segodnya, 11 October 1995, 6. Report by Andrey Terekhov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 52 illegal material dealings in 1993-1994 and 13 in 1995.

"Russian Mafia can Steal Nuclear Materials." Reuters, 14 October 1995. Based on reports by "60 Minutes" and US News & World Report that 4 tons of beryllium and 19.8 pounds of cesium were stolen in 1993.

"Russian Security Chief Admits Nuclear Terrorism Danger." The Xinhua News Agency, 27 February 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Mikhail Barsukov states it is "quite possible" for terrorists to seize nuclear weapons.

"Russian Weapons Plutonium Storage Termed Unsafe by MINATOM Official." Nucleonics Week, 28 April 1994.

"Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces under Reliable Control." Military News Bulletin (July 1994), 3. Article appearing in a monthly publication produced by the Voeninform Agency of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation and Russian Information Agency Novosti.

Shapiro, Margaret. "Russia Orders Tightened Security to Protect Nuclear Materials." Washington Post, 24 February 1995, A15. Investigations by Interior Minister Viktor Yerin into 30 smuggling cases.

8 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Shenon, Philip. "Bombs for the Making." New York Times, 17 March 1996, sec. 4, E2. Account of the General Accounting Office's report of nuclear material security in the former Soviet Union.

______. "Ex-Soviet A-Bomb Fuel an Easy Target for Terrorists, U.S. Says." New York Times, 13 March 1996, A5.

Shoumikhin, Andrei. "The Weapon Stockpiles." Comparative Strategy (April/June 1995), 211-17.

Solntsev, Vladimir. "U.S. Aids Russia to Prevent Proliferation of Nuclear Materials." ITAR-TASS, 28 March 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis.

"Some Security Problems with Nuclear Materials in Depots of Northern Fleet." Yadernyy kontrol' (February 1995), 12-15, as translated in FBIS-UMA-95-239-S, 24-30.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "U.S. Takes Nuclear Fuel; Officials Feared Terrorism in Kazakhstan." Washington Post, 23 November 1994, A1.

Sutyagin, Igor. "Security of Russian ICBM Launch Sites." Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1994), 356-57.

"Terrorist Threat to Nuclear Plants Denied." Komsomol'skaya pravda, 22 February 1995, 2, as translated in FBIS-SOV-95-039, 20-21. Interview with Georgiy Chirov, chief of "Rosenergoatom" Department for Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Stations, on Chechen threats.

Thompson, M. "Sapphire's Hot Glow." Time, 5 December 1994, 38-39. Report on smuggling from Kazakhstan.

Turbiville, Graham H. Jr. Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and Security Force Dimension. INSS Occasional Paper 10. Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, June 1996. Concludes that Russian military and security forces are the principal source of arms available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray and legal arms markets.

"Ukrainian Regulations on Nuclear Safety." Pravyla Fizychnoho zakhystu yadernoho materialu ta yadernykh ustanovok, 12 July 1994, as translated in JPRS-TND-94-007-L, 35-40.

Umbach, Frank. "Control and Security of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union." Aussenpolitik: German Foreign Affairs Review (Winter 1992), 363+.

"U.S. and Russia May Share Intelligence Services." New York Times, 19 October 1992, A4(N), A6(L). Discussions that United States and Russia may pool intelligence information to fight nuclear proliferation, terrorism and drug smuggling.

US Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), September 1994.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on European Affairs. Loose Nukes, Nuclear Smuggling and the Fissile Material Problem in Russia and the CIS. Washington, DC,

9 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

GPO, 1995. Superintendent of Doc-uments catalog no. Y4.F 76/2:S HRG.104-253.

"`Vympel' Force to Combat `Nuclear Terrorism'." INTERFAX, 19 April 1994, as translated in FBIS-SOV-94-076. Commander of Russian Interior Troops, General Anatoliy Kulikov, reorganizes special Vympel' force.

Walker, William. "International Responses to the Threat of Nuclear Smuggling from Russia." Medicine, Conflict and Survival 12 (1996), 53-57. Discusses efforts by the Russian, US, British and other governments to control this problem.

Weglarczyk, Bartosz. "Atomic Smuggling, Cont'd." World Press Review (January 1996), 28-29. Presents the views of Sergei Novikov, a Russian nuclear-security official, and other issues concerning weapons security in Russia.

Whitney, Craig R. "Germans Suspect Russian Military in Plutonium Sale." New York Times, 16 August 1994, A1.

"Yadernaya mafiya v Rossii: Pravda i mify." [Nuclear Mafia in Russia: Truth and Myths] Vek, 22-28 September 1995, 4-9. Gennadiy Yevstafev, director of the SVR, states that there is no evidence that Russian nuclear scientists are working in countries such as Libya and Iran.

Zachary, Davis and Jonathan Medalia. Nuclear Proliferation from Russia: Options for Control. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1992.

II. Threat Assessments

Abelson, Philip H. "Need for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards." Science, 18 March 1994, 1543.

Attali, Jacques. Economie de l'apocalypse: Traffic et proliferation nucleaires [Economy of the Apocalypse: Nuclear Trafficking and Proliferation] Paris: Fayard, 1995.

Badolato, Edward V. and Dale Andrade. "Red Mercury: Hoax or the Ultimate Terrorist Weapon?" Counterterrorism and Security (Spring 1996), 18-20.

Barnaby, Frank. "Nuclear Accidents Waiting to Happen." World Today (April 1996), 93-95. Discusses safety of reactors, illicit trade of materials and safe management of plutonium and uranium.

______. "Red Mercury: Is There a Pure-fusion Bomb for Sale?" International Defense Review (June 1994), 79-81.

______. "Nuclear Terrorism." Safe Energy (June-July 1993), 10-12.

______. "Nuclear Threats." Medicine and War (April/June1992), 74-86.

______. The Role and Control of Weapons in the 1990s. London; New York: Routledge, 1992. Discusses proliferation in the Third World, nuclear terrorism and environmental damage.

Beckman, John. "The Clock is Still Ticking; Unstable Regions, Terrorists Push the World a Little Closer to the Nuclear Brink." Los Angeles Times, 29 February 1996, B2.

10 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Begley, Sharon, Daniel Pedersen, et al. "Chain Reaction: It's the Ultimate Nuclear Nightmare: Terrorists with the Bomb. Could They Make One?" Newsweek, 12 July 1993, 50-51.

"Blackmail Threat from `Nuclear Terrorists' Viewed." Neue Kronen-Zeitung, 13 September 1994, 10-11, as translated in JPRS-TND-94-019, 35.

Bluth, Christopher. "Nuclear Proliferation 2: Assessing the Risks." World Today (August-September 1993), 146-47.

"BND: Arab Terrorists Buying Nuclear Material." Bild, 24 April 1995, as translated in FBIS-WEU-95-078, 13-14.

Boyar, Robert E. "Senator Lugar Warns about U-235 Bombs." Insight on the News, 25 March 1996, 27.

Brooks, Linton. "New Nuclear Threat." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1994), 52-55.

Cameron, Gavin. "Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Threat?" Jane's Intelligence Review (September 1996), 422-26.

Cetron, M.J. and O. Davies. "The Future Face of Terrorism." Futurist no. 6 (1994), 10-15.

Cheek, Gary H. Coping with Mass Destruction: United States Power Projection in the Nuclear and Chemical Third World. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993. Weapons of mass destruction proliferation may cause grave consequences for power projection forces in the future.

Cohen, Sam. "The Coming Neutron Bomb Threat." Wall Street Journal, 15 May 1996, A14. Possible use of nuclear fusion byproduct by terrorists.

Crowell, Todd. "Nukes on the Loose: The End of the Cold War Has Made Nuclear Terror More Likely." Asiaweek, 6 October 1995, 50-56. Cover story; contains the following subsections: "Diversions: Examples of Nuclear Smuggling; Ground Zero: What If a Terrorist Bombed Hong Kong?; Danger: Five Spots in Asia to Worry about; Testing: Why Nations Feel They Must Explode Their Bombs."

De Santis, Hugh and Marvin Ott. "Rating Clinton Policy on Nuclear Terrorism; Administration Long on Talk, Short on Real Effort to Halt Nukes." Christian Science Monitor, 14 December 1993, 22.

"Die neuen Risiken." [The New Risks] Internationale Politik (February 1995), 3-46. Seven articles discussing organized crime, narco- and nuclear terrorism and arms smuggling.

Eberle, J. "Nuclear Proliferation 1: The Politics of Fear." World Today nos. 8-9 (1993), 144-46.

Edwards, Rob. "Cherry Red and Very Dangerous." New Scientist, 29 April 1995, 4-5. Discusses the dangers of "red mercury," a powerful chemical explosive.

Evancoe, Paul R. "Germinating Technology Feeds A-weapon Scenario: Illegal Acquisition of Enriched Uranium, Plutonium Becomes the Source of Deep International Concern." National Defense (October 1994), 18-19.

11 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Falk, Bernhard. "Nuklearkriminalitat in Deutschland." [Nuclear Criminality in Germany] Journal Kriminalistik (May 1995), 323-29. Describes changes in Germany's internal security because of nuclear material diversion.

Fialka, John J. "Nuclear Terrorism Threat is Growing, Senate Panel is Told." Wall Street Journal, 14 March 1996, A8. Testimony of Sarah A. Mullen before the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee.

"FIS' Yevstafyev on World Proliferation." Yadernyy kontrol' (January 1995), 12-15, as translated in JPRS-TAC-95-002, 99-104. Interview with the head of the Directorate for Arms Control and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia.

Fischer, David. "Plutonium Smuggling: Assessing the Risk." Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (January 1995), 92-97.

Ford, James L. Nuclear Smuggling: How Serious a Threat? Strategic Forum series no. 59. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January 1996.

Galeotti, Mark. "Decline and Fall-Russian Bombs and Global Security." Jane's Intelligence Review (October 1994), 434.

Gardner, Gary T. Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer. New York: Lynne Reinner, 1994. Covers the prospects of the 1994 Nonproliferation Treaty, status of international safeguards and other topics.

"German Study Casts Doubt on Terrorist Nuclear Bomb." Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 14 March 1995. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Discusses the report Nuclear Terrorism: Facts and Fiction, which concludes that nuclear security in Russia appears far more stable than expected, that extremists are not interested in mass killings, and other assertions.

Harrison, Charles T. "Hell in a Hand Basket: The Threat of Portable Nuclear Weapons." Military Review (May 1993), 68-76.

Heron, Charles M. Probable Trends in Terrorism in Western Europe. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1992. Covers topics such as sources of terrorism, nuclear weapons materials, the Single European Act of 1993, separatist movements, cooperative efforts to combat terrorism and other topics; available from NTIS.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Responding to Terrorism Across the Technological Spectrum." Terrorism and Political Violence (Autumn 1994), 366-90. Analyzes three salient trends in terrorism including the rise of "amateur" groups, the simplicity of the weapons and the growing sophistication of "professional" groups.

Hughes, David. "When Terrorists Go Nuclear: The Ingredients and Information Have Never Been More Available." Popular Mechanics (January 1996), 56-59. Explains the easy access to nuclear weapons technology.

"IAEA Says Its Plutonium Threshold for Making Nuclear Bombs is Too High." Wall Street Journal, 23 August 1994, A4. Article asserts that weapons could be made with amounts smaller than the established benchmarks.

12 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Ikle, Fred Charles. "The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age." Foreign Affairs (January/February 1996), 119-28. Fear of new threats of terrorism or catastrophic accidents.

Jenkins, Brian M. "The Limits of Terror: Constraints on the Escalation of Violence." Harvard International Review (Summer 1995), 44-45+. Argues there is no evidence that any terrorist groups have tried to obtain nuclear material and that using radioactive substances as a contaminant or hoaxes are more realistic threats.

______. "No market for Sellers of Plutonium." Los Angeles Times, 11 November 1994, B7. States that terrorists do not have the large finances required to build a bomb.

Kamp, Karl-Heinz. "Nuclear Terrorism: Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?" Aussenpolitik: German Foreign Affairs Review no. 3 (1995), 211-19.

Kiernan, Vincent. "A Little Plutonium Goes a Long Way . . ." New Scientist, 27 August 1994, 7. Claim by Natural Resources Defense Council that only 1 kg of plutonium would be necessary for one bomb.

Labbe, Marie-Helene. La tentation nucleaire [Nuclear Temptation] Paris: Payot, 1995. Discusses the nuclear arms race, international security and nuclear terrorism; contains a bibliography, 325-30.

"La proliferation nucleaire." [Nuclear Proliferation] Defense nationale (August/September 1995), 23-72. A series of articles addressing the 1968 treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism; includes bibliographic references.

Lemonick, Michael D. and Janet I-Chin Tu. "Could a Freelancer Build a Bomb?" Time, 29 August 1994, 48-49.

Lewis, William H. and Stuart E. Johnson, eds. Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1995. Contains assessments on proliferation in South Asia, North Korea, Middle East, China and Russia and several articles on preventive approaches.

"Little Boys: Nuclear Weapons." Economist, 27 August 1994, 72. A smaller amount of plutonium needed to explode a nuclear bomb could lead to attempts by countries or terrorist groups to build nuclear bombs.

Loehmer, Andrew. "The Nuclear Dimension." Terrorism and Political Violence (Summer 1993), 48-69. Concludes that in the near term, future chemical or biological terrorism is more likely.

Longworth, R.C. "Doomsday Clock May be Ticking in 2 Time Zones." Chicago Tribune, 8 December 1995, 1. Suggestions for another clock to show the danger of small-scale nuclear wars or nuclear terrorism.

"Loose Nukes." Current Events, 6 November 1995, 1-2. Assesses the black market for smuggled uranium.

Lugar, Senator Richard, Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's European

13 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Affairs Subcommittee Hearing, Topic: Nuclear Smuggling, 22 August 1995. Database Online; Available from Dialog, Federal News Service, 00163886. Witnesses included Paul Goble, Retired General William Odom and David Osias of the CIA.

Mann, Paul. "Mass Weapons Threat Deepens Worldwide." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 June 1996, 58-61. Discusses the threat of weapons of mass destruction worldwide; concludes that facilities in the former Soviet Union are just as vulnerable as in 1991.

Marrs, Robert W. Nuclear Terrorism: Rethinking the Unthinkable. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994. Asserts that a terrorist demand exists and that a preventive campaign be established; available from NTIS.

Moore, Mike. "Nuclear Temptations." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1993), 14-49. A detailed cover story.

Muller, H. "Smuggling of Nuclear Materials- Deadly Game." Internationale Politik (February 1995), 23-30. Article in German.

Nelan. B. "The Price of Fanaticism." Time, 3 April 1995, 38-41. Assesses terrorists' willingness to use mass destruction weapons.

"New Nightmare for Old?" New Scientist, 27 August 1994, 3. Discusses the possibility of terrorism replacing the old nuclear fears.

Nuckolls, John H. "Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers: Proliferation and Terrorism." Science, 24 February 1995, 1112-14.

Nunn, Sam and Auo Shinrikyo. "The New Terror: Nutcakes with Nukes." New Perspective Quarterly (Winter 1996), 32-35. Asserts that this is the greatest threat to US security and emphasizes the need for vigilance.

Perkovich, G. "The Plutonium Genie." Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), 153-65.

Potter, William C. and Leonard S. Spector. "Nuclear Terrorism-The Next Wave?" New York Times, 19 December 1994, A15(N), A19(L). Discusses the vulnerability of power plants or the diversion of nuclear materials.

Raine, Linnea and Frank Cilluffo. Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.

Rhodes, Richard. "Atomic Logic." Rolling Stone, 24 February 1994, 30-36. Covers the history and use of nuclear weapons including the fantasy of the terrorist bomb, proliferation and political functions.

Roberts, Guy B. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear Weapons Grade Fissile Materials. INSS Occasional Paper 8. Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, February 1996. Presents the dangers, especially in the former Soviet Union, proposals to combat trafficking, disposal of stockpiles, inadequacy of IAEA safeguards and ways to strengthen nonproliferation norms.

14 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Roos, John G. "Ultimate Nightmare" Armed Forces Journal International (October 1995), 67-68+. Assesses terrorism with the use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

Schmidbauer, B. "Illegaler nuklearhandel und nuklearterrorismus." [Illegal Nuclear Trafficking and Nuclear Terrorism] Internationale Politik (February 1995), 19-22.

Schneider, K. "Nuclear Disarmament Raises Fear on Storage of `Triggers'." New York Times, 26 February 1992, A1. Deals with problems of storing dismantled weapons' fuel and its possible target by terrorists.

Seidman, Joel and Patricia F. Allingahm. Time Bomb: How Terrorists and the Russian Mafia Threaten the World with a Nuclear Nightmare. Bethesda, MD: National Press Books, 1995.

Seifritz, W. "Spekulationen um Rotes Quecksilber RM 20/20." [Speculations about Red Mercury RM 20/20] ATW, Atomwirtschaft, Atomtechnik (August-September 1994), 585- 88.

Simon, Jeffrey D. "Time for a New Look at Terrorism." USA Today, 7 December 1994, A11. Describes the ease with which terrorists can acquire NBC materials.

Snell, Albert E. and Edward J. Keusenkothen. "Mass Destruction Weapons Enter Arsenal of Terrorists." National Defense (January 1995), 20-21.

Starr, Barbara, et al. "Nightmare in the Making." Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 June 1995, 23-24+. Assesses possible nuclear, biological and chemical threats.

Stern, Jessica. "Act Now to Prevent Nuclear Terror in the Future." International Herald Tribune, 11 April 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Describes how Russian army troops sell weapons, often through Russian mafia middlemen.

Taylor, Linda E. "Global Bomb Bazaar." Canada & the World Backgrounder (April 1995), 10-12.

"The Ultimate Nightmare-Sooner than Most People Expect, the United States May Face the Danger of Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Terrorism." Armed Forces Journal International (October 1995), 67+.

US Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks. Washington, DC: GPO, 1993. Superintendent of Documents catalog no. Y 3.5 22/2:2W 37/2.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles: Hearing, January 31, 1995. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995. Superintendent of Documents catalog no. Y 4.Ar 5/3:S.hrg.104-35.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 104th Cong., 2d sess., 13, 20, 22 and 27 March 1996. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

15 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 31 October and 1 November 1995.

Vaught, James W. Jr. The Emergence of the Nuclear Industry and Associated Crime. Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology, August 1991. Examines in Chapter 2 past crimes associated with the nuclear industry such as spies, terrorists and insider crimes.

Whitney, Craig R. "Plutonium for Sale. Call 1-800-TERROR." New York Times, 21 August 1994, 1+.

______. "Who Will Buy?" New York Times, 21 August 1994, sec. 4, 1. Discusses lack of strategies to prevent easy access to nuclear materials, the motive of money, and other issues.

Williams, Phil and Paul N. Woessner. "Nu-clear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment." Transnational Organized Crime (Summer 1995), 206-39.

______. "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling." Scientific American (January 1996), 40-44. Contends that little is being done to contain the problem of smuggling these materials.

Wines, Michael. "Aspin Orders Pentagon Overhaul of Strategy on Nuclear Weapons." New York Times, 30 October 1993, 8. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin fears new threat of nuclear terrorism.

Wright, Robert. "Be Very Afraid." The New Republic, 1 May 1995, 19+. Cover story assessing the situation with weapons of mass destruction.

Zimmermann, Tim and Douglas Pasternak. "Critical Mass." US News & World Report, 17 April 1995, 39-44. Assesses the new nuclear age with unwritten rules and unpredictable players.

III. Threats by Nation States

Albright, D. "An Iranian Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1995), 20-26.

Brower, Kenneth. "North Korean Proliferation-The Threat to the New World Order." Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1994), 376-80.

Cerami, Charles A. "Rogue States, Criminals and Terrorists Crash the Nuclear Club." Insight on the News, 20 June 1994, 6-10.

Deutch, John M. "The New Nuclear Threat." Foreign 71 (Fall 1992), 120-34. Surveys problems of nuclear proliferation, especially in Iraq, Algeria, and North Korea.

Gonzalez, Iris M., et al. The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Syria and Libya, 1998. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1994. Distribution of publication limited to DOD organizations only.

Hoffman, David. "Many Obstacles Remain to Closer U.S.-Iran Ties; Tehran's Support for Terrorism, Interest in Nuclear Technology Concerns Administration." Washington Post, 6 December 1991, A39.

Kahan, Jerome H. Nuclear Threats from Small States. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

16 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Institute, US Army War College, June 1994.

Kanter, Arnold and Stephen Hadley. "North Korea: The Clock is Ticking." Officer (January 1994), 26-30.

Kauzlarich, David and Ronald C. Kramer. "The Nuclear Terrorist State." Peace Review nos. 3-4 (1995), 333-37.

Livingstone, Neil C. "Nuclear Weapons: Still the Ultimate Terrorist Threat." Sea Power (February 1993), 33+. Surveys the spread of nuclear weapons to anti-Western governments.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "Lessons of the Next Nuclear War." Foreign Affairs (March/April 1995), 22-37. Assesses the political situation with hostile states.

Millot, Marc Dean. "Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries." Washington Quarterly (Summer 1994), 41-71. Proposes changes in US nonproliferation policy, especially concerning North Korea.

Murphy, Kim. "`Rogue Nation' or Terrorist Poses Serious Nuclear Threat, Perry Says; In Cairo, the Defense Secretary Expresses Fear that Weapons-Control Programs in the Middle East Could be Unraveling." Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1995, A4.

"North Korea: The Hermit Kingdom Strikes Back." Economist, 17 July 1993, 19-21. Discusses suspected nuclear weapons program and links to international terrorism.

"North Korea Shops for Nuke Technology in Russia." Washington Times, 5 July 1994, 1.

Ottaway, David B. and Steve Coll. "U.S. Focuses on Threat of `Loose Nukes." Washington Post, 10 April 1995, A1+. Published as part two of the six-part series "Rethinking the Bomb"; Expresses concern that dictators might acquire nuclear arms.

Phillips, James A. "The Saddamization of Iran." Policy Review (Summer 1994), 6-13. Discusses the possible buildup of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in Iran and the exporting of terrorism.

Potter, William. "Exodus: Containing the Spread of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities." Harvard International Review (Spring 1992), 26-29, 64. Presents confirmation by Russian nuclear officials of countries recruiting Russian scientists, reportedly involving Libya, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Brazil, India, North Korea and Cuba.

Reiss, Mitchell. "South Asia and Nuclear Proliferation: A Future Unlike the Past?" RUSI Journal (December 1993), 63-7. Discusses the situation with nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan.

Sears, Jonathan. "Northeast Asia Nuclear Threat." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (July 1995), 43-46.

Timmerman, K.R. "Iran's Nuclear Menace." New Republic, 24 April 1995, 17-19.

US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights. U.S. Security Policy towards Rogue Regimes:

17 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Hearings, July 28 and September 14, 1993, 1994. Superintendent of Documents catalog no. Y 4.F 76/1:Se 2/23; Focuses on acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.

US Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. North Korean Military and Nuclear Proliferation Threat: Evaluation of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: Joint Hearing, February 23, 1995, before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific. 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995. Superintendent of Documents catalog no. Y 4.In 8/16:K 84/5.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Threat of North Korean Nuclear Proliferation: Hearings, November 25, 1991-February 6, 1992. 102d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., S. hearing 102-635, 1991-92. Superintendent of Documents catalog no. Y 4.F 76/2:S.hrg. 102-635.

"Washington Goes it Alone Against Iran." US News & World Report, 15 May 1995, 15. Imposes Trade embargo for supporting terrorism and buying nuclear weapons.

Wright, Robin. "President Says He Will Ban Trade with Iran." Los Angeles Times, 1 May 1995, A1. Trade ban imposed because of encouragement of terrorism and a possible nuclear threat.

Zifferero, Maurizio. "The IAEA: Neutralizing Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Potential." Arms Control Today (April 1993), 7-10.

Zimmerman, Peter D. Iraq's Nuclear Achievements: Components, Sources, and Stature, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1993.

IV. Security of Nuclear Facilites and Weapons

"All Eyes on Imposter-Proof Protection." Nuclear Engineering International (June 1990), 54. Description of the EyeDentify security system.

"Better Safe than Sorry." Los Angeles Times, 23 March 1994, B6. An editorial describing the need for US nuclear power plants to be upgraded for protecting against terrorism.

Broad, William J. "Moving A-arms by Rail: Can Terrorists Be Foiled?" New York Times, 18 February 1992, A8(N), A6(L). US to supply Russia with armored rail cars to help disassemble Russian nuclear warheads.

Carnahan, Burrus M. "Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After the Gulf War." American Journal of International Law (July 1992), 524-41.

"Clinton Announces Widened Iranian Trade Embargo; Cites Iran's Terror Links and Nuclear Aspirations." Facts on File, 4 May 1995, 313-14.

Gill, Bob. "The Evolution of Nuclear Security." Nuclear News (December 1992), 30-35.

Halverson, Thomas. "Silent Threat-Nuclear Reactor Safety in Eastern Europe and the CIS." Jane's Intelligence Review (August 1994), 358-62.

18 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Hughes, Sylvia. "The Day the Commandos Dropped into a French Nuclear Plant." New Scientist, 28 April 1990, 30.

Lieberman, Joseph, Chairman. Excerpt of the Hearing of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee. Subject: Rules and Regulations to Protect Commercial Nuclear Power Plants against Terrorism and Sabotage, 19 March 1993. Database Online; Available from Dialog, Federal News Service, 00128535.

"Marty Speer: Perspectives from a Regional Security Group." Nuclear News (December 1992), 26-9.

Meyer, Christina, Jennifer Duncan and Bruce Hoffman. Force-on-Force Attacks: Their Implications for the Defense of U.S. Nuclear Facilities. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993. Examines assaults against 220 nonnuclear targets from the period 1983-1988; distribution limited to DTIC users only.

Noel, James L. "Getting Ahead on Tactical Response Training at American Utilities." Nuclear Engineering International (June 1990), 52-4.

"NRC Changes on Exports, Physical Protection." Nuclear News (May 1993), 62.

Nuclear Emergency-Terrorism Response Plan. Upland, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 1994.

"Nuclear Plants Told to Build Defenses against Car Bombs." New York Times, 7 August 1994, 14(N), 29(L). Nuclear Regulatory Commission orders plants to install barriers.

Portzline, Scott D. Nuclear Plant Terrorism. Harrisburg, PA: s.n., 1994.

Queener, D.S. "Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides." Nuclear Safety (January-June 1995), 169-74.

"Threat of Terrorism Debated." Engineering News-Record, 28 February 1994, 15. Nuclear Regulatory Commission plans to ensure security at nuclear power plants.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation. Adequacy of Nuclear Powerplant Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Clear Air and Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on Environment and Public Works. 103d Cong., 1st sess., 19 March 1993.

US General Accounting Office. Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: GPO, 1995. Document No. GAO/RCED-96-4, 7 November 1995.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Division of Safeguards and Transportation. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. An Alternative Format for Category I Fuel Cycle Facility Physical Protection Plans, by P. Dwyer. Washington, DC: GPO, 1992.

"Vehicle Intrusion Systems Going up at Nuclear Plants." Nuclear News (September 1995), 36.

Wald, Matthew L. "Senators Want Atomic Plants Protected against Car Bombs." New York Times, 20 March 1994, 26.

19 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

______. "U.S. Examining Ways to Protect Nuclear Plants against Terrorists." New York Times, 23 April 1993, A12(N), A24(L). Nuclear Regulatory Commission analyzes precautions against terrorists.

Weinstein, Albert A. "Nuclear Security: Then and Now." Nuclear News (December 1992), 38-40. Discusses building automation systems, fault-tolerant computers, etc.

V. Countermeasures/Prevention

Adamson, A. and V. Bychkov. "Current Trends in the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards." Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (July 1993), 29-32.

Allison, Graham. "Time to Get Busy Buying Out the Ex-Soviet Nuclear Supermarket." International Herald Tribune, 2 May 1995. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis.

Anderson, C. "Countering Nuclear Terrorism." Science, 15 April 1994, 337.

Aspin, Les. "Defense Counterproliferation Initiative." Defense no. 1 (1994), 28-31.

"Balance of Terror." CQ Researcher, 5 June 1992, 498. Discusses imposing stricter measures on regulating nuclear weapons.

Benson, Sumner. "Shaping Arms Export Policy." JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn-Winter 1994-95), 84-91.

Beres, Louis Rene. "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism against the United States: 10 Vital Questions." Special Warfare (August 1996), 22-29. See below Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

______. "Facing the Ultimate Nightmare: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism against the United States." TVI Report no. 1 (1996), 19-24. Discusses how to create the basis of a US counternuclear-terrorist strategy.

______. "The Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander." Comparative Strategy (July-September 1995), 287-99. Need for conceptual clarification of terrorism and associated rejection of geopolitical definitions.

Blaker, James. "Coping with the New `Clear and Present Danger' from Russia." Arms Control Today (April 1995), 13-16. Proposes that the United States and Russia place their surplus nuclear weapons under international safeguards.

Bone, James. "American Nuclear Swat Team Emerges from the Shadows." The Times, 2 Jan-uary 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Profiles the mission of the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST).

Bradford, Hazel and Tom Ichniowski. "NRC Deals with Terrorism." Engineering News-Record, 8 August 1994, 5. Outlines the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's work against terrorism.

______. "Hill Seeks Nuclear Anti-terror Rule." Engineering News-Record, 28 March 1994, 7. Discusses legislation to protect nuclear power plants from sabotage.

20 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Broad, William J. "Preparing to Meet Terrorists Bearing Plutonium." New York Times, 1 August 1993, 3. Description of the NEST.

Bukharin, Oleg A. "Soft Landing for Bomb Uranium." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September-October 1993), 44-49. US agrees to purchase 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia.

Bundy, McGeorge, William J. Crowe, Jr. and Sidney Drell. "Reducing Nuclear Danger." Foreign Affairs (Spring 1993), 140-55.

Chow, B.G. and K.A. Solomon. Limiting the Spread of Weapon-Usable Fissile Materials. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993. Analyzes the economics of nuclear materials from dismantled weapons and spent fuel from nuclear power plants.

"CIA Chief Warns of Nuclear Diversion from Russia." Agence France Presse, 20 March 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Deutch outlines steps that should be taken to avert a "crisis of enormous proportions" from nuclear terrorism.

Coll, Steve and David B. Ottaway. "Corralling the `Loose Nukes'." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 17-23 April 1995, 8-9.

"Commentary Advocates International Nuclear Police Force." Handelsblatt (Duesseldorf), 16 August 1994, 2, as translated in FBIS-WEU-94-159, 19.

"Commission Calls for Reinforcement of Nuclear Security." Safety & Health (December 1994), 18-20. Report by the EC on increasing controls in the trade of nuclear materials.

Committee on International Security and Arms Control. National Academy of Sciences Staff. Management & Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 1994.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Vienna, Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency, September 1993.

"Cooperation Against Nuclear Terrorism Urged." Obshchaya gazeta, 18-24 November 1994, 5, as translated in JPRS-TND-94-008-L, 21-23. Contains an interview with General Gennadiy Yevstafyev.

"Countering Nuclear Terrorism." Science 15 April 1994, 337.

"Europe Alert Over Threat of Nuclear Terrorism." The European, 18-24 March 1994, 1-2. Describes Interpol's establishment of a special group to combat nuclear smuggling.

"Europol Prepares to Combat Nuclear Smuggling." Frankfurter Allgemeine, 30 August 1994, 4, as translated in FBIS-WEU-94-169, 3-4.

Feaver, Peter D. "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations." International Security (Winter 1992/1993), 160-87.

Fischer, David. "The IAEA and Its Special Inspections." Orbis (September 1992), 597-600.

21 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Gander, Terry J. "Defence against a Growing Threat." Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 July 1994, 28. Discusses the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Gray, Malcolm and William Lowther. "The `Loose Nukes'." Maclean's, 22 April 1996, 24-26. Describes top US security concern of preventing nuclear terrorism.

Hart, Kathleen. "US, Russia Unveil Cost-Effective System to Monitor Nuclear Material." Nucleonics Week, 6 April 1995, 15.

Henry, Patrick. "Russia, G-7 Agree on Total Nuclear Test Ban." Moscow Times, 12 April 1996. Database Online; Available from Lexis-Nexis. Participants also agree to create a program to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons.

Hibbs, Mark. "Russia Improving Protection for Sensitive Nuclear Sites." Nucleonics Week, 30 March 1995, 12-13.

"IAEA Spokesman Previews Nuclear Smuggling Conference." Der Standard, 2 November 1994, 2, as translated in JPRS-TND-94-020, 42.

"IAEA to Create Data Bank to Combat Nuclear Smuggling." AFP in English, 3 November 1994, as reported in JPRS-TND-94-020, 42-43. International Atomic Energy Agency on prevention of smuggling from the former Soviet Republics.

The Impact of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, February 1996. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons on the United States Air Force. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University and HQ USAF National Security Negotiations Division, February 1996. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Weapons on United States Army. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, August 1995. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

"Joint Statement on Cooperation in Promoting the Rule of Law and Combating Crime, September 28, 1994," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 3 October 1994, 1893-4. Discusses the US-Russian bilateral agreement to fight crime, nuclear materials smuggling, organized crime and drug trafficking.

"Joint Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security by the Presidents of the United States and Russia." Arms Control Today (November 1994), 31-32.

Joseph, Robert. NATO's Response to the Proliferation Challenge. Strategic Forum no. 66. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, March 1996.

Kiernan, Vincent. "Russia Enlists US to Track Plutonium." New Scientist, 12 August 1995. Profiles

22 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

an eight-year project by the Department of Energy and Gosatomnadzor to develop a computerized inventory of Russia's weapons-grade materials.

______. "A Bomb Waiting to Explode." New Scientist, 26 February 1994, 14-15. Discusses the US president's initiatives on combating nuclear terrorism.

Kimery, Anthony L. "Your Life May Depend on the Woman from NEST." Insight on the News, 23 October 1995, 12-14. Describes the work of the NEST.

Kokeev, Mikhail. "Moscow and Lyon: Nuclear Safety." International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations 4 (1996), 16-24. Summarizes the Lyon Summit in June 1996 dealing with the global problem of nuclear safety.

Krause, Joachim. "Proliferation Risks and Their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?" Survival (Summer 1995), 135-148. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

Larrimore, James A. "IAEA Safeguards Criteria." Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (May 1993), 19-23.

Lawbook, Martin C. The Next Enemy. Strategic Forum no. 35. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995.

Lippman, Thomas W. "If Nonproliferation Fails, Pentagon Wants Counter Proliferation in Place." Washington Post, 15 May 1994, A11. Discusses a plan to ward off possible terrorist threats.

Lockwood, Dunbar. "The Nunn-Lugar Program: No Time to Pull the Plug." Arms Control Today (June 1995), 8-13. Urges the continuation of the 1991 Soviet Nuclear Reduction Act and Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.

______. "Dribbling Aid to Russia." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1993), 39-42. Discusses Nunn-Lugar legislation to reduce nuclear weapons.

Lown, Bernard. "Permanence May Hasten Nuclear Terrorism." Boston Globe, 10 May 1995, 19. Argues against making the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty permanent.

Lynch, Colum. "How to Build a Bomb Treaty." Amicus Journal (Summer 1995), 28-31. Discusses the ineffectiveness of the Nonproliferation Treaty in preventing access to nuclear materials.

Mann, Paul. "Detection Sensors Crucial, but Technically Exacting." Aviation Week & Space Technology 17 June 1996, 66-69. Funding sensor research and development to combat nuclear, chemical or biological terrorism not forthcoming.

______. "Summit to Focus on Nuclear Safety." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 September 1994, 23-24. Clinton and Yeltsin to discuss more action against nuclear smuggling and other issues addressing nuclear safety.

Millot, M.D., R. Molander and A. Wilson. "The Day After..." Study: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World: Summary Report. 2 vols. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993. Report on Rand's "The Day After" project on the implications of nuclear proliferation.

23 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

"NATO Seeks Coordinated Effort on Nuclear Smuggling." Press Association in English, 19 August 1994, as reported in FBIS-WEU-94- 162, 1.

"New Russian Measures to Secure Fissile Material." Arms Control Today (March 1995), 31.

Orlov, Vladimir. "The Nuclear Eight: Expectations and Chances; Leaders of the Seven Leading Industrialized Countries and Russia Meet in Moscow on April 19 and 20 to Discuss Nuclear Security Problems." Moscow News 18-24 April 1996, 1+.

Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H. "Safeguarding the Ingredients for Making Nuclear Weapons." Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 1994), 67-73.

Perry, William J. "`We Cannot Always Rely on Deterrence,'" Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 May 1996, 66. Calls for both active and passive US defense strategies to combat terroristic use of weapons of mass destruction.

______. "Pursuing a Strategy of Mutual Assured Safety." Defense Issues no. 3 (1995), 1-6.

Pickering, D.R. Frequency of Attack and the Safeguards and Security Risk Evaluation Process: Application of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Northbrook, IL: Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 1993. Proceedings of the 34th annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management.

Powers, John R. and Joseph E. Muckerman. "Rethink the Nuclear Threat." Orbis (Winter 1994), 99-108. Describes a new strategy to deal with nuclear threats.

"Proliferation: Cold War II." Economist, 11 December 1993, 28-29. Announcement of the Pentagon's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative on 7 December 1993.

Quester, George H. and Victor A. Utgoff. "Toward an International Nuclear Security Policy." Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1994), 5-18.

"Radioactive Materials Smuggling Defies Customs' Attempt to Halt It." Nucleonics Week, 15 April 1993.

Reed, Fred. "The World's Biggest Customs Force." Navy Times, 15 August 1994, 55-56. Discusses the prevention of nuclear smuggling.

Reiss, Mitchell and Eliot Cohen. "The Future That Never Came." Wilson Quarterly (Spring 1995), 46-66. Ways of encouraging countries that are refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons.

"Rossiiskiye i Amerikanskiye uchenyye pridumali sposob borby s kontrabandoy yadernykh materialov." [Russian and American Scientists Have Devised a Method for Fighting Nuclear Materials Contraband] Izvestiya, 6 November 1994, 2. Scientists from the United States and Russia working to develop a technique of "fingerprinting" nuclear materials for tracing their origin.

Ruehle, Michael. "NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat." Comparative Strategy (July-September 1994), 313-20. Discusses possible enforcement of sanctions against proliferators.

24 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Rundquist, David E. "Status and Trends of Safeguards Equipment Development." Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (May 1993), 24-30.

Scheinman, Lawrence. "Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World Order." Security Dialogue no. 4 (1992), 37-50.

Schneider, Barry. "Nuclear Proliferation and Counterproliferation: Policy Issues and Debates." Mershon International Studies Review (1994), 209-34. Explains six approaches to proliferation theory and discusses the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, supply-side and demand-side strategies for limiting proliferation and military strategies for deterring proliferators.

Shea, Thomas, et al. "Safeguarding Reprocessing Plants: Principles, Past Experience, Current Practice and Future Trends." Journal of Nuclear Materials Management (July 1993), 17-27.

Sloane, Wendy. "FBI's Moscow Mission: The Mob, Nuclear Theft." Christian Science Monitor, 5 July 1994, 6. Describes the opening and purpose of the FBI's new office in Moscow.

______. "Countering Nuclear Terrorism: Dwindling Capabilities?" Science, 24 February 1995, 1098.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Specialists Urge Better U.S. Efforts to Safeguard Ex-Soviet Nuclear Material." Washington Post, 14 March 1996, A13. General Accounting Office's report on the security of facilities.

______. "Anti-Smuggling Effort Largely in Disarray." Washington Post, 28 August 1994, A1+. US efforts to help secure Russian nuclear facilities largely unsuccessful due to lack of funds, poor working relations with Russian officials, and other problems.

______. "Scientists Urge Clinton to Protect Plutonium." Washington Post, 25 January 1994, A3. Panel urges more action to prevent terrorists' use of materials.

Stern, Jessica Eve. "Preventing Portable Nukes." New York Times, late NY edition, 10 April 1996, A19.

Taubes, Gary. "The Defense Initiative of the 1990s." Science, 24 February 1995, 1096-1100. Describes Pentagon's efforts to develop technologies for detecting and destroying weapons of mass destruction.

Towell, Pat. "Senate Backs Anti-Terrorism Measure." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 June 1996, 1885. Passage of defense bill amendment to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States with NBC weapons.

US General Accounting Office. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls; Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division. Washington, DC, 13 March 1996. Document no. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118.

______. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. Washington, DC, 7 March 1996. Document no. GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 Mar. 7, 1996.

25 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

______. Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance can be Improved. Washington, DC, 29 September 1995. Document no. GAO/NSIAD-95-191.

______. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Helping the Former Soviet Union Reduce the Threat: An Update. Washington, DC, 9 June 1995. Document no. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9, 1995.

______. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Helping the Former Soviet Union Reduce the Threat. Washington, DC, 6 October 1994. Document no. GAO/NSIAD-95-7, 6 October 1994.

"U.S.-Russia Cooperation Agreements." US Department of State Dispatch, 10 October 1994, 670-5. Agreements on nuclear security, trade and crime.

"U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security Initiatives," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, 10 October 1994, 676-77.

"Vacco Seeks Death for Having A-bomb Materials." New York Times, 14 December 1995, B6. New York attorney general seeks death penalty for anyone possessing materials to make nuclear bombs.

von Hippel, Frank. "Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold-War World." Physics Today, 31 June 1995, 26-31.

Waller, Douglas. "Nuclear Ninjas: A New Kind of SWAT Team Hunts Atomic Terrorists." Time, 8 January 1996, 38-41. Description of the Department of Energy's' Nuclear Emergency Search Team.

Wolf, Franklin R. Of Carrots and Sticks or Air Power as a Nonproliferation Tool. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, July 1994. Proposes institutionalizing force options into nonproliferation enforcement, ideally as part of Chapter 7 enforcement actions under the authority of the UN Security Council.

VI. Legal Aspects of the Problem

Beres, Louis Rene. "On International Law and Nuclear Terrorism." Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (Spring 1994), 1-36.

______. "The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurisprudential View." Dickinson Journal of International Law (Fall 1994), 327-66.

Boyle, Francis A. "Citizen Initiatives Under International Law: The Criminality of Nuclear Weapons." Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives (June 1989), 37-43.

Capezzuto, Louis J. "Preemptive Strikes Against Nuclear Terrorists and Their Sponsors: A Reasonable Solution." New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law nos. 2-3 (1993), 375-99. See Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials.

Carnahan, Burrus M. and Jacqueline R. Smith. "A Treaty to Ban Nuclear Smuggling: The Next Step in Nuclear Material Control?" Arms Control Today (October 1994), 14-17.

Evans, H.J. "The World Court Project on Nuclear Weapons and International Law." New Zealand Law Journal (July 1993), 249-52.

26 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

"First Committee: Post-Cold-War Nuclear Security Issues Debated in Disarmament Forum." UN Chronicle (March 1995), 76-77. Discusses the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

International Congress of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists. The Calamira Trial: Protekistan v. Calamira; A Public Trial on Legal Problems Concerning the Sale of Nuclear Weapons. Jerusalem: International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, 1992.

Mullins, Wayman C. "An Overview and Analysis of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism: The Weapons, Strategies and Solutions to a Growing Problem." American Journal of Criminal Justice no. 2 (1992), 95-119.

Reye, Susan. "Nuclear Law in Central and Eastern Europe." NEA Newsletter (March 1993), 36-9.

Treiger, A. "Plugging the Russian Brain Drain: Criminalizing Nuclear-Expertise Proliferation." Georgia Law Journal (November 1993), 237-67.

United Nations. International Law Committee. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1991: v. 1, Summary Records of the Meetings of the Forty-Third Session, 29 April-19 July 1991. 1993. Contains sections on legalities on nuclear weapons and other weapons and liabilities for damage.

Weisbecker, Jane C. "Protecting Nuclear Materials in the Terrorist Age: The International Challenge." Brooklyn Journal of International Law no. 2 (1986), 305-338.

Williamson, R.L. "Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation." Cornell International Law Journal (Winter 1995), 71-167.

VII. World Wide Web Sites

Two of the most useful and informative sites are described below and contain a multitude of links to other related sites.

1) Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies http://cns.miis.edu.

The Center "was created at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) by Dr. William C. Potter to confront the serious threat of international proliferation of nuclear, missile, biological, chemical and advanced conventional weapons. The CNS provides research tools, analysis, training and education on nonproliferation issues to scholars and policy makers from around the world. Since its inception in 1989, the CNS has grown into the leading US center for training and research specifically on nonproliferation issues."

This site contains a list of CNS projects, publications (full-text) and access by subscription only to numerous databases maintained by CNS. The feature "CNS User's Guide to Nonproliferation Research on the Internet" is an extensive guide to related sites. This site's "Top Ten Sites for Nonproliferation Research" is especially useful for analysts researching this topic for the first time.

2) Nuclear Control Institute http:/www.nci. org/nci/index.htm.

27 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

The Nuclear Control Institute "is an independent research and advocacy center specializing in problems of nuclear proliferation." It is a nonpartisan and nonprofit organization monitoring nuclear activities worldwide and pursuing "strategies to halt the spread and reverse the growth of nuclear arms." In particular, it focuses on the "urgency of eliminating A-bomb materials-plutonium and highly enriched uranium-from civilian nuclear power and research programs."

This institute has an especially useful area titled "Special Section Nuclear Terrorism Threat: How to Prevent It," which contains the following subsections: "Could Terrorists Build an A-Bomb with Stolen Materials?"; "Are Nuclear Reactors Vulnerable to Truck Bombs?"; "Are International Safeguards Effective in Plutonium Plants?"; "Is There a Nuclear Black Market?"; and "Valuable Links."

Synopsis of Publications of Special Relevance to Defense Officials

This section highlights previously cited publications that I deem especially important and relevant to defense officials. Detailed abstracts follow each of the citations.

Three studies produced by the Center for Counterproliferation Research of the National Defense University are especially useful in assessing the impact on the three branches of the US Armed Forces in dealing with weapons of mass destruction:

The Impact of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Proliferation on Naval Operations and Capabilities. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, February 1996.

The stated objectives of the workshop proceedings are "to heighten the awareness within key sectors of the Navy-Marine Corps team of the rising impact on naval operations and naval capabilities of the global proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and associated technologies. The workshops emphasize the practical, operational issues associated with battle group and expeditionary naval operations mounted within a joint operational context in collaboration with allies and local, friendly military forces." Highlights of some ideas produced by the workshop include the following:

· The nuclear, biological and chemical threat faced by the fleet is serious and growing. The biological and chemical warfare threats are especially acute.

· Fleet nuclear, biological and chemical readiness has been substantially eroded.

· On balance, naval forces bring significant strengths to operations in a nuclear, biological and chemical environment.

A key near-term requirement is the development of an interactive gaming method to enable operational commanders, planners and key policy officials to improve their understanding of operational tactics in an nuclear, biological and chemical environment.

The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons on the United States Air Force. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University and HQ USAF National Security Negotiations Division, February 1996.

This report discusses initiatives aimed at coping with an adversary's possession and potential use of nuclear, biological and chemical and missiles, to include improved passive and active defenses,

28 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

accelerated development of counterforce and command, control, computers and intelligence capabilities. Workshop participants concluded that a number of closely related conceptual, doctrinal, organizational, training, equipment, intelligence, operational and planning issues dealing with this threat have not been addressed satisfactorily. A sampling of these issues includes the following:

· Effective theater air and missile defenses are crucial to protecting air bases from nuclear, biological and chemical attack and ensuring sustained air operations.

· Overseas air bases do not have the resources or people to support identification, location and early warning of biological or chemical warfare attacks.

· Insufficient individual protective equipment is available for sustained operations and there is need for a collective protection capability.

· Air Force intelligence collection requirements and efforts need to place greater emphasis on adversary nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, operational concepts and employment doctrines.

Part II of the report contains a description of the war game, and part III provides an extensive list of participants' recommendations.

The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Weapons on United States Army. Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, August 1995.

The four-part workshop focuses on the challenges presented to US Army units in combat and noncombat operations by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles. Its principal objectives are "to enhance the understanding of the participants on emerging proliferation threats and problems, to assess the Army's posture in addressing these challenges and to assist workshop participants in developing potential responses and undertaking future developments."

Workshop 1, Establishing the Baseline. Examines current intelligence estimates of the proliferation threat worldwide, US government policies, joint military approaches and initiatives, ongoing research and an overview of the Army's applicable doctrine, concepts and programs. This part of the workshop produced six key observations.

Workshop 2, Research and Development. Focuses on proliferation-relevant Army programs; progress in developing both active and passive defense capabilities; a counterproliferation planning and analysis tool; and the emerging results of the Joint Staff's Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Review. This workshop contains seven key observations.

Workshop 3, Unit Operations. Focuses on the impact of nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation on the operations of combat units at corps and division levels. It discusses the US Army Chemical School; dismounted Battle Space Battle Lab; Army Chief of Staff guidance; studies of operations in nuclear, biological and chemical environments; and doctrine, training, leader development, and requirements for organizations, materiel and individual soldier capabilities.

Workshop 4, Shaping the Future. Focuses on policy and strategy for the future; concepts and doctrine for the future, and requirements for the future.

Beres, Louis Rene. "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism against the United States: 10 Vital Questions."

29 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Special Warfare (August 1996), 22-29. Few publications have appeared for policy makers who must create a strategy for dealing with nuclear terrorism. To achieve a fuller understanding of the risk calculations that terrorist organizations make and the factors most likely to affect those calculations, the author postulates 10 questions to ask, such as, "Are the risk calculations made by terrorist groups affected by their particular relations with host states?" and "Would the implementation of effective measures to counter nuclear terrorism require special patterns of international cooperation, and how might such patterns be created?". Also discussed is the role of special operations forces in coordinated preemption operations in this country and abroad.

Capezzuto, Louis J. "Preemptive Strikes against Nuclear Terrorists and Their Sponsors: A Reasonable Solution." New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law nos. 2-3 (1993), 375-99. Discusses a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense against terrorist states.

Cottrell, Scott. "Identifying the Separate Governmental Agency Roles and Tasks in Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Among Nonstate Actors (Terrorists) During Each Phase of the Counterproliferation Process." MMAS thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997. This thesis by Major Cottrell, United States Marine Corps, identifies the threat posed by nonstate actors/terrorists wielding weapons of mass destruction and defines the roles of the separate governmental agencies during each phase of the counterproliferation process. It also makes judgments as to whether current interagency relationships are adequate to counter this threat. [Available on DTIC Summer 1997].

Krause, Joachim. "Proliferation Risks and Their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?" Survival (Summer 1995), 135-148. The article discusses NATO's June 1994 publication Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction which placed concern about proliferation of these weapons high on its agenda (see NATO Review, June 1994). NATO's publication assessed two categories of risk-weapons of mass destruction threats to Western armed forces operating in out-of-area missions and direct attacks against Western Europe by rogue nations. The author calls for reviewing other threats not envisioned in this document, which in turn will lead to adjustments in nuclear, biological and chemical defense, force structures and doctrines. His additional threats to consider include shifts in regional power balances, danger of accidents, erosion of international norms and systems of order, regional instabilities fueled by proliferation, and others.

Ruehle, Michael. "NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat." Comparative Strategy (July-September 1994), 313-20. The author, a senior planning officer in the Political Affairs Division of NATO, discusses those areas where a NATO role could be developed in the longer term to prevent and counter proliferation. He suggests various levels of a NATO contribution to what he calls an "assertive nonproliferation policy." At the basic level preventive diplomacy using military means would be used to defuse proliferation incentives at the core. Another level of an assertive nonproliferation policy would entail enforcing international sanctions against proliferators. The third level would involve offensive military action against the weapons or production facilities of the proliferating state, as in the Gulf War, in pursuing a state's weapons of mass destruction program during the initial phases of a war. A fourth level is ballistic missile defense which is being carried out in several ways.

US Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials: Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 104th Cong., 2d sess., 13, 20, 22 and 27 March 1996. These hearings, conducted by Senators Roth and Nunn, include testimonies by John Deutch of the CIA and Ambassador Rolf Ekeus of the UN Special

30 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/sanz.html

Commission. The addendum to the hearings includes very informative documents by numerous specialists in the field. Among others they include:

"The Threat of Nuclear Diversion: The Intelligence Community Response."

"Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents."

"Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls."

"The Nuclear Black Market."

"Scientists, Engineers and Proliferation of Weapons Technology."

"Weapons, Proliferation and Organized Crime: Russian Military Dimensions."

"Reducing the Threat of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Proliferation and Terrorism."

The hearing of 27 March concentrates on responses to domestic terrorism and includes presentations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FBI, NEST, Department of Defense and other agencies.

If tomorrow morning the world awakens to the realization of the specter of nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism, will US and international planning be adequate and coordinated enough to respond? With so many agencies and nations involved in countering this threat, will each entity know its precise role and be able to act on it in a moment's notice in a coordinated and efficient manner? More important, are all agencies involved doing enough collectively now to prevent this threat from ever being realized? Reading, evaluating and acting on problem areas and solutions set forth in the publications listed above will help formulate the most effective strategies to counter this worldwide threat.

1. This project was completed under the auspices of a grant from the Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado. 2. For citations to literature on this topic published before 1992, see Timothy L. Sanz, "Nuclear Terrorism: Selected Research Materials," Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (Winter 1992), 337-45; or the US Army Foreign Military Studies World Wide Web site at http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/nucter.htm. Citations found in this research from 1992 to today can be accessed at http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/mrnucter.htm. 3. I would like to thank the following individuals for helping to identify very pertinent sources of information: Chrisopher Fitz and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies; James L. Ford, senior visiting fellow at the Center for Counterproliferation Research of the National Defense University; and John Sopko, deputy chief counsel to Senator Sam Nunn on the Congressional Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

31 of 31 3/11/98 12:50 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/books.html

Books for the Military Professional Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command & General Staff College

This Bookshelf contains major works on nontraditional military operations in US history from the turn of the century. The list (with an update) is taken from Books for the Military Professional, a 25-page bibliography compiled by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) faculty and edited by Dr. Gary J. Bjorge. The bibliography was prepared to `help members of the profession of arms grow professionally and personally by providing the key to information, insights and collective wisdom' needed to understand the present and to develop a vision for the future.

The complete text of Books for the Military Professional is available on-line at CSI's homepage (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/csi/pu bs/pubs.htm) or write to Dr. Gary Bjorge, Combat Studies Institute (ATZL-SWI), USA-CGSC, 1 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.

-Colonel Jerry D. Morelock Director, Combat Studies Institute

Interventionism, 1895-1934

The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic During the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924 by Bruce J. Calder. Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 by Richard D. Challener. Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1917 by John S.D. Eisenhower. Marines in the Dominican Republic 1916- 1924 by Stephen Fuller and Graham Cosmas. Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 by John M. Gates. Drive to Hegemony: The United States in the Caribbean, 1898-1917 by David F. Healy. Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915-1916 by David F. Healy. The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902 by David F. Healy. The Banana Wars by Lester D. Langley. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 by Brian M. Linn. The Sandino Affair by Neill Maculay. The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 by Allan R. Millett. Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family by Richard Millett. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Vera Cruz by Robert E. Quirk. Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History by Hans Schmidt. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 by Hans Schmidt. Small Wars Manual by the US Marine Corps

Post-WWII Nontraditional Military Operations

Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada by Mark Adkin. Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador by A.J. Bacevich et al.

1 of 3 3/11/98 12:51 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/books.html

Delta Force by Charlie A. Beckwith and Donald Knox. The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance by Douglas S. Blaufarb. Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan et al. Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Violent Peace by Daniel P. Bolger. Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s by Daniel P. Bolger. Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War by Larry E. Cable. Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama by Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker. The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama by John T. Fishel. The Savage Wars of Peace edited by John Fishel (forthcoming). U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984 by Benis M. Frank. The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955 by Lawrence M. Greenberg. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope by John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley. "A New Kind of War": America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece by Howard Jones.

Invasion, Intervention,"Intervasion": The U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy by Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel (forthcoming). The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-the-Scene Commander by James H. Kyle. Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism by David Martin and John Walcott. Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace by Tommie Sue Montgomery. Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965 by Thomas P. Odom. Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 by Bruce Palmer. American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building by Benjamin C. Schwarz. "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon by Roger J. Spiller. Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958 by Gary H. Wade. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966 by Lawrence A. Yates.

Countering Chemical and Biological Threats

The US government will spend $2 billion to counter chemical and biological weapons. Find out how at "Countering Chemical and Biological Weapons: Government Programs and Industry Opportunities" Conference to be held 19 November 1997 at the Capitol Hill Hyatt Regency in Washington, D.C.

This conference will examine the research and development programs and acquisition requirements facing the US military and state and local governments to counter the threat of chemical and biological warfare. Invited speakers include: Senator Richard Lugar, (R-IN), Member of Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees; Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director, CIA Nonproliferation Center; Dr. Mitchell B. Wallerstein, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Counterproliferation Policy; Greg Hulcher, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Strategic Tactical Systems for the Under Secretary of Defense; and Brigadier General James T. Conway, Deputy Director for Combating Terrorism, Operations, The Joint Staff.

2 of 3 3/11/98 12:51 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/books.html

For information, contact Jane's at: (703)683-3700, extension 204, or (800) 824-0768, extension 204; or by mail at Jane's Information Group, Jane's Conferences, 1340 Braddock Place, Suite 300, Alexandria, VA 22314-1651. Jane's can also be contacted via E-mail at .

3 of 3 3/11/98 12:51 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html Book Reviews Contemporary Readings for the Professional

Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea by William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle. 294 pages. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History. 1996. $32.00.

Why, this official history of the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Korean War seeks to determine, did this particular segregated regiment perform as it did in combat during 1950 to 1951? In the foreword to the book, Chief of Military History Brigadier General John W. Mountcastle deplores "the corrosive effects of segregation and the racial prejudices" that produced a system which "crippled the trust and mutual confidence so necessary among soldiers and leaders of combat units and weakened the bonds that held the 24th together, producing profound effects on the battlefield."

Such a profoundly flawed system's continued existence in 1950 seems incredible in light of American military history. Despite African Americans' demonstrated willingness to volunteer and serve throughout the country's history, and regardless of their success in integrated as well as segregated units, World War II planners chose, once again, to segregate black soldiers and noncommissioned officers, primarily under white officers' leadership. This "flawed" institutional racism system produced a number of problems in the training base as well as in combat.

The net result of World War II's wasteful and restrictive personnel policies was to unnecessarily limit the use of black troops, thereby negatively impacting operational commanders prosecuting the war in the active theaters. African American soldiers in the segregated Army truly represented a lost opportunity as the result of being restricted in overall numbers to a fixed percentage of the population, prohibited by assignment policy from the unrestrained utilization of black manpower that was mobilized and available, and otherwise prevented from being introduced into combat at the right place and time. In 1950, this was the legacy the 24th Infantry Regiment carried into combat.

The authors painstakingly research-ed the 24th's record the year it served as a segregated unit and present it with fairness and sensitivity. Black Soldier, White Army neither glosses over the 24th's failures (especially in its first two months of combat), nor does it fail to credit individual unit members' truly heroic combat performances.

Much like the white regiments who were hastily thrown into action in a desperate attempt to stem the powerful North Korean armor-tipped drive that fateful summer, the 24th was often overpowered by an aggressive, tough, determined enemy. Comparing the black 24th's battlefield performance to that of the white 5th, 27th and 35th Infantry regiments results in an all too familiar story of poor combat performance by unprepared, not fully trained troops accustomed to the soft life of occupation duty in Japan. Therefore, the authors note, "if the 24th faltered during its first two months in Korea, the color of. . . its companies and battalions was not the reason. . . . [M]ore obvious answers lay in the deficiencies of leadership, training, supply and support that burdened the entire United Nations force, whether white or black, during the first months of the war in Korea." Thus, the real villain in this piece is not the racist white officer corps, but is, instead, the short-sighted political leadership that permitted criminal levels of unpreparedness to persist in the entire army while pursuing global military commitments that stretched an overtaxed military force structure well beyond its capacity to effectively respond.

1 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

This excellent history points out that the wonder is not that the unit sometimes failed to fight effectively, but rather, that so many of its soldiers fought as well as they did. The authors capture this essential point by noting that, when assessing the 24th's record, it is clear that "many fought well but others fled. In that light, the regiment's achievements . . . bear a special mark. They underscore the courage, resilience and determination of those among the unit's members who chose to do their duty, to fight in the face of adversity, and to prevail."

COL Jerry D. Morelock, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

AMERICA GOES TO WAR: A Social History of the Continental Army by Charles Patrick Neimeyer. 244 pages. New York University Press, New York. 1995. $35.00.

Despite its title, Charles Patrick Neimeyer's study is less about "war" and more about "America"-the America that existed in the late 18th century, when the Colonials finally decided they had had enough of British absentee landlords. Neimeyer's bold thesis is sure to raise the eyebrows of those whose patriotism has led them to revere the "typical" Continental citizen-soldier who left his farm to join General George Washington in the righteous struggle against foreign aggression.

Neimeyer claims instead that the men who won America's independence were a motley crew of vagrants and mercenaries whose desire to earn a decent wage and escape abject poverty drove them to enlist. While leaders such as John Adams and Thomas Jefferson railed again the tyranny of King George III and the English nobility, it was an assemblage of recent immigrants from countries such as Germany and Ireland, African-Americans-both free and slave-and a smattering of Native Americans who were suffering through the bitter winter cold and sweltering summer heat to stave off the better-armed and better-disciplined British forces.

Neimeyer offers a detailed account of these men's daily lives. Individual chapters analyze the contributions of each of these underprivileged groups. The author also details the economic dimensions of soldiering, pointing out through the use of letters and diaries how angry the common soldier became when the Congress or the military administration failed to deliver on promises of a decent wage, decent food and adequate clothing. This shoddy treatment led to the many mutinies and desertions, which plagued the American generals from the earliest days of the war until well after the Battle of Yorktown. What Continental soldiers wanted, Neimeyer claims, was to be paid decently for the labor they provided.

Like most historians, Neimeyer is careful to base his analysis on the historical record. Drawing from the best work in historical theory done during the 20th century, he subjects a number of personal and official documents from the Colonial period to new analysis with a decidedly sociological slant. At times, his reliance on statistics borders on the tedious; like many books that have sprung from doctoral dissertations, his work is given to repetition, and its argument occasionally overstated. Nevertheless, he is particularly adept at analyzing data from a wide variety of source materials and developing a cohesive portrait of the army Washington led against the British. Additionally, more than 70 pages are devoted to copious notes and lists of secondary sources where readers can find more information on this intriguing and neglected subject. Although Neimeyer's strident challenge to the Continental soldier's myth may disturb some, it nevertheless serves as a sobering reminder to military leaders of the commitment they must have to their troops in order for an armed force to be successful.

2 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, USA, Retired, Twinsburg, Ohio

THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD WAR II. Edited by I.C.B. Dear and M.R.D. Foot. 1,343 pages. The Oxford University Press Inc., New York. 1996. $60.00.

The series of Companion volumes (to a variety of subjects from philosophy to war) introduced by Oxford University Press is arguably an excellent and authoritative reference. The books' utility, however, may be to sit in reserve for more focused reading that may, at some point, require clarification of certain topics necessary for understanding, but which remain ancillary to the reader's current focus. To my knowledge, The Oxford Companion to World War II is the series' largest-2 3/4 inches thick, 7 1/2 inches wide and 10 inches tall, with 1,343 pages. The first consideration for a potential buyer-especially one accustomed to frequent relocations-may be shelf space for so weighty a volume.

The Oxford imprint is a guarantee of quality in terms of both content and production, and this book is no exception to that rule. This volume will provide extraordinary support to any historical inquiry into events and issues of World War II, though, as consulting editor (and frequent contributor) M.R.D. Foot admits in his introduction, the selection is biased toward actions involving the Grand Alliance of US and British forces in their main theater of war. As one would expect, the list of contributors is respectable: 144 authors, about a third to half of whom are associated with various British universities or institutions. Known American authors such as Martin Blumenson, Stephen Ambrose, Stanley Falk, Ronald Spector, G.L. Weinberg and Earl Ziemke, among others, are well represented, as well as German and Commonwealth historians and a smattering of Japanese scholars. One must be impressed by the number of entries the general editor, I.C.B. Dear, wrote himself-no mean demonstration of the breadth of his own knowledge. Foot, a well-known authority on World War II special operations, contributed a general introduction as marked for its grace in composition as its content, as well as many key entries.

The final value of the book, of course, must be found in its comprehensiveness. The editors' use of illustrations, maps and various tables, along with text, is wonderfully adept. Two fine examples are those accompanying Malcom Smith's essay on the Battle of Britain and those that support Charles Messenger's explanation of logistics, an often neglected but essential subject for an understanding of the limitations on industrial-mechanized warfare. There are numerous detailed tables providing a basis for comparison between weapon systems, tables listing World War II warships by class, small arms by country and the comparative characteristics of World War II bombers.

With regard to comprehensiveness, there will always be omissions that strike individual readers as unfortunate. Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Anderson does not rate his own entry, though he commanded the US-British ground forces that landed in North Africa in 1942, nor does Colonel-General Eric Hoepner, the commander of 4th Panzer Group on the Eastern Front, who was relieved and disgraced by Adolf Hitler and later condemned and hanged for his role in the 20 July 1944 attempt to assassinate the Fuehrer. On the other hand, German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who was prominent in the German resistance movement against Hitler and was executed at Flossenbuerg Concentration Camp in 1945, rates two paragraphs.

This truly exceptional addition to a professional library is well worth the cost and shelf space for any reader undertaking extensive study of World War II for pleasure or professional development.

3 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

COL Richard M. Swain, USA, Retired, School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC

FROM FLINTLOCK TO RIFLE: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866, by Steven T. Ross. 218 pages. Frank Cass, London. (Distributed by International Specialized Book Services, Inc., Portland, OR.) 1996. $37.50.

In this excellent book, Steven T. Ross purports to examine evolving infantry tactics from the age of Frederick the Great through the American Civil War and the Austro-Prussian War. He does more than this, however, as he also provides a general survey of the evolution of military thought and practices, along with the technological, political and social changes impacting the transformation of warfare from a form in which the infantry was the "queen of battle" to that of combined arms operations. This book is basically a reissue of the 1979 first edition with an excellent new introduction providing a very useful discussion of books that have enhanced our understanding of this warfare period.

The two themes that highlight this book are flexibility and initiative. As the period progressed, military organizations were provided the means to adapt their formations and resources to meet changing topographical and enemy situations. Concurrently, commanders and individual soldiers gained the authority to conduct combat operations and activities that best fit the situation. The period witnessed a revolution in military affairs that saw highly disciplined and rigid linear formations give way to open, flexible formations effectively using combined arms. From rare, costly and indecisive battles, warfare evolved to feature larger armies that were willing to fight more decisive battles.

The major theorists, innovators and practitioners of the period are highlighted with the contributions of such figures as Guibert, du Tell, Napoleon, Wellington and du Picq discussed in detail. To illustrate his points, Ross uses a number of battles as examples of how theory became practice.

This book is well written and very informative, especially considering the fact that it covers a relatively long period in less than 200 pages. Its organization and development flow logically with primary emphasis justifiably on European armies, since that is where most changes occurred. To understand where we are today, we need to know how and why we got here. Ross tells us.

COL Earl E. Perry, USA, Retired, Jacksonville, Florida

MAOIST INSURGENCY SINCE VIETNAM by Thomas A. Marks. 303 pages. Frank Cass, London. Distributed by International Specialized Book Services Inc., Portland, OR. 1996. $39.50 clothbound. $19.50 paperback.

For the coterie who follow insurgencies, Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam is a find. Thomas A. Marks has done his homework, tracing the tale of four post-Vietnam civil wars and rebellions. He is sensitive to the subtleties of the intricate causes and strategies characteristic of insurgent movements. Today's professional soldier can profit from this book.

Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam is not always easy to read. The writing, particularly early on, is

4 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

occasionally turgid and too self-consciously academic. However, it gets better, and Marks' cogent observations make such lapses bearable. He goes well beyond the analysis frequently marking First World looks at Third World uprisings. His suggested sources of causation and counterstrokes are insightful - and probably valid.

The individual Thailand, Philippine Islands, Sri Lanka and Peru studies stand on their own. Each contributes insights rarely encountered elsewhere. Notably, the studies avoid patronizing the understanding of indigenous players. For example, some commentators have disparaged Thai counterinsurgency efforts as merely having been successful through a fluke in timing. Marks correctly gives credit to the Royal Thai government for moving beyond adherence to British and US models to one specifically Thai.

His thorough picture of the Philippine battle against the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Moro Independence Movement reveals a deep and objective understanding of those struggles. His illumination of Sri Lanka's bloody trial is probably new ground for most readers. Sri Lanka's ethnic component may make it particularly significant as similar problems seem to be a 1990s hallmark. His look at Sendero Luminoso is also compelling. Although there is still a cloak of mystery about Sendero, even those intimately involved in suppressing the movement may disagree about what they see.

Marks' solid investigative skills and broad knowledge of insurgent movements allow him to posit plausible explanations where others are merely bemused. This is a solid contribution to the field. Soldiers and civilians able to look beyond preconceived notions will find this book stimulating. A definite "thumbs up."

COL Horace L. Hunter Jr., USA, Retired, Williamsburg, Virginia

COMMUNIST LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR by Charles R. Shrader. 312 pages. Greenwood Publishing Inc., Westport, CT. 1995. $59.95.

This comprehensive book describes logistic systems used by the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) and the Chinese Communist Force (CCF) deployed on the Korean Peninsula from June 1950 to July 1953. With the book's excellent charts, maps, diagrams, sketches and tables, the reader can visualize the sophisticated logistic infrastructure developed by communist forces despite hostile terrain, inhospitable weather and the combined effects of determined ground resistance and overwhelming naval and air power.

Author Charles R. Shrader begins with a regional peninsula appraisal. He discusses the country's geography, including its climate, topography, waterways and road and rail networks, and gives detailed data about the age and location of rail lines, availability and capability of rolling stock, location and capabilities of port facilities, navigable waterways and the north-south/east-west road networks available to combatants.

Next, Shrader describes the doctrine employed by the UN adversaries and the organizations each country developed to support its combat force. He makes the important point that the UN intelligence apparatus grossly misjudged NKPA and CCF capabilities to support themselves in a protracted conflict. More than a decade later, this same myopic view of enemy capabilities confounded US forces in Vietnam with

5 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

similarly unacceptable results.

The book's most significant part is probably the two chapters about the supply, maintenance, storage and materiel distribution systems. Shrader describes how each supply class was provided throughout the theater. NKPA and CCF doctrine and methods very closely paralleled those of a mechanized army, even though neither was a mechanized force. The communist forces made great use of decentralized command, improvisation and echelonment of logistic units and materiel. Their soldiers and units carried basic loads. Supply points and depots were established along main supply routes, and all available transportation was used to sustain combat forces. In short, the primary logistic difference between the UN Command and its adversaries was not necessarily the presence or absence of a particular sophistication level. It was merely the difference in the quantities of materiel required to support the forces.

Shrader details the July 1951 and July 1953 stalemates characterized by combat actions much like the short, violent fights Western Front soldiers experienced in World War I. Limited objectives produced limited results-except for dead and wounded soldiers. During this time, NKPA and CCF forces reorganized and refit their units, moving and positioning large quantities of materiel near the battle area despite significant UN air interdiction campaigns. The best efforts of air and sea power could not force the enemy to retreat or capitulate.

This book has valuable lessons for the professional soldier preparing for the next conflict. One is that the opponent thinks, plans, organizes and executes his plan according to his tactical or strategic vision. He is either hampered or abetted by his logistic support's quality, quantity and timeliness. Seemingly unsophisticated forces require the same types of support as do highly technical forces, although in smaller quantities.

Another lesson is that an adversary is likely to use innovative methods that have fallen into disuse by technologically advanced forces. Intelligence gatherers and analysts must examine an adversary's full potential in terms of the adversary's capabilities. Last, how a commander strikes and destroys his opponent's "Achilles' heel" will determine how quickly victory is achieved.

With his book, Shrader gives us a tool to better understand an adversary. Professional soldiers should study this text and apply its concepts when analyzing intelligence, logistic support and warfighting.

COL Robert A. Gimbert, USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

A VERY SHORT WAR: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang by John F. Guilmartin Jr. 254 pages. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas. 1995. $39.50.

In A Very Short War, John F. Guilmartin Jr. gives a detailed analysis of what appeared to be a postscript to US involvement in Indochina-the May 1975 SS Mayaguez seizure in the Gulf of Siam. Using operational analysis techniques that focus on the conflict's tactical and operational dimensions, Guilmartin adroitly extrapolates larger lessons about the post-Vietnam era conflict, particularly the impact of real-time global command and control capabilities.

Many lessons lost in the Koh Tang Island action aftermath were relearned subsequent to Operation Desert One and Grenada, Lebanon and Somalia. For example, effective joint operational procedures and the cost of ad hoc task forces must be established, as well as the fact that inadequate intelligence

6 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

dissemination and unclear political guidance led to failure. Throughout his book, Guilmartin counsels against underestimating "fog-of-war" impact and observes that conflict is and always has been far from a "linear phenomenon."

Placed in the Saigon and Phnom Penh evacuations context, Guilmartin's book details both operations' impact on Special Operations (SO) and Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) aircraft crews. Guilmartin is well qualified to provide this background, because he participated as a pilot in both operations and served as a maintenance officer at one of the Koh Tang launch sites. From this perspective, Guilmartin provides insight into the operations' more subtle dimensions, detailing the differences in SO and CSAR unit personalities. He explains how unit culture influences an operation's planning and execution phases and shows how unit personalities affected the Koh Tang operation when both units were forced to operate jointly under extremely adverse conditions with no preparation and little planning.

In his operational assessment, Guilmartin identifies "information saturation" and "tactical and operational ig-norance" at chain-of-command mid- points as causal factors in a series of miscommunications and bad decisions. The operation ultimately resulted in the deaths of 15 US servicemen-several after the Mayaguez and its crew had been returned to US control. The deceptive nature of dramatically improved global communications capabilities is cited as a factor leading higher headquarters to overload operational commanders with requests for superfluous information while believing they had a clear tactical environmental picture. This led to "confused and divided lines of command and tactical micromanagement" and exacerbated the friction inherent in a rapidly conceived and executed operation.

An enduring Mayaguez lesson learned is that a unit commander's individual initiative and adaptability often can overcome untenable conditions resulting from political and strategic decisions. Guilmartin's highly readable and insightful assessment of an often-overlooked "sideshow" conflict provides important lessons for the type of operation that will increasingly test US national security policies.

Andrew J. Harris, Special Warfare Division, Analytic Services, Arlington, Virginia

FUTURE WAR: An Assessment of Aerospace Campaigns in 2010 by Jeffery R. Barnett. 169 pages. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. 1996. No charge.

Future War is US Air Force Colonel Jeffery R. Barnett's vision of the role of aerospace and related forces in future contingency operations. This fast-paced book embraces the fundamental concepts of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and the information age. Unfortunately, although Barnett calls his book an assessment, he rarely questions current technology's potentials. The result is a book technocrats will accept without hesitation and traditional military scientists will disdain outright.

Future War ascribes to the basic RMA tenets. As an Air Force officer, Barnett naturally emphasizes future war's aerospace aspects, including space technology. The heart of his approach is "parallel war," described as using aerospace forces in simultaneous attacks on enemy centers of gravity "at rates faster than the enemy can repair and adapt." Parallel war's goal is victory through shock effect.

A disconcerting aspect of Future War is Barnett's faith in information technology. He believes modern

7 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

systems will allow the joint force air component commander (JFACC) to conduct a campaign without leaving the Continental United States (CONUS). It is difficult to swallow a proposition calling for operational and tactical leadership from the strategic rear. Accept-ing a CONUS-based command is made more difficult by Barnett's view that future operations' speed and scope will create a more centralized execution environment, particularly for tactical and operational aerospace defensive operations. It seems contradictory to expect a CONUS-based JFACC to effectively control all elements executing and supporting theater and tactical air defense.

The threat of a peer or niche competitor conducting limited parallel war against our theater-based forces drives Barnett's train of logic. He believes future warfare will not require or allow mobilizations, deployments and force buildups. The United States needs forces that can fight and win on "day one" of any campaign. As expected, Barnett's emphasis is on an aggressive aerospace campaign with a minimized forward presence, followed up by light ground forces. To the military history student, this sounds too much like the artillery defeating and the infantry occupying.

Future War's major flaw is an unquestioning belief in technology. The book is a statement of conclusions by a very intelligent author who is an expert in his field. Thus, many of Bar-nett's assumptions are not openly stated. Most points are offered as givens, rather than proved through rigorous argument. This intuitive approach makes the book difficult for the less expert reader and, more significant, will open many of Barnett's more important conclusions to criticism from opponents of technological warfighting.

If the reader is a true believer in RMA, this book makes perfect sense. If one is from the "antitechnology" school of thought, the book comes across as one more bottle of snake oil. Because of the book's all-or-nothing approach, those of us in the middle still wait for a comprehensive future warfare analysis.

Despite the book's weaknesses, it should not be discounted. Between Barnett's unquestioning faith and others' natural conservatism lies a realistic future war vision. Only by reading works from all sides with critical openmindedness can the military professional find useful truths and make progress.

MAJ C. William Robinson, USA, 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

THE FORGOTTEN FEW: The Polish Air Force in the Second World War by Adam Zamoyski. 239 pages. Hippocrene Books Inc., New York. 1996. $24.95.

It is almost impossible to overstate the Battle of Britain's importance. Besides being history's first decisive air campaign, the British success in stopping the Luftwaffe marked the first military strategic-level reversal for Nazi Germany. The battle is also one of the great "ifs" of the war. If the Germans had succeeded in gaining air supremacy over Britain and then followed through with Operation Sea Lion-the invasion of Britain-there is no telling what the effect would have been on any subsequent German campaign in Russia. Without Britain as a base, the Allied campaign in northwestern Europe in 1944 and 1945 would have been much different-if it even took place.

During the Battle of Britain's short two-and-a-half months, control of British air space was stoutly defended by a razor-thin line of only 2,363 pilots-446 of whom were killed in action. Almost forgotten

8 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

today, however, are the 487 pilots-some 21 percent of the total-who were not British. They were a mixed assortment of volunteers from many nations, including various European air force contingents in exile. By far, the single largest group of these non-British pilots flying under Royal Air Force (RAF) operational control were the 146 pilots of the Polish Air Force.

The title of Adam Zamoyski's book, The Forgotten Few, is a direct reference to Winston Churchill's famous statement made about the Battle of Britain pilots: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few." Zamoyski's "forgotten few," of course, are the Polish pilots, air crews and ground crews.

Although the Battle of Britain is the centerpiece of Zamoyski's story, he follows the Polish Air Force in World War II from the September 1939 initial German victory to the May 1945 final Allied victory. Zamoyski argues that without the non-British pilots in general, and the Polish pilots in particular, the RAF might have been overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe in the critical August through October 1940 months.

Zamoyski musters an impressive array of facts and statistics to make his point. In September and October 1940, the RAF had only 400 fighters to defend the country's vital southwest sector. At any given time, from 50 to 100 of these fighter planes were flown by Polish pilots. "On 11 September, the Poles accounted for 18 percent of the enemy aircraft destroyed; on 15 September, they accounted for 14 percent; on 19 September, 25 percent; on 26 September, a staggering 48 percent."

Zamoyski also tells the story of the all-Polish units within the RAF, including the No. 303 Kosciuszko Squadron. No. 303 was the top-scoring squadron in the Battle of Britain. It downed three times the average RAF score while incurring one-third the average casualties. The RAF as a whole lost one pilot for every 4.9 enemy kills. The Polish squadrons shot down 10.5 German aircraft for each pilot lost.

The Forgotten Few is a rare combination of solid history and enjoyable reading. Relying heavily on archival sources and interviews, Zamoyski pieces together the story of one of World War II's most effective, yet least- recognized, fighting forces. I highly recommend this book to military professionals and, in particular, World War II students.

COL David T. Zabecki, USAR, 7th Army Reserve Command, Heidelberg, Germany

AMERICAN WAR PLANS, Edited and introduced by Steven T. Ross. Garland Publishing Inc., New York. 1995.

1919-1941: Volume 1, Peacetime War Plans, 1919-1935, 212 pages, $89.00.

Volume 2, Plans for War Against the British Empire and Japan, The Red, Orange and Red-Orange Plans, 1923- 1938, 412 pages, $139.00.

Volume 3, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, 1939-1940, 345 pages, $123.00.

Volume 4, Coalition War Plans and Hemispheric Defense Plans, 1940-1941, 365 pages, $127.00.

9 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

Volume 5, Plans for Global War, Rain-bow-5 and the Victory Program, 1941, $110.00.

Volume 6, American War Plans, l945- 1950, 189 pages, 1996. $32.50. Frank Cass, London. (Distributed by International Specialized Book Services Inc., Portland, OR.)

In the five American War Plans volumes published by Garland Publishing, Steven T. Ross reviews the development of 21st-century US military strategy. With little accompanying narrative, these volumes provide declassified war plan photocopies from the National Archives. Ross' sixth volume, published by Frank Cass, is a detailed narrative of war planning before the Korean War but without the supporting plans. Despite contrasting styles, all six volumes are useful research resources for military historians and strategists.

Ross' books look at the evolution of the Joint Board, made up of US Army and Navy war planners, which was established in 1903 mainly because of poor Army and Navy staff performance during the Spanish-American War. Unfortunately, the board scuttled itself on the eve of World War I because of Army-Navy bickering over Pacific region strategy.

After World War I, a reorganized Joint Board guided US contingency and war planning until World War II began. The Army and Navy chiefs and their plans and operations deputies developed the strategies for peacetime contingencies and for launching the US World War II effort.

The reader probably will go to the key World War II plans first. The war plans against the British Empire and Japan-Red, Orange and Red-Orange-were early planning scenarios. For example, Plan Red-Orange pointed out logistic, operation and force structure requirements.

Ross shows how Plan Rainbow 5 was transformed from a major regional European contingency plan to a global war plan. After a US, British and Canadian agreement in 1941, Rainbow 5 became the framework for the strategic global plan-win in Europe first while defending in the Far East. Ross writes, "The real value of the plan . . . was in training staff officers to cope with the range of problems associated with global war."

Of equal interest are the US plans for dealing with lesser contingencies. Plan Yellow was developed to land a China Relief Expedition of 40,000 troops to maintain communications along the railroad from Peking to the sea. The theater of operations encompassed "the territorial limits of China." The plan failed to address the option of coalition cooperation among the other contingents there-the French, British, Japanese and Italians had another 35,000 troops in the area. None of the pre-World War II plans adequately addressed "jointness" or coalition warfare. This is ironic, because these issues would come to the forefront in World War II. Nevertheless, Plan Yellow seemed feasible, especially aspects of the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation.

Plan Green posited the invasion of Mexico and was completed just three years after Brigadier General John J. Pershing's expedition there. The plan's objective was to "protect American interests by the border" and American property in Mexico. The plan also included concepts for an "advance upon Mexico City via Vera Cruz" and a secondary attack "southward from the border. . ." Plan Green identified centers of gravity for what are now considered the operational and strategic levels of war. Despite Mexican government cooperation during World War II, Plan Green remained an active US war plan until 1946.

10 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

In his sixth volume, Ross details US planning to counter the Soviet superpower threat that emerged after World War II. In the postwar planning process, the vital importance of nuclear weapons became clear to military planners. While no one knew what impact nuclear weapons would have on modern warfare, nearly all agreed the Soviets had an enormously powerful military. US reliance on atomic warfare was not based on confidence in America's superior strength, Ross says, "but on a feeling of weakness amounting almost to desperation." Indeed, the United States had only 13 atomic bombs in 1947, although there were 50 by 1948. The 1947 Plan Broiler called for seven bombs to hit Moscow, and planners were not certain how many really would be available. Ross concludes that NATO's evolvement as an effective military structure made defending Europe against the Soviets really possible. Thus, nuclear weapons became a key part of the West's arsenal.

These six volumes are important to the military researcher for the insight they provide about wartime strategies-especially when viewed through original documents not readily available. The early reference to doctrinal issues, important today for US planning and operations, is fascinating. Volume 6, however, disappoints on two counts-it does not include copies of the plans, and the index listed in the Contents on page 191 was missing in my copy. Even with the heavy price of $588 for the five-volume set, American War Plans, 1919-1941, should be maintained at libraries. American War Plans, 1945-1950, at $32.50, is a less-compelling purchase.

COL William Mendel, USA, Retired, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA by David B.H. Denoon. 230 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1995. $65.00.

David B.H. Denoon quickly establishes his premise: US missile defense is much like catastrophic health insurance-hopefully never used. Although there is a strong argument for the cost and coverage of deterrence, Denoon calls it and its cornerstone of mutually assured destruction an "elegant doctrine for a bipolar world . . . not adequate to deal with the complexity" of a post-Cold War society. Instead, Denoon proposes a theater missile defense (TMD) concept for US worldwide assets and allies and a limited national missile defense (NMD) for the homeland. "Limited deterrence," says Denoon, must be ready, like insurance, to counter all proliferating threat types.

Theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) now pose a greater threat to US assets worldwide and allies than do intercontinental ballistic missiles. TBMs are easy to build, export and sell; can deliver chemical and biological warheads; and can be used by enemy aircraft or skillful terrorists. TBM mobile launchers are almost impossible to find and destroy, even with the most sophisticated aircraft. Thus, argues Denoon, TBMs are likely an enemy's best survivable asset. Yet, with all these options, TBM defense is much less complex than strategic defense. Because of the growing Third World TBM threat, Denoon explores why TMD is an immediate US foreign policy issue.

The NMD issue, however, is not as easy to portray. NMD, like the word "politics," has many meanings. Denoon explains how NMD has been a barbed political contest for presidents and the US Congress since the Eisenhower administration. This seesaw debate is generally centered on the proper mix of defensive versus offensive systems and defending populations versus retaliatory capability. As he points out, these options overlap somewhat, often confusing those who must make decisions on their purchase and employment.

11 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

Denoon also masterfully lifts and explains each piece of this complex puzzle, places it in context and ends with some sobering questions. How much is missile defense worth? Should there be a US NMD? If so, what related policy changes should occur? His overall conclusions are clear and concise, showing the need for strategists and policy makers to realistically establish a viable US missile defense in the new world order.

Denoon, a political science and economics professor at New York University and former assistant secretary of defense, includes appendixes referencing major US and former Soviet agreements and approaches to ballistic missile defense. If there is a drawback to this book, it is its $65 price. It should, and probably will, turn up on reference lists at service and joint commands dealing with strategic and space operations, in joint staff and congressional staff libraries and on intermediate and senior service school reading lists. Adroitly written and easy to read, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold War Era is an outstanding book.

MAJ Phillip L. Osborne, USAF, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

COLDER THAN HELL: A Marine Rifle Company at Chosin Reservoir by Joseph R. Owen. 272 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1996. $29.95.

Although Colder than Hell is a story about Marines written by a Marine, it is applicable to all American warriors. Author Joseph Owen has produced a finely tuned, very readable account of his personal experiences during the first six months of the Korean War.

Written from a platoon commander's perspective, Colder than Hell depicts the good, the bad and the ugly of leading troops under fire. Owen powerfully describes war's grime and discomforts, graphically portraying its nauseating stench, hellish noise and bewildering confusion. Owen also ably communicates the anguish of death and injury during close combat. Anyone who has been in combat will recognize the sensations related to thinking about a spouse and children while in the midst of dangerous, miserable conditions. This realism makes Owen's story incredibly vivid.

Colder than Hell's intensity is similar to Guy Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier and E.B. Sledge's With the Old Breed. Like Adolf von Schell's Battle Leadership, Owen's book presents many of the nuances of small-unit leadership under difficult circumstances.

The author does a good job of reminding the reader of the weighty demand for bravery and stamina in combat. We see small-unit leaders, battalion commanders and commanding generals enduring hardship, standing up under fire and displaying moral courage. We also read about lieutenants breaking down under fire, division commanders unable to stand up against faulty orders from Eighth Army Headquarters and squads being wiped out because their sergeants did not post lookouts. The importance of substantive training and maintaining unit cohesion is repeatedly noted through these tough illustrations. So, too, are the destructive consequences for units whose leaders refuse to listen to the counsel of the men and officers in the trenches.

Colder than Hell is pertinent reading for junior officers, because it offers sound advice: Be patient because you will have more action than you want, and keep your mind on your responsibilities. Owen's

12 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

work is also a reality check for those who run operations as they sit in relative comfort and stick pins in maps-lest they forget what goes on at the pointed end of the spear. Colder than Hell is recommended with enthusiasm.

CPT Jeff Kojac, USMC, Marine Air Control Squadron 7, Yuma, Arizona

MEN, IDEAS AND TANKS: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 by J.P. Harris. 342 pages. Manchester University Press, Manchester, England. (Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York.) 1996. $75.00 clothbound. $24.95 paperback.

The book's front cover collage largely encapsulates the story of Men, Ideas and Tanks. Pictured are Major General Ernest Swinton and Winston Churchill, early tank development pioneers. Also pictured are the 1916 Mark I tank and the 1934 Medium Mark III tank, representing two important British tank design evolution steps. And prominently featured is Brigadier General George Lindsay, a little-known figure who served as the experimental Mobile Division commander in the interwar period. Conspicuously missing are the two icons of mechanized warfare theory-J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart.

In Harris' history of the ideas that drove British armored forces' development, he gives credit where it is due and demolishes the historical reputations he believes are ill-founded. Thus, Swinton and Churchill are credited as key "idea" men in the birth of the tank, along with relatively unknown figures such as Lieutenant Walter Wilson and William Tritton, who turned ideas into practical prototypes and, eventually, effective fighting vehicles. Lindsay is described as that rare interwar period officer who saw the need for a balanced, combined arms mechanized force. Fuller and Liddell Hart receive little praise for their widely publicized efforts as armored warfare prophets. Harris portrays their ideas as logistically unrealistic, tactically impractical and politically naive.

Harris also rehabilitates several senior leaders who have received rough treatment in the past. He portrays Field Marshal Douglas Haig, often criticized for his faulty use of tanks, as a perceptive commander who saw the early tanks' potential despite their serious mechanical limitations. Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, Imperial General Staff chief in the crucial years from 1933 to 1936, has been pilloried for stunting the development of Britain's mechanized forces. Harris shows how tight budgets and conflicting strategic requirements limited Montgomery-Massingberd's options and credits him with sponsoring the previously experimental Tank Brigade as a permanent formation.

Men, Ideas and Tanks is a valuable book that challenges the accepted views of mechanized warfare's evolution. In particular, Harris succeeds in undermining Liddell Hart's and Fuller's roles in developing armored warfare doctrine. Ruthlessly selective in emphasizing their more fanciful ideas, he still makes a strong case that the two did as much mischief as good as the British army wrestled with mechanized "revolution in military affairs" problems during the interwar years.

Most significant is Harris' description of the British army's path as it went from world leadership in armored vehicle design, theory and experimentation in the early 1930s to a position hopelessly behind the Germans by the decade's end. Harris shows how the combined effects of inadequate budgets, muddled procurement programs and strategic confusion left British mechanized forces desperately unprepared to face the 1940 blitzkrieg. To the military reader, Britain's fall from armored pre-eminence

13 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

is a sobering reminder of how fleeting the military advantage offered by new technologies can be.

LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC

DOMINANT BATTLESPACE KNOWLEDGE: The Winning Edge. Edited by Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C. Libicki. 149 pages. National Defense University Press, Washington, DC. 1995. No charge.

The essays in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge are especially interesting as we move into the 21st century. The editors and authors see modern military forces moving into a new era in using intelligence, command and control (C2) and precision force. Knitting these three elements into a decisive whole, or "system of systems," is dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK).

DBK is defined as "merging our increasing capacity to gather real-time, all-weather information continuously with our increasing capacity to process and make sense of this voluminous data." This capability gives the United States a significant intelligence advantage over other nations. The book's well-chosen introduction and essays are sequenced to create a step-by-step layout of the potential benefits of exploiting DBK.

Retired Admiral William A. Owens' introduction gives an overview of how the DBK concept justifies its importance. Owens also identifies and effectively argues against several DBK criticisms. Stuart Johnson's "DBK: Opportunity and Challenges" complements Owens' introduction and lays out the competing and changing national and global environmental demands made on the US military. Johnson offers DBK as the cost-effective, high-payoff solution. He argues that DBK makes maintaining our current two-theater military capability irrelevant, because decisive intelligence, real-time C2 and precision stand-off capabilities will allow us to blunt an aggressor's efforts before a main battle can begin. Johnson also believes DBK-based warfare capabilities will allow an in-theater force reduction and, therefore, a vulnerability reduction.

In another significant article, "DBK and Autonomous Weapons," Michael Sovereign examines the simulated results of applying these emergent systems against an armored invading force. He identifies our modern weapons' awesome lethality and some of their significant limitations. Unfortunately, he does not have enough space to solidly address the limitations.

The final article, "Just-in-Time Warfare" by James Hazlett, takes like-minded readers to a significant conclusion: Modern technology will allow the US military to evolve into a smaller, highly responsive force that can win by precisely applying force at the right time and place. Therein lies the rub-technology's high cost makes conventional and DBK-based force structures mutually exclusive.

Those trying to choose between a conventional or high-technology force structure will need more detailed analyses than those found in Dominant Battlespace Knowledge. However, this collection of essays is a good start-ing point. Although its concepts may not be completely convincing, this slim volume is a good primer on modern technology and its potential military applications.

MAJ C. William Robinson,

14 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

USA, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMACY: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 by James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank. 687 pages. G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York. 1996. $32.50.

Most people seem to agree that foreign policy was the most successful aspect of George Bush's presidency. As evidence, they point to his administration's successful management of Germany's reunification and the Soviet Union's disintegration and to Bush's ability to organize the international coalition against Iraq. Bush's critics point to the mess that followed our overwhelming victory in Operation Desert Storm, to US failure to take a stronger stand against the "butchers of Beijing" after Tiananmen Square and to the overall lack of vision for the post-Cold War world beyond vague talk about a "new world order."

Regardless of viewpoint, all would probably agree that the Bush presidency coincided with an unusual number of dramatic and important international events. As secretary of state for all but the last four months of the Bush administration, James A. Baker played a central role in them all. In The Politics of Diplomacy, Baker gives his account of US policy making and diplomacy during his tenure.

If there is any overarching theme to this sprawling and episodic 34-chapter book, it lies in Baker's evident belief in the primacy of politics over policy. This is implicit in the book's title. Baker writes that "international politics can be thought of as an ongoing negotiation . . . a series of discreet problems that require solution." Baker views himself as a "realist," who is "more comfortable with action than with reflection" and who sought to impose a "principled pragmatism" on a sometimes reluctant State Department bureaucracy. Critics will undoubtedly seize on all this to assail an absorption with short-term tactics at the expense of long-term vision and an emphasis on pragmatism rather than principle.

Despite recounting tense moments and negotiations, Baker largely avoids unflattering judgments of others, except for obvious heavies such as Saddam Hussein and one hapless congressman who aroused Baker's ire at a House hearing. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the disdain he expresses in his preface for "kiss-and-tell" books. More significant, it also highlights the essential collegiality of the Bush foreign policy and national security teams-men who had known, worked with and respected one another for years. As described by Baker, Bush was well served by selfless advisers who shared a similar world view while avoiding the trap of "group think." Baker stresses his own efforts to run a tight, but happy, ship at the State Department.

Although lacking the literary merits of previous secretary of state memoirs, such as Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation and Henry Kissinger's two-volume record of service under Richard Nixon, Baker's account is readable and important. While nothing he writes will change the minds of either his supporters or detractors, he furnishes useful details that both sides and future scholars will use in their arguments about a period many already regard as a watershed in late 20th-century history.

LTC Alan C. Cate, USA, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, USAGSC

15 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

DTIC's Technology Navigator

The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) plays a vital role in collecting and disseminating scientific and technical information for the Department of Defense. Technology Navigator is an integral part of DTIC's continuing efforts to improve access and exchange of such information.

Technology Navigator, a DTIC-sponsored web site, uses the Internet and the government's "intranets" to enable government, industry and academia to share research efforts on today's technology issues. This information-sharing service is designed to match the needs, interests and requirements of government technologists and program managers with products, service providers and researchers in industry, academia and other government agencies working in "specific interest" domains. The service focuses on information technology and measurements and signatures technology. Topics include:

Automated warning, anomaly detection and discovery tools. Collaborative analysis tools and groupware. Data analysis, visualization, fusion tools, warehousing, storage, retrieval and dissemination. Geographic information systems and displays. Human-computer interface for information systems. Information processing, transformation, management and decision support. Modeling and simulation for intelligence analysis. Multimedia authoring, production, distribution, storage, retrieval and analysis. Multisearch, data mining and retrieval from heterogeneous sources. Object-oriented data bases and data base development. Security, auditing, records and copyright management. Advanced radio frequency sensors. Nuclear, biological and chemical material sensors. Nonimaging infrared sensors. Remote spectral and unattended sensors.

Technology Navigator provides a comprehensive marketing opportunity for industry and academia to advertise their latest projects and products to a worldwide audience. It is free to both its users and to those who submit information. Each source is limited only by the number of applicable products, projects, programs and events it has to input.

In addition, Technology Navigator has news groups, detailed abstracts, information papers, points of contact, E-mail addresses, telephone numbers and an events calendar. For additional information about Technology Navigator or other products and services, contact DTIC's Product Management Branch at (703) 767-8267 or (800) 225-3842.

War College Hosts Conference

The US Army War College recently hosted "The Future of Russia as a World Power" strategy conference. The conference attracted over 100 participants from academia, government agencies and the military. International participants represented Denmark, Canada, Great Britain, France and Russia. Four key speakers and 14 other presenters provided insights on Russia's economy, political system and

16 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/july/review.html

military; per-spectives on Russian security; and assessments of Russia's 21st-century defense posture. Most speakers portrayed Russia in continued, multiple crises for the next 10 years. A minority thought that Russia will begin to re-emerge as a great power in that time frame. Dr. Alexei Arbatov, Russian Duma Defense Committee deputy chairman, provided a frank view of Russian military prospects. His vision for the future Russian military is a vastly restructured, smaller and modernized force based on concepts similar to our own Army After Next. A general consensus was that communism has no major role in the country's future.

17 of 17 3/11/98 12:52 PM