Competing Modes of Coordination in the Greek Anti-Austerity Campaign, 2010–2012

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Social Movement Studies

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Competing modes of coordination in the Greek anti-austerity campaign, 2010–2012

Kostas Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Kostopoulos, Dimitris Papanikolopoulos & Vasileios Rongas

To cite this article: Kostas Kanellopoulos, Konstantinos Kostopoulos, Dimitris Papanikolopoulos & Vasileios Rongas (2017) Competing modes of coordination in the Greek anti-austerity campaign, 2010–2012, Social Movement Studies, 16:1, 101-118, DOI: 10.1080/14742837.2016.1153464

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2016.1153464

Published online: 07 Mar 2016.

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Download by: [85.74.178.175] Date: 10 January 2017, At: 11:04 Social Movement Studies, 2017 VOL. 16, NO. 1, 101–118 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2016.1153464

Competing modes of coordination in the Greek anti-austerity campaign, 2010–2012

Kostas Kanellopoulosa , Konstantinos Kostopoulosb, Dimitris Papanikolopoulosa and Vasileios Rongasa aSociology, University of Crete, Rethimno, Greece; bPolitical Science & History, Panteion University of Political & Social Sciences, Athens, Greece

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY Collective reactions to the Greek debt crisis and the austerity measures Received 24 November 2014 imposed by consecutive Greek governments in accordance with the Troika Accepted 6 September 2015 of lenders (European Central Bank, European Commission, IMF) have been KEYWORDS widely reported by the media; however, the study of contentious events and Protest networks; eurozone episodes has only recently started on a systematic basis. Since the beginning crisis; Greek politics; modes of the debt crisis, an impressive series of large protests and general strikes of coordination; anti- occurred in Greece against austerity policies. In this paper, we will focus on austerity the main organizations/groups that called and coordinated 31 large protest events from February 2010 until November 2012. Our sample includes trade unions, political parties of the left, anarchist groups, students, justice oriented groups, professional organizations, and Indignados, while their repertoires of contention are combinations of demonstrative, confrontational and violent protests, direct-democratic action, threats, symbolic violence or/ and destruction of property. Viewing collective action as an operation of inter-organizational networks that also comprise different and competing modes of coordination, our aim here is to examine how these very different groups managed to work together or, to what extent they did so. Were the differences in the ideological patterns of each challenging group an obstacle to inter-organizational alliances? How did threat and the changing political opportunity structure shape the Greek anti-austerity campaign?

Introduction Greece, a euro zone member, was one of the European countries most severely hit by the current economic and financial crisis (Patomaki, 2013). In spring 2010, the national economy went almost bankrupt. The EU, the European Central Bank, and the IMF formed a ‘Troika’ that provided financial aid to Greece and as an exchange the center-left government of PASOK (Greek socialists) signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ on the structural reforms and the austerity measures that had to be imposed upon Greek economy and society. This ‘Memorandum’ received fierce opposition from the beginning. For the three-year period we examine here, austerity policies deepened the economic recession; new more severe measures were imposed and consecutive mass protests erupted all over Greece forming an impressive anti-austerity campaign (Diani & Kousis, 2014; Kousis, 2013). At the same time, similar anti-austerity protests were

erupting in various places around the world leading many scholars to argue for the emergence of a new global wave of protest (Della Porta & Mattoni, 2014; Flesher Fominaya & Cox, 2013; Tejerina, Perugorría, Benski, & Langman, 2013). In spite of the similar anti-austerity frames and the common repertoires of action of these protests, their evolution largely depends on the particularities of each case (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Kanellopoulos, Papanikolopoulos, & Loukakis, 2015). In the Greek case special attention has been paid on the one hand to the role of new social actors – either individuals entering the politics of protest for the first time (Rudig & Karyotis, 2013), or new social categories like young unemployed or precarious workers (Sotirakopoulos & Sotiropoulos, 2013; Vogiatzoglou, 2014) – and on the other hand to the political impact of recent protests in reshaping the Greek political system (Kousis & Kanellopoulos, 2014; Kouvelakis, 2011). However, the role of major players in the anti-austerity campaign at the meso-level of mobilization like the trade union confed- erations and the political parties and organizations of the Left, has not yet been studied thoroughly. The period beginning in spring 2010 is a typical period of ‘thickened history’ (Tilly, 1978) – the pace of challenging events accelerated when whole populations engaged at a higher level of contention. The high frequency of protests that were synchronized at the national level, the high level of participants, the broad cross-class coalitions that involved a large number of challenging groups and the general public, make us argue for the emergence of a sustained anti-austerity campaign in Greece. In order to understand how these groups managed to work together, to what extent they did so, and the nature of their coalition, an array of insights from network analysis seems appropriate. These insights will help us first identify the various organizational networks operating in the campaign, and then focus on the alliance building processes that facilitated the inter-organizational collaboration. Thus, in our research we rely on network analysis to map the recent Greek anti-austerity campaign and then we turn our attention on the alliance building processes and on the different modes of coordination among the different actors within the emerging protest network trying to explore the

relations among the different protest actors and understand whether this new anti-austerity context creates a whole new dynamic, or pre-existing network structures and competing relations continue to shape the field.

Network analysis and modes of coordination Network analysis has long been applied in contentious politics (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Knoke, 1990; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). However, most studies focus on recruitment processes (Fernadez & McAdam, 1989; McAdam, 1988; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980), or on interorganizational dynamics (Diani, 1995; Rosenthal, McDonald, Ethier, Fingurtd, & Karant, 1985). Other scholars have addressed the community embeddedness that allow for participation in movements (Ansell, 2003; Gould, 1991). Diani has approached social movements as networks and has proposed a relevant research agenda (Diani, 2002, 2003b). But besides the advances offered by a growing body of studies on network effects, there is still little theoretical agreement on how collective action is coordinated and moreover what are the basic mechanisms of this coordination (Diani, 2015; Passy, 2003; Passy & Monsch, 2014). Moreover, seen from a strategic action field perspective, network analysis is very helpful to map a field but is ‘… mute on the dynamics that shape fields’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 29). Recent research has emphasized the importance of alliances to social movements by exploring how such alliances come about (for an overview see Van Dyke & McCammon, 2010). As researchers turn to the examination of conditions facilitating inter-organizational collaboration, the list of the explanatory factors keep growing: social ties and especially brokers or bridge builders (Obach, 2004; Rose, 2000), common interests and congruent political identities and/or ideologies (McCammon & Campbell, 2002; Rose, 2000), political opportunities and – mainly – political and economic threats (Almeida, 2010; Borland, 2010; Isaac, 2010; Van Dyke, 2003; Van Dyke & Soule, 2002). However, as McCammon and Dyke (2010) suggest, the major challenge for the researchers is not multiplying the Social Movement Studies 103

key-factors, but considering their interactions, thus how they combine to produce alliances among social movement organizations (SMOs). Diani (2015) in a recent study proposed to look at the modes of coordination of collective action as consisting of different combinations of the mechanisms of resource allocation (the whole set of procedures through which decisions are taken regarding the use of organizational resources) and boundary definition (the internal functioning of an organization regarding the creation and reproduction of boundaries), to better capture and analyze the formation of protest campaigns and their relational dimensions (Diani, 2015, p. 15). Diani distinguishes between four different modes of coordination, namely the organizational mode which assigns limited importance to cooperation and alliances and is more promoted by units that pay more attention to the preservation of their autonomous decisional capacity, the social movement mode that operates at the level of broad collectivities rather than specific groups/organizations and assigns great importance to boundary construction and identity building, the coalitional mode which is promoted by units where alliance building is instrumental to them and which assign limited importance to longer term goals and broader values, and the subcultural/ communitarian mode where interorganizational linkages are sparse and greater attention is assigned to multiple involvement in cultural associations and events and in communitarian lifestyles (Diani, 2015, pp. 15–24). Based on the research we conducted, we analyze not only the interactions among key mobilizing factors but also among the major organizations/groups that coordinated the Greek anti-austerity campaign. This analysis sheds new light on questions still not fully understood in the literature: How do organizations/groups that are openly hostile to each other manage to act together and mount a massive campaign? Do the reasons people decide to form alliances change depending on the anti-austerity context or do they actually remain quite stable? How do some actors profit more than others? How does a protest campaign interact with the political system and how does it evolve under changing

circumstances? Two parameters are crucial to our case: (a) the role of the central trade unions especially GSEE (Confederation of Greek workers) and ADEDY (Central union of civil servants), and (b) the role of the political parties of the Left and of anarchist groups. Concerning the trade unions, there is a widespread distrust of Greek workers for GSEE and ADEDY (Vogiatzoglou, 2014). All the respondents from trade union core members we interviewed that belong to fractions other than PASKE (PASOK’s fraction) attributed this distrust to ‘governmental unionism’ enforced by the ruling PASKE in Greek trade unionism. However, GSEE and ADEDY have organized numerous general strikes during the last decades with significant gains in workers’ rights and salary rises and the influence and authority of PASKE inside them was never actually challenged (Hamman, Johnston, & Kelly, 2013). Concerning the political parties of the Left, there exists a bitter rivalry between KKE (the traditional Communist Party of Greece) on the one side and SYRIZA (Coalition of the radical left) and other smaller organizations of the anti-capitalist extra parliamentary left (ANTARSYA). There are also numerous militant anarchist groups in Athens and in other Greek cities that are hostile toward both GSEE/ADEDY and KKE. Consistent with these rivalries, political organizations of the left and anarchist groups, along with the first-level trade unions, are used to gather in different points of the same street during the mass demonstrations which take place in the center of Athens. While GSEE and ADEDY call the workers to gather in front of GSEE’s headquarters, the aforementioned political forces call their members and the working people a few hundred meters from there. As for KKE and PAME, its front in trade unionism, they prefer to gather even further away. These parameters could plausibly lead someone to believe that alliance building in Greece and the buildup of a nationwide anti-austerity campaign would be improbable. But the phenomenon of multiple militancy and inclusion of actors is common in protest campaigns, even across strong ideological divides and different forms of organizing (Flesher Fominaya, 2007). On the other hand, and concerning especially the recent almost worldwide protests, which includes the European anti-austerity campaigns, Juris (2012) has argued that we can no longer speak about networks but of logics 104 K. Kanellopoulos et al. of aggregation. However, what we find in the Greek case is that some sort of networking between different and competing modes of coordination creates a multiplicity of networks within networks that enables a protest campaign to endure. In the following sections we present the methodology of our research, we discuss the importance of GSEE/ADEDY general strikes, the centrality of the parliamentary political parties of the Left to the mounting of protests and the effective alliance strategy of SYRIZA vis-a-vis the isolationism of KKE that paved the way for SYRIZA’s eventual rise at the polls. We also argue for the significance of common threats, strategic interests, and ideology, as well as prior ties between organizations, groups, and individuals.

Methodology of research Our research draws on a recent protest event analysis that examined the large protest events (LPEs) that gathered from 40,000 to 500,000 participants in the Greek anti-austerity campaign (Diani & Kousis, 2014; Kousis, 2013; Kousis & Kanellopoulos, 2014). Thus, we selected the 34 organizations/groups that were appearing most often as participants and/or coordinators: 15 of them are trade unions and trade union fractions and fronts, 14 of them are political organizations/parties, and 5 of them are SMOs. Of course, many smaller organizations/groups participated in the LPEs but with significant less frequency and less impact. In our organizational landscape, one more organization/group appears that we had not included in our initial sample but was mentioned by the majority of our respondents as an opponent: the far-right political party of Golden Dawn (XA). Golden Dawn is also against the Memorandum with the foreign lenders from a nationalist perspective but never called or openly participated in any LPE. This would be against its political orientation and very risky for their members. However, through informal talks

with some XA members they informed us that some of their members were trying to mingle in some LPEs (especially with the Indignados) to gain leverage. Two of the organizations we examine are officially recognized by the Greek state as social partners: the confederation of trade unions (GSEE) and the central union of civil servants (ADEDY). GSEE and ADEDY are highly bureaucratized organizations run by groupings that are actually fronts of the main political parties of Greece. Thus, we also included in our sample PASKE, which holds the majority of seats in both GSEE and ADEDY administrations and is connected to PASOK; DAKE that is connected to ND (the conservative party of Greece); and AYTONOMI PAREMVASI, which is connected to SYRIZA. DAS, connected to KKE, is formally participating in the elections for GSEE and ADEDY but it does not take part in their administration although it controls some seats along with the control of some second-level workers federations. KKE has created its own trade union front, PAME, which is not officially recognized and often mobilizes separately from GSEE and ADEDY. We also included in our study the largest federations that were the most active in the campaign (electricity workers, school-teachers, workers in local administration, and public hospital workers). The second set of groups we examined are the political forces that actively participated in the LPEs: KKE, SYRIZA, and ANTARSYA, and some of the largest anarchist groups. Finally, we looked at some newcomers in anti-austerity contentious politics: the associations of merchants, taxi drivers and jour- nalists, and some newly founded collectivities like that of REAL DEMOCRACY, which coordinated the Indignados protests in public squares, the Coordination of first-level grassroots unions, which mobilize independently from GSEE and ADEDY, and the ROSINANTE, which is an anarcho-syndicalist collective. Most of these collectives, besides the many differences and tensions among them, were already regularly active in Greek street politics long before the crisis (Kanellopoulos, 2012; Lountos, 2012). Our case study does not include NGOs or voluntary associations that often appear in short-term coalitions and non-conflictual movements where network analysis is applied (Diani, 1995; Diani, Lindsay, & Purdue, 2010). The reason for this exclusion is simply that NGOs do not appear as major coordinators in our LPEs. Our sample comprises a set of organizations/groups that: (a) sometimes are antagonistic or even openly hostile to each other, but they participated in the same LPEs, (b) are Social Movement Studies 105 also engaged in conventional politics, thus their size and impact are greater. Additionally, what was at stake made not only the Greek governments but also foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies interact in the conflict while the wider public was indeed engaged in massive numbers (Mavris, 2012). In other words, the Greek anti-austerity campaign as a massive political campaign was also a dynamic process. We, thus, suppose that our application of network analysis will also be more dynamic. In doing so, we distributed an extended questionnaire to core members of our sample organizations/ groups asking not only questions about the other groups they collaborate and whether they share resources, information, and so on, but also questions about claims-making and the perception of opportunities and threats. These questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected core members of the 34 organizations/groups before or after important organizational meetings or assemblies. The response rate was 42% (114 out of 242). Additionally, we conducted in-depth interviews with one representative from each one of these 34 organizations/groups asking questions concerning tactics and strategy, the evaluation of the conflict and the stance toward alliance building.

Protest networks operating in the anti-austerity campaign In table 1, we can see the most active organizations behind the large protests in Greece. These organizations are grouped according to their type and in the third column there is their original title or a short description. In Figure 1, we depict the overall network of the Greek anti-austerity campaign. We placed our organizations/groups along two axes. The first concerns the organizational structure of the groups and the second their political positioning. On the vertical one at the top appear the most hierarchical organized groups, at the middle the less hierarchical, and at the bottom the horizontal coordinated groups. On the horizontal axis, we replicated the classical 1–9 left-right axis (Castles & Mair, 1984;

Mavrogordatos, 1987). We placed at the far-left the more radical leftist and groups, then the left, center-left, center, center-right groups, and at the right edge the far-right groups. For the design of all figures that depict the anti-austerity networks, we used eight questions from the questionnaire we distributed. To measure the political positioning of each group, we asked respondents to place their group on the 1–9 left-right axis and we combined these responses with the responses to an open question where respondents stated their group’s political and/or social ideology. Regarding the positioning on the axis of the horizontal or vertical organizational structure, we also used two questions: the first was asking to respond whether their group has a ‘chairman,’ a ‘central committee,’ a ‘general assembly’ etc., and the second whether the crucial decisions were taken by ‘the leadership,’ the ‘base,’ by ‘majority,’ or by ‘consensus.’ The next step in analysis was to look for the existence or absence of links between organizations/ groups. For that purpose we have used a set of four questions. The first two focused on the search for possible collaborations that an organization/group has with other organizations/groups in the sample, while the other two looked for which organizations/groups an organization/group does not cooperate despite being active in the same areas. More specifically, on the existence of links, we asked respondents to point out up to five organizations with which the group they belong to cooperates most intensively and to clarify the relationship that characterizes this cooperation through the following positions: ‘we share financial resources,’ ‘sharing information,’ ‘we do joint actions,’ ‘we have personal relationships,’ ‘we have dual membership’ and ‘solidarity.’ This statement alone as an organization affiliated with the organization of the respondent is a first indication bond between the two organizations/groups. If the declaration is accompanied by one or more of the first three placements (share resources, information, joint actions) then we have formal ties. If accompanied by one or more of the following three positions (personal relationships,double integration, solidarity) then we have informal ties. The ties among organization/groups can be only formal or only informal. But more often ties are both formal and informal. For this reason, we make a second classification of these placements. Thus, if the declaration of an organization/group is accompanied by one placement in the category of formal ties, then we have weak formal bonds, if is accompanied by two then we have moderate 106 K. Kanellopoulos et al.

Table 1. Organizations and groups in Greek contentious politics 2010–2012.

Type of organizations Organization name Organization description Trade unions ADEDY Supreme Administration of Unions of Civil Servants AYTONOMI PAREMBASI Autonomous Intervention, Trade Union faction of SYRIZA (A.P.) GSEE General Confederation of Greek Workers GENOP-DEH General Federation of Personal in Public Electricity Company DAKE Democratic Independent Workers Movement, Trade Union faction of N.D. DOE Teachers’ Federation of Greece ESEE Greek Confederation of Trade and Entrepreneurship OLME Greek Federation of Secondary State School Teachers P.A.ME All-Workers Militant Front, Trade Union front of Communist Party (KKE) PASEBE Pan-Hellenic Antitrust Coiling of Professionals, Craftsmen and Mer- chants, Trade Union of Communist party of Greece PASKE Pan-Hellenic Militant Trade Union movement of workers, Trade Union faction of PASOK PASY Pan-Rural Militant Coiling, agrarian Trade Union of Communist Party of Greece POEDHN Pan-Hellenic Federation of Workers of Public Hospitals POEIATA Pan-Hellenic Federation of Professional Owners Taxi POE-OTA Pan-Hellenic Federation of workers in the Municipalities and local communities ROSSINANTE Anarcho-Syndicalist Initiative GRASSROOTS UNIONS Coordination of first level unions of the private and the public sector Political Parties/Political ANTARSYA Anticapitalist Left Cooperation for the Overthrow organizations EEK Workers Revolutionary Party KKE Communist Party of Greece KKE-ML Communist Party of Greece-Marxist Leninist SEK Socialist Workers Party, participant in ANTARSYA SYNASPISMOS Coalition of the Left, of Movements and Ecology, component of SYRIZA SY.RIZ.A Coalition of the Radical Left XA Golden Dawn AKOA Renewing Communist Ecological Left, component of SYRIZA ARAN Left Recomposition, participant in ANTARSYA ARAS Left Anti-capitalist Coiling, participant in ANTARSYA ARIS Left Coiling, participant in ANTARSYA DEA Internationalist Labour Left, component of SYRIZA KOE Communist Organization of Greece, component of SYRIZA KOKKINO Political organization component of SYRIZA NAR New Left Current, participating in ANTARSYA OKDE Organization of Internationalist Communists of Greece, participating in ANTARSYA ROZA Political group component of SYRIZA DIMAR Democratic Left PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement ND New Democracy Student and youth MAS Front students struggle, university faction of Communist Party of organizations Greece SYNASPISMOS YOUTH Youth of SYNASPISMOS KNE Communist Youth of Greece, youth of Communist Party of Greece nKA Youth Communist Liberation, youth of NAR Social movement organ- DEN PLIRONO Not Pay izations AK Antiauthoritarian Movement of Athens DIKTYO Network for the civil and social rights ‘INDIGNADOS’/Squares/ Mobilization of squares Real Democracy Others organizations EEDYE Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace, organization of Communist Party of Greece OGE Federation of Greek Women, organization of Communist Party of Greece Social Movement Studies 107

typical bonds, if it is accompanied by three then we have strong formal bonds. The same applies to the category of informal links. This amounts to a range of possibilities that goes from weak informal ties up to strong formal and informal ties. In a second question, we examine the factors that facilitate cooperation between the organization of the respondents and the organizations they mentioned in the previous question. These factors are: ‘similar values and principles,’ ‘common interests,’ ‘reliable leaders,’ ‘provision of resources, information, advice,’ ‘basic actor in our field,’ ‘important source for access to politicians and the media,’ ‘personal ties with its members,’ ‘similar forms of action,’ ‘good communication between us,’ ‘similar political past,’ and ‘complementary roles/functions.’ The question gives us a more qualitative picture of cooperation and links mentioned in the previous question. This procedure was followed for all organizations/groups in our sample. About non-cooperation, we asked the respondents to indicate up to five organizations with which their organization does not cooperate and clarify the reasons for this non-cooperation by choosing among the following three proposed answers: ‘mutual tolerance,’ ‘rivalry,’ and ‘open conflict.’ The statement of a group as non-cooperating with the group of the respondent is a first indication of bond absence. If this statement is accompanied by one of the above descriptions then the case of absence bond strengthens. We believe that two groups are closer, without of course having links, when their relations are governed by ‘mutual tolerance’ and farther when these relationships are characterized by ‘rivalry’ even more than ‘open conflict.’ The case of link absence between two organizations is also examined by a second question that asked respondents to indicate the reasons why their organization is not affiliated with these organizations they have stated in the previous question. Respondents had to choose between the following reasons: ‘different principles,’ ‘unreliable leaders,’ ‘they cannot offer help/information,’ ‘insignificant organizations/groups,’ ‘alliance with them would destroy our image,’ ‘no links with its members,’ ‘disagreement

with the forms of action that selects.’ At this point, we should note that we have taken into account only the interactions between organizations. That is, we consider that two organizations have ties (formal or informal) between them only when, for example, members of the organization a state that their organization is working with the organization b and vice versa. Figure 1 depicts the polycephalous and complex nature of the Greek campaign. The anti-austerity campaign consists of three main clusters. On the one side are the trade unions and on the other the organized political forces. These political forces are divided into four different camps: SYRIZA,

Figure 1. Greek anti-austerity network 2010–2012. 108 K. Kanellopoulos et al.

Figure 2. Network of trade unions.

ANTARSYA, which are in themselves coalitions, KKE, and the anarchists. Somewhere between the political cluster and the union cluster appears the short-lived but very decisive cluster of Indignados. Unlike other cases of polycephalous networks (Sawer & Groves, 1994), the clusters in our case are not only strongly connected internally but also share considerable ties between them. Many core activists in the Indignados cluster were also members of political parties and organizations of the left, while Greek trade unions are related strongly to the same political parties and organizations. GSEE and ADEDY called seventeen 24-h and three 48-h general strikes during 2010–2012. Calling a general strike is, though, a very common feature of industrial relations in Greece (Hamman et al., 2013). However, as almost all of our interviewees stated, Greek unions have low mobilization capacity. Union density is also low and those workers that went actually on strike were drawn mainly from the

public sector where state law effectively protects workers’ rights. GSEE and ADEDY called the general strikes but very few people, mostly top official bureaucrats from each trade federation, participated at GSEE and ADEDY central blocks at the demonstrations. Most of the unionized workers in the LPEs participated under the banners of their federations or under those of KKE, SYRIZA’s and ANTARSYA’s, while many marched outside party or union blocks. The official Greek unions share strong ties with the political parties that enforced the austerity policies, namely PASOK. Throughout the 2010–2012 period, the administration of all major trade unions were controlled by PASOK (through PASKE and in collaboration with DAKE) and had to compromise between two ends. On the one hand, they had to protect the interests of the workers they represent and on the other they also had to bear in mind the interests of their political party of origin that happened to be in office at the same time (see Figure2 ). The political forces cluster of the campaign consisted of four different components which all are strongly connected internally but have little ties between them. Given the considerable weight that political forces exercised in our LPEs, this typical polycephalous structure in the interior of the political cluster explains the low density of the overall network whilst the certain amount of centralization. To better understand these tendencies and the alliance building processes, we decomposed the overall network into four smaller networks (see Figures 3, 4, and 5).

The forces around the communist party (KKE) Figure 3 depicts the network of KKE. It appears like a typical wheel-shaped network (Diani, 2003b), with KKE at the central position and all the other organizations connected to it, but it could barely be characterized as a network. In reality, all the other groups appearing in Figure 3 are frontal organizations of KKE in various sectors (students, farmers, and women) that are fully controlled by the party. Only through PAME and its participation in the administration of some major unions, KKE is networking with other groups in the campaign. Throughout the campaign, KKE participated in Social Movement Studies 109

Figure 3. Network of organizations close to KKE.

NAR OLME

ARAS ARAN DOE

ARIS

POEDHN SEK nKA OKDE POE-OTA

Rossinante Grassroots Unions

Den Plirono Kokkino A.K. Indignados/Squares Diktyo

Figure 4. Network of organizations formulating ANTARSYA.

the majority of LPEs except those initiated by the Indignados. But in any case, KKE and PAME have chosen to march separately and at a safe distance from other organizations/groups.

The network of the anti-capitalist left (ANTARSYA) The network of ANTARSYA is very different from that of KKE. ANTARSYA is actually a coalition of 10 different organizations of the ‘anti-capitalist, revolutionary, communist left and radical ecology’ that was formed in 2009. Most of these organizations had already formed coalitions in the past. The largest organizations of ANTARSYA are depicted in the frame of Figure 4. They form a denseclique structure (Diani, 2003b) since none of these organizations holds a more centralized position or exerts significant influence over the others. ANTARSYA has ties with the rest of the extra-parliamentary left organizations that are not part of the coalition. It retains strong ties with the Coordination of Grassroots Unions while it has even secured few seats in the administration of some large trade unions. Also, many ANTARSYA activists vividly participated in the Indignados LPEs. Finally, ANTARSYA has only indirect ties with SYRIZA but the two coalitions march very close to each other. 110 K. Kanellopoulos et al.

Figure 5. Network of organizations formulating SYRIZA.

The network of the radical left (SYRIZA) SYRIZA was formed in 2004 as a coalition of the parliamentary party of SYNASPISMOS (a pre-existing coalition of the remnants of the euro-communist party, a large fraction of KKE, and some ecologists) and some small extra-parliamentary political organizations of the left. SYNASPISMOS was always the dominant party of the coalition. According to the principles of SYRIZA, the position of the coalition leader was occupied by the chairman of SYNASPISMOS and finally in 2013 and after its great electoral advance SYRIZA was transformed into a unified political party. SYRIZA’s network in 2010–2012 is closer to the clique structure. Unlike KKE, this is a much looser network and in fact is the largest one comparing to those of the other political forces. SYNASPISMOS maintained its central position but all the other groups maintained their independence and participated in the leadership of SYRIZA. SYNASPISMOS youth organization is more radical and is not fully controlled by the party. SYRIZA has a very open alliance strategy to its left and to its right. On the one hand, it has established strong ties with social justice groups (DIKTYO), it connects to radical trade unions, and has embraced the Indignados LPEs. On the other hand, it has participated in the administration of GSEE/ADEDY and, mainly, has attracted many defected PASOK MPs and rank and file social-democrats forming the electoral front of SYRIZA/EKM just before the elections of 2012. SYRIZA has a more or less bureaucratic structure but at the same time maintains ties with less hierarchical and horizontal organizations and groups, seemingly resembling the Greek version of the mass connective party (March, 2011; Spourdalakis, 2013).

The community of anarchists Among Greek anarchists there is neither an umbrella organization nor even some typical formal organizations. Since they choose to act autonomously rejecting leadership, representative structures and (most of the time) collaboration with non-anarchist organizations of the left, they are generally unable to participate in broader coalitions. Consequently, they organize themselves through informal groups and social centers that have produced a typical segmented decentralized network (Diani, 2003b). Some groups are connected to each other while others are acting only at a local level or on their own. Also some groups are hostile toward other anarchists, although some other groups have recently embraced a more collaborative and inclusive political style. Greek anarchists in general are in open Social Movement Studies 111 confrontation with KKE, which, in turn, generally considers them as provocateurs. Their relations with the others parties of the Greek left are more peaceful since all sides tolerate each other, and at the big anti-austerity demonstrations anarchists march on their own blocks next to those of SYRIZA and ANTARSYA. During the Indignados square occupations, anarchist groups held an ambivalent position: some were hostile to the declared non-violence while others provided useful know-how to direct democracy procedures. In the case of the anti-austerity campaign as a whole, some anarchist collectives managed to form a network of communication and, mainly through organizational assemblies prior to large demonstrations, to coordinate their actions. As expected, these groups employed a more confrontational repertoire of action in the anti-austerity LPE’s.

Major trends in the Greek anti-austerity network By mapping and examining the Greek organizations/groups that opposed the austerity policies we have discerned four basic trends: First, the systematic co-presence of the individual networks in the mass protests from the very start of the campaign allows us to argue for the formation of an informal coalition among them. This coalition is based on informal ties, between sets of organizations rather than single organizations, while bridge builders or brokers seem to be playing a marginal role in intra-network linking. Every organization is pursuing its own agenda but is also participating in common protest events with other organizations regardless of whether they share friendly relationships or not. In that case, the overall network could neither be characterized as fully centralized nor as fully decentralized. It looks like an intermediary case. Second, tension either among networks or among groups of the same network seems to be perma- nent. Contrary to the trade unions network, which is a concrete network, all the others are identity

networks whose existence reflects the ideological conflicts and segmentation of the Greek left. Despite the fact that almost all of our interviewees declared their willingness for cooperation and political synthesis they, finally, insist on the salience and usefulness of their organization’s distinctive tactics and strategy. Furthermore, tensions emerge very often both between organizations and groups of the leftist and anarchist networks (with the exception of KKE’s network) and between ideological fractions inside the same organization. Here, the most salient example is SYRIZA’s network, where internal debates between the more ‘revolutionary’ small groups of the network and the more ‘reformist’ SYNASPISMOS, occur rather often. Consequently, the overall network is neither a cooperative one nor an explicitly hostile one. Third, some organizations appear to be more central into the overall network than others despite the absence of an accepted leadership. There is no central actor; GSEE and ADEDY are devaluated by the left parties and every left-wing organization considers itself as a vanguard. An accepted leadership seems not to be necessary, since in dense networks as such, closely tied actors do not usually need centrally placed actors to coordinate them (Diani, 2003a; Krinsky & Crossley, 2014). However, SYRIZA and KKE, as parliamentary parties, enjoy much more visibility by the political system and public opinion. But KKE and SYRIZA possess very different positions in the overall network depending mainly on their historical trajectories and strategic choices. More specifically, the majority of left-wing organizations in Greece were created in opposition to, or are splits from, KKE. They would like KKE to change its traditional-communist style while KKE would accept them as allies only if they rejoin the party or follow its line. In short, KKE’s centrality is about its high mobilization capacity rather than its leadership. On the other hand, SYRIZA also brings a large amount of resources by holding links to almost every social movement through overlapping memberships. In that case, the question of SYRIZA’s position in the overall network is not a question about ‘betweenness’ (meaning whether an actor lies between unconnected others) centrality, but a question about ‘degree’ (meaning how many connections to others an actor has) centrality (Krinsky & Crossley, 2014, p. 12). SYRIZA has not a key-connecting role, but dispose many connections to others, has an inclusive strategy, and positions itself in the overlapping area between moderates and radicals. Accordingly, in the specific 112 K. Kanellopoulos et al. terrain of the Greek anti-austerity campaign, SYRIZA with its ‘unity in action’ tactics just appears to be the central player. But a closer look at the network and at the dynamics of contention reveals the importance of GSEE/ADEDY. Without the sanctioning of GSEE, it is very difficult for a general strike to be organized and without general strikes it has proved difficult for the anti-austerity LPEs to continue (Kousis & Kanellopoulos, 2014). The anti-austerity campaign takes place mainly within the industrial/working relations field of Greece. It could be argued though that GSEE/ADEDY, based on both its ‘betweenness’ centrality and ‘degree’ centrality, continue to act as internal governance units whose ‘… sole job it is to ensure the routine stability and order of the strategic action field’ (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 77). Fourth, the Greek anti-austerity campaign exemplifies a sort of ‘social movement partyism’ (Almeida, 2010), since it manifests overlapping membership in SMOs and political parties. In Greece, as in other European countries (Hutter, 2013), political parties often mobilize their members and sponsor political and social protests without necessarily reflecting electoral incentives. Greek political parties, especially of the left, experienced in mobilizing intensively throughout the period after the democratic transition of 1974, have provided crucial resources to the recent anti-austerity campaign. Social movements and the political parties of the left in Greece are very often blurred (Marantzidis, 1996; Papanikolopoulos, 2013). Party members participate simultaneously in trade unions, student associations, and/or other political or social initiatives, playing an important role in connecting conventional and contentious politics.

Alliance building process The debt crisis and the austerity policies signaled a major economic threat for the majority of Greeks (Mavris, 2012). Consequently, the trembling economy started to monopolize the political agenda of

trade unions and leftist organizations. Since they focused on the same issue, they created an informal coalition based on previous alliance work. As we have found in our research, most Greek political organizations, trade unions, and SMOs have been participating in the same protest events and campaigns over the years. Joint involvement in movement activity can generate ties between the actors involved in them, although this does not necessarily happen during a protest campaign (Diani et al., 2010, p. 224). Links between these organizations were formed before entering the anti-austerity campaign, thanks to previous co-presence in protest events and to the intention to join forces for massive protest campaigns. Like in other European anti-austerity protests, pre-existing networks and alliance structures helped in strengthening and sustaining mobilizations (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). We turn now to specifying factors that facilitated the alliance formation process in order to demon- strate both their significance (sufficient, necessary, or just important) and the combination through which they became significant. Before doing so, however, it would be useful to make a crucial dis- tinction. It seems to us that the major factors highlighted by social movement scholars (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996), namely threats, opportunities, access to increased resources, common ideology, and social ties, respond to different questions concerning the alliance building process. The first three respond to the question ‘why coalesce?’, while the other two respond to the question ‘who coalesces?’. Accordingly, we are not going to search for factors in an undifferentiated pool, but rather to address these two questions accordingly.

Coalition building: why coalesce? Opportunities and threats are the most common responses to the question ‘why coalesce?’, with threat tending to gain the lion’s portion among researchers as we move into the twenty-first century (McCammon & Dyke, 2010). This is not because researchers abandoned their focus on opportunities on behalf of threats, but because the subsequent rounds of neoliberal economic reforms and the capitalist crisis of 2008 changed dramatically the political and economic context in which social movements operate. An obvious threat for significant portions of the domestic working classes became Social Movement Studies 113

the major incentive for mobilizing, overshadowing the decreasing opportunities offered to them by the mainstream political system. However, ‘threats and opportunities can coexist at a given point in time’ (McCammon & Dyke, 2010, p. 296). Austerity policies and structural adjustment programs provided a common threat and at the same time stimulated inter-organizational collaboration. It was not, as we mentioned above, the first time that left-wing political parties and organizations along with other civil society groups acted as SMO’s and participated in common protest actions. The external threat pushed different trade unions, parties, organizations, and groups to underplay their differences in ideology, goals, and strategies, and see the cooperation between them as urgent and potentially efficacious. This boundary de-activation process was triggered by heightening polarization between governmental parties and the majority of Greeks and a subsequent convergence between people with different political trajectories. Unity in action became instrumental among certain oppositional social forces. This process became quite obvious during the 40-day occupation of Syntagma Square by the Greek Indignados in May–July 2011, where thousands of people, right-wing and left-wing, were discussing and protesting without thinking of their different political identities as an obstacle to the common struggle (Petropoulos,2014 ; Stavrou, 2011). Widespread opposition to austerity policies as well as the similar protest campaigns in other countries created, for the Greek protest groups, a series of favorable contextual factors: an opportunity directly linked with the major threat. The only case where we could recognize a classical opportunity providing incentives for collaboration is that of SYRIZA’s network formation where both the possibility of having access to increased resources (public funding of parliamentary parties) and the chance of coming to office after a future electoral victory stimulated a series of leftist organizations to join SYRIZA’s coalition and then self-de- struct in order to participate in SYRIZA’s unitary party. In contrast, participation in ANTARSYA did not provide access to new resources and eventually its member organizations, despite their bigger

ideological congruence, refused to abandon their organizational autonomy and transfer more resources to the umbrella-organization. SYNASPISMOS’s tactic toward coalition work was very open. As a prominent SYNASPISMOS member told us in an interview: … At the political level the line we have for the unity of the Left prioritizes the attempt to overcome disagreements … and at the social level we want the resistance movement against the Memoranda to be as wide as possible … Other organizations have chosen not to get involved in such coalition work at all thinking that this is not in their strategic interest. A KKE member we interviewed clearly stated that: Political organizations to collaborate politically with, they don’t exist. Maybe in some specific ad hoc issues it could be some common positions but even there we will first and foremost take into consideration the interest of class unity … our action has to do with this precondition: how you can function with a class orientation.

Coalition building: who coalesces? Let’s turn now to the second question: ‘who coalesces?’ Researchers think of common interests, compatible ideologies, and overlapping identities as well as prior social ties as the strongest predicators of who may coalesce with whom (McCammon & Dyke, 2010). All Greek organizations active in the anti-austerity campaign, with the exception of trade unions, are on the one hand on the left and ide- ologically cohesive and on the other hand hold multi-issue and overlapping agendas. Even the trade unionists, despite their different political views, protest together to defend their common interests. Resistance to neoliberal structural adjustment is a common denominator goal for them and in order to avoid internal frame disputes they have produced a kind of ‘consonant frame pyramid’ (Croteau & Hicks, 2003), which helps them differentiate their rhetoric according to the constituency. In doing so, it may be possible for the left-wing activists to march next to ‘bureaucratic’ trade unionists and for ‘revolutionaries’ to cooperate with ‘reformists.’ Accordingly, our research provides support for the 114 K. Kanellopoulos et al.

hypothesis that protest diffuses more quickly through groups with high ideological homogeneity, while it diffuses more broadly through groups with low ideological homogeneity (Vasi, 2011). Common ideology is apparently a strong predicator for collaborative activity, but, as we have already mentioned, tensions among and inside networks seem to be endemic. There is no doubt that, despite their common interests and overlapping ideologies, left-wing parties, organizations, and groups could not overcome all existing barriers to more collaboration. Roth (2010, p. 112) suggests this is due to the fact that on the one hand ‘coalition efforts need to be perceived as good politics in order to be made’ and on the other hand ‘coalitions represent challenges to activists’ identities.’ Our research provides strong support to this argument. Most of the Greek left-wing parties, organizations, and groups consider themselves as a kind of vanguard in the revolutionary or transformative process of the society and, consequently, they strongly defend their ideological clarity. KKE adopts an openly non-collaborative strategy, anti-capitalist groups in and beyond ANTARSYA demand political agreement with their partners before entering more collaborative initiatives, while most of the anarchist groups, even if they discuss about collaboration between them, they keep the ‘ethos of organizing one’s own’ that prevent them from real cooperation and coalition work. Accordingly, our research reveals that a series of common interests and ideological/identical elements facilitate coalitional work, while sectarianism prevents from it. Common ideological elements may aid protest groups coalescence but does not automatically produce ties. Networking is a sine qua non process for forming alliances. The SYRIZA and ANTARSYA networks are actually products of long-term alliance processes. KKE kept itself out of this process seeking to unify the movement forces by leading them rather than intermingling with them. Contrary to KKE’s self-marginalization, other groups – including some anarchist groups – engaged fully in alliance processes. Furthermore, some SMOs functioned as ‘social brokers’ providing the context in which distant actors started establishing ties. This is especially the case of a social justice group, DIKTYO,

and an anarchist group, AK (anti-authoritarian movement). Activists from both organizations named themselves for their intermediary role, respectively, as ‘leftist anarchy’ and as ‘anarchist left.’ DIKTYO’s antiracist festivals, for example, were the ‘neutral spaces’ where left-wing SMOs learned to coexist. Since this long alliance process exceeded the internal boundaries of the established networks and started to include the ‘coordination of coordinators’ (a humorous activists’ phrase, which means coordination between different networks), the left-wing networks reached such a dynamism that they were charged with the role of brokers between the oppositional social masses and the authorities. Even in the mass gatherings in Syntagma Square during the Indignados protests, another ‘neutral space,’ one could recognize experienced activists, lefties, and anarchists, in the core roles of the organizational structure of the square.

Conclusion The Greek case stresses that network shaping and alliance building are more complex processes than often suggested. Different types of networks and different and competing modes of coordination can coexist and act together in the context of a protest campaign, while an overall network can incorporate totally different features. Our analysis does indicate that the overall network could neither be characterized as fully centralized nor as fully decentralized, neither as a cooperative one nor as an explicitly hostile one. In both cases it looks like an intermediary case. Centrality and leadership reflect different dynamics in alliance building. On the one hand, some organizations appear to be more central into the overall network than others, but on the other, there is no recognized leadership. De facto centrality and de jure vanguardism seem to fit well in the Greek case. Similarly, our research sheds some more light to the phenomenon where political parties are ‘taking to the streets.’ Greek leftist parties often fall into this category and we could plausibly argue that these political parties under the current economic crisis are strongly oriented toward protest activity. However, it is the trade unions that actually act as ‘internal governance units’ within the anti-austerity campaign. Without their calls for general strikes and demonstrations, the Greek anti-austerity campaign proved incapable of continuation after 2012. Social Movement Studies 115

Our research revealed the three main protagonists of the campaign and the circumstances under which they engaged in ad hoc alliance: the trade unions, the political parties of the Left, and the Greek Indignados. The latter played a crucial role in the campaign only for a short period in 2011 but shortly after they virtually ceased to exist and no new organizations or political parties were formed out of them as has happened in other countries (Flesher Fominaya, 2015). The Indignados protests seemingly reflect the logic of aggregation suggested by Juris (2012), but in our view better represents a case of new logic of collective action carried out by ‘old’ actors since the whole organization of square occupations rested in resources and activists linked to political organizations heavily engaged at that period at coalitional modes of coordination. These ‘old’ actors soon returned to their usual duties as the anti-austerity campaign continued and climaxed after the summer of 2011 (Kousis & Kanellopoulos, 2014). Of course many new activists got also involved in the Indignados protests and some of them later became active in social economy and solidarity projects, but further research is needed to establish the significance of this trend. Concerning the political parties of the Left, SYRIZA’s tactics of ‘unity in action’ and open calls for cooperation with all ‘anti-memorandum’ forces with the strategic goal of forming a government of ‘social salvation’ proved successful. In the elections of 2012, SYRIZA rose as the leading oppositional party. After these elections, the party continued to support anti-austerity protests but SYRIZA neither possessed adequate mobilization capacity to lead a protest campaign itself nor wanted to jeopardize its central electoral strategy. For KKE it could be argued that a self-marginalizing tactic before, during, and after the anti-austerity campaign led to the party’s incapacity to lead the campaign, despite its superior mobilization capacity. GSEE and ADEDY played a dubious role since the beginning of the crisis. On the one hand and relying on their experience of past struggles against privatizations and austerity policies, they facilitated the anti-austerity campaign of 2010–2012. But on the other hand, as parts of the dominant system of

political and social representation they were not willing to push this system to its collapse. After the extraordinary elections of 2012 and the formation of a coalition government between ND and PASOK (and DIMAR a ‘pro-Memorandum’ split of SYRIZA), the trade unions seem to have lessened their pressure. Either by exhaustion or by tactical maneuver GSEE and ADEDY did not challenge the austerity policies, and the political system, of the 2012–2014 period as forcefully as they did in 2010–2012. The Greek anti-austerity campaign displays a case of competing modes of coordination. On the one hand, there were the big unions and KKE that were mainly oriented toward organizational modes of coordination focusing more on resource allocation and on the other hand there were SYRIZA and ANTARSYA mainly oriented toward coalitional modes of coordination while groups oriented toward social movement modes and subcultural/communitarian modes of coordination had a rather marginal role. The campaign became possible because coalitional modes prevailed for some time. But the changing political context after the elections of 2012 with the great electoral advance of SYRIZA and the prospect to rise to power probably caused SYRIZA to turn more to organizational modes of coordination and pay more attention to resource allocation. This trajectory became even more apparent after the elections of January 2015 and the actual rise of SYRIZA to power and, in a way, facilitated SYRIZA’s rapid transformation into a pro-Memorandum, pro-austerity party in the summer of 2015. Economic crisis provided a favorable opportunity for pre-existing network structures to attract mass numbers of people to protest activities at a first phase but when the organizational logic gained ground, and despite the continuation and the deepening of the economic crisis, the masses demobi- lized. Thus, it could be supported that a mass and sustained protest campaign requires actors rich in resources, pre-existing network structures, and the presence of a coalitional logic among at least some of the powerful actors. When the modes of coordination and even more the interests of the powerful actors are not compatible with the protest campaign, this campaign is difficult to sustain. 116 K. Kanellopoulos et al.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank Mario Diani and Maria Kousis for helping us in setting up this research at its initial stages, and also the editors and the anonymous reviewers at Social Movement Studies for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding This is an independent project that has received no funding

Notes on contributors Kostas Kanellopoulos is a senior researcher at the University of Crete, Research Fund. He works at the GGCRISI (www.ggcrisi.org) and TransSOL (www.transsol.eu) projects and coordinates the independent research on “Social movement networks in Greece”. Dr Kanellopoulos specializes in the study of social movements, globalization, and contentious politics. Konstantinos Kostopoulos is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science & History at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences in Athens (Greece). His scientific interests focus on the study of social movements, sociology of activism and intellectuals. He has participated in research projects at the University of Crete and Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Dimitris Papanikolopoulos is a researcher at the University of Crete, Research Fund. His research interests include Greek political history, social movements and collective action. Currently, he is working on Greek trade unions and protest in contemporary Greece.

Vasileios Rongas is a PhD candidate at the Department of Sociology of the University of Crete. His research interests include social movements and collective action. His thesis focuses on the Greek social movements in the twenty-first century.

ORCID Kostas Kanellopoulos http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8869-6943

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