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The Agonistic Model of Democracy and the European Union

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The Agonistic Model of Democracy and the European Union The agonistic model of democracy and the European Union Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel vorgelegt von Caroline Maria Kalkreuth Kiel 08.03.2021 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Dirk Nabers Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Paula Diehl Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 11.06.2021 Durch den Prodekan für Studium und Lehre, Prof. Dr. Michael Elmentaler, zum Druck genehmigt: 21.07.2021 DEDICATION To Simon TABLE OF CONTENT 1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1! 2. RESISTANCE TO THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .................................. 11! 2.1!CHANGING!DISCOURSE!FROM!PERMISSIVE!CONSENSUS!TO!RESISTANCE!..........................................................................11! 2.2!THE!STUDY!OF!EUROSCEPTICISM!.........................................................................................................................18! 2.3!RESEARCH!GAP!...............................................................................................................................................40! 2.4!CONCLUSION!.................................................................................................................................................44! 3. THROUGH THE LENSES OF THE AGONISTIC MODEL OF DEMOCRACY .................. 47! 3.1!MOUFFE’S!TRAJECTORY!FROM!MARXISM!TO!POST?MARXISM!.....................................................................................48! 3.2!SOCIAL!ONTOLOGY!OF!THE!POLITICAL!DISCOURSE!THEORY!..........................................................................................56! 3.3!THE!POLITICAL!LEVEL!OF!THE!DISCOURSE!THEORY!.....................................................................................................72! 3.4!CHANTAL!MOUFFE’S!AGONISTIC!MODEL!OF!DEMOCRACY!..........................................................................................89! 3.5!ANALYTICAL!FRAMEWORK!...............................................................................................................................!112! 3.6!CONCLUSION!...............................................................................................................................................!119! 4. RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE STUDY ................................................................................. 122! 4.1!SELECTED!TEXT!CORPUS!..................................................................................................................................!128! 4.2!DATA!ANALYSIS!PROCEDURES!...........................................................................................................................!134! 4.3!CONCLUSION!...............................................................................................................................................!141! 5. THE AGONISTIC MODEL OF DEMOCRACY AND RESISTANCE ................................. 144! 5.1!EXCESS!OF!CONSENSUS!...................................................................................................................................!146! 5.2!CRISIS!OF!IDENTIFICATION!...............................................................................................................................!164! 5.3!HEGEMONIC!STRUGGLE!..................................................................................................................................!177! 5.4!APATHY!AND!DISAFFECTION!.............................................................................................................................!185! 5.5!CONCLUSION!...............................................................................................................................................!192! 6. THEORY AND RESULTS ....................................................................................................... 194! 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 204! 8. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG IN DEUTSCHER SPRACHE .......................................................... 260! 9. CURRICULUM VITAE ........................................................................................................... 280 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Research agenda ............................................................................ 44! Figure 2: The phenomenon of resistance ..................................................... 112! Figure 3: Focus of analysis ......................................................................... 142! Figure 4: Resistance and European integration............................................ 145! LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Empirical data overview …………………………………………...133 ABBREVIATIONS AFD – Alternative für Deutschland AMD – Agonistic Model of Democracy CFSP - The common foreign and security policy EC- European Community ECR - European Conservatives and Reformists ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community ECU - European Currency Unit EEC - European Economic Community EIS – European Integration Studies EMS - European Monetary System EN - European of Nations Group EP – European Parliament ERM - Exchange Rate Mechanism EU – European Union EUI – European Integration EURATOM - European Atomic Energy Community FN – Front National GAL - Green-Alternative-Libertarian HSS – Hegemonic and Socialist Strategy IND - Independence/Democracy Group IPS - International Political Sociology IR- International Relations M5S – Movimento 5 Stelle MEP – Member of the European Parliament NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland NR - New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time PDT - Poststructuralist Discourse Theory PJCCM - Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters SEA - Single European Act SYRIZA – Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras TAN - Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UK – United Kingdom UKIP – United Kingdom Independent Party UN – United Nations USA – United States of America ACKNOWLEDGMENT The successful completion of the present work would have never been possible without the support of the following people. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Dirk Nabers, whose expertise and consistent support throughout the process was invaluable to the completion of this thesis. His insightful feedback has encouraged me to continually develop and improve my writing and research. Furthermore, I would like to thank the “Evangelisches Studienwerk” for their overwhelmingly kind and comprehensive financial support. I would also like to thank my supervisor at Yale University, Sterling Professor Ian Shapiro, who made it possible for me to stay in New Haven in 2020 despite the Corona crisis. I would also like to thank many other scholars and practitioners who have contributed to this work by providing theoretical and practical insights at various occasions. I gratefully acknowledge their relevance to my work. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support during these challenging years. My special thanks go to my partner Simon, without whom this whole project would not have been possible. 1. Introduction The process of European integration (EUI) has long been the subject of limited public debate, and the domain was seen as dominated mainly by European political elites. The project generally presents itself as a continental-scaled, post-national political project, aiming to pool certain executive, legislative, and judicial responsibilities at the supra- or international level.1 It aims to achieve an “ever closer union of the European people” to constrain of past national rivalries and promote a sphere of peace and stability.2 The process can broadly be divided into three main periods: the first period spanning the early stages of the integration process in the 1950s until the late-1980s, the second period from the establishment of a union in the early-1990s until the late-2000s, and the third period lasting until the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2019.3 Especially during the first period of EUI, political rivalries and ideological conflicts were mostly absent from the process. The modi-operandi within the European institutions favored compromise over conflict.4 The process was dominated by pro-integrationists supporting the European project and a favorable attitude among the public. This favorable attitude among the European public during that time was generally labeled as “permissive consensus.”5 The presumed consensus enabled European elites to accelerate the process of integration without much interference of the broader public. For instance, it seems that the Schuman Plan from 1950 – as a fundamental political concept to amalgamate of German and French coal and steel production after 1 Hix (2007); European Union (2012). 2 Recital 1 of the preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See European Union (2012), also Cantat (2015). 3 See also: Vasilopoulou (2013), who assumes a somewhat similar division of time periods within the process of EUI. 4 About narratives, see also: Cantat (2015). 5 Lindberg and Scheingold (1970). 1 the Second World War – was launched by a small political elite working in an almost conspiratorial fashion. They were able to maneuver quickly and effectively, partly due to the lack of public involvement.6 In the second
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