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MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT Socialist Parties in the EU STIFTUNG NEW YORK OFFICE By Dominic Heilig Table of Contents

The Rise of the European Left. By the Editors 1

Mapping the European Left

Socialist Parties in the EU 2

By Dominic Heilig

1. in : History and Diversity 2

2. and Europe’s Left 10

3. The Black Autumn of the Left in Europe: The Left in 17

4. DIE LINKE: A Factor for Stability in the Party of the European Left 26

5. Strategic Tasks for the Left in Europe 33

Published by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, New York Office, April 2016

Editors: Stefanie Ehmsen and Albert Scharenberg Address: 275 Madison Avenue, Suite 2114, New York, NY 10016 Email: [email protected]; Phone: +1 (917) 409-1040

With support from the German Foreign Office

The Rosa Luxemburg Foundation is an internationally operating, progressive non-profit institution for civic education. In cooperation with many organizations around the globe, it works on democratic and social participation, empowerment of disadvantaged groups, alternatives for economic and social development, and peaceful conflict resolution.

The New York Office serves two major tasks: to work around issues concerning the and to engage in dialogue with North American progressives in universities, unions, social movements, and .

www.rosalux-nyc.org The Rise of the European Left

The European is changing rapidly. As a result of the ongoing neoliberal attack, the middle class is shrinking quickly, and the decades-old party allegiance of large groups of voters has followed suit. The European far right has been able to capitalize on this development; in many countries, populist and -wing parties have experienced an unprecedented boom, as Thilo Janssen’s RLS-study on “Far-right Parties and the ” shows.

On the other side of the , the electoral victory scored by the Greek “ of the Radical Left”—better known as SYRIZA—in January 2015 has galvanized the European Left, which had previously comforted itself by standing on the oppositional sidelines. Still rubbing their eyes in disbe- lief, the Left in Europe realized that they could not only conquer “respectable” positions, but could, in fact, become the leading force in . The European and international Left was enthused.

At the same time, however, this electoral victory alarmed their opponents. Under the leadership of the German government, they made life for the Greek government difficult and, at times, turned it into a living hell. The struggles between SYRIZA and the Troika (consisting of the European Union, Euro- pean Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) over Greek government policy dominated the headlines in spring and summer 2015. In the course of this conflict, Merkel, Schäuble & Co. succeeded in defending the cornerstones of their neoliberal austerity regime against the Greek attack and forc- ing SYRIZA to accept cornerstones of this regime. At the same time, however, the re- of the Tsipras government in September 2015 demonstrated that the Troika did not succeed in getting rid of the leftist “troublemakers.”

Since then, the Left in Spain and scored electoral victories in the fall of 2015. In Spain, the conservative People’s Party lost their majority due to the rise of . In Portugal, the conserva- tive Prime was even replaced by a center-left government. In Britain, the Labour Party elected socialist as their chairman, while in other European countries, including , the left parties were able to reorganize and stabilize themselves.

So it’s about time we take a closer look at the European Left! Which parties are of particular relevance, and where do they stand politically? What is dominant: programmatic parallels or national differ- ences? How was the Left able to organize on the European scale?

In this study, journalist Dominic Heilig examines the current situation. Starting from an overview and a categorization of the different European left parties, Heilig focuses on three particular parties: SYRIZA, Podemos, and DIE LINKE. In his thorough presentation of recent developments, Heilig shows what has already been accomplished—thanks to the rise of the Left—but also where the Left still needs to evolve. For one thing is clear: The Left still has a lot of work to do if we want to politically influence the path of the European continent.

Stefanie Ehmsen and Albert Scharenberg Co-Directors of New York Office, April 2016

1 Mapping the European Left Socialist Parties in the EU

By Dominic Heilig

1. The Left in Europe: History and Diversity

The left spectrum in Europe ranges from social This2focus is necessary simply to be able to democratic through green-alternative to tradi- compare left parties in Europe. In the EU alone, tional communist parties. Taking as our point in each of its 28 member states, we are in part of departure the way they position themselves dealing with 28 very specific national contexts; as left parties, 60 of them can be identified for that is, with diverse electoral systems, legal the European Union alone with its 28 Member statuses of the parties, and historical condi- States.1 This self-definition, however, is based tions. For example, while in Germany a party on diverse historical, strategic, and program- needs to get at least 5 per cent of the votes matic backgrounds. The parties of this political in national in order to gain seats in spectrum are, moreover, at the same time sub- parliaments, this bar in Portugal and is ject to continual change through splits, refoun- only 3 per cent; by contrast, in there is dations, or fusions. a first-past-the-post system instead of propor- tional representation. Also, the possibility of Before looking more closely at selected exam- forming electoral of parties or social ples—Syriza (Greece), the and movements is handled in very diverse ways Podemos (Spain), as well as DIE LINKE (Ger- in different countries. Together these factors many)—in the context of this study, we will have great impact on the concrete form that first analyse two European associations in left parties take. which left parties are active. First there is the Party of the European Left (EL), a Europe-wide In some EU states—as in Portugal—there are federation of national left parties in the frame- several significant left parties in competition work of the EU. Then the member parties of with each other. In the Scandinavian countries the ’s (GUE/ (with the exception of ) the left is not NGL) are understood as elements of the left divided and is stable (even if recently at a low family of parties. This study only looks at those level). Here, in , Norway, Iceland, and left parties which either have representation , there is only one significant in the European Parliament or—despite all the in each country, and until recently each has criticism they may have, or even rejection, of been in led by social . the EU—have accepted the European arena as a framework for political activity and have In most eastern European countries, by con- joined the EL.2 trast, the left is not only fragmented, as in

1 See Birgit Daiber, Cornelia Hildebrandt, and Anna Striethorst (eds.), From to Coalition—Radical 2 See Jürgen Mittag and Janosch Steuwer, Politische Partei- Left Parties in Europe, Dietz Verlag, 2010, p. 7. en in der EU, : Facultas wuv, 2010, p. 179.

2 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Table 1: Member parties of the GUE/NGL in the European Parliament since 2014

Members of Party Country Parliament AKEL 2 Bloco de Esquerda Portugal 1 DIE LINKE Germany 7 Euskal Herria Bildu Spain (Basque region) 1 People’s Movement against the EU — Denmark 1 -Green Front de Gauche (PCF; Parti de Gauche, et al.) France 3 Izquierda Plural (Izquierda Unida et al.) Spain 5 of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) 3 L’Altra Europa con Tsipras 2 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) Portugal 3 Party for the Animals 1 Podemos Spain 4 Greece 1 Sinn Feín (SF) Ireland/Northern Ireland (GB) 4 (SP) Netherlands 2 Syriza Greece 4 Union pour les Outre-Mer France (DOM-TOM) 1 Left Party (V) Sweden 1 (VAS) Finland 1 Independents Germany, Ireland, 4 Greece, Italy

southwestern Europe, but also completely mar- European left parties link particularly to four ginalised. Only in and has par- voter groups: On the one hand, (1) a classical liamentary representation been achieved via worker and (2) alternative milieu that protests refounded organisations and fusion processes the present state of things; on the other hand, within the left spectrum. 3 Thus one characteris- new voter groups, which the left, in its resis- tic of left parties is their heterogeneity. tance to and austerity policy, has been able to attract, are (3) people with experi- All left parties in Europe are classical member- ences of precarity and (4) middle strata in dan- ship parties. Even newly founded parties like ger of falling into the precariat. However, none France’s Parti de Gauche emphasise the reten- of the parties has been able to win over all tion of members; none of the left parties are four voter groups in equal measure. Commu- personality-oriented electoral organisations. nist parties like Portugal’s PCP mainly receive the votes of classical worker milieus whose existence is threatened; on the other hand, 3 See Dominic Heilig, "Ein weißer Fleck färbt sich rot," 14 July 2014, www.die-linke.de. DIE LINKE is chiefly supported by the precari-

3 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

ous. At the same time, workers and those with ern Europe some communist parties broke precarious work lives are the minority among their ideological and organizational ties to the members of all left parties. In the Scandina- CPSU; others split. Eastern Europe’s state par- vian and central European EU countries, it is ties continued to subordinate themselves to overwhelmingly employees and members of their big brother in Moscow. the upper educated middle strata who join left parties.4 The Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/ The evolution and programmatic location of NGL) comprises 52 Members of Euro- parties of social have pean Parliament (MEPs) from 19 parties always also been the product of social changes or electoral alliances. The MEPs come and conflicts within the left. In each case these from 14 EU Member States. As the name changes meant drastic caesuras for the left, indicates, the group has a confederal which furthered the emergence of the most character, that is, each party retains its diverse forms of left parties. autonomy and therefore makes its own decisions within the broad framework of The first caesura that led to the formation of the group. left parties in Europe was the split in as a result of the First World , the , and the founding Increasing European integration, the emer- of the Union. Even if previously there gence of new areas of social conflict, and new had occasionally been parties to the left of green-alternative movements, as well as the social democracy that wanted to achieve com- growth of the movement for (nuclear) munism or through a revolution- disarmament in the 1970s and 80s marked ary path, it was only with the split in social a third caesura for the left. These years saw, democracy that such parties gained social for the first time, new composite left parties relevance. whose roots were in the social movements of the period and raised demands going beyond The second caesura occurred around the 1968 those of the classical representation of work- Prague Spring. The split of classical communist ers’ interests against . The left party parties in western Europe took place here in spectrum thus enlarged to include left eco-so- relation to how the CPSU’s claim to leadership cialist formations. These parties, which first was seen. "" parties, or Eurocom- appeared to resemble plural movements less munist parties broke away from those who than classical parties, focused on a transfor- insisted on a social develop- mative strategy for overcoming ment, the "democratic-centralist" leadership while taking account of new social attitudes principle, on - as the obliga- and values. tory ideological foundation, and on the CPSU’s claim to leadership. The rejection of alternative A fourth caesura—especially in the countries of paths of development to socialism and of alter- "actually existing socialism," but also in coun- native, democratic conceptions of socialism tries of the European Community (EC)—came involved an intransigent ideological battle with with the fall of the Wall and the end of any divergence from the Soviet model. In west- the power bloc confrontation. Socialist/com- munist state parties lost their leadership role, 4 See Anna Striethorst, Mitglieder und Elektorate von Linksparteien in Europa, in Daiber et al., Von Revolution dissolved, or underwent internal processes of bis Koalition, pp. 89ff. reform made necessary by external circum-

4 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

stances. In what followed, many of these par- emergence of new political parties or brought ties in eastern Europe transformed themselves about further reforms of already existing left into social democratic parties, as in or parties, as in Spain, Greece, or France. Hungary; others underwent a programmatic and democratic process of transformation, such as DIE LINKE in Germany, and still belong The Party of the European Left to the camp of parties to the left of social democracy. Some parties that emerged from After the end of the power bloc confrontation former state parties, such as the Czech Repub- the left in eastern and western Europe went lic’s KSCM, kept to their traditional communist onto the defensive. The collapse of state social- orientation. However, the existing left parties ism became a new defeat of an entire political of western Europe, as in the Eurocommunist idea and with this the defeat of left parties as parties or those tied to the new social move- a whole, independently of their ideological ori- ments, also entered into legitimation crises entation. To overcome this, coordination and and underwent processes of internal reform, substantive exchange on the European level during which some of them, for example the became more important than ever. In NELF, Eurocommunist (PCI), a common search began for reform ideas, completely disappeared. models for , and for the most successful party concepts for a reformed left. European integration, which rapidly inten- sified after the end of the power bloc con- The new millennium saw the founding of the frontation, the crisis of classical communist European Anti-Capitalist Left (EAL), strongly and other left parties, and the simul- characterised by Trotskyist and extra-parlia- taneously arising social and alter-globalist mentary left parties. It was, however, hardly 5 movements, led by the end of the 1990s to able to gain any political influence. On 8 May the formation of new composite left parties. 2004 the Party of the European Left (EL) was This fifth caesura also led to a pooling of founded. It has been attempting to work out left forces and parties across the borders of a common political identity amongst member -states. It is true that loose cross-bor- parties, without ignoring national political con- der discussions had already been conducted ditions. It is governed by the principle of con- starting in 1990/91, as with the New European sensus. The EL today comprises 31 member Left Forum (NELF); these attempts, however, and official observer parties, some of them did not produce cooperation of a binding from countries that are not in the EU (, character. In 2004, the lack of a European Moldavia, Belarus, , and North coordination process was to a certain extent Cyprus). The important left parties in Sweden rectified with the founding of the Party of the and Norway, however, are not represented in European Left (EL). the EL.

There is great consistency among all EL mem- The unleashing of capitalism—or, more pre- ber parties in terms of the core issues; they cisely, unbridled, revolutionising neoliberalism want to concertedly lead a struggle for "peace, and the resulting dominance of the financial democracy, social , equality, and markets—led from 2007/2008 not only to what was up to then the most serious economic and financial crisis of the post-war era but also to 5 See , Links—kreuz und quer: Die Bezie- the emergence of anti-austerity move- hungen innerhalb der europäischen Linken, Berlin: Dietz, ments. This sixth caesura led in part to the 2009, p. 69.

5 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Table 2: Caesuras of the left in Europe

Six caesuras Time frame Left Examples October Revolution 1914 until 1923 Communist left PCP, KKE, KPD, PCE, and et al. Prague Spring 1968 Euro-communist left PCF, PCI, PCE, KKE reform New left-leaning alter- 1970s until mid-1980s Formation of left- IU, , native left; left-green green, left-leaning Swedish Left, SP Neth- formations alternative & anti-au- erlands, SYN thoritarian Left End of the Cold War 1989 until 1990 Pluralistic, democrat- PDS, PRC, Left Alliance ic- & re- Finland, Red-Green formed states parties Alliance Denmark European integration End of the 1990s until Party alliances inte- Bloco de Esquerda, Dei & global justice move- mid-2000s grating the global Lénk Luxemburg, PRC, ment justice movement SYN, IU Global economic and Starting 2007/2008 Party alliances inte- Syriza, Podemos, Parti financial crisis grating the anti-aus- de Gauche terity movement; transformation of an- ti-austerity movement into parties respect for nature".6 There is particular focus ery through a redistribution of wealth from on issues such as the defence of the welfare the top to the bottom and thus respond to the state, the struggle against unemployment and crisis. The focus is on the demand for public precarious conditions of employment, and for investments and the critique of the retreat of collective security and peace. A further issue the state from important economic and social that was not yet a focus in 2004 but influences functions. the politics of EL parties today is the crisis of financial-market capitalism and the EU’s aus- Among the EL’s member parties, there are terity policy. eight that have more than 30,000 members and a stable parliamentary presence. Along- EL proposals for overcoming the crisis are pri- side these, the EL also includes middle-sized marily conceived within the capitalist system. left parties with 8,000 to 17,000 members, Here a dilemma arises: The need to develop which are represented in parliaments. Then concrete concepts that can be realised now to there are a variety of extra-parliamentary benefit broad strata of the populations forces small parties with 5,000 or less members left parties to shore up a system they actu- (such as the Communist Party of ).7 In ally would like to defeat. This can be seen, for total, the EL comprises more than 500,000 example, in the demand for stronger regula- members. tion of the financial sector. The left wants to boost domestic demand and stimulate recov- 7 Membership numbers must of course always be seen in proportion to the population of the particular EU states; 6 See Statute of the Party of the European Left, adopted 8 see Anna Striethorst, "Mitglieder und Elektorate von and 9 May 2004 in , p. 1. Linksparteien in Europa," Daiber et al., op.cit., p. 90.

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Table 3: Member parties of the EL (incl. observer status)

Party Country Bloco de Esquerda Portugal Izquierda Unida (IU) Spain Partido comunista de España (PCE) Spain Esquerra unida i alternativa (EuiA) Spain () Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI) Italy Partito della rifondazione comunista (PRC) Italy Parti de Gauche (PG) France Gauche Unitaire (GU) France Parti Communiste Francais (PCF) France Syriza Greece Birleşik Kibris Partisi Cyprus Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi Cyprus Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού (AKEL) Cyprus Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) Turkey Българската левица (BL) Partidul Socialist Roman (PSR) Rumania Partidul Comuniştilor din Republica (PCRM) Moldavia Magyarországi Munkáspárt 2006 Hungary Komunistická strana Slovenska (KSS) Slovakia Komunisticka strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM) Czech Republic Strana demokratického socialismu (SDS) Czech Republic Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) Austria Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz (PdA) Switzerland DIE LINKE Germany Communist Party Wallonie-Bruxelles (PC) Enhedslisten — De Rød-Grønne (EL) Denmark Suomen kommunistinen puolue (SKP) Finland Vasemmistoliitto (VAS) Finland Eestimaa Ühendatud Vasakpartei (EÜVP) Estonia Belarusian Рarty of the Left “Fair World“ (BSM) Belarus

Left Parties in Europe and only using the word "socialist" in their names or programme in a rudimentary way, Europe’s left parties are in very diverse phases other parties, like the PCF in France or the PdCI of their development. While the Scandina- and PRC in Italy, are still strongly Eurocommu- vian parties all have a strong ecological pro- nist in character (that is, they represent the file and are at pains to launch comprehensive second caesura) in character. The Bloco de socio-ecological transformational processes, Esquerda (BE) in Portugal and the SP in the

7 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Netherlands are strongly action-oriented dem- In order to grasp the multifacetedness of the ocratic socialist parties arising out of two dif- history of the left in Europe we will, in what ferent phases (SP: third caesura, BE: fifth cae- follows, look in greater detail at four different sura) as composite parties of the new left. DIE party formations. LINKE and the KSCM, on the other hand, have emerged in the course of the fourth caesura First, we will describe Greece’s "Coalition of (1989-90) and have pursued different paths of the Radical Left" (Syriza) and its present chal- development. While DIE LINKE can be included lenges as the governing party. Syriza is a clas- with the democratic socialist reformed state sical party alliance, which arose in the course socialist parties, the KSCM belongs to the of anti-austerity movements and protests. camp of the communist parties. While, for Nevertheless, the history of its constituent example, the Communist Party of Portugal party—Synaspismos (SYN)—dates back to (PCP) is a classical communist party (first cae- the split of the Communist Party in 1968/69. sura), the French Parti de Gauche (fifth cae- Synaspismos itself has repeatedly changed its sura) is a left social democratic formation. The character as new social movements formed in category of left socialist party alliances would the 1980s and the alter-globalisation move- include Spain’s Izquierda Unida (third caesura) ment in the 2000s. Through Syriza it was or Greece’s Syriza (sixth caesura) whose dom- finally possible to develop from an alliance of inant core, Synaspismos arose in the second splinter groups of several very small parties caesura (1968/69). Spain’s Podemos, like Syr- to the largest —and then govern- iza, arose in the course of the sixth caesura. ment—party. However, in contrast to its Greek sister party it is not a left socialist party alliance but a move- Spain’s Izquierda Unida (United Left, IU) has ment with a party statute. its roots in the new social, alternative move- ments of the 1980s. However, the Communist Not all left parties in Europe can be unequiv- Party of Spain (PCE) exerts major influence ocally classified in this way, in part because of on its politics. In contrast to Syriza, the IU internal party debates and conflicts between was and is still an alliance of various (partly their various wings. Denmark’s Red-Green Alli- regional) left parties. Even if it was active in ance, for example, arose out of a left socialist the anti-austerity movements of recent years, alliance of parties but programmatically also IU is not an example of the new anti-auster- exhibits many features of a left-green for- ity parties. This kind of left is represented in mation. The accompanying table provides an Spain by Podemos, which will also be exam- overview of the classification of parties against ined here. Podemos is among the most recent the background of their historical origins and left parties in Europe that have no direct his- present shape. torical predecessor. It can be described as a movement with a party statute since it is It is clear that the different caesuras led to the officially registered as a party, but its organ- formation of specific types of left parties. They isation can hardly be compared with that of a filled a political representation gap that the classical party. extant parties at the time could not fill. This means at the same time that different forms of Finally, the Federal Republic of Germany’s DIE left parties existed and exist simultaneously, LINKE is a party whose roots are in a reformed which are able to demonstrate their political state socialist party of the former East Bloc. It relevance within the competition between is true that since the fusion with the West Ger- parties. man WASG it acts as an all-German party, but

8 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Table 4: Subfractions of the family of leftist parties in Europe (GUE/NGL & EL)8

Leftist Leftist socialde- Mo- Reformed Reform- socialde- mocratic Leftist vements state Commu- commu- mocratic party green with par- socialist nists nists parties alliances parties ty status parties Examples PCP, PCF, PdCI, SP, SDS, BE, Syriza, ÖDP, EL, Podemos DIE LINKE, KSČM, PRC, KPÖ, PdA, PG, IU, EuiA, VAS, SF, V KSČM, KSS SKP, DKP, PCE, AKEL SF, V GU, DIE PC, KSS, LINKE, EL, PCRM, PSR, BSM Alterna- Com- Com- Caring so- Demo­ Social-eco- Direct Demo­ tives/pa- munist munist ciety with cratic logical, democrat- cratic thways , society, demo­ socialism, feminist ic society, socialism revolution revolu- cratic emanci- and sus- popular vs. com- tionary structures patory tainable democrat- munist transfor- of partici- process society, ic plebi- society, mation pation transfor- scites revolution processes mation (KSČM & process KSS) Forms of Avant Relativ- Political Broad cor- Red-green Alliances Broad cor- co-opera- garde ized avant alliances, porative alliances of popula- porative tion garde center-left alliances and cor- tion strata alliances as a pre- porative against as a pre- with social condition alliances oligarchy condition democrats for parlia- for parlia- mentary/ mentary/ political political alliances alliances with social vs. Avant demo­crats garde (KSČM & KSS) its programmatic contents are still strongly a left party, the IU is focusing on maintain itself marked by its confrontation with the failed as a party alliance. And while Podemos wants attempt at socialism in eastern Europe. DIE to remain more of a movement than a party, LINKE is among the most stable and largest left DIE LINKE politically competes for majorities as parties in Europe and is consequently a central a classical party formation. Common to all four pillar of the EL. parties is their tendency to succeed when they launch coalition processes and connect the All four parties have comparable program- plurality of actors to each other. In contrast to matic demands but meet the current politi- classical communist parties they do not claim cal challenges with very diverse strategic and a vanguard role. These examples thus also organisational concepts. While Syriza, after a demonstrate that the left in Europe can once broad social fusion process, is now working again play a role in the struggle for alternative towards the formation of a common identity as majorities.

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2. Syriza and Europe’s Left Spring

The German weekly once compared matic leftists and the so-called KKE reformers him to Elvis Presley. When he stepped onto the decided a year later to transform the Synaspis- stage his supporters burst into cheers—as mos alliance into a party. In 1996 the new for- they did at the beginning of 2015 when Alexis mation was able to get into Greece’s parliament Tsipras launched his electoral campaign in (in Greek, Vouli). In succeeding years, the party front of thousands of sympathisers. While continuously struggled to break through the 3 the ruling conservative Nea Dimokratia (ND) per cent . kicked off its campaign in a convention hotel, the social democrats (PASOK) considered a caf- In 2000 the party’s first big split occurred. eteria an adequate venue, and their ex-leader Protagonists of wing migrated to the Papandreou presented his splinter project in a social democrats, and Synaspismos shifted museum, the Syriza crowd boundless. further left. This made it possible for the party to incorporate more left groups and Greece’s But Tsipras was rarely described positively alter-globalist movements, the first on the in European media. Shortly before the 2012 European scene. Shortly before the 2004 par- parliamentary election, , Germany’s big- liamentary election, the "Coalition of the Radi- gest tabloid, described him as a semi-criminal cal Left"—Syriza—was formed for the first time; who sympathises "with violent anarchists." At however, it was only able to garner 3.3 per cent the beginning of 2015 media descriptions of of votes. After this, the largely the charismatic continued to be fell apart. Only in 2007 could Syriza be revived. unflattering. The common basis for the widely divergent parties and groups was once again the struggle against the neoliberal reconstruction of Greece From Synaspismos to Syriza and the close ties to the new social movements. Despite the presence of Maoist and Trotsyist The founding of Greece’s left party began with groups in Syriza, Synaspismos remained the the split of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). central pillar of the alliance. Despite deep scep- In 1968, a wing later designated as Eurocom- ticism within the alliance vis-à-vis the EU, it was munist left the CP, which was outlawed during possible to establish Greece’s continued mem- Greece’s military dictatorship (1967-1974). After bership in the EU as part of the programme. the end of the military dictatorship a section of the Eurocommunists evolved into the undog- After the electoral alliance’s 2007 entry into par- matic (EAR), which was close to the liament with 5 per cent, other left, social, and new social movements. At the end of the 1980s, ecological groups joined it. In the 2009 election, in the midst of a crisis of the scandal-plagued however, its vote percentage fell to 4.6 per cent. social democratic PASOK, the EAR together During the first years of the financial crisis, the with the Marxist-Leninist KKE formed the "Coa- continually re-emerging internal battles nearly lition of the Left and " (SYN). Although led to the definitive split of the alliance. In 2010 this electoral alliance was very fragile from the a large section of Synaspismos’s right wing left start, it did get 13 per cent of votes in the par- and founded the "" (DimAr) liamentary election of 1989. In 1991, internal "as a constructive left opposition" to PASOK. conflicts and the collapse of the In what followed, the party leadership around led to a break once again; nevertheless, undog- Tsipras succeeded in using the new room for

10 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

manoeuvre in order to open up Synaspismos fragmentation of the political system and the further and thus win over disillusioned mem- inability to create stable majorities in . bers of PASOK and the KKE to work in Syriza. What was new was that it was no longer the camps around ND and PASOK that were con- In the 6 May 2012 election, Syriza, with nearly fronting each other; now the confrontation 17 per cent, captured the second largest share was between the proponents and opponents of votes in the country. After failed attempts at of austerity policy. The two major establish- coalition by the ND, which placed first, Tsipras, ment parties saw themselves confronted by who had always advocated a common alliance growing political margins that had previously of all left forces, was given the task of forming functioned as nothing more than legitimation a government. However, his attempts failed. aids to democracy. The small parties had never Tsipras' refusal to go into coalition with PASOK taken part in coalition governments; but now and instead push for a left government led to they were suddenly needed. The days of a Syriza’s increased popularity in opinion polls. mere exchange of majorities between ND and This meant a neck-and-neck race with ND in PASOK were over.8 the new ballot that had now become neces- sary. But the biggest obstacle for Syriza turned That the two dominant parties at first still con- out to be not ND but a peculiarity of Greece’s trolled the levers of power was due not only to , which awards 50 bonus seats the tremendous media pressure from Europe to the strongest party in a parliament with but also to Greece’s left. The left—which was about 300 seats. Since only parties and not divided into the three parliamentary parties electoral alliances can benefit from this Syriza Syriza, KKE, and DimAr—did not see itself in registered itself as a party in time for the 17 a position to act together. Instead, DimAr and June 2012 ballot. It increased its vote share and KKE pursued their rejection of got 26.9 per cent but narrowly missed the goal and refused any pre- or post-electoral cooper- of becoming the strongest party. ation. That in 2012 the votes of ND and PASOK still allowed for a of these The increase in its electoral showing from 4.6 two parties was primarily due to the electoral (2009) to 26.9 per cent (June 2012) is histor- system with its 50 bonus seats for ND. At the ically unprecedented for the left in Europe. It same time, however, the election showed that was only possible because the party was able Syriza was reaching more than protest voters, to form a common party out of the two-de- but rather was able to collect 27 per cent of cades-old fragile alliance, without losing the voters behind an anti-austerity policy based on character of a broad . both resistance and the responsibility to shape policy. This simultaneously illustrates that a new societal line of conflict had come into cen- Among the European left, the period after Syr- tre field in Greece: austerity and Troika policy. iza’s January 2015 electoral victory is generally known as the European left or red spring. In my view, however, this spring already had its Syriza’s Electoral Victory beginnings years before Syriza’s coming into government. After being shaken for four years The conservative/social democratic coalition’s by a devastating economic and financial cri- parliamentary vote of 7 December 2014 on a sis, Greece caught the attention of Europe with the parliamentary elections of May and 8 See Dominic Heilig, Griechenland: Europa streitet wieder über Alternativen, 2012, and Heilig, Die - June 2012. The reason for this was, aside from mentswahlen in Griechenland, 2012, both at www.ro- the left’s good performance, the increasing salux.de.

11 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

new round of budget cuts made it clear that that the Europe-wide media and political com- Antonis Samras’ (ND) government no longer mentary on the 2012 electoral campaign was had the secure support of 180 deputies in par- unusually heated learned better in 2015. One liament. Thus number is constitutionally nec- would have to look far and wide to find an elec- essary to elect a new state president (in the tion in an EU Member State that drew similar third ballot), and this vote, due to rotation, was attention throughout Europe. Seen positively, due to occur two months later. The governing this election thus had a European dimen- coalition, which only had a narrow majority sion—much more so than the European Par- after DimAr’s exit from the governing alliance, liament elections held a year before. Speaking sought rescue by leaping and calling as objectively as possible, we have to say that anticipated elections for a new state president. never before had there been such an aggres- The intention was to pressure their own dep- sive attempt to exert external influence on uties and at the same time push through the the electoral behaviour of an EU country. This austerity policy anchored in the budget plan. was mainly because Syriza was leading in the The announcement of an anticipated presi- polls, which truly terrified Europe’s conserva- dential election also had to do with the Euro- tive and social democratic elites. They feared group’s declared wish to prolong the "Bailout they would have to swallow a symbolic defeat Programme"—which is to say, to subject the for their neoliberal policy of cuts, which would country to the further diktat of the Troika. In so have a ripple effect on the upcoming elections doing, Samaras was holding out the prospect in the crisis countries: Spain, Portugal, and Ire- that the Troika’s austerity diktats would soon land. Especially in Germany, the most decisively end. important state for current European policy, many politicians felt obliged to criticise Syriza’s In the first two ballots, with 160 and 168 votes, electoral programme. Flanked by high-circula- the coalition fell short of the requisite two- tion media, members of the German govern- thirds majority for electing a president. For the ment threatened Greece with being thrown third and final ballot, in which only 180 votes out of the euro ("Grexit"). were necessary, Samaras counted on the votes of deputies from the DimAr and ANEL parties, These attacks also produced a fightback. which according to polls had poor prospects Throughout Europe a struggle developed of getting back into parliament in the event of between the political camps—Troika propo- anticipated elections. nents versus the left—around hegemony in the Greek parliament. Delegations of prom- Between ballots Syriza made it clear that the inent left politicians travelled to Athens to party insisted on anticipated elections. The lend support, organised actions Greek people, it said, must first have the pos- and tried to put their national governments sibility of voting on the future of the country— under pressure to correct their policy towards the budget plan. Athens. In the course of this confrontation a European left consciousness developed for the When after the third ballot on 29 December first time. After 2014, when the EL had already 2014 the coalition failed to receive the needed put up Alexis Tsipras as their majority of 180 deputies, Samaras called for for the office of EU Commission president, new elections to be held on 25 January 2015. he now became a European candidate again. Never before had the electoral campaign of a The 2015 electoral campaign lasted less than a left party created such extensive mobilisation month but was very intense. Whoever believed beyond national borders in its partner parties.

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The stooge of the conservative Europe-wide of the greater part of the nominal value of campaign was the conservative Nea Dimokra- public debts; tia and its Samaras. If Tsip- ⇒⇒ inclusion of a growth clause in the repay- ras were to win the election, the country would ment of the remaining debts that would be isolated and be without a strong currency, peg them to the growth rate rather Samaras warned. He repeatedly stressed than having them paid with budgetary that the country had "already accomplished a resources; long and painful road of cuts and consolida- ⇒⇒ a European New Deal for public invest- tion," which could now turn out to have been ments, financed by the European Invest- in vain. Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang ment Bank.10 Schäuble (CDU) put it similarly. He warned Ath- ens against abandoning the "reform course" Since the June 2012 election there have been prescribed by the Troika and pointed to the bil- seven parties in the Vouli. With the exception lions in bond purchases by the European Cen- of DimAr, they could all hope to re-enter parlia- tral Bank (ECB), which had begun right before ment. In 2015 a total of 22 parties stood for elec- election Sunday in Athens. The political right’s tion. According to polls, the social democratic campaign was thus based on fear and "more of PASOK was hovering around the 3 per cent the same." electoral threshold; so was its splinter group KIDISO—founded by former PASOK chair and "Syriza is restoring hope," was the party’s own prime minister Giorgos Papandreou—and the motto. Its campaign rested on two pillars: the (ANEL). All polls indicated struggle for democracy, that is, the Greeks win- that the party To Potami (), founded ning back their sovereignty; and an economic in 2014, was sure to enter parliament. programme worked out in detail, but set forth in layman’s terms, for overcoming the crisis. On the eve of 25 January 2015 election it Since the 2012 parliamentary election, Syriza became clear early on that Syriza would be had rallied many celebrated economists to its the strongest party. It also soon became evi- side and had them develop a new programme dent that Papandreou and his KIDISO splinter for a future government.9 The core demand party would not make it into parliament and was the rejection of the Memorandum (the that his former party, PASOK, would get in at Troika treaties) and their substitution by an an extremely low level: 4.7 per cent. Thus the alternative economic and social programme. once major party of the 1980s after the fall of This programme was based on: the military dictatorship was only able to get a tenth of the votes. Even the KKE, with 5.5 per ⇒⇒ ending austerity policy and the reinstate- cent, slid into parliament ahead of PASOK. On ment of collective labour agreements as the other hand, the results of ANEL, the ND well as the rescinding of the labour legisla- splinter, were sobering; with a 3 per cent loss tion introduced by the Memorandum; but just ahead of PASOK it also got into par- ⇒⇒ a commitment to reviving the economy, liament. The economic-liberal To Potami, which stimulating the labour market, and the had arisen from protest against Troika policy, introduction of a fair tax system, as well fell below expectations and won 6 per cent of as a democratic restructuring of the the votes, which was even a bit less than the incrusted political system; ⇒⇒ cancellation, through a debt conference, 10 See the Greek Government Programme, www.trans- form-network.net/en/focus/greece-decides/news/de- 9 See the interview with John Milios, , 22 tail/Programm/what-the-syriza-government-will-do. January 2015. html.

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Diagram 1: Left-right scale of parties in Greece (simplified)

fascists of . The unequivocal loser had declared on election eve that they would of the election was—alongside DimAr, which not be available as a coalition partner, Tsip- disappeared from parliament altogether—the ras had very little room for manoeuvre. If he conservative governing party under Prime wanted not to break his electoral promise of Minister Samaras. not going into coalition with any of the parties supporting the old system, the only possibility However, Syriza won 36.3 per cent and became left was cooperation with ANEL, a right-wing the strongest party. That gave Alexis Tsipras populist, clerical, and chauvinist formation. It the electoral mandate to form the first left-led was founded by ex-ND members that had left government in the history of the EU. their party in opposition to the government’s social spending cuts. This is where the minimal consensus of the unequal partners lay: ending Europe’s Left Spring Loses Its Bloom austerity.

In the first weeks after Syriza’s electoral suc- In spring the Tsipras government tried to nego- cess Europe’s left was in a euphoric mood: tiate new conditions for debt forgiveness with "We began in Athens, next we’ll take ". the members of the . Many on the For the first time, leftists in Europe’s capitals left had high hopes for a change of course in demonstrated for and not against a govern- Europe, for an alternative to the austerity dik- ment. tat and Germany’s crisis policy. But in view of the real relations of forces, people already But the first test for the new Greek government began to sense that first on the agenda would occurred as early as February 2015, when fur- be "compromises to buy time and keep open ther payments that had been negotiated by the spaces for manoeuvre."11 Alexis Tsipras is the predecessor government in a second aid reported to have said in the European Parlia- package had to be paid by Athens, necessitat- ment: "We negotiated more than we governed. ing another round of Eurozone credits. "Under conditions of financial strangulation our care, our worry, our thinking was about Tsipras withstood this test as well as left-wing how we would manage to keep Greece’s econ- 12 criticism in Europe directed against the choice omy alive." of ANEL as coalition partner and also the fact 11 Tom Strohschneider, "Nach dem Frühling," ND-Dossier: that his government had not appointed one Deutsch-Europa gegen Syriza. #ThisIsACoup, 2015, p. 3. woman as minister. However, since the KKE 12 Quoted in ibid.

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However, by the end of June it was clear that more concessions, others demanded a harder there would not be any settlement between line against Brussels and brought the idea of Athens and the Eurogroup. In the innumera- Grexit into play. Many people in Greece felt the ble negotiation rounds Tsipras had gone a long absence of the promised reforms—but these way to try and accommodate the creditors, but were only feasible for the government if there the latter had no interest in compromise. They were means to carry them out, in other words, wanted to be rid of this government as quickly if the creditors’ conditions were changed. Even as possible—on principle but also as a signal within the EL, criticism of Tsipras was growing, to the other crisis states in which there were although his critics did not formulate alterna- upcoming elections and the left was becoming tives. increasingly strong. What followed from Tsipras' announcement Especially over the Greek Finance Minister, was equal in its dramatic intensity to the Jan- , there was a parting of the uary electoral campaign: European politicians, ways, and the negotiations increasingly took especially those from Germany, openly inter- on a personalised form. For weeks negotia- fered and campaigned against the vote Syriza tions were under way between Syriza and the was calling for. Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijssel- representatives of the International Monetary bloem called the referendum a "sad decision Fund, the ECB and the EU over an extension of for Greece’ that would close the door to fur- the credit programme for Greece. At the ulti- ther discussions.13 Accordingly, the Eurogroup mate meeting of the Eurogroup finance min- discussed a temporary closing of banks and isters on 25 June it was finally impossible to capital controls in Greece to be enforced up reach an agreement. At the meeting of heads of to the referendum, which at that point was to government, President of the European Coun- take place a week later. The ECB pressed the cil Donald Tusk said of Athens, "the game is Greek government to agree to these mea- over". Tsipras packed up his bags. On the next sures. On the other hand, the ECB did not want day Tsipras issued a public declaration that he to expand the framework for default loans for had decided to submit to the Greek people via Greek banks; this was to intensify pressure on a referendum the final conditions offered by Athens. the creditors for a continuation of the credit programme that had been ongoing since 2012. These steps show that the ECB was carrying At the same time he asked the population for out a policy directed against the elected gov- their rejection because the current paper was ernment. Athens had to agree to a closing of "worse than the original Memorandum of the banks a week before the referendum; from 2010". Europe’s establishment was aghast. that moment on citizens could only withdraw a maximum of 60 euros per day. Greece’s econ- From Syriza’s point of view, it was obvious that omy practically came to a standstill. The Ger- this was the course of action to take—after man federal minister of the economy and chair all, the party’s aim was, after getting control of the SPD, , even declared that of the crisis within the country, also to democ- the referendum would be about Grexit: A "No"- ratise Europe’s monetary system. Still, the vote would be a clear signal against remaining Prime Minister was anything but certain that in the euro. Eurogroup president Dijsselbloem he would get a majority voting OXI (no). Since agreed: "If the Greeks vote OXI in the referen- there was no movement in the negotiations, dum, there will of course be no basis for a new the criticism within his own camp had become louder in recent weeks. While some asked for 13 Quoted in Strohschneider, p. 5.

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credit programme, and it will be very question- nue increases. In return Athens wanted credits able whether there is any basis left for Greece from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to be in the Eurozone."14 in the amount of at least 53.5 billion euros over three years in order to be able to pay back For a long time polls pointed to a close race debts until 2018, an investment package, as between the left’s OXI camp and those who well as concessions on the primary surplus and wanted to vote against the Tsipras government. on debt relief. However, on 5 July the referendum turned into a brilliant victory for the Tsipras camp, which Some of the left in Europe saw this paper as a got 61.3 per cent. reinterpretation or even "betrayal" of the OXI- vote, and Syriza’s left wing itself also rebelled For one more time the Greek and European and demanded that the country exit from the lefts could breathe a sigh of relief together. euro. Tsipras vehemently disagreed with a Once again the left in Europe could draw euro-exit and asked parliament to mandate strength from this unexpected referendum vic- further negotiations. Although he got a solid tory. Once again Syriza had made it against all majority, the governing coalition at the same establishment resistance, against Merkel and time was short of its own governing majority. the Eurogroup. The fury of the neoliberals was One day later the German finance minister as great as it was because the numbers from reissued his threat: Either the Greek govern- Greece were so impressive: 85 per cent of 18- to ment accepts the creditors’ conditions or it 24-year-olds said no to austerity policy, as did must leave the Eurozone. And so the German 70 per cent of employees in the public sector suggestion of Athens’ (temporary) exit from and almost 73 per cent of the unemployed. But the euro came onto the agenda. the big question now was: What next? On 12 July the heads of government of the The day after the referendum Yanis Varoufakis Eurozone met and negotiated until late at resigned as Minister of Finance, explaining night. Tsipras received no support from other that he wanted to depersonalise the conflict member states. Later, the phrase "mental with the Eurogroup and free the way to new waterboarding" was to make the rounds. At any negotiations. His successor Efkidis Tsakalotos, rate, the pressure exerted on the head of gov- who had already assumed the responsibility of ernment, who was forced to choose between negotiating with Brussels two days after the being thrown out of the euro or a terrible cred- referendum, got no further with his propos- itors’ package, must have been huge.15 als than had Varoufakis. It had long since not been a matter of Greece but of the question The next day it was clear that Tsipras would whether the euro would become a straitjacket accept the Eurogroup’s demands. "In this fierce in which there would be no room for manoeu- struggle," he said, it was possible to achieve a vre left for democracy. restructuring of debts, and with the new ESM programme put a solution on the table. At the On the Thursday evening after the referendum same time, Tsipras spoke of "our lost demo- the Greek government sent a new paper to the cratic sovereignty". #ThisIsACoup became the EU institutions with new proposals that largely number one hashtag on social media. The left accommodated the creditors’ conditions. As in Greece and in Europe was shocked. As a a whole, the measures were to total 13 billion result of the credit programme agreed with the euros, consisting of spending cuts and reve- creditors Tsipras finally lost his majority in par-

14 Quoted in Strohschneider, p. 7. 15 Ibid, p. 12.

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liament, because members of Syriza’s left wing become the third strongest force in parlia- did not want to support the accord. In several ment. In addition, it advocated Greece’s exit votes on the government’s reform course, from the euro. up to a third of Tsipras’ parliamentary group refused to give him allegiance. On 20 August In the end, Syriza won the anticipated elections Tsipras therefore announced his resignation of 20 September 2015 with 35.5 per cent (0.8 as prime minister in order to clear the way for per cent less than it received in January) and new elections. took 145 of the 300 parliamentary seats. Tsip- ras' second cabinet, again a coalition govern- The wing of Syriza organised as the "Left Plat- ment with ANEL, was sworn in three days after form" left the group and the party and on 21 the election. The other parties’ results were August founded the party Laiki Enotita—Left very close to what they received in January; the Popular Unity (LAE). The new party confidently Syriza splinter LAE did not manage to enter the launched its electoral campaign, hoping to Vouli.

3. The Black Autumn of the Left in Europe: The Left in Spain

Since the end of the Franco dictatorship in Izquierda Unida: The Left Unites 1975, Spain’s political landscape has been characterised by extreme polarisation. This On 15 April 1920 the Partido Comunista is expressed in the struggle of two political Español (PCE) was founded out of the youth blocs, one side of which is dominated by the organisation of the Socialist Workers’ Party. At Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) and the same time, members of the Socialist Party the other by the conservative People’s Party (PS) tried to move their party to join the Com- (PP). Other smaller, often regional, formations munist International. Instead, the PS joined and parties are located on the political mar- the International Working Union of Socialist gins and between these two blocs. This bloc Parties, at which point those who favoured confrontation was broken through the pro- the announced their tests against the central government’s auster- exit and on 13 April 1921 founded the Partido ity policy with the emergence of new parties Comunista Obrero Español (PCOE). Both of that did not identify with either bloc. Instead, the two young communist parties—the PCE they—especially the movement with a party and the PCOE—united on 14 November 1921 statute: Podemos—see themselves as move- to form the Partido Comunista de España ments against the old political oligarchy. (PCE).

The regionalisation of Spain, in any case, was At the end of the 1920s, a pro-Soviet tendency not broken by these new citizens’ parties. prevailed in the party, which resulted in splits This regionalisation, and the electoral system and resignations. When the Second Spanish derived from it today, still favours the forma- Republic was proclaimed in 1931, internal con- tion of regional parties. Consequently, a coun- flicts brought the party to the verge of collapse. try-wide left has difficulties in asserting itself, The PCE actively participated in the workers’ to the chagrin of the left socialist party alliance uprisings in 1934 and in the 1936 elections affil- Izquierda Unida (IU). iated with the Frente Popular ().

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In the , which broke out in also the occasion for inner-party conflicts.19 In 1936 and lasted until 1939, the PCE enjoyed the end, the party broke loose from the influ- great popularity, and its membership rose to ence of the CPSU, turned to , circa 200,000.16 With the defeat of the Republic and accepted Spain’s .20 the PCE was outlawed, and its members were persecuted and murdered under Franco. Many In the 1982 elections, the party fell to only went into exile, especially in the Soviet Union 4.1 per cent of votes. Its still centralist struc- and France. tures counteracted its programmatic open- ing and turn towards Eurocommunism. But Until its legalisation on 9 April 1977 the party an explanation of its vote loss also needs to operated illegally.17 In the first free elections of take account of the polarisation of the political 1977, the PCE received 9.4 per cent of votes. At conflict between the PSOE and PP, for at the this time, it was in an alliance with the Socialist end of the 1970s the Socialist Workers’ Party Workers’ Party, the Coordinación Democrática, had established itself as the alternative to the against the representatives of the old regime. Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD), a bour- In the 1979 elections, the PCE could even geois party of the centre right, which had been improve its result, reaching 10.8 per cent. The governing up to that point. The UCD’s crisis of history of the party can be divided into five government was aggravated when the party phases:18 made Spain’s accession to NATO—which is unpopular among Spaniards—a central issue 1. split-off from the PSOE and founding of in its electoral campaign. This enabled the the PCE; PSOE to get an absolute majority and govern 2. Spanish Civil War and establishment of uninterruptedly until 1996. the PCE; 3. illegality and orientation to the CPSU; With its accession to the European Commu- 4. legalisation and acceptance of the consti- nity (EC) in 1986, Spain began to experience tutional monarchy; strong economic growth, which was often 5. socialist turn and formation of new alli- compared to the German "economic mira- ances. cle". The upswing brought changes to the economically weak country, affecting its polit- Since the 1960s, the PCE has acted in an increas- ical attitudes, social relations, and cultural ingly moderate manner. This strategy proved orientations. Above all, the EU’s Structural successful, as the 1979 elections showed, but Funds contributed to decomposition of the it—especially the change of relation of the classical in Spain. With this the PCE party to the Soviet Union and the CPSU—was lost broad sections of its base. The left—that is, the movements and parties to the left of the PSOE—had no answer to the effects of the increasing globalisation of economic and 16 See Andreas Baumer, "Jenseits der Pyrenäen. Partei- ensysteme und gesellschaftliche Konflikte in Spanien financial circuits. und Portugal," Edith Ulrich and Gerd Mielke (eds.), Ge- sellschaftliche Konflikte und Parteiensysteme, Länder und Regionalstudien, : Westdeutscher Verlag, 19 See Fred A. Lopez III, "Bourgeois State and the Rise of 2001, p. 144. Social Democracy in Spain," Ronald H. Chilcote et al. 17 See Walther Bernecker, Spanien-Lexikon. Wirtschaft, Poli- (eds.), Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy. Com- tik, Kultur, Gesellschaft, : Beck, 1990, p. 338. parative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece, New York: 18 Division following Rainer Schultz (who recognises only Crane Russak, 1990, pp. 17-72, especially pp. 53f. four phases); see Rainer Schultz, Linksdemokratische 20 See Marita Müller, Politische Parteien in Spanien (1977- Parteien in Spanien. Facetten und Entwicklung, RLS-Studie, 1982). Interne Konflikte und Wahlverhalten, Saarbrücken: January 2003, p. 4. Verlag für Entwicklungspolitik, 1994, pp. 46ff.

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The left socialist party alliance, Izquierda The party today is divided into 17 regional IU Unida, has its origins not in a party but— organisations, which pursue politics locally in as with Syriza or Synaspismos—as a loose parallel to the regional organisations of the IU electoral alliance grouped around the ques- member parties, themselves in part regional tion of NATO membership. Although Spain organisations. Ever since its founding, the IU had since 1950 already accepted US military has sought to strengthen its pluralist profile bases, Spain’s NATO accession in 1982 rep- and open itself to the new alter-globalist and resented a political sea change for the still social movements or also be active as parts of young democracy in the context of the Cold the latter in the various social forums at the War and the Reagan Administration’s nuclear regional, nation-state, European, and global offensive. Many voters were disillusioned with levels. In the report to the Seventh General the PSOE’s "cave-in," turned away from the Assembly of the IU in December 2003, the IU party, and were active from then on in citi- explicitly declares its commitment to socialism zens’ movements against NATO membership. and that it will struggle to achieve a society Through these struggles a to the that is "participatory, critical, and alternative to left of the PSOE was established. In 1985, from the dominant model".23 In the view of its mem- the Plataforma Civica por la Salida de España bers, this includes pacifism as well as ecologi- de la OTAN, there developed the electoral alli- cal standpoints and .24 ance Plataforma de la Izquierda Unida, which got 4.6 per cent of votes and finally in 1989 The party’s links to the trade unions come prin- received 9.07 per cent.21 In 1992 IU was finally cipally from its member party, the PCE, which officially registered as a Spanish party—con- is closely tied to the country’s biggest trade sisting of eight founding parties.22 union, the Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.). The fact that the PCE had already decided in 1986 Despite the circumstance that the IU is regis- to work actively in the creation of electoral alli- tered and publicly active as an autonomous ances, and in the end transform the IU into a party, IU primarily has the characteristics party, cushioned the effects on the PCE of the of a party alliance, in which the constituent collapse of actually existing socialism in 1989. member parties retain their formal, legal, As a result, the electoral alliance’s very good organisational, and political autonomy. This results, 9.6 per cent, in the 1989 parliamentary fact repeatedly leads to tensions among the election could even be improved four years member organisations, especially in terms later, when the party received 10.5 per cent of of candidate choices for electoral lists, finan- votes. This outstanding showing, however, was cial resources, and programmatic orientation. not repeated in succeeding elections.

In parallel to the lack of electoral successes, 21 See Juan J. and José Ramón Montero, "The party sys- tems of Spain. Old cleavages and new challenges," Lau- the political, strategic, and programmatic con- ri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle (eds.), Party Systems and frontations within IU grew. Above all, the PCE, Voter Alignments Revisted, , New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 163ff. which for a long time had been on the defen- 22 However, with the exception of the PCE and the Colecti- sive and, in relation to its relative strength, vo de Unidad, the founding parties left IU between 1987 restrained within the party alliance, now began and 2001. Today many regional parties also belong to the IU, for example, Catalonia’s Esquerra Unida i Alter- to demand more influence in its organs. nativa, the left-alternative Trotskyist Espacio Alternati- vo, the Colectivo de Unidad and the smaller Trotskyist groups Cuadernos Internacionales, Nuevo Claridad, 23 See the resolution of the Seventh IU General Assembly, Partido Obrero Revolucionario, as well as the Partido December 2003, p. 3, www1.izquierda-unida.es. Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Izquierda Revolu- 24 See Paola Giaculli, "Parlamentswahl in Spanien," DIE LIN- cionaria. KE International, Juli 2008.

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In the 2004-2008 legislature, IU tolerated a countrywide and become the third strongest under José Luis Rodrí- party. The party also benefitted from the mas- guez Zapatero (PSOE) but was hardly able to sive social protests against the government’s exert any substantive influence on it. The fact austerity programme, since its members had that the PSOE bypassed IU in significant ques- been active in the protest movement from the tions and instead sought an alliance with the very beginning. After the regional elections, IU conservative opposition party, the PP, weak- had more than 58 mayors elected with abso- ened the United Left just as much as did the lute majorities and 53 mayors with relative PSOE strategy, in general directed against IU, majorities. IU also increased its number of of the voto útil (useful vote) or voto de miedo seats in the regional parliament elections.25 (fear vote). IU General Director Gaspar Llamaz- Shortly after the regional elections that were ares announced his resignation already before so disappointing for the PSOE, Prime Minister the national congress of 15-16 November 2008. Zapatero called anticipated elections for 20 Although the congress, which was rocked by November 2011 and announced he would not heated confrontations, was able to elect a new be a candidate. directorate it could not agree on a new chair. Finally, on 14 December, the IU directorate In 2011, Spain was particularly hard hit by the elected PCE member Cayo Lara as new gen- worldwide economic and financial crisis. The eral director. Lara tried to undo the strategic boom of the "economic miracle" was over; it alliance of his predecessor Llamazares with the had had feet of clay—especially in terms of the governing PSOE and emphasise IU’s autonomy. construction and real estate sector. Driven by hype in the financial and stock market at the beginning of the decade, new satellite towns Spain: A Crisis-torn Country had arisen on the periphery of metropolises, whose housing units had mortgages of up to In the regional elections of May 2011 the PSOE, 120 per cent. The consequences of the real which had been governing under Prime Min- estate bubble that burst in 2008 was particu- ister Zapatero up to that year, suffered a dra- larly alarming in Spain: 700,000 unsold hous- matic defeat and sunk to 27.8 per cent coun- ing units awaited buyers; according to Spain’s trywide (it was at 35 per cent in 2007). Strong- central bank 176 billion euros were outstanding holds like Seville and were lost. The and rested on rickety mortgages. Many people party’s weakness principally benefitted the could no longer manage the interest on these conservative opposition party, Partido Popu- mortgages; as a result, since 2008 at least lar (PP). It entered almost all regional govern- 300,000 Spaniards have been forcibly evicted. ments and reached a national average of 38 per cent of votes. In May, many Spaniards cast The rate of unemployment also rose during the "invalid" ballots to express their protest and crisis. If the unemployment figure in 2008 was solidarity with the mass protests (of the 15 May still officially at about 2 million, in 2011 it had Movement in the Puerta del Sol in Madrid) that risen to 4.4 million. The rate of unemployment had continued since 15 May 2011. was thus 22 per cent, with youth unemploy- ment even reaching 50 per cent. An entire gen- For the IU, the regional elections offered the eration had no hopes of a future. And this has first glimmer of hope after steadily declin- changed very little to this day. ing electoral results in previous years. Espe- 25 See Dominic Heilig, Ein Hoffnungsschimmer für die cially by winning over disillusioned PSOE voter Linke. Eine kurze Einschätzung der Regionalwahlen in milieus it was able to improve to 6.3 per cent Spanien aus linker Sicht, www.rosalux.de, pp. 4f.

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The most important conflict since the transformation of Spanish society after the death of Franco in 1975 is the confrontation between church and state. Spain’s society and party system are, in addition, plagued by clientelism and paternalism. This authoritarian political tradition is reflected to the present day in highly personalised parties and weak political participation27: in relation to other European countries Spain has a very low rate of party membership.28 Furthermore, the transformation of Spanish society is characterised by the fact that from the late 1970s the parties were assigned a role within the institutional fabric out of which it is difficult to develop forces that can mobilise society. The advent of modern mass media substantially changed the requirements of communication.29 With the transition from the fascist dictatorship to a constitu- tional monarchy, moreover, a took shape that still today determines broad sections of political discourse. Regional parties not only dominated the party system but also received a parliamentary anchoring in the national chamber of deputies.30 The church-state conflict, the conflict between party and institutions, and the centre-periphery conflict today hamper national parties like the IU in building and extending a country-wide party base. It is hard for the IU to present voters with an ongoing and consistent programme. Especially the discarding of in favour of regionalisation aggravates the problems of establishing left parties that want to be able to act on the national scale.

The neoliberal recipes of the PSOE government and registration; the second was the expan- for solving the crisis were the same as under sion of participatory democracy in the party; PASOK in Greece (under Papandreou) and PS the third was counteracting the low morale in Portugal (under Sócrates): spending cuts to affecting the payment of membership dues. the detriment of the population in education, The United Left could rely on the support of the healthcare system, and in pensions and the largest Spanish (CC.OO.) in salaries in the public sector. In addition, pub- the 2011 parliamentary elections and also lic budgets are to be replenished by privatis- benefitted from the new protest movements ing basic public services. Conversely, billions and disillusioned PSOE voters. In the electoral in emergency credits for banks and tax incen- campaign, Cayo Lara was presented as a "par- tives for enterprises are to be enacted. liamentary indignado," and he urged people not to boycott the elections but to give IU their With the election of a new directorate under vote in order "confront neoliberal policy head the leadership of Cayo Lara, IU paved the way on". The party’s electoral programme showed to a "refounding of the party alliance". The first that this was not a heavy-handed attempt to step was continuing membership recruitment capture votes but that it was certainly attempt- ing to include Spain’s 15-M protest movement. 26 See Rafael Arias-Salgado, "Entstehung und Struktur des More precisely, this was not really an electoral spanischen Parteiensystems," Zeitschrift für Parlaments- fragen 1988, p. 379. programme but rather a "call to action against 27 See Jonathan Hopkin, "Spain: Political Parties in a Young the crisis and for the mobilisation of a social Democracy," David Broughton and Mark Donovan 30 (eds.), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe, London, alternative and genuine democracy". It was New York: Pinter, 1999, pp. 224f. the product of a broad consensus among 28 See Melanie Haas, "Das Parteiensystem Spaniens," Mel- those who were "building an alternative social anie Haas, Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Stöss (eds.), Die Parteiensysteme Westeuropas, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag bloc against neoliberal hegemony". The draft- für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006, p. 427. 29 See Dieter Nohlen, Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem—Über 30 See Convocatoria social para 7 revoluciones [Social Call die politischen Auswirkungen von Wahlsystemen, Opladen: for 7 ], http://izquierda-unida.es/sites/de- Leske + Budrich, 2000 (third edition), pp. 332ff. fault/files/doc/7_Revoluciones.pdf.

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ing process saw the participation of 200 asso- national level, for example, committees against ciations and organisations throughout the forced evictions and self-help organisations country as well as 15,000 IU sympathisers in appeared. The first high point of this protest 500 public assemblies and many internet dis- movement, whose strongest offshoot was cussions. 15-M, was the founding of the party Podemos ("We Can"). Nevertheless, the left’s electoral results were disillusioning: the right-wing conservative PP Podemos is, in a strict sense, a Spanish politi- got 44.6 per cent of votes (2008: 39.9 per cent), cal citizens’ and democracy movement, which which gave it an absolute majority of seats, formed in January 2014 and was approved as and could name Mariano Rajoy as prime min- a party on 11 March 2014. Its popular leading ister, which he remains to the present day. The figure is Pablo Iglesias Turrión. The party stood PSOE, which had governed up to that point, its first test in the June 2014 European Parlia- lost more than 15 per cent and only received ment elections, in which it got 8 per cent of 28.7 per cent of votes (2008: 43.9 per cent). votes and 5 MEPs in Brussels, who, like those of IU, joined the left GUE/NGL group. This is one If the May 2011 regional elections had already of the reasons why the party is categorised as given the IU a glimmer of hope, its score, left—it is an external, European categorisa- as of now, still was a success. The party was tion, with which not everyone in the Podemos able to almost double its results in compari- milieu says they agree. to 2008—and once again became one of the strongest left parties in the EU. With the The origin of the Podemos movement is in inclusion of broad social sectors in drawing up the manifesto "Mover fiche: convertir la indig- its political and programmatic objectives the nación en cambio político" ("Make a move: party had gained more societal grounding. It turn indignation into political change’). The is especially interesting that the party alliance, manifesto was signed by around 30 intellec- which had previously been on the verge of a tuals, cultural figures, journalists, and social split and/or dissolution, was able to reinforce activists, who pointed to the necessity of field- its self-confidence through internal reforms. ing candidates for the European Parliament in Cayo Lara had been able to implement his order to oppose EU austerity policy at the Euro- programme of "refounding and democratising pean level as well. Some of the emphasised the IU’, and the IU understood how to link the programmatic points were the redistribution extra-parliamentary and the parliamentary of wealth in Spain from top to botttom, the levels. As a result it enhanced its programmatic maintenance of the public character of educa- profile as a left socialist party alliance. tion and healthcare, the raising of salaries, the creation of a stock of public housing, as well as resistance to the tightening of Spain’s abor- Podemos: From Citizens’ Movement tion legislation. The movement also demanded to Party Spain’s exit from NATO.

With the executive in the hands of the con- From the start, Podemos focused on a high servative PP, now commanding an absolute degree of citizen participation. It wanted to majority, austerity policy was further intensi- present candidates for the European election fied. This provoked countrywide protests and only if at least 50,000 people declared their the emergence of many citizens’ organisa- support for the project. These signatures tions, especially strongly regional ones. At the materialised within 24 hours. Today, according

22 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

to Podemos, it has more than 380,000 sup- of both the traditional and modern lefts in porters.31 Europe. For this reason, the decision was made for the EU election to use Pablo Iglesias’ face as At the time of the 2014 European election, the the logo on the ballot cards. This met with mas- majority of Podemos’ initiators still hoped to sive criticism in social media. In the party logo create a common candicacy with other left or colours today there is—deliberately—noth- parties and opponents of spending cuts and ing that recalls the traditional left in Europe. the dismantling of the welfare system, and many activists of smaller left parties joined the In the EU election Podemos instantly became alliance. On 24 February 2014, Podemos and IU Spain’s fourth strongest political force (IU was met with the aim of sounding out the possibil- in third place with 10 per cent). The party prof- ity of a unified slate. These talks revealed areas ited from the activation of voters who, given of agreement but also differences between other choices, would have abstained, as well the two organisations in establishing electoral as those who were disillusioned with the PSOE lists. While Podemos advocated conducting and turned their back on it. According to a poll, open primaries in which every citizen could 66 per cent of Podemos voters were older than take part, IU argued that the parties taking 35, with 56 per cent of them men and mostly part in the candidacy should determine the employed people (50 per cent as against 22 per leading candidates. cent unemployed, 15 per cent students, and 9 per cent pensioners). A third of Podemos vot- The differences proved insuperable. After ers had voted for the PSOE in the 2009 Euro- the failure of the negotiations, Podemos pean election. Ideologically, Podemos voters announced it would stand in the elections were located between IU and PSOE. Up to the alone and conduct an open primary in which last moment, 60 per cent of them had not yet non-members could also participate via inter- decided which party to vote for.32 Podemos’ net. In the 2014 EU electoral campaign, some success was above all due to regional social movements joined company parties’ loss of credibility and motivated by the with Podemos and others with Izquierda Unida. middle stratum’s fear of falling into poverty. Podemos’ primaries—in which candidates had to be proposed by one of the Podemos Circles At the end of July 2014, Podemos began admit- (Circulos Podemos) in order to run—took place ting party members. Within the first 48 hours in March 2014. According to some information, 32,000 people registered on its website. After 33,000 people took part. 60 per cent voted for 20 days Podemos already had about 100,000 Pablo Iglesias as the lead candidate. members and consequently became Spain’s third largest party, bigger than IU.33 However, within the party, in part because of its great heterogeneity, there were repeated conflicts over the direction of the alliance. The The Question of Alliance Causes Strife biggest conflict—around the party logo for the European election—was at first purely sym- The municipal and regional elections of 24 bolic, but in the end it was to significantly affect May 2015 in Spain heralded the final end of the Podemos’ political-programme orientation. In two-party system. Although nationwide the order to take as many people from the protest conservative PP remained the strongest force, movements with them as possible, Podemos’ it lost more than 10 per cent in relation to the initiators wanted to exclude the symbols 32 See El País, 1 June 2014. 31 See https://participa.podemos.info/es. 33 See El Huffington Post, 17 August 2014.

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2011 election; the PSOE achieved 25 per cent. the Indignados movement, presented candi- Thus both major parties that had dominated dates together with the Initiative for Catalo- the country since the 1975 transition taken nia (ICV), a part of the IU, in the 2015 regional together only achieved slightly over 50 per cent election. The election was framed by president countrywide. of the regional parliament, Artur Mas, as a ref- erendum on Catalonia’s independence from The winners of the elections were, on the one the Spanish central state. The ICV alliance with hand, the right-wing liberal citizens’ movement Podemos took neither of the two sides—for or Ciudadanos (C’s), which with 6.6 per cent of against independence—but advocated more votes became the third strongest force in the democracy and sovereignty for the population country, and, on the other hand, the Podem- against the ruling, oligarchic major parties. In os-supported citizens’ movements in the cit- the end, the electoral alliance received almost ies. (Podemos did not present nationwide 10 per cent of votes. While Iglesias interpreted candidates but was only on the ballots in sin- this result as a defeat and a sign that an alli- gle regions in alliance with other groupings.) ance with IU had no chances of success, the The local alliances were, in alliance with IU, result in actuality, in view of the sharpened able to conquer the mayoralties in Barcelona polarity around the independence question, (en Comú) and in Madrid (). But was a completely respectable one. in other places too it was possible to score successes where Podemos, IU, and other left Due to the continued inability of Podemos’ parties and groups presented common candi- leadership to establish a countrywide left dates. By contrast, where there were compet- alliance after the elections, Izquierda Unida ing candidacies instead of cooperation, con- shortly afterwards unilaterally formed the servatives could get majorities in town halls or platform Ahora en Común (Together Now). defend the ones they had. Alongside IU, its participants are the Equo and individual Podemos activists. For IU, the 2015 regional elections were disap- They all believed that a coalescence of the left pointing in the localities where they ran alone. would have offered a possibility in December Their designated party head, Alberto Garzón, 2015 of being able to follow Greece’s Syriza and who is to succeed Cayo Lara, has thus turned becoming an influential force in the country. again to Podemos to lauch a common left alli- The initiative’s name is a combination of Ahora ance. Pablo Iglesias, however, rejected a com- Madrid and Barcelona en Común."35 mon candidacy; there "will be no electoral agreement with IU," he said. He accused the IU One of the main reasons for Podemos’ hesita- of "stewing in its own juices with red stars".34 tion about joining this left alliance is that the The misgivings particularly had to do with the party wants to be electable beyond the tradi- strong and decades-old party apparatus in IU tional left electorate. Its activists see Spain’s and the antagonistic groups within it. But what political system—and with it also the political especially dismays Podemos is the dominance left—as being in a profound crisis of legitima- of the PCE in IU. tion. Podemos therefore uses other terminol- ogy, and speaks of struggles for "authentic Recently, however, Iglesias’ influence on democracy". In so doing it wants to establish Podemos has often reached its regional limits. a logic, that of the mass against the For example, Podemos, coming as it did from oligarchy. The relative elusiveness of the proj-

34 Quoted in Ralf Streck, "Podemos zeigt IU die kalte Schul- 35 See Ralf Streck, "Iglesias und “grummelnder Zwerg", ter," Neues Deutschland, 27 June 2015. Neues Deutschland, 13 July 2015.

24 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

ect certainly makes the party vulnerable. But, onian left liberal ERC formed an electoral alli- on the other hand, this openness allows for a ance with the small party Catalunya Sí under broad political alliance that gives discontent a the name ERC-CATSÍ. form.36 On the evening of 20 December 2015 it was However, Iglesias’ intransigence may have immediately evident that this election meant damaged Podemos—at least in the short term. the end of the two-party system in Spain. This The process in establishing was substantially due to Podemos. However, the lists for the parliamentary election was dis- there was no left majority present. Spain may illusioning; only 16 per cent of the base partic- not be more easily governable or have become ipated. Even exciting coups, like the news that more left after these elections, but it is cer- French economist Thomas Piketty would col- tainly more democratic. At the same time, the laborate on the economic programme, did not regionally divided political system continues help reverse the falling opinion poll numbers; to exist, mostly due to the Spanish electoral in October, with 15 per cent, Podemos finished system, which has the particularity that the fourth place in party rankings.37 election threshold varies in some provinces, which disadvantages smaller national par- On the other hand, IU broadened its elec- ties. (Thus in the 2004 election IU needed an toral alliance Ahora en Común and presented average 254,000 votes to win a parliamentary itself as Unidad Popular: Izquierda Unida, with seat, while the PSOE needed only 66,000 votes Alberto Garzón as top candidate. to win one.) In the new chamber of deputies regional parties occupy 26 of the 300 seats. The 20 December 2015 Parliamentary The PSOE and PP massively lost support in Election: The Left Marches Separately comparison to the previous election. If in 2008 both parties together had 83.8 per cent of the After the final failure of the talks, IU and vote and in 2011 still reached 73 per cent, this Podemos, in the majority of electoral districts, time the total figure was less than 50 per cent. competed with each other. There was a com- The conservative PP lost nearly 18 per cent, mon list only in the four Catalonian electoral receiving 28.7 per cent of votes, while the social districts (under the name En Comú Podem, democratic PSOE lost more than 6 per cent and together with the Catalan Left Party ICV and only reached 22 per cent. Barcelona’s municipal party En Comú), and in the four Galician electoral districts (under the name , together with the regional For the left in Spain the result—despite the 20 left party Anova-Irmandade Nacionalista). per cent for Podemos—has to be disillusion- Podemos, on its part, ran in the Valencia region ing. It was especially the Podemos leadership’s together with the regional left party Compro- decision not to run together with Izquierda mís. In addition, IU ran with various smaller Unida that significantly impeded a left change countrywide or regional left parties. Alongside of government. Where Podemos and Izquierda these alliances there was a left alliance, Bildu, Unida ran together they became the strongest in the three Basque provinces and Navarra. force (in Catalonia) or the second strongest Independently of Podemos and IU, the Catal- (). Where they ran separately and against each other they tended to be damaged—at 36 See Jonas Wollenhaupt, "Inside Podemos," Neues least in terms of the complicated allocation Deutschland, 10 September 2015. 37 See Ralf Streck, "Podemos will den Alleingang," Neues of seats. Because the special situation in the Deutschland, 8 October 2015. Basque country was not an issue addressed by

25 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

either party in the electoral campaign, there which it succeeded in doing, as voter partic- were even three left forces—with the Bildu ipation rose to 73 per cent. At the same time, party alliance—that ran against each other, all they diminished their criticism of Spain’s power three of which are organised within the Euro- structures; to be polemical one might say that pean Parliament’s left group (GUE/NGL). Podemos sacrificed content to .

The political scientist Raul Zelik presents a crit- But Izquierda Unida, which with its charis- ical view of the course taken by the left-wing matic lead candidate Alberto Garzón utilised Podemos. He notes that the party, only founded the social networks, also had disappointing in January 2014, has "dropped central substan- results. It lost more than 4 percentage points tive positions’ in order "to project itself as a and only received 3.7 per cent countrywide trustworthy force for reform capable of gov- and two (instead of 11) seats. erning. It no longer speaks of overcoming the 1978 post-Frankist constitution or of opposition Forming a government after this historic elec- to the EU’s austerity policy," he wrote in a short tion eve was more than difficult. The numbers analysis for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.38 were sufficient neither for a coalition between Podemos is now only calling for "a selective the conservative PP and the right-wing lib- reform of the constitution," which may explain eral C’s nor for a coalition between PSOE and its drop in voter popularity in comparison with Podemos, even enlisting IU and other regional the beginning of 2015. Podemos conducted its left parties. If the new parliament fails to elect electoral campaign with the aim of getting as a head of government, new elections will be in many people as possible to the polling booths— the offing in June 2016

4. DIE LINKE: A Factor for Stability in the Party of the European Left

Unlike the parties presented so far, the Federal component is the (primarily West German) Republic of Germany’s DIE LINKE involves nei- Electoral Alternative for Labour and Social ther a party alliance (like Syriza and IU) nor a Justice (Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale party that emerged from a protest movement Gerechtigkeit—WASG) that was founded by (like Podemos). Instead, DIE LINKE, founded in former SPD members and by trade unionists 2007, is a hybrid, with its core comprising two close to the SPD who were disappointed with components. On the one hand, it is shaped by the harsh social cuts (Hartz laws) enacted by the part that has existed for 25 years, which the social democratic-green coalition under counts among the reformed state socialist chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD). parties of the East Bloc but which, in several steps, has transformed itself into a democratic WASG represented a classic left social demo- socialist party to the left of social democracy. cratic tendency within the European left that This part previously went under the name no longer wanted to go along with a neolib- Party of (PDS). Its other eral-oriented social in Ger- many that was increasingly distant from the 38 See Raul Zelik, "Die interessantesten Wahlen seit über interests of employees, comparable with Tony 30 Jahren," www.rosalux.de; and Raul Zelik, "Spaniens Linke erstarkt," www.rosalux.de. Blair’s "New Labour" in Great Britain.

26 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Both parties at first created a common list motions to all party organs. There is also the for the elections in 2005 and after possibility for guest members to be involved, entering the Bundestag merged in 2007 to to which almost all membership can be form DIE LINKE. Both then dissolved as sep- conferred. Through this the party wants to arate entities. Specific political attitudes and open itself to social groups and movements. traditions that can be ascribed to the two The response to this, however, has so far been source parties continue to exist within the new limited. Gender equality is constitutive for the organisation, so that one could call it a hybrid party, and there is a 50 per cent quota. party. This, however, does not mean that the party’s course is ambiguous. Programmatically and organisationally, a stable consensus has Who or What is DIE LINKE? been worked out amongst the members. The party—together with trade unions, social For 25 years, DIE LINKE—in the form of its movements, and with citizens in Germany, source party, the PDS—has been one of the Europe, and worldwide—wants to "build a soci- stable pillars of the left in Europe. It is true ety of democratic socialism, in which the free- that the PDS’s federal election results meant dom and equality of each and every individual that it always had to worry about getting back is the condition for the solidary development into the Bundestag—and in fact it once failed of all". This is how DIE LINKE formulates its pro- to reach the 5 per cent threshold in 2002 and grammatic objective in its party programme. could only stay in the Bundestag through two In it, three basic ideas are connected within the directly elected deputies. Nevertheless, Ger- idea of democratic socialism: first, individual many’s importance within the EU catapulted freedom and the development of personality the PDS and then especially DIE LINKE into the through socially equal participation in the con- position of perhaps the most important left ditions of a self-determined life and of solidar- actor in Europe. An additional factor in this is ity; second, the subordination of economy and the high level of constitutional protection par- the mode of life to solidary development and ties enjoy in the Federal Republic of Germany the preservation of nature; and, third, the reali- and the fact that they are largely financed sation of both of these ideas through an eman- through tax revenues. Consequently, although cipatory process "in which the dominance of DIE LINKE, in terms of its members and elec- capital is overcome by democratic, social, and toral results, is neither the biggest nor the ecological forces". DIE LINKE sees itself as being strongest left party in Europe, it has the best "in fundamental social and political opposition structures and greatest resources in relation to neoliberalism and the dominance of capital, to its sister parties. to imperialist policy, and to war".40

DIE LINKE is not one of the self-proclaimed In order to produce alternative social and par- revolutionary communist forces in Europe. liamentary majorities, DIE LINKE strives for Instead it sees itself as pluralist and open "to broad alliances. The kind of cooperation with everyone who wants to achieve the same goals other parties required for another kind of gov- by democratic means".39 It grants extensive ernment majority will only be considered if this membership rights, among them the right to promotes a change in politics and society and form groups with others within the party or the takes up core left demands. Among the latter right even as an individual member to present are the withdrawal of Germany’s armed forces

39 Federal Statutes of DIE LINKE, en.die-linke.de/die-linke/ 40 Programme of DIE LINKE, en.die-linke.de/die-linke/doc- documents/federal-statutes/. uments/party-programme/.

27 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

from , the abolition of the neolib- SPD’s junior partner in -Anhalt, Mecklen- eral labour market laws (Hartz laws), the rais- burg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin. This also ing of the legal , and the rejec- had to do with the PDS having been shunned by tion of pensions that only start at age 67. the SPD as a coalition partner for many years. When there finally were coalitions, the party It is precisely around the question of politi- was not prepared for them. Only in recent years cal-party alliances and coalitions that heated has this situation improved, and DIE LINKE can programmatic and strategic conflicts have better hold its own now as a junior partner in repeatedly flared up ever since the party was coalitions. At present, DIE LINKE is governing in founded. There are four principal reasons for as the SPD’s junior partner and this. First, coalitions, especially at the federal could finally even name its own prime minis- level (with and Social Democrats) are ter in the red-red-green (i.e., DIE LINKE, SPD, viewed very critically. This is not least because Greens) Thuringian state government. it was a red-green federal government that was responsible for the first foreign troop deploy- Four, there were always fundamental differ- ment of the army, in the form of the 1999 Yugo- ences over the path by which society can be slav War, in the history of the Federal Republic. changed. A minority always advocated a more By contrast, the majority of DIE LINKE is against or less "revolutionary" path that had no place any form of military foreign intervention and for coalitions with the SPD or Greens. Today use of force. Second, ever since they were in this debate, mainly because of the successful government from 1998 to 2005, and government leadership in , is taking Social Democrats have moved away from the place in a less emotional register within the left spectrum and towards the political centre. party. There are hardly party members any The Greens are increasingly open to alliances longer who categorically rule out government with Germany’s conservative CDU/CSU, and the participation. Although there are divergent Social Democrats have largely sacrificed their conceptions of what preconditions need to be social-policy image. It is controversial within DIE present for entry into a coalition, these no lon- LINKE whether social-policy and solidary polit- ger represent a fundamental conflict. ical concepts can still be carried out at all with the SPD. Finally, under SPD governance, mini- By now, as the third strongest force in the Bund- jobs, precarious conditions of employment, estag, DIE LINKE has an image of wanting to and social spending cuts have been introduced assume responsibility for change rather than and extended, and privatisation of public basic only carry out fundamental opposition. This rel- services has been permitted. ative success, however, only first set in after the merger of the PDS with WASG, which emerged Third, DIE LINKE’s (or the PDS’s) experiences from the protest against ’s dis- with coalition government with the SPD were mantling of the social system and democracy. problematic. It is true that these have occurred In Germany’s post-war history, Agenda 2010 up to now only in east German states and not represents an unprecedented so-called flexi- at the federal level; however, at the end of bilisation of the labour market and lowering of these coalition government episodes, the PDS social standards, which led to increased poverty (and then DIE LINKE) has had to face problems in Germany and reduced wages and pensions. of credibility and sagging voter popularity. Although it could easily point to its social-policy The image of DIE LINKE as a protest party successes, the PDS’s approval ratings fell mas- against social spending cuts only slowly evolved sively after government participation as the into its image as a party that can shape reality.

28 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

This evolution was possible in part because in pressure on the SED corresponded to the inter- the territory of the former GDR—five eastern nal pressure exerted by party members for German federal states and Berlin—it can be reform. The party leadership accommodated regarded as a major party (a Volkspartei). Here this symbolically by renaming the SED the people see the party as potentially in govern- Party of Democratic Socialism on 4 February ment. 1990. Symbolic reforms were followed by pro- grammatic reforms; the PDS thus renounced Although since 2013 there is an arithmetical its vanguard-party role and gave up its con- majority with the SPD and the Greens in the stitutionally guaranteed claim to leadership in Bundestag, a left government coalition is not the country. foreseeable in the near future. For this the relationship between the protagonists, espe- The PDS’s first chair was . In the cially between DIE LINKE and the SPD, has to first free election of the (the substantially improve. GDR’s parliament) on 18 March 1990 it received 16.4 per cent of votes and the party went into In the meantime, party members derive dif- opposition. After the unification of the two ferent lessons from the differences in voter German states on 3 October 1990, the PDS got approval: 20 per cent in the east and under 10 2.4 per cent (and thus far less than the 5 per per cent in the west—a protest party for west- cent normally required for a party to enter the erners, and a major player in the east as a large Bundestag). However, since the Federal Consti- party seen as able to shape reality. Added to tutional Court had declared the territories of this is the fact that DIE LINKE’s parliamentary the former GDR and the BRD as two separate strength at the federal level is not the result electoral territories for this election, the PDS, of strong extra-parliamentary resistance or which had received 11 per cent of the vote in social movements, as with left parties in Spain eastern Germany, entered the Bundestag. and Greece, but the result of political-party and parliamentary work. In the 1994 Bundestag election the party was able to increase its results to 4.4 per cent. That it got into the Bundestag again even though The History of the PDS it did not make the 5 per cent threshold has to do with a particularity of German electoral The history of DIE LINKE is a history of two law—in the PDS received four direct parties, the PDS and WASG. The PDS emerged mandates (each citizen has two votes—one for from the Socialist of Germany a party list and another for a direct individual (SED), which in turn had been founded in the representative from the in question, process of a fusion (accompanied by strong whom the party has presented as a candidate), state pressure) of the SPD (that is, the parts which made it possible for the party to enter of it found within the Soviet occupation zones parliament at its actual percentage level. of Germany and Berlin) and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 1946. From 1949 to In the eastern German federal states, the PDS 1989 the SED was the GDR’s state party. In the increasingly developed into a major party and course of mass protests and hundreds of thou- by the end of the 1990s had electoral results sands of GDR citizens leaving the GDR for the that were mostly above 20 per cent. In the 1998 Federal Republic, pressure on the country’s Bundestag election the party passed the 5 per state institutions for political reform grew that cent threshold for the first time. In the west, did not even spare the ruling SED. This external however, the party’s popularity remained

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Table 5: Membership development41

State Female members Percentage of associations 2015-12-31 (incl.) women Baden-Württemberg 2,836 704 24.82 2,508 602 24.00 Berlin 7,447 3,192 42.86 Brandenburg 6,626 2,898 43.74 481 138 28.69 1,307 375 28.69 2,525 673 26.65 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 4,034 1,805 44.74 2,552 663 25.98 North Rhine-Westphalia 6,465 1,787 27.64 -Palatinate 1,594 464 29.11 2,114 694 32.83 Saxony 8,677 3,878 44.69 Saxony-Anhalt 4,044 1,747 43.20 Schleswig-Holstein 970 251 25.88 Thuringia 4,767 2,067 43.36 Federal Office 42 16 38.10 Total 58,989 21,954 37.22 weak and under 2 per cent, in some regions matically it was anything but its successor: even under 1 per cent. 41 In the two programme congresses the party repeatedly distanced itself from the Stalinist In 2002, with 4.3 per cent the PDS failed to system and its crimes committed in the name re-enter the Bundestag. Since in East Berlin only of socialism in the GDR. two of the previous four direct mandates were elected, the party only had two deputies in par- liament. After this the party entered a period The History of WASG of serious internal crisis. However, already by 2004 a consolidation set in, as the PDS became In 2004, out of the protest against the Agenda a strong participant in the protests against the 2010 reforms pushed through in 2003 by neoliberal labour market and social reforms Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the Wahlalter- (Agenda 2010) of the second red-green federal native (Electoral Alternative) formed in north- administration. In the succeeding years the par- ern Germany simultaneously with (but inde- ty’s approval ratings rose, though at first only in pendently of) the Initiative Arbeit und soziale the eastern German federal states. Gerechtigkeit (ASG—Initiative Labour and Social Justice). In July 2004, both organisations To sum up, although the PDS was the legal suc- at first came together as the Wahlalternative cessor of the state party, the SED, program- Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit (WASG). In 41 Vgl. www.die-linke.de/partei/fakten/mitgliederzahlen/. May 2005 the new party stood in the state

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Table 6: Members in parliaments

Female members Percentage of Parliaments Total (incl.) women European Parliament 7 4 57 Bundestag 64 35 55 Berlin House of Representatives 19 10 53 Bürgerschaft Bremen 17 8 47 Bürgerschaft Hamburg 8 4 50 Hesse State Parliament 6 3 50 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania State Parliament 14 7 50 Saarland State Parliament 8 4 50 Saxony State Parliament 27 13 48 Saxony-Anhalt State Parliament 16 9 56 Thuringia State Parliament 28 14 50 parliament election in North Rhine-West- PDS. (German electoral law does not allow elec- phalia and got 2.2 per cent of the votes (the toral alliances to run, in contrast to Spain and PDS received 0.9 per cent). A little later Oskar Greece.) Gregor Gysi, who was later to become Lafontaine, former SPD chancellor candidate the chair of the Bundestag group, and Oskar and , who was also minister of Lafontaine were chosen as the lead candidates. finance under Gerhard Schröder, left the SPD In the 18 September 2005 election, die Link- and joined WASG. spartei. PDS reached 8.7 per cent of votes and became the fourth strongest force in the coun- The PDS and WASG recognised that the nar- try. Less than two years later, on 16 June 2007, row space to the left of social democracy could the fusion of both parties to form DIE LINKE not be successfully utilised by two competing finally took place. Through ballot votes 96.9 per parties; both ran the risk of failing at the next cent of the members of the Linkspartei. PDS and Bundestag election. Furthermore, the younger 83.9 per cent of WASG members approved it. formation, WASG, had very few resources. The PDS was still weak in the west, while in the east The party grew rapidly to over 78,000 mem- it could draw on its pre-2002 successes. With bers and scored a series of electoral successes. the announcement of anticipated new elec- Many new members—from social movements, tions for September 2005, the pressure grew former SPD and Green members, as well as on both parties, analogously to Syriza in June activists of smaller groups—joined the party. 2012, to agree on a common candidacy. In this way DIE LINKE became a kind of collec- tive movement for radical leftists. In the 2009 Bundestag election the party could grow to The Unification to Become DIE LINKE 11.9 per cent of votes.

In June 2005 the PDS and WASG agreed to stand Success also brought inner-party conflicts, together in September. To do so, WASG mem- especially between members of the former bers stood on the electoral lists of the PDS— source parties. The result was failures in west which in July had been renamed Linkspartei. German state parliament elections, which in

31 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

turn fuelled further party infighting that was Government participation was always a con- waged in public in the June 2012 Göttingen tested issue in the party. However, this ques- party congress. Nevertheless, after this the tion does not describe a conflict between east party slowly consolidated and was able to con- and west or between supposedly radical and tain old rivalries and get members to work at reform-oriented tendencies within DIE LINKE. making their common party succeed. Although Hardly any political tendency fundamentally in the last Bundestag election, the approval rejects government participation. Instead, the ratings for DIE LINKE did drop, at the same time subject of discussion is the conditions under the party became the third strongest force in which DIE LINKE is prepared to accept govern- the Bundestag with 8.6 per cent, making it the ment participation. The debate is also com- largest parliamentary opposition group. plicated by the SPD’s refusal to work within a centre-left alliance at the federal level. Here, in Today the party is still a major party in the new contrast to the state level, DIE LINKE continues eastern federal states and is represented in all to be ostracised by the SPD. state parliaments there (mostly as the second biggest force). In Brandenburg it has governed Within the left group (GUE/NGL) of the Euro- since 2009 as the junior partner of a coalition pean Parliament, DIE LINKE is the party with under the leadership of the SPD. In Thuringia the most MEPs, and the group’s chair is DIE its vote meant that the party got to name its LINKE’s . She is a founding mem- own as prime minister of a coa- ber of EL, was co-chair with , and lition government with the SPD and Greens plays a part in the New European Left Forum for the first time in the history of the Federal (NELF). Republic. Before this the PDS had been the junior partner in red-red state governments in With its founding in 2007, DIE LINKE has Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. brought European normality to Germany. In In Anhalt Saxony in the mid-1990s it tolerated prior decades in the Federal Republic there was a red-green minority government. The party is no parliamentary representation of a party not represented in all west German state par- to the left of social democracy. The east-west liaments. It has never been in the parliaments conflict, and with it extreme anti-, of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Rhine- made it difficult for left formations to gain a land-Palatinate; but it has been in the parlia- foothold—in contrast to France and Italy. ments of Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westpha- lia, and Schleswig-Holstein, though in each case However, DIE LINKE not only provided "Euro- for one legislative period. On the other hand, in pean normality" in Germany but also brought Hamburg, Bremen, Hesse, and Saarland it has socio-political alternatives back into the focus repeatedly been elected to parliament. of political conflicts. After its government participation in 1988, the SPD had gradually A coexistence of divergent political conceptions abandoned this kind of project. DIE LINKE, and a variety of political cultures and cultural in occupying this area, however, also devel- codes continue to exist—in part related to the oped a counter project to austerity policy and different degrees of the party’s social anchor- Germany’s dominance at a time of economic ing and regional strengths. In concrete terms and financial crisis in Europe. This had a spe- this meant the coexistence of authoritarian cial strategic-political value for the European social-state-oriented, communist, Trotskyist, countries hit by the crisis and the left in those left socialist, social democratic, or reformist-lib- countries, which should not be underesti- ertarian groupings. mated.

32 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

Through the fusion of the PDS and WASG it and the FDP, also have difficulties in being was finally possible to develop the political left represented in all of the country’s state parlia- into a pan-German left, even if differences, for ments, and so in this sense DIE LINKE is not an example in terms of regional electoral results, exception. The strategic question is whether continue to exist. But here too the figures point the time will come at the federal level when the to the development of DIE LINKE into a strong SPD’s blockade attitude towards cooperation pan-German left party. In reality, the other with DIE LINKE can be broken. This would in smaller parties in Germany, like the Greens turn be the basis for other majorities.

5. Strategic Tasks for the Left in Europe

The European Union is deeply divided. With time as formulating policies for the specific the 2015 Greek crisis and then the ongoing situations in the individual EU Member States. refugee crisis, the member states’ solidarity This is not an easy task, for the European left, has collapsed under German leadership. The for its part, is a multi-layered—or, viewed neg- German government has up to now found atively, divided—phenomenon. In the eastern no common or even solidary answer. Many European countries it is, with the exception of member states, especially in eastern Europe, Slovenia and in part Croatia—absolutely mar- categorically refuse to receive refugees from ginalised. Relevant left parties or parliamen- Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, or the North Afri- tary representation to the left of social democ- can-Arab countries—although they them- racy do not exist there. selves are actively playing a part, alongside the United States, in the so-called War on Terror, In this context, DIE LINKE in Germany represents in civil , in famine, and unstable power a special case. It is the only former state party constructs. The current refugee situation only that could—against the trend of a historical and reinforces the picture of a divided Europe, renewed anti-communism in eastern Europe— which is sometimes benevolently described radically renovate itself and hold its own. The as a Europe of diverse speeds. In addition, the only other former state party that could assert conflict in is undermining the relation- itself is the Communist Party of Bohemia and ship to as well as the internal relations Moravia (KCSM), but it did not take the path of of the EU Member States. a self-renewing, modern democratic socialist party and has instead adhered to the politics Already in 2008 the economic and financial and organisational form of a classic democratic- crisis divided Europe into an economically and centralist communist vanguard party. politically dominant "core Europe" and an eco- nomically weak and not politically sovereign However, it is not only in eastern Europe that south. The diktats of the Troika in Brussels are the left finds itself on the defensive. The grow- the instruments for perpetuating this contra- ing social and intra-European crises has mainly diction and are therefore the expression of the strengthened the populist and radical right. In social, economic, and political division of the EU. France, the right-wing radical Front National has become the leading party, while the left The left in Europe is facing the challenge of is stagnating at a low level, and this despite finding an answer to this division at the same the fact that there are two different left for-

33 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

mations in the country—the Eurocommunist However, in these countries the resistance of PCF and the left social democratic Parti de the rulers is also strong. In the case of Greece, Gauche—that have sought to ally with each conservatives and social democrats through- other. In many other countries right-wing radi- out Europe, in alliance with oligarchies and cal or right-wing populist forces are on the rise, economic moguls, mobilised every possible for example in Austria, Belgium, Italy, Poland, resource to prevent Syriza’s electoral victory. and Hungary. In all these countries the left is When this did not work, they set in motion weak, which may be due to the fact that classi- everything, including EU institutions, in order cal communist parties occupy the space to the to bring the EU’s first left government to its left of social democracy. knees. In what followed, although Syriza was able to assert itself in government, it only On the other hand, it can be argued that left did this at the cost of a third anti-social and parties in the form of protest parties are not anti-democratic "aid package". Since then, viable in the long run. Times of social crises in Europe’s left has been arguing about whether no way cause people to turn to the proposals the conflict around Greece should be seen as a put forward by the radical left. In fact, the left success or failure. has to "enter" the system it criticises in order to be able to carry out the changes it hopes That Europe’s neoliberal elites are not ready for. Admittedly, all left parties in Europe move to concede power and space to a left anti-aus- within this contradiction. However, it is increas- terity partiy like Syriza that has the majority of ingly difficult for those parties which hold to the population behind it is seen in exactly the "revolutionary" solutions to give convincing same way in Portugal. Portugal is, like Greece answers, translating into successful electoral and Spain, strongly affected by the economic arithmetic, to the question of how people’s and financial crisis and had to be financially concrete problems can be solved. Since in the supported by the EU and the Eurogroup. Bil- foreseeable future in Europe we cannot expect lions were given to rescue banks while social revolutionary tendencies, these parties cannot acquisitions, wages, and pensions were cut. achieve decent results in the short and middle The conservative government (2011-2015) term. under Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho (PSD) left no doubt about its readiness to carry The Scandinavian left parties, which had out the privatisation and social spending cuts already transformed themselves in the 1970s demanded by the Troika. and 80s into democratic socialist, left social- ist, or green-left formations, have for decades Passos Coelho had to pay for this policy in the now been parliamentary forces to be reckoned 4 October 2015 parliamentary election. He lost with. They were occasionally participants as his majority, and two left formations, the Bloco junior partners in social democratic-led gov- de Esquerda (BE) and the Communist Party of ernments. Nevertheless, this did not result in Portugal (PCP), declared their readiness to sup- a major leap forward for them. port a minority government of the social dem- ocrats (PS). Portugal’s conservatives stirred At present, it is only the south—Greece, Spain, up fear about a left government. When this and Portugal—that is a source of strength could no longer be prevented, they even made and renewal for Europe’s left. This has been use of the institutional system to impede the encouraging, and it opens up the opportunity formation of a new government. State pres- to bring a reinforced politics ident Cavaco Silva (PSD) refused the creation back onto the stage of political confrontation. of a left government, which had a majority in

34 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

parliament, and instead mandated the loser formulate answers to social changes play an of the election, his fellow party member Pas- essential role; it is clear that the left—precisely sos Coelho, to form a government. Only after in view of its institutional disadvantage—has months in which this failed was the new left to make more effort than other parties to seek regime finally sworn in.42 out alliances with other, progressive, forces. Only if the traditional divisions of the left are The examples of Greece and Portugal make overcome, as in Greece or Germany, and actors clear that the political and economic elites are agree on common goals—such as the struggle no longer even prepared to accept democratic against austerity and de-democratisation— electoral results if these could lead to any loss can success be achieved. of their power. It is all the more incumbent on the left in Europe to step up pressure if it wants It appears that the left parties best prepared to implement its alternative political concepts to meet these challenges are those that are against these elites. organised as collective movements, take up social protest, and simultaneously are open The southern European examples show at once for parliamentary alliances to the left of cen- that the left in Europe is now strong where it tre. The left in Europe is successful when it sub- exists as a modern collective movement, takes jects itself to a transformational process, turns up the protest of the population, and through to new societal milieus, and leaves behind its broad alliances poses the question of power. inherited vanguard character.

By contrast, the European left is on the defen- Syriza in Greece, Podemos and IU in Spain, as sive wherever it refuses to take steps to reform well as BE and the PCP in Portugal have more- itself and rejects opening processes, and where over shown that it is no longer enough to be it splits, with its parts competing against each a party of social protest. They emphasise that other. The election outcome in Spain shows the systemic question today takes the form of that even successful opening processes like the question of democracy. Without a democ- that of Podemos are not free of this. As in Por- ratisation of "post-democracy" and European tugal, the left after austerity, and citizens’ par- integration, social distortions in the EU Member ties in Spain were not able to come together in States or in the EU itself cannot be prevented or a broader alliance. However, while in Portugal it reversed. Precisely the example of Greece illus- became possible to correct the division of the trates that the construction of a more just social left (between BE and the PCP) after the election welfare system cannot be done without radical and form a majority, this option does not yet reform of democratic sovereignty and co-deter- exist in Spain due to its complicated electoral mination; for it is the current decision-making system and the country’s regional divisions. processes which—alongside the relations of forces in Europe—have up to now severely ham- The developments in Spain, but also in Ger- pered a social breakthrough in Athens. In Spain, many, show that success and failure always it is the undemocratic instruments for forming also depend on institutional conditions (such a majority coalition, the Francoist constitutional as electoral law). In addition, factors such as heritage, and the monarchy that impeded a the left’s social mobilisation or its capacity to social transformation in December; while in Portugal institutional power—in the form of the 42 See Dominic Heilig, "Den Unterschied herausstellen. state president’s refusal to let the left majority Wahlanalyse der Portugiesischen Parlamentswahl vom 4. Oktober 2015," www.rosalux.de; Dominic Heilig, "Por- form the government—was at pains to prevent tugals Linke vorn," Disput, 11/2015. a rejection of austerity policy.

35 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

The left must forcefully pose the question of lead to a broadening of the base and electoral power against the old oligarchies and power success. structures—this, too, was strikingly demon- strated by the left parties in southern Europe—, By contrast, the communist and reform-com- for in the long run it cannot implement its pro- munist parties no longer appear to have the gramme as a junior partner of social democracy. impact and internal structure to make a broad- This thesis has been confirmed by the experi- ening of its base and influence possible. Revo- ence of the Scandinavian left and Germany’s lutionary situations are not in sight in Europe DIE LINKE. More than a few policy corrections despite the ongoing social and economic dislo- are not possible in such parliamentary alliances. cations. In the 21st century, people on the con- tinent are not waiting for a vanguard to show Syriza and Podemos have posed the question them the way. It is therefore improbable that of power as new collective parties and move- these parties can significantly influence the ments. Greece’s Coalition of the Radical Left future of the left in Europe or find themselves succeeded in transforming itself from a mar- in a position to conquer political majorities in ginal formation with 4 per cent voter approval the EU Member States. into a party that could get more than a third of the population behind it. Within a year, The classical left socialist and left social dem- Podemos was able to get 20 percent of the pop- ocratic parties of Europe, as in Scandinavia or ulation to come together behind an alternative the Netherlands, will have a hard time in the political message. In Portugal, where BE and the near future expanding their—albeit stable— communists together could assemble almost 20 parliamentary spheres of influence. For this per cent of the electorate, a similar project was they are simply too dependent on the strate- successful. One of the reasons has to be that gic behaviour of the social democrats in their they credibly conveyed, in understandable lan- countries. guage, their readiness to take responsibility for change beyond mere opposition. Only those party formations that open them- selves to new members and internal reform If Germany’s DIE LINKE, which has been gen- will have a future. The worlds of work are very erating between 8 and 10 per cent approval exposed to changes—through globalisation, for 10 years now, wants to shape Europe’s digitalisation, and the transformation of the development it too has to pose the question capitalist system into financial-market-driven of power and undergo a second opening. It has capitalism. This process has a massive effect to face the particular difficulty that in Germany on social relations and milieus. Only parties political conflicts are not expressed by social that find new programmatic and organisa- movements to the same degree as in the south tional responses to this may be able to survive of Europe; nevertheless, there are starting and create majorities. points for a collective movement. Already its first opening—the fusion of PDS and WASG— In any case, the very important year 2015 has moved many thousands of citizens to join the shown that the left in Europe can only survive, new left party. Now the next step has to be continue to exist, and perhaps even be suc- taken to broaden its own membership and its cessful if it no longer limits itself to the nation- own political spectrum. state but cooperates and acts on a Europe- wide basis. A single left government in Europe The history of the European left shows that does not make for a red European spring. The openings and internal party reforms as a rule left would therefore do well to overcome its

36 DOMINIC HEILIG MAPPING THE EUROPEAN LEFT

European divisions. With this aim, Syriza and whether after Greece and Portugal there can Podemos went into their electoral campaigns: also be a left government in Spain. And 2016 They did not limit their democratisation and holds further important elections in store for social projects to their respective nation-states the left, for example in Ireland—another aus- but related them to the whole European Union. terity-shaken EU country. The 2017 Bundestag But to do this the left in Europe has to make election will be of decisive importance. If DIE greater use of its transnational organisations, LINKE is able to grow stronger and vanquish such as the Party of the European Left and the Federal Chancellor , the archi- left group in the European Parliament (GUE/ tect of European austerity policy, Europe can NGL). In this way it may be possible in the develop in a different, a more social and dem- future to prevent a situation like in the Basque ocratic, direction. country where three left parties compete against each other, all of which are members What is absolutely certain is that the European of the GUE/NGL. left has to meet the challenges of our time and advance. In the 21st century this can only The European spring, which began in Janu- mean defining left politics democratically and ary 2015 with Syriza’s election victory, has pluralistically—and not being content with an not ended in a European winter. But the chal- oppositional role but instead taking account of lenges remain formidable. A lot will depend on one’s own capacity and willingness to govern.

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