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Greece Political Briefing: an Assessment of SYRIZA's Review

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Greece Political Briefing: an Assessment of SYRIZA's Review ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 26, No. 1 (GR) Febr 2020 Greece political briefing: An assessment of SYRIZA’s review George N. Tzogopoulos 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 An assessment of SYRIZA’s review In February 2020 the central committee of SYRIZA approved the party’s review covering the period from January 2015 until July 2019. While the performance of SYRIZA after the summer of 2015 was largely based on bailout obligations and was efficient, its stance in the first semester of that year stigmatized not only the national economy but also the party itself. The review discusses successes and failures and constitutes a useful document in the effort of the main opposition party to learn by its mistakes and develop attractive governmental proposals. A few months after the general election of July 2019, the main opposition SYRIZA party is keeping a low profile in domestic politics. Its electoral defeat has required a period of self- criticism and internal debate in order for the party to gradually start formulating new policies which will perhaps allow it to win the next national election. Against this backdrop, three experienced politicians, former vice-President of the government Yiannis Dragasakis, former Shipping Minister Theodoros Dritsas and former Education Minister Aristides Baltas prepared a review of the party’s 4.5 administration year. The review was presented to SYRIZA’s central committee at the beginning of February 2020 and was subsequently approved. In their analysis Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas initially concentrate on the main reason why SYRIZA won the national election of January 2015. As they explain, the party had successfully employed a ‘bottom-up’ approach against the policies of the bailouts supported by its main political rivals, New Democracy and PASOK (that was later named a Movement for Change). And they argue that the confidence shown by people to SYRIZA was so strong that they voted for it again in September 2015 – despite the dramatic turnaround it was forced to make in July 2015. Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas believe that the referendum former Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras had announced in the end of June 2015 was largely seen by the majority of Greeks as a good negotiations tactic allegedly leading to the signing of a better agreement between Greece and the EU than the one proposed before the referendum. The decision of Tsipras to call a referendum in the end of June 2015 remains highly contradictory. The assessment provided in SYRIZA’s review can be certainly challenged. Another view was recently heard in an interview given to Greek SKAI TV by former President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. Juncker says he could not understand why 1 the referendum was called. More importantly, he explains that the former Prime Minister asked Greek citizens to accept or reject an invalid and old proposal. This proposal had been given to the Greek government approximately two months before the day of the referendum In the aftermath of the ‘no’ vote, Juncker adds, Tsipras did exactly the opposite from what he had promised to Greek citizens encouraging them to reject the invalid proposal. Beyond the debatable issue of the referendum, SYRIZA’s review offers interesting insights concerning mistakes the government made, especially in the first five months of 2015. To start with, SYRIZA failed to seriously note internal divergences within the EU. In particular, while several eurozone countries were encountered with debt problems, the Greek government failed to adopt a holistic approach in order to forge successful alliances. It was thus almost completely alone in difficult negotiations. As a matter of fact most eurozone countries – including Italy and Spain – preferred to preserve good relations with Germany instead of joining the revolutionary course of Tsipras and the then Finance Minister Yianis Varoufakis. Moreover, the report prepared by Dragasakis, Dritsas, and Baltas discusses additional mistakes. These include the failure to acknowledge that the eurozone had been very well prepared to manage a potential exit of Greece in 2015. So, the ‘blackmail’ policy – proposed by Varoufakis and applied by Tsipras – could not but have limits at the EU level. Additionally, several SYRIZA members had cultivated the illusion that countries such as Russia and China might be interested in financially supporting Greece and others believed a Latin American model to release the country from economic suppression might be replicated in the country. While it is prudent for Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas to admit these mistakes, it is certainly problematic that the Greek government jeopardized the country’s stay in the eurozone by relying on wrong assumptions. Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas also point out that the crisis in the relationship between SYRIZA and Independent Greeks had a serious impact on the attempt of the former to persuade Greek public opinion on the importance of the Prespes Agreement. In their opinion, the society was susceptible to populist messages sent by New Democracy and reproduced by partisan media. Although the three SYRIZA members are right in this assessment, it still remains unclear whether the continuation of the collaboration between Tsipras and leader of Independent Greeks Panos Kammenos could have a positive effect on the mediation of the Prespes Agreement. The usage of the term ‘Macedonia’ is highly sensitive for the majority of Greek citizens while New Democracy’s efforts to expose negative aspects of the deal were intensifying on the way to the national election. 2 For the authors of the SYRIZA’s report, the defeat of SYRIZA in the election of July 2019 should be attributed to two main factors. The first is the decision of the party to change course and sign the third bailout in July 2015, although it won the snap election two months later. This decision led to SYRIZA’s split and alienated it from numerous voters who had hoped for a true leftist policy. From that perspective, the political consequences of the dramatic shift were rather long-term than short-term. And the second factor is the implementation of bailout policies for a period of three years, from August 2015 until August 2018. Austerity measures and painful structural reforms particularly impacted on the middle class and could hardly be forgotten by voters in the national election of July 2019. This said, SYRIZA, Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas argue, did not successfully react to promises given by New Democracy about fresh growth perspective. On the same wavelength, the party lacked an efficient communication strategy following the floods in Mandra and the wildfires in Mati. In spite of mistakes and miscalculations, SYRIZA’s review concentrates on perceived successes while in government. One of them is its attempt to refute the ownership of the third bailout. While this argument could sound appealing among core supporters, MPs who practically disagreed decided to leave the party in the summer of 2015. Others accepted the turnaround and took the responsibility of voting in favor of bailout policies for a period of three years. In addition, the authors of the report praise the tactic of tough negotiations in bailout reviews that – in their view – replaced the stance of previous governments to comfortably accept the demands of creditors. They also focus on the Prespes Agreement which boosted the international reputation of SYRIZA by putting a brake on nationalism in the Balkans, paving the way for the EU enlargement in the region and restraining alleged Russian influence. Last but not least, another element that needs careful attention in SYRIZA’s review is the way the authors illustrate the third bailout. They believe that the agreement was much better in comparison to previous fiscal consolidation programs because of milder fiscal measures, lower surpluses and by offering the possibility of a settlement for the debt as well as the hope that no fourth program would be required. Dragasakis, Dritsas and Baltas criticize the previous coalition government of New Democracy and PASOK for undermining SYRIZA’s effort to negotiate with Greece’s creditors. It is true the then coalition government had not successfully concluded the final review of the second bailout and was on the process of agreeing on a credit line with the country’s creditors. However, SYRIZA’s review fails to acknowledge the dramatic impact its appetite to come to power had caused on the economy. It equally ignores the basic fact that no third bailout would have been required without its risky policies in the first semester of 2015. Subsequently, the unnecessary third Greek bailout was set up in accordance with the 3 status of the national economy in the summer of 2015. The national economy had been then largely traumatized by SYRIZA’s choices such as the closure of banks and the enforcement of capital controls in July 2015. Conclusion Seven months after the July 2019 national election, the central committee of SYRIZA approved the party’s review covering a period of 4.5 years, from January 2015 until July 2019. The report offers some insights on mistakes such as miscalculations in the first semester of 2015 and successes such as the exit from the bailout. What is currently more important for the main opposition party is to draw on previous experiences and to start making preparations in order to possibly win the next national election. A modernized core governmental policy, better review mechanisms, the democratic transformation of the state, a register for members, an opening up to the society and the embracement of leftist, green and progressive policies are regarded as key elements in this process. The first months of 2020 will be significant for SYRIZA’s new political attitude.
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