Social Capital, Policing and the Rule-Of-Law: Keys to Stabilization Karen Finkenbinder and Paul M
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CENTER for STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP and DEVELOPMENT U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE U.S. Army War College ARAMETERS P Senior LeaderSLDR Development and Resiliency FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ Social Capital, Policing and the Rule-of-Law: Keys to Stabilization Karen Finkenbinder and Paul M. Sangrey This Publication PKSOI Website USAWC Website ISBN: 13:978-0-9894393-2-9 PKSOI PAPER Social Capital, Policing and the Rule-of-Law: Keys to Stabilization Karen Finkenbinder Paul M. Sangrey An Anthology of United States Army War College Strategy Research Project Theses July 2013 The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart- ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov- ernment. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti- tute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic free- dom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5054. ***** All Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) publications are available on the PKSOI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered while copies last from our homepage. PKSOI’s homepage address is: https://pksoi.army.mil ***** The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute pub- lishes a quarterly journal to update the peace and stabil- ity operations community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications and upcoming con- ferences sponsored by PKSOI. If you are interested in re- ceiving this journal, please subscribe on our homepage at http://pksoi.army.mil/subscription.cfm. ISBN: 13:978-0-9894393-2-9 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION…………..............................…….....v Karen J. Finkenbinder 1. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND STABILITY OPERATIONS………….........................................…1 M. Annette Evans 2. HOME GUARD, POLICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT……….......................………41 Colonel Kevin S. MacWatters 3. PROVIDING SECURITY: THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF POLICING………...................67 Colonel David M. Krall 4. FOREIGN POLICE DEVELOPMENT: THE THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM…….........…..95 Colonel Robert K. Byrd 5. AFGHAN CIVIL POLICE: POLICE INSTEAD OF SOLDIERS………....……121 Colonel David L. Ward 6. MOUNTING A U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY POLICE FORCE…..…………151 Colonel Robert A. Karmazin 7. MILITARY POLICE: THE ANSWER TO THE STABILITY OPERATIONS GAP………......183 Colonel Jesse D. Galvan 8. PUTTING THE POLICE BACK INTO THE MILITARY POLICE……………...……....…217 Colonel Robert Dillon iii 9. U.S. ARMY POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION— RELEVANCY BEYOND 2012…............................250 Colonel Bradley W. Graul 10. MEDICAL SUPPORT TO FAILED STATES: START WITH THE PRISONS…….................…275 Colonel John M. McGrath iv INTRODUCTION Karen J. Finkenbinder Social Capital, Policing and Rule-of-Law: Keys to Sta- bilization reflects a breadth of U.S. Army War College Strategy Research papers in which students tackled tough issues. The danger in compiling student papers is that an anthology can become a set of isolated, dis- connected, anecdotal experiences. We have tried to select those that best describe the essentials of stabil- ity tasks and activities and the role they play in our success, failure, or combination thereof, in current and future operations. Stabilization is a process in which personnel iden- tify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions. Stability, ultimately, aims to create conditions such that the local populance regard the overall situa- tions as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of: the level of violence; the func- tioning of governmental, economic, and societal insti- tutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from the decreased support for the government, a result of the government failing to meet the expectation of the lo- cals. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, a situation that usu- ally occurs when locals see spoilers as those helping v to solve the priority grievance(s). Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal function- ing of society when the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms. Stability tasks and activities are not things that we have only been doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a long-time recognition that we have been doing this “other stuff” for a long time. But the term(s) keep changing. Professor Bill Flavin, the Chief of Doctrine, Concepts, Education and Training (DCET) at PKSOI and one of the Army’s foremost experts in stability op- erations, has been keeping track of the various terms used to describe stability tasks and activities over the past fifty years. This list includes terms such as: at- tenuated conflict, nation building, marginal military operations, indirect war, lower-level war, brush fire war, low intensity conflict, constrained operations, and ambiguous war. But the essential message has not changed. That being: there is something, other than offense and de- fense, that the military always winds up doing. We may not know what to call it, but we know it when we see it. But because we do not know what to call it – we often try to hide it under the rug and keep tripping over it. Only then do we deal with it. But in the in- terim, we have lost the competencies required to do it well. My fear, and others, is that as we become leaner, we will forget how painful it was to trip over the rug and, once again, lose our hard-earned competencies in the stability arena. vi Scope and Organization The anthology is divided into chapters that begin looking broadly at stability issues. It then begins to focus on policing – identified as essential to successful rule of law. The area of policing starts with a broad view of the strategic importance of policing and for- eign police development in general. It then looks at Afghan police development and narrows its scope to- ward the military role in policing before focusing on the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and what it can offer to stability. Lastly, it provides an overview of medical support to failed states by starting with the prisons. At first glance, this may not seem to fit with the theme, but it does. As we learn more about stabil- ity, we know that healthcare is essential to long-term development. Often, our own military police are inte- gral to an often neglected area of rule-of-law, prisons. The first chapter is a very broad article by Ms. M. Annette Evans, in which she questions why, in spite of herculean efforts by the U.S. and its international partners to rebuild the legal system, is the alternative legal structure usurping the official Afghan judicial system? She identifies social capital, which she de- fines as the “composition of relationships that define how communities operate and a societal resource that links citizens to each other,” as the missing element of the USG’s stability operations strategy. In Chapter 2, Colonel Kevin MacWatters, looks at the social contract required in implementing a suc- cessful home guard and police, security mechanisms which are essential to securing the populace and re- building trust in government, and thus required to have a successful counterinsurgency campaign. He argues for recruiting indigenous or village security vii forces to supplement the local police forces; thus re- pairing the overall social contract – necessary to better government. In Chapter 3, Colonel David Krall, looks at the strategic importance of policing in restoring security, a prerequisite for establishing stable and legitimate governance. He uses United Nations’ efforts in East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosovo to highlight current meth- ods and practices used by the international communi- ty to establish policing in post-conflict environments. In Chapter 4, Colonel Robert Byrd explores foreign police development. He argues that the USG rushed police development in Iraq and Afghanistan in an “uncoordinated and impromptu manner with respect to planning, structure, and endstate.” And by doing so, it undermined public support for the government as the police are the most visible manifestation of the new government. If the police are seen as incompe- tent and dishonest, so is the government. Colonel David Ward uses Chapter 5 to focus on the Afghan Civil police. He argues that the Afghan Civilian Police (ACP) should train and focus on law enforcement duties and apply tribal and secular law, rather than perform paramilitary duties. By doing so, they can build the legitimacy of the Afghan govern- ment, a conclusion that supports Robert Byrd’s obser- vations as well. In Chapter 6, Colonel Robert Karmazin addresses a U.S. government shortfall in supporting partner- nation police forces: the lack of a dedicated corps capable of creating or assisting partner-nation police forces. He argues that this capability gap directly af- fects National Security and should be addressed by developing a permanent civil-military professional policing component, in particular, a constabulary ca- viii pable of training, advising and sustaining local secu- rity.