Assessing Changing Defense Strategies’ Implications for Army Resource Requirements
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Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. C O R P O R A T I O N How Much Will Be Enough? Assessing Changing Defense Strategies’ Implications for Army Resource Requirements M. Wade Markel, Stuart E. Johnson, Carolyn Chu, David C. Gompert, Duncan Long, Anny Wong Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND—make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute.html R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2014 RAND Corporation This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see the RAND permissions page (www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html). RAND OFFICES SANTA MONICA, CA • WASHINGTON, DC PITTSBURGH, PA • NEW ORLEANS, LA • JACKSON, MS • BOSTON, MA CAMBRIDGE, UK • BRUSSELS, BE www.rand.org Preface In the lexicon of the Departments of Defense and Army, strategy is the process of combining available means in various ways in order to achieve the ends established by national policy. In order to devise appropriate strategies, Department of Defense (DoD) leaders must be able to assess their costs with some degree of accuracy. DoD has powerful, if ponderous, methods for performing such assessments, loosely grouped under the rubric of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system. These methods are best suited to providing precise estimates of the resources required to implement incremental change in a relatively stable security environment. Defense strategy can change substantially and suddenly, however, for reasons beyond policymakers’ control. Just to offer one example, the September 11 attacks derailed the “Transformation” strategy developed in the course of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. That strategy itself represented a significant shift. Therefore, DoD leaders need responsive methods for assessing alternative strategies’ costs. This monograph describes such a method, the Strategic Investment Analysis Protocol (SIAP). SIAP follows much of the same logic used in existing processes for assessing strategies’ resource implications, particularly those used in Total Army Analysis. It abbreviates the analysis, however, to allow decisionmakers to explore alternatives before selecting one or more of the most robust alternatives for further development. In particular, SIAP focuses on the Army context. To the extent that this research breaks new ground, it does so with respect to an analysis of how strategy affects costs for the Army’s generating force. This method is likely to be most useful at the beginning of the planning phase of the PPBE cycle. Readers will find some familiarity with existing defense planning processes useful in following this report. We have tried to explain terms and references clearly, in plain English. Such explanations are necessarily brief. The study leading to this monograph built on another set of 2009 RAND studies.1 Those studies explained how Defense Department officials and senior joint military leaders can assess the expected results, costs, and risks in the consideration of alternative national defense strategies. Noting this earlier work, the U.S. Army Training and 1 See Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, Duncan Long, and David C. Gompert, Developing Resource- Informed Strategic Assessments and Recommendations, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-703-JS, 2008, referred to hereafter as Davis et al., 2008. See also David C. Gompert, Paul K. Davis, Stuart E. Johnson, and Duncan Long, Analysis of Strategy and Strategies of Analysis, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-718-JS, 2008, referred to hereafter as Gompert et al., 2008. iii Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) asked RAND’s Arroyo Center to undertake this study. The research described in this monograph took place in late 2008 and 2009. RAND is publishing it now for a wider audience because the methods described herein continue to demonstrate their utility. Those methods have evolved since the original study, and this report reflects that evolution. However, the authors have not attempted to update the rest of the research describing contemporary issues, background and context. The study on which this report is based has been conducted within the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of the RAND Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is ATFCR08938. iv Contents Preface ............................................................................................................................................ iii Figures............................................................................................................................................ ix Tables ............................................................................................................................................. xi Summary ...................................................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... xxi Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................. xxiii 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Definitions ................................................................................................................................................. 1 An Army Need for Responsive Analysis .................................................................................................. 3 Existing Processes ..................................................................................................................................... 4 Combatant Commands As Units of Analysis ............................................................................................ 8 Research Method ....................................................................................................................................... 8 Structure of the Report ............................................................................................................................ 10 2. Developing Alternative Strategies to Support Analysis ........................................................... 11 The Strategic Investment Analysis Protocol in Brief .............................................................................. 11 Articulate Alternative Strategies ......................................................................................................... 11 Derive Combatant Command Objectives ........................................................................................... 12 Identify Required Capabilities ............................................................................................................ 13 Translate Required Capabilities into Investment