UNCLASSIFIED

A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Operational Leadership Experiences interview collection archives firsthand, multi-service accounts from military personnel who planned, participated in and supported operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

Interview with MAJ Kell Glass

Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas UNCLASSIFIED

Abstract

In this May 2009 interview MAJ Kell Glass, Military Police (MP) discusses his deployment to Iraq as a member of an Iraqi National Police Transition Team (NPTT) in from August 2007 through August 2008. MAJ Glass discusses his pre-deployment training at Fort Riley, Kansas and how his team came together and gelled as a team prior to deploying. MAJ Glass discusses his deployment to Iraq, his follow-on training in Kuwait and in Taji and improvements that should be made to that training. MAJ Glass describes challenges he had on this deployment with working on a NPTT and the satisfaction he received from working with his Iraqi counterparts from the 7-2 Brigade INP. MAJ Glass concludes his interview by stating that if asked he would not want to deploy as part of a transition team again but rather with a whole unit. UNCLASSIFIED

Interview with MAJ Kell Glass 22 May 2009

LL: My name is Lawrence Lessard (LL) and I'm with the Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I'm interviewing MAJ Kell Glass (KG) on his experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Today's date is 22 May 2009 and this is an unclassified interview. Before we begin, if you feel at any time that we're entering classified territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classified information, and if classification requirements prevent you from responding, simply say that you're not able to answer. How did you find out that you would be on a transition team?

KG: I was actually working in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and the message came out to the Military Police (MP) Corps saying there was a shortage of captains and majors for the military transition team (MiTT). At first they asked for volunteers but I still had a commitment to fill with ROTC. After about six months I got another letter that said, "How would you like to be on a MiTT?" and it was addressed to me. I didn't have a problem with it it was just that at the time my boss wanted me to complete an entire year. Once I got to that point I volunteered and said, "Yeah, I'll go on a MiTT?"

LL: Where were you at the time?

KG: Norfolk State University, Norfolk, Virginia; Army ROTC as an assistant professor of military science (APMS).

LL: When did you say, "Yes, I'll go on the MiTT?"

KG: I think I officially said it in January of 2007. I talked to my branch manager and said I wouldn't mind going. As a matter of fact I told him, "Yeah, I want to go on the MiTT."

LL: Where did you go for pre-deployment training?

KG: Fort Riley, Kansas.

LL: When did you go there?

KG: After volunteering in January I received orders in February -- about two weeks later -- and I reported to Fort Riley on 20 May, my wife's birthday.

LL: I'm sure she was happy about that.

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 3 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: She wasn't too happy about that. We celebrated early that's all.

LL: When you first arrived at Fort Riley did you know what kind of transition team you'd be on and was the team already formed? Or, was it formed after you'd been at Fort Riley for a while? How did that work?

KG: They actually sent me a roster but no, I didn't know what type of MiTT I was going to be on. They sent me a roster of everyone who was going to be on the team so I tried to figure out by looking at the branches what type of team it was. I was the only MP; everybody else was either -- we had one Aviation major, one Logistics major, one Military Intelligence (MI) captain, and a lieutenant colonel who was infantry. All the NCOs were infantry except for the one medic. So no, I didn't know the type of team I was going to be on. I thought it was going to be an Iraqi Army transition team but it turned out to be a National Police Transition Team (NPTT) once I got there. The teams were already formed; they had a roster ready and we all met up once we got to Fort Riley.

LL: What's your professional assessment of the pre-deployment training you received at Fort Riley?

KG: I think it was worth it and it was welcomed. I left command in 2004, so for 2005, 2006, and part of 2007 I was doing ROTC and a lot of the Army had changed. Blue Force Tracker (BFT) was talked about when I was in command and by the time I got to Fort Riley it was in existence; it was out there and fielded. Some other devices that were talked about when I was in command were now being fielded. We had a chance to play with different radio sets and different equipment and get ourselves back up to speed as far as our combat tasks.

LL: Of all the different pieces of the pre-deployment training that you received there at Fort Riley, in retrospect what was the most valuable for you and the team once you got downrange?

KG: Improvised explosive device (IED) awareness and IED response; how to react to IEDs. I think that was the most valuable. Also, getting to know each other at Fort Riley; spending those three months at Fort Riley getting to know the team. It's a little bit different than being in a regular unit. We were in a smaller element and we were stationed at Joint Security Station (JSS) Dora which is an Iraqi compound. We spent a lot of time together right underneath each other. It's like taking a family of 11 and they all live in the same house. It can get hectic at times but once you get to know each other and everybody's likes and dislikes we got along fairly well. Yeah, there were some bumps and bruises.

LL: Were there any blocks of training which in retrospect were basically time better spent doing something else?

KG: I would have to say no. I think everything that was going on at the time was well planned out. The language training we received, the cultural training we received, the weapons training

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 4 UNCLASSIFIED we received, the equipment training, and convoy security training was all well worth it. What you're doing is taking senior leadership -- NCOs and officers -- and you're throwing them together but they all have different backgrounds and they all have different ways of doing things. That training gave us some time to sit down with each other and figure out, "Okay. How exactly are we going to do cordon and search? How exactly are we going to do room clearing?" By going through the training you realized that you have a bunch of infantry NCOs. One was stationed in Germany most of his time. Another one was stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina most of his time. Another one was stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington most of his time. Another one, who was an infantry NCO, spent most of his time at the school house. They have three different concepts about how to clear a room. I'm not saying any of them are wrong but the bottom line is we needed to pick the best one for this team that was going to work for us. We had a chance to do that at Fort Riley. The time spent at Fort Riley was well deserved to the point where a lot of times the training we were doing -- it was almost like they were force feeding us. We got up at every morning at 0500 and most times you didn't get back to the barracks until the sun had gone down and that was Monday through Saturday.

LL: Knowing what you know now if you could magically go back in time and give yourself and your team one single block of instruction to better get you prepared for going downrange what would you have given yourselves?

KG: Leadership, a class on leadership; learning how to work with senior leadership. You cannot lead senior leaders the same way you lead Soldiers. Senior leaders think; they just don't react. They're going to think about it and then they're going to react. That's all I have to say.

LL: How was the team chemistry?

KG: The team chemistry was good and it started off real well at Fort Riley. Everybody got along; all 11 of us. It started to break apart within our second month in Iraq. That's when it really started to break apart. It broke apart because of that lack of leadership; not knowing how to lead senior leaders. Not knowing that you need to be honest with senior leaders because they're going to see through it. That's when it really started to break apart to the point where it was almost us against them. The senior NCO and the team leader -- the team leader was, "This is the way we're going to do it. This is why we're going to do it. This is why I want to do it. This is why I feel as though this is the best thing to do." Deep down inside the rest of the team is going, "Well, that's because you're trying to make yourself look good but that's not necessarily the best course of action. It's the course of action you want to take because it's going to make you look good. We're going to take that course of action because you're in charge but then you don't give us credit for it."

LL: When did you guys fly into theater and how was the movement over?

KG: I actually thought it went pretty smooth. We flew out on 12 August and we were in country by 14 August; we were in Kuwait. We spent about two weeks in Kuwait for additional

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 5 UNCLASSIFIED train-up but I don't think that was worthwhile. All we did was redo the same thing we'd been doing for the last three weeks. We moved from Kuwait to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) and once we got to BIAP we went our separate ways. Every team went to their area of operations (AO) and did a five to 10-day relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with the outgoing team.

LL: You and your team didn't go to Taji and the Phoenix Academy?

KG: Oh, no. Yes we did. I forgot about that. We went from Kuwait to Taji. The Taji portion, once again, was the same training. It was to the point where it was the same PowerPoint slides, the same pictures; I even made a comment one time and said, "Hey sir. Go ahead and sit down. Let me teach this class because these are the same slides, the same things we've just seen at Fort Riley three weeks ago."

LL: Once you guys left to Taji where did you find yourselves located?

KG: We went to Joint Security Station (JSS) Dora in East Rashid, Bagdad.

LL: Was it at this point that you discovered you were going to be a NPTT as opposed to --

KG: Oh no. We found out back at Fort Riley. We had been there about three or four days when we found out we were going to be a NPTT. The problem with the training was that it was geared to the MiTTs. Any time we asked questions about the Iraqi National Police (INP) we weren't getting a lot of information because all the instructors knew was, "Hey, we're going to train you up to be a transition team for the Iraqi Army." "Well, we're going to [work] with the INP." "Well we really don't have that much information on the INP." We just stuck with the regular MiTT training.

LL: Did you know which transition team you were going to replace?

KG: Yes, the 7-2 Brigade MiTT.

LL: Were you able to communicate with them while you were back at Fort Riley?

KG: Yes. We communicated through the secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNet) back and forth. I was able to ask my counterpart exactly some of the things I should be focusing on but a lot of times we had that gap because they were busy. They were working and I was on email asking questions but it might take two or three days before he could get back with an answer. We did communicate quite often.

LL: Once you got there on the ground in Dora how close was the reality to the expectations you had going in just from your communication and your training?

KG: It wasn't close at all. It was far apart. We went in thinking we were going to train up the INP and we spent most of our time being logistics. Before you could train them there were other

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6 UNCLASSIFIED things we had to focus on. We spent more time rebuilding equipment and the facilities than we actually did training them. A lot of their problems were with their logistics; their logistics were shot. A lot of things we wanted to do with them we couldn't do with them because we couldn't get the equipment. We did set up a warrior leader's course for the NCOs to try and train the NCOs. The problem with that was officers didn't take to it too well because they don't treat their NCOs the same way we do. They're not going to give their NCOs the same power that we give our NCOs. We were trying to teach their NCOs how to lead Soldiers and the officers were saying, "You just do what I tell you to do." We did a couple of classes while we were there for 12 months; we did approximately 10 classes -- once a month for two weeks

LL: When you first got there how was your handoff with the team you were replacing?

KG: Quick because they were trying to get out of there.

LL: [Laughs] How long was it? Was it long enough?

KG: I think it was long enough. When you come in there your enthusiasm is high; you're ready to start. You're like, "Just show me what I need to do and get out of my way." After about five days of my counterpart showing me what to do I was like, "Okay. Move out of the way. Just sit back for five days. If I have some questions I'll come ask you." That's how my transition went. Because we were hot seating it was also a problem because we were both trying to work off the same computer. He's trying to redeploy, I'm trying to get my feet wet and find out where I'm going so we were both battling over the computers. Not only that, I'm occupying his bed and I'm trying to get him out of his bed so I could take over the bed. We worked through it because we were all professionals but it was rough. It was also fun.

LL: How was your initial introduction to your Iraqi counterpart?

KG: The major I took over for did a good job. I didn't have just one Iraqi counterpart and that was the thing you don't learn at Fort Riley. You don't learn that until you get to the ground and you're thinking that, "Hey, all I have to do is advise the operations officer (S3)." Well, they have three or four S3s but you don't find that out until you get on the ground. He introduced me to LTC Mohammad; then he introduced me to LTC Karif. Then he introduced me to another colonel and then another colonel. I said, "Which one is the S3?" He said, "All four." "Oh, okay. Well, which one is the main one?" "LTC Mohammad." "Okay. Well, let me focus on LTC Mohammad and when he's not there I'll focus on the other three." It was a good handoff. We spent about two or three days with the two of us working with LTC Mohammad. My counterpart redeployed and I saw LTC Mohammad every day he was there because they work 10 days on and 10 days off. I saw the S3 -- whoever was sitting in that seat at the time -- every day.

LL: How easy was it to develop that rapport with LTC Mohammad and the other secondary S3s?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 7 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: The language barrier is the big problem so it was hard at first. After about a month or two he started coming around and I started coming around. The key with working with the INP or just working with Iraqis is getting to know them first. That was one of the things I knew from a prior deployment to Kuwait: you have to get to know them first. Once you get to know them -- talk about their family, ask about their family; they're going to ask about your family. If you talk to each other and you get to know them personally you'll work a lot better together professionally.

LL: Before I move on, which Iraqi unit was this that you guys were working with?

KG: The 7-2 Brigade INP.

LL: When you initially got there on the ground what was your assessment of the unit? What did you think their strengths were and what were their weaknesses?

KG: [Laughs] My initial assessment? Can I be frank? [It was], "Oh shit!" [Laughs] I didn't know what to expect. For some reason I thought I was going to get there and see an army or national police unit similar to the way we are as far as being in uniform and being professional but that's not what we got. What we got were half of them in uniform, the other half who had uniforms but weren't wearing them. We had [Iraqis] in four or five different uniforms. They spent most of their time sleeping during the day. If you asked them to do something they'll do it but it's going to be a while before it gets done. Although you need it done within the next 30 minutes you better give them about two or three hours before they get it done. There was no true leadership in the NCO ranks and that what we had to go and search for. "Who are the NCOs? Who is controlling the barracks?" In our Army the NCOs control the barracks. They didn't have anybody controlling the barracks so of course, their barracks looked like crap. You said, "Who is actually controlling the unit?" Well, it was the officers but they weren't doing it very well at all. They hardly went down to see their Soldiers; they hardly ever talked to them unless it was to tell them something to do. They were more concerned with their needs than the actual Soldier needs. The compound itself was filthy to the point where there was trash everywhere. I thought it was a landfill. I even thought to myself, "Man. I have to spend 12 months in that." That became our first priority. "Number one; let's make this compound look like a professional military compound." It took us almost two months to clean up the compound that's how bad it was. You had trash everywhere and debris everywhere. There were broken down vehicles and feces everywhere. Some of the buildings were just falling apart. I couldn't understand how they were still using them but they were still using the facilities. We had to repair most of them and that took us about two to three months to actually get the compound cleaned up so we could start to do some work. We were actually doing two things at once. You're trying to play [inaudible]; you're trying to clean up their compound, fix their facilities, and you're trying to conduct some type of training program.

LL: Were there any strengths that you noted initially within the unit?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 8 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: If I have to think about it, no. No. When we first got there accountability sucked; they had no accountability of their people. One thing they did do well was keep records well. If you asked them for something, "I need to know what happened three months ago -- there was a report filed." They kept reports; they kept a lot of reports. They did do that well. Now, the system they used, I couldn't understand it but if you asked them for a report, give them about two hours, and they would come back with that report. They had file cabinets all over the place; they did keep reports.

LL: In terms of unit missions, what were the Iraqis doing and what did their tempo look like?

KG: They basically focused on traffic control points (TCPs) all the time. That's all they had -- TCPs. The other missions they were doing were cordon and searches and detainee operations. They had a small detainee building but it wasn't up to standards and we had to work on that. The only thing they had was a building with four rooms and some Hesco baskets around it. They weren't even filled in with dirt, it was just the wire. It was basically chicken wire around a four- room building and they said, "Yeah, that's where we keep all the detainees." We had to work on that and then we had to work on the TCPs. We had to figure out why they had so many TCPs and we had to cut down on some of those TCPs. We could conduct other operations like patrolling operations or cordon and search operations. Once we cut down on some of the TCPs then we could focus on some of the other things.

LL: Working with the S3 and the S3 shop, was that pretty much what you focused on; shifting what they were doing so they could more training and do more patrols?

KG: Yeah. What I had to help them focus with was -- I actually worked with the S3 and the training officer. At the same time I was doing operations I was also working with the training officer so he could work with the rest of the brigade and come up with a training plan for the rest of the brigade. I was working with the operations officer so he could keep missions flowing and so he's battle tracking the missions going on. I had to work simultaneously with the both of them so we could keep missions and training going at the same time. One thing I had to teach them was how to task organize amongst the battalions. You can't just keep pulling one battalion. That was one of the things he would do; he would pull just one battalion and make them do all the work. "No, you can't do that. You have to task organize amongst the battalions." We had to teach them come up with as tasking for the battalions. "If you've already given this battalion several tasks you can't go back to them again. They just can't keep it up." You have another battalion down in their sector and they're doing anything but pulling TCPs. That's all they do. I had to work with them on that and how to task organize amongst the battalions and how to organize their training so they don't take away most of the battalions' man power for training when they still have missions to conduct. I spent a lot of time on that.

LL: What was the single biggest challenge you had to deal with?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 9 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: The single biggest challenge was actually me -- learning how to deal with them and how they operate. I think it really hit me in the second month when I tried to teach them the military decision making process (MDMP) and I realized it just ain't going to work. We don't even like doing MDMP. That whole process of trying to teach an Iraqi lieutenant colonel from the INP wasn't going to work; it takes entirely too long. I said, "Well, let me teach him troop leading procedures (TLPs)." Then I came to find out that they had their own way of doing TLPs but they don't follow it. Once I took our TLPs and their TLPs and I put them together and showed them the similarities with the two, I said, "We're going to work with this and this is what we're going to do: you receive a mission, you issue a warning order, and you start TLPs." That's how we worked. The biggest challenge was actually me learning how they work and operate. They don't believe in working as hard as we do.

JF: How was interpreter support?

KG: We had good interpreters. I don't think we had any issues with interpreters. We had pretty good interpreters. I think sometimes a lot of issues got lost in translation but I think that's just because of the differences in the languages. We did have one interpreter who was pretty good at translating exactly our meaning, not just going word for word. He did a pretty good job, although I can't remember his name -- Jimmy, yeah.

LL: How useful were the interpreters in terms of bridging the cultural gap and smoothing over some of those speed bumps you'd otherwise hit?

KG: Very, very helpful. Like the one I mentioned, Jimmy. Jimmy would tell us -- if I came out and said something he'd say, "No, sir. You don't want me to say it that way because if I say it that way he's going to take it as an insult." I'd say, "Well, okay but do you understand the meaning I'm trying to get across?" He'd say, "Yes, I understand. I'll interpret it that way." They helped us a lot with the culture and how they operate and do things. They were very helpful. They didn't take exactly what we said and translate it back and forth. They didn't do that. It was a learning environment for us with the interpreters because a lot of them had been interpreters since 2001. This wasn't their first time working with Americans; they were from Iraq so they understood the culture and they understood our culture a little bit. They understood that sometimes when we raise our voices we're not really pissed, we're just trying to get our point across. They'd explain to us, "Sometimes when you raise your voice they're taking it as a sign of aggression." "No, I'm not being aggressive. Sometimes I could just be getting excited." They worked well with us as far as making us understand culture and even helping the Iraqis understand our culture and how we do things. I think we'd been there so long that a lot of the INP and Iraqi Army understand how the Americans work.

LL: Did you get out very much to see how the squads and platoons were actually executing the operations you were helping the Iraqis along with?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 10 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: We did but not as much as the battalion teams since we were at brigade level. We did go out and check on some of the battalions from time to time. That would help me because I'd go back to the S3 and say, "Hey. Did you write that operations order (OPORDER) the way I asked you to write it?" Come to find out that the copy he gave me was different than the one he sent down to the battalion. I said, "Okay. That's the problem right there." A lot of times I would sit down and write out the OPORDER and say, "Hey. These are the tasks that you have to make sure the battalion understands." I'd then have the interpreter translate it and that's how we worked around some of those bumps and bruises. Me sitting down and telling him exactly what needs to go in the OPORDER? A lot of times it didn't get in the OPORDER. They're not as detailed in their OPORDER process as we are.

LL: What are the kinds of things they do include and what are the things they just don't care about and leave out?

KG: Service and support. I don't know how many times we went out on missions -- we had a mission out in the palm groves. It was about six miles of searching for weapons caches and you had two battalions out there and neither of them had water and its 115 degrees out there. We just didn't have enough water for all of them. We carried enough water for our teams, our trucks, but we didn't have enough water for all of them. That was one of the things I had put out, "Hey. You need to make sure --." "Oh, no, no. They already understand that. They already know that." Sometimes in a brigade order you have to put it in there and when that battalion commander or those company commanders don't follow it, then you can go back and point the finger and say, "Hey. We told you to make sure that your Soldiers had enough food and water for two days. You didn't put it in there. You assumed the battalion commanders knew that. You assumed they were going to put it in the OPORDER. Then you assumed the company commanders were going to put it in their OPORDER and it didn't happen."

LL: In terms of trying to get that kind of detail -- filling in paragraph four -- was that pushing a noodle or were they actually picking up on that?

KG: I really don't think they ever picked on it. Little, simple stuff like that -- they never went out with water. When we'd go out to check a checkpoint there'd be no water out on the checkpoints. What they would do is go into the muhallahs and get water from the populace. I said, "You need to provide your Soldiers with water." It's like us working within the city limits and me knocking on somebody's door saying, "Hey can I have a glass of water?" every 10 to 15 minutes. No.

LL: You already mentioned this a little bit earlier, but after the first couple of months you were on the ground working with the Iraqis the team itself started fracturing. How did that affect you doing your job with your Iraqi counterpart?

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 11 UNCLASSIFIED

KG: It didn't at all because I liked working with my Iraqi counterpart. It really didn't affect my job working with them at all. All it did was effect tensions within the team during meetings and different exercises but as far as working with the Iraqis it didn't affect us at all.

LL: Did it affect the team as far as everybody moving in the same direction?

KG: No, because in the end the man in charge gets what he wants. It's just that you didn't like being around the man in charge any more.

LL: The level of support you got in terms of basic life support. How was that while you were there?

KG: From the BCTs? From the American side of the house?

LL: In terms of how you were living; how was your support there?

KG: The transition team itself got plenty of support from the BCT. We didn't have any problem with that. By us living out there on the JSS sometimes we didn't get to the FOB but maybe once a week if we had a meeting to go to; we were lucky to go twice a week. As far as equipment support or logistics support we didn't have any issues with the BCTs. Anything we wanted or needed all we had to do was ask for it and we got it.

LL: How was the team's relationship with the local American units that owned the battle space?

KG: It was good. We had our mission, they had their mission, and all we had to do was talk to the S3s and we got the mission accomplished according to the BCT commander's intent. It might have been different in other areas but where we were we got along well with the BCTs and I didn't feel like we were treated like step-children at all. When we first got there we worked with 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (ID). Halfway through they redeployed and 1st Brigade, 4th ID moved in. We still didn't have any issues; we still got along really well.

LL: Did the Americans try and work joint ops with the Iraqis at all?

KG: Yeah. We had joint patrols. We started conducting joint patrols about six months in. The battalions in the BCT's sector would do joint patrols with the INP battalion in their sectors and it worked out really well. The reports that we got said that the INP liked doing it and so did the American Soldiers. I'm not just saying that to give you the sugar coating; I'm telling you from my point of view and what I saw. They worked well together. A lot of the junior Soldiers loved it and I'm talking on the INP side; they liked doing it.

LL: Why did they really seem to get into it?

KG: Because I think they felt important. They got to interact with the American Soldiers and let's face it; they do look up to us. I guess they took it as a pride thing to say, "This American platoon wants to go out with my platoon on patrol." They would inter-mix the platoons and

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 12 UNCLASSIFIED conduct different training while they were out there also. They took it as a pride thing. If you were shunning them away and saying, "You get out of the way; we're going to take care of this." Now, you're telling them, "Number one; I don't trust you and number two; I don't think you can do the job. You're not good enough to be with us." By pulling them in and working with them you're not only teaching them what they should be doing but you're showing them what they should be doing. You're telling them, "I have trust in you to get this job done so we can go home." That's the bottom line.

LL: Were there other instances of joint ops aside from patrolling together?

KG: We did a huge cordon and search together. They did the cordon and search, the inner security and the actual searching of buildings, and we had the outer cordon and air support because they don't have air support. We did work together.

LL: Was this like a battalion sized operation?

KG: This was brigade.

LL: So you're talking thousands of guys out there working together.

KG: Yes, this was a brigade sized operation.

LL: Over the course of the deployment were there any specific areas where you could visibly see that, "Yeah, the Iraqis I'm working with are getting better at doing this."

KG: What I saw was that they were getting better dealing with the people. They were more accepted by their own people about halfway through the deployment. Their own people were starting to accept them. There was a time when the INP would roll down into the muhallahs and people would go inside and close the doors because they were scared of them. That fear was gone.

LL: Were there any particular areas that you basically felt you were butting your head up against the wall about because they weren't getting any better and if you squinted really hard they might even be getting worse?

KG: Some of their work ethics -- they're only going to do so much and then they're going to stop. You can only push them so far and then they're going to stop. They're going to do things their way and there is no problem with doing it your way but you have to do it.

LL: The brigade itself, what was its sectarian/ethnic makeup and how did that compare with the areas of Baghdad they were working in?

KG: It was mostly Shi'a and a few Sunni. They might have had some discrepancies within but we never saw it. As a matter of fact the brigade commander GEN Kareem was Shi'a and the deputy brigade commander was Sunni and they pretty much got along. We didn't notice it. We

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 13 UNCLASSIFIED didn't hear anything about the differences. Even in the barracks we didn't hear anything about it. It seemed to me like they got along; I really didn't notice within the INP.

LL: What about the neighborhoods they were mostly working in?

KG: Mostly Shi'a and a few Sunni. I can't remember the exact breakdown but it was mostly Shi'a. Every once in a while you would hear about discrepancies and who was getting the most amount of power -- the Shi'a neighborhood or the Sunni neighborhood. The Sunnis would say, "Hey. The Shi'a are getting more power than we are. They're getting two or three hours a day more power than we are." Okay, I'd like to have 24-hours [of power a day] in whatever neighborhood it was but to them that was a big deal. When we'd go to some of the community centers you'd hear that amongst the populace.

LL: You might hear some tussling at the neighborhood level but you never saw it within the INP?

KG: In the INP? No.

LL: Did you ever see any tussling between the police and neighborhoods because of ethnic or sectarian difference?

KG: No. I'm trying to think if we had some reports -- I can't think of any complaints.

LL: Did you have any opportunity to work with other US Services while you were there?

KG: We worked with the Air Force because the Air Force was in charge of the Iraqi Police. We did work with the Air Force police transition teams (PTTs) because they were in charge of training the Iraqi Police. The Iraqi Police were a lot worse than the INP. We had issues with logistics but they had no logistics. We did work closely with the Air Force.

LL: How was it working with them?

KG: The only problem with the PTTs is that their makeup was not completely correct. A lot of the teams were staff sergeants (E6s) and below and you had a lieutenant in charge of several teams. You had a major who was in charge of the entire section. When you look at a NPTT, we had captains and majors, in charge of battalion teams. The lowest ranking person we had on our team was an E6 and he was the medic. The highest ranking person on one of their teams was an E6. A lot of times they didn't have the experience or expertise to train them the way they should be trained. They didn't have the experience or expertise to teach them how to manage their logistics system. They didn't have the knowledge to know where to get the information to teach them how to manage their logistics system. A lot of the police stations were just falling apart and then it fell back on the BCT to try and help to get those police stations up to standard -- some type of standard.

LL: Did you have much opportunity to work with other Coalition Forces aside from the Iraqis?

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KG: No, not at all. We saw them out there but we weren't working with them.

LL: Did you have to deal with contractors at all?

KG: As far as getting some of the facilities fixed within the compound, yes, we worked with contractors for that. What kind of contractors are you talking about? Are you talking about engineering? Security?

LL: Any kind of contractor.

KG: Yeah, we worked with them as far as getting some of their facilities fixed. That's all I have to say about that: we worked with them to try and get some of their facilities fixed. There was no good or bad to it. Once we had the paperwork go through the system, they came out, made repairs, and put in T-walls. We remodeled their detention facility, brought in [inaudible], cleaned out the area, and took out all of the debris.

LL: Did you have any media contact while you were there?

KG: Yes. The brigade public affairs officer (PAO) came out and did stories. Some civilian media came out and did stories.

LL: Was that local civilian media or US?

KG: It was some local civilian media that the INP invited out when we helped them open up their medical center. They had a medical center on their compound that wasn't open and wasn't being used. We helped them get that open. Once we got the medical center open they could service not only the INP but about once a month they would bring in the civilian populace to the medical center and they would have a doctor there. We had a pediatrician one time. We had a dentist there a couple of times. A lot of them would come in to be seen so that brought in a lot of media coverage to help facilitate that and do some stories on that.

LL: Did they specifically talk to you or was it just in general?

KG: In general; wherever they could [inaudible] and basically the brigade commander, GEN Kareem.

LL: When did you guys fly back to the States?

KG: 2 August 2008.

LL: How was your handoff with the team that replaced you?

KG: [Laughs] You're going to have to ask them that.

LL: How do you think it went?

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KG: I thought it went well. I thought it went real well. According to my guy he was surprised at the knowledge detail I had broken down for him, the continuity book I had broken down for him, and the thumb drive. I went through and showed him where everything was. I gave him a walk through and introduced him to all of the key players he had to work with and some of the other key players that he may or may not have to work with. We spent about five days doing that and it seemed like they were eager to take over and I know I was eager to get up out of there. I will tell you that I do miss working with my counterpart. LTC Mohammad was a good guy. It was to the point where when his wife had a baby my wife sent some baby clothes and some of our kid's old clothes. I never met his wife but he appreciated that. He sent [my wife] back -- I can't remember what the female dress is called -- but he sent my wife one of those. I doubt if she'll ever wear it but it's something she can say that was sent to her.

LL: What were the big professional lessons that you took away from that deployment to Iraq?

KG: Number one; you can't lead senior leadership the same way you lead junior leadership. The second thing is if you're going to conduct training with another country a lot of times they have ways they like to do things or they have their own ways of doing things. Sometimes they use it and sometimes they don't. Find out how they do things, compare it to the way you do it, and then come to a happy medium. A lot of times they're not going to do it the way the Americans do it but they have a way that's similar. Meet in the middle and try to get them to work that way.

LL: Based on your experiences from this deployment to Iraq, if you could make a recommendation to the US Army on how to do things better in the future, what would you suggest to them?

KG: As far as the MiTT is concerned, I think we did it backwards. Instead of sending 11 Soldiers over there to train them on what they should be doing, you should send a training team of whatever -- a battalion training team -- right there in the middle of the country and you bring 11 of their guys. Train them up and then send them back out there. A lot of times what we did, even with the warrior leaders, was to train up some of their guys, put them out in front, and then we coach, teach, and mentor the trainers to train the rest of the Soldiers or jundi. The same thing with me. I would train up LTC Mohammad and say, "Sir, this is what you need to be doing. This is how you do it. Let me see you do it. Now, let me see you teach your officers how to do it. Let's move on to the next task." I think it would be a lot better than sending our guys there for 12 months to train them up when we could just request, "Send me 11 of your best guys; you train them up and then send them back to train up their own forces."

LL: Transition teams don't have family readiness groups (FRGs).

KG: That's not true.

LL: Really? You guys had one?

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KG: Yeah.

LL: How did that work? I assume you're being dragged from all different reaches of the Army.

KG: You are. You're being dragged from all over the place. Me, coming out of ROTC in Virginia meant I left my family in Virginia Beach. When you sign into Fort Riley you also sign into the FRG. They contacted my wife from Fort Riley to Virginia. They would call -- not every month -- but they called and sent emails several times keeping her updated on where we were in Iraq, what we were doing in Iraq, and if she needed anything. There is a FRG system. I won't say it's perfect but my wife said she was contacted at least six times and to me that's pretty good out of state. She got newsletters on a weekly basis or whenever they put out the newsletter but she actually got a phone call at least six times just to check up on her. I will give them credit for that. The FRG was there and it was working although she never saw them and they never saw her but they did contact her.

LL: Do you think that was probably the best solution they could have come up with aside from your wife having to move to Fort Riley?

KG: Yeah, that's the best thing they could do. I knew I was only going to Fort Riley for train- up; it was a temporary change of station (TCS). I was actually stationed out of Kuwait so I was really permanently changing stations (PCSng) to Kuwait with TCS to Fort Riley. Why would I move my family to Fort Riley knowing that when I got back to Fort Riley I'd be there for four days and then I'd go to my next duty station. I might as well leave my wife where she is. A lot of people who go on transition teams do that very thing. They also had a FRG website. Plus, my wife was back home so she was an hour from mom and dad. It didn't make sense to move her anyway. The FRG was up and running.

LL: How was connectivity between where you were at and the people back home?

KG: I talked to my wife every night. The time difference was hard; I was getting ready to rack out and she was getting ready to take the kids to school but I talked to her every night. Even on the compound we had internet so I talked to her every night. Technology today is great with the webcams; we had no issues.

LL: How was reintegration back into the family?

KG: I really didn't feel it. I think the reason I didn't feel it was because the moment I got back to Fort Riley we did our four days out-processing, I flew back to Virginia, and I started on my PCS. We started packing up and getting ready to PCS.

LL: So everybody was uprooted and moving.

KG: Everybody was uprooted and moving. The good thing was -- I guess we've been doing this too long -- I really didn't have to do anything as far as PCSng because my wife took care of

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 17 UNCLASSIFIED everything -- transportation, closing out the house, and all that's entailed with PCSng; she took care of it. By the time I got there the only thing I had to do was take orders from her and catch up on sleep to try and get my sleep pattern back and get rid of that jet lag. That was it.

LL: Is there anything else about your deployment to Iraq on a transition team that you'd like to add to this interview?

KG: If I had to do it all over again, no. I wouldn't do it again. I'll put that in there. It's always better to deploy with a unit. Although we got good support, excellent support, you feel like you're begging. "Hey, can you take a look at our vehicles and make sure they're running properly?" "Okay, alright, listen. This is what we're going to do. We're going to put you on the schedule. Every Sunday you make sure you bring your vehicles in for maintenance." You did and you felt like you were begging. "Hey, we need some supplies; paper, pencils, whatever." You feel like you're begging. When you're in a unit you just got to the logistics officer (S4) and say, "Hey. I need it. Give it here." That's about it. When you really think about it it really wasn't that bad but if I had to do it again I probably wouldn't. I'd want to stay with a conventional unit.

LL: Okay. Thank you very much.

END OF INTERVIEW

Transcribed by Jenn Vedder

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