UNCLASSIFIED

A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Operational Leadership Experiences interview collection archives firsthand, multi-service accounts from military personnel who planned, participated in and supported operations in the Global War on Terrorism.

Interview with MAJ Shawn Steele

Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, UNCLASSIFIED

Abstract

In this interview, MAJ Shawn Steele, US Army, Air Defense Artillery; discusses his deployments to as the team executive officer in 2009 through 2010 in support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF). MAJ Steele discusses a typical day in theater and describes the interaction

he had with the locals. MAJ Steele compares his prior deployments and acknowledges the

changes made between his deployments. MAJ Steele closes his interview by stating,

“Understand how to use interpreters.”

UNCLASSIFIED

Interview with MAJ Shawn Steele 23 November 2010

AS: My name is Angie Slattery (AS) and I'm with the Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I'm interviewing MAJ Shawn Steele (SS) on his experiences during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Today's date is 23 November 2010 and this is an unclassified interview. Before we begin, if you feel at any time that we're entering classified territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classified information, and if classification requirements prevent you from responding, simply say that you're not able to answer. Before we talk about your deployment experience I'd like to capture a little bit of your background in the Army so if you could expand on that for me please.

SS: I joined the Army 19 years ago; back in 1991 during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. I've kind of served as a combat service support element and a combat support element. I have two prior military occupational specialties (MOSs) and received a Green to Gold scholarship in 1997. I attended school from 1998 to 2000 and got commissioned. I received my commission in 2000 as an Air Defense Artillery (ADA) officer. I went to Fort Bliss, Texas and did my basic course at Fort Bliss. I did my Captain's Career Course at Fort Bliss. I did deploy in support of OIF I. My battalion supported the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) as they went north through Iraq out of Kuwait. I also deployed again in 2009 as a military transition team (MiTT) executive officer (XO) and fires trainer.

AS: What inspired you to join the Army?

SS: I needed a job. I really did. I kind of left home at a young age. My background would be that I dropped out of high school and was on my own when I was 16. I was 17 working commercial fishing boats in south Florida. I was walking through a strip mall during Desert Storm/Desert Shield and the recruiter saw me and was like, "Hey. Let me talk to you for a minute." The next thing you know I took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and I was at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri going through basic training.

AS: Good for you. With all the many branches within the Army, what made you decide to specialize as ADA?

SS: My professor of military science was ADA. Now we're air missile defense but we used to High Medium Air Defense (HIMAD) and Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD). As a SHORAD guy he had been in many of the divisions so he kind of romanticized what it was like to be an ADA officer; having your own platoons, being a battery commander, all those great things, and I got interested in it. When I was enlisted I had served in the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) when they were an ACR and 3rd ACR so I knew Armor operations. My two choices were basically Armor or ADA. My wife, who I met in 1994 in El Paso, Texas when I was with 3rd ACR, was from El Paso which is the home of ADA. I put ADA first and Armor second and the Army said, "You're going to be an ADA officer."

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AS: What does it mean to be an ADA officer?

SS: We are a force protector. Prior to the restructuring of ADA we used to have SHORAD -- the Avenger, MANPADs, the Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle, and the Linebacker and those assets would establish a protective area over forces on the battlefield whether they're in the defense or offense against enemy air threats such as helicopters or fast movers. The HIMAD, which is what I've been branched most of my career, was targeted at helicopters and planes but also the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) as well as SCUDs. In Desert Storm/Desert Shield Iraq as the SCUDs and everything was worried about SCUD missiles. That's what the Patriot defended against there. In OIF I we were used for the same purpose -- to defend against SCUD missiles. There wasn't an air threat from enemy air weapon systems -- air breathing threat (ABT) is what we call them. That's what ADA does; it really protects the force. It's part of our protecting war fighting function.

AS: How many deployments in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) have you had?

SS: Two.

AS: With those two deployments, what year [did you deploy], [what was your] duty position, and [please give] a brief overview of your missions?

SS: I deployed for OIF I in 2003 with 2-43rd ADA Battalion part of the 108th ADA Brigade. We deployed in order to assist with the buildup of forces and we supported the Marines providing air missile defense coverage as they moved north during their attack into Iraq. I was the battery XO and we basically established an air envelope over the forces that were at Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Coyote as they built up to go through the breach lanes into Iraq. We leap frogged the batteries up with the battalion and covered forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) as well as Staging Area Cobra. My battery covered An Nasariyah and the bridgehead crossings. Alpha Battery and Charlie Battery covered the river crossing. My battery went up to a place called Klitzcar in the middle of Iraq and we covered a Marine FARP and then we went forward to Numaniyah and we covered another FARP. We were basically providing air coverage to prevent against air attacks. That was in essence our mission during OIF I and then we did retrograde operations back down to An Nasariyah, we were there for a little while, and then we left theater. For my second deployment I deployed out of , Kansas as a MiTT member and my job was to be the fires advisor to the Iraqi battalion initially and then we got bumped up to be the brigade team. I was the fires advisor for the brigade as well as the team XO. We deployed to the An Najaf Province and we were partnered with the 30th Iraqi Infantry Brigade which is part of the 8th Iraqi Infantry Division.

AS: What unit were you assigned to during your deployment?

SS: Our host nation force that we were partnered with was the 30th Iraqi Infantry Brigade but we fell up under two different US Army brigades. The first brigade was the 172nd Infantry Brigade out of Germany and the second was 3rd Brigade 3rd Infantry Division (ID) out of Fort Benning, Georgia. We were partnered with them and within that we worked with a battalion that was the land owner for Diwaniyah and Najaf.

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AS: For the remainder of this interview we're going to focus on your second tour which was from 2009 until 2010. With that when did you first find out that you would be deploying to the Iraq?

SS: I was an observer controller (OC) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and I called up my branch manager after I'd been there for 18 months and my branch manager said, "I got your next assignment. You're going on a MiTT." That's how I found out and was basically notified. As an ADA officer I had to go through Field Artillery (FA) training for a month at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in order to be the fires advisor. I went through a month-long transition force to learn how to do battalion and below fires planning, do all the forward observer tasks, understand how to call for fire, synchronize fire, and do non-lethal targeting. A lot of the stuff I kind of knew because of the Combined Training Center (CTC); I learned a lot of that as an OC. I did a month-long transition course and from there I met my 10 other members of my team -- the team chief and the nine other members of the team -- at Fort Riley. We closed in on Fort Riley, we walked into the chapel, and there was our row that had our unit request form (URF) number for our 11-man team. We sat down and met each other for the first time and that was in March.

AS: And you deployed in May?

SS: We actually got into theater 14 June and we redeployed back in May; we were just under 12 months.

AS: What was your family's reaction to your deployment?

SS: They were sad. My family actually did not stay at ; they moved back to my wife's home town in El Paso. We own a home there so they went back and stayed there for my deployment. I married my wife when I was a corporal so she understands the Army a lot better than most and my sons -- that's all they've known since they were born.

AS: How was your pre-deployment training?

SS: I was surprisingly shocked. When I say that I mean it was good. Fort Riley and the 1st ID did an outstanding job training us. The training was focused on survivability skills as well as cultural skills. There were also classes on the basic skills we needed to be teaching the Iraqi Army. The three-month training cycle we went through culminated with pairing us with a unit at the CTC; it was awesome. They allowed us to go deploy to Fort Irwin, California with a brigade that was going through their mission readiness exercise and be a MiTT embedded with them. That gave us a preview of what we were going to experience when we went to Iraq. It was good; I did appreciate it. The one thing that was lacking -- and I'll probably hit on it later when you ask about lessons learned -- was the use of the interpreter. For a MiTT the interpreter is key for your success.

AS: I can see that. As a team XO how much leeway did you have in training your Soldiers?

SS: The train-up was pretty regimented. They had already fleshed all the bugs out of the network and we were pretty set. The team chief was the guy who had the yay say or nay say o what we were going to do. I would make recommendations to him if it was critical we do something again. On a small team the guys tend to grow together so you do make a lot of

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 5 UNCLASSIFIED decisions as a team with the team chief being the ultimate authority; he says yes or no on what we're going to do but everybody gets to weigh in when there's only 11 guys. As the XO I wasn't necessarily driving things; I was more synchronizing events and what we did.

AS: You said the cultural training or interpreter training was the most beneficial; what was the least beneficial part of the training process?

SS: To be honest with you I thought the curriculum was well laid out. I didn't see anything that could be trimmed away. I think it was all pertinent to what we were doing. You never know where you're going you end up or what environment you're going to be in. You could luck out and be in a great province where the military is well established or you could end up in one where they're just putting a battalion or brigade together and where every skill set they helped you learn and understand as you go through MiTT training comes into play. I wouldn't take anything out of what the 1st ID established; it was rather good.

AS: Where did you serve?

SS: We served in the An Najaf Province. It's kind of toward the southern part; north of Basra and south of Hillah. It was a nice area. I should say it was one of the cleaner cities that I've seen in Iraq; Najaf is very well maintained. It was predominantly Shi'a; there were no Sunni there. As a matter of fact it was the home of Al Sistani. He lives there. It was a very religious hub and critical to the success of the mission is maintaining success in Najaf, in my opinion. With what was going on with the brigade and in the south it was nice.

AS: Once you arrived in country, what were your major responsibilities?

SS: As we arrived we went through Kuwait and did some additional training that the guys who ran the training -- I can't remember the name of the organization we went through -- but we were Security Force Advisors (SFA) by the end of it. They recertified us on weapons and things like that in Kuwait and we got acclimated. I thought that was a little redundant but at the same time it gave us a chance to get used to the time change and things like that. When we moved north from there we went to Taji and we went through additional cultural training as well as some system specific stuff such as Blue Force Tracker (BFT) reinforcement for everybody, radios, and things along that line. That was nice; it was kind of a reinforcement of what we had learned at Fort Riley. From there we deployed south to Najaf. We deployed out of Taji, took some Chinooks down to Camp Echo in Diwaniyah and then we road marched over to the little combat outpost (COP) we were at in Najaf.

AS: Describe a typical day for you in Iraq.

SS: I had two types of typical days. One was when we were with the Iraqis and one was when we were back doing reset or refit. We would get up about 0430 or 0500 depending because we didn't want to move at the same time every day when we went to go train. We'd leave a little earlier or a little later and we'd go up to the brigade headquarters. During our tenure there we went through basically three main training cycles. The brigade asked us to train their enablers which were some of their recon platoons and their mortar battery as well as the brigade headquarters company as far as Soldier skills and junior leader skills. We'd go up there and during the training cycle we'd live with the Iraqis on their forward operating base (FOB). We'd

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 6 UNCLASSIFIED deploy with our supplies and live at FOB Hotel which was a little bit west out of the city. We had our own little building and we'd established our own internal security. We'd get set up with communications -- we had to have comms back to battalion so they knew where we were and what was going on -- and then we'd begin our training. The training was interesting as it was Iraqi in nature. We tried to regiment it but we had to account for prayer times and meal times and some of that rest that they do after meals. We'd go through and train them. That's where the interpreter became key. We didn't practice teaching classes through the interpreter; we just learned the classes we were going to teach with our own subject matter expert (SME) skills that we would train the Iraqis on. When you do the first class with your interpreter and you're rehearsing it you quickly learn that you have to have two interpreters there because some interpreters understand what you mean and some don't and they'll use different words. If you have two interpreters one will ask, "Did you mean to say this?" And you'll say, "No. I didn't mean that. I meant this." They'll help the other interpreter as the senior guys who have been doing it for a while that understand. Each interpreter on the MiTT we found had specific skill sets like the guy who used to work with the medic was really good about talking medical issues. The operations interpreter that would go with us to the division operations section (G3) was very good about military terms and graphics and things like that. We had to begin crosspollination of our interpreters as we developed as a team. We'd go through and train from the morning at about 0730 and it would end about 1630. When we were with the mortar battery we were teaching them how to fire their mortar systems, basic lifesaving skills, and marksmanship. The same was true for the reconnaissance platoon and we taught them how to do cordon and searches and things like that. At the same time we were partnered with the brigade so our requirement was to go over and meet with our counterparts -- the brigade operations officer (S3), the brigade training officer, the brigade XO or deputy commanding officer (DCO); I would meet with him from time to time. I mainly spent my time in the S3 shop because I was the fires advisor as well. We would talk to them about current operations ongoing; religious holidays, any intelligence they may have gotten through their operations and our intelligence (S2) trainer would work through the S2 channels to get intelligence that their intelligence officer may have gotten. We could also take that, pass it back to the American forces, and then share releasable and relevant information to the Iraqis so they could get a bigger picture of what was going on. The days would start at 0730 and go until 2100 or 2200 at night. You'd pull guard at night and then you'd get up the next day and do it again. We'd do that for three or four weeks at a time and then go back to our little COP. We'd go back to where the American forces were and consolidate reports and we'd also train as a team as well. Those were the days; we'd flip flop between being with the Iraqis and being back on our COP where we'd refit and resupply; things like that. We were very blessed in the fact that we were partnered with one Iraqi unit and we got to stay with that unit the whole time. When the 3rd Brigade 3rd ID came in they came as an advise and assist brigade (AAB) which meant they had internal advisors. We were partnered with a major and a lieutenant colonel so we worked with them as transition overlap from November through March before we started our retrograde operations to get out of theater. They worked with us as well and it was beneficial in the fact that we had a lieutenant colonel working with us who could get us things that were hard for two majors to acquire. That was a big thing. A big lesson learned also is that when you're working with the Iraqis you have to be humble. For instance, I was paired with a colonel who had fought in the Iran-. He'd been serving for 30 something years and there I was as a major advising him and discussing what they're doing and what's relevant. You have

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 7 UNCLASSIFIED to keep in mind that they're fighting an active insurgency. Training and fighting a war was a balance they maintained. I was very impressed with the Iraqi unit we were partnered with.

AS: Talking about your interaction with the Iraqis, how were they as far as their perception of you or to making changes?

SS: One thing about this that's a lot different from us culturally is that relationships mean a lot more. When we first got there we were the third or fourth MiTT they worked with and we were still all about business when we first showed up. It was funny. It was almost like they were training us how to be a little more culturally sensitive to what was going on. You didn't walk in and say, "How's training going?" You walked in and said, "Hello. How are you? How is the family? How is the weather?" You would talk about things and really open the scene and then training would come up. At the close of a conversation you would settle business for the upcoming events. For instance we supported several of the holidays by getting intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets for the brigade to use to monitor what was going on in the area of responsibility (AOR) they had. Some of the meetings and some oft eh key points and requests we had to get up we'd literally flesh out in the last 20 to 30 minutes of a conversation that we had spent the last hour or hour and a half or two hours talking. Their perception of us was that we were very up front, "Let's go! Let's go!" My perception when we started was, "Whoa. These guys are very laissez-faire about events." What I came to understand was that they believed more strongly about relationships and developing that relationship. It came to bear later when I was able to ask the G3 -- movement became tied to the Iraqi Army. We were directed from higher not to move without the Iraqi Army. We could as a MiTT but no one wanted to move without the Iraqi Army because they were in the lead. We had to take some information up to them in the middle of the night one time. Because you know the G3 you call one of the battalions because you work with their S3 you can say, "Hey. We really need this. Can you guys get somebody over here? We've got to go." There was a time when they couldn't get us anything to support us but there were times when they were like, "Yes. Give us two hours," because they don't spin up like we do. "Give us a couple of hours," and sure enough we got escorted to where we needed to go. Normally we were supposed to make requests like that three days out. You don't do that all the time but because of the personal relationships that develop you can make those requests and it's not burdensome to them. I think their perception of American Soldiers is that we are very professional. I heard that several times. Their military is very officer centric. A lot of decisions are not made by the NCOs like in our military. It's neat to see a change or transition in respect to the NCOs. Our team NCO in charge (NCOIC), MSG Holcomb, was a phenomenal NCO. He developed a program with the brigade sergeant major for NCO professional development (NCOPD). It started with just him and the brigade sergeant major to eventually where they were having sergeant major meetings and talking about soldier issues. They could then take that back to their commanders and begin to work through them as NCOs. That was a very amazing thing to see take place. When we first got there officers made all the decisions and you didn't really see any of the NCOs talking very much if the officer was around. A year later when we were leaving the units we were training with -- the mortar battery or headquarters company at the brigade -- we were watching the platoon sergeants take active roles with their soldiers during our training sessions. The lieutenants would be there but it was the NCOs that were starting to do the training. We were beginning to develop junior leader trainers in their army. That was amazing to see; it was the small wins when you're on a MiTT that are good.

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AS: Talk to me about some of the missions you were involved in.

SS: We supported a large number of the holidays that were there: Arba'een, Ashura, and Ramadan. After the security agreement the US Army would no longer provide material to the Iraqi Army. They were going to have to be self-sufficient and order it through their supply channels. As a MiTT you had to begin to leverage intellectual property; your expertise in working with the Iraqi military. One of the aspects we realized was that we could utilize the brigade ISR assets and work with your partner brigade and provide them with a capability they didn't inherently have. By doing that it made you more valuable to the brigade; it would allow for training and things like that so we would support during the holidays. In Najaf as well as in Hillah you have Ali Hussein and several big mosques and those mosques are well protected; it's a religious mecca in Najaf and up in Hillah as well for the Shi'a. We would support their holidays and you'd have a lot of pilgrims, especially for Ashura. I think we saw three million walk through in five days at point when we were counting. You're helping them to protect the pilgrims which is very big. The reason I say it was big is that as I was leaving we met with one of the battalion commanders to say goodbye. He said that, "God is going to bless you and your families because you have protected the pilgrims. You have protected those that take the walk and by doing that God is going to protect you and your family." Vice versa I was thinking that the election was this huge event and in their minds they had done the election and the election was going to happen but what was significant was the protection of those pilgrims as they went through Najaf. It showed me the difference in the way and American would think compared to a soldier in the Iraqi Army. There were a lot of religious holidays we supported, training events, and providing information to the Iraqi Army so they could execute missions. That was our role; to facilitate their growth as an army and to work with the brigades we were partnered with as well as to work with the division MiTT to pass information on how our brigade was doing so they could look at the 8th Iraqi Army Division and see where the brigade fit in to it.

AS: Can you describe your living quarters and the meals you had?

SS: All I can say is, "Thank you for provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)." On our little COP there was a PRT and because the PRT was there we actually lucked out. We had a small mess facility there; we had a little laundry facility that had four washers in it. The meals -- wow! If you don't stay vigilant on physical training (PT) you could get fat over there so you have to stay vigilant on PT. The meals were good. I lived in a box; we all did. Containerized housing units (CHUs) are boxes. As a major I got my own little -- actually all 11 of us ended up in single man CHUs. It was basically six feet by eight feet; that was your room. It was big enough for your bed, a little shelf or a locker, and small area next to it.

AS: What surprised you most about being in Iraq? I know you've been there before so you had a little bit --

SS: Actually for me, unlike some of the other guys who had been back since 2003, it was a culture clash for me. The last time we were there we were engaging and destroying enemy as we went north. Everybody was the enemy. This time the same guys we were shooting at and trying to destroy were now our friends. When you're talking to an Iraqi officer and he talks about where he was in OIF I and what he was doing, his goal was to kill us. Now we were training them. For me it was an adjustment. I went back with heightened nerves. We had several team

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 9 UNCLASSIFIED members who were on their third or fourth [deployment] so they weren't as high strung as I was when we first got into theater. I was still used to the idea that everybody was out to get us. I realized where your vigilance has to be; it has to be on maintaining situational awareness and intelligence updates. You have to know your operational environment where you are and who the players are. If there are insurgents operating in your area you have to know where they're operating out of. You have to know the routes; know the terrain. The people weren't trying to get you; the people weren't trying to kill you. You had to know where the enemy was and where he would strike and you start to focus your attention in those areas and you anticipate. Over the year the stress level kind of got to what it is in combat stress level. You worry when you go outside the wire. When you're back in you get that moment of respite and then you go back out.

AS: In working also closely with the Iraqis were you ever concerned for your safety?

SS: With the MiTT we never lost sight of the fact that we were always not on an American FOB when we stayed with the Iraqis. As time progressed you begin to know the people you're working with and you have to assume risk. Our mission is to work and live with the Iraqis. There is a level of risk you're going to assume that a lot of Soldiers don't. As you get to know your Iraqi counterparts we, when we went on the Iraqi FOBs, would dress down. We didn't wear our body armor and we didn't wear our Kevlars; we kept our side arms with us but that was how we interacted with them to show them we trusted them. You had to have that level of trust. At night when we slept we maintained guards. You establish the strong point in the building where you're located but you have to trust in the Iraqi Army that you're partnered with. By the end of my deployment I wasn't fearful of being attacked or harmed by any of the Iraqi Army I worked with. Could it have happened? Yes, but I didn't feel that way.

AS: Did anyone from your unit suffer any injuries or receive Purple Hearts?

SS: No, we were blessed. We did a large amount of patrols and no one was ever hurt, harmed, or injured. The closest was when a rocket landed next to our S3 and our maintenance advisor were training when we were up at Kalsu. I wouldn't even call it close; it was probably 150 meters away. We were very blessed and I thank God every day for that.

AS: As a leader, how did you keep your Soldiers' morale up?

SS: I have to thank God for the gentleman he put me up under as a team chief. He was remarkable with patience. He was. He and our NCOIC, MSG Holcomb, established these little family meetings and when we had the family meeting we were all on a level playing field. We could voice our opinions and how we felt and we addressed things as a team. We were more a family than we were Soldiers and subordinates. It was an 11-man squad so the application of that to regular unit is not the same. We all knew who was the boss; we all knew what our roles were on the team and we worked along those lines.

AS: How was communication back home while you were deployed?

SS: Actually the communication infrastructure is not too bad in Iraq. On the American FOB we were on we could get Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) so we could Skype home. If you wanted to pay out of pocket there was an Iraqi network on our COP so you could call home if you wanted to. As a MiTT we ended up with our own SPAWAR set and we

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 10 UNCLASSIFIED were able to use that to call home. Communication was rather good other when the weather didn't permit it.

AS: Was communication easier on this deployment compared to your first deployment?

SS: Yes. During the first deployment I called my wife once before line of departure (LD). I was able to get to a MSE network phone. I called her again when we were at Numaniyah because the Marines had a MSE phone. As we were there getting ready to go back to An Nasariyah the battery commander and the first sergeant filtered the battery through so everybody could call home. So you're talking four months between phone calls. Other than that it was letters. It was old school.

AS: How was reintegration with your family?

SS: I'll tell you, the Army has come a long way. After OIF I came home and within 72 hours I was pretty much working. It was reverse Soldier readiness processing (SRP) and go back to work. That was it. There were a few leaves here and there but there weren't any of the counseling things. From the first one I probably suffered significantly -- when you see all the things you see in war like the dead bodies, the blown up vehicles, you're moving north, and you're stressed. You're only interacting with the unit you're in so when you're away from them you get antsy until you get back. I probably suffered some detachment from my family and I almost ended up divorced from my wife between that and command. This time the Army did a lot better. We came back and got talked to. We went through and did our post deployment health assessment and the next one you do online after that. There are a lot of programs the Army has developed now and I was thoroughly impressed when I came back this time. I was like, "Wow! Where were these questionnaires and where were these people the first time?" They learned. The Army has done a great job with that. Having deployed before it was much easier. My wife kind of knew and the kids this time were a little older. Everybody kind of gives you your space. If you need a minute, you need a minute. If you have an anxiety attack you just kind of step off. This integration was nice and it doesn't hurt that I'm here in Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and when I'm not in class I get to be with my family. It is nice.

AS: You're essentially still going through reintegration really.

SS: Yeah, we're sitting in November so we're six months out. I'm probably on the tail end of any reintegration. I know my role and my wife has me in it. [Laughter] It's nice to be a dad and be home again.

AS: Based on this deployment, if you could make one recommendation to the Army about how to make things better in the future, what would you recommend?

SS: When training units the MREs are very complicated, synchronized, and they're there to stress the leadership and the Soldiers during their pre-deployment. I would tell the Army to emphasize culture and we do do this and a lot of units do this but there should be a way to really go in and check that the unit understands what cultural sensitivity means and what cultural understanding is of where they're going throughout the unit as an organization. That way there is no disparity between actions of the unit and what the leadership is saying. I believe we're getting better as an Army in doing that but I would say continue to do that so the actions of your

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 11 UNCLASSIFIED subordinate elements don't contradict what you're doing as a brigade or division organization. I would tell you a lesson learned -- and this is from the MiTT perspective for any future MiTTs -- understand how to use an interpreter. That was one of the hardest things for me to learn. The interpreter is key for you to be able to communicate with your counterparts. He is key for you to be able to convey classes. You can't rely on one; you need to balance them. We found that it was much smarter to have two interpreters listening to the class because you will talk and the Iraqis will listen and they'll nod as you're talking and a few of them may understand English but most of them have no clue what you're saying. They're being polite; they're being attentive. The interpreter will speak and it's really what the interpreter is saying that they learn from. They can convey it with your actions and movements what he's saying. At the same time your interpreter has to almost become a Soldier; he has to become a trainer. The interpreter has to be integrated to understand what you are doing. I believe in my heart there are interpreters in Iraq that are better at the improvised explosive device (IED) fight and better at first aid than some Soldiers because they repeatedly do those skill sets and work at it. They themselves could train the Iraqi Army by what they're learning. I think the interpreter is valuable. You have to be willing to work with them and work through the language barrier; learn almost as an extension of you. Your interpreter has to be in there training and that was a hard lesson for me to understand. [Another one is that] big words don't go far. My fires NCO SFC. He was invaluable. He came from being a drill sergeant to being on our MiTT and his approach to training young American men and women on basic skills -- we were able to take that and mirror it for how we worked with our interpreters. You didn't sit there and use large words or large sentences. You used bite sized chunks and we saw improvement in the soldiers we were training. That was the lesson learned for me: the interpreter is a lot more important than you think. When you're in that spot where you're trying to explain something and your interpreter is like, "I'm not understanding you sir." You're like, "Uh!" That would be the big lesson learned -- how valuable an interpreter is.

AS: I'd like to thank you MAJ Steele for coming into day and sharing your deployment experience and also for your service.

SS: Thank you.

END OF INTERVIEW

Transcribed by Jennifer Vedder

Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 12